

Domestic Institutions and the Spread of Boko Haram in Nigeria

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ABSTRACT

Terrorism has found its way into the nooks and crannies of the Nigerian society. Hence, this has headlined global news across the world in the last decade. Terrorist organizations such as the Niger Delta militants and Boko Haram are the major security problems the country faces. Boko Haram seems to stand out and have been perceived to be one of the most lethal terrorist organizations in the world. Though there are uncertainties about the year Boko Haram was founded, the year 2010 marks a period of violent extremism and radicalization by the group. The reason for the spread of the terrorist group from what it was to what it became is attributed to two different factors: The dissatisfaction from local governance and the weaknesses of power agencies to curb the violent group. Thus, the research aims to find a synergy between these factors and the spread of Boko Haram.

The research is structured in six chapters: Chapter one which is the introduction, introduces the research and states the research question, hypotheses, methodology, significance of the study and the theoretical framework of the thesis. The next chapter reviews important literature in terrorism in Africa and Nigeria. Chapter three give an overview about what Boko Haram is all about. Chapters four and five provides evidence for the first and second hypotheses respectively and the final chapter concludes and gives recommendations.

Keywords: Terrorism, Nigeria, Frustration-Aggression, State weakness, Domestic institutions.

ÖZ

Terör köşe ve Nijeryalı toplumun yarıklarına onun yolunu buldu. Dolayısıyla, bu son on yıl içinde dünya çapında küresel haber headliner etti. Böyle Nijer Deltası militanlar ve Boko Haram gibi terörist örgütler ülke karşı karşıya önemli güvenlik sorunları vardır. Boko Haram öne görünüyor ve dünyanın en ölümcül terör örgütlerinden biri olarak algılanmıştır. Boko Haram kurulduğu yıldan konusunda belirsizlikler olmasına rağmen, 2010 yılı grup tarafından şiddetli aşırıcılık ve radikalleşme bir süre işaretler. Yerel yönetimden memnuniyetsizlik ve şiddet grup frenlemek için güç ajansları zayıf: Bu iki farklı faktöre atfedilen ne oldu oldu ne terör örgütü yayılması nedeni. Böylece, araştırma ve bu faktörler Boko Haram yayılması arasındaki sinerji bulmayı amaçlamaktadır.

Araştırma, altı bölümden yapılandırılmıştır: Bölüm, giriş olan araştırma tanıtır ve araştırma sorusu, hipotez, metodoloji, çalışma ve tezin teorik çerçevesinin önemini belirtir bir. Bir sonraki bölümde Afrika ve Nijerya'da terör önemli literatürü gözden geçirmektedir. Bölüm üç Boko Haram tüm hakkında ne olduğu konusunda genel bir bilgi vermek. Dördüncü ve beşinci bölümlerde, sırasıyla birinci ve ikinci hipotezler için kanıt sağlar ve son bölüm sonucuna ve öneriler verir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Terörizm, Nijerya, Engellenme-Saldırganlık, Devlet halsizlik, Yurtiçi kurumlar.

DEDICATION

To my Family

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ANC	African National Congress
ANPP	All Nigerian People Party
AQIM	Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb
BH	Boko Haram
CBN	Central Bank of Nigeria
CTC	Counter Terrorism Committee
ELF	Eritrean Liberation Front
FTO	Foreign Terrorist Organization
GIA	Armed Islamic Group
GTD	Global Terrorism Database
IAEA	International Atomic Energy Agency
IED	Improvised Explosive Device
IMO	International Maritime Organization
MEND	Movement for the Emancipation of Niger Delta
MUJAO	Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa
NBS	National Bureau of Statistics
NPF	Nigerian Police Force
PDP	Peoples Democratic Party
RUF	Revolutionary United Front
SDGT	Special Designated Global Terrorists

Chapter 1

INTRODUCTION

The issue of Terrorism is beginning to gain prominence and dominate the international scene in past few decades. However, the concept of terrorism is not a new practice; in fact, it is deeply rooted in history. It has been employed by different insurgent and guerrilla groups to attract attention and convey their messages since ancient times. Unfortunately, it is an unconventional means of relating these messages to the public. It is one of, if not the biggest threat to world peace. Mostly, the primary targets of terrorist actions are usually non-combatants and the civilian population. That is not to say the government, public institutions and its officials are not also a target but rather an act to show the governments incapacity to act as a protector of its citizens (Campos et al, 2009).

“Terrorism is ineluctably political in aims and motives, violent and designed to have far-reaching psychological repercussions beyond the immediate victim or target, conducted by an organization with an identifiable chain of command, perpetrated by a subnational group or non-state entity.” (Hoffman, 2006).

Terrorism refers to a form of violence politically aggravated which intentionally and indiscriminately aims at civilians (Goldstein et al, 2009:198). From the various definitions of terrorism, one can say the common denominator underlying them is that terrorism is an aspect of political violence. A great number of audiences tend to refer to terrorism as being politically propelled because a person who might be considered a freedom fighter for one party is the other party’s terrorist. The use of terror has gone beyond the national boundaries. In recent times, the use of information technology and globalization has aided the spread and intensity of

terrorism making it cut across borders and representing a more regional and international image.

Africa may be the richest continent evaluating from the possession of natural resources. However, most countries in Africa remain the least developed countries, which are not economically stable, characterized by widespread poverty, high rate of unemployment, political instability, social underdevelopment with high rate of illiteracy and child mortality, ethnic conflicts and very importantly, the high rate of insecurity as a result of increasing terrorist groups across the region.

For many decades, the world has suffered from terrorism and the African continent has also experienced different form of terrorism. No region of the continent is immune to terrorism. It constitutes one of the many problems which Africa and other parts of the world have to wrestle with. There are lots of non-state violent groups which commit these terrorist actions in Africa. Examples include the South African African National Congress, the Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF), Al-Shabaab in east Africa, the Lord's Resistance Army in Uganda, Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) in North Africa, The Armed Islamic Group (GIA) in north Africa and Boko Haram in Nigeria, and others who have attracted ample media attention.

Historically and contemporarily, Africa has experienced a number of terrorist cases. For instance Muammar Gaddafi of Libya was highly perceived to be anti-western who would support terrorist organizations. He funded them and gave them every support they needed including his connection to the Lockerbie bombing (Davis, 1990). Also, the African National Congress in South Africa played a big role for modern day terrorism in Africa where they would engage in different forms of

terrorist attacks and car bombings in the country's capital in the 1980s. The Revolutionary United Front in Sierra-Leone (RUF) in the 1990s, sought to overthrow the government by inducing fear and intimidating the local communities. This was their political strategy and they would amputate both government officials and civilians, leaving behind child soldiers (Forest, 2011).

Lately, Nigeria has experienced different forms of terrorist attacks where Boko Haram who are predominantly in the northern region of Nigeria have affected the lives of thousands of people. On the other hand are the Niger Delta militant primarily situated in the southern part of the country. The latter have been more focused on carrying out attacks on government properties and structures of multinational corporations. Hence, a major actor which affects the economic stability of the country (Ibid.). Shortly before 2000 did Africa begin to experience terrorist cases with international characteristics where the embassies of the United States in Tanzania and Kenya were bombed. Countries like Nigeria and Algeria have also suffered such terrorist attacks where international infrastructures have been targeted. After 1990, the African continent has been a major victim of terrorism where over 6000 casualties have been recorded from almost 300 separate acts (Solomon, 2011). Somali al-Shabaab militant group also killed at least 67 people in Nairobi's west gate shopping center in September 2013 (BBC News).

The United Nations always stands firmly to reiterate its stands on issues relating to international peace and security, the UN has reiterated that any practice or act of terrorism is contrary to the practice and principles of the United Nations, neither should these terrorists acts be financed, planned or incited as they are also contrary to the practice and principles of the United Nations (UNSCR, 1373). The UN Security

Council has also established a Counter Terrorism Committee (CTC) who would manage the execution of Security Council Resolution 1373. Past leaders and secretary generals have also repeatedly condemned terrorist acts. In addition, various agencies of the UN have adopted different resolutions to improve security and limit terrorist acts. Some of which includes The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), The International Maritime Organization (IMO) and the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) (Cordesman, 2002).

In conformity to the measures taken by the United Nations against the act of terrorism, regional bodies like the African Union also responded with their position on terrorism. This is illustrated in the Constitutive Act of the African Union of 2002, Article 4 (o) which emphasizes that human life should be respected, all forms of political assassinations and impunity must be rejected and condemned (Constitutive Act of the A.U).

Though Nigeria is religiously and ethnically divided along the North-South axis, series of militant activities have been recorded in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria which is oil rich where the struggle has turned into an arena of economic crimes, violence, wars between ethnic and communal groups, general criminalization of social life and the region has been turned into a battle zone between militias and the Nigerian state (Ikelegbe, 2006). Boko Haram gives an additional reason why one might say the Nigerian government is weak. Former president Goodluck Jonathan speaking on Boko Haram insurgency stated that “the situation we have in our hands is even worse than the civil war we fought” (African Spotlight, 2012)

The origin of Boko Haram terrorist group gives us a reason to say that there is more to terrorism than the fight for a more equitable allocation of resources or better representation in government as in the case of the Movement for the emancipation of Niger Delta (M.E.N.D) in southern Nigeria. In most cases, as in the case of northern Nigeria, terrorism lies across religious and political axis. This means a lot of factors might lead to terrorist actions, just as Stefan Mair posits that terrorism occurs when there is interaction between social deprivation, a loss of social identity, political repression, economic instability and a dysfunctional state (Mair, 2003). He further posits that terrorism in Sub Saharan Africa would not attain its present if not for the complexities which arises from its own internal society.

For terrorism to prosper, it needs a fertile ground. Explaining the mechanism between terrorism in Nigeria and the institutions responsible for preventing the escalations of further terrorist actions is what this thesis dwells on. Terrorism is a very broad concept and explaining what causes its origin and spread may be a Sisyphean task. However, the role of the state institutions regarding terrorist activities whether local or international should not be underestimated.

1.1 Statement of Research Problem

The concept of terrorism is very broad. The ambiguity which surrounds terrorism makes it attract research from different fields. Furthermore, this has been a major hindrance towards conducting empirical research. The lack of a universally acceptable knowledge of terrorism is what prompts scholars and students to further engage in this concept. Although, this thesis aims to add to the existing research in this field. Basically, the problem of this research lies on the question which asks: what factors facilitated the spread of Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria? The rise

and spread of Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria has and will continue to be explained from different perspectives due to factors which are beyond the scope of this thesis. However, this research is one out of many which aims to attribute the rise and spread of Boko Haram insurgency to a weak and dysfunctional government. This is not to suggest that terrorism or Boko Haram insurgency can only be explained by ineffective curtailment, but the research aims to locate a link between terrorism and the state institutions.

1. The definition of the spread of Boko Haram in the context of this thesis indicates territorial expansion sphere of influence, terrorist tactics and membership of the terrorist group. The group's ability to cover a wider geographical network, the nature of their influence to target an international organization and have transnational links, the use of advanced terrorist tactics and the expansion of their membership will be analyzed during the course of this thesis.

1.2 Research Question

What Factors Facilitated the Spread of Boko Haram Insurgency in Nigeria?

As stated above, one thing this thesis does is that it brings the Nigerian state and its institutions into questioning. The research question is thus; **what factors facilitated the spread of Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria?**

This question aims at explaining why administration after administration, the problem of insecurity in Nigeria has only exacerbated. In addition, the territorial influence which the Boko Haram group covered in 2009 was limited to Borno in the North East of Nigeria. The research question asks the reason behind the territorial expansion of Boko Haram since 2000. The research question seeks to find out if the

weaken state institutions are enough justification for the spread of the insurgent group. Furthermore, within the context of this question, it will seek to analyze whether a more functional state and stronger power agencies would lead to alleviation of terrorism in Nigeria. This goes a long way to show the fabrics which joins state institutions and terrorism. Whether loosely or closely related is what the research question explains in this research.

1.3 Significance of the Study

This thesis shows to be significant because it analyzes the role a state plays in curbing its internal affairs which may turn out to be instrumental in protecting the peace and security of not only the state but the international community at large. The research explains a quite ambiguous and difficult to discern concept like terrorism. The Nigerian government, more recently have shown to prioritize the issue of insecurity more than previous decades. This goes on to complement the amount of research scholars and students put in explaining this trend, hence a motivation for this research. In reaction to the research problems, this research limits the scope of study to a single terrorist group (Boko Haram) and a single state (Nigeria) primarily to have a more concise analysis.

The thesis also draws much attention because it takes a different path from the mainstream analysis on the causes of terrorism especially in the global south which mainly attributes the spread of terrorism to increased radicalization, the rise of social media or an expansion in the rate of marginalization of a particular sect. This research however, brings the Nigerian government into account to explain why the Giant of Africa cannot control how a terrorist group operates within its territory.

Another importance of this research is that it covers a contemporary challenge which the Nigerian state faces. Unlike previous researches which explain general situations using old ideas or old facts, the limitation of the scope of this research makes it worth relating to a current problem which the Nigerian government faces.

1.4 Hypothesis

1.4.1 Hypothesis H1: The dissatisfaction from domestic governance facilitated the spread of Boko Haram.

1.4.2 Hypothesis H2: The weaknesses of power agencies led to the spread of Boko Haram.

1.4.3 Null Hypothesis H0: There is no relationship between power agencies and the spread of Boko Haram.

1.4.4 Null Hypothesis H0: There is no relationship between dissatisfaction from domestic governance and the spread of Boko Haram.

1.5 Methodology

The thesis employs the use of Boko Haram as a case study to explain the relationship between terrorism and state institutions in Nigeria. The data used for this research will be basically from the year 2000 primarily because one of the purposes of this paper is to address contemporary problems, one of many which the thesis talks about. Casualties and events of terrorism within this period will be analyzed showing the spread and growth of Boko Haram under four different administrations of the Nigerian government. Furthermore, data will span a period of 15 to 16 years which shows 4 different administrations and replacement of different military chiefs, hoping to alleviate the menace of terrorism in the Nigerian society.

The case study will be based on Boko Haram insurgents which will help in explaining the spread of terrorism and the weakness of the Nigerian domestic institutions. Group discussions and interviews would be conducted to proffer recommendations at the end of the thesis. The data collected from groups and interviews is important because sources will be gotten from an academic society with diverse cultural background possessing intellectual prowess to aid the conduct of this research. Also, the use of journal articles, books, research papers, blogs, news reports and the social media will serve purpose in conducting this research. The thesis will also employ the use of the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) which comprises a comprehensive list of database concern terrorism in every part of the world.

These sources would provide a holistic data on Boko Haram acts particularly in Nigeria from the start of the millennium. The data set will be limited to Boko Haram terrorist group which possesses the basic qualities of what defines the new terrorism, hence it must contain the primary characteristics of terrorism which are; a degree of violence or a threat of violence carried out intentionally by non-state actors, it is mostly an asymmetric warfare, a religious based ideology, an organizational structure, the lethality of their actions (Neumann, 2009). In this research, the demands of the Boko Haram group are clearly religious seeking to ban western education and implement Islamic laws.

The dataset will be analyzed using comparisons between the number of casualties which involves both victims and damage to infrastructure and the number of changes recorded within the Nigerian government which involves heads of military

institutions, representatives, governors and presidents of the local, state and federal areas of affected place respectively.

1.6 Scope and Limitations

The scope of this research is quite limited. It encompasses an analysis of terrorism in Nigeria. However, terrorism carried out by Boko Haram not including other groups like the Movement for the Emancipation of Niger Delta in the south-south region. More so, the research attributes the spread of Boko Haram to a particular factor which is the incapability and improper functioning of the Nigerian state to curb the terrorism. Furthermore, the research will encompass terrorist activities carried out within the borders of Nigeria and may have a couple of international cases for clarity of issues. The research work will also show the origin of Boko Haram, their organizational structure and their effect and impact in the Nigerian society. As regards the limitations, the major factor which serves as a hindrance to this research is the unavailability of primary data which for some reasons the Nigerian government might decide to keep confidential.

1.7 Theoretical Framework

In the pursuit to provide explanation which supports the spread of Boko Haram terrorism in Nigeria, quite a number of theories have been previously employed by authors and scholars. Outside the scope of this research, in a bid to explain the causes of terrorism in Nigeria, different scholars have advanced different theories to explain the causes of terrorism. However, theories do not give a universal explanation of an event; hence they explain those events from a particular point of view. Therefore, the concept of terrorism seems too broad to be explained from one point of view. Narrowly speaking, explaining the activities of Boko Haram has attracted quite a number of theories usually historical materialism, Islamic extremism, Social

exclusion theory. Though these theories are useful, they may not be able to give the readers an in depth understanding as it relates to questioning the Nigerian institutions.

The research thesis adopts two theories to explain the spread of Boko Haram. The frustration-aggression theory and the weak state theory. Scholars have developed a psychological model of understanding terrorists, one of which is the Frustration-Aggression theory. The theory postulates that terrorism is the outcome of frustration, which in turn breeds an aggressive behavior. The reason for such frustration may arise from different sources, some of which occurs when individuals do not have enough to survive on, or when they have enough but still feel they have less compared to people around them or even when they feel their demands are not adequately met.

Aggression is a form of behavior which causes harm on the people it is directed towards. Behind it is a state of mind marked by expression of dissatisfaction as a result of unachievable goals, (Fortman, 2005 in Dollard et al, 1939, 7). It is seen as a form of malcontent which drives the fighting spirit in man, directed against the members of the same specie (Lorentz, 1966). The frustration-Aggression hypothesis explains the causes of violence where the former leads to the latter. Furthermore, it is the innocent civilians that suffer more when frustration is the reason behind such aggression. It should be noted that not all cases of frustration leads to aggression but aggression happens when the individual or group perceive there is no other alternative to achieve their goal (Pastore, 1950). Neil Miller asserts that frustration, in most cases always yields aggression because that has always been the consequence of frustration (Miller, 1941). One of the primary features of terrorism is

the act of displacement which follows the Freudian roots to suggest that the characteristics of terrorists emanates from frustration in their own private lives and thus urges them to act with such extremism against others. If frustration plays a major role to explain the actions of terrorists, another factor to complement this is the political make up of a state. When the ethnic, religious and socio-cultural cleavages of a state are deeply divided, this may prove that normal outlets for agitation of such needs are hindered.

While a related theory such as the relative deprivation theory emphasizes on a situation where expectations do not match with the outcomes, the frustration aggression theory emphasizes violence as a result of pure frustration. In other words, lack of expected outcomes among other factors can generate frustration for an individual or group which can further lead to violence. Also, cases like poverty, unemployment, lack of services etc. can act as triggers of frustration.

As in the case in Nigeria, we see that the frustration- aggression theory plays a significant role in the explanation of this research. The saying that a hungry man is an angry man, mostly shows that if some psychological needs of a person are not met, even when that person works to achieve that need or want, there is high possibility to resort into aggression (Akanni, 2014). This suggests that there is a synergy between psychological and physical needs, where by terrorists lack these needs.

The minds of terrorists contain a shattered psychosocial identity, and in a bid for these terrorists to feel complete is to create contact with the group; relationship with this group signifies an important part of the member's self-construction (Post, 1993).

Furthermore, the Nigerian government has not been able to provide a means of self-actualization for majority of the population where poverty and unemployment rate is high, people still live under \$2 a day without basic social welfare and then when people feel an innate urge to apply a violent response, it turns out to be the Nigerian government whose victims are usually the innocent unprotected civilians, government officials (The military and police) public property usually perceived as agents of the state.

Secondly, the weak state theory postulates that the strength of a state is relative and can be measured by the state's ability and willingness to provide the basic political goods associated with statehood such as effective economic management, the state security, basic social welfare and responsive and accountable political institutions (Patrick, 2006). Many states have lapses in one or more of these areas. Actually, they lack the real sovereignty. Security wise, they fail to maintain a monopoly on the use of force, fail to fully control borders and territory, fail to ensure public order, and also fail to provide safety from crime. Politically, weak states do not have stable and responsible institutions which govern and ensure proper administration and checks and balances, they don't respect the basic human rights and freedoms of its citizens, they are not accountable, there is a level of impartiality in delivering justice, and they do not allow wider citizenry participation, hence yields corruption. Economically, they do not carry out the basic fiscal policies and regulatory climate suitable for entrepreneurship, neither are they flexible towards foreign investment, and they lack a stable economic growth. Lastly and very importantly, socially, weak states are not effectively responsive to their populations' needs due to an uneven level of development and investments in different government sectors.

According to (Torres and Anderson, 2004) to look at weak states, they have to be seen from the sovereign perspective where the functions of a sovereign state involves some primary duties like ensuring the welfare and security of their citizens, and also ensuring a stable relationship internationally. In other words, the state is important to its citizens and when they don't meet their standards, they will be tagged as 'weak'. Not every weak state is the same. While some have lapses in the four different realms, others might just be in a fragile state. Compared to other states, weak states suffer from low growth and analysts identify numerous links between weak states and transnational security threats, ranging from terrorism and nuclear proliferation to the spread of infectious diseases, environmental degradation, and energy security (Wylter, 2008).

The case of Nigeria might not take the same dimension such as Somalia or Syria. However, (Hill, 2012) has attributed Boko Haram insurgency to Nigeria's state failure. He goes on to say Nigeria's state failure has been predicted right from independence and can be considered weak because the government does not run the length and width of its territory such as some places in the North East of Nigeria and also because the government does not promote the flourishing of all its citizens (lack of public goods and social services). The National Bureau of Statistics shows that about 60.9% of Nigerians in 2010 were living in "absolute poverty" which had risen from 54.7% in 2004 (BBC NEWS, 2012).

The corruption and criminal activities currently in the state is partly the reason why Nigeria is called a weak state. The weakness of the central government aids the existence and activities of Boko Haram which still survives irrespective of different measures employed by the government in ending the insurgency in Nigeria.

Apparently the Nigerian government is not sufficient enough in exercising its sovereign authority over parts of Nigeria mainly in the North east and North central part of the country where Boko haram carries out its criminal acts (Failed state index in Fund for peace, 2012). Boko Haram is seen to threaten the existence of Nigerian unity, promoting fear, complementing the assertion that Nigeria has failed in their bid to exercise control in all its territory.

The Nigerian government has also shown to lack a specific military code of justice which will identify the intended targets different from the innocent civilians. For example in 2013, reports by The Associated Press and Amnesty International investigations found the military had killed more than 200 civilians and burned down thousands of homes in the northeast fishing community of Baga after a soldier was killed in the town (Aljazeera, 2015). The role of social and economic development also proves worthy as other scholars have argued that the poor socio-economic conditions such as the widespread poverty, mismanagement and embezzling of the country's wealth, corrupt practices and weak political institutions have all aided the spread of Boko Haram insurgency (Kirwin and Cho, 2009).

1.8 Organization of Chapters

The thesis will consist of five chapters. The first chapter is an introduction which consists of background information, the statement of research problems, a research question, hypotheses, methodology of the study. The research also proffers some assumptions, gives the scope and limitations of the study and the theoretical framework as well. It serves as a foundation for the conduct of the research.

The second chapter will look at important literatures in and around the field of international relations which looks at terrorism and domestic institutions. What this chapter intends to do is that it looks for a general trend in the conduct of this research and looks for a gap when the current research will be able to contribute to the existing literature on terrorism. The chapter will cover terrorism in Africa, terrorism in Nigeria before narrowing down to the insurgency of Boko Haram.

The third chapter will talk about how Boko Haram came about, their membership and group structure. It will go on to explain how the group is funded, the ideological framework of the group which is anti-western where they see the Nigerian state as carrier of that western values and belief. The chapter also looks at the group's sphere of influence and the network of expansion it has covered as well.

Chapters four and five connect each hypothesis with the theories of the study. Chapter four gives evidence as to why the spread of Boko Haram is as a result of the frustration the group faces. It talks about factors like vengeance, crisis of poverty and unemployment, corruption and political alienation and the quest for sharia law as the basic motives behind the spread of the group. The succeeding chapter looks at the weaknesses of the Nigerian power institutions which are the Nigerian Police Force and the Nigerian Army, their problems and how they have facilitated the spread of Boko Haram. Chapter six gives a conclusion and recommendation.

Chapter 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1 Introduction

This chapter explores a number of various scholarly works, writings and views of different authors and writers in the field of terrorism on various aspects of the subject matter. It looks at the opinions and views of various writers which are contained in books and journal articles related to the study ‘Domestic institutions and the spread of Boko Haram in Nigeria’. Consequently, the chapter will identify the strengths and weaknesses of the existing literature and by so doing, it will use the availability of new sources to fill in the vacuum of the existing literature.

The chapter takes into account the general concept of the meaning of terrorism, trends and causes of terrorism, terrorism in Africa and then the Boko Haram insurgency. Is Africa becoming a hotspot for terrorism? The attacks in Mombasa of November 2002 have drawn huge attention to a region of the world that had been seen as a minor stage in the fight against terrorism following September 11, namely sub Saharan Africa (Mair, 2003). Furthermore, Mair posits that Poverty is not the main cause of terrorism, it is rather founded on an interaction of various factors such as a dysfunctional state, political repression, lack of cultural identity and economic perspective and social deprivation can be causes of terrorism in Africa (Ibid).

The concept of terrorism is very broad. Different scholars have looked at it from different perspectives. While there is no specific geographical region which suffers terrorism, it occurs in different parts of the world under different circumstances and reasons where many different groups in various places have used political violence in their bid to achieve their goals. More so, it is important to avoid stereotyping terrorists as persons from a particular region (Lutz and Lutz, 2004).

2.2 Meaning and Nature of Terrorism

Oche and Dokunbo (2001) in their article “ *The scourge of globalized networks of terror and Nigeria’s security*” postulate that the term terrorism is characterized by the desire to reach its objectives by threatening people who might hinder it. However there is no generally accepted root cause of terrorism, they are either political, economic or social. Furthermore, Lodge (1981) has identified three different types of terrorism. The revolutionary terrorism which is aimed at a political revolution, the sub- revolutionary terrorism which is political motivated but not aimed at a revolution and the repressive terrorism which focuses on restraining particular groups, individuals or restraining any form of behavior seen as undesirable.

To base the concept of terrorism on a universally acceptable ground would be misleading. As a result, different scholars have come up with different definitions of the concept which in some way, may be emphasizing different things. This shows the diversity of the concept. The ambiguity of this concept has attracted some challenges to it by state and non-state actors who describe the concept only to favor their own political and economic interests. The ambiguity doesn’t go well with academics as well because defining terrorism is a problem for the general public, not restricted to the academic community. (Horncastle, 2014). He goes on to say the consistency in

defining terrorism is dependent on the emotional resonance created by traumatic events (Ibid).

As Christian Walker posits; the term is imprecise, ambiguous and above all serves no operative legal purpose (Walker, 2003). He goes on to say that it is possible to discern two types of terrorist actions; the first which pursues a form of freedom fight for part of the country's population like ETA in Spain, the PKK in Turkey and IRA in Northern Ireland. The other form who pursue a political concept without a link to a particular part of the population of the country like the RAF in Germany and brigade rosse in Italy. More so, terrorism requires an objective element, i.e. whether violence on person or property and that violence against persons alone is not a criterion for speaking about terrorism. Secondly, a subjective element which is the element of insecurity and fear should be seen as a sufficient element but not a necessary requirement to qualify terrorism. Finally, about the number of perpetrators, most developed countries like the UK and US do not specifically require a number of persons who must collaborate so as to be qualified as terrorists (Ibid).

Similarly, Anthony Richards shares his views on what terrorism should entail. He says the fact that there is an act of violence does not qualify it to be judged as terrorist. Terrorism is employed by different forms of actors and the definition of terrorism is incomplete when it does not address the motives of the perpetrators and that, civilians and non-combatants are not the only targets for terrorists, infrastructures and properties could also be a target (Richards, 2014). The definition of terrorism should consider some factors. Individuals, groups or state can perpetuate the act. However, other definitions usually attribute the perpetrators of terrorist acts exclusive to non -state actors. Furthermore, the definition of terrorism should also

consider the type of terrorist acts, i.e. what is the nature of the attack, is it suicidal, random, or selective? And the motive behind the attack should be clearly stated (Ibid).

Attoh reiterates the differences between a terrorist act and other forms of violence when he says that terrorism is different from mass killing because mass killings emphasizes the killing an entire group. On the other hand, terrorism focuses on the killing of a few people in other to influence a larger audience. Again, contrary to armed robbery and kidnapping, which directs their acts to individuals so as to retrieve material benefits from their victims, terrorism is aimed towards the state intended to cause damage (Attoh, 2012)

In the article “ Why Do We Know So Little about Terrorism?”, the author Ignacio Sanchez-Cuenca looks at the ambiguity of terrorism as he introduces the article by saying due to the ambiguity of the concept, we have less substantive knowledge about terrorism than we have about interstate and civil wars thus hindering empirical research. He goes on to say terrorism is an elusive phenomenon where the media have used it to cover almost all non-state violence and that the concept is ambiguous at three levels: political, ontological, and conceptual. Politically, it is a derogatory term to the point that terrorists use it to debase their enemies; in this case, it is difficult to establish a consensus on which armed groups merit the label “terrorist”. Ontologically, the term can encompass different political entities which may be a particular kind of violence, certain armed groups, conflicts and violent strategy. Other conflict terms such as war, riot or genocide do not enjoy such flexibility. Conceptually, there has been a variety of discussions about what terrorism entails, where the dominant school argues that terrorism is seen in terms of violence against

civilians. Other schools focus on the aim and nature of the attack (Sanchez-Cuenca, 2014).

Karen De Young and Dobbs (2001) in Oviasogie (2013) argues that the threats of terrorist attacks do not necessarily come from indigenous extreme-left movements rather from struggles of self-determination and struggles against injustices which most times tallies with their moral justification through the use of religion. Oviasogie further postulates that the act of terrorism becomes a criminal violation when it is committed within the jurisdiction of any state. These actions are intended to intimidate and create fear within the civilian population, also influence government policies by means of intimidation or coercion, and even indirectly influencing government by assassinations and kidnappings. When terrorism is not within national jurisdiction, it can transcend national boundaries in form of the means in which they are accomplished, the place in which the perpetuation operate or even the persons they appear intended to coerce or intimidate (Oviasogie, 2013).

It might be naive to pursue a single definition of terrorism says George Fletcher in his article "*The indefinable concept of terrorism*". He says that the concept has different contours for different purposes and that the better way to think of terrorism is not as a crime, rather as a different dimension of crime, a higher and a more dangerous version of crime, a kind of super-crime which incorporates some of the characteristics of warfare (Fletcher, 2006). He further suggests that there are eight variables of terrorism; the factor of violence; the required intention; the nature of the victims; the connection of the offender to the state; the justice and motive of their cause; the level of organization; the element of theatre; and the absence of guilt.

Where not all factors can apply at the same time, it is important to become aware of all the relevant factors (Ibid.).

Alex P. Schmid and Albert J. Jongman in their groundbreaking book ‘*Political terrorism*’ examine different definitions of terrorism and have come up with elements and a consensus of what terrorism should incorporate. They see terrorism as an anxiety-inspired method of repeated violent actions which are usually carried out by covert individuals, groups and even state actors, for political and criminal purposes. As against other forms of violence like assassination, the contact groups are usually not the main targets. The victims are chosen at random whenever there is an opportunity or victims are selected from a target population so as to send a clear message. This form of violence-based communication between terrorist and victims on one hand and the main targets on the other hand are used to manipulate the latter to turn their attention to what the terrorists want (Schmid and Jongman, 1988).

Terrorism is a threatened and illegal violence that is directed towards human and nonhuman objects provided that the act was undertaken with a view to alter or maintain a particular norm in given territorial unit, provided that the perpetrators conceal their personal identities and locations in a clandestine or secretive manner, provided that it is not conventional warfare (the participants see themselves as less vulnerable to the conventional military action) and as long as the participants perceive themselves as contributing to the normative goal by inculcating fear of violence into people (Gibbs, 1989).

Walter Laqueur argues that terrorism is not sub-specie of guerilla or revolutionary warfare, they have different political functions. He says the difference between

guerilla and terrorism is not one of semantics but quality where the main features of terrorism are that terrorism is a new and unprecedented phenomenon, a response to injustice, deeply ideological carried out by fanatical believers, can occur anywhere and is underlined by grievances, stress and frustration (Laqueur, 2001).

Terrorism, like everything else, comes in waves (Rapoport, 2001 in Schinker, 2009), in cycles (Bergesen and Lizardo, 2004 in Schinker, 2009). Terrorism as a paradox: It is indivisibly bound to the reaction to terrorism. It is the reaction of some states to terrorism that actually constitutes an act as terrorism by refolding actions that unfolded subsequent to an event into that event as the root cause of the entire chain of events. Because terrorism is paradoxically intertwined with the reactions to terrorism, research on causes of the concept of terrorism cannot do without explicit conceptualization of terrorism (Schinker, 2009).

Although there are quite a variety of distinctions in all definitions of terrorism, most contain at least three basic features; it entails the use of the threatened use of violence, to differentiate terrorism from other forms of violence such as assault or murder, it has to be politically motivated. Third, and very importantly, terrorism entails the use of threat on innocent civilians. Whether terrorist actions are deliberate or random, direct or indirect, physically or psychologically impacted, or with the purpose of intimidation or coercion, it is the impact of such actions on the innocent that is considered as the central characteristic of terrorism (Butko, 2006).

After reviewing some of these definitions, one can deduce that some scholars can arrive at a level of agreement of what terrorism entails. First, it the use of violence and intimidation, the larger public is usually the target, it aims at coercing or

intimidating the government. In accordance to this, this research will define terrorism as an illegitimate use or threat of force by an individual, group or state to create fear and coerce a vulnerable target in order to achieve their goals.

2.3 Causes of Terrorism

It is of great importance to understand the root causes of terrorism. Some scholars have argued that finding the root causes of terrorism might be the link to what will end this menace. There have been a lot of arguments about what exactly causes terrorism. It is however difficult to explain the act of terrorism as a result of a singular cause. Therefore, the causes of terrorism vary from one terrorist group to another.

Martha Crenshaw in her work "*The causes of terrorism*" explains that giving a general definition of the causes of terrorism is a difficult task. However, one can establish a theoretical order based on three levels of causation which will be based on situational variables, the strategies of the terrorist group, and the problems of individual participation. She goes on to say that because terrorism is seen collectively as a logical means to advance desired ends, it can serve a variety of goals; Revolutionary, nationalists who are fighting foreign occupiers, minority separatists, reformists. However diverse the goals of different terrorist groups are, the primary reason for terrorism is to gain recognition or attention (Crenshaw, 1981).

Identifying these root causes is a complex task, for several reasons. Tore Bjorgo explains why the manner of 'terror from above' and 'terror from below' is different in different fundamental ways. Besides the left-wing revolutionary terrorists employ terrorism in different ways from the religiously motivated terrorists. The notion of

the 'root causes' is seen more from an angle of political discourse than from any other research on terrorism and social theory. He adds that there are different levels of causes of terrorism; some are more remotely while others are more closely and directly attached with terrorism where the preconditions and precipitants of terrorism is what differentiate the causes. He further distinguishes them into structural causes (class structure, demographic imbalances, globalization), facilitator causes (weak state control of territory, weapons technology), motivational causes (Ideology and rhetoric) and triggering causes such as outrageous acts, political calamities. (Bjorgo, 2005).

Extreme views in secular ideology, religion, psychology, nationalism and ethnicity mostly lead to terrorism. Furthermore, the perceived political grievances of poverty, occupation, religious influence, and sometimes military oppression are sometimes antecedents to terrorism. The reasons why the aggrieved parties complain are usually based on factual evidence or even their beliefs. The aggrieved tender their complaints in the form of harm done to them and sometimes they respond in kind to those who inflict the harm on them, other times they want to draw attention. International injustice can be a cause of terrorism using the case of the United Nation's action to create the state of Israel on Palestinian land after WWII. He says ideologies play a vital role how terrorists select their targets: it gives them the motive for action, provides a prism on how they view other people and provides a justification of their actions (Azar, 2003).

According to D.M Price and JW Morris, in the bid to understand what truly drives militants into violent extreme groups, one need to understand their motivations. Different researchers and policy makers as well have underestimated the role of

ideologies as motivators behind various types of terrorism. They further assert that terrorist groups are motivated by self-interest, the quest for wealth and power and their desire to further a political agenda. They usually have a vision of how they think a state should be organized and further question the foundation of the organization of their society, in most cases, extremists who share such a vision work together. Furthermore, they posit that extreme religious and political beliefs also play a major role of the reasons behind terrorism. Perpetuators are partly driven by what they perceive to be either fair or unfair and they further justify the use of their violence when they feel there has been a breach of contract between the government and the citizens (Price and Morris, 2011).

(Babalola, 2013) have argued that the role of religious beliefs in explaining terrorism cannot be underestimated. While religious beliefs have been widely accepted to be behind terrorism in some societies, there are other sources which may amount to discontent. Conflicts may be about competition over power, resources and territory, religion adds another layer of complexity to it. Not too far from this argument comes James Piazza and Ali Ozdogan who argue that the segregation of minority groups like unequal employment opportunities, lack of access to basic facilities such as education, health and welfare services has helped ignite dormant grievances by minority groups within a state which may take the form of terrorist activities. Furthermore, the more socially fragmented a society is, the higher propensity there is to labor force that can easily resort to terrorism. The deep cleavages between social groups in terms of ethnicity, religion, culture and religion might lead to a social breakdown as a result of weak interrelationship between each other (Piazza, 2011; Ozdogan, 2007).

The causes of terrorism can be widely broken down into structural factors and direct underlying grievances claims Edward Newman in his ‘‘*Exploring the root causes of terrorism*’’. Structural factors such as poverty create an enabling environment which does not have an explanatory value alone but when analyzed together with other factors, may have explanatory value. Poverty is mostly presented as a basic underlying root cause of terrorism according to the proposition that ‘‘Poverty of resources, combined with poverty of prospects, choices and respect, help enable terrorism to thrive’’. It can breed desperation and resentment and can act as support for political extremism. It can mean underdevelopment, weak governance or sometimes failed state referred to as a black hole within which fanaticism can emerge (Ranstorp, 2003).

Poor society facilitates a weak state which may not have the capacity to prevent a terrorist activity or even promote an educational program which reduces support for terrorism. Hence, when citizens are denied access to clean water, air and land to meet their basic human needs, there tends to be a rise in ill-health and a sense of hopelessness, thus resorting to desperate solutions. Environmental degradation might also fan the flame of hate and make people believe terrorism is what is required to solve the nation’s ills. On the other hand, the underlying grievances represent tangible political issues. They are more than the mere structural factors. They may include human rights abuses, dispossession, alienation, and humiliation (Newman, 2006).

Claude Berrebi doesn’t agree with this when he says educational content which advocates particular political or religious messages may increase an individual’s propensity to join terrorist organizations or participate in terrorist activity. In

addition, if the education is more religious, it might as well encourage radical thoughts. Education might be a tool to better equip the moral and religious justifications of such groups (Berrebi, 2007). On a more domestic level, Nigeria has been threatened by a high level of religious terrorism. Thousands of lives and properties have been destroyed as a result of religious terrorism. This has been a rampant case in Nigeria. Equally, politicians have used terrorist strategies to kidnap and assassinate their political opponents including campaign managers so as to achieve their political aims. (Oche, 2007; Alabi, 2007).

Different scholars have asserted that different factors have advanced the reason behind terrorism in Nigeria. Ozoemenam Mbachu argues that first is the system of government in the country. The nature of the system does not allow power to be deeply allocated to the federating units; instead, power is concentrated in the center. The practice of federalism in the country is adulterated and corrupted and is further challenged as more demands are made on the system. Second, the nature of impunity, nepotism and the weak judicial structure is a factor. There is a high amount of discrimination and preferential treatment in the Nigerian judiciary where there is a notion that justice can be bought. Third, the absurd level of corruption in the country cannot be underestimated. It is eating up the fabrics which hold the nation together where public office holders have been recorded to embezzle and misappropriate public funds. Fourth, the crisis of natives vs. settlers questions the security and stability of the nation. A Nigerian would first identify himself with his ethnic group rather than his country, such misunderstandings between both parties which can be ordinarily settled amicably, have resulted in violence which breeds terrorism. Fifth, the weakness of the state institutions and the overarching power of some individuals aids terrorist acts. The state lacks a proactive and systemic means to arrest terrorism

as reprisal attacks loom large across different parts of the state. Sixth, the crisis of unemployment contributes to instability and insecurity in Nigeria and other parts of the world. Unemployment is on the rise in Nigeria where the government has not taken effective measures to curb the crisis. Some unemployed people have indulged themselves into crimes such as terrorist activities in order to survive. Finally, the lack of a valid database of criminal records infringes the alleviation of criminality and terrorism in Nigeria. This further has an effect on the stability and security in the country (Mbachu & Bature, 2013; Igbuzor, 2011).

Coming from a similar perspective, is Shehu Sani where he asserts that illiteracy is believed to be seen as one of the major factors behind insecurity. It is a factor which misleads citizens against their states because of the lack of information. Most northern illiterates believe that western education is bad which in turn threatens the entire nation; a lot of major attacks in the country have been credited to groups who are nurtured mostly by illiteracy (Sani, 2013). He adds that psychology of many youth has been daunted by the government; it has created these criminals through the collapse of educational systems in the northern part of the country (Ibid.).

I would like to add that some factors have complemented the above named reasons behind terrorism in Nigeria. They may include the abandonment of the agricultural sector which used to be the nation's economic mainstay prior to the oil boom. Attention has been tilted towards the petroleum industry, thereby neglecting other vital sectors which could act as a pathway to social development. Also, the incapability of government's security apparatus at guaranteeing safety and security for the civilians is something to worry about. The weaponry and equipment of the

power institutions do not even match these insurgent groups where the insurgents have been seen to possess heavy artillery. There has also been an explosion of the population with an annual growth rate of 2.8%; it is no match for the rate for the economic growth and social development. The development pace has not been able to curtail the growing population.

2.4 Terrorism in Africa

Terrorism is an endemic plague in Africa where the future threat potential rests on a complex synergy between sub-national and international terrorism. Africa may come to play a vital role in international terrorism where there exist the means, motivation and targets. These opportunities cannot be overlooked for much longer. The continent has presented a facilitating and a target rich environment for terrorists who intend to attack the western nations and indeed the global system at large basically because African governments constantly face the dilemmas in balancing their national agendas, national security policies and domestic support for democracy and human rights. Thus it is self-evident that in the absence of a functioning and recognized central government, the weak and failed African states would provide a safe haven and fertile environment for both domestic and international terrorism. Therefore there is no military operation that can make these weak and failed states safe or else there is a process aimed ultimately at the creation of a working state with a viable government in control of all its territory, whether urban or rural, land, sea or air (Cilliers, 2003).

Anneli Botha and Hussein Solomon look at terrorism from an Islamic extremism view. They posit that this form of militancy is not necessarily based on a hold on political and economic power in a particular state; rather it is based on the formation

of a terror network which is transnational with disastrous consequences, just as seen in Tanzania and Kenya US embassy bombings. African countries have been used as a target for foreign governments and also have been directly involved with terror attacks. The reason behind the rapid spread of terrorism in Africa is as a result of the socio-political problems born out of bad socio-economic conditions, which have been the story of many African states after independence. Furthermore, they argue that African countries are challenged by corruption, which worsens the government's inability to deal with extremism. This has been the reason why African regimes have been unable to proffer solutions to every-day socio-economic conditions. Again, another reason for the increasing importance of extremism in Africa is the political changes in some of the countries in the region (Botha and Solomon, 2005).

On the contrary, Jessica R. Piombo does not agree with them when she argues that these organized terrorist groups are not rampantly spread across the continent because prior to 2001, there have not been any designated "foreign terrorist organizations" and not until after then, have area governments began to unnecessarily label opposition groups terrorists in order to gain support to combat their opponents. Second, these notions are a mere overstatement of the influence of militant Islam in Africa which leads to a misunderstanding of what terrorism entails. Terrorism across Africa should not be seen alone from the radical Islamists perspective even though they receive the most attention. Third, the common notion that terrorism is aided by "failed states" is belied by geography, terrorist organization which have targeted Western states tend to operate in the states with some degree of law and order, such as South Africa, Nigeria and Kenya who possess more infrastructure than states like Liberia and Somalia. Lastly, she adds that it is

important when analyzing terrorism in Africa, to note the distinct regional variations of the presence of Islamist terror networks across Africa (Piombo, 2007).

Christopher Clapham has argued that terrorism is generally seen to be foreign to the political traditions of the African continent. He doesn't see any plausible synergy between terrorism and poverty, or terrorism and state collapse, both factors which have been heavily touted by other authors. However, he identifies some conditions which are conducive for terrorism to thrive in the continent; High level of political instability leads to urbanization in a form represented by refugee settlements and overcrowding of internally displaced persons in cities and then they have a higher propensity to resort to violent political action because they have been resented and alienated. Again, he adds that there has been a development of ideologies which favor terrorist actions such as Islamism and Marxism (Clapham, 2003).

Professor Asafa Jalata who shares his view about terrorism in Africa comes from a rather different point of view when he argues that slavery can be seen as the origin of terrorism in Africa. The processes of attacking, owning and dispossessing human beings of the lands is what entails colonial terrorism, the process involved torturing, kidnappings and burning villages leading to civil wars, destruction of existing leaderships, institutions and cultures; thus, such social violence can be categorized as terrorism, for example the French annihilation of the Algerian people in the 1830s. European states have dominated the African economies through genocide and terrorist activities; they have enriched their individual countries and brought Africa under the domination of the capitalist world system which is basically Eurocentric. As a result, Africans today suffer from poverty, diseases, social, cultural and leadership crises (Jalata, 2013). Fernanda Faria also agrees with Asafa Jalata where

she argues that colonial heritage provides a partial explanation for violence and extremism in Africa. Boundaries were imposed on the continent which didn't correspond to the indigenous ethnic and social dynamics. More so, indigenous population were not prepared for statehood where the economic infrastructure depended on their former colonies and most African states after the colonial regimes were characterized by authoritarianism and centralization which in itself is a source of conflict (Faria, 2004).

Professor Yonah Alexander looks at terrorism in Africa from another angle. He says there are two major reasons behind the crisis of instability which stretches from the Red Sea right to the Atlantic. First, the long overdue Western Sahara conflict which creates an avenue for the expansion of AQIM (al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb) and recruitment of members from refugee camps in Algeria, this factor hinders the West Saharan diplomatic processes. Second is the Arab spring revolutionary processes which cut across Tunisia, Egypt and Libya. Subsequently, terrorist groups like al-Qaida and others tend to take advantage of the instabilities in those states and even further destabilize the region (Alexander, 2012).

2.5 Terrorism in Nigeria

The country, Africa's largest oil producer, going by the latest ranking, is only better than two largely Islamic countries; Iraq and Afghanistan who are placed first and second respectively where Pakistan and Syria complete the five most terrorized states (Premium Times). It is possible to say Nigeria is experiencing one of its darkest times ever since the civil war in 1967. The Global Terrorism Index (2015) posits that Nigeria above any other country recorded the highest increase in Terrorist deaths, increasing by over 300% (7512 fatalities) where Boko Haram can be considered the

deadliest terrorist group in the world. Nigeria together with Iraq, Pakistan, Afghanistan and Syria have accounted for 78% of lives lost in 2014, they constitute the most concentrated terrorist regions (Ibid.).

Table 1: Top five countries of terror most affected areas. (GTI Index, 2015)

Rank	Country	Score
1	Iraq	10
2	Afghanistan	9.233
3	Nigeria	9.213
4	Pakistan	9.065
5	Syria	8.108

2.5.1 Boko Haram

The group Boko Haram, a Hausa term which means “Western education is forbidden,” gained attention in 2009 when they started to attack Nigeria and its government institutions, like police stations and politicians, as well as people who they see as ‘un-Islamic’ have been their primary targets. The group which is barely organized has amongst them some disagreeing factions. They are mostly centered in northeastern part of Nigeria. Most of its members are origins of the Kanuri tribe (Forest, 2012). They are officially known as “Jama’atu Ahli-Sunnah Lidda’awati Wal-Jihad” (group of the preaching o Sunnah and struggle), and have orchestrated a number of bloody attacks which have left hundreds of lives dead and property destroyed (Hamid and Baba, 2014). Boko Haram resent the highly educated Nigerian

elites who have failed to deliver prosperity to the majority of Nigerians and for them; politics should entail total commitment to the idea of Islam as a societal blueprint.

This fanatical Islamist group recruits from the northern parts of Nigeria targeting disaffected youths, depressed and disillusioned people, unemployed students and Almajiris (street children) by looking at their grievances and radicalizes its members (Nicoll, 2011). They threaten the sovereignty of the nation, national peace and security, and the territorial integrity of Nigeria by targeting symbols of authority and infrastructures within the state. They engage in diverse range of criminal activities like as robbery and vandalism. Though they may have regional level of influence at this stage, they are developing transnational operational links to international terrorists' organizations in relation to training (Blanquart, 2012).

There is a strong link between the Boko Haram tactics and their objectives, for instance the killing of a gubernatorial candidate of Borno from the ANPP (All Nigeria People Party) whose ideologies were not in alliance with the objectives of this group (Nicoll, 2011). The Nigerian borders are porous and this is primarily what gives the group the freedom to freely transport small and light weapons across and within the state (Onuoha, 2013). The group's ideology is rooted deeply in the tradition of Islamism which constitutes one of different forms of radical Islamism present in northern Nigeria. The cocktail of chronic poverty, political corruption and youth unemployment in northern Nigeria has continued to ignite membership and supporters of Boko Haram (Agbiboa, 2013). Boko Haram has been carrying out series of killings and kidnappings where one of their major tactics was the active use of women which is said to be in response to the corresponding tactics previously employed the Nigerian government. Furthermore, male Boko Haram members have

been recorded to disguise themselves as women in veils so as to evade arrest (Zenn and Pearson, 2014).

The number of fatalities from terrorism is at a record high now between just two groups, Boko Haram and Islamic State responsible for half of them. The Nigerian militants have killed more people than their Iraqi-Syrian allies. The Nigerian militants who have pledged allegiance to IS in March 2015 killed quite a number of people than their fellow Islamists, claiming 6,644 lives compared to 6,073. This means that Nigeria has experienced a 300% rise in deaths as a result of terrorism in 2014; however other militant groups like the Fulani militants take partial blame for the increase (RT, 2014). Though the group started off with violent attacks mainly towards public office personnel and security institutions; they later extended their attacks to include innocent civilians, religious institutions and market places. They have also engaged in high-profile attacks and kidnappings which includes the 2011 UN building attack in Abuja and the kidnap of over 270 school girls in Chibok in 2014 (Alexander, 2012).

2.6 Gaps and Conclusion

The chapter contains strong points that helps understand the research. It gives the readers an insight on the sources of violence and terrorism to state who are faced with security challenges. The chapter has looked at the concept and dynamics of terrorism from different perspectives, thus it can be said that there is no universally acceptable definition of the concept. Furthermore, the chapter reviews scholarly insights on the situation of terrorism not just on a global level, but in Africa and Nigeria. It also provided a definition which cut across different views.

The chapter discussed the causes of terrorism which encompasses factors ranging from nationalistic and revolutionary factors to ideology and religious extremism. Poverty and the state failure theses were not excluded as contributors to terrorism in a state. While the chapter provides enough literature on the socio-economic and religious causes of terrorism in and outside Nigeria, the weak state thesis still provides the analytical framework of this research.

It should be noted however, that some areas of the literature have failed to address some issues which I find fundamental to the course of this research. First, most reviewed literature on the concept and meaning of terrorism tend to look at it from the “Non-state” perspective, forgetting the fact that states can actually sponsor terrorism. Secondly, terrorism is terrorism, whether local or international, in Maiduguri, Lahore, Paris or Boston. I heavily criticize the oversimplified idea that terrorism is attributed to “failed states” or states that are undergoing some form of political instability. Thirdly, most views from these scholars do not carry a form of recommendation. It is believed that half of a problem is solved when you identify the root cause; the other half should come from careful recommendations.

Chapter 3

BOKO HARAM

3.1 Development of Boko Haram Insurgency

The return of democracy in Nigeria in the year 1999 has seen a lot of outbreaks and different forms of violence majorly because of inter communal or ethno-religious differences. Majority of these conflicts have been pointed out to religious differences and others have been seen to have political roots where election disputes and who controls the government have led to violence in Nigeria (Walker, 2012). Boko Haram is not the first Islamic movement in Nigeria to advocate a Jihad; however, it widened the scope of the efforts at Islamic revivalism. Such movements had started since the early nineteenth century by Usman Dan Fodio in order to establish the rule of religious scholars. During the 1980s, the Maitatsine movement was established by Muhammed Marwa a Cameroonian Muslim scholar who settled in Kano. They were known to reject all forms of non-Quranic innovation which led to a clash with the Nigerian army where over 6000 people died during this period (Loimeier, 2012). Others may include the Islamic Movement of Nigeria led by Sheik Ibrahim El-Zakzakky, the Kala-Kato led by Mallam Badamasi, the Ahmadiya Movement led by Al Gulan and the Darika Shi'a Salafiya (or Izala) led by Late Abubakar Gunmi (Onuoha, 2012).

Often compared with the Boko Haram movement, they all share a common social root of '*Almajiris*' (students of Quranic schools), many of which live in destitute

circumstances and usually fall easy prey for radical groups. The activities of these groups undermine the safety of people and properties of the Nigerians which further threatens the legitimacy of the Nigerian state.

In the early period of the 2000s did an offshoot of a youth group who had not been regarded as Boko Haram yet decide to establish an Islamic establishment which they claimed would be irredeemable and intolerable to corruption. They would operate under the ideology of ‘‘true’’ Islamic laws in a village called Kanama close to the Niger border (Walker, 2012). Little disputes over fishing rights led to a confrontation with the Police which ultimately led to a siege of their mosque and a shootout where almost eighty of their members were killed including their leader Mohammed Ali (Ibid.).

After regrouping and relocating back to Maiduguri under the new leadership of Mohammed Yusuf, they were allowed to build their own mosque (*the Ibn Taimiyyah Masjid*). They strategically recruited more members by providing food, shelter and welfare to the unemployed Nigerian youths and refugees from war thorn neighboring states. A major incident that marked the development of Boko Haram differently from the traditional Islamic bodies was the killing of a popular cleric Sheikh Ja’afar Mahmoud who criticized the group for its extremist ideologies prior to the 2007 general elections (Hassan, 2009).

Two years later, a bloody confrontation ensued between the group and the Nigerian police. A similar event which led to the death of their previous leader some years earlier. This time, over seven hundred of the groups were arrested and more actions were taken against the group. Dozens of people were killed and tortured without trial,

including the public killing of young boys and their leader Mohammed Yusuf which was uploaded on YouTube (Gorman, 2009). However, there are reports that Yusuf's right hand man Abubakar Shekau and a couple of members who fled Maiduguri had gone to receive training in a Tuareg rebel camp in Mali (Ejiofor, 2013).

As at 2010, more deadlier assaults were carried out by the returned Boko Haram members in series of assassinations and attacks on the police, churches, markets and barracks were now the main targets in an out of Maiduguri. The attack launched on the UN compound in Abuja 2011, drew Boko Haram to international news after finding out the group's ability to make suicide bombs. By this time a lot of things have changed about the group including having a spokesman by the name of "Abu Qaka". They had also been more disciplined in the act of communicating with outside journalists (Jacob & Akpan, 2015).

As at 2012, it is estimated that the group had attacked about 12 public schools, forcing thousands of pupils out of education which is in retaliation for the capture of Islamic teachers from Quranic schools in Maiduguri. Furthermore, there has been an increase in the number of public beheadings as a result of members of the group who has been arrested and cannot be trusted anymore; more suicide bombings have been carried out in churches and newspaper houses in Plateau, Kano and Kaduna, all to be considered a retaliatory tit-for-tat attack (Lodge, 2014).

3.2 Boko Haram Membership and Group Structure

Boko Haram is built on an anti-Western ideology and its members regard the Nigerian state, some Muslim elites and others who are seen as westernized Muslims as instruments and stooges of the West (Onapajo et al, 2012). These members are

convinced that Nigeria is filled with social depravities and what is required of a devout Muslim to do is migrate from the morally bankrupt society to a more secluded Islamic society political corruption and moral deprivation (Akanji, 2009). As of 2009, Boko Haram had established a structure where every state had its own Amir (commander) and local government areas where those commanders administer their local government and reports to the supreme leaders. They are alleged to have over 280,000 members spread across the 19 states of northern Nigeria and neighboring countries (Agbibo, 2013). The group may have successfully established its sphere of influence in neighboring countries which can be referred to as relatively weaker states as a result of the fact that members of the group who have been chased down by the military are able to find refuge in those countries. This gives more credibility to the connection between weak/failed states and international terrorism (Howard, 2010).

The group members have not only come from the unemployed, drug addicts, Almajiris and migrants from neighboring states, surprisingly, included are also bankers, university lecturers and political elites (Agbibo, 2014). These members primarily come from the Kanuri tribe concentrated mainly in the northeastern region of Nigeria, while majority of others are Hausa-Fulani (Ibid.). It is important to note that these members have been enraged at different forms of grievances which have been translated into a religious idiom.

The group has a highly decentralized structure led by Abubakar Shekau who has been behind the group deadly insurgency in the north-east and other parts of the country. Since he took over the group over six years ago, he has become more radical and fearless. Though he does not communicate directly with the group foot soldiers,

his power is said to be wielded through a few cell leaders. The group's trademark was originally the use of gunmen on motorbikes, killing police, politicians and anyone who criticized it, they usually have distinctive facial marks and in addition to their heavy Hausa accents, they are easily identifiable to others Nigerians (BBC NEWS, 2015). While Abubakar Shekau has asserted his leadership and evidently proven successful in achieving a high level of organization in coordinating punishable attacks, the group is still made up of composite actors, ranging from Islamist militants to disaffected citizens to opportunistic criminals and hooligans who have been encouraged by politicians ambitious to take advantage of the ensuing violence and instability in order to advance their own political ambitions (Pham, 2012).

3.3 Boko Haram Funding

In the past, the Nigerian officials have been heavily criticized for its inability to trace the sources of the group's funds. However, arrested Boko Haram officials in the wake of 2012 had revealed that the group's funding had earlier relied on donations from its members but its links with AQIM had exposed it to more funding from groups in the United Kingdom and Saudi Arabia (Agbibo, 2013) Others claim that Al-Qaeda is the main funder of the group. Also, they have added that other sources of funding have come from the Islamic World Society and the Al Muntada Trust Fund. Whereas, another spokesman of the group had revealed that politicians had been involved in funding the group such as Isa Yuguda, former governor of Bauchi state and Ibrahim Shekarau, former governor of Kano state (Ibid.).

Former President Goodluck Jonathan had frankly stated that there are factions within the Nigerian government itself who support the movement. However, neither he nor

any other member of the government has elaborated further (Murtada, 2013). It is also important to note that the group derives its funding from robbing local banks. As of 2011, the spokesman of the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) Mohamed Abdullahi claimed that there have been at least 30 bank attacks attributed to Boko Haram that year. In addition, there have also been rumors that the group is involved in trafficking illicit weapons which probably enter the country via Chad.

3.4 The Nigerian State and Boko Haram's Ideology

More recently, no doubt the world has seen an avalanche of different Islamic movements built on ideologies of radicalism and anti-Westernism mostly in the Muslim-dominated countries. This global climate can significantly explain the connection to the existence of Boko Haram in the northern part of Nigeria which is Muslim dominated. It is important to note that in 1999, shortly after the change from a military rule to a democratic regime, most parts of the Nigerian northern region had attempted to deviate from the western type of democracy to a Sharia-driven democratic system (Dudley, 1969). Not only that, the northern region has long displayed more resistance than the southern region to Western modernization, where the former are more conservative and sought to protect its ethno-Islamic values. Though the British colonialist were not oblivious about this arrangement, it prompted them to install a system of indirect rule to protect the identity of the region (Ibid.). This paved a way for an increased culture of anti-Westernism.

These colonialists left behind a country of more than 300 ethnic groups that speak over 200 different languages. The country is 50% Muslim, 40% Christian, and 10% animist, where the north remains primarily Muslim dominated and the south, dominated by Christians and animists (Johnson, 2011). Hence, there has always been

a strong impulse towards regionalism based on ethnicity and religion versus nationalism since independence. This shows how deeply the country is divided along ethnic and religious lines. Even in the most benign situations, religion has shown to be a powerful political tool which has and continues to be a major identifying feature in the lives of most Nigerians (Adesoji, 2010).

The hegemonic position of Islamic education in the northern part of Nigeria has been challenged by the introduction of Western education, which is symbolized by the books of the British colonial schools. Consequently, such colonialist infrastructures have been seen as a threat and a symbol of the increasing impact of a colonial, corrupt, alien, Christian, and materialist process of Westernization. The establishment of colonial rule, British education, British law and the economic dynamics of the colonial and postcolonial period have created an easy pathway that leads to different forms of crises in the northern Nigerian Muslim society that can be described as the “modernization shock”. These extremist groups show outright contempt and opposition towards Darwinism and argue that it totally contradicts the Islamic philosophy of existence, thus any body of knowledge that contradicts the principles of Islam is forbidden (Ahmed, 2009).

The Boko Haram insurgents do not only condemn western education, they also condemn western liberalism in general where the entire system of education must be changed or else war is inevitable (Salkida, 2009). They have a clear ideological mission, which is to displace the Nigerian State with western values, and then replaced by strict Islamic Sharia law in the entire country, in other words as quoted by one of the members of the group, ‘cleaning the Nigerian system which has been polluted by western education’ (Hazard, 2009). Though they claim to be against

different forms of western technologies like Social Medias, radios and television sets, they have used those same western instruments and gadgets including YouTube to relay their messages to the public.

Boko Haram has always believed that politics in northern Nigeria and Nigeria as a whole has been infiltrated and seized by the corrupt and false Muslims. Their intention is to wage a war against them and the Federal Republic of Nigeria in general so as to create a pure Islamic state that is governed by sharia law. The group does not regard the secular nature of the Nigerian state and they see the state as an illegitimate state which holds no respect for the constituted laws. They also regard the authorities of the Nigerian state as agents of Western culture. Mostly after 2009, the group has been driven by a strong desire for vengeance against politicians, security institutions and even religious authorities for their role they have played to suppress the group. However, they have proved themselves to be very adaptive, changing its tactics quickly as well as its targets at the command of a charismatic leadership (Walker, 2012).

3.5 Boko Haram Influence and Expansion

Boko Haram can be seen to be growing into a more coherent and substantive group. They tend to have taken a more active role away from the Northeast which was its original location of influence into central and possibly even southern states of Nigeria (Rogers, 2012). The US Department of State Country Report on Terrorism has indicated that the group has killed almost 600 people in 2011 in 136 separate attacks with similar reports from the US military that there have been 196 bomb cases in that same year as against 52 cases recorded the previous year. It can be said that Boko Haram is heavily influenced by the events unfolding in the contemporary

Muslim world. They have appeared to justify acts of violence as deserved revenge for perceived injustices.

3.5.1 The International Dimension

Boko Haram rose to international limelight between the years 2010 and 2011 when they carried out a couple of deadly attacks against the Nigerian government and also detonated a car bomb at the UN building in the country's capital, Abuja (Karmon, 2014). The death of their leader Mohammed Yusuf and the re-organization of its members saw another evolutionary stage towards the internalization of the group where the interim leader Sanni Umaru had stated that the group were spread across the 36 states of the country and that they were another version of Al-Qaeda which they respect and align with and would continue to support Osama Bin Laden till the entire country converts to Islam (Doukhan, 2012). The Emir of al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb has equally been reported to have promised the group with provision of weapons, training and other forms of support so as to expand its reach into other Sub-Saharan states with the primary purpose of gaining strategic depth, defending Muslims in Nigeria and also stopping the advancement of minority crusaders (Radin, 2012).

Furthermore, in 2010 Abdel Malik Droukdel, leader of AQIM (Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb) had offered support to Boko Haram while the group's leader Abubakar Shekau had been recorded to express his support for Al-Qaeda where he boasts that the influence of Boko Haram will not only be felt in Nigeria but in the whole world (Aljazeera, 2010). Boko Haram took responsibility for the suicide bombing in the UN headquarters in 2011 where more than 20 people died and almost 100 sustained injuries. The suicide bomber Mamman Nur was said to have close ties with Al-Qaeda and had just returned from Somalia (Gbooza, 2011). The Nigerian

security officials together with independent security experts came to a conclusion that the attack on the UN building was far beyond the scope of a local terrorist group because of the large quantities of volatile and powerful plastic explosives triacetone triperoxide and pentaerythritol tetranitrate (Brock, 2012). US bomb experts have suggested that such bombs have been used exclusively in the 2003 Iraq war adding to the evidence that there is a strong link with Al-Qaeda who is training and advising African militants.

Regionally, the internationalization of the group can be seen to entail the 19th century Bornu empire which covers today's north eastern Nigeria, northwestern Chad, northern part of Cameroon and northeastern part of Niger, many members of the group are said to have originated from these regions (McGregor, 2012). Furthermore, the group has constantly used Cameroon as a rear base for hideouts, kidnappings and carrying out attacks against nationals and foreigners (especially the French) who they feel are a threat to their ideology. The Nigerien authorities have also arrested a couple of Boko Haram members and seized homemade grenades and explosives. The group has been said to create broader ties with Mali after groups like AQIM and MUJAO (Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa) have controlled the northern part of the country (Heras & Zenn, 2013). The French military and A.U states' intervention in Mali in 2003, has given Boko Haram the opportunity to have closer relationships with other Jihadist groups which fight within the region (Ibid.).

The United States have also warned not to underestimate the capabilities of Boko Haram group launching an attack on American soil. As of 2013, the US government put a huge reward of \$7million for information that leads to the location of Abubakar Shekau (Tinti, 2013). Subsequently, the US department of state designated Boko

Haram as FTOs (Foreign Terrorist Organizations) and as SDGTs (Special Designated Global Terrorists) as well. Thus, enabling the US Justice Department to prosecute terrorist suspects in the United States. The group may operate locally. However, they have international connections and financing. Because of Nigeria's economic relations with the US, and the vital role it plays in peacekeeping in Africa and globally, it has warranted the United States to take a more proactive role in this crisis (Ward, 2013).

Furthermore, the group had earlier stated that "The US is its number one target for its aggression and oppression against Muslim nations particularly in Iraq and Afghanistan and its blind support to Israel in its killings of our Palestine brethren" (Abubakar, 2010). The US has also highlighted that the group are also likely to target facilities that are of western (especially US) interest. This may include the Nigerian oil facilities where Nigeria exports 8% of America's oil imports, International airports which may disrupt trade between Nigeria and western countries, International hotels which host businessmen, politicians, tourists and diplomats (PM News, 2012).

Chapter 4

THE SPREAD OF BOKO HARAM: THE FRUSTRATION AGGRESSION APPROACH

4.1 Introduction

The H1 of this thesis claims that the dissatisfaction from domestic governance facilitated the spread of Boko Haram. This chapter provides us with credible evidence which shows the dissatisfaction and frustration among members of the Boko Haram terrorist group. As such, the group resorted to aggressive measures against the Nigerian state and its citizens to express its dissatisfaction. This dissatisfaction is a combination of different factors, factors that will be examined in the chapter.

The spread of the Boko Haram insurgency in this chapter is explained from one of the theories employed; the Frustration-Aggression theory. This theory provides evidence on how different factors have frustrated members of the group leading them to exert more form of aggression on the Nigerian state and its citizens. The re-emergence of the Islamic group in 2010 after the death of its leader Yusuf is of great concern. Since then, the group's rhetoric and tactics has indicated that the organization has expanded its reach well beyond its original base in northeastern Nigeria. In the decade since it first appeared, the group has graduated from crude drive by attacks on beer parlors to bombing security buildings in the northern Muslim heartland and environs. More so, situations in Nigeria have aided the spread

of Boko Haram insurgency in different ways: First is the motive of retaliation by the group who feel their families and members have been killed without trials. Secondly, the crisis of poverty and unemployment especially in the northern part of Nigeria. Thirdly, relative economic neglect of the Muslim north and the plague of corruption, especially in the political system (Rogers, 2012). Fourthly, the group's quest for the complete implementation of Sharia law in northern Nigeria.

What is of particular relevance is that despite the relatively high levels of economic growth in Nigeria in recent years, which has about the third fastest growth rate in the world, have not been able to improve on the sharing of the fruits of that growth. Obviously, the evidence actually suggests a greater concentration of wealth in fewer hands in a period where there are a growing number of young people with little or no employment prospects. About 40 million people between the ages of 18-25 are unemployed which leads to disempowerment, resentment and anger (Ayegba, 2015). Boko Haram demands have included the prosecution of individuals responsible for the execution of their leader in addition to the release of all Boko Haram prisoners and the full implementation of Shari'a laws in the twelve northern states of Nigeria (Rogers, 2012). Ideally, this means with the death of their leader, the movement should be curtailed. Unfortunately, they have grown in size, strength and influence.

4.2 Vengeance

The ultra-violent and bloody turn Boko Haram has taken can be traced to the extra judicial killing of its charismatic leader Mohammed Yusuf and the incarceration of other members by the state authorities. It is important to note that the group, under the leadership of Mohammed Yusuf had previously employed a non-violent approach in their campaign through constant preaching and forming alliances with

politicians (START, 2014). Though there were attacks, these attacks were only considered mild compared to the well-coordinated and lethal attacks that followed after his death.

Mohammed Yusuf had painted a utopian and fundamentalist vision for his followers; this vision was a peaceful one. His vision entailed that, to attain a just society, Sharia in form of strict fundamentalist Muslim laws must be adopted. His promise of a reprieve from economic and social inequalities and lack of opportunities in northeastern Nigeria earned him a lot of followers; this message of hope struck a chord with his followers. Even though he envisaged the imposition of Sharia, he deliberately abstained from using violence as a tactic and even went further to engage with other Muslim religious leaders about the costs and benefits of western education (Pirio, 2015).

Widespread human right abuses by the Nigerian military and security forces have been recorded under the administration of former president Goodluck Jonathan. First recorded in 2009 when the Nigerian security forces opened fire on unarmed members of the group that were travelling and subsequently killing a peaceful Mohammed Yusuf while in police custody (Gorman, 2009). It was Abubakar Shekau, the current leader of the group that took the center stage who began promoting a quest for vengeance as justification of violence against the security apparatus of the state saying ‘do not think the jihad is over. Rather, jihad has just begun’. He vowed to revenge the humiliation the group has suffered in the hands of Nigerian security forces. He promised that moral injustice will be punished and righted by counter violence (Pantucci & Jespersen, 2015).

Under this new leadership did they start employing the use of Rocket Propelled Grenades (RPGs), Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs), armored tanks and surface-to-air missiles all for the purpose of causing havoc to the Nigerian state. It was after the death of Yusuf that messages were spread to different news outlets on behalf of Boko Haram, portraying it as a ‘‘Version of Al-Qaeda’’ The message also stated how callous, malicious and wicked the killing of its leader was and that they were willing to carry out the command of Osama Bin Laden in Nigeria without remorse (Ibid.). It is important to note that the death of Mohammed Yusuf was seen as an opportunity for those factions within the group such as Abubakar Shekau and Abubakar Adam Kamar who were against the non-violent approach employed by Yusuf to use their extremely violent approach to justify their objectives (Gilbert, 2014). They began to target security forces and government officials, and then they expanded to attack schools, religious houses, traditional rulers and international facilities.

Subsequently, other group members have perceived such actions to be unjust, thus giving them a sense of outrage and desire to revenge. To them, the killing without trial of their leader was the catalyst behind their actions. Though prior to 2009, the group could be referred to as radical, but it was after the death of their leader it became ultra-violence (Onuoha, 2012). These Boko Haram members have made up their minds to settle scores with the Nigerian police and army; this explains why as of 2010, these insurgents have raided over 60 police facilities, killing over 200 police officers in Northern and central regions (Agbibo, 2013). Any peaceful solution to resolve this crisis even becomes more complicated as the Jihadist justify their actions from the position of rectitude of those humiliated and victimized and the state authorities too feel victimized and aggrieved which makes the cycle go on and on.

Table 2: Attacks Before and After Death of the Leader

Forms of attack	Before the death of Yusuf	After the death of Yusuf
Attacks on Police	4	234
Attacks on Private citizens and property	10	544
Attacks on military	0	138
Attacks Government (General)	2	120
Attacks on Religious institutions/ figures	2	118

Source available at Global Terrorism Database 2015.

The figures above show that the number of attacks was at least a hundred times more against a particular target. Private Citizens were most attacked. However, the military which had never been attacked prior the 2010, were hit 138 times more after the death of Yusuf. The Nigerian Police Force were not excluded for taking captives of Boko Haram members and killing the leader, were hit 230 times more than before all across different cities in the country. Churches and Mosques were also targeted so as to warn Religious leaders who tried to preach against them.

4.3 The Crisis of Poverty and Unemployment

The eruption and spread of Boko Haram violence is compounded by the fact that Nigeria, which is one of the largest producers of oil in the world where majority of its population live below the poverty line of \$1 a day (Danjibo, 2009). Charles Soludo, the former governor of the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) made it clear in his statistics that while the North central part of the country recorded a 67% of people living under the poverty line, the North West recorded 71% and North East


72.2% (Ibid.). Thus, it is fitting to argue that it is no surprise that the Northern part of Nigeria is the region worst hit with the crisis of Boko Haram.

The failure of the Nigerian government to provide adequate number of employment for the many graduates who roam the streets to look for unavailable jobs explains the increase in membership of Boko Haram (Ayegba, 2015). Figure 1 show the unemployment rate of Nigeria as of 2010 which has been on a steady increase from 2005. However, this does not apply in all cases; some members have come from a wealthy family such as Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab and Aminu Sadiq Ogwuche. It is important to note that while some youths are educated in Nigeria, such education comes with no value after they withdraw from their various institutions and demonstrate their loyalty to Boko Haram. This is as a result of frustration, frustration that arises as a result of inability to secure a job. In other words, education is treated with so much disrespect by the government itself where the educated population is unimportant and the uneducated political leaders are in the privileged positions (Danjibo, 2009). Furthermore, the fact that you are educated in Nigeria does not mean you will be employed, said Chimobi Ucha. Unemployment induces poverty, which in addition triggers crime rate and violence in a country, it is the victims of this unemployment that resort into kidnappings, armed robberies and various forms of criminal activities (Ucha, 2010).

Unemployment is a major economic problem; as such every country's economic policy should be directed towards alleviating it. However, the Nigerian policy makers don't seem to be disturbed by the growth of this economic crisis in the country (Akanni, 2014). According to the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS), the unemployment rate has been increasing between 2009 at 19.7% to 21.4% in 2010

and then 23.9% in 2011 (Ibid.). The (NBS 2013) shows that within 2009 till 2011, there has been an average of about 1.8 million entrants each year, into the labor market. Ideally, this is worrisome because a larger percentage of the entrants are youths. There are lots of unemployed Nigerian graduates who wander the streets, though the government is capable but unwilling to provide adequate jobs. This fuels the level of frustration among the youths which provides a fertile ground for terrorist groups such as Boko Haram to thrive. Nigeria has turned a blind eye towards the welfare of its citizens, thus leaving them on a time bomb. Those who loot the wealth of the population, go about flaunting them with freedom in the face of poverty and extreme hunger. This way, temptation to violent behavior and extremism become irresistible to the population who has no form of consolation (Gottlieb, 2013).

Figure 1: The Unemployment Rate in the Past Years



4.4 Corruption and Political Alienation

The political history of Nigeria shows how the ruling elite are quite alienated from the general citizenry. This has contributed to the loss of legitimacy among the ordinary population where they don't believe in the political, economic and legal institutions (Forest, 2012). Corruption seems to have eaten into the fabrics of the Nigerian society where there are corrupt practices embedded in virtually every agency and ministries in the country, even the police force are not an exception (Adetoro, 2012). This explains why the general public is aggravated with the Nigerian government and also why Boko Haram shows its resentment against the security forces. Law enforcement agencies have carried out extra-judicial killings and unlawful public executions of members of the insurgent groups which have gone uninvestigated and unpunished (Johnson, 2011).

There is no country in the world in which citizens do not have at least some form of complaints about their government. Different forms of grievances can lead to divisions between states and citizens which can result into political violence including terrorism and insurgency as in the case of Boko Haram in Nigeria (Forest, 2012). Since the death of former president Umaru Musa Yar'adua, there have been persistent agitations of imbalances and political discomfort from the northern elites (Ibid.). They saw the administration of former president Goodluck Jonathan, a southern Christian as illegitimate because it did not follow the normal party protocol of power rotation which should have kept a northern Muslim in power. The policies of the ruling party PDP (Peoples Democratic Party) created an atmosphere for such agitations to occur. It led to the sack of southern top government officials, to be

replaced PDP members from northern Nigeria (Pilot Africa, 2012). This section will be discussed in detail in the following chapter.

4.5 Quest for Implementation of Sharia Law

It was the transition from a northern military majority to a southern democratic regime in 1999 that sparked up the suspicion of the position of sharia law in the country. The situation was compounded the following year when Zamfara state took the first step to extend sharia law from personal status to its judicial system (Agbibo, 2015). While the federal government of Nigeria allows for the state sharia court of appeals, it is the quest of such state to extend sharia into the scope of criminal justice that is questionable.

While critical of the government, Yusuf was involved in official efforts to introduce and implement Sharia in several northern states in the 2000s. The failure to achieve this fully helps to explain Muslim youths' anger with government deception and insincerity and the call for an authentic Islamist revolution (CGAR, 2014). The sects core beliefs are strict adherence to the Quran and the Hadith (sayings of prophet Muhammed), and their interpretation as sanctioned by Ibn Taymiyyah. Abu Qaqa, the group's best known spokesman, explained that the group's agenda is to destabilize Nigeria and take her back to the pre-colonial period when the Sharia law was practiced. Abu Qaqa, the group's spokesman, in an interview with The Guardian Newspaper said " We will consider negotiation only when we have brought the government to their knees, and once we see that things are being done according to the dictates of Allah, and our members are released from prison, we will only put aside our arms" (The Guardian, 2012). He goes on to say the Christian population of

the Nigerian state would be protected under the envisioned Islamic state but everyone must live by sharia law (Mark, 2012).

Figure 2: The 12 Northern States that Practice Sharia Law



Aliyu Tishau, a prominent member of the group, mentioned in an interview in 2011 that: What we are demanding is that those states that have independently declared their states Sharia states should implement it to the brim. Have you seen Sharia cut the hand of someone who steals a cow head, while someone who corruptly enriches himself is left to go free? (Sahara Reporters, 2011). He goes on to say ‘‘The northern political elites have chased away local prostitutes and brought in international red light prostitutes to replace them. They have also banned local alcoholic drinks, yet they drink imported spirits in their respective government houses. Is that Sharia? They are insincere, so they must be effective in the implementation of Sharia. Sharia is being abused’’ (Ibid.). These group leaders posit that the reason for the woes in the country is because of its secular nature which is worsened by the stark injustice in the land.

4.6 Conclusion

Nigeria does not form a homogeneous block; rather it is divided into different small and large movements and groups that reflect their social, political and religious orientations and divisions. While some of these groups and movements are against the Nigerian state, others are deeply involved in governmental dynamics and politics of positioning. The problem and the growth of insecurity is as a result of frustrated expectations which in turn breeds aggression. The structure of the Nigerian society is what generates this frustration where inhabitants are compelled to express their frustration through different violent responses. This consistent structure of the Nigerian system has led a remarkable increase in the actions and networks of Boko Haram group where they cannot be seen only as a local terrorist group; it has indeed developed to a higher status of a transnational terrorist organization.

There is dire need to address the corrupt federal structures and answer the recurring national questions which are becoming more apparent in Nigeria in order to curb the increasing wave of militancy in the country. Any further delay in tackling this problem may prove catastrophic as some aggressive northern and greedy politicians are already waiting to employ any available opportunity to dismember the country through its ethnic, religious and geopolitical sentiments.

Chapter 5

THE NIGERIAN WEAK STATE AND THE SPREAD OF BOKO HARAM

5.1 Introduction

This chapter analyzes the H2 of the thesis which claims that the weaknesses of power agencies led to the spread of Boko Haram. The spread of Boko Haram is as a result of the ineffectiveness of Nigeria's power institutions, ineffectiveness itself which is a product of a weak state. The definition of weak state as defined in chapter one indicates that, it is the inability and unwillingness of the Nigerian state to provide good economic management, social welfare, legitimate political institutions and security that enabled the spread of Boko Haram insurgency. In other words, the basic things that qualify a state are not entirely present in the Nigerian system. The use of force is not monopolized by the state and territories and borders are not effectively controlled by the state. The absence of a legitimate governing institution breeds corruption, this corruption finds its way into every sector including the power institutions. The chapter goes on to argue that it is the inability of the state as a protector of its citizens through its power agencies that aided the spread of the group. Though the Nigerian state has wielded the monopoly of violence for a long period, recent decades have shown a larger part of the society and groups to also possess the use of violence (Mayowa, 2001).

While the argument of what makes a country either a failed or a weak state remains debatable, an index of states weakness in the developing world was set up by senior fellows of the Centre for Global Development Research together with the Brookings Institution. Table 3 shows the ranks of a total of 141 developing states on the basis of their political, economic, security and social welfare performances. A 0.00 represents the worst score amongst all the states and a 10.00 signifying the best among them.

Table 3. Index of State Weakness in The Developing World

Rank	Country	Overall Score	Economic	Political	Security	Social Welfare	GNI Per Capita
21	Niger	4.60	5.45	4.69	7.33	0.94	260
22	Nepal	4.61	5.17	3.84	2.94	6.50	290
33	Guinea	4.67	5.00	2.64	7.43	3.61	410
24	Rwanda	4.68	5.33	4.26	6.62	2.51	250
25	Equatorial Guinea	4.77	7.51	1.73	7.95	1.91	8250
26	Togo	4.80	4.78	2.68	7.38	4.38	350
27	Uganda	4.86	5.78	4.55	4.89	4.23	300
28	Nigeria	4.88	5.39	3.51	5.37	5.24	640

Source available at Brookings Institution

The table above indicates that Nigeria ranks 28th of the 141 country sample. It goes further to show that while its political, economic and social welfare performances are bad, its security performance is even worse. Somalia ranks number one with 0.00 in

both economic and political performances and 1.37 and 0.70 in security and social welfare performances respectively. At the tail end of the table is the Slovak republic which shows consistency in all sectors with an overall score of 9.41 have proven to be the least weakest state in the developing world.

5.2 Nigeria's Power Institutions and Their Role in Managing

Terrorism

History goes a long way to show how involved the Nigerian Police Force (NPF) has been in curbing the menace of violence in Nigeria. The spread of Boko Haram insurgency can be attributed to the fact that Nigerian Police Force, which later involved the Nigerian military, has not been able to play their role as protectors of the population. The Nigerian Police Force which holds the responsibility of maintaining law and order in the country turn out to be fueling abuses against ordinary citizens of the country, which in turn undermines the rule of law in the country. Corruption and human right abuses in the NPF is said to be a deeply rooted problem (Human Rights Watch, 2010). Though it is said to be one of the major employers recruiting about 377,000 officers, this has not been able to curb the crisis of insecurity that befalls the country (Owen, 2014).

Though the NPF receives quite a sizable quota from the federal government budget allocation, its staff have been recorded to be very corrupt and irresponsible. This has further worsened the public representation of the police, both in Nigeria and abroad. Most surveys and popular culture have been really negative (Ibid.). Even the former inspector general of police has been quoted to say that:

“Police duties have become commercialized... Our men are deployed to rich individuals and corporate entities such that we lack manpower to provide security for the common man. Our investigations departments cannot equitably handle matters unless those involved have money to part with.

Complainants suddenly become suspects at different investigation levels following spurious petitions filed with the connivance of police officers. Our police stations, State CID and operations offices have become business centers and collection points for rendering returns from all kinds of Squads and Teams set up for the benefit of superior officer’’ (Owen, 2014)

5.2.1 The Problem of the Nigerian Police

According to Solomon Arase the Inspector General of Police, one of the major weaknesses of the Nigerian Police Force is its workforce. Between 20 to 30 policemen die every month, they are hardly replaced. A lot of officers get killed by insurgent and violent groups especially in the Northern part of country (Igwe, 2015). The lack of replacement of police officers with equal or more competencies means that insurgent groups like Boko Haram and other armed groups stand a better chance when engaging in a war. If you can imagine the number of police officers who lose their lives daily to the number of Boko Haram members that are recruited daily, the spread of Boko Haram group is almost inevitable.

Again the level in which corruption had been deep rooted into the Nigerian Police Force cannot be underestimated; it runs through every rank and file of the police. Cases have been reported where police have to be paid before they report to a crime scene, most of which they show up hours or even days later. This level of corruption is heightened in all regions of Nigeria where police officers do not report to scenes of crime, let alone terrorist attacks (Ayodele & Aderinto, 2014). This has given more liberty to Boko Haram group to expand its networks knowing well this kind of weakness that exists within the Nigerian Police Force.

Table 4: Extent to which domestic institutions are perceived by the public to be most affected by corruption.

Institutions	Perception of corruption
Political parties	4.5
Parliaments and legislature	4.2
Police	4.7
Business and private sector	2.9
Media	2.7
Public officials and civil servants	3.5
Judiciary	3.7
NGOs	2.4
Religious bodies	2.2
Military	3.1
Education	3.8

Source: Transparency International

The table above indicates the perceived degree of corruption in different Nigerian domestic institutions, where 5 is the highest level of corruption and it indicates extreme corruption and 1 indicates no corruption at all. The Nigerian police is perceived to be the most affected by corruption and religious institutions are the least likely to be affected by corruption.

Though it would be incorrect to say that Nigeria does not put enough effort in curtailing the menace of Boko Haram, it is the effort Nigeria has put towards its security prior to the escalation of Boko Haram extremism that counts. How ready has the Nigerian Police Force been to manage such escalations? How much funds have been invested into police institutions to attain a high level of adequacy and preparedness. Even former president Goodluck Jonathan has said that the level of insecurity the country faces is as a result of long years of underfunding of the Nigerian Police (Akinsuyi, 2010). While the NPF is said to have almost 6000 serviceable vehicles, 108 serviceable boats, and just 2 functional choppers, the level of equipment do not correlate with its workforce. They are not heavily equipped to engage in battles with terrorists. This is why Boko Haram insurgents who have more sophisticated weapons than AK 47s kill policemen and occupy their stations without much difficulty (Nigeria Films, 2011).

Lack of police investments in Forensics has hindered the Nigerian Police Force to cases of violence as they develop. Maybe the controversy which surrounds the alleged killing of the Abubakar Shekau (Boko Haram leader) on whether or not he was actually killed would not have been necessary if the Police had made use of the DNA technology to identify the said 'Shekau.' Instead, the security forces relied upon other traditional means like identification by the mark on his forehead and the oral testimony of the local people of Konduga in Borno State who claimed to have known him. Yet, the U.S used the DNA to identify Osama Bin Laden even after he was killed (Mbamalu, 2014).

5.2.2 The Problem of the Nigerian Military

Even though the Nigerian military have been given high reputation internationally due to its involvement in peacekeeping in Africa, it has not escaped its legacy of the

past. It is true that most countries which have thrived under a military administration have gone further to cripple their militaries so as to evade further coups (Walker, 2014). While this is an assertion, the problem of the Nigerian military may be seen from a different point of view. What Boko Haram group needed wasn't a territory to thrive, rather a weak state. The mere fact that the insurgent group was able to get so close to a major army operating base meant that there was a gap inside the Nigerian army which promulgated the spread of the terrorist group (Baker, 2016).

Lack of clear military code

The Nigerian military has shown that it lacks a clear military code. This means that the tactics and methods to be used in tackling Boko Haram are not clearly stated. What the army wants is just to see a defeated Boko Haram. They have been recorded to arrest and kill innocent civilians suspected to have been members and sponsors of the insurgent group on countless occasions. As a result, tensions have continued to escalate in these terrorized regions (Babalola, 2013). Sometimes the army have been said to be on revenge missions over the death of their colleagues. For example the Nigerian soldiers have been reported to invade several villages of Wase local government area in Plateau state where about thirty innocent civilians were killed over the suspicion of the killing of four soldiers (Ejiofor, 2015). This kind of thing is seen as tradition in Nigeria every time people attack the Nigerian police and military, there is always a strong reprisal attack to avenge the deaths (IRIN, 2009). Again, quoting a Northern human rights activist in Nigeria, Shamaki Gad Peter:

‘‘It is unbelievable the way the security forces went about indiscriminately shooting and killing innocent residents of Maiduguri, and members of Boko Haram’’ (Ibid.).

In this case, the Nigerian military do not make much effort to identify the targets of their crackdown, neither do they abide to the basic principles of resorting to the use of force only non-violent means have been exhausted, they also do not respect the

basic the basic principles on the use of firearms. They have been accused of committing horrific human rights abuses in the northern region even as far back as 2002 before the group started its terror campaign (Baker, 2016). In this case, the negligence and lack of respect for human lives of the Nigerian army have led to the mistrust of the security agencies and further strengthened the spread of Boko Haram group. Even civilians who were not members of the radical group have been forced to fight the Nigerian security forces over the death of their loved ones.

Politicization of the Nigerian Military

Politics in the Nigerian Army is one that plays a significant role in undermining the alleviation of Boko Haram insurgents and, of course, strengthening its spread. A lot of Nigerians are convinced that the Nigerian state is nothing more than a cash machine for the Nigerian elites which also include the top military officials. More recently, the incursion of politicians into the activities of the military together with the involvement of military men in political circles in Nigeria were situations that amounted to the weakness of the institution. Kolapo Olapoju in his YNaija editorial argues that the responsibility of a typical military should be carried out in a non-partisan manner devoid of tribal or ethnic sentiments and other tendencies that undermines a nation's integrity (Olapoju, 2015). Furthermore, the Nigerian military is divided. One that was first said to be divided right before civil rule in 1999 between the military officials who wanted to continue its military rule and those who were against it (Ibid.).

While the foot soldiers cannot be completely blamed, the top officials are said to be begging for pennies from politicians at the same time siphoning the salaries of the lower ranks. This has further lead to the porosity of the Nigerian water ways, airspace and borders, giving broader access to insurgents from neighboring states

like Chad and Niger (Olapoju, 2015). One retired captain Kamarudeen Olatunde in an interview with Peoples Daily newspaper says one problem the Nigerian army faces which also made him retire was because:

“ The Nigerian army has derailed from professionalism into politics and the reward is what we are seeing today. There is difference between the military of yesterday and today, there are no similarities. Previously, the soldiers were trained purely with the rule to defend the territorial integrity of the nation, right now the army has been monetized” (Peoples Daily, 2016).

However, Olatunde goes on to say Nigeria possessed one of the finest military men who could quell any form of disorder the society. But the problem we are facing today started when young officers would be given big political roles in order to protect the interest of the Head of state. When a subsequent Head of state comes to power, those former vibrant officers would be forced to retire. This is how the Nigerian state has lost some of its finest officers; he added. The problem with the Nigerian army right now is its materialistic nature. Recently, people have joined the Nigerian military because of the wealth they intend to amass from it and not because they want to defend the territorial integrity of the Nigerian state. Even while the Boko Haram insurgency remains a critical national issue, the Nigerian army has been reported in more cases which involves politics and election processes (Ibid.).

This means that there is a gap within the Nigerian army. The Nigerian soldiers do not like to get posted to the North-East, places like Adamawa, Yobe and Bornu states. So the politics within the institution makes the process of posting and allocation corrupt and ineffective. Soldiers would rather lobby for more commercial cities where they can easily establish personal businesses enterprises and earn additional money. There are cases where soldiers in the North East have been reported to go AWOL (Absent

without leave), leaving their camps. Boko Haram, having full knowledge of this, gains wider leverage to expand from village to village in the north and even beyond.

The asymmetric nature of warfare

One major reason the Nigerian military was able to win the civil war which occurred 1967-1970 and also curtail religious uprisings in the 1980s was because they could face their opponents and engage in warfare. Both belligerents had a standing army and their tactics and strategy didn't significantly differ from each other. In that case, the military was able to show its strategic and tactical prowess, one which they were trained for. The same cannot be said about the war against Boko Haram. Unfortunately, the Nigerian military has not been quick to adapt to the tactical evolution of the Boko Haram group. Former US ambassador to Nigeria Robin Sanders in an interview with Aljazeera says that *'Boko Haram learns very quickly. They have moved a little bit from asymmetrical warfare to guerilla attacks that are happening now, similar to Al-Shabaab in east Africa.'* (Aljazeera, 2016). Though there have been commitments to create a multinational joint task force which would repress the Boko Haram tactics, lack of funds have hindered this process (Ibid.).

Apart from a form of armed assault which Boko Haram group employs to carry out its attacks, the Global Terrorism Database shows that the next likely preferred tactics is through bombings and explosions, attacks on facilities and infrastructure and kidnappings (GTD, 2015). To say that the Nigerian army is always ready for such types of attacks will be deceptive. Boko Haram gained more international recognition after they bombed the UN building, they gave also had more success in terms of dialogue right after they kidnapped 200 school girls in Chibok. Victims and casualties from Boko Haram insurgency would have been less if the Nigerian power

agencies have developed enough to be able to counter any form of asymmetric tactics employed by Boko Haram.

Furthermore, it cannot be said that Nigerian Army are fully developed in terms of technological advancement and intelligence gathering in such a way that the asymmetric tactics of the insurgent group would be curtailed. To say the Nigerian army does not possess the advanced military equipment might not be entirely true; it is the use of advanced technological intelligence to subdue Boko Haram from spreading and creating more external ties that is absent. Lots of soldiers have been killed and army tanks and equipment captured by Boko Haram because the former were caught off guard. Also the Nigerian military has not been able to penetrate the deep forest enclaves of Sambisa where these terrorists operate from. These are the deep remote hideouts where most Boko Haram operations are been operated from. At the same time, it harbors most kidnapped victims that were kidnapped in 2014.

5.3 Conclusion

The spread of Boko Haram has further been attributed to power institutions which are supposed to hold the monopoly of violence. The weaknesses of these institutions combined with other factors are the reason why Nigeria suffers this height of Boko Haram terrorism today. Again, the heterogeneous nature of the Nigerian society which has found its way into the Nigerian armed forces are ignored. The prioritization of politics over the defense of territorial integrity by the Nigerian military is a problem which Nigeria faces today; it has divided the nation even wider than it was under a military regime.

Even though heavy manpower and funds need to be budgeted towards the Nigerian Police Force, there is dire need for the Nigerian government to keep up with the pace of the globalized world. As Boko Haram have begun to create more international ties, expanding their wide range of tactics, so does the Nigerian power institutions need to develop in their anti-terrorist tactics as well. These power institutions should hold the monopoly of violence of Nigeria, once Boko Haram begins to compete with such monopoly or outweighs the Nigerian state, the spread of the insurgent group would almost be inevitable, leading to more problems.

Chapter 6

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

6.1 Conclusion

Conclusively, terrorism has headlined global politics in recent decades where Africa and Nigeria in particular, has not been left out. Nigeria has experienced a variety of violent groups in different parts of the country ranging from the Maitatsine group in the north central to the Niger Delta militant group in the south-south and very importantly, the Boko Haram insurgents from the north east. The concept of terrorism is very broad as different schools of thoughts have different criteria as to what defines a terrorist act. However, these different schools of thought agree that terrorism entails the use of violence and intimidation directed at the larger public in a bid to achieve their intended goals.

Terrorism in Nigeria didn't appear out of a vacuum. Different groups are seen to have different motives behind their terrorist acts. The escalation and spread of Boko Haram is seen to be attributed to two different factors. The frustration the members of Boko Haram have faced over the years, which have further aggravated the aggression mentality of the group, forcing them to employ extreme violent measures on the Nigerian government and its citizens. Secondly, the weaknesses of the power institutions which have facilitated the growth of the insurgent group. The study provides credible explanation why the spread of Boko Haram is as a result of these two factors. This is not to say that other theories do not explain the spread of Boko

Haram. Boko Haram has also been able to justify their actions by claiming the religious motives behind their actions.

The literature review looked at concept of terrorism as seen by different scholars, the reasons behind terrorist acts, terrorism in Africa and also different scholarly works on the Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria. These scholars didn't really differ on their analysis of terrorism in Nigeria. However, a number of scholars hold that religious extremism and poor economic conditions help Boko Haram to succeed. The succeeding chapter looked at Boko in retrospect; it talked about how the group developed from 2002; the composition and group structure of the group, its source of income and very importantly, the group's ideology which contradicts the beliefs of Nigerian state.

The study generates two hypotheses which claim that there is a significant relationship between dissatisfaction from domestic governance and the spread of Boko Haram and that there is also a relationship between the weaknesses of power agencies and the spread of Boko Haram. The group was mostly comprised of individuals who have suffered one form of frustration or the other and in turn blame the Nigerian state for the situations they passed through. This would make them see the Nigerian state as an enemy where Boko Haram was the perfect avenue for them to exercise their aggression on the Nigerian state. Boko Haram were able to capitalize on the 'illegal' execution of their leader Mohammed Yusuf and as a means to seek vengeance, they escalated into a more extremist group.

The weakness of the Nigerian power institutions such as the Nigerian army and the Nigerian police force are also the reasons why Boko Haram is as deadly as they are

today. The corruption of the Nigerian state itself has found its way into power institutions; the institutions which are supposed to be protectors of the state and also possess the monopoly of violence have been contaminated. The politicization of the Nigerian army has led to negligence of its primary duty and also triggered the insurgent group.

6.2 Recommendation

It is evident that the use of military forces to combat Boko Haram insurgents and deployment of armed men into inflicted areas have only helped a little in curbing the spread of Boko Haram. The menace of Boko Haram is generally perceived to be worse than the Nigerian civil war which occurred decades ago. The group has inflicted a sizeable amount of casualties and has displaced millions of people in and outside Nigeria. It is imperative that issues concerning the security of people and properties of Nigeria be treated with importance.

The Nigerian government has received a lot of surveillance and security support from foreign governments. However, the mayhem the country faces requires a lot more than these forms of responses. One of the major features of members of Boko Haram is that they are frustrated and hold grievances against the Nigerian state. This means that the Nigerian state needs to address this long term and deep rooted grievances. Unlike the Niger Delta militants in the south-south part of Nigeria who were frustrated and feel they have been heavily deprived of their quota of the Nigerian revenue which comes from oil proceeds. The Nigerian government found it easier to address compared to the Boko Haram insurgency. Former president Umar Musa Yar'adua was able to start up the amnesty programme which was a negotiation deal with the Niger Delta military where they would give up their arms and would be

compensated with wages monthly. The programme ran through the next government and yielded success. On the other hand, the Nigerian government has tried to take the same approach in curbing the spread of Boko Haram, even to the point of negotiating the exchange of the kidnapped Chibok girls. However, this approach has served little purpose.

From 2013, The Nigerian government has been able to impose a state of emergency in Borno, Yobe and Adamawa states which are the vulnerable regions heavily affected by the scourge of Boko Haram. While this has helped to monitor the Boko Haram movement, it has not totally limited the spread of the group. More directives and actions different from the mainstream military combats need to be taken to end the growth of the insurgent group. Instead of overcrowding civilian populated areas with armed military men, more soldiers need to be deployed to every border area Nigerian shares with its neighbors (Chad, Niger and Cameroon). The border porosity is inexplicable and the border laws need to be reformed to see that insurgents are not given free access in and outside the country.

It is important that the asymmetric nature of Boko Haram attacks need to be figured out. The Nigerian power institutions need to reconfigure the combat into a more symmetrical warfare by complete deforestation of the Sambisa forest and other enclaves the insurgents take refuge in. This way, surveillance and intelligence on the group would be made much easier and further attacks will be able to be curtailed. The Nigerian security agents need to be fully empowered. The Nigerian Police Force together with the Nigerian army needs to be prepared enough to deter future attacks from insurgent groups. Boko Haram over the years have been noted to use the social media propaganda as a tool to defeat the Nigerian state, as such, The Nigerian state

through various outlets needs to devise a way to win the propaganda war. They have to be dissociated from the political affairs of the country that seem to get in the way of their primary objectives of defending the territorial integrity of the state.

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