

**Critical Examination of the African Union's  
Peacekeeping Mission: A Case of African Union  
Mission in Somalia  
(AMISOM)**

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## **ABSTRACT**

The aim of this study is to critically examine the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). The study offers empirical reflection on the strength of realist theory using AMISOM as a case study. In this paper, the concept of national interest was analyzed through the lens of realist theory as to understand the motives underlying states engagement with AMISOM. Further, the research paper, reveals that national self-interest such as economic interest, political interest, military and security interest all have shaped the motives of states engagement with AMISOM. Thus has greatly jeopardize the long term stability in the country. My objectives, however, transcend beyond simply exploring the motives of states for participation in AMISOM. I also attempt to find out the root causes of Somalia conflict and to examine the challenges confronting AMISOM in their ongoing operation in Somalia. This research paper is divided into five chapter; the first chapter provides the introduction of the subject matter. The second chapter covered the literature review and theoretical framework of peacekeeping mission. It also covers a conceptual understanding of conflict, conflict resolution and peacekeeping. Chapter three provides the root causes of Somalia conflict, the international and regional engagement in Somalia and the roles, mandates and composition of AMISOM. The chapter four analyzes in detail the motives for states interventions in Somalia conflict and how it has jeopardize the potential for long term stability in the country. It also discusses the prospects and challenges confronting AMISOM. Finally, in the fifth chapter, I present conclusion and recommendations derived from the analysis.

**Keywords:** Conflict, Peacekeeping Operation, AMISOM and National Interest.

## ÖZ

Bu çalışmanın amacı, Somali'deki Afrika Birliği Misyonusunu (AMISOM) eleştirel olarak incelemektir. AMISOM ele alınarak realist teori çerçevesinde deneysel bir çalışma yapılmıştır. Bu tezde, devletlerin AMISOM ile ilişkisini anlayabilmek için yazıda ulusal çıkar kavramı realist teori altında analiz edilmiştir. Sonuç olarak, ekonomik çıkarlar, siyasi çıkarlar, askeri ve güvenlik çıkarları gibi ulusal çıkarlar devletlerin AMISOM ile işbirliğini açıklamaktadır. Fakat AMISOM uzun vadede devletlerin istikrarını tehlikeye atmaktadır. Bu amaçla, Somali'yi örnek olarak seçtim ve Somali çatışmasının nedenlerini ve Somali'de devam eden çelişken AMISOM faaliyetlerini inceledim. Bu araştırma beş bölüme ayrılmıştır. Birinci bölüm konunun giriş bölümüdür. İkinci bölümde literatür taraması ve barış misyonunun teorik çerçevesi oluşturulmuştur. Aynı zamanda çatışma, çatışma çözümü ve barışı koruma gibi kavramsal tanımlar yapılmıştır. Üçüncü bölümde ise ilk olarak Somali çatışmasının nedenleri üzerinde duruluyor. Daha sonra çatışma için yapılan uluslararası ve bölgesel işbirliği ve AMISOM'un rolleri, görevleri ve nitelikleri inceleniyor. Dördüncü bölümde ise detaylı olarak Somali çatışmasındaki devlet müdahalelerini ve ülkedeki istikrarı uzun vadede tehlikeye atacak potansiyelleri incelemektedir. Ayrıca, AMISOM'un karşı karşıya kaldığı zorlukları ve beklentileri ele almaktadır. Son olarak, beşinci bölümde yapılan analizler sonucunda varılan vargılar ve öneriler sunulmaktadır.

**Anahtar Kelimeler:** Çatışma, Barış operasyonu, AMISOM ve Ulusal çıka

# DEDICATION

I dedicate this thesis to my Mom, Mrs. Grace Nwando Obinwa, she is my inspiration.

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## LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AIAI	Al-Itihad al- Islamiya
AL	Arab League
AMIB	African Mission in Burundi
AMIS	African Mission in Sudan
AMISOM	African Union Mission in Somalia
APF	African Peace Facility
APSA	African Peace and Security Architecture
ASF	African Standby Force
AU	African Union
AUPSC	African Union Peace and Security Council
CA	Constitutive Act
CAR	Central African Republic
COIN	Counterinsurgency
CSIC	Council of Somalia Islamic Courts
DDR	Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration
EAC	East African Community
ECOMOG	Economic Community of West African Monitoring Group
EU	European Union
EUTM	EU Military Training Mission
EUNAVFOR	EU Naval Force
FPU	Formed Police Unit
HOA	Horn of Africa

IC	Islamic Court
ICU	Islamic Courts of Union
IDP	Internally Displaced Persons
IFOR	Implementation Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina
IGAD	Inter-Governmental Authority for Development
IGASOM	Inter-Governmental Authority for Development for Forces in Somalia
IPO	Individual Police Officers
KDF	Kenya Defense Forces
MINUGUA	United Nations Verification Mission in Guatemala
MINURSO	United Nations Missions for the Referendum in Western Sahara
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
NSC	National Salvation Council
OAU	Organization of African Union
OIS	Organization of Islamic State
OLF	Oromo Liberation Front
ONLF	Oganden National Liberation Front
ONUMOZ	United Nations Operations in Mozambique
ONUSAL	United Nations Observer Mission in EL SALVADOR
PDD	Presidential Decision Directive
REC	Regional Economic Council
RM	Regional Mechanisms

SFG	Somalia Federal Government
SFOR	Stabilization Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina
SLT	Senior Leadership Team
SNF	Somalia National Defense
SNM	Somalia National Alliance
SNM	Somalia National Movement
SPL	Somali Police Force
SPMU	Strategic Planning and Management Unit
SRCC	Special Representative of the Chairperson of the African for Somalia
SRRC	Somalia Reconciliation and Restoration Council
SSDF	Somalia Salvation Democratic Front
TFG	Transitional Federal Government
TNG	Transitional National Government
UIC	Union of Islamic Courts
UN	United Nations
UNAMSIL	United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone
UNAVEM	United Nations Angola Verification Mission
UNFICYP	United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus
UNHCR	United Nation High Commissioner for Refugee
UNICEF	United Nations Children’s Fund
UNITAF	Unified Task Force
UNOB	United Nation Operation in Burundi
UNSC	United Nation Security Council

UNSCR	United Nation Security Council Resolution
UPDF	Ugandan People’s Defense Force
UNOSOM	Nations Operation in Somalia
USSR	UNION of Soviet Socialist Republics
UNTAG	United Nations Transition Assistant Group
WFP	World Food Programme
WHO	World Health Organizations
WTO	World Trade Organization

# Chapter 1

## INTRODUCTION

Since 1970s, Somalia has been plunged into the scene of protracted rounds of conflicts, when the Somalia/Ogaden war of 1977-1978 caused a long period internal insecurity, internal displacement, worsening food security and refugee flows in the country. These problems were compounded by the complete collapse of the Somalia central government in 1991 (Menkhaus 2007, p. 31). What accompanied the collapse of Somalia central government was counter-productive and effective international intervention (Demeke, 2014, p. 251).

After the withdrawal of United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM) in 1995, Somalia was abandoned to its own fate. Afterwards, there was excessively localized polity that altogether failed to bring about a conventional entity that will produce sustainable peace and security in the country (Kenneth 2011, p. 1). Western states displayed lack of interest and commitment in their participation in peacekeeping in the Horn of Africa (HOA) and if a peacekeeping operation was needed to stabilize peace and security and as well support the newly established Somali national government, it would be authorized and deployed by the African states. Certainly, it is in this situation that African Union (AU) has authorized a range of peacekeeping operations, such as African Union Mission in Somali (AMISOM) to contain the convoluted conflicts that have submerged Somalia (Nudwimna2013, p. 1). The African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) since its establishment in January 19,

2007 has been trying to stabilize the complex security challenges and resuscitate the failed state of Somalia. Considering years of AMISOM attempts to stabilize peace and security in Somalia, Al-Shabab militias still continues to pose terror and misery in Somalia. Al-Shabab presently is still capable of effecting the course of events in Somalia and able to determine the security condition in Somalia (United Nations Security Council report 2014, 7/461). This study will focus mainly on the roles and choice of Uganda, Burundi, Kenya and Ethiopia engagement with AMISOM. However this study will discuss the participation and supportive roles of other external players in Somalia conflict. Though they are not the main focus of the study.

### **1.1 Statement of the Research Problem**

Since Somalia plunged into civil war in 1988, it has been submerged in decades of violent conflict. About fourteen peace conferences backed by the international society could not terminate the crisis and revamp the institutions. Efforts to enhance security, mainly through United Nations Peacekeeping mission could not successfully stabilize the country. Over the past two decade this conflict has caused several political headache and security challenges in the Horn of Africa (HOA) and above (Bruton and William, 2014). The presence of AMISOM since 2007 has not conquered Al-Shabaab nor weaken its capacity to launch attack, this has resulted to continued killing and displacement of civilians both in Somalia and beyond. Furthermore, states that have intervened in Somalia conflict have pursued their own national interests, agendas and priorities, thus undermining the peace process in the country (ibid).

To date, Somalia is still in chaos as Al-shabaab has continued to launch deadly attacks on Somalia and has posed a serious threat to security of East African states.



The Al-Shabaab Garissa University attack on Kenya Soil on April 2<sup>nd</sup> 2015 that killed 147 persons clearly displayed the extent of anarchy and violence in the Horn of Africa. This research is conducted in a bid to examine the choice of states for engaging with AMISOM and national interest has jeopardized the potential for long term stability of Somalia.

## **1.2 Justification of the Study**

This study attempts to examine and understand the choice of states for their engagement with AMISOM. There has been increasing interest to examine AMISOM. African Union Mission in Somalia is largest peacekeeping operation ever deployed by the African Union. However, this mission has failed to achieve its anticipated result. Accordingly Somalia has turned to a playing field for range of states pursuing their own national interest. However, there are several challenges facing AMISOM. This research therefore will contribute to the existing body literature and it is anticipated to benefit academicians and practitioners in initiating effective framework to successful AMISOM peacekeeping in Somalia in foreseeable future.

## **1.3 Research Questions**

- 1: What role does self-interest as defined by the realist theoretical framework of international relations play on the choice of states to engage with the AMISOM project?
- 2: How does the national interest jeopardize the potential for long term stability of Somalia?
- 3: What are the challenges facing African Union Mission in Somalia?

## **1.4 Hypothesis**

States participation in African Union Mission in Somalia maybe used as an instrument to foster state's national interest. In so doing this has greatly jeopardized the potential for the long term stability of the country.

## **1.5 Methodology of the study**

This research is a case study examination of peacekeeping specifically focused in the African Union's Mission in Somalia. Starting from a position that takes account of state interests from a realist theoretical perspective, the analysis of this research will be done by employing qualitative methods of interpretation of data which involve both content analysis and analysis of discourse. The study will draw from primary and secondary sources related to various actors relevant to the research questions providing both empirical and theoretical data. In adopting this approach, this research will employ reliable and relevant secondary data that will be collected from published scholarly articles and journals, government documents, extant literature work on peacekeeping operations, African Union peacekeeping journal, articles and some relevant books.

## **1.6 Structure of the thesis**

This thesis is structure in five chapters. Chapter 1 provides the introduction and historical background to the thesis. It points out the statement of research problem, justification of the study. It also sets out the research objectives, questions, hypothesis and the research methodology.

Chapter 2 outlines the review of literature and theoretical frame work for peacekeeping missions. The objective of this chapter is conduct a comprehensive

review on the scholarly work on peacekeeping missions and the problem this study attempts to work on.

Chapter 3 covers the overview of African Union Mission in Somalia, it involves the root causes of conflict in Somalia, the international and regional engagement in the Somalia conflict and the roles, composition and AMISOM mandate.

Chapter 4 is the analyzes the role of self-interest as defined by the realist theoretical framework of international relations play on the choice of states to engage with the AMISOM project. This chapter also points out the successes and challenges facing AMISOM.

Chapter 5 includes the conclusion and recommendations.

## **Chapter 2**

### **LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK**

The study of peacekeeping operations requires the conceptual comprehension of conflict, peacekeeping and conflict resolution. Therefore, this chapter will begin with conceptualization of conflict, conflict resolutions and peacekeeping operation. This chapter also will review the contemporary literature on peacekeeping operations and the theoretical framework of peacekeeping operations.

#### **2.1 Conceptual Understanding of Conflict**

Conflict indicates a struggle whether physical, emotional or verbal. It is a collision between incompatible opposing forces. It can also be understood as a state of nonconformity between individual's that could lead to violence (McCandles and Tony 2011, p. 28). Banfield (2005, p. 3) states that Conflicts emanates when two or more factions perceive their interests are not compatible, demonstrate hostile behavior or take measures that ruin other's ability to seek their own interest. However, conflict is always used in the same manner with violence, but violence is just means which a given party employed to address a particular conflict. Non-violent conflict can lead to social and political transformation, but when violence occurs, there will be a total breakdown of the social and political environment. Coser further argues that conflict is goal oriented and there is often something that we are striving to actualize through conflict. According to Tom Woodhouse et al (2008, p. 22) conflict is the quest for incompatible goals by persons or groups. Generally,

conflict occurs when persons or groups recognized a goal they desire to pursue as to satisfy their material needs, interests and values. When these recognized goals lead to attitudes that crop up against the needs, interests, and values of other persons or groups, conflict occurs. This definition of conflict by Tom Woodhouse et al encompasses all forms of conflict whether interpersonal or international and whether it is pursued through peaceful ways or through the application of force.

On the sources of conflicts, Evera (2001, p. 13) posits that conflicts erupts as a result of unequal distribution of resources, which can be an unfair distribution of power in the society, human instinct and the nature of internal political and economic system of a polity. In a study conducted by Collier and Anke (2004, p. 563), they identified denial of political rights, high inequality, division in religion, and exclusion in the society as the causes of violence in the society. They also argue that extortion of natural resources, poor public service corruption and economic mismanagement causes conflicts. Furthermore, Nhema et al (2008, p. 1) in identifying the causes of conflict in Africa argues that violent conflicts have plagued Africa and have taken a heavy toll on the African societies, economies, and politics, depriving them of their democratic possibilities and development potentials.

Nhema et al also contend that African conflicts have multiple roots which can be traced back to colonial violence, such as anticolonial war which was brutal and protracted. Other sources of conflicts are rooted in anxieties, antagonisms, aggressions, economic stagnation, manipulation and politicization of tribal and ethnic diversity by distrustful and bankrupt politicians. This leads to group awareness and generates conflicts that a directed against the state and other institutions which also

could spill to warlordism and terrorism (Nhema 2008, pp. 5-8). According to Marten (2007, 41), warlordism has plagued many failed and weak states, and the vicious and parochial rule of warlords dispossess states of the opportunity for enduring peace, security and economic development. Bulus (2014, p. 14) asserts that conflict can be grouped under the headings of; boundary adjustments, disputes between neighbors and internal problems. Conflicts occur from tugs and pulls of divergent allocation of resources, access to power and conflicting definition of what is just, right and fair, which may emanate from the pursuit of divergent interests, goals and aspirations by persons in their quest to dominate the society. In addition, Chikwanha (2012, p. 14) argues that conflicts in the East African Community (EAC) are mainly a struggle for the rights of citizenships by factions strongly pursuing non-discriminatory participation in the projects of the states. Chikwanha further asserts that greedy politics, contest over resources and bad governance have caused conflicts in EAC and have created a conducive environment for criminals. The conflicts in EAC are not really a request for resources and power allocation or consolidation, but are emanated in the refusal of such individual desires as recognition, identity and security.

## **2.2 Conflict Resolution**

The objective of conflict resolution is to resolve and provide solution to an existing violent conflict (Bar-Siman 2007, p. 10). If there is no conflict there would be no need for conflict resolution (Susan 1998, p. 7). Conflict resolution involves the identification of the reasons for the conflict and the preparedness to listen to the opinion of all the parties involved in the conflict, in order to provide a permanent solution to the conflict. Conflict resolution covers some strategies ranging from adjudication to arbitration, negotiation, mediation, peacemaking and peacekeeping (ibid). Conflict resolution encompasses the methods that can facilitate our

comprehension of the root cause of conflict and our collaborative practice of reducing the violence and improving of political process for reconciling and coordination incompatible interests (Bercovitch et al 2009, p 1).

### **2.3 Conceptual Understanding of Peacekeeping**

The word peacekeeping broadly applies to the deployment of international personnel to assist in stabilization of peace and security. Many literatures define peacekeeping as an effort to terminate or reduce conflicts or to avert hostilities. (Fortna and Howard 2008, p. 285), while some studies limit the definition of peacekeeping as an effort to ward off the re-occurrence of conflict once ceasefire is announced. According to V.P Fortna (2008, p. 4), peacekeeping in the Cold War was applied mainly in the interstate conflicts, (for instance, in Cyprus), the main purpose was to not to avert the recurrence of war, but instead to avert the direct intervention of Superpower. All peacekeeping missions include military personnel, however they may be armed or not armed and many missions as well involve civilian element (ibid).

The Blue Berets (2008, p. 18) defines peacekeeping as a method designed to maintain peace when conflict has been terminated and to help in executing agreements attained by the peacemakers. Peacekeeping in the course of years has advanced from its main military technique of ceasefire observation and separation of belligerents after inter-state conflict, to involve a more complex technique of several components that incorporate civilian, police and military, working collaboratively to assist establish the ground for sustainable peace.

Although peacekeeping mission has become the central intervention mechanism of United Nations (UNs), to contain and manage conflicts, peacekeeping is not specifically provided in the UN Charter. This practice was only improvised after UN Charter was written and has described to have fallen between the Chapter VI and Chapter VII of UN Charter. The General Dag Hammarskjöld, the former UN Secretary General, referred to it to fall between “Chapter 6 and a half” because it goes above traditional “Chapter VI11 pacific measures, but falls short of Chapter VII collective security actions” (Kofi 2014, p. 26). UN peacekeeping lies on the principle that neutral presence on the ground can mollify tension between the belligerents and assist to bring about lasting peace if the groups to a violence has the political will required to achieve the goal. Formally established as a technique of containing and managing interstate conflicts, peacekeeping has growingly been used in intra-state violence and civil wars, which is always characterized by numerous armed groups with different political goals and ruptured line of Command (Handbook on UNs Multidimensional Peacekeeping Operations Dec 2003, p. 1).

The practice of peacekeeping started in 1948, when UN first deployed its military observers in Middle East (UNPO 2008, p. 20). Fortna (2008, p. 6) in her study distinguishes four types of peacekeeping operations on consent-based and non-consent based, the first three types are consent-based, while the four one falls under Chapter VII missions;

### **2.3.1 Observation Missions**

This involve not much deployment of military and most times civilians observers to monitor a ceasefire, troops withdrawal and other forms of agreement, like referendum or election. The deployed military are not armed, and their primary



duties are just to monitor and report what they observe. For instance, United Nations Missions for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) in 1991 or the United Nations Angola Verification Mission 11 (UNAVEM) in 1991.

### **2.3.2 Interpositional Mission/Traditional Peacekeeping Mission**

This covers the deployment of few armed personnel similar to observation mission, these armed troops are expected to observe and report on compliance by comprehensive agreement, they as well in many cases, server to separate belligerents by stationing themselves in buffer zones or assist to disarm and demobilize the warring factions. For instance, United Nations Verification Mission in Guatemala (MINUGUA) in 1997.

### **2.3.3 Multidimensional Missions**

This involves the combination of military and civilian elements to execute a comprehensive peacekeeping agreement. Additional to the tasks performed by observer and traditional missions, these missions are to establish a secured and stable environment while invigorating the state's institutions such as police and the army in their capacity to provide adequate security with full regard to human rights and rule of law, organizing, conducting and supervising election. United Nations Transition Assistant Group (UNTAG) in Namibia 1989-1990, United Nations Observer Mission in EL SALVADOR (ONUSAL), 1991-1995 and United Nations Operations in Mozambique (ONUMOZ), 1992-1994 fall under this category.

### **2.3.4 Peace Enforcement Missions**

This includes considerable armed military personnel to maintain and secure compliance with the truce. The military men can apply force in the purpose of self-defense. Some peace enforcement operations are like multidimensional in nature, involving considerable military forces and civilian elements of multidimensional

operations. For instance, The Economic Community of West African Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) and United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone in 1991 (UNAMSIL) and Stabilization Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina (SFOR) and Implementation Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina (IFOR) in 1995.

## **2.4 African Union (AU) Approach to Peacekeeping Mission**

Most of the peacekeeping operations are conducted by the United Nations, but quite often, regional organizations have deployed peace mission to ensure peace and stability. Analyzing the African Union (AU) approach to peacekeeping operations would begin with the underlying situation in the African continent that has driven AU organized approach to conflicts settlements. United Nations has managed many peacekeeping operations of different categories, duration and level of success. However, the collapse of Soviet Union and the end of Cold War in the beginning of nineties drastically changed the security direction on the African Continent. The super powers interests to pursue important allies in the region had reduced. Furthermore, this changes took place during the period UN Security Council was evenly developing lusterless indifference towards the security challenges of the African region because super powers were becoming discriminative to get involved in oversea peacekeeping operations regarded as low strategic importance (Charles 2010, pp. 466-467). It is also obvious that many Africans are bothered by lack of effectiveness of the international actors in containing conflicts in the continents. For instance, the conflicts in Democratic Republic of Congo and Darfur have lingered with little or no progress. Moreover, the killings of the civilians and the swift flow of refugee together with internal displacement of the civilians persists. The terms like “failure” are now constantly ascribed to the operations of international organizations. Lacking progress, there is obvious demand for an alternative (Messner 2009, p. 40).

Further, because of the reality and lack of interest by the super powers in the UN Security Council that debate has been made that African should play more active role in containing its own security challenges (Charles 2010, p, 468).

In spite of Organization of African Union (OAU) Charter 1963 that provides a function for the organization in providing settlement to the African disputes in the continent by establishment of commission on negotiation, mediation and arbitration (OAU Charter 1963, Article VIII, No 4). Though the OAU has seriously emphasized the need for peaceful settlement of conflicts, it has a bad record in terms of participation in Africa's disputes. This however, has been ascribed to the "non-intervention" clause in the Charter of the OAU, and considering the fact that it was never created to play the role of peacekeeper, but rather an organ to enhance African Unity (Murray2004, p. 118). This event is unfold by SalimSalim, the former OAU Secretary General that "there is a strong viewpoint that disputes within states lie only within the competence and jurisdiction of the concerned states. Therefore OAU has no business involving itself and lacks the mandate to pursue its participation in settlements of conflicts in warring states. As a result, OAU has stood by in virtual helplessness as these conflicts have disintegrated states, damaged infrastructure and property, caused millions of deaths, created refugees and displacement of civilians and have inflicted intense pains and suffering to the innocent civilians" (SalimSalim, quoted in Cannie Peck 1998, p. 160).

The principal legal framework guiding peacekeeping operations mandated under the auspices of the OAU is primarily the UN Charter. The UN Charter VIII acknowledges the existence and the subordination role of regional agencies to

contain the security threats. However, the Charter stipulates that the main responsibility over global maintenance of security challenges is under the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). Further the Charter VIII of UN Charter maintained that all peacekeeping missions must first be handled amicably before application of force in the action of self-defense which would be reported immediately to UN (Dace 2014, p. 9).

The OAU had no provision for the application of force as a mechanism of conflict settlement in Africa. The OAU charter was structured under the premise of non-intervention and had recounted the use of several traditional conflict resolution such as conciliation, mediation and negotiation (Charles 2010, p 471). Since the creation of OAU in 1963, and due to its compliance to the principle of non-interference in the domestic affairs, OAU was latent and had limited its responsibility in resolving boundary disputes (Jannie 2012, p. 7). In an attempt to create a stronger response to security threats in the continent, the OAU in 1993 established a mechanism for disputes management, settlement and prevention known as Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution (Kristiana 2005, p. 9). The objectives of the mechanism were

- Anticipation and prevention of disputes from escalating into full war.
  - Undertaking of peacekeeping and peace building responsibilities if the full war occurs.
  - Performing peacekeeping and peace building functions in post-war situation.
- (ibid)

However, the establishment of this mechanism led to more but ineffective actions, since it was still confined to the principle of non-intervention (Jannie 2012, p. 8 & Kristiana 2005, p.10). The replacing of Organization of African Union (OAU) with African Union (Union) in July 9, 2002, significantly transformed the principles guiding the peacekeeping operations that was formerly executed under OAU (Charles 2010, p.484). The AU succeeded the OAU's main organ for Conflict Prevention Mechanism with the Peace and Security Council (Jakkie 2002, p. 1). The newly established AU Constitutive Act (CA) abandoned the old principle of non-intervention to the principle of non-difference in the internal affairs of its signatories (Marusa 2014, p. 4). The Article 4 (h) of the CA mandates the AU to intervene in the domestic affairs of its member state in case of grave situation such as war crimes, genocide and crime against humanity (ibid p.17).

Looking closely at this provision apparently denotes that it is intended at protecting the innocent civilians and permitting AU undertake necessary steps which involves military actions whenever there is grave situation even without the permission of the concerned state (Benedek et al 2010). Further, Makinda et al (2007, p. 12) argue that the transition of OAU to AU indicates that AU legal and institutional mechanisms were more equipped to efficiently and effectively contain all sorts of security threats and any manner of insecurity that occurred from political related issues in Africa.

In order to empower the Peace and Security Council (PSC) execute its objectives with respect to the AU peacekeeping operations, the article 13 of PSC Protocol stipulates that there shall be creation of an African Standby Force (ASF). The standby force "shall be constituted of multidisciplinary contingent with civilian and

military elements in their countries of origin and ready rapid deployment at the proper time” (PSC Protocol Article 13.1). AU Peace and Security Council recounts peacekeeping missions to be multidimensional. The AU adjustment to PSO encircles all the categories of peacekeeping explained by V.P Fortna in her book “Does Peacekeeping Work?” Most important, Dersso (2010, p. 7) states that ASF is not equivalent to national soldiers. The ASF actually is not a standing force, the standby adaptation is to be attained depending on the pledges from AU member states and their preparedness by the Regional Economic Council (REC) and Regional Mechanisms (RM).

Despite the transition of OAU to AU and the discard of principle of non-intervention to non-indifference in respect to peacekeeping operations, the activities of AU lack merits. According to Vogt (2005, pp.24-25), in spite of the multidimensional peace approach of AU, African and inter-governmental organizations still stay behind in establishing and deploying extensive peacekeeping missions capacity involving military, police and civilian elements. Vogt further argues that few examinations of AU conducted peacekeeping missions have indicated that AU has considerably limited as regards achieving the extensive demand. Further examinations of AU capacity in PSO shows conflicting results. The study conducted by Agoagye (2004) on African Mission in Burundi (AMIB) deployed in 2003, contends that the success of the mission was explicitly mixed. It cannot be said that AMIB completely enhanced the implementation of the agreement of ceasefire, since the rebel continued to fight, though the operation contained security threats in some parts of Burundi. The mission was not able facilitate the Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) scheme and the reincorporation of the ex-combatants in to the

civil society. In a study conducted on the challenges and constraints of African Mission in Sudan (AMIS) established in June 2014, Appiah (2005, p. 7) argues that AMIS since its creation has been a restrictive mission. Insufficient troops to protect the civilians, grave operational capacity and logistic deficiencies have engulfed AU's operation and so observers have seen the operation as ineffective and ineffectual. Further study by Feldam (2008) reveals that the military forces of AU are always not up to their responsibilities. In Sudan, AMIS failed to prevent the ongoing war in the Darfur area in Sudan. There are insufficient fund, insufficient trained armies, ineffective counter terrorism/ insurgency capacities and lack of political willpower among the AU member states to intervene effectively in Africa disputes (ibid). Another challenge on the paradigm shift of AU and its multidimensional peacekeeping arrangements explains that AU approach to peacekeeping lacks well-articulated framework for peacekeeping and its practices have been erratic, hasty and incautiously planned (Murithi 2009, p. 2).

Williams (2011, p. 5) demonstrates in his study of AU multidimensional mission that the commitment of the AU member states is questionable. He argues that up to the present time, Art4 (h) is still not invoked in order to justify military measures against AU member states. For instance, the case of Ivory Coast and Libya 2011 reinforces this fact and shows AU's reluctance and lack of commitment to invoke Art4 (h) even when UNSC recognized the conduct of crimes against humanity in those country.

Generally, AU peace operations rest on the involvement of handful of major military forces contributing states, such as Nigeria, South Africa, Ethiopia, Rwanda, Egypt,

Benin and Senegal. Its operations depend solely on external assistance which has undermined the credibility of PSC (Fisher et al 2010, p. 68).

To date, the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) is the canopy term for the AU mechanism maintaining peace and security in the continent (AU Handbook 2014, p. 23) and since 2003, a total of 12 peacekeeping operations have been conducted by African Union and they are laid out in the table below:

Table 1. African Union's Peace Missions, 2003-2013

MISSION	LOCATION	DURATION	SIZE	MAIN FORCE CONTRIBUTING state	TASK
African Mission In Burundi (AMIB)	Burundi	2003-2004	3,250	South Africa	Peace building
AU Military Observer Mission In the Comoros (MIOC)	Comoros	2004	41	South Africa	Observation
AU Mission in Sudan	Darfur	2004-2007	7,7000	Nigeria, Rwanda, South Africa, Senegal and Ghana	Peace and Civilian Protection
Special Task Force Burundi	Burundi	2006-2009	750	South Africa	VIP Protection
AU Mission for Support Election in the Comoros (AMISEC)	Comoros	2006	1260	South Africa	Election Monitor
AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM)	Mogadishu	2007 – Present	9000	Uganda and Burundi	Regime Support
AU Electoral Security Assistance to the Comoros (MAES)	Comoros	2007-2008	350	South Africa	Election Support



Democracy in Comoros	Comoros	2008	1350+450 Comoros	Sudan and Tanzania	Enforcement
AU-UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID)	Darfur	2008-Present	23,000	Ethiopia, Egypt, Rwanda and Nigeria	peace building and civilian protection
Regional-cooperation Initiative for the Elimination of Lord's Resistance Army (REC-LRA)	Uganda	2011-Present	3500	Central African Republic, DR Congo, South Sudan and Uganda	Elimination of Lord's Resistance Army
African Union led International Support Mission in Mali (AFISMAT)	Mali	2012-2013	7,469	Nigeria, Chad and Ivory Coast	Regime Support
African Union led International Support Mission in Central African Republic (AFISM-CAR)	Central African Republic	2013-Present	3652	Congo, Cameroon and Chad, DR Congo and Gabon	Peacekeeping and Civilian Protection

Sources: African Union Handbook, 2014 and African Union's Conflicts Management Capabilities (Paul 2011, p. 15).

## 2.5 Review of Existing Literature on AMISOM

According to Paul (2009, 514), AMISOM experience during their first thirty months of its operation provides significant understanding about some wider issues that involve the challenges of peacekeeping without any peace to keep. Moller (2009, p. 5) argues that the Somalia's war creates a situation that is feasible to examine many external actors, thus Somalia's neighbors, regional, international organizations, super powers and other forms of non-state actors. In point of fact, the Somalia's protracted

conflict has led to many studies in order to evaluate the capability of AU in managing and containing intrastate violence. However, ever since AMISOM was established, there have been several varying studies, perspectives, and conclusions not only in relations to its effectiveness, but also in regards to the challenges that have undermined the achievement of its mandates.

Some researchers have limited their studies on the basis of considering if AMISOM has had a positive impact or not, without considering the root causes of the violence. The study conducted by Andrews and Victoria (2007, p. 8) fail to consider the causes of Somalia's conflict, but instead focus only on the challenges facing AMISON operations. Further, Kathrine and Victoria argue that AMISOM has a lot of gaps and challenges that will be very difficult to redress. Similarly, Paul (2009, p. 527) did not identify the causes of the Somalia's conflict, but focus only on the challenges and constraints of the local and international political forces influencing AMISOM operation. Paul demonstrates that AMISOM is ill-conceived operation which cannot be said to have concluded to peace and stability in the Horn of Africa. Additionally, Cilliers, Henri and Festus (2010, pp. 4-5) recount that AMISOM has failed to effect considerably on humanitarian and security challenges and being threatened with failures cannot be able achieve peace in Somalia. Stefan and Christalla (2013, 168,) state that notwithstanding AMISOM's intervention, Somalia's conflict is still unresolved. On the contrary, Neus (2013, p.3), appraises the successes and the constraints that emanated in the AU's mission in Somalia. Neus argues that AMISOM has made some progress in the political dimension and Somalia is undergoing political transformation. Freear and Cedric (2013, p. 4) also contend that there has been a partial success on AMISOM operations and has made a considerable

success against Al-Shabaab, in the past 18 months. However, these studies do not mention the causes of Somalia's conflict and that questions the premises of their recommendations. Identifying the causes of conflict is very relevant to peacekeeping, because it helps to handle all the factors included in a conflict and devise a solution to resolve those factors.

Some scholars have examined the effectiveness of AMISOM through the analysis of particular factors. However, these findings are inadequate since some factors are being considered while others are avoided. For instance, Baker (2007), explains that AMISOM's effectiveness has been undermined by inability to dispatch troops to the location they are needed and get them well equipped. Neus (2013) demonstrates a different view that shortage of troops was the major factor weakening the AU's operations in Somalia. Coning (2007, pp. 1-12) his study posits that shortage of troops was not a challenge to AMISOM, since Africa has significantly contributed up to 28% of uniformed UNs peacekeepers. In his point of view, lack of funds, poor planning and management are the major factors undermining the effective of AU's peace operation in Somalia. Gjelsvik (2013, p. 4) identifies low level of female's involvement in AU's peace operation in Somalia as a major challenge. She points out that increase in the involvement of Women is necessary for AMISOM to actualize its mandate.

Some studies have been conducted to examine the contribution of international and regional organization on the AMISOM's effectiveness. Moller (2009, p. 23) argues United Nations intervention in Somalia had in the beginning of Somalia's crisis had a negative effects, and its support together with EU on AMISOM is minimal. Moller

states that the core actors are other subsidiaries like World Health Organizations (WHO), UN Children's Fund (UNICEF) etc. Assanvo et al (2007, 22) examined the contribution of EU to African Union' peace operations mainly in Somalia and demonstrate that the support offered for establishing and financing the African Peace Facility (APF) demonstrated on of the most significant projects of EU in the course of it approach to Africa. These scholars assert that AMISOM's cannot be effective without the support of the EU. Derblom et al (2008, p. 7) in agreement with Williams et al, contend that UN and EU are very effective in peacekeeping missions in Africa and that AMISOM cannot be effective without the assistance of UN and EU. In contrast, Wolff and Yakinthou (2013, 164) argued that African Union's peace mission effectiveness will still remain insignificant until AU reduces its dependence on external actors.

Notwithstanding, the availability of studies on AMISOM describe significant features and factors about Somalia's conflict, this literature still has some gaps which can be completed by this research. First, this debate over the merits and the effectiveness of AU multidimensional category of peacekeeping operations is handicapped by lack of critical examination of the roles and motives of AU contributing states. Second, we lack an adequate information on the challenges undermining effectiveness of AMISOM on the premise of its mandate. Third, local root of Somalia's conflicts have been neglected by the available studies on AMISOM. Finally, we know little about the theoretical understanding of AU's mission in Somalia. This study is aimed at rectifying these shortfalls. The study will draw from the perspectives of realist theory in international relations to explain the motive of states engagement in Somalia conflict and participation in AMISOM.

## **2.6 Theoretical Framework**

Many theoretical frameworks can be utilized to conceptualize and analyze peacekeeping missions, focusing on the nexus between state and inter-governmental organization like UN, NATO, EU and AU etc. that organize and manage peacekeeping missions (Mohan and Gippner 2013, p. 7). This research depended on the theoretical framework of realism to analyze the roles and motives behind states engagement in Somalia conflict and participation to AMISOM.

### **2.6.1 Realist Theory**

There are varieties of realist paradigm; structural neorealism (Waltz 1979), offensive realism (Mearshiemer 2001), classical realism (Morgenthau 1948), post-classical realism (Brooks 1979), defensive realism (Synder 1991) and neo-classical realism (Rose 1998). Although these realist may generate predictions and explanations that contradicts one another, but they all have a common ground on the issues of foreign policies priorities. States actions to international events are solely guided by calculation designed to foster their national interest (Freyberg-Inna 2004, p.2). Realism is a concept applied in several contexts in many different disciplines. In the field of philosophy, it is ontological approach considered to be the opposite of liberalism. In the branch of international relations, political realism is a framework of analysis that underlines that every nation behave within an international system of anarchy. The absence of overarching government is the cause of unending conflict between nations. States are often competitive actors striving for the national interest; survival and security (Walt 1998, p.30). This theory is usually apparent as the most dominant theory in international relations, in the 1930 - and 1940's, E. H Carr and Hans J. Morgenthau had great influence in international relations. They emphasized the unlimited power; the state could and should always seek for more power. They

further considered politics to be a competition between states. Since the beginning of the Second World War, policymakers and different leaders have seen world politics from a realistic perspective (Dunne & Schmidt 2005: 161-162).

According to Ashely (1981, p. 204), the concept 'realism' in the field of international relations involves (balance of power, anarchy, self-help, national interest, security dilemma). According to the theory of political realists such as Hans Morgenthau, international relations take place in the absence of world government. This means that the international system is anarchical and that international relations are best understood by focusing on the distribution of power among states. Realism maintains that universal moral principle cannot be applied to the actions of states (Morgenthau 1973, p. 9). Many realists have argued that realism controls and guides the entire state's actions in international relations. Realists center their assumptions on power politics, which derived its background in international politics. Realists have the assumptions that states are the key players in the international politics, and every state strives for power as to survive, morality has no place in the international politics (Gene, 2010). Realists view states to be the most important actor in international politics, and states primarily pursue their national interest (Cozette, 2004). Realism puts high value on sovereignty, state sovereignty is absolute which means that the state has the highest authority to implement laws (Dunne & Schmidt 2005: 172). Though realism emphasizes on the respect for state sovereignty, it does not entail that realism entirely desert interventions. The realist understanding on intervention is grouped into two dimensions. Legal intervention and political intervention. The legal dimension deals with cases such as non-interference principles. No players outside the sovereign state, be it other states or regional or

international organization are permitted to intervene in the internal affairs of another state as all state has the absolute right to govern and control within its territorial borders. Failure to respect this statement implies violation of territorial sovereignty. The political category is based on the realist perspective that states initiate a foreign policy that fosters and protects the national interests. When the national interest is at stake an intervention is conducted (Hoffman 2006, 669). If a nation has no interest, it will not engage in the intervention risking the lives of troops (ibid, 2006). States do not intervene in a conflict on moral ground, they intervene because they have something to benefit or have national interest to preserve or pursue (Glanville 2006, p. 154). The behavior of states are not determined by legal commitment and moral principles, but instead by consideration of interest and power. (Morgenthau 1970, p. 382). Realism explains that peacekeeping operations are conducted selectively, selectivity guides the decision of states to intervene or not. If there are gains involved in conducting an intervention, then states will be willing to participate (Wheeler and Bellamy 2005, p. 558). Primarily, states demonstrate unethical actions and focus on self-interests and power when pursuing their national interest (Rory, 2009). The overriding concern for the national interest is a matter of unavoidable necessity. All realists thus explicitly present pursuit of the national interest, and realist power politics, as a matter of ethical obligation (Jack 2005, p.50).

The school of political realism is influenced by the concept 'national interest'. National interests are viewed as an analytical instrument in identifying the objectives or goals of a foreign policy (Ishizuka 2013, p. 6). In the milieu of international politics, the concept of 'national interest' has impacted significantly in the study of international relations. According to both academics and practitioners, the national

interest hold be the main objectives of a state behavior in the international domain (Evans 1989, p. 9). Once national interests are discovered among states, they establish their goals, which then guide state policies and these policies permit government actions to be undertaken. In other words, a state continuously attaching to its national interest is possibly to advance towards its objectives (Lerche and Abdul 1979, 28). According to Morgenthau (1970, p. 382), interest is the center of all politics, therefore on the global stage, states are expected to pursue their national interest which guides and rules their actions in the global politics. Furthermore, Mearsheimer (2001, p. 21) contends that the paramount goal of a state is to acquire a hegemonic status in the international system. States often strive for more power and are willing if opportunity comes. Mearsheimer took a step further to say that states operate in a world of self-help, often behave according to their national interest and do not sacrifice their national interest for the other states or international society. In a similar vein, EH Carr (1939) explains that national self-interest better explain the international politics, and the idea of universal harmony of interest is unrealistic. What looks like international principle is nothing but a state policy under the interpretation of national interest in a given time. Holton (2009, p. 86) citing Waltz, provides that national interest operates like signal directing states how, when and where to go, and self-interest is the main orientation for states actions in international relation. Jack Donnelly goes far as to claim that main obligation of any state is the national community it represents. Therefore, the moral considerations are not relevant to it, and the primary concern for national interest is matter of inevitable necessity (Donnelly 2005, p.50).



Gieb (2009, p. 129) explains that states intervene in crisis of another state when their national interest is under threat especially their security interest. Drawing from the work of Geogout (2009, p. 238), under the realist perspective, national interest are defined in terms of military interest, economic interest and the prestige of a state. The realist requires states outlined national interest to override altruistic humanitarianism. What kind of factors have motivated states to engage in peacekeeping operations from the perspective of realist? The number one factor is national identity and prestige. Han Morgenthau contends 'whatever the ultimate objectives of a nation's foreign policy, its prestige is always an important and decisive factor in considering the prospect or pitfalls of its foreign a policy of prestige is therefore indispensable element of national foreign policy' (Morgenthau 1993, p. 95). From the realist dominant paradigm of international actions, Charles de Gaulle claims that states have no friends, but only interest. In other words, the *raison d'être* for states participation depend on the benefits of the intervening states, instead of the host states (Norrie 2014, p. 8).

The realist explanation of states engagement in peacekeeping operations is that states do whatsoever within their power to preserve and protect their national interest (Neack 1995, p. 184). From this explanation, engagement in peacekeeping operations, therefore is understood mainly as a tool to enhance the national interest of a state. Neack in her realist explanation argues that states contribute to peacekeeping in order to demonstrate themselves as regional power and show how powerful they are. Monnakgotlan (1996) concludes that peacekeeping is self-interest operation to create, maintain or enhance the position and power structure in the globe. Also, realist standpoint offers some certain motivations for engaging in

peacekeeping. For instance, states engagement to a specific peacekeeping missions is sometimes as a result of relationship with the recipient states, such as historical background and awareness of hostility between states. Another certain motivation is that the bigger states regional interest derives them to establish peacekeeping mission. In a national interest based global system, the peacekeeping operations are strongly backed by super powers or powerful states when their interests are related to the conflict. For instance, Britain has a specific interest in Cyprus as its former colony and that drove them to initiate peacekeeping mission in Cyprus, namely United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) in 1974 (Ishizuka 2004, p. 9). France has merely pursued its national interest in and supported government friendly to it against challenges that France considers as a threat. In 1980s and 1990s, France intervened in the Central African Republic (CAR) to back regimes it considered as pro-French (Macqueen 2006, pp. 2-3). Australian intervention in East Timor in 1999 was driven by its motivation to play of an active role in the region security and to protect its economic interest within the maritime resources between its own maritime border and East Timor (ibid). In the same context, Ishizuka (2004, p. 8) suggest that the participation of sates in peacekeeping mission is a hype appealing to international community, for instance, my state is doing something good for the world peace and this permits states to play the role of global policeman. States are particularly committing in a peacekeeping because they can increase their the scale of their military by enlarging military facilities and equipment out of the pockets of UN, EU, AU and other funding organization and countries (Galtung and Hveen 1978).

Additionally, it should be recognized that national self-interest has been pronounced by super power in the context of peacekeeping missions. On May 4<sup>th</sup>, Bill Clinton, Former US president signed the Presidential Decision Directive 25 (PDD 25). This directive comprehensively served national self-interest, assuring that American peacekeeping policy turns more cost effective and selective. The overview of the directive declares that “In proving our capabilities for peace operations, we will not discard or weaken other tools for achieving US objectives. If US participation in a peace operations were to interfere with our basic military strategy, winning two major regional conflicts nearly simultaneously, we would place our national interest uppermost” (US State Department, “The Clinton Administration’s Policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations”, 16 May 1994, p. 801).

Finally, from the realist perspective, therefore, it is considered that the frequency of the contribution of states to peacekeeping depends on how much a state’s national interest will be involved. The realist standpoint stemming from the national self-interest can be undoubtedly be agreed upon because participation in peacekeeping operations are not conducted based on any international law, but instead at the discretion of states. There are many supporters of realist perspective towards peacekeeping mission and their interpretations on prestige, financing, military grounds and historical background and few cases stated above, is regarded to be compelling. States can hardly decide to participate in peacekeeping or intervene in a conflict without a realist standpoint.

## **Chapter 3**

### **OVERVIEW OF ROOT CAUSES OF SOMALIA CONFLICT, REGIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL ENGAGEMENT IN SOMALIA**

This chapter encompasses the root causes of Somalia conflict, it will analyze the both international and regional peacekeeping interventions in Somalia. This chapter will also cover the mandate, composition and the financing of African Union's Mission in Somalia.

#### **3.1 Root Causes of Somalia Conflict**

Somalia composites the Horn of Africa including Kenya in the southwest and Ethiopia in the northwest. It is also bordered with Djibouti to the northwest, Gulf of Aden to the north and Indian Ocean to the East. In 1960, the former colonies of British Somaliland and Italian Somalia were amalgamated to become an independent Somalia. The primary economic activity in the country is pastoralism, majorly camels and exports of livestock are the main sources of revenue. Foreign aid was also another main sources of revenue in the country before the outbreak of civil war in 1991. Moreover, life was very stressful and lack of access to natural resources were common especially at the period of droughts before the Somali civil war (Mcferson 1996, p. 18). Somalis speak one language called Somali, they share one religion (Muslim-Sunni), and they share similar traditional cultures. Despite the clear homogeneity in Somalia, there are strong divisions in the country which is not based only on pastoralism, but more significantly on the lines of genealogy that many

Somalis fall to (Alasow 2010, p.3). The Somali conflict is immensely complex with many and interrelated roots. Single factor cannot explain the root causes of the conflict as many factors contributed to Somalis plunge into protracted warfare and societal violence (Menkahaus et al 2000, 213). The root causes of Somali conflicts are

### **3.1.1 The Colonial Legacy**

Many African independent states have suffered blight by the colonial legacy. Somalia inherited borders of enormous arbitrary arraying different groups under one canopy. This eventually led sovereign governments to seek for centralization policy as to establish national unity and integration. However, in most cases, the overall result instead of the required national cohesion, were instabilities and conflicts over the borders of states, power and call for national self-determination (Annan 1998, p. 3). The Somalia crises can be traced back to the splitting of Somalia into five different units by the European powers such as France, Italy and Britain. France took the Northern Coast, known today as Djibouti, Italy had one unit called Somaliland, Britain took two units known as Northern Kenya Districts and British Somaliland, while the rest was taken by Ethiopia which is known as the Ogaden (Woodward 1996, p. 50). Since the unification of Italian and British Somaliland which made up the sovereign republic of Somalia in 1960, Somalia has attempted to reclaim and reoccupy her inhabited territories in Ethiopia, Kenya and Djibouti. This, in turn has not only put a strain in Somalia relationship with her neighbors, but also instigated conflicts with her neighbors and the eventual collapse of Somalia state (Alasow 2010, p. 11).

### **3.1.2 The Clan System**

Another fundamental factor in Somalia's conflict is clan system or lineage identity. Although Somalia speak one language, share one religion and have only one ethnic group which is not easily found in African situation. Clan system has prevented internal unity in the country (Mulugeta 2009, p. 9). The Somali society is divided into two major clans such as the Sab and the Samale, which is split into six sub-clan families; Dir, Isaag, Darod, Digil and Rahanweyn (Teutsch 1998, p. 18). The clans system to a very large extent describes how Somalis form the basis of cohesion and opposition. It explains the social, economic and political context of Somalia. More than 80 percent of Somalis survive as pastoralists, without the characteristics of centralized system of government, supporting loyalty to the clans. Clan identity is stronger than other identity in Somalia and above the clan, the sense of community is lacking. Each clan attached less importance and meaning to the affairs of other clans. The majority clan do not only prohibits the minority clans from political and social participation, but also abused and harassed them (Freedom House Report 2003, pp. 61-62). Clannism influences inclinations toward separation and disintegration that make political cohesion and agreement very short-lived and elusive. Almost all deadly conflicts in Somalia have been against one clan to the other. For instance, at the time SiyadBarre ascended to power through coup d'état in 1969, he made a pronouncement to proscribe clannism. Unfortunately, Barre continuously depended on the divide and rule strategy between the clans in Somalia in order to hold sway over power (Menkhaus et al 2000, p. 214). As Lewis (1993) noted, Barre depended heavily on the undependable advantageous arming and bribing clans to revile the claims of his oppositions. Consequently, the separation of clans led to distrust, suspicion, struggle for resources and political gains among various clans. This

eventually plunged Somalia into complete chaos and statelessness (Memar 2014, p. 252).

### **3.1.3 Ogaden War of 1977-1978**

The Ogaden war of 1977-1978 also known as Ethiopia/Somalia war was initiated by the republic of Somalia in order to reclaim and reoccupy her lost territories. These included the Ogaden that remains part of Ethiopia. This trend turned into violent in the Ogaden, which Somalia was defeated by Ethiopian with the support from Eastern Bloc allies and the USSR (Nkaisserry 1997, p. 9). Barre lost domestic legitimacy as a result of the defeat and withdrawal of Somali's army from Ogaden. This instigated internal opposition which led to foiled coup d'état by aggrieved military officer and subsequently there was emergence of rebel movement against Barre which was supported by Ethiopia which finally aggravated Somalia conflicts (Mulugeta 2009, p. 10).

### **3.1.4 Said Barre Dictatorship**

The Somalia conflict has its root cause in a General Siad Barre bloodless military coup d'état in 1969. Barre's regime was flagrantly corrupt, dictatorial and patronage based. The degree of political suppression under Barre's government was highly inflammable factor in the Somalia's conflict. In order to retain power, he resorted to terror, killing and targeting his opposition for torture and imprisonment (Gersony 1989, p. 19). The high extent of political suppression employed under Barre's regime had a negative effect in the mind of the Somalis. It built up the Somalis with the impression that government is not a mechanism of good governance, but instead an instrument for repression and marginalization by one faction over the other. In point of fact, the attempts to restore Somalia have actually aggravated armed conflict, this is because control and revive the state was considered a zero-sum game by the

Somalis (Menkhaus 2003, p. 407). Finally, Somalia was wrecked with civil war, criminality and starvation because of struggle to oust Barre. When he was eventually toppled in January 1991, there was strong contest for power by guerrillas and militia based on loyalties to clan, which descended the country in full war (IDMC 2006, p. 17).

#### **3.1.4 The Legacy of Cold War**

Another crucial factor in Somalia's crisis was the effect of the Cold War. For example, in the era of Cold War, the former Soviet Union and U.S strongly contested for the influence and supremacy in Somalia, because of her strategic value, particularly in gaining and maintaining access to the Middle East oil. Barre gained military and economic assistance from both collapsed USSR and United States of America. For instance, Somalia gained military assistance from former USSR till 1977 when Soviet diverted its assistance to Socialist government in Ethiopia. It is estimated that arms USSR delivered arms worth \$250 million into Somalia within 1973-1977. United States and its allies rendered huge military support to Somalia. Arms worth \$525 million was estimated to have been delivered by U.S and her allies to Somalia within 1981 to 1991 (Hogendoon et al 2003, Para 15 and 16). The Somalia strategic importance finally diminished with the fall of USSR and the country was abandoned by the foreign donors without economic and political assistance. Menkhaus et al (2000, p. 213) underline that the withdrawal of super powers assistance from Somalia brought the end of Somalia's national cake derived externally which empowered Barre government to utilize patronage as a binder holding together a recalcitrant Somali society and the remarkable reduction of that national cake after the Cold War emanated unavoidable violent conflict over the remaining resources. Furthermore, the USSR and U.S military stockpile enabled



Barre's regime to arm his own clan loyalists which escalated the inter-clan conflict and the total collapse of the (Zartman, 1995).

### **3.1.5 Ethiopian invasion of Somalia**

The America-backed Ethiopian invasion of Somalia in 2006 was a combustible factor in the Somalia conflicts. According to Bruton (2010, p. 9) the presence of Ethiopian troops instigated complex insurrection in Somalia, Many Somalis were recruited into the resistance movement to fight against Ethiopian troops. In addition to the invasion, Somalia and Ethiopia backed various armed factions in their territories. For instance, there was establishment of Somalia Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF) in Ethiopia, and backed by the Ethiopian troops to wage guerrilla across the frontier (Ahmed and Herbold 1999, p. 11).

Evidently, the Somalia protracted conflict has several consequences in the states, which involve lawlessness, absence of legal government in the state, famine, displacement of innocent civilians, loss of human lives and livelihoods, smuggling, human trafficking and piracy. This conflict led to the emergence of various clan-based and Islamic fundamentalism ranging from Al-Ithida, the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC), Hizbul Islam and the deadly Al-Shabaab that influence the present of political milieu in Somalia (Dagne, 2011).

### **3.2 International Engagement in Somalia Conflict**

The humanitarian crisis, famine, and civil war after the collapse of Somalia state in 1991 necessitated the voting of UNSC Resolution 773 on January 23 calling to unanimously expand humanitarian aid, promote cease fire and complete arms embargo on Somalia (UNSCR 733, 1992). Subsequently on April 24 1992, UN augmented its aid in Somalia with UNSC Resolution 751 that authorized the

deployment of fifty man (UNOSOM1) to monitor the ceasefire, enhance effective termination of hostilities and to ensure the distribution of humanitarian aid to Somalia especially to Mogadishu (UNSCR 751 1992). Unfortunately, UNOSOM1 that was deployed with the agreement of the leaders of the two major factions in Somalia, Ali Mahdi Mohamed (United Somalia Congress) and General Mohamed Farah Aideed (Somalia National Alliance) failed to deliver its mandate, because of the slow and continued lawlessness, violation of ceasefire and the persistent looting from the warring groups (Glanville 2005, p. 2 Lofland 1992, p. 56 and Mulegeta 2009, p. 16).

The failure of UNOSOM1 led President Bush to deploy 20,000 American troops in Somalia on 4 December as a Unified Task Force (UNITAF) also called Operation Restore Hope under UNSC Resolution 794 (Glanville 2005, p. 4). UNITAF was expected to supervise the ceasefire consent, however the worsened security situation in Somalia, including the killing of several Pakistani peacekeepers drove UNSC to transform the mandate of UNITAF, by the adoption of Resolution 794 on December 3 1992. UNITAF forces should act under the Chapter VII of UN Charter with the right to employ every necessary military measure to guarantee the distribution of humanitarian assistance (Buer 2001, p. 1). Eventually, there was expansion of UNITAF to UNOSOM11 on 26 March 1993 under the UNSC Resolution 814. Nevertheless, UNOSOM 11 had many challenges, such as, lack of administration and logistics and land and lack of command and control at the UNISOM 11 level, reduction of American troops and the decrease of UNOSOM 11 infantries which swelled the operations of militias in Somalia (ibid).

Fighting between the militia and the UNOSOM 11 led to the death many innocent and guilty Somalis, 17 American troops and about 150 UNOSOM 11 personnel between June and October 1993. Subsequently, to do this incident, in March 1995, there was withdrawal of American troops out from Somalia and reduction of UNOSOM11 forces in March without their mission being fulfilled (MacQueen 2002, p. 215).

### **3.3 Regional Engagement in Somalia Conflict**

Somalia is signatory to many regional organization, such as the African Union (AU), Inter-Governmental Authority for Development (IGAD), the Arab League (AL) and the Organization of Islamic State (OIS). Over the past two decades the platforms of OIS and AL have been narrow in voting resolutions that call for the termination of Somalia conflict. However, AU and IGAD since 1991 respectively have engaged in Somalia conflict (Elmi 2010, p. 100).

At the second stage of engagement in Somalia, military invasion was followed with regional attempts to dominate the role of peacemakers after the international actors had apparently failed to stabilize Somalia. Ethiopia was assigned by IGAD and OAU, now AU as the main organizer of the peace process in Somalia (ibid, p. 102). However, before the departure of UN and American troops from Somalia in 1995 and after the collapse of Barea Government, AU under the umbrella of IGAD, in June and July 1991 in Djibouti attempted to broker peace deal among Somalia warring factions. These peace attempts were unsuccessfully because General Aideed, the most powerful warlord refused to accept Ali Mahdi as the Somalia new president (Bradbury and Healy 2010, p. 10; Mulugeta 2009, p. 26).

The failure of Djibouti peace conference culminated to 1993 United Nations backed peace conference in Ethiopia which also failed due to strong competition among the warring groups in Somalia. Accordingly, Ethiopia in November 1996 hosted a national peace conference in Sodere, 27 faction leaders attended, but leaders of Somalia National Movement (SNM) National Movement and Somalia National Alliance (SNA) failed to participate. The conference led to the creation of a National Salvation Council (NSC) a decentralized system of government (Malito 2011, p. 142). The proceedings of this conference was strongly rejected by some factions, and the competing interest in the region made the Egyptian government to sponsor another conference in Cairo in 1997 and that led to the formation of two administration in Somalia (Bradbury et al 2010, p. 13).

Regional peacemaking attempts were reinvigorating on July 10<sup>th</sup> 2000 in Arta when the government of Djibouti sponsored the National Peace Conference of Somalia. The Arta conference achieved significant political success in August 2000 by creating a Transitional National Government (TNG) the first authority after Barre was ousted. TNG was under the leadership of SalatAbdulqasimHassn. It achieved national, regional and international recognition (Heatly 2009, p.9). The national recognition for TNG was limited, some warlords do not support the leadership of Abdulqasim and in March 2001, the oppositions created Somalia Reconciliation and Restoration Council (SRRC) headed by Yusuf Abdulhi, with the sponsorship of Ethiopian government to weaken TNG (ibid, p. 10).

The atmosphere of global insecurity that accompanied the 9/11 attack on America, Somalia being a failed state became a safe haven and breeding place for global

terrorists. The reputation of the TNG suffered the spreading influence of IC and this was very clear when the IC was admonished to attend the international peace conference that led to the integration of TNG AND SRRC to form Transitional Federal Government (TFG) in 2004. At this point, UIC was transformed to political dynamic (Grubeck 2011, p. 12 and Healy 2009, p. 13). In December 2004 after the formation of TFG, the reputation of IC grew wider as they were able to stabilize some level of peace in Mogadishu. This led to the IC to establish o a new canopy called Council of Somalia Islamic Courts (CSIC) in Somalia, with Ahmed Sheikh Shaif as the chairman and Sheikh Aweys as the consultant of the union. Sheikh Aweys appointment as the CSIC consultant attracted the intention of America and Ethiopia because he has placed on UNs sanction list in 2001 for his links with terrorism. Furthermore, the courts created another form of warring and politicized sect called Islamic Courts of Union (ICU). Somalia was hit with the strongest inter-factional violence and ICU fought with the weak TFG. In the course of months, ICU captured more than 7 out 10 province in the southern part of Somalia, which Mogadishu (HRW 2007, p. 20).

In the climate of severe fighting between TFG and UIC, followed by the fast advances by the ICU, it was clear that government of Abdulahi Yusuf, the president of TFG lack enough support to function. IGAD contended with the divergent interest of it member nations as they attempted to decide how to back the TFG. The controversial issue besieging IGAD was the employment of intervention force in Somalia (Healy 2009, 10). To this end, IGAD on January 31 2005 in Abuja, Nigeria mandated the deployment of Peace Support Mission to Somalia (IGASOM) with the endorsement of African Union Peace and Security Council (AUPSC) in September

2006 (IGAD Communiqué 2005). Additional UNSC Resolution 1725 authorized the deployment of IGASOM in Somalia by IGAD and AU signatories. The UNSC operating under Chapter VII of UN Charter stipulates that state bordering Somalia “would not deploy troops to Somalia” (UNSC R 175, 2006). However, IGASOM fail to stabilize peace in Somalia, its mission portrayed mutual suspicion, power struggle among member nations, lack of resources and absence of neutrality in their activities (Healy 2009, p. 14).

In spite of the IGAD attempts to restore peace in Somalia through organizing several peace conferences, the involvement of some Somalia neighbors have worsened the conflict instead of resolving it. According to Elimi (2010, p. 103), it was a wrong decision for the regional organization to assign Ethiopia as the coordinator of the peace reconciliation process in Somalia, without considering the historical animosity between Somalia, Kenya and Ethiopia. In similar view, Barise and Abdi (2006, pp. 39-42) contend that expecting Kenya and Ethiopia to settle the conflict among Somalia faction is like putting foxes in the henhouse. Ethiopia’s mediating in the Somalia is the major factor in protraction Somalia crisis. It had crippled the two major peace agreement (1997 Cairo Agreement and 2000 Arta). Ethiopia a well position and powerful country is a Somalia’s hostile neighbor maintain collapsed and fragmented Somalia. It also interested in creating many clan that are aggressive to each other in Somalia, but maintain good ties with Addis Ababa. Kenya has a significant stake instituting their own proxy regime in Somalia and has protracted Somalia conflict as long as it can. By maintaining divided Somalia, Ethiopia believes it can prevent any forms of aggression from Somalia. Another factor that perpetuated the Somalia conflict is the emergence of warlords and factions that have the interest

attached to the existing status quo instead of stability and peace. These warlords because of their benefits from the ongoing conflict have employed intimidations and violence to thwart any peace agreement (Menkhaus et al 2000, p. 216).

By December 2006, Ethiopia unilaterally launched a full scale military attack against ICU in Mogadishu on the ground of self-defense in the face of danger or against any terrorist threat and with the consent of legitimate regime (Warbrick and Yihdego 2007, p. 8). The Ethiopian military invasion on Somalia was fiercely resisted by Al-Shaabaab and there was outright rejection of Ethiopian presence in Somalia by the Somalis. Ethiopian troops were pulled out from Somalia, and the reluctance of UN to mandate peace keeping operation in Somalia after the withdrawal of Ethiopian troops drove the AU to deploy AU peace force (AMISOM) in 2007 with the authorization of UNSC (Peace AU, 2007 a).

### **3.4 African Union Approach to Somalia Conflict**

Despite the provision under article 4(h) of the AU Constitutive Art ensuring AU to intervene in the domestic affairs of its member state in respect of serious situation, AU abandoned the course of restoring peace and security in Somalia to UN and IGAD. However, it can be argued that IGAD attempts to restore peace in Somalia was authorized by AU.

#### **3.4.1 AMISOM Mandate in Somalia**

AMISOM was created from the decision of AU to deploy peacekeeping force in Somalia under the resolution 1774 authorized by UNSC on February 20<sup>th</sup> 2007 to prevent security vacuum, protect TFG and enforce arms embargo, and to support reconciliation process in Somalia (UNSC Resolution 1774). The initial authorized six months mandate has severally been extended and renewed. The latest extension of

AMISOM mandate was on October 24 2014 under UNSC Resolution 2182 which is expected to last until November 30 2015. AMIOSM mandate since 2007 has centered on the need to support and protect the Transitional Federal institution, enhance compliance on arms embargo, provide humanitarian assistance and to create enabling atmosphere for long-term peace and security stabilization and post-conflict rehabilitation in Somalia. The Resolution 2182 provides AMISOM with wider mandate in order to enhance political stability and improve stability in and beyond Mogadishu by exerting pressure on Al-Shabaab. (Williams 2009, p. 516).

At the initial creation of AMISOM, 8000 troops were mandated to be deployed to Somalia, Nigeria, Burundi, Ghana, Malawi and Uganda promised to commit their troops. Unfortunately, only 2613 troops were deployed from Burundi and Malawi. Between 2007 and 2008, 1600 Ugandan soldiers and 100 Burundian troops were dispatched to Mogadishu. By the middle of 2009, 4300 soldiers were deployed from Uganda and Burundi (ibid, 519). The reluctance to deploy soldiers was due to lack of fund, lack of interest, logistic problems and deadly Somalia environment. These shortfalls caused the contingent of AMISOM to be insignificant on the battleground (Anderson 2014, 5). According to Paul Williams, Ugandan full commitment in deploying troops in Somalia is a vigorous interest of Uganda President, Museveni in his quest to become the East Africa regional leader and Uganda bid to be accepted as Non-permanent member of UNSC (Williams 2009, p. 519).

After the deployment of AMISOM under the UNSC Resolution 1774 on February 2007, its mandate has been reviewed by series of factors involving 40 UNSC Resolutions. AMISOM to date is operating with directions United Nation Political



Support Office for Somalia (UNSOA) established on 19<sup>th</sup> January 2009 under UNSC Resolution 1863 to help to enhance peace reconciliation efforts, address and provide assistance to AMISOM troops and officers (UNSCR 1863).

### **3.4.2 The Structure of AMISOM**

The mission is under the leadership of the Special Representative of the Chairperson of the African for Somalia (SRCC) Ambassador Maman S. Sidikou from Niger Republic. AMISOM is made of three components in order to actualize its mandate. The military component is controlled by the AMISOM Force Commander, Lieutenant General Silas Ntigurirwa from Burundi. The police component is controlled by the acting Police Commissioner Benson Oyo-Nyeko from Uganda and the Civilian Component is under the supervision of SRCC and his deputy Hon. Lydia WanyotoMutende from Uganda. The SRCC (Halane 2012, p. 64).

The military component is the most important of the three components of AMISOM. Its mandate is to coordinate Peace Support Operation, establish the necessary environment for the conduct of performance of humanitarian activities and final handover of the AMISOM to UNPO. It also provides protection and support to the Federal Institution in Somalia and some key infrastructures such as seaports and airports. The AU member states were mandated under the UNSC Resolution 2093 on March 6 2013 to deploy a total number 22, 126 soldiers for the mission. The military component is consist of 4395 soldiers from Ethiopia, 3664 soldiers from soldiers from Kenya, 850 soldiers from Sierra Leone, 1000 soldiers from Djibouti, 5432 soldiers from Burundi and 6223 from Uganda (AMISOM Press Release 2015 a). The military troops are headed by a military commander that is rotational within the six troops contributing states are deployed within the different six regions in the country

with a regional commander (Human Right Watch 2015, p. 15). The Police Component is mandated to observe, advice, and to train the Somali Police Force (SPL) in order to achieve and maintain effectiveness and credibility in accordance to international principle. To date, the component has over 515 police force, which is made up of 230 Individual Police Officers (IPO) from Ghana, Uganda, Sierra Leone, Zimbabwe and Nigeria, 280 Formed Police Unit (FPU) from Uganda and Nigeria and 5 Senior Leadership Team (SLT) from Nigeria, Ghana, Burundi and Uganda (AMISOM Press Release 2015, b). The Civilian Component key function is to assist the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) in restoring functional state institutions and effective delivery of services to the people of Somalia. Other roles of the component is to liaise and dialogue with the relevant stakeholders to enhance conciliation in Somalia, to assist in disarming, demobilizing and reintegrating of armed factions to back to the civilian society. The component is comprised of 6 units; Security and Safety, Political, Humanitarian, Public and Administrative unit, Gender and Civil affairs unit (AMISOM Press lease 2015, c).

The safety and security unit is obliged with the role of ensuring the protecting the AMISOM programs and activities as to safeguard the property and civilian staff. The political unit observers, explains, advises and reports on the Somalia political developments. The Humanitarian unit works in collaboration with other humanitarian agencies; World Food Programme (WFP), World Health Organization (WHO), United Nation High Commissioner for Refugee (UNHCR) and Non-Governmental Organization (NGO) in to coordinate and share information. The public administrative unit is responsible for providing and communicating information about the activities of AMISOM to the Somalia and international

community. The unit ensures that through the transparent journalism AMISOM will be accountable to the people of Somalia and international partners. The gender unit is charged with the responsibility of reflecting the AU determination on the enhancement of gender equality and to report and resolve gender-related matters. It also promote the application of the directives of AU and UN on gender equality in Peacekeeping and UNSC Resolution 135 on women. Finally, the civil affairs unit is tasked with the function of implementing AMISOM at the local government level in Somalia (ibid).

### **3.5 European Union Support to AMISOM**

EU intervention in Somalia was due to failed United Nations interventions in the country. Initially, European Union was reluctant to provide assistance to AMISOM due to the controversial American-support Ethiopian intervention in Somalia and lack of interest in AU member states (Balossi 2011, p. 79). However, motivated by the security interest in the maritime waterways to Europe which is threatened by piracy, therefore EU Council on the 23 April extended its military support from African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) to involve military support component for the establishment of AMISOM. EU since 2007 has been assisting Somalia in developmental programme, humanitarian aid and diplomacy through African Peace Facility (APF), which is EU mechanism to back peace and security in African continent through the support of EU signatories. It has established operational, financial and diplomatic initiative in Somalia. On the operational scheme, EU has approved four specialist on civil engineering, budgeting, commutation and human resources to AMISOM Strategic Planning and Management Unit (SPMU) in Addis Abba in order to offer significant technical and strategic directives to AMISOM officials. EU also has initiated three operations to contain security threats; (1) the EU

Naval Force (EUNAVFOR/Atlanta Operation) to detect and combat piracy off Somalia waterways, and to support AMISOM in Safeguarding World Food Programme (WFP) vessels distributing food to poor Somalis. (2) EU Military Training Mission (EUTM) to train prospective Somalia security force and (3) the EUCAP-Nestor to improve regional maritime strength of countries in the Horn of Africa (EU 2012, a). On the diplomatic part, EU has backed several peace process attempts in Somalia, it also has involved in regular dialogue with international stakeholders and regional agencies to back national peace conference (Giovanni et al 2009, 260). On the part of finance, EU has significantly supported AMISOM through APF. In September 2013, EU pledged € 1.8 billion to AMISOM to assist end over 20 year's crisis in the country. EU Financial contribution to AMISOM since 2007 to 2013 total up to € 579.3 million. This covers troop allowances, police officers and civilian staff salaries, and transportation, housing communication and medical costs. EU financial contribution to AMISOM in 2013 worth over € 200 million (African Peace Facility Annual Report 2013, p. 18).

Despite huge EU support to AMISOM, it has not deployed her troops on ground in Somalia, according to (Norheim 2013, p. 1) EU peace support activities in Arica can be explained as proxy form of peacekeeping. EU chooses to support AMISOM politically and financially instead of sending boots on the ground. EU member states seem to be unwilling to deploy their patrol boats, surveillance aircraft and naval forces to the Somalia coastline (Ehrhart and petretto 2012, p. 35).

EUNAVFOR has not delivered its mandate, in the area of stopping and combating piracy. Though it has reduced the success rate of the pirate, but the activity of the pirates still flourishes. The pirates demand more ransom by enhancing their skills and

capabilities collecting more ransom than before. Second, EUNAVFOR has been able to deter pirates from holding WFP vessels, but not certainly for the distribution of humanitarian aid to the poor Somalis, which is prevented by the coordinated theft by criminals, militias and the security forces of the TFG (ibid). More than 90% of the arrested pirates were released without trial due to lack of interest and capacity by states and these has encouraged piracy to flourish in the region. Though, there is international jurisdiction to try a pirate, but there no international obligation to execute that, which entails that it falls with the discrete of a state to prosecute or not (Van et al 2012, p. 334).

### **3.6 Non-Regional Assistance to AMISOM**

Apart from the assistance given to AMISOM from regional and international organization such as UNs and EU, few states in their individual strength instead of multilateral actions have played a role in funding and assistance the mission. AMISOM do not have direct advantage to consolidated source of funding like UN peacekeeping Operation, thus it receives financial assistance through several sources and mechanism including individual states contribution to UNs managed trust fund for AU mission in Somalia, bilateral assistance to troops contributing states, and through states direct contribution to the AU (Global Humanitarian Assistance 2012, p. 15). The main bilateral supporters of AMISOM is America and Britain. America has played an extensive role in funding and supporting AMISOM, it has offered training for the force re-deployment in Burundi and Uganda and has provide a support programme AMISOM officials. America in her support to AMISOM has supplied equipment for force protection and counter-terrorism training to energize the capacity of AMISOM to combat Al-Shabaab, while Britain has assisted the

troops contributing states and also donated to AMISOM trust fund (Wilkund 2013, p. 31).

It is reported that in 2007 US financial contribution to AMISOM amounts over \$168.2 million for general relief activities. \$78.7 was allocated to AMISOM while \$89.5 was expended humanitarian issues. Between 2007 and 2010, US has donated approximately \$185 million to AMIOM for equipment, logistic and training of AMISOM personnel (Norris and bruton 2011, p. 23). The financial assistance to AMISOM in 2007 is laid down in the table below:

Table 2. US Financial assistance to AMISOM in 2007

Expenditure Category	Total 2007
Initial Uganda Deployment	\$19.6 million
Additional Training to Uganda and Burundi (ACOTA)	7.0 million
Additional monies earmarked for Equipment & Training, Logistic support to AMISOM & Security Sector Reform	40.0 million
Burundi Deployment 20 November 2007	14.5 million
Total	81.1 million

Source: [http://www.usau.usmission.gov/fact\\_sheet.html](http://www.usau.usmission.gov/fact_sheet.html)

Table 3: US Assistance to Non-AMISOM Expense in 2007

Expenses Category	Total 2007

Humanitarian Aid	\$60.0 million
Development	\$12.0million
Post Conflict Stabilization	\$17.5 million
Total	89.5 million

Source: [http://www.usau.usmission.gov/fact\\_sheet.html](http://www.usau.usmission.gov/fact_sheet.html)

Table 4. Individual States Assistance to AMISOM, 2009 to 2011

States	Contribution (US \$ m)	Share of Total Contribution %
Britain	22.6	48.2%
Japan	9.4	20.0%
Denmark	6.2	13.2%
Germany	3.8	8.1%
Saudi Arabia	2.1	4.4%

Turkey	1.0	2.2%
Korea	0.5	1.1%
India	0.5	1.1%
Australia	0.4	0.9%
Sweden	0.3	0.6%
Czech Republic	0.2	0.3%
Malta	0.0	0.0
Total	48.6	100%

Source: <http://www.globalhumanitarianassistance.org/wpcontent/uploads/2012/02/ga-somalia-briefing-paper-feb-2012-final.pdf>

Despite US leading role in Somalia, Moller (2009, p. 25) demonstrates that US actions, Somalia have been generally ineffective, the distinction between the 90s and the recent time appears that US motive in Somalia during 90s was humanitarian and altruistic, but now it is selfish interest that is based on her national security. In the past and presently, Washington appears to have received the opposite of what it was pursuing. In the 90s, the outcome was aggravation of the humanitarian crisis, while recently, it was the resurgence of Islamist militancy or even terrorism. In the same direction Bronwyn and Williams (2014, p.46) report that the risk of AMISOM



serving as proxy for America strategic interest in “fight on terrorism” made AU member states unwilling to deploy troops to Somalia.

From the work of Loubser and Solomom (2012, p.10), Britain’s leading role in Financial support to AMISOM is driven for her interest in Somalis connections with Al –Shabaab and Al Qaeda, the abduction of British nationals and the effects of piracy and unlawful migration which involved 250, 000 Somalis Refugee in Britain. In a similar view, the second conference on Somalia hosted in Istanbul on 31<sup>st</sup> May and June 1<sup>st</sup> 2012 indicated Turkey’s interest to exhibit regional leadership in the Muslim world. However, the conference also reflected that agreement on the global intervention to Somalia was not close from being achieved. High-level delegated from 57 states, 11 representatives from both regional and international organization, leader of TGF, Sharif Ahmed Sharif and some Somalis involving religious leaders, Somalia diaspora, youth women were attended the conference (Roland 2012, p.2).

In spite of regional and international organization including individual states support to AMISOM, Somalia persists a failed state. The entire scene reflects a classic case of anarchic failure of a state. The thoughts of national self-interest rather than altruistic reflection on the side of international community has exacerbated the situation (Loubser and Solomon 2013, p.13). In several ways AMISOM reflects an attempt by the west to contain security in a low cost. Instead of deploying genuinely effective international peacekeeping that includes the mandate to protect the people of Somalia, Western power rather prefers to employ regional troops and proxy military support in order to strike a particular terrorist spot. It is no surprise that this technique is always seen a “whac a mole game” a repetitive and continuous process

of striking the terrorist while the environment that permits there is not affected (Norris and Bruton 2011, p. 23).

From the above analysis, it is obvious that Somalia crises have caused a strings of political headaches and security challenges for the Somalia and beyond. Despite the huge attempts made by the international community to quell these conflicts and restore Somalia, the country still remains insecure. It is also clear that international and regional organizations, including individual states are pursuing their own national self-interest objectives in Somalia.

## **Chapter 4**

### **ANALYSIS OF ROLE OF SELF-INTEREST IN THE MOTIVES OF STATE ENGAGEMENT WITH AMISOM**

This chapter applies the realist theoretical frameworks explained above in order to descriptively analyze the role of self-interest in the motives of state engagement with AMISOM. The prospects and challenges facing AMISOM will also be looked into in this chapter.

#### **4.1 Uganda Engagement in Somalia Conflict.**

It is known that Uganda motive to intervene in Somalia conflict was to pursue its national interest. In fact, economic, and prestige interests have shaped the Uganda participation to AU mission in Somalia. Ever since the creation of AMISOM in February 2007, over 6000 Ugandan People's Defense Force (UPDF) and police officers have been deployed to Somalia as part of AMISOM and to date, Uganda is the largest troop contributing state to AU mission in Somalia. Since 1990s between 30 to 70 percent Uganda national budget has been provided by western donors. Despite the growingly bad reputation in the aspect of human rights, democratization and governance. Ugandan engagement in Somalia conflict, therefore, represents a means to strengthen and sustain the donor assistance. By deploying substantial size of Uganda force to Somalia, Museveni government has been able to convince his western donors to see him as important regional friend worthy of assistance instead of a semi-authoritarian or corrupt regime (Fisher 2012, pp. 1-3). While strengthening the argument that Uganda participation in AMIOSM was motivated by a decision to

sustain western assistance, fisher explains that donor have reached out to Museveni government urging him to participate in peacekeeping mission in Somalia. The US the Secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice lobbied Uganda minister of foreign affairs, Kutesa Sam informing him about the clear links between the UIC and Al-Qaeda in Somalia and George W Bush personally contacted Museveni on a phone call convincing him to participate actively in peacekeeping mission in Somalia (ibid).

Second, the interpretation for Uganda's involvement in AMISOM was that Museveni regime has a lofty ambition for his country. He desired that Uganda will be seen a giant of East African region while his colleagues will see him a regional leader like Nyere, Mandela or Kofi Annan. Therefore, participating in AU mission in Somalia has been an avenue for him to actualize this position (ibid, p. 8). The third important factor was to revive Ugandan People's Defense Force (UPDF) that faced serious criticism for their intervention in Republic of Congo from 1998 to 2003. AMISOM seems to be a chance to rebuild the reputation of UPDF and more importantly, attract military training, fund and equipment especially from America (Bruton and Williams 2014, p. 40). The reason for Uganda involvement in AMISOM was that the mission would be a military neutral budget for Uganda, which mean that financing will not be from the country budget. Uganda army commander reports that money received by UPDF in Somalia has supported their economy and Uganda troops engaged in the building of houses and establishing business in their country and thereby enhance the growth of their national economy (Eriksson 2013, p. 73).

According to Jowell (2014, 3) Uganda participation in Somalia conflict is based on its realistic strategy motivated by its national interest. AU peace operations has

offered Ugandan regime with some incentives for its soldiers equipment which are provided by UN and state donors. The America, Britain, France, have offered Uganda a considerable financial assistance for its active participation in AMISOM. Therefore, Somalia has been a strategic place for Uganda to maintain its arm force financially (Paul 2007, p. 519). In similar vein with Paul, Kiiza et al (2008, p. 68) narrate that Uganda engagement in Somalia was motivated by the need to preserve its national image. Uganda national image was extremely damaged in 2005 after Museveni amended its country's constitution in order to allow him contest for a third tenure and the arrest and detention of his main political rival Besigye Kizza. Therefore, Somalia conflict provided Uganda with the opportunity to rebuild its damaged image. By playing active role in Somalia especially fighting Al-Shabaab and its ally, such as al-Qaeda. Museveni pragmatic strategy worked out successfully. Sence Johnnie Carson, then US Secretary of State for Africa described the election free and fair in spite of US department of states findings that the election was marred by grave irregularities (Bruton and Williams 2014, p. 40).

Lastly, Uganda national security has always been terrorized by regional insecurity (in Sudan and Congo). Therefore, the Museveni government has participated in the Somalia peace process often as a means to ensure peace and security for its citizens (Fisher 2009, p. 9).

Despite the active role being played by Ugandan troops in Somalia, their operations are still not neutral. Uganda is accused to have trained members of Al-Shabaab, and sold ammunitions and fuel to the terrorist group (Sarah 2014). Uganda and Rwanda

army officials disagreed over who takes the charge Kisangomi, a strategic and core business hub for diamond and timber (ibid).

## **4.2 Burundi Engagement in Somalia Conflict**

Burundi is the second largest troops contributing troops to AU mission in Somalia, with total of 5432 soldiers and the second country to send troops into Somalia after Uganda (AMISOM Press Release d). When the Al-Shabaab killed over 70 Burundi peacekeepers in Somalia in December 2011, it called to think why mountainous tiny state in Central Africa deployed 4000 of its troops to fight in Somalia. Burundi is not bordered with Somalia. Burundi also was still wobbling from its own civil war a year before it sent its troops to Somalia. Meanwhile, United Nation Operation in Burundi (UNOB) were still monitoring Burundi ceasefire agreement. The Burundi involvement in Somalia has been attributed to economic and military reasons Burundi participated in Somalia because it allows the country to equip, train and build stronger military. America is training Burundi army and AU with support from EU, pays the troop wages while they are on the battle ground. Therefore, it mains that from savings and reimbursement for soldiers and equipment, Burundi receives about \$45 million yearly from it engagement in Somalia conflict (Dickinson, 2011).

In a state like Burundi, finance is easily the motivation for sending soldiers to Somalia. During the period AMISOM was established, Burundi army was overlarge with troops from various armed factions that were fighting themselves until after 2004 (Burgess 2014, p. 315). It was huge financial burden to maintain its large army force, as AU force was offering to pay each soldier \$750 per day, through the financing from EU, considerably above the amount the Burundi troops would be paid at home. It becomes apparent Burundi national interest to deploy their troops into

Somalia and every soldier is ready to go to Somalia because of the “financial windfall”. Out of the \$750, the government of Burundi would deduct \$100 from each soldier salary according to (WikiLeaks diplomatic cable release in January 2010).

According to the Human Right Watch report (2014, pp. 20-28), there have been cases of organized sexual abuse occurring in the Burundi contingent base in Somalia. This is area where Burundi forces are responsible for security, the Burundi troops have turned from protectors to perpetrators. Due to the entrenched poverty, dreadful living condition and limited human assistance, particularly for the displaced communities, some Somali girls and women are forced to indulge in sex with Burundi troops in exchange for medicine, money, and food. Some girls and women also explain that threats and coercion have become part of their relationship with AMISOM troops. Anisa a 19 year old girl reported that a Burundi troop who paid to have sex with her had been violent with her, involving slapping and hitting on a various occasions. Regrettably, the rape victims did not lodge complaints with the relevant authority because were afraid of stigmatization and reprisal for police, terrorist groups, or even their family. Some did believe that their voices were be held. The actions of Burundi troops inflict unnecessary suffering to the Somalia girls and women, which Edward Siad in Bellamy et al (2004, p. 7) called the disadvantaged, the poor, the powerless and the unrepresented.

### **4.3 Kenya Engagement in Somalia Conflict**

Kenya has a land border with Somalia and it hosts a sizeable number of refugees and migrants from Somalia. The Northeastern region of Kenya is mainly occupied by Somalis tribal group, unlike the Ethiopia that has strained relations with Somalia, Kenya’s relations with Somalia have been regulated by its pursuits to be a good

neighbor. For over 20 years, Kenya had pursued the policy of non-interference in the Somalia armed conflict. Kenya has been very passive to Somalia conflict and instead of involving militarily in the Somalia crisis, it has installed itself as the economic and political center of the region (Eriksson 2013, 34). However, this does not mean that both Kenya and Somalia have been entirely smooth. The both were embroiled in border conflict between 1963 and 1967, in which the Somalis tribal population in Northeastern Kenya attempted to breakaway (Miyandazi 2012, p. 2).

As a consequence to the changing magnitude of Somalia crisis, the threats it causes to Kenya worsened. The Al-Shabaab carried out numerous attacks on the Kenyan's soil, disrupting the national security and the profitable tourism sector in East Africa's biggest economy (Maito et al, 2013). Somalia violence spread into Kenya, the northeastern region of Easleigh has experienced incessant violent events, involving assassinations and bombing which are linked to Al-Shabaab (Eriksson 2013, p. 43). Accordingly, Al-Shabaab began to recruit Kenya youths and other Muslims nationals in Kenya into their terrorist group. The government of Kenya considered this a serious threat to its interest and national security. Recruitment of Kenya youths can provide the Al-Shabaab with the strength to disrupt Kenya through indigenous element. Therefore, the government of Kenya changed its action in Somalia Conflict by launching unilateral military intervention in Somalia known as Operation Linda Nchi or protect the nation, Kenya government deployed Kenya Defense Forces (KDF) to Somalia in 2011 to attack Al- Shabaab and protect their assault against Kenya (International Crisis Group, 2012). According to Miyandazi (2012, p. 2) Kenya military intervention in Somalia indicates that states intervene in a conflict when their national interest is at stake. Kenya's intervention in Somalia was



attempted to safeguard its territory from external attack (ibid, 3). In similar vein, Eriksson (2013, 47) explains that Kenya intervention in Somalia conflict was driven by national security concerning its borders security, Al-Shabaab threat to its tourism sector, its political interest to back the newly established Somalia government and quest to play active regional role.

The Somalia conflict posed serious security challenge to Kenya. Al-Shabaab repeated kidnapped and attack on tourists and aid workers on the Kenyan's soil had become a serious threat to its trade and tourism, both of which are of significant sector of its economy. Kenya witnessed several problems from the Somalia pirates, which affected the country economically and socially. The Somalia pirates attacked and hijacked cargo vessels and tourist ships sailing to Kenya through the Somalia waterways. This has crippled the activities of Kenya seaport of Mombasa and almost led to its closure. In this context, as to safeguard its own national interest, Kenya seeks for peace and security in Somalia (Yussuf 2014, p. 45). Warner (2012, p. 106) states that Kenya's engagement in Somalia Crisis was aimed at gaining electorate support during the political election in Kenya in 2013. Besides, in consideration of Uganda and Ethiopia effort to contain Somalia crisis, Kenya have decided to show the international community that it is capable and willing of protruding military strength to resolve crucial regional security problem.

Despite that Kenya military intervened in Somalia and participated in fighting Al-Shabaab, the terrorist group is exceptionally active and constitutes a serious threat to Kenya national security (Menkhaus 2012, p.5). Al-Shabaab operates freely within and outside of Kenya, the intervention of KDF into Somalia has worsened Kenya

civilian casualties as a retaliatory attacks from Al-Shabaab. Since October 2011, Al-Shabaab has carried out many terror attacks in Kenya leading to deaths of several persons and leaving several persons injured (Maito et al, 2013). Kenya's tourism sector faced reinvigorated crisis as a new wave of assault on the coastline by the Al-Shabaab .frightened the industry. The terrorist group linked with Al-Qaeda attacked Kenyan village in Lamu Island, on 5<sup>th</sup> of July 2014 killing 15 persons and over the next day killed 49 persons in Mpeketonia a village in Kenya (Manson, 2014). Also Manson (2015) explains that despite the Kenyan military invasion in Somalia, the Al-Shabaab still influences situation in Kenya. The terrorist group besieged Garissa University in Kenya on 2<sup>nd</sup> of April 2015, spraying bullets and throwing grenades. The attack on Garissa University was the deadliest since the bombing of US embassy by Al-Qaeda in Nairobi in 1998 and the Al-Shabaab terror attack on Westgate shopping mall in Nairobi in 2013, killing 67 Kenyans and tourists in a hostage that captured global horror.

After Kenya unilateral intervention in Somalia, it eventually forced to incorporate KDF in AMISOM, because its unclear objectives were considered as counterproductive by the relevant stakeholders in Somalia conflict, and Kenya cannot act alone financially. Kenyan involvement in Somalia does not intend to support Somalia centralized government, rather it was strategy to create a semi-autonomous state that can stand as a buffer zone between Kenya and Somalia border which will be governed by friendly Somalia group. The buffer zone also known as Jubbaland was intended to be used to keep Al-Shabaab off the Kenyan soil. (Pijovic 2013, p. 21). As Mohamed notes (2013), Kenya forces in Somalia have been actively backing anti-government faction while disrupting the activities of the Somalia

Federal Government. They have made the region a no-go area for the SFG and instead chose a terrorist group that separated from Al-Shabaab. The presence of Kenya troops in Somalia is interpreted by the UNSC Resolution 2036(2012) that mandates the Kenyan troops, in complete compliance with its responsibilities under the international human rights law and the international humanitarian law and in complete respect of the political independence, territorial integrity, sovereignty and the unity of Somalia. Strengthening the above explanation, Andreas (2013, p. 17) reports that there is absence of Somalia National Army (SNA) in Kismayo region, Kenya forces are undermining the creation of conditions for legitimate and effective government and institutions in Somalia by supporting the RasKamboni armed brigade to challenge the SFG. Kenyan troops have denied safe passage and free movement for those involved in the peace process because the Kenyan troops supported the self-declared president of Jubbaland. Also Kenyan forces have been manning only the Kismayo seaport, airports and their supply route and are not ready to expand their operations out the Jubba region.

Kenya involvement in Somalia conflict demonstrates that state participates in peacekeeping mission in order to protect its national interest. Kenya reason for engaging in Somalia conflict was the desire to create a Kenya controlled buffer state in the southern region of Somalia as to protect its national interest. Another reason was the need to enhance security for commercial activities with Somalia (Hull 2013, p. 33). In spite of integrating into AMISOM, Kenya strives for its own national interest. For instance, there was clear disagreement with AMISOM when KDF refused to liaise adequately with AMISOM leadership. Kenya forces are only interested in the Jubbaland region, the Kenya forces participated actively to establish

regional autonomy in Jubbaland. Moreover, the federal government of Somalia did support Kenya's strategy to create autonomous Jubbaland, which is considered by FGS to lead to further regionalization of Somalia. Political tension between Somalia and Kenya have severally been taken to the United States to intervene (Eriksson 2013, p. 35).

#### **4.4 Ethiopian Engagement in Somalia Conflict**

Ethiopia's engagement in Somalia conflict has its origin in numerous political and territorial disputes that bred hostility between the two states in the past. This involves the 1960 to 1964 boundary conflict, the Ogaden war of 1977 to 1978, the 1982 boundary clash and the 1988 to 2000 cross border dispute (Sharamo and Mesfin 2011, p. 102). While the disputes between the both is not officially resolved through interstate process, the Somali civil war began in 1991 and the context of the civil war raised a fresh security concern to the Ethiopian authority as many factions in Somalia threatened to attack Ethiopia (Abbink 2003, p. 238).

Ethiopia has been involved in the Somalia conflict for over 20 years. Since Siad Barre was overthrown and the subsequent collapse of Somalia government, Ethiopian troops have intervened in Somalia crisis repeatedly. The first invasion of Somalia by Ethiopian troops was in August 1996, followed by March 1999 incursion. Ethiopian forces reportedly assaulted Balanbelle town in Somalia border fighting Al-Itihad al- Islamiya (AIAI) terrorist group, which was fighting to reclaim and incorporate the Ethiopian eastern Ogaden region into Somalia (Sharamo et al 2011, p. 102).

In the context of Somalia conflict, Ethiopian involvement was motivated to maintain its hegemony leadership in the East African region and to show the international community that it has contributed significantly to stabilization of peace and security to the Horn of Africa (Lloy 2013). According to Muthuma (2007), the main reason for Ethiopian engagement in Somalia conflict is the value it accrues to its national interest. Ethiopia did not want to see effective Somalia government that can restart the struggle to reclaim the Oganden region from itself which the Islamist had begun to do. This appeared to be true since the Ethiopian authority was very effective in the course that brought the Transitional Federal Government to power and later appeared to have sponsored the election of its own ally Yusuf Abudullah to power as the Somalia president (Moller 2009, 20). Addis Ababa engagement in Somalia conflict was not only aimed at undermining the Somalia decision toward irredentism, but also to prevent the influx of Somalia refugees to Ethiopia which could cause fragile ethnic imbalances and to contain the rise of Shiekh the leader of Al-Ithihaad al-Islamiya which is considered a potential threat to Ethiopian national security (ibid p. 21).

Considering the Ethiopian strained relationship with Eritrea, Ethiopia interest was also to disrupt and prevent any relationship between her internal revolutionaries such as Oganden National Liberation Front (ONLF) and Oromo Liberation Front (OLF), Somalia group and the state of Eritrea (Malito 2011, p. 140). The stability and security of the Ethiopian federation was based on the chance of convincing the Somalia population dwelling in Ethiopia to drop their irredentist determination (Markakis 1996, p. 567). Due to this, Ethiopia ensures cordial relationship with some powerful warlords in Somalia and offers them with military assistance to counter the Islamist (Elimi and Barrise 2006, p.40). Regarding the resolution of Somalia conflict,

Ethiopia has been the main factor in protraction of the Somalia conflict. Ethiopia has disrupted the Somalia peace process and the transnational government that was established. Ethiopia has repeatedly sent arms across the border and has severally invaded southern Somalia. Therefore, Ethiopia a well-positioned and strong state is an aggressive neighbor that attempts to maintain divided and weak Somalia (ibid).

In either way, the Ethiopian military engagement and the fight between the terrorist groups in Somalia has been proved counterproductive. The outcome has strengthened the Islamist movement by permitting the terrorist group like Al-Shabaab to become more popular by encouraging salafist form of sharia over nonpolitical and modest Sunni (Braden 2009, p. 136). In point of fact, Ethiopia is considered predominately Christian state, it looks simple for the Islamist to present the intervention as a crusade by the infidels against seekers of true faith. However, Ethiopian intervention has caused serious humanitarian crisis and mass displacement of the civilians. From 2006-2009, 15,000 of innocent civilians have been killed, over 1 million Somalis have been displaced while 47600 Somalis flee their homes out of fear of war seeking refuge in and outside Somalia (ibid). Due to the worsening security situation on the ground, it has been very difficult for aid workers to deliver humanitarian aids to the poverty-stricken Somalis displaced person (Moller 2009, p. 17).

Ethiopian troops were officially integrated into the AMISOM family on the 22<sup>nd</sup> of January 2014 by the adoption of UNSC Resolution 2124, deploying about 4000 troops to AU mission in Somalia. Reason to the withdrawal of its troops and reintegrate into AMISOM seem to be for economic interest, because they are not under AMISOM and should fund their own expenses (Andreas 2013, p.16).

However, since the Ethiopia national interest is the reason for engaging Somalia conflict, the Ethiopian forces under AMISOM have only operated in the southwest province of Somalia and their geographical line of operation has not changed (Yussuf 2014, p. 41).

#### **4.5 The Implications of National Interest on Somalia Conflict**

The above analyses have depended on the realist interpretation to explain that engagement and intervention of Uganda, Burundi, Kenya, and Ethiopia in Somalia were driven by national interest. These explanations show diversities of national interest concomitant to their engagement from military perspective, achieving of prestige, fostering leadership status, and economic interest.

The military engagement of Uganda, Burundi, Kenya and Ethiopia have been based on the consent of FGS. However, the choices of these states have instigated regional disagreement and in so doing have jeopardize the potentials for long term stability in the country. The behaviors of these states in line with their national interests appear to be at variance with the comprehensive objectives of stabilizing the entire Somalia by creating a strong federal government. These states could not often adhere to common appropriate course of action in Somalia (Williams 2013). Kenya and Ethiopia are attempting to establish a buffer zones in Somalia border at the expense of establishing strong central institution in Somalia. Ugandan chose to create a strong central government against the goal of Kenya and Ethiopia. This has become a source of continuous instability in Somalia (Eriksson 2013, p. 82). Many political disagreement have occurred between Kenya and FGS over an attempt by Kenya to reinforce the AMISOM maritime component in order to address the threats of Al Shabaab at the sea. If a maritime component of AMISOM had been approved, it

would have meant reinforcing the Kenyan navy at the expense of creating a navy in Somalia (ibid, 83). Uganda, Burundi, Kenya, and Ethiopia hold a divergent perspective on the FGS and other political and warring factions in Somalia. Kenya has displayed apparent aspirations to become the key security actor since it engaged with AMISOM. AMISOM's effectiveness has been undermined by the absence of political neutrality. For instance, in 2013, there was serious tension when the FGS accused Kenya soldiers of operating against Somalia national army in a flagrant violation of the mandate of AMISOM. Especially, FGS accused Kenya of backing Ahmed Modobe, the ex-ally of Al-Shabaab and the head of RasKamoni Militia. The collision between FGS and Kenya's national interest in Somalia is a reflective of many crises in the country (Bruton and Williams 2013, p. 69). In a bid to block the influence of Kenya military in Somalia, a military deal was signed between Somalia and Turkey that threatened an oppositional disrupting the Turkey's interest with Mogadishu, including Egypt and Djibouti (Jane 2013). Kenya soldiers have been accused of violating the UN embargo on the sale of charcoal. Additionally, several Somalis view that particularly Ethiopia and Kenya choose to keep divided and weak and because of national security and economic interest attempt to undermine the establishment of strong central Somalia government (Bryden, 2013). Since AMISOM is considered by Somalis as mechanism which states can pursue their national interest, it has jeopardized the mission capacity to achieve its goals, stumble its efforts to conduct effective campaign for public diplomacy and its capacity to wage effective peace operations (Bruton and Williams, 2013).

The key issues was that Somalia, her neighbors, and several external actors have often disagree with the objectives of the mission. Each one attempted to apply her



own policies to alter the fact on the ground. There has been also disagreement between Kenya and Ethiopia over the Kenyan's plan to create a separate autonomous region government in Jubbaland, an area mainly inhabited by the Ogaden clan which occupies the south-eastern region of Ethiopia (Berhane 2012). There were tensions over priorities and strategies among the troop contributing states. For example, Burundi contingent were aggrieved that Kenyan were the second in command in AMISOM when Burundi had engaged longer and sacrificed more (Neus 2013, p. 10). Also, AMISOM-afflicted commander has ordered his militia to attack AMISOM positions at night and claimed thereafter that Al-Shabaab has fired on his base because of lack of arms and other supplies (Bryden, 2013).

#### **4.6 Prospects and Challenges of AMISOM**

This section discusses the prospects and the major challenges affecting the activities of AMISOM since it was created in 2007.

##### **4.6.1 Prospects of AMISOM**

Since the establishment of AMISOM in 2007, it can be considered to have managed to retake and safeguard a number of places in Mogadishu once under the control of Al-Shabbab while involves seaport, airport and government palace. However, AMISOM has been unable to operate outside Mogadishu as Al-Shabaab and other militia are in control of larger areas in the country (Hull 2013, p. 20). Prospect has also been achieved in the political phase, after more than two decades, and with the support of AMISOM, Somalia is undergoing post-national transition. The establishment of a new Somalia federal parliament in 2012, the inauguration of Mr. Hassan Mohamud Sheikh as the president of federal republic of Somalia and the supportive role of AMISOM toward 2016 general elections in Somalia are considered by many as a timid prospect (Neus 2013, p. 4).

#### **4.6.2 Challenges Facing AMISOM**

**International Pessimism:** In the early years of AMISOM deployment, it was clouded with international pessimism which led to lack of effective support for the mission. Until 2012, only Uganda and Ethiopia have deployed their troops to Somalia. There was persistent failure to deploy mandated size of troops. The inability to deploy significant number of troops and other basic supplies needed for the success of the mission was militarily and morally indefensible. It undermined drastically the morale of AMISOM troops to operate. AMISOM was abandoned to conduct a massively dangerous tasks without effective enablers such as organizing resources, mission analysis capacities air assets, including drones, fixed-wing aircraft and helicopters (Bruton and Williams 2013, p.83-84).

**Weakness of AU political Leadership:** In addition to lack of support to the mission, AMISOM external actors often have divergent interest. There have always been conflicts of interest between the mission troops contributing countries. AMISOM is being faced with a serious challenge of weak political leadership, ranging from the chairperson of the AU, and chairperson of the AU Commission and the PSC chairperson. The locating of the mission headquarters in Nairobi and not in Somalia has resulted to the successive force commanders contending as the chief political interlocutor between the TFG and AU. This also entails that the mission's troop contributing countries are able to perform with significant degree of autonomy, which has produced counterproductive outcomes (ibid 2013, 84).

**Humanitarian Crises and Exploitation:** At the initial period, AMISOM did not involve a particular component of human rights according to the international

standard of peace operation. The international community focused mainly on supporting the TFG, protecting only installations, equipment and the personnel of UN and AU and to curbing the control and capacities Al-Shabaab, which led to neglecting of the Somalia civilian population by the international community for many years. For example, the first four months after AMISOM was deployed, 1/3 of the innocent civilian population in Mogadishu abandoned the area because of deadly violence caused by fights between AMISOM and the Al-Shabaab. The mission was not provided with clear mandate to protect the civilians, it was only allowed to use force in self-defense. Besides, the conflict seriously worsened the humanitarian crisis, which was aggravated by reported restriction of humanitarian supplies by the officials of the TFG. Though there was increased attention toward protection of Somalia civilian population, but there are some remaining gaps that ought to be filled by AMISOM in order to be recognized and credible and legitimate by the Somalis (Neus 2013, 8). According to Human Rights World Report (2014), Somalia civilian population have continued to suffer severe human rights violations. All the parties to the protracted conflict were accountable for severe abuses of Somalia civilians. Violation involves indiscriminate attacks, unlawful arrest and detention and sexual abuses. The Al-Shabaab has stepped up attacks on the civilian areas. Despite the pledges to protect Somalia civilian, AMISOM has disrupted these pledges. For instance, a woman who alleged raped by an AMISOM, together with the journalist that interviewed her was arrested and convicted on the ground of tarnishing the state institution (Lotze and Kasumaba 2012, p. 23).

AMIOSM troops are protected from disciplinary actions and accountability when it is responsible for effecting civilian harm. AMISOM has not established disciplinary

policy, there is no established instrument to enhance actions related to disciplinary proceedings against AMISOM troops. This effectively entails that disciplinary matters are in the discretion of head of the mission (ibid).

Resources Constraints: A serious challenge faced by AMISOM is the resources constraints and the capacity gap related to it mandated functions. These resource constraints appeared in various dimensions. There is a huge gap between the number of troops on ground and the authorized number. The guideline for the number of soldiers needed for stable operation in Somalia in less hostile zone is between 5 and 10 troops per one thousand persons, while in hostile areas, the requirement is 20 troops per one thousand persons. It is estimated that Somalia total population is about 9 million people which shows that a total intervening troops of 100,000 are required for the various security situations in the country. African troops contributing states have been unwilling to deploy their forces to AMISOM. The current number of forces on ground are not sufficient to actualize the mandate of the mission. The insufficient troops has restricted the mission operation to a particular areas in Mogadishu (Kromah 2010, p. 22). The current strength of the mission troops is at 22,126, which is inadequate for the mission to operate in all regions in Somalia. This has limited the AMISOM deployment to major strategic areas in Mogadishu, involving seaport, airport, government house and the mission installations (Boon 2012, p. 495).

Another challenge related to resource constraints is the shortage of military equipment and supplies. International community is unwilling to respond to AMISOM calls to provide the mission with attack helicopters and transportation.

This lack of equipment, particularly the air assets prevents AMISOM from carrying out offensive operations and constrained the effectiveness of the mission. This form of supply would assist AMISOM troops will be transported efficiently and safely (Tres, 2014).

The other major challenge confronting AU mission in Somalia are funding for soldiers salaries and reimbursements for state-owned equipment. This includes inadequate assistance to troop enablers and multiplier. The inadequacy has adversely affected on the mission operation. AMISOM is overstretched that it does not expand its military operation to new areas. The effect of this scenario are in fact, very serious for the general peace and security stabilization in the region. (AU 2013a). Additional, inadequate compensation to troops who died and sustained injury also undermines the effectiveness of AMISOM. There may be a time when a troops will refuse to fight even if they are ordered to do so. Additionally, this lack of salaries present a problem causing the troops to sell or desert their equipment (Kiyonga, 2015).

**Lack of Internal Coherence and Coordination:** The lack of internal coherence and coordination existed due to the multifaceted dimension of AU mission. There is geographical partition of the major components of the mission. For instance, the mission political affairs and strategic planning was located in Addis Ababa, the mission operational and military unit was based in Mogadishu, while the mission headquarter was in Nairobi. The point that many AMISOM training instrument for the stabilization of Somalia were separated across Djibouti, Uganda and Ethiopia did not lessen the problem. This separate mission set up undermines the effectiveness of internal coherence and coordination, particularly the tactical and operational issues.

Since AMISOM mission headquarter was located in Nairobi till the end of 2012 was a bad political signal to both Somalis and outsiders. The AMISOM commanders were left to operate as the chief political representatives of the mission. The handling of the task of the head of the AMISOM mission undermined the prospects for peace reconciliation in Somalia (Paul 2013, 229). The fact that civilian personnel travel frequently from Nairobi to Mogadishu to carry out their responsibility over a long periods of time has been a big challenge for the mission to fulfil its mandate. The regular shuttle between Nairobi and Kenya has considerable logistical, financial and psychological effect to the effectiveness of the mission mandate. For instance, each time civilian personnel want to travel out of the protected zone, they must be guarded by military escorts, and this effects the military component by reducing their limited resources (Kromah 2010, p. 27).

Second dimension of coordination problem confronting AMISOM is insufficient coordination of the patrol teams between the task force, particularly in the point of fact that it is very difficult to patrol the whole high risk zone. The mission does not have the capability to prosecute or even detain everybody charged with piracy and no single state in the Horn of Africa has. There has been several acts of piracy in the Somalia waterways because of the absence clear jurisdiction and security (Block et al 2012).

Challenging Nature of Al-Shabaab: The challenging nature of Al-Shabaab (The Youth) is a serious challenge to AMISOM. Formed in 2003 with the primary aim of irredentism and to create a greater Somalia (Dagne 2011, p. 6). Nearly eradicated in 2007 by Ethiopian troops, this terrorist group currently is a powerful actor in Somalia

and entire Horn of Africa. The main mechanisms for the strengths of this group are the contentious regional and western policies such as whether AMISOM will be transformed into UNPO, which was turned down by UN member states who were reluctant to commit their troops to the mission and the debate whether to engage in dialogue with Al-Shabaab (Marchal 2011, 4-8). Second the illegality of its contenders in Somalia. For instance, the unilateral intervention of Ethiopia and Somalia. Third, the capability to organize the group using ideological and economic resources. Raising funds mainly through hijacking, piracy, support from individual states and diaspora. The group has been capable to pay the salaries for its followers (ibid). Further, another instrument for the strength of Al-Shabaab is the advancement of information communication technology (ICT) which provides the group the avenue to communicate and gather assistance from international terrorist rings (Wise 2011, p. 8).

The military wing of Al-Shabaab is composed of both domestic and foreign fighters and in the point of fact this group is made of divergent segments is a big challenge to AMISOM since it is impossible to identify and focus on a particular scene of gravity. The group fighter is currently a hybrid of local guerrilla army and foreign oriented Al-Qaeda terrorist group. This therefore makes it very difficult for AMISOM to pinpoint who is an Al-Shabaab (ibid, 6). The Al-Shabaab military strategies such as hit and run attacks, assassinations, suicide bombings and ambushes are serious challenges for AMISOM. Further the Al-Shabaab temporary alliance with the national armed force of Somalia has posed a great challenge to AMISOM in drawing the battle line. The group united with the national armed force of Somalia to fight the Kenya forces. It was alleged that arms supplied to Somalia government were being

directed to Al-Shabaab, indicating a high rate of corruption and collusion between the group and Somalia government. (Sheeham and Porter 2014, 5-6). AMISOM witnessed lack of trust within the TFG troops which were underpinned, disorganized, unruly and poorly motivated. The TFG forces and the police were involved in unlawful looting and roadblocks. They were giving out information about the activities of AMISOM to Al-Shabaab. The TFG troops engaged in several illegal activities, such as leading AMISOM soldiers to ambush. All these posed a serious challenge to AMISOM and reduced the outcomes of the mission (Paul 2013, p. 232).

The Conflict of Legitimate Government: At every stage of the Somalia conflict, the main challenge to peace reconciliation was the challenge of finding the legitimate authority in the country. Indeed, the lack of legitimate government has undermined efforts to stabilize Somalia (Menkhaus and Ortmyer 2000, p. 216). Moreover, the government power in Somalia is characterized as violent, fragmented, and heterogeneous hybrid form of formal and informal institutions managed by clan militias without a pause to fighting over Mogadishu seat of power (Tim 2005, 90). Access to power and resources being the significant incentive for the clan has been a serious challenge for AMISOM. Above clanism, there are disputes over desirability and nature of the country. Many Somalis have been suspicious and nomadic of the involvement of the central government in their affairs, an impression recreated by experience with Barre's dictatorship. The main clans supports a federal system of government where the different regions of the state would be autonomous, thus allowing control over a region of the state (Frazer 2012, p. 2). The effectiveness of AMISOM therefore is depended on whether the central government structures can command legitimacy among the Somalia population. This can be manifested through



for instance, by ensuring efficient and timely delivery of goods and services and securing of liberated places.

The conflict of legitimacy also leads to clan militia rivalry. Clan rivalry has been a serious challenge on the effectiveness of AMISOM in stabilizing Somalia. Apart from the AU troops, most of the Somalia National Army is mainly an alliance clan militia united only by their rivalry against Al-Shabaab. There has been cases of infighting between the government troops. Due to the strong clan militia tension in Somalia, it has been very difficult for the whole clans to unite under one umbrella as to provide sufficient assistance to AMISOM. The clan rivalry has been a dire challenge to AMISOM in deploying troops outside Mogadishu (Tres, 2014).

Consent of the Warring Parties: AMISOM is also faced with a challenge related with obtaining the consent of all the parties involved in Somalia conflict. Since the deployment of UNPO requires the consent of all the parties involved, it is also required in regional peacekeeping mission. AMISOM has failed to obtain the consent of all the warring groups in Somalia. Although, AMISOM obtained the consent of the TFG, but it clear that the Islamist militant rejected the deployment of external troops. This therefore makes it difficult for AMISOM to achieve it mandate (Halane 2012, p. 62).

Reintegration of Disengaged fighters: AMISOM in cooperation with other stakeholders have been creating policies and strategies for the reintegration of arrested and voluntary disengaged fighters. These mechanisms have been put forward to the Federal Government of Somalia for implementation but without necessary sufficient financial resources. Attempts to provide alternative living for the

disengaged fighters are bound to fail. The outcome entails that the disengaged fighters might end up into criminality or other forms of banditry. AMISOM task is to reintegrate the disengaged fighters only for 2 days and turn them over to the FGS full reintegration. AMISOM has been receiving these fighter but lacks the adequate resources to manage them (Nduwimana 2013, p. 25).

We can see that national interest has shaped the choices of Uganda, Burundi, Ethiopia and Kenya engagement with AMISOM. The consequences have been counterproductive, and undermining, rather than enhancing the potentials for long term peace process in the country. Additionally the above listed challenges have also prevented the mission from achieving its mandate.

## Chapter 5

### CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

#### 5.1 Conclusion

This research explores the Somalia conflict, the role and support of external actor, with main focus on the motives of Uganda, Burundi, Kenya and Ethiopia engagement with AMISOM and how their participation has undermined the long term peace process in the Somalia Since the establishment of AMISOM in 2007. Using realist theory, this research paper examined the role self-interest play on the choice of states to engage with AMISOM. Accordingly, this work found that that national interests, such as economic, political, military, security and prestige have shaped the motives of these states for their engagement with AMISOM and in so doing have jeopardized the peace process in the country.

It is understood that Somalia politics is divided into clan factions and competition clan factions for the control of economy and political power have among these deteriorated the hope of consolidating peace and security in Somalia. In the Somalia political playground, clans play active role being important element of political organization. The people of Somalia gave much loyalty to the head of their clans than to their central government. Due to this, they do not have trust on their political dynamics taking power, thus making peace process unattainable. It is important to note that Somalia conflict is not only internal, it is a regional conflict affecting

neighboring countries and also possess present and clear threat on Somalia and the national security of the east African region, particularly Kenya.

Although, AMISOM has successfully pushed Al-Shabaab out from Mogadishu and major town in Somalia, Al-Shabaab remains a principal threat to peace, has shown resilient and continuous to control considerable regions out Mogadishu, thereby deteriorating humanitarian crises.

Lastly, I admit that this thesis does not elucidate and cover all the issues in Somalia conflict and all states that have engaged with AMISOM. Therefore, I recommend for further study AMISOM from a comprehensive perspective which explores the cooperation among the AMISOM troop contributing states and how that affects the peace process in Somalia.

## **5.2 Recommendations**

AMISOM should seriously engage with all the actors in the Somalia conflict. In addition, Somalia federal government should seriously engage with various actors and enhance its governing coalition. It should enhance the ties and negotiate power sharing with various clans and groups in Somalia

Considering the financial challenges facing AMISOM, African Union should establish a reliable funding mechanism to assist AMISOM directly instead of over reliance on external support.

African Union member states should officially acknowledge the principle of non-indifference and apply a common and uniform policies on the tasks of AMISOM.

However, putting pressure and imposing sanctions against any state that defaults to comply with the policy of AMISOM can be an effective instrument.

African community should offer robust assistance to AMISOM to permit it accomplish its mandate. However, the present troops contributing structure which depends on voluntary ground is not suitable for the mission. African member states are called upon to show impartial commitment and willingness in order to ensure AMISOM success by fully contributing their troops. It can be useful to establish permanent African Standby Force consisting of both civilian and military element ready for deployment at the right time. This permanent ASF will be very important in preventing escalation of violence and this objective will only be possible through participating in continuous military training.

AMISOM should increase the size and roles of female and female personnel and ensure that the mission is highly gender mainstreamed. More female soldiers should be recruited into AMISOM because female soldiers would have easy access to local population in Somalia. Gaining access to local population is necessary when the nature of Somalia conflict is being considered. Female Soldiers can easily create rapport with the Somalia local population and may not face cultural and religious restriction compare to their male colleagues. The presence of female soldiers in AMISOM can help to empower women and youths in Somalia and more importantly reduce the rate of gender-based sexual violence and assist in interviewing the victims.

AMISOM should establish performance and military training standard for its personnel and proper evaluation of this metric. Additionally, AMISOM should

establish effective disciplinary policy and code of conduct based on the international standard as to clear the public impression that the personnel of AMISOM are immune from prosecution when AMISOM personnel have caused harm to the civilians.

AMISOM should pursue a clear objectives, in the absence of clear objectives, considerable military deployment will not be produce expected results.

Civilian knowledge and skills are relevant in all forms and very aspect of conflict resolution mechanism: mediation, early warning, prevention and peace building programmes. Therefore, as to enhance AMISOM effectiveness, there is urgent need for AU to reinforce its capacity to involve sufficient civilian element in its mission in Somalia. Accordingly, the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) in Somalia, should engage with all the internal actors and expand power sharing with the various clans, including negotiating with the armed factions that are will to negotiate.

United Nations regional organization and international donor must provide AMISOM with the necessarily facilities it requires to get the job accomplished. As stipulates in UNSC Resolution (2036) these involves force enablers and training and coordinated support.

Finally, UNSC should not only provide financial, logistical and intelligent support to AMISOM, they should also deploy troops on ground in Somalia. This will not only enhance the mission effective but will also increase the commitments and willingness of AU member states to contribute to AMISOM. Meanwhile, the battle is still to be won, previous intervention have demonstrated that success in the battleground can be

reversible and inability to consolidate and reinforce and the proper time permits the extremist the advantage to regroup. Therefore AMISOM should never relent at all since that could give Al-Shabaab the opportunity to regroup and becomes more deadly.

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