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Ahmet Sözen

Assoc. Prof. Dr., Eastern Mediterranean University,
Department of International Relations

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A Theoretical Evaluation of Different Faces of Power: US-Turkey Relations Towards Iraq

Ahmet SÖZEN*

ABSTRACT

This paper focuses on the use of different forms of power by a (leader/patron/hegemonic) state to get the other (non-leader/client) states to cooperate with its policies. Most of the literature on cooperation operates on the level of bargaining power where the policy changes are directly visible. This article aims to show how the bargaining power model is not adequate in capturing the complete picture of the relationship between Turkey (a non-leader/client state) and the United States (leader/patron state) in their cooperation with regard to Iraq during the Gulf Crisis (1990) and the War against Iraq (2003). Hence, I attempt to show that the three levels of power as discussed by Krause is a better and more comprehensive framework for understanding and explaining the power relationship between Turkey and the US.

Keywords: Turkey, Iraq, Bargaining Power, Structural Power, Hegemonic Power.

Gücün Farklı Düzeylerde Teorik bir Değerlendirmesi: Irak Konusunda ABD-Türkiye İlişkileri

ÖZET

Bu makalede bir lider(patron/hegemon) ülke tarafından lider-olmayan (müşteri) bir ülkeyi kendi siyaseti doğrultusunda işbirliğine çekme yönünde gücün farklı formlarda (düzeylerde) nasıl kullanıldığı araştırılmaktadır. Literatürde işbirliği üzerine yazılmış eserler çoğunluğu siyasetin doğrudan gözlemlenebildiği pazarlık gücü üzerinde yoğunlaşmaktadır. Bu makale lider-olmayan bir ülke olan Türkiye ile lider ülke olan Amerika arasındaki Körfez Krizi (1990) ve Irak Savaşı (2003) dönemlerindeki ilişkilerinin tam olarak anlaşılmasında pazarlık gücü modelinin yeterli olmadığını göstermektedir. Bu makalede Karause'un üç düzeyli güç modelinin Türkiye ve Amerika Birleşik Devletleri arasındaki güç ilişkisini en kapsamlı şekilde anlamak ve açıklamak için çok daha iyi bir model olduğu iddia edilmektedir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Türkiye, Irak, Pazarlık/Müzakere Gücü, Yapısal Güç, Hegemonyacı Güç.

* Assoc. Prof. Dr., Department of International Relations, Eastern Mediterranean University, Gazimağusa, TRNC. E-mail: ahmet.sozen@emu.edu.tr.

Introduction

Scholars are sometimes not very quick in incorporating new understandings of certain theoretical concepts into their research. One such concept is *power*.¹ Any student of power should be able to have a sound understanding of what power is and related arguments about how power is exercised. Understanding power in its full dimensions gives the scholar the opportunity to survey the behavior of states in their attempts to exercise influence over others through the use of various tools of foreign policy.

This paper focuses on the use of different forms of power by a (leader/patron/hegemonic) state to get the other (non-leader/client) state's cooperation with its policies. Most of the literature on cooperation operates on the level of *bargaining power*² where the policy changes are directly visible to or observable by the researcher. In this paper, I attempt to show how the *bargaining power* model is not adequate in capturing the complete picture of the relationship between Turkey (a non-leader/client state) and the United States (leader/patron state) in their cooperation with regard to Iraq. In that regard, I attempt to show that the *three levels of power* put forth by Krause is a much better and more comprehensive framework for understanding and explaining the power relationship between Turkey and the US.³

There are three main objectives of this study: (1) To shed more light on the cooperation process; (2) To challenge the conventional wisdom in the area of cooperation that states' cooperative or non-cooperative behaviors are best understood or explained on the bargaining level, and; (3) To challenge the utility of paradigms, in this case the *rational choice paradigm*, in the discipline.

This study aims to show why a client state cooperates with a patron state even when it appears not to be in the best interest of that state, i.e., the client state's first preference is not to cooperate or the client state does not have a dominant strategy to cooperate. Simultaneously, this study also aims to show why a client state does not cooperate with a patron state even though cooperation seems to be in the best interest of the client state.

For this study, I attempt to explain why Turkey cooperated with the US during the Gulf Crisis by sanctioning Iraq in 1990s and in turn, why Turkey did not cooperate with the US in the War Against Iraq and rejected the stationing of American soldiers in Turkey to open the northern front against Iraq in 2003.⁴ Directly observable empirical

¹ Keith Krause, "Military Statecraft: Power and Influence in Soviet and American Arms Transfer Relations", *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 35, 1991, p. 314.

² Ibid., p. 314, Keith Krause divides power into three different forms or levels: 1. bargaining power, 2. structural power, and 3. hegemonic power.

³ Ibid.

⁴ For a background account on the US foreign policy and the post Iraq war world liberal paradigm, see Gültekin Sümer, "Amerikan Dış Politikasının Kökenleri ve Amerikan Dış Politik Kültürü" [The Roots of American Foreign Policy and The American Foreign Political Culture], *International Relations*, Vol. 5, No 19, Autumn 2008, p.119-144; and İlkin Özdikmenli and Şevket Ovalı, "Irak Savaşı Sonrasında Liberal Dünyanın Yapay İkililiği" [Pseudo Split of the Liberal World in the Aftermath of the Iraqi War], *International Relations*, Vol. 5, No 19, Autumn 2008, p.89-118.

data on the US-Turkey talks with regard to the cooperation on the Iraq issue are analyzed at the bargaining level. Of course, non-quantifiable directly observable data in the form of policy changes are also used at this level.

My working hypothesis is that Turkey's cooperation (or non-cooperation) with the US with regard to the Iraq issue can not be fully understood or explained by using solely a *bargaining model* which focuses on directly observable (visible) results of a policy or an observable policy change that, for example, could be utilized by either empirical non-quantifiable, or empirical quantifiable data. Lisa Martin's game theoretical model is a good framework to examine the relationship between the two states on the bargaining level⁵. But it does not take into consideration the two other levels of power, i.e., it focuses on *bargaining power*, and omits *structural power* and *hegemonic power*. A comprehensive framework of different *forms of power relationship* between a patron state and a client state is needed to explain *cooperative/non-cooperative* behavior.

Research Model

This study falls under the category of literature where, by using a comparative case study, it focuses on a relationship between the patron state and a client state. Thus, my comparative case study specifically focuses on the relationship between Turkey (client) and the US (patron), and the question "Why did Turkey not cooperate with the US in the War Against Iraq in 2003, while Turkey did cooperate with the US during the Gulf Crisis in 1990?"

The literature on international cooperation comes handy for this study. Most of the literature on international cooperation draws its main arguments from Martin's "understandings of the collective-goods problem."⁶ For example, hegemonic stability theory argues that cooperation is a public good which can be produced only by a single dominant state - the hegemon.⁷ The institutionalist approach, on the other hand, comes as a reaction to the hegemonic stability theory. This approach claims that both formal and informal institutions can facilitate international cooperation, especially in the absence or the decline of a hegemon.⁸

When Iraq invaded Kuwait, there was widespread agreement among many states that there should be economic sanctions against Iraq. However, the leader state - the US - found out that it required some effort to organize support for economic sanctions against Iraq. Basically, this is a collective action problem or *cooperation problem*, which is widely,

⁵ Lisa L. Martin, *Coercive Diplomacy: Explaining Multilateral Economic Sanctions*, New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 1992, p. 16.

⁶ Ibid., p. 294.

⁷ Robert O. Keohane, "The Theory of Hegemonic Stability and Changes in International Regimes, 1967-1977", O. Holsti et al. (ed.), *Change in the International System*, Boulder, Westview Press, 1980, p. 131-162.

⁸ Oran R. Young, *International Cooperation: Building Regimes for Natural Resources and the Environment*, Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1989, p. 204.

studied using only the *bargaining level* of power in the literature.⁹ Lisa Martin’s model is a good example of the *bargaining level* studies¹⁰.

Figure 1 is the general payoff matrix in a bilateral sanction game that Lisa Martin uses.¹¹ The relevant episode of Lisa Martin’s game theory in this study is the case of a *strong leader state* (the US) and a *sanctioning non-leader state* (Turkey). Several equilibria can be found in this relationship. For example, equilibrium when both countries have a dominant strategy to sanction (cooperate), neither has a dominant strategy, or when only one of the sanctioners has a dominant strategy. Here, the role of “coercion” and “coincidence” bring a more comprehensive dimension to the “cooperative” behavior of the two sanctioners - however, the model is still inadequate in covering the power relationship between the sanctioning leader state and the cooperating non-leader state in its entirety.

Figure 1:

		Player 2 (Non-leader)		
		y=0	y=1	
Player 1 (Leader)	x=0	(n1, n2)	(f1, u2)	- General Payoffs in a Bilateral Sanction Game - Players’ Strategies X=0 or Y=0 : players impose no sanction (not cooperate). X=1 or Y=1 : players impose full sanctions (cooperate). Payoffs (n1, n2) : both players impose NO sanctions. (f1, u2) : player 1 free rides while player 2 unilaterally sanctions. (u1, f2) : player 1 unilaterally sanctions while player 2 free rides. (m1, m2) : both players impose full sanctions.
	x=1	(u1, f2)	(m1, m2)	

⁹ Martin, *Coercive Diplomacy*, p. 26. The literature on economic sanctions can be classified in three major categories: Firstly, major part of the literature is comprised of case studies which focus on the impact of sanctions on the policies of their target. As examples, for the sanctions on Rhodesia see Margaret Doxey, “Economic Sanctions: Benefits and Costs,” *World Today*, No 36, 1980, p.488; Donald L. Losman, *International Economic Sanctions*, New Mexico, New Mexico Press, 1979; and for South Africa see Margaret Doxey, “International Sanctions : A Framework for Analysis with Special Reference to the UN and Southern Africa,” *International Organization*, Vol.26, No.3, 1972, p.527-550; Richard C. Porter, “International Trade and Investment Sanctions: Potential Impact on the South African Economy,” *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 23, 1979, p. 579-612. The second sets of studies are the comparative case studies focusing on the impact of sanctions by using a broader definition of success of sanctions than the first category. See, Gary C. Hufbauer and Jeffrey J. Schott, *Economic Sanctions Reconsidered: History and Current Policy*, Washington, Institute for International Economics, 1985; David Baldwin, *Economic Statecraft*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1985. Finally, the smallest group of work is in the areas where studies focus on the “dimensions of economic sanctions other than their success, such as international cooperation”. See, Lisa L. Martin, *Coercive Diplomacy: Explaining Multilateral Economic Sanctions*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1992; see also Robert O. Keohane, *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1984 and Joseph M. Grieco “Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism,” *International Organization*, Vol. 42, 1988.

¹⁰ Martin, *Coercive Diplomacy*, p. 16.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 17.

A *modified*¹² model of Krause's "*three forms of power*" is utilized as a better approach to the game theory. This helps to understand why Turkey employed sanctions against Iraq in 1990 while; for example, Jordan (another neighbor and trading partner of Iraq) did not. In other words, it provides a rich detailed analysis of the "client-patron" relationship between Turkey and the US, and why Turkey cooperated with the US. Such a model is also useful in explaining why Turkey did not cooperate with the US in the War Against Iraq in 2003. In that regard, the US, being a hegemonic power, can utilize three dimensions of power in influencing the other sanctioner (Turkey) to cooperate.

Krause, in his 1991 article "Military Statecraft: Power and Influence in Soviet and American Arms Transfer Relations," criticizes the literature on arms transfer arguing that most of the studies are done on the bargaining level. He instead proposes that the *three forms of power* model is much more comprehensive in capturing the arms transfer relations between the patron states (i.e., Soviet Union and the US) and the client (recipient) states. This is the model whose modified form I use in this study. The following table (Table 1) is my modified model of Krause's three forms of power that will be utilized in this study on cooperation of Turkey with the US in economic sanctions against Iraq.

Bargaining Power

Bargaining power is defined by Krause as "gaining leverage over specific issues of immediate concern to the patron."¹³ Other names, such as "*relational power*" and "*interactional power*" are also used for *bargaining power* in the literature.

In this study, bargaining power involves actions where a specific goal, such as cooperation is achieved "via threats of punishment and/or promises of rewards as a direct means."¹⁴ In that regard, bargaining power is "relational" and "situational" between two or more actors in a given context.¹⁵

The leader state's goal is to get the non-leader state to comply with the leader state's decision, such as to cooperate with the leader state in sanctioning a specific target state. Bargaining power is used here by the leader state to achieve this immediate goal: to get the non-leader state to cooperate with the leader-state in the short run. In this context, the non-leader state has two immediate courses of action as a response: (1) to comply with the leader state's decision or (2) to resist it directly; both of these actions are directly visible to the observer.

Structural Power

"The focus on situations with an observable conflict between patrons and clients over specific goals can miss the interactions between two actors in which a conflict over short-term goals is avoided because power is exercised at a prior level."¹⁶

¹² Krause, "Military Statecraft", p.314. Krause uses this framework for his study of "arms transfers" from a patron state to its client states. I modified his framework in order to make it applicable to the issue of cooperation.

¹³ Ibid., 316.

¹⁴ Ibid., p. 316.

¹⁵ Ibid., p. 317.

¹⁶ Ibid., p. 321.

Keohane argues that the establishment of a context of power relation has to be considered separately from “rational choice” considerations, which normally operates at the bargaining level.¹⁷

An actor’s policy choices emerge in a structure, which prescribes the limits of a state’s behavior. “Structural power is exercised when a patron [leader] alters the range of options open to the client [non-leader] or makes it more or less costly for the client to change these options.”¹⁸ In that sense, exercising structural power is the exploitation by the leader state of the non-leader’s certain *vulnerabilities*. Simply the existence of these structural parameters is not always, at least initially, evident to the non-leader (nor to the observer), but they usually become evident over time.

Structural power is used by the leader state on a medium term (of time). Here, the goal of the leader state is to possess the general means to foster the achievement of its desired objective, which in this case, is to obtain cooperation from the non-leader state, for example to sanction a specific target state. In such a context, the non-leader state’s response is to try to reduce or eliminate its *dependency* or *vulnerability* to the leader state.

Hegemonic Power

Behind both *bargaining power* and *structural power*, there remains another level where power is exercised. In this level, the exercise of power is not readily observable to the observer. This level of power is called the *hegemonic power*. According to Krause:

It (hegemonic power) involves influence over the concepts (or rules of the game) that govern military statecraft and security policies; the nature of the threat faced by a state, the understanding of the best means to achieve security, and even the definition of security itself. Its exercise involves coopting the decision-making elites and/or legitimating a certain understanding of security (and threats to it) to win continued *willing* acceptance of the definition of these concepts established by the patron. It therefore suspends the remaining assumptions that analysts use to detect exercises of bargaining or structural power: that decision making is autonomous and that rational calculations of costs and benefits are made (of course, decision making does not become nonrational, but what is considered rational is in part determined by choices made at the level of hegemonic power).¹⁹

Here, the goal of the leader (patron) state is not to get cooperation of the non-leader state on only specific or situational issues or objectives, but to get the non-leader state to accept the rules of the game and the definitions of security goals and threats that the leader state itself has established. Krause argues that:

Hegemonic power is created and exercised by altering the composition or views of the ruling elite so its perceived interests converge with those of the patron. This occurs crudely when a patron supplies a group that takes power, or more subtly through the socialization of the ruling elite.²⁰

¹⁷ Keohane, *After Hegemony*, p. 70.

¹⁸ Krause, “Military Statecraft”, p. 322.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 325.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 325.

The US is regarded as the *hegemon* of the post-WW II era, although some scholars claim that its hegemony started to decline in the 1970s.²¹ Whether its power is currently declining or not, the US played a major role in the establishment of many important international institutions such as the UN and NATO. These institutions were created under US leadership during a time when US' power was truly hegemonic. So, the norms and the rules of these institutions pretty much reflected those rules and definitions of security issues that were in line with US' interests. These institutions play a major role in the socialization of the ruling elites whose countries are the members of these institutions. However, it should be emphasized that the US acted together with the other great powers in establishing these institutions. In other words, the US provided leadership but the decisions were taken multilaterally with the other great powers.

Having emerged as the victorious side during the Cold War superpower competition, the US in a way consolidated the already established rules and norms of the game after the end of the Cold War. In that sense, power of the debatable US hegemony and power of the rules and norms of important international institutions are somewhat intertwined.²² In this study, that intertwined power is treated broadly as the exercise of *hegemonic power*, since I assume that the already established rules and norms are predominantly the creation of a hegemonic power - the US.

In the post-9/11 era, however, there is a debate that the credibility of the international institutions and the widely observed international norms established by the US leadership in the post-WW II era have been challenged and even damaged by the very unilateral actions of the US in its war against terrorism. It seems like the hegemon (i.e., the US) is modifying the rules of the game according to the new realities in the international affairs. This time, however, unlike the post-WW II era, the US leadership is not been much appreciated by the large portion of the international community.

Analysis in the Bargaining Level

The Gulf Crisis

The Iraqi army invaded Kuwait on August 2, 1990. This action resulted in a widespread protest by almost all nation states. "Beyond posing a severe economic challenge by consolidating control over vast oil reserves," Iraq's action violated one of the most important international norms and international law: *invasion and occupation of a territory under a sovereign state by use of force*.²³

²¹ Keohane, *After Hegemony*, p. 186.

²² It is very difficult to claim whether the US is a hegemon or not. In addition, it is difficult to make a clear-cut distinction between the rules and the norms of international institutions and those that were established by a hegemonic state (*most of the institutions were established by the leadership of a hegemon*). Therefore, I broadly categorized these rules and norms as the elements of *hegemonic power*.

²³ Martin, *Coercive Diplomacy*, p. 3.

During the beginning of the Gulf Crises, the widespread opinion of many states was the need to take some sort of action – probably some form of economic sanctions or maybe more severe measures – against Saddam’s ruthless behavior. But, who would take the initiative? The general perception based on the historical paradigm on economic sanctions is that economic sanctions usually do not work due mainly to the *collective action problem*: how to come up with a *common action* which is usually a result of the convergence of interests among the potential sanctioning states? This was even more difficult during the bi-polar Cold War era when the world was divided between two major competing camps – the democratic, free market supporting, capitalist West versus an authoritarian socialist East. In this superpower competition context, a target state could easily find a way to avoid economic sanctions by aligning itself with one of the competing camps.

The Gulf Crises, however, took place in such a period when the Cold War and the bi-polar world were coming to an end, and the differences between the two major camps were not pronounced as strongly as before. The US took the initiative (leadership) in organizing a common response against Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait by imposing stringent economic sanctions against Iraq. According to Martin:

In spite of the widespread common interests in responding to Saddam’s aggression, the United States found that organizing support for sanctions required some effort. States faced a collective-action problem, since the potential economic and, in some cases, domestic political costs to potential sanctioners from joint action were high.²⁴

Turkey and Jordan, for example, were among the few states in the region that would face high economic and political costs in sanctioning Iraq due to their close trade and neighborly relations with Iraq. In that regard, Jordan was one of the very few states, which opposed to the economic sanctions against Iraq. Jordan preferred facing a widespread condemnation from many nation states, instead of imposing sanctions against Iraq.

Turkey, on the other hand, imposed full sanctions against Iraq from the very beginning of the US organized response to Iraq. In that regard, Turkey preferred having economic and political losses rather than opposing the economic sanctions against Iraq which would probably result in widespread condemnation of this action, and maybe more severe consequences, such as being isolated in many international platforms. However, the visible consequences of Turkey’s sanctioning Iraq are two fold: 1) Turkey’s massive economic loss²⁵ due to the terminated trade with Iraq who was one of Turkey’s major trading partners before the crises²⁶, and 2) gaining a hostile neighbor, which could host and provide logistics to the separatist PKK in its territories.²⁷ Later, this can be used (and actually was used) as a weapon against Turkey to adjust its foreign policies according to Iraq’s wishes.

²⁴ Ibid., p. 3.

²⁵ Iraq owed Turkey about \$750 million in trade debts. In addition, Turkish-Iraqi trade had been around \$2 billion a year. For further details, Sükrü S. Gürel et al., Turkey in a Changing World -with special reference to Central Asia and the Caucasus- Institute of Developing Economies, *Middle East Studies Series*, Vol. 33, 1993, p. 1-44.

²⁶ Gerd Hohler, “Türkiye Irak’ta Gaza Basiyor”, *Frankfurter Rundschau*, Berlin, 29 June 2008.

²⁷ Graham E. Fuller, *Turkey’s New Geopolitics: From the Balkans to Western China*, Oxford, Westview Press, 1993, p. 22.

Let us try to analyze (through Martin's game theoretical model²⁸) on the bargaining level why Turkey cooperated with the US in sanctioning Iraq, despite the above mentioned visible economic and political losses that Turkey has incurred.

Bargaining Power

Cooperation on economic sanctions in this case study involves the relationship between the main sender of the sanctions - the US - and a prospective nonleader sanctioner -Turkey. Here, I use directly observable quantifiable and non-quantifiable data to see if this model can explain Turkey's cooperative behavior in sanctioning Iraq.²⁹

If one looks at Table 2 on the Turkish exports to Iraq before the Gulf Crisis and Table 3 through Table 6 on the economic and military relations between the US and Turkey in figures, it is obvious that directly visible quantifiable data does not show any evidence in the form of side payments from the US to Turkey for Turkey's cooperative behavior. Turkey's cooperative behavior at this level (i.e., bargaining) then can only be explained - at least partially by means of directly observable non-quantifiable data. Some suggestions might be listed as follows:

1. The US had supported³⁰ Turkey in its struggle to become a EU member and more specifically the US had supported and lobbied for Turkey's customs union with the EU. Turkey has always received support from the US in its EU affairs. Closer integration with the EU is Turkey's one of the main foreign policy goals if not the primary policy which has always been supported by the US and has been compatible with the US's national interests. So, there is no visible US policy change on this issue after the Gulf War.
2. The US had handled Turkey's human rights record in a more flexible manner than the other democratic countries, such as the EU countries. The US has always supported Turkey in its major problem - the war against the PKK.³¹
3. The US had been impartial³² in the Cyprus conflict, which was one of Turkey's major obstacles in international platforms. The US has always played a balancing and an impartial role in the Cyprus issue, at least more impartial than the pro-Greek EU states, since its first serious involvement in Cyprus in the 1960s. Therefore, there is no visible change in US policy towards Cyprus.

As can be seen from the above *bargaining model* analysis, the directly observable non-quantifiable data gives no (or maybe only a weak) support for the coopera-

²⁸ In a previous study (Ahmet Sözen, "Cooperation on Economic Sanctions: A Case Study on the Cooperation of Turkey and the US in Sanctioning Iraq", paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association, Midwest St. Louis, MO, 1996) I used Martin's game theoretic model in the bargaining level. See the appendix for the game theoretical analysis of the Turkey-US cooperation during the Gulf Crisis.

²⁹ See the appendix.

³⁰ Fuller, *Turkey's New Geopolitics*, p. 29.

³¹ *Ibid*, p. 29.

³² *Ibid*, p. 29.

tive behavior of Turkey. In addition, as mentioned above, quantifiable empirical data (see Table 2 through Table 5) do not give any support on the bargaining level. In other words, there is no evidence of possible US side payments to Turkey in the quantifiable date to explain Turkey's cooperative behavior.

The War Against Iraq

The US first informed Turkey about its intention to change the political regime through force in Iraq on November 6, 1998.³³ It was, however, 9/11 that gave the pretext to the US to put its Iraq plan into action. In mid January 2002 the Turkish Embassy in Washington DC sent a encrypted message to the Turkish Foreign Ministry stating that:

1. The US will definitely strike Iraq,
2. The military operation will take place with or without UN Security Council resolution,
3. The US shall want Turkey by its side,
4. However, the US will strike Iraq even without Turkey's support.³⁴

During the summer of 2002 the diplomatic traffic between the US and the Turkish officials intensified with regard to Iraq. In September 2002 the US Office of Defense Cooperation in Ankara sent a message directly to the Office of Chief of Staff requesting permission to deploy US combat troops in Turkey and use certain bases in the framework of *full and complete cooperation*.³⁵ What was odd here is that the US tried to negotiate its demands with the Turkish military whereas it was clear that it should be done through the diplomatic and political channels. This is because the decision to permit foreign troop deployment in Turkey belongs to the Turkish Grand National Assembly (TGNA). This was clearly told to the US officials in many different occasions by the Turkish military and foreign ministry officials.³⁶

The Turkish military was supporting the Turkish cooperation with the US. In that regard, it recommended the government that Turkey should be actively involved in an operation in order to be able to control the developments in northern Iraq. The military was particularly interested in preventing the PKK to use the vacuum in northern Iraq as well as preventing the Kurds in establishing an independent state in northern Iraq. However, the military left the decision and the responsibility to the Turkish government. The Turkish foreign ministry was also recommending the Turkish government that it was Turkey's national interest to be involved in the Iraq operation. Moreover, the AKP government came to believe that whether involved in the Iraq operation or not Turkey would be negatively influenced from the Iraq situation.³⁷ Eventually, the Turkish government decided to negotiate a memorandum of understanding

³³ Murat Yetkin, *Tezkere: Irak Krizinin Gerçek Öyküsü* [*The Bill: The Real Story of the Iraq Crisis*], İstanbul, Remzi Kitabevi, 2004, p. 14.

³⁴ Ibid., p. 51.

³⁵ Ibid., p. 45.

³⁶ Ibid., p. 85.

³⁷ Ibid., p. 109.

(MOU), which would include the terms of Turkish involvement in the Iraq operation. Through the MOU the AKP government wanted to minimize its losses and maximize its gains in Iraq for its cooperation with the US.³⁸

Bargaining Power

The internal debate in Turkey whether to cooperate with the US or not in the Iraq operation focused on rational calculations at the highest decision producing circles. On December 23, 2002, a summit meeting took place at the Prime Ministry after the recommendation of the Foreign Ministry and the Turkish military. Here, the Iraq issue was rationally calculated by the top decision makers and the consequences of cooperation and non-cooperation with the US regarding the Iraq operation were put on the table.

In case of Turkey's non-involvement in the Iraq operation:³⁹

- after the war, Turkey will not be able to take a share from the reconstruction activities conducted by the US in Iraq,
- Turkey will be left out of the events taking place in northern Iraq. Therefore, it will either have to act alone when faced with *fait accomplis* of the Kurdish groups and will have to confront the US or it will have to keep silent when faced with adverse situations,
- Turkey will not be able to take American support to compensate for her economic losses,
- Turkey will be faced with American hostility. The US will have to look for another strategic partner in the region,
- American support for Turkey during IMF and World Bank meetings will be weakened,
- Turkey will be left without American support during the Cyprus negotiations that will last until 28th of February,
- On the issue of immigrants (Kurds from northern Iraq) Turkey will have to accept the "weak" support of the UN and other international organizations on migration.

In case of Turkey's cooperation with the US in the Iraq operation:⁴⁰

- Turkey will be able to get the support of Washington for its economic losses. The quantity and the terms of that support will depend on the negotiations conducted by the government,

³⁸ See Fikret Bila's four-day column for the details of the MOU, *Milliyet*, 22-25 August 2003.

³⁹ Yetkin, *Tezkere*, p. 16.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 117.

- US administration will be sensitive to the “red lines”⁴¹ of Turkey. In other words, Turkish control in northern Iraq will increase, Iraqi Kurds will not be able to oppress the Turkomen and other groups in the area, and it will be possible to deal more effectively with the PKK/KADEK militants in the area,
- In return for those gains, Turkey will lose credibility in the eyes of some European and Muslim states, and the AKP government will lose credibility both in the eyes of those countries and its own constituency,
- Turkey may appear on the target list of international terrorist organizations,
- If American operation in Iraq fails, Turkey will be having troubled relations with the Baghdad administration and may be directly affected from the uncertainties in the region.

Hence, after rational calculations Turkey decided to negotiate the terms of its involvement in Iraq. Turkey decided that if it could satisfy its demands in the negotiations with the US, then Turkey would cooperate with the US in the Iraq operation. On December 27, 2002, the National Security Council (NSC), the top security policy designing body in Turkey, recommended that there should be three separate committees negotiating with the US for the MOU. Hence, the Office of Chief of Staff would be negotiating the military issues; the Foreign Ministry will be conducting the negotiations on the political issues and the Ministry of Treasury would be negotiating the economic issues.

On December, 28 2002, the US delegation headed by Undersecretary of State Marc Grossman and the Deputy Secretary of Treasury John Taylor accepted the Turks' proposal that the method of negotiations be conducted on three separate committees. The same day Grossman put the US demands on the table:⁴²

1. Inspection of the bases,
2. Modernization of the bases,
3. Authorization of use of the airports and sea ports,
4. Permission to the US land forces to enter Turkey,
5. Giving overflight rights to the US.

After several weeks of tough negotiations in all three committees, Turkey got almost all of its demands satisfied and put in the MOU.⁴³

⁴¹ It was at the 27 December 2002 NSC that the Turks also decided on what was later appeared in the press as Turkey's “red lines” regarding Iraq. Kirkuk and Mosul falling under Kurdish control; oppression of the Turkomen in Kirkuk and Mosul; and the creation of an independent (Kurdish) state in northern Iraq were regarded as Turkey's “red lights.” The crossing of these red lines would trigger a Turkish military intervention (see Jon Gorvett, “Turkey's ‘red lines’, U.S. raid in Northern Iraq Cause Further Strain in Relations,” *The Washington Report on Middle East Affairs*, 2003, p. 36.

⁴² Yetkin, *Tezkere*, p. 122.

⁴³ For the details of the MOU see Fikret Bila's four-day column on the MOU, *Milliyet*, 22-25 August 2003.

1. Turkish troops would enter northern Iraq under Turkish command,
2. Turkish “red lines” would be observed by the US,
3. Turkey would receive financial compensations for its losses.

On March 1, 2003, to the great surprise of many countries, the Turkish parliament voted down the resolution that would authorize the US forces to enter Turkey. This was a clear message from the Turkish MPs, despite the support of the resolution by the government, the military and the Foreign Ministry that Turkey would not be a part of the “dirty” war. This was an unexpected situation because, as the above analysis showed, Turkey obtained almost all of its demands in the MOU and that there was a strong backing of the MOU by the government, the military and the Foreign Ministry. In other words, on the bargaining level, all signals were in the direction of the Turkish cooperation.

So, similar to the Gulf Crisis (1990) where Turkey’s cooperation with the US could not be explained on the bargaining level, the Turkish non-cooperation with the US in the War Against Iraq can not be explained on the bargaining level. In other words, on the bargaining level one rationally expected Turkey not to have cooperated with the US during the Gulf Crisis, while one rationally expected Turkey to have cooperated with the US in the War Against Iraq. However, just the opposite happened in both cases. How do we explain this? Obviously, one has to turn to other levels of analysis (of power) for possible explanations that the bargaining level fails give.

Analysis Through Structural Power

In this study, it is also a possibility to explain Turkey’s cooperative and non-cooperative behavior (Gulf Crisis and the War Against Iraq, respectively) by looking at the structural power relationship between Turkey and the US: Turkey imports major chunk of its arms from the US. In that sense, Turkey is dependent (vulnerable) on US military supplies, and military parts that Turkey uses, say, in manufacturing F16s. Turkey also needs certain arms from the US in its attempt to modernize the Turkish military, such as KC-135 tanker aircraft that refuels Turkish F16s in the air.⁴⁴ Turkey is also dependent on the US in attracting US investors and businessmen.⁴⁵

Moreover, during the 1990s Turkey needed US support in its human rights issues and its war with the PKK - which Turkey has received so far. For example, the *Turkish Daily News*⁴⁶ quotes Wendy R. Sherman, assistant secretary of state for legislative affairs, saying:

The PKK has stated that its primary goal is to create a separate Kurdish state in part of what is now Turkey. In the course of its operations, the PKK has frequently targeted Turkish civilians. It has not hesitated to attack Western - including American - interests. The Turkish government has the right to defend itself militarily from this terrorist threat.⁴⁷

⁴⁴ Metehan Demir, “Turkish KC-135 refuels F-16s on flight from US to Turkey”, *Turkish Daily News*, 7 March 1996.

⁴⁵ “US commerce secretary plans trip to Turkey to promote business”, *Turkish Daily News*, 14 March 1996.

⁴⁶ Uğur Akıncı, “State department defends Turkey’s right to fight PKK”, *Turkish Daily News*, 3 April 1996.

⁴⁷ Ibid.

Sherman also stated that the US did not support negotiations between several exiled Turkish Kurdish parliamentarians and the Turkish government. Unlike many European countries, she argued that “[t]he ‘Kurdistan parliament in exile’ is financed and controlled by the PKK”.⁴⁸ On the human rights issues in Turkey, Sherman supported Turkey by stating that the Turkish constitutional amendments of summer 1995, and the amendment of Article 8 of the Anti-Terrorism Act in October 1995 resulted in the release of 130 prisoners.⁴⁹ Similar support especially on the most recent Turkish constitutional reforms in the 2000s has continued to be provided by the US.

It is also known that the US has been impartial with regard to the Cyprus issue compared to the mostly pro-Greek position of the many European countries. Last but not least, the US has been a firm supporter of Turkey’s EU accession.

In short, keeping in mind the Turkish dependency to the US military supplies, Turkey has received very valuable support from the US in most of its international problems such as the human rights record, the Cyprus issue and Turkey’s aspiration to become a EU member. In that regard, Turkey has to take its dependency to the US and the support from the US it receives for many issues into consideration when it has to make a decision on an issue which is related to whether to cooperate or not with the US.

In the 2000s, and especially after the US unilateral actions in the post-September 11 era, many Turkish intellectuals and policy makers started to question the Turkish dependency to the US and the need to decrease this dependency. It is also believed that the Turkish dependency to the US had been damaging the Turkey-EU relations in an era where there was a rift in the trans-Atlantic alliance and Turkey was very close to start the accession talks with the EU.⁵⁰

Analysis Through Hegemonic Power

Turkey has been a member of many important international institutions from their very beginning, such as NATO. In addition, Turkey had been a close ally with the US during the Cold War. Especially since the early 1980s, Turkey became closer to the US while moving away from Europe.⁵¹ However, after 1986 the European Community normalized its relations with Turkey due to the return of the civil government in power in 1983. In fact, the EU agreed to establish a customs union with Turkey (which came to effect since January 1996).

⁴⁸ Ibid.

⁴⁹ Ibid.

⁵⁰ For more details, see the interview of Gürkan Zengin with Prime Minister Tayyip Erdogan’s chief advisor for foreign relations Prof. Ahmet Davutoğlu in CNN TURK, 17 February 2004.

⁵¹ After the 1980 military coup d’état in Turkey, European Community froze its relations with Turkey until a democratic civil regime was established again. In that sense, the US moved in and Turkey moved closer to the US in order to fill the vacuum that was created due to the freeze in the relations between the European Community and Turkey. For further details, see the introduction in Balkır, Canan, and Allen M. Williams, (eds.), *Turkey and Europe*, London and New York, Pinter Publishers, 1993.

Having been an important member of NATO and establishing such a close relationship with the US (and its Western European allies) in security issues, led Turkey to internalize the rules and norms of the hegemon and the international institutions, especially on security issues.

Although Turkey visibly suffered huge economic and political losses due to its sanctioning of Iraq, it would have been very unlikely (or naive) for Turkey to follow a noncooperative behavior in sanctioning Iraq if we take into consideration Turkey's relations with the US and its membership in many Western international institutions, such as NATO - whose members were the first to follow the US lead (*International Coalition*) in sanctioning Iraq.

However, in the case of the US War Against Iraq the international conjuncture was quite different from the one in the Gulf Crisis. While the international community (including the EC members) followed the US leadership in sanctioning Iraq during the Gulf Crisis, the same international community was very skeptic about the US unilateralism in the post-September 11 era. Most of the members of the international community believed that the reasons, such as the existence of WMD in Iraq, do not justify the US operation in Iraq and that the US unilateralism has been damaging the already established international norms and the credibility of the international institutions created since WW II (ironically, under the leadership of the US).

Conclusion

Rational models (such as Lisa Martin's game theoretical model) on the level of *bargaining* power fail to provide a comprehensive framework for understanding and explaining Turkey's both cooperative behavior in sanctioning Iraq and noncooperative behavior in the War Against Iraq. Empirical quantifiable data on the bargaining level does not show any significant evidence on why Turkey cooperated with the US in sanctioning Iraq. In other words, there is no dramatic increase either in the amount of Turkish exports to the US or in the amount of the US military and economic aid to Turkey after the Gulf Crises, which could be seen as the US side payments for Turkey's cooperative behavior. In addition, directly observable non-quantifiable data gives no (or maybe only a partial) explanation for Turkey's cooperative behavior in sanctioning Iraq in the Gulf Crisis. On the other hand, empirical data on the bargaining level shows that it was rationally in Turkey's best interest to be involved in the War Against Iraq in cooperation with the US. In that sense, the bargaining level explanations fail to explain both the Turkish cooperation with the US in the Gulf Crisis and the Turkish noncooperation with the US in the War Against Iraq.

However, utilizing the model of three faces of power as a complimentary approach makes the whole study much more comprehensive, i.e., it provides a more fine-tuned framework. In other words, using a well-designed model of three faces of power minimizes the likely hasty and ad hoc conclusions of the rational (game theoretical) model.

According to the rational (game theoretical) model of cooperation problem, Turkey cooperated with the US in sanctioning Iraq because either

- (1) Turkey was “coerced” (i.e., either threatened or persuaded by promise of reward) by the US to do so (due to their having conflicting interests), or
- (2) Turkey’s interests “coincided” with those of the US.

The model of three faces of power opens up the above conclusions, which emerged from the game theoretical model, and allows the researcher to understand and explain why those conclusions were reached, i.e.,

Turkey was coerced because the US utilized its

- bargaining power
- structural power
- hegemonic power, where each one suited for the US’ interests.

Turkey was *coerced* by the US to cooperate due to US’ promise of rewards for cooperative action (on the *bargaining* level). Turkey cooperated with the US, because the US manipulated the structural relationship between Turkey and itself (i.e., certain Turkish vulnerabilities) to trigger a cooperative behavior from Turkey (on the *structural* level). Finally, Turkey’s interests coincided with the US’ since the US is a hegemon and Turkey (similar to the majority of the international community) internalized and took for granted the rules of the game that the US has established globally.

According to the rational (game theoretical) model of cooperation problem, Turkey did not cooperate with the US in the War Against Iraq because, although Turkey was “coerced” (i.e., either threatened or persuaded by promise of reward) by the US, Turkey’s interests did not “coincide” with those of the US (on the *bargaining* level). Turkey did not cooperate with the US, because Turkey was trying to decrease its dependency on the US in order not to damage its relations with the EU (on the *structural* level). Finally, Turkey (similar to the majority of the international community) believed that the reasons, such as the existence of WMD in Iraq, do not justify the US operation in Iraq and that the US unilateralism has been damaging the already established international norms and the credibility of the international institutions created since WW II. Hence, the US unilateral actions and the attempt to unilaterally change the international norms (the rules of the game) in the post-September 11 era, were not internalized by Turkey (on the *hegemonic* level).

TABLES

Table 1: Three Faces of Power*

Form of Power	Goal of the Leader/ (Patron)	Time Frame	Client's Response	Visibility of the Exercise
BARGAINING	Compliance of the client with the decision of cooperation	Immediate, short-term	Direct resistance or compliance	Directly visible to observer
STRUCTURAL	Possessing general means to facilitate the attainment of the desired objective=cooperation	Medium term	Efforts to reduce or eliminate the dependency/ (vulnerability) to the leader (patron)	Indirectly visible to observer
HEGEMONIC	Acceptance by the client of the rules of the game, which are established globally by the leader (patron) - including the decision of cooperation	Long-term	No resistance or efforts to alter the situation	Not readily visible or accessible to observer

*The above table is a modified version of Krause's "Characteristics of different forms of power" in Krause, "Military Statecraft", p. 321.

Table 2: Turkish Exports to Iraq (in millions of US \$) before the Gulf Crises (1990).

Year	Amount	IFS World Total	% (100 x Amount/IFS World Total)
1980	134.8	2,910.1	4.626
1981	558.8	4,702.9	11.901
1982	610.4	5,746.0	10.595
1983	319.6	5,727.9	5.580
1984	934.4	7,133.7	13.100
1985	961.4	7,957.9	12.081
1986	555.3	7,465.7	7.448
1987	946.2	10,190.0	9.287
1988	986.0	11,662.0	8.389
1989	445.0	11,625.0	3.764

Source: Directions of Trade Statistics Yearbook. International Monetary Fund (1985, 1989, 1995).

Table 3: Turkish Exports to the US (in millions of US \$) before the Gulf Crises (1990).

Year	Amount	IFS World Total	% (100 x Amount/IFS World Total)
1980	127.4	2,910.1	4.372
1981	268.1	4,702.9	5.710
1982	251.6	5,746.0	4.367
1983	231.7	5,727.9	4.045
1984	368.2	7,133.7	5.162
1985	506.0	7,957.9	6.358
1986	549.3	7,465.7	7.367
1987	713.3	10,190.0	7.001
1988	761.0	11,662.0	6.475
1989	971.0	11,625.0	8.178
1990	968.0	12,959.0	7.213

Source: Directions of Trade Statistics Yearbook. International Monetary Fund (1985, 1989, 1995).

Table 4: US Military and Economic Assistance to Turkey (1991-97)

(millions of US \$)							
Military	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997
Grants	500	475	-	-	-	-	-
Loans	50	25	450	405	364	320	175
Economic	250	75	125	120	50	33	22

Source on Military figures: Federation of American Scientists, "U.S. Military Aid and Arms Sales to Turkey Fiscal Years 1980-1999", available at http://www.fas.org/asmp/profiles/turkey_fmschart.htm (accessed on May 15, 2009).

Source on Economic figures: Federation of American Scientists, "U.S. Security Assistance to Turkey, FY 1984 to 1999", available at <http://www.fas.org/asmp/library/reports/turkeyrep.htm> (accessed on May 15, 2009).

Table 5: Purchase of Weapons from the US (1991-99)

1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999
697	741	878	951	536	547	1.270	642	803

Source: Federation of American Scientists, "Total Dollar Value of U.S. Arms Deliveries to Turkey through the Direct Commercial Sales (DCS) and Foreign Military Sales (FMS) Programs from FY 1950 to 1998", available at <http://www.fas.org/asmp/library/reports/turkeyrep.htm> (accessed on May 15, 2009).

Table 6: Turkey-US Trade (1991-2000)

(millions of US \$)										
	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000
Imports	2.467	2.734	3.428	2.752	2.768	2.846	3.539	3.505	3.217	3.720
Exports	1.005	1.109	1.197	1.574	1.797	1.778	2.120	2.542	2.629	3.041

Source: US Census Bureau, "Foreign Trade Statistics", available at <http://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/balance/c4890.html> (accessed on May 15, 2009).

APPENDIX

In Lisa Martin's (1992) original model there are four basic types of *sanctioning episodes*:

- 1) Player 1 is a *strong* leader with a dominant strategy,
- 2) Player 1 is a *strong* leader without a dominant strategy,
- 3) Player 1 is a *weak* leader with a dominant strategy, and
- 4) Player 1 is a *weak* leader without a dominant strategy.

In this study, Episode 3 and 4 are omitted, since the leader - the US - is *strong*, i.e., Episodes 3 and 4 are not relevant to our case study.

1) Strong Leader without Dominant Strategy

If the leader state has no dominant strategy to sanction, the outcome depends on whether the non-leader state has a dominant strategy. This case has three possibilities:

- a) The non-leader state has a dominant strategy **not** to sanction at all,
- b) The non-leader state has a dominant strategy to sanction fully, or
- c) The non-leader state has no dominant strategy.

Figure 2: Non-leader has a dominant strategy not to sanction at all.

		Player 2 (Non-leader)	
		y=0	y=1
Player 1 (Leader)	x=0	(1,2)	(4,1)
	x=1	(2,4)	(3,3)

- Coercion (1) -

Players' Strategies

X=0 or Y=0 : players impose no sanction.

X=1 or Y=1 : players impose full sanctions.

Figure 3: Non-leader has a dominant strategy to sanction fully.

		Player 2 (Non-leader)	
		y=0	y=1
Player 1 (Leader)	x=0	(1, 1)	(4, 2)
	x=1	(2, 3)	(3, 4)

- Coercion (2) -

Players' Strategies

X=0 or Y=0 : players impose no sanction.

X=1 or Y=1 : players impose full sanctions.

Figure 4: Non-leader has no dominant strategy.

		Player 2 (Non-leader)	
		y=0	y=1
Player 1 (Leader)	x=0	(1, 1)	(4, 2)
	x=1	(2, 4)	(3, 3)

- Coercion -

Players' Strategies

X=0 or Y=0 : players impose no sanction.

X=1 or Y=1 : players impose full sanctions.

2) Strong Leader with Dominant Strategy

In this case, the outcome depends on whether Player 2, too, is *strong* with a dominant strategy. “Only if she is will she impose sanctions; otherwise Player1 (leader) will be stuck with unilateral sanctions” (Martin 1992: 20). This can be seen in the figures below. In **Figure 5**, both states are *strong* with dominant strategies. In **Figure 6**, however, the non-leader state does not have a dominant strategy.

Figure 5: Non-leader is *strong* with a dominant strategy.

		Player 2 (Non-leader)	
		y=0	y=1
Player 1 (Leader)	x=0	(1, 1)	(3, 2)
	x=1	(2, 3)	(4, 4)

- Coercion -

Players' Strategies

X=0 or Y=0 : players impose no sanction.

X=1 or Y=1 : players impose full sanctions.

Figure 6: Non-leader is *strong* without a dominant strategy.

		Player 2 (Non-leader)	
		y=0	y=1
Player 1 (Leader)	x=0	(1, 1)	(3, 2)
	x=1	(2, 4)	(4, 3)

- Coercion -

Players' Strategies

X=0 or Y=0 : players impose no sanction.

X=1 or Y=1 : players impose full sanctions.

Episode 1, *Strong Leader without Dominant Strategy*, is not a realistic situation in our study. It is clear that the US took the initiative in sanctioning Iraq and even consolidated this commitment with the Desert Storm. Therefore, the *Strong Leader without Dominant Strategy* sanctioning episode does not provide the correct model for our specific study on the bargaining level.

Episode 2, *Strong Leader with Dominant Strategy*, is the most suitable model (on the bargaining level, of course) for our study. It gives a more accurate description of the relationship between the strong leader state - the US - and the non-leader state - Turkey.

Figure 5 shows the situation of *coincidence*, where both states have a dominant strategy to sanction. Here, the equilibrium is where both states fully sanction. However, Turkey's economic (see Table 2: *Turkish Exports to Iraq Before the Gulf Crises*) and political costs⁵² from possible sanctions give the researcher the doubt that Turkey might not have a dominant strategy to sanction Iraq. Therefore, there is a big doubt whether Figure 5 could actually explain Turkey's cooperative behavior (even merely on the bargaining level). Figure 6, on the other hand, is a much more realistic description of the relationship between the two sanctioners and their preference orderings than Figure 5. Here, the equilibrium is where the US unilaterally sanctions while Turkey free rides. Through the use of *coercion*⁵³ the strong leader (the US) could induce the other state (Turkey) to change its policy (towards cooperation on sanctioning Iraq).

⁵² See also Gürel, "Turkey in a Changing World", p. 1-44.

⁵³ I define *coercion* broadly as the persuasion of a state by another to follow a certain course of action by use of either *threats* or *promises of reward*. In this study, I found no evidence to any visible *threats* that the US might have used against Turkey. However, there are certain *promises of reward* that the US used to gain Turkey's cooperation in sanctioning Iraq. The only visible *threat* against Turkey could be the international condemnation that Turkey might have got if it had not cooperated.

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