

JCS

Journal of Cyprus Studies

Kıbrıs Araştırmaları Dergisi



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The Centre for Cyprus Studies at Eastern Mediterranean University was established in 1995 for the purpose of encouraging scholarly research on the cultural history and political problems of Cyprus. The fields of research supported by the Centre range from archaeology, anthropology and economics to history, linguistics and folklore.

In collaboration with the University Library, the Centre is working to develop documentation resources on all aspects of the history of Cyprus, and, as part of its mission to establish collaborative projects aimed at the development and preservation of the historical and cultural heritage of the island, is fostering close contacts with other institutions involved in related research. As the Centre grows, its resources will include online bibliographical services; audiovisual facilities and archives such as videotapes, diapositives, photographs and microfilm; and rare book and manuscript collections.

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Kıbrıs Araştırmaları Merkezi, Doğu Akdeniz Üniversitesi bünyesinde, Kıbrıs'ın kültürel tarihi ve siyasi sorunları ile ilgili bilimsel araştırmaları teşvik etmek amacıyla 1995'de kurulmuştur. Araştırma alanları arkeolojiden antropolojiye, ekonomiden tarihe, dilbilimden folklorlara uzanan geniş bir yelpazeye yayılmıştır.

Merkez, Üniversite Kütüphanesinin işbirliği ile, Kıbrıs araştırmalarını her yönüyle içeren bir kaynak arşivi oluşturmayı amaçlamaktadır. Bu arşiv, olanaklar geliştikçe video-bantlar, dia-pozitifler, fotoğraflar ve mikrofilmler gibi görsel ve işitsel kaynaklar ile, arşivler, ender bulunan kitaplar ve el yazması koleksiyonlarını da içerecektir. Ayrıca, Kıbrıs araştırmaları konusunda faaliyet gösteren diğer kuruluşlarla Kıbrıs'ın tarihi ve kültürel mirasını korumak ve geliştirmek için ortak projeler geliştirmek de Merkez'in hedefleri arasındadır.

Kıbrıs Araştırmaları Merkezi araştırma projelerinin gerçekleşmesinde eşgüdümü sağlamanın yanı sıra, misyonuna uygun alanlarda araştırma yapan bilim adamlarına ve akademisyenlere ev sahipliği de yapmaktadır. Merkez aynı zamanda, Kıbrıs ile ilgili araştırmaların sunulup tartışıldığı yıllık Kongreler düzenlemekte ve yılda iki kez çıkan *Kıbrıs Araştırmaları Dergisi*'ni yayınlamaktadır.

Editorial Policy

The *Journal of Cyprus Studies*, JCS, is a refereed, international, interdisciplinary publication whose primary purpose is twofold: i) to develop an authoritative archive and bibliography of sources for the study of ideas on social, cultural, historical, political and legal matters relevant to the past, present or future of the island of Cyprus; and ii) to provide a scholarly, academic forum for the analysis, development, exchange and critique of ideas on these matters.

The *Journal* is bilingual, publishes material in English and/or Turkish. Articles submitted for consideration must focus on subject matter specific to the island of Cyprus, and may include (but are not restricted to) the following topics and areas of interest: analysis of archaeological artefacts; culture of the Egyptians, Romans Persians; the Eastern Roman Empire, the Crusades; Lusignans, Venetians and Ottomans; art, literature, music; cartography, military history and technology; trade routes, water and natural resources; the geopolitics of the Eastern Mediterranean, Cold War, EU and superpower concerns, contemporary developments in international law, conflict resolution, war; race, religion, ethnicity, nationhood, colonial and post-colonial perspectives, identity. Suggestions for other subject areas will be considered by the editor.

Material published in the *Journal* may include original critical essays or studies, statements of reasoned opinion, sustained critical responses to published material, book reviews, translations, photographs, reproductions of works of art or cultural artefacts, interviews, official documents, transcripts of media broadcasts, or reprints of significant texts.

Because of the unique legal and political contexts of the peoples of Cyprus, problems of ideological and methodological bias in the writing of history are a central issue for the *Journal*, and one of its primary objectives is to establish definitive and authoritative texts for primary source material in the history of Cyprus. Accordingly, an occasional issue of the *Journal* will contain an archive of significant historical, legal, political and cultural documents related to this history, meticulously copy-edited and authenticated, with annotations provided where significant textual variants exist. The purpose is to make these documents available to researchers, without censorship, and foregrounding problems of distortion caused by translation or other forms of interpretation.

The *Journal of Cyprus Studies* does not discriminate against contributions on the basis of the nationality, race, ethnicity, religion or gender of the contributors; nor on the basis of their points of view or conclusions, provided that they are conveyed by careful, reasoned argument and discussion. Submissions are sent anonymously for review to readers whose identities also remain confidential. The editor may, where complex issues are concerned, invite other contributors to submit critical evaluations and responses to an article, or alternative perspectives; and these may be published simultaneously.

Derginin Amacı

JCS-Kıbrıs Araştırmaları Dergisi içerik bakımından çok yönlülüğe sahip uluslararası hakemli bir dergi olup temel misyonu şöyle özetlenebilir: i) Kıbrıs adasının geçmişi, geleceği ve bugünü ile ilgili toplumsal, kültürel, tarihsel, siyasi, hukuksal konular ve sorunlar ile ilgili çalışmalara etkin bir arşiv ve kaynakça oluşturmak ii) sözü edilen konular ve sorunlarla ilgili fikirlerin geliştirilebileceği, tartışılacağı, görüş alışverişinde bulunulabileceği, bilimsel ve akademik bir forum oluşturmak.

Dergi İngilizce ve Türkçe olarak iki dilde yayınlanmaktadır. İncelenmek üzere dekiye gönderilen makaleler içerik bakımından Kıbrıs adası ile ilgili olmalıdır. *Dergi*'ye gönderilen makaleler, belirtilen konularla kısıtlı olmamakla birlikte şu konuları içerebilir: arkeolojik eserlerin incelenmesi; Mısır, Roma ve Pers kültürleri; Doğu Roma İmparatorluğu ve Haçlı Seferleri; Lusinyanlar, Venedikliler ve Osmanlılar; sanat, edebiyat, müzik; Doğu Akdeniz'in siyasi coğrafyası; Soğuk Savaş, Avrupa Birliği, süper güçlerin bölgesel çıkarları, uluslararası hukuk ile ilgili yeni gelişmeler, çözüm önerileri, savaş; ırk, din, etnik köken, ulus kavramı, sömürgecilik ve sömürgecilik sonrası yaklaşımlar, kimlik sorunu. Diğer konularla ilgili öneriler editör tarafından değerlendirilecektir.

Dergi'de yayınlanacak olan yazılar özgün eleştirel denemeler veya araştırmalar, uslamlamaya dayanan kişisel fikirler, önceden yayınlanmış yazı ve yapıtlara yönelik eleştirel yanıtlar, kitap tanıtım ve incelemeleri, çeviriler, fotoğraflar, sanat ve kültür eserlerinin baskıları, söyleşiler, resmi belgeler, medya yayınlarının kopyaları, basın açıklamaları, veya önemli metinlerin yeni baskıları olabilir.

Kıbrıs'ta yaşayan halkların kendilerine özgü yasal koşulları nedeniyle ideolojik veya yönetsel önyargının tarihin yazılmasındaki etkin rolü *Dergi* için ana meselelerden birini oluşturduğundan, *Dergi*'nin temel amaçlarından biri, Kıbrıs tarihinde kesin ve yetkin yazılardan meydana gelen bir ana kaynakça oluşturmaktır. Bu nedenle, zaman zaman *Dergi*'nin bir sayısı Kıbrıs tarihi ile ilgili, tarihsel, hukuksal, siyasi ve kültürel belgelerden oluşan titiz bir çalışma sonucu elde edilmiş, dikkatle kurgulanmış ve doğrulanmış bir arşiv içerecek ve gereken yerlerde çeşitli ve değişik belgelerle ilgili dipnotlar verilecektir. Amaç, bu belgeleri sansürden uzak bir biçimde araştırmacıların kullanımına sunmak ve bunu yaparken çeviriden veya yorum farklılıklarından kaynaklanan sorunlara da dikkat çekmektir.

Kıbrıs Araştırmaları Dergisi, milliyet, ırk, etnik köken, din veya cinsiyet farkı gözetmeksizin, bakış açıları veya vardıkları sonuçlar itibarı ile, itinalı ve mantıklı tartışma içeren yazılara açıktır. *Dergi*'ye gönderilen bütün yazılar, değerlendirilmek üzere incelenirken yazarın olduğu kadar hakemin de kimlikleri saklı tutulur. Tartışmaya açık konular söz konusu olduğunda, editör herhangi bir makaleye ilişkin eleştirel değerlendirmeler, yanıtlar veya alternatif yaklaşımlar için başka araştırmacılardan görüş isteyebilir ve bu konudaki bütün görüşler *Dergi*'nin aynı sayısında yer alır.

Editorial

The divided status of Cyprus has been evidently exerting impact beyond the borders of the island for some time now. Over the decades of stalemate, it has grown into a major force affecting not only the wellbeing of the Turkish and Greek Cypriots, but Turkish foreign policy, the EU's civic capabilities, Turkey-EU relations, European Mediterranean Policy and the future of transatlantic security as well. This issue of the *Journal of Cyprus Studies* seeks to display how influential the Cyprus question still is in the current course of international affairs. In this respect, the articles of this volume are not concerned directly with the past and present attempts at solving the Cyprus problem, but they rather dwell on the resonances of failed attempts to reconcile the two Cypriot communities in other contexts. As the reader will see, our main focus rests on the decisive role that the Cyprus problem plays in Turkey's EU candidature in particular, and the EU's enlargement, neighbourhood, Mediterranean, security, and defence policies in general. In this rather implicit way, we hope to lay emphasis on the fact that the EU's performance in its dealings with Cyprus has been underwhelming and that the non-solution of the Cyprus problem damages not only the credibility of the EU's normative action-tools such as conditionality and Europeanization but equally its actor capacity in its periphery and beyond.

The first article is the product of a comprehensive research and first-hand results of a survey conducted by the authors, S. Barış Gülmez and M. Didem Buhari-Gülmez. With a particular concentration on the impact of the EU's conditionality on Turkish foreign policy vis-à-vis the Cyprus problem, this article magnifies the link between the Euro-scepticism among Turkish political elite and the EU's Cyprus policy. Our second article, written by Petek Karatekelioğlu and Volkan İpek, examines the phases that Turkish foreign policy has gone through with regard to the Cyprus question under the influence of Turkey's EU candidacy. In doing that, it grounds its arguments mainly in the official documents of the EU and, accordingly, adopts the discourse-analysis method of inquiry. In the third article, the author has ventured to highlight the challenge that the Cyprus problem poses to the EU's self-perception as a normative power. In its foreign-policy actions, the EU experiences serious difficulties in terms of creating outcomes desirable for all parties involved, and such a deficit generates doubts about the normativeness of the EU's position in the face of current global affairs. Finally, the article by Emel G. Oktay and Yiğit Uçak elaborates on the EU's neighbourhood, security, and Mediterranean policies and puts forward the necessity of solving the Cyprus problem as a necessary condition for the development of these policy areas. The Union for Mediterranean, the most recent initiative of the French presidency of the European Council, is also treated within this context.

In addition to articles, this issue comprises a discussion paper and a book review, whose contents are highly relevant to our general theme. Sinan Ülgen's discussion paper is a quest for the implications of EU-NATO relations on the future of the transatlantic security community. One of the impediments in front of the full reconciliation between the EU and NATO is undoubtedly Turkey's veto on the adhesion of Cyprus to NATO, which seems to be the only leverage left in Turkey's hand to better negotiate a substantial solution on the island. Ülgen draws attention to this crucial point, which has been, in fact, insufficiently stressed in the discussions of Cyprus. In closing this issue, the book review by Nur Köprülü introduces us to a "good read"; Mesut Özcan's *Harmonizing Foreign Policy: Turkey, the EU, and the Middle East*, published by Ashgate. *Harmonizing Foreign Policy* offers insight into the recent political phenomenon of Europeanization and treats it within the context of the Middle East. A probe of Turkish foreign-policy actions towards the Cyprus question alongside the dynamics of the Middle East provides the reader with a fresh view.

I would like to thank my colleagues in the *Journal of Cyprus Studies*, especially Özlem Çaykent, for their invitation to compile this issue in co-operation with them. I have taken this opportunity to assess the Cyprus question from the current perspective of the foreign-policy dynamics of Turkey and the EU. I would also like to thank all the authors, whose generous contributions have made this issue possible, the Centre of Cyprus Studies, and the staff of the Eastern Mediterranean University Printing House.

C. Akça Ataç

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Makaleler

The EU Conditionality in the Cyprus Problem: Catalyzing Euro-Scepticism in Turkey?

Seçkin Barış Gülmez and Didem Buhari-Gülmez

Royal Holloway University of London

Abstract

The objectives of this article are twofold. In the first part, it aims to discuss the EU policies towards the Cyprus problem with regard to the concept of conditionality. As regards the analytical distinction between negative and positive conditionality, the authors argue that there are variations in the EU strategy towards the Cyprus question that could be analyzed in three main phases. In the second part, the article evaluates the responses of the Turkish political elite to the variations in the EU strategy on Cyprus. In this respect, the main question of this article is whether there is a link between Euro-skepticism in Turkey and the EU's conditionality strategy concerning the Cyprus problem.

Key words: conditionality, euro-skepticism, Cyprus, Turkey, European Union, Turkish political elite, Greek Cypriot administration, TRNC

Özet

Bu makalenin amacı iki aşamalıdır. Birinci aşamada, AB'nin Kıbrıs politikalarını şartlılık bağlamında tartışmayı amaçlamaktadır. Yazarlar, negatif ve pozitif şartlılık arasındaki analitik farklılık göz önüne alındığında, AB'nin Kıbrıs sorununa yönelik stratejisindeki değişmelerin üç dönemde incelenebileceğini öne sürmektedir. İkinci aşama olarak bu makale, AB'nin Kıbrıs stratejisindeki değişmelere Türk siyasi elitinin tepkisini değerlendirmektedir. Bu açıdan, bu makalenin esas amacı, Türkiye'deki Avrupa şüpheciliği ile AB'nin Kıbrıs sorunu bağlamında uyguladığı şartlılık stratejisi arasında bir bağ olup olmadığını anlamaktır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Şartlılık, Avrupa Şüpheciliği, Kıbrıs, Türkiye, AB, Türk Siyasi Eliti, Kıbrıs Rum Yönetimi, KKTC

Introduction

With the membership application of the Greek Cypriot Administration (GCA) to the EU, the Union has become a key actor in the Cyprus question. The involvement of the EU in the problem has created obstacles for both Turkey's EU membership process and the resolution of the ongoing problems. Accordingly, the objectives of this article are twofold.

In the first part, it aims to discuss the EU policies towards the Cyprus problem with specific reference to the concept of *conditionality*. As regards to the analytical distinction between negative and positive conditionality, the authors here argue that there are variations in the EU strategy towards the Cyprus question that could be analyzed in three main phases. Within this context, this article will first provide a brief discussion of the concept of conditionality and then discuss the three phases that reveal the shifting EU policy on Cyprus, with a particular focus on the core documents of the EU such as the European Council decisions and the Commission progress reports. In the second part, the article will evaluate the responses of the Turkish political elite to the variations in the EU strategy on Cyprus. The main question that this article is concerned with is whether there is a link between *Euro-skepticism* in Turkey and the EU's conditionality strategy towards the Cyprus problem. Therefore, after a brief discussion on the concept of Euro-skepticism, the relevant discourses of Turkish governments and opposition parties since the early 1990s will be examined along with the results of a recent short survey done among the deputies of a Turkish opposition party (CHP). Finally, the existence of a viable link between the EU Cyprus policy and Euro-skepticism in Turkey will be sought.

Prelude: From 1990 to 1993

The motivation for the Greek Cypriot administration in applying for the European Community (EC) membership was mainly about political rather than economic gains.¹ The political gains that it expected to attain were to be used against Turkey. The GCA assumed that its accession on behalf of the whole island would make it possible to put pressures on Turkey and the Turkish Cypriot community through the European Union (EU) conditionality that worked in favour of GCA interests.²

The GCA's application to the EU was based on the Association Agreement signed on 14 May 1973 between the EC and Cyprus President Makarios. In order to ensure stability in the eastern Mediterranean region and have access to Middle Eastern markets via Cyprus, the EC developed economic relations with Cyprus through this agreement. However, it was reluctant to politicize this relationship in order to preserve its "neutral" image in the eyes of the conflicting parties, including Turkey.³ Consequently, the EC decisions concerning its relations with Cyprus insisted on the non-discrimination principle towards the other concerned

parties as well as Turkish Cypriots.⁴ Finally, as Christou remarks, the EC was equally reluctant to respond to Turkey's intervention in Cyprus in 1974. Following the Turkish intervention, it suspended commercial relations with Cyprus until 1986, when Greece – an EC member since 1981 - convinced the EC to restart economic integration with Cyprus. Three years later, the EC decided to provide financial assistance to Cyprus and deepen the economic relations by signing the third financial protocol. According to Christou, the EC attempted to limit the developing relations with the economic domain and pursue non-discrimination by highlighting that the development of economic relations with Cyprus would be beneficial to both Cypriot communities.⁵

The GCA membership application, nonetheless, risked adding a political dimension to the EC-Cyprus relations. In June 1990, the European Council of Dublin concluded that:

The European Council, deeply concerned at the situation, fully reaffirms its previous declarations and its support for the unity, independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Cyprus in accordance with the relevant UN resolutions. Reiterating that the Cyprus problem affects EC-Turkey relations and bearing in mind the importance of these relations, it stresses the need for the prompt elimination of the obstacles that are preventing the pursuit of effective intercommunal talks aimed at finding a just and viable solution to the question of Cyprus on the basis of the mission of good offices of the Secretary General, as it was recently reaffirmed by resolution 649/90 of the Security Council.⁶

The Dublin Council statements openly demonstrate the three tenets of the EU stance towards the Cyprus question at that time. Firstly, the necessity to solve the political problem in Cyprus under the United Nations (UN) aegis was underlined. Secondly, the damaging effect of the Cyprus problem on Turkey-EC relations was recognized and thirdly, the importance of these relations was stressed -at the expense of the GCA efforts towards further integration with the EC.

Briefly, two main factors reinforced the EC's reluctance to respond to the GCA's membership application in 1990. Firstly, the preparation of the Maastricht Treaty that would transform the EC to the EU provided

limited time and capacity for the member states to get involved in a remarkably difficult political problem such as Cyprus. Secondly, two European member states were already actively involved in the Cyprus conflict, namely the UK and Greece. Such involvement could have restricted an impartial and coherent European policy towards the Cyprus question. In particular, Greece had developed the habit of using the EC/EU as a forum to raise its problems with Turkey in the Aegean Sea and Cyprus since its accession to the EC (Christou, 54). It even blocked the subsequent financial assistance under the customs union regulations concerning Turkey although, prior to its membership, Athens had affirmed that its accession to the EC would not undermine the EC's balanced approach towards Turkey.⁷

The GCA's application for EU membership was perceived as a threatening condition by Turkey and the Turkish Cypriot Community. The concerns were about the possibilities that, in case of GCA membership in the name of the Republic of Cyprus, Turkey's accession to the EU could have been hampered by the GCA's veto and the status of the Turkish Cypriot community would have been relegated to that of a minority in the Republic of Cyprus. It should here be remembered that Turkey and the Turkish Cypriot leadership rejected any solution basis other than the UN. Consequently, Turkey had to criticize the appointment of a EU envoy to Cyprus during the intercommunal talks.⁸ And the Turkish Cypriot leader, Denktaş, sent a letter to the European Commission in order to protest the unilateral application of the GCA for EU membership. The letter re-emphasized the established legalities and stressed that Cyprus's membership in an international organization where not all of the three guarantor states were members would have violated the Cypriot Constitution of 1960.

Contrary to the Turkish arguments, the Greek Minister of Foreign Affairs overtly conducted lobbying activities in the European Commission in favour of the GCA candidacy, advancing the novel argument that the EU should not avoid its responsibility to "catalyze" the resolution of the Cyprus problem.⁹ For its part, the GCA asked for a positive opinion from the Commission on the issue of its application though it did not press for an explicit accession calendar.¹⁰ Then it increased the intensity of its diplomatic campaigns based on three arguments. First, it claimed to be the official representative of the Republic of Cyprus. Second, it argued that it was not fair to give a non-

recognized entity, the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC), and a non-member of the Union, Turkey, the opportunity to hold the EU hostage by blocking the GCA's admission to the Union. Finally, the GCA underlined that it had mobilized all its resources to fulfil the EU membership criteria.¹¹

The pressures and lobbies of Greece and the GCA were successful to convince the European Commission to issue a positive opinion on Cyprus candidature in June 1993.¹² The Commission stated that “[Cyprus’s accession to the Community] would help bring the two communities on the island closer together” and “implies a peaceful, balanced and lasting settlement of the Cyprus question”. Finally, rejecting the rightful Turkish protests, it claimed that Cyprus’s membership of the Union would be of benefit to all interested parties.¹³ Unsurprisingly, Turkey and the TRNC immediately protested the Commission decision. The Turkish Foreign Minister sent a letter to the Belgian President of the EU Council to convey that the Commission’s opinion regarding the GCA undermined international law as well as the UN efforts.¹⁴ The Turkish Cypriot leadership protested the EU’s *de facto* recognition of the GCA as the official government of the Republic of Cyprus and decided to increase its efforts for the official recognition of the TRNC’s independence.¹⁵

These developments reinforced the impasse in the UN negotiations even more strongly. The appointment of Serge Abou as the EU envoy to Cyprus demonstrated the EU’s will to develop a coherent strategy towards the interested parties in Cyprus in order to “catalyze” the reunification.¹⁶ However, extremely concerned over the loss of equal footing with the GCA, the Turkish Cypriot community, together with Turkey, reacted negatively to the EU’s developing “presence” in Cyprus.

The Conceptualization of the EU Strategy

In the following section, the strategy of the EU towards the parties in the Cyprus conflict aspiring to EU membership will be explained briefly in three phases. Given the developing branch of the current literature on the transforming effect of the EU conditionality on member and candidate states,¹⁷ this article suggests that in spite of its incapacity to act as a unified and coherent body, the EU could nevertheless use conditionality as a strategy to pressurize EU candidates to converge with EU preferences in general, and on the Cyprus question in particular.

The EU preferences on the Cyprus question exceed the aggregation of the domestic preferences of its member states actively involved in the Cyprus conflict, the United Kingdom and Greece as guarantor powers in the first place. This is mainly due to the institutionalized membership criteria and related policies that are not easily reversible by the individual member states. In this sense, the article will focus on the relevant European Council decisions as well as the Commission reports rather than the national divergences among the EU member states. Additionally, it will be grounded on the assumption that the EU strategy towards Turkey and the GCA is based on the conditionality principle. In other words, it will venture to highlight that had the GCA and Turkey withdrawn their application for membership, there would be no sufficient ground for a EU strategy at all.

According to Checkel, “[c]onditionality is a basic strategy through which international institutions promote compliance by national governments”. For the purposes of this article, an analytical distinction between negative and positive conditionality appears to be useful. Negative conditionality of the EU is based on the threat of exclusion and sanctions towards the applicant states as well as the withdrawal of rewards. Through negative conditionality, the EU hopes to modify the behaviour of the applicant state by increasing the costs of non-compliance with the EU. Positive conditionality implies the EU’s offers of material and social incentives to the applicant countries, such as financial assistance or more concrete prospects for membership that allow participation in the EU forums -albeit in a limited way.¹⁸

Against this background, it could be argued that there are variations in the EU strategy towards the Cyprus question in the era spanning from the GCA’s application for membership to the present day. In the first phase from 1993 to 1999, the EU applied positive conditionality towards the GCA while Turkey was subjected to negative conditionality. In the second phase from 1999 to 2002, the EU changed its strategy towards Turkey in favour of a positive conditionality. In the last phase, it has included Northern Cyprus in its strategy calculus and, following the GCA’s accession to the Union towards the end of the third phase, the EU has returned to its negative conditionality strategy towards Turkey.

It is important to note here that the EU is only one of the international actors involved in the Cyprus question. The role played by the UN and the United States is decisive in the course of Cyprus-related

events. The legitimacy of the UN, of course, is the strongest in comparison to the other external actors in Cyprus. In this sense, the EU strategy does not intend to substitute or duplicate the UN engagement in Cyprus. The EU makes it clear that it intends to complement and facilitate the UN-led negotiations for reunification.

First Phase: From 1993 to 1999

The first phase between 1993 and 1999 is characterised by the EU's double conditionality strategy towards Turkey and the GCA, both at that time having aspired to join the Union. However, in substance, the EU differentiated between the two by applying positive conditionality to the GCA, offering concrete prospects for membership, and by implementing negative conditionality to Turkey. The EU's dealings with Turkey in the first phase, therefore, were conducted through a strategy based on the threat of exclusion and lack of concrete prospects for accession. The main three assumptions underlying the EU's differentiation between Turkey and the GCA are as such: 1) A change in the allegedly intransigent Turkish attitude would bring parties closer to a solution in Cyprus. 2) the GCA's membership prospect would lead Turkey to a more compromising position in the Cyprus problem. 3) This change of attitude in Turkey would be directly influential on the TRNC's stance.¹⁹

Meanwhile, during the first phase, the resolution of the Cyprus problem became a pre-condition for Turkey's EU membership, whereas the GCA was granted official candidacy without such a political pre-condition. Finally, the TRNC was excluded from the EU strategy, as it was not an officially recognized entity. In the coming section, first the EU's double conditionality strategy towards Turkey and the GCA and the exclusion of the TRNC will be studied. Then, the political outcomes concerning the Cyprus imbroglio as well as the evaluation of the EU strategy in terms of its efficiency to resolve the impasse will be assessed.

EU Double Conditionality Strategy: Including the GCA While Excluding Turkey

The EU's positive conditionality towards the GCA started on 4 October 1993 with the decision of the EU Council to adopt the European Commission's positive opinion regarding the candidature of the GCA as the Republic of Cyprus. This decision was also supported by the European Council of Corfu in June 1994, which included Cyprus in the

upcoming enlargement without explicit emphasis on the prevailing political conflict on the island.²⁰ In this sense, the decisions of the EU Council were path-breaking as they paved a new way for the GCA accession before the resolution of Cyprus problem (Nugent). The inclusion of Cyprus in the following enlargement was also confirmed by the following European Essen Council, which denied such membership prospects to Turkey.²¹

Turkey's decision to accede to the EU Customs Union in March 1995 prior to its membership coincided with the EU's decision to start accession negotiations with the GCA. On the same day that Turkey signed the EU Customs Union agreement, the EU General Affairs Council announced that the EU would launch accession negotiations with the GCA. According to Hale, the EU's decision was mainly due to the Greek government's pressure in return for not using its veto against Turkey's accession to the EU Customs Union. Greece thus convinced the EU to launch negotiations with the GCA even without a viable political solution. Accordingly, the Agenda 2000 document of the EU suggested the initiation of negotiations with Cyprus (GCA) in the 6 months following the Intergovernmental Conference, while denying similar prospects to Turkey.²² In December 1997, the European Council of Luxembourg officially included Cyprus in the fifth enlargement, while it advised Turkey to improve the political dialogue with the Union by fulfilling particular criteria, including active support of the UN efforts regarding the Cyprus problem.²³ The EU thus expected Turkey to convince the TRNC to participate in the EU-Cyprus accession negotiations as a part of the Cypriot delegation. In that sense, Turkey was not to oppose the accession of Cyprus to the EU either.²⁴ Hence, the Cyprus question became a *sine qua non* for Turkey's bid for EU membership.²⁵ In response, Turkey slowed down the political dialogue with the EU, and the TRNC refused to join the GCA delegation to the EU membership negotiations, which started on 30 March 1998.

Both the issue of the "Communication on a European Strategy for Turkey" document of 4 March 1998 and the inclusion of Turkey in the screening mechanism (legislative examination) by the European Council of Cardiff of 15 June 1998 could be deemed as examples of the EU's continued negative conditionality towards Turkey. They set the relevant EU requirements and threatened to exclude Turkey unless it aligned with those requirements. The first report of the European Commission on

Turkey's progress towards accession confirmed the link between Turkey's membership and its efforts in the Cyprus question.²⁶

The Exclusion of the TRNC

Another significant aspect of the first phase is the EU's reluctance to establish direct contact with the TRNC within the GCA's membership process. Several instances could be highlighted to underpin this point. Firstly, the unilateral application of the GCA on behalf of the two communities on the island was accepted by the EU, despite the fact that the TRNC protested for not having been consulted prior to the application.²⁷ Secondly, certain court decisions should be taken into account. On 5 July 1994, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) decided to ban the export of TRNC goods under the pretext that they did not bear the certificates given by the GCA authorities.²⁸ This decision was clearly to damage the TRNC economy.²⁹ Talmon argues that it was a political decision rather than a legal one. Accordingly, justifying its decision by the non-recognized status of the TRNC, the ECJ "misjudged the scope and consequences of the principle of non-recognition in international law and, in fact, applied economic sanctions, a measure that should be reserved for the political bodies."³⁰ Moreover, the judgements of the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) concerning the *Loizidou* and *Cyprus v. Turkey* cases³¹ revealed that Turkey, and not the TRNC, was recognised as the legitimate authority to be brought to trial for the matters concerning Northern Cyprus. In this respect, it was Turkey, which was forced to pay fines for the alleged violations of the European Human Rights convention.

The EU's invitation to the TRNC to participate in the GCA delegation overlooks two facts. Firstly, such participation would have nullified the TRNC by the *de facto* recognition of the GCA as the sole official representative of the Republic of Cyprus. Secondly, the TRNC's participation in the GCA delegation would have been devoid of sense, since the Turkish Cypriot community was not officially represented in the institutions of the Republic of Cyprus.³² In the light of the instances outlined above, it is argued that the EU refused to pursue direct contact with the Turkish Cypriot leadership during the first stage of the accession process of Cyprus.

Political Developments and the Evaluation of the EU Strategy in the First Phase

In spite of some positive developments in Turkey-EU relations, such as the conclusion of the Customs Union, Turkey's increasing support of the UN efforts in Cyprus, and Turkey-Greece rapprochement, the impasse prevailed throughout the first stage. The TRNC did not participate in the accession negotiations of Cyprus and blocked several times the ongoing UN talks in order to protest the EU's decision to include the GCA in the fifth enlargement on behalf of Cyprus. In the meantime, Turkey and the TRNC launched a closer integration in spite of the EU protests. At the end of this phase, Turkey decided to halt political dialogue with the EU, which meant an effort to curtail the jurisdiction of the EU conditionality over Turkey. Finally and more severely, several international crises such as Kardak (Imia) crisis between Turkey and Greece, the eruption of violent events on the Green Line in Cyprus, and S-300 missile crisis between Turkey and the GCA occurred. In particular, the Kardak and Missile crises could have ended in a war situation, since the Turkish government had declared "casus belli" in both cases, if it were not for US mediation.

The continuation of the impasse in the UN-led talks on Cyprus and the emergence of serious political crises among the involved parties highlighted the necessity for the EU to reconsider its double conditionality strategy. According to Dodd (19), the EU strategy of including Cyprus and excluding Turkey was a big failure, as it ruled out the possibility of convincing Turkey to unblock the prevailing impasse in the Cyprus question. From a similar perspective, in his report, dated 8 February 1996, to the Political Affairs Committee of the Council of Europe, Lord Fingsberg, rapporteur on Cyprus for the Council of Europe's Parliamentary Assembly, criticized both the EU's approval of the GCA candidature and the ECJ decision to ban TRNC exports uncertified by the GCA as factors which widened the confidence gap between the conflicting parties. Furthermore, in November 1998, during the meeting of the EU General Affairs Council, four major EU member states, France, Germany, Italy and the Netherlands submitted a joint statement claiming that the accession of Cyprus to the EU before the resolution of the political problem would have implied serious risks for the EU's security as it would have imported a territorial conflict to the

EU.³³ Additionally, it would have undermined both Turkey-Greece relations and Turkey-EU relations (Nugent, 134).

The second phase, to be elaborated below, witnessed a significant change in the EU strategy of conditionality towards Turkey. This stage starts with the EU Council of Helsinki in December 1999, which conferred official candidate status to Turkey. It should here be stressed that by offering a substantial membership prospect, the EU began to apply positive conditionality to Turkey.

Second Phase: From December 1999 to November 2002

The second phase of EU involvement in the Cyprus issue displays the EU's practice of applying positive conditionality both to Turkey and the GCA while continuing to ignore the TRNC. This period is different from the previous one in the sense that it refers to a shift in the EU strategy towards Turkey. Rather than continuing with its negative conditionality strategy, the EU offered to Turkey a more concrete prospect for membership. In so doing, the EU assumed that such a shift would incite the Turkish government to enact substantial reforms that would align national policies with the EU requirements and to provide greater support to the resolution of the Cyprus problem (Christou, 55).

The second phase of the EU strategy starts with the officialization of Turkey's EU candidature at the Helsinki Council in December 1999. The Council decisions were ambiguous in terms of the EU strategy towards Turkey and Cyprus. The Helsinki Council decisions, on one hand, officialized the EU candidature of Turkey and, on the other, stipulated that the accession negotiations could only be launched when Turkey fully complied with the Copenhagen membership criteria. Furthermore, within the framework of pre-accession strategy, under the heading of the "strengthened political dialogue", Turkey was invited to give stronger support to the resolution of the Cyprus problem under the UN aegis.³⁴ Finally, the Council highlighted the necessity for Turkey to solve any existing conflict with its neighbours prior to its EU membership.³⁵ The Council's explicit emphasis on the Cyprus problem led the Turkish government to question the relevance of all the Cyprus-related prerequisites to the Turkish membership. Before accepting the official candidate status, the Turkish Prime Minister, Bülent Ecevit sent the Finnish Presidency of the EU Council a letter asking whether the resolution of the Cyprus question would be set as a precondition for

Turkey's accession to the Union. After having received, albeit unofficial, reassurance from the Finnish Prime Minister that Cyprus was not a precondition for the Turkish accession, the Turkish government accepted the official candidacy status.³⁶

Nevertheless, the controversy continued during the preparation of the Accession Partnership document for Turkey. In the first draft of the document, the Cyprus question was considered by the EU as a short-term political priority for Turkey.³⁷ However, due to the protests of the Turkish government, the Cyprus question was left out of the short-term priority list (Firat, 359). However, it is crucial to underline here that the link between the Cyprus question and Turkey's EU membership thus started to be consolidated through official EU documents.³⁸

As to the GCA, the Helsinki Council decision enshrined in article 9(b) was also ambiguous.³⁹ The article 9(b) of the Helsinki Council decision stated that

[t]he European Council underlines that a political settlement will facilitate the accession of Cyprus to the European Union. If no settlement has been reached by the completion of accession negotiations, the Council's decision on accession will be made without the above being a precondition. In this the Council will take account of all relevant factors.⁴⁰

The last sentence of article 9(b) of the Helsinki Council was conveniently perceived by the GCA and Greece to indicate that it was sufficient for the GCA leadership to show willingness to find a solution and there was no urge to actually solve the problem (Brewin).

Political Developments and the Evaluation of EU Strategy in the Second Phase

Throughout the second phase, Turkey negotiated to undertake significant reforms, including those in relation to the civilian control of the military and the abolition of the death penalty, in order to comply with the EU criteria, which would have contributed to democratization.⁴¹ In this context, the traditional Cyprus policy of Turkey inevitably started to be questioned on the political elite level. For instance, the Deputy Prime Minister Mesut Yılmaz criticized Turkey for pursuing old-fashioned policies derived from a historical fear, the Sevres syndrome.⁴² By the

same token, although Denktaş was reelected as the TRNC “President” on 15 April 2000 with a landslide victory against his rival Mehmet Ali Talat.⁴³ Yılmaz attacked the traditional stance of Denktaş as “intransigent”.⁴⁴

In this period, Turkey and the TRNC took initiatives to motivate inter-communal talks under the UN aegis. Upon Denktaş’s proposition backed by Turkey, the two Cypriot leaders agreed to participate in face-to-face meetings for the first time since 1997. The TRNC leader made it explicit that his proposition was intended to improve Turkey-EU relations.⁴⁵ However, despite the attempted reinvigoration, the deadlock in the UN negotiations persisted. Furthermore, the debates over the prospects for the integration between Turkey and the TRNC as a reaction to the accession of the GCA to the EU heated up in spite of the EU protests.⁴⁶ In the face of these developments, the efficiency of the EU strategy in terms of political outcome remained negligible, since the impasse in the UN-led inter-communal negotiations was not resolved. However, in terms of affecting the political initiatives, the EU strategy proved efficient, as it convinced Turkey to develop joint efforts with the TRNC to resume the face-to-face talks under UN auspices, as well as to inspire Turkey to reconsider its traditional stance on the Cyprus issue.

Third Phase: From 2002 To Present

The third and the last phase in the development of the EU’s Cyprus strategy opened with the introduction of the UN backed Annan plan, which foresaw the unification of Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities before the accession of Cyprus to the EU. During this period, the EU gave active support to the Annan Plan while continuing positive conditionality towards Turkey and the GCA. The most important novelty in this era was the visibility of “Northern Cyprus” on the EU agenda. The EU offered economic incentives to the Turkish Cypriot community in return for their approval of the Annan Plan. The government changes that took place in Turkey, the TRNC and the GCA throughout the third phase affected the efficiency of the EU strategy. On the one hand, the rise of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) as a single-party government in Turkey and the victory of the pro-EU politician Mehmet Ali Talat over Denktaş facilitated the EU’s success in mobilizing the pro-EU forces in both Turkey and Northern Cyprus. On the other hand, on the Greek Cypriot side, a more conservative leader Tasas Papadopoulos won the general

elections. Papadopoulos's victory soon proved to be a force that would render it more difficult for the EU and the UN to persuade Greek Cypriots to support reunification before 1 May 2004, the date set for the fifth EU enlargement.

During the third phase, as exhibited in its explicit support in consecutive EU Council decisions, the EU bolstered the Annan Plan. Furthermore, the EU announced that it was ready to grant temporary derogatory rights to the Turkish Cypriot community on basic EU principles of free movement in accordance with the Annan Plan.⁴⁷ Together with the Turkish and Greek officials, the EU representative participated in the inter-communal negotiations in Bürgenstock, and provided technical assistance to the UN.⁴⁸ Finally, the EU promised financial assistance for facilitating the implementation of the Annan Plan once the reunification took place.⁴⁹

In addition, the EU continued to apply positive conditionality both to Turkey and the GCA. On 20 June 2003, the EU Council of Thessaloniki "urge[d] all parties concerned, and in particular Turkey and the Turkish Cypriot leadership, to strongly support the UN Secretary General's efforts, and, in this context, call[ed] for an early resumption of the talks on the basis of his proposals".⁵⁰ The Council's emphasis on Turkey and the Turkish Cypriot leadership was important as it implied that the EU continued to assume that a change in the attitude of the Turkish parties would be a priority in the resolution of Cyprus problem. Accordingly, on 5 November 2003, both the EU Strategy Document and the Commission Progress Report issued for the candidate states confirmed that the GCA would become an EU member on 1 May 2004, while highlighting the fact that failure to resolve the political problem before that date might hinder Turkey's accession to the Union.⁵¹

The most significant novelty in the EU strategy was that the EU considered the Turkish Cypriot leadership explicitly as an entity separate from Turkey. In line with the decisions of the EU Council of Seville on 22 June 2002, facilitating the economic development of Northern Cyprus was added to the EU agenda. In this context, the European Commission promised financial assistance for economic development - in particular for improving the infrastructure in relation to water, waste, and transport management - and the overhaul of civil society in Northern Cyprus. Concerning commercial relations, under the condition of reunification with the GCA, it was proposed that the Turkish Cypriot Chamber of

Commerce should become involved in the issuing of movement certificates. Finally, the EU promised an additional financial package, amounting to 259 million Euros, to the Turkish Cypriot community to be opened in the event of settlement. In this sense, the EU “sen[t] a clear political signal of support to the Turkish Cypriot community through [those] measures”.⁵² Finally, the Council of Europe took initiatives to organize a round table meeting among the political parties of both the TRNC and the GCA on 7 July 2003.⁵³

Political Developments and the Evaluation of the EU Strategy

Turkey gave explicit support to the UN Plan. The Commission’s Progress Report of 2004 on Turkey confirmed the explicit support of the Turkish government for the UN Plan and for the referendum “calling the Turkish Cypriot community to a yes vote to the plan”.⁵⁴ At this point, the ideological gap between the Turkish government and the Turkish Cypriot leadership widened. The criticisms against the uncompromising position of Denktaş⁵⁵ were backed by the new Turkish government. Subsequently, under pressures from both the Turkish government and the Turkish Cypriot opposition, Denktaş agreed to negotiate the UN’s Annan Plan, although he had previously declared his total opposition to it.⁵⁶ Furthermore, the Turkish government agreed to pay the compensation incurred by the Loizidou case as decided by the ECHR in 1998. This decision was revolutionary in the sense that, within five years of the Court judgment, consecutive Turkish governments had refused to acknowledge the Court’s sentence, considering it a political act rather than a legal one.⁵⁷

On the eve of the Annan-Plan referenda, the three parties of the Cyprus conflict took initiatives demonstrating good will. For instance, the Turkish Cypriot leadership opened the Green Line on 24 April 2004 as a step to encourage cross-border mobility.⁵⁸ On 30 April 2004, the GCA responded by announcing the introduction of measures to improve cooperation between Turkish and Greek Cypriots regarding various domains such as employment, commerce, medical services, culture and heritage rights. Accordingly, Turkish Cypriots were allowed to work and live in southern Cyprus from 1 May 2004. Finally, the GCA allowed the promotion of education in the Turkish language in southern Cypriot schools.⁵⁹ For its part, Turkey reciprocally announced its willingness to

contribute to the developing peaceful atmosphere in Cyprus and eased the visa procedures for Greek Cypriots, starting from 22 May 2004.⁶⁰

It is plausible to argue that the EU conditionality contributed substantially to the developments cited above. However, the impasse in the UN negotiations persisted. The UN Plan was amended 5 times upon various requests from each party but no final agreement was reached. The UN Secretary-General proposed to put the Plan to referenda in the two Cypriot territories. The results of the Greek Cypriot referendum were disappointing for both the UN and the EU: under a heavy campaign of “no” backed by the Greek Cypriot leader, 75.83% of Greek Cypriot voters rejected the reunification plan, whereas 64.91% of the Turkish Cypriot voters accepted it. Subsequently, Cyprus became an EU member on 1 May 2004 without any resolution of the political problem and Northern Cyprus was left out of the EU.

The EU commissioner for enlargement, Gunther Verheugen accused the Greek Cypriot leader of deceiving the EU and preventing a viable historical solution to the Cyprus problem in compliance with the UN plan.⁶¹ Only one week after the failure of the Annan Plan, the GCA became a EU member and the EU lost its leverage in the Cyprus problem granted by the conditionality principal. Under the newly emerged conditions, the GCA became significantly less willing to renegotiate reunification with Turkish Cyprus. In July 2005, Papadopoulos announced that he would not support the UN Plan without at least 25 substantial amendments, including the total withdrawal of the soldiers from Northern Cyprus and the annulment of Turkey’s guarantorship.⁶² As the UN Secretary-General later testified, the disappointed Turkish Cypriot side was hesitant when faced with the option of reopening of the negotiations for the plan. Consequently, the impasse in Cyprus remained unresolved. As a last attempt to work out a solution on the island, the UN Secretary-General advised the EU to support the economic development of the Turkish Cypriot community.⁶³

With the accession of the GCA to the Union, the EU has become a key actor in the Cyprus problem along with the UN. However, the EU has made it clear that it would not substitute the UN as a forum for negotiations on the Cyprus conflict and called the Cypriot communities to continue to support the UN efforts.⁶⁴ Also, as the pro-reunification stance of Turkish Cypriots was confirmed, in order to support the pro-EU forces in Northern Cyprus, the EU decided to grant the promised amount of 259

million Euros to the Turkish Cypriot community. It would be an appropriate move to facilitate economic integration and other exchanges between the two Cypriot communities.⁶⁵ The legislative elections of 20 February 2005 in Northern Cyprus demonstrated a still-increasing support for the pro-EU party of Talat, who one month was elected President of the TRNC. Within this context, the EU strategy of offering economic incentives to the Turkish Cypriot community is likely to continue in the future. This would contribute to the conception of Northern Cyprus as a separate actor from Turkey.

As to Turkey, Verheugen underlined that the EU was successful in the sense that a traditional “domain réservé” such as Cyprus had been opened to negotiation in Turkey.⁶⁶ Turkey had fulfilled the political condition of supporting the UN efforts in Cyprus. Hence, upon the recommendation by the Commission,⁶⁷ the European Council of Brussels decided to open accession negotiations with Turkey.⁶⁸ However, the opening of the negotiations was conditional on the expansion of the customs union agreement to the new EU member states, including Cyprus. In this way, the EU continued its positive conditionality strategy towards Turkey. In this context, on 29 July 2005 the Turkish government signed the additional protocol expanding the customs union to all EU member states but excluded Cyprus with an annex. The EU responded with a counter-declaration stating that Turkey’s annexed declaration had no legal effect on its obligations to recognize Cyprus and normalize its bilateral relations with it.⁶⁹ As a reaction to Turkey’s refusal, on 11 December 2006 the EU decided to suspend negotiations on eight chapters - namely the free movement of goods, right of establishment and freedom to provide services, financial services, agriculture and rural development, fisheries, transport policy, customs union, and external relations - and not to close any of the remaining chapters until Turkey has fulfilled its commitments under the Additional Protocol to the EU-Turkey Association Agreement and removed the restrictions with regard to the Republic of Cyprus.⁷⁰ This last step shows that at the end of the third phase, the EU has returned to negative conditionality towards Turkey by adopting a threatening discourse and emphasising the possibility of suspending bilateral relations. The section below will deal with the response of the Turkish political elite to the above-mentioned variations in the EU strategy towards Turkey.

The Concept of Euro-Skepticism

Euro-skepticism could be defined as “the idea of contingent or qualified opposition, as well as incorporating outright and unqualified opposition to the process of European integration”.⁷¹ According to this formula, Euro-skepticism is comprised of two elements, hard and soft Euro-skepticisms. Hard Euro-skepticism stands for the “outright” and “unqualified” refusal of European integration both in economic and political terms right from the very beginning. Therefore, the hard Euro-skeptics reject becoming a EU member, since they never desire to be a part of such a Union. Soft Euro-skepticism, on the other hand foresees a “contingent and qualified opposition to European integration.” Soft Euro-skeptics are generally in favor of EU membership, but oppose the EU integration due to two main factors. Either, they reject a specific policy during the integration process or they oppose the integration in part with the motivation of preserving their national interests.⁷²

Euro-skepticism is mainly developed within political parties. In this respect, there are three assumptions with regard to the relation between political parties and Euro-skepticism. First, Euro-skeptic policies are mainly adopted by opposition parties in order to exert pressure upon governments (Taggart and Szczerbiak, 4). Second, not only peripheral but also mainstream parties might pursue Euro-skeptic policies.⁷³ Finally, the ideology of parties is not a determinant in the adoption of Euro-skepticism (Taggart and Szczerbiak, 4). A far right party and a leftist party might pursue Euro-skeptic policies at the same time. In this article, the applicability of Euro-skepticism to the Turkish case will be evaluated along with a discussion on the validity of these three assumptions considering the responses of the Turkish political parties to the Cyprus policy of the EU.

The Responses of the Turkish Political Elite

Concerning the analysis of the Turkish political elite’s responses to the EU policy on Cyprus, the first and second phases should be treated together, because although the EU’s Cyprus strategy indicates certain changes between the two phases, the Turkish political elite’s responses, whether from the government or opposition, reflected a unified image.

The First and Second Phases

As the integration process of the GCA with the EU became visible in the mid 1990s, Turkey hardened its rhetoric on Cyprus membership and formulated its course of action. Accordingly, the Turkish government claimed that the initiation of the accession negotiations with the GCA was in contravention of the 1959-1960 London and Zurich treaties, which were the founding treaties of the Republic of Cyprus. Equally, the unilateral accession of the GCA to the EU would hamper the solution of the Cyprus problem. If the GCA's membership was concluded, the Turkish government firmly stated that options of Turkey's integration with the TRNC would be considered.

This policy stance was preserved both on the government and opposition level. The Minister of Foreign Affairs and leader of the Social Democratic Populist Party (SHP), Murat Karayalçın, who was accused by the opposition of consenting to EU membership for the GCA for the sake of joining the Customs Union, stated that his government never pursued such a policy but sent a declaration to the EU informing that Turkey would be integrated with the TRNC in the case of the EU membership of the GCA.⁷⁴ Right before the Customs Union agreement, Turkish political parties discussed the issue in the Parliament and all the parties expressed their stances. Accordingly, the major coalition partner, the True Path Party (DYP) emphasized the importance of Cyprus for Turkey and stated that Turkey would never sacrifice Cyprus for the Customs-Union membership.⁷⁵ Concerning the opposition parties, the Motherland Party (ANAP) also dwelt on the argument that Turkey should not give up on Cyprus as a concession in return for EU membership.⁷⁶ Bülent Ecevit, the leader of the Democratic Left Party (DSP) claimed that Turkey should not let Cyprus to be integrated with the EU without Turkey being a EU member, even if a solution to the Cyprus problem was achieved beforehand.⁷⁷ Finally, Muhsin Yazıcıoğlu, the leader of the Great Unity Party (BBP) claimed that Turkey's integration with the TRNC should have already been completed given the prospect of the GCA's EU membership. In this respect, he urged the immediate initiation of a security pact between Turkey and the TRNC.⁷⁸

Previously, in the EU Summit of Luxembourg, the Turkish government was eager to send firm messages to the EU that Turkey did not endorse the EU's policy towards Cyprus. In a meeting with EU members in Rome in late January 1997, the Minister of Foreign Affairs

and the leader of DYP Tansu Çiller stated that Turkey was concerned over the commencement of the accession negotiations with the GCA, which would certainly hamper the chances for a solution to the Cyprus problem.⁷⁹ Subsequently, in several joint declarations, Turkey and the TRNC stated that the initiation of accession negotiations with the GCA was in contravention of the 1959-1960 London and Zurich treaties. They also stated that it would render the inter-communal talks obsolete and thus hamper a solution to the Cyprus Problem. In this respect, they emphasized that in response to the integration of the GCA to the EU, the TRNC would be integrated with Turkey in the fields of economics, finance, defense and foreign policy.⁸⁰ An important development in this regard was that Süleyman Demirel, as the President of Turkey, declared his stance on the Cyprus problem, which was, unsurprisingly, similar to the rest of the Turkish political elite.

Although the Turkish government sent a firm message to the EU concerning its Cyprus policy, the EU decided to start accession negotiations with the GCA in Luxembourg in December 1997. In response, Turkey issued a declaration again stating that the decision of the EU concerning the GCA defied the 1959 London and Zurich treaties prohibiting Cyprus from being a member of an organization in which Turkey and Greece as guarantors were not members. The statement also declared that according to the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee, Cyprus could not be integrated economically into another state partially or completely. Moreover, Turkey argued that this decision seriously damaged the efforts for a coherent solution on the island and ultimately served as a viable ground for the GCA to be unified with Greece. Finally, Turkey reiterated its resolve to be integrated with the TRNC in the case of an initiation of accession negotiations between the EU and the GCA.⁸¹

After the Luxembourg summit, Mesut Yılmaz, the Turkish Prime Minister decided to “freeze” political relations with the EU. Yılmaz asserted in a press conference that given the discriminatory attitudes of the EU towards Turkey in Luxembourg, it became an undeniable necessity for Turkey to revise its foreign policy priorities.⁸² During this term, the US special envoy, Richard Holbrooke also admitted that the efforts to revive inter-communal talks in Cyprus became futile, mostly because of the EU’s insensitivity to Turkey’s concerns over Cyprus.⁸³ The EU reiterated its policy of rejecting candidate status to Turkey at the Cardiff Summit and Yılmaz overtly stated Turkey’s resolution to keep its

relations with the EU “frozen”.⁸⁴ He blamed the EU for “deliberately misleading” Ankara “for years” over its future role in Europe.⁸⁵ During this period, Turkey and the TRNC took a significant step to indicate their willingness to pursue integration by signing the treaty of Association Council on August 16, 1998.⁸⁶

After the 1999 elections, the DSP, led by Bülent Ecevit, formed a government in coalition with the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) and ANAP. The new government adopted the existing Cyprus policy of Turkey. As in 1995, not only the government but also the opposition embraced this policy, which enabled Turkey to achieve a unified voice on the Cyprus problem. The political parties represented in the Parliament, namely DSP, MHP, Virtue Party (FP), ANAP and DYP issued a joint declaration on the occasion of the 25th anniversary of the Turkish military intervention in Cyprus and stated their attachment to Turkey’s Cyprus policy and the military presence of Turkey on the island.⁸⁷ Concerning the Cyprus problem, Prime Minister Ecevit was of the opinion that the Cyprus problem had already been resolved after the Turkish military intervention in 1974.⁸⁸ İsmail Cem, the Turkish Foreign Minister stated that it was vital for Turkey to preserve the integrity of the TRNC and that Turkey would accept no other solution for the Cyprus problem.⁸⁹ Şükrü Sina Gürel, the Minister of State argued that the EU was blackmailing Turkey by putting forward the Cyprus problem as a condition for Turkey’s EU membership.⁹⁰ He also firmly stated that Turkey would immediately be integrated with the TRNC, if the GCA became a EU member.⁹¹

To conclude, during the first and the second phases, the Turkish political elite, namely the president, government and opposition in a unified fashion adopted a hard-line policy towards the EU concerning the Cyprus problem. Considering Cyprus as Turkey’s top foreign policy issue, the Turkish political elite did not pay attention to the dangers of this policy stance for Turkey’s EU membership prospects. In this sense, it could be argued that the EU’s Cyprus policy and the significance of Cyprus for Turkey resulted in the adoption of a Soft Euro-skeptic policy among the Turkish political elite, because Turkey saw the EU’s Cyprus policy as a threat to its national interests and thus chose to give a strong reaction to the EU. Therefore, the Turkish opposition could be counted as “qualified”, since Turkey reacted in a way aimed to guard its national interests. It could also be seen as “contingent”, since Turkey’s opposition

was influenced by the EU's attitude, meaning that if the EU adjusted its Cyprus policy accordingly, Turkey would withdraw its opposition. Nevertheless, the intensity of the Turkish opposition was so considerable that Turkey even implied to terminate all its EU membership aspirations and to be integrated with the TRNC. The significance of these two phases is that all major political parties in Turkey were unified in spelling out one single, coherent Cyprus policy. Hence, it could be argued in this sense that Soft Euro-skepticism with the motivation of preserving national interests became the dominant paradigm in Turkey's EU policy during the first and second phases.

The Third Phase

The traditional Cyprus policy of Turkey and Soft Euro-skepticism against the EU gave way to a significant Euro-enthusiasm during the third phase. Having won the 2002 elections with a landslide victory, the Justice and Development Party (AKP) adopted Turkey's EU membership policy as its top priority. At the same time, the AKP came up with a very ambitious plan to resolve the Cyprus problem, which had haunted Turkey's foreign policy agenda for decades. A shift of rhetoric on the government level thus became visible in Turkey. Consequent to the presentation of its program to the Parliament, the AKP government declared its determination to make pro-active efforts towards achieving a viable settlement in Cyprus.⁹² On November 21, 2002, AKP leader Tayyip Erdoğan announced that they were not going to act as hawks in Turkey's Cyprus policy.⁹³ Erdoğan also declared that no solution was not a solution in the Cyprus problem.⁹⁴ In its Cyprus policy formulation, contrary to the previous Turkish governments, the AKP government did not reject a link between the Cyprus question and Turkey's EU membership. Accordingly, the AKP government gave explicit support to the Annan Plan and Mehmet Ali Talat, the pro-EU Turkish Cypriot leader who defeated Denktaş in the general elections. However, the AKP underestimated the Greek Cypriot resentment towards the Annan Plan. The results of the referenda on the island overrode the unification of Cyprus and further isolated the TRNC, while enabling the GCA to become a EU member unilaterally.

In the aftermath of the referenda, the AKP government conducted alternative policies to end the political isolation of Turkish Cypriot community. For instance, the AKP persuaded Azerbaijan to initiate direct

flights to Ercan Airport in the TRNC. Moreover, Abdullah Gül, the Minister of Foreign Affairs issued an action plan for Cyprus, promising to open Turkey's harbors and airspace to the GCA provided that the political and economic isolation of the TRNC from international society would end.⁹⁵ However, these policies were far from fruitful, since the GCA was already recognized as the sole representative of the island and had been granted all the EU membership rights. The TRNC was still seen as a *de facto* rather than *de jure* state by the EU. Furthermore, the EU rejected Gül's proposition and suspended the accession negotiations with Turkey in relation to eight chapters. Turkey refused to open its airspace and harbors to the GCA, a EU member.

With its Euro-enthusiasm, the AKP succeeded in deconstructing the government-based soft Euro-skepticism of Turkey and pursued a solution-based Cyprus policy. However, even this policy proved insufficient to resolve the Cyprus impasse and finally, the AKP had to return to Turkey's traditional policy stance by rejecting an informal recognition of the GCA. During the third phase, the soft Euro-skepticism endured on the opposition level. The main opposition party, the Republican People's Party (CHP) led by Deniz Baykal, and the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) led by Devlet Bahçeli, mainly remained attached to the traditional Cyprus policy of Turkey.

The CHP

The CHP is the oldest political party in Turkey and throughout the three phases elaborated in this study Social Democracy has been its main ideology. The party mainly endorses the EU membership of Turkey. The top party officials base their support for EU membership on the Ankara Association Agreement of 1963 signed by İsmet İnönü, the Turkish Prime Minister and CHP leader. On the other hand, while supporting Turkey's EU membership, the CHP raises strong criticisms against the EU and the AKP with the apprehension that their policies might threaten the national interests of Turkey. Concerning the Cyprus problem, the CHP's stance is shaped by such strong criticism.

During the third phase, the CHP has remained as the main opposition party in the Turkish parliament, and given the active policy of the AKP on Cyprus, the CHP officials have tended to defend the traditional Cyprus policy of Turkey. The responses of the CHP officials could be seen as threefold. First, the CHP opposed the link between the Cyprus problem

and Turkey's EU membership process. It was their preoccupation that in order to become a EU member, Turkey would be forced by the EU to officially recognize the GCA when it acceded to the Union. Second, the CHP criticized the substance of the Annan Plan, which would eliminate the bi-zonality established since 1974. The CHP officials claimed that it was the bi-zonality which provided peace and stability in the island. If the Plan was accepted, this stability would be distorted and Turkish Cypriots would be confined to minority status.⁹⁶ Their final criticism was against the Cyprus policy of the AKP. The party officials blamed the AKP for changing the traditional and rightful Cyprus policy of Turkey for the sake of entering the EU.⁹⁷

After the referenda, the CHP claimed that the rejection of the Annan plan provided a viable ground for Turkey to lobby for the international recognition of the TRNC, but the AKP government did not take this offer seriously. Deniz Baykal, the CHP leader still insists on the preservation of the two-state model in order to maintain peace and order in Cyprus.⁹⁸ Nevertheless, unlike the political elite in the first and the second phases, the CHP has not offered integration with the TRN as a solution. Still, it has insisted on the survival of the TRNC.

The persistent attachment of the CHP to the traditional Cyprus policy of Turkey is mainly due to the fact that it was the former top officials of the CHP who had developed the very idea of Turkey's Cyprus policy. İsmet İnönü challenged the infamous letter of the US President Lyndon Johnson in 1964, and Bülent Ecevit ordered the implementation of military intervention in Cyprus in 1974. Both figures were the Prime Ministers and the leaders of the CHP. The official Cyprus policy of Turkey was developed with reference to these policy stances of the two leaders. In this respect, it is reasonable that the CHP tended to preserve this traditional policy against the actions of the AKP.⁹⁹

The Cyprus policy of the CHP has also been shared, to a great extent, by the CHP deputies in the Parliament. According to the questionnaire survey conducted by the authors of this article, among the CHP deputies from November 2005 to May 2006, 102 out of 154 deputies answered two questions on Cyprus. As regards to the question "what is the most important foreign policy issue for Turkey?", 44% of the respondents chose the Cyprus problem as their answer, while 31% said Northern Iraq and 18% the Armenian question. Hence, the Cyprus problem has appeared on the top of the CHP deputies' agenda and it has been treated

as an issue even more important than the Northern Iraq problem, which is deemed to be directly related to PKK terrorism in Turkey. Concerning the question “what will be the repercussions of the Greek Cypriot Administration’s entry to the EU?”, 53% of the CHP deputies responded that the EU would endorse the Greek Cypriot position and for that reason, the Cyprus problem would never be solved and Turkey’s accession to the EU would be barred. 16% answered that in order to adhere to the EU, Turkey would have to recognize the Greek Cypriot administration as the “Republic of Cyprus”, withdraw its recognition of the TRNC, and would in the end acquiesce in qualifying Turkish Cypriots as a minority in Cyprus. Finally, 14% replied that this will lead to the recognition of the TRNC and the Cyprus impediment to Turkey’s EU membership process would thus be overcome. Accordingly, an overwhelming majority of the respondents reflect a pessimistic view on both the Cyprus question and Turkey’s EU membership. More than half of the CHP deputies believed that the GCA’s EU membership would eventually hamper the solution of the Cyprus problem and Turkey’s EU membership. What is striking here, is that a quarter of the respondents believed that for the sake of EU membership, the GCA would be recognized as “the Republic of Cyprus” and the TRNC would be undermined by Turkey. On the other hand, another quarter of CHP deputies optimistically claimed that this would lead to the recognition of the TRNC and Turkey would no longer suffer from the Cyprus problem in the conduct of its EU membership process.

The MHP

The MHP is another well-experienced political party in Turkey founded in the late 1960s. As a far right political party, the MHP does not conceal its negative sentiments towards the EU, since its top officials claim that there are “ulterior motives in the EU for Turkey”. However, the MHP leaders at the same time keep their European vocation.¹⁰⁰ The MHP officials currently assert that the party, in fact, supports the EU membership of Turkey. However, in doing that, the MHP puts forward a vital precondition for its support, which is the guarantee for securing Turkey’s national, political and territorial integrity.¹⁰¹ This precondition lay at the heart of the MHP’s strong criticisms directed against the EU and the AKP. The party officials claim that the national integrity of Turkey has always been undermined by the policies of the EU and the AKP.¹⁰²

Although the MHP did not gain any seats in the parliament in the 2002 elections, it is currently the second largest opposition party in the Turkish Assembly. An influential far right party in Turkey, the MHP bolsters the traditional Cyprus policy of Turkey and sees it as a national cause. It maintains the view that the London and Zurich Agreements are still the determiners of the fate of Cyprus, and the EU membership of the GCA is in contravention of these treaties. Besides, the MHP does not believe that the Annan Plan carries sufficient credibility to resolve the problem, as it poses fundamental threats for the future of the Turkish Cypriot community.¹⁰³

According to the MHP, the Cyprus problem has always been used by Greece as veto leverage against Turkey's EU membership aspirations. Moreover, the MHP believes that after the GCA was granted a clear membership perspective, both Greece and the GCA developed the ability to drag the EU on their side in the issue of Cyprus. The MHP claims that Greece and the GCA aim to achieve *Enosis*, union with motherland, through the EU. Hence, according to the MHP, the EU's favorable attitude towards the GCA, and its discrimination against Turkey strengthened the position of Greece and the GCA on the Cyprus problem. The MHP also criticizes the policies of Turkey during the Customs Union talks in which, the MHP claims, the Turkish government failed to show sufficient reaction to the EU membership candidature of the GCA for the sake of completing the Customs Union negotiations.¹⁰⁴

The MHP asserts that while formulating its attitudes towards Turkey, the EU assumes that the EU membership perspective is deemed to be the most important foreign policy priority by Turkey and, in this respect, believes that Cyprus problem could be subordinated to Turkey's EU membership process. Within this context, according to the MHP, the Cyprus policy of the AKP justifies this assumption of the EU, since the AKP attaches more importance to EU membership than to the Cyprus problem itself. The MHP believes that the Turkish decision-makers gained an advantageous position when they threatened to integrate with the TRNC in the case of GCA membership. This determination forced the EU officials to feel uneasy and cautious about their next move on the Cyprus problem. However, in the sequence, the policies conducted by the AKP sacrificed Cyprus for a still vague promise of EU membership and destroyed this advantageous position.¹⁰⁵ In its progress reports issued for the candidate states, beginning from 2004, the EU has demanded that

Turkey withdraw its veto against the GCA for NATO membership and open its harbors and airspace to the GCA. According to the MHP, the EU has been implicitly demanding that Turkey should recognize the GCA as the Republic of Cyprus and has ignored the rights and liberties of the Turkish Cypriot Community.¹⁰⁶

After the referenda in Cyprus, the MHP leader Devlet Bahçeli accused the AKP government of forcing Turkish Cypriots to vote in favor of the Annan Plan in order to eliminate the Cyprus obstacle from Turkey's path to EU membership once and for all.¹⁰⁷ He also claimed that the Greek Cypriots' "No" and the EU's willingness to grant the GCA an EU membership, with or without a solution on the island, reveals clearly the insincerity of the EU in this matter. Yet, in order to find a comprehensive solution, the MHP offers its own proposals. These proposals suggest either integration with Turkey or the protection of the independence of the TRNC as a separate state.¹⁰⁸ Therefore, similar to the CHP stance, the MHP considers Cyprus as an issue more important than Turkey's EU membership and rejects the plans for solving the problem through the EU. In this regard, no different than the political elite of the first and the second phases, the MHP offers the integration of the TRNC with Turkey as a viable solution to the problem.

In conclusion, when the responses of the CHP and the MHP to the EU policy on Cyprus are evaluated together, it is possible to observe that both parties display similar standpoints. Accordingly, both parties - at least in rhetoric - are in favor of Turkey's EU membership while maintaining concerns with the motivation of preserving Turkey's national interests. Concerning Cyprus, both the CHP and the MHP are inclined to defend the traditional policy of Turkey. The Cyprus policies of both the EU and the AKP have provoked strong criticisms within both parties. In this sense, it could be reasonable to state that both opposition parties have adopted a soft Euro-skepticism in shaping their Cyprus policies. Their opposition is "qualified", since they oppose a certain policy area, which is the Cyprus policy of the EU, and raise their concerns over national interests. Their opposition is also "contingent" since their support for the EU membership depends on the condition that the EU should not become a hurdle to the solution of the Cyprus problem.

Conclusion

Considering the EU's conditionality strategy on the Cyprus problem, the Turkish political elite's responses are crucial in terms of measuring the importance that Turkey attaches to the Cyprus problem. During the first phase, both opposition and government in Turkey were unified in their reactions to the negative EU conditionality. They attached more importance to the Cyprus issue than to Turkey's EU membership and they even presented an image of being willing to withdraw from the EU membership process if the EU continued with its Cyprus policy. In the second phase, the EU conditionality on Turkey shifted from negative to positive, as Turkey was finally granted candidature by the EU. However, Turkey's candidature was not instrumental in changing the stance of the Turkish elite on Cyprus, since the EU continued to apply positive conditionality to the GCA. During this phase, both opposition and government conveyed the same unified messages to the EU: that Turkey might even consider the option of being integrated with the TRNC.

The landslide victory of the AKP in Turkey was a turning point for Turkey's Cyprus policy, since the AKP decided to pursue a solution-based Cyprus policy with the motivation of strengthening Turkey's EU membership perspective. Hence, during the final phase, Turkey has changed its Cyprus policy stance, although on the opposition level the traditional view on Cyprus was maintained. However, the shift in Turkey's Cyprus policy was not enough to resolve the Cyprus problem. After the GCA became a EU member, Turkey was forced by the EU to open its air space and harbors to the GCA. In this regard, it is observed that the EU has returned to its negative conditionality on Turkey and stressed the obligation to eventually recognize the GCA as the Republic of Cyprus. In response to the negative conditionality, the AKP could no longer continue its new Cyprus policy and had to return to the traditional stance of Turkey on Cyprus. In his latest press statement on the issue, Tayyip Erdoğan, Turkish Prime Minister and the AKP leader has declared that they would not tolerate the double standard concerning the Cyprus problem and its implications for Turkey's EU membership process. He has even stated that given the current situation, if Turkey's EU membership might be overridden by the EU at some point, then the EU should fulfill its responsibility to inform Turkey about such an option immediately so that Turkey could draw a new road map without the EU.¹⁰⁹

In order to theorize the Turkish responses, soft Euro-skepticism could be seen instrumental. In this sense, although in favor of the EU membership in essence, the Turkish political elite opposed the Cyprus policy of the EU explicitly with the preoccupation of preserving Turkey's national interests. Consequently, it could be argued that the conditionality policy of the EU towards Turkey and the GCA concerning the Cyprus problem increased the tendencies of the Turkish political elite to tilt towards soft Euro-skepticism. This is not to say that the EU's Cyprus policy was the only determiner of Euro-skepticism in Turkey. The Welfare Party (RP) in 1990s, for instance, was known for its hard Euro-skeptic rhetoric. The RP mainly perceived the EU as a Christian club in which Turkey should never have a place.¹¹⁰ Moreover, the CHP and the MHP have currently raised criticisms against the EU focusing on policy areas other than Cyprus, such as the Kurdish problem and minorities. Be that as it may, since 1993 it has been the EU policies on Cyprus that have strongly affected the attitudes of the Turkish political elite towards the EU. Even the AKP could be deemed to be tilting towards soft Euro-skepticism, as the latest remarks of Erdoğan indicate.

Concerning the three main assumptions of Euro-skepticism in political parties, the first assumption—that Euro-skepticism is an opposition party phenomenon—can only be partly applied to the Turkish case since not only opposition but also almost all the governments in Turkey have adopted a Euro-skeptic stance concerning Cyprus. Nevertheless, especially in the final phase, it has mainly been the opposition, namely the CHP and the MHP who have raised criticisms against the AKP government and its Cyprus policy. The second assumption, which claims that both peripheral and mainstream parties might adopt Euro-skepticism, applies in the Turkish case since both governments and opposition adopted a Euro-skeptic policy against the EU's Cyprus policy. Finally, the last assumption, which suggests that the ideology of parties is not a determinant in the adoption of Euro-skepticism, is also valid for Turkey, as both the CHP, a Social Democrat party, and the MHP, a far right party, defend similar Euro-skeptic rhetoric and policies.

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Turkey's EU Candidacy Process and Prospects for Democratic Settlement of the Cyprus Issue

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Abstract

This paper analyzes the impact of Turkey's EU candidacy process on Turkish foreign policy towards Cyprus. In doing that it focuses on the impact of the EU's political conditionality on Turkey's Cyprus policy through the lenses of the Europeanization approach to foreign-policy change. The main argument of the paper is that even though Turkey's foreign-policy objective with regard to Cyprus has not substantially been transformed, the policy strategies, tools and opportunity structures of foreign-policy makers have considerably altered along Turkey's process of Europeanization. The paper, therefore, explores the policy change and continuity in terms of three major historical turning points in Turkey-EU relations in order to analyze the extent to which Turkey's Cyprus policy was influenced by the EU. These turning points are the post-Helsinki period (1999-2002), the process of accession negotiations (2002-2006), and the post-December 2006, the European Commission's Regular Report on Turkey. In all these periods, the resolution of the Cyprus conflict remained a major foreign-policy challenge for Turkey-EU relations. However, it is evident that Turkey's policy responses to the EU's political conditionality concerning Cyprus have significantly been transformed through Turkey's process of Europeanization, which spans the period from 1999 to 2008.

Key words: Europeanization, Turkey's EU Candidacy, Cyprus Policy

Özet

Bu çalışma, Türkiye'nin AB'ye adaylık sürecinin Türkiye'nin Kıbrıs sorununa yönelik dış politikasına olan etkisini analiz etmektedir. Bunu yaparken, Avrupalasma yaklaşımının neden olduđu dış politika deđişimi aracılığı ile AB'nin politik şartlılığının Türkiye'nin Kıbrıs politikasına olan etkisine odaklanmaktadır. Bu çalışmanın temel amacı, Türkiye'nin Kıbrıs'a yönelik dış politika hedefleri, tam olarak dönüşmemiş olsa da dış politika yapıcılarının politika stratejileri, araçları ve fırsat yapıları, Türkiye'nin Avrupalasma süreci boyunca önemli ölçüde deđişmiştir savını öne sürmektedir. Bu bağlamda bu

makale, AB'nin Türkiye'nin Kıbrıs politikasını hangi ölçüde değiştirdiğini analiz etmek için Türkiye-AB ilişkilerinin geçtiği üç dönüm noktası çerçevesindeki politika değişimi ve sürekliliğini ele almaktadır. İncelenecek olan dönüm noktaları, Helsinki sonrası (1999-2002) dönem, katılım müzakereleri süreci (2002-2006) ve Avrupa Komisyonu'nun Aralık 2006 İlerleme Raporu sonrası dönemlerdir. Bütün bu dönemlerde Kıbrıs sorunu, AB Türkiye ilişkileri açısından önemli bir dış politika kısıtı olarak kendini göstermiştir. Ancak, AB'nin Kıbrıs'a yönelik politik şartlılığına Türkiye'nin yanıtı, Türkiye'nin 1999'dan günümüze uzanan Avrupalaşma süreci boyunca gözle görülür bir şekilde değişmiştir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Avrupalaşma, Türkiye'nin AB Adaylığı, Kıbrıs Politikası

Introduction: Tracing the EU's Influence on Turkish Foreign-Policy Change towards Cyprus

In March 2008, the peace talks were re-launched by the Greek and Turkish Cypriot leaders, Mehmet Ali Talat and Demetris Christofias, to resolve the power sharing disputes that constitute the core of the Cyprus problem. Currently, the talks continue under the moderation of the United Nations (UN). The Foreign Minister of the Republic of Turkey, Ali Babacan, declared that “Turkey’s policy towards Cyprus has not changed, and is ready to support the democratic settlement of the conflict on the condition of recognition of equal status of the both founding states.”¹ This implies the support of the Turkish government for any agreement guaranteeing the sovereign rights of the both communities, the existence of two democracies, and, at best, the acknowledgement of Turkey as the guarantor of the rights of Turkish Cypriots. This is an important turning point for the Cyprus question since there is an ever further emphasis by Turkey, especially since March 2004 referendum, on the centrality of establishing an official agreement between the two Cypriot communities for the resolution of the nearly half century-long conflict over the rights of both communities on the island. What has remained constant in Turkish foreign policy is the objective of achieving the international recognition of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC).

In this context, understanding the factors behind the increasing support for a democratic settlement of the Cyprus conflict, which is becoming the core rhetoric of Turkish foreign-policy makers, deserves further analysis. One of the major reasons for this drastic shift in the foreign policy strategy of Turkey can fairly be attributed to this country’s political will to become a full member of the European Union (EU).

Recent scholarly work on Cyprus focuses on the impact of the EU and its enlargement policy on the settlement of the conflict, and explores the “EU’s external capabilities and enlargement as a conflict resolution tool.”² Since the ‘Republic of Cyprus’ – as only represented by Greek Cypriots - became a full member of the EU on 1 May 2004, the increasing role played by the EU with regard to solving the conflict affects Turkey-EU relations deeply. Additionally, Turkey’s EU candidacy process, among other domestic and international factors, significantly impacts Turkey’s foreign policy strategies towards the Cyprus.

The Europeanization process, which should be understood as the EU’s impact on the domestic and foreign policies of candidate states, has become an integral part of Turkey’s institutional reforms towards meeting the political conditionality for membership since the 1999 Helsinki summit in which Turkey was granted official candidate status. Since then, the EU’s impact has been more visible in Turkey’s foreign policy agenda. The Europeanization of foreign policy does not necessarily imply a change in the substance of the policy subject matter. It can also lead to structural changes in policy-making styles, policy strategies, tools, and opportunity structures of foreign-policy actors along the process of alignment with the EU’s common foreign policy guidelines.³ Turkey’s political objective of becoming a EU member and the Union’s provision of a clearer membership perspective are major motivations behind its foreign policy alignment according to the EU’s common foreign policies and policy guidelines. A very recent Report of the European Commission (November 5, 2008) contains mostly positive evaluations on “Turkey’s broad alignment with common foreign and security policy (CFSP) statements, declarations, and demarches.” According to the Report, “in 2008, Turkey aligned itself with 109 out of 124 CFSP declarations.” However, in the same report, the European Commission also states that:

External Relations is one of the eight chapters covered by the conclusions on Turkey adopted by the Council (General Affairs and External Relations) on 11 December 2006 and endorsed by the European Council on 14/15 December 2006. As long as restrictions remain in place on the free movement of goods carried by vessels and aircraft registered in Cyprus or where the last port of call was Cyprus, Turkey will not be in a position fully to implement the *acquis* relating to this chapter.⁴

During Turkey's candidacy process, from 1999 onwards, the peaceful resolution of the Cyprus issue has remained one of the most controversial foreign policy matters on the agenda of Turkey-EU relations, because it directly involves the immediate foreign and security concerns of both actors. The EU's political concerns derive especially from the concerns of the two member states, Greece and Cyprus. Additionally, the geopolitical importance of Cyprus within the context of the political stability in the Mediterranean region makes the resolution of the conflict essential for European common foreign, security and defense policy objectives.

At the present stage, the course that the conflict over Cyprus would take remains one of the important factors that could either facilitate or hinder Turkey's accession talks with the EU. However, this paper argues that the resolution of the problem is highly dependent on the achievement of a democratic settlement of the Cyprus talks, which would satisfy the demands of the both Cypriot communities. One of the major reasons for this is that the EU granted full membership status to the Republic of Cyprus without waiting for a durable agreement to be reached. In this way, it has partially lost ground as an international actor that could mediate a peaceful settlement between Turkish and Greek Cypriots. The following sections of this paper aim at elaborating on this argument through an analysis of the reasons behind the transformations of the Turkish foreign policy strategies, tools and opportunity structures in the name of resolving the Cyprus debacle.

1999-2002 EU's Post-Helsinki Summit Developments: Turkey's EU Candidacy Process and the Questioning of Whether Cyprus Should be a Pre-Condition for Full Membership

In the post-Helsinki period, Cyprus remained a top foreign and security policy on the agenda of Turkey, the EU, and Greece. Greece's security concerns center on the potential threat of Turkey's total domination over the island, and the country's foreign policy preference is the unification of Cyprus under Greek Cypriot rule.⁵ In historical perspective, the Cyprus problem is based on the conflict between the two Cypriot communities. It goes back to the 1960s when the London-Zurich accords that created the 'Republic of Cyprus' based on the principal of political equality of the two communities were breached as the result of a political crisis between the Greek and the Turkish Cypriots and the subsequent mounting

violence on the island.⁶ The events resulted in the division of the island between the Greek Cypriot administration, internationally recognized, and the later founded TRNC, recognized only by the Republic of Turkey. Since then, the recognition of the sovereignty rights of both Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots has remained a central problem preventing a permanent and coherent resolution of the issue within the context of Turkey's EU candidature. Additionally, the military buildup, and policies of deterrence, in both the northern and southern parts of Cyprus also pose a serious security concern for the parts involved in the conflict. Turkey's official position asserts that unless the international recognition of the political rights of the TRNC as representing the Turkish Cypriots has been achieved, Turkey would neither recognize the southern Cyprus administration nor, under the Customs Union Agreement, lift the trade barriers against the 'Republic of Cyprus'. From the 1970s to present, the resolution of the conflict on Cyprus has been predominantly led under the moderation of United Nations (UN), which prepared numerous plans to satisfy the demands of both Cypriot communities, yet an enduring consensus has not been reached.⁷

Against this historical background, the EU's policy guidelines on the Cyprus issue remain highly contested within the context of Turkey's accession negotiations process. First of all, back in December 1999, in the Helsinki Summit, the EU decided to include the 'Republic of Cyprus' –as only represented by the Greek Cypriot community- in the forthcoming wave of enlargement and by doing this, gave up on the leverage of conditionality suggesting that the Cyprus's membership could only be finalized under the condition of the political settlement of the Cyprus problem.⁸ Secondly, at the European Council Helsinki Summit, the settlement of the Cyprus issue had not been officially set as a precondition for Turkey's accession negotiations. It should here be stressed that there are two major aspects of the EU's political conditionality concerning alignment with common foreign, security and defense policies that are directly related with Cyprus, and they became quite visible from the late 1999 onwards. First of all, the European Commission Regular Report on Turkey stated back in October 1999 that:

[w]ith resolution 1250 on June 29, the Security Council requests the UN Secretary-General to invite the Greek and Turkish Cypriot leaders to hold negotiations in the autumn. It also calls

on the two sides on Cyprus, including military authorities, to work constructively with the Secretary-General and his special representative to create a positive climate on the island that will pave the way for these negotiations ... Turkey as a guarantor country, should show strong commitment to bring the two sides together under the UN process launched at the invitation of the G8. Turkey could have an active and constructive role in this framework in order to reach a comprehensive solution that addresses the legitimate concerns of all parties.⁹

Therefore, from 1999 onwards, the EU has put much emphasis on the centrality of the principle that Turkey should support the UN efforts to reconcile the territorial disputes over sovereignty rights of the Cypriot communities. The other integral part of Turkey's alignment with the EU's foreign, security and defense policies has been treated as a short-term priority in the Accession Partnership Document (2001). In this respect, Turkey should,

[i]n accordance with the Helsinki conclusions, in the context of the political dialogue, strongly support the UN Secretary General's efforts to bring to a successful conclusion the process of finding a comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus problem, as referred to in point 9(a) of the Helsinki conclusions.¹⁰

In historical perspective, successive Turkish governments and state officials, in their policy rhetoric, had rather stressed the centrality of resolving the Cyprus problem within the framework of Turkey's security and defense policy concerns.¹¹ Under the 1999-2002 coalition government of the Democratic Left Party, Nationalist Action Party and the Motherland Party, the Cyprus issue continued to dominate the security policy agenda of Turkey. On July 20 1999, the then president of TRNC Rauf Denktaş and Turkey's prime minister Bülent Ecevit declared that Turkey and the North of Cyprus were in the course of assessing the possibility of developing their relations "in line with the target of integration set at the highest level," to be deployed as a policy tool against the isolation of the TRNC by the international community.¹² Turkey's policy rhetoric in this phase underlined that the best policy option to resolve the problem was the recognition of TRNC by the

international community. The Turkish concerns revolved around the centrality of the geostrategic location of the island and the protection of the political rights of Turkish Cypriots. On November 11 2000, Ecevit declared that “the security of TRNC and the Republic of Turkey, and that of Eastern Mediterranean cannot be thought separately.”¹³ Ecevit’s policy discourse also put forward the points that Turkey could not accept the settlement of the Cyprus issue as a precondition for its adhesion to the EU, and that without the recognition of the presence of two equally sovereign states on the island, a resolution was almost unachievable. Therefore, in the post-Helsinki period, Turkey’s foreign policy strategy and rhetoric on the settlement of the Cyprus problem were shaped by the relative importance given to the geostrategic significance and security interests of Turkey in the Mediterranean region.

It is also important to emphasize that between 1999 and 2002, the coalition government led by Ecevit simultaneously supported the UN efforts to bring a comprehensive settlement to the Cyprus problem that would satisfy both the Turkish and Greek Cypriots. According to the 2001 Turkish National Program for the Adoption of the Acquis (NPAA) Turkey should be understood as

a country that contributes to the enhancement and reinforcement of peace, security, stability and prosperity in international relations and will continue to develop her relations with neighboring countries on the basis of a peace-seeking foreign policy. In this context, Turkey will continue to undertake initiatives and efforts towards the settlement of bilateral problems with Greece through dialogue; support the efforts of the UN Secretary General, in the context of establishing a new partnership in Cyprus based on the sovereign equality of the two parties and realities on the island.¹⁴

Nevertheless, at this point one should remember that although justifications for Turkey’s Cyprus policy objectives were rather defined through a security rhetoric at that time, the then Foreign Minister, İsmail Cem made considerable efforts towards deepening the economic cooperation and political dialogue between Greece and Turkey.¹⁵ Measures towards confidence building between the two Aegean countries became an integral part of the governmental, state and foreign policy of

Turkey from this period onwards.¹⁶ This step could also be considered as the motor of a rejuvenated foreign policy towards deepening the bilateral relations between Greece and Turkey that would eventually, and hopefully, lead to enhance the political dialogue between Turkey and Greece over finding a resolution to the Cyprus problem.

Despite the UN efforts and the Turkish-Greek confidence-building measures, in the post-Helsinki period, the Cyprus issue remained unsolved. The centrality of the geostrategic location of Cyprus in the eyes of both Greece and Turkey and the EU's decision to admit Cyprus to the EU on 1 May 2004 have, unfortunately, led the efforts to resolve the debacle to an impasse.¹⁷ Nonetheless, the EU's provision setting a clear membership perspective (2002-2006) for Turkey by spelling out a concrete date for the accession negotiations has served as a major factor that contributed to the deepening of the effects of Europeanization in the Turkish foreign policy. During this period, important policy initiatives taken by the Turkish government, notably the Justice and Development Party (JDP), in support of the UN plan designed for resolving the Cyprus conflict, made a novel impact on the issue. The reassessed objectives of Turkey were stated in the revised version of the NPAA (2003), which put forward the Turkish agenda for domestic institutional reforms and foreign policy alignment with the EU.

Turkey's EU Accession Negotiations Process (2002-2006): Cyprus Problem Revisited

On 13 December 2002, the Copenhagen European Council concluded that "if in December 2004 the European Council, based upon the report and recommendation of the European Commission, decides that Turkey sufficiently fulfills the Copenhagen political criteria", the Union would "open accession negotiations without delay."¹⁸ This statement pointed to the launch of a major incentive in support of Turkey's alignment process with EU norms and policies. The European Council's resolutions, in 2003, on Turkey's accession negotiations reinforced the credibility of the EU's enlargement strategy and provided justification to the new Turkish government's reformist policy rhetoric. The JDP government, elected on 3 November 2002, and the Republican People's Party, the main opposition party in the Turkish Parliament, passed major EU harmonization reforms between 2003 and 2006. This period, therefore, witnessed considerable progress in the alignment of Turkey's foreign

policy structures with the EU's common foreign, security and defense policy structures. However, the Cyprus issue remained as a major foreign policy challenge for Turkey during the process of accession negotiations. Furthermore, in relation to the enlargement policy, there had been a reluctance, on the EU's part, to continue to dwell on the prolonged Cyprus dispute to the extent that it had been challenging the supranational efforts of enhancing the EU's security strategy.¹⁹

It wouldn't be wrong to suggest that in the name of reaching a peaceful settlement on Cyprus, the EU's policy strategy has functioned to push for foreign-policy change in Turkey through the tools of the enlargement policy. The goal of peaceful settlement of the Cyprus dispute accordingly appeared in all of the relevant EU official reports on Turkey from 2002 to 2006.²⁰ What is striking is that the impact of the EU's policy strategy has been clearly felt on Turkey's current accession negotiations process, and bilateral relations with the EU member states. The Accession Partnership document (2003) states that Turkey, as a short-term priority, should

in the context of the political dialogue, strongly support efforts to find a comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus problem, through the continuation of the United Nations Secretary General's mission of good offices and of negotiations on the basis of its proposals.²¹

In addition to the revised version of the Accession Partnership documents, in November 2003, the European Commission in its Regular Report on Turkey clearly stated that the absence of a comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus problem between the two communities "could become a serious obstacle to Turkey's EU aspirations." Therefore, the Report emphasized that "Turkey should provide determined support for efforts to achieve a comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus problem."²²

In Turkey's foreign policy rhetoric in the period of 2003-2006 regarding the Cyprus issue, a clear shift from prioritizing security to prioritizing democratic settlement took place. The year following the European Council resolution of December 2002, the revised version of the NPAA (2003) clearly stressed that

as part of the enhanced political dialogue, Turkey will continue to support the efforts of the United Nations Secretary General in his good offices mission aimed at a mutually acceptable settlement, with a view to establishing a new partnership in Cyprus, based on the sovereign equality of the two parties and the realities of the Island. Turkey supports the steps taken by the Turkish Cypriot side, which will foster an environment of confidence and pave the way for a comprehensive solution.²³

Accordingly, finding a peaceful settlement that champions both Cypriot communities will inevitably give priority to the security and defense considerations. Yet, despite some reservations of the main opposition party and some state elites in Turkey regarding the UN's Annan Plan,²⁴ one would content that the JDP government brought along a substantial change in the existing foreign policy strategies.

One of the major reasons behind the transformation of Turkey's Cyprus policy discourses and strategies was the JDP government's political ambition to start the accession negotiations with the EU by 2005. This desire became very evident, when the Turkish government extended unprecedented support in 2004 to the negotiation process over the fifth and latest version of the peace plan developed by the then UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan. The subsequent 24 April referenda in Cyprus received an equal amount of support from the JDP.²⁵ The Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, during his official visit to Washington in January 2004, declared that Turkey supported the peace plan developed by the UN Secretary General in its full means.²⁶

Despite the JDP government's support of the 2004 Annan Plan, the resolution of the Cyprus problem was a far more complicated issue that went beyond any consensus among Greece, Turkey and the EU. The resolution had to involve the establishment of peaceful coexistence through democratic means, between Turkish and Greek Cypriots. The international community's attempts to reconcile the two peoples of the island evidently go decades back from the Helsinki European Council summit of 1999. Yet, the peoples of Cyprus have always found it impossibly difficult to agree on any series of plans under the auspice of the UN.²⁷

On the eve of the double referenda to be held in Cyprus, Turkish Cypriots were backed by a considerable number of pro-EU, reformist

state and political elites in Turkey supporting the comprehensive settlement plan proposed by Annan.²⁸ Within this context, the Turkish party claimed mutual recognition, equal sovereignty rights, and establishment of a federal (or con-federal) model of governance and voted 'Yes' in their 24 April referendum. The Greek Cypriot community, however, to the surprise of the world public, rejected the plan in the referendum held on their side of the island, even though the Annan Plan was infamous for favoring the Greek Cypriot administration over the internationally unrecognized Turkish Cypriot state. The failure of the Annan Plan has, in fact, demonstrated that Greek Cypriots were still reluctant to accept that Turkish Cypriots had equal sovereignty rights with them in governing Cyprus, and were uncompromised in their ambition of unifying Cyprus under a Greek government.²⁹ As a result, neither a federal solution nor a system of shared sovereign and constitutional rights could be achieved between Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots. As one observer has noted, the political manipulation boosting up the feelings of insecurity on both sides of the island during the referendum campaigns triggered a spectacularly communal distrust among Greek Cypriots.³⁰ Their concerns over whether Turkey would let the implementation of the plan work smoothly, whether the island would eventually become a Turkish protectorate, or whether there would be a secure future for Cyprus predominated the Annan-Plan discussions. Furthermore, the fact that the EU would not exert any 'conditionality' sanction on Greek Cypriots in case of their rejection of the plan and would grant them the membership no matter what paved the way to the doom of the Annan Plan.

Between the years 2002 and 2003, the support provided by the reformist camp of the political and state elites for a democratic settlement in Cyprus was an integral part of the foreign-policy strategy change that took place within the framework of Turkey's Europeanization process. In search for a viable solution to the Cyprus issue, democratic concerns prevailed over security priorities in the rhetoric of Turkey's foreign policy. However, the Greek Cypriot community's rejection of the UN plan has rendered the prospects for an enduring solution in Cyprus even more complicated. Following the failure of the plan, the Turkish government declared that Turkey had given full support to the UN efforts in settling the dispute through peaceful, democratic means.³¹

Additionally, after the referendum process, the then Chief of the General Staff Hilmi Özkök (2005) said that

the Turkish Armed Forces has always supported a just and lasting solution to the Cyprus issue ... There have been two consequences of the April 24 referendums; no longer can anyone accuse either Turkey or the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus of causing an impasse on the Cyprus issue ... Turkey could recognize a new order emerging from a negotiation process to be held among parties with equal political status on the island, one which would not be a continuation of the 1960 Republic of Cyprus. This new order must not harm the rights of Turkey arising from the Treaties of Guarantee and Alliance.³²

As one may know, the position of the Turkish military on the Cyprus question is of key significance. On this account, the above words by Özkök must have been heard. The traditional position of the Turkish army on the Cyprus question refuses the withdrawal of the Turkish troops from the island unless a peaceful settlement to the satisfaction of all the parties involved has been reached.³³

In the aftermath of the referenda, the Turkish authorities, including the military, expressed their disappointment in the EU's policy strategies on Cyprus. The Turkish government reminded that Turkey provided its full support to the democratic settlement of the issue in line with the short-term priorities set forth in the Accession Partnership Document. Prime Minister Erdoğan at the World Press Meeting held in November 2006 openly criticized any consideration of the resolution of Cyprus issue as a precondition for the smooth functioning of Turkey's accession process.³⁴ According to the government, after the Turkish Cypriots "Yes" in the referendum, the EU now had to strengthen the channels of political dialogue and economic cooperation with the TRNC and to take initiative to end the Turkish Cypriots' incomprehensibly long isolation from the international community.³⁵ Meanwhile, the government of the TRNC voiced similar criticisms. President Talat, elected on 20 April 2005, declared that "[w]e want a federal state composed of two regions and two people. And, we want for there to be political equality between the two sides. For us this is indispensable. The decision in a united

Cypriot state shall reflect equality.”³⁶ It has thus become clearer than ever that without the maintenance of successful negotiations between the two Cypriot governments on the island, peaceful settlement will remain a naïve dream. Unfortunately, the EU’s admission of the Greek Cypriot government, without necessitating the representation of the Turkish Cypriot community has not only pushed this dream further away, but weakened conflict resolution mechanisms of the UN as well.

Conclusion: Is Europeanization of Turkey’s Foreign Policy Strengthens the Prospects of Democratic Settlement in Cyprus?

The recent change in Turkey’s Cyprus policy along the guidelines of the EU’s political conditionality has encouraged the European Council in its decision to open accession negotiation talks with Turkey on 3 October 2005. However, as an undesired outcome on Turkey’s behalf, the resolution of the Cyprus problem has been established as one of the preconditions for the EU membership of Turkey. The stalemate on the island now inevitably hinders the pace of Turkey’s accession negotiations. On 11 December 2006, the European Council, upon the recommendation of the European Commission, decided to partially suspend accession negotiations on eight of the thirty five negotiating areas with Turkey under the pretext that Turkey had failed to implement its obligation under the Association Agreement to remove trade barriers applied Greek Cypriots. The EU’s Commissioner for Enlargement, Olli Rehn, affirmed that the Turkish Parliament “must ratify the Customs Union Additional Protocol in order for the accession negotiations to proceed.”³⁷

The JDP government expressed its objections to the decision of the European Council.³⁸ And, Prime Minister Erdoğan subsequently responded to the same decision as such: “Nobody shall expect us to open the airports and ports unless the isolation of Northern Cyprus is relieved.”³⁹ According to the Turkish government, all of this was very unfair on Turkey. Cyprus cannot be an obstacle to Turkey’s accession negotiations, since the resolution of the problem depends on the negotiation talks between the Turkish and the Greek Cypriots in the first place. The then Foreign Minister Abdullah Gül similarly stated that “Turkey is committed to the objective of becoming a full member of the EU ... the platform for the resolution of the Cyprus problem is not the EU but the UN.”⁴⁰ The Republican People’s Party, too joined the JDP

government in expressing concerns on the European Council's decisions to partially suspend the accession negotiations with Turkey. The deputy leader of the party, Onur Öymen, for instance, asserted that the EU membership of Greek Cypriots, in fact, created a situation in violation of international law and the violation would endure, unless a permanent settlement had been found. In Öymen's words, "this membership has become a tool to hinder Turkey's accession process, it is difficult for Turkey to make any concession before the TRNC is recognized as politically equal or Turkey becomes a member of the EU."⁴¹

In the post-2006 period, still in compliance with the EU conditionality, the Turkish government offered several policy propositions leading to the termination of the TRNC's isolation, if not to its recognition by the international community. The JDP government also encouraged Greek Cypriots to open their ports and airports to Turkish Cypriots, as a step that could eventually result in a change in Turkey's current implementation of the Customs Union Agreement. Therefore, Turkey's foreign policy rhetoric on Cyprus suggests that a lasting solution is dependent on an agreement that would take into consideration the demands of Turkish Cypriots.⁴² This stance has now come to define Ankara's conditions for reconsidering "lifting the barriers to trade with Greek Cyprus so as to implement the *acquis* and make it possible to recognize Southern Cyprus within the framework of the Customs Union Agreement and other negotiation frameworks within the EU."⁴³ In 2006, Gül contended that no option other than the recognition of the political equality of the two Cypriot communities was acceptable.⁴⁴

All in all, the Turkish government expects the EU to pursue economic and foreign policies that would relieve the isolation of the Turkish Cypriots and would support a plan for the international recognition of the TRNC. Once such conditions have been met, substantial change in Turkish foreign policy required by the EU would follow. Within this context, Turkey's efforts towards finding a peaceful and democratic settlement of the issue have continued in the wake of the Brussels Presidency Conclusions of 2006. In January 2006, Turkey put forward an action plan that aimed to enforce political cooperation between Greece and Turkey. The Action Plan, which was in part designed to create a breakthrough in the Cyprus impasse, was considered by some as a significant initiative in the sense that it proposed to open Turkey's

one seaport and one airport to Greek Cypriots. In order to promote this new action plan, Gül spelled out the following words to CNN:

I believe we can build confidence between the two sides with this action plan...We propose to lift all kind of economic restrictions on the island. With this action plan we offer to open our seaports, our airports, but also Greek Cypriot side should remove economic embargoes imposed on the Turkish side.⁴⁵

Although the plan was welcomed by the European Commission as a novel step in the solution of the frozen Cyprus conflict, some UN and EU officials pointed out the vagueness of the statements in the Action Plan and recommended its substantial revision. Nevertheless, in the UN Security Council's session of June 2006, the plan played a certain role in conveying the world public the message that "Greek Cypriots seem to remain resistant to any initiatives on substantive issues by the UN or other third parties." Hardly surprising, Greek Cypriots rejected the Action Plan on the grounds that "the concessions offered were already obligations Turkey had undertaken towards the European Union."⁴⁶

To conclude, as this analysis of the Turkish political elite's discourse and EU's official papers demonstrates, a considerable shift in Turkey's foreign policy towards Cyprus has taken place from 1999 to present. In this shift, a civic understanding has infused into the underlining security concerns of Turkey, as it has adopted a rhetoric emphasizing the notion of a democratic settlement. Turkey's ongoing Europeanization process has been one of the factors influencing the foreign policy strategies, tools and opportunity structures in the hands of policy-makers. However, the fact that the EU granted the full membership status to the Greek Cypriot administration before the conflict had been resolved has spectacularly hindered the prospect for further Europeanization of the Turkish foreign policy Europeanization. What is important here, the EU's normative power to promote a lasting solution to the Cyprus issue has been, in fact, weakened by its own enlargement policy strategy. Even though the solution on the island requires the success of the bilateral negotiations between the Turkish and Greek Cypriot communities in the first place, substantial progress in the Turkey-EU confidence-building attempts could stimulate the progress in the ongoing negotiations on the island. Substantial progress, of course, stands for a breakthrough, no less a

development than the lift of the political barriers *de facto* blocking the membership negotiations of Turkey.

The reinvigoration of Turkey's Europeanization process through the alignment of foreign and security policies with the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy could, in effect, sufficiently facilitate the democratic settlement in Cyprus. As it comes to the fore here, finding a stable solution to the Cyprus issue involves the peaceful coexistence of Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots, which depends on the restoration of confidence between the two communities. Currently, bilateral peace talks continue between the Cypriot leaders, even though an agreement to satisfy both sides has not yet been reached. Still, the change in the EU's current discouraging attitude towards Turkey's accession process could at once boost up the impact of Europeanization on the Turkish foreign policy and hence contribute to the breaking of the deadlock on the Cyprus question.

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EU'S Capacity of Creating Desirable Outcomes: Cyprus, Georgia, Central Asia, and Some Other Matters of Normative Leadership

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Abstract

This paper seeks to explore the normativeness of the EU by judging its capacity of creating desirable outcomes through its foreign-policy implementation process. From the 1990s on, the EU has become more visible in global politics as a unique, non-traditional actor using its norms and values as a deliberative force. Nevertheless, its conflict-management patterns, conduct of foreign affairs beyond its neighbourhood, participation in the sustainable-development efforts, fight against the climate change, and attitude towards the global financial crisis have all displayed that the EU is, in fact, not at ease in creating desirable outcomes subsequent to its foreign-policy actions. The failure of the Annan Plan in Cyprus is one of the quintessential examples of the EU's consequence-challenged foreign politics. This paper intends to probe the Cyprus question from the perspective of the EU's normative leadership. Georgia, Central Asia, the Doha Round, climate change, and the global financial crisis are among the topics that will be enquired into here in a similar light.

Keywords: Normative leadership, EU's actorness, Cyprus, Georgia, Central Asia, Doha Round

Özet

Bu makale, AB'nin dış politika uygulama süreci çerçevesinde istenilen sonuçları yaratabilme kapasitesini ve buna bağlı olarak normatifliğini sorgulamayı amaçlamaktadır. 1990lardan itibaren AB, yaptırım gücü olarak norm ve değerlerini kullanan benzersiz ve geleneksel olmayan bir aktör olarak küresel politikada giderek daha görünür oldu. Ancak, çatışma çözme yöntemleri, komşuluk bölgesinin dışında uyguladığı politikalar, sürdürülebilir kalkınma çabalarına katkısı, iklim değişikliği ile mücadelesi ve küresel finansal kriz karşısındaki duruşu, AB'nin dış politika uygulamalarında istediği sonuçları almakta aslında zorlandığını göstermektedir. Annan Planı'nın Kıbrıs'ta başarısızlığa uğraması, AB'nin tecrübe ettiği bu güçlüğün en tipik göstergelerinden biridir. Bu makale, Kıbrıs sorununa AB'nin normatif liderliği perspektifinden bakmayı amaçlamaktadır. Kıbrıs ile birlikte Gürcistan, Orta

Asya, Doha Turu, iklim deęişiklięi ve küresel finansal kriz konuları da burada bu bakış açısı ile ele alınmaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Normatif liderlik, AB'nin aktörlüğü, Kıbrıs, Gürcistan, Orta Asya, Doha Turu

Introduction

Honouring its founding fathers, the EU has developed an integration policy to foster peace and prosperity within and beyond its borders. It has championed a unique integration model without resemblance in contemporary global politics. Following the dissolution of the Soviet bloc, the EU has forcefully come to the fore as an actor claiming normativeness and a more visible international presence. The thick set of laws, norms, and values enshrined in the *acquis communautaire* has become the features of a European identity in the making. The institutional and discursive framework created by the intergovernmental EU Council and the supranational European Commission in the course of time has served as the backbone of this Europeaness, which is normatively defined through free trade, good governance, democracy, rule of law, and respect for human rights. Having celebrated its fiftieth anniversary, the EU, still a young contender for the world's normative power, has been progressively constructing a deliberative force grounded in peaceful governance and commitment to European norms and values.

In the design of its foreign policy in general and enlargement and neighbourhood policies in particular, the EU has established the compliance with its norms and values as the prerequisite for the further enhancement of its external relations. Also, as its foremost conflict-management, peace-promotion, and negotiating tool, the EU has grown a norm-based existence, and has hence distinguished itself from the other global actors such as the US. In this sense, it has been viewed by some scholars as “a new form of international actor, which has defied categorization.”¹ This article, however, will argue that the EU's normativeness is confined to rhetoric only and is a self-image, which isn't commensurate with the external perceptions of the EU. The lack of military initiative in the Union's *raison d'être* doesn't necessarily vindicate its self-image as a global normative power.

Empirical observations on the EU's norm-based foreign-policy implementations reveal proofs of considerable incapability. In this study, the incapability is understood as the vague, unsure attitude towards the

problematic foreign-policy issues, which prevent the EU from arriving at the desired outcomes. The world public has witnessed countless times that the intended consequences stipulated in the Union's official *papiers* have not been reached subsequent to a foreign-policy (in)action. What is striking, following the failure of producing an envisaged consequence at the end of a foreign-policy (in)action, is that the EU has not assumed responsibility for failure in the way that a normative power ought to. Skilful in dressing its Teflon armour immediately after its solution plan proposed for an international conflict has been removed from the agenda of the international community, no such failure sticks on the EU. And the member states do not feel the urge to debate the reasons of failure in depth.

In discussing the effectiveness of the Union's foreign-policy implementation process, its consequence-challenged presence in the global politics, which casts shadow over its normativeness, requires to be elaborated upon. Within this context, the Cyprus question begs to be revisited from the consequentialist perspective extended to the EU's foreign-policy mechanisms. If after each failure, the member-states, institutions and the officials of the EU do not reconsider and reformulate the efficiency and appropriateness of their policy instruments, the EU could not build normative capacity and improve its perceptions by the third parties. In the aftermath of the collapse of the Annan proposal, the EU spectacularly avoided reassessing its stance on the current situation in Cyprus. Similarly, a close-up view of the EU's dealings with Georgia and Central Asia from a consequentialist perspective is essential in order to arrive at a better comprehension of the European normative power. The EU's international presence in the Doha Round and its responses to the climate change and global financial crisis would also contribute to this inquiry.

The Normativeness of the EU

When Ian Manners coined the term "normative power" to define the EU's *raison d'être* in 2002, the Union had increasingly come to be perceived as the incarnation of the normative ethics in the international system.² In its attempt to provide an ethical and normative framework through its *acquis communautaire* and institutionalism, the EU has aspired a soft leadership on the global level stemming from the power of its norms and values and not from the hard power of a military existence. Although, given the EU's

recent militarization attempts in the name of overhauling its Common Foreign and Security Policy, Manners has revisited his contention of calling the EU a normative power in 2006, discussions over the normative attributes of the EU have already permeated the intellectual agenda.³ In one of his sequential articles, Manners grounds the EU's normative power in its success in changing "the norms, standards and prescriptions of world politics away from the bounded expectations of state-centrity." In this way, it has altered, for the better, "what passes for 'normal' in world politics."⁴ In celebrating its fiftieth anniversary, the EU and its ability to transform the existing conceptions of normal deserve considerable praise.

The normative leadership of the EU, however, is an argument that still requires substantial validation. European normativeness, at the outset, presented itself as the antithesis of American foreign policy and a unique feature of the EU. Nevertheless, as Helen Sjursen, a very harsh critic of arguments for the EU's normativeness, emphasizes, US foreign policy too bears "normative undertones" and "a particular focus on human rights and democratic principles."⁵ The EU's compensation of its lack of military clout with the binding force of norms and values has also been highlighted as a significant tenet of its normative power. The EU's Security Strategy of 2003 in which the future challenges to the European security were spelled out, is a document testifying to the member-states' will not to resort hastily to military options in its conflict-prevention and -solution mechanisms.⁶ The EU Council holds that the contemporary security threats are not necessarily militaristic in character. Furthermore, the EU's superior hand in setting international trade regulations, the conditionality principle conducting the relations with the candidate states, and its financial assistance mechanism to support good governance in newly democratic states serve as better pre-emptive instruments than military force. Nevertheless, Sjursen contests this aspect of the normative EU as well by suggesting that "the use of non-military instruments cannot on its own be enough to identify a polity as a 'normative' power," as "economic sanctions," for instance, "can [too] cause serious harm."⁷

In his attempts at understanding and describing the normative attributes of the EU, Manners explicates the sustainability of normativeness with the perceptions the actors "who practice and experience it."⁸ If normative power is not recognised by its subjects as normative, such power suffers irreconcilable legitimacy problems. The action taken by a normative power, according to the definition provided

by Esther Barbé and Elisabeth Johansson-Nognés, will be “essentially subjective, relational and open to interpretations.”⁹ Normativeness necessitates external approval, either universal or regional. In the absence of such recognition, normativeness is delimited to a self-image and could not be treated as an established fact. And in the discipline of European studies, the EU’s normative role has remained highly disputable and, furthermore, has not been wholeheartedly shared by the candidate and neighbouring states –not to mention the underdeveloped world represented in the World Trade Organisation.¹⁰ The scope of the discussions over the European normativeness evidently exceeds the limits of this study. Therefore, within the broad area of insights into differing normative capacities, it is essential to concentrate on what is relevant to this article.

This article seeks to elaborate on two inherent weaknesses of an international actor’s normative aspirations and thus to enquire how normative the EU’s present foreign policy is. The first feature to be taken into account in this inquiry is the inevitable challenge posed to the norm-based foreign policy implementations by the primordial priority to guard the national, and in the case of the EU, both national and supranational, interests. With such a flaw embedded in the normative-power theories, an actor in international relations with normative aspirations will eventually fall into, what Thomas Diez calls, the “norms versus interest” trap.¹¹ The second inherent weakness that the normative actor would need to surmount is the (in)capability of achieving the desired outcome at the end of the normative action taken. Of course, current international relations lack an ideal observer who would judge the consequences that an action produces. On this account, the judgement of the actors who have been directly affected by the action taken should determine whether that action is right or wrong, normative or not. Drawing on Elizabeth Anscombe’s consequentialism, Manners contends that if a consequentialist approach is to be adopted in understanding the EU’s normative power, then “analysing the impacts of EU actions and their implications for others” will be imperative.¹² Without dwelling on the consequentialist ethics, which has extreme and ambitious interpretations underpinning the truism the “end justifies means,” this study argues that the failure of attaining the intended consequences contributes to the normative quality of an action.

In the absence of an ideal observer, the outcomes of the EU's foreign-policy (in)actions are judged by the actors subjected to them. In their widely cited work *The European Union as a Global Actor*, Charlotte Bretherton and John Vogler hold that the EU's actorness could be perceived through three elements: opportunity, presence, and capability. Opportunity stands for the necessity that requires a foreign-policy action. Presence denotes the will of an actor to take an action to influence the geography beyond its jurisdictional area. Finally, capability refers to "the ability to exploit opportunity and capitalise on presence."¹³ In the case of the EU's actorness, the capability element has not been fully reinforced, as the EU's foreign-policy actions encounter both the 'norm vs. interest' dilemma and a grave deficiency of facilitating intended results. The EU's problematic capability as a global actor inevitably exerts a negative influence on how it is perceived by others. In this respect, it wouldn't be wrong to suggest that its external perception as an uncertain and unreliable actor doesn't coincide with the EU's self-image as a normative power.

In the coming sections, the EU's foreign-policy (in)actions towards some notoriously problematic issues such as Cyprus, Georgia, the Doha Round, climate change, and the financial crisis will be probed into. Having tested the EU's conflict-management and norm-promotion skills, these currently unresolved issues shake the ground on which the EU aspires for normative actorness. Additionally, its Central Asia strategy is the quintessential example of the tension between norms and interests, which presents considerable challenges to the EU in creating a stable, accountable foreign policy. On this account, Central Asia should also be included in this inquiry of the EU's (in)capability of attaining the desired outcomes beyond its borders. Of course, the way that Mathias Albert and his friends define the EU as "no single, unified actor," but rather "a set of actors...and an institutional and discursive frame"¹⁴ provides an explanation for why the EU's foreign policy falters from a consequence-oriented perspective. Nevertheless, since the EU's official papers insist on its global actorness and readiness "to share responsibility for global security,"¹⁵ such faltering can't go unnoticed.

A Reluctant Normative Power: EU and the Cyprus Question

Manners contends that "[t]he ethics of the EU's normative power" is enshrined in its "ability to normalize a more just, cosmopolitical world."

Grounding his argument of cosmopolitics in the comprehensive discussions of Pheng Cheah and Bruce Robbins, Manners embraces the definition of cosmopolitics as the moral force “empowering people in the actual conditions of their lives.”¹⁶ Once such understanding of cosmopolitics has been recognized as a valid criterion to evaluate the normative capability of the EU, it is essential to take it into account in the probes about the EU’s normative-policy implementation habits and their outcomes. From this perspective, if an EU policy fails to bear the consequence of empowering people and bettering the socio-economic and political conditions in which they live, such failure gives one the reason to question the global actorness of the EU and its cosmopolitan capability. At this point, the Cyprus question comes to the fore as a relevant topic that explicates more about the current potential of the European cosmopolitics.

There is no doubt that the role of the EU in the Cyprus question has been widely treated by many able hands. Nevertheless, as the problem persists, it has not yet been a subject definitively exhausted. It has appeared and reappears repeatedly within the context of the EU’s enlargement policies, conflict-management abilities, and, of course, of its normative actorness. Evidently, this article does not aim to recap the interminable history of the Cyprus conflict or to provide a content analysis of the exceptionally large literature on the problem. It rather seeks to pin down the normative consequences of the Greek Cypriot government’s adhesion to the EU as the Republic of Cyprus with particular reference to the Annan Plan. When the Union offered the membership prospect to the Greek Cypriot administration, EU officials, experts and academics seemed to be convinced that the membership negotiations would indeed have, what Diez called, “a catalytic effect on the Cyprus conflict,” which would accelerate a working and permanent solution on the island.¹⁷ Nonetheless, the expectations towards the EU’s catalytic role in this frozen conflict have, till today, remained unfulfilled and the envisaged consequences have not been achieved. This article is concerned with the point that the way in which the EU has dealt with Cyprus, in terms of the outcomes of the actions taken, is underwhelming.

Since the opening of the membership negotiations with Cyprus in March 1998, the EU has pursued a process in which it divorced its role as an outsider and reconstructed its position, despite its contrary claims, as a “part of the conflict.”¹⁸ To be more exact, it has assumed a dual role both

as a neutral mediator and a partial entity guarding the interest of its members, Greece and the Greek Cypriot government. Given the awkwardness of the situation and its inherent incapability of facilitating desirable outcomes, the EU has taken part in the conflict as at once an enthusiastic and a hesitant, reluctant actor, which took one step forward and two steps back. Furthermore, to a certain degree, this unclear attitude has contributed to the perpetuation of the problem. As held by Mathias Albert, Thomas Diez and Stephen Stetter, in the cases of frozen conflicts, the integration process could in fact trigger “the effect of intensifying conflict discourse.”¹⁹ In the aftermath of the Annan-Plan referenda in Cyprus, such intensification on discursive level resurfaced alongside the spectacular disappointment of those who invested their hopes in a EU-promoted solution. As Mustafa Türkeş puts it, the involvement of the EU in the Cyprus question has not solved the problem, but rather transformed it –and not yet for the better.²⁰

European integration was expected to bridge the Greek and Turkish parties of the Cyprus conflict through “the legal and normative framework of the EU,” which would work to “delegitimize previously dominant positions.”²¹ It is true that the EU membership prospect has shifted the ground on which the conflicting parties stood and that some positions have been repositioned. Nevertheless, the transformation in motion set by the EU has not touched equally the lives of all peoples concerned by the current situation on the island. In other words, adopting the language of cosmopolitics, the EU, since its involvement in the question through its support of the Annan Plan, has been incapable of empowering the Turkish Cypriots in their actual lives. What has grown to be integral to the EU’s ethos, “the neofunctionalist logic of a reorientation of daily practices towards a new centre through the integration process” has not been extended to Northern Cyprus. The estimated consequence of the planned action, therefore, has fallen short of the requisite of “bringing people together” and “transforming their daily lives.”²² The financial aid and technological assistance to rehabilitate the infrastructure and better the waste management has not sufficed for such transformation.

In its dealings with Cyprus, the EU always underlines “its embeddedness in the UN discourse,”²³ hence its obligation to act within the framework drawn by the UN. What is more, the Union seeks to justify its position as an impartial outsider to the Cyprus question by particularly relying on these claims. However, from the moment the EU offered full

membership to the Greek Cypriots to represent Cyprus as the legitimate government and included them in its decision-making process with a veto right, it has internalised the problem and become partial by definition. The EU's self-assumption about still being an outside actor is misplaced, as it is "not shared by Turkish and Turkish-Cypriot officials."²⁴ Since the commencement of its accession process, the Greek Cypriot administration, allied with Greece, has campaigned for "a European solution"²⁵ and hindered any attempt by any other member state to empower the people of Northern Cyprus in their actual lives. Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots have been thus reduced to a lesser, unequal status among the conflicting parties.

When the Turkish Cypriot administration, with the encouragement of the AKP government of Turkey, opened their frontiers in 2003 and let Greek Cypriots step into the territories under its jurisdiction, this move was considered as a turning point in the Cyprus impasse and the solid proof of the positive influence of Europeanization in the foreign policy of Turkey, a candidate country.²⁶ Though still a baby step, it also demonstrated the Turkish Cypriots' will to accelerate its move towards a political solution. It was a quintessential example of the non-member states' attempt to adjust their current foreign-policy implementations according to the European policies and norms. Such attempts were even further encouraged by the Greek Cypriots' lifting of the restrictions on the mobility of Turkish Cypriots across the island. As a sequence to these developments over Cyprus on the eve of the EU's fifth enlargement, Brussels put the UN's Annan Plan to referendum on both sides of the island on 24 April 2004, just days before Cyprus joined the Union. When the plan was rejected by 76 percent of Greek Cypriots and accepted by 64 percent of Turkish Cypriots, the EU's dream of admitting in a unified island, in an open Democracy commentator's words, "hit the rocks of political reality."²⁷ Of course, right from the outset, the Cyprus question has not followed a smooth path and the EU in April 2004 tried its hand at an almost unprecedentedly difficult task. The rejection of the Annan Plan, nonetheless, points to the EU's inherent weakness of achieving the consequences intended and, in many respects, is a failure, which should have implications for the normativeness of the EU.

Despite the overtly expressed disappointment of the EU's then commissioner for enlargement, Gunter Verheugen, who felt "deceived"²⁸ by the Greek Cypriots' last-minute change of heart and overwhelming

“No” to the Annan Plan, the Greek government of Cyprus was rewarded by full membership within the following couple of days. The fact that the EU did not set the condition of a permanent and coherent solution on the island as a prerequisite of the adhesion of Cyprus and that, instead, it assured the Greek Cypriot leadership of the unconditionality of their candidature definitely contributed to the further entanglement of the already complicated issue. As Hugh Pope, a senior analyst with the International Crisis Group, commented on the doom of the Annan Plan, “Cyprus now has no real carrot to go for a solution and there is no real stick to use against it. There are no brakes on the situation anymore.”²⁹ The EU had to settle for a design in complete defiance of its historical mission of value and norm promotion.

What is striking here is that the EU has never treated the ill fate of the Annan Plan as one of its own shortcomings that restrict the success of its conflict management policy. On the day after the double referenda on the island, it took refuge in its traditional role as an outsider to the problem and restored the Cyprus deadlock back to the UN agenda. As if such failure never existed, it has not been debated within the EU. And this attitude, in the words of Türkeş, is “understandable but not acceptable.”³⁰ Today, the leaders of Greek and Turkish Cypriots bilaterally come together on a regular basis to work out the solution yearned for by all involved parties for decades now. Given the Greek Cypriots’ EU membership and the willingness of Turkish Cypriots to rightfully join the Union, one has reason to assume that the tendency to honour European norms, values and institutionalism is decisive in the ongoing negotiations. This aspect of the current situation in Cyprus may be explained by the EU’s normative actorness and therefore appreciated. Nevertheless, its hesitancy and delay in empowering Turkish Cypriots in their actual lives, reluctance to step forward as an assertive mediator capable of achieving the intended results, inconsistency in its dealings with the Cyprus question, and, finally, its insistence on deploying the ‘trial and error method’ as a viable conflict-management instrument challenge the EU’s self-image as the global normative power.

Crisis in the Neighbourhood: Georgia’s August War with Russia

In a quest for the actorness capability and normative capacity of the EU, the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) serves as another apt place to conduct particular scrutiny.³¹ Since its official launch in 2004, it has

functioned within a distinctive discursive framework of peace, universal values, good governance, rule of law, mutual benefit, and regional cooperation and, in appearance, remained a decisive attempt to extend this normative discourse to Europe's widely defined periphery. Grounded in the principle of providing European expertise for the 'right' kind of statehood, climate improvement and free trade in the regions that fall out of the reach of the EU's enlargement policy, the ENP has promised stability and cooperation to the partner states, of course, in return for their commitment to the European norm and values. Its norm-promoting capacity in economically backward and politically troubled countries has even been further enhanced, as the European Neighbourhood Partnership Instrument (ENPI) replaced in 2007 the EU's two technical and financial assistance programmes: TACIS (Strengthening Environmental Information and Observation Capacity in the Newly Independent States) and MEDA (Euro-Mediterranean Partnership). For the budget period 2007-2013, the ENP countries are allocated an amount of 11 billion euro excluding the financial contributions by the European Investment Bank and some voluntary EU member states.³²

Through the ENP, the EU has found a means not to alienate 16 neighbouring countries, which, for the time being, are not offered membership prospects. It has engaged with them in mutually rewarding commercial relations and political dialogue that would inspire them to eventually solve the 'frozen' conflicts at hand in a peaceful way. Furthermore, the ENP has exerted a boosting influence on the EU's capability of setting norms far afield and thus underpinned its tendency towards establishing a hegemonic position. Its neighbourhood strategy should have ideally gained Europe leverage in its competition with the US and Russia over dominance in South Caucasia. Nevertheless, the ENP resembles only on paper a subtle or sound hegemonic plan, which could have given hope to those willing to see the EU with a more dominant and assertive role in the international arena. The policy's implementation process has proven that the EU is not yet able to live up to the ambitious targets and missions permeating the official documents issued by the European Commission. Georgia's August war with Russia has unfortunately justified the doubts of those who questioned the EU's reliability as an omnipotent neighbour.

Beside provision of financial and technical assistance, empowerment of a conflict-resolution mechanism through the ENP has been paramount

to the designers of this potentially hegemonic plan. It wouldn't be wrong to say that the ENP area was permeated with frozen conflicts and if the EU succeeded in taking greater part in eliminating some of them before they were defrosted, this tangible interest in "pursuing universal values" might grow the ENP into "a vehicle for the UN Charter's ambition with regard to peace and conflict settlement."³³ Thus, as an alternative to the hard power of the US, the EU would venture to fulfil its interest in spreading good governance, rule of law and civil dialogue as well as securing trade and energy routes through an overt lack of military initiative. Although the soft-power of the EU has engaged in some "ethical action" and demonstrated a "moral stance"³⁴ in its dealings with Europe's periphery, the ENP has recently proven ineffective in creating substantial political dialogue and preventing military confrontation among Georgia, South Ossetia and Russia. Georgia's four-year participation in the neighbourhood policy has left a bitter taste in the mouth of Georgians and caused considerable disappointment and resentment.

Subsequent to the Rose Revolution in 2003, having promised comprehensive political reform and substantial transformation, Georgia was fully convinced that this new pro-democratic path would lead to the EU membership in the near future. The Partnership and Cooperation Agreement had been in force since 1999 and familiarized Georgia, though in a limited degree, with the dynamics of the European integration. Now, under the leadership of the west-oriented, revolution hero Mikhail Saakashvili, Georgian statecraft had more reasons than ever to expect from the EU a better offer no less than membership prospect. Nevertheless, to their great disappointment in June 2004, eight months after the revolution, the EU classified Georgia as a 'neighbour' together with Armenia and Azerbaijan by excluding it from the current enlargement agenda. Still, Georgia didn't cease looking up to the EU, and the US of course, for its welfare, prosperity and security. The appointment of the former Minister of Defence, Giorgi Baramidze, as the Vice-Prime Minister and State Minister for Euro-Atlantic Integration in December 2004 was one of many indicators of Georgia's inclination towards the West. Particularly, the point suggesting that the relations with the EU may still result in full membership grew to be a rhetorical strategy frequently used in domestic political discourse in Georgia.

For the sake of the ideal of the EU, the post-revolution government of Georgia risked antagonizing an economically aggressive and politically domineering Russia, which is geographically a much closer neighbour than the EU. On that account, Georgia expected to hear from Europe more assertive and concrete strategies that would help it resist the overwhelming influence of Russia in the region. To be included in the EU's general system of preferences for trade, food security programme, civil society dialogue or budgetary reform initiatives fell short of Georgia's imperative requirement for a "substantial, immediate and politically oriented support"³⁵ that would peacefully extinguish the separatist movements active in its territory. The EU has expressly maintained distance from the tough questions related to Georgia's territorial sovereignty.

In 2005, a working paper published in Britain aptly asked the question whether the EU's neighbourhood policy could deliver Georgia.³⁶ Georgia joined the ENP with the baggage of frozen conflicts with South Ossetia and Abkhazia and hoped that the EU, through the dynamics of its neighbourhood policy, would eventually offer meaningful guidance "putting pressure on Russia to encourage its proxies to negotiate constructively."³⁷ In origin, the ENP has been devised to enhance the EU's capacity as a global actor exerting sound influence beyond its borders. The conflicting situations in Georgia, in effect, represented a great opportunity for the EU to test its 'neighbourly' hegemonic powers. The problematic independence claims of South Ossetia and Abkhazia have troubled Georgia since the fall of the Soviet Union, and the Rose Revolution of 2003 marked a turning point in terms of the accelerating importance of the EU alongside the US in the resolution of the conflicts. As Georgia became the key actor in the transit energy route from the Caucasus to Europe, the Saakashvili government came to believe firmly in the indispensability of Georgia for the EU. In its historical presidential statement of November 11, 2003 the EU claimed to be "a global actor possessing the instruments and ability to improve the lives of people beyond the borders of Europe."³⁸ Against this background, in its rivalry with Russia over the unresolved separatist conflicts in its own territory, Georgia relied on the EU's global-power attributes, which, however, hadn't been tested beyond rhetoric.

The way the EU handled Georgia's August war - to the justification of the Eurosceptics, who doubt the EU's skills of conducting a distinct

and efficient foreign policy- displayed the immaturity and inaccuracy of its regional and global leadership discourse. From the outset of the Georgian crisis, instead of demonstrating a strong will in order to resolve conflicts, the EU rather pursued a “timid ‘Russia-first’ policy”³⁹ at the expense of Georgia and jeopardised the future of the ENP by its own hands. Inspired by the long-distance prospect of EU candidacy, in January 2005 Saakashvili concluded his plans of peace to be presented to the Council of Europe and consented to Moscow’s attempts at granting citizenship to the residents of South Ossetia and Abkhazia and accepted the dual citizenship as a *fait accompli*.⁴⁰ As an indication of encouragement, Tbilisi in return expected to be included in the EU’s visa-facilitation list. Nevertheless, in late 2006, the EU completed a visa-facilitation agreement not with Georgia but in fact with Russia. Having done that, the EU – as expressed by the Georgian ambassador to the EU – further complicated an already very sensitive situation and not in favour of Georgia. Contrary to the essence of the ENP, the EU undermined the efforts of Georgia to keep its relations with South Ossetia, Abkhazia and, of course, Russia in balance as well as to “consolidate the incipient democratization in process.”⁴¹

The outburst of the South-Ossetia separatist movement, Georgian intervention, and Russia’s military actions in Georgia in August 2008 have displayed that unlike the discursive suggestions of Europe’s capability “to project notions of peaceful coexistence into previously conflict-ridden territories within and beyond its borders,”⁴² the EU was not yet the normative power that it claimed to be. In the article published in *Speigel*, the former Dutch Prime Minister Ruud Lubbers and his friends argue that “the explosive situation” in Georgia “can not be resolved without a coherent policy response from the European Union.” The ENP should have served as a preventive mechanism communicating European norms and values to the conflicting parties. Europe, however, refrained from interfering “much earlier as a mediator” and “this was a serious mistake.”⁴³ In its attempts at creating a coherent foreign policy, the EU still functions on the principle of “trial and error” and unlike the argument put forward by the article entitled ‘In Defence of Europe,’ this fact does not make it a “pioneer actor” or “one of the most formidable machines for managing differences peacefully ever invented.”⁴⁴ In order to go beyond its very impressive rhetoric of ‘force of good,’ the EU should learn, for the sake of its neighbours, to be able to act on the right

strategy once and for all, without waiting first for the bitter lessons of failure to guide the policy-making process. The Spanish Foreign Minister Miguel Angel Moratinos, for example, could have urged the EU, prior to the August war, to conclude “certain practical steps of visa facilitation” and “some free trade relationship” with Georgia, but more importantly to give this neighbouring country “a political signal” promising this time the stable support of the EU.⁴⁵

Another Soft-Power Dilemma: EU’s Central Asia Strategy

In addition to its painful and equally disappointing dealings with Georgia, the EU’s Central Asia Strategy is definitely another test case that would measure the EU’s ever-questionable capability of pursuing a soft-power leadership. In discussing how effective the EU’s efforts of norm promotion are, or could be, its relations with the five republics of Central Asia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, appear to be highly determining. Cornered by its excessive reliance on the world’s ‘undemocratic’ energy sources, the EU prefers to act rather as a trade partner and hence mutes the assertive voice within supposed to set the European values as the prerequisite of its more friendly existence in the region.

In terms of further cooperation in energy supply and trade, as the meeting between the EU troika and the foreign ministers of these five states in Ashgabat on 9-10 April 2008 showed, a rapprochement between the two geographies, connected through pipelines, has been happening for some time. In compliance with the EU’s quest for new energy transport routes, energy-saving and energy-efficient projects as well as for renewable energy resources, the Central Asia generously offers various prospects of partnership and opportunities, including the Trans-Caspian corridor. Being fully aware of these prospects, the EU, since the independence of these republics, has allocated moderate but mounting financial assistance that has today reached the amount of 1,4 billion euros. Furthermore, as Benita Ferrero-Waldner, EU’s Commissioner for External Relations and European Neighbourhood Policy, frequently highlights, in the budget period 2007-2013, the EU has earmarked a total of 750 million euros to be used in Central Asia related matters.⁴⁶ Within these enhancing liaisons, the energy dialogue, as the EU interminably seeks to secure its energy supply and reduce its very visible dependence on Russia, seems to be given the ultimate priority.

Nevertheless, the soft-power aspiration of the EU requires a more complex interaction between two parties to facilitate progress in terms of rule of law, democratization, good governance, and education. Despite its inherent commitment to these values, Brussels has appeared rather slow to reinforce an action plan to attend to these priorities. Having so far managed its Central Asia policy through one-facet approach of energy interests, the EU has deliberately and conveniently postponed its norm-promoting, reform-facilitating role. European public opinion, on the other hand, is very aware of this neglect and through the NGOs and press; it aims to influence the European Commission's dealings with the Caucasias in favour of a norm-oriented attitude.⁴⁷

The Central Asia Strategy, relaunched in Ashgabat on 14-15 May 2008, reveals one of many dilemmas embedded in the functioning of the EU foreign policy. As Diez puts, in the mission of creating and promoting norms to guide the international affairs, a clash between the norms and interests will be inevitable at some point.⁴⁸ When the norm promoter in the international arena faces the dilemma of choosing between its economic, political or geostrategic interest and the norm to be promoted and when the norm in question jeopardizes the interest in question, the norm promoter's capacity of surmounting such dilemma should determine its capability as a soft power. In the cases of disentangled norms and interests, the EU has not always adopted an uncompromising stance constantly enhancing its civilian and normative power, fostering human rights, democracy and the rule of law.

The shifting position of the EU causes neighbour states, NGOs and scholars to question the EU's sincerity and capability as a soft power. Despite the EU officials' claim to be learning from mistakes, rather than following an unfolding great strategy, in terms of skilfully conducting its foreign affairs, the EU has been facing what Christopher Hill underlined fifteen years ago as the "capability expectation gap."⁴⁹ When the policy area to attend to is the energy-supply security and the counterparts are the once 'newly independent' republics of Central Asia, the EU deliberately fails to highlight its civilian-power discourse and appears mostly as an energy partner acting solely on its own interests. In that sense, it appears almost trivial whether the EU has fulfilled the capability expectation of its own public or not. Such pragmatic attitude, undoubtedly, exerts a damaging influence on the soft- power aspirations.

As German Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier said last year, on the occasion of the introduction of the EU's new Central Asia Strategy, "countries such as Russia, China, Japan, Turkey and the US are very present there" and, inevitably, there is an urgent need for "some catching up to do in Europe" on the matter.⁵⁰ Therefore, the EU encounters a very serious competition in Central Asia, which attributes priority to the economic and security interests at the expense of promoting the European values and principles of good governance. It is clear that the competitive environment dominated mainly by Russia, Turkey and the US prevents the EU from insisting on the socio-political transformation of the Central Asian republics as the prerequisite of further economic and security cooperation.

It is evident here that a firm, uncompromising attitude similar to that adopted in face of the candidate and some neighbouring states is simply not affordable in such conditions. Furthermore, if the norm promotion put at the front as prerequisite in the progress of the relations with the Central Asian republics, the assertive tone constantly reminding of the lack of reforms in the arrays of democracy, human rights and the rule of law would in effect strengthen in the region the hands of Russia and Turkey, which already enjoy significantly much tighter interaction with the five republics due to their geographical, cultural and historical proximity. The EU takes expressly cautious steps for not losing ground to other states in the crowded rivalry over Central Asia.

The shifting position of the EU in playing the norm promoter has not gone unnoticed by the NGOs in Europe and a strong opposition appealing for an uncompromised commitment towards the enhancement of the civil society equally in every candidate, associate or partner state has emerged. Among the most fervent participators of this opposition, the Human Rights Watch criticizes the EU on the grounds that "a credibility gap exists between words and deeds." It is no longer possible to conceal the fact that the member states have "no room for manoeuvre because of their energy dependency" in their dealings with Russia and Central Asia and the soft-power prestige of the EU erodes considerably because of this – and not a little– flaw.⁵¹ Of course, expecting a monolithic attitude towards all 130 states, which the EU has established relations with is not realistic. Nevertheless, consistency while conducting foreign affairs and claiming soft but still a hegemonic power is essential and the EU receives much

criticism on its inconsistency and insufficiency with its good governance-building incentive, especially from the civil actors within.

The meeting between the EU-3, Commissioner Ferrero-Waldner, then current EU president Slovenia and coming president France, and five of the Central Asian republics on 9-10 April 2008, as a matter of fact, aimed at a renovated, intensified dialogue to serve both the overhaul of the soft-power credibility of the EU and the broadening of the cooperation areas designated between the two parties. The new dialogue suggests a tighter interaction in the spheres of politics, economics, environmental protection, education, poverty reduction and law as well as security and energy. It also envisages comprehensive plans for personnel training, human resources development and, of course, civil-society building. This meeting was the third time that the EU and the Central Asian states came together at the level of foreign ministers and it was the first time that a will was exhibited more strongly than ever on both sides to take their cooperation and association to another level, beyond just mere projects. A tangible indicator of this new phase of comprehensive cooperation will be the "Europa House," which, as Ferrero-Waldner points, will be built in Ashgabat as a contact point in Central Asia and in accordance with the intensification of the EU existence in the region, full Delegation offices will be opened in all Central Asian states.⁵²

Undoubtedly, all these attempts by the EU Council and Commission are designed to foster a new relationship with the Central Asian states essentially grounded in norm promotion and thus to respond well to the criticisms of the European civil society. Ferrero-Waldner's words spelled out after the 9/10 April meeting saying "human rights are, indeed, a very important part for us in our external relations, and therefore we really want to see an even better commitment" are significant in that sense.⁵³ Re-emphasising its soft-power mission, the EU seeks to join the international competition over the Central Asia as a hegemon promising stability, good governance and democratization and asking further integration of transport and energy networks and common actions strengthening border management and drug trafficking control in return.

Nevertheless, norm-promotion in foreign realms does not always yield desired outcomes. Whereas other actors compete for dominance in the region without setting prerequisites such as painful and comprehensive political transformation in their offers of security and trade, the EU carries around its neck a very heavy burden of norms,

which makes the European promise at times very repulsive and offensive to the partner or associate states. In order to prevent the departure of these states from its sphere, the EU has also begun to adjust its soft-power discourse in the way to elaborate that the partnership and association programmes will be more carefully “tailored to the specific needs of each country”⁵⁴ and that they will not always prescribe one rigid set of unchanging norms. And in the case of Central Asian states, as Ferrero-Waldner puts, the EU is now more “aware of different historical and cultural contexts” there and will act accordingly.⁵⁵ Still, even such compromise from the norm-promoting stance unleashes criticism and accusations of double standard within the EU.

All in all, the EU has not yet overcome the ‘capability expectation gap’ that becomes shamefully visible in its foreign affairs and the Central Asia is especially an apt test case to observe such gap. Although the expectation from the EU to sustain the rule of law, democratization and good governance in its neighbourhood and beyond, through comprehensive cooperation and multilateral partnership treaties are high, its capability in doing that is, in reality, restrained by its need for energy. As long as the EU states’ inconceivable need for energy continues, the EU’s soft-power capability will not be realised in its full force. The soft-power capability requires lots of prescriptions of bitter medicine for socio-political and economic transformation most of which may disturb the counterpart governments and put the energy interests of the EU at risk.

A Sample of Other Dilemmas: Doha Round, Climate Change, and Economic Crisis

The EU’s normative capacity has not only been tested over its performance of spreading democratization and good governance as well as of eliminating the frozen conflicts within and beyond its borders in a peaceful way. As a global actor, the EU is also required to manifest strong leadership in terms of norm setting in the areas such as global sustainable development, climate change and international financial governance. Participation in the “sustainable development of the Earth, solidarity and mutual respect among people, free and fair trade” and undoubtedly the “eradication of poverty”⁵⁶ with results of the desired sort will retain its role in determining the normative capacity of the EU. The deadlock of the Doha Round, the attempts within the EU to delay the

climate-change package and the hesitant attitude towards the global financial crisis and the possible scheme to recreate the Bretton Woods institutions point to the acute problem of producing the consequences compatible with the EU's self-assumed moral image.

Evidently, the EU considers the spread and enhancement of its trade regime as a foreign-policy matter. As a working paper by Ulrika Mörth exhibits, through its participation in the WTO the EU aims to pursue four norm-based issues. The first three normative priorities, which are called "the issues of substance," are related with environment protection, health –particularly within the context of intellectual property- and labour rights. The fourth priority of the EU necessitates "good governance in the WTO."⁵⁷ Since the WTO's first ministerial conference in 1996 in Singapore, the EU has treated the WTO as an invaluable platform, which bears the potential to realise its normative designs for global trade. In the beginning, the EU provided much support to the three working groups on trade facilitation and investment, competition and on transparency in government procurement, which have all later come to be known as the Singapore issues.⁵⁸ Nevertheless, the developing countries received those issues rather unpleasantly as the new instruments of manipulation in the hands of the dominant powers of global politics. Due to the enduring objections from the developing countries, only the trade facilitation of the Singapore issues made its way to the WTO agenda in July 2004. The "tough posture" of the developing countries took the EU member states by surprise.⁵⁹

The failure of the Singapore issues and the subsequent deadlock in the Doha Round draw a clear picture of the developing countries' perceptions of the EU. The developing countries did not consent to incur the cost of compliance to the Singapore issues, because the EU's self-image of normative power is not commensurate with the developing countries' image of the EU within the context of the WTO negotiations. The EU's meticulous efforts to keep the health and environment issues on the negotiating table and to prevent the draft regulations from including agriculture and fisheries have justified the suspicion of the non-western world that the EU is simply "a market-driven technocratic organisation" in the disguise of a normative power.⁶⁰ New regulations on health and environment that the EU is a champion for would, on one hand, impose heavy financial burden on the restricted budgets in the developing world. The inclusion of fishery and agriculture in the trade regime of the WTO

that the EU aims to prevent, on the other hand, will open the European markets more freely to the rest of the world and increase the competition power of the developing countries in their own markets.

It shouldn't be surprising therefore that the EU faces serious legitimacy problems in the WTO. Despite the role it has assumed as a normative actor, the Union's impression perceived by the non-member, external states depicts an interest pursuer, who aims at avoiding the further liberalisation of the agricultural trade at the expense of the developing world. Against this background, the success of the current trade-negotiation round of the WTO, the Doha Round would not have been a realistic expectation. The most recent round of negotiations, which were conducted in the axis of liberalisation versus protectionism, froze on July 23-29 2008. The talks suffered a considerable lack of trust between the negotiating parties and failed, in the end, to resolve the impasse over agriculture, industrial tariffs, non-tariff barriers, and service and trade remedies. The claims of Peter Mandelson, the former EU Commissioner for Trade, arguing that the EU has "never sought to be paid for reform of [the EU's] farm subsidies in Europe by receiving market access in developing country farm markets,"⁶¹ have not exerted any influence on non-European countries.

The Doha Round is another quintessential example demonstrating the gap between the EU's self-image as normative power and its external contesting perceptions. The stalled talks over lowering trade barriers in the Doha Round could have helped the EU empower the world's poor people in the actual conditions of their lives and thus vindicated its own normativeness. Nevertheless, the opposition of several individual EU member-states to the WTO negotiations, such as that of France, have degraded the image that the EU Commission has taken pains to develop. France's opposition towards the EU's concessions on farm subsidies has prevented the EU Commission from stretching its position further for the developing world. Also, equally important, under the roof of the WTO, the EU has not yet received the adequate support from the US to comfort their poor partners and improve their understandings of the western world. In the eyes of the developing countries, the EU and US inevitably partake in the image of a monolithic west.

On the eve of the historical G20 Summit of November 15, the EU and US initiated new attempts to rekindle the Doha Round negotiations. They may eventually arrive at a consensus with India, Brazil, China and

African countries in favour of global sustainable development. Nevertheless, the current stalemate in the Doha Round stands for another tangible proof that the EU's normativeness has not been shared by the rest of the world and that the 'norm versus interest' dilemma still appears to be an effective force in determining the foreign-policy action of any actor aspiring to be normative. Although Mandelson's words saying "we worked for success; we had failure pushed on us"⁶² beg appreciation in the EU's own right, the impasse of the Doha Round constitute no less a failure. The EU's participation in the fight against climate change, another pressing normative concern, should be understood in a similar light.

As the countdown has begun to the World Climate Change Summit to take place in Copenhagen in December 2009 in which a successor agreement to the Kyoto Protocol will be decided, a certain amount of unease surrounds the EU's officials who interminably work to arrive at a consensus on one coherent European climate policy. By virtue of presiding over the EU Council until 1 January 2009, France has assumed the leading role in bringing member states and their contesting viewpoints in line. The opposition from Italy and Poland to the proposed version of climate and energy package has been seemingly overcome only after the negotiated text was obscured by "vague wording" particularly over the topic of energy-intensive industries.⁶³ Having taken its role and responsibility in the fight against the climate change very seriously, the EU put into force the Greenhouse Gas Emission Trading Scheme in 2005 to set green regulations for the energy-intensive sectors and monitor them. Given the insensitive attitude of the Bush administration to climate change, the task to establish global climate governance grounded in firm norms, values, and rules fell upon the Brussels to a great extent. The undertaking of such scheme should undoubtedly be considered to be in support of the EU's claim as a normative force in compliance with the UN's Kyoto Protocol.

The implementation process of the emission trade regulations, nevertheless, ended in some unwanted results across the EU. The failure of collecting accurate "emissions-tracking data" and the member states' individual protectionist policies designed "to shelter their industries from real cuts" caused the EU to set "an artificially high baseline pollution level for companies," which was, in fact, a consequence exactly opposite to the desired one.⁶⁴ Thus, the EU could not meet the previously

designated levels of carbon-emission reduction and in the end, some chapters of the EU's climate policy has once again fallen into the 'capability gap.' The EU's normative capacity has been from the outset restricted by the political economy of energy production and consumption in Europe. Furthermore, as the new government of the US now appears more responsible in involving itself in global problems, Brussels could lose its normative leverage to Washington particularly in terms of climate change.

The member states may eventually iron out their differences in deciding on a coherent, precise climate policy. Nevertheless, one should bear in mind that the tension between the executive and legislative branches inherent in the decision-making practices of the EU will always remain as a force influencing the outcomes to depart from the envisaged end. In the particular of the climate change, the member states could seek to arrive at a climate package at the level of the EU Council where unanimity is required. The pursuit of unanimity, as Romano Prodi said in 2002, paved the way to some historical "darkest moments" of the EU.⁶⁵ Throughout the EU's integration history, if it hasn't caused a deadlock, it has definitely watered down the conclusion statements to be issued and rendered them indecisive and vague. Yet, even though the EU Council will achieve unanimity in the vote on new climate measurements, with questionable efficiency of course, the European Parliament this time will be placed "in a tricky position," as "little room for manoeuvre" will be left for the MEPs who claim to be heard and strive to involve in this decision-making.⁶⁶ A World Wildlife Fund spokeswoman, who expresses her concerns about the consequences of the European climate debate, warns that the EU is "on the verge of losing an ambitious climate package" and, therefore, of sending "the wrong signal to developing countries."⁶⁷

Another recent complication indicating that the EU's actorness incapability still persists has surfaced in the discussions on how to arrive at an appropriate common European response to the global financial crisis. In the wake of the EU Council Summit held on 15-16 October 2008 in Brussels, the French President Nicolas Sarkozy implied to the French daily *Le Monde* that since the Lisbon Treaty, which enshrines a strong EU presidency is on hold consequent to the Irish referendum, the EU Council should resort to alternative ways in order to compensate for the insufficient executive power, especially at rough times of crisis.⁶⁸ To

this end, Sarkozy proposed that France's EU presidency, which was supposed to be over by 01 January 2009, should *de facto* be extended by creating a temporary economic government for a year. France grounds this proposal in the fact that the coming presidents of the EU Council, the Czech Republic and Sweden are not members of the Eurozone and, therefore, are not qualified to lead the Euro states out of the financial storm. When Spain, a member of the Eurozone, takes over the rotating presidency in 2010, France then could terminate this emergency position that is supposed to enable it to serve as acting president.

Although some may see a practical value in this offer, the rest – including the author of this article- consider it as the demonstration of the insufficiency of the EU and its current administrative mechanism to assert a stance on the global level as well as of the inharmonious voices of the member states alienating the option of a consensus in path-changing moments. The prominent member states' reluctance to trust the lesser member states with the presidential tasks could be seen among many factors compromising the Union's integrity and authority as a normative power. Such distrust and incapability clearly cast shadow over efforts to fully enhance the EU's global status. Without hiding their resentment towards the French proposal, the Deputy Prime Minister of the Czech Republic, Alexandr Vondra bitterly expressed that “if the Eurogroup agrees to be presided by a Frenchman and to meet more frequently, most probably we will not be able to prevent this. However it would not be a wise move but one which would divide EU rather than unify it.”⁶⁹ Similar huffing and puffing among the member states leave one to only surmise that the EU has heavy baggage critically slowing it down in its march towards the ambitious targets stipulated in its written documents.

In order to compensate the erosion of the image of an efficient global actor, the member states displayed an exceptional unity during their unofficial meeting on 06 November 2008 organised to decide on their position to be defended in the G20 Summit on 15 November 2008 in Washington. Their commitment to submit “rating agencies to registration [and] surveillance,” to allow “no market segment, no territory, and no financial institution” escape “regulation or at least oversight” and to give “the IMF the initial responsibility” and “necessary resources” for “recommending the measures to restore confidence and stability” in the global financial market appear to be the common position on which the 27 EU member states have agreed.⁷⁰ Nonetheless, the end of the crisis is

not yet to arrive and the measures to be taken will be reached only after long tedious sessions of harsh discussions. To complicate the current situation even further, developing countries are preparing to involve themselves in the negotiations with full force in order to ensure the creation of significantly fairer global financial governance. The task of filing and bending the sharp edges of the arguments and making smooth norms out of them has been a burden, which the EU desires to bear. Guaranteeing the consequences, on the other hand, has not. And against this legacy, the EU will strive to reform the world economic order and survive the financial crisis.

Conclusion

In creating a presence for itself in global politics, the EU has assumed a normative leadership role and deployed a normative deliberative force through its institutional and legislative framework, norms, and values. The normative claims connected to deliberativeness have gained the EU a negotiating advantage in its relations with the candidate, neighbouring, and partner states. Non-traditional and unique in that sense, it singles out itself from other global actors. Nevertheless, the difficulties in achieving a common foreign and security policy as well as landing on the intended outcomes at the end of a foreign-policy action have been compromising the image of normative Europe. On several occasions of global leadership, the sometimes-competing interests of its supranational and intergovernmental institutions, or simply reluctance and hesitancy, have prevented the EU from involving itself in effective actions that could provide permanent solutions to the satisfaction of all parties involved in the problem. A brief overview of its foreign-policy (in)actions would demonstrate that the EU has been at pains to keep up with the consequences envisaged in its official documents or articulated in the *porte-paroles* of EU officials.

The normativeness of a global actor requires external recognition. Otherwise, it remains as a self-image, which is not commensurate with how that actor is perceived in the international arena. The consequence-challenged foreign policy of the EU, also, reduces the European normativeness to a self-image, which is hardly shared by the affected parties. Particularly, before and after the spectacular failure of the Annan Plan in Cyprus, the EU has displayed the attitude of an unsure, hesitant mediator, who is not willing to incur the cost of mediation. The Cyprus

question was a capability test, which ended in the adherence of the Greek Cypriot administration to the EU to represent the entire island to the total disappointment of the Turkish Cypriot community. Although the EU has not assumed any responsibility on the grounds that the UN framework was the only legitimate ground on which the Cyprus negotiations would take place, the double referenda of the Annan Plan were held under the auspices of the EU and the failure of the plan must have had some implications for the EU's actorness. This paper has attempted to reassess the Cyprus question in relation to the discussions over the EU's normative (in)capacity. Consequent to its dealings with Cyprus, the EU has not succeeded in producing the desirable outcomes that would facilitate a comprehensible solution on the island. Evidently, putting the entire blame of the Cyprus impasse on the EU has not been intended here in this article. It has rather ventured to draw attention to the fact that in the post-24 April era, the EU seems not to respond to the moral urge of evaluating how it has contributed to the further complication of the problem, whereas its aim was simply to participate in the solution.

Brussels' hardship in arriving at planned and anticipated consequences recurred in Georgia's August war as well as in the renewal of its Central Asia strategy. The EU's delay in taking efficient foreign-policy actions, ambivalent positions in the face of considerable odds, and its inherent incapacity to surmount the 'norm vs. interest' trap, despite its negotiating advantage over its counterparts through a unique legislative and institutional framework, has constituted an external image for the Union that does not yet suggest a fully-enhanced normative leadership. By the same token, the foreign-policy actions taken to manage the Doha Round, sustainable development, climate change and the global financial crisis have not either underpinned the EU's self-assumed role as a normative power, altruistically bringing solutions to the common problems of mankind by the 'good force' of norms and values.

Manners, the presenter of the idea of normative Europe, also enquires into the capabilities of the EU from the perspective of consequentialism and suggests that if the EU was to be probed according to consequentialist ethics, then its foreign-policy actions would be expected to meet the condition of "doing least harm" in world politics. In this respect, when the outcomes of its foreign-policy actions are taken into consideration, the EU is encouraged to think "reflexively about the impact of its policies on partner countries and regions."⁷¹ As the EU has

begun a new quest for reform in the aftermath of the Irish rejection of the Lisbon Treaty, this could be the time for embracing a more consequence-oriented approach in its common foreign and security policy, which will focus on achieving the right outcomes and empowering people in their actual lives.

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The New Parameters of Security and Cooperation in the Mediterranean: The European Union's Mediterranean Initiatives and Implications for Cyprus

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Abstract

This article aims to focus on the implications of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks for the European initiatives in the Mediterranean region. The main objective is to evaluate the transformation of Euro-Mediterranean relations and shifting regional dynamics in the light of changing international politics with regard to the new security environment triggered by September 11, 2001 as well as the subsequent Istanbul (November 2003), Madrid (March 2004) and London (July 2005) bombings that shook Europe. In addition it briefly dwells on possible repercussions of European domestic affairs on its Mediterranean policy as well as the compatibility of the existing European initiatives with the new ones. It also assesses the implications for Cyprus.

Keywords: Mediterranean Security, European Union, September 11, Mediterranean Initiatives

Özet

Bu makale, 11 Eylül 2001'deki terörist saldırıların, Avrupa'nın Akdeniz bölgesindeki girişimlerine olan etkisine odaklanmayı amaçlamaktadır. Makalenin temel amacı, 11 Eylül saldırılarının yanı sıra Avrupa'yı sarsan İstanbul (Kasım 2003), Madrid (Mart 2004) ve Londra (Temmuz 2005) bombalamalarının tetiklediği yeni güvenlik anlayışı bağlamında değişen uluslararası politika ışığında, Avrupa-Akdeniz ilişkilerinin dönüşümü ve bölgedeki değişen dinamikleri değerlendirmektir. Buna ek olarak makale, bu dönüşüm ve değişimin Avrupa iç işleri ve Akdeniz politikası üzerindeki olası sonuçları olduğu kadar yeni Avrupa insiyatiflerinin eskisi ile ne ölçüde örtüştüğünü inceleyecektir. Aynı zamanda, bu çerçevede Kıbrıs sorununa yönelik çıkarımlarda da bulunmaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Akdeniz Güvenliği, Avrupa Birliği, 11 Eylül, Akdeniz Girişimleri

Introduction

In the Wider Europe framework, the EU defines security problems as “common challenges” and expresses its willingness to tackle them with the help of its Southern Mediterranean partners. In this respect, it appears that the Wider Europe framework does not put forward anything innovative or different than the principle goals of the Barcelona Process, especially with regard to European intentions and medium to long-term expectations in the Mediterranean. What was aimed at in the Barcelona Declaration back in 1995, in terms of security, migration, social and cultural cooperation, economic and financial aspects and various other topics, has permeated more or less in the same way in the Wider Europe framework, perhaps with a more emphatic tone.

Nevertheless, besides the similarities, there are also important points that distinguish the Wider Europe framework from its predecessor, the Barcelona Declaration. First of all, in the Wider Europe framework, the EU clearly indicates its willingness to take an active role in its southern neighborhood mainly for the purpose of conflict prevention and crisis management. Such a role is indicated as “political,” as the official document of the European Commission puts it; but this time the role is defined in more specific terms and in a tone that keeps the door open for military intervention for crisis management purposes.¹ Although the phrase “military intervention” is never mentioned in the official European Commission communication, it is quite apparent that the EU goes one step beyond its usual mode of expression by addressing the conflicts in Palestine, the Western Sahara, and Transdniestria, adding that “the EU should take a more active role to facilitate settlement of the disputes over” these regions.²

Therefore, it will not be wrong to say that the Wider Europe framework addresses the main deficits of the previous European initiatives, mainly the EMP, and arranges the benefits of the European partnership in such a way that the Southern Mediterranean countries would enjoy economic and political advantages according to the progress they make as individual partners through a step-by-step approach. By virtue of its geographical proximity to the Southern Mediterranean, Cyprus holds the potential to play a decisive role within this framework.

However, it should also be noted that Wider Europe draws certain limits for the relations between the EU and the neighboring countries. Probably the most important subject that should be underlined in the

Wider Europe framework is that the option of EU membership or a similar role within the EU structure for non-European neighboring countries is clearly ruled out from the very beginning. Another point is that countries which previously had limited relations with the EU are at a disadvantageous position from the very beginning compared to the countries which undertake certain economic, political and social reforms to a certain extent, the latter eventually becoming eligible to a greater amount of financial assistance from the EU. It should here be noted that the Wider Europe framework was eager to deal with the EU's eastern and southern neighbors together, rather than addressing the members of the Barcelona Process alone. The framework is constructed mainly to attend to the concerns over the fact that the EU enlargement process will bring Russia into its immediate periphery. Given that the EU enlargement covers almost the entirety of Eastern Europe, this framework inevitably puts more emphasis on Eastern European members. Accordingly, it would be apt to focus on the ENP (European Neighborhood Policy), which can be pointed to as a milestone in Euro-Mediterranean relations that would, with its different set of goals and motivation, assign a reinforced importance to the geostrategic position of Cyprus.

European Neighborhood Policy (ENP): Before and After

In June 2004, as a definitive policy statement on the ENP, the EU Council firmly endorsed the European Neighbourhood Strategy Paper less than two weeks after its historic fifth enlargement. Originally designed for the eastern neighbours of the enlarged EU (Belarus, Russia, Ukraine and Moldova), the ENP also included the countries of the southern Mediterranean and the Middle East (Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, and including Israel and Palestine). It should be underlined that the ENP was introduced only one year later than the proposal of the European Security Strategy (ESS) and the Wider Europe framework, almost as a supplement to them. The reason why such need arose can be found in the following two aspects: firstly, the EU enlargement which included the Czech Republic, Estonia, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia, encompassed both Eastern and Southern European countries; secondly, the necessity of extending the ENP on matters related to Mediterranean such as the security threats and other regional concerns defined in the ESS a year before. For the EU, what was at hand on 1 May 2004 was not only the

greatest enlargement process, which added new members to the club, but also the acquisition of new neighbors in its periphery.

“As soon as the big enlargement from 15 to 25 member states was becoming virtually certain” and when the discussions within and without Europe over what strategy the EU should follow towards these new neighbors began, the EU started to develop a neighborhood policy.³ As the European Commission puts it, the ENP is “designed to prevent the emergence of new dividing lines between the enlarged EU and its neighbors”.⁴ The enlargement process, indeed, has placed new challenges and security concerns on the table, just as Javier Solana mentioned in the Security Strategy in 2003, giving special emphasis to new and mostly unpredictable security challenges that Europe may have to confront both in Eastern Europe and in the Southern Mediterranean. The inherent problem of the enlargement policy suggests that the integration of acceding states brings the EU closer to neighboring geographies of turmoil, while it enhances European security.⁵

When compared to the European Mediterranean Policy (EMP), the ENP is a novelty in relations between the EU and its neighbors which aims to create a single framework for engaging in dialogue and cooperation with a set of widely different neighboring third countries. The actual necessity behind the formation of such a new policy can be summarized as “to stay clear of further enlargements and to manage the new external borders.”⁶ While the EU is planning to determine the limits of the enlargement as well as the policies towards its neighbors, one may wonder whether the new neighborhood policy would conflict with or totally undermine the already-existing Barcelona Process and its legacy in the Mediterranean. As an answer, one can observe that in the Mediterranean perspective, the ENP has more or less boosted relations between the EU and the Southern Mediterranean countries, which had very much lost momentum lately.

It is a widely acknowledged fact that Euro-Mediterranean relations have lost their previous dynamic and that there is much need for more flexibility towards the partner countries. The most important of all concerns over the Euro-Mediterranean partnership seems to be that it should be re-designed and re-utilized in accordance with recent regional and global developments. Adopting this perspective, the ENP has introduced two main benefits to Euro-Mediterranean relations. Firstly, it promises to enhance bilateral relations by diminishing the inhibiting

effects of the existing status quo between the EU and its Southern Mediterranean partners, allowing them to establish more direct relations. Thus, it reduces the possibility of restrained relations caused by the political fluctuations affecting the entire Southern Mediterranean. The second benefit is very much related to the first one, giving emphasis to the notion of “differentiation,” which has been also signaled in the Wider Europe framework. Differentiation most simply lets the Mediterranean partners be responsible only for their own level of progress in their relations with the EU. To be more specific, it ensures that more advanced Mediterranean partners can derive more and easier benefit, according to their level of progress, from what the new neighborhood policy offers. Consequently it does not require a Mediterranean partner country to wait for other countries in the region to level up their relations with the EU in order to be eligible for the ENP incentives.

The ENP follows the same bilateral and regional tracks of the EMP as the main agendas of cooperation. The procedure of how the ENP shall work is actually copied from the EU accession negotiation process; relations with the members are held bilaterally and in accordance with their current political, economic, and other kinds of capabilities besides their compatibility to the European norms and expectations. The ENP Strategy Paper defines the method of this new policy as follows:

The method proposed is, together with the partner countries, to define a set of priorities, whose fulfillment will bring them closer to the European Union. These priorities will be incorporated in jointly agreed Action Plans, covering a number of key areas for specific action: political dialogue and reform; trade and measures preparing partners for gradually obtaining a stake in the EU’s internal market; justice and home affairs; energy, transport, information society, environment and research and innovation; and social policy and people-to-people contacts.⁷

Evidently the main catalyst, though not the only one, that shaped the changing structure of the Mediterranean security and the European Union (EU) foreign policy in recent years towards the Mediterranean is the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 (9/11). Although it would be a mistake to blame this tragic event as the sole culprit for the lost

opportunities in the Mediterranean, today it is widely accepted that the 9/11 attacks had a great impact on Mediterranean politics in general and the future of the relations among the Mediterranean countries and the EU. Although “terrorism” is not new for European countries, 9/11 and also the Madrid and London bombings compelled the EU to divert, if not entirely abandon, its attention from the previous Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) issues—poverty, the North-South gap, socio-economic development—to issues of terrorism and radical Islam both within and outside the borders of the EU. As it was seen during the following years, this shift triggered dramatic developments in the traditional policy of the EMP towards the Middle East and North African (MENA) countries.

The terrorist attacks of 9/11 did not compel the EU to shape new Mediterranean policies immediately. Prior to that, it changed the perception of security threats of the EU countries together with the international community. In a sense, the post-9/11 era can be considered as the second important phase in security studies, the first being the end of both the Cold War and the bipolar international system in the 1990s.

As to the first era, the EMP was clearly a European response to the newly emerged post-Cold War security challenges that aimed for regional stabilization through cooperation; basically democracy and market economy, instead of old-fashioned hard security exercises. However what the EMP intended to achieve in the Mediterranean could have only been achieved through a “soft” security understanding which is extremely time-consuming and very much relies on mutual consent to be successful. However 9/11 and its aftermath forced both the EU and also the United States (US) to reassess their foreign policy priorities to a certain extent, such as the policies related to the EMP and the “Security Community,” which the EU aimed to establish in the long run. As a result, those priorities have been replaced by the policies aiming to tackle imminent threats, such as international terrorism. It was a major shift in that the strategies designed to address the actual causes of terrorism became less significant than coping with the terrorists and terrorism itself.

In light of these changes, this article aims to focus on the implications of the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the European initiatives in the Mediterranean region. It attempts to evaluate the transformation of Euro-Mediterranean relations and shifting regional dynamics in the light of changing international politics with regard to the new security environment triggered by the September 11, 2001 as well as the following

Istanbul (November 2003), Madrid (March 2004) and London (July 2005) bombings that shook Europe. First, it discusses the first ever common strategic vision of the EU, the European Security Strategy (ESS) that emerged in 2003, and its relevance to the Mediterranean region. It subsequently discusses the Wider Europe Framework and the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) as a novelty in Euro-Mediterranean relations. The ENP's contributions and shortcomings as a new approach are analyzed thoroughly and in comparison with the EMP. Lastly, the recent French initiative concerning the region, The Union for the Mediterranean, and its compatibility with the existing European initiatives are dealt with.

European Security Strategy (ESS)

The European Security Strategy (ESS) was first adopted as the basis of the EU's Strategic Concept at the Thessaloniki European Council in June 2003, which enabled the EU to "adapt effectively to the changing security environment".⁸ Later, it was approved by the European Council in December 2003 and entitled "A Secure Europe in a Better World." In this document five key threats were defined, which require more attention and insight than ever. According to the ESS these threats are terrorism, proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs), regional conflicts, state failure, and organized crime. Michele Comelli argues that "not all of these security challenges coming from the EU's neighborhood area are specific to the region. However, the impact of these challenges on EU security, either real or perceived, can still be greater because of geographical proximity."⁹ And, when geographical proximity is taken into account, the geostrategic position of Cyprus in the Eastern Mediterranean is always considered decisive in preventing security threats.

According to Emel Oktay, the ESS was prepared to define a common and cohesive EU foreign policy in the aftermath of the Iraq War.¹⁰ "The US decision to take military action in Iraq... without a specific UN mandate and with only some members of the EU on its side had created open rifts and a more general crisis of confidence within the EU and NATO."¹¹ The ESS can be viewed as a response to the post-9/11 security priorities of the US and a positive step in adjusting transatlantic divisions over Iraq.¹² It emphasizes the transatlantic relationship as "one of the core elements of the international system."¹³ In addition, the ESS argues that

the transatlantic relationship is not only in the bilateral interest of the US and the EU but also something that strengthens the international community as a whole.

On the other hand significant differences exist between the ESS and its US counterpart as many claim, the US National Security Strategy (NSS) of 2002. Firstly, the ESS underlines that the EU “should be ready to act before a crisis occurs and conflict prevention and threat prevention cannot start too early.”¹⁴ Contrary to the “preemptive” strategy of the US, the EU did not use this as an argument in favor of military preemption, but rather as an argument that new threats are far from being purely military. Secondly, as Bjørn Møller observes, “rather than advocating military attack the document... emphasised the need for ‘effective multilateralism’ as a means to the end of ‘a stronger international society, well functioning international institutions, and a rule-based international order.’”¹⁵ On the other hand, the NSS of 2002 clearly did not rule out the option of “unilateral action” stating that:

...while the United States will constantly strive to enlist the support of the international community, we will not hesitate to act alone, if necessary, to exercise our right of self-defense by acting preemptively against such terrorists, to prevent them from doing harm against our people and our country.¹⁶

The ESS and the Mediterranean

The Mediterranean region has a prominent place in the ESS for a couple of reasons. Firstly, the Arab states in North Africa are seen as the main importers of two major problems of Europe today—illegal immigrants and radical Islamism—that are often linked to terrorist activities in Europe. Secondly, North African countries are vital actors for Europe, with Gulf countries and Russia, which Europe relies on for its energy needs. The European security perceptions towards the Mediterranean have been defined in the ESS as follows:

The Mediterranean area generally continues to undergo serious problems of economic stagnation, social unrest and unresolved conflicts. The European Union's interests require a continued engagement with Mediterranean partners, through more effective economic, security and cultural cooperation in the

framework of the Barcelona Process. A broader engagement with the Arab World should also be considered.¹⁷

As mentioned above, terrorism has been listed as one of the five key threats named in the ESS. European perception of terrorism had rather been focused on the North Africa and the volatile conditions in most of the region. The ESS illustrates the possible explanations of terrorism as soft-security problems, which are inter-connected and regional. It may be argued that the five threats mentioned in the ESS are in a sense the EU's diagnosis of the root-causes of terrorism. However it has also been acknowledged in the ESS that these regional problems have the capacity to develop into much more international concerns unless all European countries confront them. Moreover the spillover effects on Europe cannot be disregarded:

The most recent wave of terrorism is global in its scope and is linked to violent religious extremism. It arises out of complex causes. These include the pressures of modernization, cultural, social and political crises, and the alienation of young people living in foreign societies. This phenomenon is also a part of our own society.¹⁸

Getting back to the energy issue, it is not surprising that the ESS draws attention to Europe's energy dependence as well. As is widely known, Europe is the world's largest oil and gas importer. It is assumed that European imports constitute about 50% of energy consumption today. It is predicted in the ESS that this amount will rise to 70% in 2030 and most energy imports come from the Gulf, Russia and North Africa.¹⁹ Therefore, it appears that the Mediterranean region has top priority for Europe not only for being constituted of countries that produce energy, but also for being the region where these energy lines are located.

The Wider Europe Framework and the European Neighborhood Policy

The European Security Strategy (ESS), as the first ever-common strategic vision of the EU, also provides an outline for the general strategy of the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) at a global and regional level²⁰. Although the ESS does not explicitly refer to the ENP as a means to build

security in the EU's neighborhood, it is clear that the ENP is the main instrument through which to pursue the objective of achieving security in the EU's immediate periphery.²¹ Both the ESS and the ENP put emphasis on preventing "new dividing lines" between Europe and its neighbors especially in the Middle East and North Africa. In a sense, the strategic vision adopted in the ESS constitutes the essence of the ENP's "soft security" actions that had started with the drawing of the boundaries of Wider Europe Framework.

Even before the terrorist attacks in Madrid on March 11, 2004 and in London on July 7, 2005, the EU felt the necessity to surmount the impasse which the EMP and the decade-old Barcelona Process were experiencing.²² In March 2003, European Commission proposed a new framework called Wider Europe; an important step for the Euro-Mediterranean relations as the ENP was outlined in a Commission Communication.²³ Although Wider Europe was considered to be a product of the European enlargement, with regard to Mediterranean, it is built on the fundamental principles of the Barcelona Process and the EMP.

The Wider Europe Framework came up with new perspectives on neighboring countries, political and economic relations, as well as some previously defined objectives which were stated in the ESS such as the desire to "develop a zone of prosperity and a friendly neighborhood—a ring of friends—with whom the EU enjoys close, peaceful, and cooperative relations."²⁴ Moreover, this new EU approach has distinguished itself from a decade-old EMP by abandoning the "one-size-fits-all" policy; neighboring countries (namely the Southern Mediterranean countries within the scope of this study) would be evaluated separately by their willingness as well as their progress in political, economic and social aspects. In order to achieve the given relations with its neighbors the European Commission emphasized the 3P principles: proximity, prosperity, and poverty.

Proximity simply refers to the geographical location of the neighbors and is significant for the overall success of the comprehensive policies and mutual relations between them and the EU. To be more specific, proximity is a two-dimensional principle; a neighboring country which is closer to Europe in geographical sense possesses both greater opportunities to be pursued and greater security challenges to be confronted as well. The other two principles, prosperity and poverty, are

interrelated to one another in order to tackle “the root causes of the political instability, economic vulnerability, institutional deficiencies, conflict, poverty and social exclusion.”²⁵ It is worth stressing that these goals are very much similar to those of the EMP’s and demonstrate the parallel objectives that the EMP and the Wider Europe framework share.

In addition to these problems addressed, the Wider Europe framework puts emphasis on certain principles and ideas which at the same time constitute the core of the idea of a “European Union,” democracy, pluralism, respect for human rights and civil liberties, the rule of law, and labor standards. These principles are seen as the prerequisites of a politically stable, socially and economically developed, prosperous, and peaceful Mediterranean.

The method proposed is, together with the partner countries, to define a set of priorities, whose fulfillment will bring them closer to the European Union. These priorities will be incorporated in jointly agreed Action Plans, covering a number of key areas for specific action: political dialogue and reform; trade and measures preparing partners for gradually obtaining a stake in the EU’s internal market; justice and home affairs; energy, transport, information society, environment and research and innovation; and social policy and people-to-people contacts.²⁶

As mentioned above, the main difference between the ENP procedure and the EU membership accession is that the ENP (as was indicated in the Wider Europe framework as well) clearly rules out the possibility of EU membership from the very beginning. In addition, the ENP does not allow EU institutions to be completely shared by the Western Newly Independent States (WNIS) and Southern Mediterranean countries. As former president of the European Commission Romano Prodi puts it, the EU will “share everything but institutions” with the non-members.²⁷ However these set of procedures were designed in such a way that the benefits of the ENP will be granted to the neighbor countries only if they comply with the values and principles of the EU.

It is undeniable that the ENP is a novelty in Euro-Mediterranean relations; but it is equally hard to say that it is flawless. The ENP was unable to satisfy the needs of the Euro-Mediterranean community in almost every aspect. Although it has been noted that the ENP brought a promising approach to Euro-Mediterranean relations as a fresh solution to the deadlock in relations, it has been criticized especially for the

economic perspective it visualized and the expected gains from the bilateral approach to be conducted together with the partner countries.

In Barcelona in 1995, it was hoped that the asymmetric relationship between the EU and its Southern Mediterranean partners could be averted by the gradual development of the “Free Trade Area” (FTA), one of the goals to be achieved by 2010.²⁸ However, the developments have clearly not lived up to expectations so far. Although the bilateral approach of the ENP favors the partner countries in many aspects, the ideal of a FTA eventually favors the EU in terms of economic superiority over the partner countries, rendering the partners somewhat dependent on the European countries. This is actually the point on which the new neighborhood policy is criticized: abandoning the goal of promoting the FTA as it was stated in the Barcelona Declaration, and instead putting relations on a bilateral track leaving the encircling notion of a “Euro-Mediterranean region” aside—very similar to what the Wider Europe framework did.

Related to the economic aspect of the ENP, it would be accurate to claim that the future of Euro-Mediterranean relations with the countries that have relatively unstable or weak economies are left in the dark, as the ENP tends to favor relatively stable partner countries in this aspect. As officially declared by the European Commission, emphasis is on the importance of the regional dimension of the EMP and the intention to promote it financially. However both the Wider Europe framework and the ENP, probably unintentionally, degrade the regional dimension of the Barcelona Process and acknowledge that it “is only a complementary element which has a more limited function of “promoting *intra-regional* trade and *sub-regional* cooperation” in the Southern Mediterranean.”²⁹ Even though the European Commission used to define its Mediterranean policy as multilateral, stating “multilateralism is now as common as, and sometimes even prevalent over, traditional bilateral approaches,”³⁰ the previous EU initiatives regarding the Mediterranean enjoyed very limited effects.

The unsure economic goals which the EU tries to reach through the ENP are not the only shortcomings of the new neighborhood policy. One of the European aspirations, a “ring of friends,” is worth mentioning here, broadly referring to the peaceful, democratic, and well-governed states sharing the EU values in the European “near abroad.” As one may notice, this notion somehow reflects the EU’s foreign policy shift towards its

neighborhood, an outcome of the European internal dynamics aiming to keep a closer look on its “near abroad.” Having these expectations, the ENP puts democracy and democratic institutions, respect for human rights, and the rule of law on the table as prerequisites of progress in relations throughout the Mediterranean region. In other words, the new neighborhood policy’s benchmarks will probably be utilized by the European Commission to measure the reform activities of the partner countries.³¹

It is widely accepted that without achieving the prerequisites above, it is indeed difficult for Euro-Mediterranean relations to reach a step beyond the existing level, as well as for partner countries to enhance their relations with the EU. However, as Emerson and Noutcheva note, the Barcelona agreements present a “considerable switch in emphasis” away from the intention of cooperation, to the provision of instructions for harmonizing the norms and standards of the partner countries in accordance with those of Europe.³² Moreover, it is equally irritating for the Mediterranean partners that unlike the Barcelona Declaration, the ENP is based on political conditionality; that is, if one party fails its obligations or undertakes different actions that are not defined in the association agreement, the other party may take appropriate measures based on pre-defined articles of the agreement. Although this conditionality seems to offer some sort of flexibility to both the EU and the Mediterranean partner countries, from a diplomatic perspective this can be interpreted as the EU having an upper hand in those asymmetric relations. This negotiating position of the EU is capable of suspending the advantages granted to the partner countries, if they do not achieve a desirable level of progress in adopting European norms and values.

To put it in a different way, the European countries have clear advantage in terms of economic and political power over their Southern Mediterranean partners, which allows the EU to manifest its demands from the partners and define the boundaries of benefits to be granted through the ENP. This has not been the case so far in the Barcelona Process. Related to the principle of conditionality issue, the EU’s sensitivity over the implementation of norms such as freedom of speech, respect for human rights, and other social liberties has been widely questioned in the partner countries as a result of the EU’s lack of will or attention in such aspects. European credibility has been hurt when the EU has not always taken the measures necessitated by the Association

Agreements. Which of the granted incentives would be suspended by the EU in case of the failure of the partner states to honor their commitments, remains rather problematic.

A Recent French Initiative Aimed at the Region: The Union for the Mediterranean

Initially proposed by the then president of the UMP (Union for a Popular Movement Party) Nicolas Sarkozy during the French electoral campaign in early 2007, the idea of Mediterranean Union (MU) sparked a hot debate within the EU, especially among the Southern Mediterranean members as well as the non-EU Mediterranean countries, including Turkey. Countries within the EU have been expressing “strong dissatisfaction with current relations with Southern Mediterranean partner countries and emphasizing the need to go beyond the EMP to enable Europe to tackle the real challenges that the Mediterranean and the EU have been facing after the strategic changes of the last decade.”³³

The initial structure of the Mediterranean Union envisaged that it would include only the riparian countries of the Mediterranean while leaving the non-Mediterranean EU members outside. In December 2007, the mini-summit held in Rome between the heads of state and governments of France, Italy and Spain adopted the “Appel de Rome” in which the initiative was turned into “Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean” (UfM). This shift has in fact opened possibilities for non-Mediterranean EU countries eager to play a role in the area.³⁴ However, in March 2008 the French and German heads of state decided that it would better not to divide the EU members into Mediterranean and non-Mediterranean, particularly after the German objections stating that “if there are group-specific cooperations within the EU, those have to be open to all member states.”³⁵

It is noteworthy to mention that the French proposal has gone through some substantial modifications even though it has been only one and a half years since President Sarkozy put it forward. The idea of a Mediterranean union gained a new dimension when the Spanish Foreign Minister outlined a proposal about transforming the EMP into a “Euro-Mediterranean Union” (EMU) a couple of months later. With this new proposal, Spain suggested assuring people greater freedom of movement in the area—something neither the EMP nor the EU is able or willing to do today. It is worth noting that the Spanish initiative does not dwell on

an institutional configuration to regulate the task of integrating the European and Southern Mediterranean areas with the objective of allowing people to circulate freely.³⁶

It was argued that the EMU has the ability to embrace the EMP agenda and effectively advance it by taking advantage of its cooperation-based platform. As a long-term objective, the EMU has the intention to integrate the EU with the Southern Mediterranean as a priority on its agenda. In this sense, the EMU-approach can be seen as both ideologically and politically compatible with the existing EU initiatives, namely the EMP. The Southern Mediterranean leaders of the Maghreb region, following the lead of the Tunisian President, also insisted on “the importance of not detaching the new Union for the Mediterranean project from the EMP,” arguing that the union can only be successful, if it complies with the existing Euro-Mediterranean instruments.³⁷

According to Astrid Coeurderoy, “Sarkozy’s priorities include the promotion of an open-minded and tolerant interpretation of Islam, both within France’s Muslim communities and countries in the Muslim world themselves.”³⁸ The plan theoretically envisions a consensus and cooperation among the members of this union based on four themes: environment and sustainable development; intercultural dialogue; economic growth and social development; and security of the Mediterranean region, the fight against terrorism in particular. The number of immigrants who seek better conditions on the northern shore does not seem that it will decrease in the coming years. It is for that illegal immigration is feared as one of the biggest sources of insecurity in Europe, as many European documents, including the UfM, underline. It has the potential of creating political frictions as well, such as the rise of extreme right-wing parties in Europe. The solution, according to many experts, is to create opportunities for employment on the Southern shores of the Mediterranean, which would mean investing and backing development in the region. It is equally questionable whether the UfM is able to put solutions on the table.

It is true that both the UfM and the EMU aim at upgrading the Euro-Mediterranean relations institutionally and improving the ENP experience. But they are also quite different in that they are based on different strategic visions. According to Roberto Aliboni and his co-writers, “the EMU is based on a long-term objective of integration across the Mediterranean.”³⁹ The UfM, on the other hand, reflects the political

stand of President Sarkozy and, in this sense, is primarily based on a broad sense of confrontation with the Muslim world, beginning with Turkey. It would be wrong to say that the UfM puts Mediterranean cooperation and heritage aside completely. However, it should also be noted that the UfM agenda has its own priorities and handles some problems in a different perspective than they are usually handled. Immigration is one of them, as it is defined as a crisis that the EU has to tackle in the UfM. In other words, the UfM is designed to control rather than allow freedom of movement. Therefore, it differs from the EMU, which actually offers the latter.

If we evaluate the UfM as the leading and most debated proposal so far, we should underline the fact that reactions from the EU member states, especially from the EU and non-EU Mediterranean members alike, have been generally skeptical so far. The reality is that this initiative is seen very much as an alternative to Turkey's membership in the EU and a way of controlling illegal immigration from Northern Africa. After all, President Sarkozy has voiced his concerns many times about Turkey and illegal immigration commenting that "it is better to see Europe's relations with Turkey through this Mediterranean Union" and argued that "if Europe wants to have an identity it must have borders and, therefore, limits."⁴⁰ In this sense, a challenging task awaits Sarkozy as the newly founded union comprises 27 EU members plus most of the North African countries, the Balkans, Israel and the Arab world, meaning approximately 756 million people from Western Europe to Jordan.⁴¹

The official inauguration of the UfM was during the Paris Summit held on July 13, 2008. The summit brought together 43 European and Mediterranean States as well as both international and regional organizations like the UN, the League of Arab States, and the African Union. In addition, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Monaco and Montenegro have been included to the initiative, as these countries have accepted the *acquis* of the Barcelona Process. As stated in the Joint Declaration of the Paris Summit for the Mediterranean, the UfM is "building on the Barcelona Declaration and its objectives of achieving peace, stability and security, as well as the *acquis* of the Barcelona Process"⁴²—particularly appeasing the concerns that the UfM will be a duplication of the Euro-Mediterranean efforts.

It can be argued that the Paris Summit is a milestone for the future of the UfM as well as the Middle East peace process. While the participant

countries underlined their support for the Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process, Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert's comments on Israeli-Palestinian conflict are remarkable as he pointed that Israel and the Palestinians had never been as close to a peace deal as they were now and he would like direct talks with Syria as well. After four months of hot debate, the problem of where the UfM headquarters would be located was finally solved during the Marseilles ministerial conference held on November 3-4, 2008. Members agreed to base the headquarters in Barcelona, Spain. In addition, the official name ever since "Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean" has been shortened to "Union for the Mediterranean." Since it has already been accepted that UfM is actually a "level-up" continuation of the Barcelona Process, a special emphasis would no longer be required.

As stated during the Paris Summit, the Marseilles conference very much dealt with the institutional structure of the UfM. As a novelty compared to the Barcelona Process, a new institutional framework has been introduced during the Paris Summit, which envisages a co-presidency, mainly to strengthen the joint ownership. According to this new structure, one Mediterranean and one EU country would serve as co-presidents of the UfM. It has been agreed that French and Egyptian presidents would be the first co-presidents. In Marseilles, the governing organs of the UfM were unveiled as well, specifying who is responsible from which task. In addition, the 2009 work programme as well as a "fields of cooperation" list has been agreed upon.

The Cyprus Question from the EU's Mediterranean Perspective

Against this background, it seems clear that the EU appears eager to invest time, effort, and money in its reinforced Mediterranean initiative. The EMP and UfP come to the fore as tools in differing capacities to enhance the European designs of security as well as to create an awareness of and commitment to the European norms and values in its "near abroad." Within this framework, Cyprus's privileged geostrategic position in the Eastern Mediterranean serves as a very appropriate connecting point between the EU and the Southern Mediterranean. As the EU's Commissioner for Environment, Stavros Dimas stated in June 2005, the adhesion of Cyprus together with two other Mediterranean countries, Malta and Slovenia, strengthened the EU's hand "[i]n a bid to create a true 'ring of friends' around its new external frontiers."⁴³ Therefore, the

recent Mediterranean emphasis of the EU would assign a decisive role to the island once more substantial plans begin to unfold properly. The Greek Cypriot administration, on various occasions, has expressed its willingness to more actively engage in the “military and civilian capabilities” of the EU and even promised “a more constructive role” in the further development of the European security.⁴⁴

Nevertheless, the EMP and UfP lay considerable emphasis on the confidence-building capacity of the EU, as they seek to improve the perceptions of Europe across the Southern Mediterranean and a divided member-state, such as Cyprus, would harm rather than underpin, the EU’s renovated attempt at building confidence in its neighborhood and beyond. Without the substantial solution of the Cyprus problem, the EU would never be perceived in the way it desires to be seen in the area of its Mediterranean policies. The Cyprus problem could perpetuate what Heinz Kramer highlighted in 1997 as “the disruption of the strategic pattern in the Aegean and the Mediterranean region with serious consequences for Europe’s future security.”⁴⁵ In this respect, the current political situation on the island bears the potential to cast shadow over the EU’s Mediterranean policies and disproves the Union’s confidence-building rhetoric in the eyes of the non-European members of the UfP.

Carl Bildt, the former Prime Minister of Sweden, holds that Cyprus is not the conductor but still a part of the “enormous task” of “creating or influencing the creation of stable structures from Bihaj to Basra.” The EU’s failure to facilitate peace and reconciliation in Cyprus deserves considerably more attention from the member-states and EU institutions, as it signifies “monumental shortcomings” in Europe’s security, defense, neighborhood and Mediterranean policies. The sought repoliticization of neither the ESS nor the EMP could be achieved as long as the Cyprus question endures.⁴⁶

Conclusion

Reflected in the recent initiatives, the policy shift in Euro-Mediterranean relations can be explained by the internal dynamics of the EU and by the insecure atmosphere created in the Mediterranean after the 9/11 attacks and the subsequent war in Iraq. However, it would be very optimistic to expect from the new initiatives such as the ENP and the UfM extensive contributions to the solutions of partner countries’ standard problems such as poverty, social development, and regional security. The ENP is

designed to address the regional problems of the Mediterranean secondarily. In addition, it is fair to claim that the ENP primarily serves European rather than the Mediterranean security.

Despite various commitments that have been made in the Barcelona Declaration as well as in the ENP, especially with regard to democracy, human rights, socio-economic development, and finally European norms and values, the Euro-Mediterranean partnership as a whole process “is in reality characterized by a lack of common values.”⁴⁷ The Euro-Mediterranean partners generally had the tendency to prioritize the second basket of the EMP, which is the partnership on economic and financial cooperation. On the contrary, the Europeans always gave emphasis to the first basket, which covers political and security aspects. Consequently the partnership in social, cultural, and human affairs (third basket) has been neglected for a long time by both sides.

According to Anette Jünemann, “the EU’s desire to address issues that have proved difficult to deal with in the context of the first (political and security) basket of the Barcelona Process; the growing importance of the EU’s Justice and Home Affairs agenda” (probably as a consequence of 9/11), “European responses to the Middle East conflict—and last but not least—the need to respond to September 11,” have led to the rediscovery of the third basket.⁴⁸ In fact, since April-May 2001, the field of Justice and Home Affairs has become one of the main areas of the EMP activity.

Since 9/11, the relevance of Mediterranean policies to European security has been increased even more.⁴⁹ Considering the timeline of Euro-Mediterranean relations, the launch of the ENP falls in the aftermath of 9/11, a period in which the prioritization of terrorism as a main threat to European security as a whole, rather than an issue of peace and stability, reached its peak in the European discourse on terrorism. As Ulla Holm puts it, “The fight against terrorism and the terror attack in Madrid 2004 have accentuated the importance of the Mediterranean and the Middle East for European security.”⁵⁰

The question of why the ENP did actually follow a contrary approach in certain aspects compared with its predecessor, the Barcelona Process, can be understood better by taking these catalysts into account. The notion of terrorism has been considered a threat prior to 9/11 as well; however it is probably the first time that we have seen terrorism on the top of the European agenda, dominating its external as well as internal

relations. Europe now perceives terrorism as an exceptionally serious threat, especially after the Madrid and London bombings, and eventually decided that it is very much directed against its norms, identity, and other values that the idea of European Union has built on.

The policy shift that the ENP initiated in the Euro-Mediterranean relations is very much related to the issue of shaping the southern shores of the Mediterranean through a “one-way formulation” (rather than a “partnership” which the Barcelona Process favors) of relations between Europe and Mediterranean partners. To put it in a different way, the ENP downgrades the notion of partnership to serve European security, moving away from a more neo-realist approach. It certainly does not mean that the Barcelona Process put European interests in the second place, after the chronic problems of the region; however the ENP is eager to associate the wellbeing of the Euro-Mediterranean relations with the level of political and economic liberalism adopted by the Southern Mediterranean partners, mainly because of the European perception of security being equal to adoption of democracy and other common values. As the EMP had long before lost its pace, the Wider Europe framework and later the ENP changed their tone with regard to the situation in Southern Mediterranean and in the Middle East, openly prioritizing the European interests even while offering the partners a share in the European market.

Endnotes

¹ The communication document of the European Commission puts it as follows: “Greater EU involvement in crisis management in response to specific regional threats would be a tangible demonstration of the EU’s willingness to assume a greater share of the burden of conflict resolution in the neighboring countries.” (European Commission, *Wider Europe-Neighborhood: A New Framework for Relations with Our Eastern and Southern Neighbors* (Brussels: European Commission 2003), 12.

² Ibid.

³ Michael Emerson and Gergana Noutcheva, “From Barcelona Process to Neighbourhood Policy.” *IEMed-Cidob Med. 2005 Mediterranean Yearbook* (2005): 92-97, 92.

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⁴ European Commission. *European Neighbourhood Policy Strategy Paper* (Brussels: European Commission, 2004), 3. http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/strategy/strategy_paper_en.pdf

⁵ Javier Solana, *A Secure Europe in a Better World: European Security Strategy* (European Institute for Security Studies: Brussels: 2003), 8. <http://ue.eu.int/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf>

⁶ Elisabeth Johansson-Nogués, “A 'Ring of Friends'? The Implications of the European Neighbourhood Policy for the Mediterranean,” *Mediterranean Politics* 9:2 (2004): 240–7.

⁷ European Commission, *ENP Strategy Paper*, 3.

⁸ Gerrard Quille, “Making Multilateralism Matter: The EU Security Strategy,” *European Security Review* 18 (2003):1-2 (p.1). http://www.isis-europe.org/pdf/esr_19.pdf

⁹ Michele Comelli. “Building Security in Its neighborhood Through the European Neighborhood Policy?” Paper presented at EUSA Biennial Conference, Montreal, IAI, 2007, 2. <http://www.unc.edu/euce/eusa2007/papers/comelli-m-02b.pdf>

¹⁰ Emel Oktay, *Today's Neighbours, Tomorrow's Partners: Managing the Neighbourhood in Post-Enlargement Europe* (The Hague, Clingendael Institute, 2007).

¹¹ Alyson J. K. Bailes. *The European Security Strategy: An Evolutionary History* (Stockholm: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 2005), p.9. <http://books.sipri.org/files/PP/SIPRI10.pdf>

¹² Quille, 2.

¹³ Solana, 9.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 7.

¹⁵ Bjørn Møller, “The EU as a Security Actor: Security by Being and Security by Doing” (Copenhagen: Danish Institute for International Studies, 2005), 36.

¹⁶ “The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, September 2002,” <http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss/2002/index.html>.

¹⁷ Solana, 8.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 3.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*

²⁰ Oktay.

²¹ Comelli.

²² It should be noted that such necessity actually arose right after September 11, before there were any serious terrorist attacks that threatened or directly targeted European countries.

²³ European Commission, *Wider Europe—Neighborhood: A New Framework for Relations with Our Eastern and Southern Neighbors* (Brussels: European Commission, 2003), 3.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, 3.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, 6

²⁶ European Commission, *ENP Strategy Paper*, 3.

²⁷ Romano Prodi: “Enlargement is a Necessity,” *Business Week*, November 18, 2002.

http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/02_46/b3808713.htm.

²⁸ Johansson-Nogués, 240-7.

²⁹ Rafaella Del Sarto and Tobias Schumacher, “From EMP to ENP: What’s at Stake with the European Neighbourhood Policy Towards the Southern Mediterranean?” *European Foreign Affairs Review* 10 (2005): 17-38.

³⁰ See the “Conclusion” of *The Barcelona Process, five years on: 1995-2000* (Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 2000).

³¹ Johansson-Nogués, 240-7.

³² Emerson and Noutcheva, 93.

³³ Roberto Aliboni, Ahmed Driss, Tobias Schumacher, and Alfred Tovias, *Putting the Mediterranean Union in Perspective* (Lisbon: EuroMeSCo, 2008), 9. <http://www.euromesco.net/images/paper68eng.pdf>

³⁴ *Ibid.*

³⁵ “Sarkozy’s Mediterranean Union Plans Irk Merkel,” *EurActiv*, December 13, 2007. <http://www.euractiv.com/en/future-eu/sarkozy-mediterraneanunion-plans-irk-merkel/article-169080>

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³⁸ Astrid Coeurderoy, “Turning the Page,” *The Journal of International Security Affairs* 14 (2008): 29-33. <http://www.securityaffairs.org/issues/2008/14/coeurderoy.php>

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⁴² *Joint Declaration of the Paris Summit for the Mediterranean, Paris, 13 July 2008.*

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⁴⁵ Heinz Kramer, "The Cyprus Problem and European Security," *Survival* 39:3 (1997), 16-32, 19.

⁴⁶ European Policy Center, "Whatever Happened to the European Security Strategy." <http://www.epc.eu/en/er.asp?AI=506&LV=293&PG=ER/EN/detail&TYP=ER&see=y&t=2>.

⁴⁷ Anette Jünemann, "Security-building in the Mediterranean after September 11," in *Euro-Mediterranean Relations after September 11: Regional and Domestic Dynamics*, ed. Anette Jünemann (London: Frank Cass, 2004): 1-20, 6.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, 9.

⁴⁹ Federica Bicchì, "The European Origins of Euro-Mediterranean Practices," *Institute of European Studies (University of California, Berkeley)*, Paper 040612 (2004). <http://repositories.cdlib.org/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1044&context=ies>.

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Articles

Makaleler

The Evolving EU, NATO, and Turkey Relationship: Cyprus Impasse and Implications for Transatlantic Security*

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Having come into being as a result of the St Malo agreement between France and the UK back in 1998, the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) will soon enter its second decade. Within its first decade of existence, ESDP became a significant contributor to the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). The emergence of ESDP went hand in hand with the EU's growing willingness to take responsibility for a number of peace support missions around the globe. To date, there have been a total of 20 missions, of which nine have been completed and eleven are current and ongoing. The majority of these missions have been in the sphere of civilian crisis management. Recent examples include the EULEX mission in Kosovo and the EUPOL mission in Afghanistan.

Yet despite its burgeoning role, the effectiveness of ESDP remains hindered by the continuing lack of a sound relationship with NATO, the more traditional security provider. As a result, the implementation of the envisaged partition of labour between EU and NATO in areas of crisis faces serious practical difficulties. A case in point is the increased security risks faced by the civilian EULEX members in Kosovo where their protection cannot reliably be outsourced to NATO forces.

An improvement in the NATO-EU relationship depends to a great extent on the evolution of two issues. The first one is the French attitude towards NATO. As opposed to the more Atlanticist members of the EU, France has traditionally given precedence to the development of an independent European pillar. However, the advent of Sarkozy seems to have changed this policy. Although it will become clearer when the White Paper on French security strategy is published in the near future, there are signs that France is now ready to re-engage with NATO and to support a more harmonious NATO-EU relationship.

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The second root cause of the outstanding problems can be traced to the difficulties inherent in the Turkey-EU relationship. As long as Turkey's quest to fully take part in European security structures remains unresolved, the strains in the NATO-EU relationship are likely to remain visible. Moreover the Cyprus question further compounds already existing difficulties as it precludes Turkey's further convergence with ESDP. Yet with the elimination of the French obstacle to the betterment of the NATO-EU relationship and the ongoing ESDP missions in Kosovo and Afghanistan, pressure is mounting for the settlement of this thorny question.

This first section of this paper will review the evolution of the Turkey-EU relationship in the security domain. The second section will analyze the current bottlenecks and their consequences. The last section concludes with a number of key recommendations for overcoming the present stalemate.

Turkey in the European Security Architecture: the Early Years

The starting point for Turkey can be characterized as the quest to maintain NATO's role as the primary institution for security and defence in Europe and the main forum for transatlantic cooperation, while carving out a role for itself within the burgeoning sphere of European Security and Defence. Turkey achieved a considerable degree of success more than a decade ago by obtaining a virtual member status within the Western European Union (WEU). This achievement proved, however, to be of a temporary nature. The St Malo agreement of 1998 between the UK and France, which paved the way for the development of an ESDP within the EU structures, meant the dishelming of the WEU as the security institution of the EU. It also meant the sudden vanishing of all the hard fought "acquis" regarding the foundation of the security relationship between Turkey and the EU.

Since then, the security relationship between Turkey and the EU was forced to undergo a redefinition. This exercise proved to be a rather difficult and strenuous one, and the process has been significantly influenced by the internal political dynamics within the EU intent on determining the limits of the "communautarization" of defence and security policy. The concomitant process of enlargement, and the constitutional debacle, which ushered in a new period of reflection on the future of Europe, further compounded the picture. Finally, the lingering

uncertainty about Turkish accession provided another layer of volatility.

Indeed, policy makers have had to negotiate the current institutional arrangements between Turkey and the EU Member States in the field of security and defence cooperation without knowing whether they would be temporary or permanent. Had there been a clear political will on the EU side for supporting Turkey's full membership objective, Turkish policy makers may have been more flexible with regard to their demands, knowing that these arrangements would necessarily be upgraded once Turkey became a full member. However the last EU enlargement, which brought in the Republic of Cyprus created a new set of problems, not only for the Turkey-EU relationship but also for the EU-NATO relationship.

The NATO-EU relationship: a Stalemate?

The central problem for the EU-NATO relationship can be traced back to the interpretation of the agreement between NATO and the EU reached at the end of 2002. This basically sealed the decision taken by NATO at the Washington Summit to provide support to the EU under "Berlin Plus" in exchange for certain rights within ESDP for non-EU European allies, as stipulated in the Nice implementation document. The NATO decision excludes non-Partnership for Peace (PfP) countries and those lacking security agreement from activities, including discussions, related to both Berlin Plus and strategic partnership. The EU decision, however, limits the exclusion only to Berlin Plus and does not refer to strategic cooperation. Therefore, under the NATO decision, Republic of Cyprus (and Malta) is excluded from participating in anything falling under "strategic cooperation." However, according to the EU decision this is not the case. Today, the EU seeks to overcome problems posed by this wording. On the basis of the Community solidarity principle, the EU claims that the Republic of Cyprus cannot be left outside the scope of this arrangement any longer and refuses to engage in dialogue with NATO without all EU members sitting around the table. Turkey sticks to its position of the strict interpretation of the North Atlantic Council (NAC) decision of 2002 and blocks the participation of the Republic of Cyprus in the NATO-EU strategic cooperation.

As a result, whereas there is an agreed mechanism to do so, there is practically no meaningful dialogue between NATO and the EU on emerging threats. The EU-NATO strategic cooperation remains blocked.

The agenda of the regularly scheduled joint meetings of the NAC and the Political and Security Committee of the EU (PSC) is generally void of any new items and can only legitimately discuss the Berlin Plus operation in Bosnia. Questions of imminent concern such as the fight against terrorism or energy security cannot be tackled.

In addition, this state of affairs can also negatively influence performance in the theatre of operations. The need for strategic cooperation will become more pressing as the EU is set to replace the UN in Kosovo while starting a rule of law mission in Afghanistan. In both of these areas, NATO's military presence will co-exist with EU civilian missions. The existing collaboration in the field between the two institutions cannot remedy the lack of cooperation at the policy level in the headquarters. This predicament will be increasingly visible if and when the situation on the ground, especially in Afghanistan or Kosovo, becomes crisis prone. In short, the uncertainties linked to Turkey's EU accession and the intractable Cyprus problem have created serious liabilities for a genuine and substantive NATO-EU partnership.

A Dilemma for Europe, a Dilemma for Turkey

Another consequence of this state of affairs is the Republic of Cyprus veto on the signature of the security agreement between EU and Turkey as well as the administrative arrangements that would enable Turkey to formally cooperate with the European Defence Agency. The purpose of EDA is to help EU Member States develop their defence capabilities for crisis-management operations under the ESDP. The EDA encourages Member States to spend their defence budgets on required capabilities and to pool their resources where appropriate. 26 EU Member States participate in the EDA, with the exception of Denmark, which has an opt-out from ESDP. The non-participation of Turkey in the work of EDA can certainly be considered a serious liability for this organisation given that Turkey has the largest standing army among the European members of NATO and especially in view of its sizeable defense budget.

The inability or unwillingness of some EU member states to think constructively about the institutional arrangements linking Turkey to ESDP creates a similar dilemma for Turkish policy makers. On the one hand, on almost all issues related to regional security, with the notable exception of the problem of Cyprus, Turkish policy is actually quite closely aligned with European foreign policy. It is perhaps worth

recalling that Turkey's alignment with CFSP statements and common positions stands at 92 %.

Turkey has participated in a number of military and civilian ESDP missions including Concordia and Proxima (Macedonia), and EUFORRD Congo. It is currently participating in Althea (Bosnia), EUPM (Bosnia), and EUPOL Kinshasa. Turkey is also slated to participate in the EU-led Kosovo rule of law mission as well. As such, it is the most active participant in ESDP missions among all third countries and out performs many EU member states as well. For instance, Turkey is overall the 6th largest contributor to Althea and it is also set to become a contributor to the Italian-led EU battlegroup to be operational in the second half of 2010.

Furthermore, Turkish security doctrine is more at ease with the approach outlined in the EU security strategy than the US security strategy. References to effective multilateralism, soft power and critical dialogue contrast with the heavy-handed approach of the US to regional security as illustrated in Iraq and as feared in relation to Iran. With its growing political and economic influence and self-confidence, Turkey has become more active in regional politics. Its relationship with the countries of the Middle East has improved considerably. Trade and investment flows between Turkey and the region are at an all time high. Therefore the opportunity cost for Turkey of a radical change in the status quo in the region that may upset the current state of affairs is significant. In that sense, Turkey is a status quo power in the region. Whereas the EU is perceived as a more conservative foreign policy actor, the US is seen as a "revolutionary" power that may sometimes act without taking into consideration the full implications of its actions.

It may be useful to recall that one of the main stumbling blocks during the Turkish-US negotiations in February 2003 before the ill-fated vote of the Turkish parliament for the opening of a new northern front in Iraq was the inability of the US administration to clearly spell out and convince Turkish authorities about their exit strategy for Iraq.

So the dilemma for Turkish authorities is a very fundamental one. From a policy perspective, the natural ally seems increasingly to be the EU. But institutional and political realities preclude the elaboration of a mutually satisfactory framework for the deepening of the Turkey-EU security cooperation.

Moreover on the foreign policy front, the Turkey-EU relationship

has not progressed as one would have hoped. The reason is the difficulties brought about by the start of the negotiations. Whereas the initiation of negotiations had been expected to usher in a period of increased mutual trust, confidence and therefore collaboration, the real as well as imaginary barriers erected in Europe against Turkey's full membership have prevented such an outcome. As a result, foreign policy cooperation and dialogue between Turkey and the EU remains below its potential. The frequency, scope and format of the currently existing framework for the exchange of views on regional issues such as Iran, Iraq and the Caucasus and even in the area of energy security are clearly insufficient for a genuine policy dialogue and partnership to emerge between Turkey and the EU.

As things stand now, the Turkey-EU relationship in the security domain is fraught with difficulty. Turkey's aspirations to become a full-fledged actor contributing to Europe's security with almost equal rights as EU full members remain unfulfilled. In particular Turkey wants:

- to be fully associated with the planning and implementation of EU-led missions as opposed to being asked its contribution if and when needed after the political and technical planning phase is already completed;
- particular attention to consultations when the EU envisages action in the proximity of Turkey or in areas of strategic interest to Turkey;
- increased bilateral contact between the parties on crisis management;
- the convening of the Committee of Contributors at a higher level and more frequent updates from the Operation commander to the Committee;
- Turkish presence in EU headquarters for operations to which Turkey contributes;
- participation in the work of the European Defense Agency (EDA);
- conclusion of the Security Agreement between Turkey and the EU;

That is in essence how Turkish policy makers define the characteristics of a genuine partnership in this sphere. They also believe that if these conditions were to hold, Turkey could substantially reinforce the EU's military and also civilian capacities of crisis management.

Towards a settlement ?

Turkey is therefore under increased pressure from its European allies to

accept the new state of affairs and lift its veto on the Republic of Cyprus. So far, Turkey conditionally decided to lift its objection to the NATO-EU strategic dialogue with the EU-27 i.e. including the Republic of Cyprus. The conditions are for the meetings to be held non-officially (i.e., "informal" dialogues) and in relation to urgent matters involving humanitarian concerns. As a result of this change of attitude, "informal" NAC-PSC meetings were held on Darfur and on Kosovo.

Turkish officials are undoubtedly aware of the detrimental consequences of blocking the conclusion of the Republic of Cyprus' security agreement with NATO for the Alliance as a whole. Technically, it is the absence of such an agreement, which prevents the Republic of Cyprus from taking part in the EU-NATO strategic dialogue. The other condition is Cyprus' participation in PfP. However, this is a strategic and politically sensitive decision for Turkey. It is seen as the sole real leverage that Turkey has on the Republic of Cyprus government. The Greek Cypriot government is intent on using Turkey's negotiations process to steal concessions from Turkey regarding the political settlement on the island. So for Turkish policy makers, the NATO card remains an indispensable element in their efforts to redress this asymmetric relationship.

As a result, Turkish policy makers will not lift their objections to the Republic of Cyprus concluding a security agreement with NATO unless a political settlement is achieved. As a matter of fact, this is perhaps nothing more than an annoyance for the Greek Cypriots. The Greek Cypriot government may eventually be unwilling or find it politically impossible to apply for a NATO partnership. But at the least, the present state of affairs serves to underscore the existence of an international problem and raises the spectre of a possible contagion in other areas. It may hence induce the transatlantic community to become more actively involved in the resolution of this specific conflict.

To conclude, what specific measures should be taken to overcome the problems highlighted in this analysis?

The Cyprus question must be resolved. The election of a seemingly more conciliatory new Greek Cypriot president and the expected start of a new round of negotiations is certainly a window of opportunity for settling this intractable dispute. This opportunity should not be missed. A failure this time around will have a host of negative consequences. It will ossify the division of the island, jeopardize the whole process of Turkish-

EU accession and solidify the existing institutional problems between NATO and the EU. Therefore relevant parties should draw the right lessons from the failure of the last UN sponsored round of negotiations.

Turkey and the EU must engage in a program of confidence building. The normalization of the NATO-EU relationship will depend to a great extent on the normalization of the Turkey-EU relationship, which in turn depends on two factors. The first one is Cyprus. As long as the dispute remains unresolved, Turkey's EU aspirations will remain on hold. The second factor is the EU's approach to Turkey. Notwithstanding the question of Cyprus, the EU has been unable to send the right messages to its future member and negotiating partner. For instance, the privileged partner rhetoric refuses to die down. The possibility of national referenda in some member states on Turkish accession is a further difficulty clouding the road to full membership. As a result, under these conditions, Turkish policy makers and the Turkish public opinion continue to nurture doubts about the country's ability to ever fulfil the conditions for full membership. EU member states must now simply allow Turkey to proceed with the negotiations on the same basis as past candidates. In addition, both European institutions as well as national governments should take more responsibility in communicating with their publics about enlargement with a view to building a more solid foundation for what can be considered as the EU's most successful policy.

In relation to Turkey's aspirations to be fully associated with European security, a package deal that would fulfil Turkey's specific demands as identified in this paper including its membership of EDA and the conclusion of the Security Agreement can be engineered in return for the lifting of Turkey's veto, albeit on an ad hoc and case by case basis, for the NATO-EU dialogue on ongoing ESDP operations in Kosovo and Afghanistan.

Finally, even if the Cyprus obstacle is lifted, NATO-EU relationship may still stumble as a result of the deep divisions regarding the future of NATO between the Atlanticist members of the Alliance and the others. Therefore, the rejuvenation of the transatlantic dialogue with a view to engaging in a more constructive debate about the division of tasks between NATO and the EU should be envisaged. The changing attitude of France towards the Atlantic Alliance seems to provide an opportunity for this strategic debate to go forward.

Book Review

Kitap Tanıtımı

Mesut Özcan, *Harmonizing Foreign Policy: Turkey, the EU and the Middle East* (Hampshire: Ashgate, 2008) ISBN: 0754673707, 978-0754673705; 208 pp; £55.00.

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Embracing a comprehensive, descriptive and analytical inquiry, this book provides an explanation of Turkish foreign policy-making patterns and policy actions with a particular focus on the impact of Turkey's European Union candidature, which dates back to the Helsinki Summit of 1999. The author examines Turkey's place in the EU's policy towards the Middle East and attempts to explore the main dynamics (both internal and external) that have led to the formulation of a *common* foreign policy among Turkey and its European counterparts (p. 59). The primary objective of this work is, therefore, to analyze the configuration of such common foreign policy in general and towards the Middle East in particular as a direct response to the process of *Europeanization*. In this sense, the construction of this common foreign policy can broadly be understood as an attempt to harmonize Turkey's foreign policy with that of the Union subsequent to Turkey's EU candidature. For the author, the situations in Iraq and Palestine should be considered as the two most prominent regional instabilities that explicitly manifest how Turkey's policy-making process has in fact come into alignment with the EU's policy-making practices in the past few years.

The term "Europeanization" is deployed by the author to refer to the "changes in Turkish foreign policy as a result of the EU." (p. 147) In the case of Turkey, the author traces the response of a non-member, candidate country to the process of Europeanization in terms of the changes in making and implementation of foreign policy. One of the significant arguments of the book stipulates that the changes in the foreign policy of the EU members should be analyzed carefully, since these changes cannot solely be tied to Europeanization; but rather may come from countries' domestic needs derived from the effects of globalization.

The author's particular concern, above all, rests on the transformation in Turkish foreign policy-making vis-à-vis the Middle

East. Prior to the 1990s, Turkey's policies, for the most part, were in line with the US and Israeli positions. In the post-1999 era, however, Turkey's foreign policy tenets have begun to undergo the effects of Europeanization. According to Özcan, those effects can be illustrated by several driving forces which include the end of support from the European countries to the PKK, the unilateral attitude of the Bush government, the tremendous effects of the 9/11 attacks and the rise of general opposition to terrorist activities, the government change in Israel and the policies of the Sharon government in Palestine, and the divergence between the US and Turkey over the future of Iraq. These factors have played their roles in the formulation of the Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East to be much closer to the European policy pursuits in the region. The US-led war in Iraq also alarmed the EU into constructing a more coherent and stable foreign and security policy despite the differences among the member countries. Thus, the decrease in the impact value of Turkey's security perceptions and its increasing engagement in the Union's policies have incrementally brought along the necessity and process of *harmonizing* Turkey's foreign policy with that of the EU with reference to the instabilities in Palestine and Iraq (pp. 76-8).

Viewed from this perspective, the EU reforms have been central to the harmonization of Turkey's policy-making agenda with that of the Union. The AKP government's commitment to meeting the Copenhagen Criteria for the opening of accession negotiations initiated democratic reform in Turkey. Although many countries have begun to shape their foreign policies to correspond with their security concerns in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, Turkey can be illustrated as an *exceptional* case. In this sense, it is rather the effects of the EU candidature and the Copenhagen Criteria that have been imperative in the expansion of the democratization process in Turkey's political landscape. The effects of the democratic reforms in internal affairs can easily be observed by looking to Turkey's new foreign policy agenda concerning the attitude to be adopted in the face of three prominent conflicts in the region; Cyprus, Iraq and Palestine. One of the prominent shifts in Turkey's foreign policy was the change in its long-standing strategy towards the Cyprus issue during 2004 due to Turkey's new EU vision. The expansion of political reforms was decisive in increasing the size and scope of public opinion and empowering the pro-EU groups and NGOs countrywide, including TÜSIAD (the Association of Turkish Businessmen and Industrialists),

TOBB (the Union of Chambers and Commodity Exchanges of Turkey), and İKV (the Foundation for Economic Development). The change in Turkey's stance regarding the non-settlement of the Cyprus problem was, as the author holds, a direct foreign policy outcome derived from the harmonization process under the impact of the EU candidature. And, in the case of the Iraqi war, the Turkish Grand National Assembly's refusal to transfer US troops through Turkish territory during the strike against Iraq clearly illustrated the fact that Turkey's major foreign policy preferences were conditioned by the EU agenda at the expense of the US at that time.

The non-settlement of the Palestinian-Israeli dispute and subsequent peace initiatives to solve the problem constitute another case study in demonstrating to what extent Turkey's Middle East policy overlaps with that of the EU in the post-2001 era. With the revitalization of the peace process by the change in the government from the Likud to Labour Party in 1999, Turkey has increasingly been required to re-consider and rebuild its relations with both Israel and the Palestinian Authority (p. 126). However, Turkey's position in the peace process was to be altered by the outbreak of the second Palestinian *intifada* in the Occupied Territories from September 2000 onwards. A year later, Turkey became the only Muslim country in the Mitchell Commission established by the UN with the aim of monitoring the situation in the region. During this period, Turkey attempted to become a vital actor in the peace process by emphasizing her role in NATO, the impact of its EU candidature, and her non-Arab Muslim identity in particular. In this respect, the OIC-EU Summit meeting, which was held in Istanbul in 2002, can be regarded as a display of "examples of the *Europeanization* of Turkish foreign policy and a "Europeanized strategy" towards the Middle East" (p. 128).

Considering the settlement of the Palestine problem, Turkey gave support for the 2003 Road Map – a policy action in line with the EU's Palestine agenda – which was then confronted both by Sharon's unilateral disengagement plan in 2004 and instabilities in the Palestinian territories. While the Turkish Prime Minister Tayyip Erdoğan evaluated the situation in the form of a harsh criticism towards the Israeli policies saying that the actions "were reaching the level of state terror", the US on the contrary considered the turmoil as a matter of Israeli defense and security (p. 129).

In the case of Turkey's relations with Iraq, Turkey's EU candidature occupies a crucial place for the author in understanding the shift towards

a more European strategy. The main area of concern between Turkey and the EU prior to 1999 was dominated by Turkey's struggle with the PKK and human rights matters. Previously, Turkey's relations with the Iraqi Baath Party were determined and conditioned by the threat perceptions and maintenance of Turkey's territorial integrity, which also legitimized the army's involvement in the process of conducting external affairs (p. 133). With the decline of the security threats and Turkey's EU candidature, Turkey's relations with the Middle East countries have begun to shift from the US – Israeli axis towards a more European framework. An apt example of such foreign policy shift was the assertion of the Turkish authorities that the American strike against Iraq was, in fact, "lacking international legitimacy" (p. 137). In addition, the Turkish President Ahmet Necdet Sezer emphasized that Turkey's policy during the Iraqi crisis would remain in parallel with France and Germany. Furthermore, it is commonly argued that Turkey's relations regarding the Middle East and the EU can play a critical role in handling regional instabilities by filling the gaps between "Islam and democracy", and "freedom and security". Against this background, Turkey's commitment to uphold democratic reforms can reinforce the stabilization of the conflicts in Iraq and Palestine as well.

Given the economic interdependency between Turkey and the EU countries and the increase in Turkey's commitment to full EU membership, the main argument of the author appears to be that "Ankara's foreign policy is moving in the direction of the alignment of the EU" in the post-1999 era (p. 145). It is necessary to analyze this change in Turkey's foreign policy with two related aspects, which could be termed "adaptation through membership" and "socialization of the foreign policy makers". The Europeanization of Turkey's foreign policy might be a long-term process due to Turkey's cultural background, high military expenditures, economic structure and, of course, the geopolitical environment in which Turkey is embedded. The second aspect of the foreign policy change in question is closely tied with how the security perceptions of the policy-makers change. For instance, the 2006 Progress Report for Turkey sufficiently demonstrates to what extent Turkish policy makers formulate their policies in line with the foreign and security policies of the EU. The report illustrates this harmonization between the Turkish and European policies, giving references to Turkey's policy implementations in relation to the Middle East, including Syria, Lebanon,

Iraq, Iran and Afghanistan, and also to Turkey's involvement in UN, NATO, and EU-led operations (p. 152). Turkey's harmonizing capacity can clearly be seen in the formulation of policies with respect to Hamas in the Palestinian issue. Turkey certainly took into consideration the EU's position during the 2006 crisis in Palestinian politics and officials of both sides set up a common policy after a series of consultations.

The domestic and bureaucratic factors are also very crucial in exploring the change in Turkey's foreign policy (p. 153). Within this context, the author argues that it is essential to pay attention to the role of sub-national units and interest groups, the modifications in the Turkish constitution, the relationship between the political parties and the government, and the breakdown of the domestic-foreign distinction in examining the changes in Turkey's foreign policy process. For instance, the amendment of Article 118 in the Turkish Constitution concerning the role and the function of the National Security Council (NSC) in foreign policy-making occupies a central place in manifesting the effects of domestic factors on the harmonization process. The article re-defined the role of the NSC in accordance with the EU's political criteria, reducing the Council to an advisory board and increasing the power of its civilian members (p. 98). Nevertheless, the author argues that *real* Europeanization will be achieved with full membership, since the Turkish officials will find the opportunity to meet and consult regularly with their European counterparts.

The *conceptualization* of foreign policy actions within and outside the Union is the most striking part of this book. The author categorizes the actions into two different groups: the actions within the EU, which could be understood as constriction or opportunity, and the actions outside the EU, which could be highlighted as special relationships and special interests (p. 157). In analyzing the impact of the EU membership on the member states and to see the constrictions and opportunities, it is imperative to understand states' pre-existing foreign policy orientations, European foreign relations and also international foreign relations. Within this framework, Turkey's candidature, for the most part, did not produce divergences with the EU policies regarding the Middle East. Although the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) may force states to pursue their pre-existing interests, in Turkey's case this is not likely to happen given that the pre-existing agenda of Turkey has been easily adjusted in line with the EU's agenda. Particularly after Turkey's admission to the

organization, the adjustment process will accelerate even further and be completed. As a candidate country, Turkey's close relations with the US are a matter of concern for some EU member states. However, Turkey's foreign-policy actions -precisely with respect to the Middle East region- have recently moved towards the European stance, which has significantly reduced the impact of the US dominance. Nevertheless, the author holds that the "issues related to national security in Turkey," pertaining to the Aegean problems with Greece and the situation in Northern Iraq for example, "can be immune from Europeanization" (p. 160). Although Turkey's national interests have mostly coincided with that of the Union over the past decade, Turkey may still prefer to pursue her own policy actions in such issues related with national security.

Harmonizing Foreign Policy is a significant contribution to the literature on Turkey's foreign policy in its introduction of the recently coined concept of Europeanization to complicate further the current analyses. The author contends that Turkey's EU candidature as established in 1999 was instrumental in exploring Turkey's making and implementing of foreign policy, when Turkey's three major foreign policy preferences are concerned. These preferences could be summed up as the relations with the Western world, Europe and Euro-Atlantic Institutions, the relations with the Middle East, and finally the relations with the Eurasian world (pp. 100-01). These three foreign policy priorities certainly coincide with the foreign policy agenda of the EU in general. The inherent shortcomings in the construction of CSFP, specifically, have increased the role to be played by Turkey. The path towards Turkey's EU membership has therefore reinforced this candidate country to adapt and pursue a more *harmonized* foreign policy with the Union on international matters in general and the Middle East region in particular.

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Stephen Yablo, "Mental Causation," *Philosophical Review* 101 (1992): 245-80.

Book

Samuel Scheffler, *Human Morality* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), 25-30.

Article in a book

John W. Houck, "Stories and Culture in Business Life," in *A Virtuous Life in Business: Stories of Courage and Integrity in the Corporate World*, ed. Oliver F. Williams and John W. Houck (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 1992), 129-38.

Note:

For repeated references, do not use 'op. cit.' - use a short title instead (e.g., Yablo, "Mental Causation").

You may use 'ibid.' (not italicized) where appropriate.

If you make many references to a single work, you may (and are encouraged to) give bibliographic information in a note at the first such reference, and then, for subsequent references, give page numbers only, in parentheses, run into the main text.

The subsequent references are run into the text, enclosed in parentheses, like so: (Yablo 1992, 248-52). The author's name may be omitted if it is clearly implied by context.

Note the distinction between 'Yablo 1992', which refers to a work, and 'Yablo (1992)', which is a reference to Yablo the person, followed by a parenthetical reference to one of Yablo's works.

Abbreviations. Most abbreviations should be spelled out and rendered in English.

Emphasis. Use italics, not underlining.

Quotation marks. Use double quotation marks for quoted material run into the text, and for irony and other literary purposes. Use single quotation marks for quoted material *within* a quotation and to mention linguistic expressions.

Spelling. Use American spelling.

For further information see: <http://jcs.emu.edu.tr>

Yazı Göndermek İsteyen Yazarların Dikkatine

1. *Kıbrıs Araştırmaları Dergisi*, Derginin Amacı bölümünde belirtilen ilkeler doğrultusunda Türkçe ve İngilizce makaleler yayınlar. *Dergide* basılacak yazı ve makalelerin içeriğinin özgün olması, daha önce hiçbir yerde yayımlanmamış, hali hazırda başka bir dergide değerlendirme aşamasında olmaması ve yayın haklarının verilmemiş olması gerekmektedir. *Dergide* yayınlanan makalelerde ifade edilen inanç, görüş ve fikirler tamamen yazar veya yazarlara ait olup, Kıbrıs Araştırmaları Merkezi veya Doğu Akdeniz Üniversitesi'nin görüşlerini ve genel politikasını yansıtmaz. Yazının içindeki malzemelerle ilgili telif haklarının elde edilmesi yazar veya yazarların sorumluluğundadır.
2. Bir yazı ancak editör, yayın kurulu ve hakemler tarafından uygun görüldüğü takdirde yayımlanacak.
3. Yazılar editöre ya Microsoft Word, ya da Microsoft Word uyumlu bir programda yazılmış olarak i) cd üzerinde, ya da ii) e-posta bağlantılı gönderilmelidir.
4. Yazarlar adlarını, yazının başlığını, hangi kurumda çalıştıklarını, posta adresi, telefon ve faks numaralarını ve e-posta adreslerini yazıdan bağımsız olarak ayrı bir sayfada göndermelidir. Bununla birlikte 200 kelimeyi aşmayacak şekilde İngilizce ve Türkçe (mümkünse) özetler ve altına 3-8 kelimedenden oluşan anahtar kelimeler yazıya eklenmelidir.
5. Kesin bir kelime kısıtlaması olmasa da metin ve notlar birlikte 6000-10000 kelime arası olması tercih edilmektedir.
6. Değerlendirmeye alınan makalelerin yazarları ve hakemlerin karşılıklı olarak isimleri gizli tutulur. Değerlendirmedeki gizlilik esası için makalede yazarın adı ve çalıştığı kurum geçmemelidir. Bu bilgiler sadece gönderilen elektronik posta mektubunda yer almalıdır. Değerlendirmeye gidecek makalede yazarın kendisine yaptığı referanslar yazarın kimliğini açığa çıkartmayacak şekilde verilmelidir. Bütün referansları aynı şekilde verip yazarın adı yerine sadece *Yazarın makalesi*, *yazarın kitabı* ve *yazarın kitabı* 2 gibi verilmesi yeterli olacaktır. Yazarın kimliğini açığa çıkartacak teşekkür notları makalenin ilk gönderiminde yer almamalıdır.
7. Değerlendirmeye gönderilen yazılar aşağıdaki belirtilen format ölçütlerine uygun olmalıdır: Ana metin: 12 punto, "Times New Roman" karakterde, iki (2) aralıkla yazılmalıdır. Kaynaklara göndermeler dipnot olarak makalenin sonunda verilmelidir. Yayın için gönderilen makaleler *Chicago Manuel of Style*, 15inci Basım, uygun olmalıdır. Bütün sayfalar numaralandırılmalıdır.
8. Kaynaklara referans
 - a. Dipnotları makalenin sonunda verilmelidir.
 - b. Kitap ve dergi isimleri için *italik* kullanılmalıdır.

- c. Basım bilgilerinde bilindik şehirler için eyalet ve devlet isimleri yazılmamalıdır.
- d. Bibliyografik notlar için aşağıda verilen bazı örneklerde olduğu gibi *Chicago Manuel of Style* (15. basım) kullanılmalıdır.

Sürelî yayımlar:

Stephen Yablo, "Mental Causation," *Philosophical Review* 101 (1992): 245-80.

Kitaplar:

Samuel Scheffler, *Human Morality* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), 25-30.

Kitap içinde makale:

John W. Houck, "Stories and Culture in Business Life," *A Virtuous Life in Business: Stories of Courage and Integrity in the Corporate World*, der. Oliver F. Williams ve John W. Houck (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 1992), 129-38.

Not:

Tekrarlayan referanslar için 'op. cit.' kullanılmamalı, bunun yerine kısa isim kullanılmalı (örneğin, Yablo, "Mental Causation"). Eğer aynı kaynağa birçok kez atıfta bulunuyorsanız bibliyografik bilgileri ilk sefer bir notta verdikten sonra ayrıca içinde sayfa numaralarını ana metnin içinde vermeniz tavsiye edilir. Ayrıca içindeki sıra şöyle olmalıdır: yazar(lar)ın soyadı, kaynağın yılı, sayfa numaraları. Karşılaşılabilecek farklı durumlar şöyle örneklenebilir: (Yablo 1992, 248-52). Eğer yazarın ismi açık bir şekilde geçiyorsa metnin içinde yazarın ismi yazılmayabilir. Burada dikkat edilmesi gereken nokta 'Yablo 1992' (bir esere referans verir) ve 'Yablo (1992)' (bir yazara ve parantez içinde onun bir eserine referans verir) arasındaki farktır.

Kısaltmalar. Kısaltmalar ilk açık halleriyle yazılmalıdır.

Vurgu. İtalik kullanılmalı.

Tırnak İşareti. Alıntı ironi ve diğer edebi amaçlar için çift tırnak işareti kullanılmalı. Tek tırnak işareti alıntının içinde alıntı varsa ve dilbilimsel terminoloji için gerekliyse kullanılmalı.

Detaylı bilgi için bkz.: <http://jcs.emu.edu.tr>

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