

**Deterrence and Stability in the Middle East:
The Role of a Nuclear Armed Iran**

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ABSTRACT

The significance of nuclear deterrence in today's multi-polar world cannot be underestimated. With the end of cold war in 1991 more states have felt the need of acquiring nuclear weapons. The fear of destruction is one of the main reasons why states go nuclear. States like North Korea, India and Pakistan have employed this notion in defense of their nuclear statuses. The Iran-Israeli relationship in the Middle East has been frigid since 2005 due to the Iran nuclear program which is widely perceived as a threat to Israel and the West. Though, the relationship between these two states has been tense since the Arab-Israeli war period. The shift from friendly to hostile relations between both countries has been said to be motivated by both the foreign policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran with its revolutionary ideology and the political situation in the region in combination with international factors.

This research is aimed at investigating if nuclear deterrence is a possible means of ensuring stability between Israel and Iran in Middle East. Looking at how deterrence ensured stability during the cold war to a certain extent, will a nuclear Iran stabilize the Middle East?

The first chapter of this research provides introduction, historical background, and hypothesis, purpose of research, research question, methodology and scope of research.

Chapter two aims at providing literature review and theoretical framework on nuclear weapons and deterrence. This chapter is a comprehensive survey on scholarly research on nuclear deterrence.

Chapter three is an overview of nuclear weapons and Iran-Israel relationship in the Middle East. This chapter captures Iran-Israeli nuclear approaches.

Chapter four opens on the view of Iran nuclear program by regional and external actors with U.S and international policies towards Iran's nuclear intention.

Chapter five covers the theoretical analysis and reasons for Iran's possession of nuclear weapon in the Middle East and how it can ensure stability using neo-realism.

Chapter six is conclusion and recommendation

Keywords: Deterrence, Stability, Nuclear weapon, Israel-Iran, Retaliation, Defense

ÖZ

Bugünü çok kutuplu dünyasında nükleer caydırıcılığın önemi küçümsenemez. 1991’de soğuk savaşın bitimiyle çoğu ülke nükleer silah sahibi olma ihtiyacı duymuştur. Yokedilme korkusu ülkelerin nükleere dönmesinin birçok önemli nedeninden biridir. KuzeyKore, Hindistanve Pakistan gibi ülkeler nükleer statülerinin savunmasıyla bu kavramı istihdam etmişlerdir. Ortadoğu’daki İran-İsraililişkisi, 2005’ten bu yana İran’ın nükleer program dolayısı ile ve bu programın İsrail ve Batı’ya bir tehdit olarak algılanması nedeniyle, soğumustur. Yine de, bu iki ülke arasındakiilişki Arap İsrail Savaşı döneminden bu yana gergin olmuştur. İki ülke arasındaki samimi ilişkiden düşmanca ilişkiye olan bu kayma hem İslamik İran Cumhuriyeti’nin dış politikası’nin devrimci ideolojisi ve uluslararası faktörlü bölgedeki politik durumdur.

Bu araştırma Ortadoğu’daki İsrail ve İran arasındaki dengeyi nükleer caydırıcılıkla sağlamanın mümkün olup olmadığını araştırmayı amaçlar.

Bu araştırmanın birinci bölümü giriş, tarihi geçmiş ve hipotez, araştırmanın amacı, araştırma sorusu, metodoloji ve araştırmanın kapsamını sağlamaktadır.

İkinci bölüm literature incelemesi ve teorik taslakta nükleer silahları vecaydırıcılığı sağlamayı amaçlar. Bu bölüm nükleer caydırıcılık üzerine bilimsel araştırma kapsamlı ankettir.

Üçüncü bölüm nükleer silahlar ve Ortadoğuda'ki İran-İsrail ilişkisi üzerine bir genel bakıştır.

Dördüncü bölüm bölgesel ve İran'ın nükleer isteğine karşı Amerika ve uluslararası politikalarının dış aktörleri bazında, İran nükleer program düşüncesi görünümünde açıklar.

Beşinci bölüm teorik analizi ve Ortadoğu'daki İran'ın nükleer silah sahibi olması ve bunun neo-realizm kullanarak nasıldengede tutulabileceğini kapsar.

Altıncı bölüm sonuç ve tavsiyeden oluşur.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Caydırıcılık, İstikrar, Nükleer silah, İsrail-İran, Misilleme, Savunma

DEDICATION

I dedicate this work to the Almighty God who made everything possible.
And also to my Mum, Mrs. Ruth Adejo A. who labored with closed
courage to enable me attains my present educational status.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

WMD	Weapon of Mass Destruction
MAD	Mutual Assured Destruction
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
NPT	Non-proliferation Treaty
IAEA	International Atomic Energy Agency
UN	United Nations
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
IRBM	Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile
UK	United Kingdom
MARCA	Mid-Air Refuel Combat Aircraft
GCC	Gulf Cooperation Council
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
EU	European Union
U.S	United States
HEU	Highly Enrich Uranium
SRBM	Short-Range Ballistic Missile
CM	Cruise Missile
LSB	Libyan Scub-B
MRBM	Medium-Range Ballistic Missile
PRC	Peoples Republic of North Korea

Chapter 1

INTRODUCTION

Since the cold war period, Nuclear weapons have often been regarded as a source of deterrence; they have undergone several phases of improvement owing to advancements in technology. New means of delivering nuclear weapons in the 21st century range from submarines, to vehicles, and unmanned drones. Delivery means shows a great part of that advancement (Gorshkov, 1977). This advancement in technology has been accompanied by a proliferation of nuclear knowledge, especially after the collapse of the Soviet Union which led to the rise of new military and economic powers. The transfer and sales of these technical knowhow between states as allies or via trade has so far brought the number of countries with nuclear expertise to 56 with over 310 reactors running in the world, not to mention the ones under speedy construction, a fact that reflects the rising trend of small states possession of nuclear energy and weapons for defense mechanisms. (NWNAA, Version 2.18) (WNO: Feb. 2015).

Proliferation took place during the cold war before the signing of NPT and still occurs today. Countries that have nuclear weapons from the cold war era still possess them and are even joined by new states that did not sign the NPT. Presently, eight (8) countries are known to possess nuclear weapons. Russia, France, Great Britain, India, china, Pakistan, united states and Israel (Cohen, 2013 pp. xx ii) with North Korea making nine, having tested their weapons in 2006, 2009 and 2013.

According to IAEA reports, countries attempting to acquire reactors for the purpose of power production counts at 47 with 65 currently requesting take-off permission from the IAEA. At the moment, 437 commercial reactors are currently in good working shape with another 66 under speedy construction as well as 331 applications on the desks of IAEA to start the first phase of building commercial nuclear reactors not forgetting current widespread research operations in the nuclear field. (IAEA 2012).

The Middle East seems on course for a spike in the number of working reactors by 2030, as several states like UAE, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Turkey ,Iran, Egypt and Israel already possess working reactors while three of these seven states are internationally pointed to already have nuclear capabilities (WNO:2015). Israel in wanting to remain the only nuclear state in the region destroyed Iraq's Osirak nuclear reactor in 1981, the destruction was completed by America in 1991. Syria's efforts to build nuclear weapons were also inhibited, Syria with the help of North Korea secretly started building their weapons in order to deter Israel but the Israeli air strike in 2007 dismantled their facilities. (Bruce 2008:96)

With the destruction of Syrian facilities, no other countries in the Middle East have nuclear plants with the exception of Israel and Iran (Bruce 2008:96). The new nuclear reactor facility state is the UAE, which is at the moment speedily constructing to meet up internal needs. Middle East states with awareness of proliferation in the region have in time been increasing the capabilities of their reactors to a level of higher production. States have planned for more power reactors with UAE (10) Iran (2), turkey (4) and Jordan (2), other states decided on

commercial power reactors proposed with Iran (7), Israel (1), Saudi Arabia (16), and Egypt (2) bringing the total to forty four (44) power reactors to be added to the region (WNO 2015).

1.1 Research Background

As the cold war ended in 1991, the world moved from a bipolar to a multi polar system, a system which enabled other states to rise in relative military and economic power. States like India, Pakistan, and Israel. Israel acquired nuclear weapons but turned to opaque policies because it did not signed the Non-proliferation Treaty organized (NPT) by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) under the auspices of United Nations.

Nuclear deterrence actually worked during the cold war as it was between the USA and the USSR. However, in the multi polar world, new states can no longer be certain of their enemies unlike in the bipolar system and if states have conflict with other states who possess nuclear weapons, the only way to deter them is to acquire nuclear weapons of their own. In 2003, when Iran officially made clear its intentions to continue its nuclear program, Israel and the International community placed sanctions on Iran (Sanger, 2012). Nonetheless, Iran sees a clear need to acquire nuclear weapons; to deter Israel from regional aggressions. The thinking is that, due to fear of retaliation, Israel will not strike a nuclear Iran because Israel is an instrumentally rational actor whose actions are always consistent with her objectives, and given that the ultimate objective of the state is to survive, Israel will not deliberately initiate a nuclear war. The fear of mutually assured destruction (MAD) will ultimately leave the two States with no choice but to accept diplomatic engagements as the only recourse and will therefore cooperate with each other

regarding the disuse and eventual reduction of the weapons for the sake of mutual survival and regional stability.

1.2 Research Question

With the cold war running from 1945 to 1991, the number of nuclear weapons displayed by the US and the USSR was at an all-time high. These nuclear weapons acted as a deterrence measure that prevented the escalation of the war into a full blown World War. Several states got this idea that the acquisition of nuclear capabilities ensures national security, which made them push for possession of Nuclear weapons with the intention of achieving a balance of Power necessary for regional safety (Mearsheimer, 2003). Several issues in Middle East necessitate questions on how deterrence can be utilized in ensuring stability through the acquisition of nuclear armaments. These questions to which this research seeks to proffer answers are of great importance. *Does Iran possess a Nuclear weapon? And To what extent can nuclear Iran ensure stability in the Middle East?*

1.3 Hypothesis

Iran in obtaining nuclear weapons can be a facilitator of stability through deterrence. Israel's believed acquisition of nuclear weapons and aggressive behavior towards neighboring states which have pursued nuclear technology has presented a perceived existential security challenge to Iran. In contrast to what many scholars have argued, Iran acquiring nuclear weapons could serve as a facilitator of stability in the region through the mechanism of deterrence.

1.4 Purpose and Significance of the Study

This research documents the Iran-Israel nuclear struggle, and elucidates how deterrence can be used to achieve stability. It also documents the methods used in

achieving stability in the cold war, particularly the aspects that bear obvious relevance for the Iran-Israel case.

It hopes to serve as a reference material for further research in Deterrence and stability in the Middle East and also aims to contribute to the burgeoning Iran-Israel nuclear program literature.

This research was embarked upon in part, because of the importance of Iran's ability to deter aggressors and defend itself from external attacks as a sovereign state in the international system, coupled with the need to enhance stability in the Middle East.

1.5 Scope and Limitation of Research

The Middle East is known for frequent wars from the ancient times to the present day. The 34 years from 1948 to 1982 was a tumultuous period in the region as the Arabs and the nascent state of Israel were continually at war. These crises drew considerable International attention. Besides the Israeli problem were internal crisis such as the Iraq-Iran war and other ethnic crises and also notably the attrition war between 1969 and 1970. The 21st century is not left out of this crisis in the Middle East as the Arab spring erupted and spread across the Muslim world like wild-fire destabilizing civil life.

This research will use the region's strategic geography and the trend of nuclear weapons for scope of this research. I analyzed the Middle East as though consisting of Israel and Iran being the two most powerful states in the region, and to discuss nuclear deterrence and stability. So, I limit my analysis to nuclear deterrence, and stability concerning Israel and Iran.

1.6 Methodology

This research will use a qualitative method which is according to Creswell (1998:15)“an inquiring process of understanding”, where the researcher develops a “complex, holistic picture, analyses words, report detailed interviews of informants, and conducts the studying in a natural setting”. In this work, I will make knowledge claims based on the Neorealist (Waltz 1979; Mearsheimer 2001) perspectives. Data will be collected from, journals, books, news (TV, magazines and papers), internet, agreements and treaties documents. The data analysis will be based on the value of the information perceived. And I will attempt to provide an understanding of the problem based on the multiple conceptual factors.

Iran presently is running an enclosed government, carefully guarding information regarding their nuclear program from the public and same goes for Israel which I felt was another medium of maintaining their national security. As a result this work was carried out largely based on scholarly and other available sources.

Chapter 2

CONCEPTUALIZATION AND THEORITICAL FRAMEWORK

2.1 Concept of Nuclear Weapons and Evolution of Deterrence

The Berlin wall crisis of 1958-1962 (Burr, 1994:1), the Prague spring of 1968 and Budapest crisis of 1956 were some of the most notable tensions that dominated the early cold war (Triandafyllidou, 2009:3). The USA had been known to have nuclear weapons after the dropping of atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki; an event that motivated the USSR to acquire weapons of their own before falling to the fate of Japan. As a result of their acquisition of nuclear weapons, deterrence played an effective role as both sides had been rational enough to prevent an escalation of tensions into hostilities. Moreover, Nuclear weapons became a means of keeping small states as allies in order to balance power (Tomashevskiy, Pp5). The Weapons of Mass destruction (WMDs) as known to both sides and their allies basically guaranteed Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) which deterred any country from launching a strike against the other, because there will surely be retaliation which might realistically lead to annihilation. Nuclear deterrence became the order of the day as both sides acknowledged that using nuclear weapons will compel other to retaliate, which was prevention from action due to its consequences. (Morgan 2003:2)

These states realized that with nuclear power comes a certain security guarantee, owing to deterrence which came from the possession WMD's by both actors. These emerging states got a clear incentive to acquire WMDs as a means of pre-emptive defense and deterrence against external aggression, with the motive of Balance of Power. States like North Korea, Pakistan and India (Waltz 2003:357) acquired nuclear weapons without signing the Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT).

According to the Arms Control Association, Five states currently possess nuclear weapons. First, the United States in 1943, and then in 1949 USSR tested their first nuclear bomb, followed by United Kingdom in 1952, France in 1960 and by 1964 China followed suit. In 1968, the NPT was initiated to prohibit nuclear proliferation, but states like Pakistan, India and Israel did not sign the NPT, and promptly acquired their own nuclear weapons. Iraq's facility in Osirak 1981 and Syria 2007 were struck down by Israel (Bruce 2008:96). While North Korea in 2003 unilaterally withdrew from NPT, and carried out nuclear weapons tests thereafter. Iran, Syria and Libya have been suspected of pursuing nuclear capability secretly in the past, in avoidance of preventive strikes from nuclear states. Iran has for a long time refused to budge regarding its nuclear program; and has consequently been hit with a variety of severe sanctions ranging from economic embargoes to political and diplomatic isolation, and still remains in the process of negotiating with the international community. (ACA Feb, 2015)

2.2 Nuclear Deterrence in the International System

The destruction of Hiroshima and Nagasaki cannot be undermined as it serves as a corner stone to nuclear deterrence.(Wilson 2008:422) The strike was effective as a means of retaliation for the Pearl Harbor and keeping USSR in check in Europe

while reminding them of what America is capable of should they attempt to occupy Japan. Deterrence is mainly used for dissuading others from carrying out their actions by placing a threat of retaliation should the person/state attacks (Morgan 2003:1). The fear of retaliation only comes when both states are aware of each other's capabilities, but sometimes smaller states deter threats from powerful states according to Freeman who asserts that to deter, is to prevent or counteract the strategic management of smaller states by powerful states, which is mostly carried out through conditional use of threats every now and then (Freeman 2004:6). Surveys indicate that deterrence has so far, persisted in the literature of significant strategic ideas for more than 50yrs, both in eras of "bipolar" discourse and in discourses of "reciprocal vulnerability", in the way buzzwords were used in rationalizing security policies. (Betts, Freeman 2004-2005).

The continued value that deterrence maintains comes as a result of norms, compared to the era when it was an interest based belief. (Unger 2005:62-63). From the conception of deterrence during the cold war it has been a factual way of safeguarding national interest together with those of allies, which has made nuclear weapons become an attractive tool for states to shape International affairs and other activities through deterrence. (Patrick 2003:60). There are two generally accepted types of deterrence; conventional deterrence and nuclear deterrence.

Conventional deterrence is mostly associated with denial and punishment in case of hostilities and is considered a means of denying an enemy the ability to achieve goals on the battle field during crises. While, *Nuclear deterrence* works mainly with the use of retaliation, strike or threat with the use of nuclear weapons on either military

or militants. The standard of *working deterrence* depends on the threatening states capability to engage the opposition in battlefield and win at all point (Morgan, 2003:24). Theoretically, *structural deterrence* tends to have been the most practiced as Quackenbush believes is part of realism; nuclear weapon contributes to *balance of power* which leads to peace. Any state that possesses nuclear weapon will not want to strike first for fear of retaliation, which has maintained stability in the international system. The second strike capability of deterrence is achieved because of fear of retaliation. (Quackenbush, 2011:743)

2.2.1 Pre-Emptive Strike

Nuclear weapons are mostly not developed to be used domestically or internally, (Waltz's 1981:13). Deterrence forces need physical requirement which are *preemptive* and *preventive* strike carried out by state for the purpose of national interest, which is why nuclear weapons are only meant for external use. *Preemptive* strike is an attack launched on state's planning an attack to give them a sense of readiness, so as to cripple them from making move of their planned attack (waltz 1981:16). Preemptive attack are most time appreciated due to its promise of making the difference between victory and defeat as it's less damaging compared to allowing the enemy state be the first striker, though not always used by states like in the cold war e.g. Israel attack on Syria 2007, Iraq 1981 and Egypt in the six-day of war 1967. (Mueller 2006:6)

2.2.2 Preventive Strike

Nuclear armed states have consolidated power by preventing other emerging states from acquiring weapons of their own; this is often accomplished by destroying their nuclear reactors, viewing them as potential threats. *Preventive strike* is launched before a state reaches the capability of acquiring the second stage of nuclear

development is even less promising than a preventive strike during the first stage. (Waltz 1981:17) preventive strike is carried out upon the plans of the new rising power to acquire the capability of offensive or defensive arm, an example was the 1981 Israel strike on Iraqi's nuclear facility in Osirak, as much like the 2003 American attack on Iraq to keep freedom. (Muller 2006:8-9). This Israeli strike revealed a determination among the Arab states and others in the region to produce nuclear weapons in a more secretive manner (Waltz 1981:13).

2.3 Stability in the International System

The credibility of deterrence hinges on its ability to ensure stability as the enemy state have to always have the idea that an enemy state is capable of launching a nuclear strike at any time.

In the post-war World, the loss of American dominance that brought about a bipolar system was as a result of the USSR's challenge to America's supremacy, having acquired nuclear weapon capabilities, which brought about political and ideological stability in the global system. This stability lasted till 1991 when the USSR collapsed giving back America the world hegemony despite the rise of other powers like China and North Korea. According to Morgan, deterrence stability actually works with a *balance of threats* and crisis in a way to abstain from inciting the enemy state, in an attempt to improve prudence without raising opposition which might lead to war (Morgan 2003:22). Balance of power is the tool for stability, Tomashavski citing Hans Morgenthau's definition calls it a "policy aim at certain states affair" (Tomashavski: 2). Since all small states have to defend themselves and survive in the world of anarchy, the need to balance up against powerful states comes up in their

policy towards powerful states; to deter powerful states from hegemonic propensities and preserve themselves from external subjugation.

It has been noted that countries with nuclear weapons do not like nuclear wars, as nuclear weapons make wars hard to start due to the rationality of actors. States like America, UK, China, Russia, and France that are signatories to the NPT do strike first; States with nuclear weapons capability are more careful of first strike due to the fear of retaliation induced by nuclear psychology which remains effective in the 21st century even with new rising nuclear powers. It's obvious that the proliferation of Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile (IRBM) and Mid-Air Refuel Combat Aircraft (MARCA), some power's in the middle east became a threat mechanism to other small states, Israel pulled back from war in 1990-1991 but had before then struck Baghdad in 1982 and Tunis 1985 (Yezid Sayid, 1992:16). The fear of external encroachment has motivated states with survival motive strengthening their national security for self-help against powerful states.

2.4 Review of Relevant Literature on Nuclear Deterrence

There has been a lot of research on deterrence and stability in the Middle East with particular regards to Iran and Israel. While most of the works focus on nuclear free zone, nonproliferation, several scholars though have works that are anchored on the need for Iran to acquire nuclear weapons.

In the work "*A nuclear Iran: promoting stability or courting disaster*" (waltz, Sagan and belts, 2007) waltz utilizes the "*Deterrence theory*" approach to structure his arguments. Waltz argued that proliferation is not a problem because it has not been proliferated and Stressed on the fact that there has been nuclear military capability

for more than fifty years now, and we have nine states with nuclear capabilities yet it has not been used since 1945. He feels that is hardly proliferation and he terms it “glacial spread”, if another country acquire nuclear weapons for peaceful purpose, it’s not a thing to worry about. Furthermore, it does not matter which states own nuclear weapons as its spread will make a lot of difference because countries with nuclear weapons tend to act with caution and moderation given example of China during the Cultural Revolution. He tested the hypothesis; any state with nuclear weapons will not attack militarily in a form that will place a threat to its national interest and this to him has been true without exception from evidence of over fifty years.

He asked a question which he subsequently answered. His question was ‘why Iran should have nuclear weapons’ in attempting the question; he narrates from a map which shows Iran is been surrounded by countries with nuclear weapons. Pakistan and Afghanistan which are to the East do not seem stable. Iraq lies to the west and for eight years Iran and Iraq were at war during Saddam Hussein’s regime. The Iraq and Afghanistan case is serious as both states are occupied by America which possesses such capabilities. To support more reason why Iran should possess nuclear arm, he pointed at the fact that America has taken over the military of Iraq since the death of Saddam Hussein and the ideology of Iran towards the West makes them unsafe with America in their region. Giving illustration he admitted he would feel unsafe if were the one ruling Iran, he will feel unsafe.

His second answer pointed to the speech of President George Bush in 2002 where he mentioned of three countries that are an “axis of evil” which after them he proceeded

to invade Iraq (Sagan,Waltz& Betts, 2007:137). Waltz now asked what Iran and North Korea should think. Furthermore he placed more light that rogue state are said to be hard to deter but what state should be considered as the biggest rouge state in the world? He feels the United State is a threat, what should be their reaction? (Sagan,Waltz& Betts,2007:137-138). He answered by emphasizing that the only way to deter the United State is to have nuclear weapons no country can actually do it conventionally, America can overwhelm them conventionally. Though The US could also overwhelm them none conventionally. Even if Iran had weapons their ability to use them to target the US would be limited (Sagan,Waltz & Betts,2007:138).In his conclusion to his question, he asked of every one to place themselves in the decision making cabinet of Iran, what will they say? It will be strange to hear that Iran is not in the struggle for nuclear weapon and no country should worry they do. This he said because deterrence has turned out workable with 100%, as small powers have deterred big powers vis-a-viz, no country will want to acquire nuclear weapon if not for deterrence as nuclear weapon have one purpose and only the purpose deterrence, finally everyone should sleep well. (Sagan,Waltz& Betts,2007:138)

In answering a question by Richard Betts, he said I have no doubt that Israel will find it hard to accommodate a nuclear Iran but what can there do rather than to accept it, giving example of America's acceptance of North Korea. (Sagan 2007) agrees with waltz that Iran cannot be stopped from nuclear weapon possession. If Israel should attack Iran's nuclear facilities it will be dangerous or accept it. Both options are bad but Israel cannot stop Iran from building their weapon as to an extent that Iran built their plant close to civilian facilities in order to keep averts attack. Sagan 2007

added, he will want Israel to disarm as Iran nuclear program create an incentive which is the main reason for their nuclear pursuit/ according to agreement by (Sagan, Bennet, Waltz 2007:144) (Kaya and wehrey, 2007:115) the acceptance of Israel by America as a nuclear state even without coming publicly is the main reason for Iran's quest to acquire nuclear weapon. "*The main threat to the Middle East stability does not lie in the region but outside as Iran's possession of nuclear weapon will keep the region stable*". (Kaye and wehrey 2007:111) noted that the threat on Middle East is due to the action of external causes. (Feldman , Shai 1995) in "*Middle East Nuclear Stability*" he researched on the spread of nuclear weapon amongst Middle East states, discussing on the speed at which it will spread due to Israel's possession. He argued that proliferation will affects regional stability, bouncing it on situations that might affect the nuclear stability of the region. Shah puts the prospect of a nuclear middle east into consideration to see how the weapon will bring about stability checking on destabilization which may come forth as effects of proliferation risk and opportunities which may exist in the region. Shah has thrown light on nuclear stability but did not compare the cold war situation to the present day to see if nuclear weapon in Iran will enhance stability in the region.

In his article (Evron, Yair 2012) "*Extended Deterrence in the Middle East*" examines the extended deterrence strategy of U.S in the Middle East in accordance with those provided by states in the region. He attempted to see the efficiency of the committee's effectiveness and credibility to know if there are for state's interest. Furthermore, his research looked into a successful nuclear Iran to access the security needs and approaches of the states of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) before going ahead to consider the stability and instability paradox between Iran and Israel

nuclear balance of power. Evron argues that the presence of U.S in the Middle East with extended deterrence is to deter Iran, make allies settle and to contribute its quota to the Israel- Iran nuclear balance of power as it concerns their stands with other states in the region. Just like every other researcher so far Evron's work did not compare the condition of the bi-polar system with the multi-polar.

The notice of Iran's nuclear program brought about western cooperation against a nuclear Iran (Rakel, 2007). (Giboa, 2010), noticed a strong support by American's for the president to open a preventive means on the U.S enemy (Terhan) as pressure has been on the U.S government by the congress but Israel has been considered not a threat (waltz 2006:42). In 2012, Israel lobbyist placed a serious pressure on the Obama's administration to sign an attack on Iran's nuclear facilities (Madsen, 2011). In order to stop the hegemonic ability of Iran in the region, other states in the Middle East has allowed for America's base in Iraq (Mattair 2007). The aid of this external threats stand strong as it became part of an organized way to keep Iran from developing her nuclear weapon, they came in different forms like cyber war, as Israel admit waging war on Iran alongside the killing of Iranian scientist (James p. Farwel, et al. 2011)

Harkary, Roberts (1997) in his work *“Triangular or Indirect Deterrence/Compellence; Something New in Deterrence Theory?”*. He narrated some events like the Israel-Arab-USSR triangular, the circ 1970-1990, the Iraqi send attacks on Israel and Saudi Arabia in 1991. He puts his hypothesis in the case of Iraqi and Iran's reply to America's strategic move in repeat of operation desert storm. His work is weak that after mentioning state of Israel and Iran in his work, he did not lay

any example on their deterrence, not to start with attempting to see how it will be possible.

In an attempt to calculate the reason why Iran has been so hell bent on continuing nuclear weapon program, I will try to check literature on Israel and American policy towards Iran's nuclear program. According to Sprusanky, Dale 2012 in the research *"Panel Discusses Iran-Israel-US relation "Waging Peace"*, he asserted on the speedy move by America in the sale of armaments to Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirate in trying to prove to Iran that, their nuclear weapon program will not be of benefit but harm to their national security. He quoted Eisenstaedt "America, Israel and the western power has decided not relent in Iran's quest for nuclear program", (GawatBahgat 2007) the work *"Iran-Israel and the United State. The Nuclear Paradox"* confirms that America and Israel alongside other western states has stated Iran is at the verge of possessing nuclear weapon. He went ahead to describe how Israel has the only nuclear weapon in the region and has threaten to strike Iran's nuclear facilities. He analyzes Iran and Israel nuclear program, assessing the possible option's in the respect of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East. Gawdat's work failed to look at how deterrence has worked in the past and why Iran seeks to possess nuclear weapon.

It's obvious it will not be easy for strike (Sick et al, 2001), put's it that the likelihood of military conflict between NATO, EU, U.S and Iran will not be possible. To (Towle 2000), because Iran has been placing the threat of retaliation if any attack on them, which to (Powell, 2003) is the reason for serious rethinking on attacking Iran by America, as there are not sure if Iran already possesses nuclear weapon.

Furthermore (Ben-Meir, Alon 2010) in his work *“Israel’s response to a nuclear Iran”*, analyses the response of Israel to Iran’s nuclear program as Israel is surrounded by unfriendly states in the Middle East.

The work provides that Israel has a military capability as strong to face her enemies in the region and has several times threatened to use it on any nation on her way. Buttressing `on EU, Russia and U.S.A foreign policy towards Iran, he noted the strength America has in the decision making of Israel, in the use of force against Iran. He concluded his work with suggestion to the American government, which says “America should reduce their manner of threat on Iran and should give a way for Iran to pursue a peaceful nuclear program and keep an eye on them to make sure it’s not redirected into nuclear weapon”, Alon showed the need for threat to be reduced on Iran as well America should give Iran the right to own a nuclear program, but he failed to outline the crisis between Israel and Iran which has made the government so bent on acquiring nuclear weapon. The debate on allowing Iran keep nuclear weapon as which as it has to do with Israel and American policy toward Iran. (Yaphe Judith and Kori Schake, 2000) in their research *“strategic implication of a nuclear armed Iran”*, analysis the effect of a nuclear Iran on America’s interest and give ways of reducing the effect of nuclear Iran on America. They argued that America should reduce their military and political as well economic sanctions on Iran to allow them continue with their possession of nuclear weapon, but in a way made suggestion of strong free nuclear zone in the Middle East. This will allow Israel to handle hegemonic control of the region if Iran attempt dropping their acquisition move, he noted. The work failed to check on the fact that America’s

presence in the gulf is already a threat to Iran and the region, as it might lead to a total control of the region.

Israel and America has to breakdown on Iran nuclear program in “*Balancing for (in) Security; An Analysis of the Iranian Nuclear Crisis in the light of the Cuban Missile Crisis I*”, (Bock 2014), researched that Israel and America are doing everything to balance against Iran due to their perception about a nuclear armed Iran becoming a threat to their national security. Bock went ahead to put some question forward in his research, to see if Israel and America’s action will stop Iran from acquiring nuclear weapon, he ask if balancing really work? Secondly, will their action reduces threat and ensure security. To answer their question he applied Stephen waltz’s *Balance of Threat theory*, and tried to understand why Israel and America see’s Iran intention as a threat because, as he argues that all states has sovereignty and deserve survival therefore self-help is need to defend themselves against external aggressors. His hypothesis states that if balancing fails and bounce back, it might affect the security situation of the balancing states (Israel and America). He asserts that the use of balancing method in the Iran situation might be unsuccessful and this will strengthen the mental acceptance of claim that Iran nuclear program is meant for deterrence and self-defense wax stronger within Iran and outside world. His work is weak as he did not mention how stability can be achieved like in the cold war era.

Other scholars have done their research on Israeli and Iran nuclear program to determine their capabilities. In the research “*Israel Nuclear Weapon*”, (kristensen, Hans M: Noris, Roberts 2014), work noted that Israeli’s government has never consented to having a nuclear weapon and at the same time never denied the

accusation of having it. It's a worldwide agreement that Israel have in half a century possessed nuclear capability. Their research was able to beat the information gotten in 2002 about the Israeli's stock, which according to Kristensen et al. in their conclusion was become is an openly available information for everyone to view. Their work claims that firstly, though Israel poses nukes but with public exaggerated estimate, secondly, Israel possesses nearly 80 nuke war head that can be launched via two dozen missiles, with a few squadrons of aircraft and also, few sea launch missiles. This work ended not giving the exact estimate of Israel nuclear heads and number of launching tools but rather giving confirmation that Israel poses nukes and can be launched through different means. With the confirmation of Israel's nuke (Coughlin, 2011) in the research "*why it wants the bomb*", investigated the Iran nuclear program to know intention behind it, he argued that the hard times of Iran-Iraqi crisis in the 80's Ayatollah R. Khomeini decided that no matter what it may cost, but Iran needed to acquire nuclear weapon. He noted that, Khomeini decided to use the words like 'whatever necessary, including development of nuclear weapon, if it will protect Iran from being encroached by aggressor Arab states and the world'. His work shows a great deal that Iran from time has put in their agenda to stand against any aggressor state with nuclear weapon if necessary. In the article '*why Iran should get the bomb*' Kenneth Waltz noted that international relation theories lack regional in-depth knowledge. He argues that Israel possession of nuclear weapon has from time strengthened instability in the region and that Iran nuclear weapon will bring stability back to the region. He laid emphasis on how Israeli air strike Iraq 1981 and Syrian 2007 nuclear facilities to keep hegemony in the region and now Israel has laid embargo on Iran oil alongside a threat of strike their nuclear facilities if Iran refuse to stop their nuclear program. On the fear of expansion as held by

scholars like Scott, Waltz argued that since an atomic state of Israel did not cause an arms race for over fifty years now, they will be no reason for a nuclear Iran to foster arms race in the Middle East. If Iran gets the bomb, she will gain more knowledge on deterrence, as other state in the GCC from Jordan to UAE are keeping up with the development of nuclear program because as NPT members, they have the rights to atomic energy. He concluded that, there should be no fear of proliferation as it has proven positive since the last fifty years, first between USSR and USA down to the present day India and Pakistan.

According to (Eisenstaedt, 1999) in his research "*living with a nuclear Iran?*" the researcher examines the motivation for Iran quest in acquiring nuclear weapon and the problem the country passed through to make her feel it's the right move. The works put that Iran is a signatory and going contrary to this NPT treaty which will allow international body placing Iran under pressure. Eisenstaedt continued to attempt ways by which nuclear arm can affect Iran's current regime, alongside the consequences that might come with other countries deterring Iran. The work tries to see the consequences that may occur with other countries deterring a nuclear Iran as Western countries and Israel are willing to deter Iran. The researcher elaborates on how Iran should calculate their move before making them not to incur more eyes on them meaning Iran has to examine the cost benefit of violating the NPT. This work is weak in the provision of a basic step to be taken by Iran if it has to negotiate. On the other hand, Iran has gone into negotiation table from 2005 to the present with sanctions place on them. The negotiation has gone through different stages.

According to (Joseph, Cirincione 2006)in “*The Continuing Problem of Nuclear Weapons-Controlling Iran's Nuclear Program*” the researcher asserts that there is no evidence that Iran possess nuclear weapon as at present but has enough Highly Enrich Uranium (HEU) to produce nuclear weapons. To him Iran has already engaged in a secret assembly of these materials in other to enable build nuclear weapon. He explains the fuel-cycle and all the process it will take to arrive at a nuclear bomb. He concluded by laying out one step to tackle the Iran nuclear program. Though his work is clear showing that Iran has no ready nukes, but possesses all the materials needed for one, the weakness of his research is where he fails to outline issue concerning why Iran would want to engage in transforming their HEU into a weapon.

The collective mass of literature on deterrence and stability in the Middle East aids in analyzing why Iran needs to acquire nuclear weapon like how deterrence could enhance stability between USSR and USA during the cold war. The collected existing literature on deterrence in the Middle East has been reviewed on Iran-Israel case, however, there is no literature applying deterrence in the cold war and to Iran-Israel case to see if the Iran needs nuclear weapon will enhance stability in the Middle East. This research is significant because due application of the cold war stability methods to the Iran-Israeli case as Iran’s quest to acquire nuclear weapon to deter Israel and other states in the Middle East, as well any external aggression is serious to its national security.

2.5 Theoretical Framework

This research will apply Neo-realism to explain how like in the cold war, a nuclear Iran will deter Israel and enhance stability in the Middle East.

The ultimate reason behind nuclear weapon is to ensure peace and security in the global system. As nuclear weapon have not been used beside the 1945 Hiroshima and Nagasaki scenario on Japan, which took place before USSR acquire nuclear weapon to balance power in order to deter America from any attack(Pasley 2008:21). With both sides possessing nuclear weapon, deterrence became the tool to ensure non-use through the fear of retaliation. The argument of nuclear proliferation has not only be pursued by Waltz, scholars like Gallio 1961, Bueno de Masquita 1982, Sandoval 1976, Weltman 1995 and Mearsheimer 1990 theorized that the potential of nuclear weapon to destroy has kept peace reigning in the international system (Pasley 2008:21). Other scholars like Doty 1960, Nye 1981, Morgestern 1959, Ikle 1960, Bailey1991, Spector 1995 and Kraig 1991 did not reject proliferation but call for nuclear weapons to be curtailed at all times (Pasley 2008:21). Scholars such as Kenneth Waltz who adopted Thomas Schelling's work on *Classical Work on Deterrence* argue that anarchy is the structural principle in the global system. His ideas on deterrence theoretically contextualize why Iran should have a nuclear weapon. Neo-realist believes that interstate conflicts are due to lack of an overarching authority above state and the distribution of power in the international system. Mearsheimer(2001:29) divides the structure of international system into three elements; character of units, distribution of capabilities, and character of actor's units. To him, two of these elements are constant, that is they lack overarching government and principle of self-help meaning all state has to see to their defense against external attacks and cannot rely on other states for protection due to not knowing the intention of their allies (Waltz, Sagan 2013:5). This means all states units are functionally alike. Survival which is one of the three "S" of realism has placed a primary goal on nations by anarchy which has on a long run shaped what

power means between states. This work will make use of Deterrence theory in aiming to answer the question, “How is neo realism similar to the case in the Middle East; and how will it give Iran reason to acquire and possess nuclear weapon”.

According to Mearsheimer in (Waltz 2003), the idea of self-help in anarchy has led to states maximizing their relative power. Realist’s belief in balance of power as nothing changes; war has been in place right from the beginning to the present and will continue to be as far as the international system exists. Waltz separated the military logic of *defense* and *deterrence* into different meaning as it concerns nuclear weapon. He sees deterrence as a way of “stopping states from doing something by frightening them and not just for defense but dissuading a state out of attacking because the expected reaction of opponent may result in one’s severe punishment.”(Waltz, Sagan 2013:5) Putting into consideration the capability of nuclear weapon as his strong opinion of deterring and attack is the reply action of the opponent. Meanwhile the main principle that deterrence holds is that “inducing someone to refrain from unwanted action by placing before the person the further consequences of that action his planning will be of his downfall” (Waltz 2013:5-6). Defense is the act of state maximizing their security as a result of distrust of other states. (Baylis et al, 2005)

Realism happens to be one a significant theory in the international system. He stipulates on the raise of traditional realism theory and neo realism theory. Rudolf (2013:47) The Neo realism theory of Mearsheimer 2001 and Waltz 1978 acknowledges the domestic aspect and institutions of states. Structural realist have some believes in common e.g. survival, statist, anarchy and self-help but sees why

state acts differently toward other states as either offensive or defensive. *Defensive realist* believes anarchical structure of the international system gives an open space for states to create their own policies to maintain security (Gentles 2002:111-112) as the pressure from offensive powerful states and the fear of encroachment from less powerful states lead to the quest to acquire nuclear weapons to foster balance of power (Lynne 2003:51). Mearsheimer contends that *Offensive realism* maintains, the anarchical nature of the international system has come to be a yardstick for state aggression against other states. But states do not trust other states due to lack of not being aware of their intentions, this does not allow states to take offensive attacks against others and states cannot increase their security without threatening others (Mearsheimer 2001:33-36). Most of the time states that only want to survive end up wanting to gain hegemony to secure power. (Mearsheimer 2001:31)

“Offensive realist generally argues that the global system fosters conflicts and aggression as security is scarce, allowing international struggles and likely war. While Defensive realist argues that international system does not necessarily generate conflict and war, as defensive strategies are mostly the best route to security.” Rudloff (2013:47)



Figure 1. Iranian president surprised with talks about Israeli state, which maintains speech

Source: <http://operamundi.uol.com.br/conteudo/opiniao/31471/sera+que+israel+vai+seguir+o+conselho+de+hassan+rouhani.shtml>

Waltz defending a nuclear Iran in accordance with deterrence theory argues that *“proliferation is not a problem because nuclear weapons have not proliferated.”* (Waltz, Sagan & Bets, 2007:136) and even if proliferated no need to worry much as Waltz assert *“Nuclear weapon have one purpose and only one purpose: Deterrence.”* (Waltz, Sagan & Bets 2007:146). States are always in the need for more power and can do anything to attain power. (Mearsheimer 2014:181) Though, states are mainly defensive and will not beseech the might if it endangers their security (Mearsheimer 2014:182). Meaning every state handles her affairs aggressively in times of crisis (Waltz 2008:42) to defend her national interest. To a great extent deterrence has ensured stability right from the cold war era and has not failed in fifty years. In this work deterrence will be apply in the Iran and Israel case, checking why it worked between USSR and USA to pull out reason for Iran’s quest to acquire nuclear weapon in the aim of balancing against Israel to enhance stability in the region.

Chapter 3

NUCLEAR WEAPON AND MIDDLE EAST NUCLEAR SECURITY

3.1 Conflict and Cooperation in Iran-Israel Relationship

Iran and Israel has a high level of complicated connection as they both had mutual benefits from the creation of the Israeli state in 1948 to the 1980's before their fall out this ended up making them worst enemies in the Middle East region.

The state of Israel found itself defending the territory it has now acquired from the Palestine, it became clear to Israel that the Arab's were never going to stop fighting until the territory is given back. To keep stability and balance up with the spread of Arabs, Israel entered alliance with Iran, turkey, Lebanese, Ethiopia and the Kurds to kick against pan-Arabism in the region (Paris 2007: 21-22) this alliance wedge a great war that it won against Israelis advisories, noted the Arabs of Israel's new might and stop the battle of expansion by the Arab's states (Paris 2007:22) only for few years.

Iran on its side had already waited for this alliance due to the awareness of the expansion ideas of the Arab's and the both sides had America as ally, so when the proposal came in 1953, the dictatorship regime of Iran saw it as an opportunity not to lose its territory to the Arab's (Paris 2007: 24). With the periphery alliance, Iran and Israel had a special close ties in a mutual interest game. The Israeli in the training of

Iran's army provided the knowledge for agricultural produce while Iran in return was pumping large amount of crude oil into Israel for economic development to keep shape (Simon 2014). The common idea of containing the Arab expansion was stronger between Iran and Israel, which gave them better sense of belonging to the same ideology with great cooperation.

3.1.1 Iran – Israel Break-Up and Consequence

The mutual interest cooperation of Israel and Iran lasted to the regime of Khomeini in 1979, the new spiritual leader used rhetorical words against Israel critiquing them for illegal invasion and taking over the territory of Palestine (Simon 2010: 2). The need for balance started setting in the policies of both states, because the common interest also had common threats, which mean each state had to gain more strength to deal with their internal and external problems on their own for survival (Mearsheimer 2003:3) the Arab-Israel crisis to a level that became higher in the threat compare to the Arab–Persian annoyances, which ended at Israel in problem solving at this point with the anger of Iran's leader. Iran noticed with the Arab's at their side, Arab alliance will be of more favour (Paris 2007:29). The act of breaking relationship with Israel was view by Khomeini as a right move because to him Israel became a source of oppression to the Muslim world. As the revolution was recognizing Islam identity and ideology (Takey 2006:86). In his view, the displacement of Palestine which is an Islamic state is an unforgivable sin committed against the Muslim world which he called upon the Muslims to align in war against Israel (Takey 2006:84). The revolutionary idea took grounds in the Arab world leading to several crises with Israel gaining a win from the Arab world, Israel went ahead in 1982 to intervene in the Lebanon civil war and Iran took the advantage involving with moral, political and logistic supplies for the sake of Islamic

movement. Iran sponsored the Islamic jihadist alongside Hezbollah and Hamas to fight Israel (Menashri 2006:109). Iran's leader also saw the conflict as liberation for the Muslim world in two dimensions of opposing states; as a war between the righteous and the foolish by which attribution was not necessary. However, it has become the service of Muslim brotherhood to force Israel existence, meaning any Arab or Palestinian leader that negotiates with Israel stands to be recognize as a betrayer and traitor (Menashri 2006:110) secondly, Khomeini went ahead proving documents that the Jewish holocaust was a fabricated number of death tool so as to gain public to sympathize with Israel, therefore opening opportunity for them to occupy Palestine and justify their Zionist movement (Takey 2006:85).

Iran due to geography and other variables had no direct contact with Israel in the entire crisis. The war was been fought by the jihadist, Hezbollah and Hamas, while Israel also had their methods of fighting the Arab world. The battle is a cold war in the Middle East as it was fought through proxy and even within the tension Iran and Israel still had a secret deal.

3.1.2 Iran-Israel Secret Deal

As self-interest crises continued to linger on between both countries in the region, Israel and Iran during the .crises had a common interest at a point which came as a result of Iran-Iraqi war.

Discovering the backdrop of Iran-American relationship, Saddam Hussein saw how weak the Islamic Republic of Iran had become and planned to encroach on its oil rich neighbour. Saddam with his new policy toward Iran in the 1980, he immediately stopped sharing the in the Khomeini's revolutionary ideology of Islamic

brotherhood. Iraq planned on thwarting the government and remove Khomeini from seat replacing with an Iraqi controlled government as the Khomeini government was replacing the exiled Shia and not really strong as an opposition. First attempt had a leak of intelligence which cumulated to the arrest and killing of several officers for co-opting with Saddam to take over Khuzestan (Western Iran) from the newly formed government (Bergman 2008:40).

The failure of a takeover attempt did not give Saddam a signal, he further invaded Iran with his army armed and trained by the USA against Soviet encroachment invade Iran in a straight war. He conquered and took over oil fields and attempted to control the three major islands in the region as he believe that will boost his name in the Middle East forgetting that Israel has power to counter him in the fight for hegemony (Bergman 2008:40-41). Ten months into the war, Saddam had already taken over some oil rich parts of Iran pushing the weak revolutionary guard and Khomeini to look out for backup. The need for trained soldiers became eminent that Khomeini resorted to using boys at age twelve and above who volunteer to fight the war with permission from their sibling but it failed on the Islamic Iran to the continue victory of Iraq (Simon 2014:IP).

Israel not wanting to give up on Iran but was not enthusiastic about helping them, two day in the war Israeli deputy defense minister Zippori Mordechi to Iran in the daily newspaper of their readiness to provide arms to Iran only if they can change their ideology towards Israel, Israel after hearing from Iran, signed several agreements with Iran in Zurich which led them into training Iranian soldiers and providing them with American made guns for battle (Paris 2007:105). The arms sale

went a long way in the battle to gain back areas taken by Iraq, as Khomeini's government gained grounds to the winning of the war and later came with the use of chemical weapon on Iran. Iran had gotten the intelligent of the Osirak facility and its capability as much as Iranians were scared of been the victim of the weapon that will be forge in that facility, Israel in wanting to remain the only nuclear state in the region, with the information provided by Iran, Israel strike by air on the Osirak reactor in 1981 (Bruce 2008:95).

3.1.3 A Drift of another Relationship (Alliance)

It became obvious that even with their proxy crisis going on, the need to balance and counter their mutual enemy brought Iran and Israel into a trade instigated by America. It's clear that America drove on self-interest due to the soviet aid arms used by Iraqi's against Iran whom happens to be their ally in the past. America's policy towards the region was to balance Iran and Iraq again in other to keep stability, but American later discovered they cannot balance each state without Iran and Iraq relying on each other (Paris 2007:171)

With the defeat of Iraq and sanction placed on them by the United Nation in 1980 (Paris 2006:249), Iran settle on the idea that if Iraq could use chemical weapon on Iranian and Kurdish soldiers; Iraq use muster gas in 1983 and Nerve gas Tabun beginning 1985 on Kurdish and Iranian troops, Iraq tragically dropped a bomb containing Muster gas and Tabunon 16/03/1988 in the city of Hilabja with a death toll of 5000 people (BBC). Iran noted the damage the bomb caused of her soldier and decided to acquire nuclear technology. This idea gained approval owing to Israel's possession of nuclear weapon and the unstable relationship between Iran and Israel (Paris 2006:251). Israel by this time had opened a policy for Iran's ideological

incentives and expansionism. Israel became an opposition to Iranian nuclear program as it's a threat to the Jewish nation as a result of Iran's question '*should Palestine be wiped from world map and replace with the fake state like Israel*'? As Israel was held to animosity towards Islam and hostility to Iran were seen (Menashri 2006:110)

Right from the first intention of Iran to acquire nuclear weapon, Israel have been on guard checking and cross-checking to make sure that Iran does not acquire nuclear weapon. This has made their relationship gone in several dimension from that period as Israel through their influence as America ally, with the U.N placing Iran on sanctions. Furthermore, this relationship has been so disrupted that Israel has promised a military strike on Iran like Iraq and Syria if nuclear reactor is not closed down (Akbar- Aljazeera 2013). Though with opinion of scholars and political world view, no one is sure if Iran really possess nuclear weapon at the moment but Israel is still bent on using military strike as sanctions has appeared to be falling. Some scholars ask if military strike is the best option due to Iran's response of retaliation.

3.1.4 The Proxy Conflict

With the situation of enmity on the scene, Iran wants to reclaim hegemony of the region not to lead the Arab state but to rather form alliance against to defend Israel (Paris 2007:173). Though Iran and Israel are far from each other geographically, which aid in not involving in a direct conflict but their relationship chartered led to several crises that were seen like a cold war in the Middle East with both sides as the major actors. This war fought in proxy strictly indirect but known by the both states of the course and consequences of the outcome of the war either Israel or Iran has to become hegemony.

With Iran's involvement in the 1982 Israel attack on Lebanon and organization of the community to support the crisis financial and militarily in the Hezbollah growth and might, Hezbollah attacked the American military base in Binite with death toll of 24 military men in 1983 (Levitt 2012:1) Hezbollah fought a strong war on guerilla level against Israel that forced Israel with no other option rather to in their history of war withdraw for the first time from Lebanon as Charles Freilieb places it as a unilateral Israel withdrawal in 2000 (Freilieb 2012:41). The Lebanese group trained Hamas to go in line with the guerilla crisis on ground which also got funds and military support from Iran. In 2006 July, the extra diction and murdering of Israeli soldiers by Hezbollah in the boarder turned out to become another crisis after the withdrawal bringing to an end, a six year place at the boarder (Fraeilieb 2012:45) this action provoke Israel into going to a destructive war against Lebanon.

Israel was bent on using her political allies in America to suppress Iran at same time when Iran was busy supporting militants morally militarily and financially (Paris 2007:80). Since the invasion and taking over of Iraq by America in 2003, the stand of America in the Middle East was in question but though was strong at a level of standing with it Israeli ally. Though, Iran also benefit from it as gaining a kind of leadership stands (Paris 2007:81). But this in turn became an increment in the fear of Israel a nuclear Iran would be a threat to both America and Israel in the region, meaning Israel now need a strong hold from America to reduce Iran and Palestine tension in the region.

The Iran-Israeli relationship has a good beginning before its rise and fall right from the cold war era. The two countries seem to be geographically far apart to have war

between them both religion and ideology have been known to be their stand to be enemies. The two old time friend were allies against the Arabs but at a point split and started fighting a guerilla war against themselves. The Iraq-Iran war brought their ties to a good point as Iran needed Israeli's aid to defeat Iraq, but with the use of chemical weapon on Iranian soldiers, Iran decided to embark on nuclear program to deter future attack and Israel wanting to remain the hegemony has done everything necessary to stop Iran from balancing power with them till date.

3.2 Israel Nuclear Program

Israel has been in conflict with the Arab neighbor right from its birth in 1948; through this crisis the need to stand up against all Arab state gave Israel opportunity to acquire nuclear capability. Israel nuclear from its beginning had already started developing nuclear weapons (Steinbach, 2009:327), Israel-Iran relationship has not been on cooperation and conflict base, which has brought their enmity in the Middle East far in this present time. They both are non-Arab states in the Middle East which aligned against the Arabs before Iran pulled out in 1979 for the reason of religious ideology. After their alignment against Iraq during the Iran-Iraqi, the two states shifted from a cold peace to a cold war due to Iran's motive to acquire nuclear weapon to stand against future use of the sort of weapon Iraq used on Iran during the crisis (Aljazeera).

Israel has threatened a preventive strike against Iran but America, E.U and the U.N decided to place sanctions on Iran. With the knowledge of damage nuclear weapon is capable of and knowing how deterrence works, other states in the Middle East might decide to embark on nuclear weapon program to deter Israel and America like Iran.

3.2.1 Israel Nuclear Weapon in Brief

The state of Israel has acquired and possessed nuclear weapon from its existence in 1966, but at that time it was still not disclose to the public, meaning that by 1973 war

Israel had but did not use the weapon. The state is bordered by Arab states which was a security problem which led into war with Egypt, Palestine, Syria, Jordan and Iraq in 1948 same year it was born after the holocaust through the Zionist movement (Evera 2009:2) Israel won the war after (ten) months of battle, but with this act of offensive attack reveled to Israel leaders that been able to take their stand in the region, a strong compellence and deterrence strategy have to be acquired. Israeli's Ben-Gurion noted that the defeat of Yeshiva at a point in the battle was as a result of their wait and see policy and he decided that all men and women in Israel must go through military training (Saylor, ORG ip4), and both scientist should be ready to pull their knowledge in deterring the Arabs, as Israel took it that legalization of nuclear weapon came with the U.S not finding evidence in their territory and reactor (Kumaraswamy 2001:96)

In agreement with American atom of peace, Israel built a reactor close to Palmachin with no much inspection on Israel's intension, which gave Israel the opportunity to request or buy nuclear materials from other countries. This move for signing the Atom for Peace misled the Arabs on Israeli intention of acquiring nuclear weapon and Israel-French agreement developed another reactor for nuclear research purpose (kumaraswamy,2001:96) (Steinbach, 2009:330). In 1957 the prime minister had a meeting with some trusted advisers secretly notifying them on Israel plan of nuclear weapon and the policy of opacity. (Cohen 2011) after which he entered into the deal

with America and France for minor research reactors and Israel acquired plutonium for their nuclear weapon program. when asked by the American government, Israel claim their Dimona reactor is for textile factory while they acquire plutonium test were been carried out in their labs leading to the establishment of nuclear bomb and according to Cohen as quoted by Kumaraswamy, Israel was in collaboration with French-Algerian nuclear test by 1967 as Israel had already coupled about two bombs. (Steinbach, 2009:332) meaning as at 1973 during another phase of Arab-Israeli war, Israel was equipped with nuclear weapon. Countries like America, Britain and France suggested the NPT to Israel as a means of keeping their nuclear in the peace range which became an obstacle for Israel. The issue of balancing power with the Arabian army was the main concern of Israeli state and possession of nuclear weapon will not allow other states to interfere or aid Israel in the war and Israel with the nuclear arsenal cannot match the whole Arab states but Israel refuse signing the NPT, so state have stayed out in helping Israel against the Arab states (Kumaraswamy 2001:99). Israel went ahead in denying the existence of nuclear weapon in the state while in their meeting put more strict measure in opacity policy even with their reactors and everything to prove their possession of nuclear weapon. The inspection of Dimona facility was brought to an end in 1970 for not finding evidence of nuclear weapon as Israel policy of opacity pushed them into keeping everything about nuclear weapon in secret (Steinbach 2009:335). The policy played a big role in Israel security as it aid in stepping up and adding more missile, naval and air craft's to Israel's might from America and France. Even with the policy of opacity highly held and practiced strongly by the Israeli government by 1979 nuclear missile test was captured by American satellite on Indian Ocean which shows owned

by South African in alliance with Israel (NWT), Israel managed to escape the accusation even with the evidence of their involvement.

Israel denied Iraq and Syria the possession of nuclear weapon in the region but all evidence shows that Israel possesses nuclear weapon and has held strong to their nuclear policy of opacity. Iran nuclear program has come as a threat to Israel which has made them take up a policy to strike Iranian facility if sanctions and diplomacy fails. Israel was in a joint nuclear activity with Jordan but it failed due to the Fukushima accident because it receives aids from China, Canada, Russia, France and America (IAEA, 2008). The attention given to this project by these countries makes it a weapon free project and with Israel's involvement, it will be the first of its kind with no offensive strike in the region but Israel in their fear of balance will not allow the Jordan negotiation with partners. According to king Abdullah, a Jordanian delegation would approach a potential partner and a week later and Israeli delegation would be there asking them out not to support Jordan in their quest for nuclear energy (NPD, 2012). This means Israel is aimed at remaining the only nuclear state in the Middle East as the only facility challenging them is Iran's, which there have threatened to strike also if negotiation and sanctions fails.

3.2.2 Israeli Nuclear Capability

Israel had already acquired nuclear weapon by 1973 Arab-Israeli war, America had claimed that Israel was in possession by 1974 with evidence of showing nuclear heads of about 10-20 nukes (Karpin 2006) also like I mentioned above, South Africa and Israel tested a bomb on an island in the Indian ocean 1979 which Israel denied any connection (NWT). Israel's nuclear capabilities cannot be outlined without one mentioning the Ground to Ground Missile (GGM) which was the first kind of nuclear

missile owned by Israel (Kristiansen & Norris 2014:100). This GGM is also known as surface missile which are launched from the ground to the sea or land. Israel is said to possess over 200 nukes (Kristiansen & Norris 2014:101).

Jericho I was built to enable missile launch in rocket, which came as the first level of GGM and were in place as at 1970 but lack enablement space launch speed, this made Israel to go into buying an American product of GGM after the war in 1973 in the quest of making their missile work properly (Karpin 2006). It all started in the 1960 with Israel attempt the development of technology for the launching of nuclear heads. Later in 1965, France in alliance with Israel had already completed and tested the first stage of their nuclear weapon which was the MD-660 (Levey, 1997:128). As time went on Israel decided to improve their nuke with technological advancement took the nuclear capacity to stage two known as Jericho 2. Jericho 2 ranges an average of 1500 to 4000kilometers carrying a single war head of about 1000 kilogram with either one mega tone or high explosive convention which launched with solid fuel rocket vehicle (Warner 1999). This became the very viable means of deterrence for Israel towards the Arab states and became the background for the development capability of Space Launching Vehicle (SLV) which was used in launching Ofeq satellites (NTI January, 2010). With more technological advancement in the field of nuclear, Israel evolved in the third stage of their nuclear weapon known as Jericho 3. This missiles capability is more improved compared to the 1 and 2 as it ranges an average 480km loaded with about 1000kg nukes for battle (Kristiansen &Noriss 2014:104), but Israel did not stop at this stage of nuclear weapon production as in 1970 went ahead to buy an American produce surface to surface launcher a more sophisticated and heavy war head carrier; the MGM-52

which is capable of going as far as 1300km if launched carrying 450kg of conventional nukes on board (Kristiansen & Norris 2014:103-104).

Israel's nuclear weapon ranges from land, sea, cyber space to the air space and it deviates of their capability of delivering this missile through Israel decided to operate opacity policy but American CIA plane cut the image of the missile in Israel. Karpin (2006) shows that Israel war head stoke pile is about 200 to 400 while the Jericho missile are mainly placed more valued and can be launched with about 12 motor Jericho missile by air via craft with squadrons attached to it and from the sea via Cruise Missile Launcher. Even with all the evidence at hand Israel has still not publicly agreed to the possession of nuclear weapon as part of their opacity policy, in as much as not wanting to be the country to introduce nuclear weapon in the Middle East.




Figure 2. Israel's nuclear range if delivered. www.csis.org/burke

3.2.3 Implication of Israel Nuclear Weapon on Iran

The signing of atom for peace gave Israel the opportunity to own nuclear research but Israel took the opportunity to acquire their local nuclear research reactor for nuclear weapon by 1973 another phase of Arab Israeli war, Israel already posed nuclear weapon with evidence on ground (Steinbach 2009:335) but decided to operate opacity policy at 1970. With the Israel-France agreement, Israel tested nuclear weapon on Indian Ocean but denied because of South Africa involvement (NWT).

States develop nuclear weapons to either suppress conventional threat to deter other states from attacking, used as coercive mechanism in trying to change status quo (Brown:2004:48). Israel acquisition of nuclear weapon was as a result of deterring the Arabs states but Brown quoting Shultz, “*proliferation begets proliferation*”. When a state acquire nuclear weapon its stands that neighboring states becomes threatened and to balance power there tend to acquire their own state nuclear weapon as a means of self-help to deter against attack (Brown 2004:49). When it was discovered that America had nuclear weapon because of the hits on Japan, it begat that of the USSR, followed with UK, for of USSR, France felt threatened by UK to acquired and China saw a reason to guide herself from external aggression from any of these countries. After the cold war, North Korea felt threatened by America and thought it as a good reason to deter, later followed by India and Pakistan which followed the America-USSR situation. Iran has been careful about Israel just as Israel is to Iran. As Mearsheimer asserts states try to defend their sovereignty because other states intention are unknown (2003:32).

Israel have gained nuclear weapon capabilities in alliance with America for her security against enemy state, but denied the acquisition of other states in the Middle East with making Iraq and Syria an example to others. Israel strikes Iraq nuclear facility in 1981 with the help of Iran as it was in their common interest for state security and completed by Americas 1990-1991 Operation Desert storm while Iran was for national security as a result of the then ongoing war between Iraq and Iran. On the other hand, Israel strikes Syrian Al-kibar facility which was close to Turkey and Iraqi border. This act was been seen as a defensive move as a reason of Syria's relationship with Hamas and Hezbollah, which have records of terrorism according to department of states of America (Makovsky, 2012:12). According to Maskovsky prime minister Netanyahu alongside his cabinet are considering on a way to confront and strike a nuclear program as Syria seems to be an example to Iran (2012:NY).

Israel has refused to sign the NPT and Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT) suggested by America which will not allow the possession, production and enrichment of uranium for weapon purpose. Though America did not give much attention to it as a possible way to disarmaments (Cohen 2013:216), this means threat to Iran as their relationship has been in conflict because Israel has threatened to strike and for them not wanting to sign the treaty Iran needs to be ready when they strike. America has recognized Israel and other states such as India, Pakistan, and North Korea, placing obligations to manage them, why would Iran's case be different? If Iran is accused of terrorism, amongst Iran's reason for building army and increasing their arsenal is to deter Israel from further encroachment into Palestine or attacking Iran nuclear program as viewed by Israel and American officials (Entous, Levinson and Barnes 2004).

Iran views the region under its control, the feeling of big brother role has been in the Iranian foreign policy since her alliance with the Syria. So, the goal of possessing a nuclear weapon dates back to that 1950s alliance with Arab world during the turn in their relationship with Israel. But Israel nuclear weapon has been a tool to gain that stand of security against the Arab states, though; the nuclear weapon was the reason for the Israel-Iran acute separation that led Iran to merge the Arabs in the name of Islam. With Israel, Iran claims to the region as a super power, it will be an unwise idea to have nuclear weapon (Miller and Scheiman 2003). After all, the possession of nuclear weapon by Israel without signing the NPT stands as a threat to the Islamic world mostly Iran; Israel is of the opposition of nuclear Iran but Iran would not want to back down as Israeli state still possesses and also due to not having knowledge of Israel future intentions (Miller & Shieman 2003). It's difficult will for Israel to hold monopoly on nuclear weapon in the Middle East without causing distraction in the future because on a long run it will invoke an arms race in the region.

Another implication of Israel's nuclear weapon does not stop at Iran's possession but might stop other GCC and PAN Arab states their right from securing themselves. Israel possession has already become a threat to Iran that was close to acquiring one and in future nuclear weapon acquisition will spread to countries like Syria, Algeria, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Turkey and Libya (Yeph& Lute, 2005:71). If the Israel issue of stopping state from acquiring nuclear issue is not settled more crisis are going to come up in the nearest future, Israel even with their involvement in Jordan's nuclear program still went behind to stop their partners from assisting them (NPD 2012).

3.3 Evolution of Iran Nuclear Program

Iran nuclear program was propagated under the rule of Shah Pahlavi by 1950s under the auspices of America under the Atom for Peace program in 1957, which led to the understanding of acquiring a research reactor center in the university to enable high electric energy and health (Lin, 2011:217). Iran nuclear program gained more growth from America due to their national interest on the realist perspective of keeping Iran away from the USSR through support and by 1960 Iran wanting to continue a peaceful nuclear research took another step in becoming a signatory with the NPT which rectification came in the 1970s entering into force (Lin 2011:217). Becoming a member of the NPT, Iran further gained the support of other Western countries with supplies which had continued to improve during the regime of shah.

The plan to gain 23,000 megawatts of energy in electricity came as a result of him looking beyond oil for production of electricity in the future encouraged him in developing to meet up when the situation occurs in the future. The contract was issued to a German company for the construction of Bushel reactor in 1974(Yaphe& Lutes, 2005:49). The 23,000 megawatts program greatly gained support and growth down to the 1979 when the revolution struck with the removal of Shah from his seat. Iran nuclear program saw another phase with a decline in the interest of international cooperation state that were supplying materials, technical know-how and uranium for research in the reactors stopped. This came as a result of the kidnap of American embassy workers, keeping hostage, demanding the release of Shah from America to come and answer to Iranians (McDermott 1992:239).

Iran decided to restart their nuclear program immediately after the Iran–Iraq war. Iraq used chemical weapon on the Kurds of Iran killing over three thousand leaving over 1,000 injured people in one attack 1980-1988. The president of Iraq Saddam Hussein took an offensive attack on Iran's sovereignty by encroaching on Iran's territory and attempting to occupy the oil rich areas during the war. Ayatollah Khomeini's government demanded to continue the program to enable Iran acquires a nuclear weapon in order to defend Iran from such attack in the future. Iran had started working on their nuclear and chemical weapon during the war (Grafet Porter October 2014). At this time Iran secretly requested for Soviet's help in their nuclear program by helping developing their knowledge bought from Pakistan. A.Q Kahn's network in Pakistan sold bomb design, centrifuges and aided in initiating Iran's nuclear program in 1989 (Sagan, Waltz, & Betts 2003:140-141). This year Iran succeeded in their nuclear weapon program from the IAEA and decided to air it out in 2003 NPT members meeting their enrichment at Natanz facility, Arab heavy water reactor plant for fuel fabrication and the research on centrifuges conversion and enrichment (Aftergood & Garbose, June 2012).

Iran after calling one on their intent was meant to face sanction in condition with a strong hold of international loneliness but later in December complied with more signing of Nuclear Additional Protocol on safeguard to which Iran agreed the suspension of all enrichment. But even with the signing refused IAEA total inspection of their nuclear plant (IAEA 2003), this became more reason of a suspicious act to the West and UN and P+5 leading to their sanction.

3.3.1 Iran's Bid for Nuclear Weapon

The international community still had suspicion on Iran continuance of its nuclear program after sanction and international isolation because the level of enrichment. Iran's continuing her nuclear weapon program was not shocking as a lot of reason surrounds Iran intent towards acquiring nuclear weapon.

Iran believe in self-defense, so Iran's policy to acquire nuclear weapon has one reason on stand at a balance of power in the region as Iran has long been known to be controlling other kinds of bomb. The Iraq-Iran war in 1980 Saddam Hussein's use of mustard gas against Iran killing over 4,000 people has remained fresh in the minds of Iranian people and leaders. Russians invasion and occupying of Iran due to the discovery of oil in 19th century has also lingered in the minds of learning a kind of military occupation in the early 1700s (Ramazani, 2010:309). Iran ideology and Islamic revolution of 1979 which cumulates hatred in the minds of the western countries especially America alongside the taking of hostage due to America harboring the shah Rezi Pahlavi for crime committed against his people. The American involvement in support of Iraq during the Iraq-Iran war leading to the bombing of civilian plane by 1988 (Fisher and Kingma, 2001) and more is the Israeli nuclear weapon standing face to face with Iran in the region, the Pakistan nuclear weapon on the other hand, India and North Korea face invasion in times past and the number of nuclear states around Iran. Currently Iran does not know the intention of these states which has led to fear of invasion from the region or external aggression of America's presence in Iraq since 2003 (Kar, 2003).

According to Waltz (2007) Nuclear weapon have been acquired by states for 50 years and has proved not to have been used by any state against another. Even at that state still quest to acquire nuclear weapon knowing full well that it might not be used but it will definitely serve its purpose 'Deterrence', Iran's quest for nuclear weapon was as a defensive means against regional and external aggressors, as it will deter them from striking Iran by thinking of Iran's defense or retaliation capability. The placement of Iran under sanctions since 1979 has been a matter of serious discussion on security both at home, regional and international level to show their strength and readiness awaiting any other of such moves from the US or other states in as much as, if successful will prove to other less powerful of ways of such conditions.

The history of conflict between Iran and US has brought the hatred of Iran towards America to a high level as there are threat and number one enemy to Islamic Republic of Iran. It's obvious that smaller states who have big state as enemy tend to want to acquire nuclear weapon to secure themselves from any form of attack due to lack of strong support from their allies (Kadhim 2006). Americas presence in two state border of Iran has remain a great threat to Iran and not only is their presence felt but replacement of their presidents with anti-Iranian government is also another level of its right which America did not say in secret Americas occupation in Iraq. During Iran-Iraq war, America supplied Iraq with arms of different kinds alongside chemical weapon that killed 30,000 people (Dobbs, 2002:3). According to waltz, American president noted some countries as three '*axis of evil*' with Iraq invaded and government over thrown leading the presence of state by the US based in Iraq, the move by America to draw North Korea into negotiation to stop her nuclear weapons program. What do you think Iran should feel knowing that she is the only left

country along that region attempting to possess nuclear weapon? (Sagan,Waltz& Betts, 2007).

Iran is been surrounded by nuclear weapons states as mentioned earlier which Iran perceive as threat to their regime. Israeli nuclear weapon has always stood as a threat to Iran due to their hostile relationship because Iran wants to continue being hegemony in the region but with nuclear armed Israel been more militarily powerful, domination of the Middle East seems to be on Israel's shoulder and this has made America use Israel as their threat to state in the Middle East (Aranson,1992), America uses Israel's nuclear weapon in constructing the foreign policy of other states in the Middle East which is why Iran state that plans of nuclear program will either be attacked offensively or placed on sanction to continue with negotiations. The case of Pakistan lies on one hand though Pakistan has been ruled by military for several years now but of recent there is a probability of fundamentalist government (Wahhabi) to power (kadhim 2006). The political atmosphere in Pakistan will change because of their act of anti-government which happens to be a threat to Iran. Iran religious leader are not in alignment with the wahhabi and with them possessing nuclear weapon, then Iran's religious leader will have to find a way to defend themselves of wahhabi's nuclear capability (Perkovich 2003).

Though, Iran might not gain hegemony in region even after possessing nuclear weapon but it will end up achieving a deterrence aim for balancing power between Iran against Pakistan and Israel nuclear weapon. This will maintain the stability of threat in the region (Evron, 2008). The struggle and motivation of Iran to possess

nuclear power comes in line with the idea of joining the powerful states club with nuclear weapon.

3.3.2 Does Iran Have Nuclear Weapon?

The present issue of arms race in the Middle East is a result of balancing threat from neighboring states and has to be done as state intentions are unknown. Iran differently has a hostile relationship with Israel and the confirmation of Israeli nuclear weapon (Kristensen & Norris, 2014), Iran needs nuclear capability to deter Israel from any form of attacks as Israel nuclear weapon is really ambiguous (offensive or defensive) calculating from offensive attacks on Syrian and Iraqi facility and defensive is on the Arab-Israeli war. Iran has been faced with the dilemma of Israel plan to strike their facilities, so decided to build facility close to civilian settlement (Moayeni-time news, 2012).

The technical know-how of Iranian enrichment capabilities has gained much assistance from Pakistan through A.Q.Khan on his numerous visit to Iran through his visit to transport his knowledge on uranium enrichment and nuclear weapon design to Iran, which was a reason for being given a house in Iran (Russell 2004:36). IAEA also confirmed the Pakistan replica of the designs and enriched uranium alongside centrifuges found in Natanz inspection in February 2002 (Kumun, 2014), the program continued in 2005 with Iran's connection to other experts around the world by Khan and this built the confidence of Hashemi Rafsanjani the former president of Iran to turn to black market source of materials in order to keep the programs knowledge hidden from the international community (Kumun, 2014). Iranians will not be so non-calculative as to break the truth of their nuclear weapon program to the

public as it might raise more alarm enabling Israel and America to tighten up security on Iran. According to Russel,

“...it is evident that they should have confidence in making such an assessment given that their secret regime in Tehran is not likely to publicly broadcast a decision to acquire nuclear weapons” (2004:36).

Scholars on Iranian studies has refused the argument that Iran has embark on a good stage nuclear weapon program because the Iranian leaders have told the international society that is for peace purpose which to Russel,

...such a decision would be tightly held in a small circle of regime insiders. But the observers were shocked by the large amount of sophisticated enriched uranium discovered by the IAEA inspectors (2014:36).



Figure 3. Locations and functions of Iran’s nuclear program facility

. www.csis.org/burke

Iran’s nuclear capability is presently not clear due to the ambiguous nature of their program as some of the evidence on ground shows their strength to retaliate any attack (Dunn, 2007) in order to understand Iran’s means of retaliation which will

show if Iran does have a nuclear weapon already, there is a need to know Iran's capability. Iran has acquired a Ground to Ground Missile which can be used to defend and attack any state that offensively attack Iran. As at 1989 during the Iraq-Iran war the use of the Libyan Scud-B (LSB) by Iran became apparent and this went on for a long time allowing Iran to know the worth of ballistic missile in their arsenals (Elleman, 2014). Right from 1989 up, Iran increased their missile arsenal in quantity and quality but owing to the secrecy in the regime, the truth about the quantity of ballistic missiles in Iran's military arsenal has been hidden from the public and this has been part of the reason why Israel and America are not so sure on attacking Iran offensively, to be of more concern is the launching of space program to control some of their missiles (Elleman, 2014). But according to 2009 assessment of ballistic missile around the world, Iran comes to have acquired more ballistic than Israel and other states in the Middle East (Cirincione 2000:134) and has invested more into their international suppliers company (Elleman, 2014).

Iran's ballistic missiles ranges from long to short range capabilities, she possess Short Range Ballistic Missiles (SRBM), Medium Range Ballistic Missiles (MRBM), and the Cruise Missiles (CM) which can travel between 1,000km to 5,500km on a full scale with a sub marine- launcher that has no regard for short range. The most commonly used are the SRBM and the MRBM as Iran's regional crisis does not mostly exceed the Middle East region which comes in the range of 5,500km down to 1000km (Elleman, 2014). The Shabab 1, 2 and 3 which had a flight test in 2004 will be for the Middle East through Shabab 3 can also extend to sub-border countries and some parts of Europe with range not more than 1,000miles, which is more effective

than the 1 and 2 when it comes to retaliate any threat or attack from such parts of Europe.

Iran has over 150 missile launchers for different types of missile and these launchers can launch over and again missiles that fits its launchers, but the quantity of the rocket still remain unknown to the public as part of Iranian regime plans (Cirincione, 2008). Not having the precise accurate of Iran's missile is something to think overtime before launching any attack on Iran. These launchers are placed at the edge and borders of Iran facing every corner waiting an attack of any form. The Iran-Chinese connection gave Iran the opportunity to acquire a CM ship launcher cruise missile C802 and sometime got the PRC HY-2 seersucker, Anti-ship cruise missile that are placed at all coast of Iran (Rubin,2006;63). The technical know-how on the production of SRBM was also purchased from the Chinese to add up to Iran's military capability. Iran has been able to produce domestically an SRBM that has a high destructive ability and mostly accurate in their targets as it has been tested with the use of SRBM during the Iraq and Iran war (Elleman, 2014). By the mid 2004 the Shabab 3ER was unveiled ranging 2000km became another long range missile manufactured, renamed Ghader 1 which is capable of carrying the small war head of 750kg (Rubin,2006:65) (Elleman,2014). Later in 2007 Iran's defense minister introduced the Ashura missile with the range of about 2,400km going the reach furtherthat stops at countries in the missile such as turkey (Ankara), Egypt (Alexandria), Yemen (Sanaa) with just one launch from Iran. The Shabab 3 could only stop its range at Tel-Aviv (Rubin, 2006:65).

Table 1. Stages of Iran missile development. www.csis.org/burke

Stages of Development of Iran's Missiles							
Designation	Stages	Progenitor Missiles	Propellant	Range (Km)	Payload (Kg)	IOC (Year)	Inventory
Mushak-120	1	CSS-8, SA-2	Solid	130	500	2001	?
Mushak-160	1	CSS-8, SA-2	Liquid	160	500	2002	?
Mushak-200	1	SA-2	Liquid	200	500	NA	0
Shahab-1	1	Soviet SSN-4, N Korean SCUD B	Liquid	300	987-1,000	1995	250-300
Shahab-2	1	Soviet SSN-4, N Korean SCUD C	Liquid	500	750-989	?	200-450 (these are very high estimates)
Shahab-3	1	N Korea Nodong-1	Liquid	1,300	760-1,158	2002	25-100
Shahab-4	2	N Korea Taep'o-dong-1	Liquid	3,000	1,040-1,500	NA	0
Ghadr 101	multi	Pakistan Shaheen-1	Solid	2,500	NA	NA	0
Ghadr 110	multi	Pakistan Shaheen-2	Solid	3,000	NA	NA	0
IRIS	1	China M-18	Solid	3,000	760-1,158	2005	NA
Kh-55	1	Soviet AS-15 Kent, Ukraine	jet engine	2,900-3,000	200kgt nuclear	2001	12
Shahab-5	3	N Korea Taep'o-dong-2	Liquid	5,500	390-1,000	NA	0
Shahab-6	3	N Korea Taep'o-dong-2	Liquid	10,000	270-1,220	NA	0

Source: Adapted from [Iran Special Weapons Guide](http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/Iran/missile.htm), Global Security.org, available at: <http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/Iran/missile.htm>



Figure 4. Iran's missile program

www.csis.org/burke

Iran-North Korean alliance brought BM 25 alongside the launcher to Iran which according to Rubin can target Europe from Iran as it ranges about 2,500km to 3,500km (2006:65). This means Iran can target as far as their European enemies from inside Iran which Elleman noted that it is a medium range and uses solid fuel as well less prone to preemptive strike due to its less minutes launch ability. Iran was the

only country to acquire a long range missile of this kind without having nuclear weapon (2014). It was tested in 2008 from a surface launch and in 2009 had its first flight test. But Iran denied the purchase of this missile due to international community's focusing on Iran (Rubin 2006) unlike the transparency policy applied to the Shabab program. Iran developed the Shabab 4 secretly, and was meant to be tested as at January 2006, Shabab 4 has the capability of ranging as far as 4,500km (IOI 2004). Rubin confirmed it that Iran is developing a replica of Russian KH55 with 3,500km range but can be more capable of carrying 410kg war head which is like the first generation of war heads (2006:66). Iran as of 2008, February 4th showed the world Safir which was used in launching their satellite known as "OMID" into space. After the launching of the space satellite, Iran is planning to orbit the satellite by upgrading it to view every part of the earth by 2015, though the new satellite will needs a more sophisticated SLV (Satellite Launching Vehicle) to be able to get to a target in other for the bomb to reach every part of the world (Rubin, 2006). Meaning Iran can at this point develop its own Intercontinental Ballistic Missile which can reach America through their monitoring satellite (Rubin, 2006).




Figure 5. Estimate range of Iran missiles

<http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2095799/West-scrambles-avoid-Israeli-attack-Iran-come-months.html>

With this capability in Iran, their main aim is to be able to deter Israel in the Middle East and other nuclear powers especially America, to gain their freedom and become a nuclear powers in the international system. With the space satellite Iran can reach any part of the world with their weapon and this will lead to stability between Iran and her nuclear power rivals. With such improvement of Iran's technology on missile and range of missile, the type of missile in Iran's possession, the test of different missiles by Iran, and one can attempt to say Iran is hiding their nuclear arsenals. It's obvious to tell of Iran's capability through the issue of their full nuclear because her weapon capability is still ambiguous.

3.3.3 Capability of Iran Rationality

Iran's quest for nuclear weapon is a threat to the entire Middle East region especially Israel and Western states such as America as threat is been perceived because of their hostile relationship with Iran. Like every other nuclear state, Iran has in several ways checked the cost float of a nuclear attack as retaliation or second strike as a

punishment that might end up wiping the entire country (Morgan, 2003). Numerous issues within and outside of Iran prove that a nuclear Iran will be as rational an actor as every other nuclear armed state.

The Middle East has been known for its unstable nature, meaning Iran is in the midst of instability with the likes of ISIL (Islamic state of Iraq and Levant), the Arab-Israeli crisis, Pakistani issue, the Afghanistan problem about terror and the introduction of a one world system by America leading to involvement and occupation of some states in the Middle East, Arab spring, not to be left out is the Yemen crisis with Houthi's overthrowing the government alongside the unending Syrian crisis.

The issue of rationality on the part of Iran can be seen both in the Middle East and internationally. Iran maintains relations with its neighbors in light of the fragility and instability of the region and therefore recognizes the need for a militaristic balance of power between the key players in what is effectively a middle-east cold war. This became a self-interest issue for Iran in which anything can be done to achieve this objective even if it means having nuclear weapon to make it happen (Mearsheimer 2003). Another rationality of Iran comes with being a modern state, for the modern state, policy reflects national identity and prestige; such notions require that the Iranian political leadership exercise a certain degree of Weber's value rationality in foreign policy decisions. Iran's identity matters a lot to its leaders. They merely seek sufficient power both regionally and internationally in their aim to balance threats from external aggressors, as they protect their political ambitions alongside their religious prestige (Kibaroglu, 2006).

The crisis between Israel and Iran which started in 1979 during the revolution as a result of Israeli-Arab conflict but the both has seen cooperation in some cases like the gun sales to Iran during the Iraq-Iran war. Coming to the issue of Iran's rationality, Israel has portrayed Iran as the threat in public places but even at that still has some good views about Iran's rationality. Israeli's view Iran as a good player in the region (Parsi, 2007) and some feels Iran is very rational as labeling Iran irrational is a kind of putting away reality (Parsi, 2007). The alliance in arms trade between Iran, Israel and America during the Iran-Iraqi war shows a part of Iran's rationality. while Israel and America provided arms to Iran, in return, Iran kept her own side of the bargain by making sure of the release of Israeli soldier in captive at Lebanon and secondly support the American soldiers in carrying their operations in several ways making Iran a thoughtful business associate (Parsi, 2007). Another way of rationality was keeping to the agreement of releasing the American captured from the embassy as Iran put their state interest before any other thing. For example keeping religion aside during invasion of America in Afghanistan, Iran cooperated with America to have a change of regime (Kugelman(FD), 2014) and after getting rid of the government as well as the terror that led to attack on American, president Bush still mentioned Iran among the evils (Sadat & Hughes 2010). Iran has shown rationality like the US in way to prove their nuclear rationality but the accusation of aiding terrorist and fighting to attain hegemony in the Middle East has made them a threat to America.

Chapter 4

FOREIGN POLICIES TOWARDS IRAN NUCLEAR PROGRAM

4.1 Israel Foreign Policy towards Iran Nuclear Program

Israel's reaction towards Iran nuclear program has not been on smooth grounds due to their conflict nature which has led to proxy wars between them. Iran's military capabilities and threat on Israel has led to the unacceptability of a nuclear Iran to Israel. Israel claims their capability is to survive in the Middle East as the Israeli-Arab war has kept Israel on the edge since independence. As noted above the relationship between Israel and Iran has been on the hostile side right from the Islamic revolution era. Israel has been in dilemma concerning Iran nuclear program which became a matter of debate amongst Israel policy makers. The points of discussion lied on striking the Iran nuclear facility like in the Iraqi situation because of the fear of Iran supplying the weapon to Hezbollah and other terrorist group against Israel but on the other hand, the success of such an attack became an issue of discuss and lastly was the issue of retaliation, should the strike fail due to the capability of Iran military arsenal.

A. The Striking Debate

In an attempt to stop Iran from building the bomb, Israel focused on Iran's motive which an attack was planned on in order to stop Iran from acquiring nuclear weapon and checking that an attack on Iran might not stop them from achieving the bomb (Lindsay and Takeyh, 2010). The fear of a nuclear Iran came from the threat of

wiping the Jewish state from the face of the earth (Schaffner, Christina, 2008), but having a nuclear weapon is not a good reason for Iran to strike first where Israel believes the retaliation will be so heavy on Iran. Israel policy makers also sees Iran as a rational player with Ehud Yari and Ephraim Halevi conforming that Israel's respect the Iran people and leaders as they are very rational (Parsi:2007).




Figure 6. Israeli plans to strike Iran
. <https://latuffcartoons.wordpress.com/2012/02/>

B. The Need Not To Strike

The opposition side of the debate noted that Israel should not strike on three basically issues, they insist that Iran nuclear weapon is meant for defensive purpose in order to strengthen the regime which according to Ephraim the motive behind the Iran nuclear weapon program stands on defensive deterrent (Madson, 2006), to them any strike on Iran will be a turn up for Iran which deserves retaliation. Also the Israeli-American relation has been and will always remain a deterrence tool for Israel

against Iran because America has assured Israel of safety from any attack or threat (Mearsheimer & Waltz, 2006). Iran like any other nuclear state will have the psychological trait of fear for retaliation from America and curb their use of nuclear weapon on Israel. More also Iran's fear is on the Israel strike on the progress in nuclear technologies as their state own nuclear facility remains prone to Israeli pre-emptive strike. Watching closely, the both states offers nuclear possibility from a negative aspect as Israel plan on holding to monopoly of nuclear weapon in the region, Iran has been busy securing more stock piles, so Israel plans on attacking Iran before achieving the nuclear weapon has noted to be kept mute therefore any of such attack on a nuclear Iran might stand retaliation (Madson, 2006).

Iran has been accused to have supplied terrorist arms for a longtime, for example Hezbollah and Hamas (Byman, 2003), but Iran has not shown any sign of having delivered weapons to Hezbollah or Hamas. This debate became another issue of discuss which brought them to note that Iran's nuclear weapon is meant for deterrent to improve security which will always remain on the motive it was built (Byman 2006), as Iran's not in the business of bringing down the image of their facility and their nuclear weapon. To check the cost of building one nuclear weapon alone is enough for Iran not to put her nuclear weapon in the hands of non-state actors like Hezbollah considering how they will improperly use it on civilians or states. And since there is no evidence of Iran supplying nuclear weapon to non-state actors, it will be proper for Iran to keep that policy.

So far, the reason for Israel to keep to not attacking the Iran nuclear program stand on the fact that even after striking the Iraq nuclear facility, it did not dissuade Iraq

from continuing their program, and rather the attack got the other side of its aim. So striking Iran might deter their nuclear weapon program but might stop Iran from acquiring the weapon which will be more security threat to Israel.

C. The Security Concern

From the proposing side of the debate came for the need for a strong security on the side of Israel, this means supporting strike. A nuclear Iran will be on security matters of Israel so there should be no two ways in solving the Iran nuclear problem than stopping them from acquiring the bomb. But when the issue of Israel security comes in a lot have to be put in place before attacking Iran's facility: Iran's standing on their strong desire for the bomb will remount their facilities, the axis needs to attack Iran will end up requiring Americas assistance which America might not want to be part of the strike, the anticipation of the strike will have Iran equip their facility from much damage, from the numerous facilities the question comes of which to attack and Israel will not want to attack twice in this case, a strike on Iran might for a good reason lead to escalation (kroeign 2012:167). Iran happens to have built their arsenal to a strong state becoming one of the highest owners of missiles in the Middle East considering this even if the nuclear facilities are raised down the possibility of Iran retaliations using other weapons of mass destruction has to be put into consideration and also a thing of note that not all Iran's nuclear facilities are on the surface making it more difficult to attack all the facilities (Salam &Ruster, 2004).

4.2 The Interest of the Middle East toward Iran Nuclear Weapon

(GCC)

The controversy in the Middle East in the 20th century placed fear in the heart of the Arab states which led to their coming together to balance threat. Iran and Iraq at a certain time became threat to the entire Middle East pushing the Arab Gulf nations

for an alliance known as the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) (Furtig, 2007) Not quite long after their joint alliance to protect themselves because of their identity, came the Iran-Iraq war of 1981. The war brought the need for self-defense against Iraq and Iran combined with the spread of Iranian ideology in the region, so more strategies for regional defense were enacted (Gause, 1994).

Iran has become powerful through their accumulated Ballistic Missile in military arsenal. At present the Gulf States are not strong enough to secure themselves against Iran as the EU and America has been their security back bone with the 1988 Luxembourg agreement with EU (Furtig, 2004)). But only to America's interest in the protection of their oil state colony, America looked by to their guarantee of extended security toward the Gulf Coast in 1968, which encompass providing security to the Gulf States in exchange for stability in oil price (Furtig, 2004). The Desert Storm Operation concluded to the regional leaders of how a security threat America is to Iran and Iraq. This agreement went as far as the removal of Iraq away from their occupation of Kuwait and the distribution of troops to aid the American soldiers in Somalia in 1993 showed how strong the relationship grew (Furtig, 2004). With the withdrawal of Iraq from Kuwait and the hold down on Iran which became the balance brought stability in the region. Americas interest and the need for oil increased knowing full well that that the Gulf states need for America will increase in the same vain as the Gulf states will not be able to defend against Iraq and Iran (Gause, 1994) (Baer, 2003) in the present era of Iran nuclear program, the GCC state are back on tension and going against a nuclear Iran. Saudi Arabia have been in the recent years of stocking their military might by buying arms from America (Pierre, 2014) as a result of the Iran nuclear program as the Gulf states reaction towards a

nuclear Iran is strong refusal. There stand to deny Iran from possessing nuclear weapon as Iran do not have reason to have one because it poses a great threat to the region to go into nuclear program in other to balance with Iranian ambitions which can end up building a nuclear Middle East (Kaye & Wehrey, 2007:112-113). Taking into note is the meeting of the GCC leaders with IAEA in 2007 to discuss on the feasibility study of building a nuclear plant. Even with not wanting to spit out loud, the concern of the GCC is the Iran nuclear weapon meaning Iran threat has end up moving Middle East states to go nuclear with first moves from Saudi Arabia and Egypt which will be directly followed by Iraq. (Wehreyetal, 2007:113).




Figure 7. Persian Gulf Area a Nuclear Iran will affect

www.csis.org/burke

The action of feeling threatened by the Gulf states could support a great deal of regional nuclear program as stated above despite the formal claim on Saudi Arabia, the truth about the provision of money for supply of nuclear program to Islamabad, (Russel, 2005) with a secret agreement between Saudi Arabia and Pakistan on the

exchange of oil for nuclear program (Bahgat, 2006). The spread of nuclear weapon will enhance strong global deterrence and in the Middle East with nuclear weapon followed by Saudi Arabia, Egypt or Turkey (Kibarough&Caglar, 2008), though Turkey and Iran are in good relation and Turkey on its part for national interest wants to be close to nuclear threshold, some of which has brought the agreement between Turkey and Russia to build a plant in Mersin (Yaman, 2014). By the time Middle Eastern states are going nuclear the international security will be on the watch on to see Iran reaction to its neighbor nuclear program, it's not even far fetch as Iran felt threatened by Iraq nuclear program giving information that led to Israeli bombing Osirak in the case of Israel due to the number of state fighting against state, strikes where been taken to prevent those countries from acquiring the weapon. Though Iran is not been attacked because of Americas interest of safe guarding the Gulf state as any attack on Iran might lead to proxy retaliation. (Wehrey, 2007).

4.3 The Unfavorable Condition of a Nuclear Iran on America's Interest in the Middle East

America's policy towards Iran nuclear program has been on the use of soft power due to the view of Iran ideology towards the west and also the fact that America is the security shield of the GCC, on another hand is America's occupation of Iraq which is on their border country. But America's interest in the region to curtail Iraq is due to threat of Iraq and Iran on the GCC countries which is in exchange for oil price in favor of America. America has not only been the deterrent agency of the GCC but has some trade agreement as well, with the sales of arms to Saudi Arabia. Now any attack on the GCC will affect Americas interest which according to Wehrey (2007) is one of the reason why America did not strike Iran nuclear facility as Iran might attack the Oman oil plant but decided with the international community that

sanction be imposed on Iran cutting Iran from having relationship with the wider world in term of business, diplomatic and military. The decision was passed across according to the United Nations resolutions 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008) and 1929 (2010). That all nuclear and missile activities be ban, import and exportation of such materials be ban, Iran leaders travelling passport and asset be kept on hold and that a committee to help in keeping the fact sheet about Iran for one year before any change on the sanctions.(UN-1737, 2010). This sanction had a lot of impact on Iran because the economic imbalance it caused in their economy due to stoppage of oil export or importation by other countries, Iran central bank balance sheet showed a great decline in the country's economy (Torbat 2005). Iran ideology and national identity was still a reason to pursue their program to a fruitful end which can only be achieved by playing the America game by ensuring not to disturb the GCC states and run their problem diplomatically in a way that will ease America's policy on Iran. As a result, Iran claims that their nuclear weapon is for security and peace purpose not to threaten any neighboring state country or attack which has become of question in Saudi and the whole of GCC (Wehrey, 2007). Though balancing of Israeli nuclear weapon by Iran might ease a little on Iran's sanction which will give America more opportunity to explore Iranian oil on a high scale, as this will increase the oil supply from the Arabian Gulf region. The increase supply from this region demand security which will not only go along with Americas interest but also leads to a drop in price as more countries wanting to buy oil even as Iran has an important export market agreement (Leveret & Bader, 2005) (Torbat, 2005).

The continuous flow of oil from the region happens to be top of America's interest in the Middle East. America feels threatened by nuclear Iran as it has been on their agenda since the early stage of Iran in way that Iran nuclear program seems to be against their interest in the Middle East and an attack from West was the threat on any country that opposes their interest (Ehteshani, 2002). Iran knows better than to thwart America's interest in the region because of the example of attack America has bestowed on them in the past; the attack that strike down Iranian plane and the Navy defeat on Iran soil which touched Iran deeply. (Kuypers, Young &Launer, 1994).

The GCC state already feels in-secured with a nuclear Iran and most of the states in the Middle East are acquiring more security strategy to defend themselves against Iran. Iran seem to continue their nuclear program but even if Iran acquire the weapon the possibility of using it is very slim when it comes to the case deterrent and combined with the example shown to them by America in the past intervention. Another possibility is the fact that Iran want to ease their sanctions in other to boost their economy with exportation of oil and as a result reduce instability in the Middle East. But in a case were Iran attempts to use their weapon it will affect Iran more because Americas interest will be dashed and since America has an agreement to protect the GCC against Iran and Iraq in return for ease price of oil, America and NATO due to EU agreement with GCC will fall back on Iran but the consequences of both America and NATO on Iran will make it difficult for Iran to think of any attack as there will act as a rational state.

America has secured the GCC for her interest as the security offered to the GCC is been used as a means of deterring other powerful countries from oil region. America

extended deterrence in this region has helped in a way of helping these countries not to rush into acquiring nuclear weapons as they feel a little bit safe for the main time. Though, some states in the region have been trying modalities on acquiring state owned nuclear programs to enhance self-defense in the near future.

4.4 The Present State Of the Ongoing Iran Nuclear Negotiation

The international body suspected that Iran did not halt nuclear programs as agreed by Iran and the IAEA as they continued contraction of more stockpiles of nuclear materials. Though Iran claims their nuclear weapons to be for civilian and peace purposes but according to reports as at May 2013, Iran already possesses about 182kg of stockpiles of enriched Uranium of about 6,357kg with the range of 5.6% with the capability of building seven nuclear weapons. By the help of using same technology not only did Iran possess these stockpiles but continued the installation of centrifuges in the Fordow plant meaning hastening the level of building nuclear weapons. (ADL, 2015).

The international body has been on and off negotiating with Iran looking at diplomatic ways of allowing Iran to still continue nuclear programs but stop the increase of any material that can improve the plant into a nuclear weapons building plant. As at November 2013 an interim accord agreement was reached by the P5+ (America, UK, China, France, China with Germany and Russian) on how Iran should stop their increase and any activities related to nuclear in order for an ease of Iran sanctions (Pollack 2003). Iran and the P5+ set for a final agreement to be reached which was by July 2014 as time came close for the agreement to be reached, four months were added to enable Iran negotiators come to a conclusion with their leaders. The both parties met in Nov 2014 as part of the four months added for Iran internal

conclusion but even with the extension and agreement reached upon in the meeting, the meeting was again adjourned to the next seven months. The west indication of a better agreement by march 2005 was the reason for the adjournment of the meeting and In the meeting on 1st march (ADL 2015) several agreement were reached with a hope of finally signing them by July 2015 as part of the agreement or significant to western interest through the joint comprehensive plan of action regarding the Islamic Republic of Iran in Lausanne, Switzerland and will be written, inspected and agreed upon between April and June ending (PJCPOA 2015). The Following are the initial agreement to be worked upon before the next meeting in July. But still negotiation has also broken down.



Figure 8. The March 2015 meeting in Lausanne

. <http://www.commondreams.org/news/2015/04/02/we-agree-iran-and-p51-announce-consensus-nuclear-framework>

A. Enrichment

According to IAEA report of Iran highly enriched Uranium and its capability to build a nuclear weapon, the tides of curbing Iran grew higher and it was noticed that Iran did not comply with the IAEA in the reduction of stock pile as instructed which has been a concern to the United states. The agreement during the meeting came as Iran agrees to reduce the level of their centrifuges which is the main technology used for enriching uranium from about 19,000 to 6,100 and also bring it down to keeping 1,000 from performance. This has to be in shape to give an assurance to the international body because Iran has about 3,000 centrifuges as at 2008 (Fitzpatrick 2007). In combination with the reduction of highly enrich uranium, Iran went ahead to lowering the level of her low enrich uranium which happens to be a good move into the not acquiring nuclear weapon, Iran will drop down low enriched uranium from an estimate of 10,000kg to 300kg and assure not to erect any facility to hold such capability in the next 15 years (Harvard.edu, 2015). The JCPOA came to an agreement on elongating time for Iran access to fossil material to like 10-12 months for about 9-10years to get fossils materials used in building one nuclear weapon.

B. Facilities

An agreement was also reached with Iran agreeing to cut down nuclear plants, as at present two are currently working at Fordow and Natanz. This means that all activities of free enrichment in the Fordow facility will have to hold put for the next 15years allowing the plant to be changed into a physics and nuclear research center. But also any research taking the shape of Uranium enrichment will be stopped with the help of IAEA regular inspection under the auspices of UN (JCPOA 2015). Concerning this reduction, the Arab heavy water reactor will be converted in a manner it will stop converting heavy water. Heavy water reactor is used for the

production of plutonium for weapons capability. This means Iran will no longer be able to produce plutonium because the materials will be dismantled and the main technology will be exported out of Iran for safe keeping.

C. Monitoring by world's nuclear watch

The agreement will be effective in IAEA supervising all Iran plant from the Natanz to Fordow and new machineries bought for nuclear program purpose with IAEA's monitoring equipment also to be in the inspection list are nuclear materials supply chains between Iran and other countries in order to end the ambiguity of their program, it will extend to Iran Uranium Mines in order to stop extraction for the next 25 years. There will be a steady watch on Iran centrifuges bellow and rotors manufacturing and stock pile for another 20 years. This will entail the total closing down of the centrifuges manufacturing center, as the IAEA will keep a watch on all centrifuges and enriched uranium by first removing them from the various facilities to another place. And the case of sale and buying of nuclear related material loan will open a portal that will be accessed and always approved before going into any of such transaction. Another way Iran showed diplomacy is in implementation of additional protocol to provide every information and access needed by the IAEA about their nuclear plants and related materials granting IAEA access into every facility that has to do with Yellow Cake enrichment facilities, conversion plants, centrifuge production plant est. to enable the implementation of modified code 3.1 come to play as new facilities will be reported to the IAEA and address possible military dimension RMD as it concerns the IAEA (Harvard.edu, JCPOA, 2015)

D. Sanction Relief

The sanction imposed on Iran with the help of America and Israel stands the chances of reduction if Iran complies with the agreement after the IAEA has confirm through

inspection that Iran is not hiding any information about their nuclear materials and facilities so that any failure is discovered will put back these sanctions in place. It also entails that United Nations resolutions against Iran will be lifted after the signing of the agreement by July 1st 2015 and America will also have the chance to see Iran once again as no threat to the United States of America.

In conclusion, the Middle East has been unstable as a result of several conflicts on the sides of both states and non-state actors; like the Arab-Israeli war and terrorist on states in the region. Iran-Israel relationship has gone back before the birth of Israel state in 1948, but as time went on the relationship began to breakdown into conflict and cooperation. The Arab-Israel war was the medium used by Iran to thwart the relations as it was viewed by Iran leaders as a war against the Muslim world during the 1979 revolution, which led to the up rise of Muslims and jihadist against Israel. Prior to Iran revolution Israel already possessed nuclear weapon which challenged Iran's politic of hegemony in the region and Iran felt to keep its status, there has to be a balance of power to stabilize the region.

Chapter 5

NUCLEAR WEAPON: A VIABLE SOURCE OF DETERRENCE AND STABILITY IN THE MIDDLE EAST

5.1 Theoretical Analysis to Reasons for Iran's Nuclear Weapon

This chapter will apply neo-realism to the reason for Iran's nuclear. Among Iran's reason to acquire nuclear weapon is the need to acquire power for self-defense against any foreign encroachment, also to be amongst the nuclear club thereby having the power to be regional head in the Middle East.

As noted in chapter two, classical realist are of the view that while state are different in their international political affairs, there must acquire power to survive and enforce their state interest in international politics. The issue of encroaching and conquering will not end between states as the struggle of power will continue between states (Waltz & Sagan, 2013 p5). On the other hand, neo-realist believe that the nature of man is not to be blame in this aspect as classical realist notes that man's mandate is to continue to rule and can do anything to keep ruling, but rather blames the anarchic nature of the international system to have pushed state in to their actions (Waltz, 2003 p11). This means the level of power a state will want to achieve can be estimated to be result of defense and in this manner might gain the power to a level of trying to dominate other states (Mearsheimer, 2001 p31). Mearsheimer continued his argument that the status quo aspect of neo-realism is not accepted but

the structure of which neo-realism base is a point to ponder upon, some states have historical facts to put to work (2001, pp 33-43).

Neo-classical realist also agrees to the impact of structure in states, but still lay more emphasis on human beings and that states behavior influences the way the government policy towards balance of power should be handled in the international system, including the level at which a state can use their power due to distrust towards other states (Baylis et al, 2005).

Though, the issue of states possibility of offensive aims are always checked when attempting to neo-realism into check but realist mostly use self-help to show how nuclear weapon is a source of deterrence and defense against external actors (Jo & Gartske, 2007). Nuclear weapon is not only known for its capability of defending states from external attacks, but also means of offensive attack by states against states; like the retaliation and threat used to deter conventional offensive attacks. With this understanding above one should know Iran's defense is the reason for their nuclear acquisition checking from their defensive-offensive behaviors.

5.2 Reason's For Iran's Quest for Nuclear Weapon

As explained in chapter three on the motivational history that make Iran wants nuclear weapon, the historical analysis of chapter three will now be used here to test the theory for theory for the research, which will aim at gaining power in other to defense and survive in the international system.

Among the reason for Iran to acquire nuclear weapon to defend and survive stand on their relationship with the Arab Sunni Muslim and GCC state which controls most oil

rich parts of the Persian Gulf, while Iran happens to be part of the Arab. The controversy over the Caspian Sea, the Pakistan nuclear weapon Israeli nuclear threat as their relationship has been on hostile side, and Iraqi aggression which has been on right from 1970's. Iran is not only concern about the Middle East but has some external reason that require defense of its territory; at a point in history Iran faces threat from Russia because of the need for oil leading to the encroachment of Iran, and the issue of Western Penetration; America views Iran as a threat right from the revolution, Americas invasion and occupation of Iraq in 2003 which Iran views as a threat been named as part of the 'axis of evil'. This part will explain from the regional threats and secondly, the external threat that requires defense.

5.2.1 Regional

5.2.1.1 The Gulf Cooperation Council

The need for self-defense that has been the interest of all state has been the yard stick for Iran's need to secure it territory from its neighbours in the gulf coast. This has to be in place because the connection between Iran and its surrounding states have been more of conflict and lack of trust due to not knowing the intention of the other state's (Mearsheimer, 2003 p32). This has led to several cooperation and conflict in the years back and still evident in the present as states try to fight for their national interest (Sadr, 2005 p39). The spread of Iran ideology by the Khomeini became hated by its neighbours who went as far as other gulf state supporting Iraq during the war between 1980 to 1988 (Sadr, 2005 p37) even with their knowledge of Iraq's use of nuclear weapon on Iranian Kurds. Iran due to this alliance and support from other Arab states took to stand alone even at that same time the Gulf state never trusted Iran (Halliday, 1991). Meaning Iran's location within the Arab states and closely connected by geographical boarder does not make them good in relations.

The notice of Iran going into nuclear program was laid down in 2003 after Americas invasion and occupation of Iraq, with the occupation of Iraq, Iran became conscious of the need for more national security which became the fear of the GCC been a reason for them to view Iran as a threat therefore building more closer ties against Iran (Gause iii, 2007). Before this event, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and Iran were in conflict for the Arab hegemony but the occupation of Iraq, left Iran and Saudi Arabia in the race. Saudi Arabia has been a strong opposition to Iran, this oppositional behavior led Saudi to start developing a nuclear program followed by some states in the region starting from 2007 (Sadr, 2005 p38). Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Jordon have entered into nuclear program, building the plant in the name of peaceful use but still placing emphasis to stop Iran's nuclear program as there feel threatened by the weapon due to their hostile relationship with Iran (Halliday, 1991 & Vakil, 2006). This conflict nature of relationship led to alliance between some Arab states and Israel, forgetting Iran's support during the Arab-Israel war. The worst of their alliance with Israel is their support and agreement for military strike on Iran's facility which was seen as not a possible solution to the crisis (Raas& Long, 2007)

In the area of arms security, Iran has decided to tighten up their security against its neighbor because as sanction was placed on Iran. It became difficult for Iran to produce homemade weapons due to the capital involvement and has relied on other countries like china, Russia, North Korea etc to build and supply ammunitions to Iran (Cordesman, 2004). But on the other hand, the Gulf States used this period of Iran's sanction in building their nuclear program immediately after the Iran-Iraqi war. The gulf states became conventional developed which was a threat to Iran as a result of their support with Iraq during the war (Cordesman, 2004). As a result Iran has not

been strong in the area of arm production locally giving its land soldier large number of soldiers but low weapon, same goes to the use of old products of arms in the navy and air force before importation from other countries (Gasiowski, 2007).

Contributing to Iran's need for security is the lack of allies both in the region and external, Iran's immediate neighbour are against the state so most of the external states are not in line with the progress of Iran mostly the west. Syria happens to be the only ally Iran has in the region and with the Arab spring crisis in Syria that has not ended, Iran remains alone, meaning if Assad should lose the battle then Iran stands alone in the Middle East. Also, if Iran should lose Syrian friendship it will cost Iran Hezbollah and Hamas opening Iran to attacks from the region (Samii, 2008). Also, the Iran-Turkish relationship lost co-operation but did not really end up in conflict as a result of Iran's support to Assad during the Arab spring, the turkey turnaround from Iran support ended them with strengthening their relationship with America on one hand and Russia on the other hand (Onis, 2012). Turkey due to self-interest of wanting to own a nuclear plant never supported the sanction against Iran, but played along until the clash of interest in Syria.

Iran has been seen to have relationship of strong ties with Russia, china and North Korea is mostly perceived as allies, but due to the alliance of the Gulf state security agreement with America, these countries might not involve their military in times of Iran's conflict.

So as it stands, Iran has n allies either in the region or international and as well cannot trust his military weapon for self-defense as in times of conflict no country

will support which can lead to continue attack on Iran, but with possession of nuclear weapon. States will have to think too before attacking Iran and it has been proved by waltz that nuclear weapon has not been used for 50 year therefore deterrence has been achieve through nuclear weapon boiling down to stability of mass destruction.

5.2.1.2 Israel

The relationship with Israel and Iran has been on cooperation and conflict, Israel was amongst Iran's ally before the Arab-Israel war, but due to national interest Iran felt threatened by Israel and choose to go with the Arab world against Israel. Today the relationship has become worst with the Iran's ambition to acquire nuclear weapon to balance Israel nuclear weapon.

Iran saw the occupation of Palestine as a starting point for Israel to conquer the Muslim world, which became a reason for Iran's support to Jihadist with the involvement of Syria. Right from the 1980.s, Iran has held tight to Syrian, Hezbollah and Hamas to serve as part of their security measures against Israel from attacking Iran, Palestine and Syria (Atlantic Council in FPIF, 2014). The relationship have been more strained in the recent years because of the unsolved Israel-Palestine crisis, the Iran ambition for acquisition of nuclear weapon in 2003, the rejection of the holocaust by Iran and so on. Firstly, Khomeini viewed the holocaust as a way of gaining pity from the rest of the world and the international community, secondly, Ahmedenajad noted it as a platform for Israel to claim land in the Middle East especially from the Muslim Arabs (Vick, 2005 & Parsi, 2007).

Israel threatened to attack Iran's nuclear facility in Fordow which is mainly suspected to be enriching high uranium, but even when the debate was concluded, it

became clear that an air strike was not going to solve the problem. But Israel kept it at a point that if negotiation fails to work, military strike will be the next move. From my analysis, Israel, EU and America are reluctant on strike because of not knowing Iran's of retaliation capability (Sick et al, 2008 p1). Israel's Netanyahu spoke publicly about how Iran is drawing close to nuclear threshold pointing to the high level of uranium enrichment of 280kg of 20% amongst which 167kg is left in their stock haven used the rest for medical purpose. Meaning it will not take up to the estimated time before Iran acquires the bomb (Allison, 2015). But to oppositional report insincerity, the international body rejects Israel's claims giving time for negotiations to continue, and Israel came to conclusion that Iran's nuclear possession is an unaccepted risk and that any deal with Iran might end up as a bad deal, so proper solution should be decided before it strikes Iran's nuclear facility (Allison, 2015).

The ambiguous nature of Israel's nuclear weapon was unveiled which became a threat to Iran. Israel did not only have the weapon but accompanied with delivery vehicles, submarines and air planes capable of delivering nuclear war heads (Karpin, 2006). Due to the practice of opacity policy, Israel has been able to hide its nuclear weapon from the international community, as it became clear that Israel had already possessed nuclear weapon by 1966 before the 1973 Arab-Israeli war but never made use of it in the war. Later in 1982, it was reported that Israel had over 200 war heads that could be delivered ranging from 100km above (Khan, 2010 p36). Some other reasons like Israel attack on Iraq nuclear facility in 1981 and Syria in 2007 leading to unsuccessfulness in their nuclear program and Israel possession of low nuclear

weapon capable of destroying underground centrifuges (Sadr, 2005 p60) are part of the reason why Iran feel threatened by Israel

Another reason boils down to Israel-American alliance which is a medium which American has been able to shape the foreign policy of some state in the Middle East. From a long time Israel's survival relies in their alliance with America, which in return America uses Israel bomb to construct the policy of state such as Iran and Arab states (Parsi, 2007). Also, Israel has highly invested in their local weapon development industries boosting their arsenal as one of the high developer of conventional weapon in the Middle East (Sadr, 2005 p90). It's eminent that Israel is a threat to Iran and its alliance with America became an added threat. The threat surrounding Iran from the region happens to be a strong reason for self-help in form of defense.



Figure 9. America holding onto the international community and using Israel nuclear weapon in threatening Iran

[.https://latuffcartoons.wordpress.com/2012/02/](https://latuffcartoons.wordpress.com/2012/02/)

5.2.2 External Threats

5.2.2.1 America as Threat

Iran views America as much threat, starting with the overthrow of Muhammad Masaddeh in 1953 through a coup, the cutoff from diplomatic connection with Iran due to the taking to hostage of American working in the embassy as a result of Hassan Rouhani escape to America, American alliance with Iraq during the war of 1982-1988 that gave America an opportunity to play a military role in the Middle East (Khan, 2010). More so, is the event of 1991 close to the end of Gulf war when America announced Iran amongst the so call 'Rogue states' put together by America (Bolton, 2002). Iran was accused of plotting and sponsoring terrorism along-side attempting to purchase nuclear weapon for offensive use (Bolton, 2002) particularly giving them to Hezbollah and Hamas to use against Israel and America foreign policy towards Iran became rigid with trying to contain Iran like other 'rogue' states like North Korea, Syria, Iraq and Libya (Litwak, 2000). The accusation on Iran became a matter of serious discourse by Iran which added to the rhetoric image given to America because Iran has not offensively to gain control but yet named as a 'rogue' state (Lawson, 2012).

Te Iran-American relationship is seeing a significant phase of their ties with conflicts in the 21st century due to the knowledge of America's threat during the Bush administration which favoured strikes instead of diplomacy. After taking over presidency in 2001, the opportunity to show the use of strike came knocking on his door with the 'axis of evil' statement which he pronounced Iran among North Korea and Iraq (Waltz, Sagan and Betts 2007), noting he will not allow the 'axis of evil' to arm themselves as there will end up been a threat to the world and everything

necessary will be done to curb the danger ahead (Merril & Paterson, 2009). Iran other states became America's enemy, placing serious embargo on them alongside a high rate of rhetoric (Litwak, 2000) and Iran viewed this as another humiliation increasing their distrust for America, but decided to try in every manner to clean its name from the list. Iran shape its policy towards Al-Qaeda members in frowning manner by aiding in several ways needed to trap down the terrorist and gaining Afghanistan government back in shape (Sadat & Huges, 2010). Though aiding America in combating terrorism, Iran still took note the pronouncement on the them as part of the 'axis of evil' as a threat from America which was confirm with the invasion and occupation of Iraq in March, 2003. The attack was carried out in the name of controlling crime of terrorism by stopping Iraq from developing nuclear weapon (Kramer & Michalowski, 2005). The occupation of Iraq made it clearing to Iran even with a threat been removed, another was replaced with the presence of American troops at its boarder, Iran started beefing up their security in other to meet up self-defiance should Iran be the next 'axis of evil' to visit. According to Waltz, with the invasion and occupation of Iraq, what do you think Iran should do? (Waltz, Sagan & Betts, 2007)

5.2.2.2 Loss of Confidence in International Community

Iran's disappointment in the international community was as due to taking sides with Iraq during the war of 80-82, despite the use of chemical weapon on Iranians Kurds killing over 3,000 people. The international community did not react to the situation on Iraq but rather watch other countries support Iraq pushing Iran to place aside any treaty and agreement that concerns the international community (Khan, 2005). Iran confirmed that, the occupation of Iraq was meant to be the International organizations top most concern as America has threatened the sovereignty but the

UN left America to perform its act in Iraq (Khan, 2006) and the presence of America is more threat than Iraq as a state. With this Iran noted that the UN is not on their side so there is a need for self-help.

Right from the 90's sanction through the auspices of the UN Security Council (UNSC), Iran noticed how much influence America has in the UN, as the sanctions were tighten in 2006 in the areas of finance, travel ban and the hindrance from purchase and sales of nuclear material, 2010 also saw in the areas of finance and sea travelling suppressing Iran's relations with the outside world (Katzman, 2010). The UN watch on Iran through the IAEA increased and with a little movement by Iran, EU and America freeze the Iran's asset abroad and removed all oil exportation rights. Iran is facing a serious economic down fall relating to inflation and lack of jobs mostly for oil exporting sector and security exchange which has led to the fall of Iran's currency (Kazman, 2010). The international community is in the position to reduce this sanctions but has done nothing only persuading Iran to stop it nuclear program and it has push Iran into have distrust for the international community.

The international system involvement in the negotiation between EU+3, P5+ and Iran have not been favourable to Iran as there have not been able to arrive at a conclusion due to national interest of Iran and the P5+. Iran due to threat want to keep their program run and the P5+ has refuse to an extent of attempting to derive Iran of peaceful use in the fear of secret enrichment, this to the international community is been careful not to make a bad deal (Allison, 2015). Right from 2002 to 2014 negotiations have broken down several times as Iran stood on their right to the use of nuclear for health and electricity but the IAEA and P5+ has denied Iran,

requesting that Iran should dismantle and transport some important material out of Iran while the rest should be under the watch of IAEA before any sanction can be lifted. In March, 2015 Iran agreed to all P5+ plan which is meant to be sign by 1st July 2015. The outcome of July 1st will determine the lifting of sanction from Iran, but in the name of seeking security do not feel Iran will sign the agree due some issues of threat still present both in the region and external.

Iran from the above analysis has face several threats from both regional and external level which does not seems to be stopping but rather more states are becoming enemy with Iran because of America rhetoric on Iran. The level investment in local production of arsenal became low as a result of the first sanction on Iran leading to inefficient amour for defense, thereby left Iran venerable to attack. But Iran has been able regain military strength through the trade with North Korea, China and Russia In other to enable secure itself against it any attack and if need retaliate. More states sprang up against Iran for its attempt to acquire nuclear weapon both regional (Israel) and external (America) to an extent that the GCC stood strong by Israel on the plan for a military strike on Iran's facilities. The increase in sanctions on Iran affected it economy to a level as investors has abounded Iran for now. Israel and America in the fear of retaliation decided not strike Iran as it not really certain if Iran has already developed the bomb and with distrust in the international community, Iran has noticed that if invaded like Iraq there have to defend their sovereignty.

5.3 Overview of Deterrence between Israel and Iran

The international community and Israel have in years been plotting ways to stop Iran from acquiring nuclear weapon. Israel feels threatened by a nuclear Iran, same as Iran is threatened by Israel nuclear capability, on other hand, Iran view America as a

threat from 1979 and the invasion of Iraq in 2003. Iran's nuclear program has been claimed to be for peaceful purpose but with some evidence from IAEA's inspection shows high enrichment of uranium and plutonium use for development of nuclear bomb in Iran's facilities. Iran accepted owning, but reason that Israel has in its possession nuclear weapon from 1996 which is a threat to Iran's security in the region; therefore the only assurance making sure Iran will not attack is by deterring Israel with the fear of retaliation. This part of the work will attempt to how nuclear weapon can enhance relationship between Israel and Iran.

Like in the India and Pakistan case, the test of nuclear bomb in 1998 by India and Pakistan made it clear that both countries possess the bomb, Before this period, there had developed nuclear weapon towards the end of 1980's and early 90's but hid it from the international community by refusing to possess such weapon. It was a matter of suspicion and since there was no sign of the bomb, the international community lowered their heat on both countries (Evron, 2008 p49). The Kashmir crisis became serious that the fear of escalation set in both India and the international community, which noted that the crisis at brinkmanship with the tendency of escalation from conventional to nuclear war (Mearsheimer, 2012). Even with both countries possessing nuclear weapon India never wanted the use of the bomb. This fear of escalation became the yardstick for international involvement to resolve the crisis with diplomacy in order to restore stability between them (Evron, 2008 p50). This happens to be the fear of the international community about the Iran-Israel case but rational differs between state because is what state make of rationality that it becomes. Iran has been noted as calculative and rational actor, same also

Israel has not used their weapon since it possession so one cannot relate the India-Pakistan case here as the reasons for their crisis are different.

Relationship between Israel and Iran started its breakdown when the Arab-Israel war when Israel acquires nuclear weapon to deter the Arab states. Iran's quest to acquire nuclear weapon is viewed as a threat by Israel, while Israel's nuclear is been a threat as it has displaced Iran as a regional head which was a reason Iran's leader called upon the Muslim world to balance against Israel (Parsi, 2007). Though Iran's nuclear program had kicked off in the 50's only for Iran to continue it as a result of the use of chemical weapon on Iran during the Iraq-Iran war and in 2003 again came with the same plan which has become the new perceived threat by Israel. The early 21st century brought Israel and Iran to a more pronounced enmity as there both view each other as threats. Iran's ambition to acquire nuclear weapon is viewed as a threat Israel's peace which Evron argues it as a result of Iran's Ideology, financial and arms in support Jihadist to war Israel and crippling the peace settlement (2008, p52). On the other hand, Iran's rhetoric towards Israel has increased due to their effort to strike Iran's facility in alliance with America and international community to bring a stop to its nuclear weapon program (2008, p52). The silent Israel-Iran crisis came out in public, this may led to war either by an attack on Iran's facility or between Israel and non-state actor boiling down to accusation on Iran. But just in the 1973 war, Israel did not use the bomb proving their rationality and there's no reason for Iran not to behave in same manner (Kibaroglu, 2006). The most essential reason for nuclear weapon is that the fear of retaliation (second strike) to enhance stability, Iran will not want to put its survival in jeopardy as every state want to survive in the international system pushing them to acquire power. So far, Iran's leaders has continued to be on

the side of self-defense rather than fight a war as the side effect of on Iran will be more worst due to lack of allies for the fear of nuclear Iran. The Arab state and Iran were once allies in the name of Muslim brotherhood, where Iran solidly stood behind Arabs and later the formation of GCC came in to play a role of stand to defend Iran and Iraq (Gause, 1994). One of the advantages is Israel second strike capability if Iran decides to strike, Evron (2008) notes that Iran can only stop the second if there can stock enough war heads and delivery vehicles to disable Israel once as the failure to destroy all Israel war heads will ensure a second strike which can end up annihilating Iran. Even if Iran is probably capable of destroying all Israel nuclear war capabilities, the international community and America will definitely retaliate on behalf of Israel, so whichever way Iran will not strike Israel first at Israel for nothing. Iran happens to be known as strategic calculator when it comes to issues about nuclear weapon (Russel, 2004). Viewing from Israel's capability holding to the number of war head in Israel's nuclear arsenal, delivery technologies, radial watch for missile detection, Iran will want to put a lot in consideration because aside from civilian casualties, the image of Iran will more humiliated than the present in the international system. Iran like every other state seeks self-help in form of military and economic power to defend its self from attacks (Waltz, 2007).

My opinion on the reason for Iran allowing their intention out in the 2003 meeting is due to America's invasion and occupation of Iraq because Iran was listed among the 'rogue state', later Bush mentioned them as an 'axis of evil'. Israel and America are allies so Israel's nuclear weapon is a threat to Iran because Israel nuclear weapon can be used as a source to attack Iran if other means fails. Iran intention is part of nuclear psychology as knowing that Iran has ability to produce will keep them await from

invading Iran at their wish. The fear of retaliation has worked for 50 years now to extend that countries with nuclear weapon are not easily attack ensuring stability in the international system. Iran has rational records and will not want to risk the lives of the citizens left alone the fear of retaliation from Israel and America. But from all indications, since Iran cannot war Israel, it shows their nuclear program is for security purpose to defend itself from any attack. Mearsheimer (2012) asserts nuclear weapon is a weapon of peace and that no doubt a nuclear Iran will enhance stability in the region. A nuclear Iran will not be attacked by either Israel or America taking example from North Korea; if Iraq would have possessed nuclear weapon America would not have invaded Iraq.

Table 2. Effects of biological, chemical and nuclear weapon on a state.
www.csis.org/burke

<u>The Comparative Effects of Biological, Chemical, and Nuclear Weapons Delivered Against a Typical Urban Target</u>		
<small>Using one aircraft delivering 1,000 kilograms of Sarin nerve gas or 100 kilograms of Anthrax spores: Assumes the aircraft flies in a straight line over the target at optimal altitude and dispensing the agent as an aerosol. The study assumes that a biological agent would not make maximum use of this payload capability because this is inefficient. It is unclear this realistic.</small>		
	<u>Area Covered in Square Kilometers</u>	<u>Deaths Assuming 3,000-10,000 people Per Square Kilometer</u>
<u>Clear sunny day, light breeze</u>		
Sarin Nerve Gas	0.74	300-700
Anthrax Spores	46	130,000-460,000
<u>Overcast day or night, moderate wind</u>		
Sarin Nerve Gas	0.8	400-800
Anthrax Spores	140	420,000-1,400,000
<u>Clear calm night</u>		
Sarin Nerve Gas	7.8	3,000-8,000
Anthrax Spores	300	1,000,000-3,000,000
<small>Source: Adapted by the Anthony H. Cordesman from Office of Technology Assessment, <u>Proliferation of Weapons Mass Destruction: Assessing the Risks</u>, US Congress OTA-ISC-559, Washington, August, 1993, pp. 53-54.</small>		

5.4 Rationality and Stability between Israel and Iran

The ability of nuclear Iran and Israeli rationality can be justified with the need for state survival like in the USSR-US case. Though, in the first few years a lot of thing has to be put in place like as there will still be struggle before achieving stability. These considerations should be on communication and other factors that will make

them see their common goal. Mearsheimer (2012) argues that Iran nuclear capability will bring stability to Middle East but though there only a small, a very small possibility that escalation would happen because human nature cannot be predicted fear can hold peace. Scholars like Ganguly&Biringner notes stability in crisis as the motivation of a state deliver a pre-emptive strike during crisis in other to avoid escalation into a nuclear war. Mostly motivations for stability are gained when the intention to strike becomes low on striking first (Ganguly&Biringner, 2001). Applying the cold war model to surveying the possibility of rationality to enable stability in Iran-Israel case, Waltz (1981) notes the achievement of nuclear peace to reside in what the state make of rationality, holding that nuclear stability can be achieved through states that act rational like USSR and US. Though, the ambiguous nature of Iran and Israel nuclear program might not allow communication and other basic factors to connect them immediately be taken serious in the first year of their nuclear relationship. States relates in a way that brings them to gaining their interest because there always attempt to get power on other to survive in the international system (Bordner, 1997) because of the anarchic nature of the international relation. During the cold war, neither America nor USSR was after striking each other rather calculations became the head of the period in other to avoid escalation that can lead to war thereby obstructing their survival. In a manner to attain stability, both states took up to Nuclear Diplomacy, but the probability of a nuclear diplomacy between Israel and Iran can be determined if Iran possess nuclear weapon because the America and USSR both possessed . As time went on the relationship was boosted as entered agreement to curb proliferation of nuclear weapon and to stop its use in war. Since the crisis between Israel and Iran will be calm when both countries sees an issue of common interest to a level of even entering agreement.

Using the Cuban Missile Crisis as an example, America and USSR were for the first time close to using nuclear weapon, America had Jupiter stationed in Turkey and while USSR had their missile in Cuba becoming the first time the missiles came face to face with each other. At this stage, calculation became so high of how not to use the weapon against each other which was achieved through nuclear diplomacy. If nuclear diplomacy is achieved at the early stage of their nuclear relationship, it will enhance their level of talks not to allow to a level of having to come close to using the weapon. Though Iran as a rational actor and calculative will want to keep to survival to spread its ideology as religion became a medium to drawing the Arab to Iran in the past, as Shah called on the Muslim brother to raise against Israel for taking over Palestine and no Islamic state should have any diplomatic ties with Israel as whom ever do it will be seen a traitor (Parsi, 2007). In other words, there is a need to also threaten an enemy state with world than action as its clearing that nuclear diplomacy ensured stability in the cold war with evidence; 1. The memorandum of understanding that led to the opening the Hot-Line for urgent communication in 1963(Nanz, 2010), 2. The Banning of Nuclear Weapon Test in 1963 (Schwelb, 1964), 3. The Agreement on the Nuclear Prevention of Nuclear War (Chivian et al, 1985) est. putting the agreement in practice ensured the non-use of nuclear weapon between USSR and US, and this was achieved because both states where trying to maintain their survival through self-help knowing the damage nuclear weapon can incur on the both states if used. The Hot-line kept both side leaders in communication at every moment of decision, ensuring national security during the cold war in alerting on the non-use of nuclear weapon as any act of such intentionally will be retaliated (Nanz, 2010). The Hot-Line fostered every needed step for stability started coming into place; the PTBT of 1963 was achieved through the Hot-line. As a

way of limiting the development of nuclear weapon, the USSR-US and UK signed the agreement. The essence of the agreement was to ban the test which will lead to the stop of its development. (PTBT, 1962 p1), this agreement went as far to ensure stability as both state focused on how the international system calm keep giving PTBT an importance (Hopman&King, 1976 p106). Israel-Iran Nuclear diplomacy will ensure war less increasing stability need as the pursuit of nuclear diplomacy in their nuclear relation will prevent escalation in to a nuclear war and demonstrate their rationality.

Another agreement came through in 1973, The Prevention of Nuclear War Agreement (PNWA). America and USSR not wanting nuclear war came together to sign the PNWA meant to stop the danger of nuclear use in war by stopping its use (Hopman&King, 1976 p112). The agreement showed how rational USSR and US are coming together to achieve stability and state survival. In the UN general assembly Sept, 2012, Netanyahu accused Iran of been irrational for not opening up for talk, adding that nuclear diplomacy work in the cold war because both side dropped their ideology for survival sake, but he forgot that unlike Israel-Iran case, USSR-US both possess nuclear weapon. For every state wants survival which is mostly why Iran should have the bomb.

During the cold war nuclear diplomacy was the main reason why stability ground through good nuclear relations. Iran-Israel is viewed as rational actors so a nuclear Iran will mean creating a nuclear relationship between them to ensure stability in as much as set up agreement that will keep the in good relationship. (Altay Nezat,

(2015), class seminar on Cuban Missile Diplomacy and Strategy on January, 5th as at 2:35pm)

In conclusion, counting from both offensive-defensive perspectives, Iran's stand to have benefited than been hostile, in this research is been defensive. Iran's decision to embark on nuclear weapon program is due to several threats from regional and external level, knowing that possession of such weapon will ensure state survival even if it has to come with several difficulties such as sanction. The nuclear program from its start was for peace purpose but due to not knowing the intention of Israel, other regional neighbours and the West, the weapon took the weapon dimension. From defensive aspect, Iran-Israel crisis will be stable only if regional and external threats are balance and relief of sanctions.

Scholars like Waltz and Mearsheimer argues that a nuclear Iran will really foster stability in the Middle East as it will end up balancing power between Israel and Iran, therefore solving the crisis of power struggle between them. Though nuclear weapon will ensure stability but it has to begin under some conditions. These conditions are the reason for Mearsheimer's argument that Iran's nuclear weapon will ensure stability in the Middle East.

Checking why deterrence ensures stability in the cold war. USSR and US place their national interest of survival first and as that went in to good nuclear relation allowing nuclear diplomacy to have its way in maintaining stability. And if in same manner if applied to Israel and Iran case will work, but as noted earlier survival idea of both

sides has to put first for the leaders to calculate in their way of handling nuclear weapon during crisis in other not escalate the crisis in to a nuclear war.

Chapter 6

CONCLUSION

6.1 Conclusion

This research pointed at examining if a nuclear Iran will enhance stability in the Middle East checking when Iran wants the bomb, to know if Iran already possesses the weapon because of the time space of the program. Also the work looked at the ongoing negotiations to see if it can stop Iran and if not, can a nuclear Iran deter Israel and enhance stability in the region?

Nuclear deterrence came in to play with the use of the atomic bomb on Japan in 1945. The dropping of the bomb in Hiroshima and Nagasaki was enormously destructive, making it one of the worst tragedies in human history, even today; its biological and agricultural effects are still felt. As time passed, the fear of such attack moved USSR into acquiring their WMDs to be able to retaliate in the event of such attack on them. During the cold war the USSR and the US both possessed WMDs but due to the fear of retaliation did not use the bombs because of their concern for state survival. From that period on it became clear that possession of nuclear weapons meant having power as it deters states from attacking others offensively. The possession of WMDs by the USSR gave the needed guts to go in to the cold war with America even to an extent of deploying missile to Cuba.

Iran started its nuclear program with the aid of America through Eisenhower's Atoms for Peace initiative in the 1950's. The program was meant for peaceful purpose but with the use of chemical weapon by Iraq during the 1980-1988 war, Khomeini decided to continue the program but this time in a nuclear weapon form, noting that Iran will do all it takes to defend its sovereignty even if it means acquiring nuclear weapon (Parsi, 2007).

Applying neo-realism, Iran as a sovereign state will do what it takes to survive in the international system due to the anarchic nature of the system as state does not know the intentions of other states. Iran is surrounded by states that possess nuclear weapon like Pakistan, Israel and before late 2014 the western threat presence in Iraq, though the GCC does not possess nuclear weapon to threaten Iran but their security agreement with America makes them a threat as America can at any time gain access to the region in the name of security. The March 2003 invasion and occupation of Iraq was like an attack on the so-called 'axis of evil' which includes North Korea, Iraq, and Iran. So to that feeling Iran decided to restart nuclear enrichment to which effect, in acquiring power to deter any attack, secondly, Israel as an American ally might decide to strike in America's favor. In September 2003, when Iran mentioned its nuclear program, Israel and America jointly opposed the plan placing sanctions on Iran, making it worse was the IAEA discovery of Iran's enrichment of about 20% uranium which increased the sanctions in 2010 under the auspices of the UN.

The ambiguous nature of Iran nuclear program could not allow this research to decide if Iran already has the bomb but Iran possesses ICBM delivery vehicles which can range as far as 4500km going as far as borders of America and to ask why Iran

would have such technology without the bomb, which is not far-fetched as Iran is the only country to have acquired it 'without the bomb'. According to Mearsheimer (2003), states in their aim to acquire power can do anything possible to achieve the power necessary to defend their integrity as they are apt to do. This is especially true in a multi-polar World because unlike the bipolar system when there are two major rivals, in the multi-polar system the reverse is the case.

In the aspect of rationality, both Iran and Israel have calculative leaders which is one thing it takes to ensure the non-use of the bomb during crisis, an example was Iran's drop of its religion and Ideology to help combat terrorism in Afghanistan and Israel's non-use of the bomb in 1973 war. Also Iran will not want a nuclear war because of their aim to survive, as striking Israel will attract retaliation even from America.

Negotiations have been going on between Iran, EU 3 and P5+1 since 2003 in the aim of stopping Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. The negotiations have broken severally due to lack of agreement on both sides. The March 2015 meeting led to some agreement but will be signed by June 1st if Iran complies with the agreement.

Though proliferation of nuclear weapons does not guarantee peace in itself, but as means of balancing power, it enables a state to deter an otherwise unstoppable aggressor when needed. It became clear that countries with nuclear weapons do not go to war with each other for fear of escalation, and even when they do the possession of these weapon will ensure crisis stability through a form of nuclear relationship which USSR and US took advantage on in opening a Hot-Line. Using the USSR-US example on how nuclear diplomacy ensured and maintained stability

in the cold war, a nuclear Iran will balance power with Israel which allows them the realization of a common goal of not using the weapons and thus build the nuclear diplomacy that will stabilize the region.

Like the USSR and US, If a nuclear Iran and Israel will ensure nuclear deterrence given their rationality, they will not want to incur the wrath of nuclear destruction because every state essentially wants to survive and Iran and Israel are not different, so in essence the main reason for the WMDs is not really to use it but to deter others from using. Applying nuclear diplomacy to Israel and Iran situation, nuclear psychology will make them find out survival as a mutual interest.

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