

**Interventionism-Locating the Lines between
Humanitarian Ideals and States' Realistic National
Interests: A Case Study of the Libya and Syria Crisis
between 2010 and 2012.**

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Submitted to the
Institute of Graduate Studies and Research
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Degree of

Master of Arts
in
International Relations

Eastern Mediterranean University
July 2015
Gazimağusa, North Cyprus

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ABSTRACT

This research examines the question of interventionism from the perspective of realism vs. idealism. Realism is defined in relationship to states' national interests whereas idealism is defined in relation to the UN's Responsibility to Protect doctrine—a doctrine heavily influenced by Western rhetoric over the past decade. By addressing the question of interventionism from this standpoint, by way of a case study of Libya and Syria, a picture of the realistic implications of “humanitarian intervention” becomes clear. Idealistically, humanitarian interventionism is a process that stops atrocities and establishes peace and prosperity. Realistically, interventionism allows Western businesses to reap the spoils of destabilization—as has been seen in Libya with the Libyan oil fields being claimed by Western oil companies—and as is being seen in Syria, with the threat of invasion bound to have detrimental effects on the construction of a new pipeline that bypasses the Turkey-Israel pipeline. Syria also presents itself as the last bastion for Russian naval presence in the Mediterranean, a role that Russia is not likely to see Syria yield up, and which poses significant problems to the West as it readies itself for a possible strike on Syria. This research seeks answers to question of what the Western states' national interests in humanitarian intervention in Libya and Syria? It examines the need for intervention, discusses the evidence of atrocities, and concludes that even when evidence is apparent there is no consistency in terms of Western response. Only when Western powers see an opportunity to secure their national self-interests does intervention become an imperative. This study concludes that humanitarian intervention is at best an idealistic notion that the UN supports and at worst it is an

oxymoron, a glossy façade that allows Western powers to raid countries from which it has something to gain.

Keywords: Interventionism, Syria, Libya, International Law, National Interest, Humanitarian ideals.

ÖZ

Bu araştırma müdahalecilik sorusunu realizm ve idealizm ideolojilerini karşılaştırarak incelemektedir. Realizm, ülkelerin kendi çıkarları ile ilişkilendirebilirken, idealizm, geçmiş yüzyıllarda Batı sözbiliminden oldukça etkilenmiş BM'in 'koruma sorumluluğu' mezhebi ile tanımlanır. Libya ve Suriye örnekleriyle bu bakış açısından müdahalecilik sorusunu ele alarak, insancıl müdahale kavramının gerçekçi etkileri netleşmektedir. İdealistik olarak, insancıl müdahalecilik, vahşeti durdurma ve, barış ve refahı sağlama sürecidir. Realistik olarak da, daha önce Libya'nın başına gelen, Libya petrol sahalarının Batı petrol şirketleri tarafından talep edilmesi gibi müdahalecilik batı işletmelerinin istikrarsızlaştırma ganimetini biçmesine izin verir. Şu anda da Suriye'de görüldüğü gibi işgal tehdidi nedeni ile Türkiye-İsrail boru hattının yanından geçen yeni bir boru hattı inşası üzerindeki zararlı etkileri de buna bir örnektir. Suriye, aynı zamanda da, Rusya'nın Akdeniz'deki varlığının son kalesi olmasından dolayı, Rusya'nın Suriye'nin teslim edildiğini görmek istememesi, Suriye'ye saldırı yapmaya hazırlanan Batı'ya ciddi problemler oluşturmaktadır. Bu araştırma Batı ülkelerinin Libya ve Suriye'de ki insancıl müdahalelerin üzerindeki çıkarların nedenlerini sorgulamaktadır. Müdahale gereksinimini incelemekte, vahşet delillerini tartışmakta ve Batı tepkilerinin tutarsız olması kanaatine varmaktadır. Batı güçleri sadece kendi çıkarlarını koruma altına almak için bir fırsat gördükleri zaman müdahale, zorunluluk haline gelmektedir. Bu araştırma insancıl müdahalenin iyi yönden bakıldığı zaman, BM'in desteklediği idealistik bir kavram, kötü yönden bakıldığı zaman ise bir oximoron; Batı güçlerinin çıkarı olduğu ülkelere baskın yapmasına izin veren sahte bir cephe'dir.

Anahtar Kelimeler : M¼dahalecilik Suriye Libya Uluslararası Hukuk Ulusal
Çıkarlar İnsancıl idealler

DEDICATION

To My Family,

ACKNOWLEDGMENT

All thanks to almighty God for His help from ages past, may He alone be praised.

My sincere appreciation goes to my amiable supervisor Asst. Prof. Dr. John Turner, for his support, positive drilling, encouragement, productive criticism and suggestions in the course of this research, it is a rare privileged to have worked with you.

My undiluted appreciation goes to my immediate family, Bishop and Mrs. J. Olu Akinola, Mr. and Mrs. Udoh, Mr. and Mrs. Akinola, that gave me the opportunity to travel all the way from Nigeria and supported me in all ramifications. This is dedicated to you.

To my loved ones, Samantha Chido, Ayomide Baderinwa, Oluwafisayo Ajayi, Damilola Fagbamiye, Omolara, Dammy Olu, Isioma, Blessing, Shola, Chukwuma, Seyi, Ayodele, Phibean, Temidayo, Oluwatosin, Abdulwasiu, and others too numerous to mention, who believe in me and ceaselessly challenged me to work very hard, am indeed grateful.

To Olabola, Adebanke who were also always there just at nick of times, to provide more academic intellect and went through the rigours of editing, I owe you lots. Gracias!

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT.....	iii
ÖZ.....	v
DEDICATION.....	vii
ACKNOWLEDGMENT.....	viii
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS.....	xi
1 INTRODUCTION.....	1
1.1 Background to the Study.....	6
1.2 Statement of Problem.....	9
1.3 Research Questions.....	11
1.4 Significance of the Study.....	12
1.5 Methodology.....	12
1.6 Definition of Terms.....	13
1.7 Limitations of the Study.....	21
1.8 Assumptions.....	22
1.9 Organization of the Study.....	22
Conclusion.....	23
2 REVIEW OF SELECTED LITERATURE.....	24
2.1 Overview of the Research.....	24
2.2 Relevance of Interventionism.....	32
2.3 Interventionism and this Study's Research Questions.....	35
2.4 Methodological Approach to Selection of Literature.....	42
2.5 Data Analysis: Case Study.....	43
2.6 Conclusion.....	45

3 HISTORICAL BACKGROUND TO LIBYA AND SYRIA CRISIS	47
3.1 Background to the Case Studies.....	45
3.2 Libya	46
3.3 Syria	51
4 ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS	59
4.1 Analysis of Case Studies.....	59
4.2 Interventionism in Libya Crisis	60
4.3 Interventionism in Syria Crisis	64
5 CONCLUSION.....	72
REFERENCES	74

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ISIS	Islamic State of Iraq and Syria
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NTC	National Transition Council
PNAC	Project for the New American Century
RT	Russia Today
R2P	Responsibility to Protect
UN	United Nations
US	United States
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
WMD	Weapons of Mass Destruction

Chapter 1

INTRODUCTION

The NATO-led military intervention in Libya in 2011 resulted in the overthrow of the Libyan government and the death of Muammar Gaddafi. Since then, reports of Libya becoming the “main base for (Al-Qaeda) Jihadist (now largely allied with ISIS) in the Maghreb” (Violent Chaos, 2013) and the rising influence of the Muslim Brotherhood in the region (Heneghan T, 2013) serve as counterpoints to Clark’s (Clark D, 2011) assertion that the “Libyan intervention was a success.” Thus, the terms of “success” are enough to cause hot debate between interventionists and anti-interventionists. Yet that debate is often framed by the assumption that countries like Libya are in need of humanitarian aid in the first place and that member countries of NATO can answer that need (Chesterman, 2011).

Over the past 300 years humanitarian interventions have not had a consistent enough basis to determine a framework in international law (Evans, 2008). The question remains to be asked about the essence of the humanitarian intervention as well as its aims and objectives. This is due to the fact that every state and every contextual situation is different; it is likely that every aim will be different. A general understanding of the objectives of humanitarian interventionism should be clear in a geopolitical landscape filled in recent times with rumors of war and/or intervention. The apparent lack of decisiveness on the part of Western leaders regarding intervention in Syria is not unconnected to unsubstantiated claims about war-time

atrocities committed by the Syrian government, unfavorable public opinion (intervention in Iraq and, more recently, Libya has failed to win the mass of Americans to support another “humanitarian” cause) and the possibility of geopolitical blowback is being trumpeted loudly by the Russian state—Syria’s ally. Thus, anyone in a position to support or condemn a humanitarian intervention in Syria is left first to address cogent issues as to what would be the objective (the positive effects) of the intervention, what would be the possible negative effects, whether the negative effect will “outweigh” the positive and if there is a precedent (legal right) for intervention?

Preventing some from asking the appropriate questions is rhetoric of idealism that gives a gloss to the reality of interventionism. Terms like “success” are flaunted too easily (in the case of Libyan intervention in 2011, for example) when the reality, plain to see, is that humanitarian intervention in Libya has resulted in economic, cultural, and political destabilization in a country that, prior to intervention, ranked among the most productive GDP countries in Africa. The implication here is that depictions of humanitarian intervention are colored by an idealistic narrative when what is needed is a more realistic approach to the question of interventionism.

This study proposes that the popular framework for debating interventionism is flawed by an idealistic approach. It argues that governments like that of the US are, historically speaking, not nearly as idealistic in their reasons for intervention as statesmen like McCain, Kerry and Biden and the popular press make them seem to be. This study asserts that the reality of interventionism is based more on states’ national self-interest than on a desire to administer humanitarian aid (Evans, 2008).

This research approaches the issue of interventionism from a case study perspective. By undertaking a situational context of interventionism in both Libya and Syria, the research is able to observe in a qualitative way the actual reality of interventionism—as it is conceived, developed, administered, and concluded—in the cases of Libya and Syria. The situational context of interventionism is observed by gathering a multitude of perspectives from varying sides of the interventionism/anti-interventionism debate, including that of Western powers (NATO), forces within Libya and Syria, and opposing voices (Russia, China). The research focuses on issues of legality, right, will, intent, consequence, and achievement in order to determine the reality of interventionism.

The relevance of this study should readily be apparent to everyone from investors on Wall Street to humanitarian watchdog groups. On 27 August 2013, both the Nasdaq and the DOW dropped significantly as news of US intervention in Syria spread across the Internet (Berman D, 2013). The effect of interventionism is not lost on the financiers of the world—and it is surely felt by all members of society, whether in fluctuating prices of oil, gold, or non-essentials, or in the cost of lives, time, material, and/or the mental/social/spiritual stability of members of all societies. This study is also timely and relevant. The Benghazi assault in 2012 brought the issue of the consequences of interventionism to the forefront in both popular and alternative media (Chivvis C, 2012). The current geopolitical climate surrounding Syria is bringing the issue of interventionism to the forefront once more. The politics of intervention raises questions regarding the “obligation” of offering humanitarian aid to countries—and it also raises issues regarding international law, the possibility of geopolitical backlash, and the effectiveness of such military interventions. As NATO countries are embarking on different measures towards military strikes on Syria,

voters and representatives in those countries should be aware of the moral hazard, the geopolitical hazard, and the economic hazard of engaging in foreign intervention. When the question of interventionism is approached realistically rather than idealistically, a new picture emerges—one that is characterized by a policy of national self-interest on the part of the intervening countries. The questions remain to be addressed on what these intervening countries stand to gain from humanitarian intervention and how their national interest served.

Historically speaking, the policy of Western interventionism has been likened by Maj. Gen. Smedley Butler to racketeering. Upon his retirement after 33 years in the Marine Corps, Butler toured the US giving a speech regarding the state of American foreign policy and the military's role in that policy. Butler's assessment of foreign intervention is worth quoting in full, but a brief quote about his role in active duty service will suffice to make the point: "I spent most of my time being a high class muscle-man for Big Business, for Wall Street and for the Bankers. In short, I was a racketeer, a gangster for capitalism" (Butler, 1933). Butler's words, as colorful as they are, impressed many at the time, but they have since failed to make a significant impression on American foreign policy. That policy, rather, has continued to be formulated by men Butler describes as "'finger men' to point out enemies, ... 'muscle men' to destroy enemies, ... 'brain men' to plan war preparations, and a 'Big Boss' Super-Nationalistic-Capitalism" (Butler, 1933). Scott (Scott, 2007) has identified them as the insider members of what he calls "deep politics"—the inner core of government, the layers of which are so complex that it is difficult to factually discern who is doing what, why, and how. The "deep politics" of Western governments only serves to cloud the issue of humanitarian interventionism. Dispelling that cloud is imperative to this study.

Researchers who are aware of Butler's assertions and the findings of the Nye Committee upon which they were partly based have taken issues with the modern-day system of politics (Stone & Kuznick, 2012), disputing its worth, its transparency, and its "humanitarian" objectives. Others who reject Butler's characterization of interventionism see NATO countries' interventions as necessary maneuvers in a world slowly but surely progressing towards a global embracement of democratic ideals (Bellamy, 2010).

Thus, implicit in the politics of intervention is the dispute between two worldviews, one which is fundamentally rooted in realism and the other which is fundamentally rooted in idealism. The realistic view tends to promote a foreign policy guided by national interests. The idealistic view tends to promote a foreign policy guided by a vision of international democracy and liberal culture/values. The former suggests a Machiavellian outlook. The latter suggests a Progressivist outlook. In the politics of intervention, while there may appear to be a Progressive, idealistic reason for military intervention in countries like Libya and Syria, there are always those who point towards a more realistic, Machiavellian interpretation of such acts of military intervention.

This research will approach the problem of realism vs. idealism in the question of interventionism by adopting a qualitative case study analysis. It will assess whether military interventions promote humanitarianism or whether they promote states' national interests. The recent interventions in Libya and Syria will be used as case studies.

What exactly does humanitarian interventionism intend to achieve? What have been the results in Libya? How does it find a context in today's Syrian affair? These questions serve as the framework for the focus of this study.

1.1 Background to the Study

The current crisis in Syria is presented to Western readers by Western media in dramatic fashion. The Syrian government of Bashar al-Assad is said to be using chemical weapons against his own people, resulting in thousands dead. This accusation has been trumpeted by several statesmen including US Secretary of State John Kerry, who called the use of such weapons against women and children “a moral obscenity,” denounced the Syrian government’s attempts to “cover up” the deed, and highlighted the purity of the American government’s interventionist intentions; again, to achieve a full sense of the situation, it is helpful to quote Kerry: “Our sense of basic humanity is offended not only by this cowardly crime but also by the cynical attempt to cover it up. At every turn, the Syrian regime has failed to cooperate with the UN investigation, using it only to stall and to stomp the important effort to bring to light what happened in Damascus in the dead of night” (Kerry, 2013).

Kerry’s rhetoric offers a good example of the way in which idealism and interventionism are intertwined at the government level. Kerry references “our basic humanity,” the “cowardly crime” of Syrian leaders, a lack of transparency on Syria’s part—the “cover up”—the failure of Syria to cooperate with UN officials, the overall criminal and evil nature of the Syrian regime, which appears to lurk about gassing the populace in the “dead of the night.” Kerry’s rhetoric is just as colorful as Butler’s was some 80 years ago. Yet the aim is just the opposite. Kerry’s intentions are

clear—to incite outrage among the voting public and to garner support for intervention. What are less clear are the facts upon which Kerry bases his accusations.

Assad, for instance, denies using chemical weapons and blames the rebels for any and all gas attacks. He describes the rebels, moreover, as outsiders—terrorists who have infiltrated his nation—not Syrian citizens: “The majority of those we are fighting are infidels (Takfiris), who adopt the al-Qaeda doctrine, in addition to a small number of outlaws...” (Assad, 2013).

It would be reasonable, under UN guidance, to expect that a disinterested third party “intervene” between the Western leaders, apparently enthusiastic for a military strike on Syria, and the Syrian leaders, apparently defensive in their denial of the accusations made against them. This is where the UN investigators come into the picture—but one must be naïve to imagine that Western powers are beholden to the UN. After all, hours after UN investigators leave Syria to test the samples taken from the site of the “attack,” Western warships are ready to launch a missile-strike as though the verdict were already decided and the investigation merely a formal and incidental exercise.

At the UN General Assembly in March 2005, in the 59th session and the follow-up to the Millennium Summit, the UN issued an agenda as idealistic and forward-looking in tone as any of the Western leaders’ rhetoric issued during the politicized explanations of why Westerners should support intervention in the Middle East. The difference exists in the objective the UN looks to establish peace and prosperity whereas the West’s motives (if one judges by history) are less noble—or at least less

certain. Indeed, the UN Charter is invoked and the objective of the Summit taken from this invocation—the objective of the UN being to “serve” the “needs” of “peoples everywhere” (UN 2005b, 2005).

The UN calls for a “global intergovernmental institution” that can ensure collective action towards the serving of the needs of peoples everywhere, suggesting that one more institution or organization—in short, more oversight—or, the right individuals given the right amount of authority—is all that separates the nations of the world from their goal of peace and prosperity. The UN’s framework for action focuses on the need for transparency, “accountable systems of government, grounded in the rule of law” and a “dynamic” private sector which can ensure economic stability and growth (UN 2005b, 2005). Without commitment from all member states to this framework, it is a supposition that the ideals of the Summit cannot be attained.

The issue of transparency is the first stumbling block. Recent events have raised the specter of totalitarianism in the West. The Snowden documents which highlight an NSA policy of spying on American citizens have reminded Westerners of the threat of over-reach on the part of Western government. Transparency has been an issue in Western politics since as long as subterfuge has existed. Moreover, establishing a system of transparency in a democratic Republic in which administrations are in a constant state of flux every 4-8 years faces severe limitations. The replacement of one administration with another, possibly as many times as thrice in one decade, is comparable to a major shake-up in any serious corporation. What sort of consumer/investor confidence could so many shake-ups in so short amount of time inspire? Not much—yet the UN Summit report does not address this reality. It is too invested in a narrative of idealism.

The reality of humanitarian intervention paints a much bleaker picture than the one offered by the UN. Western rhetoric is dominated by cynicism and hostility as political leaders view Assad's regime as guilty in the extreme, and the words they use to justify military intervention use the idealistic terms of the UN's report in order to appeal to humanitarian principles. The idealistic terms invoked by the West, however, are not the positive terms used by the UN—those of “cooperation” and “respect”—but rather the negative terms, “atrocities,” “terrorism”—things which must be stopped, and which the West aggressively desires to stop. At least, it desires to stop them in Syria—for now—or so it says.

1.2 Statement of Problem

The problem addressed in this study is the role of the great Western Powers' national interest in foreign interventions. It adopts a realist point of view in challenging the idealistic perspective which asserts that the West (NATO) has a duty and a right to interfere in nations where governments exercise inhumane dictatorships. If indeed, NATO is primarily concerned with curbing mass killings, unlawful immigration, genocide, abuses against human and women's rights, etc.—why has it done so little in regions like Darfur—and why does it support the erection of one nation (Israel) while causing the displacement of another (Arab)? Studies have shown that the principal Western Powers have a political, geopolitical, and economical reason for intervening or not intervening in foreign affairs (Perkins 2004; Scott 2007; Stone, Kuznick 2012). These studies serve as the foundation for this present analysis.

Other studies have shown that foreign military intervention can easily be conducted even if they are in violation of the United Nations charter and lack authorization of the Security Council (Cassese, 1999). This shows that countries can and do act on

their own in engaging in interventionism. The motives for doing so are what this study plans to investigate.

A number of Western countries support humanitarian interventionism but they have not yet intervened in Syria. The reality behind humanitarian interventionism is that there are clear political, geopolitical, and economic consequences to every foreign intervention. Intervention is not merely a humanitarian cause but rather a highly explosive affair that can cripple countries' infrastructures and have global ramifications in terms of economic trade, political discourse, and geopolitical variables. There are states' national interests to be considered, which dictate against humanitarian intervention.

First, there is political interest to be considered. More importantly to the West is Israel's position in the region as well as the US's concern to secure its borders; Kerry cites the importance of halting Syria's "use" of chemical weapons as an example to the rest of the world; Bachmann, in the 2012 Republican primary debates cited Israel as "our greatest ally" in spite of the fact that the US and Israel have no formal treaty with one another. Yet Israel receives billions of dollars in US foreign aid each year and as Israelis reportedly scramble for gas masks (fearing a chemical assault by Assad on their country), the rhetoric of US politicians grows ever more inflammatory.

Second, there is economical interest where gas and oil fields and pipelines as well as influence in countries' banking affairs are valuable economic variables that play a tremendous part in interventionism (Dawson, 2012). Protecting stability or initiating destabilizing factors in countries are issues of economic interest (Escobar, 2011). The

Central Intelligence Agency has undertaken a considerable number of operations designed to achieve destabilization (Weiner, 2008).

Third, geopolitical interests must be considered as these overlap the economic and political interests but include the operations of international law, topography, geography, history, international alliances, and more.

Fourth, the recently established Responsibility to protect doctrine is an area of interest. For instance, is the doctrine meant only to protect civilians or does it go beyond this and apply to economic or political interests? Does the doctrine apply to geopolitical interests of Western states? Does it invite interpretation?

1.3 Research Questions

This will be a case study based on a qualitative assessment of literature reviews regarding Western interventionism, its history, its facility, and its present relation to Libya and Syria.

1. Why did the NATO states not intervene in Syria until now—even though there has been a strong case for humanitarian intervention (evidence of mass killing, forced immigration, genocide) in the past and why did it easily intervene in Libya.
2. How strong is the evidence for atrocities committed by the Assad regime and how effective was the case for humanitarian (military) intervention in Libya.

Furthermore, this study hopes to answer such questions as what are the common national interests of the Western States—from a historical perspective, a political perspective, a geopolitical perspective, and an economic perspective. An understanding of states' national interests will help to inform readers of how national

interests affect states' policies regarding foreign intervention. An analysis of the tangible effects of their interests on interventionism, if any, may be gleaned from the literature review, as well as the intangible effects.

1.4 Significance of the Study

The potential value of the study is found in the idea that proponents of foreign intervention could benefit from a more realistic interpretation of intervention—one that is not colored by the gloss of idealistic “humanitarian” mission statements. It may be beneficial to the field of political, geopolitical, and economical/financial study. Military intervention has ramifications across a broad swath of society—from financial sectors to socio-political sectors, affecting everyone from members of humanitarian watchdog groups to persons of cultural and/or religious organizations. A realist understanding of interventionism will help many levels of society to discern whether support for such intervention should be given or withheld in the future.

1.5 Methodology

The research design adopted in the research is a case study method with secondary analysis. Hence, the case study method chosen was informed by the need to collect data from the selected countries' on the subject matter. The choice of secondary analysis is to enable the researcher benefit from existing literature on the subject matter. The sources of data were collected through secondary sources. The method of data collection were carried out through collection from books, journals, magazines and newspapers. Others include published and unpublished lectures, conferences and seminar papers, and online sources. The data collected were analysed qualitatively using logical reasoning to arrive at cogent deductions and recommendations and as well the findings of this research were reported descriptively.

1.6 Definition of Terms

The following terms are defined by the researcher except where sources are consulted and citations given.

Humanitarian Aid- This study views humanitarian aid as a material or managerial assistance supplied by outsider parties in response to man-made disasters (governmental tyranny) in foreign countries. Essential to the idea of humanitarian aid is the ability to implement aid and to develop a structure that may be sustained independently of the assistor. Humanitarian aid is not to be considered equivalent to humanitarian occupation or to regime change, overthrow, or regional destabilization. That such effects tend to accompany humanitarian intervention in Libya, for instance, raises the question of whether humanitarian aid is what was delivered.

Idealism- While in realist analyses of international politics internal societal differences are left out, idealist theories of international organization see societies rather than nation-states as the building blocks of the international community, and believe that it is possible for states to find common ground and look beyond self-interested, balance of power politics. Woodrow Wilson's radical idea, the creation of the League of Nations, places him squarely in the normative school of international politics: "normative idealism views international organizations both as the representative of an order of values supported by the societies of their member states and the advocate of the norms which contribute this order" in the international community as a whole (Blanke 2008). This form of Wilsonian idealism has been somewhat tempered by a more contemporary reformulation of idealism, social constructivism.

Idealism connotes a view in which abstract principles, such as humanitarianism, peace, prosperity, etc., are judged to have a weight over practical/sensory conditions. Idealism characterizes the language adopted by the forward-looking UN. It is a language that situates the UN Charter in an attitude of “what-could-be” rather than “what-is”. It relies on the adherence of member states to an ideal, but in effect has no way of ensuring this adherence. It must trust to faith, hope, and charity in a world where such ideals and virtues are by no means exceedingly popular.

Interventionism- The policy of one country intervening in another country’s affairs on the grounds of establishing a new order, whether conducive to peace and prosperity or to states’ own national interests.

Legality- International law is not binding without an international court, and an international court is only as effective as the strength of those who can enforce its decisions. Thus legality is an unclear idea, at least in terms of the focus of this study. For instance, the UK has stated that an attack on Syria would be legal (even without UN authorization) according to humanitarian doctrine (Kat, 2013). The Responsibility to Protect (R2P) doctrine is a 2005 UN initiative which outlines the 3 conditions of legal intervention. Those conditions are:

- A. A state is responsible for protecting its populace from crimes against humanity.
- B. The international community is responsible for helping the state to protect its populace from such crimes.
- C. If the state fails to embrace its responsibility, the international community may intervene by using “coercive measures such as economic sanctions”—

with military intervention being utilized if all other coercive measures fail (Badescu, 2010).

However, R2P is not a law but rather a peremptory norm—though it has been argued that it has a basis in international law (Hehir & Cuncliffe, 2011).

Moreover, the legitimacy of humanitarian intervention at the expense of national sovereignty has been an issue for over a century (Kahler, 2011). The most recent guidance on the issue comes from the UN General Assembly, which passed guidance known as "responsibility to protect". The final arbiter of such intervention under the R2P framework in the UN Security Council, and any nation that signed on to R2P must accept that it may one day be subject to intervention, as such action would be legal if the UNSC approves it.

The R2P mechanism was put into place because of the lack of legal framework justifying humanitarian intervention. An example provided by Chesterman (2011) is that of Kosovo, where most Western leaders danced around calling their actions intervention because they knew to do so would be to straddle ethical and legal lines. He notes that R2P represents not only a mandate to intervene, but creates a moral obligation making it harder to "do the wrong thing, or nothing at all." Pape (2012) argues that the doctrine of intervention has failed in the past specifically because the bar for such intervention was set too high. He points out that by the time evidence of genocide or other war crime has been uncovered, it is too late to stop the killing. R2P is a recognition that the norms surrounding intervention need to change. Where previously a nation's sovereignty was considered nearly sacrosanct, Pape makes the

case that R2P resets the bar for intervention to a level that is too low, but at least it allows for intervention in a situation like Syria, should the UNSC agree.

National Interest- This is a set of political, economic, military, and social goals of a state, which are not based on moral “ideals” and do not depend on the contribution or adherence of other states to an “ideal.” The national interest is that which promotes the objectives of the State; it is inherently self-serving, founded on the principles of Niccolo Machiavelli. The national interest is, very simply, the objectives of a country ranging from the macro goals i.e. economy, military to the micro goals like social use cyber space. National interest is an integral part of international relations as it is a concept based out of the realist school of thought. When dealing with national interest, one has to wonder about the degree to which domestic politics is vital for the comprehension of that country's foreign policy. Domestic politics is not of immense significance; this has been depicted by an eminent assumption related to structural realism, global association. The systemic vigour of the global supremacy division propels a country's foreign policy formulation over the domestic politics, as mentioned by structural realists. Hence, on the basis of this presumption it can be explicated that a foreign policy is influenced by external milieu. An eminent learned personality has mentioned even before the Cold War that realism seems to be the solitary and vital constituent in our logical wallet (Waltz, 1979) for comprehending global politics. However, recent discoveries related to democratic harmony has propelled eminent learned personalities to deduce that domestic politics is a vital constituent in the formulation of a country's foreign policy (Souva, 2005).

The discussion associated to discerning the significance of domestic political constituents on global associations is vital when the focus is to segregate the chief

casual methodologies pertaining to a set of occurrences, discerning the chief inspiration of the political leaders, and precisely scrutinizing calamity negotiation conditions. For example, if structural realism is precise then policy formulators should accentuate competences and equilibrium of influence in the process of negotiation with an opposition. Nonetheless, if domestic political dialogues are more astute and intuitive, then the policy formulators initially require comprehending the domestic condition of the opponent nation and based on that formulate their own foreign policy (Souva, 2005).

Responding to the query associated to the vital nature of domestic politics is exigent for a couple of motives. Foremost what reckons as a domestic political elucidation of foreign policy hinges on an implied distinction to elucidations that are not domestic or political (Fearon, 1998). It is not adequate to explicate that a domestic-level constituent is rationally considerable in explicating that national political elucidations supplant systemic elucidations, while a few systemic elucidations entail domestic-level constituents (Souva, 2005).

Secondly, majority of the investigations has not utilized apposite statistical experimentations for scrutinizing diverse and deviating abstract representations. The customary technique for judging non-experimented representations is to coalesce each and every constituent in to a solitary representation and then determine which of the elucidations are noteworthy. As mentioned by Clarke (2001, 2003) this methodology is an abstract form of judging non-experimented representations and it is unbeneficial to progressing scientific comprehension.

When dealing with the national interest and foreign policy notions, it is first important to know what are the precise stimuli required by the nations from the systemic realist standpoint. The answer is simply – security. Albeit the systemic realism accentuates on nations as prime performers in global politics, the micro foundation of the assumption speculates that any person when encountering an analogous condition will perform in analogous conduct i.e. wherever agents and agencies are conjoined by vigour and opposition as a replacement for influence and regulation (Waltz, 1979). The common insinuations of the above mentioned assumptions of the political leaning activity and politics are atypical in their involvement in the national interest strategies and foreign policy paradigms (Souva, 2005).

The rationales for this dual action towards national interest and foreign policy are: foremost, every person will perform analogous computation concerning the methodology of formulating a national interest policy that complements the foreign policy (Waltz, 1979). Policy location does not instigate from insularity disquiet as far as the national interest policy is concerned. Moreover, computation founded by these stresses can ascertain the formulation of those policies which will be of immense magnitude for a nation, internally and, in the long run, internationally (Waltz, 1979). Secondly, interior squabbling, or political leaning, grants an opportunity to opposing countries a prospect for targeting a nation. Hence, such condition debilitates a country's stance of negotiations with its peers; therefore political figures should not indulge in political leaning when formulating a national interest strategy or a foreign policy.

In an investigation conducted by Gowa (1998), on the implementation of American armed forces in foreign territories, has asserts that a country's status relating to its utilization of armed influence overseas is a vital constituent of its national security. Because status can diminish swiftly, endeavours to manoeuvre the implementation of force overseas for short-run aims can impose hefty long-term costs. Hence, when the subject of national security crops up then there is a phenomenon of, tactical political leaning cessation (Gowa, 1998).

Realism- Realism has dominated international relations since the end of World War II and the beginnings of the Cold War. This view emphasizes the state as the primary actor in the global geopolitical scene. Realists generally have a pessimistic view of human nature, and a conviction that international relations are necessarily conflictual and that international conflicts are ultimately resolved by war. Realists operate with the core assumption that world politics unfolds in a system of international anarchy, that is a system with no overriding authority, no world government. As a result international relations can be defined as a struggle between power maximizing states in an anarchical environment (Morgenthau 2005). For this reason realism is sometimes referred to as the power politics school of thought.

The ideas of realism date as far back as Thucydides whose "History of the Peloponnesian War" is recognized as the first attempt to explore conflict in terms of the dynamics of power politics. In addition to, no universal principals of statecraft exist that are viable and usable for all states. Geography, chronology, and numerous other factors influence statecraft recent discoveries related to democratic harmony has propelled eminent learned personalities to deduce that domestic politics is a vital

constituent in the formulation of a country's foreign policy and are independent of maxims (Carr E. , 2001).

The language utilized by proponents of the national interest, it is a perspective that looks at the “here-and-now” in order to address the question of “what-needs-to-be-done”. In doing so, it does not consider such ideals as “hope” as essential to its outlook. It does not “hope” what one might do, but asserts a vision of what one is “likely” to do based on historical analysis, an understanding of human nature, an understanding of contextual situations, etc. It is diametrically opposed to the perspective of idealism in that it undercuts the possibility of embracing the selfless principles which idealists promote (such as self-sacrifice, hope, charity, etc.) by embracing self-serving principles, which are perceived to benefit the State first and foremost. In realist politics, the State matters first, people matter second (and only matter in so far as they serve the State).

Moreover realists’ school of thought believes that due to globalization the anarchy has been decentralized and the economic system of world is now hegemonic controlled by super powers. They believe that due to inherit selfish nature of states world is more insecure in the case of economic developments thus they believe that the new economic system is only due to globalization so global security is impossible due to globalization. The realist experts major critic is on the rights of individuals as in realist perspective only state is the primary actor in international relations and politics on the other hand globalization focus on the individual security. So realists claim that root of globalization is actually weakening the global security.

Success- Success is a troubling term because it is often used in various ways and takes on varying meanings. Unless the terms of success are clearly outlined, it is useless to say that a mission has been “successful”—for one camp is bound to ask, “Successful in what way?” Spring argued that Operation Iraqi Freedom was a “success” because the “statue of Saddam Hussein” fell, WMDs were “eliminated” (an unsubstantiated claim), “terrorists” were “driven out” (an unsubstantiated claim), and oil fields were secured. Also noted by Spring was the “humanitarian relief” that the operation brought to Iraqis (another unsubstantiated claim) (Spring, 2013). Nonetheless, all of this meant “success”—though the only success that could be substantiated was the securing of oil fields. If the mission of Operation Iraqi Freedom was to secure these fields, then the term “success” would appear to be used appropriately. But the very name of the mission suggested something more idealistic—the installation of peaceful, democratic ideals in Iraq—and this installation are yet to be seen.

Thus, “success” in this study will be used to mean the attainment of real, desired goals, which can be substantiated as a satisfied objective and not as the momentary attainment of an ideal.

1.7 Limitations of the Study

This study is limited in terms of place and scope. It is limited in terms of place, meaning that due to practical constraints, an ideal case study (in which the researcher is able to personally throw himself into different worlds, vis-à-vis Western and Middle Eastern, in order to gain a greater perspective of the problems of interventionism) could not be accomplished. The researcher was unable to travel or visit or speak with significant persons directly, which limited his ability to make

critical phenomenological observations, such as taking into consideration the characters of significant persons like Kerry, Assad, Putin, etc. Such observation would greatly emphasize the validity of a qualitative study, because character analyses have been shown to reveal universal truths regarding effective policy decisions and tactics (Laura, 2011).

1.8 Assumptions

The study assumes that Western foreign policy is steered by a two-fold agenda, best described as “realistic” and “idealistic.” It is the assumption of this paper that the realistic motives of intervention are identical to states’ national interests and that the idealistic motives are identical to “humanitarian” services promoted by the UN. These assumptions are not tested.

1.9 Organization of the Study

This study is organized into chapters. The first chapter provides an introduction to the focus of the study, a statement of the problem, a statement of the research questions, a definition of important terms, and a statement of the significance of the study and an identification of the audience for whom it should be relevant. The second chapter provides a literature review, focusing on the history of the literature on the question of interventionism, literature which analyzes the importance of interventionism, literature which applies directly to the case studies of this paper, and then selection methods. The third chapter provides a detailed analysis of the methodology used in this study. The fourth chapter provides an explication of the literature and a detailed analysis of the case studies. The fifth and final chapter brings the research work to a logical conclusion.

Conclusion

The “deep” politics of intervention pose a problem in which idealism and realism are opposed to one another. The idealist perspective promoted by the UN is one that depends upon the adherence of the international community to hopeful, humanitarian, and moral ideals. The realist perspective promoted by Western states, if one is to judge by their historical actions, depends upon the adherence of the State to the principle of national interest.

This study seeks to examine the essence of Western states’ motives in “humanitarian intervention” in Libya and Syria. It aims to show that a realistic perspective is necessary in understanding the reasons states have for intervening (or not intervening) in other countries’ affairs.

Chapter 2

REVIEW OF SELECTED LITERATURE

This chapter provides an extensive review of relevant research and is divided into sections which include; history of research on interventionism, importance of the issue of interventionism, interventionism and the study's research questions, current selection practices, and recommended selection practices.

2.1 Overview of the Research

The practice of realism in international relations starts as far back as several centuries. However, there is still a commonality between ancient state practice and modern thinking in international relations since it has been revealed that modern diplomacy is often based on the realist theory. Realists' thinkers include: Hans J. Morgenthau of USA in 1950s, Thomas Hobbes during torn civil war in England, Thucydides of Ancient Greece, Machiavelli of (Medieval Italy, Mao Tse Tung of Communist China (Cristol, 2009).

All these realists have all concluded that realism guides the overall conduct of international relations. Realists base their ideas on power politics, which found its landscape in international politics, and they base their premises on the following important assumptions that states are important actors in international politics, anarchic is the feature of international system, all states in international political system pursue power in order to survive, morality has no room in international politics (Callahan, 2010).

Realists consider states to be the principal actor's international relations, and the states principally exist to pursue their national interests and their national securities (Murielle, 2004). Typically, states demonstrate unethical behaviors and emphasize on power and self-interests when pursuing their national interests (Conces, 2009). Realists argue that human beings are inherently self-interests and egoists, and there is absence of morality in international politics making the realists to believe that there is no place for morality in international politics (Walker, Morton, & Jeffrey, 2005).

Cozette adds argument of realists by pointing out that:

“man being primarily driven by the lust for power, and man being the primary actor who, within a state, takes decisions, it logically follows that ‘the essence of international politics is identical with its domestic counterpart. Both domestic and international politics are a struggle for power, modified only by the different conditions under which this struggle takes place in the domestic and international spheres” (Murielle, 2004).

The theory of realism reveals that absence of international government makes human beings to be egoists and the factor leads to the conflict-based paradigms among states. Typically, realists believe power, security, and egoism become the main issues in international relations, there is a little place for morality, and if there is any moral practice at all, it is only used as an instrument to justify the state conduct (Spegele, 1987). However, there are realists who still believe that there is ethical practice in international relations. Carr challenges pure realism on the ground that there is still an idealist dimension in international politics (Carr E. H., 2002). Mearsheimer illustrates the argument of Carr by pointing out that states main preoccupation are their national securities and are only committed to amass weapons in order to deter the aggressors (Mearsheimer, 2005). Carr argues that states are preoccupied with power calculation and amassing the military ammunition to achieve supreme importance in international relations. However, Carr still maintains that there is still idealist dimension international politics (Carr E. H., 2002).

For several decades, realism has been a dominated concept in international relations. From classical realism point of view, the behavior of states is the same, states often defend themselves in the absent of hierarchical international order leading states to defend their national interests (Hall, 2006). States exist to defend their interests and evidence of history reveals that statesmen pursue powers with the aim to pursue their interest. In the view of world politics, realism is driven by the competitive self-interests (Kunz, 2010).

In international relations, realism is placed in priority over ideology and it is often synonymous with power politics (Hall, 2006). Costalli also contributes to the argument by pointing out that the classical realism is very useful in explaining the states foreign policy in term of pursing of economic and military power (Losch, 2009). States tries to perceive the behavior of other states with relative to power conflicts and statesmen view power, as necessities, which should be, maintain at all time. Classical realists further argue that the central concept of international politics is power and the level of power that a state possesses usually affects the state's strategy and it is the outcome of various military and economic conflicts (Nuri, 2006).

Despite the argument of classical realists with relation to the states behavior, the twentieth century classical realists attacked neo-classical realists on the ground that states ought to avoid power conflicts and respect the international law, and there is a need to build international order in order to prevent world conflict (Lawson, 2011). The twentieth century realists believe that the cause of the First World War and Second World War was due to the pursue of power among nations, and the thinking of twentieth century realists gave birth to the idealism (Sinclar, 2011).

Idealism originated as far back as 14th century when Dante, an Italian poet envisaged unified world state. Idealist follows Dante doctrine by challenging realism in the sense that power politics pursued by the states led to the outbreak of the First World War. The theory of idealism emerged after the World War 1 and during 1920s and 1930s; idealists preached cooperation among states and believed that world should be in form of association where the international order should prevail in order to prevent another world conflict. Idealists argue that the solution to the inter-state conflict is to respect international law, which should be backed by the international organizations. Idealists further believe that states could avoid conflicts if they choose to pursue common interests that could unite humanity. Unlike realism that argues that morality has no place in international relations, idealists focus on morality and believe that war emerge because of the imperfection of political arrangements and this could be improved by avoiding egoism in human nature (Farrenkopf, 1995). Idealists challenges realists on the ground that nation-states could move beyond power politics and significant cooperation and peace among states is the key assumption of idealists. While realists believed that states were the only important actors in international relations, however, idealists argued that the interdependence should be the dominant features of international politics and creation of republican government such as international organizations was critical to check the power of nation states (Tabensky, 2007).

To enhance cooperation within international political system, idealists focus on legal aspect of international relations leading to the formation of international organizations and promotion of human rights. Prominent proponent of idealism was Woodrow Wilson, a former president of the United States (Mearsheimer, 2005). Wilson had been influenced by the destruction of the American Civil war in 1865.

Wilson was born in Virginia and graduated from Princeton University and Virginia Law School. Wilson earned a doctorate degree in Johns Hopkins University, and became a professor of political science. Wilson experience and academic background influenced his thought. Wilson focused on peace and international cooperation, and envisaged a new world order based on the rule of law, formation of international organizations and acceptance of shared values. Wilson also advocated for the covenants of peace by reducing armaments among nations (Steele, 2007).

The idealists thought led to the formation of League of Nations to bring about cooperation among states as well as guarantying peace and security of all countries (Hard, 1972). Between 1920s and 1930s, idealist doctrine dominated international relations and the idealist believe made Britain to be slow in re-arming itself in the face of German with the believe that the League of Nation would prevent the outbreak of Second World War (Ashworth, 2006). While idealist doctrine reigned between 1920s and 1930s, idealistic thought was struggling to materialize with the outbreak of Second World War (Boucher, 1994). After the Second World War, idealists tried to strengthen the rule of law and spread idealism in world affairs. The effect of atomic bomb in Hiroshima and Nagasaki that nearly eroded the civilization influenced the spread of idealistic though after the Second World War. To secure international peace and security, United Nations was formed in 1945. Followed by the formation of International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank (Mearsheimer, 2005).

Additionally, Universal Declaration of Human Rights was formed in 1948 making the idealistic stance to be more realistic in international affairs. Despite the effort of idealists in the promotion of international peace and security, power politics still

dominated the international affairs between 1950s and 1980s (Ashworth, 2006). During this period, there was an intense rivalry between USA and USSR and both countries displayed nuclear weapons to enhance their power influence in international politics. In the present day international political system, realists practice still dominates the international political practice (Goldsmith, 2003).

The balance between a realist and idealist positions in foreign policy was evident in the immediate post-War years of the 1940s, as Stone and Kuznick (2012) show; Henry Wallace represented the “idealistic” position regarding foreign policy, while President Truman represented the “realistic” one. The Truman administration was responsible for dropping two atomic bombs on Japan, an act which was at the time and has since been viewed privately as a war crime (Stone & Kuznick, 2012). Yet, that same administration successfully sold the attack on Japan to the American public and to generations of history writers as an action which ultimately saved American lives (an unsubstantiated claim—and one flatly contradicted by American war time generals) (Stone & Kuznick, 2012). The objective of using the bomb was not to save lives but to demonstrate to the Soviets that America was “in charge” (Stone, Kuznick 2012). What it really showed was a tendency on the part of the American government to use aggressive force in order to achieve objectives given a gloss of respectability painted as “humanitarian.” Stone and Kuznick suggest that there was nothing “humane” about the American use of two atomic bombs on Japan. On the contrary, they state that American foreign policy in the 20th century was based wholly on imperialistic aims—as the post-war memo of George Kennan plainly illustrated. Stone and Kuznick report that:

In a top secret 1948 memo, George Kennan outlined the dilemma facing US policy makers, making clear why Wallace’s [humanitarian] alternatives were dismissed with such contempt: ‘We have about 50 percent of the world’s wealth, but only 6.3

percent of its population...we cannot fail to be the object of envy and resentment. Our real task in the coming period is to devise a pattern of relationships which will permit us to maintain this position of disparity....To do so, we will have to dispense with all sentimentality and daydreaming....We should cease to talk about vague and...unreal objectives such as human rights, the raising of the living standards, and democratization...we are going to have to deal in straight power concepts. The less we are then hampered by idealistic slogans, the better. (Kennan in Stone, Kuznick 2012).

Thus, Stone and Kuznick argue that the “humanitarian intervention” has never truly existed but as an empty ideal touted by Western powers only to give a gloss to their real motives—national self-interest.

Evans (2008) traces the history of interventionism from the Peace of Westphalia of 1648 to the Holocaust of the 1940s—roughly 300 years in which nations have effectively intervened in other countries’ affairs. “None of the small normative advances made during this whole period,” Evans asserts, “translated into much in the way of activism by states when confronted with the reality of mass atrocities occurring outside their own national or colonial borders” (Evans, 2008). The reality of intervention, in other words, is consistently one of national interest—not humanitarianism. The United Nations intervention regarded as “humanitarian” were the “military incursion mounted by England, France and Russia into Greece in 1827 to stop massacres by Turkey,” and interventions on behalf of Maronite Christians in Syria in 1860, Christians in Crete in the same decade, in the Balkans the following decade, and in Macedonia at the turn of the 20th century (Evans, 2008): each intervention by Western powers was a response to Ottoman atrocities against Christian peoples and thus earned the title of humanitarian intervention. Evans points out, however, that these interventions by no means established “a doctrine of humanitarian intervention...as a matter of customary international law”—for the practice of “humanitarian intervention” has never been consistent (Evans, 2008).

Such a lack of consistency is important when assessing the legality of humanitarian intervention. It has been argued (Chandler, 2002) that R2P came into effect as a result of, among other instances, Western intervention in Kosovo (in spite of a no-vote from the UN). R2P, therefore, is a rather recent doctrine—and, ostensibly, an extension of Western initiatives in foreign countries. While the UN gives R2P an idealistic front, the Western militarism that inspired it is less idealistically-inspired and more realistically grounded in national interests (Stone, Kuznick 2012). National interest is the only real consistency in foreign intervention. This does not set a very moral precedent for the UN standard adopted in 2005—much less for the legality of intervention.

The legality of humanitarian intervention is discussed by Hurd (2011) in his study of the rule of law in the modern world according to the UN Charter of 1948. According to the UN Charter, humanitarian intervention is apparently illegal—but precedent set since the establishment of the Charter has made humanitarian intervention into a norm, which makes it less problematic in international law. Hurd concludes that there is no clear way to assess humanitarian intervention that it “exists in a space between legality and illegality” (Hurd, 2011).

In spite of Hurd’s arguments, Hilpold asserts that responsibility to protect doctrine has attained a degree of legitimacy, become a norm, and thus become an established principle of conduct in international law because the UN in the 21st century, in the wake of 9/11, has adopted a vision of global humanism—one that is eager to embrace the idealistic principles inherent in the theme of humanitarian aid (Hilpold, 2012). Hilpold does not argue the validity of humanitarian intervention in a world where states’ national interests may actually be served or furthered under the cover

of humanitarian intervention; he merely examines the “legality” that humanitarian intervention has attained within the last decade. Indeed, there has been a decisive shift in global politics from anti-interventionism to interventionism, a shift that reflects both the idealistic doctrine of the UN in 2005 and the realistic geopolitical struggle in the Middle East.

The UN mandate regarding R2P appears to contradict the UN Charter regarding states’ intervention—granting a degree of permissibility to states to intervene in order to establish peace and thwart atrocities. The R2P doctrine is based on the principle of idealism—but as researchers Stone, Kuznick, Evans, and others have shown, states do not consistently act according to idealistic principles but do consistently act on behalf of national interests. Thus, R2P gives legitimacy to humanitarian intervention, in legal terms, but does not acknowledge that states are likely to act, in their own national interests.

2.2 Relevance of Interventionism

A number of researchers have identified the importance of the issue of interventionism. Evans (2008) has highlighted the need for the implementation of a Responsibility to protect doctrine that can be used to guide all cases of foreign intervention. Evans shows how current UN policies are ineffective in obliging Western powers to intervene on “humanitarian” grounds, meaning making the “ideal” the “reality”—whereas, currently, the reality and the ideal do not necessarily meet in every case.

Evans accepts the idealistic vision of R2P while at the same time acknowledging the reality of states’ operations on behalf of national interest. Evans calls for a better

policy of enforcement of R2P, one that will ensure that states act on the principles of idealism rather than on the principles of realism. The problem with Evans' point is that it is in itself idealistically formulated. The realistic and the idealistic cannot be reconciled in any way, shape, or form any more than selflessness can be reconciled with selfishness—yet, such reconciliation is exactly what is called for by Evans.

The issue of interventionism is further discussed by Pattison (2010) who argues that even with the change in attitude from anti-interventionism to interventionism within the UN, the vocabulary utilized by the UN in its declarations fails to clarify certain problematic realities—such as, who is the international community? Pattison points out that the term “international community” is without definition and does not provide an idea of which states are to lead, how so, which and how many states serve to effectively designate a community, and whether the interests of that community are best served by intervention. Moreover, Pattison notes that the UN Security Council mentions no such agent of authority but “only a procedure that agents should follow” (Pattison, 2010). Thus, the importance of interventionism to the international community may be discernible in the concept of the value of a leadership role in that community where interventionism is to be carried out. Clearly the Western states occupy that role as they have effectively articulated the doctrine of R2P in such a manner as to turn it into an acceptable principle to the UN—contrary to principles of the original UN Charter. Powell (2012) takes a different approach to the importance of interventionism by examining the case of Libya, which she cites as the first instance in history of the UN acting upon the R2P doctrine allowing the Security Council to grant permission to a NATO-led intervention. This instance was historic in the sense that it marked a definitive shift away from the “Westphalian notion of sovereignty” towards a more international sovereignty, which translates into

leadership of Western powers, with whom rests the most significant amount of arms and revenue (Powell, 2012). Powell asserts that interventionism in the modern sense is important because it illustrates the change in the international dynamic: that change, while it may have been sparked by the “Arab Spring” and a people’s revolution, has not necessarily led towards the more peaceful and prosperous ideals embraced by the UN but rather towards the more realistic aims of the members of think tanks like the Project for the New American Century (PNAC). By acknowledging the major shift in international working law that R2P represents, one can see just how much sway the realists of politics have garnered for themselves by employing the language of the idealists and utilizing it for their own purposes, or rather for their states’ national interests.

Welsh (2011) argues that the problem that the international community faces today is one of focus. It is preoccupied with building “normative consensus” rather than with addressing the problem of how states should “act” in regards to R2P. Welsh (2011) suggests that the Libyan intervention was by no means a unanimous decision by the Security Council, in spite of its authorization, and that member states of the UN viewed the intervention with circumspection. The importance of intervention in the light of the case of Libya and now of Syria should show that humanitarian aid, as expressed by Western powers who have a national interest in intervening in states like Lybia and Syria, is an issue of contention among member states of the UN—particularly with Russian and China.

This same observation has been made by Simma, who, in the wake of the NATO-led intervention in Kosovo (which lacked UN approval), stated that this exercise by the West paved the way for future interventions that “would undermine the universal

system of collective security.” This undermining is the result of the insistence on the West to intervene in countries where it itself judges intervention to be necessary. The West, by its own actions, has set precedent for overriding the authority of the UN and its idealistic aims. The West sets itself up as sole policeman of the world—or at least of those parts of the world it determines it can have some sway over. In short, the realistic aims of interventions, i.e., the states’ national interests, is what the West actually seems to be at stake (Simma, 1999).

2.3 Interventionism and this Study’s Research Questions

Pattison (2010) poses the question of interventionism thus: Who has the right to intervene? And who has the duty to intervene? His answer is that the state with any legitimacy has a right to intervene—and that the state with the most legitimacy has the duty to intervene. Hence, the difficulty surrounding interventionism centers on the problem of moral legitimacy. Lieven & Hulsman (2006) was quick to point out that the realism proponents see no equation between realist interventionism and immorality. And as such, Morgenthau found it “untenable”. The issue of morality stands as an overarching issue which touches on all of these. Overall, one finds that despite a moral imperative to intervene, humanitarian intervention should not occur but is perhaps the lesser of a series of evils.

In realist theory, states are self-interested in that their own ‘relative gains’ are favoured over ‘absolute gains’ (i.e. gains for the entire society of states). This raises questions of motive and the potential for abuse in executing humanitarian interventions, particularly those that are unilateral. This potential for abuse is a serious flaw in the doctrine of humanitarian intervention.

The relevance of the issue to this study's research questions may be observed after a brief discussion of the relevance of the Syrian and Libyan nations to the Western powers. Syria's independence was established by King Faisal in the first half of the 20th century, but Faisal's authority was not to last, as the League of Nations intervened and gave Syria to the French. French occupation lasted for about twenty years (1920-1940), during which Syrians revolted in armed rebellion. In 1936, the Franco-Syrian treaty of Independence was written, but it would be another seven years before Syrian authority would be re-established, partly thanks to the Free France movement led by Charles de Gaulle. The government in Syria continued to face inner conflict as opposition parties within the country sought power. In 1970, Hafez al-Assad of the Baath Party took control in the wake of a military coup. Thirty years later, the rule of Syria was taken up by his son, the British educated Bashar al-Assad, who stepped into power in the wake of the car accident that killed his brother. Since becoming the ruler of Syria, Bashar al-Assad has allied the country with forces in Lebanon and Iran, alliances that are keenly felt to be provocative as Hezbollah is an instrument of indirect conflict between Israel and both countries. Although al-Assad regime is not particularly friendly with Jerusalem, it however maintains relation of non-aggression as has been the status-quo. Thus, the question of Syria today is also a question of Israel and its role in Western foreign policy.

Syria has long received attention from the West. The Bush administration viewed the nation with suspicion during the US invasion of Iraq and openly suspected the country of operating in conjunction with al-Qaeda. The 2011 Syrian "uprising" was viewed as a continuance of the "Arab Spring" by Western media, in particular the BBC (Arab Uprising, 2012)—but alternative media reported quite a different story, one of outside forces (terrorist agents) invading Syria in an attempt to wage war on

Assad. Western leaders portrayed Assad as a genocidal tyrant, whose murderous policy was directed against his own populace. The West appointed itself the provider of humanitarian aid and democratic ideals, just as it had done prior to the Libyan intervention. Action against Syria was blocked due to the votes of Russia and China who vetoed the UN from adopting any resolutions (Solomon, 2012). President Obama continued to pursue the policies of the Bush administration and called for sanctions against Syria, the first step in the third directive of the UN's R2P policy. Obama's call for sanctions against Syria were a direct instance of intervention, formulated to thwart the "use of violence... [and allow Syria to] begin transitioning to a democratic system that protects the rights of the Syrian people" (U.S. Department of Treasury, 2011). Evidence of a massacre at Houla was presented in Western media as justification for the sanctions—yet that evidence was later withdrawn. Nonetheless, it had already served its apparent purpose. That the photographs of the "massacre" were taken in Iraq—not Houla—was apparently beside the point (Glaser, 2012). The West was intent on intervening in Syria, whether or not atrocities were being committed by the Syrian government.

The question as to why the West so eager to intervene in Syria, now has widened, as recently the subject of the day as been the invasion of Syria by ISIS. when more substantial reports of atrocities were existent when Bashar al-Assad's father ruled the country? What is the geopolitical interest? What is the national interest? How do politics play a part in the West's motives? Studies by Dawson (2012) and Escobar (2011) are particularly helpful in answering these questions.

Just as the intervention in Libya represented an opportunity for Western oil companies to gain possession of Libyan oil fields (Anderson, 2011), an intervention

in Syria represented an opportunity for Westerners to gain geopolitical spoils. Indeed, Syria's geopolitical situation in the Middle East makes it particularly valuable to Western realists. Dawson (2012) notes that Syria agreed to a \$10 billion pipeline contract that could theoretically destroy the Turkey-Israel BTC pipeline monopoly. The other key geopolitical factor that makes Syria valuable is that it possesses "Russia's last naval base on the Mediterranean" (Dawson 2012).

To view the subject from another angle, Syria is geopolitically situated in such a way that it may thwart Israeli hegemony in the Middle East, at least in terms of energy dominance. Escobar (2011) notes that "virtually all current geopolitical developments are energy-related"—and this applies to the crisis in Syria just as much as it does to the crisis in Libya. Both nations are at the center of an energy-grab being conducted by the West under the auspices of humanitarian aid. This is the realistic side of geopolitics. The idealistic side is that peace and prosperity are being re-established in these countries—so it is theoretically stipulated (the reality does not substantiate the theory). If Escobar is correct, Syria may be viewed merely as another domino in "Eurasian integration"—the maintenance of which is a source of contention between Western powers and Asian powers. Bhadrakumar (2012) states that "keeping Russia, an energy powerhouse, from developing friendliness with the oil-rich Persian Gulf oligarchies has been a priority in Western strategies through the past several decades." This would suggest that Syria is what may be called a chess piece in the global strategy of Western-Arab-Israeli hegemony in the Middle East. Perle (1996) of PNAC has written extensively on the subject of military intervention in Syria, Iraq, and elsewhere—his perspective is a realist one and concerns the West's national interests, which are linked inextricably with the national interests of Israel. "A Clean Break" serves as the outline for Western militarism in the Middle

East; it was presented to Netanyahu as a focus study for the securing of Israel's borders, and called for a heavy reliance upon the US for the engaging of "proxy wars" in Syria through Lebanon. The strategy was designed to eliminate Syria and Iraq as potential threats to Israel's national interests. The US invaded Iraq following 9/11. In 2013, it is prepared to invade Syria. Perle's directive at the end of the 20th century is apparently being followed to the letter at the beginning of the 21st century. The position of the Syrian government in all of this is debated. Since 2005 when the Bush administration accused the Syrian government of being a terrorist-harboring state, Syria has been viewed in a negative light by Western powers. Yet, prior to the accusations, Syria had always maintained a friendly attitude towards the West. Indeed, Bashar al-Assad lived in the West until circumstances required his return to Syria following the violent death of his brother. However, Prados (2008:108) provides the perspective of the Project for the New American Century when he condemns Assad as being "anti-Israel" and an obstacle to peace in the Middle East. Assad is viewed by Prados as a violent reactionary who condemns Western influence in the Middle East, and who vehemently condemns the nation-state of Israel and its influence in Middle Eastern geopolitics. Prados' view, moreover, is typical of Western governments, which tend to demonize countries that do so threaten the national security of Israel. This raises the issue of Israel in the question of the realistic nature of the politics of interventionism.

It is also helpful to see how Assad himself views the situation that is currently evolving into a major global confrontation, with the West and Israel on one side, and Russia, Iran, and China on the other side. In an interview with the Russian newspaper *Izvestia*, Bashar al-Assad denied all allegations of using chemical weapons against his own people, noting that the territories where these alleged gassings were

supposed to have taken place were occupied by Assad's own men and therefore, had chemical weapons been used, his own men would have suffered. Moreover, Assad welcomed a UN investigation, confident that such an investigation would prove false the allegations made by Western statesmen like Kerry and McCain. Assad's statements are worth quoting in full because they outline what he believes to be the Western protocol of preparation for intervention—unsubstantiated allegations of atrocities in order to win public support for a military intervention, the real aim of which is destabilization and/or regime change (both of which objectives have been flatly denied by the Obama administration). Assad stated:

As for the UN Commission, we were the first to request a UN investigation when terrorists launched rockets that carried toxic gas in the outskirts of Aleppo. Several months before the attack, American and Western statements were already preparing public opinion of the potential use of chemical weapons by the Syrian government. This raised our suspicion that they were aware of the terrorists' intentions to use these weapons in order to blame the Syrian government (Al-Asaad, 2011).

What Assad demonstrates is a willingness to comply with the idealistic aims of the UN Security Council. His invitation to the UN, moreover, signifies confidence in the impartiality of UN investigators—an impartiality which, geopolitically speaking, the Western powers do not clearly demonstrate. Incidentally, if the West was really interested in humanitarian intervention it would demonstrate more willingness to await the findings of a UN investigation into the allegations, rather than pronouncing a verdict first (as it so often does—one need only remember the allegation of Iraq possessing WMDs—an allegation which proved incorrect) and then rushing to collect the evidence. This rush to level accusations and prepare for a strike runs parallel to the rhetoric of Israeli leader Netanyahu, whose “red line” speech at the UN in 2012 showed how aggressively intent Israel is in leveling accusations which fail to be supported by UN investigations. That Western powers follow Israel's suit suggests that Israel is in some regard leading the West in terms of foreign policy.

Were humanitarian ideals truly at the heart of the West's concern, common sense would dictate that the findings of the UN investigation into allegations of chemical warfare be taken into consideration well before the launching of war ships. This has not proven to be the case. Currently, the US is preparing for a strike on Syria—even as UN investigators continue to investigate the US's allegations against Syria.

Assad's viewpoint is consistent with what Evans (2008) describes as the history of interventionism. From the Peace of Westphalia to the Holocaust, the bulk of states' humanitarian intervention focused on relieving Christians of persecution in hostile countries. Since the Cold War, however, interventionism has been based on more "cynical" and "self-interested" motives—even as it has retained the practice of invoking the name of humanitarianism in its mission statements (Evans, 2008).

The same may be said for Libya. The UN authorized a NATO-led intervention in 2011—yet that intervention has so far proven to have achieved no real objective other than the securing of Libya's oil fields. This supports Escobar's energy-grab thesis in the geopolitics of the Middle East. The realist perspective is thus thoroughly supported by historical fact, policy directives, and current rhetoric.

The literature review has examined the idealism and realism with relation to the contemporary international political system. While realism believes that states should engage in power politics, however idealism focuses on the legal aspect of international relations and postulates the formation of international organization to enhance international order.

2.4 Methodological Approach to Selection of Literature

Selection processes for this literature review were developed according to a substantive procedure that allows for a synthesis of literature and analysis. The process was organized by a guiding concept, which utilized relevant key words in various search engines, based upon reoccurring phrases used in seminal works already familiar to the researcher. This process ensures a suitably large-enough scope in regards to the gathering of a relevant literature pool, of both quantitative and qualitative research. Some literature is more seminal than others—for instance, Butler’s (1933) speech, or Perle’s (1996) policy paper—both of which provide insight into the realistic perspective of intervention. Other works have built on the findings of researchers whose studies of humanitarian intervention have cast light on ideas that this study found it pertinent to pursue still further.

A recommended selection process for study that might elaborate upon the findings of the paper would be to utilize the appropriate key words in a variety of search engines. “Humanitarian intervention” brings a wide selection of literature to the forefront, when searched in Google’s Scholar database—a search engine that has access to the main academic databases. Therefore, a more refined search should receive focus. The Russian news outlet Russia Today (RT) offers a unique perspective on the US-Syria affair, as well as intervention in Libya. RT provides an outlet to voices often unheard in Western media—such as the voice of Assad himself, and alternative media correspondents such as Escobar and Dawson.

It is important for a qualitative study to gather as many different perspectives on a question as is possible, so that a deep analysis of the context of the situation may be

formulated. Accompanying this aim should be a reasonable skepticism regarding anything that appears to be a Western apologetic—that is, a work which attempts to portray the West’s interventions in idealistic terminology. Western realists are much more matter-of-fact in their approach to intervention, and one need only acquaint oneself with the Perle paper, “A Clean Break,” in order to see exactly how well thought-out intervention policy actually is—and how far back this policy actually goes. A healthy skepticism on the smoke that professional propagandists employ to obscure the deep politics of interventionism is essential in any research on the realistic aims of states. This is the recommended procedure for any further study.

2.5 Data Analysis: Case Study

A case study approach to interventionism in the Middle East is not only helpful but essential in determining the precise nature of the question under scrutiny. Realism vs. idealism in interventionism can only be thoroughly understood when examples of real interventions are qualitatively reviewed. This study takes a qualitative approach to the cases of Libya and Syria and bases its analysis on an extensive literature review of relevant material.

This study includes analysis of several pieces of literature spanning a variety of perspectives and fields in order to formulate a qualitative view of humanitarian interventionism. From Perle’s vastly important 1996 policy paper “A Clean Break” to Assad’s interviews with Russia media, this study incorporates opposing perspectives and synthesizes a unique perspective based on realism rather than idealism. It acknowledges the ideals of the UN and how the rhetoric of the UN’s idealistic conventions is utilized by realists within Western government. By exploring certain realist motives (identified by Perle), the researcher was able to

identify precisely where idealism and realism merged and separated. A need to assess the reality of the situation in Libya and Syria was satisfied by literature affiliated with independent or objective-based publications. Researchers with a reputation for objective reporting were given priority over less-established researchers. To this end, time was devoted to investigating the works of Escobar, Dawson, Stone, Kuznick, Scott, Perkins, and others. Particularly attention was paid to research with a realistic/historical basis, one that did not stop short at the idealist aims of intervention in the 20th century, but took measures to look more closely into the “deep” politics of the situation.

The case study was conducted by comparing the idealistic aims reported by the West in Libyan intervention with the achieved (and substantiated) objectives in that same country. Achieved aims were then categorized according to grouping, either idealistic or realistic. In every instance, in Libya, aims achieved fell within the category of realistic rather than idealistic. In the case of Syria, a similar approach was taken—but because direct military intervention has yet to proceed (aside from the arming of Syrian “rebels”), a different criterion had to be developed to aid in the analysis. For Syria, the researcher looked at the rhetoric of the West and matched it both with the ideals of the UN stated in its R2P doctrine of 2005 and the policy papers of Perle and PNAC from as early as 1996. In every case, an indifference to or blatant obfuscation of idealist principles was manifest and preference given to the realist aims of Western government, including the objectives of the state of Israel. Special attention was also given to the doctrine of R2P and its development in recent years as a norm in international law, due in part to the practice of Western intervention in Kosovo and other countries where political and militaristic conflict merged. This analysis gave way to a deeper analysis of the assumption of the role of

superpower “hero” or defender of humanism on the global stage that the West decidedly took on for itself, all the more since 9/11. The glaring contradictions inherent in the assumption of this role by a power indifferent to human suffering in places of no geopolitical significance led the researcher to inspect more closely the divergence of ideal from reality in the practice of Western intervention.

By expanding his frame of reference outside the politicized discourse of Western media reports, the researcher was able to secure a foothold in the realistic aims of Western states and to identify their national interests. Corroborating these aims with the research of historians who have paid particular attention to this line of conduct helped to solidify the claims of this research.

This methodology utilized an intuitive approach and the researcher’s ability to discern the perspective of a piece of literature at the outset. This ability allowed the researcher to make quick calculations that would ensure a balanced gathering of material—from both idealistic and realistic perspectives.

By analyzing every major perspective available to him in his research, the researcher aimed to achieve an objective but qualitative analysis of relevant literature.

2.6 Conclusion

The history of research pertaining to the question of realism vs. idealism in interventionism reveals a consistent pattern of Western intervention in the 20th century primarily based upon states’ national interests. The use of idealistic rhetoric is commonly used by the West in order to provide a gloss or a “justification” for intervention. In reality, these interventions propose significant gains for states in terms of geopolitics and economics.

Literature relevant to this study supports the idea that there is a need for awareness of the realist perspective in humanitarian intervention. As Western states initiate yet another step in Middle Eastern intervention, critics of such an intervention are pointing to the reality that allegations for atrocities are simply unfounded. No evidence has yet been produced or found by the UN for the attacks of which the US and other Western states claim the Syrian regime is guilty. The case against Libya was equally fabricated, or interpreted, in such a way as to paint Gaddafi as a criminal responsible for crimes against humanity in the wake of “popular” uprisings in the Middle East. These uprisings, however, are essentially part of the “deep” politics of Western states, which include the radicalizing and arming of sects in the Middle East, the formation of revolts and protests, and the overthrow of governments—a practice at least as old as the 20th century (Butler 1933), and a practice very much a part of Western foreign policy, official (Perle 1996) or unofficial (Scott 2007).

The significance of this study may be found in the near-constant debate over the principles of humanitarian intervention as the US “gears up” for a strike against Syria, as the popular media put it. Such a strike can have effects all across the board—from social to political to economical. Once made aware of the real reasons for such intervention, it is perhaps possible that Western voters can apply pressure to Western statesmen in order to cancel all hostile aggression against states which have neither been found to be guilty of R2P violations nor represent a clear and present danger to civilization.

Chapter 3

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND TO LIBYA AND SYRIA CRISIS

The “Arab Spring” revolution which notably began in 2010 was a major force towards the beginning of several social movements in the Middle East and as well in North Africa. As well it was evidential that the uprising in each region and nations of these regions differed between one another and yielded different results. However, this chapter and the whole research work focuses on the uprising in two countries vis-à-vis Libya and Syria under Muammar Gaddafi and Bashar al-Assad respectively. It also fleshes out how the conflicts in these two countries led to a need for intervention and protection of human and properties. A background to this conflict will be substantiated in the chapter.

3.1 Background to the Case Studies

Syria, a country that accommodates several diverse culture and ethnic group gained her independence from France in 1946. However, several events have been accustomed to it including the unification with Nasser’s Egypt until nationalist took over in 1963.

Moreover, the state have lived in several protests as a result of the prolong government, economic set back and the competing interest in the Middle East. On the other hand, Libya an oil rich desert state was ruled by Muammar Gaddafi for forty two years till there was revolution which led to him being ousted.

3.2 Libya

The Libyan Mass unrests which started in Benghazi, Libya's second major city on 15th February 2011, concentrated more on abuses on the right of human, social project bungle, as well as political debasement which eventually led to the fall of Muammar Gaddafi's reign in power. Having laid down its plans as well as preparations by the NTC against Gaddafi, he as well rose to countering the plans. The serene environment soon descended into a gruesome common war which signaled the formal end with Gaddafi's passing away on the 20th October, 2011, hence the NTC's presentation of victory. The contention formed degenerated to a globally perceived civil war met with several setback edges and also the necessity of characterized administration and agitator sides because of impact of several effects. Gaddafi's cruel and harsh administration, regional partitioning of Libya into NTC and supporter fortresses, NTC deadly implementing and military organizing, pushed the nation's contention in the crisis.

After the dismay in 1969 , Muammar Gaddafi's professedly communist political arrangement of "Jamahiriya" demolished the public which concentrated the administration more or less on Gaddafi's sultan principle, described by a hidden imposing commercial model of procedures through the religion he identify with. The Green Book and different writings shaped Gaddafi into the "Brother Leader and Guide of the Revolution," without a moment's delay to the pith of a state's shut to prevalent cooperation. The arrangement of control, while offered with substantial benefit projects to purchase loyalty was a major drive of Libya to financial crisis and neglected to harvest the advantages of benefits from oil. In any case, Gaddafi stayed unrepentant all through his forty two administrative periods in force in his local and

remote strategy in Libya's perspective, taking a decision to opt out of the league of Arab Nation as well from the union of Africa nation and making his plan inert to famous will.

As much as NTC's hostility to the administration's policies extended, his reaction was bent on accepting the cautious, revitalizing faction and declining to surrender control at any price. This protective self-importance stayed unaltered all through the contention with his rejection of UN authorization based on his activities, human rights misuses, and sent defense strengths for savage singed earth arrangements to defeat the oppositions. Also, after the demise of Gaddafi's, his children declined to acknowledge NTC command and regretted its illegalities.

Despite the fact that the NTC reacted in terrific manner to supporter multitude that gathered around Gaddafi because of his ideology of preference, its cruel reaction was foreordained by Gaddafi's resistant and viciousness substantial talk. Hence, Gaddafi's suppression, disengagement from the real, as well as his unwillingness to have an alteration shoot-up the complaints of the Libyan individuals and activated kickback of brutal and steady attacks. Crackdowns in the Regime gave the basic complaints to rebels and that went about as the immediate foundation for NTC militarization by expanding its stage quality. Cruel reactions both instigated clash and pulled in bigger prominent bolster, extending challenges into savage dismissal of Gaddafi with no plausibility of bargain. Administration radicalism in this way cemented the grisly way of contention by constraining the NTC's hand and averting transactions, subsequently making common war to a great extent unavoidable.

The Libyan dissents and consequent civil war were firmly established in regional partition, dividing the state into agitator restricted agitator as well as restricted

follower directed urban communities. Mutiny in Libya started in Benghazi, and NTC control stretched out to consolidate provincial territories.

Shared motivation encouraged wide NTC home bases with mainstream bolster that profoundly decreased supporter crowd efficiency. Thus, territories under follower direction were fairly concentrated in ranges with individual centrality aimed at Gaddafi however which was not directed to adherent to the armies, comprising the cities in Libya. The poor misuse of domain by the legislature implied that in spite of characterized forefronts, follower disintegration was a steady issue and obliged tougher controller for military increases, cementing the improvement of dissents into common war.

Afterward the NTC's combination in belief system and regional control, arms get to and preparing urgently maintained clash and forestalled the initial NTC rout. NATO mediation approved by the Security Council of the United Nations gave air attacks, weapons, and military preparing to revolt powers, encouraging brutal improvement of the NTC. Arms exchange and hired fighters from territorial partners, for example, the government of Qatar as well as the transnational organizations made the use of force which rolled equalization from serene challenge to equipped common war. While agitators were at first depicted as dubious and unfit in war, outside preparing and help lessened dangers of broke up command as well as upheld the NTC personality being shared through comparative troop experience. The following absence of government restraining infrastructure over viciousness in this way critically permitted the NTC towards mobilizing a counter wicked supporter crackdowns. Militia development and misuse of tribal arms access permitted powers

united by grievances to practically accomplish brutality as opposed to being promptly quelled by follower military and security troops.

Global impact was a key reason for Libyan common war through different systems. Unequivocally ideal media scope of the NTC and Gaddafi's longstanding negative image legitimized worldwide activity. Indeed, the discourse that portrayed Libya's civil unrest ahead of schedule as February, news associations and research organizations distinguished administrative restraint as a genuine explanation behind NTC viciousness. Such talk was resounded in strategy briefings and lobbyist proclamation that eventually prompted UN activity with the aid of Resolution of 1973, in order to "build up a no fly zone" thus permit mediation.

French binds to Libya as an effective reach, and Europe pushes for US contribution impacted US government arrangement and talk to act for mediation to backing the NTC because of apprehensions of administration drove "massacres", overpowering shaky open support.

Such solid worldwide association as an afterthought on the part of the NTC, and a lucid United Nations' NTC code authenticity and NATO military support, characterized and isolated the contradicting sides, delegitimized the administration, created an avenue for more rebel assaults. Hence, several occurrences on the part of the administration and the opposition group with the backing of the NATO and the UN set the stage for taking after cruel administration crackdowns and NTC stage improvement, set off the Libyan clash's advancement from uprising into common war.

Gaddafi's seclusion from the truth was likewise very causative in nation's conflict in rousing the indigenes for staying behind the opposition group. Due to the fact that the president at that point an untouchable within the world where he allied himself because of his backing of autocrats, peculiar remote approach, and general unsavoriness, provincial countries need not to put in consideration the fragile parity of force for the rebel.

Furthermore, the nation's geological area, found between two major regions in the world ("Africa and Middle East"), permitted evacuated countries to supply armies as well as brought on local associations such as the Arab League to collectively denounce the administration and energize worldwide intervention. Gaddafi's alienation in the provincial group did not just give the causative system to common conflict by benefitting from the backing of its neighbors in terms of military and political in NTC's respect. It additionally implied that there were no organizations together to be lost or unforgiving discernments to acquire if supporter retaliations were particularly brutal, accordingly wiping out political expenses of cruel backlash. Thus, Libyan segregation diminished reasons for alarm of common war overflow, and created territorial actors to give political backing to NTC as a structure of the Arab Spring through armed artilleries stream and troops. The consolidated political and military territorial impact expanded rough conflicts in the middle of supporter and restriction powers and spiraled uplifted clash into characterized common war.

3.3 Syria

The Syrian crisis, which started by protests on twenty-six of January two thousand and eleven, swelled into a solidified uprising on March 15th, has turn into the bloodiest clash of the Arab Spring. Military and restriction strengths have endured

more than 9,000 losses since the start of challenges, brutality, and armed force involvement. Whereas common conflict talk encompassing the Syria flourished all through the end of 2011 and the start of 2012 and even earlier, and the loss of life has conclusively come to edges general and likely for every side also, the contention has yet to be indisputably indicated a common war.

Despite a cruel and harsh administration with Assad, a major figure of little concessions for administration change, the decentralized nature of viciousness because of cultural collaboration of values on the high side, deficient militarization and activation of resistance powers, the wavering, as well as the delay by universal establishments and local players are mutually lacking to bring about the contention in the state to attain dynamic limits for common war.

Syria's sultanistic arrangement of control, described by pioneer imposing business model of legislative and political procedures, is like that of Libya, Tunisia, and Egypt, and emphatically wiped out prevalent engagement in the political process and move of force. Then again, progression by Bashar alAssad in 2000 diminished disappointment downwards and created a vacuum for restructuring. The history of Syria partisan clash and precariousness constrained regular people to acknowledge higher constraint in return for security, and dependability to the administration was further purchased with side-installments as social projects and wellbeing.

Notwithstanding, the administration remained to a great extent abusive and not amiable to contradiction, political detainees were discharged and mainstream verbal confrontation was at first permitted at the outset of president's "Damascus Spring." Conversely, administration remained genuinely useless and schizophrenic, taking

part in cycles of "raising dissents and repression" and inevitably splitting down after little changes neglected to fulfill the public. Likewise, the president alluded a "remote scheme" and simultaneously examine lifting the nation's highly sensitive situation, yet, refute having a participation to the distress when his powers pulverized dissent. While al-Assad's beginning prominence avoided challenges as energetic as other areas in the Middle East going through revolution, the ineffectuality of his addresses for administration change and indicated truces and going with smothering of calls for administration change induced dissents to proceed and heighten. Thus, the administration's solidification and military preparation against regular citizens and restriction strengths encounters the measurement of common war. Notwithstanding, the rebel are well aware of the inadequacies of the president as well as absence in regards to responsibility as regards peacefulness, truces, or genuine change, the administration's higher level of smoothness and more grounded control of power implied the administration was deficiently oppressive and brutal to drive resistance dissents to full scale common war.

The most grounded confirmation of contention unified around particular areas have centered the second biggest city in Syria, Homs. Government strengths endeavored to take back the city in the hands of larger part Sunni equipped revolutionaries, which had before been taken by the rebels. These were the major towns of the country. Monstrous resistance on the part of the populace created a transformation to an "attack city," where viciousness in the middle of government and restriction constrains and shared setbacks went about being an identified as a potential general unrest. Nonetheless, past spotlights of attack urban communities under questioned control, the contention in Syria is to a great extent divided into parts. The present absence of prominent backing for one characterized radical association augments the

complex nature of the rebels. Conceivable as it is, the contention will keep on turning out to be more territorialized; existing conditions absence of separated areas keeps the revolutionary powers from uniting and fighting administrative powers to a level equal to measures of interior military activation and enrollment for common war.

Non-union of different dissident gatherings likewise kept the strategic military arrangement and arms access important to bring about common war. As opposed to one-sided worldwide media reports that demonstrate no combat hardware of agitator forces, there has also been cases of savagery and setbacks dispensed through activists contrary to administration forces. However, general the Syrian revolutionary strengths need arms, preparing, and centralization. Radicals are part within the “Syrian Free Army”, “the Damascus based National Council of Coordination”, and the “Turkey-based Syrian National Council”. They all differ on the utilization of viciousness and the extent of transactions with Assad, with none speaking to all-encompassing open desires. Although the Syrian Free Army is comprised of professionally prepared abandoning warriors from the legislature army, the radical strengths need soundness in terms of defense and strategic assembly and neglect to summon a varied number of army. Since the contention's starting from nine thousand damages, a moderate assessment demonstrates that a lion's share of passing were delivered by Alawite follower powers as opposed to the faction of the Sunni. Although supporter strengths order access to substantial weaponry and tanks, revolutionary strengths are not able to achieve real access to weaponry or preparing and subsequently cannot resist the regime for too long. Without satisfactory the use of force in it restriction, Syrian clash cannot transform into civil war.

Media scope and worldwide view of Syrian clash has to a great extent been uncertain and indeterminate. Media sources and researchers have then again been good to government-abused regular folks and dubious along the way in contention with the general unrest; it is "somewhat a common war" while extra researchers caution of the contention's expanding power. Vulnerability is elevated because of the political ramifications of naming the contention: recognizing Syrian clash as partisan common war diminishes the authenticity of any future intervention, permitting the universal group to "wash [their] hands" as the press denounced.

The inactive way of the worldwide group can generally be clarified by overstretch in Libya. In spite of the fact that the United Nations body in charge of civil privileges cautioned to point out what "happened in Libya, might happen in Syria". Performing artists continued to be generally unbiased as supporting administration revolution and as well creating a common ground. Overall, in forestalling "internationalization" of the contention, European lack of engagement and worldwide paralysis speak to inadequate universal contribution to unite rebel limits and reason common war. In 2012, particularly in the spring, the universal group had been progressively impelled by mass abominations in Syria to make a move, coming full circle in a choice on April 1st to sanction restricted dissident backing. The "Companions of Syria" coalition individuals have, on account of Arab countries, sanctioned hundred million US dollars in monetary value.

Individual states have during the early stages of the crisis censured Assad's administration: the king of Jordan contended the president absence of change will augment roughness and ensure that his administration cannot be sustained. The Prime Minister of Iraq decried administration's excesses as well as cautioned the

nation's "spring" transforming into a "winter". "Somebody who has battled until the demise against his own kin, [like]... Hitler" were the words of Erdogan the Prime Minister in Ankara. The verbal deprecate of the president administration impacted the Arab League to first suspend Syria in the event that it didn't stop its savage repression and afterward to affirm exceptional financial and political authorizes in a 19:3 vote. Its activities in general, notwithstanding, were waffling, just as the class conveyed eyewitness bunches, it didn't call out for intervention, Iraq and Lebanon refused the vote because of worries about overflow in the country's flimsiness.

The "Companions of Syria" associate, nonetheless, has furthermore made the countries in the region of Syria jeered towards force and peaceful means to deal with radicals, endorsing a hundred million dollars for agitator bolster. However, excepting an express revolt system, it is questionable whether pay rates and other radical installments will instrumentally abbreviate the contention. Subsequently, while the late approbation of approvals sign expanding Syrian segregation within region and expanding provincial merging in opposition to the president's endorsement of express outside guide for the rebels drives the contention closer to the verge. The mind boggling partisan craving more force within the region counteracted completely durable territorial impact for one side.

Chapter 4

ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS

This chapter affords the research work the opportunity to embark on the empirical analysis of the case studies. Whereas the case studies are Libya and Syria, the chapter seeks to find the motive behind intervention in these states.

4.1 Analysis of Case Studies

The international community has long struggled to lay out clear rules for humanitarian intervention. In the 1990s, when humanitarian intervention was utilized on multiple occasions by the international community, civil war was the cause on a few occasions. One such occasion was during the Rwandan genocide. The UN's response during that time, with peacekeepers, no end of bureaucratic bungling, and other issues, was fairly weak, did not stop the slaughter, and became a black mark for the UN because the international community was seen as failing. Humanitarian intervention, in principle, does not imply the use of force, but rather to enter a sovereign state to restore order and begin the rebuilding process.

Later in the same decade, Kosovo became another test for the doctrine of humanitarian intervention. The preconditions for intervention were present – crimes against humanity and apparently intractable conflict – but in that case the international community was divided. In particular, the UN Security Council could not reach agreement on intervention, because Russia was a strong supporter of Serbian president Slobodan Milosevic. Henkin points out that the doctrine as

humanitarian intervention, as written in law, under Article 2 (4) of the UN Charter, "prohibits the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state" (Henkin, 1999).

Kosovo represents a critical case study because with the UN unable to intervene because of Russia's veto power, NATO unilaterally entered into conflict with Serbia over Kosovo. This was an unprecedented action. In Rwanda, the UN failed to prevent genocide, and that sting on the international community loomed large in Kosovo, where genocide was also occurring. But there were significant political dimensions to Kosovo as well – Milosevic was supported by Russia, and reviled in the West. The fall of Yugoslavia had been bloody, and the West saw this conflict as an opportunity to expand its sphere of influence, not just in Europe but in the Muslim world, as Kosovars are Muslim ethnic Albanians

4.2 Interventionism in Libya Crisis

Libya represented a similar situation to Kosovo in some respects, and Syria also draws certain corollaries as well. A key similarity was that the ruler, Gadhafi, had clearly authorized the use of military force on civilian protestors. In this case, they were not an ethnic minority – everybody involved was Arab – but they were the voice of dissent in a country that had existed under dictatorship for decades. The use of force internally is not by any means unknown in the world, and as such Kosovo presents a fairly flimsy precedent for military action. Doubtless this was one of the reasons why there was no consensus in the international community with respect to action against Libya. For their part, Russia and China specifically opposed intervention. Russia had on several occasions fought battles against its own insurgents, especially in Chechnya. China, having invaded Tibet and brutally

repressed those people, surely did not want to set the precedent that the concept of humanitarian intervention could be invoked to defend an oppressed group.

Without the support of the international community, NATO did as it had in Kosovo and acted unilaterally to intervene militarily in Libya (Meo, 2011). As in Kosovo, NATO saw in the Arab Spring an opportunity to extend its sphere of influence, in particular in the Arab world. NATO intervention was only really considered in nations that were traditionally antagonistic towards the West – Libya and Syria in particular – while more Western-friendly countries with similar uprisings were never subject to the same sabre-rattling (i.e. Bahrain, Tunisia, Egypt). Gadhafi had made more than his share of enemies over the years, especially in the West, but also within the Arab League. As such, Gadhafi was particularly vulnerable to NATO intervention, because the Arab League had little interest in standing up for Libya's sovereignty. The West saw an opportunity not only to depose an enemy and increase its sphere of influence in the region, but also to gain access to oil that had otherwise not been made available to many prominent Western companies for many years.

As with Kosovo, the political opportunity was simply too great. In the years since 9/11, there has been significant discord between the West and the Muslim world. The West has an interest in promoting its values in the Muslim world, as secularism, democracy and freedom of thought/speech are all aspects that would serve as a counterbalance to Islamic extremism in these societies. Thus, there was likely the perspective among NATO leaders that by lending support to the overthrow of a brutal dictator, that it could then fill the power vacuum in its own image. Such a thought would have been naïve, optimistic, or both, because the reality was certainly nothing of the sort. But the underlying logic at the time would have been to support

the Arab Spring, or in a more cynical take to leverage the Arab Spring to increase the West's influence in the Middle East.

The NATO actions in Libya were limited to air support. They neutralized Libya's air force, which provided better opportunity for opposition forces to combat the Libyan military. Unlike in Kosovo, NATO did not put the proverbial "boots on the ground", something that may have allowed it to avoid too many accusations of outside interference, and to maintain the veneer of humanitarian intervention. However, it is worth remembering that a key tenet of humanitarian intervention is that it is supposed to provide help to ordinary citizens, not to rebel militias. Humanitarian intervention, under the UN charter, is not about becoming involved in military conflict, or about taking sides.

The actions of NATO did not extend to actual humanitarian acts. They did not provide the sort of support for refugees, health care, reconstruction or other elements that would normally all under the rubric of humanitarian intervention. NATO merely provided a counterbalance to Gadhafi's air power, allowing the rebels to take over the country. This simply does not meet the criteria of humanitarian intervention. It is intervention, but military, and the fact that NATO limited its actions in Libya does not negate the fact that it did not contribute to any actual humanitarian efforts in the country.

The question of this case study as to the reasons why the NATO states did immediately intervene in Syria (and at the present where ISIS is the order of the day) and Libya until when it did—even though there has been a strong case for

humanitarian intervention (evidence of mass killing, forced immigration, genocide) in the past will be duly brought to book based on analysis of the relevant literature.

The intervention of Libya can be seen as an aggressive assault on a nation, whose leader had conducted less than human policies but whose oil fields are apparently more important to the West than the restoration of order.

The political reasons for interventions in both nations are equally clear. The US has long supported Israel in the Middle East, and the Project for the New American Century is made up of members with dual Israeli-American citizenship. The link between Israeli and American policy is strong—but not complete, in political terms. Opposition to such a link has been expressed by the then Secretary of Defense Hagel, whose confirmation as Secretary was criticized by members of both parties on the grounds that Hagel had been in the past critical of Israel. The connection between the two states runs deeply (Scott 2007).

The geopolitical reasons for interventions in Libya and Syria are equally apparent. Libya's oil fields rank among the richest in the world—and the petrodollar has long been a source of geopolitical influence for the US. The securing of oil fields either through invasion, intervention, alliance, or treaty is historical fact. That the only substantiated achievement in the Libyan intervention has been the securing of the oil fields shows to what extent the intervention was based on the UN ideals of humanitarian aid and the R2P doctrine. This doctrine, evidently, is little more than a gloss for geopolitical actions that benefit Western states' national interests. Were such not the case, one would likely be able to point to some humanitarian headway in Libya—but anything resembling such headway simply was not evident.

4.3 Interventionism in Syria Crisis

The Syrian situation bears some similarities with the Libya situation but for a key difference that had a dramatic effect on the outcome. The West was interesting in intervening, and indeed, there was talk for the first couple of years of that conflict that intervention would be necessary. On the surface, this was Libya 2.0, with a brutal anti-West dictator waging civil war against his own people. The Assad government was not only anti-West but had also made enemies within the Arab League, the powerful body in Middle Eastern politics. Unlike Gadhafi, who was Sunni, Assad is Alawite, which is a branch of Shia Islam. The backdrop of the schism looms large in Syria, where the Shia minority rules over the Sunni majority, to the consternation of the largely Sunni Arab League. So like Gadhafi, Assad was an enemy both of the West and of his own neighbors.

Without a doubt, the key difference in Syria economic variables the one that prevented intervention assume a part in deciding Russian interest. In this, the risk of spreading political insecurity and worry about setting points of reference are at any rate as essential for Russian government, who see the potential for the spread of the crisis to different states in the region and the exhibition of probable impacts of effective revolts on weak administrations in Central Asia (Dmitry, 2012).

Moreover, Syria is the home of Russia's Mediterranean naval fleet. Russia had long maintained a massive fleet at Sevastopol, in Crimea, which at the time was part of Ukraine, a situation that has since changed. But this fleet could only operate in the Black Sea, as getting beyond would mean passing through the Bosphorus, controlled by Turkey, a NATO state. The presence of a Russian naval station in Syria allowed

Russia for decades to get around this logistical issue. As such, Russia would remain strenuously opposed to any intervention, military, humanitarian or otherwise. Where Russia and China could scuttle action against Libya at the UN Security Council, they had no forcible means of preventing NATO intervention there. In Syria, Russia's military presence provided such a buffer against NATO.

The contention stand that in spite of the fact that Russia's economic and vital interests in the Middle East have assumed a part in molding its reaction to the Arab Spring, the fear of the outcome of demonstration and its impacts in the universal arena have apparently had a bigger influence on Russia's backing for Middle Eastern autocrats during the period in review (Dmitry, 2012). Russian leaders' essential objective has been to keep the foundation of a standard that takes into account worldwide mediation because of government suppression of domestic rebellions or vicious uprisings. Second, the Russian government has tried to counter what it sees as U.S. vital gains in the Middle East. Economic factors, including arms deals, are in this manner just the third most essential purpose behind Russian support for Bashar al-Assad and other Middle Eastern rigid leaders confronting series of revolts.

NATO had a desire to enter Syria, and resolve the conflict. Doubtless this would have involved removing Assad from power, and opening Syria up to the little oil vessels to western oil companies in particular. It has nothing to do with Israel, nonsensical anti-Semitic conspiracy theories notwithstanding. NATO's interest was the same in Syria as Libya – to remove a perceived enemy, with Russia and China being at the forefront, prevented it from happening.

While nobody really predicted ISIS, it is worth remembering that intervention in Syria would have at least brought stability to the country. ISIS arose because large swaths of Syria were lawless, not controlled by Assad but by random and inchoate militias. The humanitarian crisis in Syria has gone from bad to worse to unfathomably awful. One can debate the extent to which NATO intervention would have prevented ISIS, or resolved the humanitarian crisis. If the intervention was of the Libya type, then it would not have been humanitarian at all, and while the situation would be better, it would not be good.

Syria represents an interesting point of discussion regarding humanitarian intervention. On one hand, intervention was expressly prevented by Russia, and this has led to a much worse humanitarian crisis than otherwise would have occurred. However, intervention would not necessarily have been humanitarian in nature, would surely have contravened international law, and would only have served to further the ambitions of Western powers.

Looking through the lens of realism, it is evident that the concept of humanitarian intervention is flawed. Where initially the idea certainly sounded like a good idea – the nations of the world would unite to fight injustice – the reality is that the world's powers hold vetoes at the Security Council that prevent intervention in a meaningful way. Speculatively speaking, China would have vetoed intervention during the Pol Pot regime in Cambodia, and would likewise prevent intervention in North Korea. So in that sense, there are few situations where intervention would be allowed under the auspices of the UN. Where it was, such as in Rwanda, the doctrine of humanitarian intervention that does not influence local politics but only seeks to prevent humanitarian disasters, met with failure, specifically because one cannot

both safeguard citizens facing genocide and avoid engaging in active military conflict simultaneously. Thus, humanitarian intervention becomes just simply *intervention*, and the humanitarian part little more than pretext.

The pretext is a good reason to enter a nation, but the reality is that intervention is always in most cases going to be where there are political interests. Rwanda may have been an exceptional example of a place where no major Security Council veto nation had strong enough interests to prevent the UN from entering the country, or where maybe the intervention would have been thought to restore stability. But in the other cases – Libya and Syria – even the hope of improved stability was undermined by the reality that the restored stability would have a different equilibrium than the old regime. If the West fights to bring in a new regime, it will gain in influence. Russia prevented intervention in Syria specifically to maintain its interest in the country. Nobody felt strongly enough about Libya to prevent NATO from engaging in a limited military intervention in that country. But no nation is willing to risk its military capabilities and assets for military intervention unless there is an upside. Chaos presents the opportunity to build a new order, one more suited to a nation's interests.

Thus, realism provides the lens by which humanitarian intervention can best be understood. There are few examples of truly humanitarian intervention. In many such cases, the response is inadequate. Where the greatest force and enthusiasm is demonstrated is when there are specific foreign policy objectives, usually relating to assets or to the balance of power that will be served through the intervention. As an example, Darfur was a situation that cried out for humanitarian intervention, but there's little of interest in Sudan. So intervention was not forthcoming. But the

minute Gadhafi or Assad attacked his own people, there was talk of intervention. It only took weeks to start flying aircraft over Libya, and if Russia did not have a naval base in Syria the response may well have been as fast there.

It is in this strategic use of intervention that one can understand the reality of humanitarian intervention. There are few states, if any, that have demonstrated a lasting commitment to the humanitarian cause. Intervention occurs when a state has something to gain, which explains why intervention in areas where there is nothing to gain tends to be half-hearted, if it is engaged at all. Where there are critical strategic interests, there is intervention, or least the call for it. Libya and Syria both of have oil. Libya was under a secular dictator who was hated by the Arab League and the West. Syria was under a Shia dictator who was hated by the Arab League and the West. In both cases, there are clear economic and geopolitical reasons why the West would have been interested in intervention, and helping displaced citizens was not really among the most pressing priorities.

It may be cynical to suggest this, but there is actually little evidence that humanitarian intervention in its purest form is a priority for the world's major powers. Smaller Western nations have taken the mantle of intervention at times – Canada in the 1990s and European states in more recent years – but most intervention serves a different purpose. Territory may not be expanded, but there are clearly issues with respect to access to resources, and the balance of power in the Middle East, that were at work both with the NATO intervention in Libya and the repeated calls for a similar intervention in Syria. Russia, and the fact that many Syrian rebels were terrorists, meant that intervention in Syria never happened. The humanitarian crisis there is appalling, but the benefits associated with helping people

are not worth the cost that would be incurred at the political level, of getting involved in Syria. The cost is not really supposed to be an issued with humanitarian intervention.

The economic reasons for intervention are likewise apparent when one considers the value of the probable gains of Libya's oil and the intangible effect of destroying Syria's infrastructure. The Israel-Turkey pipeline guarantees a source of economic revenue to the West and its "allies" in Israel and Turkey. It also guarantees a greater market share of energy profits for the two Middle Eastern states. A pipeline through Syria may be seen as an economic threat to the current monopoly held by Israel-Turkey. The economic impact of a Syrian pipeline would surely cut into Israeli profits, but were Syria to fall to the rebels with the help of a US intervention, the prospects of a Syrian pipeline coming to fruition would likely be diminished.

There is also a social aspect of intervention in Syria to be considered. Since the establishment of the Israeli state at the end of the first half of the 20th century, conflict between Arab states and Israel have been well documented. That conflict is most pronounced in rhetoric stemming from Iran and Israel leaders. Because the land occupied by Israel is held to be holy land by members of both Arab and Israeli communities. This tension is natural, and the fact that the Israeli state was supported by the US from the beginning has naturally placed Iran in opposition with US interests. The proxy war called for by Perle in Syria is a proxy war between Iran and the US, with Iran supporting Assad and the US supporting the rebels. However, Assad has entered into a coalition of cold détente with Israel which has put the status quo in place. It may thus be said that intervention is already evident in Syria, that it has taken the form of sanctions and arming of the rebels. Whether this can be

accounted as humanitarian intervention depends upon the real objectives of the West—not simply on the allegations that Assad is a tyrant guilty of murdering his populace.

Moreover, with regard to the allegations, on an imperative note, the analysis underpins how strong is the evidence for atrocities committed by the Assad regime in Syria and by Gaddafi in Libya? The evidence is hardly devastating. Assad has denied allegations of using chemical warfare—and no UN investigation has absolutely found him guilty of authorizing such a chemical attack. On the contrary, the US appeared at the forefront of striking before the results of the UN investigation were completed. This points a good deal more to the realistic purposes of Western intervention than to the idealistic purposes of UN-supported intervention. Moreover, the UN-supported intervention in Libya was in response to Gaddafi's suppression of protests, inspired by the "Arab Spring" revolts in Egypt (EP 2011). It has been argued by more than one critic of UN idealism that these revolts were engineered by Western agents in order to serve as a pretext for intervention. German-American researcher W. F. Engdahl has been particularly vehement in his assertions that such is precisely the case. Scott (2007) is likewise emphatic in his arguments pertaining to "deep" politics that pretexts for invasion are a common and almost routine affair for Western states looking to serve their own national interests. An idealistic outlook blinds one to this reality. An objective consideration of the facts, however, obliges one to consider the realist perspective and its role in humanitarian interventionism.

Indeed, Assad's remarks should be noted, for they illuminate the very nature of the question of intervention:

During the last few weeks, we have worked with the Commission and set the guidelines for cooperation. First of these, is that our national sovereignty is a red line and as such the Commission will directly liaise with us during the process. Second,

the issue is not only how the investigation will be conducted but also how the results will be interpreted. We are all aware that instead of being interpreted in an objective manner, these results could easily be interpreted according to the requirements and agendas of certain major countries. Certainly, we expect Russia to block any interpretation that aims to serve American and western policies. What is most important is that we differentiate between western accusations that are based on allegations and hearsay and our request for an investigation based on concrete evidence and facts (Assad, 2013).

Assad's words are rational and subtle—the direct opposite of the bombastic rhetoric of the interventionists in Washington. Where respect and humanity really on the line, one would expect the West to respond to Assad's remarks with equal candor and less rancor. The fact that they do not, but respond with cynicism and aggression reveals the reality behind the actions which shows more evidence of war rather than humanitarian intervention.

The cases of Libya and Syria, as well as some of the cases before them, call into question the doctrine of humanitarian intervention. All told, this doctrine has struggled with its definition from the start, and has in particular been challenged by the realities of its implementation. Intervention may be a doctrine by which a nation can engage another, to the point of interfering with domestic affairs, but this must be understood as strictly a realist affair, using force with a pretext, for the purpose of improving one's influence or gaining access to critical resources. In either case, intervention may have nothing to do with humanitarianism, regardless of whatever rhetoric the intervention is couched in.

Chapter 5

CONCLUSION

The question of Western interventionism in the 21st century can be answered by studying the cases of Libya and Syria—both of which reveal the realistic aims of Western states which pursue their own national interests under the guise of humanitarian intervention. The evidence for this claim is based both on the objectives successfully achieved and substantiated in Libya and in the insistence upon aggressive action in Syria before any real evidence of atrocities has been verified by UN investigators. One recognizes the heavy hand of realist politics in both cases—a hand which has furthermore been set down in plain policy by Perle of Project for the New American Century (PNAC) a think tank guided by Israeli-Americans dedicated to strengthening the borders and power structure of Israel in the Middle East.

The idealistic aims of the UN's R2P doctrine are, consequently, adopted by Western states only in so far as they are useful in garnering support among Western voters and statesmen for intervention. There is no consistent adherence or insistence upon the R2P doctrine, however; its usage plays merely a practical facility in the determining of events, as far as Western states are concerned. The US in particular is adept at playing one "card" then playing another when the first fails to satisfy the public. Even still, Western leaders have proven to be anything but beholden to the Western public in terms of foreign policy: their initiatives are guided by the

Machiavellian principles of realism rather than the humanitarian principles of UN idealism.

As intervention with Syria (on behalf of Israel rather than on behalf of the Syrian populace) nears, one should be aware of the real policy which is guiding Western states. That policy has been plainly detailed in the PNAC papers. The Western states' national interest outweighs the idealistic aims it trumpets before the world and the UN: those aims are political (allegiance with Israel), geopolitical (the securing of oil fields and pipelines), economical (the guaranteeing of cash flows through protected nations), and social (the destabilization of regions, whose populace is culturally opposed to that of Israel and Western liberalism). These aims are made readily apparent by researchers who lift the lid on idealistic rhetoric and expose the realistic aims of the West in the Middle East.

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