

AKP's Foreign Policy Regarding the Cyprus Issue: Perceptions of Turkish Cypriots

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ABSTRACT

This thesis aimed to analyse the perception of the Turkish Cypriots regarding the AKP foreign policy. Turkey has always been in relation with the European Union and in order to become a full member, Cyprus problem has been demonstrated as an obstacle for Turkey. The rise in power in 2002 by the Islamist based Western oriented party; the AKP has brought a new vision to the Turkish foreign policy.

In this dissertation, it will be argued that during the Annan Plan period the AKP government has supported the plan and promoted an effort to convince the Turkish Cypriots to vote for the favour of the Plan. In other words Turkish Cypriot leaders have worked hand in hand with the AKP government in Turkey. After the failure of the Annan Plan the foreign policy of the AKP has become more conflictual, conservative and rigid. Therefore the 2009 has been the turning point of the AKP foreign policy. According to the latest developments in the island, the continuing negotiations between the two communities of Cyprus have been following by the AKP government. To be more precise, Cyprus issue has always been the national case for the all Turkish governments that has come to power. However Turkey's tendency to join the EU has changed the Cyprus policy of Turkey. The rise in Kurdish problem and the conflicting nature of the Middle East has pushed Turkey beyond the EU line and AKP government has decided to postpone the EU membership negotiations and leaned to become a regional power.

Keywords: AKP, European Union, Annan Plan, Cyprus.

ÖZ

Bu tezin amacı Kıbrıslı Türkler'in AKP'nin dış politikasına olan algısını incelemektir. Türkiye'nin AB ile ilişkileri her zaman olmuştur ve AB üyeliği için Kıbrıs sorunu hep bir engel olarak görülmüştür. 2002'de İslam kökenli Batı yanlısı bir parti olan AKP'nin iktidara gelmesi Türk dış politikasına yeni bir vizyon getirmiştir.

Günümüzdeki gelişmelere bakıldığında adada iki toplum arasında devam eden görüşmeler AKP hükümeti tarafından takip edilmektedir. Daha açık olmak gerekirse Kıbrıs sorunu gelmiş geçmiş tüm hükümetler için milli dava olarak görülmüştür. Bunun yanında Türkiye'nin AB'ye katılmak için meyilli oluşu uyguladığı Kıbrıs politikasının da değişmesine sebep olmuştur. Artan Kürt meselesi ve Orta Doğu'da baş gösteren çatışmalar nedeniyle AKP hükümetinin AB üyeliği sürecini ertelemesine ve bölgesel güç olma yolunda ilerlemesine yol açmıştır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: AKP, Avrupa Birliği, Annan Planı, Kıbrıs

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AKP	Justice and Development Party
ANAP	Motherland Party
DIKO	Democratic Party
DP	Democrat Party
DSP	Democratic Left Party
EC	European Community
EOKA	National Organisation of Cypriot Fighters
EU	European Union
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
IMF	International Monetary Fund
ISIS	Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant
MHP	Nationalist Action Party
MÜSİAD	Independent Industrialists' and Businessmen's Association
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NOP	National Order Party
OIC	Organization of Islamic Conference
PKK	Kurdistan Worker's Party
PYD	Democratic Union Party
ROC	Republic of Cyprus
TRNC	Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus
TOBB	Union of Chambers and Commodity Exchanges of Turkey
TUSKON	Turkish Businessmen and Industrialists' Confederation
UNFFICYP	United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus

UN SG	United Nations Secretary General
UN	United Nations
USA	United States of America
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
WP	Welfare Party
WWI	First World War

Chapter 1

INTRODUCTION

The aim of this thesis is to analyse Turkish Cypriots' attitudes towards the AKP policies on the Cyprus issue. The main research question of this thesis is; what are the main sources behind Turkish foreign policy change towards Cyprus problem under the rule of the AKP government since 2002? Hypothesis of this thesis is the AKP administration does not pursue foreign policy according to the Turkish Cypriot or Turkish constituency.

Throughout the Turkish political history critical changes has been taken place over time and number of challenges as well as opportunities have arisen. In terms of foreign policy, Atatürk- founder of the republic has adopted a Western-oriented policy. For the first years of the Republic relations with the Arab and Middle Eastern neighbours were not those much important.

The Turkish political history has been witnessed domestic instabilities due to number of coups and rise in number of regional conflicts. Therefore Turkish foreign policy mainly relied on military security and hard power policy in the region. AKP focused on European Union membership process from the 2002; therefore it followed a pro-European policy. Especially, between 2002 and 2005 that tendency on foreign policy was completely pro-European. This pro-European policy has arisen to alter during the year of 2005. However Middle East has started to take important part in AKP's

foreign policy agenda. Therefore Turkey pursued pro-active foreign policy in Middle East and foreign policy of Turkey became less dependent to the West between 2007 and 2011.

Since then there was a correlation between the domestic and foreign policy priorities. For instance the role of AKP over the Middle East as a foreign policy issue has positive impact over the domestic politics. The party ideology of the AKP was not anti-Western but it was Islamic oriented which based on National Outlook Movement. In that sense it is noteworthy to mention that AKP foreign policy priorities based on pro-EU idea and the Islamism.

Thereby two factors became more important: EU membership and the democratization process. Meanwhile reforms has formalized by AKP government in order to fulfil Copenhagen Criteria. The main purpose of the AKP in domestic politics was to gain trust of citizen. The increase in the role of Turkey in Middle East was initial aim of the AKP, and the AKP concentrated on to accelerate the relation with Middle Eastern countries such as Syria and Iran.

There is an intimate linkage between the domestic and foreign relations of the states and Turkey is one of those states that used foreign threats to rally for the public support. However Cyprus issue was always important for the Turkish governments that have come to power.

From the beginning of the 2002 the AKP gave strong support to reach a bi-zonal and bi-communal federal solution to Cyprus. Besides, “no solution is the solution” idea has changed by the AKP, and it aimed to change the status-quo policy on

Cyprus. However, attitude of AKP towards Cyprus issue has effected by domestic and foreign matters. Especially, EU membership process of Turkey has changed the Cyprus policy of Turkey. In that sense Turkey's interest and priorities were based on it. For this reason, AKP government cooperated with the TRNC government in order to achieve this aim on the way of pro-EU policy. In the general elections of 2002, 2007, 2011 and in 2015 AKP came to power without having a coalition in government. The power of the AKP has risen in domestic manner also the interest of Turkish government has begun to change. In addition to that, as a result of zero-problem with the neighbours, AKP's relation with the Middle Eastern countries has developed especially until the 2011. On the way of "strategic depth" principles Turkey started to take active role in the conflict resolution especially in Syria.

Meanwhile Turkey has been addressed as a path to establish peace and stability in its region. In that sense, Turkey has shown as 'the role model' for the Middle Eastern countries.

Within this context this thesis has been designed to analyse Turkish Cypriots' attitudes towards the AKP policies on the Cyprus issue under the neoclassical realism theory. The theory of realism is focused on use of power, threat of power etc. The neo-classical realism on the other hand does not reject relation between internal-external politics. This theory analyses the state and the system at the same time. Mainly neoclassical realism accepts inter-relation of the states in the international system and focuses on to understand the reason behind why states follow certain policies and why do states follow same policies in different times. The neoclassical realism is accepted as the part of realism which deals with foreign affairs. However it

is also argued that there is a relation between the perceptions of the leader of the state and the attitudes of the states in foreign policy. Besides it is suggested that while analysing the external matters the leaders sometimes might be affected by the internal matters.

Throughout this perspective, Turkey's foreign policy has undergone considerable changes in the previous years. Turkey applied a proactive policy with its neighbours and decided to revise its previous conflicts through a different perspective. Therefore, Turkish Cypriot presence in Cyprus and the continuing role over the island as a guarantor state has triggered with the ambition to become a member of the EU.

In the light of these subject matters the transformation of Turkish foreign policy under the AKP government with its new theoretical basis and policy initiatives and the attitudes of the Turkish Cypriots will be analysed.

The importance of current study is to create relations with domestic and foreign policy of the AKP's government through investigating and analysing the Turkish Cypriot's perception over the AKP's foreign policy. This survey aimed to provide better understanding to the effect of AKP's foreign policy on Turkish Cypriot's perspective. However attitudes and views of Turkish Cypriots are recognized by that method. The awareness of the AKP enables to create and make effective policy towards to Cyprus. Beyond this advantage, awareness of Turkish Cypriots' creates an understanding about the effectiveness and efficiency of AKP's foreign policy on Cyprus. Especially, questions which are about the attitudes of AKP government ensure results and outcomes of the foreign policy effectiveness over the Turkish

Cypriots. For example, questions are asked as “Do you think that the AKP government is reliable and sincere about the solution of the Cyprus problem?” or “The AKP government has claimed that the Annan Plan is pro-solution in the referendum period. Do you find this approach of the AKP government is constructive attitude?”

The initial purpose of this thesis is to investigate the effect of domestic development on the foreign policy priorities on AKP’s government. Secondly, detect to change in AKP’s foreign policy on Cyprus with the influence of Turkey’s domestic developments, in this regard official announcements, and official documents are used as primary sources. Thirdly, survey is used for create an understanding about the Turkish Cypriots perception towards to AKP’s foreign policy. And lastly, survey results bear an importance for assessing the efficiency of AKP’s foreign policy on Cyprus.

1.1 Historical Background

Throughout the history the island of Cyprus has always been important for the conquerors starting from the ancient times. The geographic position of the island triggered political and economic importance of Cyprus. After the British rule the Muslim and Christian representatives of the island as Turkish and Greek Cypriots wanted to determine their own future in which main cleavages has become visible. Each community wanted to unite with their motherlands and the inter-communal conflicts has started. Following the establishment of the ROC in which Britain, Turkey and Greece became guarantors of the new born Republic had only chance to survive until 1963. After the 11 years of continuing inter communal violence in 1974 Turkey called other guarantor powers to cease the fights and re-establish the order.

Nevertheless none of the guarantor powers intervened and only Turkey unilaterally interfere the island to re-establish peace. After the cease fire several peace talks has been conducted by the representatives of the communities. However the unilateral application of the Greek Cypriots to become a member of the EU has brought new dimension to the Cyprus conflict. And under the auspices of the UN SG Kofi Annan a blueprint document would be prepared and presented to the votes of the communities. The failed referendum in 2004 opened the door for the Greek Cypriots who were not favoured the plan. On the other hand Turkey as a guarantor state has played active role during the negotiations. Turkey's new foreign policy principles and ambition to join the EU under the AKP government promoted the peace talks which in return enabled to gain domestic support. Unlike the previous governments since 2002 the AKP government has shown western oriented and pro-solutionist foreign policy priorities.

1.2 Literature Review

The AKP as an Islamic oriented party had to create an image to show that it was not representing the same characteristics with its previous Islamist heritage. Furthermore, the foreign policy of AKP has shifted from Islamic oriented and anti- Western policies to the pro-European policies. According to Esen Kirdiş AKP moved away from the “National Outlook Movement” and its foreign policy focused on pro-EU approach and gave priority to its EU membership process and democratization.¹ On the other hand, Leslie Keerthi Kumar noted that AKP called themselves as “conservative democrats” and therefore the domestic policy of the AKP is based on conservatism. For example, AKP applied consumption of alcohol by putting

¹ Esen Kirdiş, “The Role of Foreign Policy in Constructing the Party Identity of the Turkish Justice and Development Party (AKP)”, *Turkish Studies*, Vol.16, No.2, (2015):178-194. Available at <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14683849.2015.1044444>. Accessed (27.04.2017).

limitation in the industry of alcohol and it brought Quran course as elective for primary school. Other side, economic development has achieved further minority rights were not underestimated by AKP government.²

Joshua W. Walker focused on the Turkish government tends to give importance on relations with other states compared to the previous governments. In addition to that, Turkey has problematic relation with the West. Furthermore, Turkey continued to experience with domestic problems such as constitutional change. Walker claimed that foreign policy of the AKP is complex even Turkish foreign policy connected with its domestic situations. Besides, the change in AKP's foreign policy has recognized in third term and it tends to concentrate on regional relations. AKP's foreign policy principles were formalized by Ahmet Davutoğlu who defined the main principles in "Strategic Depth Doctrine".³

According to Davutoğlu providing stability in domestic as well as peaceful environment internally produces "proactive foreign policy". Besides, creating connection with neighbour countries is significant in Turkish foreign policy agenda. The main purpose is to increase the role of Turkey in international level. Davutoğlu suggested Turkish foreign policy prioritizes the protection of national interest due to its value-based approach. Additionally, Davutoğlu argued that Turkish foreign policy compromises Turkish national primacies. However, Davutoğlu examined that it is

² Leslie Keerthi Kumar, "Examining AKP's Impact on Turkey's Domestic and Foreign Policy", *Contemporary Review of the Middle East*. India:SAGE, Vol. 1, No.2. (2014):207–230, p. 211.

³ Joshua W. Walker. "The Interlinking of Turkey's Domestic and Foreign Policy in the AKP's Third Term". The German Marshall Fund of the United States. Available at www.gmfus.org/file/2532/download. Accessed (27.04.2017-18:29).

important to create balance between vision and the crisis management therefore Davutoğlu underlined the “vision-oriented” approach of the Turkish foreign policy.⁴

Ziya Öniş assesses the pro-active policy of the AKP as the main principles were introduced by Turgut Özal in 1990’s. Furthermore, Turkish foreign policy principles were mainly pro-active and multi-dimensional during 1999-2002.⁵

Kıvanç Ulusoy emphasized that Cyprus problem has never been an ordinary issue in Turkish foreign policy. Besides, in the beginning of the AKP’s term of office the aim was to become an EU member. Ulusoy noted that Cyprus policy of the AKP is formalized through the principle of “zero problems with neighbours”, and then the policy has changed on the hard line. Ulusoy clarified it by the effect of obstruction on its EU membership negotiations. On the other hand, Ulusoy emphasized that Cyprus issue is an example for the struggle of national interest of Turkey in its neighbourhood.⁶

Müge Kınacıoğlu and Emel Oktay discussed that the solution of Cyprus issue has shore by AKP government on the way of EU’s desire. The former Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s viewed solution of the Cyprus problem was the key element in the EU membership process of Turkey in this sense, Turkish foreign policy on

⁴ Ahmet Davutoğlu, “Principles of Turkish Foreign Policy and Regional Political Structuring”, *Turkey Policy Brief Series*, TEPAV. 2012.

⁵ Ziya Öniş, “Multiple Faces of the “New” Turkish Foreign Policy: Underlying Dynamics and a Critique”, *Insight Turkey*. Vol.13, No.1,(2011):47-65, Available at http://file.insightturkey.com/Files/Pdf/insight-turkey_vol_13_no_1_2011_onis.pdf. Accessed (21.03.2017-01:01).

⁶ Kıvanç Ulusoy, “The Cyprus Conflict: Turkey’s Strategic Dilemma”, *Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies*, vol.18, no.4, (2016):393-406, p.393. Available at <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/19448953.2016.1196007>.

Cyprus has shaped by that purpose. Kınacıoğlu and Oktay supposed that the Cyprus issue was perceived as an obstacle for EU membership process of Turkey and it should no more be an obstacle.⁷

Burçin Uluğ Eryılmaz argued that domestic regards effected AKP's policy on Cyprus which was supported by the EU regards and they hindered to alter AKP's policy on Cyprus in the 2005. The elections in 2011 influenced AKP's Cyprus policy, because AKP's self-confidence has increased, and the effect of EU on Turkey has decreased. Turkey experienced domestic developments in post-2011 era. For example, increase in economic power, and increase in regional role.⁸

Kılıç Buğra Kanat emphasized that transparency of Turkish foreign policy has increased in compared to previous years. Besides, AKP's Turkish foreign policy compromises pro-active and multi-dimensional principles.⁹

İbrahim Kalın underlined the multiple characteristics of AKP's foreign and domestic policies, and emphasized its conservative approach. Kalın, added the values of the AKP includes rule of law, democracy as well as human rights. On the other hand, Turkish-Islamic values are included such as conservative values. Davutoğlu noted

⁷ Müge Kınacıoğlu and Emel Oktay, "The Domestic Dynamics of Turkey's Cyprus Policy: Implications for Turkey's Accession to the European Union", *Turkish Studies*, Vol.7, No.2, (2006):261-273, p.262. Available at <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14683840600714699>.

⁸ Burcin U. Eryılmaz, "The myth of 'Europeanization' of Turkish foreign policy: the Cyprus debacle as a litmus test", *Southeast European and Black Sea Studies*, Vol.14, No.3, (2014):431-462, p.455. Available at <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14683857.2014.924676>. Accessed (10.04.2017-23:47).

⁹ Kılıç Buğra Kanat, "AK Party's Foreign Policy:Is Turkey Turning Away from the West?", *Insight Turkey*, Vol.12, No.1, (2010):205-225, p.222. Available at http://file.insightturkey.com/Files/Pdf/insight_turkey_vol_12_no_1_2010_kanat.pdf. Accessed (29.04.2017-14:15).

that the strategic depth is related with nation's geostrategic position further historical, cultural inheritance associated.¹⁰

According to İsmail Ermağan and Tücel Taklak in the field of international relations, analysing the perceptions is the important part of the studies. In other words, perceptions are the reflections of the truth.¹¹ Therefore, analysing the Turkish Cypriots' perceptions regarding to the AKP policy is important for testing the policy of Turkish political actors over Cyprus issue. The reason is satisfied respondents means successful policy of the government Foreign policy making is the affected by public opinions. However, political actors either disregard public opinion or prefer to lead the mass to gain support for their position. In this study it has been analysed that perceptions of the Turkish Cypriots is important or the success of the Turkish foreign policy.

William Davis claimed that the traditional international relations theory is against the influence of public opinion over the foreign policy. The reason behind this could be stressed as the divergence between the elites and mass public opinion. In other words the dominant position of the ruling elites in foreign policy making might cause inconsistency between the public opinion of the mass and the foreign policy. In other words this inconsistency might cause frustration.¹²

¹⁰ İbrahim Kalın, "Turkish foreign Policy Framework, values, and mechanisms", *International Journal*, (2011-2012):7-21, p.12. Available at <http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/002070201206700102>. Accessed (29.04.2017-15:51).

¹¹ İsmail Ermağan and Tüncel Taslak, "Türkiye'de Dış Politika Algısına Dair Bir Saha Çalışması: Beşiktaş İlçesi Örneği", *SDU Faculty of Arts and Sciences Journal of Social Sciences*, No.27, (2012): 211-230, p.212. Available at <http://sdu.dergipark.gov.tr/download/article-file/117831>. Accessed (19.07.2017-12:01).

¹² William Davis "The public opinion-foreign policy paradox in Germany: integrating domestic and international levels of analysis conditionally", *European Security*, No.21, Vol.3,(2012):347-369.

1.3 Methodology

This thesis surveys the question of how the Turkish Cypriots perceive AKP's policies and several significant events that have taken place in Cyprus. A limited amount of relevant historical data and surveys contribute in the analysis of this question. The aim of the survey is to understand, investigate and observe interacting in the community while asking survey questions. Thus, a better understanding of the perceptions of the Turkish Cypriots can be understood.

The aim of the current study is to investigate Turkish Cypriots' attitudes towards the AKP policies on the Cyprus issue. Therefore, questionnaire would be employed as a data instrument to collect data from respondents, which will be between November 2016- January 2017 period. Due to limited time current study 383 respondents were selected as a data collection process.

The questionnaire which administered for the study, consisted of twenty four questions, and it is divided into three parts. The first part of the questionnaire was designed to gather information about socio-demographic profile of the respondents. However, sample questions could be mentioned as gender, age and education of the respondents whereas; the second part was aimed to assess the perspectives of Turkish Cypriots' attitudes towards to the Justice and Development Party (AKP also known as AK-Party) policies regarding Cyprus. Sample questions could be indicated as "Do you think the AKP foreign policy on Cyprus is successful?", "Do you think that the AKP government is reliable and sincere about the solution of the Cyprus problem?" or "How do you describe the importance of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) for Turkey? Finally, in the last part of the questionnaire, questions were

designed to evaluate the attitudes of Turkish Cypriots' towards specific foreign policy of AKP regarding Cyprus. Sample questions could be reported as "Do you find that AKP government has claimed that the Annan Plan is pro-solutionist in the referendum period?", "Do you find this approach of the AKP government is constructive attitude."

Aside of this, the respondents are stressed as the focus group of the study who are Turkish Cypriots and aged between 18 to 65. Furthermore, sample of study may be mentioned as random sampling method. Respondents are kindly requested to articulate their answers by five point Likert Scale. To conduct data analysis, SPSS (Statistical Package for Social Sciences) would be used and Frequency Analysis, and Chi-square exhibit findings of the questionnaire.

Primary and secondary sources on various documents have been used i.e. official gazette, official announcements, and minister's speeches to create better understanding about Turkish foreign policies. Furthermore, Cyprus conflict itself could be considered as a case and in that sense, case analysis could be also performed for the current study.

1.4 Theoretical Framework

Neo-classical realism enables to detect relation between domestic and foreign policy. In this thesis AKP's foreign policies and domestic policies are examined, in addition this thesis investigate the influence of domestic policy of Turkey on Cyprus. Neo-classical realism defines domestic factors that influence foreign policy. In this reason neo-classical realism is used to create better understanding to this dissertation. State's domestic arrangement is prominence for neo-classical realism. Besides, there

are factors that affect the foreign policy of state such as national interest and security issue. Especially, national interest is the significant factor that shaped AKP's foreign policy on Cyprus. National interest has evolved by the times in Turkey's agenda though it still effect to shape foreign policy.

The Neo-classical realism concentrates on two kinds of variables, these are internal and external. State's rage in foreign policy is their priority; material power which includes in realist perspective is also valid for neoclassical realism. Power ability has an effect on foreign policy, this effect does not occur directly, for this reason it creates oppression on the system. This oppression is detected by using level of unit.¹³

Neo-classical realism explores not only international dynamics, but also domestic politics. Moreover, structure as a concept is agreed in neo-classical realism, and inducement of system able to form of state's actions. However, that is not ordered to its activities. Framework of neo-realism is also valid for neo-classical realist.¹⁴ According to realism states are perceived as rational actor, besides, states aim to maximize interests. Furthermore, international politics is formed by anarchy, and it means that existing higher authority above the state is not occurred. Another aspect of realism is balance of power, states desire to maximize benefit, and they are trying to greater extent of its power in order to achieve that aim. Besides, requirement is occurred for states because essential to have more power in contrast to their

¹³ Nicholas Kitchen, Systemic pressures and domestic ideas: a neoclassical realist model of grand strategy formation, *Review of International Studies*, (2010):117-143, p: 117. Available at [http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/27670/1/Systemic%20pressures%20and%20domestic%20ideas\(lsero\).pdf](http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/27670/1/Systemic%20pressures%20and%20domestic%20ideas(lsero).pdf). Accessed (10.03.2017-19:50).

¹⁴ Michiel Foulon, "Neoclassical Realism: Challengers and Bridging Identities", *International Studies Review*, (2015):635–661. Available at <http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/misr.12255/pdf>. Accessed (23.03.2017-20:51).

competitor.¹⁵ The Neo-classical realism is compatible with Walt's realism. Moreover, it extends the factors that included in realism's framework. In this sense, neoclassical realism interpolates the domestic politics and policymaker's knowledge. Therefore, domestic politics, and policymaker's knowledge have an impact on foreign policy. Neo-classical realist elaborated that on the about domestic policy influences on foreign policy.¹⁶ Mainly, neoclassical realism elaborates the foreign policy's theory. On the other hand, realism is different from liberalism and constructivism, because international relations of state are significant for realism. Additionally, domestic effect on foreign policy is less significant for realism.¹⁷ Besides, neo-realism defines the specific matters, on the other hand, neoclassical is bring perception that not mentioned by realism. Neo-realist concentrated on to define outcomes through the occurred by connection of actors such as arms races or international cooperation. Neo-classical realism defines that the reason of detailed strategies for particular times. Furthermore, it explores behaviour of states towards conditionality in system, for example, military doctrine and alliance preferences.¹⁸

Neo-classical realism provides benefit through the explaining factors which affect the policies. Moreover, it consists of the other elements such as security or strategic

¹⁵ John J. Mearsheimer, "Reckless States and Realism", *International Relations*, SAGE, 23(2009):241-256. Available at <http://mearsheimer.uchicago.edu/pdfs/A0048.pdf>. Accessed (23.03.2017-20:55).

¹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷ Tudor Onea, "Putting the 'Classical' in Neoclassical Realism: Neoclassical Realist Theories and US Expansion in the Post-ColdWar". *International Relations*. SAGE. 26(2012):139-164. Available at <http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/0047117811430674>. Accessed (23.03.2017-20:58).

¹⁸ Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, "Security Seeking under Anarchy", *International Security*, President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Vol.25, No.3 (2001):128-161, p.7. Available at http://www.rochelleterman.com/ir/sites/default/files/taliaferro%202001_0.pdf. Accessed (23.03.2017-21:01).

work. These studies aimed to discern social life therefore, they examine culture, individual, institutional traits, and individuals.¹⁹ Consequences of state connection with states are attempted to define by neorealism. Further, neorealism attempted to detect the state's incentives. However, it is not give effort for describe state's acts. According to Waltz, foreign policy is shaping by internal and external aspects because of this reason achievement of finding theoretical explanation is not simple, and there is no need to search for it.

On the other hand, neoclassical realism supposed that material power has an effect on shaping foreign policy's framework. Furthermore, foreign policies decisions are taking by elite. Besides, view towards power can be varied even in society perception may be varied. As a result, each state behaves differently form each other, because the structural alterations between states cause to state's behaviour changes between each other.²⁰

1.5 Limitations

The aim of this study is to focus on the last fourteen years of Turkish foreign policy. However, government has responded to the changing political environment by actively engaging with policy arrangements. The nature of foreign policy could be characterized as dynamic, thus it is changing rapidly. Therefore, current issues are taking part in Turkish foreign policy agenda, and each issue may change previous policy's outcome, issues are interrelated. Because of this reason, detection of foreign policy results and outcome are complicated.

¹⁹ Mihai Zodian, "NEOCLASSICAL REALISM AND THE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT". *Romanian Military Thinking*, 1(2015):103-112, p.112. Available at http://smg.mapn.ro/gmr/Engleza/Ultimul_nr/zodian-p.103-112.pdf. Accessed (23.03.2017-21:05).

²⁰ Gideon Rose, Review of Michael E. Brown and Thomas J. Christensen, "Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy", *World Politics*, Cambridge University Press. Vol.51, No.1, (1998):144-172, p.6.

Furthermore, agenda is constantly changing as a result of this some issues may lose its importance. Turkey's changing political environment and its changing political strategies are limitations of this study. Secondly, survey was limited in terms of the age factor. In other words participants who are below the age of eighteen and above the 65 were excluded. In this sense, survey was limited through the ages of participants. I could not conduct with the survey with Greek Cypriots due to limited time and traveling problem therefore I decided to analyse the perception of Turkish Cypriots.

1.6 Thesis Outline

Structure of the study could be expressed as follows:

- In Chapter 1, problem statement of the study would be indicated. To be more precise, this chapter would stress how Turkey's changing domestic policy may influence on its foreign policy on Cyprus issue. Furthermore, in this chapter; literature review, methodology of the study, limitations and lastly aim of the study would be discussed.
- In Chapter 2, the key milestones of Cyprus conflict, and its importance of Cyprus for Turkey would be presented. Beside of it, nature of Turkish foreign policy in general forms, and background of AKP and its main foreign policy principles would be explained.
- In Chapter 3, how developments in Turkish domestic policy would influence Turkish foreign policy on Cyprus Conflict would be addressed. These developments would be analysed under two main headings. The first heading would provide information about the developments during 2002-2007 whereas; the developments which took place 2007-2016 would be discussed

under the second heading. Lastly, potential alternatives would be mentioned in case of having no solution at the end of the negotiations

- In Chapter 4, findings of the study would be illustrated. Survey results and analyses will be mentioned.
- In conclusion, summary of each chapters are mentioned and it includes result of this study. Survey and case analysis assisted to test this study hypothesis.

Chapter 2

BACKGROUND OF CYPRUS CONFLICT AND NATURE OF TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY

Firstly, this chapter analyses history of Cyprus in order to understand background of the conflict. Secondly, the nature of Turkish foreign policy since Ottoman Empire has been investigated, compared and illustrated with the AKP's period. Thirdly, the last part consists of AKP's period and its party principles in general.

2.1 History of Cyprus Conflict

The main aim of this part of the study is to express the milestones of the Cyprus conflict.

It is believed that History of Cyprus is known as certainly ancient in the world history and it is divided into periods. It begins with the Neolithic Age (8200-3900 B.C.), and continues with Chalcolithic Age (3900-2500 B.C.), Bronze Age (2500-1050 B.C.), Competing Influences (1050-333 B.C.). Cyprus was ruled by Byzantine Empire (Byzantine Era 330-1191) and Franks (Frankish Period 1192-1489). Historians argued that, Cyprus was ruled by Venice until the Ottoman conquest which took place in 1571.²¹

²¹ Cyprus in the period 1571 – 1959. MFA. Available at <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/cyprus-in-the-period-1571---1959.en.mfa>. Accessed (11.03.2017-16:09).

The geo-strategic importance of the Cyprus (located in Mediterranean Sea which provides an opportunity to monitor trade routes) also charmed empires and which then fuelled their passion to conquer the island and rule it. Moreover, it could be also indicated that Cyprus located at the passage which acts as a bridge among Suez and Bab al Mandab.²² Furthermore, Cyprus provides a chance to reach the three continents, as it is located at the turning point among three continents.²³ It could be argued that Cyprus issue critical for Turkey. There are few reasons behind of it. The first reason could be articulated as “Cyprus is significant for Turkey’s security”. To create better understanding, its geopolitical position has promoted to its importance for Turkey and the other point is that the Turkish Cypriots were minority in the island whereas Greek Cypriots possessed majority of the population. Therefore, Turks had to secure their presence, and as a result Cyprus issue took position as national issue by Turkey.²⁴

In order to detect root of Cyprus conflict, historical development has to be taken in to consideration. Chronologically, it begins with the conquest of the island by the Ottoman Empire in 1571 with the fall of Ammochostos (Famagusta). The Latin was repelled from the island and Muslims ruled Cyprus until 1878. After the conquest it is decided to send Anatolian people to increase Turkish population in Cyprus. Thus newly established society composed of different ethnic groups. In order to achieve

²² James Leigh and Predrag Vukovic, “A GEOPOLITICS OF CYPRUS”, *Middle East Review of International Affairs*, Vol.15, No.4 (2011): 59-70. Available at <http://search.proquest.com/docview/920317889?pq-origsite=summon>. Accessed (24.03.2017).

²³ “Cyprus' Strategic Importance (Dispatch)”, *Stratfor*, 28 June 2012, Available at <https://www.stratfor.com/video/cyprus-strategic-importance-dispatch>. Accessed (15.03.2017-15:22).

²⁴ Mustafa Aydin, “Determinants of Turkish foreign policy: changing patterns and conjunctures during the Cold War”, *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol.36, No.1, (2000):103-139, p.120. Available at <http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/00263200008701300>. Accessed (18.03.2017-18:01).

this goal Anatolian Turks were carried to Cyprus. In that time, Church perceived as guarantor of security by Greek Cypriots.²⁵

Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots had cultural differences nevertheless they were living in serenity²⁶ under the Ottoman rule. Until the 1878 there was no overt conflict between the Turkish and the Greek Cypriot communities of Cyprus. In 1878, the control of Cyprus was given to the Great Britain after the secret treaty signed between Great Britain and the Ottomans at the Congress in Berlin. As an outcome while the Greek Cypriots were expecting economic, social and political improvements in their lives, this secret treaty caused disillusionment especially when British colonialism did not give any room for the materialization of the Greek demands for unification with Greece (ENOSIS).

Cyprus was aimed to employ for “place d’armes”, and used for unsuccessfulness of Ottoman in the face of Russia. As a result, formally island was given to British control. British administration applied a vital policy that influenced the ethnic division of the island negatively. The policy allowed bringing teachers from Turkey and Greece. In this condition, Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots had a right to get education by the teachers that came from their mother countries. Greece supposed to assign nationalist teachers to the island. This implementation increased nationalist feeling of both two sides, thus ethnic division became visible. Migration of Turkish Cypriot has increased after the island became British colony. Meanwhile as a British colony Cyprus was forced to subsidize British Colony which triggered the island

²⁵ Dan Lindley, “Historical, Tactical, and Strategic Lessons from the Partition of Cyprus”, *International Studies Perspectives*, Vo.2, No.8, (2007):224–241, p.228. Available At <http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1528-3585.2007.00282.x/pdf>.

²⁶ Ibid.

economy to go under depression. As with the 1929 Great Depression in which social and economic lives of the Cypriots became catastrophic, it led Greek uprisings to be welcomed.

Thus it can be argued that the British policies accelerated the rise of idea of Enosis.²⁷ “Megalo Idea” is the root of the Cyprus conflict. According to “Megalo Idea” Cyprus was supposed to be integrated with the Greece. The purpose of this idea is to reach the “Great Greece”.²⁸ As the British attempted to leave Cyprus in the 1950s, she decided to give right to Turkish and Greek Cypriots to determine their futures. However, the Turkish Cypriots started to demand *taksim*, in response to Greeks’ Enosis. In addition to that, as the self-determination gives right to people to fix statues as politically, economically, and socially by themselves the mental and physical partition of the island between the Greek and Turkish communities had started afterwards. Meanwhile on 15 January 1950 a referendum took place to vote unification with the Greece. According to the results 95, 7% of Greek Cypriots voted in favor of the referenda and the Bishop of Kition Makarios III was elected as Archbishop.²⁹ On the other hand, people who were not in favour of Enosis were threatened by the Church of Cyprus and they have faced with brutality during the British rule in the island, despite that these people faced with brutal attitudes during

²⁷ Oliver P. Richmond , *Mediating in Cyprus*, (London: Frank Cass Publisher,1998), p.68.

²⁸ Ayhan Cankut &Erdal Açıkse,“Kıbrıs Meselesinin Tarihsel Gelişimi ve Uluslararası Hale Gelme Sebepleri”, *Turkish Studies*, Ankara, Vol.9, No.4, (2014):1241-1259.Availableat http://www.turkishstudies.net/Makaleler/1026802037_67A%C3%A7%C4%B1ksesErdal-vd-trh-1241-1259.pdf. Accessed (19:56-02.03.2017).

²⁹ D. E. Yitmen, “1950 Plebisiti, 2017’de politikada şizofreni”, *Kıbrıs Gazetesi*, 2017. Available at <http://www.kibrisgazetesi.com/kibris/1950-plebisiti-2017de-politikada-sizofreni/12732>. Accessed (23.03.2017).

the British period in the island.³⁰ Greek Cypriots gave rise to their activities under the name of EOKA between 1955 and 1960, at that time many people were killed. Besides, Turkish Cypriots had forced to move away from their homes.

At that time there was Turkish villages and Greek villages in which they were living separately whereas there was also some villages that they were living together. The Idea of united Cyprus was approved by Foreign Ministers of Turkey and Greece in Zurich, and then agreement became formalized with the sign of treaties by the Prime Ministers of Greece, Turkey, and Britain held in London.

The Republic of Cyprus was established by Zurich and London Agreements in which Turkey, Greece, and Britain were the guarantor states according to the Treaty of Guarantee signed in 1960. As the guarantor powers, Turkey, Greece, and Britain were responsible for the independency, security, and integrity of territory of the Cyprus. Besides, these guarantor states possessed the right to intervene in the situation of treats towards independency, security, and integrity of territory.³¹

According to Article IV:

In the event of a breach of the provisions of the present Treaty, Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom undertake to consult together with respect to the representations or measures necessary to ensure observance of those provisions.

³⁰ Charlotte Heath-Kelly, *Politics of Violence Militancy, international politics, killing the name*, (London: Routledge, 2013), p.31. Available at https://books.google.com.cy/books?id=QiFmAQAAQBAJ&printsec=frontcover&hl=tr&source=gbs_ge_summary_r&cad=0#v=onepage&q&f=false. Accessed (23.03.2017-14:31).

³¹ "Timeline: Cyprus", *BBC News*, 13 December 2011. Available at <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/1021835.stm>. Accessed (22.03.2017-00:44).

In so far as common or concerted action may not prove possible, each of the three guaranteeing Powers reserves the right to take action with the sole aim of re-establishing the state of affairs created by the present Treaty.³²

Furthermore, thereupon, while Great Britain would have two military bases for itself, both Greece and Turkey would enjoy keeping a small number of troops as a guarantor states.

Meanwhile the new born Republic would have a Greek president who was Archbishop Makarios III and a Turkish Cypriot vice-President who was Dr. Fazıl Küçük. The 1960 Constitution of Cyprus divided legislative executive and judiciary between the two equal partners in which the right of self-determination of those two partners had been used separately. However the Greek Cypriots as the majority of the population took 70 per cent of administrative organs while the Turkish Cypriots were taking 30 per cent as the minority. This ration was also valid for the military services. Greek Cypriots acted contrary towards constitutional settlement.

The Republic of Cyprus would also not join any political or economic organization in which the two guarantor powers are not members of such organization. Nevertheless three years after the declaration of independence, in 1963 the Archbishop Makarios attempted to force with the 13 amendments to the constitution. The Greek Cypriots were questioning that minority effect on decision making process. Majority decisions was not employing because the administration units and

³² “Treaty Concerning The Establishment of The Republic of Cyprus”, <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/treaty-concerning-the-establishment-of-the-republic-of-cyprus.en.mfa>. Accessed (22.03.2017).

country were formalized by two different nations.³³ The main reason behind this attempt was to relegate the Turkish Cypriots from the position of a legal partner into a minority position.

The “Secret army” that belongs to the Greek Cypriots was established before 1961. Greek Cypriots were not delivering their weapons to the police. This “secret army” extended to its members to 10.000 in 1963. However the Akritas Plan was arranged by the effort of Polykarpos Yeorgadjss, Tassos Papadopoulos, and Glafkos Klerides. Purpose of this plan was the dispose of Turkish Cypriots from Cyprus Island and finally achieves Enosis.

With the preparation of the Akritas Plan there has been bloody riots conducted between the two communities of Cyprus. After the Greek atrocities perpetrated during the years of 1963-64, all the organs of the government of Cyprus was collapsed. Thus the continuation of Greek ethnic cleansing against the Turkish Cypriots was followed by the U.N. involvement in peace-keeping and peace-making upon the Britain’s call for the U.N. Security Council meeting to discuss the situation in Cyprus.

The involvement of the U.N. in Cyprus predates on March 4, 1964 with the resolution 186 that allowed the establishment of the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP). According to this resolution 186 the UNFICYP would act as a buffer between the two communities of Cyprus to prevent the repetition of

³³ Zenon Stavrinides, *The Cyprus Conflict National Identity and Statehood*, (Unk.place., Unk.publisher, 1999).

fighting between the Cypriot communities and to promote both the maintenance and restoration of the law and order in the island.

The former US Secretary Dean Acheson prepared the Acheson Plan and presented to the guarantor states of the Republic of Cyprus. This Plan recommended the unification of the Cyprus with Greece and in return Turkey would own some part of the island of Cyprus, along with, it would be utilized for the military purposes.³⁴ The respected plan included the point that the Turkish Cypriots would administrate three cantons whereas Turkey would obtain the chance to have a military bases. Additionally, Archbishop Makarios rejected the plan because it involved ceding part of the island to Turkey. The two Cypriot communities of Cyprus tried to bring solution to the Cyprus problem from the beginning of 1968 until 1974. However the negotiations between the two communities failed several times.³⁵

Generally speaking, the main issue was insufficiency of the constitution on specific issues in which both of the two communities give more priority such as power sharing, taxation, security and administrative issues. Besides, Greek Cypriots attempted to eliminate Turkish Cypriot's political rights rather than treating two communities on equal footing.

³⁴ "The Peace Plans: 1964 – Acheson Plan", *Cyprus Mail*, 29 December 2016, Available at <http://cyprus-mail.com/2016/12/29/peace-plans-1964-acheson-plan/>. Accessed (22.03.2017-13:24).

³⁵ Farid Mirbagheri, *Cyprus and International Peacekeeping*, (Newyork: Routledge, 1998). Available at <https://books.google.com.cy/books?id=Ht9AAwAAQBAJ&pg=PA55&lpg=PA55&dq=cyprus+between+1968+1974&source=bl&ots=PmO8QIYUQ&sig=RcHi5p3RqnZjdVsp9CpFNOr8bg&hl=tr&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwjeiK2qtdPSAhVG2hoKHWH9D9kQ6AEIXTAI#v=onepage&q=cyprus%20between%201968%201974&f=false>. Accessed (13.03.2017-15:22).

As the failed negotiations followed by the military junta against Makarios in 15 July 1974, Turkey on the other hand, asked Britain to put an end to this brutality. Nevertheless this request has been rejected by the Britain. Therefore Turkey organized a military intervention as a guarantor power in order to re-establish peace in the island. As a result of the military intervention, Cyprus divided into two sides in which the Greeks started to live in the South whereas the Turkish Cypriots settled in the North of the Cyprus.

The ceasefire has reached in 1974, then negotiations were started to establish peace in Cyprus. “Turkish Federated States” was established as a temporary administration under the leadership of Rauf R. Denктаş. Moreover, High Level Agreement was made between Denктаş and Makarios in 1977 under the auspices of the United Nations. Parties agreed on four points, these are:

1. We are seeking an independent, non-aligned, bi-communal Federal Republic.
2. The territory under the administration of each community should be discussed in the light of economic viability or productivity and land ownership.
3. Questions of principles like freedom of movement, freedom of settlement, the right of property and other specific matters, are open for discussion, taking into consideration the fundamental basis of a bi-communal federal system and certain practical difficulties which may arise for the Turkish Cypriot Community.

4. The powers and functions of the central federal government will be such as to safeguard the unity of the country having regard to the bi-communal character of the State.³⁶

A Second High Level Agreement in 1979 focused on the return of the Famagusta to its lawful inhabitants.³⁷ After the several round of failed talks Turkish Cypriots decided to declare Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus in 1983. This unilateral declaration was only recognized by Turkey. The United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 541 and called upon all the countries to not to recognize any state other than Republic of Cyprus and put embargoes in political, economic, social and cultural lives of the Turkish Cypriots.

As a result of continuing dispute over the island, soon after the Greek Cypriots unilateral application to the European Union, the former Secretary General of the UN, Kofi Annan decided to prepare a blueprint of settlement for Turkish and Greek Cypriots. Indeed, this blueprint document would be a combination of the previous failed documents.

The greatest political solution for the Greek Cypriots was the establishment of a federal Cypriot State with a single sovereignty and international personality, and a single citizenship whereas the Turkish Cypriot side asked for recognition of the realities' on the island under the confederative structure of Cyprus.

³⁶ “High Level Agreement”. Available at [http://www.mfa.gov.cy/mfa/mfa2016.nsf/FB80B3D87DE5A915C2257F95002BE30E/\\$file/High%20-%20Level%20Agreement%20-%2012%20February%201977.pdf](http://www.mfa.gov.cy/mfa/mfa2016.nsf/FB80B3D87DE5A915C2257F95002BE30E/$file/High%20-%20Level%20Agreement%20-%2012%20February%201977.pdf). Accessed (22.03.2017).

³⁷ Ibid.

The UN sponsored negotiations to reach solution in Cyprus. The UN Secretary General Kofi Annan presented five successive revisions of the Plan in November 2002 that would be submitted to separate referendums on 24 April 2004.

After these events, Greek Cypriots applied to be a member of the EU. Moreover, negotiations held in New York in which no solution has been reached for the Cyprus issue. The Annan Plan which produced by the United Nation of Secretary General Kofi Annan was supposing a federal state with two separate administrations. If two communities said “yes” to the Annan Plan in referendum held in 2004, solution would be accomplished. Although, Greek Cypriots voted against to the Annan Plan, approximately 75, 83 per cent of Greek Cypriots rejected to it, Turkish Cypriots on the other hand, voted in favour of the Plan, approximately 66, 90 per cent of Turkish Cypriots said “yes”.³⁸ Today negotiations are still continuing and the solution has not been achieved yet.

2.2 The Legacy of the Ottoman Empire

It is almost the most inevitable event to expect the Turkish Republic to not to be inherited from the Ottoman Empire. As the Republic was established on the ashes of the Ottomans, the legacy of the Empire had also been inherited in terms of foreign policy prerogatives. Especially the ruling elites and the bureaucrats of the Ottoman Empire continued to have their servings in the Republic era. In the 19th century with the collapse of the Ottoman Empire and the balance of power politics after the WW1 paved the way for the War of Independence in which there was a struggle to reoccupy the territory lost by the Sevres Treaty. As a result of this fought the military officers have been avoided from the politics during the first years of the Republic.

³⁸ “Rumlar 'Hayır', Türkler 'Evet' dedi”, *Hürriyet*, 24 Nisan 2004. Available at <http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/rumlar-hayir-turkler-evet-dedi-38597068>. Accessed (14.03.2017-18:27).

However after the establishment of the Republic there was no any attempt to gain more territories and the boundaries drawn by the “Misak-I Milli” has been respected. Thus it can be argued that the foreign policy of the Ottoman Empire was concentrated on defensive rather than offensive politics in the nineteenth century, in order to preserve its own territory. Especially, territories, where located in Europe.³⁹

The Western orientation of the Ottoman Empire can be given as a second legacy on the Turkish foreign policy. It should be noted that the Ottoman Empire has been recognized as a European country in which Turkish Republic had the same claim.

As of the third legacy the suspicious nature of the Ottoman Empire especially during the last years, caused to obtain securitization policy in domestic and foreign politics of the Republic. This securitization policy eventually led the establishment of the militaristic foreign policy.

It can be argued that the Ottoman diplomacy and the foreign policy objectives of the newly established Republic had similarities in terms of counteracts against the other European countries. It is important to note that through the successful diplomacy the Ottomans has postponed their collapse while the founder of the Republic Mustafa Kemal Atatürk took the advantage from disagreements between the Western countries and won the War of Independence.⁴⁰

³⁹ William Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy since 1774*, (USA: Routledge 2013), p.251.

⁴⁰ Cengiz Okman, “ Turkish Foreign Policy: Principles-Rules-Trends, 1814-2003”, in *Turkish Foreign Policy in Post Cold War Era*”, ad. İdris Bal, (Florida:Brown Walker Press, 2004), pp: 5-26.

2.3 Legacy of Kemalism

The location of the country is the most significant component in determining the foreign policy. Especially possessing the trade route and holding remarkable spots that makes the country strategically and geographically important than the others should be taken in to consideration by the foreign policy makers. Therefore geography is the important element in this purpose.

In terms of Turkey which is located at the heart of the three continents of Europe, Asia and Africa it is difficult to no to consider historical ties with the neighbouring countries. The possession of the Straits brings both advantage and disadvantages for Turkey. On the one hand straits are difficult to defend and require reliable military force for sustaining naval and aerial security. Meanwhile, in terms of the number of neighbouring countries that Turkey has due to its geographic position, there is also a risk of being attacked or threatened. Within this kind of environment, the Republic of Turkey, the predecessor of the Ottoman Empire has been established by the Mustafa Kemal Atatürk after the War of Independence.⁴¹

The newly established Republic would emphasis on the internal stabilization and sustainability of the new regime instead of obtaining policies and strategies of the Ottoman Empire.

During the first years of the establishment, there was no boundary between Ottoman Empire and Republic of Turkey. Therefore one of the main principles of Turkish

⁴¹ Ayla Göl, "A Short Summary of Turkish Foreign Policy: 1923-1939", *Ankara Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi*, Vol.48, No.1, (1993):57-71, p.57. Available at <http://dergipark.ulakbim.gov.tr/ausbf/article/view/5000053943/5000051258>. Accessed (30.03.2017).

foreign policy was to be seen and accepted as a sovereign entity. Another principle could be stated as to take benefit from the peaceful environment.⁴²

Kemalism as an ideology represents a type of regime and governance that has possesses the alteration of Eastern society in to a Western society. Firstly, the realism was provided to achieve continuity of independence of Republic of Turkey, and it was the initial principle. Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, the founder of the Republic, obtained realist approach in conducting both international and national matters. Loyalty within international law was the second principle, such as Membership of League of Nations or The Montreux Convention in 1936. Thirdly, “Peace at home, peace in the world” was the important principle of Mustafa Kemal’s foreign policy, which affected all Turkish governments that came to power. Fourthly, western oriented foreign policy has been perceived key element for the development of Turkey.⁴³ Thus, Turkey has started to follow Western values in its domestic and foreign policies.⁴⁴

Although Kemalism refers to an opposition to the Western imperialism, in order to establish modern Turkey some western values has been adopted to the Turkish society.

Mustafa Kemal as a founder of the Republic of Turkey has formulated principles. These principles are “nationalism, republicanism, secularism, populism, statism,

⁴² Ibid., p.57.

⁴³ Ibid., p.58.

⁴⁴ Şaban Çalış and Hüseyin Bağcı, “Atatürk’s Foreign Policy Understanding and Application”, *SÜ İİBF Sosyal ve Ekonomik Araştırmalar Dergisi*,(2004):195-228, p.196. Available at sead.selcuk.edu.tr/sead/article/download/407/402. Accessed (30.03.2017).

and reformism”. These principles identified as “Six Arrows” (Altı Ok). Furthermore, the Republican People’s Party manifesto explains “Six Arrows”. These six principles created a foundation for domestic and foreign policy construction.⁴⁵ 11 November 1938 İsmet İnönü came to power in Turkey after the death of Mustafa Kemal. During the first years of the Second World War Turkey did not join to the war instead stayed away to protect its territorial integrity.⁴⁶

2.4 Cold War Period

After the catastrophic effects of the two world wars the world has witnessed another power struggle named as a Cold War period which continued until the 1980s. In this era there was two blocks competing each other in order to dominate the entire world. On the one hand there was a Western Block (NATO) competing against the Eastern Block (Warsaw Pact). Within such kind of environment, Turkey was trying to be close to the Western block to prevent Soviet expansion or any threat posed by the Soviets’. In 1947 Truman Doctrine was provided by USA in order to sustain military and financial help to Greece and Turkey. At that time there was a threat of communism and through the Truman Doctrine it was expected to prevent such expansion. Further, Truman Doctrine has an international manner also, it defined as anti-communist act. On the other hand, Marshall Plan was also designed to give financial support for European states and Turkey for economic recovery after the

⁴⁵ Agapi L. Glyptis, Phd Thesis: *Kemalism as a Language for Turkish Politics: Cultivation, Reproduction, Negotiation*, (London: University of London, 2007), p.18. Available at http://etheses.lse.ac.uk/423/1/Glyptis_Kemalism%20as%20a%20language%20for%20Turkish%20politics.pdf. Accessed (17.03.2017-03:45).

⁴⁶ “İkinci Dünya Savaşının Sebebi ve Sonuçları”, *Tarih Gazetesi*. 18 November 2014. Available at <http://www.tarihgazetesi.net/index.php/dunya-tarihi/1436-ikinci-duenya-savas-n-n-sebebi-ve-sonuclar>. Accessed (30.03.2017-17:00).

WW2. Thus it is worthy of note that Turkish foreign policy focused on Western oriented politics during the Cold War period.⁴⁷

Under the presidency of the İsmet İnönü, Turkey has moved from single-party system to the multi-party system. This movement was significant event for the domestic and foreign policy formulation during the Cold War period. At the beginning of the Cold War period İsmet İnönü was the president and the Republican People's Party was the ruler party. In the 1950s, the Democrat Party (DP) came to power and followed the ideology of the activism in foreign policy. Beside to that Turkey has started to have cooperation in military and security issues.⁴⁸

In that period, Turkish foreign policy purpose was highly concentrated on being NATO ally. In 1952 Turkey became a member of NATO. Moreover, foreign policy has begun to tend to the West.⁴⁹ In addition to that, Turkish foreign policy relied on alliances, and Turkey decided to work together with NATO, that decision was taken through the 3rd Government Program. Furthermore, that program supposed to create collaboration with western states such as England and France. In addition to that program it was also aimed to develop annexation between Turkey and Italy, Germany.

⁴⁷ Ayça Ülker Erkan, "Amerika Birleşik Devletleri ve Sovyetler Birliği Arasındaki Soğuk Savaş Yıllarında Amerikan Dış Politikası", *Sosyal Bilimler*, Vol.8, No.1 ,(2010):183-194. Available at <http://www.acarindex.com/dosyalar/makale/acarindex-1423874630.pdf>. Accessed (01.04.2017).

⁴⁸ Cihat Göktepe and Süleyman Seydi, "Soğuk Savaş Başlangıcında Türk Dış Politikası", *Bilgi*, no.72, (2015):197-222, p.207. Available at <http://bilgi.yesevi.edu.tr/yonetim/icerik/makaleler/159-published.pdf>. Accessed (18.03.2017-17:53).

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, p.112.

In 1957 Menderes claimed that Turkey's relations with eastern states and western states were developed. Thus, the relations were in balance between west and east.⁵⁰

In 1960's the Turkish-American relations have affected negatively by two important events. These are the Cuban crisis and Cyprus. Turkey has started to reassess of its NATO position.⁵¹ Moreover, Cyprus issue had an important position in agenda of Turkish foreign policy between 1960 and 1980. Military prominence of Turkey has been raised through the event of Cuban Missile Crisis (1962) and U-2 episode (1960), in that time two major blocks encountered with risk of war, and they had an agreement on the elimination of missiles, which were located in Turkey and Cuba.

Another event, which occurred in 1974, was the Cyprus Conflict in which Turkey as guarantor state launched military intervention in order to protect civilians and re-establish the order in the island. The military intervention and the reason behind of it illustrated the change in Turkish foreign policy prerogatives. For example, in the 1975 and 1978 the USA applied embargoes towards Turkey and the perpetration of military intervention has raised tensions between Greece and Turkey. In 1980 third military coup d'état occurred in Turkey, which affected Turkish economy.⁵²

⁵⁰ Gül T. Dağcı, and Kaan Diyarbakırlıoğlu, "Turkish Foreign Policy during Adnan Menderes Period", *Turkish Journal of International Relations*, Vol. 12, No. 1, (2013):18-31, p.19. Available at <http://dergipark.gov.tr/download/article-file/19305>. Accessed (24.03.2014-22:50).

⁵¹ Ibid.

⁵² Unk. Author. , "Foreign Policy of the Turkish Republic", *CIDOB*. 2011. Available at file:///C:/Users/Byte-16/Downloads/237240_ANEXO_POLITICA+EXTERIOR+DE+TURQUIA_ANG%20(11).pdf. Accessed (01.04.2017-19:09).

Turkey experienced three coup d'état during the Cold War period which caused changes in foreign policy prerogatives. Especially, the Turkish political system has changed by the constitutional arrangement.

2.5 Post-Cold War Period

As the most known effects of the all wars being concluded in the history the Cold War has been affected the global politics as well as regional politics. The rivalry between superpowers had a great impact on global politics. In 1989 with the fall of the Berlin Wall and with the collapse of the Soviet Union new states has been established. Furthermore, ethnic conflict was common in Caucasus also in Balkans. These factors caused Turkish foreign policy change.⁵³ As a result of the collapse of the USSR, the geopolitical importance of Turkey has started to decline. During the post-cold war period United States was the most powerful state, and international system dominated by the USA.

Moreover, the new world order was created by the USA with the purpose of establishing liberal system and providing human rights. However, the US relations with Turkey and other Western states have started to be problematic especially during the 1990's. Besides, alternative options were occurred for Turkey after the collapse of USSR, in that reason Turkish foreign policy became more active.

The 1980's military coup d'état had negative impact on Turkey's foreign relations and domestic structure. It caused to decrease democratic characteristic of Turkey.

⁵³ Sabri Sayari, "Turkish foreign policy in the post-Cold War era: The challenges of multi-regionalism." *Journal of International Affairs*, Vol.54, No.1, (2000):169-182. p.169. Available at <http://www.sbu.yildiz.edu.tr/~faksu/Fuatyayinlar/TDPIIdocs/tdppostcoldwar.pdf>. Accessed (30.04.2017-17:26).

Additionally, democratization process and promotion of human rights created stress on Turkey which later on shaped by the US and European Community.

Though, in 1987 Turkey applied full membership of EC, yet Turkey faced with obstacles such as human rights and problematic relations with Greece, and Cyprus conflict. Turkey was omitted from the process of membership, although in 1999 Turkey became a candidate by the Helsinki European Council Summit.

Turkey also had an internal problem during Cold War. Mainly Kurdish problem had an effect on Turkish diplomacy and its economy negatively. The chaotic environment was occurred during 1970's, and Kurds were demanding separatism. These separatist movements perceived as an important movement under the PKK. Thus the Kurdish question took place in agenda of Turkey, and parties tried to find a way to solve this issue which is still unsolved.

The Prime Minister Turgut Özal claimed that there was necessity for the reassessment of fundamental objection of Republic, such as individual rights, and unity. Furthermore, he claimed Turkey is a guard of Turkmens and Iraqi Kurds. These reassessment initiatives related with the neo-Ottomanism ideology. Therefore, Sedat Laçiner supposed that political liberalism and Ottomanism both accelerated the

rise of Kurdish Problem.⁵⁴ As a result, Kurds did not able to achieve their goal, which was to create autonomous area for Kurds.⁵⁵

In summary, the Turkish foreign policy took a different way from previous foreign policy during post-Cold War period. It removed from pro-Western policies towards to Eurasian countries. Besides, relations with West became problematic, nevertheless Turkey concentrated on activism in foreign policy.

2.6 National Outlook Movement

The birth of the Political Islam has been accepted as the 1990's.⁵⁶ In Turkey the framework of political Islam has been appeared by “national outlook movement” which has founded by the Necmettin Erbakan.⁵⁷ However the Ottoman Empire has been accepted as a source of this movement. Aside of this, in the 1970s the National Order Party was established by Necmettin Erbakan who was a professor at the Istanbul Technical University as well as a member of the parliament.⁵⁸

Moreover, NOP was supported by Naqshbandi order, and political Islam was reinforced by it. Furthermore, Erbakan argued that the Western values and ideologies

⁵⁴ Sedat Laçiner, “Özalizm (Neo-Ottomanism): An Alternative in Turkish Foreign Policy?”, *Journal of Administrative Science*, Vol.1, No.2, (2003-2004):161-202. Available at http://acikerisim.lib.comu.edu.tr:8080/xmlui/bitstream/handle/COMU/490/sedat_laciner_makale.PDF?sequence=1&isAllowed=y. Accessed (02.04.2017-00:36).

⁵⁵ Ibid.

⁵⁶ Ergun Özbudun, “From Political Islam to Conservative Democracy: The Case of the Justice and Development Party in Turkey”, *South European Society & Politics*, Vol.11,(2006):543-557,p.543. Available at <http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/13608740600856561?needAccess=true>. Accessed (15.03.2017-18:20).

⁵⁷ Eric S. Edalman, et al., *The Roots of Turkish Conduct: Understanding the Evolution of Turkish Policy in the Middle East*, (Bipartisan Policy Center, 2013). Available at <http://www.silkroadstudies.org/resources/pdf/publications/1312BPC.pdf>. Accessed (16.03.2017-03:24).

⁵⁸ Ibid., p.543.

were dominant all over the world which caused emergence of the negative effects in the Muslim world. For instance secularism as one of the Western values is argued as a threat to the Muslim world.

However NOP argued that in order to achieve the rise of Muslim world the sovereignty of Islam is needed to be achieved first. As it is mentioned earlier the idea of national outlook is based on Ottoman's views and values. Therefore, it compromises conservatism.⁵⁹ The NOP was the first Islamic oriented- political party. Hence, when the NOP acted in contrary towards the constitution, the constitutional court took decision to close it in 1971. Afterwards, the National Salvation Party (1972-1980), the Welfare Party (1983-1998), and the Virtue Party (1998-2001) were established by Islamic references. However, these parties were also closed by the constitutional court. The reason behind the decision of the constitutional court was the acts and actions of these parties to the constitution which were not compatible with the secularism.⁶⁰ The Islamist Welfare Party came to power in 1995. The WP was not in favour of the European Union and their activities were conflicting with secularism. Then Islamist Welfare Party was closed by the decision of National Security Council. The new Islamist party was established after the closure of the Welfare Party which was named as the Virtue Party. Moreover, the Virtue Party included the members of the Welfare Party. However, this party was also closed down by the Constitutional Court, and the reason was the similar with Welfare

⁵⁹ Koumlidou Gesthimani , “The Rise of Political Islam in Turkey: Is democracy under threat?”, (2012). Available at <https://dspace.lib.uom.gr/bitstream/2159/15364/3/KoumlidouGesthimaniMsc2012.pdf>. Accessed (23.03.2017-22:04).

⁶⁰ Feriha Perekli, “The Ideological Framing of the National Outlook Parties in Turkey”. *New Middle Eastern Studies*, (2012), p.2. Available at <http://www.brismes.ac.uk/nmes/wp-content/uploads/2013/01/NMES2012Perekli.pdf>. Accessed (16.03.2017-03:27).

Party's anti-secular acts. Meanwhile the AKP was established in 2001 by the Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and politicians who belong to Welfare Party have joined to the AKP.⁶¹ On the other hand, the AKP labelled themselves as conservative democrat party. Furthermore, the encouragement of National Outlook Movement accelerated AKP's leader to access politics. However, that support is not accepted by AKP, besides "Muslim Democratic" character is not accepted by the AKP. In addition to that, AKP denied supporting the idea of "National Outlook".⁶²

2.6.1 The 2002 General Elections and the AKP

The Justice and Development Party, the AKP was elected in 2002. There were factors that caused to change government in Turkey. Turkey has experienced military coup in 1997, this military coup purposed to hinder movements which occurred in Islamist origin, it was accepted as the initial factor. Another factor was economic crisis that Turkey faced with in 2001.⁶³ Basically, political and economic factors assisted to AKP to take ruler position in government.⁶⁴ As a result the AKP was established in 2001, after one year it became the ruler party.

⁶¹ Senem Aydın and Ruşen Çakır, *Political Islam in Turkey*, (CEPS, 2007). Available at <https://www.ceps.eu/system/files/book/1490.pdf>. Accessed (16.03.2017-03:10).

⁶² Hakan M. Yavuz, *Secularism and Muslim Democracy in Turkey*, (UK: Cambridge University Press, 2009), p.3.

⁶³ Rasim Ö. Dönmez, "The Justice and Development Party Between Islam and Modernity", *Religion Compass*, (2010):365–375. Available at <http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1749-8171.2010.00222.x/pdf>. Accessed (15.03.2017).

⁶⁴ Yonca Özdemir, "TURKEY'S JUSTICE AND DEVELOPMENT PARTY: AN UTMOST CASE OF NEOLIBERAL POPULISM", (2015). Available at <https://ecpr.eu/Filestore/PaperProposal/1afd5880-af7d-4232-a8ca-97da30743db6.pdf>. Accessed (15.03.2017-19:29).

2.6.2 AKP's Principles and Conservative Democracy

The AKP is identified themselves as “conservative democrats”.⁶⁵ The idea of conservatism is perceived as alterations by AKP government. By expressing conservatism it is meant that to conserve certain values such as traditions. Though, the meaning of conservatism has changed by AKP in Turkey, and became in compatible with the modernization. According to the former president of Turkey Abdullah Gül, the cultures and values are part of conservatism.⁶⁶ The Kemalism is the main source of Turkish political system. Moreover, Kemalism agreed on applying Western values however, Western values which were in contrary with the Turkish culture have been removed in Kemalism ideology.

For instance, values which were in contrary with secularism are not accepted by Kemalism. In addition conservative democracy and Kemalism are not completely separated from each other, even they are affiliated.

Meanwhile the norms and values that based on Islam are valid for conservative democracy. Another principle of conservative democracy is political legitimacy. Also, values of Western modernity are accepted in conservative democracy.⁶⁷ The former Prime Minister Recep T. Erdoğan claimed that “...we are not Muslims on democrats but these two (Islam and Politics) should be considered on different

⁶⁵ Ibid., p.355.

⁶⁶ Emad Y. Kaddorrah, “Conservative Democracy and the Future of Turkish Secularism”, (2015). Available at <http://english.dohainstitute.org/release/809b18ee-a00a-49d8-8d3f-699b56fa8b60>. Accessed (16.03.2017-03:20).

⁶⁷ Ibid, p.366.

planes”.⁶⁸ For this, Recep T. Erdoğan was rejecting “Muslim democracy” label for AKP.

Moreover, the AKP aimed to change political rivet, then initial act was to restructure the order. The local governors had experience in their local position, and then they took position in central-government. In this sense, these politicians applied their knowledge and experience in central government. AKP has bound with neo-liberal principles, and it is labelled as global political party. Further, AKP creates a link between local and global.⁶⁹

However the AKP is not accepting “national outlook” idea, in addition they do not prefer to entitle themselves as “Muslim democrats”.⁷⁰ On the other hand, former Prime Minister Recep T. Erdaoğan claimed that “the mistakes committed by the state would have been attributed to religion”.⁷¹ AKP supposes democratic values such as “rule of law, science, democracy, fundamental rights and freedom”. Further, it rely on diversity that means country may has different ethnic oriens, that is diversity, in addition it consists of different cultures, and ethnicities. Moreover, every individual

⁶⁸ Sefa Şimşek, “Conservative Democracy as a Cosmetic Image in Turkish Politics: The Semiology of AKP's Political Identity”, *Turkish Studies*, Vol.14, No.3, (2013):429-446, p.431. Available at <http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/14683849.2013.831258?needAccess=true>. Accessed (16.03.2017-16:24).

⁶⁹ Ibid., p.439.

⁷⁰ William Hale and Ergun Özbudun, *Islamism, Democracy, and Liberalism in Turkey*. (New York: Routledge, 2010), p.20.

⁷¹ Metin Heper, “The Justice and Development Party Government and the Military in Turkey”, *Turkish Studies*, Vol.6, No.2, (2005):215–231, p.221. Available at <http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/14683840500119544?needAccess=true>. Accessed (15.03.2017-18:22).

has right to have own belief and thought, and they have to be able to express their belief and thoughts, in this sense, AKP supports freedom of expression.⁷²

Meanwhile AKP is not completely rejecting “national outlook” hence, they tend to be “democratic outlook”. Therefore it could be mentioned that the AKP is favour of the West in contrary to “national outlook” ideology.⁷³ In general the National outlook parties were against to the Westernism, and their foreign policies were formulated in the frame of this idea. Those parties were argued that becoming an EU member would cause to Turkey’s depletion of her sovereignty and cultural identity.⁷⁴ AKP is explained in some definitions as “Islam-friendly”.⁷⁵

However the AKP determined to apply free-market economy, according to this strategy government’s institutions has to be privatized, and government takes a regulatory role in the system.⁷⁶ Thus privatization has begun with the decision of structural reforms. As an economic recovery through the privatization policy the government expenditures would be decreased. The economy of Turkey expanded between 2003 and 2007, after the 2007 and 2008 crisis Turkey’s economy has begun to expand in 2010. Thus after following the principle of liberalism, AKP started to rely on both conservatism and liberalism. In this sense, they named themselves as

⁷² Ibid, p.547.

⁷³ Şaban Kardas, “Turkey under the Justice and Development Party: Between Transformation of ‘Islamism’ and Democratic Consolidation?”, *Critique: Critical Middle Eastern Studies*. Vol.17, No.2, (2008):175-18, p.3. Available at <http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/10669920802172361>. Accessed (16.03.2017).

⁷⁴ Ibid., p.6.

⁷⁵ Ibid., p.176.

⁷⁶ Ibid., p.20.

“conservative liberals”.⁷⁷ The economic policy of the AKP is accepted as successful. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) is codified a strategy to develop Turkey’s economy. This strategy was collected in the austerity program. Besides, AKP applied it, and it is similar with previous government’s act.⁷⁸ AKP was re-elected in 2007, it came to power by taking 47 per cent of the votes. Turkey achieved economic growth through the apply IMF’s reforms during AKP’s government. However, this process has been started during the previous government administration period.⁷⁹

2.7 Turkish Foreign Policy under AKP Government

“Nine governments, ten prime ministers, ten foreign ministers, and coup d’état”⁸⁰ were encountered between 1992 and 2003. Moreover, three economic crises were occurred in Turkey. These were occurred in 1994, 1999, and 2001. The GDP decreased as a result of these crises. AKP is re-elected four times until the 2016. In 2002 the AKP took 34.29 per cent of the votes. Nevertheless the percentage was increased in 2007, and it became 46.28 per cent⁸¹ whereas in 2015 AKP took 49.5 per cent. The foreign policy of Turkey has also changed with AKP government. Especially, Ahmet Davutoğlu who was the prime minister between 2014 and 2016

⁷⁷ Ibid., p.8.

⁷⁸ Ibid., p.222.

⁷⁹ Ziya Öniş, “Conservative Globalism at the Crossroads: The Justice and Development Party and the Thorny Path to Democratic Consolidation in Turkey”, *Mediterranean Politics*, Vol.14, No.1,(2009):24-40. Available at <http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/13629390902747376?needAccess=true>. Accessed (16.03.2017-03:13).

⁸⁰ Ekrem, T. Başer, SHIFT OF AXIS IN TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY: TURKISH NATIONAL ROLE CONCEPTIONS BEFORE AND AFTER THE AKP, (2013), p.292. Available at <https://poseidon01.ssm.com/delivery.php?ID=015017002073026127123005082083077018005089018032067023088097070093021106119007091024029042031023054007048068085018065064122086031021028008031092102118080069104086127008020005116119121119125018099108009016026086096126015011030123015126113097028031022097&EXT=pdf>. Accessed (20.03.2017-15:58).

⁸¹ Davuthan, H. Aslan, Omurcan Eralmac, and Senol Ozaydin “Turkey’s Foreign Policy and the Middle East under AKP Rule (2002-2012)”, *ZNUV*, Vol.48, No.3,(2016):5-24. Available at file:///C:/Users/Byte-16/Downloads/Vistula-Zeszyty-naukowe-48_2016.5-24.pdf. Accessed (20.03.2017-15:55).

has a great contribution on AKP's foreign policy structures. Moreover, former president Abdullah Gül, and former Prime Minister Recep T. Erdoğan created the recent framework of foreign policy⁸² during the second term of the AKP.

In terms of the Europeanization, it has started in the 1990's in Turkey, and the process accelerated with the change of government in 2002. The economic growth was started after the AKP came to power the most important impact was IMF principles on the economy. The IMF arranged the reforms, and Turkish government applied them, which brought economic process for Turkey. Moreover, AKP made arrangements on some issues. It is influenced by process of Europeanization.⁸³

For example, Kurdish people's rights were enlarged, and Kurdish people accessed to basic rights through the constitutional arrangements such as expression of their cultures and right to use their mother languages. The former Prime Minister Davutoğlu mainly explained that Turkey has strategic depth because of the historical and geographical importance.⁸⁴ According to this depth there are five fundamental principles. These are; "balance between freedom and security, zero-problems with

⁸² Ibid., p.53.

⁸³ Ziya Öniş and Şuhnaz Yılmaz, "Between Europeanization and Euro-Asianism: Foreign Policy Activism in Turkey during the AKP Era", *Turkish Studies*. Vol.10, No.1, (2009):7–24, p.3. Available at http://media.library.ku.edu.tr/reserve/resfall14_15/Intl385_SYilmaz/week15.pdf. Accessed (20.03.2017-16:11).

⁸⁴ Gözdem S. Doğanil, (2013), "Analysing Turkish Foreign Policy under the AKP governments between 2002 and 2013: Is Turkey moving away from the European Union?", Msc. Available at: http://www.jeanmonnet.org.tr/Portals/0/scholars_database_thesis/sevim_gozdem_dogangil_tez.pdf. Accessed (21.03.2017-22:43).

neighbours', multi-dimensional and multi-trade policies, a new diplomatic discourse based on firm flexibility, rhythmic diplomacy".⁸⁵

Davutoğlu claims that:

... Turkey enjoys multiple regional identities and thus has the capability as well as the responsibility to follow an integrated and multidimensional foreign policy. The unique combination of our history and geography brings with it a sense of responsibility. To contribute actively towards conflict resolution and international peace and security in all these areas is a call of duty arising from the depths of a multidimensional history for Turkey.⁸⁶

The origin of strategic depth based on ineffective use of Turkey's geographic and historical importance by Kemalism ideology. In order to use this advantage strategic depth focuses on these two factors.⁸⁷

Therefore, Turkey has started to give priority to security issues also stability in politics in order to achieve these aims it tends to be active in regional matters. Activism in foreign policy has begun in 1990's also it used by AKP. According to Davutoğlu geopolitical position might affect country's position in international

⁸⁵ Cemil Boyraz, "Crisis Of Turkish Foreign Policy In Syrian Issue: From Regional Leadership To Overall Disappointment". *İstanbul Bilgi University*, (2013), p.2. Available at http://www.eisa-net.org/be-bruga/eisa/files/events/warsaw2013/Boyraz_Crisis%20Of%20Turkish%20Foreign%20Policy%20In%20Syrian%20Issue.pdf. Accessed (21.03.2017-22:45).

⁸⁶ Loannis N, Grigoriadis, "The Davutoğlu Doctrine and Turkish Foreign Policy", HELLENIC FOUNDATION FOR EUROPEAN AND FOREIGN POLICY (ELIAMEP), (2010), p.3. Available at http://www.eliamap.gr/wpcontent/uploads/2010/05/%CE%9A%CE%95%CE%99%CE%9C%CE%95%CE%9D%CE%9F-%CE%95%CE%A1%CE%93%CE%91%CE%A3%CE%99%CE%91%CE%A3-8_2010_IoGrigoriadis1.pdf. Accessed (24.03.2017).

⁸⁷ Murat Yeşiltaş, and Ali Balcı, "A Dictionary of Turkish Foreign Policy in the AK Party Era: A Conceptual Map", *SAM*, (2013), p.2. Available at http://sam.gov.tr/wp-content/uploads/2013/05/SAM_Papers-7.pdf. Accessed (21.03.2017-01:14).

politics.⁸⁸ The fundamental principles of “Strategic Depth” are mentioned in the following part.

Firstly, “Zero problems with neighbours” principle aimed to decrease the troubles with neighbours that already occurred. There was a general prejudice, that was about the all countries where located in Turkey’s borders that are opponents for Turkey. For this reason, Turkey has to change this prejudice towards its relations with neighbours. Furthermore, there is a necessity to upgrade relations with Turkey’s neighbours. Main objection of this principle is to create durable environment in its relations. However, Turkey’s relations became problematic with some states. In this condition, good relations with certain state may accelerate having problematic relation with others. For example, the relations between Syria and Turkey became problematic after the Arab Spring.⁸⁹ Thus, Turkey’s geographic position and historical background assisted to be named as “central power”.

Secondly, another principle of AKP is to create cooperation rather than to create conflict with neighbours. The AKP is concentrated on to create consolidation between neighbours. For example, Turkey and Greece relations were ameliorated because AKP’s perception was different with the previous government’s perceptions towards Cyprus conflict. However, the AKP was endorsing to solve Cyprus issue, in 2004 Cyprus experienced referendum for appose and reject Annan Plan. The Annan Plan which was formulated by UN Secretary General Kofi Annan was proposing to

⁸⁸ Siret Hursoy, “Changing Dimensions of Turkey’s Foreign Policy”. *International Studies*, Vol.48, No.2, (2011):139–164, p.152. Available at <http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/0020881712469458>. Accessed (20.03.2017-17:04).

⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, p.15.

unite Cyprus. AKP was favour of this plan, and Turkish government showed their support through the propagandas.⁹⁰

Thirdly, main objection of proactive diplomacy is to protect the crisis which occurred in its neighbours and vicinity. In order to achieve this aim Turkey purposed to be active in solving these crises. Besides, Turkey desired to take mediator role in disputes of Arab-Israel, Syria-Israel, Iran-West, and Bosnia-Serbian.⁹¹ For example, Turkey took mediator role in problems between Iran and UNS (England, US, China, France, Russia) plus Germany.⁹² In that time, Turkey took role as well, and it insisted to solve problem through the use of diplomatic ways.⁹³ Another example for Turkey's mediator role is on the conflict between Hamas and Fatah. These are different Palestinian groups.⁹⁴

Fourthly, with the role of rhythmic diplomacy, Turkey has to increase its involvement in international relations. Besides, Turkey applies diplomatic strategies for every matter in international relations. These strategies should be compatible with

⁹⁰ Joerg Baudner, "The Evolution of Turkey's Foreign Policy under the AK Party Government", *Insight Turkey*, Vol.16, No.3, (2014):79-100, p.86. Available at http://file.insightturkey.com/Files/Pdf/01_baudner_3.pdf. Accessed (21.03.2017-01:09).

⁹¹ M. Yeşiltaş, and A. Balcı, "AK Parti Dönemi Türk Dış Politikası Sözlüğü:Kavramsal Bir Harita", *Bilgi*, Vol.23, (2011):9-34, p.15. Available at https://www.academia.edu/3598975/AK_Parti_D%C3%B6nemi_T%C3%BCrk_D%C4%B1%C5%9F_Politikas%C4%B1_S%C3%B6zl%C3%BCk%C4%9F%C3%BC_Kavramsal_Bir_Harita. Accessed (22.03.2017-12:36).

⁹² Yeghig TASHJIAN, "From Conceptualization to Implementation and Revaluation: Turkey's "Strategic Depth" in the MENA region", *Strategic Outlook*.(2012), p.16. Available at http://www.strategicoutlook.org/publications/turkeys_strategic_depth.pdf. Accessed (22.03.2017-15:25).

⁹³ Bekir Ünal, "İran Nükleer Anlaşması ve Türkiye'ye Etkileri", *Bilgesam*, (2015), p.2. Available at <http://www.bilgesam.org/Images/Dokumanlar/0-74-20150723211232.pdf>. Accessed (22.03.2017-15:23).

⁹⁴ *Ibid.*, p.16.

each other, and Turkey has to be stayed depended on that order in its diplomatic relations.⁹⁵ Davutoğlu supposed that, Turkey has to mediate these problems, and it should not to act reactive.⁹⁶ The idea of rhythmic diplomacy indorses Turkey to be involved in international organizations, besides if these organizations meeting makes in Turkey's territory it enhances Turkey's power.⁹⁷

The democratization and economic development are key elements for the Turkey's foreign policy. In this sense Turkey was able to build relations between its neighbours through the economic prosperity. AKP tends to apply active diplomacy in its foreign relations, and it purposed to provide assistance in the frame of regional and international politics. According to these objectives, Turkey takes role as a problem solver in some cases also contributes peace in the regional and international manner.⁹⁸

In Chapter 3, how the developments in Turkish domestic policy would influence Turkish foreign policy on Cyprus Conflict will be analysed. The developments divided as during 2002-2007 and the developments which took place 2007-2016 would be discussed. Lastly, potential alternatives would be mentioned in case of having no solution at the end of the negotiations.

⁹⁵ Ibid., p.16.

⁹⁶ Eduard Soler I Lecha, "THE CONCEPTUAL ARCHITECTURE OF TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY: An update in light of regional turbulence", *CIDOB*. (2012): 1-9, p.4. Available at https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/146320/DOCUMENTOS_WEB_MEDITERRANEO_18.pdf. Accessed (22.03.2017-15:21).

⁹⁷ Matthew S. Cohen, "Ahmet Davutoğlu's academic and professional articles: understanding the world view of Turkey's former prime minister", *Turkish Studies*. (2016), p.7. Available at <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/14683849.2016.1220838>. Accessed (22.03.2017-16:15).

⁹⁸ Gökhan Telatar, "Ak Parti Hükümeti'nin Düzen Kurucu Dış Politikası ve Ortadoğu". *Alternatif Politika*, Vol.7, No.3. (2015):491-523, p.493. Available at <http://alternatifpolitika.com/makale/ak-parti-hukumeti-nin-duzen-kurucu-dis-politikasi-ve-ortadogu>. Accessed (26.02.2017-17:55).

Chapter 3

AKP'S FOREIGN POLICY ON CYPRUS

This chapter focused on the AKP's foreign policy on Cyprus between 2002 and 2016. Besides, AKP's principles have examined which aims to provide method in order to deal with Cyprus conflict. Evaluation of its principles on Cyprus has detected in this chapter. In this regard this chapter involves the transition of foreign policy in AKP's period. Domestic development bears significant importance on AKP's foreign policy. Foreign policy has effected by domestic development, and change in foreign policy was recognized through the progress. As the main principles of the AKP the pro-EU policy has caused to evolution in this principles. In addition this change affected the AKP's foreign policy on Cyprus.

3.1 AKP and Turkish Foreign Policy on Cyprus 2002-2007

The Turkish foreign policy has changed with the general election of 2002, and it is called as an "earthquake". Afterwards, the Turkish foreign policy had a liberal character. Before the election of 2002 Turkey had a coalition government, which consisted of Nationalist Action Party (MHP), the Motherland Party (ANAP) and the Democratic Left Party (DSP). Single-party government came to power in 2002. Besides, AKP maintained European Union membership process.⁹⁹ After the short time general election of 2002, the new government introduced reforms and policy alterations, especially in the framework of foreign policy. The former Prime Minister

⁹⁹ Marcie J. Patton, "AKP Reform Fatigue in Turkey: What has happened to the EU Process?", *Mediterranean Politics*, Vol. 12, No. 3, (2007), pp: 339–358. Available at <http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/13629390701622382>. Accessed (04.04.2017-16:30).

Recep T. Erdoğan pointed out European integration's prominence for Turkey that represented divergence of Turkish foreign policy from the anti-Western idea. In that sense, Erdoğan preferred to visit Greece and Western states after 2002 election in contrary to Necmettin Erbakan who initially visited to Iran.¹⁰⁰

The election manifesto of AKP in 2002 initialized the solution for the Cyprus issue. In the manner of AKP's election manifesto solution should be reached for Cyprus, and the "Belgium model was the key model for the negotiations"¹⁰¹. In addition to that, AKP did not support the policy of "no solution is the solution" for the Cyprus issue. According to "Belgium model" there should be a single state composed by two sovereign states. The Belgium model would be an inspiration for Cyprus issue and it would be arranged for the conflicting nations. Nevertheless Belgium and Cyprus represents different conflicting backgrounds which could not be applicable for the Cyprus issue.¹⁰² Although, the essential deadline was not encountered by the AKP government in 2003, at that time the Treaty of Accession was signed by ten countries and the Republic of Cyprus was also one of those countries. The Treaty of Accession provided to become full member of EU in 1 May 2004. The AKP government did not achieve the provisions required. Firstly, the AKP government came to power recently in that reason they had no experience in administration. Secondly, government supported American invasion to Iraq. Thirdly, the Turkish Cypriot representative Rauf R. Denktaş left the negotiation table and the Greek Cypriot

¹⁰⁰ Ibid.

¹⁰¹ AKP Election Manifesto, 2002. Available at https://www.tbmm.gov.tr/eyayin/GAZETELER/WEB/KUTUPHANEDE%20BULUNAN%20DIJITAL%20KAYNAKLAR/KITAPLAR/SIYASI%20PARTI%20YAYINLARI/200304063%20AK%20PARTI%20SECIM%20BEYANNAMESI%202002/200304063%20AK%20PARTI%20SECIM%20BEYANNAMESI%202002%200000_0000.pdf. Accessed (04.04.2017-23:03).

¹⁰² "AKP clarifies its stance on Cyprus issue", *Hurriyet Daily news*, 11 September 2002.

representative Tassos Papadopoulos contracted the Accession Treaty of European Union.¹⁰³ Denктаş appealed that they would not accept to abandon from guarantorship of Turkey.

Furthermore, Erdoğan supported a solution which two sides are equal and have equal rights and status. Meanwhile the AKP government gave importance to its EU membership process, though EU put pressure on Turkey to solve Cyprus issue. While Turkey working towards solving the Cyprus issue, the EU abused Turkey's perspective on Cyprus. The former Prime Minister Erdoğan expressed that:

"Twenty years of standing firmly in the TRNC, is the source of pride for us. The Turkish Cypriot people crowned their struggle for independence on November 15th. There are peace and stability in Cyprus since 29 years. Therefore, it is important to achieve a permanent solution that will not lead to events and tensions again in the island. No solution at all costs is unthinkable. Elements of permanent resolution; the safeguards of the Turkish Cypriots are equal status, protection of political equality, preservation of two sections. The solution will be based on a new partnership that will consider the Turkish-Greek balance anyway. Embargoed, there is no other example of the TRNC exposed to unjustified obstacles. We are against the embargo and they must be removed. You are in peace and trust. Turkish Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot people will always find Turkey in their homeland, whatever the circumstances."¹⁰⁴

The Annan plan was offered in 11 November 2002 by the United Nations Secretary General. The Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot leader were assessing the Annan Plan on the bases of their positions. In that time Erdoğan insisted on becoming an EU member. Furthermore, AKP's foreign and domestic policy was not aimed to keep the status quo. The AKP government has tried to reach support from foreign states

¹⁰³ Ahmet Sözen, "The Cyprus Challenge in Turkey-EU Relations", in *Turkey and the European Union Facing new challenges and opportunities*, ed. Firat Cengiz, and Larf Hoffmann, (New York: Routledge, 2014), 46-63.

¹⁰⁴ Esat Pala, "AB'ye Endekli Kıbrıs Politikası", *Hürriyet*, 11 December 2003. Available at <http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/abye-endekli-kibris-politikasi-189141>. Accessed (05.04.2017-10:50).

regarding the Cyprus issues; which in return it is expected to increase its power in domestic politics.¹⁰⁵

As the Foreign policy of Turkey as well as domestic policy has started to change with Erdoğan's becoming a prime minister in 2003¹⁰⁶, Turkey's decision to become an EU member was delayed to 2004. Besides, when the EU announced that Turkish and Greek Cypriot negotiations have to proceed up to 28 February 2003, otherwise the negotiations between parties would be not possible. The former President Denktaş was seen as an obstacle for the solution of Cyprus issue. Turkey's stress has risen in the achievement of the solution in Cyprus after the 24 January 2004 with the Erdoğan's participation in Davos. Mainly Erdoğan claimed that agreement is reachable if both sides desire the solution.¹⁰⁷ The Greek Cypriot government replaced in 16 February 2003, elected President Tassos Papadopoulos (DIKO) had a negative impact on negotiation process in addition to that he was not favour of the Annan Plan. On the other hand, Mehmet A. Talat became a Prime minister with the election of 14 December 2003.¹⁰⁸

As such, during the initial phase of the AKP rule, the Turkish position in Cyprus was divided mainly into two camps: the President Sezer and the president of TRNC Rauf

¹⁰⁵ Ibid.

¹⁰⁶ Stefan Engert, *EU Enlargement and Socialization Turkey and Cyprus*, (New York: Routledge, 2010), p.145.

¹⁰⁷ Ibid.

¹⁰⁸ Ibid., p.145.

R. Denктаş, and the Turkish military; on the other side, the AKP and the opposition parties in the TRNC.¹⁰⁹

The Third version of Annan Plan was submitted by Kofi Annan in 26 February 2003. According to Erdoğan, last version of the Plan was improved and developed version of the plan. The AKP re-elected in 28 March 2004, by that situation its power has raised.¹¹⁰ Turkish foreign policy was concentrated on to change the status quo and to find a solution for Cyprus problem. These main aims were promoted and supposed by AKP. Furthermore it is decided not to be passive in negotiation process¹¹¹ and support “win-win” strategy on the solution of Cyprus issue. In addition to that, pro-active policies were used also by Turkey and Turkish Cypriots.¹¹² The former President Abdullah Gül claimed that Cyprus was not seen as obstacle for Turkey’s EU membership process. This expression had a positive impact on Cyprus negotiation. Before that Turkish side was seen as inflexible, by that change of Turkey’s policy the position of Turkish Cypriot has changed.¹¹³

The Annan Plan mainly compromises federal government and idea of United Cyprus Republic. The federal arrangement of the Annan Plan founded similar with Swiss

¹⁰⁹ Ibid.

¹² Ibid.

¹¹¹ Ayşe Aslihan Çelenk, The Restructuring of Turkey’s Policy towards Cyprus: The Justice and Development Party’s Struggle for Power, *Turkish Studies*, Vol.8, No.3, (2007):349-363. Available at <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14683840701489092>. Accessed (05.04.2017-23:08).

¹¹² Ahmet Sözen, “The Cyprus Challenge in the TurkeyEU Relations: Heading towards the Defining Moment”, Paper prepared for delivery at 52st Annual Convention of the International Studies Association, Montreal, Qubec, Canada, 16-19 March, 2011. Available at http://i-rep.emu.edu.tr:8080/jspui/bitstream/11129/2220/1/The_Cyprus_Challenge_in_the_Turkey-EU_Re.pdf. Accessed (06.04.2017-15:02).

¹¹³ Philip Robins, “Between the EU and the Middle East: Turkish Foreign Policy under the AKP Government, 2002-2007”, Milano:ISPI, (2007). Available at http://www.ispionline.it/it/documents/wp_11_2007.pdf. Accessed (07.04.2017-18:29).

model, it was based on bi-zonal bi-communal structure. “An independent state in the form of an indissoluble partnership, with a federal government and two equal constituent states, the Greek Cypriot State and the Turkish Cypriot State”.¹¹⁴ The Referendum held in 24 April 2004, and referendum was applied in two sides of Cyprus. As a result the 64.91 per cent of the Turkish Cypriots said “yes” to Annan Plan, and 75.83 per cent of the Greek Cypriots said “No”.¹¹⁵

Furthermore, becoming an EU member for the Greek Cypriots affected Turkey’s membership process, because the ROC gained a power in EU such as veto power.¹¹⁶

The Republic of Cyprus became an EU member in 1 May 2004 with the other nine states (Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuanian, Hungary, Malta, Poland, Slovakia). Furthermore, Turkey was bound to add the Republic of Cyprus to Custom Union under the name of Republic of Cyprus. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Turkey claimed that, the use of the name of “Cyprus” was the legal obligation for Turkey under the scope of Turkey and EU relations. Nevertheless Turkey claimed that Republic of Cyprus was not recognized.¹¹⁷

The Turkish Foreign Minister announced the recent proposal of Turkey for Cyprus issue in 24 January 2006. The “Action Plan” consisted of ten important points and it

¹¹⁴ Michael Theodoulou, “The Peace Plans: 2004 Annan Plan”, *CyprusMail*, 29TH DECEMBER 2016. Available at <http://cyprus-mail.com/2016/12/29/peace-plans-2004-annan-plan/>. Accessed (05.04.2017-23:55).

¹¹⁵ Jan Asmussen, *Cyprus after the failure of the Annan-Plan*, (Germany: European Centre for Minority Issues, 2004).

¹¹⁶ Ibid.

¹¹⁷ Ata Atun, *Kıbrıs Eksenli Siyasete Akademik Alarga*, Aralık 2003-Nisan 2005 Arası Politik Yazılar ve Öngörüler, (Famagusta: Samtay, 2006), p.46.

was presented to UN Secretary General Kofi Annan. Turkey's main objection was based on opening of the ports and airports to the ROC which in return asked for removing the isolations and embargoes on North Cyprus. In addition to that, Turkey aimed to solve the problems on its EU relations.¹¹⁸ The "action plan" shows that Turkey has good faith in reaching a settlement in Cyprus, that action was related with proactive policy of Turkish government. Furthermore, Turkey aimed to establish fair settlement for both sides and eliminate the isolations on the TRNC.¹¹⁹ However, these were not achieved by Turkey, and the comprehensive settlement which Abdullah Gül mentioned before was not accomplished.

Between 2006 and 2007 there was initiative to solve Cyprus issue. The resolution was proposed by the Security Council, additional two side's leaders Mehmet Ali Talat and Tassos Papadopoulos were approved the process. In addition to that, leaders were motivated to involve the bi-communal debates, and leaders' reaction was not negative. The Committee of Coordination meetings were arranged, positive atmosphere was present at that time for the solution of Cyprus issue. Moreover, establishment of technical committees would be creating a base in order to make a "comprehensive settlement".¹²⁰ The president Abdullah Gül expressed Turkey's

¹¹⁸ Cyprus PIO: Turkish Press and Other Media, 06-01-25. Available at <http://www.hri.org/news/cyprus/tcpr/2006/06-01-25.tcpr.html#01>. Accessed (06.04.2017-17:28).

¹¹⁹ Fehmi Kuru, "Kıbrıs'ta yeni bir adım", *Yenişafak*, 25 January 2006. Available at <http://www.yenisafak.com/arsiv/2006/ocak/25/fkoru.html>. Accessed (06.04.2017-17:56).

¹²⁰ Cyprus: Lack of political settlement prevents the displaced from fully enjoying their property rights A profile of the internal displacement situation, 18 December, 2007, Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre. Available at <http://www.internaldisplacement.org/assets/library/Europe/Cyprus/pdf/Cyprus-December-2007.pdf>. Accessed (07.04.2017-13:39).

proposal to EU's permanent representative. However, these proposals were rejected by Greek Cypriots. As a result, Turkey's EU membership process was blocked.¹²¹

In 2007, the Greek Cypriot administration was not desired to solve Cyprus issue. However, three principals were accepted by two parties. These were;

1. Implementation of the agreement of 8 July
2. Demilitarisation of the Green Line, including of the Ledra Street area, on the same basis as existing crossing. Doubts remain as to the willingness of the Turkish army to facilitate this, but it can take place only with their consent.
3. Regular meetings and an end to the war of words on both sides an end to public attacks and the resumption of direct contacts.¹²²

In 2007 Turkey and EU relations was seen as positive, besides modernization and domestic transformation had begun as a result of EU integration process. The Turkish government explained that Turkey would comply with EU's law until the 2013. However, EU did not accept the date. On the other side, Turkey's domestic issues became problematic, in contrary to that, reforms on the way of EU were processing. In 2007 Turkey faced with terror attacks, also parliamentary and

¹²¹ "Lefkoşa: 2006 Kıbrıs'ta Çözüm Getirmedi", 26 December 2006. Available at <http://www.haberler.com/lefkosa-2006-kibris-ta-cozum-getirmedi-haberi/>. Accessed (07.04.2017-14:14).

¹²² Unk. Author, *Visit to Turkey and Cyprus*, (London:TSO, 2007), p.14. Available at <https://books.google.com.cy/books?id=4JIIWDRfYaQC&printsec=frontcover&hl=tr#v=onepage&q&f=false>. Accessed (07.04.2017-14:47).

presidential elections took place. Mainly, security issue was in the agenda of Turkey.¹²³

The TRNC has gained important benefits in its political relations such as it became able to conclude trade agencies with Gulf States and travel Syria via port of Lazkiye and also became able to arrange official visits to other states. For example, the visit of OIC teams to North Cyprus. In addition to that, the financial gap between two sides has raised the question of embargoes and isolations for this reason condition of North Cyprus have increased.¹²⁴

At the time that the ROC declared to explore gas and oil in the maritime zone of the TRNC, Turkey sent naval forces to the area, and it claimed that this attempt of Greek Cypriots would provide profit to them in which Turkish Cypriot rights were excluded.¹²⁵ The conflict did not turn into a war. However Turkey proposed to protect rights of both Turkey and North Cyprus. Besides, Turkey explained their position by claiming that they would take necessary measures in order to protect their continental scenery's rights and interest.¹²⁶

Between 2002 and 2007, the AKP concentrated on to comply with EU, by applying domestic reforms. Furthermore, Turkish foreign policy has shaped with that

¹²³ Ahmet Davutoğlu, "Turkey's Foreign Policy Vision: An Assessment of 2007", *Insight Turkey*, Vol. 10, No. 1, (2008):77-96. Available at http://file.insightturkey.com/Files/Pdf/insight_turkey_vol_10_no_1_2008_davutoglu.pdf. Accessed (07.04.2017-19:51).

¹²⁴ Ibid.

¹²⁵ "Oil Crisis: Cyprus aware of Turkish warship movements in region", 02 February 2017. Available at <http://news.pseka.net/index.php?module=article&id=6426>. Accessed (07.04.2017-22:49).

¹²⁶ "Kıbrıs'ta doğal gaz gerginliği", 29 March 2016. Available at <http://www.aljazeera.com.tr/haber/kibrista-dogal-gaz-gerginligi>. Accessed (07.04.2017-23:11).

objective. However, after the 2007 Turkish foreign policy has changed due to change in dynamics.

3.1.1 The Transition of the Foreign Policy of the AKP

Turkey has started to make reforms in order to comply with EU requirements, due to the need to create in harmony between obligations of the EU and Turkey's domestic situation. Furthermore, in the concept of Europeanization, Turkey agreed to apply EU provisions. In addition to that, AKP government agreed to alter Turkey's foreign policy on Cyprus. The Annan Plan was the main example for the policy change of Turkey. After the Annan Plan, Turkish Grand National Assembly was not approved the alteration in its Cyprus policy in order to fulfil EU provisions. For this reason, foreign policy and domestic policy were interrelated.¹²⁷

The AKP was re-elected through the general election in 2007 by taking 47 per cent of the votes. Köksal Toptan became a parliament's president whereas Recep T. Erdoğan was prime minister and Abdullah Gül became eleventh president. Political origin of Köksal Toptan was centre-right rather than the "national outlook". However debates on some issues have come to an agenda of the government, such as adultery and headscarf. Davutoğlu initialized to give importance to the relation with other regional states rather than West. The Neo-Ottomanism was used for frequently for define AKP's principles.¹²⁸

The second term of AKP has started in 2007, and character of party has changed. It became "centre" party rather than "centrist". In addition to that, role of Turkey in

¹²⁷ Ibid.

¹²⁸ Ahmet Sözen, "A Paradigm Shift in Turkish Foreign Policy: Transition and Challenges", *Turkish Studies*, Vol.11, No.1, (2010):103-123.

international politics was described by AKP. “Zero problems with neighbour” policy aimed to create good relations with Western states as well as the Eastern. Thus, concentration to West on foreign relation has started to change.¹²⁹

The AKP concentrated on EU membership process, in that sense strategically the party moved away from its Islamic roots. Furthermore, AKP has begun to evaluate with its relation with Middle East. However it showed sustenance towards Arab Spring in following period. In addition to that, Syria became Turkey’s domestic matter. Electorate’s opinion towards identity of AKP is influenced by its foreign policy. Party identity is shaped through the political party’s strategies on foreign policy. Furthermore, it shows the political party’s position in international politics, also, it display hint about the party’s domestic policy.¹³⁰

In first period of AKP between 2002 and 2007, party turned away from National Outlook Movement and it focused on to fulfil Copenhagen criteria. In addition to this, AKP made reforms in order to achieve Copenhagen criteria. This attitude of the AKP was the sign of leaving its Islamic origin. According to pro-Europeans the first initiative was the necessity to focus on economic modification. In other words it is unlikely to focus on Islamic resurrection in domestic politics. The foreign policy in the framework of pro-EU investigates solution to domestic issues. Liberal democratic

¹²⁹ Ibid.

¹³⁰ Esen Kirdiş, “AKP’s Foreign Policy and Its Party Identity”, *Contemporary Turkish Politics*, (2016):32-37. Available at http://www.bakerinstitute.org/media/files/files/6240636c/POMEPS_Studies_22_Turkish_Politics_Web-2_95rZWni.pdf. Accessed (06.05.2017-01:34).

modifications were bringing through the pro-EU in addition to that it preserved values of religion in line of conservatism.¹³¹

In second period compromised 2007 and 2011 in which the AKP took the ruler position in government without the existence of the coalition with the increased percentage of vote in compared to the previous election. However, AKP experienced closure decision that taken by constitutional court. Turkey has always followed a systematic and cohesive approach in international relations which was the outcome of its internal political stability.¹³²

The foreign policy of Turkey has shaped by former Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu and announce of the “Zero problems policy” is crucial during his term. The purpose of redefined foreign policy was remaining in Western alliances in addition to that create improved relations in Caucasasia and Middle East’s countries. Furthermore, Turkey has an exceptional role with its political system in Middle East because Turkey has democracy as sole in Middle East. The passive as well as defensive policies were not taking place in new Turkish foreign policy.¹³³

The AKP had ruler position for a third time in 2011, namely AKP had third sequential successive election. The referendum on constitutional change held in 2010. Before the third term the activities of the AKP was restricted however, by the constitutional change it has altered. Meanwhile the AKP has begun to underline prominence of “history, geography, traditions and values” for Turkish foreign policy.

¹³¹ Ibid.

¹³² Ibid.

¹³³ Ibid.

Another important development was the construction of polarizations. Especially, Syrian conflict became domestication for Turkey, polarization accelerated by Reyhan Attact (Reyhanlı Saldırısı) and rise in Syrian refugees.¹³⁴

In June 2015 it is for the first time after 2002 that a single party could not become a ruler party. Therefore, general election has repeated in December 2015 and AKP took ruler position in government. The Coup attempt has been on 15 July 2016. In addition to that, there were threats towards Turkey due to the regional condition. Furthermore, the reason of difficulties of Turkey was based on its foreign policy on Syria. In fourth term public opinion is required to be uniting in Turkey. In order to achieve this, AKP concentrated on nationalist policy in its foreign relations. AKP could not find support from international community against threats such as EU and US.¹³⁵

3.2 AKP and Turkish Foreign Policy on Cyprus 2008-2016

AKP has continued to stay bound with proactive principle in 2008, for this reason mission of Turkey has shaped under the principle of mediate with reconciliation with states. In addition to that foreign policy on Cyprus has shaped by that principle thus it supported reconciliation.¹³⁶ “Turkey’s National Program” which published in December 2008 encompassed the Turkish foreign policy on Cyprus. According to that program, Turkey supposed that the realities on Cyprus Island have to be taken into consideration in order to achieve fair and permanent solution in Cyprus. The realities compromise that two separate society and presence of democracy, bi-

¹³⁴ Ibid.

¹³⁵ Ibid.

¹³⁶ Yusuf Suiçmez, “AK Parti’nin Kıbrıs Politikası”, *Star Kıbrıs*, 28 April 2008. Available at <http://www.starkibris.net/index.asp?haberID=9846>. Accessed (30.04.2017-16:50).

zonality, two communities' political equality, and equivalent position of constituent states. Turkey with support of the UN Mission of Good Offices supposed solution that two communities would accept in which the Treaty of Guarantee would remain in force.¹³⁷

As the bi-communal negotiation has begun in March 2008, then the 21 March Agreement has proclaimed. In addition to that, the leaders of the both communities agreed upon to create technical committees and working groups. Six working groups were created about the topic on "Governance and Power Sharing, Economic Matters, European Union Matters, Property, Territorial Adjustment, Security and Guarantees as well as seven technical committees on Environment, Health, Crisis Management, Economic and Commercial Matters, Crime and Criminal Matters, Humanitarian Matters and Cultural Heritage".¹³⁸ Moreover, leaders of both sides agreed on the idea of federation which based on bi-zonal, bi-communal bearing political equality even single international personality of that federation was agreed by the two sides. "Mutual solution" had an importance for the both sides, they explained if the mutual solution would be reached the referendum would be apply in both societies.¹³⁹ In that period, Prime Minister of Turkey made a speech in 20th July Celebration of Peace and Freedom in TRNC, and he emphasized that:

The solution in Cyprus Under the framework of the United Nations (UN), two equal peoples based on the reality of the island within the framework of the United Nations Secretary General's goodwill mission will specifically

¹³⁷ "Avrupa Birliđi Müktebasının Üstlenilmesine İlişkin Türkiye Ulusal Programı", December 2008, p.3. Available at http://www.mfa.gov.tr/data/DISPOLITIKA/AB/up2008_tr.pdf. Accessed (19.04.2017-12:45).

¹³⁸ "2008 Negotiation Process". Available at <http://mfa.gov.ct.tr/cyprus-negotiation-process/cyprus-negotiations/2008-negotiation-process/>. Accessed (19.04.2017-13:12).

¹³⁹ Ibid.

underline this and will be framed by a new partnership relationship between the two constituent states."¹⁴⁰

The leaders of the both communities were met regularly in order to reach an agreement, however as a result they did not achieve agreement. The purpose of the first phase was to detect matters of the agreed and disagreed points, even to collect that on the particular page. Furthermore, the aim of second phase was to discuss subjects agreed before deprived of agreement, and in the third phase two sides of the conflict decided to use “give and take” techniques. The activities and opinions of the leftist political parties were advocated by the leaders of the AKP in 2009. During the second phase, the former president of TRNC Mehmet A. Talat met with the president and prime minister of Turkey, as result of that meeting they agreed to modify the negotiation’s technique. In addition to that, the leaders specified the matters that they would be able to act more flexible towards those matters during the negotiations.¹⁴¹

However, Derviş Eroğlu who was the important representatives of the rightist politics and known as the strong supporter of the motherland Turkey was elected as a Prime Minister of TRNC in 2009. Meanwhile the change in foreign policy objectives of the AKP led Eroğlu to be warned for the support of negotiations. According to the foreign policy of the AKP which based on the principle of “strategic depth” enabled Turkish government to act in conformity with these strategies. Especially, the “zero-problem with neighbours” principle had an effect on AKP’s foreign policy on Cyprus, as a result of that Cyprus issue has to be solved. Purpose of the AKP was to

¹⁴⁰ A.A., “2008'de Kıbrıs'ta neler oldu”, *Hürriyet*, 19 December 2008. Available at <http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/2008de-kibrista-neler-oldu-10603765>. Accessed (19.04.2017-13:47).

¹⁴¹ Nasuh Uslu, “Searching a Beneficial Way Out from the Impasse: The Cyprus Problem and Turkish Foreign Policy”, *Perceptions*, Vol.15, No. 3-4, (2010): 79-112. Available at http://sam.gov.tr/tr/wp-content/uploads/2011/12/nasuh_uslu.pdf. Accessed (20.04.2017-14:03).

eliminate the significant barrier on Turkey's EU membership process. Furthermore, Cyprus problem had an impact on Turkish foreign policy in that reason Turkey as a motherland and the guarantor state insisted on reaching a solution. On the other hand, Turkey desired to finalize Cyprus problem because the Greek Cypriot leadership was avoiding Turkey's collaboration with NATO and the EU. In that sense, Turkey supported the solution of Cyprus problem. Furthermore, former Prime Minister Recep T. Erdoğan claimed that in case of the insolubility of the Cyprus problem, Turkey's initial aim would be the recognition of the TRNC. Turkey gave importance to the recognition of the TRNC and in order to fulfil this goal, agencies in varied states were established. For example, Turkey supported the establishment of the collaboration between the TRNC and Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC). By doing so it is believed that restrictions and embargoes would be lifted.¹⁴²

As Derviş Eroğlu became the president of TRNC in 18 April 2010, and leaders of both side met in 26 May 2010. The meetings of five tripartite have been begun by the support of United Nation Secretary General.¹⁴³ However former President Derviş Eroğlu's was a right-wing leader and mostly Eroğlu insisted on the establishment of a new state rather than being a constituent state. That aim was the significant conflicting matter between the Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot leaders. On the other hand, AKP supported Eroğlu to continue the negotiations. Moreover former Prime Minister Erdoğan supposed that if the two Cypriot communities agreed on

¹⁴² Ibid.

¹⁴³ Ibid.

specific issue Turkey would support it. The equal representation of the leaders during the final talks was crucial however; Greek Cypriots did not accept that offer.¹⁴⁴

The AKP government concentrated on “revolutionary” Cyprus policy beginning from the 2003, in that sense Turkish Cypriot community was convinced to accept the Annan Plan. However, from the beginning of 2009 AKP policy has changed, and it became conservative on Cyprus policy. The election manifesto of the AKP compromised two paragraphs about their Cyprus policy before the General Election of Turkey 2011. That was an implication to trivialize the Cyprus issue. However AKP took 50 per cent of the votes in election held in 12 June 2011. The alliance between the nationalists and Kemalist was seen as an obstacle for the AKP government. After the election held in 2011 this perception has changed. Furthermore, the interests of the AKP government towards the EU have started to decrease due to the EU’s political and economic crises. After this change in perspective the AKP government has strained to stay in principle of strategic depth on Cyprus issue. On the other side it supposed to take step further rather than to fall behind of 2004.¹⁴⁵

In 2011, Turkish Cypriot leader claimed that they were ready to negotiate on territory issue, further they supposed that negotiation has to be limited by time. In addition to that, Turkish Cypriots were ready for referendum in 2012. The process has supported

¹⁴⁴ Carol Migdalovitz, “Turkey: Selected Foreign Policy Issues and U.S. Views”, Congressional Research Service. Available at <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RL34642.pdf>. Accessed (20.04.2017-16:32).

¹⁴⁵ Sinan Dirlik, “Dünden Bugüne Türkiye Siyaseti ve AKP ”, (2011):1-7. Available at http://www.hyd.org.tr/attachments/article/125/kibris_meselesi-turkiye_sinan_dirlik.pdf. Accessed (21.04.2017-17:10).

by AKP government.¹⁴⁶ According to Erdoğan's speech in 2011 Turkish policy on Cyprus has changed, he mentioned many prerogatives were ensured by Turkey for Cyprus however, prerogative would not provide to anything further.¹⁴⁷

The effects of the economic crisis in South Cyprus created a chance for Turkish government to turn the situation towards their interest, in order to achieve that the Minister of EU Affairs of Turkey Egemen Bağış claimed that "Just as we provided \$5 billion in loans to the International Monetary Fund, we will consider helping the Greek Cypriots if they request this"¹⁴⁸. Furthermore, he supposed that if the South Cyprus support solution of Cyprus issues it would provide benefit to both side as economically. In that sense Turkish government had a demand to provide assistance for South Cyprus. Purpose of that act of Turkish government was to increase its image while targeted to decrease South Cyprus's. Economic crisis of South Cyprus provide a new way for Turkish government on its Cyprus policy. On the other hand, former Prime Minister Derviş Eroğlu supposed that the EU had to promote solution for Cyprus issue. Furthermore, according to Derviş Eroğlu EU has to provide economic assistance which in turn Greek Cypriot would eliminate the embargoes on the North Cyprus. The TRNC and the Turkish government policies had synchronisation. Besides, another initiative was about the change in the position of the TRNC in international relations.¹⁴⁹ Furthermore, former Prime Minister Recep T.

¹⁴⁶ Ibid.

¹⁴⁷ Ibid.

¹⁴⁸ Zenonas Tziarras, "Economic Crisis in Cyprus: Repercussions, Turkey and the Turkish-Cypriots", 3 JANUARY 2013. Available at <http://www.e-ir.info/2013/01/03/economic-crisis-in-cyprus-repercussions-turkey-and-the-turkish-cypriots/>. Accessed (23.04.2017-14:58).

¹⁴⁹ Ibid.

Erdoğan claimed that in 2012 Turkey accepted South Cyprus as Greek side not as the Republic of Cyprus.¹⁵⁰

Moreover the AKP government was concentrated on the elimination of isolations and embargos on Turkish Cypriots. In that purpose, former President Abdullah Gül supposed that there is a need to act for the elimination of these restrictions in his message form the speech of the 29th year anniversary of the establishment of the TRNC. Furthermore, former President Abdullah Gül also mentioned that Turkish government would always support the permanent solution in Cyprus and added that the TRNC's economic and social development would always be supported by Turkey.¹⁵¹ At the time that the Greek Cypriots took EU presidency in July 2012, the former President Derviş Eroğlu claimed that the negotiations are suspended. The Turkish government has foreseen Cyprus problem needed to be solved before the Greek Cypriots' EU presidency because the negotiation process would be problematic after that situation.¹⁵² Turkey has continued to support solution that based on political equality and two societies with continuation of founding treaties. However, the lack of political will of Greek Cypriots to reach solution caused to not to achieve solution for the Cyprus issue. On the other hand, lack of mutual trust was determined as the main obstacle by Turkish Cypriots.¹⁵³

¹⁵⁰ Ibid.

¹⁵¹ "Cumhurbaşkanı Gül'den Derviş Eroğlu'na Mesaj", 15 November 2012. Available at <http://www.haberler.com/cumhurbaskani-gul-den-dervis-eroglu-na-mesaj-4092118-haberi/>. Accessed (23.04.2017-16:39).

¹⁵² Kıvanç Ulusoy, *Doğu Akdeniz'de Güç Mücadelesi ve Kıbrıs Sorunu*, (Ankara: Uşak, 2015).

¹⁵³ Ahmet Davutoğlu, *2013 Yılına Girenken Dış Politikamız*, p.50. Available at http://www.mfa.gov.tr/site_media/html/butce_2013.pdf. Accessed (24.04.2017-11:55).

The reason of AKP's policy alteration on Cyprus based on the change of Turkey's "warrior power" to "regional power". Furthermore, AKP government had desired to become a member of the EU that also one of the factor that shaped AKP's Cyprus policy. According to Ahmet Davutoğlu:

This small island has a position to directly influence the strategic links between Asia-Africa, Europe-Africa and Europe-Asia ... The Cyprus Island, which stands as an arrow pointing towards the Middle East with its east end, Is the cornerstone of strategic balances ... No country can be indifferent to such an island located in the heart of its own life field ...¹⁵⁴

Turkey's "Regional power" principle shaped its Cyprus policy. The Cyprus policy of AKP based on realism and a national interest that is compatible with "regional power" principle.¹⁵⁵

Meanwhile Nikos Anastasiadis was elected in February 2013 and became the president of the Greek Cypriots and the negotiations have re-started February 2014. The leaders of the two Cypriot communities announced the model of partnership that would comprises bi-communal bi-zonal factors with the esteem of fundamental freedoms and rights.¹⁵⁶ The Greek Cypriot leader Nicos Anastasiadis was favour of the Annan Plan in 2004. While Eroğlu and Anastasiadis were continued to negotiate up to the 2014 the tensions has raised due to the natural gas turfs.¹⁵⁷ In 2014 negotiation has continued another eight months, and deadlock is occurred because the Greek Cypriot leader Anastasiadis left the negotiation table by the effect of seismic exploration. The few important development were occurred in 2014, such as

¹⁵⁴ Ibid., p.140.

¹⁵⁵ Ibid.

¹⁵⁶ Ibid.

¹⁵⁷ Ibid., p.401.

special representative of United Nation was renewed by Espen Barth Eide, and Turkish Cypriot negotiator Kudret Özersay's position replaced by Ergün Olgun.¹⁵⁸

In 2014, gas and oil reserves have caused to increase stress in Eastern Mediterranean, even war has seen as possible in area. Turkish government did not support to Greek Cypriots' oil and gas exploration in Eastern Mediterranean, as a respond to that act Turkey sent exploratory vas (Barbaros Hayrettin) also warship. On the other hand, Turkey's act caused to president of Greek Cypriot left the negotiations. Furthermore, Turkey against to cooperation between South Cyprus, Greece, Egypt, and Israel. As the tensions have increased in the area the AKP government argued that oil and gas have belonged to the two Cypriot communities.¹⁵⁹ The AKP government claimed that every act aimed to eliminate Turkish Cypriot's rights on that issue would enable Turkey to intervene.¹⁶⁰

The Presidency of the TRNC has been replaced by Mustafa Akıncı in 26 April 2015, and he supported solution in Cyprus issue. The president Akıncı concentrated on to alteration of relation with Turkey and TRNC. He claimed that "It should be a relationship of brothers/sisters, not a relationship of a mother and her child".¹⁶¹

¹⁵⁸ Unk. Author, "2014 de heba oldu Kıbrıs müzakereleri 2014'te hidrokarbon yataklarına", *Yenidüzen*, 31 December 2014. Available at <http://www.yeniduzen.com/2014-de-heba-oldu-45912h.htm>. Accessed (24.04.2017-15:11).

¹⁵⁹ Nikos Konstandaras, "Is the Cyprus Issue Insoluble?", *The New York Times*, 1 December 2014. Available at <https://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/02/opinion/nikos-konstandaras-is-the-cyprus-issue-insoluble.html>. Accessed (24.04.2017-22:47).

¹⁶⁰ Ali Hüseyinoğlu, "Türkiye-Yunanistan ilişkilerinde Kıbrıs ve enerji düğümü", 9 December 2014. Available at <http://www.aljazeera.com.tr/gorus/turkiye-yunanistan-iliskilerinde-kibris-ve-enerji-dugumu>. Accessed (24.04.2017-22:54).

¹⁶¹ "Erdoğan engages in war of words with new Turkish Cypriot leader", *Hurriyet Daily news*, 27 April 2015. Available at <http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/erdogan-engages-in-war-of-words-with->

Barbaros Hayrettin Paşa vessel has started to explore gas and oil in Eastern Mediterranean in 2015. Turkey was responded to unilateral act of South Cyprus in which Turkish Cypriot government was against to it. Furthermore, AKP government was not against to oil and gas exploration in Eastern Mediterranean.¹⁶² The Greek Cypriot leadership supposed to retain the activities of Turkey’s vessel to create positive environment for beginning of negotiations. Recep T. Erdoğan was favoured of solution in 2015, also Turkey acted as a creator of constructive relations between Turkish and Greece Cypriots. The “United Cyprus Federation” was determined as a name of federal government.¹⁶³ Two important developments were occurred in 2015. Firstly, Greek Cypriots informed to Turkish Cypriots about the minefield in North Cyprus. Secondly, North Cyprus eliminated filling the form procedure on the borders between North Cyprus and South Cyprus.¹⁶⁴ Negotiations were accelerated in 2015. Turkish government supposed to provide contribution to reach the solution in Cyprus. Turkish government gave importance to Cyprus as a “national issue” in 2015. Especially, AKP supported the relations with TRNC which based on “motherland” and “motherhood”.¹⁶⁵

[new-turkish-cypriot-leader.aspx?PageID=238&NID=81607&NewsCatID=510](http://www.yeniduzen.com/2015te-muzakerelerde-neler-yasandi-59610h.htm). Accessed (25.04.2017-00:40).

¹⁶² Özlem Güran Akkorlu, “2015’TE MÜZAKERELERDE NELER YAŞANDI?”, *Yenidüzen*, 27 December 2015. Available at <http://www.yeniduzen.com/2015te-muzakerelerde-neler-yasandi-59610h.htm>. Accessed (25.04.2017).

¹⁶³ SETA, *2015’te Türkiye*, (SETA,2015), p.149. Available at https://books.google.com.cy/books?id=P_JOCwAAQBAJ&pg=PA319&lpg=PA319&dq=SETA,+2015%E2%80%99te+T%C3%BCrkiye+pdf&source=bl&ots=0_DF2ODWN&sig=LZw_NqVGD_Zt_HaMn6pGCzzl5Q&hl=tr&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwj1z7fltbTAhWBK5oKHdibAr4Q6AEILzAD#v=onepage&q=SETA%2C%202015%E2%80%99te%20T%C3%BCrkiye%20pdf&f=false. Accessed (04.05.2017-14:54).

¹⁶⁴ Ibid.

¹⁶⁵ Begüm Zorlu, “Tsipras versus Erdoğan: Kıbrıs’ta Egemenlik Siyaseti”, 2 May 2015. Available at <http://bianet.org/biamag/siyaset/164252-tsipras-versus-erdogan-kibris-ta-egemenlik-siyaseti>. Accessed (25.04.2017-15:47).

Furthermore the “Zero-problems with neighbours” is consistent with pragmatism that Turkey aimed to increase its soft power. The Turkish foreign policy on Cyprus has a tie with that principle, in order to achieve solution UN plan maintained by Turkish government.¹⁶⁶

In 2016, progress has achieved in issues of “administration and power sharing”, “EU”, and “economy”, “security and guarantors”, “territory” and “property” issues were determined as matters would be negotiate at the last stage. On the other hand, “Water Supply Project” was completed in 2015. The purpose of it was to meet the need of TRNC’s drinking and irrigation water. Water would be coming from Anamur (Dragon River, Turkey) to Geçitköy (TRNC) through the submarine pipeline. The AKP government targeted to contribute peace in the future by fulfilling the water demand of the whole Island that would be constructive attitude towards to Cyprus negotiations.¹⁶⁷

In 2016, the AKP government believed that the negotiations would come to an end.¹⁶⁸ The year of 2016 was determined as the last year for solution of dispute. Furthermore, while Turkey supported to the continuation of the guarantorship unlike

¹⁶⁶ Kemal Kirişçi, “Is Turkish foreign policy becoming pragmatic again?”, 11 July 2016. Available at <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2016/07/11/is-turkish-foreign-policy-becoming-pragmatic-again/>. Accessed (25.04.2017-17:37).

¹⁶⁷ Ibid.

¹⁶⁸ “Turkey backs continued Cyprus peace talks, warns Greek Cypriots”, 26 July 2016. Available at <http://www.reuters.com/article/us-cyprus-turkey-talks-idUSKCN10611M>. Accessed (25.04.2017-18:21).

Greece', Cyprus would always be a "national case" for Turkish government. Besides, Turkey emphasized to give priority for Cyprus's interest.¹⁶⁹

The financial protocol has been taken in to force by the TRNC between 2010-2012 in order to decrease budget deficit and state involvement in financial matters through privatization methods. In other words these steps would pave the way for the creation of an independent economy. Meanwhile Turkey continued to fund infrastructure and establishment of private organizations. In order to avoid dissimilarity between Turkey and the TRNC. In other words, institutions in Turkey have to be in common position towards progress in TRNC. However financial protocol which applied between 2010 and 2012 supported privatization in TRNC.¹⁷⁰

Additionally there has been another economic protocol signed between Turkey and the TRNC which encompassed 2012-2015 not fulfilled by the TRNC government.

In 2016 economic protocol which has published in the official gazette included privatization of Kyrenia Tourism Port's administrative right.

In October 2016 Energy Agreement has signed between parties. The important project was the electric transmission from Turkey through the cable under the sea.

¹⁶⁹ Yurdagül Şimşek, "Muhalefet Kıbrıs müzakerelerinden endişeli: KKTC feda edilemez", 20 January 2016. Available at <https://tr.sputniknews.com/politika/201601201020322339-kibris-muzakere-kkct/>. Accessed (25.04.2017-18:38).

¹⁷⁰ Nikos Moudouros, "Erdoğan's Cyprus: Another Aspect of the Turkish Model", in: *Contemporary Social and Political Aspects of the Cyprus Problem*, ed. Jonathan Warner, David W. Lovell & Michalis Kontos, another aspect, (UK: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2016), 112-132.

Project object is decrease electricity cost in TRNC, safeguarding source safety in the energy market, and export surplus electricity created by renewable energy.¹⁷¹

3.3 Domestic Policy of the AKP

It can be said that today Turkey is more democratic and highly engaged in the world affairs than before which as a result it has more tensions with the states. The AKP government undertook domestic policy which focused on a fundamental change and re-structuring. Therefore the first two terms in office the AKP governments preferred to have coalitions composed of its own supporters and other metropolitan liberal forces under the purpose of Europeanization. At the beginning of the accession negotiations of the EU, especially between the November 2002 and December 2004, there were some requirements in which former President Gül and Prime Minister Erdoğan aimed to change constitutional and liberal order of Turkey. This change in Turkish politics also furthered the economic reforms. Meanwhile the democratic and liberal vision of the European political systems is applied to the legal systems of Turkey and in return Turkish economy has started to develop. During the 1990s the political instability had negative impact over the economy which led high inflation and budget deficit that the previous governments failed to give just solutions. However the rise of the AKP enabled new economic perspectives to be developed.

For most of the academicians economic situations of Turkey has been divided in three periods. Between 2002 and 2007 Turkey's economy was better than previous years which showed an incredible growth. Meanwhile the economic growth

¹⁷¹ “KKTC-TC arasında elektrik kablo projesi önemli”, *Kıbrıs*, 7 April 2017. Available at <http://www.kibrisgazetesi.com/kibris/kkct-tc-arasinda-elektrik-kablo-projesi-onemli/16127>. Accessed (06.05.2017).

overlapped with democratization as a result reforms have made by Turkish government in order to fulfil Copenhagen Criteria's.¹⁷²

The “Proactive foreign policy” is considered for that period to achieve the rise in “soft power” of Turkey. Between 2007 and 2011 it is called as the ‘recalibration years’ for Turkey and socio-political chaos at the same time. Consequently, Turkish economy has started to worsen¹⁷³. As a remedy Turkish government applied values of liberal democracy as an economic remedy.

The reliability of the EU obligations was questioned. Therefore democratization reforms have started to decline in domestic sphere. The Turkish government arranged Turkey’s primacies because of the regional changes such as Arab upheavals in Middle East. Third period has begun with the general elections of 2011. The Post-2011 substantial economic problems have arisen, namely “turbulent years”.¹⁷⁴

Furthermore, structural difficulties became visible. Polarization dominated in domestic politics, additional destruction in check and balance system. The on-going negative tensions with the neighbours had also affected. In addition to this the high employment rate and refugee problem has credible affect over Turkey.

In terms of security matters the world as a whole has experienced global challenge in September 11 terrorist attacks perpetrated against the Twin Towers. However, this

¹⁷² Mustafa Kutlay, “Turkish Political Economy Post-2011: A Turbulent Period”, in *The Uncertain Path of the ‘New Turkey*, ed. Valeria Talbot. (Milan: Istituto per gli Studi di Politica Internazionale, 2015), 49-63.

¹⁷³ *Ibid.*

¹⁷⁴ *Ibid.*

chaotic environment has affected Turkey which has borders with Iraq and Syria. The Turkish foreign policy has been tested through several unique incidents. As it is mentioned above the 9/11 terrorist attacks was the turning point of the starting war against terrorism. Besides, global economic crisis, Arab Rebellion in 2010, the rise in ISIS's power in Iraq and lately the Syria affected Turkey's internal security. In 2015, Turkey encountered with security issues in which regional instability has been raised.

There are important issues that affect national security of Turkey. First, excessive entrance of the refugees to Turkey caused to crises whose population rise over the six million. Second, Turkey continues to fight against ISIS which is the violent and insane terrorist organization in the world.¹⁷⁵

Third, Syria and Iraq as a "failed states" are spreading out of the region. Fourth, power politics have performed by powerful states with the purpose of increase in their self-interest. Fifth, sectarian differences have raised problems in identity that caused to increase tragedy of people. Therefore insecurity in addition to instability has increased by the effect of these aspects.

Turkey experienced an unexpected coup attempt in 15 July 2016. The perpetrated attack was against the President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and the AKP government. The Grand National Assembly was bombed and after the call of the President Erdoğan the citizens struggled to end the coup. The Coup attempt was not successful due to media, economic actors, civil society organization and political parties. However; civilians have been injured and above the two hundred civilians killed

¹⁷⁵ E. Fuat Keyman, "A New Turkish Foreign Policy: Towards Proactive "Moral Realism", *Insight Turkey*, Vol. 19, No. 1, (2017):pp. 55-69, p.61. Available at http://file.insightturkey.com/Files/Pdf/keyman_5.3-17.pdf. Accessed (11.05.2017-16:28).

during that time. As a result, despite of the cultural and religious differences between the citizens, many people came together to prevent the coup.¹⁷⁶

Furthermore, the “Golden Age of Europeanization” has continued until 2005, AKP gave importance to reforms in order to achieve EU membership process. Furthermore, activism in Turkish foreign policy has continued until post-2005. After 2005 period Turkey has started to move away Europeanization in that sense that is called as “loose Europeanization”.¹⁷⁷

In addition to that, AKP does not deviate from Atlanticist component in contrast Turkish foreign policy became flexible. Meanwhile Anti-EU idea has developed in Turkish society through the Brussels Summit. Sarkozy and Merkel interrogated to membership of Turkey to EU, which created negative effect on Turkish public opinion. According to statistics the number of citizen who favoured the EU membership was declined from 74 per cent to 50 per cent in 2007. In addition to that identity crisis has emerged in EU for this support to EU has decreased in Turkey. Furthermore, EU has failed to meet demands of Turkish Cypriots.¹⁷⁸

For this reason, Turkey’s negotiation progression has postponed by the effect of Cyprus conflict, the reason was Turkey rejected to accept the entrance of ROC’s ships to the ports. The situation created difficulty for Turkey’s membership process.¹⁷⁹

¹⁷⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷⁷ Ibid.

¹⁷⁸ Ibid.

¹⁷⁹ Ibid.

Furthermore the democratisation policy of the AKP has started to lose its importance after the Kurdish question and the Armenian problem has started to pose a threat to the national integrity of Turkey. Especially in 2014 the peace process has become more complicated by the developments in Syria. There have been many attempts regarding the Kurdish issue to find a solution but all have failed. The Kurdish opening in 2009 followed by the uprisings in Syria that PKK had close relations with the PYD which triggered the dissolution of the issue in which PKK and HDP endangered the process. Later on the flow of peshmerges from Iraq to Kobane implicitly showed the end of the process.

With the absence of democratization policy the followers of Kemalism started to wage Kultur-kampf against the supporters of the AKP. Nevertheless the July 2007 elections and the victory of the AKP implicitly showed the shift of Turkish government from the democratic and liberal change to the civilian constitution. The second victory of the AKP opened the way for the conservative-religious policies. For instance lifting the ban on the headscarf on universities.

The importance of the kultur-kampf is that it took place without the military intervention which could be given as a result of the decrease in the armed forces against the government. The Ergenekon trial is the consequence of the displacing the elected government from power.

In terms of the democratization process of the Turkish politics there is a symbolic relationship between the civil and the military.

According former Prime Minister Davutoğlu, there has been more active and independent foreign affairs established. Moreover Arab Spring especially the Middle East was the milestone of the Turkish foreign policy. Before the Arab Spring, there were two important issues about the Turkish foreign politics. The one is the economy, which is not directed by the government itself but also the non-governmental institutions that are -MÜSİAD, TUSKON, and TOBB- played significant role over the trade and economy. The other one is the identity. Especially Muslim identity that is born with the Syrian refugees. Turkey unlike Western States and the EU prefers to have a relationship among cultures on the equal bases rather than implementing the socio-cultural and economic difference.

Nevertheless Arab Spring had started to show the difficulties of this strategy applied. Because with the Arab Spring, Turkey is forced to be democratized. The previous paradigm between Erdoğan and Esad relations had no such push-ups.

In other words, no-state preferred to intervene the internal affairs of the others'. But it is claimed that Syria has always been accepted as an internal matter for Turkey. And for the view of Turkish politicians, Turkey could not stay outside this matter.

It can be said that the first two terms of the AKP have succeeded the democratising and liberalising the Turkish state and the society.

3.4 Inter-relation of AKP's Domestic Policy and Foreign Policy on Cyprus Issue

The Cyprus issue has always been national matter for Turkey since the physical division of the island in 1974 and after the year of 2004 with the proactive Turkish foreign policy it gained another vision.¹⁸⁰

In 2002 when the AKP came to power the change in internal dynamics of Turkey has reflected and triggered on the change in external politics. AKP had rightist and Islamism based nature itself which indicated the pro- European approach and had the perception of being a one step further of finding solution in Cyprus. While the tendency to become an EU member goes back to the late 1950s until 2002 there was no credible effort for this purpose. In terms of fulfilling the prerequisites of the full membership of the EU the Greek Cypriots were more enthusiastic than the Turkish Cypriots and Turkey. The government of Denktaş and Turkey were dealing with the unlawfulness of the application.¹⁸¹

Nevertheless the change in approach has first shown by Erdoğan who decided to revise the 40 years of Cyprus Politics. From this point of view Cyprus issue was not only an international matter of the UN and the EU but also a problem which linked to the internal dynamics and a national matter which plays critical role over the speed and the degree of the EU integration process of Turkey.¹⁸²

¹⁸⁰ Ibid.

¹⁸¹ Ibid.

¹⁸² Ibid.

It is argued that AKP has been executing a power struggle domestically by looking at the attitudes of the Cyprus and Kurdish problems. Starting from the 2003 the AKP government applied a revolutionary approach by step by step eliminating the role of former president Denktaş and struggling to convince the Turkish Cypriots to gain support for the Annan Plan. This struggle of the AKP government had positive impacts over the Turkish Cypriots. Nevertheless the change in AKP policies in 2009 as more conservative and more conflicting approach in its foreign policy had also impact over the Cyprus problem and the Turkish Cypriots as well. However this change has led to the relations between Turkish Cypriots and Turkey to move away from the diplomatic politeness. This shift in Cyprus politics of Turkey possessed the fear of losing the conservative-right voters of the AKP. In other words the partial unsuccessfulness of the Cyprus issue and the Kurdish problem had caused a backward shift in foreign policy. Because this regression or the withdrawal of the Cyprus and Kurdish problems possessed the purpose of showing the process in under control and a part of the strategy.¹⁸³

Throughout the bi-communal negotiations the enthusiasm of the former president M. Ali Talat towards the establishment of the United Cyprus had caused problems with the AKP government which forced former president Erdoğan to revise the support of the negotiations. It is believed that the conflicting views between Erdoğan and Talat had caused Talat's run for the presidency for the second term. However this reflected

¹⁸³ Ibid.

the idea that AKP always wanted to have the primary and the determinative role over the Cyprus issue.¹⁸⁴

The nationalist-Kemalist alliance has been accepted as the most significant obstacle for the AKP government. Nevertheless the third term in office of the AKP has shown that the nationalist-Kemalist alliance had no more create an obstacle in contrast to the previous term in office. However this also shows that AKP has no such eagerness to join the EU. The economic and political crises within the EU have played a significant role over the attraction of the EU. On the other hand the rise in democratization in Middle East and the historical and political relations with the region has introduced the new opportunities to the AKP government. In this respect the change in foreign policy of the AKP has shown that the AKP would never give up the strategically interests in the region and initiatives in Cyprus and also it would follow a policy which gained in 2004.¹⁸⁵

The Cyprus politics of the AKP government has always possessed the aim of being a part of a just solution in the island. While on the one hand Greek Cypriots do not want to be the one who rejected the plan for the second time, Turkey on the other hand does not want to be the reason of the possible deadlock.¹⁸⁶

In Chapter 4, there will be findings of the current study including the survey results and analyses will be mentioned.

¹⁸⁴ Ibid.

¹⁸⁵ Ibid.

¹⁸⁶ Ibid.

Chapter 4

SURVEY AND ANALYSIS

This chapter consists of the detailed information about the methodology of this study. The research method, population and sample, data instrument, procedure of data collection and interpretation of the data for the current study are defined in this chapter. Survey namely quantitative method is employed to understand the perception of Turkish Cypriots' towards the AKP's foreign policy on Cyprus.

4.1 Research Method

The descriptive research may be mentioned as a research method for the current study. Moreover, it might be discussed that research method would be helpful to identify main characteristics and behaviours/ attitudes of the sample. It is also discussed that Descriptive studies could also be in form of quantitative research. To create better understanding current study designed as descriptive-quantitative research to advance understanding to identifying, explaining as well as validating research findings.¹⁸⁷

4.1.1 Population and Sample of the Study

Population of the study may be expressed as individuals who were born and living in the TRNC with the 18-65 age interval. Researcher had applied to State Planning Organization and Statistics Department to determine number of population for the study. With the light of the information which was provided by TRNC State Planning Organization and Statistics Department, number of population for the

¹⁸⁷ N. Karasar, (*Bilimsel Araştırma Yöntemi*. Ankara: Nobel Yayınları, 2011).

current study could be expressed as 162,374.¹⁸⁸ Since it could be difficult to access the whole population (in terms of time, cost), stratified random sampling method has been preferred to stratify respondents by considering their place of living. Then simple random sampling method was executed to choose respondents for the study. To be more precise, researcher employed %95 confidence interval, %5 as a marginal sampling error to compute sample size for the study. The formula could be indicated as follows:

N: Denotes Number of population

n: Denotes number of people which would take part in the sample (to be found).

p: Denotes probability of the success of the event.

q: Denotes probability of the failure of the event.

t: Denotes the t-score that we use to calculate the confidence interval that depends on both the degrees of freedom and the desired confidence level

d: Denotes desired marginal error

$$n = \frac{N * t^2 * p * q}{(N - 1)d^2 + t^2 * p * q} \quad n = \frac{162374 * (1.96)^2 * 0.50 * 0.50}{(162373)(0.05)^2 + (1.96)^2 * 0.50 * 0.50} = \mathbf{383}$$

Table 1: Population Size of TRNC

	Population	Ni/N	Size of the Sample
Nicosia	59.943	0,37	141
Famagusta	38.987	0,24	92
Kyrenia	30.131	0,19	71
Guzelyurt	18.648	0,11	44
İskele	14.665	0,09	35

¹⁸⁸ <http://www.devplan.org/frame-tr.html>. Accessed (24.04.2017-14:42).

Total	162.374	1,00	383
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4.1.2 Data Instrument

Data instrument of the current study was shaped with the light of the literature review and by having the opinions of the academicians. To be more accurate, questionnaire has been employed as a data instrument for the current study.

Furthermore, it could be indicated that questionnaire which employed for the study consisted two parts. The first part of the instrument aimed to gather information regarding the socio-demographic characteristics of the respondents. Sample questions could be stressed as gender, age, academic backgrounds of the respondents.

Moreover, the second part of the data instrument was designed to gather attitudes of the respondents regarding the economic and social policies which are formulated and practiced by AKP.

4.1.3 Procedure of the data collection

Moreover, to prevent incomplete responses, researcher had preferred to take a part and kindly explained any question which might seem confusing to the respondents. The administration of the instrument took about 30 minutes.

4.2 Interpretation of the Data

Data which collected from the participants would be analysed and interpreted by using Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS) 21.0 software program.

In this research the questionnaire method has been used for the data collection. The random selected respondents have been informed about this scientific research and the personal information would be kept in privacy.

Besides, to interpret socio-demographic profile of the respondents Frequency Analysis would be appointed. Furthermore, to determine the respondents' attitudes towards to the social and economic policies of AKP, Chi Square analysis would be employed and findings would be illustrated by cross-tabs.

Table 2: Socio-demographic Profile of the Respondents (n=383)

	Frequency (n)	Percentage (%)
Gender		
Female	185	48,30
Male	198	51,70
City		
Nicosia	142	37,08
Famagusta	92	24,02
Kyrenia	71	18,54
Guzelyurt	44	11,49
Iskele	34	8,88
Age		
18-25 years old	101	26,37
26-33 years old	86	22,45
34-41 years old	67	17,49
42-49 years old	55	14,36
50-65 years old	74	19,32
Academic Background		
Undergraduate/ graduate study	142	37,08

High School	180	47,00
Primary School	61	15,93
Occupancy		
Student	91	23,76
Working at Public Sector	88	22,98
Working at Private Sector	124	32,38
Other (s)	80	20,89

The socio-demographic profile of the respondents is illustrated by Table 2. It could be indicated that of those 383 respondents, %48, 30 were female and %51, 70 were male. Moreover of those 383 respondents, %37,08 had stated that they are living in Nicosia and %24, 02 had indicated that they are living in Famagusta. Beside of this, %18, 54 expressed that they are living in Kyrenia whereas %11, 49 had mentioned that they are living in Güzelyurt.

Furthermore, it could be stressed of those 383 respondents, %26,37 were 18-25 years old,%22,45 were 26-33 years old, %17,49 were 34-41 years old and lastly %19,32 were 50-65 years old.

Academic background of the respondents was also questioned for the current study. Findings revealed that majority of the respondents were graduated from High School while % 37, 08 were graduated from university and/or had a master degree-Ph.D.

Lastly, frequency analysis showed that majority of the respondents were working for private sector while %22, 98 were working as public officer and %23, 76 were student.

Table 3: Opinions of The Participants Regarding The most Critical Issues on The Agenda of Foreign Policy Which were Shaped by AKP (n=383)

Most Critical Issues	Frequency (n)	Percentage (%)
Relationships with Europe	52	13,58
Fight against terrorism	140	36,55
Relationships with USA	26	6,79
Relationships with Islamic Countries	79	20,63
Cyprus Conflict	12	3,13
Relationships with Russia	19	4,96
Other (s)	55	14,36

Table 3 exhibits the opinions of the participants regarding the most critical issues on the agenda of foreign policy which was shaped by AKP. Results indicated that majority of the respondents agreed that having a fight against terrorism and relationships with Islamic countries are two vital issues, while Cyprus conflict and Relationships with Russia were expressed as less critical issues for the foreign policy of AKP.

Table 4: Attitudes of the Respondents Regarding the Importance of TRNC for Turkey

Statements	Frequency (n)	Percentage (%)
A country which cannot be abandoned	183	47,78
An obstacle for Turkey	44	11,49
Not critical issue for Turkish Foreign Policy	51	13,32
Turkey can make concessions for EU membership	54	14,10
No opinion	51	13,32

The attitudes of the respondents regarding the importance of TRNC for Turkey were summarized by Table 4. Results revealed that majority of the respondents have stated that TRNC is a country which cannot be abandoned while %11, 49 have stated that TRNC is an obstacle for Turkey, on the other hand, %13, 32 have mentioned that TRNC is not critical issue for Turkish Foreign Policy.




Figure 1: Statements of the respondents regarding the success of Justice and Development Party on Cyprus Policy

Figure 1 illustrates the statements of the respondents regarding the success of AKP on Cyprus Policy. Majority of the respondents have mentioned that Cyprus policy of AKP is partially successful whereas %14, 88 of the respondents have expressed that Cyprus Policy of the AKP is successful. Moreover, it could be stressed that %31.33 of the respondents have mentioned that Cyprus Policy of AKP is unsuccessful.

Table 5 : Opinions of the Respondents on Some Specific Issues Which Shaped by the Attitudes of AKP (n=383)

	Freq uenc y (n)	Perce ntage (%)
Sincerity and reliability of AKP towards the solution of Cyprus conflict		
Totally agree	38	9,92
Agree	125	32,64
Disagree	128	33,42
Totally disagree	66	17,23
Neutral	26	6,79
Thinking that AKP favouring peace during Annan Plan		
Totally agree	55	14,36
Agree	146	38,12
Disagree	76	19,84
Totally disagree	69	18,02
Neutral	37	9,66
Agreeing a thought by the President of TRNC , Akinci in the early months“ Division had been defined as a solution by Turkey, but for the last ten years it has changed”		
Totally Agree	29	7,57
Agree	134	34,99
Disagree	79	20,63
Totally Disagree	54	14,10
Neutral	87	22,72
Thinking that Turkey will have benefits in case of solution of Cyprus Conflict		
Totally Agree	75	19,58
Agree	149	38,90
Disagree	76	19,84

Totally Disagree	42	10,97
Neutral	41	10,70

Results revealed that majority of the respondents have negative responses for the Turkey's sincerity and reliability about the solution of Cyprus conflict. Moreover, it could be indicated that most of the respondents were thinking that Turkey had favoured solution of Cyprus conflict during referendum period. To be more precise, % 38,12 of the respondents have agreed that Turkey had favoured solution of Cyprus conflict during Annan Referendum period whereas %14,36 of the respondents have stated that that they totally agreed with the statement that Turkey had favoured solution of Cyprus conflict. On the other hand, %9, 66 of the respondents had stated that they were neutral with that statement.

In the research conducted, it is stated that %7,57 of the participants totally agreed with the statement of the President of TRNC Akinci, "Division was stated as a solution in the past years by Turkey, however it all changed for the last 10 years', 34,99% of the participants agreed, %20,63 disagreed and %14,10 participants totally agreed, however, %22,72 had no idea on this matter.

Lastly, %38,90 of the respondents have agreed that Turkey will have some benefits in case of solution of Cyprus conflict while %19,84 of the respondents have stated that they did not believe Turkey will have benefit in case of peace in Cyprus whereas %10,70 of the respondents had no idea about that question.




Figure 2: Thoughts Regarding Turkey is Providing Benefits to TRNC (n=383)

Thoughts of the participants regarding Turkey are providing benefits to TRNC were presented by Figure 2. It could be argued that %9 of the respondents totally agreed that Turkey is providing benefits to TRNC. Moreover, %28 of the participants agreed that Turkey is providing benefits to TRNC whereas %27 of the respondents did not agree with that statement.

Table 6: Opinions of the Respondents Regarding Statements of Economic Relationships with Turkey (n=383)

Statements	Frequ ency (n)	Percent age (%)
Turkey's economic development programs are stimulating economic growth for TRNC (particularly after the year of 2000).		
Totally Agreed	32	8,36
Agreed	141	36,81
Disagreed	105	27,42
Totally disagreed	83	21,67
Neutral	22	5,74
Turkey's privatization policies are stimulating economic growth of TRNC		
Totally Agreed	42	10,97
Agreed	122	31,85
Disagreed	99	25,85
Totally disagreed	82	21,41
Neutral	38	9,92
Being informed about the structural "transformation program (which was signed with Turkey)		
Totally Agreed	19	4,96
Agreed	102	26,63
Disagreed	68	17,75
Totally disagreed	47	12,27
Neutral	147	38,38
Thinking that Turkish Cypriots interests are considered by the protocols which were signed with Turkey		
Totally Agreed	38	9,92
Agreed	108	28,20
Disagreed	116	30,29
Totally disagreed	77	20,10

Table 6 illustrates Opinions of the respondents regarding statements of economic relationships with Turkey. These statements could be expressed as Turkey's economic development programs are stimulating economic growth for TRNC particularly after the year of 2000, Turkey's privatization policies are stimulating economic growth of TRNC, being informed about the structural "transformation program, and lastly thinking that Turkish Cypriots interests are considered by the protocols which were signed by Turkey.

It could be argued that majority of the respondents have agreed that Turkey's economic development program to facilitate economic growth in TRNC. Moreover, it might be stressed that majority of respondents have argued that Turkey's privatization policies were successful to boost economic growth for TRNC. Beside of this, most of the respondents were neutral about being informed on the context of the structural transformation program. Lastly, majority of the respondents have discussed that interests of Turkish Cypriots were not considered by the protocols which are signed with Turkey.




Figure 3: Privitization of Ercan Airport would Positively Affect Economic Growth in TRNC

Respondents were asked to what extend do they agree with the statement of “Privatization of Ercan Airport would positively affect economic growth in TRNC” Figure 3 exhibits that %31 of the respondents agreed that privatization of Ercan would positively influence economic growth in TRNC while %11 of the respondents totally agreed with that statement. Furthermore, it could be stressed that %25 of the respondents totally disagreed with the statement of “privatization of Ercan would positively influence economic growth in TRNC whereas % 23 of the respondents disagreed with the statement.

Table 7: Responses of Participants Regarding the Provision of Electricity and Water From Turkey (n=383)

Statements	Frequency (n)	Percentage (%)
The shortage of water in TRNC could be solved by provision of water via pipelines from Turkey		
Totally agree	78	20,37
Agree	181	47,26
Disagree	60	15,67
Totally Disagree	47	12,27
Neutral	17	4,44
Power failures in TRNC could be solved by transmitting electricity from Turkey via cables which laid down undersea		
Totally agree	54	14,10
Agree	185	48,30
Disagree	69	18,02
Totally Disagree	31	8,09
Neutral	44	11,49
Transmitting electricity from Turkey will positively influence autonomy of establishments in TRNC		
Totally agree	36	9,40
Agree	134	34,99
Disagree	88	22,98
Totally Disagree	56	14,62
Neutral	69	18,02

Participants were also asked to articulate their responses about to what extent they agreed with the statements of; “shortage of water in TRNC can be solved by provision of water via pipelines from Turkey”, “power failures in TRNC could be solved by transmitting electricity from Turkey via cables which laid down undersea”,

Transmitting electricity from Turkey will positively influence autonomy of establishments in TRNC. To create better understanding, it could be argued that majority of the participants agreed that shortage of water in TRNC can be solved by provision of water via pipelines from Turkey. Aside of this, most of the participants agreed that power failures in TRNC could be solved by transmitting electricity from Turkey via cables which laid down undersea . Finally, most of the participants agreed that transmitting electricity from Turkey would positively influence autonomy of establishments in TRNC while %18.02 of the participants was uncertain about that statement.




Figure 4: Opinions of respondents about finding Turkey's efforts effective for protecting rights of immigrants that in TRNC

Participants were asked to articulate their opinions about Turkey’s efforts to protect the rights of the immigrants in TRNC. Figure 4 illustrates that majority of the respondents stated that Turkey’s efforts as “effective” in terms of protecting the rights of the immigrants in TRNC.

Table 8: Comparing AKP's Cyprus Policy with the Light of the Socio-demographic Variables of the Respondents (n=383)

	Unsuccessful		Partially Successful		Successful		X ²	p
	N	%	N	%	n	%		
Gender								
Female	92	49,73	59	31,89	34	18,38	1,54	0,46
Male	86	43,43	72	36,36	40	20,20		
Age								
18-25 years old	64	63,37	27	26,73	10	9,90	31,20	0,00*
26-33 years old	43	50,00	32	37,21	11	12,79		
34-41 years old	30	44,78	22	32,84	15	22,39		
42-49 years old	18	32,73	18	32,73	19	34,55		
50-65 years old	23	31,08	32	43,24	19	25,68		
Academic Background								
University Graduate	78	54,93	45	31,69	19	13,38	30,66	0,00*
High School Graduate	86	47,78	65	36,11	29	16,11		
Primary School Graduate	14	22,95	21	34,43	26	42,62		
Occupancy								
Student	61	67,03	19	20,88	11	12,09	22,36	0,00*
Working on public sector	40	45,45	31	35,23	17	19,32		
Working on private sector	47	37,90	51	41,13	26	20,97		
Others	30	37,50	30	37,50	20	25,00		
City								
Nicosia	74	52,11	49	34,51	19	13,38	14,92	0,06

Famagusta	49	53,26	29	31,52	14	15,22
Kyrenia	27	38,03	26	36,62	18	25,35
Güzelyurt	14	31,82	17	38,64	13	29,55
İskele	14	41,18	10	29,41	10	29,41

*p<0,05

Cyprus Policy of AKP was compared with the light of the demographic profile of the respondents. Results could be listed as the following:

- In terms of gender, responses of participants were not statistically significant.
- In terms of age group, responses of participants were statistically significant. In other words, when compared with other age groups, respondents aged between 18-25 stated the success of AKP's on Cyprus Policy as least successful (p<0,05).
- In terms of academic background, responses of participants were statistically significant. In other words, when compared with other academic backgrounds, respondents that were graduated from primary school stated AKP's on Cyprus Policy was successful.
- In terms of occupancy, responses of participants were statistically significant. To be more accurate, when compared with other occupancies, students stated the success of AKP's on Cyprus policy as least successful. (p<0,05).
- In terms of city, responses of participants were not statistically significant. (p>0,05).

Table 9: Comparing Reliability and Sincerity of AKP's on the Solution of Cyprus Conflict (n=383)

	Yes		No		X ²	P
	n	%	N	%		
Gender						
Female	76	43,43	99	56,57	0,69	0,41
Male	87	47,80	95	52,20		
Age						
18-25 years old	28	29,47	67	70,53	25,59	0,00*
26-33 years old	34	40,96	49	59,04		
34-41 years old	28	43,75	36	56,25		
42-49 years old	32	64,00	18	36,00		
50-65 years old	41	63,08	24	36,92		
Academic Background						
University Graduate	53	39,55	81	60,45	21,94	0,00*
High School Graduate	69	41,07	99	58,93		
Primary School Graduate	41	74,55	14	25,45		
Occupancy						
Student	24	28,57	60	71,43	15,78	0,00*
Working on public sector	39	47,56	43	52,44		
Working on private sector	54	47,79	59	52,21		
Others	46	58,97	32	41,03		
City						
Nicosia	54	40,30	80	59,70	9,56	0,04*
Famagusta	31	38,27	50	61,73		
Kyrenia	34	50,00	34	50,00		
Güzelyurt	24	58,54	17	41,46		
İskele	20	60,61	13	39,39		

*p<0,05

Responses which related with the reliability and sincerity of AKP on the solution of Cyprus Conflict were compared with the light of the demographic profile of the respondents. Findings could be listed as following:

- In terms of gender, responses were not statistically significant ($p > 0,05$).
- In terms of age groups, responses were statistically significant. To be more precise, In other words, when compared with other age groups, respondents aged between 18-25 stated the reliability and sincerity of AKP on the solution of Cyprus as least reliable and sincere ($p < 0,05$).
- In terms of academic backgrounds, responses were statistically significant. To be more accurate, when compared with other academic backgrounds, respondents that were graduated from primary school stated that AKP are highly reliable and sincere for the solution of Cyprus Conflict.
- In terms of occupancy, responses were statistically significant. In other words, when compared with other occupancies, students stated that AKP is not reliable and sincere for the solution of Cyprus Conflict.
- In terms of city, responses were statistically significant. To be more clear, it could be argued that respondents which were living in İskele stated AKP is highly reliable and sincere for the solution of Cyprus Problem ($p < 0,05$).

Table 10: Opinions of Participants on Thinking that AKP Favouring Peace during Annan Plan (n=346) with the Light of the Socio-demographic Profile

	Yes		No		X ²	P
	n	%	n	%		
Gender						
Female	96	57,49	71	42,51	0,05	0,82
Male	105	58,66	74	41,34		
Age						
18-25 years old	39	41,94	54	58,06	20,20	0,00*
26-33 years old	42	56,00	33	44,00		
34-41 years old	36	61,02	23	38,98		
42-49 years old	32	62,75	19	37,25		
50-65 years old	52	76,47	16	23,53		
Academic Background						
University Graduate	77	60,16	51	39,84	2,77	0,25
High School Graduate	89	53,94	76	46,06		
Primary School Graduate	35	66,04	18	33,96		
Occupancy						
Student	35	41,67	49	58,33	16,04	0,00*
Working on public sector	45	56,25	35	43,75		
Working on private sector	68	62,96	40	37,04		
Others	53	71,62	21	28,38		
City						
Nicosia	77	58,33	55	41,67	5,31	0,26
Famagusta	41	50,00	41	50,00		
Kyrenia	36	60,00	24	40,00		
Güzelyurt	28	71,79	11	28,21		
İskele	19	57,58	14	42,42		

Table 10 exhibits the opinions of participants on thinking that AKP favoured peace during Annan Plan (n=346) with the light of the socio-demographic profile. Findings could be indicated as follows;

- In terms of gender, responses were not statistically significant ($p > 0,05$).
- In terms of age group, responses were statistically significant. To be more exact, it could be argued that when compared with other age groups, respondents aged 50-65 were found to be more optimistic that AKP was favoring solution during Annan Plan referendum.
- In terms of academic background, responses were not statistically significant.
- In terms of occupancy responses were statistically significant. To be more exact, it could be argued that when compared with other occupancies, students were found to be less optimistic that AKP was favoring solution during Annan Plan referendum.
- In terms of city, responses were not statistically significant.

Table 11: Thinking that Turkey's Economic Development Programs are Stimulating Economic Growth for TRNC (particularly after the year of 2000)

	Yes		No		X ²	P
	N	%	n	%		
Gender						
Female	78	45,35	94	54,65	0,87	0,35
Male	95	50,26	94	49,74		
Age						
18-25 years old	46	48,42	49	51,58	1,40	0,84
26-33 years old	36	44,44	45	55,56		
34-41 years old	34	53,97	29	46,03		
42-49 years old	25	47,17	28	52,83		
50-65 years old	32	46,38	37	53,62		
Academic Background						
University Graduate	55	40,74	80	59,26	15,84	0,00*
High School Graduate	79	45,93	93	54,07		
Primary School Graduate	39	72,22	15	27,78		
Occupancy						
Student	40	47,06	45	52,94	4,36	0,23
Working on public sector	33	38,82	52	61,18		
Working on private sector	61	52,59	55	47,41		
Others	39	52,00	36	48,00		
City						
Nicosia	63	46,67	72	53,33	10,00	0,04*
Famagusta	37	43,02	49	56,98		
Kyrenia	26	40,00	39	60,00		
Güzelyurt	29	67,44	14	32,56		
İskele	18	56,25	14	43,75		

*p<0,05

Table 11 exhibits the comparison about responses of the participants regarding “thinking that Turkey’s economic development programs are stimulating economic growth for TRNC (particularly after the year of 2000). The test conducted by considering demographic variables of the respondents. Findings could be stated as follows;

- In terms of gender, responses were not statistically significant ($p > 0,05$).
- In terms of age groups, responses were not statistically significant ($p > 0,05$).
- In terms of occupancy, responses were not statistically significant ($p > 0,05$).
- In terms of city, responses were statistically significant. To create better understanding, it could be argued that when compared with other cities, respondents that are living in Güzelyurt were found to be more optimistic about Turkey’s economic development programs are stimulating economic growth for TRNC (particularly after the year of 2000) ($p < 0,05$).

Table 12: Thinking that Turkey's Privatization Policies are Stimulating Economic Growth of TRNC (n=361)

	Yes		No		X ²	P
	n	%	n	%		
Gender						
Female	75	44,38	94	55,62	1,32	0,25
Male	89	50,57	87	49,43		
Age						
18-25 years old	41	43,62	53	56,38	5,74	0,22
26-33 years old	34	43,04	45	56,96		
34-41 years old	31	55,36	25	44,64		
42-49 years old	29	59,18	20	40,82		
50-65 years old	29	43,28	38	56,72		
Academic Background						
University Graduate	54	43,55	70	56,45	12,19	0,00*
High School Graduate	72	43,37	94	56,63		
Primary School Graduate	38	69,09	17	30,91		
Occupancy						
Student	32	38,10	52	61,90	8,61	0,03*
Working on public sector	33	40,74	48	59,26		
Working on private sector	62	55,86	49	44,14		
Others	37	53,62	32	46,38		
City						
Nicosia	53	41,41	75	58,59	8,14	0,09
Famagusta	35	43,21	46	56,79		
Kyrenia	33	53,23	29	46,77		
Güzelyurt	27	64,29	15	35,71		
İskele	16	50,00	16	50,00		

*p<0,05

Table 12 exhibits the respondents attitudes about thinking that Turkey's privatization policies are stimulating economic growth of TRNC (n=361). Responses of the participants were compared with the light of the socio-demographic variables. Findings could be expressed as follows:

- In terms of gender, responses were not statistically significant ($p > 0,05$).
- In terms of age groups, responses were not statistically significant ($p > 0,05$).
- In terms of academic background, responses were statistically significant ($p < 0,05$). To be more precise, it could be argued that when compared with other academic backgrounds, respondents that were graduated from primary school were found to be more optimistic on thinking that Turkey's privatization policies are stimulating economic growth of TRNC.
- In terms of occupancy, responses were statistically significant ($p < 0,05$). To be more precise, it could be argued that when compared with other occupancies, students were found to be more pessimistic on thinking that Turkey's privatization policies are stimulating economic growth of TRNC.

Table 13: Thinking that Turkish Cypriots Interests are Considered by the Protocols which were Signed with Turkey (n=361)

	Yes		No		X ²	P
	N	%	n	%		
Gender						
Female	70	41,92	97	58,08	0,18	0,67
Male	76	44,19	96	55,81		
Age						
18-25 years old	32	36,36	56	63,64	6,75	0,15
26-33 years old	26	35,14	48	64,86		
34-41 years old	30	50,85	29	49,15		
42-49 years old	25	49,02	26	50,98		
50-65 years old	33	49,25	34	50,75		
Academic Background						
University Graduate	49	38,28	79	61,72	5,81	0,05
High School Graduate	70	42,42	95	57,58		
Primary School Graduate	27	58,70	19	41,30		
Occupancy						
Student	26	33,33	52	66,67	4,22	0,24
Working on public sector	40	48,19	43	51,81		
Working on private sector	48	45,71	57	54,29		
Others	32	43,84	41	56,16		
City						
Nicosia	49	37,98	80	62,02	2,79	0,59
Famagusta	35	43,75	45	56,25		
Kyrenia	29	46,03	34	53,97		
Güzelyurt	19	51,35	18	48,65		
İskele	14	46,67	16	53,33		

Table 13 exhibits the respondents' attitudes about thinking that Turkish Cypriots interests are considered by the protocols which were signed with Turkey.

Responses of the participants were compared with the light of the socio-demographic variables. Findings could be discussed as follows:

- In terms of gender, responses were not statistically significant ($p > 0,05$).
- In terms of age groups, responses were not statistically significant ($p > 0,05$).
- In terms of academic backgrounds, responses were not statistically significant ($p > 0,05$).
- In terms of occupancy, responses were not statistically significant ($p > 0,05$).
- In terms of place of living, responses were not statistically significant ($p > 0,05$).

This part mention about the surveys which held on Turkey, and the sample of these surveys encompasses Turkish citizen's responses.

According to 2014 survey results which conducted by Edam in Turkey the most of the respondents favoured the idea that negotiations should not last forever therefore there should be two separate states as a solution.¹⁸⁹

With the light of the survey results, which was carried by Kadir Has University Turkey Research Center in Turkey, respondents articulated that TRNC as a country which cannot be given up and as an important strategic base at the Mediterranean

¹⁸⁹ EDAM (2014). Available at <http://www.edam.org.tr/tr/File?id=2156>. Accessed (18.07.2017).

whereas some of the respondent believed that Turkey can make concessions for EU membership.¹⁹⁰

According to “Turkey’s Foreign Policy Perception Satisfaction Survey”, which survey the probable solution on the island showed that most of the respondents argued the best solution relies on reaching the peaceful agreements whereas only the small number of the respondents believed that TRNC should be an independent state.¹⁹¹

Throughout the survey results which conducted by Mehmet Küçükçiçek in 2014 the respondents were being asked as the agenda of the Turkish foreign policy in which the most of the respondents answered as the fight against terrorism. The lowest ratio was given to the Armenian relations and Cyprus issue was not in the rank of the questionnaire. In the other words, according to this survey results Cyprus issue is not in the rank of the foreign policy priority of Turkey. Another question that has been forwarded to the respondents was which country has strong relations with Turkey. The respondents selected Azerbaijan as the country that has strong relations with Turkey whereas TRNC was perceived as the country with nearest relations.¹⁹²

Moreover, INFAKTO Research Workshop conducted a survey in 2016, the respondents were being asked as whether traditional Turkish foreign policy could

¹⁹⁰ Kadir Has Üniversitesi (2016). Available at <http://www.khas.edu.tr/news/1367>. Accessed (18.07.2017-18:48).

¹⁹¹ Mensur Akgün, Sabiha Senyücel Gündoğar, Aybars Görgülü, Enver Aydın, *Türkiyede Dış Politika Algısı*, (İstanbul: Tesev, 2011).

¹⁹² Mehmet Büyükçiçek, “Kamuoyu ve Türk Dış Politikası Algısı: Selçuk Üniversitesi Örneği“, *Selçuk Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Meslek Yüksekokulu Dergisi*, (2016): 169-179. Available at https://www.academia.edu/30681941/Kamuoyu_ve_T%C3%BCrk_D%C4%B1%C5%9F_Politikas%C4%B1_Alg%C4%B1s%C4%B1. Accessed (21.07.2017-12:25).

play more active role over Turkish-Greece relations, Cyprus problem, Turkish-Armenian and the most of the respondents agreed that Turkish foreign policy could play more active role.¹⁹³

On the other hand, the respondents were being asked whether Turkey plays an active role over Cyprus negotiations or not. Moreover, the most of the respondents favoured the idea that Turkey plays active role over Cyprus negotiations.¹⁹⁴

In the light of the abovementioned survey results, there are some similarities with this study that Turkey and TRNC has strong relations and TRNC is the country which could not be given up by Turkey.

In one of the survey results the most of the respondents favoured fight against terrorism as important subject of the Turkish foreign policy agenda which was also mentioned in this study.

Another survey results which composed similar findings with this study is that Turkey should play more active role over finding solution on the Cyprus.

¹⁹³ Kadir Has Üniversitesi (2016), “Türk Elitlerinin Türk Dış Politikası ve Türk-Yunan İlişkileri Algıları Anketi”. Available at [http://www.khas.edu.tr/w243/files/TR-YN%20Anket%20\(TR\).pdf](http://www.khas.edu.tr/w243/files/TR-YN%20Anket%20(TR).pdf). Accessed (21.07.2017-12:27).

¹⁹⁴ Ibid.

Chapter 5

CONCLUSION

Turkish foreign policy has evolved with the AKP government since general election in 2002. Terms of the period accelerated AKP's power in order to gain support from citizen and increase AKP's power. AKP's election power has risen by the citizen support and it provided benefit to AKP shape to Turkish foreign and domestic policy. Foreign policy principles have formalized by the former Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu, by the "strategic depth" fundamental principles of Foreign policy emerged. In this context, the Turkish foreign policy which has a long history has been shaped. In first term between 2002 and 2007, AKP initial purpose was to fulfil Copenhagen Criteria in order to become an EU member. The Pro-EU perspective was dominated in that period on domestic and foreign policy of AKP. For this reason AKP gave up previous Turkish governments' perceptions and attitudes towards Cyprus and it rejected to support the "no solution is the solution" idea. In contrast, "Belgium Model" was reinforced; in addition to that AKP gave full support to Annan Plan through propaganda in Turkey and TRNC. AKP's foreign and domestic policies were not based on "status quo" policy. In other words AKP initiated to increase foreign country's support to provide benefit for increase the power of AKP in domestic manner.

Second term has begun with the general election 2007 which AKP took position in government by gaining 46.58 per cent of the votes. Prominent policy was to apply "zero problems with neighbourhood" In this sense AKP's Cyprus policy has shaped

in this framework. The purpose of this policy related with the establishment of trouble-free connection and extends relation not only certain with Western countries but also compromises Eastern countries as well. In this point the change in AKP's foreign policy has recognized. The foreign policy has begun to expand its relations with the other countries i.e. Eastern countries were enlarging its part in Turkish foreign policy agenda. Furthermore, Turkey's passive foreign policy towards to international matters has evolved, and AKP has relied on "pro-active" foreign policy. The effect of this policy on Cyprus policy of AKP has recognized. In 2010, AKP accelerated its initiative on recognition of TRNC, in that sense the collaboration of TRNC with OIC were reinforced through the AKP government.

In third term that begun in 2011, Turkey experience domestic challenge, the tension in domestic manner has increased. Especially, Syrian crises had impact on to shape Turkish domestic policy. Terror attacks and the flow of Syrian refugees caused domestic crisis therefore Syrian crisis became domestic matter of the AKP's agenda. On the other hand, AKP's foreign policy on Cyprus continued under the "pro-active" principle. In addition to that AKP pointed out realities of Cyprus conflict's structure. The important concept was related with fairness of the possible solution for both sides, Also AKP government aimed to reach permanent solution rather than "give-escape". The effect of EU's economic crises and political crises were enhanced to change Turkey's interest, therefore the importance of pro-EU perspective has decline. The prominent crossroad for AKP's foreign policy on Cyprus is based on revision between two principles; AKP's interest has turned from "warrior power" to "regional power". In this point, Cyprus island has importance for Turkey in strategic manner namely it's related with state interest.

Fourth term has begun in December 2015, in the following year Turkey experienced destructive coup attempt in 15 July 2016. It affected both internal and external relations of Turkey. Turkey was concentrated on its domestic matters even state of emergency has announced by Turkish government and security became controversial. AKP's foreign policy became nationalistic at that time.

AKP's foreign policy on Cyprus was consistent with in specific issue. Especially Turkish government was more close to have a just and final solution in Cyprus. Furthermore AKP government was stable on reaching the two communities' political equality and equivalent position of constituent states. Therefore, consistency is valid for the attitude of AKP government towards to Cyprus. On the other hand, relation with Turkey and TRNC has continued with the verbal tensions in time to time. Nevertheless, the relation with two countries never became as to burn one's boat. Additionally, Cyprus issue became more national matter than the first term. The latest investments made by Turkey strengthen the ties with TRNC such as water supply project.

As the previous chapters summarized the thesis guidelines the opinions of the participants regarding the most critical issues on the agenda of foreign policy which was shaped by AKP has been evaluated.

The results indicated that majority of the respondents agreed that having a fight against terrorism and relationships with Islamic countries are two vital issues, while Cyprus conflict and relationships with Russia were expressed as less critical issues for the foreign policy of AKP.

Results revealed that majority of the respondents have stated that TRNC is a county which cannot be abandoned while %11, 49 have stated that TRNC is an obstacle for Turkey, on the other hand, %13, 32 have mentioned that TRNC is not critical issue for Turkish Foreign Policy.

Majority of the respondents have mentioned that Cyprus policy of Justice and Development Party is partially successful whereas %14, 88 of the respondents have expressed that Cyprus Policy of the AKP is successful. Moreover, it could be stressed that %31.33 of the respondents have mentioned that Cyprus Policy of Justice and Development Party is unsuccessful.

Results revealed that majority of the respondents have negative responses for the Turkey's sincerity and reliability about the solution of Cyprus conflict. Moreover, it could be indicated that most of the respondents were thinking that Turkey had favoured solution of Cyprus conflict during referendum period.

The %38,90 of the respondents have agreed that Turkey will have some benefits in case of solution of Cyprus conflict while %19,84 of the respondents have stated that they did not believe Turkey will have benefit in case of peace in Cyprus.

Since 2000, Turkey's privatization policies are stimulating economic growth of TRNC, being informed about the structural "transformation program, and lastly thinking that Turkish Cypriots interests are considered by the protocols which were signed by Turkey.

It could be argued that majority of the respondents have stated that Turkey's economic development program failed to facilitate economic growth in TRNC. Moreover, it might be stressed that majority of respondents have argued that Turkey's privatization policies were unsuccessful to boost economic growth for TRNC. Beside of this, most of the respondents were neutral about being informed on the context of the structural transformation program. Lastly, majority of the respondents have discussed that interests of Turkish Cypriots were not considered by the protocols which are signed with Turkey.

Participants were also asked to articulate their responses about to what extent they agreed with the statements of; "shortage of water in TRNC can be solved by provision of water via pipelines from Turkey", "power failures in TRNC could be solved by transmitting electricity from Turkey via cables which laid down undersea", Transmitting electricity from Turkey will positively influence autonomy of establishments in TRNC. To create better understanding, it could be argued that majority of the participants agreed that shortage of water in TRNC can be solved by provision of water via pipelines from Turkey. Aside of this, most of the participants agreed that power failures in TRNC could be solved by transmitting electricity from Turkey via cables which laid down undersea . Finally, most of the participants agreed that transmitting electricity from Turkey would positively influence autonomy of establishments in TRNC while %18.02 of the participants was uncertain about that statement.

- In terms of age group, responses of participants were statistically significant. In other words, when compared with other age groups, respondents aged between 18-25 stated the success of AKP's on Cyprus Policy as least successful ($p < 0,05$).

- In terms of academic background, responses of participants were statistically significant. In other words, when compared with other academic backgrounds, respondents that were graduated from primary school stated AKP's on Cyprus Policy was successful.
- In terms of occupancy, responses of participants were statistically significant. To be more accurate, when compared with other occupancies, students stated the success of AKP's on Cyprus policy as least successful. ($p < 0,05$).
- In terms of city, responses of participants were not statistically significant. ($p > 0,05$).

In conclusion as this study has been focused on the perception of the Turkish Cypriots regarding the AKP policies it is shown that the most of the participants believe that AKP's Cyprus policy either partially successful or unsuccessful. Nevertheless it is believed that the water shortage and electricity problem could be solved via the support of the AKP government. Despite the fact that Cyprus is strategically important for Turkey, it could be discussed that AKP does not consult the priorities and perceptions of Turkish Cypriots' while shaping their policies for Cyprus.

The joint struggle of the parties during the Annan Plan has shown that the dynamics between Cyprus-EU and Turkey relations and AKP's role over the peace process have changed. The support of the AKP government to reach final solution in Cyprus is undeniable. Nevertheless the unilateral membership of the Greek Cypriots to the EU has blocked the opening of new chapters for EU negotiations of Turkey. The loss

of enthusiasm in the EU integration process and the AKP's tendency to become a regional power sets the agenda of Turkey today.

In order to reach long run, sustainable, consistent foreign policy towards Cyprus, the AKP government should understand the needs and perceptions of Turkish Cypriots could be analysed through surveys and questionnaires.

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APPENDIX

Questionnaire

The aim of the current study is to investigate Turkish Cypriots' attitudes towards the AKP policies on the Cyprus issue. This survey will use in thesis project in department of international relations of Eastern Mediterranean University. Respondent's names are not included, these are hidden.

1)Gender

Female Male

2)Nationality

KKTC TC Diğer

3)City:

- Lefkoşa
- Gazimağusa
- Girne
- İskele
- Güzelyurt

4)Age:

- 18-25
- 26-33
- 34-41
- 42-49
- 50-57
- 58 and above

5)Educational Status:

- University
- Postgraduate
- High school
- Primary Education
- Literate
- Illiterate

6) Profession:

- Student
- Public Servant
- Private Sector Employee
- Academic
- Other

7) Do you think the Justice and Development Party (JDP) foreign policy on Cyprus is successful?

- Semi successful
- Unsuccessful
- Completely unsuccessful
- Successful
- Completely successful

8) Which is the primary issue in agenda of Justice and Development Party foreign policy?

- Relations with European Union
- Fight against terrorism
- Relations with Armenian
- Relations with United States
- Relations with Islamic states
- Relations with Iraq
- Other
- Cyprus
- Relations with Turkish world
- Relations with Russia

9) Do you think that the Justice and Development Party (JDP) government is reliable and sincere about the solution of the Cyprus problem?

- Definitely yes
- Yes
- No
- Definitely no

- No idea

10) How do you describe the importance of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus for Turkey?

- A broader country that will never be abandoned
- A hump on the back of Turkey
- It is not one of the active elements of Turkish foreign policy
- It can be compromised for European Union membership by Turkey
- No idea

11) The Justice and Development Party (JDP) government has claimed that the Annan Plan is pro-solution in the referendum period. Do you find this approach of the JDP government is constructive attitude?

- Definitely yes
- Yes
- Definitely no
- No
- No idea

12) Turkish Republic of Cyprus (Greek Cypriot Administration) has announced that Turkish seas and airports will not be opened to the Republic of Cyprus, and will not officially recognize its existence after becoming a member of the European Union. Do you think Turkey has granted any privilege to the Republic of Cyprus until today?

- Definitely yes
- Yes
- Definitely no
- No
- No idea

13) Do you think the Turkish government's attempts to reform the rights and citizenship of immigrants from Turkey in the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus are effective?

- Definitely yes
- Yes
- Definitely no
- No

No idea

14) Do you think that Turkey is a contributor to the membership of political, sporting, scientific, tourist and cultural organizations of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus?

Definitely yes

Yes

Definitely no

No

No idea

15) Do you think that the economic development programs that has implemented by Turkey since the year 2000 for the financial and technical support in the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus are successful?

Definitely yes

Yes

Definitely no

No

No idea

16) Do you think that Turkey's pipeline water supply to Cyprus will meet the water needs of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus?

Definitely yes

Yes

Definitely no

No

No idea

17) Do you think that the privatization initiatives that started in 2012 with the support of the Turkish government is support the development of the economy of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus?

Definitely yes

Yes

Definitely no

No

No idea

18) Do you think that the Ercan Airport privatization project has made a positive economic impact for the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus?

- Definitely yes
- Yes
- Definitely no
- No
- No idea

19) Akıncı emphasized that in the past few months, "the division is defined as a solution by Turkey, but it has changed in the last ten years". Do you agree with that?

- Definitely yes
- Yes
- Definitely no
- No
- No idea

20) Do you think Turkey will be a winner if there is a solution in Cyprus?

- Definitely yes
- Yes
- Definitely no
- No
- No idea

21) Do you have any information about the latest status of the "Structural Transformation Program" that signed with Turkey?

- Definitely yes
- Yes
- Definitely no
- No
- No idea

22) Do you think that the interests of the Turkish Cypriot people are kept in the front line in the protocols signed with Turkey?

- Definitely yes
- Yes

Definitely no

No

No idea

23) Do you think that electricity transmission through the submarine by Turkey will meet its electricity need of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus?

Definitely yes

Yes

Definitely no

No

No idea

24) Do you think that Turkish Cypriot electricity transmission through the submarine will affect the autonomization of Turkish Cypriot institutions positively?

Definitely yes

Yes

Definitely no

No

No idea

