Corruption and Insecurity: The Impetus of Underdevelopment in Nigeria

Blessing Ibhobe Aidelomon

Submitted to the
Institute of Graduate Studies and Research
in partial fulfillments of the requirements for the degree of

Master of Arts
in
International Relations

Eastern Mediterranean University
February 2016
Gazimagusa, North Cyprus

Approval of the Institute of Graduate Studies and Research

_____
Prof. Dr. Cem Tanova
Acting Director

I certify that this thesis satisfies the requirements as a thesis for the degree of Master of Arts in International Relations.

_____
Assoc. Prof. Dr. Erol Kaymak
Chair, Department of Political Science
and International Relations

We certify that we have read this thesis and that in our opinion; it is fully adequate in scope and quality and as a thesis for the degree of Master of Arts in International Relations.

_____
Asst. Prof. Dr. Aylin Gurzel
Supervisor

Examining Committee
1. Asst. Prof. Dr. Umut Bozkurt   _____

2. Asst. Prof. Dr. Aylin Gurzel   _____

3. Asst. Prof. Dr. John Turner   _____

ABSTRACT

Since achieving its independence in 1960, Nigeria has struggled almost incomparably to achieve a measure of economic stability and realize its projected economic potential. Through successive regime changes from 1966, the Country alternatively swung from Civilian to Military rule until democracy and relative political stability was eventually restored in 1999. Nonetheless, the challenge of underdevelopment has endured throughout this period. Despite posting impressive figures via economic indicators and boasting what is now regarded as Africa's biggest economy, Nigerians still rank among the World's poorest people as the wealth of the nation miserably fails to reflect on the vast majority of its people. Several reasons have been nominated for this apparently inexplicable disparity between the Macro-economic and Micro-economic fortunes of the State, ranging from the tartuffery of the Colonial powers to sheer widespread incompetence that permeates society today. However, corruption and insecurity remain the most salient reasons underlying Nigeria's lack of development. Together, these twin-evils have become deeply entrenched at the base of the Nigerian social culture and have come to straddle the normative ethical distinction between right and wrong. This paper is aimed at investigating the Nigerian underdevelopment problem with the goal of identifying the causal factors that stunt political and economic efforts at development.

The paper is divided into five chapters. The first chapter introduces the topic and key terms; the second chapter reviews the literature and notes some of the most notable scholarly contributions to the subject matter. The third chapter gives a robust

historical analysis of the State with respect to the topic. This chapter enlightens the reader on the historical background on which this research is carried out. The fourth chapter conveys the Constructivist insights into the underdevelopment problem in Nigeria, in this chapter a thorough data analysis is carried out in order to validate the insistence on corruption and insecurity as primary causal factors. The fifth chapter contains the summaries, conclusions and predictions.

Keywords: Underdevelopment, Corruption, Insecurity, Constructivism

ÖZ

1960 yılında bağımsızlığını elde yana, Nijerya, ekonomik istikrar bir ölçü elde etmek ve onun öngörülen ekonomik potansiyelini neredeyse kıyas mücadele etti. Demokrasi ve göreli siyasi istikrar sonunda 1999 yılında restore edildi dek 1966 ardışık rejim değişiklikleri sayesinde, ülke alternatif Askeri kuralın Sivil dan salladı. Bununla birlikte, azgelişmişlik meydan bu dönem boyunca dayandı. Ulusun zenginliği sefil halkının büyük çoğunluğu yansıtmak için başarısız olarak ekonomik göstergeler aracılığıyla etkileyici rakamlar gönderme ve şimdi Afrika'nın en büyük ekonomisi olarak kabul ne övünme rağmen, Nijeryalılar hala Dünyanın en yoksul insanları arasında yer almaktadır. Bunun birkaç nedeni bugün toplumu nüfuz sırf yaygın yetersizliği sömürge güçlerinin tartuffery arasında değişen Devletin makro - ekonomik ve mikro -ekonomik fala arasındaki bu görünüşte anlaşılmaz eşitsizlik aday oylandı. Ancak, yolsuzluk ve güvensizlik geliştirme Nijerya'nın eksikliği altında yatan en çarpıcı nedenleri kalır. Hep birlikte, bu ikiz kötülükler Nijeryalı toplumsal kültürün dibinde derinden kök salmış olmuştur ve doğru ile yanlış arasında normatif etik ayrımı apışıp kalmak için geldim. Bu kağıt gelişimine siyasi ve ekonomik çabaları dublör nedensel faktörlerin belirlenmesi amacıyla Nijeryalı azgelişmişlik sorunu araştırıyor hedefleniyor.

Kağıt beş bölüme ayrılmıştır. Birinci bölümde konu ve anahtar terimleri tanıtır; İkinci bölümde literatür gözden ve konuya en önemli bilimsel katkıları bazı notlar. Üçüncü bölümde konu ile ilgili Devlet sağlam tarihsel analizini verir. Bu bölümde bu araştırma gerçekleştirildiği tarihsel arka plan üzerinde okuyucuya aydınlatır. Dördüncü bölümdeNijerya'da geri kalmışlık sorunu haline Yapılandırmacı anlayışlar

aktarıyor, bu bölümde ayrıntılı bir veri analizi birincil nedensel faktörler olarak yolsuzluk ve güvensizlik üzerine ısrarı doğrulamak amacıyla yapılır. Beşinci bölüm özetleri, sonuçları ve tahminler içermektedir .

Anahtar Kelimeler: Azgelişmişlik, Yolsuzluk, Güvensizlik, Yapılandırmacılık

DEDICATION

I dedicate this thesis work to firstly, God Almighty and secondly to my darling Father, Mr. F.O. Aidelomon for without him achieving a Masters of Arts in International Relations would never have been possible.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

For the completion of this thesis paper I acknowledge the sufficient grace of God. I appreciate my Father, Mr. F.O. Aidelomon for inspiring me to forge ahead academically and also for his financial support.

I want to appreciate my honorable supervisor Asst. Prof. Aylin Gurzel for taking out time to motivate me and ensure that my Thesis paper was a success. I thank her for her understanding during my short comings. My gratitude also goes out to all the lecturers of International Relations Department that had taught me during the course of my program, for their sense of humor and impacting more knowledge into me. To my colleagues who in one way or the other contributed to my success be it little or small, I appreciate you.

My profound gratitude goes out to my family and friends for all their love and concern towards me, in persons of Adaugo Nwokorie, Rani Munther, Emmanuel Ohiri, Seyi Bakare, Oluwaseyi Adebayo, Joel Lobe, Salamatu Husseini, Damilola Ogunleye, Beula Pollyn, Udoka Ilodigwe, Ifeoluwa Akinola, Olabola Omisore, Esther Alizor, Winy Rosa Paulino, Ligio Jose, Abubakar Yahaya, Iheonu Chigozie, and so many others I might have failed to mention, you are all appreciated. Thanks for your contribution to my successful stay and development in Cyprus and Eastern Mediterranean University.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF TABLES

LIST OF FIGURES

Chapter 1

INTRODUCTION

The spectre of underdevelopment has loomed large over most of sub-Sahara Africa and especially Nigeria since time immemorial. The cancerous consequences of underdevelopment assume deeply rooted sociological features that are manifested in a seemingly closed cycle of cause and effect relations. Of such features, corruption and insecurity are perhaps the two most salient and therefore arguably primary causes of underdevelopment in the country. Underdevelopment is itself a multi-faceted concept whose definition has courted both attention and controversy among scholars. The merriam-webster online dictionary takes a more macro-economic view by defining underdevelopment simply in terms of a state's low production capabilities and low standard of living, relative to other states.[1] However, the implications of the term are far less simplistic in academic and political literature. Euler-Chelpin (2011) acknowledges the difficulties in attempting to reduce underdevelopment to a single analyzable concept. He notes that in the aftermath of the second world war, economic growth was largely considered the yard-stick by which development/underdevelopment was determined, and this was indicated by a State's gross national product (GNP). However, GNP fell out of fashion once it was realized it did not reflect the real status of individuals and their overall well-being, a

---

[1] The Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary.

realization that led to the creation of the human development index (HDI).[2] The HDI would seem a more accurate reflection of development because it takes a more people-centered approach to measuring development. Costanza, Hart, Posner, and Talberth (2009) defined states' development in terms of democracy, life expectancy, education, social infrastructure and standard of living.[3] Whatever the case, Nigeria is generally considered a "developing country", a term that amounts to a mere euphemism for "underdeveloped countries". According to the united nations' HDI statistics for the year 2013, of the 187 countries with available data, Nigeria was placed at 152 for human development.[4] Nigeria struggles with micro-economic measurements of success despite excelling under macro-economic microscopes. Despite boasting africa's largest economy, at least in terms of GDP at purchasing power parity, Nigerians still rank among the world's poorest people with the country itself among the most underdeveloped.

Corruption and insecurity are two challenges that continue to hinder social and economic progress in Nigeria. Both challenges pre-date the country as an independent political entity, and have continued to fester on the country ever-since. In 2014, transparency international ranked Nigeria 136 out of 175 countries in the World for corruption, basically classed among the 30 most corrupt countries in the world.[5] Moreover, Nigeria is also considered one of the most dangerous countries in the world. According to the institute for economics and peace's global peace index

---

[2] Douglas Von Euler-Chelpin. Causes of Underdevelopment.Nov.2011.
P.3.https://ibpunion.files.wordpress.com/2011/11/international-political-economy11.pdf
[3] Robert Costanza, Maureen Hart, Stephen Posner, John Talberth. Beyond GDP: The need for new measures of Progress. The Pardee Papers/No.4/Jan 2009.P.18.
[4] United Nations Development Programme.Human Development Reports. 2014.
http://hdr.undp.org/en/content/human-development-index-hdi-table
[5] Transparency International. Corruption Perception Index 2014: Results.
http://www.transparency.org/cpi2014/results

report for 2015, Nigeria is ranked as the twelfth most dangerous country in the world, coming in at 151 out of the 162 assessed countries.[6] Evidently, corruption and insecurity are two grievous challenges that Nigeria must imminently overcome, any analysis of underdevelopment in Nigeria or even the wider west-africa, that leaves out the economic consequences of insecurity and corruption is decidedly misleading and could never reveal the full picture of the challenges that beset these countries. This is especially true of Nigeria, where state employees continue to loot the public treasury with impunity, the public system lacks both accountability and credibility, and insecurity is an established norm.

This paper therefore makes the case that corruption and insecurity are together the major driving forces behind Nigeria's underdevelopment. It casts the constructivist light on an array of social and political phenomena in the country to reveal the deep interconnectedness between corruption, insecurity, and underdevelopment.

1.1 Statement of Research Problem

The research problem primarily aims to verify corruption and insecurity as the two major factors that underlie Nigeria's underdevelopment by analyzing the Nation's political history from the first civilian republic to the military era and civil war periods and ultimately culminating in its current fourth civilian republic, the research centers around the need to present alternative arguments for the core problems of developing countries using Nigeria as a case study. Several viewpoints have been expressed regarding the fundamental problems responsible for Nigeria's underdevelopment despite its obvious economic potential and considerable GDP,

---

[6]Global Peace Index 2015. Institute for Economics and Peace. 2015. P.9.
http://www.visionofhumanity.org/sites/default/files/Global%20Peace%20Index%20Report%202015_0.pdf

3

among these viewpoints are: poverty, culture, colonialism, illiteracy and ethnicity[7]. The research alternatively seeks to establish an empirical basis for the case for insecurity and corruption as the outstanding factors that is not only responsible for underdevelopment but one that also effectively necessitates other proposed causal factors of underdevelopment in Nigeria.

1.2 Justification of the Study

This sociological inquisition of underdevelopment in Nigeria with the application of constructivist methods of analysis stands out in the political literature. Several scholars have investigated the travails of developing states in general and attempted to rationalize their challenges mostly through the framework of the rationalist models which have led to the misinterpretation of economic data that never subsume deeper and more fundamental issues that are merely partly exemplified by those data. The insistence on insecurity and corruption, two entities that stem from very social roots is another reason this paper is peculiar, insecurity has always been considered a consequence of underdevelopment, not the other way round.[8] The paper argues however, that insecurity in its current form in Nigeria is actually a major vehicle for underdevelopment. Corruption has always been considered a major obstacle to development in Nigeria, but its relationship with cultural trends has hardly been explored in the context of its political and economic implications for the country. This is done rigorously in this paper, as corruption is investigated within the methodological confines of constructivism.

---

[7] Cletus Umezinwa. Ethnicity and Nigeria's Underdevelopment.Ogirisi: a new jornal of African studies, vol.9. 2012. P.215
[8] Austin A. Apogan-Yella. Underdevelopment: Main cause of Insecurity in West Africa. March, 2005. P.7

1.3 Methodology

This research implements a historical analysis methodology. The goal here is to explore the Nigerian political history while picking up on relevant social, economic and political trends that have constructively reinforced the practice of corruption as well as determine the level of insecurity in the country. A statistical outlook drawn from variously released data is also used to quantitatively solidify the arguments of this paper. Evidently issues of regional or national underdevelopment are inextricably linked with the political histories of such entities, so it therefore becomes necessary to approach the topic with an investigative historical attitude.

1.4 Research Questions

1.4.1 What are the Major Causes of Underdevelopment in Nigeria?

This question aims at providing a foundational premise from which the general problems usually associated with the Nigerian state that can possibly derail the developmental progress of the state are investigated in order to clarify why the paper argues that corruption and insecurity are largely the primary drivers of such underdevelopment. Several factors have hitherto been discussed with respect to the above question; this research question therefore establishes a responsibility for the paper to defend its assertion that regardless of other substantive challenges, insecurity and corruption constitute the greatest obstacles to the nation's developmental progress.

1.4.2 Does Corruption and Insecurity Explain the Other Discussed Causes of Underdevelopment in Nigeria?

This question aims simply to justify the assertions of the paper by providing an impetus to investigate how insecurity and corruption are inextricably linked as far as the Nigerian problem is concerned. It also provides the basis to explore how together,

corruption and insecurity could satisfactorily explain other well-known challenges to the nation that have been hitherto identified as playing significant contributory roles to Nigeria's underdevelopment. Such challenges like poverty, colonialism or its after-effects, ethnicity and several others are here explained plainly as emanating solely from the fundamental problems of corruption and insecurity.

1.5 Hypothesis

Corruption and insecurity are the major causal factors of underdevelopment in sub-saharaafrica, particularly Nigeria. They have deep rooted sociological history in the country and now form part of its unstable political culture.

1.6 Outline of the Thesis

The thesis is laid out in five chapters. The first chapter introduces the concept of underdevelopment and the several ways it may be considered. It also gives a clear idea of how the research is conducted and what methodology the paper confines itself to in the analysis of its topic. The second chapter contains the literature review segment, which highlights the numerous contributions of scholars to the field and how the topic has evolved over time, this identifies the aspects of the subject-matter that have not been specially treated in the past. This chapter also provides scholarly definition for the key notions of corruption and insecurity, which helps to understand the definitional contexts in which these terms are employed throughout the paper. The third chapter focuses largely on Nigeria's political history and the history of corruption and insecurity in the country, with a specific focus on how they have directly or indirectly stifled development. This chapter serves as the historical background against which a contextual analysis is carried out in the succeeding chapter. Chapter four also contains a critical interpretation of the text within a constructivist theoretical frame-work, here a sociological investigation is carried out

in order to better identify the common social trends that ultimately lend credence to the aforementioned causal factors of underdevelopment. This chapter also makes extensive use of relevant quantitative material for better analysis of the subject-matter. Chapter five contains important emphasis on some of the paper's most salient points as well as its findings and conclusions.

Chapter 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1 Introduction

Developing countries are faced with insurmountable challenges such as corruption and insecurity which have hindered their developmental goals. As a consequence of this menace, most developing African countries such as Cameroon, Sierra Leone, Burkina Faso, South Africa, and especially Nigeria amongst others, are failing to develop as expected economically and politically.[9] This peril of corruption and insecurity is pervasive. It is perhaps a universal phenomenon, that is, there is probably no country in the world that is absolutely rid of corruption and insecurity, this conundrum is merely more rampant in some countries than in others. However, it is noteworthy that the developing countries that endure the highest levels of underdevelopment are the same countries that indicate the highest levels of corruption and insecurity.[10] This section aims at analyzing in details, the concept of 'corruption' and 'insecurity' and to highlight the contributions of other scholars especially in the case of Nigeria as well as a theoretical framework to back up my claims.

---

[9] Ibrahim S.L. Baki, corruption and insecurity challenges in developing countries, 2014:2
[10] IlufoyeOgundiya, political corruption in Nigeria: theoretical perception and some explanation, 2009:281; ibid Ibrahim Baki.

2.2 Conceptualization

2.2.1 An overview of 'Corruption'

The concept of corruption is so complex that different authors/academics have tried to define it using value preferences.[11] Based on the views of the definer, corruption has become difficult to define within the confines of scholarly dialogue with regards to the Nigeria state. Thus yelwa (2011:2) as quoted by Yaru cited in Ibrahim Baki (2014) defined it thus:

Corruption is a multi-dimensional phenomenon and hence has been defined in multiple ways. Generally, corruption in the public sector is simply the abuse of authority by the public officials to make personal gains in the discharge of their official duties. It encompasses activities ranging from bribery, embezzlement, extortion, fraud, favoritism, dishonesty to related illegal or unauthorized behaviors in pursuance of personal objectives.[12]

Accordingly, Otite (1986) defined corruption as the falsification of honesty via inducement, partiality, or moral decadence. This involves the infusion of inappropriate transactions or deals directed towards adjusting the initial event path and causing a change in people's option of trust. As a matter of fact it comprises executor and beneficiary use of non-formal and criminal act to expedite affairs.[13]

Olopoenia (1998:17) theoretically described corruption as a body of literature grouped into three categories that are separate from each other but have the same

---

[11] ibid Ibrahim Baki
[12] Yelwa, M. Economic effects of corruption in Nigeria. 2011
[13] Otite O, "On the sociological study of corruption", university press, Ibadan. Research issue, 1: pp. 37-56

characteristics and these are economic corruption, political corruption, and bureaucratic corruption, but in a practical sense, all three categories of corruption merely consists of different insights into the same evil. Though, the display of corruption is as a result of the inappropriate use of office in attaining self-gains whereby relatives, friends and loved ones, and fellow officials are beneficiaries.[14]

Nwabueze (2002:128) in his perspective defined corruption to be a case of social deviation. According to his concept, corruption is as a result of disrespect to social norms which inadvertently creates criminal deviances. It has to do with the inappropriate adoption which involves the way people accept the cultural goals of society and how the norms for the attainments of this goals are being rejected. This shows that the function of society's interaction is low and non-effective. Thus, the personality system of the citizens of a nation is faulty. This pinpoints the shortcomings of social agencies that honors the perpetrators of evil acts such as corruption rather than penalize them.[15]

Nwabueze went on to emphasize that corruption has taken on different forms such as; a civil servant who squanders public funds entrusted to him for safe keeping. In another view, if this public officer were to without due authorization inject additional funds to the initial approved funds, or spends more than he has been authorized to spend, especially for his own benefit, it is labeled corruption. Also, if this officer deviates from the standard norms by apportioning lands and properties belonging to government to either himself, wife, family, or friends as well as use his position to

---

[14]Olopoenia, A, A political economy of corruption and underdevelopment. University of Ibadan, faculty Lecture series, 1998
[15]Nwabueze, N. "Corruption: A sociology perspective" in Adejugbe, Malthouse press limited Lagos, 2002

favor his private agendas or favor some person's, this will be referred to as corruption. Should this public officer affix an excessive value to a contract just so he can be given a bribe is adequately labeled corruption.[16]Following from a careful consideration of the explanations and definitions above, it is clear that in developing countries, specifically Nigeria, corruption could be divided into two broad categories namely; political corruption and economic corruption. The former is the abuse of power by government leaders in order to attain unlawful personal gains. Politically, those involved are public officials, general public, civil servants, the press, as well as bureaucrats. This has in one way or the other destroyed the government's image, diminished the government's integrity and also depleted the efficacy of developmental programs and in a terrible way affected the nation's economy.[17]

2.2.2 An overview of "insecurity"

In order to fully understand the concept of insecurity, it is perhaps important to first understand what "security" truly means. However, it is the states responsibility to provide security for and safeguard the properties of its citizenry.[18]

According to Zibadi (2007), the notion of security has forever been wrongly integrated with conceptions of the struggle for the survival of the state and of its citizens. He went on to say that security is not restricted to the state's security forces or its level of defense preparedness.[19] In light of this, Fayeye (2007) advocated that states should substitute the state centered and conventional militaristic definition of securityfor a more'human-centric' definition of security. Fayeye is of the belief that

---

[16] ibid Nwabueze

[17]Aransi, I.O. Bureaucratic corruption in the public service.Cuvillierverlag international scientific publisher, new York, 2008

[18]Mazrui, A, and Mazrui A.A. Interaction between the state and the nationin Africa's experience, four decades of independence.Ibadan: sibon books limited, 1997

security holds within it personal and general state of staying protected from diverse universal threats.[20]Having analyzed security via various scholars, it is perhaps easier to define its antonym "insecurity" with relatively greater clarity.

Insecurity is a situation where an individual or a state feels unprotected or exposed to threats. That is to say a condition of being in danger or feeling threatened.[21]

Ajodo and Ugwuoke (2014) notes that in decades past, most write ups from scholars on insecurity focused on the conventional way of assessing security, which is through the microscope of the state. In consideration to this, insecurity is seen as a form of danger that threatens a state and the reason why states in order to defend and protect themselves, compete for acquisition of arms and weapons of mass destruction.[22] But after the cold war, scholars' focal point on security was now centralized on people or human security. This is because violent conflicts were no longer perceived as the only threat to human life but a multifarious collection of internal and external factors.[23]In view of this, insecurity is defined as anything that is capable of provoking harm or fear towards a person. This could be in the form of diseases, poverty, gender discrimination, political instability, unemployment, insurgency, or inaccessibility to good education.[24]

---

[21] Angela A and Nkemakolam O. Corruption and the challenges of insecurity in Nigeria: political economy implication. GJHSS Vol. 14, Issue 5, 2014:12

[22]Ajodo A and Ugwuoke.Poverty and challenges of insecurity to development. European scientific journal, 2014

[23]Saliu, L and Abdullahi. Environmental degradation, rising poverty and conflict, journal of sustainable development in Africa, Vol. 9, No. 4, 2007

[24]Ibid Angela A and Nkemakolam O.

2.3 Theoretical Frame Work

2.3.1 Constructivism

In other to forge ahead, after carefully reviewing the topic of this research, it is of vital importance to adopt a theoretical frame work that would serve as a lead in illustrating, examining, explaining, and forecasting occurrences. Hopefully, this theoretical lead will serve as an expert in validating the study. Therefore, the theory of constructivism has been chosen as a theoretical frame to guide this study.

Constructivism was first postulated by Nicholas Onuf in the 1980s before Alexander Wendt took it upon himself to elucidate the concept of social constructivism in international relations.

According to Wendt (1999) in his book *social theory of international politics,* "the structures of human association are determined primarily by shared ideas rather than material forces, and that the identities and interests of purposive actors are constructed by these shared ideas rather than given by nature".[25]

In agreement with Wendt's postulation Jackson, R (2006), suggests that constructivists view reality as socially constructed. He went further to say that it is not material forces and fixed attributes that make up international relations as well as human relations but shared ideas and concepts. He noted that the constructivists ideology is of the belief that the social world is not natural and it functions by the ideas of the people that lives in it hence, it is not a given. Politics, society, and economics have no natural codes but are socially constructed by the ideas and thoughts of the state or people. Everything entailed in the social world of human

---

[25]Wendt A. Social theory of international politics. Cambridge: Cambridge university press, 1999

beings is socially constructed by them thus, it is understandable to them. This socially constructed social world of human beings is a world full of signs, concept and ideas, discourses and languages, beliefs, and understandings between individual beings and nations.[26] Constructivists hold ideational views. In contrast to constructivism, the neorealist stand point is materialistic.[27]

Wendt(1999:92) with regards to this materialist world view suggests that state interest and power are the influential factors in international politics. State interest is the race for wealth, power, and security which states desire for themselves while power amongst other resources is typically based on military strength.[28] Power and state interests are viewed as 'material' components that are equitably due to the fact that States operate in an anarchic environment and have no choice than to be engrossed with power and interest.

In using this constructivist theory in analyzing corruption and insecurity in Nigeria, it is necessary to note that Jackson R depicted the social world as constructed through the norms, belief, and ideas of people and hence it is understandable to them. Culturally, sociologically there are differences between people, group to group. A constructivist looks upon the basic concepts, shared meanings, and socially constructed meanings over time through repeated activities. Corruption and insecurity in Nigeria are not natural phenomenon but was socially constructed over time.

---

[26] Jackson, R, social constructivism: in Jackson, R and Sorensen, G (3rd ed), introduction to international relations theories and approaches. Oxford university press, 2006
[27] Jackson,R. Ibid
[28] Wendt A. Ibid p. 92

Corruption is seen by an average Nigerian to be a norm, a way of life by which one has to survive. Nigerians are definitely in awareness of corruption but have subscribed to it as a common way of life that cannot be done away with. This is in fact a reflection of the derived meanings associated with the notion of corruption and its multifarious manifestations in both private and public life. This is perhaps most glaringly exemplified by the Nigerian government. The federal government would proclaim the purchase of petrol at let's say, four billion naira, meanwhile it was actually purchased at the rate of three billion naira, thereby yanking off one billion naira. When selling the petrol, the government sells to the independent marketers at a more fraudulent rate beyond four billion naira. In distributing the product to the general public, the independent marketers will include their profit and VAT (value added tax) to the four billion naira initial price that they purchased it from the government. You will find out that the process of getting the fuel down to the general public, the government had yanked about a hundred percent of the cost of the petrol product for the public and the independent marketers about fifty percent more off of the public.

Chapter 3

OVERVIEW OF UNDERDEVELOPMENT IN NIGERIA

3.1 Introduction

With a population of 174million people (World Bank, 2013est) Nigeria is the seventh most populous country in the world and the most populous in africa. Nigeria also boasts africa's largest economy since overtaking South-Africa in 2014. As at 2013, its gross domestic product (GDP) at purchasing power parity (PPP) stood at over $150trillion, 20th in the world. Yet, for all its unarguable wealth both in human as well as natural resources, Nigeria continues to languish in perpetual underdevelopment. Wealth is very unevenly distributed as a select few accumulate it at the expense of the vast majority. Corruption is endemic, poverty is rife, insecurity is an everyday ordeal, and the life of the average Nigerian is mired in an ever repetitive cycle of political underachievement, economic stagnation, and widespread systemic failure. As Rotimi points out "in more than fifty-five years of political independence from Great Britain, corruption and underdevelopment have become immanent features of the Nigerian socio-political landscape"[29] Collected data reveal a particularly disturbing trend regarding the underdevelopment of Nigeria, they reveal that since its first democratically elected government in 1960, Nigeria has experienced consistently rising levels of poverty and underdevelopment. This was highlighted by Ogwumike, in his 2002 paper titled "An appraisal of poverty reduction strategies in Nigeria" he remarked that the level of poverty in Nigeria rose

---

[29]RotimiOmotoye, Corruption and Underdevelopment: The Nigerian Experience. Para 3. March, 2011.

from about 27% in 1980 to 46% in 1985, by 1996, the figures had reached about 67%, when president OlusegunObasanjo began his second term in office in 2002, over 70% of the Nigerian populace were languishing in poverty.[30] This chapter gives a detailed analysis of the history and evolution of underdevelopment in Nigeria through the machinery of corruption and insecurity.

3.2 Factors that Instigate Underdevelopment in Nigeria

Countless scholars, statesmen and intellectuals of all disciplines have attempted to suggest several causal factors that directly or indirectly instigate underdevelopment in africa and more specifically in Nigeria. Most continue to point out colonialism and imperialism as being the most complicit causal factors, as Grundy opines in his 1966 article "african explanations of underdevelopment: The theoretical basis for political action", the consensus among african leaders seems to involve an inextricable link between underdevelopment and colonialism and imperialism. According to Grundy, west african leaders openly proclaim that their underdevelopment is as a consequence of western colonial exploitations.[31] However, this paper takes a different view on the topic, and suggests that corruption and insecurity are the fundamental causal factors of underdevelopment in Nigeria and africa today.

Corruption and insecurity are the two greatest problems plaguing Nigeria today, and they both feed each other in a combinative manner that ultimately fosters underdevelopment. Awojbi and Nathaniel argue that the case for colonialism as responsible for the african condition no longer carries any weight, because several developing nation-states such as India and Mexico endured colonialism as well and yet have made considerable progress towards industrialization and development, they

---

[30] Fidelis O. Ogwumike, An appraisal of poverty reduction strategies in Nigeria. P.1. 2002.
[31] Kenneth W. Grundy. African Explanations of Underdevelopment: The theoretical basis for Political action. The review of Politics, vol. 28, No.1 Jan 1966, Pp 62 and 63.

noted that Nigeria has been plagued by lack of development for over fifty years since independence and therefore insist that the real problem confronting african leaders today is the high level of corruption in all spheres of public and private enterprises in their states.[32] Corruption continues to be one of the major driving forces behind the level of political, bureaucratic and institutional ineptitude that exists in Nigeria today. Public and private officials strive everywhere to enrich themselves and their families at the expense of the masses, this phenomenon is definitely complex and its cultural character is explored more fully with the use of constructivism in chapter four.

Nwanegbo and Odigbo argue for the case of insecurity as a crucial causal factor of underdevelopment. In light of the boko-haram insurgency, they analyze why insecurity more than anything else erodes development and impedes economic growth, for them, the fact that western countries who place a premium on security have achieved the greatest degree of economic success and development is not by any means a coincidence. Security therefore must be a necessary precursor to fundamental growth and development.[33] This notion seems counter-intuitive, especially in contrast with conventional literature on the issue.[34] The reason is obvious; development has always been viewed as a necessary pre-requisite for security, not the other way round. The idea that it is security that precedes development might seem outright outlandish; a simple clarification is useful here, while some measure of security is necessary for any development to occur in terms of infrastructural and economic advancement within a state, holding that the security within that state does not fall below the thresh-hold necessary for political

---

[32]Awojobi, Oladayo Nathaniel. Corruption and Underdevelopment in Africa: A Discourse approach. International Journal of Economics, Commerce and Management.Vol.II, issue 10, Oct 2014.P.5 and 6.
[33] C. JajaNwanegbo, Jude Odigbo. Security and National development in Nigeria: The threat of Boko-Haram. International Journal of Humanities and Social Science. Vol.3. No.4, Feb. 2013. P.285.
[34] Austin A. Apogan-Yella. Underdevelopment: Main cause of Insecurity in West Africa. March, 2005.

governance, a measure of insecurity could yet be sufficient to destabilize economic activity without necessary destroying the institutional political set-up of the state. In this sense, the level of insecurity within the state is such that growth is stunted and development impaired without governance substantially affected. Thus, security becomes a valid pre-requisite for development. Stephan Klingebiel highlighted the conceptual distinction between "national" and "human" security, he points out the fact that security has previously been understood exclusively in terms of the stability of the state and its ability to provide leadership and governance essential for economic development. However, the contemporary notion of human security focuses largely on the security of individuals and their protection from arbitrary violence, civil wars and terrorism.[35]

3.2.1 Corruption

Corruption, as pointed out in chapter two, is a very complex phenomenon. Here the focus is on corruption in Nigeria. What constitutes "corruption" to the Nigerian may differ slightly from how a fellow in the western hemisphere of our globe might define it. Corruption can generally be accepted to entail some form of misuse of power or authority for private profit.

In Nigeria however, there seems some palpable degree of social acknowledgement and perhaps acceptation of the inevitability of corruption. This is a sociological dimension to the issue of corruption in Nigeria which is also fully discussed through the constructivist perspective in chapter four. Moreover, Mohammed (2013) assessed the relationship between corruption and ethnicity in Nigeria. In his view, corruption and ethnicity are inextricably linked because here the notion of diminishing affection

---

[35] Stephan Klingebiel. New interfaces between Security and Development, German development Institute. 2006. P.2.

is applicable, this simply means that people feel strong emotional attachment to their families, and then their extended families, and after that, their communities, and societies, and perhaps their countries. So the tribe, which is here located somewhere between the extended family and the community, commands greater affectation than 'foreign' ethnic groups and peoples.[36] This has certain implications on the concept of corruption in Nigeria. Most evident, is the notion of "prebendalism" a term first employed by renowned african scholar Richard A. Joseph to describe the patron/client political set-up in Nigeria, which entails the appropriation of power by certain individuals simply for the enrichment and embellishment of themselves and their ethnic groups or their particular religious sect. On a more general level, this practice appears, to many Nigerians, relatively benign and necessary part of political and economic life, this is best exemplified by the voting behavior of the Nigerian polity. Public officials are typically queried as to the number of developmental projects they carried out in their "home-town". Politicians and elected officials who have been deemed to have insufficiently enriched their hometown over the course of their political tenures are socially castigated and generally regarded with contempt in their communities of origin. Besides ethnicity, poverty seems the most complicit factor responsible for widespread corruption in Nigeria.

According to a 2015 report published by "ActionAid Nigeria", a non-governmental organization devoted to tackling poverty and assisting governments in that endeavor world-wide, there exists undoubtedly, a strong correlation between poverty and corruption in Nigeria. They found that the corruption levels in the Nigerian states were directly proportional to the poverty levels in those states. States which

---

[36] Cletus Umezinwa. Ethnicity and Nigeria's Underdevelopment.Ogirisi: a new jornal of African studies, vol.9. 2012. P.217 and 218.

registered the highest number of cases of corruption were also the same states that scored lowest on general welfare and prosperity. Furthermore, they recommended that the federal government view corruption as a developmental issue, and thereby take effective measures to eradicate it, such as, good infrastructure and social provisions that will serve as disincentives to engage in corruption.[37] When analyzing corruption, there seems to be a propensity for focusing on institutional practices. In the Nigerian case, however, considerable insight comes from understanding corruption as a feature of social conduct and assessing the levels of reception it receives against that backdrop. Corruption, as was noted in chapter two, is prevalent in all societies, there is no corruption-free state anywhere in the world, but often the difference between the developed and the underdeveloped societies might just be the opinions of the inhabitants of both societies, regarding the acceptability and inevitability of corruption among humans. Those who view corruption as inevitable are apt to consider it perhaps necessary, whereas, those who consider it an artificial feature of society forged largely by ethnicity and poverty, are likelier to frown upon it and institute the harshest possible laws against it, as well as implement those laws for the betterment of society. Peter Eigen's famous line on the cause-effect relationship between corruption and poverty is noteworthy because, here again, as with security and development there seems are back and forth relationship that may well confuse the causal factor of each of these concepts. At first glance, corruption might seem the obvious cause of poverty, but meticulous considerations of their interactions prove otherwise. While widespread corruption may well lead to inequality and poverty, it seems far less certain the idea of poverty leading to corruption.

---

[37]Alemika, Pam Sha, Ogusola, Yunusa, Adeniyi. Corruption and Poverty in Nigeria: A report. ActionAid Nigeria. 2015. P.10 and 11.

3.2.2 Insecurity

Insecurity is a critical issue in Nigeria today. Since the boko-haram insurgency intensified in 2009, a lot of International focus has been turned to the Nigerian security situation. Insecurity in Nigeria, like the rest of sub-saharaafrica is more a matter of human security rather than national security. Besides the insurgency in north-eastern Nigeria, the country is also faced with security challenges such as, kidnappings, gang violence, militancy, religious conflicts, armed robbery, tribal tensions, and politically instigated clashes.

Okechukwu and Onyishi (2011) highlight the assassinations of top public officials such as Bola Ige (Attorney general of the federation), Funsho Williams (Lagos politician), and Dipo Dina (Ogun State governorship candidate) as examples of a state continually falling into utter lawlessness and without the socio-economic apparatus in place to mitigate the effects of its rapid decline.[38]Ewetan and Urhie (2014) point out the clear correlation between insecurity and underdevelopment in Nigeria, noting that a spike in terrorist activities has left the country's economy in an "unpalatable" situation, and stressing that it is the responsibility of the government to provide for the common security of the people as stipulated in the 1999 constitution of the federal republic of Nigeria.[39]

The Nigerian government has clearly failed in that regard thus far. Nigeria, perhaps more than any country in the world, suffers immeasurable setbacks to its developmental objectives as a result of insecurity. Niger-Delta militants continually

---

[38]EmeOkechukwu Innocent, Anthony Onyishi. The Challenges of Insecurity in Nigeria: A thematic exposition. Interdisciplinary Journal of Contemporary Research in Business, Dec. 2011. Vol.3. No.8.P.173.
[39]OlabanjiOlukayodeEwetan, EseUrhie. Insecurity and Socio-Economic development in Nigeria.Journal of sustainable development studies. 2014. Vol.5. No.1. P.40 and 41.

damage oil pipelines in a militancy that cost the federal government tens of millions of dollars daily prior to the amnesty program. Today, fears are growing in the south, concerns over a return to militancy since president Buhari signaled of his intentions to end the amnesty program, which was put in place by the late president Umaru Musa Yar'adua and designed to grant certain economic benefits to the oil-producing areas of the niger-delta. In return for these benefits, the militants agreed to lay down their weapons. As fears continue to grow over a potential return to those gloomy days, oil-thefts via damaged pipelines continue to occur in the meanwhile. Perhaps the most incisive publication as yet, that cut deep into the interaction between insecurity and development in Nigeria is Philip Ujomu's "national security, social order and the quest for human dignity in Nigeria: Some ethical considerations" published in 2001, Ujomu carries out a deep analysis into the concept of insecurity with regards to its effect on industrial and economic development, by focusing on the deeper moral underpinnings that establish the basis for social and political action in the Nigerian society. He remarks that the most basic problem confronting the Nigerian quest for security was the moral condition of the state and if the country is going to achieve a secure and thriving society with a healthy economy capable of realizing its full developmental potentials, then it must redefine the ethical basis for social action[40] The ethical condition of the Nigerian society is one of the greatest challenge to any exact analysis of security in the country. Nigeria draws its ethics largely from traditional and religious inclinations; these continue to exert considerable influence on the moral standards of the society, however, the real challenge lies in the near total absence of reason as a basis for ethical principles. At the basic social level, violence is not abhorred in Nigeria, young children grow up in

---

[40] Philip OgoUjomu. National Security, Social Order, and the Quest for Human Dignity in Nigeria: Some Ethical Considerations. Nordic Journal of African Studies, 2001.P.245 and 246.

environments that inculcate the idea that violence is a viable means to desirable ends; this kind of thinking is one that every Nigerian adult today can resonate with from their childhoods.

Onifade, Imhonopi and Urim (2013) express grave concerns over the consequences of insecurity on development in Nigeria. Like Ujomu, they also point out the moral basis for action as a system that essentially breeds and fosters insecurity in the country; they go further to insist that the level of insecurity in the country has left it industrially stagnant and set it backwards economically.[41] In the west, social action could be argued to stem largely from ethical considerations that have been fed by religion and tradition over the centuries, however, the understandings that feed moral considerations today, are those that survived the fiery test of the age of reason, where every socially held belief, whether religious or traditional, was subjected to a holistic and thorough philosophical interrogation. This long process of cultural cleansing began with descartes' "meditations on first philosophy". A similar inquiry is required in Africa today, an enlightened enlightenment.

3.3 Historical Background of Corruption

Corruption in Nigeria is literally older than the country itself. According to the british colonial government report of 1947, "the africans background outlook on public morality is very different from the present day briton. The Africans in the public services seek to further his own interests".[42] Even back in the pre-independence colonial era, Nigerian public officials were already showing an appetite for self-enrichment and greed, mingled with a worrisome lack of public

---

[41]Onifade Comfort, Imhonopi David, UrimUgochukwu Moses. Addressing the Insecurity Challenge in Nigeria: The Imperative of Moral Values and Virtue Ethics.Global Journal of Human Social Science.Vol.13.Issue 2.Version 1.0 2013.P.53.
[42]Ibrahim Ado Saleh.Buttressing the Anti-Corruption regime in Nigeria: Prospects and Challenges. Daily Trust, August 22 2010. Para 2.

action or outcry against the menace. It seems manifestly evident, looking at the Nigerian society today that the total embrace of corruption in all facets of political life in the country, reaches far back to its formative years. Nigerian youths today grew up in a country where electoral voting was best understood as an opportunity to elect the likeliest candidate to gain financial gifts from. In truth, once the young Nigerian finally gets some degree of exposure, and examines how corruption charges are responded to elsewhere, he struggles to understand why it seems such an abhorrent sin.

The Nigerian reception of corruption is arguably worse than the act of corruption itself, because, while the act of corruption speaks negatively to the character of one individual, the reception it enjoys certainly speaks to the moral and ethical stature of a nation. This again underlines the importance of Ujoma's call for an ethical reformulation of the social basis for action in the country. If it continues to be perfectly acceptable in the public's eyes for leaders to be judged based on how much they enriched themselves and their communities, the prospects for social change will be forever grim.

3.3.1 Corruption under Military Rule

Upon assuming office after the first military coup of 1966, Major Patrick Kaduna Nzoegwu highlighted corruption as one of the primary motivations for seizing power from the civilian government of the first republic led by Prime Minister AbubakarTafawaBalewa and President NnamdiAzikiwe. The rule of Aguyi-Ironsi was brief and relatively uneventful on the corruption front. General Yakubu Gowon's nine-year reign however, saw an unprecedented level of corruption as public officials in the military government prioritized self-enrichment over public

interest. MurtalaMohammed assumed power in 1975 and immediately sought to reform the political system and put an end to corruption in all sectors of political and economic life.

Iyaniwura (2014) notes that Murtala's crusade against corruption yielded at least a hundred thousand victims, as it was not just limited to members of the political hierarchy but also civilians, universities, and the police force.[43]Murtala's messianic reign was brought to an abrupt end in 1976 when he was assassinated en route to his office at dodan barracks by mutinous soldiers in an abortive coup including col. BukaSukaDimka. He was eventually succeeded by OlusegunObasanjo who was second in command at the time of Murtala's assassination. Obasanjo carried on with Murtala's reforms but quickly arranged for the transition to civilian rule as Murtala had promised upon assumption of office in 1975. He finally handed over to ShehuShagari in 1979 to signal the start of the Nigerian second republic. Obasanjo had modeled the constitution of the second republic after that of the united states with a presidential democracy to effectively combat corruption through a more transparent democratic process.

The second republic proved a corruption catastrophe and the military stepped in again in 1983 via a coup de tat spearheaded by disillusioned officers including MuhammaduBuhari. Buhari emerged as head of state in 1983. His regime was renowned for its effective and often brutal crusade against corruption. Hadassah Egbedi in an article, highlighted several similarities between Buhari's first and second inaugural speeches, unsurprisingly, the fight against corruption took centre

---

[43]WoleIyaniwura. Corruption and Military rule in Nigeria: An overview 1966-1999. Global Journal of Human Social Science.Vol.14 Issue 4.Version 1.0 2014. P.1

stage as he admitted that it was the most difficult challenge the country had to overcome[44] Along with his deputy TundeIdiagbon, Buhari launched what he termed a "war against indiscipline" a war that necessarily implied zero-tolerance for corruption. He inevitably prosecuted virtually all public officials of the ill-fated second republic, ordering their detention and investigation. He declared them "guilty until proven otherwise", and sentenced most of them to prison, in some cases, for up to two hundred years. General Buhari was subsequently overthrown via a coup de tat by Ibrahim BadamosiBabangida in 1985.

The Babangida era was the most corrupt military regime until the Abacha regime. In sharp contrast from the Murtala/Obasanjo periods and the Buhari era, the Babangidaregime was dominated by headlines of corruption. He proceeded to release many of the corrupt second republic politicians jailed by Buhari/Idiagbon regime in order to get political favors.Iyaniwura remarks that by 1991, Babangida had appointed over seventy governors, many more ministers, and created agencies simply out of a desire to compensate political friends.[45] It could be argued that it was under the Babangida regime that corruption finally came to mount the pedestal it now occupies in Nigeria. For the first time in the military era, it became commonplace for leaders to brazenly flaunt wealth accumulated by corruption, it was also in this period that the general Nigerian attitude towards corruption suffered its greatest dent, because the military represented an autocratic system that the masses felt powerless against, the people came to accept corruption as a somewhat inescapable and uncontrollable fate. This feeling probably explains the distinctly Nigerian passiveness towards corruption. As noted by Abegunrin (2003), under Babangida

---

[44] Hadassah Egbedi. President Buhari's speeches to the Nation: 1983 vs 2015. June 3rd, 2015. Para 6.
[45]WoleIyaniwura. Corruption and Millitary rule in Nigeria: An Overview 1966-1999. Global Journal of Human Social Science.Vol.14 Issue 4.Version 1.0 2014. P.2

and Abacha who succeeded him, corruption was simply the goal of the regimes; they looted with impunity and basically treated the state treasury as their personal bank accounts.[46]

General SaniAbacha took over government in 1993. He was by all reckoning the epitome of corruption, basically showing literally no regard for public opinion both domestically and internationally, he appointed family members to top political positions and virtually ran the country like a private business. In an article published only hours after Abacha's death, Washington post's James Rupert opined that Abacha was easily the most corrupt of all Nigerian military rulers. He noted that previous military rulers had often diverted public funds to enrich specific groups and reward political allies, but the Abacha looting industry was almost exclusively focused on enriching Abacha and family. He directly presided over the oil industry that raked in over ten billion dollars annually and oversaw the complete crippling of that industry[47] In essence, as far as the analysis of corruption is concerned, the military era could be looked at in two phases as first the Murtala-Buhari crusades to cleanse the country of the festering disease, and secondly the Babangida-Abacha erosion of every effort against corruption put in by their predecessors. The Ironsi-Gowon eras are somewhat relatively benign periods in comparison.

3.3.2 Corruption under Civilian Rule

Nigeria gained independence in 1960 and had its first general elections in 1959. Civilian leadership in the Nigerian political nomenclature is usually delineated from the periods of military interventions by the use of the term "republic". So the first

---

[46]OlayiwolaAbegunrin. Nigerian Foreign Policy under Military rule 1966-1999. 2003. P.163

[47] James Rupert. Corruption Flourished in Abacha's Regime. Washington Post, Tuesday, Jun 9, 1998. Para 7&8.http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/inatl/longterm/nigeria/stories/corrupt060998.htm

civilian leadership in 1960 is referred to as "the first republic". The first general elections brought the NPC (Northern People's Congress) to power, in a coalition government with the predominantly eastern NCNC (National Council of Nigerian Citizens) and the largely western AG (Action Group). The NPC was led by Ahmadu Bello who opted to stay as premier of the northern region. Sir AbubakarTafawaBalewa became prime minister with Dr. NnamdiAzikiwe as president and Michael Okpara was premier of the eastern region. The AG was the official opposition and it was led by ObafemiAwolowo, with party deputy LadokeAkintola as premier of the western region.

The first republic of Nigeria was a political and economic quagmire; it was insidiously undermined by ethnic strife, tribal sentiments and widespread political corruption. Usman-Janguza's piece (2014) on first republic politics is deeply insightful. He highlights the deep ethnic divides that plagued the country in this period, and underlined how corruption and plunder led to its demise in 1966. Political elites vied for position and privileges at the expense of the masses, after the second elections in 1964 and the subsequent "Zik-Balewa pact" the federal cabinet swelled to eighty ministers as unnecessary ad hoc appointments were made for the sole purpose of political pacification.[48] In retrospect, the Nigerian first republic was always doomed to fail, it was hopelessly divided along tribal lines and this fact remained the nexus around all political activity revolved, the parties identified strictly with their tribal base and relied on it for support. The entrenchment of tribalism as a precursor for political action arguably presupposes a certainty of 'unusual benefit' that comes with political office.

---

[48]MuktarUsman-Janguza. Breaking the Myth: Rethinking the myth of Nigeria's First Republic as a Vanished Eden. Jan 2014. P.8 and 25.https://independent.academia.edu/MuktarUsmanJanguza

The second republic of Nigeria lasted from 1979 to 1983. It was led by ShehuShagari as president and Alex Ekwueme as vice president under a new constitution that stipulated an "american style" presidential system of government. The hopes and dreams that preceded the second republic however, turned out to be mere fantasies. The government was hopelessly corrupt and politicians looted the public treasury with shameless impunity. Ogundiya (2009) opines that it was during the second republic that corruption came to be "institutionalized" in Nigeria as politicians feasted lavishly on government contracts and the scale of corruption nationwide accelerated alarmingly.[49]

The third republic of Nigeria was a republic that really never materialized; despite its republican constitution being drafted in 1989. General Ibrahim Babangida had promised to return the country to civilian rule by 1990; however, he later postponed this transition to 1993, citing civil unrest amidst other things. Elections were finally conducted in 1993 in which M.K.O. Abiola emerged a clear winner with a sweeping landslide. Babangida unwilling to relinquish power proceeded to annul the elections citing pending legal proceedings over its conduct. This basically threw the country into chaos in which over a hundred lives were believed to have been lost in the pandemonium that broke out with the public clearly enraged with Babangida's decision to annul the elections and basically end the third republic in its embryonic state.

---

[49]IlufoyeSarafaOgundiya. Political Corruption in Nigeria: Theoretical Perspectives and some Explanations. 2009. P.287. http://krepublishers.com/02-Journals/T-Anth/Anth-11-0-000-09-Web/Anth-11-4-239-09-Abst-PDF/Anth-11-04-281-09-565-Ogundiya-I-S/Anth-11-04-281-09-565-Ogundiya-I-S-Tt.pdf

The fourth republic of Nigeria began in 1999 after the death of the country's last military ruler General SaniAbacha, General AbdulsalamiAbubakar took over the reins of government and immediately conducted general elections to swiftly return the country to civilian rule. OlusegunObasanjo, who was previously military head of state from 1976-1979, emerged as the winner of the elections under the banner of the people's democratic party (PDP). The fourth republic has had a topsy-turvy relationship with corruption thus far. Adesote and Abimbola (2012) argue that it has been bogged by corruption charges and political malpractices and draw a correlation between corruption and underdevelopment, arguing that the former greatly affects the latter and that the progress of the nation has been stunted by its moral and ethical bout with corruption which has severely plagued the fourth republic since its founding in 1999.[50]KayodeAyodele (2014) argues to the contrary, insisting that despite the significant levels of corruption that continue to beset the country, the fourth republic has actually made considerable progress in the fight to get rid of corruption. He cites the establishment of several anti-corruption bodies such as the economic and financial crimes commission (EFCC) and the implementation of necessary anti-corruption policies as steps in the right direction and evidence of considerable progress being made in the fight against corruption since the start of the fourth republic.[51]

3.4 Historical Background of Insecurity

Insecurity has been an ever-present feature of Nigerian social and political life since achieving independence in 1960. In keeping with definition of insecurity in chapter

---

[50] Samson AdesoteAdesote, John OjoAbimbola. Corruption and National Development in Nigeria's Fourth Republic: A Historical Discorse. Journal of Sustainable Development in Africa, Volume 14, No.7, 2012.P.81.
[51]KayodeAyodele Political Corruption and Governance Problems in Nigeria. Mar 19, 2004. Para. 4. http://saharareporters.com/2014/03/19/political-corruption-and-governance-problems-nigeria-understanding-critical-issues-kayode

two, insecurity is addressed here in terms of human security. Nigerians have come to be accustomed to inane and senseless acts of violence erupting in the country and with little or no relevance to the security of the nation as a whole. From the bloody coup de tats in the immediate post-independence period to the nations bloody civil war fought between July 1967 and January 1970 and the numerous ethno-religious conflicts that have erupted since, as well as raging militancy in the Niger-Delta and an insurgency in the North-East, violence of all forms and sorts have been commonplace in Nigerian history. At a more basic level, armed- robbery and political assassinations have been rampant in the country and more recently, kidnappings and ransom seeking and gang violence have hit unprecedented levels. Needless to say, insecurity is a unique problem in Nigeria, people have always lived in fear of one form of violence or the other and this fact greatly impacts on the sociological outlook of the people. Violence has come to represent for many Nigerians, a viable alternative to achieve any tangible political objective.

3.4.1 Insecurity under Military Rule

In the military era, insecurity typically reared its head in form of organized violence, such as coup de tats and the civil war. Osaghae and Suberu (2005) explore the state of the nation in the wake of the civil war under the military governments and how the feeling of disintegration that inspired the civil war continued to instigate discord and social discontent in the country.[52]

Adeniji (2014) casts the blame for insecurity in Nigeria in the aftermath of the civil war on the northern desire for power. He argues that the north has always agitated for politicalcontrol in the country and it is useful here to note, despite Adeniji not

---

[52]Eghosa E. Osaghae, Rotimi T. Suberu. A History of Identities, Violence, and Stability in Nigeria. Centre for Research on Inequality, Human Security and Ethnicity, Working paper No.6. Jan 2005. P.4.

highlighting this fact, that OlusegunObasanjo was the only southern military head of state in Nigeria after Aguiyi-Ironsi in 1966.[53] Under the military, many Nigerians lived in perpetual fear and anxiety as the fabric of unity in the country too often dangled dangerously as if to rip into pieces and envelope the nation in a fresh civil war. Even today, many Nigerians still think a civil war is a possibility, but it is certainly a far cry from under the Babangida and Abacha regimes, when it not only seemed a distinct possibility, but often an unavoidable inevitability. The military presided over a nation still reeling from the exhaustion of the civil war and seething with ethnic bitterness, civil unrests and domestic insurrections were quelled with the utmost brutality and the daily life of the masses largely consisted of apprehensiveness towards political activity as tension loomed large over an emasculated populace. Less organized forms of violence such as armed robbery and gang clashes, despite being rampant, was much less pronounced in the military era and therefore was considered to be of secondary concern in society. Very harsh laws were imposed in this era even for non-violent crimes. General Buhari became globally infamous when his military government executed drug traffickers found guilty under the so called "Decree 20".

3.4.2 Insecurity under Civilian Rule

Insecurity has been prominent feature of Nigerian civilian governments. Aleyomi (2013) makes the case that all previous three civilian republics met their demise as a consequence of corruption and that Nigeria today in the fourth republic is still economically hampered by the menace of corruption.[54]

---

[53] Don Michael OlalekanAdeniji. Policing Insecurity. 2014. P. 88 and 89.
[54] Michael B. Aleyomi. Corruption and Democratization Process in Nigeria's Fourth Republic.International Journal of Politics and Good Governance, Vol.4 No. 4.2 Quarter11 2013.P. 10.

The first republic as was pointed out previously was terribly affected by deeply entrenched ethnic divides, and this eventually transformed into a prebendal political reality where the political representatives of the people more or less set out to enrich themselves and their ethnic people at all cost and at the expense of everyone else. Fear and anxiety over the unity of the country was an ever-present feature of the first republic.

The second republic was much worse than the first in terms of corruption but had fewer problems in terms of insecurity with the country still reeling from the after-effects of the civil war. With the country enjoying the crude oil boom that resulted partly from the effects of the Yom-Kippur war, many Nigerians felt that the new government of the second republic was certain to finally realize the nation's full economic potential. They were sorely mistaken. The Shagari led government that came to an abrupt end via a military intervention in 1983 was "hopelessly corrupt" according to the man who overthrew it, General MuhammaduBuhari.

The third republic was prevented from coming into being in a notoriously tumultuous period in the nation's history as Ibrahim Babangida simply refused to relinquish his hold on power. The fourth republic of Nigeria has experienced the gravest threats to both human and national security than any other civilian period. Nwanegbo and Odigbo (2013) insist that there have been unprecedented rise in level of insecurity in the country since the fourth republic began in 1999.[55] Besides a general increase in reported cases of armed robbery and kidnappings, there have also been numerous cases of gang violence and ethno-religious conflicts. But perhaps the most notable

---

[55] C. JajaNwanegbo, Jude Odigbo. Security and National Development in Nigeria: The threat of Boko Haram. International Journal of Humanities and Social Science. Vol.3. No.4, Feb. 2013. P.285

episodes of violence in the fourth republic have been the Niger Delta militancy and the insurgency of boko-haram.

The Niger-Delta is Nigeria's southernmost region and home to Nigeria's largest reserve of crude oil. However, it is also home to several ethnic groups of southern Nigeria, most notably, the ijaws. After the OlusegunObasanjo tenure ended in 2007, agitations began to grow in these regions over their perceived marginalization by the federal government which failed to improve their lives with the dividends of the crude-oil derived from their lands. Their political expression materialized in the form of militancy with armed youths attacking government installations and damaging crude-oil pipelines. The militancy finally ended in 2009 with the federal government's amnesty program.

The boko-haram insurgency is generally considered to have begun in 2009 despite the group being founded in 2002 by a muslim cleric named Mohammed Yusuf. After Yusuf's death at the hands of Nigerian security operatives in 2009, the group dramatically radicalized, carrying out violent attacks on non-combatants and provoking global outrage with the kidnap of over 200 school girls in chibok in 2014. The boko-haram insurgency is still raging on today, despite considerable progress being made by president Buhari's government in coalition with other regional actors.

Chapter 4

CONSTRUCTIVIST ANALYSIS OF CORRUPTION AND INSECURITY IN NIGERIA

4.1 Introduction

The Nigerian underdevelopment problem is perhaps best confronted by the analysis of the sociological underpinnings of the root causes of political and economic underdevelopment in the country. The Nigerian social life has evolved over time with very peculiar responses to the problem of want. In order to fully investigate this problem, it is important to be mindful of the social dimensions of this issue. As noted in chapter two, corruption and insecurity are experienced in every country in the World, but to differing degrees. What is evident therefore is that social factors that transcend any individual mental or essentialist conceptions must play a huge role in the determination of the reasons responsible for the greater preponderance of corruption and insecurity in some societies relative to others. This realization necessitates the implementation of a theoretical approach that focuses less on individual tendencies, and focuses instead on the artificial construction of social meanings via inter-subjective interactions.

Constructivism is the only approach that leads to the most desirable accomplishment of this goal. Solomon Ehiemua in his article titled "Nigeria crude oil: Sources of corruption and economic disparity in the Nation" (2015) states that constructivism is very conducive for the analysis of corruption in Nigeria given its qualification as a

distinct theoretical tool for the interpretation of socially constructed meanings.[56] The rationalist schools, while representing useful quantitative approaches to problems, often fail to incorporate certain kinds of problems into their definitive frameworks. The problem of underdevelopment for instance, cannot realistically be explained fully by any objective and universal model that we could presently devise.

Corruption and insecurity are notions that generally arise from the multiplicity of interactions in a social space that emanate from shared historical experiences usually coupled with austere economic conditions. Moreover, corruption in Nigeria has assumed a cultural identity of its own, essentially becoming a valid practice, a constant within given social contexts. Ayobami (2001) recounts some of the most usual exhibitions of corruption in the country, such as, parents paying bribes to get their kids into colleges, teachers selling higher grades to undeserving students, and police officers collecting bribes from arrested criminals in form of "bail".[57] This is made all the more likely in view of the statistical correlation between economic inequality and corruption.[58] However the causal relationship between corruption and inequality runs vice-versa as is shown by Gupta, et al (1998).[59]

Insecurity is also a distinct creation of historical social interactions. It exists in some states and not in others, it may be caused by a great variety of factors, and ultimately it could never be understood without rapt attention to the historical relations of the social forces at play.

---

[56] Solomon Ehiemua. Nigeria Crude Oil: Sources of Corruption and Economic disparity in the Nation. European Journal of research in Social Sciences. Vol.3, No.4, 2015.P.78.

[57] OyinolaOluwagmamigaAyobami. Corruption Eradication in Nigeria: An Appraisal. Library Philosophy and Practice. 2011. Para 9, 10 and 11. http://www.webpages.uidaho.edu/~mbolin/ayobami.htm

[58] Michael A. Mehen. The Relationship between Corruption and Income Inequality: A Cross-National Study. April, 2013. P.9.

[59] Sanjeev Gupta, Hamid Davoodi, Rosa Alonso-Terme. Does Corruption Affect Income Inequality and Poverty? May 1998. P.21.

Insecurity in Nigeria is best understood in terms of the political, economic, and social interactions of groups, individuals, tribes, and factions. Constructivism therefore represents the most effective theoretical toolbox for unlocking the mystery that is the causes of underdevelopment in Nigeria. This chapter therefore aims to confirm the hypothesis of corruption and insecurity as primary causes of underdevelopment in the country by exposing the sociological factors that lend credence to these practices as well as support this hypothesis with quantitative analysis of the most salient data indicative of the factuality of this proposition. Finally, an attempt is made to fully explicate some of the other commonly mentioned probable causes of underdevelopment in the country.

4.2 Constructivism

Social constructivism was developed in international relations in the late 1980s through the works of Nicholas Onuf, FriedriechKratochwil, and John Ruggie. However, Alexander Wendt is the most well known scholar in the constructivist school of international relations. In his influential 1992 article "anarchy is what states make of it", Wendt argued that contrary to the views expressed by the rationalist schools, there are no imminent or inherent essentialist features in the international structure. He contends instead, that the realities of the international system are socially constructed through the interactions of actors and the creation of norms. For Wendt, the behaviors of actors in the international arena are not in any sense "predetermined", certainly not by virtue of any essential quality bequeathed on actors by reason of their natural constituents[60]. Constructivists often exemplify these arguments by highlighting the fact that the United States does not feel terribly threatened by the nuclear weapons of the United Kingdom and China, despite those

---

[60] Alexander Wendt. Anarchy is what States make of it. International Organisation, vol.46. No.2. Spring, 1992. P.392.

weapons being just as destructive as those of other nuclear armed states. The given reason for such disparities in perceptions according to constructivists is the inter-subjective meanings that have been created over time via interactions between these actors.[61]

Constructivism is not to be seen as being directly in opposition to realism, liberalism, or institutionalism. Rather, the constructivist approach takes a contrasting position to the rationalist view in general. Constructivism makes no claims about the nature of the political universe, but loses a strategic analytical edge because it provides no empirical formula for predicting the future of the political universe, a fact that has led some scholars to the misleading conclusion that constructivism is essentially "reflectivist" and ultimately of relatively little use in making economic and political predictions.

The understanding with which the constructivist proceeds is that the quantifiable features of the social world are better understood after the recognition of the processes by which ideas, norms, and shared beliefs are created. States interact with each other and bestow meanings on symbolic gestures, people tend to interpret the world and attribute meanings to its qualities, and these meanings in turn quickly take on a life of their own, and are ultimately institutionalized, thereby exigently establishing a social basis for the interpretation of meanings.[62]

Constructivism is also considered to be in opposition to positivism in international relations. This juxtaposition is essentially an epistemological one. Positivists

---

[61]GanjarNugroho.Constructivism and International Relations Theory.Global&Strategis, TH. II, No.1, January-June 2008. P.88.

[62]GanjarNugroho.Constructivism and International Relations Theory.Global&Strategis, TH. II, No.1, January-June 2008. P.89

generally take an extreme objectivist approach to the social sciences. They insist that objective knowledge of the world is out there and independent of our subjective perceptions, they therefore emphasize the necessity for and viability of a rigorous and systematized social science that very much employs the methodologies and techniques of the natural-sciences. However, since the 1990s, constructivism has come to gain more widespread acceptance in international relations, and one reason for that has been its ability to subsume elements of the empirical traditions and combine that effectively with normative critical approaches.[63] It has become increasingly difficult for neoliberals and neorealist's in particular to dismiss some of the claims constructivism makes about the international arena. One might look to structure, agency, and process to understand international phenomena and make sense of things, but it is immediately appealing to consider these facets of political reality as representing what amounts to a mere superstructure firmly built upon the base of shared ideational norms that have become established through practice and now form the basis upon which interactions in the international arena take place.

4.3 Social Background of Underdevelopment in Nigeria

Nigeria is a multi-cultural society with over five-hundred ethnic groups that speak over five hundred different languages. Of these groups, the hausa, the igbo, and the yoruba are the three largest groups. English is the official language since 1960. Ethnicity has been a very essential component of Nigeria's political history. As highlighted in the previous chapter, upon achieving political independence from Great Britain, Nigeria quickly adopted a democracy that was decidedly divided along ethnic lines. Ethnic politics has been an established mechanism for power in Nigeria ever since. Kalejaiye and Aliyu (2013) emphasize the role of ethnicity as a

---

[63] Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse, Beth A. Simmons. Handbook of International Relations.Sept.18, 2012.P.112 & 113.

sociological cause of Nigeria's underdevelopment. They highlight the historical clashes between various ethnic groups in the urban cities over economic dividends and note that these clashes in turn drove the ethnic groups further apart from each other until there were clear palpable political and social rifts between the various ethnic groups in the country.[64]

The competitive economic struggles between the ethnic groups inevitably trickled to other spheres of social life, but had the most damaging effects on the nation's economic development because the practice of hiring a member of one's own ethnic group regardless of qualification and competence became prevalent. Thus, ethnicity set the stage sociologically for underdevelopment in Nigeria by providing the fault lines along which the people can draw ideological and cultural differences that will ultimately lend credence to corruption and insecurity which in turn undermines political efforts at development. The sociological structure was therefore constructed in such a way that tribalism took centre stage in the setting of norms, institution of a common national culture and impairing the moral outlook of the society from the outset.

Another salient sociological feature of the Nigerian political landscape that undermines its potential for economic development has been the status of women in the country. The status of women in Nigeria has always been muddled in ethnic notions of women's roles within the family and society. Like most societies, gender relations are influenced by the biological differences between the genders but the

---

[64] Peter O. Kalejaiye, NurudeenAlliyu. Ethnic Politics and Social Conflicts: Factors in Nigeria's underdevelopment. The Journal of International Social Research.Vol.6, Issue 27.Summer, 2013.P.254.

social and political meanings attributed to these relations are socially constructed[65] Women constitute 49% of Nigeria's population, totaling roughly 80.2million. However, according to UKAID's 2012 "gender in Nigeria report", roughly 54million women live and work in the rural areas contributing a significant 80% of the nation's rural work force but still five times less likely to own land in comparison to males.[66] The economic output of Nigerian women is still relatively low, and the poor public investment in female education plays a huge role in fostering this problem. The empowerment of women seems necessarily crucial to Nigeria's economic prospects especially in consideration of the sheer impact they could conceivably have in the labor force. But the deliberate and systematic subjugation of women has left the country reeling in economic tatters and unable to halt the trend of underdevelopment. The kidnap of over 200 school-girls from chibok in north-eastern Nigeria in 2014 by the radical islamist sect boko-haram, brought the country's ethno-religious conception of the role of women in society to an all-time low. It drew much international consternation and ultimately contributed greatly to the electoral defeat of President Goodluck Jonathan and the people's democratic party (PDP) effectively ending the party's stranglehold on power since the restoration of democratic rule in 1999. The victor of that election, erstwhile military head of state turned born-again democrat MuhammaduBuhari was elected on the promise to destroy boko-haram and do everything possible to return the kidnapped girls to their inconsolable families. The chibok girls' saga potentially drew global attention to the changing role of women in Nigeria.

---

[65]Ogege Samuel Omadjohwoefe. Gender Role Differentiation and Social Mobility of Women in Nigeria.Journal of Social Sciences inter-disciplinary reflection of contemporary society. 2011. P.67.
[66]UKAID British Council. Gender in Nigeria report 2012.Improving the lives of girls and Women in Nigeria. P.IV.
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/67332/Gender-Nigeria2012-summary.pdf

The social background under which underdevelopment thrives is also greatly contributed to by the deep religious inclinations of the populace. Nigeria is roughly evenly split between muslims who mostly inhabit the northern part of the country and christians who mostly inhabit the south. Both religions have very long histories in the country that predate its independence and they have both had very telling effects on the evolution of norms in the society over time.

Much like ethnicity, religion has often provided ample grounds for ideological disagreements and political tensions throughout the nation's fifty-five year history. Religious violence in Nigeria is traceable to the Kano riots of 1953. The riots were directly instigated by the motion put forward in the house of representatives by Chief Anthony Enahoro calling for the independence of Nigeria from Great Britain. The northern leaders unanimously rejected this motion but the social chaos that broke out afterwards was almost entirely religious in character. Africans are relatively quite a religious people, and Nigerians are especially so, as Chidiebere Obi points out in his 2012 paper titled "religion and societal development: A philosophical appraisal of African situation", Africans are statistically more religious than their western and asian counterparts, the average african tends to believe more than he acts, and for Obi, this trend indicates a widespread unwillingness to actively engage in societal development through willful over-indulgence in religious practice.[67]

There are numerous reasons as to why religion exerts such an enormous influence in the Nigerian society, vanguard's Douglas Anele suggested in a 2013 piece that the swift dislodgment of the more tolerant african traditional religions by christianity and

---

[67]Chidiebere C. Obi. Religion and Societal development: A Philosophical appraisal of African Situation. Unizik journal of Arts and Humanities.Vol.13, No.2. 2012. P.155.

islam is largely to blame for the ill social effects of religion in the country.[68] However compelling this view might seem, it fails to take into account the economic dimension of the sociological challenges that beset the nation. All religions invariably prescribe one way of life or the other, even in a society where all the inhabitants adhere strictly to one form of religious practice, its' adherents could still find room to distinguish themselves from each other on the basis of rigorousness of adherence or commitment to practice. The point is, when there are political and economic challenges in a society and the people become desperate to lay blame and point fingers at each other, should the political institutions find themselves incapable of providing effective governance necessary to maintain law and order, religion tends to provide an ideological basis and spiritual motivation for the hideous behaviors that directly undermine development. In the context of the goal of this paper therefore, it is important to understand religion both as a key element of the social background that impedes the developmental efforts in the country and also as a factor whose effect is merely a product of the fundamental causal factors of underdevelopment in the country. Corruption and insecurity ultimately feed these prima facie hindrances to development.

4.4 Constructivist Assessment of Corruption in Nigeria

Corruption as we have established is a social construction. As Granovetter (2004) writes, in terms of a general communicable definition, corruption is only meaningful within the context of social and cultural practice. What might be perceived as corrupt behavior in one place may be looked upon differently in some other place. For Granovetter, corruption is inherently indistinguishable from the local culture from

---

[68] Douglas Anele. How Religion underdeveloped Nigeria. Vanguard Newspaper, Dec 29, 2013. Para.7
http://www.vanguardngr.com/2013/12/religion-underdeveloped-nigeria-2/

which its contextual usages derive meaning.[69] Chukwudum (2009) recounts how corruption has historically evolved in Nigeria. He recalls how the blacks who worked as interpreters for the colonial masters would manipulate the people for self-enrichment by exaggerating the demands of the colonial masters.[70]

The long history of corruption in Nigeria explains the fact that the notion does not draw as much horror or widespread disapproval as it does in most developed societies. Many Nigerians see corruption as a viable means to economic advancement. The social contexts for these are guaranteed by the cultural heritage of corruption. The Nigerian society now mostly views corruption strictly in terms of financial theft in the public sector, so an employer who makes employments and employee promotions on the basis of shared tribal affiliations is no longer seen as ''corrupt''.

The sociological acknowledgement of corruption is now so constricted that several things that would provoke public outrage in western societies no longer disturb Nigerian audiences. As a matter of fact, most high profile acts of corruption in the country's political set-up such as the haliburton scandal in 2010 only get public attention in the form of comic captions on newspapers or some other form of comic treatment. The fact remains that, overall, the Nigerian society seems extremely desensitized to the notion of corruption. While several scholars have suggested in the past that this was simply as a consequence of deteriorating moral standards in the

---

[69] Mark Granovetter. The Social Construction of Corruption.Dept.of Sociology, Stanford University. Oct. 2004. P.4 & 5.http://fsi-media.stanford.edu/evnts/4117/The_Social_Construction_of_Corruption_Oct04.pdf
[70] OkoroOnyeijeChukwudum.Nigeria: Her woes and their true remedies. Mar 31, 2009. P.252.

country, (Ochulor, 2011)[71] a constructivist outlook indicates otherwise. The analysis of the social, economic and political interests of the Nigerian people throughout the country's history provides an insightful gateway to understanding the nation's corruption challenges.

4.4.1 Interest and Identity

Of the three mentioned broad categories of interests, the economic arena is perhaps the most straightforward and easiest to digest, because obviously all Nigerians want the same economic goal; prosperity. As pointed out in Chapter two, Nigeria is blessed with an abundance of natural and human resources but has failed to maximize its potential. In theory, Nigerians have abundant avenues to wealth creation and improved standards of living, but poor infrastructure and dilapidated industries have turned the struggle for prosperity in Nigeria into a desperate dogfight for survival between all sorts of groups. These groups form identities along ethnic, religious, and geopolitical lines.

In "A history of identities, violence, and stability in Nigeria" (2005), Osaghae and Suberu remark that the various points of strife among Nigerian, chiefly: wealth, power, and resource control, tends to divide the people into tribal and religious affiliations which often escalate into violent confrontations and ultimately undermines the unity of the country.[72] The classification of interests in Nigeria at the sociological level is carried out with the acknowledgment of particular identities. Basically, in the sphere of interests that pertains to economic development, the people tend to align their interests with those of some particular group in order to

---

[71]OchulorChinenye Leo. Ethical and Moral implications of Corruption.Canadian Social Science. Vol.7, No.5 July 2007. P.223.
[72]Eghosa E. Osaghae, Rotimi T. Suberu. A History of Identities, Violence, and Stability in Nigeria.Center for Research on Inequality, Human Security, and Ethnicity. No.6, Jan. 2005. P.4

form a coherent voice capable of achieving some economic will through political action. This is manifestly evident in groups like the movement for the actualization of the sovereign state of biafra (MASSOB) and the movement for the emancipation of the niger-delta (MEND), two separatist movements in the south-east and south-south regions of the country respectively.

The political interests of the various groups of people in Nigeria also come to the fore under the light of constructivist introspection. Nigeria as a multi-cultural society has always had the challenge of power distribution. The over 300 ethnic groups in Nigeria have been mostly dominated by the nation's three largest ethnic groups; the hausa, the ibo, and the yoruba. These three groups have provided all but one of Nigeria's 13 heads of state since independence in 1960 with Goodluck Jonathan a member of the ijawethnic group in the southern part of the country. The degree of tribalism and ethnic divisions in the country naturally impels Nigerians to identify themselves along ethnic lines.

The amalgamation of the northern and southern protectorates by Great Britain in 1914 essentially fused together two distinct territories with hitherto sharply contrasting political and economic fortunes.[73] Upon independence in 1960, the nascent state had to deal with the problem of power distribution, as detailed in chapter three; this was not a benign bloodless task. The political parties were immediately formed along ethnic lines. The fear of ethnic subjugation has hovered over Nigerian politics since the formation of the republic. This fear is perhaps the most useful insight to understanding the political and ethnic strife surrounding

---

[73] Moses Uchonu. The Roots of Nigeria's Religious and Ethnic Conflicts.The Global Post. Mar 10, 2014. http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/regions/africa/nigeria/140220/nigeria-religious-ethnic-conflict-roots

Nigerian politics, from the first military coup in 1966 to the pogrom that followed and the subsequent civil war that broke out after the secession of the igbo dominated eastern part of the country, the nation's history has clearly been dominated by the fear of one ethnic group completely eclipsing another by laying hold on political power.

Ethnicity in Nigeria and most of africa is a little more complicated than one might imagine especially when contrasted with the multi-cultural western nations like Belgium. Ethnicity in Nigeria relates to individuals belonging to particular tribes. The notion of the tribe itself conveys certain familial connotations, so members of a particular ethnicity tend to see themselves as belonging to certain tribes and by extension, as belonging to one extended family. This platform serves as a powerful and significant fraternal basis for the execution of collective political action. Ethnic violence over political issues is quite a familiar occurrence. At the state level, this struggle is just as fierce as it is at the national level, on March 7th 2010, hundreds of hausa-fulani herdsmen attacked three Christian villages in Plateau state located in the middle-belt region of the country, investigations later revealed that it was in fact a reprisal attack carried out by the hausa-fulani ethnic group for a prior attack in 2010 in which some hausa-fulanimuslims are said to have been killed.[74]

The last major clash of interests and identities in Nigeria occurs in the social sphere. In many underdeveloped economies, poor infrastructure and ineffective political and economic institutions undermine the people's abilities to compete freely and fairly in their pursuits of happiness, this inevitably leads to a sociological desire for political

---

[74] Joshua Segun, Ajibade Ebenezer Jegede. Ethnicization of violent conflicts in Jos?Global Journal of Human Social Science.Vol.13, Issue 7, Version 1.0 2013. P.39

expression. As people continue to lose faith in the abilities of the political authorities to provide much needed governance to safeguard rights, alignments are made in form of ethnic, political, or religious associations. These alignments will primarily be aimed at acquiring the political power to change the economic fortunes of the particular coalition or group.

However, the goal of wielding political power to change one's economic fortunes inevitably affects the group's social relations with other groups. For instance, several claims have been made regarding tribalism in Nigeria's entertainment and sports industries.[75]

Table 1.African Ethnic fractionalization table

	Per capita GNI in US$ (2000)	Under-5 Mortality per 1,000 (2000)	Percent Urban (2001)	Ethnic Fractionalization (Fearon)	Political Rights Score (2000-01)
All Sub-Saharan Africa	**480**	**162**	**33**	**0.71**	**4.5**
Nine Sample Countries	**1,130**	**139**	**36**	**0.73**	**3.7**
Botswana	3,300	99	50	0.35	2
Malawi	170	193	15	0.83	3
Namibia	2,050	112	32	0.72	2

---

[75]OluyikaEsan.AppreciatingNollywood: Audiences and Nigerian films. Participations, Vol.5, Issue 1. May 2008. Para 18.

Nigeria	260	153	46	0.80	4
South Africa	3,020	79	58	0.88	1
Tanzania	280	149	34	0.95	4
Uganda	310	161	15	0.93	6
Zambia	300	186	40	0.73	5
Zimbabwe	480	116	37	0.37	6

Notes: GNI, under-5 mortality, and percent urban figures are from World Bank (2002). Ethnic Fractionalization figures are from Fearon (2003). Political rights scores are from Freedom House (2001). Data from Afrobarometer 2004.[76]

4.5 Constructivist Assessment of Insecurity in Nigeria

Insecurity is definitively a social construction. It implies the absence of the political and economic circumstances necessary for the well-being of the citizenry. As highlighted in the second chapter, this paper focuses on human security rather than state security.

Earl Conteh-Morgan enumerated the causal factors of insecurity in his 2004 paper titled "peace building and human security: A constructivist perspective. He identified the social/structural and cultural causes of insecurity as; poverty, hunger, inequality and lack of jobs.[77] This notion would seem to be fully validated by the Nigerian situation. The rise of kidnapping and armed militancy in the Niger-Delta followed decades of poverty and starvation in that region. The majority of the people belong to the ijaw and the ogoni ethnic groups. These groups had earlier found political expression in form of the movement for the survival of the ogoni people (MASSOP)

---

[76] Alicia Bannon, Edward Miguel, Daniel N. Posner. Sources of Ethnic Identification in Africa.AfroBarometer Working Paper No.44, Aug 2004. P.3
[77] Earl Conteh-Morgan. Peace Building and Human Security: A Constructivist Perspective.IPSHU English Research Report. Series No.19, Conflict and human security: A search for new approaches of peace-building. 2004. P.231

founded in 1990 by Ken Saro-Wiwa. The government's failure to address the Niger-Delta grievances eventually culminated in the militancy.

Poverty also played a huge role in the instigation of the Nigerian civil war and continues to be a major motivational tool of recruitment for the boko-haram insurgency today. Rice, Graff, and Lewis (2006) show the correlation between poverty levels in a state and its likelihood to experience a civil War. They conclude that the "compelling evidence" suggests that poorer States with generally lower income per capita are significantly more likely to experience a civil war.[78] This is not necessarily a surprising declaration. The Nigerian civil war occurred following a period of economic upheaval and amid notorious bouts of corruption among the first republic politicians.

4.5.1 Interest and Identity

Insecurity in Nigeria derives a great deal of its social meanings from the interests and identity formations of the social actors in the country. One avenue to fully explore and drive home this salient point, perhaps, is the nature of political conflicts that have occurred in the democratic era. Post-electoral violence is common-place in Nigeria and usually occurs between rival parties contesting for political power. As a consequence of the ineffective political and judicial mechanisms in place to provide a guarantee of fair and credible elections or the means to challenge electoral outcome and perceived malpractice, parties often resort to violent confrontations and damaging behavior that further weakens the democratic process in the country.

---

[78] Susan E. Rice, Corinne Graff, Janet Lewis. Poverty and Civil War: What Policymakers need to know. The Brookings Institution, Global Economy and Develoment. No.2, Dec 2006. P.5

The pursuit of economic advancement and resource control is one avenue for the instigation of violence in Nigeria that cannot be neglected. This has always been a bone of contention between the various regions, geo-political zones, and states in the country. As a matter of fact, the Niger-Delta militancy is directly traceable to this root-cause. Nigeria is extremely dependent on crude-oil for its revenues, but its large crude-oil deposits are located in the south, especially in the Niger-Delta region. The mismanagement of crude-oil revenues and the state's failure to convert the nation's natural wealth into social infrastructure and sustainable development has led to the rise of various groups in the south with indigenous claims to crude-oil located areas demanding greater autonomy and greater resource control.

4.6 Analysis of Data

In validation of the hypothesis, relevant data is necessary to show the correlations between insecurity, corruption, and underdevelopment. Data is also used to validate the claim that the other often mentioned causes of underdevelopment in Nigeria such as ethnicity and poverty are merely manifestations of the social environments conditioned by the acceptance of corruption and insecurity which jointly enjoy a certain degree of normative acceptance in the Nigerian society in comparison to its western counterparts.

Table two shows the trend of political violence in the aftermath of election in Nigeria. There seems a clear statistical correlation between ethnicity, poverty, and potential for post-electoral violence. Plateau state which tops the list is one of Nigeria's most ethnically diverse states and also a hotspot for religious violence owing to its substantial christian and muslim populations.

Table 2.Ranking of states from highest to lowest prevelance of political/electoral fatalities (2006–2014) Data from ShamsudeenKabir Bello (2015).[79]

RANKING	STATE	NUMBER OF FATALITIES
1	PLATEAU	850
2	KADUNA	653
3	NASARAWA	258
4	RIVERS	181
5	KANO	152
6	DELTA	142
7	OYO	110
8	BENUE	109
9	KOGI	107
10	BAYELSA	93
11	AKWA IBOM	91
12	NIGER	86
13	BORNO	84
14	EDO	83
15	LAGOS	80
16	BAUCHI	63
17	TARABA	61
18	FCT	59
18	OSUN	59
19	ONDO	55
20	CROSS RIVER	54

[79]ShamsudeenKabir Bello. Political and Electoral violence in Nigeria: Mapping, Evolution, and Patterns (June 2006-May 2014). IFRA-NIGERIA working papers, series No.49, Mar 4th 2015. P.7 & 8

21	KWARA	53
22	OGUN	51
23	ADAMAWA	49
24	IMO	45
25	ANAMBRA	38
26	KATSINA	37
27	GOMBE	33
28	EKITI	31
29	YOBE	29
30	ZAMFARA	25
31	ENUGU	24
32	KEBBI	23
32	ABIA	23
33	EBONYI	22
34	SOKOTO	11
35	JIGAWA	10
	TOTAL	3,934

Figure 1. Number of fatalities from electoral violence per state and per zone
(june 2006-may 2014)
Source: IFRA-Nigeria e-papers series, 2015, n°49; data from ShamsudeenKabir Bello
(2015)[80]

[80][80]ShamsudeenKabir Bello. Political and Electoral violence in Nigeria: Mapping, Evolution, and Patterns (June 2006-May 2014). IFRA-NIGERIA working papers, series No.49, Mar 4th 2015. P.8

Table 3. Poverty head count by year

Year	Poverty Incidence (%)	Est. Pop (Million)	Pop. In Poverty (Million)
1980	28.1	65	18.3
1985	46.3	75	34.7
1992	42.7	91.5	39.1
1996	65.6	102.3	68.7
2004	54.4	126.3	68.7

Source: NBS Poverty Profile in Nigeria, 2004.Via UNODC Business survey on crime and corruption. Oct 2009.P.1

Tables 3 and 4 indicate a consistent rise in poverty statistics in the country by percentage throughout the military era. The poverty curves rise exponentially during the leadership of Ibrahim Babangida and SaniAbacha, periods of relative insecurity and unprecedented political corruption in the country.

Table 4. The poor and the core poor per year

YEAR	NON-POOR (%)	MOD.POOR(%)	CORE POOR(%)
1980	71.9	21	7.1
1985	53.7	34.2	12.1
1992	57.3	28.9	13.8
1996	34.4	36.3	29.3
YEAR	NON-POOR(%)	MOD.POOR(%)	CORE POOR(%)
2004	45.6	32.4	22

Source: NBS Poverty Profile in Nigeria, 2004. Via UNODC Business survey on crime andcorruption.Oct 2009.P.14.

Table 5 highlights the urban/rural poverty trends

Table 5. Poverty trends per sector

Year	Urban (%)	Rural (%)
1980	17.2	28.3
1985	37.8	51.4
1992	37.5	46
1996	58.2	69.8
2004	43.2	63.3

Source: NBS Poverty Profile in Nigeria, 2004 Via UNODC Business survey on crime and corruption. Oct 2009P.14

The inaugural transparency international indices were taken in the year 1995. This prevents us from properly scrutinizing the Ibrahim Babangida regime which lasted in power from 1985-1993. The structural adjustment policies that were codified in the washington consensus contained both short term plans for economic development and long term plans for eradication of corruption and relative political stability. However, despite the attempts by subsequent administrations to implement these policies since 1986, none of these goals were achieved until they were abandoned altogether by 2006 according to Ogbonna (2012)[81]. The TI data for Nigeria were not available until 1996 and is shown below.

Table six shows the Transparency International index for corruption for the year 1996. The first ever TI data on corruption were taken in the year 1995. Data for Nigeria were first indicated in 1996.

---

[81]BigBenChukwumaOgbonna. Structural adjustment program (SAP) in Nigeria: An empirical assessment. Journal of Banking, Volume 6, Number 1, June 2012, 19-40: ISSN 1597 – 2569.

Table 6. Transparency International index for 1996

Rank	Country	Score ´96 (Max. 10)	Score ´95 (Max. 10)	Variance in ´96	Number of Surveys used
1	New Zealand	9,43	9,55	0,39	6
2	Denmark	9,33	9,32	0,44	6
3	Sweden	9,08	8,87	0,30	6
4	Finland	9,05	9,12	0,23	6
5	Canada	8,96	8,87	0,15	6
6	Norway	8,87	8,61	0,20	6
7	Singapore	8,80	9,26	2,36	10
8	Switzerland	8,76	8,76	0,24	6
9	Netherlands	8,71	8,69	0,25	6
10	Australia	8,60	8,80	0,48	6
11	Ireland	8,45	8,57	0,44	6
12	Unit.Kingd.	8,44	8,57	0,25	7
13	Germany	8,27	8,14	0,53	6
14	Israel	7,71		1,41	5
15	USA	7,66	7,79	0,19	7
16	Austria	7,59	7,13	0,41	6
Rank	Country	Score ´96 (Max. 10)	Score ´95 (Max. 10)	Variance in ´96	Number of Surveys used
17	Japan	7,05	6,72	2,61	9
18	Hong Kong	7,01	7,12	1,79	9
19	France	6,96	7,00	1,58	6
20	Belgium	6,84	6,85	1,41	6
21	Chile	6,80	7,94	2,53	7
22	Portugal	6,53	5,56	1,17	6
23	South Africa	5,68	5,62	3,30	6
24	Poland	5,57		3,63	4
25	Czech Rep.	5,37		2,11	4
26	Malaysia	5,32	5,28	0,13	9
27	South Korea	5,02	4,29	2,30	9
28	Greece	5,01	4,04	3,37	6
29	Taiwan	4,98	5,08	0,87	9
30	Jordan	4,89		0,17	4
31	Hungary	4,86	4,12	2,19	6
32	Spain	4,31	4,35	2,48	6
33	Turkey	3,54	4,10	0,30	6
34	Italy	3,42	2,99	4,78	6
35	Argentina	3,41	5,24	0,54	6
36	Bolivia	3,40		0,64	4
37	Thailand	3,33	2,79	1,24	10
38	Mexico	3,30	3,18	0,22	7

39	Ecuador	3,19		0,42	4
40	Brazil	2,96	2,70	1,07	7
41	Egypt	2,84		6,64	4
42	Colombia	2,73	3,44	2,41	6
43	Uganda	2,71		8,72	4
44	Philippines	2,69	2,77	0,49	8
45	Indonesia	2,65	1,94	0,95	10
46	India	2,63	2,78	0,12	9
47	Russia	2,58		0,94	5
48	Venezuela	2,50	2,66	0,40	7
49	Cameroon	2,46		2,98	4
50	China	2,43	2,16	0,52	9
51	Bangladesh	2,29		1,57	4
52	Kenya	2,21		3,69	4
53	Pakistan	1,00	2,25	2,52	5
54	Nigeria	0,69		6,37	4

Source: TI corruption perception index 1996.[82]

Table 7 shows the corruption index for the year 1997. Again Nigeria retains its position as the most corrupt country in the World. This was the last full year of the rule of the country's last and most corrupt military head of state, Gen. SaniAbacha.

Table 7.Transparency International Index for 1997.

Rank	Transparency International Corruption Perception Index 1997	Score 1997(max 10.00)	Score 1996 (max. 10.00)	Number of surveys used in 1997	Variance in 1997 between surveys
1	Denmark	9,94	9,33	6	0,54
2	Finland	9,48	9,05	6	0,30
3	Sweden	9,35	9,08	6	0,27
4	New Zealand	9,23	9,43	6	0,58
5	Canada	9,10	8,96	5	0,27
6	Netherlands	9,03	8,71	6	0,23
7	Norway	8,92	8,87	6	0,51
8	Australia	8,86	8,60	5	0,44

---

[82]http://www.transparency.org/files/content/tool/1996_CPI_EN.pdf

9	Singapore	8,66	8,80	6	2,32
10	Luxemburg	8,61	---	4	1,13
11	Switzerland	8,61	8,76	6	0,26
12	Ireland	8,28	8,45	6	1,53
13	Germany	8,23	8,27	6	0,40
14	United Kingdom	8,22	8,44	6	1,43
15	Israel	7,97	7,71	5	0,12
16	USA	7,61	7,66	5	1,15
17	Austria	7,61	7,59	5	0,59
18	Hong Kong	7,28	7,01	7	2,63
19	Portugal	6,97	6,53	5	1,02
20	France	6,66	6,96	5	0,60
21	Japan	6,57	7,05	7	1,09
22	Costa Rica	6,45	---	4	1,73
23	Chile	6,05	6,80	6	0,51
24	Spain	5,90	4,31	6	1,82
25	Greece	5,35	5,01	6	2,42
26	Belgium	5,25	6,84	6	3,28
27	Czech Republic	5,20	5,37	5	0,22
28	Hungary	5,18	4,86	6	1,66
29	Poland	5,08	5,57	5	2,13
30	Italy	5,03	3,42	6	2,07
31	Taiwan	5,02	4,98	7	0,76
32	Malaysia	5,01	5,32	6	0,50
33	South Africa	4,95	5,68	6	3,08
34	South Korea	4,29	5,02	7	2,76
35	Uruguay	4,14	---	4	0,63
36	Brazil	3,56	2,96	6	0,49
37	Romania	3,44	---	4	0,07
38	Turkey	3,21	3,54	6	1,21
39	Thailand	3,06	3,33	6	0,14
40	Philippines	3,05	2,69	6	0,51
41	China	2,88	2,43	6	0,82
42	Argentina	2,81	3,41	6	1,24
Rank	Transparency International Corruption Perception Index 1997	Score 1997(max 10.00)	Score 1996 (max. 10.00)	Number of surveys used in 1997	Variance in 1997 between surveys
43	Vietnam	2,79	---	4	0,26
44	Venezuela	2,77	2,50	5	0,51
45	India	2,75	2,63	7	0,23
46	Indonesia	2,72	2,65	6	0,18
47	Mexico	2,66	3,30	5	1,18

48	**Pakistan**	**2,53**	1,00	4	0,47
49	**Russia**	**2,27**	2,58	6	0,87
50	**Colombia**	**2,23**	2,73	6	0,61
51	**Bolivia**	**2,05**	3,40	4	0,86
52	**Nigeria**	**1,76**	0,69	4	0,16

Source: TI corruption perception index 1997.[83]

Table 8 shows the corruption perception index for the year 2005. This was during the second term of Nigeria's first stable civilian government since 1966 under the leadership of President OlusegunObasanjo and the people's democratic party (PDP). It indicates an improved corruption score of 1.9 from 1.76 registered under Abacha in 1997.

Table 8. Transparency international index for 2005

RANK	COUNTRY/TERRITORY	CPI 2005 SCORE	CONFIDENCE RANGE	
1	Iceland	9.7	9.5 - 9.7	8
2	Finland	9.6	9.5 - 9.7	9
	New Zealand	9.6	9.5 - 9.7	9
4	Denmark	9.5	9.3 - 9.6	10
5	Singapore	9.4	9.3 - 9.5	12
6	Sweden	9.2	9.0 - 9.3	10
7	Switzerland	9.1	8.9 - 9.2	9
8	Norway	8.9	8.5 - 9.1	9
9	Australia	8.8	8.4 - 9.1	13
10	Austria	8.7	8.4 - 9.0	9
11	Netherlands	8.6	8.3 - 8.9	9
	United Kingdom	8.6	8.3 - 8.8	11
13	Luxembourg	8.5	8.1 - 8.9	8

[83]http://www.transparency.org/files/content/tool/1997_CPI_EN.pdf

RANK	COUNTRY/TERRITORY	CPI 2005 SCORE	CONFIDENCE RANGE	
14	Canada	8.4	7.9 - 8.8	11
15	Hong Kong	8.3	7.7 - 8.7	12
16	Germany	8.2	7.9 - 8.5	10
17	USA	7.6	7.0 - 8.0	12
18	France	7.5	7.0 - 7.8	11
19	Belgium	7.4	6.9 - 7.9	9
	Ireland	7.4	6.9 - 7.9	10
21	Chile	7.3	6.8 - 7.7	10
	Japan	7.3	6.7 - 7.8	14
23	Spain	7.0	6.6 - 7.4	10
24	Barbados	6.9	5.7 - 7.3	3
25	Malta	6.6	5.4 - 7.7	5
26	Portugal	6.5	5.9 - 7.1	9
27	Estonia	6.4	6.0 - 7.0	11
28	Israel	6.3	5.7 - 6.9	10
	Oman	6.3	5.2 - 7.3	5
30	United Arab Emirates	6.2	5.3 - 7.1	6
31	Slovenia	6.1	5.7 - 6.8	11
32	Botswana	5.9	5.1 - 6.7	8
	Qatar	5.9	5.6 - 6.4	5
	Taiwan	5.9	5.4 - 6.3	14
	Uruguay	5.9	5.6 - 6.4	6
36	Bahrain	5.8	5.3 - 6.3	6
37	Cyprus	5.7	5.3 - 6.0	5
	Jordan	5.7	5.1 - 6.1	10
39	Malaysia	5.1	4.6 - 5.6	14

RANK	COUNTRY/TERRITORY	CPI 2005 SCORE	CONFIDENCE RANGE	
40	Hungary	5.0	4.7 - 5.2	11
	Italy	5.0	4.6 - 5.4	9
	South Korea	5.0	4.6 - 5.3	12
43	Tunisia	4.9	4.4 - 5.6	7
44	Lithuania	4.8	4.5 - 5.1	8
45	Kuwait	4.7	4.0 - 5.2	6
46	South Africa	4.5	4.2 - 4.8	11
47	Czech Republic	4.3	3.7 - 5.1	10
	Greece	4.3	3.9 - 4.7	9
	Namibia	4.3	3.8 - 4.9	8
	Slovakia	4.3	3.8 - 4.8	10
51	Costa Rica	4.2	3.7 - 4.7	7
	El Salvador	4.2	3.5 - 4.8	6
	Latvia	4.2	3.8 - 4.6	7
	Mauritius	4.2	3.4 - 5.0	6
55	Bulgaria	4.0	3.4 - 4.6	8
	Colombia	4.0	3.6 - 4.4	9
	Fiji	4.0	3.4 - 4.6	3
	Seychelles	4.0	3.5 - 4.2	3
59	Cuba	3.8	2.3 - 4.7	4
	Thailand	3,8	3.5 - 4.1	13
	Trinidad and Tobago	3,8	3.3 - 4.5	6
62	Belize	3.7	3.4 - 4.1	3
	Brazil	3,7	3.5 - 3.9	10
64	Jamaica	3.6	3.4 - 3.8	6
65	Ghana	3.5	3.2 - 4.0	8

RANK	COUNTRY/TERRITORY	CPI 2005 SCORE	CONFIDENCE RANGE	
	Mexico	3.5	3.3 - 3.7	10
	Panama	3.5	3.1 - 4.1	7
	Peru	3.5	3.1 - 3.8	7
	Turkey	3.5	3.1 - 4.0	11
70	Burkina Faso	3.4	2.7 - 3.9	3
	Croatia	3.4	3.2 - 3.7	7
	Egypt	3.4	3.0 - 3.9	9
	Lesotho	3.4	2.6 - 3.9	3
	Poland	3.4	3.0 - 3.9	11
	Saudi Arabia	3.4	2.7 - 4.1	5
	Syria	3.4	2.8 - 4.2	5
77	Laos	3.3	2.1 - 4.4	3
78	China	3.2	2.9 - 3.5	14
	Morocco	3.2	2.8 - 3.6	8
	Senegal	3.2	2.8 - 3.6	6
	Sri Lanka	3.2	2.7 - 3.6	7
	Suriname	3.2	2.2 - 3.6	3
83	Lebanon	3.1	2.7 - 3.3	4
	Rwanda	3.1	2.1 - 4.1	3
85	Dominican Republic	3.0	2.5 - 3.6	6
	Mongolia	3.0	2.4 - 3.6	4
	Romania	3.0	2.6 - 3.5	11
88	Armenia	2.9	2.5 - 3.2	4
	Benin	2.9	2.1 - 4.0	5
	Bosnia and Herzegovina	2.9	2.7 - 3.1	6
	Gabon	2.9	2.1 - 3.6	4

RANK	COUNTRY/TERRITORY	CPI 2005 SCORE	CONFIDENCE RANGE	
	India	2.9	2.7 - 3.1	14
	Iran	2.9	2.3 - 3.3	5
	Mali	2.9	2.3 - 3.6	8
	Moldova	2.9	2.3 - 3.7	5
	Tanzania	2.9	2.6 - 3.1	8
97	Algeria	2.8	2.5 - 3.3	7
	Argentina	2.8	2.5 - 3.1	10
	Madagascar	2.8	1.9 - 3.7	5
	Malawi	2.8	2.3 - 3.4	7
	Mozambique	2.8	2.4 - 3.1	8
	Serbia and Montenegro	2.8	2.5 - 3.3	7
103	Gambia	2.7	2.3 - 3.1	7
	Macedonia	2.7	2.4 - 3.2	7
	Swaziland	2.7	2.0 - 3.1	3
	Yemen	2.7	2.4 - 3.2	5
107	Belarus	2.6	1.9 - 3.8	5
	Eritrea	2.6	1.7 - 3.5	3
	Honduras	2.6	2.2 - 3.0	7
	Kazakhstan	2.6	2.2 - 3.2	6
	Nicaragua	2.6	2.4 - 2.8	7
	Palestine	2.6	2.1 - 2.8	3
	Ukraine	2.6	2.4 - 2.8	8
	Vietnam	2.6	2.3 - 2.9	10
	Zambia	2.6	2.3 - 2.9	7
	Zimbabwe	2.6	2.1 - 3.0	7
117	Afghanistan	2.5	1.6 - 3.2	3

RANK	COUNTRY/TERRITORY	CPI 2005 SCORE	CONFIDENCE RANGE	
	Bolivia	2.5	2.3 - 2.9	6
	Ecuador	2.5	2.2 - 2.9	6
	Guatemala	2.5	2.1 - 2.8	7
	Guyana	2.5	2.0 - 2.7	3
	Libya	2.5	2.0 - 3.0	4
	Nepal	2.5	1.9 - 3.0	4
	Philippines	2.5	2.3 - 2.8	13
	Uganda	2.5	2.2 - 2.8	8
126	Albania	2.4	2.1 - 2.7	3
	Niger	2.4	2.2 - 2.6	4
	Russia	2.4	2.3 - 2.6	12
	Sierra Leone	2.4	2.1 - 2.7	3
130	Burundi	2.3	2.1 - 2.5	3
	Cambodia	2.3	1.9 - 2.5	4
	Congo, Republic of	2.3	2.1 - 2.6	4
	Georgia	2.3	2.0 - 2.6	6
	Kyrgyzstan	2.3	2.1 - 2.5	5
	Papua New Guinea	2.3	1.9 - 2.6	4
	Venezuela	2.3	2.2 -2.4	10
137	Azerbaijan	2.2	1.9 - 2.5	6
	Cameroon	2.2	2.0 - 2.5	6
	Ethiopia	2.2	2.0 - 2.5	8
	Indonesia	2.2	2.1 - 2.5	13
	Iraq	2.2	1.5 - 2.9	4
	Liberia	2.2	2.1 - 2.3	3
	Uzbekistan	2.2	2.1 - 2.4	5

RANK	COUNTRY/TERRITORY	CPI 2005 SCORE	CONFIDENCE RANGE	
	Congo, Democratic Republic	2.1	1.8 - 2.3	4
	Kenya	2.1	1.8 - 2.4	8
	Pakistan	2.1	1.7 - 2.6	7
	Paraguay	2.1	1.9 - 2.3	7
	Somalia	2.1	1.6 - 2.2	3
	Sudan	2.1	1.9 - 2.2	5
144	Tajikistan	2.1	1.9 - 2.4	5
151	Angola	2.0	1.8 - 2.1	5
	Cote d'Ivoire	1.9	1.7 - 2.1	4
	Equatorial Guinea	1.9	1.6 - 2.1	3
152	Nigeria	1.9	1.7 - 2.0	9
	Haiti	1.8	1.5 - 2.1	4
	Myanmar	1.8	1.7 - 2.0	4
155	Turkmenistan	1.8	1.7 - 2.0	4
	Bangladesh	1.7	1.4 - 2.0	7
158	Chad	1.7	1.3 - 2.1	6

Source: TI corruption perception index 2005.[84]

4.7 Conclusion

The impulse to explain the Nigerian issue by analyzing the relations of power within the state or by explaining them in terms of its political infrastructure and institutions is often all too enticing in academia, but a constructivist investigation into the underlying challenges that facilitate and necessitate that superstructure of challenges that plague the country reveals that they emanate from much deeper and more

---

[84]http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/cpi_2005

worrisome sociological factors. Corruption and insecurity eat deeply into the soul of the state, they have become generally accepted phenomena, integrated into culture, and now legitimately forge the sociological basis on which presumptions of both political and economic character take place. Violence is implicitly regarded as a viable and legitimate means to political ends.

In the western societies, corruption is viewed as encompassing a whole range of social behaviors, ranging from the responsibilities of an elected official to the duties of a bank cashier, in every walk of life people are expected to conform to long established social norms. In Nigeria by stark contrast, corruption is mainly viewed as political malpractice, and even then, it is not the corruption itself that lends credence to the behavior, it is the deficient social norms that simply do not forbid corruption, certainly not as vehemently as in most other societies.

Chapter 5

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

5.1 Summary

Nigeria is a resource-rich country with massive potential for success. It is the world's 12th largest producer of crude-oil and possesses the 10th largest proven reserves of the commodity world-wide. The nation is also endowed with huge human potential with an estimated population of 180million people. The nation also boasts a vast array of natural resources like tin, silver, ore, gold, columbite, and coal. However despite these potentials, Nigeria continues to suffer from a lack of development. Mismanagement, incompetence, violence, distrust, and corruption have all played starring roles in hindering the progress of the country.

The evidence for Nigeria's underdevelopment is abundant. The nation's social infrastructure is largely decrepit, its roads are in very unhealthy conditions, electricity supply is sub-standard and even in the largest urban cities like lagos and port-harcourt electricity is still constantly load-shed. Unemployment is also widespread in the country as university graduates struggle to gain employment regardless of qualification, likewise admission into tertiary institutions are excruciatingly difficult as secondary school leavers struggle to find their way into universities and polytechnics. Where this ultimately leaves us, is confronting a country where little if anything functions at world-class standards.

In mainstream scholarship, a lot of probable causes have been put forward as perhaps fully or partially responsible for the Nigerian under-developmental challenge, prominent among these are; colonialism, poverty, corruption, ethnicity, illiteracy and many others. These reasons all have valid sociological claims to being the root causes of the nation's underdevelopment. Nonetheless, of these aforementioned candidates, corruption and insecurity seem the primary causes of underdevelopment in Nigeria. The reason is not just because they are the most salient, that is a debatable claim in itself, but corruption and insecurity stand as the only two problems that could themselves effectively explain most of the other problems as well as statistically show that they directly undermine the nation's ability to progress economically and politically.

A constructivist analysis into the nature of Nigeria's underdevelopment immediately assesses the underlying sociological factors that directly or indirectly facilitate the nation's stagnation. This means an analysis of the implications of meanings, how they are inter-subjectively perceived and what they imply for corruption and insecurity. The constructivist assessment also investigates the social evolution of corruption and insecurity in the country, how they have affected the political process in the country at various times. Social norms are created through a process of interactions between social actors, the interpretations that these actors confer on certain actions and practices basically determine the meanings of those actions. Distinguishing between friends and foes, for instance, is entirely a historical process; an actor might do this by contrasting the behavior of another actor with a plethora of similar behaviors they have encountered previously. In pre-independence Nigeria, the historical actions and meanings all indicated a nation impelled more by fear of

subjugation than by anything else. The rival groups in the northern, south-western, and south-eastern parts of the country had experienced decades of subjugation at the hands of their British colonial masters. The quest to prevent another ethnic emasculation sat deeply at the heart of all the political actions in the pre-civil war Nigeria; in fact, to a considerable degree it still does today.

Corruption has been integral to the nation's economic stagnation for pretty obvious reasons and some slightly less obvious ones. The phenomenon pre-dates the country and had already been decried by writers and intellectuals in the society since time immemorial. Legendary author Chinua Achebe recalls how interpreters working for the "white men" would deceive their fellow Nigerians and rob them of their valuables for selfish gains. After the nation's independence however, corruption took a deadly turn for the worse, with first republic politicians now assuming control of the nation's nascent crude oil industry, revenues were all too tantalizing. Before long, politicians all over the country began helping themselves to the nation's finances to the detriment of the masses. This would set a precedent that would reach new levels in the second republic, by the time of Babangida regime, Nigeria had begun to experience an inverse proportionate relationship between revenue and poverty, the only possible explanation for that, is the unprecedented levels of corruption that effectively offset the increased revenue, in other words, the corruption levels under Babangida and Abacha were so great they outpaced the rate of increase in revenue.

Insecurity has been a crucial factor in Nigeria's micro-economic stagnation. The history of insecurity in the country goes back to the pre-independence era, but without doubt it only worsened after independence. The first coup d'état in 1966 was

a bloodbath as most of the nation's ruling elites were brutally assassinated. The coup prompted a retaliation that was equally bloody and a pogrom ensued aimed at the igbos in the northern parts of the country, the civil-war quickly followed. However in contemporary Nigeria, breach of security has been largely orchestrated by armed gangs, angry groups, militants, and terrorists. The threat of violence understandably overshadows the Nigerian human security concerns; the inefficiency of the ill-equipped security apparatus underscores the erosion of the public's confidence in the state's ability to safeguard life and property. Vigilante groups are common-place in Nigeria as the citizenry look beyond the state for their security guarantees. Some of these groups have been known to be violent in the past, such as the "bakassi boys" in some states in Nigeria's south-east. These are armed militias that have often been accused of carrying out extra-judicial killings and other illegal activities yet continue to enjoy popular support in the areas where they operate.

5.2 Conclusion

The underdevelopment challenge that besets Nigeria is better understood by examining the sociological factors that underlie the nation's micro-economic underperformance and they manifestly indicate that corruption and insecurity are the root causes of its underdevelopment. In the world bank's report on research into development in Nigeria, Francis and Akinwumi (1996) indicate that the people identify development in terms of personal security, political participation and overall well-being.[85] These are challenges that take a social dimension. People feel differently about the same social condition, but the objective for Nigeria is to concentrate its efforts into battling the right problems. President MuhammaduBuhari has so far shown great zeal for the fight against corruption and seems to be making

---

[85] Paul Francis, James AdewuyiAkinwumi. State, Community, and Local Development in Nigeria. World Bank Publications, Jan 1 1996. P.9

considerable progress in the fight to end the boko-haram insurgency, insecurity however, goes well beyond the insurgency.

The way ahead for Nigeria is an arduous one. What is clear is that no tangible victory can be won against poverty, illiteracy or ethnicity without defeating the twin-evils of corruption and insecurity first. One key grass-roots avenue to tackle this problem is through education, young Nigerians need desperately to be educated on the power of peaceful political expression. Gang violence is gaining traction in Nigerian secondary-schools today; this is the wrong way forward. Force alone cannot rid Nigeria of corruption and insecurity, the reason is because of their grounding in norms. Violence is something most Nigerian kids are introduced to domestically, they learn some more at school, thereafter they begin to rationalize their social and economic conditions, and ultimately they seek to use the only political means at their disposal to express their disapproval of the social condition.

If the policies of the current administration are upheld, there is no reason why Nigeria cannot make meaningful progress in this quest for sustainable development, the future is impossible to predict from a statistical point of view, but historically it would seem MuhammaduBuhari is perhaps the perfect fit after all, his 2016 budget recently passed seems aimed at tackling the development problem and was delivered with a promise to tackle corruption with more vigor than ever before. If this trend is maintained, the future looks brighter for Nigeria's development prospects indeed.

REFERENCES

Ajodo, A., &Ugwuoke, B. (2014).Poverty and Challenges of Insecurity to Development.*European Scientific Journal*, ESI. 10(14), 54-65.

Alemika, E., Pam, S., Yunusa, A., &Adeniyi, A. (2015).Corruption and Poverty in Nigeria: A Report.*ActionAid Nigeria*, Abuja. 6(4), 10-11.

Alexander, W. (1992).Anarchy is what States make of it.*International Organization,* MIT Press, UK.46(2), 392-400.

Alicia, B., Edward, M., & Daniel, P. (2004).Sources of Ethnic Identification in Africa.*AfroBarometer Working Paper* (44), 3-10.

Angela, A., &Nkemakolam, O. (2014).Corruption and the Challenges of Insecurity in Nigeria: Political Economy Implication. *Global Journal Inc*, USA. 14(5).

Aransi, O. (2008). *Bureaucratic Corruption in the Public Service*.CuvillierVerlag International Scientific Publisher, New York.1-96.

Austin, A. (2005). *Underdevelopment: Main cause of Insecurity in West Africa*. Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. 30-45.

Awojobi, N. (2014). Corruption and Underdevelopment in Africa: A Discourse Approach.*International Journal of Economics, Commerce, and Management*. United Kingdom. 2(10), 3-10.

Chidiebere, O. (2012). Religion and Societal Development: A Philosophical appraisal of African Situation.*UnizikJournal of Arts and Humanities*,Nigeria. 13(2), 155-170.

Cjaja, N., & Jude, O. (2013).Security and National Development in Nigeria: The Threat of Boko Haram.*International Journal of Humanities and Social Sciences*,USA.3(4),285-301.

Cletus, U. (2012). Ethnicity and Nigeria's Underdevelopment.*Ogirisi: A New Journal of African Studies*, 9(7). 215-222 accessed 11/11/2015 at 9:55pm from http://www.ajol.info/index.php/og/article/viewFile/84686/74674

Don-Michael, A. (2004). *Policing Insecurity*. Lulu.com, US. 88-96

Douglas, A. (2013). How Religion Underdeveloped Nigeria. Vanguard Newspaper,7 accessed on 12/09/2015 at 10pm fromhttp://www.vanguardngr.com/2013/12/ religion-underdeveloped-nigeria-2/

Douglas, V. (2001).Causes of Underdevelopment.*International Political Economy*, CBS. 3. accessed on 11/20/2015 at 12:30pm from https://ibpunion.files.wordpress.com/2011/11/international-political- economy11.pdf

Earl, C. (2004). Peace Building and Human Security: A Constructivist Perspective.IPSHU English Research Report. (19), *Conflict and human security: A search for new approaches of peace-building*. 231-250.

Eghosa, E., &Rotimi, S. (2005*).* A History of Identities, Violence, and Stability in Nigeria.Centre for Research on Inequality, Human Security and Ethnicity, UK. *Working paper* 6,4-21.

Eme, I., & Anthony, O. (2011).The Challenges of Insecurity in Nigeria: A thematic exposition.*Interdisciplinary Journal of Contemporary Research in Business*. 3(8), 173-180 accessed on 11/23/2015 at 3pm from http://www.journal-archieves13.webs.com/172-185.pdf

Fidelis, O. (2002). An appraisal of poverty reduction strategies in Nigeria. CBN Economic and Financial Review, 39(4), 50-78.Accessed on 11/23/2015 at 10am   from http://www.academia.edu/1437686/An_appraisal_of_poverty_redu ction_strategies_in_Nigeria

Ganjar, N.(2008). Constructivism and International Relations Theory.*Global &Strategis,* TH. 2(1), 88-95.

Global   Peace   Index   2015.Institute   for   Economics   and Peace.http://www.visionofhumanity.org/sites/default/files/Global%20Peace% 20Index%20Report%202015_0.pdf

Hadassah, E. (2015). President Buhari's speeches to the Nation: 1983 Versus 2015.Ventures,   Africa   accessed   11/25/2015   at   3pm   from http://venturesafrica.com/president-buharis-speeches-to-the-nation-1983-versus-2015

Ibrahim, S. (2010).Buttressing the Anti-Corruption regime in Nigeria: Prospects and Challenges.*Daily Trust*, Nigeria

Ibrahim, S. (2014).Corruption and Security Challenges in Developing Countries.*International Journal of Politics and Good Governance*. 5(5), 2-15, Quarter 11 accessed on 11/25/2015 at 8pm from http://www.onlineresearchjournals.com/ijopagg/art/149.pdf

Ilufoye, O. (2009). Political Corruption in Nigeria: Theoretical Perception and Some Explanation.Kre Publishers accessed on 11/23/2015 at 10am fromhttp://krepublishers.com/02-Journals/T-Anth/Anth-11-0-000-09-Web/Anth-11-4-239-09-Abst-PDF/Anth-11-04-281-09-565-Ogundiya-I-S/Anth-11-04-281-09-565-Ogundiya-I-S-Tt.pdf

Jackson, R. (2006). Social Constructivism: In R. Jackson & G. Sorensen (3rded), *Introduction to International Relations Theories and Approaches*. Oxford University Press, UK.154-167.

James, R. (1998). Corruption Flourished in Abacha's Regime. *Washington Post Company*. Accessed on 11/24/2015 at 8pm from http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpsrv/inatl/longterm/nigeria/stories/corrupt060998.htm

Joshua, S., &Ajibade, E. (2013).Ethnicization of violent conflicts in Jos?*Global Journal of Human Social Science*. Global Journal Inc. US. 13(7), Version 1.0,39-44.

Kayode, A. (2004). Political Corruption and Governance Problems in Nigeria. Accessed on 11/25/2015 at 4pm from http://saharareporters.com/2014/03/19/political-corruption-and-governance-problems-nigeria-understanding-critical-issues-kayode

Kenneth, G. (1996). African Explanations of Underdevelopment: The theoretical basis for Political action. *The Review of Politics*.WordPress.28(1), 62-70.

Mark, G. (2004). The Social Construction of Corruption.Department of Sociology, Stanford University. 4-23. accessed on 12/05/2015 at 12pm from http://fsimedia.stanford.edu/evnts/4117/The_Social_Construction_of_Corruption_Oct04.pdf

Mazrui, A., &Mazrui, A. (1997).Interaction between the State and The Nation in Africa's Experience: *Four Decades of Independence*.Sibon Books Limited, Ibadan. 15-67

Michael, M. (2013).The Relationship between Corruption and Income Inequality: A Cross-National Study. *Georgetown University Institutional Repository*, DigitalGeorgetown, Washington DC.

Michael, A. (2013). Corruption and Democratization Process in Nigeria's Fourth Republic.*International Journal of Politics and Good Governance*, 4(4), 2-50 Quarter11 2013 accessed on 11/25/2015 at 6:24pm from https://www.researchgate.net/publication/256429453_Corruption_and_Democratization_Process_in_Nigeria%27s_Fourth_Republic

Moses, U. (2014). The Roots of Nigeria's Religious and Ethnic Conflicts.*The Global Post,* US.http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/regions/africa/nigeria/140220/nigeria-religious-ethnic-conflict-roots

Muktar, J. (2014). Breaking the Myth: Rethinking the myth of Nigeria's First Republic as a Vanished Eden.8, 25-35. Accessed on 11/20/2015 at 11:15am from https://independent.academia.edu/MuktarUsmanJanguza

Nwabueze, N. (2002). *"Corruption: A Sociology Perspective" in Adejugbe*.Malthouse press limited, Lagos. 1-95

Ochulor, L. (2007). Ethical and Moral implications of Corruption.Canadian Social Science.*Canadian Academy of Oriental and Occidental Culture*, Canada. 7(5), 223-278.

Okoro, C. (2009). Nigeria: Her woes and their true remedies. IUniverse publishers.252-270.

Olabanji, E., &Ese, U. (2014). Insecurity and Socio-Economic Development in Nigeria.*Journal of Sustainable Development Studies*, Infinity: E-Prints, Nigeria. 5(1), 40-55.

Olayiwola, A. (2003). Nigerian Foreign Policy under Military Rule 1966-1999.Praeger Publishers, Connecticut.1-105.

Olopoenia, A. (1998). A Political Economy of Corruption and Underdevelopment. University of Ibadan, Faculty Lecture Series. 50-73

Onifade, C., Imhonopi, D., & Moses, U. (2013).Addressing the Insecurity Challenge in Nigeria: The Imperative of Moral Values and Virtue Ethics.*The Global Journal Inc*,US. 13(2), Version 1.0, 50-79.

Otite, O. (1986). On the Sociological Study of Corruption. University Press, Ibadan. Research(1), 37-56.

Oluyika, E. (2008). Appreciating Nollywood: Audiences and Nigerian films. Participations: *Journal of Audience and Reception Studies*, 5(1), 18.

Oyinola, A. (2011). Corruption Eradication in Nigeria: An Appraisal. *Library Philosophy and Practice*.University of Nebraska, Lincoln. Accessed on 12/05/2015 at 10am fromhttp://www.webpages.uidaho.edu/~mbolin/ayobami.htm

Paul, F., & James,A. (1996).State, Community, and Local Development in Nigeria.World Bank Publications.9-13.

Peter, K., &Nurudeen, A. (2013). Ethnic Politics and Social Conflicts: Factors in Nigeria's Underdevelopment. *The Journal of International Social Research*.6(27), 254-270.

Ogege, O. (2011). Gender Role Differentiation and Social Mobility of Women in Nigeria.*Journal of Social Sciences inter-disciplinary reflection of contemporary society*.Kamla-Raj, Delhi.67-80.

Philip, U. (2001). National Security, Social Order, and the Quest for Human Dignity in Nigeria: Some Ethical Considerations. *Nordic Journal of African Studies*, Sweden.245-265.

Robert,C. (2009). Beyond GDP: The Need for New measures of Progress. ThePardee Papers, Boston. (4), 18-26.

Rotimi, O. (2001). Corruption and Underdevelopment: The Nigerian Experience. *Lumina Journal*, New York. 3, 68-92.

Saliu, A. (2007). Environmental Degradation, Rising Poverty and Conflict: Towards an Explanation of The Niger Delta Crisis.*Journal of Sustainable Development in Africa*.Fayetteville State University, North Carolina. 9(4), 4-63

Samson, A., & John,A. (2012). Corruption and National Development in Nigeria's Fourth Republic: A Historical Discourse. *Journal of Sustainable Development in Africa.*Fayetteville State University, North Carolina. 14(7), 139-162.

Sanjeev, G. (1998). Does Corruption Affect Income Inequality and Poverty? *IMF Working Paper* accessed on 12/05/2015 at 4pm from https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/wp9876.pdf

Shamsudeen, B. (2015). Political and Electoral violence in Nigeria: Mapping, Evolution, and Patterns (June 2006-May 2014). *IFRA-NIGERIA working papers*, (49), 7-21.

Solomon, E. (2015). Nigeria Crude Oil: Sources of Corruption and Economic Disparity in the Nation. *European Journal of Research in Social Sciences*, Progressive Academic Publishing, UK.3(4),78-103.

Stephan, K. (2006). New Interfaces between Security and Development. German Development Institute.DeutschesInstitutfürEntwicklungspolitik, Tupenfeld Bonn. 2-36.

Susan,R. (2006). Poverty and Civil War: What Policymakers need to know. *Global Economy and Development.*The Brookings Institution, Washington DC. (2), 5-15.

The Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary

Transparency International.Corruption Perception Index (2014) Results.http://www.transparency.org/cpi2014/results

United Nations Development   Program.Human Development Reports (2014). http://hdr.undp.org/en/content/human-development-index-hdi-table

UKAID British Council.Gender in Nigeria report (2012).Improving the lives of girls and Women in Nigeria.accessed on 12/10/2015 at 6pm from

https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/67332/Gender-Nigeria2012-summary.pdf

Walter,C. (2012). *Handbook of International Relations (2ⁿᵈ Ed)*.SAGE Publications Ltd. 112-131.

Wendt, A. (1999). *Social Theory of International Politics*.Cambridge university press, Cambridge.165-185.

Wole, I. (2014). Corruption and Military Rule in Nigeria: An Overview 1966-1999. *Global Journal of Human Social Science*.Fayetteville State University, North Carolina. 14(4), Version 1.0, 1-47.