

The Role of the Middle East Quartet in the Israeli – Palestinian Negotiation Process

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ABSTRACT

The Middle East Quartet - Madrid Quartet - is one of the most significant international players that played a substantial role in an attempt to bring the Israelis and the Palestinians at the negotiating table in order to solve the endless dispute between them. The Quartet had been comprised of a combination of state actors (the United States, the Russian Federation) and non-state actors (the United Nations and the European Union). The formation of the Quartet followed the outbreak of the second (Intifada).

There are lots of unilateral and multilateral roles and efforts played by the Quartet members to solve the dispute. Some of these efforts faced failures and some efforts had made noticeable changes in the way that negotiations are being held. The Quartet has practiced the multilateral negotiations in the Israeli - Palestinian talks. Thus, this research will focus on studying the experience of the Quartet as an international mediator in these negotiations, their attempts to bring the two sides to the negotiation table and find a solution for the dispute. It will also explore the missions and the goals of the Quartet. In addition, this research will determine whether the policy followed by Quartet is an effective one with significant noticeable benefits while concentrating on the unilateral and multilateral roles played by the Quartet's members.

ÖZ

Ortadoğu Dörtlüsü – Madrid Dörtlüsü - İsraililer ve Filistinliler ile olan uyuşmazlığın çözümü için iki gurubu müzakere masasına getirmek için önemli bir rol oynayan en önemli uluslararası oyuncularından biridir. Quartet (Amerika Birleşik Devletleri ve Rusya Federasyonu) devlet aktörleri ve devlet dışı aktörler'den (Birleşmiş Milletler ve Avrupa Birliği) oluşur. Quartet birinci intifadanın patlak vermesinden sonra ikinci intifadanın hemen sonrsında kurulmuştur.

Quartet üyeleri hem tek taraflı hem de çok taraflı çabalarla uzun bir süre bu sorunu çözmek için çabalamışlardır. Bu çalışmaların bazıları müzakerelerin yürütülmesinde bazı göze çarpan değişiklikler sırasında başarısız oldu. Dörtlü'nün, Filistin-İsrail görüşmeleri için çok taraflı girişimleride bulunur. Bu bağlamda, bu araştırma, dörtlü'yü uluslararası arabulucu olarak ele alacak ve tarafları nasıl müzakere masasına getirmeye çalıştığını irdelleyecektir. Ayrıca, misyon ve hedeflerini araştırmayı hedeflemektedir. Buna ek olarak, bu araştırma dörtlü müzakerelerin ne kadar başarılı olduğunu ve nasıl daha etkili bir hale gelebileceğini inceler.

DEDICATION

To Every Single Member of My Family,

To My Dearest Grandmother and Grandfather,

To My Soul my Father and Mother,

To My Supporter and Model in this life; My Uncle,

To My Second mother; My Aunty,

To All my Brothers and Sisters

& To All Those Who Had Supported Me

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

CFSP	Common Foreign and Security Policy
DPA	Department of Political Affairs
EU	The European Union
IPC	The Israeli – Palestinian Confederation
ME	Middle East Peace Process
OP	Occupied Palestinian Territory
OQR	Office of Quartet Representative
PA	The Palestinian Authority
PLO	The Palestinian Liberation Organization
UN	The United Nations
UNGA	The United Nations General Assembly
UNRWA	The United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees
UNSC	The United Nations Security Council
UNSCO	The United Nations Special Coordinator
UNSCOP	The United Nations Special Commission in Palestine

Chapter 1

INTRODUCTION

After the British Labor Party's support for the foundation of a Jewish state in Palestine, in 1945, the political situation deteriorated and security became debatable. However, under the UN mandate, the United Nations Special Commission in Palestine (UNSCOP) recommended the partition and foundation of a Jewish state. The UN plan was to divide the land approximately into two equal parts between the Jewish and the Palestinian people, and Jerusalem was to be placed under the international administration. The UN General Assembly supported this proposal of partition under the resolution (GA 181), adopted in November 1947. The Jews accepted the partition of the land, but the Arab states rejected this decision.

The division of Palestine to form an Israeli state in 1948 instigated a series of Arab – Israeli wars; the wars resulted in the Arab states losing a number of their territories such as the West Bank, Golan Heights, and Sinai. However, the UN adopted Resolution No. 242 on 22 November 1976 in which the United Nations Security Council called for a cease-fire in order to start negotiations and talks for permanent peace between the conflicting parties and asked Israel to withdraw from the occupied territories. Despite these measures taken, the situation further deteriorated, and by 1987, the Palestinian people particularly in Gaza Strip and the West Bank initiated the first uprising “intifada”. The intifada continued until 1991, and it was subsequently followed by the second, Al-Aqsa Intifada.

Many international players attempted to resolve the unending series of disputes. Momentous external players formulated a combination of state actors (the US and Russia) and non-state actors (the EU and the UN) for bringing Israel and the Palestinian Authority to the negotiation table in order to resolve their dispute and avoid any further war between the two. The Quartet popularly referred to as the 'Middle East Quartet' or the 'Madrid Quartet' was established following the outbreak of the second Intifada. The members of the Quartet are; the US, Russia, the EU and the UN. The Quartet attempts to convince the two sides to accept the ceasefire and security reforms in Palestine. In a meeting conducted between the Quartet's members and their representatives in April 2002, the members and their representatives decided that they would follow up the ceasefire and peace process in the Middle East between Israel and the Palestinian Authority. However, since that meeting until now, the Quartet efforts and optimisms are that the Israelis and the Palestinians would negotiate the issue and end this dispute.

1.2 Purpose and Objective

The study was conducted in order to investigate and elaborate on the question of the practice of multilateral negotiation in the Israeli – Palestinian issue. This research aims to answer what is that the Quartet has offered to the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations during the past decades and whether its members, acting multilaterally rather than unilaterally, could offer a 'value added'. Further, it seeks to determine whether the multilateral experience can be classified as mediation or good offices. Moreover, this research also attempts to illustrate the Quartet's policies in the Middle East, particularly in settling this dispute and their efforts to find suitable opportunities and possibilities to convince the Israelis and the Palestinians to accept the ceasefire and consider negotiations. The goal of this work was to evaluate

whether the Quartet's role is more effective when the Quartet acts multilaterally as a group of players or it will be more beneficial if the members acted unilaterally as individual players.

1.3 The Methodology of the Study

Because the aim of my work is to study the Quartet's experience with multilateral negotiations in solving the Israeli – Palestinian dispute, the methodology of this research entails normative analysis, comprehensive content analysis of literature review and contextual interpretation of primary documents. The primary sources used were; generic documents obtained from constitutive documents of International Organizations like the UN Charter, the UN Resolutions, the European Union Council conclusions, Treaties and partnership agreements related to the Israeli – Palestinian issue. Interpretation of these documents was employed as a premise for understanding the rights and authority available to the Quartet's members and their capabilities and capacities to act validly in the Israeli-Palestinian negotiation peace talks.

The first chapter is the introductory chapter that explains the purpose of my study as seen above and the literature review (given below). Studying the theoretical perspective is correlated to the Quartet's role in solving the Israeli – Palestinian case. Accordingly, the second chapter studies the theoretical perspective and specifically focuses on the negotiation theory in relation its assumptions and approaches. Before analyzing the roles played by the Quartet to resolve this dispute, it is very significant to consider the formation of the Quartet and the goals aims to achieve, therefore, the third chapter evaluates the Quartet's foundation, goals, and aims. The fourth chapter focuses on studying the multilateralism and unilateralism of the Quartet's members.

The fifth chapter analyzes how the Quartet observed mediation as a policy in the negotiation process between Israel and the Palestinian Authority from different aspects. For reasons that there is limited literature on the Quartet, chapter five therefore considers interviewed people's argumentations to analyze the Quartet role in the negotiation process. Finally, the conclusion of this thesis will include some standpoints about the practice of negotiation and mediation between the Palestinians and the Israelis.

1.4 Literature Review

Currently, there exists a plethora of literature on the Middle East conflict but quite limited literature on the Quartet itself. Some scholars have discussed the multilateral role that the Quartet plays in the negotiation peace talks in the Middle East. Some of the scholars have tried to indicate the Quartet members' motives that led each of them to decide to participate in the Middle East Quartet. For example, Roland Dannreuther explored the role that the United States played in this conflict, benefitting from its deep relations with the Israeli government. He argued "peace would come from the strength of the US-Israeli relationship and not from US concessions to the Arab parties. US proposed breaking up the settlement, where the parties themselves would be encouraged to work bilaterally and to reach accords that met their common interests."¹Dannreuther's argument referred to the US's plan in solving the Israeli – Palestinian issue. There have been many efforts by the US to bring the Israelis and the Palestinians to the negotiation table and solve the dispute, yet most of these efforts failed because of either of the parties' refusal – if the other side agrees to take the step. Akram Hanieh, for example, argued "the Israeli delegation and the American peace team coordinated step by step and word by word.

¹ Dannreuther, Roland, (2010). Understanding the Middle East Peace Process: A historical institutionalist approach , European Journal of International Relations 2011 , Published by *Saga*

For the Palestinians, it was like a comedy routine. Israel and the United States wanted to fabricate a ‘solution’ and cash in with a ‘golden signature’ from the Palestinians that would put an end to the conflict and give final legitimacy to Israel.”² Therefore, the American efforts did not succeed in ending the Israeli – Palestinian conflict because of the Palestinians' lack of trust on the US and the Israeli government decisions. The unproductive American unilateral efforts led the American government to take the decision of forming the Middle East Quartet in collaboration with Russia, the United Nations and the European Union. Moreover, the United States’ motivation to be a member of the Quartet was expressed by Khaled Elgindy, who argued that, “for the United States, the Quartet has channeling the interventions of the major international powers and it is used to advance other regional objectives like the 2003 invasion of Iraq. Even if they could not compete with American power and influence, there was little to lose and much to gain from being part of even an ineffective group.”³

Costanza Musu explored the reasons that led the European Union to be a member of the Quartet. Musu mentioned that the reasons are as follow: “the failure of the Camp David talks, the collapse of the peace process, clashes among Member States - who were unable to agree on a common strategy for the peace process - and a failed diplomatic mission during which the CFSP High Representative and the Spanish Presidency were not allowed by Israel to meet Arafat in Ramallah.”⁴ These reasons left the EU's role and efforts to end the violence and solve the Israeli – Palestinian issue, ineffective. Furthermore, the European Union had long pursued to translate its

² Hanieh, Akram, (2001, Wniter). Special Documents: The Camp David Papers, *Journal of Palestine Studies XXX*, no. 2 pp. 75-97

³ Elgindy, Khaled, (2013, February 28). the Middle East Quartet: A Post-Mortem, Analysis Paper, The Saban Center for Middle East Policy, *Brookings Institutions*

⁴ Musu, Costanza, (2005). The Madrid Quartet: An Effective Instrument of Multilateralism? Assistant Professor of Public and International Affairs, *University of Ottawa*.

extensive economic influence into an expressive political role, if not on balance with that of the United States' then, at least expressively, greater than it had played previously.⁵ For that, the European Union decided to participate as a member in the Middle East Quartet hoping that its participation would influence in the peace process in the Middle East between the Israelis and the Palestinians.

Elizabeth Sellwood examines the role played by the United Nations (UN) in the Israeli – Palestinian negotiation process. According to Sellwood, in 1999, the UN envoys personalities discussed the UN's ability to manage or prevent conflicts and concerning the Israeli – Palestinian conflict, the envoys were unable to exercise their good offices role, to convey the messages and discuss ideas without access to the Israelis, the Palestinians and the international decision-makers. Israelis have long been suspicious of the UN and tend to view it as partial or 'pro-Palestinian'. Sellwood arguably wrote that there are two reasons behind the United Nations' affiliation to the Quartet. The first reason is the refusal of the conflicting parties, either the Palestinians or the Israelis, to accept the United Nations' involvement and the second reason is the United States' assertions the prime role in Israeli-Palestinian peacemaking. These two factors continued to preclude the UN from playing a significant role in the Israeli – Palestinian negotiation peace and the UN felt that its role alone is no more effective in influencing neither the Palestinians nor the Israelis. Therefore, the Secretary General Kofi Annan declared the UN's efforts integration to the US, the EU and Russia, supporting the formation of the Quartet and the UN's participation in it. In Annan's words, the Quartet was intended to support Middle

⁵ Ibid. Note No. 3

East peacemaking by harnessing the ‘legitimacy, political strength and financial power’ of these four international players.⁶

Dmitri Trenin, in addition, expressed the role and the policy of the Russian government in the Middle East particularly in the region of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. Trenin wrote that Russia is more compassionate to the Israel’s security concerns, but at the same time, Russia does not want to lose its relations with the Arabs. Russia wants to be seen as an honest broker, accepted by both parties and more objective and neutral than the United States. In spite of the fact that, the Russian attempts to win the Israelis' and Palestinians' hearts, and to be the honest broker who would solve the Israeli – Palestinian conflict yet 'Israel still looks at Russia with residual suspicion and the Arabs want to play it off against Israel and the United States.' Joining the Quartet and being a member of it is a great opportunity for Russia, because the Quartet significantly will assist Russia in indicating its great power credential.⁷ Farther, Russia’s involvement halted from a desire to improve its regional stature, as well as, its leverage with its traditional European and American adversaries on a range of regional and international issues. Ironically, this aspiration to be ‘relevant’ has assisted associating American dominance of the Quartet.⁸

Whilst, other scholars study the multilateral role that the members of the Quartet played personifying the Quartet as an effective actor in trying to resolve the Israeli - Palestinian dispute, after they failed to have a remarkable impact unilaterally. For example, Joel Peters aimed to show the importance of the Quartet’s role in the Israel

⁶ Sellwood, Elizabeth, (2009). The Role of the United Nations in Middle East Conflict Prevention, Center on International Cooperation, *New York University*.

⁷ Dmitri Trenin, (2010). Russia’s Policy in the Middle East: Prospects for Consensus and Conflict with the United States, A Century Foundation Report, by *The Century Foundation*

⁸ Ibid. Note No. 3

- Palestinian negotiation peace talks by differentiating between the bilateral role, which the members of the Quartet played, and the multilateral role that is more of a collective nature played by members of the Quartet. Peters noted somehow to the main target of shifting the Quartet members' policies from unilateralism to multilateralism. He argued, "the multilaterals would focus on the future shape of the Middle East. Developments on the multilateral level would serve as confidence-building measures that would then facilitate progress at the bilateral level-- that is, that functional cooperation would eventually spill over into regional peace."⁹ Costanza Musu as well argued that the Quartet commended its multilateralism that conveys actors whose their preferential is the implementation of multilateral approach to the peace process, because they believe that such method is the most preferable, and best strategy to create a suitable atmosphere for real process. The Quartet had shift its policy towards multilateralism because – as Musu argued – "it offers a multilateral 'control framework' for bilateral negotiations".¹⁰ Therefore, the Quartet's members attempted to work unilaterally in solving the Israeli – Palestinian issue. Yet, their efforts mostly failed, for though they decided to shift their unilateral efforts to be as multilateral ones, hoping that their united efforts would be more effective and convincing the both sides to agree upon the offers offered by the Quartet members, by which they would be able to set and negotiate. The ineffectiveness of unilateralism which led the Quartet to be formed and act as a single player and mediator, returned to many different reasons that would be mention in the next chapters. Besides, the multilateralism has offered solutions for the Israelis and the Palestinians to achieve the ceasefire and be able to negotiate peace; these will be included in the chapters as well. Additionally, there are many other specific

⁹ Peters, Joel, (1999, December). 'Can the multilateral Middle East talks be revived?', Middle East Review of International Affairs, Volume 3, No. 4, Available at <http://meria.idc.ac.il/journal/1999/issue4/jv3n4a6.html#Author>

¹⁰ Ibid. Note: 3

questions related to this ongoing issue discussed in the literature, which will be discussed in the subsequent chapters.

Chapter 2

THEORITICAL PERSPECTIVES: NEGOTIATION THEORY

Negotiation is a daily practiced method and a customary behavior used by individuals and organizations in managing their daily life matters, business and trade activities, in settling disputes between the employees and their employers, and in resolving international disputes and conflicts, it is a voluntary process that requires unending talks and discussions. Negotiations can occur between two or more parties who aim to solve their disputes through following this particular method of discourses. Sometimes, the purpose of negotiation is to develop relations between the parties and achieve mutual understandings on various interests in an attempt to appease all parties involved.

Furthermore, the negotiation process is critical, because it aims to build a shared environment that will lead the negotiating parties to long-term confidence, normalization, acceptance, and satisfaction. More specifically, because it is probably the most imperative initiative towards the attainment of peace, it is significant to study negotiation as a theory and focus on its assumptions and methods. Studying negotiation theory is important in the present context, because the Quartet's policy depends mostly on negotiation terms and this forms the main base of the Quartet members' plan towards solving the Israeli - Palestinian conflict. Through mediation and negotiation theory concepts, the members try to convince both the Israelis and

the Palestinians to stop violence, achieve ceasefire, and start real negotiations. This chapter will hence focus firstly on the meaning of negotiation and then proceed to explore the concept from a more theoretical perspective. The next section in this chapter will deal with the foundation of the negotiation process and how it is implemented. The last section will explain the assumptions of general approaches of the negotiation theory.

2.1 Definition of Negotiation

Generally, negotiation or bargaining is the process in which two or more parties, with different aims, and points of view, come together and negotiate a matter in order to find a solution for a dispute or reach an agreement or even sign a contract. Some negotiations are sought in order to give the chance for the parties to understand each other and hence attain the most suitable end, aims, and goals on the matter for which they are negotiating on.¹¹ Negotiation has different meanings according to the particular context in which it is used. For example in trade, according to Business Dictionary, negotiation is defined as; “a process by which a negotiable instrument is transferred from one party (transferor) to another (transferee) by endorsement or delivery. The transferee takes the instrument in good faith, for value, and without notice of any defect in the title of the transferor, and obtains an indefeasible title. While in banking, negotiation is defined as an accepting or trading a negotiable instrument, and contracting by the use of any method to award a contract other than sealed bidding.”¹² A number of thinkers and scholars also have given their own versions of what they think negotiation really entails. For instance, Mark H. McCormack defined negotiation as a “process of getting the best terms once the

¹¹ Moore, Christopher, (1996). *The Mediation Process: Practical Strategies for Resolving Conflict*, 2nd ed., *San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Publishers*

¹² Negotiation, (2013). Accessed: December 18, available at: <http://www.businessdictionary.com/definition/negotiation.html#ixzz2li1UYi7t>

other side starts to act on their interest.”¹³ Herb Cohen described it as “a field of knowledge and endeavor that focuses on gaining the favor of people from whom we want things.”¹⁴ Moreover, Roger Fisher & William Ury referred to negotiation as ‘a basic means of getting what you want from others’.¹⁵ In the political sense, negotiation refers to an initiative action of state and non-state actors that have mutual interests and aims, and their views accepted by both sides of the conflict, to settle a dispute by reaching an agreement or a settlement that would assist in drawing a tangible end for a crisis. Moreover, negotiation is a technique used to prevent clashes from escalating and instigating into great conflicts, and elude disputes through the implementation of consultation.

Christer Jonsson, for instance, wrote referring to the meaning of negotiation in politics, in which he states that “negotiation can be regarded as one identifiable mode of joint decision-making, to be distinguished from coalition, when the choice is made by numerical aggregation (such as voting), and adjudication, when the choice is made hierarchically by a judge who aggregates conflicting values and interests into a single decision.”¹⁶ Similarly, Tanya Alfredson and Azeta Cungu defined political negotiations as, “exploring options, finding solutions and securing needed support from relevant parties in order to ensure that planned policies are sustainable.”¹⁷ Fred

¹³ McCormack, Mark H., (1995, December). On Negotiating, Published by *Newstar Press*

¹⁴ Cohen, Herb, (1993). *You Can Negotiate Anything*, Published by *Bantam Books*

¹⁵ *Negotiation Beyond Conflict*, Helping people resolve difficult conflict, ®Registered trade-marks of, and all content is copyright to, The Negotiation Circle Pty Ltd. , Australia, cited at: <http://www.negotiationbeyondconflict.com/definition-of-negotiation.html>

¹⁶ Jönsson , Christer, (2002). *Handbook of International Relations: Diplomacy, Bargaining and Negotiation*, published by *SAGE Publications*. Chapter: 11, pg. 281 – 310. He added to the definition that “The words bargaining and negotiation are frequently used interchangeably in the literature. To the extent that a distinction is made, it goes in either of two directions. On the one hand, bargaining can be seen as the broader concept, including the exchange of verbal as well as non-verbal communication, formal as well as informal exchanges. Negotiation, in this view, refers to a formalized process relying on verbal communication; negotiation thus becomes a sub-class of bargaining (Jönsson, 1990: 2–3).” He quoted after (Hopmann, 1995; cf. Murray, 1986) that bargaining, on the other hand, ‘can be understood as the exchange of offers and counter-offers, concessions and retractions; as bazaar-like haggling in contrast to joint problem-solving. Bargaining then becomes a sub-class of negotiation. In this perspective, bargaining and problem-solving can also refer to two different paradigms in the study of negotiations.’

¹⁷ Alfredson, Tanya and Cungu, Azeta, (2008). *Negotiation Theory and Practice: A Review of the Literature*, published by (FAO) *Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations*). In order to define negotiations, Alfredson and Cungu added

C. Ikle also defined political negotiations as, “a process in which explicit proposals are put forward ostensibly for the purpose of reaching agreement on an exchange or on the realization of a common interest where conflicting interests are present.”¹⁸ In addition, I. William Zartman and Mavreen R. Berman (1982) defined negotiation as, “a process in which divergent values are combined into an agreed decision, and it is based on the idea that there are appropriate stages, sequences, behaviors, and tactics that can be identified and used to improve the conduct of negotiations and better the chances of success.”¹⁹

Alexandra Garcia Irigorri (2003) wrote, in her work defining international negotiation as, an “international negotiation is a process, a technique, and a method of how to handle conflict or how to reach an agreement even in the absence of conflict.”²⁰ In other words, negotiation is a process of defining joint decisions and actions that are presented on the negotiation table and subsequently negotiated by the parties involved. It is an inquiry of common ideas and options and appropriate sequences and behaviors, and in turn offers them as proposals to come up with an acceptable suitable solution that can satisfy all the parties.

Therefore, negotiation is an interactive process between parties that have clashed and disputed over an issue for the purpose of reaching and forming an agreement that convenes the conflicting parties and based upon common interests of the negotiating

“Negotiations are a vehicle of communication and stakeholder management. As such, they can play a vital role in assisting policy-makers to obtain a better grasp of the complex issues, factors and human dynamics behind important policy issues. Growing linkages, interdependencies and the rapid pace of change in spheres affecting important agri-food issues including economics, trade, governance and regional and international relations have created a greater need for skillful negotiators among agriculture policy-makers and experts. In summary, negotiation processes are critical for policy-making in democratic societies, a factor with the potential to shape policy outcomes and to influence which policies are implemented and how. This has gained increasing recognition, in recent decades.”

¹⁸ Ikle, Fred C., (1964). *How Nations Negotiate*, Published by *Harper and Row*, New York.

¹⁹ Zartman, I. William and Berman, Mavreen R., (1982). *The Practical Negotiator*, Published by New Haven CT: *Yale University Press*.

²⁰ Irigorri, Alexandra Garcia, (2003). *Negotiation in International Relations*, Doctoral Candidate at Political Science department, at the Pennsylvania State University, Published by *Revistade Derecho*, Universidad Del Norte, 19: 91-102.

parties. It is imperative to stress that negotiation is, indeed, a process, which has a purpose to solve disputes, clashes, and conflicts through overcoming and abandoning the wide differences between the parties as well as creating alternatives and presenting common interests of all parties involved.

2.2 Significance of Negotiation Theory

Negotiation is one of the most important arrangements used by individuals, groups of people, states and organizations at the local, national, and international levels. The idea of negotiation was not an outlandish idea for the ancient civilizations. For instance, the Greeks and the Romans used to send diplomats and ambassadors to negotiate their countries' demands with their enemy prior to initiating any conflict. The Council of Elders in Rome for example, sent the Roman delegates in order to offer their demands to their adversary before going to war. Therefore, negotiation was customary in Greek and Roman times.²¹

Negotiation is the core of the diplomatic mission's functions - as stipulated in the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations of April 1961. Article 3 provides that:

“1. The functions of a diplomatic mission consist, inter alia, in:

- Representing the sending State in the receiving State;
- Protecting in the receiving State the interests of the sending State and of its nationals, within the limits permitted by international law;
- Negotiating with the Government of the receiving State;
- Ascertaining by all lawful means conditions and developments in the receiving State, and reporting thereon to the Government of the sending State;

²¹ Carthage: The Magonids, (2014). Accessed: June 2, available at: <http://www.roman-empire.net/republic/carthage.html>

- Promoting friendly relations between the sending State and the receiving State, and developing their economic, cultural and scientific relations.”²²

Therefore, the art of negotiation became an obligatory condition for any diplomat to have sufficient knowledge in terms of its assets, permissions, and professionalism. The diplomats should be familiar with the negotiation’s nods, foe’s culture, experience, psychological structure of the received people, and accurate in identifying data. Negotiation has been listed in the UN Charter - Chapter 6, Article 33 - as one of the methods in solving the international dispute and putting an end to conflicts through peaceful means, among other means such as negotiations, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, good offices and conflict resolutions.

“1: The parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, shall, first of all, seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice.

2: The Security Council shall, when it deems necessary, call upon the parties to settle their dispute by such means.”²³

It can be noticed that the Charter prefaced the peaceful means by direct negotiation, considering it as the easiest and most important step in disputes’ settlements. If the peaceful means of conflict settlements fail - as the Charter assured in the same Chapter -; then the Security Council would have the chance to intervene in the way of drawing an end for the dispute. The reason is the United Nations assumed that if the Security Council intervenes before the negotiation and peaceful means ended, it would endanger the situation and make it more complex. Predictably, according to Alfredson and Cungu – it is conventional that the foundation of negotiation replicates

²² Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations 1961,(2005). done at Vienna on 18 April 1961, Entered into force on 24 April 1964.

United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 500, p. 95, Published by *United Nations*.

²³ Charter of the United Nations, (2013). Accessed: December 17, available at:

http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/chapter6.shtml/CHAPTER_VI:_PACIFIC_SETTLEMENT_OF_DISPUTES

the variable distinctive of the negotiation theory's efficient, concept, and discipline. They argue that it is the mutual observation of theory that indicates to the commencement of negotiations. This common interest in a shared agreement is the initial point for the "common interest and mutual dependence that can exist between participants in a conflict with which, Schelling writes, 'negotiation is concerned'- Schelling, 1960 -." ²⁴

2.3 Assumptions of negotiation theory

The negotiation process is required when a unilateral intervention has failed to solve a dispute, or even when an important issue has arisen and with it, the need for wise parties to intervene in order to resolve it. It is worthy to mention that, before initiating negotiation, mediators' intervention is required in order to "identify the causes of the conflict, and to build a hypothesis as to how the conflict might be resolved."²⁵ All the parties who are required to be members of the negotiation process should agree to participate and have the willingness to solve the issues or manage it, otherwise, they would be considered jugglery negotiators because they are not attempting to be fully engaged in the process of creating a viable solution for the issue. The mediators should be neutral and non-sided to any of the conflicting parties – or the conflicting parties should at least, accept them in order to be able to practice good offices mission. They are supposed to be skillful enough, and have an enough experience in the field of negotiation and mediation, in order to be able to keep the parties focused on the main issues and not act aggressively toward each-other's decisions. The mediators should have a strong belief that whatever kind of troubles and obstacles they will face during the negotiation process, will not deter them from continuing their negotiation. Farther, they should also believe in their abilities to

²⁴ Ibid., Note: 12, quoted after: Schelling, Thomas, (1960). The Strategy of Conflict

²⁵ Ibid., Note: 8

solve the issues in order to transfer such confidence to the parties and by indirect ways, force them to create new solutions and concessions to solve their problem.

All the negotiation theorists share the argument that negotiation is a process, yet they describe it differently. According to the negotiation theorists' point of views, negotiations are divided into two main approaches (strategies or level of analysis), which are distributive 'structural' approach, and integrative 'behavioral' approach. The difference between these two approaches is that whereas the distributive strategy is making efforts to achieve win – lose gains; the integrative strategy, on the other hand, is working to accomplish win – win gains for the negotiating parties. The following section is going to study these levels of analysis in details.

2.4 Negotiation Approaches

Negotiation can be divided into two forms, formal and informal negotiations. Theorists of negotiation classify negotiation's levels of analysis into two main approaches - or as they are sometimes called strategies - these are distributive strategy (win – lose) and integrative strategy (win – win). In spite of some theorists' disagreement on the use of terms win-lose and win-win; there are nonetheless clearly two levels of analysis in negotiation.²⁶ Michael R. Carrell and Christina Heavrin argue, "the integrative bargaining process is different from the distributive process in many aspects, although both are broad, not exact, concepts."²⁷ Therefore, distributive strategy is the strategy that refers to numerous terms, decisions, laws and actions that had been distributed and divided between the involved people within the negotiation process. This approach to negotiation is often times called a hard bargaining

²⁶ Carrell, Michael R., and Heavrin, Christina, (2008), quoted from: Greenhalgh, Leonard, (1987, April). "The Case Against Winning in Negotiations," *Negotiation Journal* 3, 167–173, "Instead, terms such as mutual gain or problem-solving or cooperative agreement might lead to a positive visualization of the bargaining situation..."

²⁷ Carrell Michael R., and Heavrin, Christina, (2008). *Negotiating Essentials: Theory, Skills, and Practice: Integrative Bargaining*, Prentice Hall, 83 - 107

negotiation as well. This strategy, as Alfredson and Cungu argued, comprises the consumption that negotiation is a zero – sum process. Integrative negotiation, on the other hand, is called interest-based or principled negotiations. It referred to more cooperation and relationships among the parties involved in the negotiation process. In such negotiation, there is a chance for new solution creation, and a high degree of exchange trust among the parties. Carrell Heavrin argued, “integrative bargaining is a cooperative approach to negotiation or conflict resolution. It is often referred to as a win-win or mutual – gains approach. The integrative approach involves searching for mutually profitable options.”²⁸ The difference between these two strategies is, in distributive strategy there is a possibility of a win – lose gains, yet in the integrative one, they are working for win – win gains.

2.4.1 Distributive Strategy and Structural Approach

Distributive negotiation strategy is a zero-sum game, in which the win of one side in the negotiation process is related to a loss of the other side. In this strategy, the negotiators consider the negotiation process as a race or a challenge, which they are attempting to win rather than to lose. Inasmuch, the amount of the benefits and mutual desires are fixed, so the negotiators negotiate with an aim to win the pie, a metaphorical description for the benefits, or a bite of it instead of losing all the pie, as Alfredson and Cungu referred to it.²⁹ It is clear that, the attempts of negotiators in negotiating in order to win on the account of the other’s loss, lead to the understanding that the negotiators are working hard in order to expand the size of the pie for one side and guarantee its win, while the losing party will only win the smallest piece of the pie.

²⁸ Ibid., Note: 22

²⁹ Ibid., Note: 18

Theorists of negotiation divided each strategy of negotiation into different approaches, which are structural, the strategic, the concession-exchange, the behavioral and the integrative approaches. The structural approach concerns power as the main element that could relate the negotiated parties to each other. There are analysts in the structural theory of negotiation that clarified the main element in the negotiation process as each party's power too. Each party's power would be secure, present and protect its individual goals. Structural theorists also gave importance to the position of the negotiating parties. Frank R. Pfetsch and Alice Landau, for example, argued that "the structural relationship between the negotiators on both sides evaluated in terms of strong or weak, rich or poor, as perceived by the negotiating parties."³⁰ Position, in this aspect, is important because it is somehow related to the power that each party has. The structural approach gives a value to power and position; owing to clarify that if the party is strong enough, and has a position of a strong party in the negotiation process; its decisions, arguments and suggestions might be taken in consideration. Then, the structural approach of win – lose concept will be effectively achieved and worked by.

Jacob Bercovitch, J. Theodore Anagnoson and Donnette L. Wille studied the effect of relative power in the success of mediation and negotiation process. They stated that

“condition that may influence the effectiveness of international mediation concerns the degree of power disparity between the adversaries. In our study, some of the strongest findings concern the relation between the degree of power disparity and the success of mediation. No mediation occurred in 48% of disputes between countries of unequal power (on the Cox-Jacobson scale; Cox &

³⁰ Pfetsch Frank R., and Landau, Alice, (2000). Symmetry and Asymmetry in International Negotiations, published by *Kluwer Academic Publishers*, International Negotiation 5: 21–42

Jacobson, 1973). And in those disputes that were mediated between unequal states, only 6% were successful.”³¹

On the other hand, there are those analysts who discredit the argument, claiming that the variance in power between the negotiated parties does not mean the success of the mediation process. This argument was developed by Marieke Kleiboer “For a mediator, power inequality between the disputants is an important source of role hindrance, because the mediator's goal is often to assist parties to compromise. The higher power party is bound to be sensitive to the implied premise upon which the mediator's activities will be based, namely that ‘as the party controlling more of the pie, [the higher power party] will nonetheless be asked to do less of the eating’.”³² Thus, some theorists and analysts of the structural approach strongly believe that the power and position are serving the strongest party and the negotiators who are working for achieving the concept of win – lose. Yet, others, like Marieke Kleiboer, think that, the differences in power and position between the negotiated parties could be a significant element in serving the mediation and negotiation process. Therefore, in this situation, the more power party would be asked to take the smallest piece of the pie, and leave the remain for the weaker party, yet this practice does not serve the premise of the structural approach.

2.4.2 Integrative Strategy and Behavioral Approach

Integrative strategy is the second type of negotiation’s levels of analysis. In comparison with the distributive level of analysis, integrative strategy extends the process of negotiation to seek successful and beneficial gains, rather than mediate in fixed points as in distributive strategy. This strategy concentrates on win – win

³¹ Bercovitch, Jacob, Anagnoson J. Theodore, and Wille, Donnette L., (1991). Some Conceptual Issues and Empirical Trends in the Study of Successful Mediation in International Relations, *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 28, No. 1, Special Issue on International Mediation pp. 7-17, Published by *Sage Publications*, Ltd.

³² Kleiboer, Marieke, (1996). Understanding Success and Failure of International Mediation, *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 40, No. 2, pp. 360-389, Published by *Sage Publications*, Ltd.

approach, yet distributive strategy is working to achieve win – lose approach. It is sometimes called an interest - based negotiation approach because it urges to find a way in order to negotiate to achieve most of the negotiating parties’ interests as well as the negotiators’ interests and willingness to draw an end for disputes and succeed in the negotiation process.

Actually, the integrative strategy is similar to the distributive strategy in offering concessions from the both sides, “while distributive negotiation assumes there is a fixed amount of value (a fixed pie) to be divided between the parties, integrative negotiation often attempts to create value in the course of the negotiation (expand the pie).”³³ This strategy considers the problem as a shared one in which the base of an agreement should be profitable for the both parties. In fact, the difference in the integrative strategy is that the negotiating parties trust and accept the negotiators. Moreover, the parties themselves trust each other, and if there is a possibility of mistrust among them, so the first step that the negotiators should work on is to improve the trust among the negotiating parties in order to make the negotiation process smooth and easier. So, the dispute will be solved corporately rather than aggressively.

Alfredson and Cungu expressed the uniqueness of this approach by assuming that ‘Integrative approaches use objective criteria, look to create conditions of mutual gain, and emphasize the importance of exchanging information between parties and group problem-solving. Integrative strategies call for participants to work jointly to create win-win solutions. They involve uncovering interests, generating options and

³³ Brazeal, Gregory, (2009). Against Gridlock: The Viability of Interest-Based Legislative Negotiation, *Harvard Law & Policy Review* (Online), vol. 3, p. 1, cited in: http://www.hlpronline.com/Brazeal_HLPR_042309.pdf

searching for commonalities between parties.’ The integrative strategy can be traced back to 1965, when Richard Walton and Robert McKersie exported a framework of a theory in which they aimed to understand the process of negotiation as well as to exchange the international relations with the other parties in order to be able to solve the internal and external disputes. The authors referred to integrative approach as a “bargaining in which negotiators employ problem solving behavior”³⁴.

The behavioral approach of negotiation theory mostly has similar ideas and arguments of the integrative strategy. Both approaches are based on cooperation and build relations between the negotiating parties. They, in fact, deal with personalities of the people representing the negotiating parties, and to what extent they are soft or hard in dealing and negotiating with the negotiated parties. Besides, the negotiators should take the personalities of the people that they are negotiating with, into account, so they will judge their behavior and the suitable way to reach the negotiating parties and succeed in the negotiation process.

Harold Nicholson wrote expressing behavioral approach that, “behavioral theories may explain negotiations as interactions between personality ‘types’ that often take the form of dichotomies, where negotiators are portrayed either as ruthlessly battling for all or diplomatically conceding to another party’s demands for the sake of keeping the peace.”³⁵ The purpose behind dealing with the parties’ personalities is to clarify that without the human’s behavior, skills, or abilities, the negotiations might not succeed and will never succeed, because this will raised the toughness dilemma, which is contrasting hardly with the negotiator’s dilemma. Michael K. McCuddy

³⁴ Walton, R. E., and McKersie, R. B., (1965). *A Behavioral Theory of Labour Negotiations: An Analysis of a Social Interaction System*, Published by *McGraw-Hill*, New York, USA.

³⁵ Nicholson, Harold, (1964). *Diplomacy*, *Oxford University Press*, New York, USA, cited in: *Ibid Note: 14*

expressed this idea by his argument, which says, “reaching integrative agreements depends on the negotiator’s ability to separate the people from the problem, Focus on interests rather than positions”.³⁶ McCuddy affirms that, dealing with personalities and the parties’ understanding for their issue is significant to reach an agreement. Besides, the negotiators will be able to develop a solution that is acceptable to all the parties.

Therefore, the negotiator has first to understand the nature and personality of person with whom he/she is negotiating, in order to be able to find the most suitable solution for the both parties and convince them to accept it. While negotiating, negotiators should keep in their accounts how to present and frame the problem. For instance, there is a big difference in saying, “Is the glass half full or half empty?” The negotiators should be careful of the way they present the problem, with a reason not to influence negatively in the individual’s feelings if they aim to achieve mutual gain for the both sides in the negotiation process.

Since the Quartet’s policy to solve the Israeli- Palestinian conflict based on negotiation and mediation terms, so studying the theoretical perspective of negotiation theory was very significant to understand the formation of the Quartet. For the reason that, the Quartet has brought the negotiation and mediation to a new milieu, the subsequent chapter will explore the foundation of the Quartet, goals aims to achieve and policies works by to resolve this issue – according to the negotiation terms. Moreover, the chapter is going to define key issues, which the Quartet focuses on to represent them at the Negotiation table as the first step to real peace talks.

³⁶ McCuddy, Michael K., (2003). *Organizational Behavior*, 8e Schermerhorn, Hunt, and Osborn, Published by *John Wiley & Sons, Inc.*, Valparaiso University

Chapter 3

THE QUARTET

In the past decades, there have been multiple unilateral attempts to solve the Palestinian-Israeli dispute. The United States, for instance, played significant and noticeable roles to convince the Israelis and the Palestinians to agree to negotiate. Yet, after the outbreak of the second Intifada in 2000, the United States invited other parties to involve in the Middle East region in order to resolve the Palestinian-Israeli dispute. In 2002, United States, Russia, United Nations, and European Union decided to cooperate to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and they formulated the Middle East Quartet.

Effectively, the format of the Quartet brought a new context to the concept of mediation and negotiation, because it is an amalgamation of two non-state actors (UN and EU) and two state actors (United States and Russia). Moreover, at the time when the Quartet was established, there were very high expectations that an agreement - to achieve a ceasefire and start negotiation - could be reached for the ancient Israeli – Palestinian dispute, if not a final solution to settle the conflict. For instance, Nathalie Tocci argued that ‘Over the course of the 1990s, the EU had emerged as a principle donor to the occupied Palestinian territory (OPT) and the nascent Palestinian Authority (PA). Russia, not only remained a major power and UN Security Council (UNSC) permanent member, but also enjoyed close historic ties to the Arab world and its organic bond to the large Russian community in Israel.

The United Nations used its international legitimacy.³⁷ During 1990s and under the supervision of the United States, the Israelis and the Palestinians recognized each other's right to exist and live in peace and signed Oslo treaty, with an agreement to negotiate their modifications bilaterally on interim period.³⁸ Therefore, the Quartet attempted to benefit from each member's relations and ties with the Middle Eastern states in order to assist them in the negotiations. This chapter will explore the Quartet in detail: First, it is going to study the foundation of the Quartet; second, the chapter will illustrate how the Quartet functions, and what are the goals it aimed to achieve. And as the final point, this chapter will focus on the key issues upon which the Quartet focuses on in order to facilitate the peace process.

3.1 The foundation of the Quartet

The second Intifada, or what is called Al-Aqsa Intifada, began on 29th September 2000, when Ariel Sharon came to Al Haram in Jerusalem to confirm the Zionist sovereignty on Jerusalem and the temple of Jerusalem. All the Palestinian powers and groups came together, opposing this visit of Sharon, forgetting their animosities. The Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), the party that representing the Palestinian people supporting negotiations and peace talks between the Israelis and the Palestinians, was disappointed because of the failure of settlement process. Fatah participated in the Intifada to show its opposition to the Zionists actions. The unity of the Palestinians in the Second Intifada did not mean that Fatah group forgot their core goals of negotiating with Israel. Further, this unity did not mean that Hamas, the party, which aim to liberate the occupied lands from Israeli occupation and does not recognize Israel as a state, waived its demands for a full Israeli withdrawal from their

³⁷ Tocci, Nathalie, (2011). The EU, the Middle East Quartet and (In)effective Multilateralism, Published by *Mercury*, pg. 3

³⁸ Oslo Accords 1993, (2014). Accessed: July 10, Available at: http://cis.uchicago.edu/sites/cis.uchicago.edu/files/resources/CIS-090213-israelpalestine_38-1993DeclarationofPrinciples_OsloAccords.pdf

land. In fact, the PLO believed that the second Intifada would strengthen the Palestinian position in the negotiation peace talks. Meanwhile, Hamas was calling for the continuity of Intifada until they succeed in achieving a full Israeli withdrawal from the Palestinian lands.

Many international players attempted to put an end to the Palestinian-Israeli dispute. There were players from all over the world especially from the Middle Eastern side, the Muslim side, and the Western side. Yet, the Arab states' and all the Muslims' over the world called for an approval for an independent Palestinian state and its right of recognition. On the other hand, the West wanted peace in the region and they were working on the concept of 'two states solution', which was already rejected by the Palestinians and the Arabs. However, there were many reasons that led the four actors to work together towards the formation of the Quartet. The failure of the July 2000 Camp David Summit that had been signed between the Israeli Prime Minister, Ehud Barak and, the Palestinian Authority Chairman, Yasser Arafat, escalated the tensions between the Israelis and the Palestinians. It witnessed the failure of Sharm Al-Sheikh Summit that had been conducted by the then US President Bill Clinton as a last attempt to bring peace to both Israelis and Palestinians.

President Bill Clinton called the Sharm Al Sheikh summit in October 2000, the last attempt of his administration to bring peace to the region. He met representatives from Israel, Egypt, Jordan, UN, PNA and EU, and together decided to resume negotiations after ending violence and build confidence between the two sides. However, this attempt failed and the violence in the region continued to escalate. Furthermore, the American administration changed, when George W. Bush came to power, and President Bush showed less concern than Clinton did in peace talks and

negotiations between the Israelis and the Palestinians. Kenneth W. Stein argued that, concerning this matter, the new American administration was “committed to a much more ‘selective engagement’ in global diplomacy. And he referred to Richard Haass, the new head of Policy Planning in the State Department, who defined selective engagement in July 2001, as a la carte multilateralism.”³⁹ However, George W. Bush dispatched the CIA director to the region in order to discuss the ceasefire plan with the sides and convince them to accept it, but the Islamic Jihad and Hamas refused the proposal.⁴⁰

After the attacks of 11th September 2001, President Bush saw the necessity to protect the United States’ coalition with Arab States like Saudi Arabia, the largest oil supplier, against the terrorists’ actions in the region. Therefore, the United States showed its support for a Palestinian State. Musu claims that, “the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 forced a change in American policy. In order to secure, the ‘coalition against terrorism’ the US had once again concentrated on the Arab-Israeli peace process. Bush declared his support for a Palestinian State.”⁴¹ Nevertheless, the new mission of President Bush failed and the violence continued to intensify.

Since the outbreak of Al-Aqsa Intifada, the United States, United Nations, the European Union, and Russia were working in order to find a policy to deal with unfolding events. Their representatives met for almost a year from 2000 – 2001, for the same purpose. For example, on 17th October 2001, the representatives of the US, Russia, the UN and the EU jointly met the Palestinian Leader Yasser Arafat and expressed their support for his policy to implement the ceasefire plan and to reform

³⁹ Stein, Kenneth W., (2002, June). "The Bush Doctrine: Selective Engagement in the Middle East", *MERIA Journal*, Vol.6, No.2, Article 6 of 7 <http://meria.idc.ac.il>

⁴⁰ Ibid., Note: 3

⁴¹ Ibid., Note: 30

security in the Palestinian Authority.⁴² The common points of views and interests led the US, UN, Russia, and the EU to decide about the formation of the Quartet, in order to work with each other flexibly to solve the Israeli - Palestinian dispute. On 10th April 2002, Colin Powell, the United States Secretary of State, met the representatives of UN, the EU and Russia in Madrid in a conference to confirm the foundation of the Middle East Quartet. The participants of the conference were the Spanish Foreign Minister Josep Pique, United Nations Secretary General Kofi Annan, European Union High Representative Javier Solana, the Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov, and the US Secretary of State Colin Powell.

During the conference, the UN Secretary General Kofi Annan expressed the United Nations' concern about the situations in the region and the massive killing and humanitarian violations that kept the region in continuous and growing risk, instability and threat. He reasserted UN's concerns about the violence and terrorist actions in the region, blaming the Israeli and Palestinian leaders for taking insignificant efforts to halt these actions, as well as, to act in the interests of their people, region and the international community. Annan stated that

“...the UN, EU and Russia express their strong support for Secretary of State Powell's mission...We call on the parties to move towards a political resolution of their disputes based on UNSCR 242 and 338 ... We re-affirm our support to the objective expressed by President Bush and spelled out in UNSCR 1397 of two states, Israel and Palestine...We agreed on the need to keep the situation in the Middle East under review by the Quartet at the principal's level through regular consultations. Our Special Envoys will assist the parties in

⁴² Statement Read by Mr. TerjeRoed-Larsen, Source: United Nations Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process (UNSCO), (2001). October, 26, cited at: <http://unispal.un.org/unispal.nsf/fdc5376a7a0587a4852570d000708f4b/fc33d890b2b968a785256af100662c08?OpenDocument#sthash.qMvh1evg.dpuf>

reaching an end to confrontation and resumption of political negotiations.”⁴³

This conference marked the beginning of the Quartet’s activities after the acceptance of the four representatives to transform their quadripartite cooperation into the Quartet forum to follow-up the peace process between the Israelis and Palestinians.

3.2 Goals and Policies of the Quartet

The four members of the Quartet, the United States, Russia, the European Union and United Nations, formulated a number of goals they aimed to achieve. The roadmap of the Quartet was to achieve peace within three years. In regards to the Quartet’s goals, the Secretary General Kofi Annan assured that,

“The Quartet stands ready to assist the parties in implementing their agreements, in particular the Tenet security work plan and the Mitchell recommendations. We would also have to step up our assistance to the Palestinians to get them into meaningful activities, as well as rebuild the entire infrastructure, the need for all to be ready to move forward to make the necessary investments of time, of money, of the resources to reconstruct that part of the Palestinian Authority. We must get the violence down and to have a defined series of steps leading to permanent peace - involving recognition, normalization and security between the sides... That’s an essential predicate in order to move forward.”⁴⁴

In addition, Nathalie Tocci observed that, “More concretely, the stated aim of the Quartet was to support the establishment of two states, Israel and Palestine, living side by side within secure and recognized borders, as affirmed by UNSC resolution 1397.”⁴⁵

The Quartet had a roadmap by which they hoped to find a solution to the Israeli – Palestinian conflict. Yet, the question is what exactly was the policy the Quartet followed in order to achieve these goals? In attempts to improve the economic

⁴³ Remarks: Foreign Minister of Spain Josep Pique, United Nations Secretary General Kofi Annan, Foreign Minister of Russia Igor Ivanov, and European Union Senior Official Javier Solana, Secretary Colin L. Powell, Madrid, Spain, (2002). April 10, cited at: <http://unispal.un.org/UNISPAL.NSF/0/4808D2E68A33B35385256B970062DEAF>

⁴⁴ Ibid., Note: 33

⁴⁵ Ibid., Note: 28

growth and develop the institutions in the Palestinian Authority, the Quartet attempted to increase the chances for negotiations to be more predictable, workable, and likely. Additionally, the Quartet made efforts to encourage both sides to be more cooperating and ready to negotiate. According to the Quartet's perspective, the Israeli side was more eligible – in terms of institutions, government, and economy - to negotiate the peace process. Yet, the Palestinian side needed to be improved in order to be more competent and eligible to negotiate with the other side and start the peace process in the region.

Therefore, the Quartet's representatives worked in the region to develop the social conditions and economic growth in the Palestinian area with a view to increase the confidence and trust of the people in themselves, their government, and the inside and outside players. Moreover, the Quartet worked to convince the Palestinians to accept the Israeli side and start negotiating with them in order to reach an agreement and initiate peace in the region. The Quartet members sought to improve these terms in the Palestinian side, because “political negotiations can only fully succeed if there is broad support on both the Israeli and the Palestinian side and if the parties perceive that a peace agreement is possible. The Office of the Quartet Representative (QOR) works to promote this principle.”⁴⁶ In a purpose to increase confidence and trust of the Israeli and the Palestinian sides and encourage them to cooperate and negotiate, there are key issues the Quartet concentrates on improving them to convince both sides to negotiate successfully.

When the Quartet was formulated, the members listed aims to be achieved and policies by which they will achieve these goals. Yet, after studying the situations in

⁴⁶ How we work, (2014). Accessed: January 3, available at: <http://www.quartetrep.org/quartet/pages/how-we-work1/>

the ground, they found out that there are main issues should be represented as the first step toward real negotiations. In order to guarantee the success of negotiations, the negotiated parties should be qualified to negotiate. Therefore, the Quartet aims to improve the key issues by which they would not struggle the negotiation process or any possible chance for building peace in the region.

3.3 Key Issues

The Quartet emphasized a few key issues in initiating successful political negotiations that might lead to a peace process in the region. Primarily, the Israelis, Palestinians and their leaders should realize the seriousness of the issue and the real need for a peace agreement in the region. They should effort to recognize the economic and social potential that peace can deliver real and lasting change, rather than violence. They also need to accept that a peace agreement in actuality is possible. To help build this confidence and trust, the Office of the Quartet Representative – by the lead of Mr. Tony Blair - focused on transformative change from the ground up.⁴⁷ In a statement, the Quartet Envoys “emphasized Israel’s obligation, consistent with legitimate security concerns, to do more to ease the dire humanitarian and socio-economic situation in the West Bank and Gaza, including facilitating freedom of movement and access, alleviating the daily burdens of life under occupation, and respecting the dignity of Palestinian civilians.”⁴⁸ Thus, the Quartet members concentrated on the following points:

- i) helping the Palestinian social and economic development,
- ii) lifting movement and access restrictions,

⁴⁷ Key Issues, (2013). Accessed: January 3, available at: <http://www.quartetrep.org/quartet/pages/key-issues/>

⁴⁸ Quartet Envoys Statement, London, (2003). February 20, cited at: <http://www.unsco.org/q.asp>

- iii) the Israeli government development for ‘Area C’,⁴⁹
- iv) the Palestinian maintenance and development for the rule of law, and
- v) promoting the overall humanitarian relief effort, reconstruction and economic recovery of the Gaza Strip.

The Quartet also attempts to increase the volume of trade, business, and investment in Palestinian Authority for assisting Palestinian social and economic development. However, the Quartet works to increase the budget provided - by the members of the Quartet and donors - for the Palestinian people and their authority in order to transfer their lives’ conditions to better conditions, if not to the best, by which they would be qualified to negotiate the peace process with the other side.⁵⁰

In fact, the Quartet works to facilitate the movements and reduce access restrictions to and from the West Bank and Gaza Strip because they influence in improving the Palestinians’ lives and on the economic growth in these areas. The Quartet works to facilitate

- “greater Palestinian movement and access in a number of different ways including removing restrictions on internal commerce and the external trade of goods,
- improving the movement of Palestinians across all passenger crossings,
- ... enhancing the movement and access of organizations, public or private, engaged in service delivery for Palestinians...
- improving access to and within the West Bank for tour operators and tourists”⁵¹

⁴⁹ What is Area C?, (2014). Accessed: January 11, Available at: http://www.btselem.org/area_c/what_is_area_c, “Area C covers 60% of the West Bank (about 330,000 hectares); Israel has retained almost complete control of this area, including security matters and all land-related civil matters, including land allocation, planning and construction, and infrastructure.”

⁵⁰ Private Sector Development, (2014). Accessed: January 15, available at: <http://www.quartetrep.org/quartet/pages/private-sector-development/>

⁵¹ Movement and Access, (2014). Accessed: January 15, available at: <http://www.quartetrep.org/quartet/pages/movement-and-access/>

According to the Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement, which the Israelis and then Palestinians negotiated in 1995, the West Bank was divided into three areas: A, B, and C. The Palestinian Authority administrates and controlled Area A. The B Area was under shared administration of both Israel and PA, yet Area C was under the control of Israel and the Israeli government was responsible for the economic growth and development in the area. The Palestinians could not invest or develop in area C without the Israeli government's permission. The Quartet works to find out whether the Israeli government was really working to enhance the economic development in the area as well as offering free movement and investment for the Palestinians or not. Moreover, the Office of the Quartet Representative reinforces the area's development through; "supporting the accelerated development of local master plans for all Palestinian communities in Area C, facilitating the timely issuance of permits for priority social infrastructure projects and strengthening Palestinian private industry development in Area C."⁵² Furthermore, it works to prove if the Government of Israel is working to "support effective development in Area C and help build the foundations of the future Palestinian State."⁵³

The Palestinian Authority was responsible for providing the capacity to secure the region and the Palestinians, and increase the chances to negotiate and build the foundations for a Palestinian state. Obeying the rule of law is very significant for guaranteeing the free movements, security of people and the economic growth and development. Therefore, the Quartet worked to affirm the Palestinian Authority's potentials in obligating and obeying the rule of law, by working with range of Palestinian and Israeli institutions and with a number of countries that donate to

⁵² Area C Development, (2014). Accessed: January 15, available at: <http://www.quartetrep.org/quartet/pages/area-c-development/>

⁵³ Key Issues, (2014). Accessed: January 15, available at: <http://www.quartetrep.org/quartet/pages/key-issues/>

assist the PA's efforts to secure the region. To support the implementation of rule of law in the region, the OQR concentrated on two key areas:

- (i) "expanding the legal and security footprint of the Palestinian Authority
- (ii) strengthening Palestinian rule of law institutions."⁵⁴

The reconstruction in Gaza Strip was a very important step toward the economic growth and development of the Palestinians in the future. Gaza is the trade channel with Egypt and North Africa and provides access to the Mediterranean Sea. However, the Quartet concentrated on improving the situations in Gaza Strip by "highlighting the urgency of the humanitarian relief effort and to lift the economic closure regime on Gaza to allow for comprehensive reconstruction and development, mobilizing international resources for and facilitating the implementation of large infrastructure projects in the water, expand freedom to import and export products and services, improving the free entry of construction material..."⁵⁵

The purpose of formulating the Middle East Quartet was to facilitate the Israeli – Palestinian negotiations and end their seemingly endless conflict. The Quartet was formed in order to unify the members' efforts and play a significant mutual role in this process. The Quartet's main goal was to reach an end that would satisfy the both sides –Israelis and Palestinians - and solve the dispute, so, they defined key issues to be solved as the first step toward real negotiations. The Quartet's members believed that both negotiating parties should be credible and qualified enough to negotiate in order to guarantee the success of the negotiation process. For that, the Quartet worked to improve the economic growth and social development in the region especially in Gaza Strip. Still, what are the roles that the Quartet and its members

⁵⁴ Rule of Law, (2014). Accessed: January 15, available at: <http://www.quartetrep.org/quartet/pages/rule-of-law/>

⁵⁵ The Gaza Strip, (2014). Accessed: January 15, available at: <http://www.quartetrep.org/quartet/pages/the-gaza-strip/>

played in the region to solve this dispute, increase the economic growth, and improve the social condition? The next chapter will attempt to answer these important questions.

After studying the formulation of the Quartet and having knowledge about its goals, policies and the key issues of concentration, it is significant to know how the Quartet's members efforts to achieve their goals and solve the key issues to be able to take a real step toward real peace in the region. Moreover, it is important to analyze the roles that the Quartet members played in the Israeli – Palestinian negotiation process. The following chapter will observe the roles played by each member of the Quartet to solve the Israeli – Palestinian issue unilaterally and the multilaterally as the Quartet.

Chapter 4

UNILATERALISM AND MULTILATERALISM

Prior to the foundation of the Quartet, the Quartet's members were acting unilaterally in order to bring the Palestinians and the Israelis to the Negotiating table. Once the Quartet was formed, the members endeavored to act multilaterally under the name of the Quartet. In any case, this chapter will begin with giving the definition of unilateralism and multilateralism. Then, it will study in detail the unilateral actions played by each member of the Quartet and finally, it will focus on the Quartet's multilateral actions. The analysis of unilateral and multilateral actions is a crucial point in this chapter. It would illuminate many reasons, motives, resolutions and policies that the Quartet's members followed and functioned to resolve this conflict. In spite of all the efforts, most results were unfavorable, so, the members attempted impatiently to find new instruments to reach a real peace agreement between Israelis and Palestinians.

4.1 Definition of Unilateralism and Multilateralism

The scholars disagree how to define unilateralism and multilateralism perceptions. It is substantial to understand the meaning of the terms unilateralism and multilateralism in order to study the unilateral actions of each member of the Quartet. Further, referring to the meaning of multilateralism will contribute the understanding of the multilateral format and actions of the Quartet in resolving the Israeli – Palestinian conflict. Unilateralism is commonly understood as the actions and decisions that are taken by one side disregarding the other sides' ideas, decisions and

actions. In addition, it always describes the decisions that are taken by one party for the benefits and interests of that party, in politics. David M. Malone and Yuen Foong Khong referred to unilateralism as “a tendency to opt out of a multilateral framework (whether existing or proposed) or to act alone in addressing a particular global or regional challenge rather than choosing to participate in collective action.”⁵⁶ Unilateralism is thoroughly correlated to isolationism, but the modification is that, unilateralism deals with ideas and actions. Jonathan Hughes defines unilateralism as “an antonym for multilateralism that maintains sovereignty. It is action initiated or taken by a single nation rather than two nations or several.”⁵⁷ Moreover, Erik Beukel associates between the definitions of unilateralism and multilateralism concepts. Beukel states that unilateralism “emphasizes the sovereign right of a country to select policies on a case-by-case basis, determined by individual preferences or situational exigencies.”⁵⁸ In contrast to unilateralism, multilateralism has more parties being involved in taking decisions and building agreements; there are three or more parties involved in multilateral agreements.

Multilateralism is identified as "involving or participated in by more than two nations or parties '*multilateral agreements*'." ⁵⁹ Steve Jones defined multilateralism as a "diplomatic term that refers to cooperation among several nations."⁶⁰ Miles Kahler has been defined multilateralism as “international governance of the ‘many’ and its central principle was opposition [of] bilateral and discriminatory arrangements that were believed to enhance the leverage of the powerful over the weak and to increase

⁵⁶ Malone, David M., and Khong, Yuen Foong, (2003). Unilateralism and U.S. Foreign Policy: International Perspectives, *Lynne Rienner Publishers*

⁵⁷ Hughes, Jonathan, (2010). November 25, Politics Unilateralism, *Prezi*, available at: <http://prezi.com/l73ud2jdz3m/politics-unilateralism/>

⁵⁸ Beukel, Erik, (1998, June). Multilateralism vs. Unilateralism: The International Political Economy of the Trade/Environment Nexus, *Institute of International Relations*, The University of British Columbia, Working Paper, No.22

⁵⁹ Multilateral, (2014). Accessed: January 4, available at: <http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/multilateral>

⁶⁰ Jones, Steve, (2014). Accessed: January 4, What Is Multilateralism? U.S., Obama Champion Multilateral Programs, About.com Guide, retried in: <http://usforeignpolicy.about.com/od/introtoforeignpolicy/a/What-Is-Multilateralism.htm>

international conflict.”⁶¹ Robert O. Keohane stated that multilateralism “can be defined as the practice of co-coordinating national policies in groups of three or more states, through ad hoc arrangements or by means of institutions.”⁶² Consequently, multilateralism refers to a group of people, nations, or institutions that cooperate together to reach and achieve an agreement or to make a decision. In comparison to the unilateralism, multilateralism undermines the sovereignty of the state members.

4.2 The Quartet Member’s Unilateral Roles

Before the formation of the Middle East Quartet, each member was playing a unilateral role in attempts to resolve the conflict, achieve a real agreement between Israel and the Palestinian Authority. Each member was trying to implement their political relations and economic cooperation with both sides, the Israelis and the Palestinians, to solve this un-ended conflict. The function of this part of the chapter is to study the roles played by each member of the Quartet in advance of their participation in forming the Middle East Quartet.


4.2.1 United Nations’ Initiatives

United Nations, the first member of the Quartet, observed all the events of the Israeli-Arab conflict since its commencements in 1947 until today. The first action of the United Nations General Assembly was the establishment of the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine, in September 1947 composed of 11 member states, distributing any matter related to Palestine. The Jewish organizations accepted to deal and collaborate with this committee in order to solve the European Jews problem of immigration. Conversely, the Palestinians refused to accept the committee efforts, because they believed that the immigrant Jews’ problem and the

⁶¹ Powell, Lindsey, (2003). Quoted after: Kahler, Miles, (1992, Summer). “Multilateralism with Small and Large Numbers.” *International Organization*, 46, 3, 681, cited in: *In Defense of Multilateralism, Yale Center for Environmental Law and Policy, New Haven, CT*

⁶² Keohane, Robert O., (1990). Multilateralism: an agenda for research, *International Journal*, Vol. 45, No. 4, pg. 731, Published by: *Canadian International Council*

Palestinian's problem are distinct, but the committee correlated them. After two and half months of investigations, the UNSOP members submitted two proposals to the United Nations concerning the question of Palestine. The proposals were distributed as regards the percentage of votes; “the majority of the members recommended that Palestine be partitioned into an Arab State and a Jewish State, with a special international status for the city of Jerusalem under the administrative authority of the United Nations. The three entities were to be linked in an economic union.”⁶³The United Nations General Assembly confirmed the partition of Palestine between the Palestinians and the Israelis in November 1947 in the resolution GA 181.



The proposed partition plan of Palestine

The partition plan - that was accepted by the Jews and rejected by the Palestinians - included “a detailed four-part document attached to the resolution, provided for the termination of the Mandate, the progressive withdrawal of British armed forces and the delineation of boundaries between the two States and Jerusalem.”⁶⁴ The United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) had been formed to avoid any

⁶³ The question of Palestine and the United Nations, (2008). *United Nations*, New York, pg. 6 - 5

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, Note: 68, pg. 7

conflict to be occurred between the Arabs and the Israelis, but the conflicted parties sustained to corrupt and fight. Thereafter, on 11th December 1948, the UN General Assembly adopted the resolution (194 III) in order to resolve the clashes between the conflicted parties in an appropriate sufficient solution that would satisfy both sides.

In April 1949, when the commission (UNSCOP) met and conversed unilaterally with the Arabs and the Israelis for the purpose of solving issues concerning the size of the territories, the refugees and the Jerusalem status according to the partition plan of the UNGA. The outcomes were pessimistic because the Arabs asserted on certifying the refugees' homecoming as the first step of crucial real negotiations, and the Israelis, on the other side, persisted that the territorial boundaries question should be the very precedence issue to start talks. Subsequent the 1967 war (Six Days War), many clashes ensued between the Israelis and the Arab states in excess of the occupied territories in the Six Days War. After extensive negotiations and meetings, the United Nations Security Council adopted the resolution 242 of 22 November 1967, in which it provided the following:

“1. Affirms that the fulfillment of Charter principles requires the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East which should include the application of both the following principles ...

2. Affirms further the necessity: (a) For guaranteeing freedom of navigation through international waterways in the area; (b) For achieving a just settlement of the refugee problem; (c) For guaranteeing the territorial inviolability and political independence of every State in the area, through measures including the establishment of demilitarized zones...”⁶⁵

The significance of this resolution that it was accepted by both, the Palestinians and the Israelis, despite, the PLO criticism for it that it did not meet the main issues and demands of the Palestinians. However, when the Yum Kippur war between the Arab

⁶⁵ United Nations Security Council: Resolution 242, (1967, November 22). available at: <http://unispal.un.org/UNISPAL.NSF/0/7D35E1F729DF491C85256EE700686136>, Accessed: 2014, March 12

and Israelis broke out in 1973, the Security Council adopted the resolution 338. In this 338 resolution, the UNSC reaffirmed paying all the efforts to confirm the exertion and accomplishment of the principles referred to in resolution 242.⁶⁶

When the United Nations tried to mediate and act unilaterally, as a mediator, between the Palestinians and the Israelis to resolve the conflict, Israel rejected to accept UN efforts, and “successive Israeli governments (as well as much of the Israeli public) have regarded the institution as inherently biased.”⁶⁷ Therefore, as it is clear that the United Nations attempts to secure the region, bring the parties to negotiation table to negotiate and accomplish an agreement continued to be in a progress for long time without any momentous solution until the United Nations decided to be a member of the Middle East Quartet. The United Nations acknowledged that its unilateral attempts are unproductive, so the General Secretary, Kofi Annan authorize the United Nations and the other three actors; the US, the EU, and Russia, via the mechanism of the Quartet and practice multilateralism in order to resolve the Israeli – Palestinian conflict.

4.2.2 United States’ initiatives

In September 1993, Yitzhak Rabin, the Israeli Prime Minister and Yasser Arafat, the Chairman of the PLO- exchanged handshake in Washington. There was a belief that the most historic conflict in the world is ending. Each side recognized the other’s right to exist, and live in peace and they agreed to negotiate their modifications. In addition, the Prime Minister of Israel sent a letter to Yasser Arafat recognizing the PLO as the representative of the Palestinian people. This was the result of the first American initiation to solve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The negotiations were

⁶⁶ Chapter Three: The 1967 and 1973 Wars, (2014). Accessed: March 12, available at: <http://www.un.org/Depts/dpi/palestine/ch3.pdf>

⁶⁷ Englander, Odelia, (June 2009). *Converging for Peace – The United Nations and the Israel-Palestine Peace Process*, Published by *The Atkin Paper Series*, the International Centre for the Study of Radicalization and Political Violence (ICSR)

secretly conducted in Oslo during 1993, and the Oslo treaty was contracted in September 1993.⁶⁸

4.2.2.1 From Camp David II summit to 2001

The failure of the Oslo treaty between Israel and PLO led United States to play another role unilaterally to solve the issue. On 11th July 2000, Camp David II summit was conducted between the PLO leader, Yasser Arafat and the Prime Minister of Israel Ehud Barak with the mediation of the US President Bill Clinton. The United States' approach at the summit was based on an old Israeli idea known as the 'New Jerusalem Diagram' or 'The Cosmological Circle', in which the city of Jerusalem is alienated into three areas. The first area is the 'center' and it comprises the parts inside the Old City of Jerusalem's walls. The second area is known as the 'circle or circuit' in which the neighborhood quarters and the areas around the old city are included, and the third area is envisaged as an 'ocean' and this part consists of the Arab areas within Jerusalem municipality such as Shuafat, BeitHanina, and Issawiyya.⁶⁹ Despite the fact, that the United States' approach was contingent on the Israeli idea, yet the U.S called for a Palestinian sovereignty over the ocean, and some parts in the center and circuit.

The Palestinians rejected the American proposals because they claimed that the proposals did not pledge the Palestinian sovereignty over East Jerusalem and the Old city, which is the core of all the clashes and conflict. Clinton administration set forth new proposals and suggestions during Camp David II summit, as a response for the Palestinian denial for the preceding obtainable American proposals. It was proposed that Jerusalem would be alienated into four geographic parts; Jewish neighborhoods

⁶⁸ Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements (Oslo Agreement) pdf, (2014). Accessed: June 4, available at: <http://www.refworld.org/docid/3de5e96e4.html>

⁶⁹ Personal efforts in translation, (2014). Accessed: March 9, cited in: http://www.moqatel.com/openshare/Behoth/Siasia21/EtefakyatS/sec10.doc_cvt.htm

in the East, whether inside or outside the walls should be merged to Israel and be under its sovereignty. The Palestinian neighborhoods, which are outside the walls, would be under the Palestinian sovereignty, but should be contained within Israel and be under its administration. The different neighborhoods, which are in the east sides of the city, should be under shared – sovereignty, the Israeli's and the Palestinian's. The Old city of Jerusalem should be under shared sovereignty or endure as it is until the advanced negotiations. Observing on these proposals, Akram Hanieh claims that “regarding the more sensitive issue of the holy places in Jerusalem, the Americans adopted the Israeli position. They then attempted to find a deceptive legal framework without much attention to Arab, Islamic, or Christian sensitivities and without seeming to realize the explosive nature of the Israeli arguments. The Palestinians often felt that they were negotiating with a joint Israeli-American delegation.”⁷⁰ Both Israel and the Palestinians rejected the American proposals. Each side refused them for different reasons. The Palestinians rejected the proposals, because they did not illuminate the issue of the sovereignty over Jerusalem, and they neglected the Palestinians’ right to return. Israel, on the other hand, refused the American proposals because Israel was not ready to handover sovereignty over East Jerusalem or any part of it to the Palestinians. The Camp David summit of July 2000 between Barak and Arafat was ineffective and the situations sustained to intensify.

The American President George Bush’s policy and reaction regard the Israelis – Palestinian conflict was different from that of Bill Clinton, because of his relations with the Israeli government. US followed the ‘hands off’ policy as an American new attitude concerning the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Inasmuch, the Palestinians

⁷⁰ Hanieh, Akram, (2001, Winter). Special Documents: The Camp David Papers, *Journal of Palestine Studies* XXX, no. 2, pp. 75-97

exasperated from the Israeli evasion and they assumed that they would lose their land if they waited for these negotiations to solve their conflict with Israel. The apprehensions between the Israelis and the Palestinians intensified and the struggles sustained, therefore, the negotiations between the two sides appeared to be impossible. Akram Hanieh argued that “The Israeli delegation and the American peace team coordinated step by step and word by word. For the Palestinians, it was like a comedy routine ... Israel and the United States wanted to fabricate a “solution” and cash in with a “golden signature” from the Palestinians.”⁷¹

The 11th September 2001 attacks on the United States reformed President Bush’s policies toward the Middle East and especially toward the Palestinians. President Bush monitored a new policy called *persona non grata*.⁷² The United States’ president intended to form a coalition including the Arab Muslim states against Osama bin Laden and his terrorist organization. For so, he declared his support for a Palestinian statehood foundation, and he enforced Ariel Sharon to agree conducting a meeting with the Palestinian Authority, “despite the fact that Palestinian violence had not stopped as Sharon had demanded as the price for talks.”⁷³ Although, the great impulsive transformation in the American President Bush’s policy to gain the Arab states’ support, but his inattention for the conflict and his reliance on his European and Arab allies to re-launch the Palestinian-Israeli peace process talks led this enterprise to only proceed with unsubstantial results.

⁷¹ Ibid., Note: 50

⁷² *Persona non grata* refers to a diplomat who is not welcomed or unacceptable to the state’s government in which he/she has been assigned. In diplomacy, *persona non grata* refers to the foreign diplomat who his/her entering or remaining in a state is inhibited by the government of that state. Read more about “*persona non grata*” in Vienna Convention on diplomatic relations – Article 9, (2013). Accessed: December 20, cited at: http://www.ediplomat.com/nd/treaties/diplomatic_relations.htm

⁷³ Freedman, Robert O., (2005, Spring). The Bush Administration and the Arab-Israeli Conflict: The Record of its First Four Years, *Middle East Review of International Affairs*, Vol. 9, No. 1

4.2.3 The European Union Unilateral Actions

Before the establishment of the Quartet, the European Union too like the US undertook unilateral actions to bring the parties to the negotiating table. The EU's strategic priority is the resolution of the Israeli – Palestinian conflict. Despite the EU's efforts to serve the two - states solution for resolving the Israeli – Palestinian conflict, but the Israeli government did not welcome the European Union efforts. Prior the failure of the 2000 Camp David, European Union enrolled a Common Strategy on the Mediterranean Region as an attempt to bring the Palestinians and Israelis to the negotiation table, but inadequately, the failure of the 2000 Camp David brought this attempt not to be successful. Therefore, it is very imperative to distinguish involvement of the European Union in the Israeli – Palestinian conflict, until it became a member of Madrid Quartet.

4.2.3.1 From the foundation of the Israeli statehood until 1999

Since the foundation of the Israeli statehood in 1948, the European states, like United Kingdom, France and Germany, attempted to maintain its influence as an honest mediator between the Israelis and the Arabs in the region. In that phase, they did not have precise and certain policy intended for the Israeli - Palestinian conflict. Each of them had different policy on the way to resolve the dispute permitting to the most guaranteed choices that serve their ingredients and time. For instance, France was the most essential and contiguous European ally to Israel. In addition, during the Sinai Campaign in 1956, Britain and France cooperatively supported Israel against the Egyptian nationalization of the Suez Canal.⁷⁴ At any rate, the Union's support for Israel prior to the 1967 war altered to the Palestinian side after the Six Days war and sustained during 1970s. Bat Ye'or asserts that,

⁷⁴ Newman, David and Yacobi, Haim, (2004). Working Papers Series in EU Border Conflicts Studies: The Role of the EU in the Israel/Palestine Conflict, , *Department of Politics and Government*, Ben Gurion University, Beer Sheva, Israel, No. 12

“the importance of oil formed the basis of the alliance between Europe and the Arab world and he quotes Ibrahim A. Obaid, Saudi Arabia's director - general of the Ministry of Petroleum and Mineral Resources, who said at a 1975 meeting of Euro-Arab Cooperation experts in Amsterdam that, together and as equals, the Europeans and the Arabs can through a 'strategy of interdependence' forge ahead to remove the thorn from their sides, the Israeli problem, and attend to the Herculean task ahead of them, the Arab-Israeli conflict and the oil problem are not only related but inseparable.”⁷⁵

The European countries endeavored to balance their support in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, whereas, they were supporting Israeli's right to exist and be secured as well as the Palestinians' right to have a state and self-determination. Farther, in 1977 during the London Summit, the EC reassured that the merely solution for the Palestinian-Israeli conflict could be accomplished with the appreciation of the Palestinians' identities and their right to have a homeland.⁷⁶ Yet, nothing new had been attained to end the Israeli – Palestinian conflict and no real ultimate agreement was reached.

In the Venice Declaration of the European Council in 1980, the members of the Council confirmed their distinctive role in settling the Israeli - Palestinian conflict under the terms they declared in 1973, 1976, and 1977 summits. Moreover, the EC members indicated that their peculiar relations with the Middle East states obliged them to play this momentous and operative role in the negotiations and, they necessitated a place in the negotiation table for the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO). The Venice Declaration amplified the strains between the Israelis and the European Council member states, especially during 1980s. In the beginning of the 1990s, the European Union found the Common Foreign and Security policy. It is measured as the safeguard for the common values, interests, and

⁷⁵ Ye'or, Bat, (2005, April). *Eurabia: The Euro-Arab Axis*, Published by *Fairleigh Dickinson University Press*, 384 pages, reviewed by: Tangelder, Johan D., Cited in: <http://www.reformedreflections.ca/book-reviews/eurabia.html>

⁷⁶ Session of the European Council, London , (1977, June 29 – 30). Conclusion statements on the Middle East, pg: 93, cited at: http://aei.pitt.edu/1410/1/London_june_1977.pdf

policies of the union. In addition, the policy was established in order to “be pursued through strengthening systematic co-operation between Member States, decide on common strategies to be implemented particularly by adopting joint actions and common positions and promote solidarity among Member States to enable them to carry out, within a single institutional framework.”⁷⁷ The members invigorated to outline common positions and views regard the different conflicts and disputes and to speak with ‘one voice’ concerning many different issues. They succeed to speak with one voice in many cases such as “observing elections in Russia and South Africa.”⁷⁸ Yet, in the case of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the European Union member states did not appear the presumed role that the union should play in order to solve the dispute or even to speak with one voice.

In an attempt to act expressively and more obviously in the negotiations peace talks, the EU member’ states met in November 1995 in Spain in Barcelona, and launched the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP / EUROMED) with 12 Mediterranean countries. The EU established this partnership in a spirit of solidarity and coherence as well as maintenance of the association agreements with the Mediterranean states that started since 1970s. This partnership aims to supply and achieve peace, stability and development for the Mediterranean partner states. It aims to promote the political, security, economic, trade, financial, social and cultural cooperation.⁷⁹ Overall, the EU’s role in the Israeli - Palestinian conflict is limited associated to its role in other disputes. The European Union effort to resolve the Israeli – Palestinian

⁷⁷ The Treaty on European Union, (2014). Accessed: February 3, Articles: 3, 1.3 and 3.2, cited in: <http://www.eurotreaties.com/lisbontext.pdf> and Article J.1.2 , J.1.3, and J.3, cited in: <http://www.eurotreaties.com/amsterdamtreaty.pdf>

⁷⁸ Bindi, Federiga, (2010). *The Foreign Policy of the European Union: Assessing Europe’s Role in the World*, Edited, *Brookings Institution Press*, Washington, D.C

⁷⁹ Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreements, (2013). Accessed: October 13, cited in: http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/external_relations/relations_with_third_countries/mediterranean_partner_countries/r141_04_en.htm

conflict unilaterally as a mediator, but, the Union figured out that the Union's unilateralism is not influencing enough in the conflicted parties. For so, the Union decided to launch the independent peace process plans, go back to the United States peace plan, and participate in the Madrid Quartet.

4.2.4 Unilateral positions of Russia

Russia is another member of the Quartet. In the Arab-Israeli disputes and negotiations, Russia engages as a pro-Palestinian, at the same time; sympathetically, it concerns about the security of Israel. Despite the Russian sympathy, yet Israel does not trust Russia. Nevertheless, Russia desires to solve the dispute, ensures the security of the both sides in the region, and most prominently, not to lose its Arab allies. For that, Russia favors to negotiate with the Palestinians and the Palestinian movements' leaders, like Hamas. Russia intention is to act differently to United States' actions.⁸⁰ So, it is essential to study how the Russian actions embraced in the Israeli – Palestinian conflict until it became a member of the Middle East Quartet.

4.2.4.1 The Soviet Union and the Arab – Israeli conflict from 1960s until 1990s

When the Palestinian movement was born in 1960 and institutionalized by the PLO and Fatah organization, the Soviet Union's government acted conservatively toward the Palestinian actions. Russia still condemned the civilians for the use of terrorism and the Fedayeen's plans. At the same time, the Soviet Union believed and still supports the Israeli right to exist. However, the USSR influence in the Middle East appeared to be diminished during the 1970s. On 8th September 1974, the Soviet Union called for the Palestinian's right to have their own statehood. Furthermore, in the summer of that year, the Soviet announced the endorsement of opening a PLO office in Moscow. After the Camp David Accords in 1978, the President Leonid

⁸⁰ Trenin, Dmitri, (2010). Russia's Policy in the Middle East: Prospects for Consensus and Conflict with the United States, *A Century Foundation Report*

Brezhnev declared that “there is only one road” to a real settlement, “the road of full liberation of all Arab lands occupied by Israel in 1967, of full and unambiguous respect for the lawful rights of the Arab people of Palestine, including the right to create their own independent state.”⁸¹ Therefore, Russia achieved some success through its unilateral actions during 1970s, whereas, the Soviet leader succeed to convince the Palestinian leader to accept the UN resolution 242, which implied the recognition of an Israeli statehood.

During the 1980s, the Russian policy toward the Israeli-Palestinian conflict transformed when the Russian president Mikhail Gorbachev shifted the Russian attentiveness toward winning the hearts of the West, especially the United States and Israel. When the PLO leader Yasser Arafat visited Moscow accompanied by other radical Palestinian leaders, George Habash and Naif Hawatmeh - in April 1988, the PLO was subjected to ‘a heavy dose of Soviet advice to generate a new peace process.’ Farther, Moscow showed a reluctance to recognize the creation of a Palestinian state, by which Russia somehow satisfied the Israelis that its efforts to assist Israeli is factual.⁸²

By the 1990s, the situation became worse for the Palestinians. Russia’s compliancy for the Israeli desires was clear and visible to the public. However, the PLO executive member, Abdullah Hourani stated in September 1990 - proving that the Russian support for the Arabs became less- that ‘Moscow was attempting to please the Zionist movement and obtain American money, and that it [was] no longer possible to regard ... [It] as a friend of world forces of liberation, including the Arab

⁸¹ Soviet World Outlook, Vol. 3, No. 10, 15 October 1978, p. 4, cited in: Andrej Kreutz, (Spring 2004), Russian-Palestinian Relations: A historical and political analysis, Journal of Military and Strategic Studies, Vol. 6, Issue 3, pg. 12

⁸² Op. cit., pp. 126-27, cited in: Andrej Kreutz, (Spring 2004), Russian-Palestinian Relations: A historical and political analysis, Journal of Military and Strategic Studies, , Vol. 6, Issue 3, pg. 13

world and the Palestinian people and cause.’ During the Israeli-Palestinians talks in Moscow on 28 – 29 January 1992, Russia reformed its position and permitted Israel to control the talks. The Palestinians had been marginalized in this process.⁸³ Observing these alterations in the Russian policy, Kreutz claims, ‘in December 1992, Israel deported 416 Palestinians from the West Bank and Gaza Strip to the no-man's land of southern Lebanon.’ On the last months of 1993, exactly, on 13th September 1993, the PLO and Israel issued the declaration of Principles, which its key term is mutual recognition. However, Russia apprehended the need to reformulate relations with the Arab and Palestinians, despite the negative Israeli reaction toward the Russian policy turn.⁸⁴

From 18th to 20th April 1994, Russia entertained the PLO leader, Yasser Arafat, and the Israeli Prime Minister, Yitzhak Rabin to initiate talks between the two parties. In contrast to the talks that happened between the Palestinians and Israelis with the mediation of Russia in 1988, Yasser Arafat controlled the talks.⁸⁵ In addition, the PLO leader called for “measures to be taken to guarantee the safety and protection of the Palestinian civilians, throughout the occupied territory, including, inter alia, a temporary international or foreign presence, which was provided for in the Declaration of Principles (S/26560), within the context of the ongoing peace process.”⁸⁶ Yasser Arafat called for the implementation of the United Nations resolution 904. By the end of 1994, Russia attempted again to resolve this conflict by the Russian UN representative Sergei Lavrov. Lavrov proposed a Russian suggestion

⁸³ Reuter, (2007). September 27, cited in: Kreutz, Andrej, (Spring 2004), Russian-Palestinian Relations: A historical and political analysis, *Journal of Military and Strategic Studies*, Vol. 6, Issue 3, pg. 15

⁸⁴ Kreutz, Andrej, (2004, Spring). Russian-Palestinian Relations: A historical and political analysis, *Journal of Military and Strategic Studies*, Vol. 6, Issue 3, pg. 19

⁸⁵ Kreutz, Andrej, (2007). Russia in the Middle East: Friend Or Foe?, Praeger Security International Series, *Greenwood Publishing Group*

⁸⁶ United Nations Security Council Resolutions, resolution 904 (1994). March 18, cited in: [http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/904\(1994\)](http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/904(1994))

for the Israeli-Palestinian dispute to the UN General Assembly, in which he specified that ‘Russia stood for a complete and just solution to all aspects of the Arab-Israeli conflict, without prejudice to any of the sides.’ In 22nd April 1996, Russia tried to play another role in the negotiation process between the Israelis and the Palestinians. The Russian Foreign Minister; Yevgeny Primakov met Shimon Peres, the Israeli Prime Minister, and conversed the conflict and the mediation process, but Peres responded him clearly “Israel needed only one intermediary with the Arabs and that only the U.S. should play that role.”⁸⁷

Russia made efforts for long time to support the peace process in the Middle East. The Russian government repetitively makes efforts to provide propitious atmosphere for real talks to take a place and calls for both sides’ concrete moves toward negotiations, stressing its willingness to assist the Israeli – Palestinian negotiations in any possible legal way.⁸⁸ In spite of the Russian less support for the Palestinians during the 1970s, but objectively speaking, Russia succeeded to win their approval and convince them during the 1980s. However, Israel still suspects Russia and describes its actions as unpredictable. The Russian government realized that its unilateral attempts would not have further influence to solve the issue. Therefore, Russia accepts the American proposal to form the Middle East Quartet and be a member of it.

4.3 The Multilateralism of the Quartet

The members of the Quartet undertook their efforts unilaterally in order to bring the Israelis and the Palestinians to the Negotiating table, but the Quartet’s efforts still

⁸⁷ Ibid. Note: 82, pg. 58

⁸⁸ Russia, Palestine propose new Mideast Quartet talks on Israel-Palestine peace, (2014). February 24, Available at: http://voiceofrussia.com/news/2014_02_24/Russia-Palestine-propose-new-Mideast-Quartet-talks-on-Israel-Palestine-peace-8075/

until today in progress attempting to bring this conflict to a resolution that would satisfy both parties. However, on April 2002 and subsequent the 11th September events, the American Secretary of State, Collin Powell, met the representatives of the European Union, the United Nations and Russia in Madrid, proposing the idea of forming an umbrella called as (Middle East Quartet) concentrating on the question of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The Quartet concerted its work on implementing a two - state solution to achieve the quality and security for both, Israelis and Palestinians with the engagement of the Quartet members. The Quartet initiated functioning officially in September 2002, and the members started talks and consultations with the Palestinians and the Israelis, showing them the utility of accepting the suggested two-state solution.

The two-state solution can be accomplished just if the Palestinians and Israelis end the violence and the aggressive actions. In addition, when the Palestinians should have a resolute leadership acting “against terror and willing and able to build a practicing democracy based on tolerance and liberty, and through Israel’s readiness to do what is necessary for a democratic Palestinian state to be established, and a clear, unambiguous acceptance by both parties of the goal of a negotiated settlement as described below.”⁸⁹ Therefore, the Quartet believed that the two-state solution could only succeed, if the Israelis and Palestinians be qualified enough to accept each other’s rights and implement international law.

4.3.1 The Roadmap (Two-State solution)

The Madrid Quartet set a roadmap that offers a two – state solution in order to resolve the Israeli – Palestinian conflict. The United States Administration officially

⁸⁹ A Performance-Based Roadmap: To a permanent two – state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, (2013). Accessed: December 27, cited in: <http://www.un.org/news/dh/mideast/roadmap122002.pdf>

declared the Performance - Based Roadmap to a Permanent Two-State Solution to the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict on 30th April 2003. The Quartet adopted the Roadmap document one month later, and on 19th November 2003, the United Nations Security Council adopted a resolution, 1515, which legalized the Roadmap document. The resolution 1515 of (2003) provides:

“1. Endorses the Quartet Performance-based Roadmap to a Permanent Two-State Solution to the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict (S/2003/529)

2. Calls on the parties to fulfill their obligations under the Roadmap in cooperation with the Quartet and to achieve the vision of two States living side by side in peace and security”⁹⁰

Essentially, the roadmap document was a proposal submitted by the United States with specific phases and benchmarks to initiate a peace process through substantial step that should be implemented by the Israeli government and the Palestinian Authority in order to achieve security, economic development, and develop the political and humanitarian fields in the region. The plan was drawn to be accomplished in three years; “a final and comprehensive settlement of the Israel-Palestinian conflict by 2005, as presented in President Bush’s speech of 24 June, and welcomed by the EU, Russia and the UN in the 16 July and 17 September Quartet Ministerial statements.”⁹¹

The two-state solution can be achieved, if the two sides, Palestinian Authority and Israel, recognized one another’s rights. The success of this plan will be reached merely when the Palestinians have a leadership that can act crucially against terrorism and terrorist actions, and have the ability to build a democratic society that can practice democracy, tolerance and liberty. On the other hand, the Israelis should

⁹⁰ United Nations Security Council: Resolution 1515 (2003). Accessed: 2014, January 4, available at: <http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N03/621/85/PDF/N0362185.pdf?OpenElement>

⁹¹ A Performance-Based Road Map to a Permanent Two-State Solution to the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, (2003). April 30, cited in: <http://www.bitterlemons.org/docs/roadmap3.html>

show their willingness to do what is possible and needed to build a democratic Palestinian state, as well as, the both sides should accept the main aims of the negotiations in order to settle the dispute that has persisted for a very long time. The plan is alienated into to three phases, so the Quartet will be the responsible and the supervisor of the implementation process of each phase, from the date the document had been issued until the achievement of the two-state solution. Indisputably, each phase is executed to be implemented in a certain time. The parties should show their full obligation to obey the phases' terms and conditions. If the parties are eager to end this conflict, so they have to effort and perform punctually to start real settlement negotiations in the region. The settlement negotiations will depend on the UNSC resolutions 242, 338, and 1397.

4.3.2 The Roadmap - Phase 1 (Ending Terror and Violence, Normalizing Palestinian Life, and Building Palestinian Institutions April 2003 to May 2003) and Phase 2 (Transition June 2003-December 2003)

In this phase, the Palestinians and Israelis should collaborate and base their cooperation on the Tenet work plan in order to end violence, comprise their control over terrorist actions, and instigate an effective Palestinian security services. The Palestinians, in one hand, should assume a comprehensive political reformation when they prepare to establish a Palestinian statehood. Further, they should embrace a draft illuminating their enthusiasm and provision to form Palestinian constitutions, and apply the concept of free and justice elections in the Palestinian statehood. Israel, on the other hand, should do all the potentials to promote in normalizing the Palestinians' life. In addition, Israel should withdraw from the Palestinian occupied territories on 28th September 2000, and rehearse the performance of security and cooperation. Moreover, Israel should stopover aggregating settlement activities.

The 2nd phase focuses on the creation of a Palestinian statehood within tentative borders and characterized sovereignty as the main object to be achieved in this round. Furthermore, this phase reaffirms the formation of Palestinian institutions as a way to achieve a permanent settlement, because “with such a leadership, reformed civil institutions and security structures, the Palestinians will have the active support of the Quartet and the broader international community in establishing an independent, viable, state.”⁹² The Quartet will monitor the fulfillment of the second phase. Therefore, if the Palestinians started proceeding the terms and goals of this phase plus the 1st phase, the possibilities of creating a Palestinian state with its permanent borders and sovereignty will be proceed as well.

4.3.3 The Roadmap – Phase 3 (Permanent Status Agreement and End of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict 2004 – 2005)

The progress in this phase is contingent entirely on the Quartet and their conclusion on the Palestinians and Israelis performance and achievements. In this phase, the plan’s main objectives are “consolidation of reform and stabilization of Palestinian institutions, sustained, effective Palestinian security performance, and Israeli-Palestinian negotiations aimed at a permanent status agreement in 2005, continued sustained and effective security performance, and sustained, effective security cooperation, and International efforts to facilitate reform and stabilize Palestinian institutions and economy in preparation for final status agreement.”⁹³ Many objectives were scheduled to be employed and the process is still proceeding, hoping to go further in the negotiations and reach an ultimate agreement for the dispute.

⁹² Ibid., Note: 76

⁹³ Ibid., Note: 77

The Roadmap had a target to accomplish a solution in 2005 but the Quartet failed to resolve the Israeli – Palestinian dispute within this timeframe. On the other hand, the plan intended to “move forward until the Israelis and the Palestinians are judged to have met the benchmarks”⁹⁴ of the Roadmap, therefore, it is still in process. Further, Condoleezza Rice, the US Secretary of State, statement confirms that key actors are still trying to resolve the issue. They have been trying to achieve “a final-status agreement by the end of 2008.”⁹⁵ Thus, the process will continue until the Israelis, and the Palestinians meet the terms of the plan.

⁹⁴ Otterman, Sharon, (2005, February 7). Middle East: The Road Map to Peace, Available at: <http://www.cfr.org/middle-east-and-north-africa/middle-east-road-map-peace/p7738#p4>, Accessed:2014, July 7

⁹⁵ Kessler, Glenn, (2007, November 7). No Mideast Deal Under Bush, White House Says, *Washington Post*, Available at: <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/11/06/AR2008110600358.html>

Chapter 5

ANALYSIS OF THE QUARTET MEDIATION IN THE ISRAELI – PALESTINIAN NEGOTIATION PROCESS

Essentially, the objective of this chapter is to examine Quartet's practice of multilateral negotiation in the Israeli – Palestinian negotiation process and to appeal certain conclusions from its experience. Since 2002 until today, the Middle East Quartet endeavored to end this ongoing conflict, the two sides, the Israelis and the Palestinians, rejected most of the Quartet's efforts. Consequently, there are many different calculated and miscalculated reasons. There is certain arguments, which blame the conflicted parties for the negotiation talks' obstruct. Chapter five will attempt to explicate the causes of negotiations' interruption, which incite the talks proceeding without any significant resolution until today. First, it will consider the negotiation and mediation theory principles in the analysis. Concerning the correspondence term, the chapter will clarify the significance of the acceptance and communication between the Palestinians and Israelis. The appointment of Tony Blair, as the Quartet Representative, can be considered as one the Quartet ineffectiveness in this negotiation process.

5.1 Negotiation and Mediation theories

Negotiations do not only refer to the settlement of differences between the conflicted parties, but it also concerns a technique of preventing clashes from ascending and instigating great disputes, or elude the escalation of any dispute through consultation. According to J. C. Merrills, consultation is “when a government anticipates a

decision on a proposed action ... with the affected party that can provide a way of heading off a dispute by creating an opportunity for an adjustment and an accommodation to do the required in a purpose of preventing any trouble from occurring.”⁹⁶ . Multilaterally, the technique of consultation is used in order to prevent international disputes, but the problem with this term is that it can increase the possibilities of the clashes and disputes rather than solving them or avoiding them, because of its legislative actions.

However, the Quartet faced difficulties in implementing the concept of consultation, because they were not only dealing with a state. In the Palestinian side, there are different groups, like the PLO and Hamas, with different point of views and arguments associated with resolving the conflict. Naively speaking, the Quartet attempted to implement the term consultation in the Israeli – Palestinian peace talks in order to convince the Israelis and the Palestinians to obey the international law and stop violence. Russia, for example, favored to talk with the Palestinians and convince them to accept the UNSC resolutions 242 and 338. The US, on the other hand, somehow succeeded in its consultation with the Israeli government, because the Israelis accept the US to be the mediator between themselves and the Palestinians.

Objectively, the Quartet might not have entirely implemented consultation techniques that would bring the Palestinians and the Israelis to reach an agreement that would take a place without any reservation. The reason is that certain members preferred to deal with one group (the PLO) from the Palestinian side and consider it as the only representative of the Palestinian people. Consequently, without the

⁹⁶ Merrills, J. C., (1993). *International Dispute Settlement: Negotiation*, second edition, published by *Cambridge University Press*, pg. 3.

involvement of other Palestinian groups, like Hamas and Jihad; the negotiation process is continuing to struggle. Furthermore, the members marginalized the Israeli denial of all of the Quartet's members to be involved in the negotiation process except for the US. Hypothetically, as the first step towards the negotiation peace talks, the Quartet was supposed to meet the essentials and demands of the Palestinians, as well as, the Israelis. Occasionally, the Israelis prohibited the proposals obtained to them because they were not ready to transmit its sovereignty over East Jerusalem or any part of it to the Palestinians. The Palestinians, on the other hand, refused the accessible proposals because, as they claimed, because of no clear indication that clarifies the nature of sovereignty over Jerusalem.

Before commencing any negotiation process, few limits should be considered by the negotiators and mediators. The mediator should be neutral, because negotiations will be ineffective if the mediator is biased. Also, the negotiators should have shared interests to fulfill the gap between the conflicted parties. Certainly arguing, the Quartet members attempt to act neutrally in order to success in negotiating with the conflicted parties, the Israelis and the Palestinians. They defined their common shared interests in order to be able to offer consultation and relatively mediate with the parties. Moreover, the Quartet members tried to gain the trust of the Israelis and Palestinians to be credible enough to negotiate with them. Mediators do not agree on how to resolve the issue because they do not have common interests. This, in turn, increases the breach between the conflicting parties.

Neutrality might assist in building trust on the mediators and offer new accesses for them to have more mutable choices and wider alternatives to persuade the conflicted parties. In the Quartet members, unfortunately, this term is rarely implemented. Each

member is biased to one side of the parties. Akram Hanieh explicitly assumed that the Israelis and the Americans attempted to form a legal framework for Jerusalem without counting the Palestinians' attitude. Bernard Mayer contends that neutrality can increase credibility, but at the same time may create mistrust and doubt. "Neutrals may offer one means for creating a safe, flexible, informal, and creative forum for interchange."⁹⁷ On the other hand, neutrality is a crucial state, by which the mediator can affect constructively in the negotiations process.

Thus far, the Quartet's members neglected the crucial prominence of neutrality. United States, in one hand, is pro-Israel and its essential apprehension in the Middle East is security of Israel. Russia, on another hand, is well-thought-out as a pro-Arab for regional interests. For that reason, there is lack of confidence and trust amongst the conflicted parties, the Israelis, the Palestinians and the mediators themselves. Consequently, the gap between mediators and the conflicted parties is flared and the probabilities for interchanging trust and confidence are arguably uncertain.

5.2 Quartet's acceptance by the parties

In order to warrantee the triumph of negotiation process, the conflicted parties should consent the negotiator or the mediator in order to assure the approval of the played roles, and the offered proposals, views and ideas. Trustfully speaking, the Quartet's determinations to be an adequate mediator cannot be neglected. United States, for example, tried to persuade the Palestinians by the role it intends to play to resolve the conflict. US called for a Palestinian statehood and attempted to accomplish this objective. The European Union, similarly, tried to convince the parties and called for the Israelis' and the Palestinians' right to be recognized and secured. The United

⁹⁷ Mayer, Bernard, (2004). *Beyond Neutrality: Confronting the crisis in conflict resolution*, Published by *Jossey-Bass, A Wiley Imprint*, pg. 29

Nations, in addition, adopted many resolutions trying to pledge the rights of both sides. Moreover, Russia attempted to have more sympathetic attitude toward both parties. Russia reformed periodically its Middle East policy in order to conquest the acceptance and satisfaction for both the Palestinians and the Israelis.

Empirically, the Israelis and the Palestinians did not consent the members of the Quartet as mediators. The Israeli government, for example, was and still claiming that United States is the only accepted mediator in the Israeli-Palestinian talks. Israel refused the mediation of the Russia because the Russian actions and policies are unpredictable. For though, Israel did not ever recognize the role played by Russia, nor the unilateral roles played by the European Union and the United Nations, to mediate in the peace talks between Israel and Palestinians. The Palestinians, on the other hand, rejected the mediation of the United States because of the US's primary interest, the Israeli security. Nathaniel Kahler expressly maintained that, "Palestinians are acutely aware that the bombs falling on Gaza, the planes dropping them, and the "Iron Dome" defense system protecting Israeli citizens from Hamas rockets, were all funded by the US. The US is not only complicating its relationship with the PA, but is also refusing to negotiate directly with Hamas."⁹⁸ They regarded United Nations as United States' puppet because it always adopts the resolutions and rules that United States demand. The Palestinians claim that, the real negotiations are not those between the Palestinians, the Israelis and the Quartet, but they are those "between the United States and the Israeli government."⁹⁹ They think that the Quartet should provide new circumstances and a strong international stance in order to have

⁹⁸ Kahler, Nathaniel, (2013, February 6). US Mediation Between Israel and Palestine: Arbitrator or Attorney?, cited in: <http://www.fairobserver.com/article/us-mediation-between-israel-palestine-arbitrator-attorney>

⁹⁹ Barghouti, Iyad, (2011, March 30). Palestinian – Israeli Negotiations: An Objective in Themselves, the international spectator: Italian Journal of International Affairs, *Routledge*

the ability to achieve a serious and concrete solution for the Israeli – Palestinian dispute.

5.3 The Quartet Representative

Tony Blair, the former British Prime Minister, was elected as the Quartet representative. He had been appointed in order to ensure the implementation and achievements of the Quartet goals. He stated that “facilitating change on the ground is a key to providing the most contexts for political negotiations to succeed.” He is working to enhance the economic growth and institutional development to improve the Palestinians’ life in the West Bank and Gaza Strip and ensure the security of both Palestinians and Israelis. The appointment of Tony Blair as a representative of the Quartet might be good choice because, obviously, the representative’s state should not be one of the Quartet members, but unfortunately, Tony Blair is considered the wrong representative to be appointed because of two main reasons: too close relations with United States, and too criticized.

Objectively speaking, Tony Blair’s too close relation with the United States’ presidents might be perceived as to serve the Israeli – Palestinian talks. Yet, these solid relations might also be understood as biased to United States and Israel. However, Tony Blair’s close relation with George W. Bush was especially criticized because of his unpredictable support for President Bush policies, decisions he made, and negligence of the British public opinion. For example, his support for a war against Iraq in 2003, which most of great power states refused to be involved in, covered him with a cloud of doubts, because he introduced doubtful claims about Saddam Hussain, and his owning of mass destruction weapons that threatened international peace and security. Simon Walters wrote that Tony Blair as “the only

Labor leader to have won three successive elections, by rights he should be remembered as the greatest Labor Prime Minister of all time. But ten years after he led the nation into the Iraq War, his legacy is still clouded by doubts.”¹⁰⁰ Moreover, Andrew Gilligan and Nick Collins posted that “... Mr. Blair made clear to Mr. Bush from April 2002 onwards that he was prepared to overthrow Saddam Hussein with or without a UN mandate.”¹⁰¹ These argumentations asserted that Mr. Tony Blair, the representative of the Quartet, had solid and too close relations with the United States. Tony Blair was criticized because of his solid relations with President Bush. Such relations elevated few questions for indicating Tony Blair to be the representative of such a mediator. United States’ decisions equivalent to Israel’s decisions. Therefore and according to the previous views, Mr. Tony Blair should not be appointed as the Quartet’s representative, because this initially would be implicit as he is pro-US and Israel.

If Mr. Blair is pro-US and Israel, this means that the Quartet representative is biased and omitting neutrality terms. Effectively, the Quartet’s representative should be the connection coterie that possesses and ensure the Israelis and Palestinians continuous in communication regardless of their distrust of one another as the core of confidence and reliance. Under these circumstances, despite the representative’s efforts to build a bridge of communication and trust amongst the Israelis and the Palestinians, Mr. Tony Blair has not yet succeed in building the confidence bridge between him, the Israelis and the Palestinians.

¹⁰⁰ As he sweats on Chilcot, question of trust is last thing Blair needs, (2014). Accessed: January 6, available at: <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2516301/As-sweats-Chilcot-question-trust-thing-Blair-needs.html>

¹⁰¹ Iraq War: timeline of Tony Blair's role, (2014). Accessed: January 6, available at: <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/politics/tony-blair/8272699/Iraq-War-timeline-of-Tony-Blairs-role.html>

5.4 The Quartet's formation

The Quartet formation was a significant step in the history of the Israeli – Palestinian negotiation process. The formation was specialized to resolve the Israeli – Palestinian conflict. There are many experts and scholars claimed concerning this point. For instance, Abdul Sattar Qasim pessimistically argued that “The international Quartet is composed of the US, UN, Russia and the EU, but actually, it is composed of the US and Israel. The roles of the UN, Russia and EU are marginal and ineffective. The Arab-Israeli conflict is still monopolized by Israel and the US; and both are unwilling to leave space for others to be effective. The EU and the UN are too weak to play a major role. Russia is not interested so far, particularly; when the Palestinians chose to support the US monopoly. Generally, the Quartet is nominal and does not have an actual value; so far, there is no mediation in resolving the conflict.”¹⁰² Objectively speaking, the United States is the most active actor, fertile and noticeable member of the Quartet in the negotiation peace talks, but this does not mean that the other members do not have any role played in resolving this dispute. I think that the other members' role cannot be compared to the United States' role. Yet, without the participation of the United Nations as a member of the Quartet, the resolutions, which compel the conflicted parties to implement international law and facilitate the negotiations between them, would not be authoritatively adopted. Moreover, if Russia was not one of the Quartet members, the Palestinians would not accept to negotiate with the Israeli government under the UNSC resolutions 242 and 338.

¹⁰² Qasim, Abdul Sattar, (2013, January 16). a Palestinian Associated Professor at An-Najah National University in Nablus, at 14:27 P.M

Therefore, even if the Quartet is ineffective mediator in the Israelis – Palestinians negotiations but it is always imperative to have a channel of communication between the conflicted parties. This prerogative was uttered by Umut Uzer, who argued that “I do not particularly think that the Quartet is very effective; but it is always good to have channels open for negotiations. The most effective country is the US, as I have mentioned before. The Quartet is a welcome addition to peaceful efforts but the positions of Palestinians and Israelis are so divergent; that it is very difficult to find common ground.”¹⁰³ Nimrod Goren claimed that “I think that the Quarter has, by definition, a limited role in the current negotiations. The process, as previous ones, is dominated by the US. Other actors, like the EU, are also searching for a significant role to play. The Quartet is dealing with an economic initiative for the Palestinians. This can be an important component, but it should be made clear that the progress on economy does not replace progress on the political issues.”¹⁰⁴ It is true that the US as a member of the Quartet effort to bring the Israelis and the Palestinians to the negotiation table and resolve the issue. In fact, United States position as a pro-Israel is affecting negatively in the multilateral role of the Quartet and on the decisions that should have been taken neutrally without siding any conflicting party. The United States is one of the powerful sides in the Quartet and its support for Israel imbalanced the real role of the Quartet and marginalized the other players’ policies and decisions. Abdul Sattar argued that “I say that its role is marginal, because in the Middle East there are changes; among of which the growing strength of the Islamic organizations, the growing power of Iran, the spirit of change in the Arab countries. These things are major concern for the Americans, the Europeans and the Russians. They are thinking of the changes that might emerge and they do not care about the

¹⁰³ Uzer, Umut, (2013, January 14). An interview, a Turkish Assistant Professor at the Department of Humanities and Social Science, at Istanbul Technical University, at 12:18 P.M

¹⁰⁴ Goren, Nimrod, (2013, December). An interview, an Adjunct Professor for Middle Eastern Studies and the founder and chair of Mitvim-the Israeli institute for regional Foreign policies

Quartet. The US and Israel dominate the Quartet. The Quartet might become meaningful only if the Arabs and the Palestinians in particular became stronger. The weakness of the Arab is a major factor in deeming the Quartet ineffective.”¹⁰⁵ Uzer, in another point of view, saw that “The Middle East Quartet tries to balance unilateralism with multilateralism; that is between strong states US, Russia, EU and the UN. The key actor in my mind for the resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian is the US. It needs to be fully committed with all its resources and will for solving the dispute. But Obama has been less reluctant than say Clinton on this issue. Many Israelis see him as pro-Arab, which is not true, but he wants to have a more balanced approach to the conflict. The Quartet is a multilateral platform but the strongest party in it is the US. But, it is still a multilateral institution. Having said that, as the strongest party in the Quartet it might also be a welcome cover for its own policies. Needless to say, the unilateralism of the Bush era was despised throughout the world. That is why the US sometimes pretends to use multilateral approaches. But we cannot assume that the EU or Russia will simply follow US instructions.”¹⁰⁶

There are various differences between the Quartet members in respect to their methods of offering an adequate solution to the conflict, and the denials of some of the Quartet members’ involvement by the conflicted parties. Apparently, the Quartet members are conciliating, but different views on ‘what the new policy meant, or how to put it into effect.’ For example, when Hamas came to power in 2006, the US contended on a ‘no aid/ no contact’ policy, but Russia called for Hamas’s engagement in the negotiations hoping to moderate its position. The EU position is in

¹⁰⁵ Ibid., Note: 86

¹⁰⁶ Ibid., Note: 87

parallel with the US stand and the UN position is closer to the Russia's stance.¹⁰⁷

Thus, I could claim that, the Quartet still attempts to reconcile those differences and reach a compromise that ultimately brings the conflicted parties into a cooperative agreement that I intend on elaborating in the conclusion.

¹⁰⁷ Elgindy, Khaled, (2013, February 28). The Middle East Quartet: A Post-Mortem, Analysis Paper, The Saban Center for Middle East Policy, *Brookings Institutions*

Chapter 6

CONCLUSION

The members of the Middle East Quartet existed in the Middle East for a long time, almost from the beginning of Israeli - Palestinian conflict. They had effort unilaterally to solve the conflict. Each member attempted to employ different policies and benefit from their relations with the both sides, the Israelis and the Palestinians, in order to resolve the conflict. Yet, the Palestinians and Israelis rejected those attempts, because none of them was ready to waive their demands and initiate real negotiations. The nonfulfillment of unilateralism led the Quartet members determined the practice of multilateral actions to solve this dispute, but, the Israelis and the Palestinians rejected the attempts. Clearly, the presence of the Quartet in the most conflicted region of the Middle East is questionable. In fact, the Quartet presence in the region might be consequential for administrating the situation and assuring the continuation of talks between the Israelis and the Palestinians, but at the same time, the Quartet made unobserved differences. The reason is simple. There are those Palestinians who disregard peaceful means to solve their case with the Israelis. So, I think that the Quartet was supposed to understand the personalities of those whom refuse the peaceful solution and meet their demands in order to be able to convince them to accept solving the conflict according to the Quartet's policy.

The Quartet has been seen as an ineffective player and this assumption is associated with Nathalie Tocci analysis of the Palestinian – Israeli conflict in her work. For instance, since the Quartet’s formation, many conflicts happened and the Quartet could not avoid any of them. There were conflicts on 2008 and 2012.¹⁰⁸ The Quartet’s members succeeded in bringing the conflicted parties to the negotiation table, but there was slight success towards more of a concrete and actual peaceful means implemented until today. Furthermore, the Quartet attribution to persuade the Israelis and the Palestinians to ensure launching effective negotiations still have more capacity to advance for further progress. Perceptibly, the Israeli government and the Palestinian Authority continue to face conflict of interests. Throughout my researches and readings, it comes to my understanding that the USA is the most fertile, effective and close member of the Quartet to the negotiation talks between the Israelis and the Palestinians. Moreover, the Quartet’s intention, as I had cited in the goals of the Quartet section, was to induce the conflicted parties, the Israelis and the Palestinians, to accomplish ceasefire and to pledge actual negotiations that would ultimately help both sides to recognize one another.

The four members, the US, Russia, the UN and the EU, had formed the Quartet in the purpose of performing multilaterally in order to secure the region and to resolve the dispute. Visibly, the problem is that there are beliefs that even if the conflict had been resolved, guaranteed security is another barrier and remains questionable. The Israelis and the Palestinians had always have mistrust each other; hence, there would be lack of confidence between both actors prolonged in decades of struggling. Abdul

¹⁰⁸ The Israeli – Palestinian conflict, (2012, December 12), “ Hamas unilaterally called off a six-month truce with Israel in December 2008 and stepped up rocket attacks, citing Israeli raids and the continuing blockade of the enclave... In November 2012, Israel launched an operation that began with the killing of Hamas's military chief Ahmed Al-Jaabari in a precision air strike on Nov. 14. ;It said the attack was in response to escalating missile strikes from Gaza. The following day two rockets from Gaza targeted Tel Aviv”, Read more at: <http://www.trust.org/spotlight/Israeli-Palestinian-conflict/?source=jtRelatedSpotlight>, Accessed: 9th June 2014

Sattar insisted that, “the Quartet is not playing a role in establishing security in the region”.¹⁰⁹ In his views, neither the unilateral actions of the members affected toward a real step in the negotiation process, nor the multilateral actions served the negotiation talks to solve the conflict. In my views, unilateral actions were more effective in the sense that the resolutions 242 and 338 of the UNSC gained more support by the administration of the Palestinian authority to further peace talks at that time until this very moment.

Palestinians rejected United States as a broker between them and Israel, for the United States’ interest in assuring the security of Israel as the ultimate priority. Rashid Khalidi, a previous adviser to the Palestinian negotiators, argued, “In fact the US hasn’t been an honest broker. When I was adviser to the Palestinian negotiators from 1991 to 1993, we saw multiple instances of the US supposedly mediating but in fact being even less forthcoming than the Israelis were themselves. It was less willing to take certain daring moves than the Israelis were at certain points.”¹¹⁰

Therefore, I can conclude that both conflicting parties have different positions of how they perceive the Quartet as effective, efficient, and justiciable or ineffectual and fall short of the Palestinians expectations as they argue that the Quartet failed to be a real mediator between them and the Israelis. Nonetheless, the Quartet is still attempting to succeed in the negotiations and bring peace in the region – the effort, which I cannot neglect. However, this gives birth to another question: Does the Quartet potentially effort to improve its actions and effectively play tangible role to achieve success throughout the negotiations? Nimrod responded to this question by

¹⁰⁹ Qasim, Abdul Sattar, (2013, January 16). An interview, a Palestinian Associated Professor, An-Najah National University in Nablus, , at 14:27 P.M

¹¹⁰ US mediation made Israeli-Palestinian problem even worse, (2013, April 29). <http://rt.com/op-edge/us-mediation-israeli-palestinian-problem-572/>

claiming, “The conflict can be addressed by making clear that this round of negotiations is not the last opportunity to achieve the two state solutions; supporting Palestinian reconciliation in order to have one government for Israel to negotiate with. Moreover, which will be able to implement a final status deal, when reached, to develop an international incentive package for Israelis and Palestinians that will help convince in the benefit of reaching peace. These challenges can be addressed, but they require some policy modifications that will not be easy to make in the coming future.”¹¹¹ The Palestinian Left Party responds to this question by stating that ‘the Quartet needs a lot of time to improve and have a significant influence in this dispute, because of the partition and one-sided support in the mediation process, as well as, the disability to force the conflicted parties to implement and obey the rules.’

This conflict may not be resolved according to the Quartet’s roadmap because the Quartet members do not take a stand on how they will act if Israelis withdraw from West bank and East Jerusalem. In other words, they did not clarify what will happen subsequently for the Israeli people, who are already living in these areas, if the Israeli government accepts the cease – fire agreement and withdrawal from those areas. Emanuel Alder also stressed that “the demand for a cessation of settlements’ construction will have no impact on the political process as long as the United States and its partners in the Quartet are not telling the Israeli and Palestinian publics what will happen with the Israelis who already live in the West Bank and East Jerusalem.”¹¹² Thus, the Quartet members need to have a plan on how to proceed, if the conflicting parties implement the Quartet’s proposals. Moreover, there are many circumstances affected negatively on the negotiation process. Evidently, any current

¹¹¹ Ibid., Note: 88

¹¹² Adler, Emanuel, (2013). *Israel in the World: Legitimacy and Exceptionalism*, Routledge, by Taylor and Francis books

events confronted the negotiated parties and the Quartet's members themselves influence in the Israeli – Palestinian negotiation process. Heretofore, the Ukrainian crisis, which Russia is involved in, influenced gravely in the Israeli – Palestinian talks. This crisis instigated clashes between the members of the Quartet. Currently, United States approaches Russia that, if Russia did not effort to resolve the Ukrainian crisis by peaceful means, there would not be any chances for a diplomatic solution. Moreover, the European Union menaces that if Russia continues escalating the situation in Southern Ukraine; the EU will prohibit travelling, freeze assets, and revoke the European – Russian Summit. United Nations General Assembly, in another reaction to Russian actions in Ukraine, affirms that annexing Ukraine's Southern autonomous republic of Crimea is illegal because Russia is violating the Ukrainian government sovereignty. All of these clashes among the Quartet's members incite the Israeli – Palestinian negotiations almost to collapse.

On the other hand and more objectively, despite all the clashes ensued and still take place among the Quartet's members and influence adversely in the negotiation talks, the Quartet still effort to assure the negotiation's constant between the Israelis and the Palestinians. John Kerry, United States Secretary of State, visited the Middle East twice recently in order to warrant the continuous of talks between the two sides. Farther, the Secretary General of United Nations, Ban Ki Moon, expresses the UN grave apprehensions of the exclusive challenging situation in the Middle East, expressly that of the Palestinian administrative detainees in the Israeli Jail. He calls

the Israeli government to accuse these prisoners, if there are any indictments against them, or to release them as soon as possible without any delay.¹¹³

The argumentations induce another question: Does the Quartet really have the power and authority to oblige the Israelis and Palestinians to implement the adopted resolutions since 1948 until today? Lately in December 2013, Robert Kerry, the Special Coordinator of the Security Council, stated that 2014 might be a real step toward comprehensive settlement between the Israelis and Palestinians by which they can coexist in “peace, security and mutual recognition of each other's legitimate rights. If both parties, with continued effective support by the international community, take the bold steps needed to see through what they have started this year, we will reach in 2014 a moment of truth regarding a two-State solution ...”¹¹⁴ On 29th December 2013, Israel released 26 Palestinian prisoners by the “mediation of United States, as BBC news reported”. However, US’s intention to guarantee the continuation of the negotiations might have different purposes, but do these purposes help the negotiations between the Israelis and Palestinians reach an efficient agreement?. The answer is quiet argumentative and multi-dimensional, in the sense that the United States is perceived as unconventional mediator by the Palestinians, claiming, John Kerry’s visit to Middle East and precisely Israel’s visit on different occasions without passing to the Palestinian side is not convenient , this step is deliberated as an inconsistent American attitude. Even if, the American perseverance was to assure the continuous of the negotiations, yet this step verified that US’s most concern is not in both sides’ interests, but only one – which might and might not be an accurate claim. Therefore, it is unlikely to find an adequate answer

¹¹³ Ban concerned at reports of worsening health of Palestinian detainees on hunger strike, (2014). Accessed: June 10, <http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=47979#.U5iAdHbm4IQ>

¹¹⁴ With bold steps, 2014 could be 'moment of truth' for Middle East peace – UN envoy, (2013). Accessed: December 21, <http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=46754&Cr=palestin&Cr1=#.UsJC89JdVtr>

of whether the American efforts will assist in reaching an efficient settlement in the short run accepted by both sides, the Palestinians and the Israelis. However, I can conclude these arguments by assuming that, the Quartet's experience of multilateralism has brought the concept of mediation and negotiation into new context. The Quartet's experience is a new form that contains practice of both mediation and good office. Since Mr. Tony Blair has gotten involved in the Quartet's peace building process, the Israeli Prime Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu and the Palestinian President, Mahmoud Abbas started negotiating. On the other hand, the other representatives of the Quartet are playing the role of good offices trying to settle the Israeli – Palestinian dispute. Thus, the uniqueness of the Quartet is that its members do not only mediate but also utilize good offices as a peaceful means of settling regional disputes.

Currently, the situations between the conflicting parties are continuing to escalate, and it seems as if rocket attacks will go on for some more time. The Egyptian Truce Initiative to stop the violence and the bombing was rejected by the Palestinians and the Israelis – simply, it failed to halt the exchanged rocket attacks between them. Actually, this initiative was supposed to start working according to the truce on 8th July 2014.¹¹⁵ Israeli government approved it, but Hamas rejected it because they argued that the terms did not present any concerns regarding the economic blockade over Gaza. The Quartet members are trying to persuade the Palestinians and the Israelis to put an end to the ongoing hostilities. “Yet, the lack of pressure from a third party, US and other Quartet members, had not driven any peaceful initiative to be vigorously implemented and lead the Israelis and the Palestinians toward real

¹¹⁵ Hamas rejects Egyptian initiative for truce with Israel, (2014), Accessed: 18th July, cited in: <http://www.turkishweekly.net/news/169163/hamas-rejects-egyptian-initiative-for-truce-with-israel.html>

negotiations.”¹¹⁶ Thus, I would like to add that the United States and the other Quartet members should put more pressure on both sides. Monitoring the dispute and administrating it have insufficient results in the way the Israelis and the Palestinians are implementing the roadmap.

According to the surveys conducted in 2007 ‘52% of the Israelis supported the idea of resolving their conflict peacefully, and 62% of the Palestinian support the idea of solving their issue with the Israelis by the use of peaceful means.’¹¹⁷ Therefore, the Quartet members should implement the integrative approach of negotiation in order to achieve win – win gains for both parties. Therefore, the Quartet should put pressure on the Israelis and the Palestinians to alter the way they perceive each other. Saleem Ali stresses that, “peace - building is a generational struggle and a responsibility that incrementally falls on us all.”¹¹⁸ The Israeli – Palestinian Confederation (IPC) remains to be in process, in order to perception of citizens. In other words, a cognitive change is necessary. Instead of trying to resolve the issue in the short term, the Quartet should try to play the role of good offices. Key actors should not expect the issue to be resolved immediately, because, the cognition of citizens should change first. Channels such as media may be utilized to produce such a change. Discourse used by newspapers negatively affects the peace process. For instance, terms such as ‘socioeconomic protests’ for their terrorist actions should not be used. If the Quartet succeed in persuading the conflicting parties to increase confidence - building measures and, in turn, convince them to cooperate then the

¹¹⁶ Kibble, David G., (2010, February 10). Are Israel and Palestine Ready for Peace?, *Peace review: A Journal of Social Justice*, Routledge

¹¹⁷ Ibid. Note, No. 112

¹¹⁸ Ali, Saleem, (2012, October 4). A Pragmatic Way to Resolve the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, University of Queensland, Australia, cited in: <http://newswatch.nationalgeographic.com/2012/10/04/israeli-palestinian-conflict/>

Quartet would be able to go further in the process and move forward to the second phase of the roadmap.

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