

**Rethinking Cyprus Conflict and Security:
North Atlantic Treaty Organization's (NATO) Role**

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ABSTRACT

Cyprus issue has been on the agenda in the international community. Disputes between Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots have gained new dimension with the hydrocarbon resources that was found in the Eastern Mediterranean. This thesis will focus on Cyprus conflict in terms of hydrocarbon resources. Before the solution of the Cyprus issue, Greek Cypriot administration unilaterally has encouraged its hydrocarbon exploration activities in the open waters of Cyprus. However, this situation has affected negotiation process and expectations in terms of security and foreign policy of Cyprus. This thesis aims to analyze the research question, “Whether NATO involvement in Cyprus’ security would create more favorable conditions for a long lasting peaceful settlement?” by testing the hypothesis that “why and how NATO should enhance energy security of the hydrocarbon findings in Cyprus offshores in particular and the Eastern Mediterranean in general to promote stability on the island?” In this context, relations between the Turkish and Greek Cypriots were analyzed. The Warsaw Pact has come to an end and the Soviet Union (USSR) has dissolved but the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is still evolving. This is so because NATO has not only been a military alliance, but also a community of shared principles and values. Two possible scenarios for NATO: the alliance may assume a new role for security as well as energy policies in the Eastern Mediterranean. NATO may not assume a new role in the Eastern Mediterranean because of the Russian involvement in Cyprus. As a result of this thesis; due to the Russia factor in Cyprus the NATO may not assume a new role to ensure the stability and security on island. This research will not only employ the method of the elite interviews but also will make use of other primary sources (treaties, agreements,

official reports and speeches). Thereby, this research will contribute to enhance the literature of International Relations studies on Cyprus problem. This research attempts to analyze the research question in five chapters. It reviews the problems inherent in making predictions in the first chapter. In the second chapter, it will summarize the Cyprus offshore hydrocarbons and regional policies between both Turkish and Greek Cypriots and Cyprus hydrocarbons and responses of the international actors. In the third chapter, Turkey's role in Eastern Mediterranean and its role assumptions will be elaborated. Turkey's role conception will be analyzed at two levels: Turkey's Big Brother role; Turkey's Natural Leader Role. Fourth chapter analyzes NATO's evolving and expanding role in energy security. This research will analyze NATO's possible new role in providing energy security in the Eastern Mediterranean. The fifth section will be an overview of the analysis and will be composed of the concluding remarks.

Keywords: Turkish Cypriot, Greek Cypriot, hydrocarbon, security, stability, cooperation.

ÖZ

Kıbrıs sorunu uluslararası toplumun gündeminde yer almaktadır. Doğu Akdeniz’de hidrokarbon kaynaklarının bulunması Kıbrıslı Türkler ile Kıbrıslı Rumlar arasındaki anlaşmazlığa yeni bir boyut kazandırmıştır. Bu tez hidrokarbon kaynakları bakımından Kıbrıs sorununa odaklanacaktır. Kıbrıs Rum Yönetimi, çözümden önce Kıbrıs açık sularında tektaraflı hidrokarbon arama faaliyetlerini teşvik etmektedir. Fakat bu durum güvenlik ve Kıbrıs dış politikası açısından müzakere sürecindeki beklentileri etkilemektedir. Bu tez “Kıbrıs’ın güvenliği konusunda NATO müdahalesi uzun süreli barışçıl bir çözüm için daha elverişli koşullar yaratır mı?” araştırma sorusunu, “NATO adada istikrarı sağlamaya yönelik Doğu Akdeniz’de ve özellikle Kıbrıs açık denizlerindeki hidrokarbon keşiflerinin enerji güvenliğini neden ve nasıl sağlayabilir?” hipotezini test ederek analiz etmeyi amaçlamaktadır. Bu bağlamda Kıbrıslı Türk ve Rumlar arasındaki ilişkiler analiz edilmiştir. Varşova Paketi’nin sonlanıp, (SSCB) Sovyetler Birliği’nin dağılmasına rağmen (NATO) Kuzey Atlantik Antlaşması Örgütü halen gelişmektedir. Bu nedenden dolayı; NATO sadece askeri bir ittifak değil, aynı zamanda ortak ilke ve değerleri olan bir topluluktur. NATO için iki olası senaryo vardır: İttifak Doğu Akdeniz’de güvenlik ve enerji politikaları için yeni bir rol alabilir. Ya da; NATO Kıbrıs’ta Rusya’nın varlığı nedeniyle Doğu Akdeniz’de yeni bir rol almayabilir. Bu tezin bir sonucu olarak; Kıbrıs’taki Rusya faktörü NATO’nun adada istikrarı ve güvenliği sağlamak için yeni bir rol üstlenmesine engel olabilir. Bu araştırma sadece elit görüşme yöntemi ile değil diğer birincil kaynakların (anlaşmalar, sözleşmeler, resmi raporlar ve mülakatlar) kullanımından da yararlanılarak hazırlanmıştır. Dolayısıyla bu araştırma, Kıbrıs sorunu ile ilgili olarak Uluslararası İlişkiler literatürünü

geliştirmeye katkıda bulunacaktır. Bu çalışma, araştırma sorusunu beş bölümde analiz etmeye çalışır. Birinci bölümde sorunun özü tahmin edilerek gözden geçirilecektir. İkinci bölümde Kıbrıs deniz hidrokarbonları, Kıbrıs'lı Türk ve Rumlar arasındaki bölgesel politikalar ve Kıbrıs hidrokarbonları konusunda uluslararası aktörlerin tepkileri özetlenecektir. Üçüncü bölümde Türkiye'nin Doğu Akdeniz'deki rolü ve rol varsayımları ele alınacaktır. Türkiye'nin rol anlayışı iki düzeyde analiz edilecektir: Türkiye'nin Ağabey rolü; Türkiye'nin Doğal Lider Rolü. Dördüncü bölüm, NATO'nun enerji güvenliğinde gelişen ve büyüyen rolünü analiz eder. Bu araştırma, Doğu Akdeniz Bölgesi'nde enerji güvenliğinin sağlanmasına yönelik NATO'nun olası yeni rolünü analiz edecektir. Beşinci bölümde yapılan çalışmalar analiz edilerek elde edilen sonuçlar açıklanacaktır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Kıbrıslı Türk, Kıbrıslı Rum, hidrokarbon, güvenlik, istikrar, işbirliği.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

2D	Two-dimensional surveys
3D	Three-dimensional surveys
AKP	Justice and Development Party
CHP	People's Party of Turkey
CTP	Republican Turkish Party
ECHR	European Court of Human Rights
EEZ	Exclusive Economic Zone
ESDP	European Security and Defense Policy
EU	European Union
FES	Friedrich Ebert Foundation
FPA	Foreign Policy Analysis
IR	International Relations
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NRCs	National Role Conceptions
OIC	Organization of the Islamic Conference
OSCE	Organization for Security and Regional Cooperation in Europe
PCC	Cyprus Centre
PRIO	Peace Research Institute of Oslo
RoC	Republic of Cyprus
SENT	Smart Energy Team
TKP	Communal Liberation Party
TPAO	Turkish Petroleum Cooperation
TRNC	Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus

UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNFICYP	United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus
USSR	Soviet Union
US	United States
USA	United States of America

Chapter 1

INTRODUCTION

The Warsaw Pact has come to an end and the Soviet Union (USSR) has dissolved but the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is still evolving. This is so because NATO has not only been a military alliance, but also a community of shared principles and values. There are two possible scenarios for NATO. The alliance may assume a new role, and function as the key institutional framework for the coordination of the security as well as energy policies. NATO, on the other hand, may not assume a new role because of differences of opinion of its member states about how to shape the common energy security. Even if NATO members decide to extend NATO's role, due to obstacles stemming from Russian involvement in Cyprus, it may not be able to assume a constructive role in the Eastern Mediterranean.

In 2010, energy security was set on the agenda of NATO, through its inclusion in the 2010 NATO Strategic Concept. "Key environmental and resource constraints, including health risks, climate change, water scarcity and increasing energy needs will further shape the future security environment in areas of concern to NATO and have the potential to significantly affect NATO planning and operations".¹

¹ *NATO Strategic Concept*, 19-20 November 2010. Retrieved 24 December 2015 from http://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_publications/20120214_strategic-concept-2010-eng.pdf

This idea was sponsored by newly formed European Union (EU) member states, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the Central and Eastern European member states, which are concerned about energy insecure by means of their energy dependence on Russia. Nevertheless, it was compelling for NATO to attain a ‘de facto’ mandate on energy security as several member states feared that they will upset Russia, and will be responsible of the militarization of an economic area. Nevertheless, after the resolution of the island, NATO may eventually lead Cyprus, Greece, and Turkey to work together, with European and the U.S. allies, “to carry out the redirection of NATO's strategic mission toward its southeastern flank and meet the challenges of a region perpetually snarled in war, terrorism, fury, instability, and crises that will unremittingly confront the West.”² In this context, the research questions whether NATO involvement in Cyprus’ security would create more favorable conditions for a long lasting peaceful settlement? Will NATO assume a new role in the field of energy? If so, what will NATO’s role (s) be in the field of energy security in the Eastern Mediterranean?

This research contributes to the academic literature on role theory by elaborating on both Turkey’s role in Cyprus issue and NATO’s role in world politics in general and security issues in particular after the Cold War, and its persistence as an international security actor implementing a broad security agenda after 2010. Further, it is important to stress that NATO bureaucracy influenced this new policy, and thus

² The Cyprus Settlement: Pulling NATO into the 21st Century, John Sitalides, *Global Europe Program, Wilson Centre*, 7 June, 2011. Retrieved 15 December 2015, from <https://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/cyprus-settlement-pulling-nato-the-21st-century# sthash. X5gv4pYE.dpuf>

played a significant role in opening new opportunities for NATO mission in the field of energy security. In this context, NATO inter-linked energy security with fields such as terrorism, cyber security and piracy; wherever they perceived the mandate of NATO is stronger and necessary. Additionally, NATO promoted energy efficiency measures in the military as means of attaining energy security as well as reducing its operations costs. The research is based on non-original interviews as well as face to face interviews conducted at Peace Research Institute of Oslo (PRIO), Atlantic Council, Cyprus Centre (PCC), Friedrich Ebert Foundation (FES) and the NATO headquarters in Brussels with high-ranking NATO officials in charge of energy security and with officials from NATO member states. Additionally, it consists of interviews conducted with academics in Cyprus and in the United States and Canada.

1.1 Literature Review

The future of NATO is significant not only for policy but also to international relations theory, particularly role theory. There are four reasons why role theory offers a base for anticipating the future of NATO. Furthermore, NATO is an ideal subject matter for neorealist and neoliberal institutionalist theory firstly “because alliances are products of processes at the systemic level of analysis.”³ Secondly, both neorealist and neoliberal scholars agree that, instead of discussing in theoretical terms the shortcomings and merits of either perspective, “an empirical research based on specific competing hypotheses and predictions with the future as acceptable as the past as a testing ground.”⁴

³ Gunther Hellmann and Reinhard Wolf, “Neorealism, Neoliberal Institutionalism, and the Future of NATO,” *Security Studies*, Volume 3, Issue 1, 1993, p. 4.

⁴ Ibid, p.4.

In this context, NATO is a ‘good test’ for both mainstream theories, but much more of use for role theory because NATO sets a good example for how new roles are assumed over time and space. Moreover, both neorealist and neoliberal schools of thought offer different deductions about how NATO will expand and evolve. For example, from a neorealist perspective the dissolution scenario of NATO was more likely than other cases. Neoliberal institutionalists, on the other hand, would anticipate that either transformation scenario or persistence would be the most likely outcome. Thereby, according to Gunther Hellmann and Reinhard Wolf, NATO is relevant in respect that it presents “both theoretical perspectives to the test of the future.” In this regard, both scholars attempt to show why a neorealist would predict the end of NATO, on the other hand a neoliberal institutionalist would anticipate that NATO would transform or go on surviving in its present form.

In the international relations (IR) theory literature predictions are not common. Our knowledge of social phenomena is limited and accordingly our theories are ‘soft’ because “social phenomena are the result of multiple causes at different levels of analysis, and it is often difficult, if not impossible, to determine the weight of different causal variables.”⁵ Nonetheless, various IR scholars formulate “implicit predictions about future developments in international relations.” For instance, John Lewis Gaddis's argument of the “insights derived from careful narration and thoughtful analogy” illustrate “distant futures.”⁶ Thereby, implicit anticipations are problematic because predictions are not all the time specified in such a manner that

⁵ Ibid, p.4.

⁶ Ibid, p.5.

they can be tested. Hence, anticipations of this kind may indeed “inform policy discourse.”⁷

Moreover, although neorealism and neoliberal institutionalism both agree on assumptions as states are “rational actors,” thus state behavior can be predicted. However, they also do not agree about the possibility for long standing international cooperation. Neorealists contend that states tend to compete, and this eventually leads to conflict.⁸ Subsequently, they fail to cooperate because of the self-help systems. Neoliberals contend that neorealists undervalue the impact of international institutions and that is the reason why they are pessimistic about the likelihood of cooperation. According to the neorealists’ perspective, international institutions have an impact on the behavior of states marginally because they are other dynamics that influence state behavior. Neoliberals maintain that international institutions can go on endorsing cooperation, even though the state interests are no longer there. However, neorealism and neoliberalism do share fundamental assumptions. Both schools of thought assume that the international system explain the regularities. Moreover, both theories assume that states are unitary actors in world politics pursuing their national interests. Further, they maintain that the international system is anarchic because there is no central authority- e.g. international police, international institution. Thus, there is no force that can urge states to comply with international agreements. Nevertheless, neoliberals contend that stable and strong international institutions can solve problems, which increase compliance and reduce states’ incentives to cheat. Institutions, in turn, create transparency by distributing information in order to reduce the costs for monitoring

⁷ Ibid., 7.

⁸ See, Brown, Chris, 2001. *Understanding International Relations*, 2nd ed., New York: Plagrave. See also, Waltz, Kenneth, 1979. *Theory of International Politics*, Boston, MA: McGraw-Hill.

state compliance. Hence, these institutions make “it more cost-effective for states to punish non-compliance.”⁹ In this respect, states attach great importance to the existence and functioning of international institutions.

On the other hand, neorealists and neoliberals disagree on whether absolute and relative gains are more significant. From a realist perspective, “states are not rational egoists whose utility functions are independent of one another, but “defensive positionalists.”¹⁰ Neoliberals maintain that states pursue relative gains only when they presume others to be aggressive or hostile. “States can afford to focus on absolute gains under conditions in which they expect substantial mutual gains through cooperation and in which they do not expect others to threaten them with force.”¹¹ The expectations, in turn, rest on principles, norms and rules of strong international institutions. Neorealists and neoliberals do agree on the linkages between the significance of relative gains, which indicate the functioning of international institutions. In this regard, “they emphasize different features of causal linkages.”¹²

Neorealists focus on relative gains as an *independent variable* while neoliberals regard international institutions as an *independent variable*. Stable and strong international institutions would, in turn, empower states to pursue absolute gains. In this regard, Kenneth Waltz argues that “for each state its power in relation to other

⁹ Ibid., 7.

¹⁰ Ibid., 8.

¹¹ Ibid., 8.

¹² Ibid., 8.

states is ultimately the key to its survival?”¹³ Neorealists’ view alliances and strong institutions as responses to threatening capabilities. According to Waltz it is the changes in the distribution of capabilities which lead to the shifts in the international system- unipolar to bipolar or multipolar over time. Thus, the shift of the international system will determine the future of alliances. Although they contend that alliance between states necessitate an institutional feature they argue that alliance evolution is prompted primarily by states common interests. Furthermore, states rely on the distribution of capabilities. “There is even the danger that today's ally will become tomorrow's enemy.”¹⁴ In this respect, states try to maintain a degree of independence even from close allies. Hence, they are hesitant to have their national capabilities regulated, controlled or governed by other states- supra-national government or global governance.

On the other hand, neoliberals view state interests much differently. They maintain that strong and stable international institutions have an impact on state’s interests in two manners. Firstly, strong institutions modify incentives because they have an impact on expectations of other states’ behavior; thereby make it less attractive to cheat. States do not like to be isolated in the international system they want to trade with each other. Additionally it makes it less risky to cooperate because the rules, procedures and information channels “reduce the costs of cooperative behavior and increase the costs of defection.”¹⁵ Therefore, strong and stable institutions increase state’s ability to anticipate the ‘intentions’ of other states. States, thus, “signal their

¹³ Kenneth N. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (Reading, Mass.: Addison Wesley, 1979).

¹⁴ Grieco, *Cooperation among Nations*, 47; also Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, 167.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 9-10.

willingness to continue patterns of cooperation, and therefore reinforce expectations of stability.”¹⁶ Secondly, neoliberals do not come to an agreement with neorealist propositions that international institutions would eventually collapse. Neoliberals do not agree that states struggle to be less dependent to institutions. “When confronting dilemmas of common aversion they do seek to justify their policy by going to seek approval from the strong institution.”¹⁷ Thus, rational actors’ do indeed construct international regimes.

1.2 Theoretical Framework

There is little empirical research on alliances which has been conducted by neoliberal institutionalists. Hard tests are needed in order to prove the validity of theoretical claims. In this regard, neoliberal institutionalism claim to be superior to neorealism has evaded a test of the theory. Few empirical researches have been conducted on the relevance of neoliberal theory in explaining the evolution and collapse of alliances. Neoliberal institutionalists argue that “states operate in an increasingly complex world with multiple issues and multiple contacts among societies, a world in which states face limitations in accomplishing essential tasks on their own.”¹⁸ The size of different issues states need to manage they would be willing to form regimes to address the challenges.

There are various definitions of regimes; however there is agreement among neoliberals as to why they are established. “They reduce transaction costs in

¹⁶ Keohane, "Correspondence: Back to the Future, Part II," 193 in Gunther Hellmann and Reinhard Wolf, "Neorealism, Neoliberal Institutionalism, and the Future of NATO", 9.

¹⁷ Arthur A. Stein, *Why Nations Cooperate. Circumstance and Choice in International Relations* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1990), 54.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 13.

interactions among states...and can act as catalysts for agreement, allowing governments to take advantage of potential economies of scale.”¹⁹ Additionally, institutions assist to ease problems resulting from uncertainty and state’s intentions. Governments are in a better position to assess whether other governments’ can be relied upon to keep their commitments. Thus, states can maximize their long-term gains.

Nevertheless, this does not explain how institutions evolve or whether and why institutions weaken or collapse. The first challenge is to how to define institutional strength. They measure strength by the degree of compliance. In other words, how frequently do states comply with international institutional principles, rules, norms as well as decision-making procedures? If states refuse to comply then an institution may be perceived to have weakened according to the neo-institutionalists. If states do not comply with rules and decision-making procedures, then an institution may not necessarily collapse. Thus, principles and norms need to be strengthened otherwise they will come to an end. When dynamics change they need also to be transformed by changing practices.

Neoliberal hypothesis about the persistence of institutions is the assumption that “they are created because states perceive them to be in their interest.”²⁰ In other words, it has to be perceived as an effective instrument for the realization of state interests. They assert that international institutions are much easier to maintain than they are to be established. Since it is very difficult to construct that and once founded it may be

¹⁹ Ibid., 13.

²⁰ Ibid., 14.

rational for states to comply their rules. Hence, institutions are thought to be resistant to change. Second, bargains are easier to communicate because an institution benefits from the information that it produces. Third, membership in institutions also affects the cost-benefit analysis and the formulation of interests by states. Fourth, neoliberals argue that “governments must fear retaliation if they renege on commitments entered into under the terms of the agreement that led to the creation of an institution.”²¹ Retaliation may be authorized under the agreed upon terms of the institution. “Even if a government saw leaving an institution in its interest, the likelihood that other governments might retaliate may lead that government not to leave.”²² Last but not least, the states may believe that their reputation might suffer and they will be isolated if they do not comply with the rules of the institution. “As the norms underlying international institutions are internalized, they affect the order and intensity of actor preferences, in the process developing a self-perpetuating dynamic. Therefore, international institutions evolve rather than die.”²³

The lack of testable hypotheses about the weakening of institutions is a major limitation of neoliberal institutionalism. Therefore there it is essential to re-examine the basic concepts underlying neoliberal theory, so as to see whether they are adequately differentiated. Therefore, this research will make use of Role Theory in order to understand how roles are assumed by states as well as institutions. In the 1970s, Role Theory emerged first in Foreign Policy Analysis when scholars began to

²¹ Ibid., 15.

²² Ibid., 15.

²³ Ibid., 16.

determine “the regular behavioral patterns of classes of states in the bipolar cold war structure, e.g. “non-aligned”, “allies”, “satellites” etc..”²⁴

States are able to adopt different/multiple role conceptions towards various states as a result of from various role expectations. Before Holsti, nine National Role Conceptions (NRCs) had been introduced by role theorists. These role conceptions are; “revolutionary leader-imperialist, bloc leader, balancer, bloc member; ally, mediator, non-aligned, buffer, isolate, and protectee.”²⁵ Holsti introduced eight more NRCs so now there were seventeen more NRCs based on his research of seventy-one states. He uncovered these roles by analyzing official statements of state leaders. In his work, Holsti employed nine hundred and seventy-two different sources (leaders’ official statements) from seventy-one states between January 1965 and December 1967.²⁶ *Table 1* shows Holsti’s typology on different roles.

Table 1.1: Holsti’s Typology of National Role Conceptions

- 1. *Bastion of revolution-liberator***
- 2. *Regional Leader***
- 3. *Regional Protector***
- 4. *Active Independent***
- 5. *Liberation Supporter***
- 6. *Anti-imperialist agent***
- 7. *Defender of faith***
- 8. *Mediator-integrator***

²⁴ Holsti, Kalevi J. (1970), National Role Conceptions in the Study of Foreign Policy. *International Studies Quarterly* 14:3, 233-309.

²⁵ Holsti (1970), p. 255.

²⁶ Holsti (1970), p. 256-257.

9. Regional-subsystem collaborator

10. Developer

11. Bridge

12. Faithful Ally

13. Independent

14. Example

15. Internal Development

16. Isolate

17. Protectee

Source: K. J. Holsti, "National Role Conceptions in the Study of Foreign Policy", *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 14, No. 3 (Sept., 1970), pp. 261-271. For detail description of these national role conceptions and additional role conceptions see Table 7 in Chapter 3.

Since then on, an increasing number of role theorists which proclaim the existence of an expanding number of social roles such as an initiator, mediator, leader counter-roles such as aggressor or followers etc. as the structure of international relations changed.²⁷ Early foreign policy role scholarship focused on the ego-part of roles, i.e. self-conceptualizations of a state's purpose by its leadership.²⁸ This literature did not review the foundations of role theory in anthropology, sociology and social psychology that emphasized social and relational roots of the concept such as the constitutive effects of counter-roles.²⁹ Role scholarship both in Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) and International Relations (IR) theory amounted to re-discover these

²⁷ Wendt, Alexander (1999) *Social Theory of International Politics*, New York: Cambridge.

²⁸ Walker, Stephen G. (1987): *Role Theory and the Origins of Foreign Policy*, in: Hermann, Charles F./ Charles W. Kegley/James N. Rosenau (Hrsg), *New Directions in the Study of Foreign Policy*, Boston, 269-284.

²⁹ Coser, Lewis A. (2003), *Masters of Sociological Thought. Ideas in historical and social context*, Long Grove, IL: Waveland Press, Inc.

roots in the last decade. Thereby, they began individual and state level of analysis to examine the systemic dynamics of role change.³⁰

By asking how narratives and identities have been constructed in both organizations (institutions) illustrate that changes have taken place in the self-conception and narrative of the two organizations resulting in different conceptions of role and identity. It is suggested that identity and narrative constructions are influenced by practical action and that the EU under European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) has experienced positive action, leaving it in a stronger position than NATO on questions of 'hard security'. The analysis utilizes recent empirical evidence in which the EU and NATO are often compared in terms of partnerships and operations.

1.3 Methodology

After the end of the Cold War, NATO has played an outstanding role by realizing an institutional control over the political situation which arose in Europe.³¹ NATO remains the capable security guarantee in the region. Even though the position of the EU is strengthening the EU does not have the ability or is not willing to defend the Eastern Mediterranean if these countries face a serious military threat to their security. Therefore, NATO will be inclined to play an essential role in ensuring the Eastern Mediterranean energy security. In this context, institutions such as NATO and states such as Turkey may change their roles over time according to changing dynamics.

In this sense, role theory offers a viable tool to understand and explain changes in state actors' foreign policy behaviors. The theory assumes that states' foreign policies

³⁰ Wendt, Alexander, *Social Theory of International Politics*, 227.

³¹ Holger Mölder, "NATO's Role in the Post-Modern European Security Environment, Cooperative Security and the Experience of the Baltic Sea Region," *Baltic Security & Defence Review*, Volume 8, 2006, 7.

are shaped in accordance with their foreign policy role conceptions that “are framed in an environment influenced by different elements of domestic and international politics.”³² This presumption does not discard “the existence of systemic variables constraining actors,”³³ state “incentives to pursue absolute gains,”³⁴ or “identity-based explanations for actors’ foreign policy behavior.”³⁵

Role theory also provides the objective of Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA), which is to fill the gap between theory and practice.³⁶ Stephen Walker asserts that “role theory is capable of reducing the uncertainty in grand theories through its emphasis on role location.”³⁷ Further, he contends that role theory “is framed as social enough to consider actors’ social interaction within complex adaptive systems, which develops viable and systematic explanations for certain courses of foreign policy behavior under certain conditions.”³⁸ Similarly, Thies and Breuning argue that both IR theory and FPA focus on the “agent-structure debate”, although from slightly different

³² Ozgur Ozdamar, Tolgay Halistoprak, Erkam Sulu, “From Good Neighbor to Model: Turkey’s Changing Roles in the Middle East in the Aftermath of the Arab Spring,” *Uluslararası İlişkiler*, Volume 11, No. 42 (Summer 2014), 93-113.

³³ Kenneth N. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, Reading, Massachusetts, Addison-Wesley Publishing, 1979.

³⁴ Robert O. Keohane, *After Hegemony, Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy*. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984).

³⁵ Alexander Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999).

³⁶ Stephen G. Walker, “Binary Role Theory and Foreign Policy Analysis”, ISA, New Orleans, February, 2010; Hudson, “Foreign Policy Analysis”.

³⁷ Ozgur Ozdamar, Tolgay Halistoprak, Erkam Sulu, *From Good Neighbor to Model: Turkey’s Changing Roles in the Middle East in the Aftermath of the Arab Spring*, pp. 96-97.

³⁸ *Ibid*, p.96.

perspectives.³⁹ Foreign policy analysis, utilizing the social psychology based role theory, has adopted a “cognitive approach” to roles, and IR, utilizing sociology-inspired constructivist analysis, and has generally adopted a “structural approach”.⁴⁰

This research attempts to analyze the research question in five chapters. It reviews the problems inherent in making predictions in the first chapter. While recognizing these problems, it maintains that deducing predictions from neorealism and neoliberal institutionalism is in line with the positivist epistemology both share and that such deductions offer important insights regarding policy making and theory building but it also makes use of role theory, which tries to understand and explain state and institution behavior from both a positivist and a post-positivist approach. In the second chapter it will summarize the Cyprus offshore hydrocarbons and regional policies between both Turkish and Greek Cypriots and Cyprus Hydrocarbons and Responses of the international actors. In the third chapter Turkey’s role in Eastern Mediterranean and its role assumptions will be elaborated. Turkey’s role conception will be analyzed in at two levels: Turkey’s Big Brother role and Turkey’s Natural Leader Role. Fourth chapter analyzes energy security and NATO’s evolving and expanding role in this field. The research will analyze NATO’s, possible new role in general and providing energy security in the Eastern Mediterranean region. The fifth section will be an overview of the analysis and will be composed of the concluding remarks.

³⁹ Cameron G. Thies and Marijke Breuning, “Integrating Foreign Policy Analysis and International Relations through Role Theory”, *Foreign Policy Analysis*, No.8, 2012, 1-4.

⁴⁰ See the Special Issue of *Foreign Policy Analysis*, Vol.8, No.1, 2012; Stephen G. Walker, “Binary Role Theory and Foreign Policy Analysis”, ISA, New Orleans, February, 2010; Lisbeth Aggestam, “Role Conceptions and the Politics of Identity in Foreign Policy”, ARENA Working Papers Series, 1999.

Chapter 2

CYPRUS OFFSHORE HYDROCARBONS AND REGIONAL POLICIES BETWEEN BOTH TURKISH AND GREEK CYPRIOTS

Since 2003, the Greek Cypriot Administration excluded Turkish Cypriots and signed Exclusive Economic Zone delimitation agreements with Egypt, Lebanon and Israel⁴¹ related to exploration of hydrocarbon resources in the open waters of Eastern Mediterranean.⁴² An American company, Noble Energy has licensed to explore oil and gas in the assigned parcels of the Eastern Mediterranean. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Republic of Cyprus (RoC) have maintained that “The decisions and actions of the Republic of Cyprus to explore and exploit its natural resources within its Exclusive Economic Zone fall squarely within its sovereign rights as recognized by the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, of which Cyprus is a state party and are therefore in full conformity with international law.”⁴³ In this respect, the Republic of Cyprus seeks other energy companies to make second round exploration contracts related to assigned parcels of Eastern Mediterranean Sea.

⁴¹ Cyprus and Israel sign deal demarcating sea borders. Retrieved 27 March 2012, from <http://www.haaretz.com/news/diplomacy-defense/cyprus-and-israel-sign-deal-demarcating-sea-borders-1.331160>.

⁴² Gürel, Ayla; Fiona Mullen; & Harry Tzimitras (2013) The Cyprus Hydrocarbons Issue: Context, Positions and Future Scenarios, PRIO Report, 1. Nicosia: PRIO Cyprus Centre.

⁴³ Public Lecture by the Minister of Foreign Affairs Dr. Erato Kozakou-Marcoullis, at the London School of Economics, Hellenic Observatory, “The Geostrategic Importance of Cyprus: Long Term Trends and Prospects” - Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Republic of Cyprus, 25/01/2012 <http://www.mfa.gov.cy/mfa/mfa2006.nsf/0/A7E9CE90518F4A5CC22579910020AB5C?OpenDocument>

Both the Turkish authorities in Ankara and the Turkish Cypriot authorities in Nicosia have opposed to the Greek Cypriot's hydrocarbon exploration actions. They also accused the Greek Cypriot administration as acting against the 1960-international agreements of Republic of Cyprus.⁴⁴ Thereby, both Turkey and Turkish Cypriots signed their own continental self-delimitation agreement.⁴⁵ They have started to explore oil and gas at the land of Turkish Cypriot controlled part of Cyprus and they also expressed their intention of starting exploration in some declared Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) offshore parcels of Republic of Cyprus.⁴⁶ Turkey also pressed Egypt, Lebanon and Israel to reevaluate their EEZ agreements with the Republic of Cyprus. Turkey pointed out that the drilling actions in the Eastern Mediterranean will cause serious problems in the region and Turkish vessels patrolled in the Eastern Mediterranean Sea.⁴⁷ "Turkey is actively pursuing a carrot-and-stick approach in a balancing act to protect its own interests in the eastern Mediterranean."⁴⁸ In this context, Turkey "should proceed diligently and cautiously in dealing with a simmering conflict in the region over drilling rights for potentially rich hydrocarbon

⁴⁴ Cyprus Treaty of Guarantee, Nicosia, 16 August 1960 <http://www.cypnet.co.uk/ncyprus/history/republic/try-guarantee.html>; Treaty of Establishment of the Republic of Cyprus, Nicosia, 16 August 1960 <http://www.cypnet.co.uk/ncyprus/history/republic/try-establishment.html>

⁴⁵ Turkish Cypriot and Turkish Media Review, *Press and Information Office*, 22 September, 2011. <http://www.moi.gov.cy/moi/pio/pio.nsf/All/F1479F4CC0E3CCC5C2257913003D8265?OpenDocument&print>

⁴⁶ Hubert Faustmann Ayla Gürel Gregory M. Reichberg, *Cyprus Offshore Hydrocarbons: Regional Politics and Wealth Distribution*, A joint publication by the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung and the PRIO Cyprus Centre, PCC Report 1/2012. Retrieved 30 November 2015, form <http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/zypern/10657.pdf>

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, 5.

⁴⁸ Abdullah Bozkurt, "Turkey Plays Balancing Act in Projecting Power in Eastern Mediterranean, *Today's Zaman*, 18 September 2011. Retrieved 1 December 2015, form http://www.todayszaman.com/national_turkey-plays-balancing-act-in-projecting-power-in-east-med_257091.html

resources in order to avoid perception problems ranging from bullying power to strong-arming its neighbors.”

2.1 Exploration offshore Cyprus

Republic of Cyprus has started hydrocarbon explorations in the area of 51000 sq km offshore Cyprus in 2006.⁴⁹ Republic of Cyprus declared Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) in the exploration area and this region divided into 13 blocks. Two-dimensional surveys (2D) were directed in all 13 blocks between the March and May 2006, after that three-dimensional surveys (3D) were directed in Block 3 between the January and March 2007.⁵⁰ Meanwhile, in January 2007, Republic of Cyprus signed an agreement with Lebanon similar to 2003 Egypt EEZ delineation agreement however it has not been ratified by the Lebanese Parliament.⁵¹

Grounded on the available seismic data, the Republic of Cyprus started international offer for three-year oil and gas exploration licenses in February 2007.⁵² The American Noble Energy Company was licensed for oil and gas exploration in Block 12 which is also called as Aphrodite.⁵³ In October 2008, Republic of Cyprus was signed a production-sharing agreement with the Noble Energy Company. After further seismic explorations, Republic of Cyprus and Israel was signed EEZ agreement on September

⁴⁹ Ayla Gürel Fiona Mullen Harry Tzimitras, *The Cyprus Hydrocarbons Issue: Context, Positions and Future Scenarios*, PRIO Report, PCC REPORT 1/2013. <https://sapientaeconomics.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/02/The-Cyprus-hydrocarbons-issue-ENG-WEB.pdf>

⁵⁰ Ibid., 3.

⁵¹ Daniel Meier, *Lebanon's Maritime Boundaries: Between Economic Opportunities and Military Confrontation*, St. Anthony's College, University of Oxford, June 2013. <http://lebanesestudies.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/maritime.pdf>

⁵² Ayla Gürel Fiona Mullen Harry Tzimitras, *The Cyprus Hydrocarbons Issue: Context, Positions and Future Scenarios*, 3.

⁵³ Ibid., 4.

2011 and first exploratory drilling started on 20 September 2011. The Noble Energy Company reported the discovery of hydrocarbons roughly 7 tcf (198bcm) in the Block 12.⁵⁴ The Noble Energy's partner Delek Group that works at the Israel gas fields has announced the Aphrodite reserves as 5.2 tcf (147bcm) by using different estimation methods.⁵⁵

After the discovery of hydrocarbon resources in the Block 12, there was competition between the companies who were interested in the second Cyprus offshore licensing round.⁵⁶ However the second round Cyprus offshore licensing actions was disapproved by Turkey. Turkey claimed that some EEZ blocks of RoC such as Blocks 1, 4, 5, 6, 7 falls into its continental shelf.⁵⁷ Also the Turkish Cypriots demanded equal rights on the Blocks 2, 3, 9, 10 and 12. RoC was cautious for those blocks because Turkey was determined to protect both Turkish and Turkish Cypriot rights regarding the offshore hydrocarbon resources of Eastern Mediterranean. Meanwhile, RoC realized that Turkish authorities would not allow hydrocarbon exploration and drilling processes to go on. In this respect, it formulated two important strategic plans

⁵⁴ Noble Energy, Operations, Eastern Mediterranean, Retrieved 29 October 2012, from <http://www.nobleenergyinc.com/Exploration/Recent-Discoveries-130.html>. Note that the geological structure in which the Aphrodite field is located actually lies on the EEZ border with Israel. As stipulated in the RoC-Israel EEZ delimitation agreement, the two parties are presently negotiating 'to reach a framework unitization agreement on the modalities of the joint development and exploitation' of reserves that may be proven to extend across the border. As of late October 2012, such an agreement was yet to be finalized.

⁵⁵ 'Delek Group Announces Consolidated Results for the First Quarter of 2012', press release, 30 May 2012, Delek Group. Retrieved 29 October 2012, from <http://ir.delekgroup.com/phoenix.zhtml?c=160695&p=irol-newsArticle&ID=1700654&highlight=Cyprus>, accessed 29 October 2012.

⁵⁶ Ibid, Ayla Gürel Fiona Mullen HarryTzimitras, 26.

⁵⁷ In discussion with Prof. Dr. Turgut Turhan who is a professor in the Faculty of Law at the Eastern Mediterranean University (EMU), "Oil and Natural Gas in Eastern Mediterranean," organized by Beşparmak Group, 23 May, 2013.

to prevent Turkish intervention in his attained EEZ blocks. Firstly, RoC signed an agreement with American Noble Energy Company dealing with hydrocarbon exploration and drilling in Block 12 to get Americans' support in the region. They also reiterated that "the international community supports the right of the (de facto Greek Cypriot) Republic of Cyprus (RoC) to explore for oil and gas, it also has strong expectations that the hydrocarbons revenues be shared in the event of a solution to the Cyprus problem."⁵⁸ Secondly it cooperated with Israel that has important gas reserves near to Block 12 at Leviathan.⁵⁹ RoC wanted to cooperate with Israel to find out a way for marketing those hydrocarbons in European countries without depending on Turkish oil pipeline. It also wanted to collaborate with Israel in military fields to protect its EEZ from the Turkish military threats. Nevertheless, Israel apology to Turkey raised concerns in RoC. And, Greek Cypriot officers were even more disappointed when the U.S. President Obama stated that "The United States deeply values our close partnerships with both Turkey and Israel, and we attach great importance to the restoration of positive relations between them in order to advance regional stability and security,"⁶⁰ The Chief Economist at the International Energy Agency, Fatih Birol, contained that "the Israeli apology would facilitate the close partnership between Turkey and Israel on energy projects in a way to isolate the 'Greek Cypriot administration'."⁶¹

⁵⁸ Ibid, Ayla Gürel Fiona Mullen HarryTzimitras, VII.

⁵⁹ Ibid., 4.

⁶⁰ Herb Keinon, "Netanyahuappologizes to Turkey over Gaza Flotilla," *The Jerusalem Post* <http://www.jpost.com/International/Obama-Netanyahu-Erdogan-speak-by-phone-307423>

⁶¹ Chief Economist at the International Energy Agency: "Turkey-Israel to isolate Greek Cypriots on energy",_Ankara Anatolia news agency 26 March, 2013.

To date, RoC acts as the sole internationally recognized state on the island and both European Union (EU) and the United States (US) support its hydrocarbon exploration and drilling movements in the Block 12 of the Eastern Mediterranean. The U.S. Ambassador to Cyprus John M. Koeing acknowledged that U.S. supports a peaceful settlement in Cyprus and it also supports the hydrocarbon explorations of Noble Energy Company in Cyprus. RoC thinks that there is not any obligation waiting for the solution of Cyprus problem to explore the hydrocarbons in the region.⁶² Greek Cypriots do not wish to negotiate their sovereign rights in the Eastern Mediterranean. RoC reassured the rights of the Turkish Cypriots and claims that it is ready to share the revenues of hydrocarbon findings.⁶³ The former RoC leader Demetris Christofias has acknowledged that the revenue distribution of hydrocarbon resources will be organized by the central government of federal Cyprus.⁶⁴ He also expressed, in the General Assembly statement, on September 2012 that both Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots will share the revenue of natural resources after the solution of reunified Cyprus. However, Greek Cypriots acted as a sovereign state and they did not accept any participation of Turkish Cypriots in the exploration or management process of natural resources before the solution of the Cyprus problem.⁶⁵ Even Greek Cypriots do not officially discuss with the Turkish Cypriots to negotiate the

⁶² In discussion with John M. Koeing (US ambassador to RoC) “American Policy in the Eastern Mediterranean” which organized by Political Science and International Relations Department of Eastern Mediterranean University, 15 May, 2013.

⁶³ Siiri Camilla Aas Rustaad, The Peace Potential of Hydrocarbon Resources A Scoping Study, *Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO)* September 2014, 12.
[http://file.prio.no/publication_files/prio/Hydrocarbon%20PRE%20Scoping%20Study%20\(6\).pdf](http://file.prio.no/publication_files/prio/Hydrocarbon%20PRE%20Scoping%20Study%20(6).pdf)

⁶⁴ Hubert Faustmann Ayla Gürel Gregory M. Reichberg, *Cyprus Offshore Hydrocarbons: Regional Politics and Wealth Distribution*, 10.

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, 80.

management of natural resources. Their strategy was to motivate the Turkish Cypriots to come to a solution by using the natural resources of the Republic of Cyprus.

RoC looks for alternative ways to export its hydrocarbon resources to European markets. They want to collaborate with Israel in the selling process of natural resources because Block 12 (RoC Gas reserves) and Leviathan (Israel Gas reserves) are very close to each other. They think that it is very convenient to transfer those hydrocarbon resources from the region to Europe. The Greek Cypriot authorities think that if a Turkish pipeline is built then they would be depended on Turkey. The President of Republic of Cyprus Nicos Anastasiades has officially offered the Israel-Cyprus-Crete-Greece pipeline for EU.⁶⁶ He also officially offered that the Italy could be second alternative way for transportation hydrocarbons from Eastern Mediterranean to Europe.

The hydrocarbon installation process is very expensive in terms of exploration, drilling, transformation, storage and transfer of Eastern Mediterranean hydrocarbon resources. The discovery of “shale gas” in America is very cheaper than the hydrocarbon resources. Especially Poland and some European countries started to use this shale gas as an alternative energy sources and the importance of hydrocarbon resources decreasing progressively. The Turkey pipeline way is the best economic alternative path to cheaply transport the Eastern Mediterranean hydrocarbons into European Markets. The Greek Cypriots should strategically determine their

⁶⁶ Stefanos Evripidou, Israel-Cyprus Strategic Dialogue Launched, *Cyprus Mail*, 16 June 2015
<http://cyprus-mail.com/2015/06/16/israel-cyprus-strategic-dialogue-launched/>

preferences in terms of both marketing of hydrocarbons and solution of the Cyprus problem; otherwise they will lose the European market in progressing time.⁶⁷

2.2 Turkish and Turkish Cypriot Hydrocarbon Policies in Eastern Mediterranean

Turkey has extensive deep-water exploration with Turkish Petroleum Cooperation (TPAO) in the Black sea. The former Turkish Minister for Energy and Natural Resources, Taner Yıldız has announced, in October 2011, that the exploration actions will be shift from Black Sea to Eastern Mediterranean.⁶⁸ TPAO has directed 2D and 3D seismic explorations in the open seas of Antalya, Mersin and Iskenderun of Mediterranean. In November 2011, TPAO and Royal Dutch Shell made an agreement dealing with exploration in offshore Antalya. It is also scheduling natural resources discoveries in the offshore Mersin and Iskenderun.⁶⁹ Turkey and (unrecognized) Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) signed a continental self-delimitation agreement on 21 September 2011.⁷⁰ According to continental self-delimitation agreement the Turkish companies can explore natural resources in areas around Cyprus on behalf of TRNC. It determines a border between the southern coast of Turkey and the northern coast of Cyprus. The agreement was ratified by the TRNC Parliament on 9 January 2012 and by the Turkish Parliament on 29 June 2012. It was counteraction for the exploratory drilling actions of RoC government off the southern coast of island. However both the RoC and Greece condemned this self-delimitation

⁶⁷ Interview Prof.Dr. Kudret Özersay, academic staff in Political Science and International Relations Department of EMU; and Günay Çerkez, The Head of The Turkish Cypriot Chamber of Commerce.

⁶⁸ Ayla Gürel and Laura Le Cornu, Turkey and Eastern Mediterranean Hydrocarbons, *Global Polititcal Trends İstanbul Bilgi University*, October 2013, p.2.

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, 4.

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, 14.

agreement between Turkey and TRNC and they found the agreement illegal and invalid.⁷¹

Turkish Cypriots demanded bi-communal federal political settlement between Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots before the unilateral exploration of Cyprus hydrocarbons by the Greek Cypriots.⁷² Turkish Cypriot side offered cooperation by the UN motivated negotiations between the sides to find a bi-communal federal solution for the Cyprus problem. Like the rest of the international community Turkey also “supports the UN sponsored negotiations between the two Cypriot communities for resolving the Cyprus problem.”⁷³ Rather than only sharing wealth of hydrocarbon revenues, Turkish Cypriots are concerned about gaining their equal sovereign rights with Greek Cypriots in the form of bi-communal federal state. Turkish Cypriots claim equal rights and equal share with Greek Cypriots on the offshore hydrocarbons of Cyprus. Although both Greek Cypriots and international community accept their equal rights, there is not any negotiated settlement between the sides in terms of maritime law and hydrocarbon resources.⁷⁴ Finnish Ambassador to Cyprus, Anu Saarela argued that the Cyprus hydrocarbon resources could be conducive to solve problems between the Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots.⁷⁵ She also offered that

⁷¹ Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2010, December 21). Press Release Regarding the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) Delimitation Agreement Signed Between Greek Cypriot Administration and Israel. No: 288. http://www.mfa.gov.tr/no_288_21december2010_press_releaseregardingtheexclusiveeconomiczone_eez_delimitation_agreementsignedbetweengreekcypriotadministrationand_israel.en.mfa

⁷² Ayla Gürel and Laura Le Cornu, Turkey and Eastern Mediterranean Hydrocarbons, 12.

⁷³ Ibid., 11.

⁷⁴ Başeren, S.H. (2010). Dispute over Eastern Mediterranean maritime jurisdiction areas. Istanbul: Türk Deniz Araştırmaları Vakfı Yayınları.

⁷⁵ Interview, Anu Saarela, Ambassador of Finland to Cyprus, 13 March 2013.

the sides should take forward a moderate way of dealing with the issue of how to share hydrocarbon resources. The ambassador Anu Saarela stressed that there should be comprehensive solution between the sides.

Turkish Cypriots defended their rights as equal partner of the 1960 Cyprus Accords.⁷⁶ They clearly emphasized their willingness to be equal political partner of Greek Cypriots in a future comprehensive federal solution. However, they rejected the unilateral delineation agreements of RoC with some coastal countries of Eastern Mediterranean such as Egypt, Lebanon and Israel. Turkish Cypriots wanted to cooperate with Greek Cypriots in the bi-communal federal solution process of Cyprus problem and equal sharing process of Cyprus natural resources. They think that unilateral hydrocarbon exploration actions of RoC would damage the negotiation process. On 24 September 2011, the Turkish Cypriots formally made a proposal for mutual suspension or mutual cooperation of hydrocarbon resources with Greek Cypriots but their proposal refused by the Greek Cypriots.⁷⁷ However, Turkish Cypriots responded to this situation with the corporation of Turkey and unilaterally signing agreements with Turkey to protect rights of Turkish Cypriot Community, thus they started hydrocarbon exploration in the offshore of Cyprus.⁷⁸

Furthermore, on 29 September 2012, Turkish Cypriots offered a new proposal to UN Secretary General to appoint a bi-communal technical committee by the members of

⁷⁶The Treaty of Guarantee between the RoC, Greece, Turkey and the UK is part of the 1960 Cyprus Accords that established the RoC. Under this treaty, Greece, Turkey and the UK became guarantors of the RoC's 'independence, territorial integrity and security and also the state of affairs established by its constitution'

⁷⁷ Ayla Gürel and Laura Le Cornu, *Turkey and Eastern Mediterranean Hydrocarbons*, 20.

⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, 30.

both Turkish and Greek Cypriots. The ‘technical committee’ would be appointed by the UN Secretary General to provide mutual consensus on the issue of how offshore hydrocarbon resources of Cyprus would be shared between the sides.⁷⁹ The technical committee would be authorized to keep the total revenue of hydrocarbon resources and this revenue would be used for the implementation of comprehensive federal settlement in the island.

The Turkish Cypriots’ proposal also recommended that a pipeline through Turkey would be cheapest way for transportation of hydrocarbon resources to the European markets. They also claimed that other transportation alternatives such as installation a LNG plant or a pipeline through Greece would not be profitable way to carry offshore hydrocarbons of Cyprus.⁸⁰ However, all those proposals of Turkish Cypriots are refused again by the Greek Cypriots and they did not achieve any mutual consensus over the sharing offshore natural resources of Cyprus.

On the other hand, Turkey has opposed to Greek Cypriot Administration because of its unilateral hydrocarbon exploration actions and Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) claims in the Eastern Mediterranean. Turkey did not recognize the RoC and its unilateral EEZ delimitation agreements with the third countries such as Egypt, Lebanon and Israel. Turkish Cypriot’s rights disregarded by the Greek Cypriots and Turkey emphasized that the Turkish Cypriots have equal rights with Greek Cypriots in the maritime zones and natural resources of Cyprus. Turkey also clearly expressed that the unilateral hydrocarbon exploration initiatives by the Greek Cypriots would be

⁷⁹ Ibid., 15.

⁸⁰ Ibid.,15-16.

inconsistent with the UN negotiation process and those initiatives should be suspended until the comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus problem.⁸¹ On February 2012, Turkey declared that Cyprus offshore natural resources should be explored and shared together between Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots. Otherwise, the concession blocks will stay as disputed areas between the two sides. Turkey also offered that the Cyprus hydrocarbon dispute either would be suspended aftermath the comprehensive resolution of Cyprus problem or the sides should negotiate for joint solution of this matter under the auspices of UN Secretary General.⁸²

However, according to the interview conducted with the Leader of Republican People's Party of Turkey (CHP) Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu the Eastern Mediterranean hydrocarbon resources are very important and both Cypriots and Turkey has rights in the region. He stated his concerns about the efforts made by the Greek Cypriot administration in the region, and he also attributed the unsuccessful policies to the Justice and Development Party (AKP). He emphasized that the AKP government should take more active policies dealing with the hydrocarbon resources of Eastern Mediterranean.⁸³

Many states of international community consider that each sovereign state has right to explore and exploit natural resources in his EEZ region.⁸⁴ Ahmet Sözen also expressed that; many states of international community say that the RoC has right as

⁸¹ Ibid.,p.16.

⁸² Ibid., p.16.

⁸³ Interview, Kemal Kılıçtaroglu, Republican People's Party (CHP), 1st May 2013.

⁸⁴ Interview, Prof. Dr Ahmet Sözen Vice Rector, former head of department of Political Science and International Relations in Eastern Mediterranean University, 21st May 2013.

sovereign state to explore and exploit hydrocarbons in the region even though there is a conflict on the Cyprus problem, but they also emphasizes that those resources should be shared equally between the both Greek and Turkish Cypriot Communities. Professor Sözen stress that there is not any continental shelf or EEZ agreement between the RoC and Turkey and Turkish Cypriots were excluded from the decision making process of Cyprus hydrocarbons by the RoC. However, this situation negatively affected the Cyprus negotiation process, and it has created a 'cold-war' in the region. On the contrary, both Turkey and Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus had signed continental self-delimitation agreement and TRNC had authorized TAPO to explore and exploit natural resources in territories and EEZ of TRNC.

Sözen has added that the negotiation process on the Cyprus problem would re-start. There are discussions towards whether the hydrocarbon issue should solve together with the Cyprus problem or it should think separately. If hydrocarbon issue would solve together with the Cyprus problem there must be a comprehensive solution to achieve lasting settlement on the island. However, the Turkish side's proposal which was the corporation of hydrocarbon resources under authorized independent commission between both Turkish and Greek Cypriots also would be another solution concept for the hydrocarbon issue.

Sözen argues that both Cyprus problem and hydrocarbon issue should be discussed by technical committees in terms of concise issues, confidence building measures and regional cooperation. Those technical committees should provide alternative solution proposals for both Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot leadership to negotiate the best alternative proposal for the comprehensive solution of both Cyprus and hydrocarbon

issue in the island. The concise issues should cover a discussion about the unresolved issues that could not achieve before negotiations. The confidence building measures could be discussion issues about the opening of the off Varosha for settlement, opening the Famagusta Port for Turkish Cypriots, opening of direct flights to the Turkish Cypriot community, opening Turkish ports to Greek Cypriots, approving Turkey's EU membership process by the Greek Cypriots, reducing the number of Turkish troops in the island and so on.

Furthermore, there could be an unofficial technical committee to discuss the regional cooperation between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots, Turkey, Greece, Israel and Lebanon on the Eastern Mediterranean hydrocarbons. Cyprus, Israel and Lebanon Hydrocarbon reserves are very close to each other and the Turkish pipeline way is the best alternative to transport them collectively to European markets. The regional cooperation on the Eastern Mediterranean hydrocarbon resources could convince Greek Cypriots for comprehensive solution.

2.3 Cyprus Hydrocarbons and Responses of the International Actors

The UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon responded sides to avoid raising tensions and he also expressed that “all Cypriots” are the owner of the natural resources of Cyprus. Lisa Buttenheim who is the Special Representative of the UN Secretary General on Cyprus has also explained that Greek Cypriots have already indicated their intention to share natural resources of Cyprus and it would be properly shared aftermath a comprehensive solution is reached.⁸⁵ POGO Secretary General, MP Skevi Koukouma stated that “the firm belief which is that, the federal solution is the only

⁸⁵ *Cyprus News Agency*, Butttenham: Talks Best Chance to Resolve the Cyprus Problem, 25 October, 2015. <http://www.cna.org.cy/webnewsEN.asp?a=545068553d98413ebf428b4a592fa2e0>

route towards the realization of our overall vision for the future of our country.”⁸⁶ According to the UN Secretary-General’s Special Adviser on Cyprus, Alexander Downer, emphasized that UN could not impose the two sides to negotiate on the matter of Cyprus hydrocarbons, both sides should willingly ask UN Secretariat to mediate role on the issue. He added that, “if you do not like a federation then nobody will impose federation on you and you can discuss some other methodology to solve the problem it is up to you not up to us.”⁸⁷ On the matter of Cyprus hydrocarbons while the Turkish Cypriots accept the UN as arbiter, the Greek Cypriots do not want to negotiate about it. UN also clearly announced that if both Turkish and Greek Cypriots collectively demand mediating role then it could act as arbiter between the two sides on the matter of Cyprus hydrocarbons.⁸⁸

The UN Security Council and its five permanent members have not undertaken any initiative related to the natural resources of island during the renewed resolutions of the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP). Except China all permanent members of UN Security Council (Russia, US, UK and France) supported the hydrocarbon exploration actions of RoC. China has not commented about the Cyprus hydrocarbons issue because it has distinctive policy that not arguing dealing with the other countries’ disputes. Russia supported the hydrocarbon exploration

⁸⁶ *Parikiaki*, UN SG “dedicated” to achieve a comprehensive Cyprus settlement, Buttenheim says, 7 March 2015. <http://www.parikiaki.com/2015/03/un-sg-dedicated-to-achieve-a-comprehensive-cyprus-settlement-butenheim-says/#sthash.bma3P1hP.dpuf> & <http://www.parikiaki.com/2015/03/un-sg-dedicated-to-achieve-a-comprehensive-cyprus-settlement-butenheim-says/#sthash.bma3P1hP.dpuf>

⁸⁷ *Famagusta Gazette*, “Downer: Any Federation Framework is not a Guarantee,” 11 October, 2011. <http://famagusta-gazette.com/downer-any-cyprus-federation-framework-is-not-a-guarantee-p13173-69.htm>

⁸⁸ Ayla Gürel and Laura Le Cornu, Turkey and Eastern Mediterranean Hydrocarbons, 20. UN SG “dedicated” to achieve a comprehensive Cyprus settlement, Buttenheim says, 7 March 2015.

actions of RoC and emphasized that the natural resources of Cyprus should be shared between the both Turkish and Greek Cypriots. Neither UN nor permanent members of UN could impose the Greek Cypriots to negotiate the hydrocarbon issue with the Turkish Cypriots. On the other hand, the US (United States) supported the RoC's collective hydrocarbon exploration actions with the American Noble Energy Company rather than pushing Greek Cypriots to negotiate the hydrocarbon issue in the comprehensive solution process of Cyprus problem.⁸⁹

The international community do not wish to impose Greek Cypriots for the resolution of hydrocarbons except Turkey. Some countries that have collective pipeline with Turkey, such as Austria may support Turkey, but this is not effective. On the other hand, the U.S. does not want to oppose the Greek Cypriot-Israel cooperation in the region. U.S. supports a comprehensive solution negotiation process between the Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots and it does not prefer to focus on only hydrocarbons issue rather than the comprehensive solution of the Cyprus problem. Turkey has a strategic relationship with the Zorlu Group and would wish to convince Israel that the Turkish pipeline way would be best alternative to transport those hydrocarbons to European markets. If Turkey persuades Israel to cooperate on Eastern Mediterranean hydrocarbons then the Greek Cypriots will face some difficulties in the region.⁹⁰ On the other hand, the Greek Cypriot, Israel, Turkish Cypriot and Turkey cooperation dealing with the Eastern Mediterranean hydrocarbon resources could create economic wealth and regional security in the Eastern

⁸⁹ Ibid., 13.

⁹⁰ Interview, Assoc. Prof. Dr. Erol Kaymak, Chairman of the Political Science and International Relations Department of Eastern Mediterranean University, 17th April 2013.

Mediterranean. However, if the legitimate rights and interests of the Turkish Cypriots and Turkey are ignored by Greek Cypriots and Israel; that would cause security crisis in the region.⁹¹

It is obvious that the future of the Cyprus hydrocarbons issue is ambiguous. There is not any consensus between the Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots on the issue of comprehensive federal solution of Cyprus problem and equal sharing of offshore Cyprus hydrocarbons. The ambiguity related to the future of the Cyprus hydrocarbons has affected foreign and security relations in the region. While Turkish authorities of Ankara and Turkish Cypriot authorities of Nicosia support comprehensive federal solution of Cyprus problem and equal shearing of offshore Cyprus hydrocarbons under the UN auspices, the Greek Cypriots authorities reject any discussion or corporation on the hydrocarbons. Greek Cypriot authorities rather than solution of the matter, they acted unilaterally to collaborate with American company Noble Energy to take Americans' support in the region. They also collaborated with Israel in the security affairs to prevent Turkey's intervention in the region. However Turkey had been emphasized the equal rights of Turkish Cypriots on the offshore Cyprus hydrocarbons. It is important that the international community such as US and UN should encourage Greek Cypriots to compromise with Turkish Cypriots on the issues of comprehensive federal solution of Cyprus problem and equal sharing of offshore Cyprus hydrocarbons, otherwise the regional stability would not be achieved in the Eastern Mediterranean.

⁹¹ Interview, Associate Prof. Dr. Umut Uzer, Department of Humanities and Social Sciences at Istanbul Technical University, 17th April 201.

Chapter 3

TURKEY'S ROLE IN EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN

Role theory analyzes the geostrategic, cultural/ideational, economic and political determinants of a country's foreign policy. Various studies analyze Turkish foreign policy with reference to state geographic location, economic material factors and strategic/military considerations, culture, identity, as well as state elites' political priorities, but only few of these researches explicitly or implicitly refer to role theory.⁹² This thesis will analyze Turkey's role in the Eastern Mediterranean big brother role and natural leader role using Hatay and Byrannts role models.⁹³

Since AKP came to power, Turkey has reached an “unprecedented economic growth” and followed a new diplomatic strategy to promote its regional status.⁹⁴ Former Turkish Foreign Minister and the recent Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu followed a proactive policy during his foreign ministry to reduce existing problems of Turkey with its neighbor countries. Turkey's “zero problems” policy has improved its economic relations in the Middle East.

Turkish proactive foreign policy has followed different type roles such as big brother role, stabilizer role, protector role and natural leader role to pursue its national

⁹² See, Bülent Aras, *The New Geopolitics of Eurasia and Turkey's Position*, Frank Cass, London, 2002.

⁹³ Bryant, R., & Hatay, M. (2013). *Soft Politics and Hard Choices*. Peace Research Institute Oslo, 1.

⁹⁴ *Ibid.*, 1.

interests in the region. Each role has produced distinctive diplomatic policies towards the regional strategic expectations of Turkey. Those roles also would be determinant in the Greek- Turkey relations dealing with the Eastern Mediterranean offshore hydrocarbons issue of Cyprus.⁹⁵

Greek Cypriots' unilateral hydrocarbon exploration action in the offshore of the Eastern Mediterranean has made Turkey to reconsider new projects such as the water and electricity projects in the Turkish side of Cyprus. Greek Cypriots has started first exploratory drilling actions on 20 September 2011.⁹⁶ After the unilateral hydrocarbon exploratory movements of Greek Cypriots, Turkey has pursued the "Drinking Water Supply Project" to solve water shortage in the north part of the island. The project aspired to achieve annual water transfer roughly 75 millions of cubic meters through a sea pipeline from Turkey. The construction of Alakopru Dam over the Dragon River was the starting point of the of "North Cyprus Domestic Water Supply" project on 7 March 2011. This water transportation project will be first international experiment for countries that have water scarcity in the world.⁹⁷ Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoglu and Turkish President Tayyip Erdogan came to TRNC "to inaugurate the pipeline bringing water to the north from Turkey in October 2015."⁹⁸ It is said that water

⁹⁵ Ibid., 1-2

⁹⁶ Ayla Gürel and Laura Le Cornu, Turkey and Eastern Mediterranean Hydrocarbons, 7.

⁹⁷ Maden, E. T. (2013). Havzalararası Su Transferinde Büyük Adım: KKTC İçme Suyu Temin Projesi. Ortadoğu Analiz. Cilt 5. Sayı 50, 102-111.

⁹⁸ *Cyprus Mail*, Erdogan's Visit to Cyprus to Inaugurate Pipeline, 13 October 2015. <http://cyprus-mail.com/2015/10/13/erdogan-visit-on-saturday-to-inaugurate-pipeline/>

pipeline may be a ‘peace project’ according to the Turkish Cypriot leader Mustafa Akinci.⁹⁹

In the past, there was three different solution proposals for the water problems of North Cyprus. Those methods were transportation of water by medusa balloons, transportation of water by tanker and transportation of water through a pipeline. In this manner, it has been planned to transport water about 25 millions of cubic meters per year from the south coast of Turkey.¹⁰⁰ Those three methods have been evaluated by the Mineral Exploration Institute of Turkey in 1996. According to this evaluation, the project cost of tanker transportation has been determined as 152 million USD by the Marine Bank and the private sector. However, this project could not be implemented due to its high cost.¹⁰¹

Medusa balloons are the most appropriate to ensure the water transport by sea. North Cyprus is intended to project 7 year life of the balloon with 100,000 m³ capacity but in that project Normed type 10,000 m³ capacity balloons have been used. Medusa balloons provided by Mediterranean Water Distribution Trading Joint Stock Company which is established by Norway Company named Nordic Water Supply in Turkey. Among the projects the most cost-effective one, water balloon transportation was carried out first time as trial on April 28, 1998. The water has been transferred from the Soğuksu source of Anamur’s Ayvacık district in Turkey. North Cyprus old president Rauf Denktaş had been announced during the test runs that in the future that

⁹⁹ *Cyprus Mail*, Akinci says water could be a peace project, 18 August 2015. <http://cyprus-mail.com/2015/08/08/akinci-says-water-could-be-a-peace-project/>

¹⁰⁰ *Ibid.*, Maden et. al., 106.

¹⁰¹ *Ibid.*, Maden et. al., 107.

water could provide settlement between Turkish and Greek Cypriots. In case the Greek Cypriot requested then the Turkish side would provide water for the Greek Cypriots.¹⁰²

After the trial runs, the first regular water transfer has been carried out with 10,000 m³ balloons on July 25, 1998. During that water transfer, Turkey President of the period Süleyman Demirel was in The North Cyprus and he stated that “Water balloon transplantation is the beginning of the transport of water with pipeline. We also will provide water requirements of the Greek Cypriot Administration”¹⁰³

During four years, even though it was not regularly transported, total amount transported by balloons from Turkey to North Cyprus has been 2 million tons of water. According to Radikal newspaper article dated December 2, 1998 a 50 m aperture tear was formed in one of the balloons and that event has caused disruption of balloon transportation. In December 2002 the Mediterranean Water Distribution Company has stopped the water transfer because of the unpaid debts of North Cyprus.¹⁰⁴

The problems on water transfer with balloons has brought pipeline project on the agenda. The unilateral hydrocarbon exploration actions of Greek Cypriots have also encouraged both Turkey and Turkish Cypriots to act collectively in order to construct a pipeline water transfer project from Turkey to North Cyprus. This project designed

¹⁰² Ibid., Maden et. al., 107.

¹⁰³ Ibid., Maden et. al., 108.

¹⁰⁴ Ibid., Maden et. al., 108.

by Alarko Holding which consisted of Finland, the Netherlands and Swedish consortium of companies. According to this project, it has been planned to transfer 75 million m³ of water under the 250 meters sea surface with 160 cm diameter plastic pipes. North Cyprus Water Supply Project is the first time in the world and also referred to as the turn of the century project that the foundation was laid on 7 March 2011. This project was planned to be completed in March 2014 but because of some technical problems and adverse weather conditions it has been delayed to the mid-2015.¹⁰⁵




Figure 3.1: It shows cross-section of “Drinking Water Supply Project” through pipeline from Turkey to Northern Cyprus¹⁰⁶.

The water will be transferred by 80 kilometers long pipeline under the 250 meters sea surface. The project has two promotion centers one is settled in the side of Alakopru Dam and the other is settled near the Gecitkoy Dam in North Cyprus to store

¹⁰⁵ Ibid., 110.

¹⁰⁶ Ibid., 107

transferred water. Gecitkoy Dam has been started to be built on 2 April 2012.¹⁰⁷ The project is the most important pillar "Sea Crossing" unit will be applied for the first time in the world. British Neptune Oceanographics, Aquatec Group Limited and Trevor Jee Associates under the auspices ARTI Project Company have the control of Smartpipe System which will detect leaks and spills.¹⁰⁸



Figure 3.2: Map plan of the Northern Cyprus pipeline water transfer project¹⁰⁹.

“North Cyprus Drinking Water Supply Project” had planned to make by Turkey and the importance of that project can be listed as follows:

-This project will provide good quality water to Turkish Cypriots who have for a long time used water, which was under the international standards.

¹⁰⁷ Devlet Su İşleri, (2014). Asrın Projesinde İkinci Adım. <http://www.dsi.gov.tr/haberler/2012/04/02/asrinprojesi>.

¹⁰⁸ Ibid., Maden et. al.,109.

¹⁰⁹ Ibid., Maden et. al.,109.

-In Northern Cyprus to meet the water requirements the groundwater is used intensively. The use of ground water is expected to decrease predominately. This project demonstrates that the Turkey is willing to meet the needs of North Cyprus and assume a big brother role.

3.1 Turkey's Big Brother Role

Turkey's assumed a "big brother" role in terms of subsidizing Ottoman cultural heritage in the Muslim populations of Balkans, particularly in Bosnia and Macedonia and Bulgaria, where ethnic Turkish minorities inhabit¹¹⁰. According to the Organization for Security and Regional Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) representative on Freedom of the Media "Turkey is often touted as a model of democracy for the Muslim world, despite internal ups and downs in its own implementation of democracy most recently seen in the jailing of hundreds of journalists, academics, and students on charges of sedition."¹¹¹

In this context, Turkey tries to play the 'big brother' role. The Economist argued that the "Turkish model" was affecting states in the Middle East and North Africa.¹¹² Notion of "Turkish movement" was employed to influence the smaller or weaker regional states which tend to follow Turkish policies in order to achieve economic

¹¹⁰ Bryant, R., & Hatay, M. (2013). *Soft Politics and Hard Choices*. Peace Research Institute (PRIO).

¹¹¹ The Organization for Security and Regional Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) <http://www.osce.org/fom/89371>). According to the Turkish daily, See also Hurriyet, in August 2012, 2,824 students were being held in Turkish prisons, after having been arrested since 31 January 2012 on charges of "being a member of an armed terrorist organization" (<http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/number-of-students-in-jail-hits-2824.aspx?pageID=238&nid=27286>).

¹¹² *The Economist*, "Turkish Model: A hard act to Follow," 6 August, 2011. <http://www.economist.com/node/21525408>

growth, stability, security and democracy, even they were not willing to adopt the Turkish model.¹¹³

Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC), for instance, “adopted a flag of its own based on the Turkish model.”¹¹⁴ Turkish Cypriots were an unrecognized minority group in the Cyprus. During the Ottoman rule (1570-1578) Muslim Turkish Cypriots were privileged minority in terms of paying fewer taxes than the Orthodox Christian Greek Cypriots on the island. However, their privileges ended when the Ottoman rule left the island to British administration in 1878. Turkish Cypriots relied on Turkey as their ‘big brother’ to prevent the nationalist aspirations of the Greek Cypriots since the beginning of British rule on the island.

Greek Cypriots were 80 percent of the population and their nationalist leaders wanted to set up a representative government in order to achieve enosis (union with Greece), which meant the unification of the island with Greece. Turkish Cypriots rejected the representative government and enosis demands of Greek Cypriots because they did not want to be a minority group under the Greek administration. Turkish Cypriots also collaborated with the British colonial rule to prevent the representative government initiatives of Greek Cypriot majority. They also expected from Turkey to undertake a big brother role in order to stop the enosis actions of the Greek Cypriots towards the unification of island with Greece. Greek Cypriot leaders demanded enosis to end

¹¹³ Ibid., 24.

¹¹⁴ *Encyclopedia Britannica*, Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, <http://global.britannica.com/place/Turkish-Republic-of-Northern-Cyprus>

British administration in 1955. “The Greek Cypriots’ demand for enosis was opposed by Turkish Cypriots, constituting a major division in the island’s politics.”¹¹⁵

The years from 1955 to 1959 were turning point of Turkish Cypriots in terms of their political future. However, Greek Cypriots’ enosis aspirations aggravated relations and created mistrust between the two communities, and prevented a peaceful resolution among the sides. In the aftermath of 1955, Turkey was concerned with the Cyprus problem. In order to secure the rights of Turkish Cypriots Turkey wished to intervene. It also aspired to halt the Greek superiority on the island due to strategic reasons¹¹⁶ Turkey, Greece and United Kingdom were three guarantor countries that could change the political destiny of the island.¹¹⁷ Turkey called for partition to prevent the Greek Cypriots’ enosis aspirations, but this was not accepted in 1958. Turkey and Greece, rather than Turkish Cypriots or Greek Cypriots negotiated the issue in Zurich and London agreements to make a new deal between Turkish and Greek Cypriots to establish a new independent communal power sharing state in Cyprus¹¹⁸

During the Zurich and London negotiations Turkey has undertaken an active role to protect the rights of Turkish Cypriot community. In 1960, the new state was established under the name of Republic of Cyprus to represent collectively Turkish

¹¹⁵ *Encyclopedia Britannica*, Cyprus: British Rule, <http://global.britannica.com/topic/enosis>

¹¹⁶ Bahcheli, T., Bartmann, B., & Srebrnik, H., *De Facto State: The Quest for Sovereignty*, (Routledge: Taylor and Francis Group, 2004), 165-166.

¹¹⁷ Cyprus Treaty of Guarantee, Nicosia, 16 August 1960. <http://www.cypnet.co.uk/ncyprus/history/republic/try-guarantee.html>

¹¹⁸ *Ibid.*, Bahcheli, T., Bartmann, B., & Srebrnik, H., 166.

and Greek Cypriot communities. The new Republic was represented by a Greek Cypriot president and there was also a Turkish Cypriot vice-president who authorized with a veto power over the security, defense and foreign issues. Parliamentary legislation provided by separate majorities of the two communities. Turkish Cypriots were only 20 percent of the population but they gained constitutional independence against Greek Cypriots with a 7: 3 ratio (70 percent Greek Cypriots versus 30 Percent Turkish Cypriots) in the institutions of civil service, parliament and cabinet of the new republic.¹¹⁹

Turkish Cypriots felt themselves in safety because of the guarantor status of Turkey together with the United Kingdom and Greece to protect the independency of Cyprus and those countries had obtained legal rights to install small contingent on the island. However, the Turkish Cypriots did not trust the intercommunal cooperation with the Greek Cypriots because they did not rely on the Greek Cypriots' intention in terms of their willingness to live together with Turkish Cypriots peacefully on the island.¹²⁰

A short period after the establishment of Republic of Cyprus, the problems on the issues of civil service quotas and division of municipalities had been appeared between the two communities. Greek Cypriot authorities claimed that the 30 Per cent quotas were very high for 20 per cent Turkish Cypriot population and they also complained that the Turkish Cypriots were insufficiently skilled. On the other hand, Turkish Cypriots demanded the separation of five major municipalities, due to poor service towards for Turkish Cypriot municipalities. Those administrative confusions

¹¹⁹ Ibid., Bahcheli, T., Bartmann, B., & Srebrnik, H., 166.

¹²⁰ Ibid., 166.

led to immobilization of the bi-communal government. Moreover, the Greek Cypriots attempted to change some important articles of the constitution such as veto power of Turkish Cypriots and separate majorities of legislation in order to make more effective constitution. However, those constitutional changes were unilaterally organized by Greek Cypriots; thereby they brought important restrictions on the constitutional rights of Turkish Cypriots.¹²¹

In 1962, Turkish Cypriots were seriously disturbed from the strong enosis demands of the Greek Cypriots, but the Greek Cypriot authorities were not willing to protect the constitutional rights of the Turkish Cypriots. A year later intercommunal clashes started between two communities in December 1963. Short period after Greek Cypriot leader President Makarios made a suggestion to change the constitutional rights of the Turkish Cypriots.¹²²

Greek Cypriot leaders were reluctant to depend on the provisions of the 1960 constitution. They had been already aspired the Akritas Plan in order to cancel the treaties, undermine the republic and succeed the Enosis. After 1963, Turkish Cypriots were thrown away from the Cyprus government and their cabinet, parliament and civil service rights came to an end. At that time, Turkish Cypriots were restricted from the financial funds of the Republic of Cyprus and they were financially supported by Turkey. One quarter of Turkish Cypriot community, nearly 25,000 of Turkish Cypriot population have been enforced to live in poor economic circumstances and insecure conditions between the years 1963 and 1974. Majority of Turkish Cypriots do not

¹²¹ Ibid., 166-167.

¹²² Ibid., 167.

want to come together with Greek Cypriots in a collective state because of their bad experience.¹²³

Greek Cypriot leader Makarios took military support from Greece between the years 1967 and 1974. However, the Greek junta regime operated a coup in order to overthrow Makarios and achieve enosis on 15 July 1974. This situation initiated Turkish military operation to protect Turkish Cypriots rights, in accordance with the provisions of Guarantee Agreement, which was signed at Zurich and London in 1960. Turkey wanted intervene to Cyprus together with other guarantor states namely UK and Greece, but they rejected to be part of the military operation. Therefore, Turkey as the big brother country of the Turkish Cypriots has used its guarantor rights and organized a military intervention to stop the bloody clashes between two communities. Turkish military intervention ended the prolonged ethnic conflict between two communities, and took control over the 37 per cent territory in the north part of island. This, in turn, created regional separation between Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots.¹²⁴

Composite demographic structure of the island has dramatically changed after 1974 Turkish intervention. Turkish and Greek Cypriot communities suffered from the refugee crisis. A third of the Greek Cypriot population approximately 160,000 people moved to south and almost 40 per cent of Turkish Cypriots roughly 45,000 people migrated to north part of the island in order to live in a secure environment. Turkish military operation welcomed by the majority of Turkish Cypriots and considered as an

¹²³ Ibid., 167.

¹²⁴ Ibid., 167-168.

intervention to stop the intercommunal problems of Cyprus. However, Greek Cypriots, Greece and some other international actors have still claimed that Turkish military operation is an invasion of the north part of Republic of Cyprus.¹²⁵

After Turkey's intervention Turkish Cypriots have gained political authority and control in the north part of island through the guarantor status of Turkey. This intervention also prevented the Greek Cypriot's pressures on Turkish Cypriots, and even stopped the civil war between the Greek Cypriots who were combating for Makarios regime and Greek junta regime. Both regimes were struggling for the independent Greek Cyprus but their targets and methods were different from each other. Makarios regime changed their aggressive policies against Turkish Cypriots, rather they preferred soft politics such as buying Turkish properties expensively or encouraging Turkish Cypriots to go abroad permanently in order to achieve an independent Greek Cyprus. However Greek junta regime was persisting on absolute military operations to kill all Turkish Cypriots and Makarios' supporters in order to achieve their enosis dreams, but that was prevented by the 1974 Turkish military intervention.¹²⁶

Greek Cypriots has lost the 1974 war but they gained international recognition as the legal government of the Republic of Cyprus in the south part of the island. Greek Cypriots also took Greece's support to put an international pressure over Turkish Cypriots and Turkey in order to provide unification of island. In this respect the Greek Cypriots were more active than the Turkish Cypriots to present Cyprus problem in the

¹²⁵ Ibid., 168-169.

¹²⁶ Ibid., 169.

international area. Therefore; majority of the UN decisions assisted the Greek Cypriots towards leaving of Turkish army and reunification of Turkish and Greek Cypriots in the island.¹²⁷

The unrecognized TRNC could not represent Turkish Cypriots in the international area. However; Turkey's support facilitates observer status for the Turkish Cypriots in order to present their problems in various platforms such as the Economic Co-operation Organization and the Organization of the Islamic Conference. TRNC has diplomatic representatives in Turkey, United Arab Emirates, Azerbaijan, Germany, Kyrgyzstan, Belgium, Switzerland, Qatar, Pakistan, Kuwait, United Kingdom, Bahrain, Oman, United States of America, Italy, Sweden, France and Israel. But except Turkey those offices could not benefit from the diplomatic missions.¹²⁸ Turkish Cypriot representatives lobby in those countries in order to get recognition for TRNC in the international arena.

Turkish Cypriots has not been successful in getting international recognition and legitimacy for TRNC and they still suffer in terms of the economic conditions due to sanctions. In other words, Greek Cypriot lobby enforce economic embargo on Turkish Cypriot administration. Greek Cypriots also convinced European states and international community to impose embargoes on the Turkish Cypriots' goods.

¹²⁷ Ibid., 169-170.

¹²⁸ Dış Temsilcilikler, Kuzey Kıbrıs Türk Cumhuriyeti Ankara Büyükelçiliği, 2015. <http://kktcbe.org.tr/www/tr/Icerik.ASP?ID=765>

Thereby, foreign states except Turkey have not permitted direct flights in the north part of island and that also leads to restrictions on tourism.¹²⁹

Turkey immediately recognized the new state TRNC and established mutual diplomatic relations with the Turkish Cypriots. Up to date, except Turkey no other state attempted to accept the recognition of new Turkish Cypriot State. Bangladesh intended to recognize the TRNC but it was prevented by the United States' pressures. Foundation of TRNC concerned Greek-Turkish relations, and United Kingdom advised UN Security Council Resolution 541 urged the TRNC's recognition to be reversed.¹³⁰

However, Turkey always supported Turkish Cypriots and at the end of the Cold War Turkish Cypriot Community was in an expectation that Turkey would be a more active regional power to promote the international status of the TRNC. After the Cold War and dissolution of the Soviet Union there was a window of opportunity. Turkish Cypriots expected that Turkey would pursue a more active foreign policy in Central Asia, the Caucasus and the Balkans. Those regional developments raised the Turkish Cypriots hopes that Turkey could encourage the newly independent Soviet states such as Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan (Turkic populations) to recognize the TRNC as an independent Turkish Cypriot state but it was not materialized.¹³¹

¹²⁹ Ibid., Bahcheli, T., Bartmann, B., & Srebrnik, H., 166.

¹³⁰ Ibid., 171.

¹³¹ Ibid., 172

Additionally, during the 1991 Gulf War Turkey and United States diplomatic relations were in very good terms. During that phase, Turkey could have brought Cyprus problem on the agenda to solve it on behalf of Turkish and Greek Cypriot communities. Turkey also could prevent Greek Cypriot and pro-Greek lobby activities in United States to enhance the diplomatic status of Turkish Cypriots. Nevertheless, in 1990s the worsening Aegean crisis among Turkey and Greece made Turkey reluctant to undertake responsibility in order to provide reconciliation between Turkish and Greek Cypriots.

TRNC Parliament has voted to change 1984 and 1985 resolutions related to federal solution of Cyprus problem on 29 August 1994. In this respect, the Parliament accepted that the Turkish Cypriots have been moving away from the federation.¹³² Nancy Crawshaw who is a Cypriot political researcher also expressed that the Turkish Cypriot side is moving away from the original agreement and during the resolution process most of the Turkish Cypriots have come to the conclusion that two states should obtain equal sovereign rights and self-determination. This was verified in negotiations between Javier Perez de Cuellar (then UN secretary-general) and Rauf Denktash in March 1990.¹³³ Turkey as the big brother country of the Turkish Cypriots rather than federation supported confederal solution in the island and the Turkish Cypriot leader Denktash negotiated confederal settlement as two equal peoples and two equal sovereign states between the Turkish and Greek Cypriot communities.¹³⁴ However, the Turkish Cypriots' confederation proposal refused by the Greek Cypriots

¹³² Ibid, Bahcheli, T., Bartmann, B., & Srebrnik, H., 172.

¹³³ Nancy Crawshaw., Cyprus: a crisis of confidence. *World Today*, April 1974, 74.

¹³⁴ *Agence France Press*, 31 August 1998.

and Ioannis Kasoulides (former Foreign Minister of Greek Cypriot) expressed that the confederal structure is worse than dissolution.¹³⁵ They aspire to rule the whole island and do not want to share power with Turkish Cypriot minority¹³⁶

Turkey's 'cultural assimilation policy' on Turkish Cypriots seems to have increased year after year. Privatization issue of the northern electricity network and its expected takeover by the Turkish companies, considered as Turkey's control over the Northern Cyprus economy. According to Turkish Cypriots, Turkey undertakes big brother role to take decisions on behalf of Turkish Cypriots however they also consider that the Greek Cyprus acts the same and they collaborate with Greece. Turkish Cypriots claims that the Greek Cypriots use same national anthem with Greece but the Greek Cypriots emphasize that after the reunification they will arrange a new anthem¹³⁷

However, the majority of Turkish Cypriots do not trust that the Greek Cypriots aspire reunification because they believe that the Greek Cypriot side is content of the current political circumstances. Turkish Cypriots emphasized that status quo is not acceptable because it increases tensions between Greece and Turkey. They want a negotiation guideline with deadline for the resolution of the issue, but their good will was not accepted by the Greek Cypriot authorities.¹³⁸

¹³⁵ *Cyprus News Agency*, 2 March 2000.

¹³⁶ Interview, Kudret Özersay, 21st May 2013.

¹³⁷ EurActiv, (2012). Northern Cypriots put hope in EU for reunification

<http://www.euractiv.com/future-eu/northern-cypriots-put-hope-eu-re-news-513784>

¹³⁸ *Ibid*, EurActiv.

Professor Erol Kaymak argued that the positive relations between EU and Turkey could contribute to reunification of the sides on the island. He thinks that recent close relations of Turkey with France and Germany could promote the EU admission process of Turkey and that could also create a resolution on the Cyprus negotiations.¹³⁹

Turkey as the big brother of the Turkish Cypriots did not accept the unilateral hydrocarbon exploration actions of the Republic of Cyprus. It emphasized that the Turkish Cypriots have equal rights on the offshore Cyprus hydrocarbons as well as the Greek Cypriots. However Turkey has not succeeded an effective proactive foreign policy to deter the unilateral hydrocarbon exploration actions of Republic of Cyprus in the offshores of the Eastern Mediterranean. Turkey could not find any international support to convince both the Greek Cypriots and international community to postpone hydrocarbons issue after the solution of the Cyprus problem. Greece as the big brother country of the Greek Cypriots undertook the protection of Republic of Cyprus against Turkey and supported Greek Cypriots on the hydrocarbon exploration actions. On the other hand, the US exploration company Noble Energy got the US political support for the drilling without Turkish consent. Even the Russian political discourses encouraged Greek Cypriots to start the project. These developments in the Eastern Mediterranean hydrocarbons have encouraged Greece and Israel to sign a security cooperation agreement in Jerusalem. These policies left Turkey and Turkish Cypriots isolated.¹⁴⁰

¹³⁹ Interview, EurActive (2012), Erol Kaymak, 9th July 2012

¹⁴⁰ Carmon, H., (2011). Neighborhood Bulling in Turkey-Cyprus Conflict. The World Post. http://www.huffingtonpost.com/haggai-carmon/turkey-cyprus_b_952964.html.

The Justice and Development Party (AKP) have pursued a foreign policy in order to stabilize its neighborhood and promote the “Turkish model” to the Middle East.¹⁴¹ Former AKP Prime Minister, President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has always emphasized that the Turkish policies would be one step ahead of the Greek policies, in order to find peaceful resolution on the Cyprus Question.

TRNC has better living standards compared to the other developing countries. Turkey assumes a “Big Brother” role by giving economic support for TRNC. It has undertaken infrastructure projects, loan programs and financial development aids in the north part of the island. Huge amount of Turkish financial aids have increased the living standards of the Turkish Cypriots compare to Turkish people because they are paid twice as much for doing the same job.

However, the unrecognized status of TRNC has extracted economic costs in Turkish Cypriot community. The Greek Cypriots has been protected by many states and international organizations, such as the EU, United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), and the World Bank but the Turkish Cypriots have not gotten as much support from the other states. It was only Turkey that helped the TRNC. Thereby, TRNC has attracted neither foreign investment nor Turkish investment. Turkish entrepreneurs did not want to risk their capital because of political instability.

Turkish Cypriots under some restrictions exported their commercial goods after 1974 but since 1994 the Greek Cypriots’ appeal to the European Court of Justice declared that the Turkish Cypriot commercial goods were illegal if they were not approving by

¹⁴¹ Bryant, R., & Hatay, M., 24.

the “sanitary certificates” of the Greek Cypriot authorities. The European Union declaration also effected the commercial relations between TRNC and United Kingdom thereby; the export of main Turkish Cypriot goods such as clothing, potatoes and citrus have been prevented in United Kingdom market, which, in turn, lead to economic recession in the Turkish Cypriot society.¹⁴²

After the European Court of Justice’s restrictions on TRNC economy, Turkey continued to provide great economic assistance for Turkish Cypriots. End of the 1990s and beginning of the years 2000 deep global economic crisis affected Turkish economy, thus due to the crisis Ankara’s economic aids were greatly declined. In the meantime, Turkey and Turkish Cypriot authorities stressed economic embargoes applied by Greek Cypriots, which lead to their economic problems. Furthermore, the European Commission reported that the Turkish Cypriots will face economic challenges in terms of business, skills and capital development.¹⁴³ According to Anatolia Agency’s news, since 2006 to up to date, Turkey contributed to North Cyprus roughly 9 billion Turkish Lira as involving security, investment, credit and incentive payments cost. Turkish Cypriots, in terms of diplomatic and economic sense greatly supported by Turkey. Since 1983 TRNC was declared to be an independent state.¹⁴⁴ Although condemnation of the independency decision by the United Nations

¹⁴² Inter Press Service, CYPRUS: EU Membership Talks Put The Squeeze On Turkish Cypriots, 9 October 1997, Retrieved 5 september 2015, from <http://www.ipsnews.net/1997/10/cyprus-eu-membership-talks-put-the-squeeze-on-turkish-cypriots/>

¹⁴³ Commission of the European Communities, 2002. “Regular Report”.

¹⁴⁴ *Kıbrıs Gazetesi*, TC’den KKTC’ye 10 Yılda 9 Milyar TL’lik Katkı, 02 May 2015, 16.

Security Council, Turkey has played a big brother role with his support over the years and established commercial relations to improve Turkish Cypriot's economy.

Since last five years, trade relations between Turkish Cypriots and Turkey, which has been the most important element of economic growth, has improved further. Despite the impact of the global crisis, positive developments in foreign trade have demonstrated once again the importance of Turkey for the Turkish Cypriot economy. According to the data of Turkish Statistical Institute, in spite of various constraints and the embargo on the Turkish Cypriots the foreign trade volume between the two countries increased by about 60 percent between the years 2005 to 2014 and reached approximately \$ 1.3 billion.¹⁴⁵ In the relations of Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots, one of the elements which holds an important place in economic terms to provide budget balance in the name of Turkish Cypriots were financial aids which have been initiated by Turkey.

The increase of the number of university students has also been effective in the Turkish Cypriot's economic and social development. In the 2013-2014 academic years, the number of students in North Cyprus increased by 13% to 62,726 and 37,858 students were from Turkey.¹⁴⁶ However, Turkey's support for Turkish Cypriots was not limited to budget and foreign trade issues. "North Cyprus Drinking Water Supply Project" has also great importance to provide transportation of irrigation and drinking water for Turkish Cypriots via 80 kilometers length pipeline from Turkey.

¹⁴⁵ Ibid., *Kıbrıs Gazetesi*, TC'den KKTC'ye 10 Yılda 9 Milyar TL'lik Katkı, 16.

¹⁴⁶ Ibid., 16

The Turkish Cypriot leader Denktash and the Turkish authorities did not contribute to reunification of island rather than wished to have a bicomunal bizonal federation for the resolution of the problem. In spite of Turkish Cypriot and Turkish arguments about two sovereign states, third-party initiatives increasingly pressed on one state solution. The United Nations and the United States have been concerned with the Cyprus problem to prevent regional dispute between Turkey and Greece. However, their initiatives could not provide permanent resolution on the island.

Turkey wants to be a full member of the European Union and he also followed a foreign policy towards the federal settlement of the Cyprus problem in the case of structured schedule of Turkey's accession process. In 1997 EU summit, Turkey's membership process did not approved but Cyprus and other ten countries assigned as the candidates of the organization. Ankara was reactive against EU because of its exclusion from the membership process. Thereby, in that term Turkish authorities did not press on Turkish Cypriots to make them more flexible in the negotiations.

Turkey's EU membership process is related to Cyprus problem. According to realistic perspective Turkey may consent the EU membership of the Greek part of Cyprus abstaining from the capturing the Turkish Cypriot provinces in the North part of island. Ankara has refused to play an active role for the resolution of the Cyprus problem unless its membership accession process guaranteed by the EU. However, Turkey's militarily existence in North Cyprus considered as an occupation and that led to challenges towards the Ankara's full EU membership process.¹⁴⁷

¹⁴⁷ Leech, J. (2002). Whole and free: NATO, EU enlargement and transatlantic relations. The Federal Trust for Education & Research.

Turkey and Turkish Cypriots strongly demanded to be a full member of the EU. They oftentimes advised EU not to accept Cyprus as a full member to EU before a comprehensive resolution is reached. Turkey as its assumed “Big Brother” role could not be effective to prevent the Greek Cypriot’s unilateral EU accession. While Greek Cypriots were welcomed their European membership candidate, Turkey and Turkish Cypriots were disappointed and they claimed that such a decision would block the negotiations because there would be no reason for Greek Cypriots to resolve the issue. The former EU enlargement Commissioner Günter Verheugen also expressed Cyprus would have to single central authority in terms of judicial and administrative powers to enforce the laws proper to EU legislation,¹⁴⁸ but this was never materialized because the Greek side rejected the Annan Plan in 2004, which took place a few months after Cyprus became an EU member. The accession was not in line with international law in general and the Guarantee Treaty in particular.

In 1990s, Greece as the assumed big brother role for Greek Cypriots urged EU to accept Cyprus as a full member into the EU by using its veto power. Greek Cypriot side made first membership application in 1990 and at the beginning the EU Commission required political settlement to start accession proceedings on the island. However, in 1995 the Commission provided concession for Greek Cypriots to accept their full membership even if the resolution could not be achieved between the Turkish and Greek Cypriots. Greece pressed on EU to start membership negotiations

¹⁴⁸ The Economist Intelligence Unit, (March 2002). Country Report: Cyprus.

of Cyprus in return for admission of Turkey for EU customs union agreement in 1995.¹⁴⁹ EU disregarded the provisions of the Guarantee Agreement as unilaterally accepted the Greek Cypriots for the membership of union. The agreement certainly prohibits one-sided alliance of the island with any state or organization. However, from the guarantor countries except Turkey, neither Greece nor UK did not warn EU to suspend the membership process of Greek Cypriots after the comprehensive resolution of the problem.

Turkey and Turkish Cypriots expected that EU would not accept a divided, militarized and problems unresolved island's access for European membership. They also thought some member countries would oppose to the membership process of Cyprus (representing only Greek Cypriots) in order not to confront with Turkey due to the Cyprus matter. However, the Greece pressures on EU and its veto threat to prevent the membership of Eastern European countries obligated the EU presidency to accept the membership process of Greek Cypriots in EU Copenhagen Summit in 2002. Cyprus except the north part where Turkish Cypriots live, gained European full membership on 1 May 2004 and the window of opportunity was lost.

Turkey a lot of times warned EU that, if membership admission of Cyprus takes place before the comprehensive resolution of the problem, it would lead to Turkey's integration with the Turkish Cypriots. Ankara and Turkish Cypriots also emphasized the unilateral membership of Cyprus would hinder the reunification chance of the island. When EU declared to start unilateral accession process of the Greek Cypriots in 1997 Luxembourg Summit, Washington worried about the extremist reaction of

¹⁴⁹ Bahcheli, T., Bartmann, B., & Srebrnik, H., 177.

Turkey.¹⁵⁰ Turkish Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit threatened that the north part of the island which was represented by Turkish Cypriot community might be annexed by Turkey.¹⁵¹

Turkey demanded to be a full member of EU, however because of the conditionalities imposed by the EU Turkey was not able to become a full member. EU urged Turkey to resolve the Cyprus problem if it wanted to be part of the EU club. Thus, Turkey's Cyprus policy was one of the items on EU's list that hindered Turkey's accession to the EU. AKP (Justice and Development Party, also known as the AK Party) came to power on 3 November 2002 with a parliamentary majority, and in the beginning supported the Annan Plan and the unification of the island. Ankara has softened its EU policy regarding Cyprus after the Copenhagen Summit in December 2002. It agreed to make concessions on its Cyprus policy in order to get an early date for EU accession process. Former Justice and Development Party leader Tayyip Erdoğan pressed on *Denktash to persuade Turkish Cypriots to accept the UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan plan* submitted in November 2002, but he could not encourage him. According to Erdoğan; an unresolved Cyprus problem would hinder the Turkey's EU membership process, so he tried to persuade Denktash to encourage Turkish Cypriots to accept the UN plan in order to achieve a comprehensive resolution on the island. When Justice and Development Party come to power, Erdogan criticized Denktash policy dealing with the Cyprus problem, and he also

¹⁵⁰ Leech, J., 95-115.

¹⁵¹ Turkish Daily News, 05 November 2001, Ecevit Talks Of Turkish Republic Of Northern Cyprus (Trnc) Annexation, Retrieved 22 January 2015, from <http://www.hri.org/news/turkey/trkpr/2001/01-11-05.trkpr.html#01>

expressed that the new Turkish government will follow more proactive Cyprus policy to resolve the problem¹⁵².

After the declaration of UN's Annan Plan several Turkish journalists also criticized Denktash's opposition for the plan and they pointed out that it would lead to challenges for the EU admission process of Turkish Cypriots and Turkey. They were concerned about Greek Cypriots becoming a full EU member alone. This could prevent EU membership process of Turkey. Turkish representatives expressed their concerns about the unilateral EU membership of Greek Cypriots. They would prevent Turkey's accession into the EU by pointing to Turkey occupation, hence they would try to encourage Turkey to withdraw its troops from the island for good.¹⁵³

Erdogan tried to change Cyprus policy of Turkey by pressing on Turkish Cypriot leader Denktash in order to soften intercommunal negotiations for EU membership process of Turkey. Some Turkish reporters have also criticized that the destiny of 69-million Turkish populations are being prevented for the future political utility of 200,000 Turkish Cypriots.¹⁵⁴ Actually, Ankara has undertaken great costly political responsibility on behalf of Turkish Cypriots on the island. However, Greek Cypriot and Greece lobby enforced the successive US governments to press on Turkey for the resolution of the Cyprus problem. Even the European Parliament decisions criticized

¹⁵² Erdogan, R. T., Declaration. New York Times, (2 January 2003).

¹⁵³ Verheugen, G., 12 March 2003. "Turkey/Cyprus: Divisions to Deepen as Peace Plan Fails". Reported by Oxford Analytica.

¹⁵⁴ The Economist, 15 January 2003, the magic of membership, Retrieved 25 January 2015, from <http://www.economist.com/node/1534788>

the Cyprus policy of Turkey in order to be more influential on Turkish Cypriots to find a settlement between Turkish and Greek Cypriot communities.

After the 1974 intervention, Turkey has been urged to withdraw from the island many times. For instance, on 28 July 1996 the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) has taken decision against Turkey to pay compensation for the Greek Cypriots who became refugee after the 1974 Turkish military intervention. Turkey addressed TRNC as the legal authority of North Cyprus and rejected to pay compensation but since 1996, the ECHR judgments continued to enforce Turkey for the compensation of Greek Cypriot refugees.¹⁵⁵ If Turkey assumes to continue the big brother role it has been assuming and cannot find a solution to resolve the issue on the island, then the Greek Cypriots appeals will continue in order to get their compensations from Turkey and Turkish Cypriot authorities. In this respect, Turkish Cypriot leader Denktash contested with the Justice and Development Party leader Erdogan, and Denktash got support from Turkish military and the opposition parties as well as the senior foreign policy bureaucrats of Turkey during the periods of 2002-2003.¹⁵⁶ However, Erdogan enforced Denktash to continue the negotiations with Greek Cypriots on the basis of Annan Plan of the UN Secretary General in February 2004, but unfortunately their negotiations could not be ended with a resolution. When the Annan Plan was rejected AK Party changed its Cyprus policy due to EU's accession of the Republic of Cyprus into the EU without a comprehensive solution was reached.

¹⁵⁵ Ibid., Commission of the European Communities, 2002. "Regular Report".

¹⁵⁶ Center for Strategic and International Studies, (March, 2003). Cyprus: Turkey's Other Difficult Decision. Washington, DC.

Denktash backed Turkey's Cyprus policies and this approach made him stay in power for six consecutive presidential elections from 1968 to 2005. The Turkish Cypriot opposition parties have always criticized the Ankara's big brother role and its Denktash support as it prevented the Turkish Cypriots to take their own political decisions on the island. Nevertheless, majority of the Turkish Cypriots hold up Turkey in order to guarantee their rights against the Greek Cypriots. Ankara's influence on the Turkish Cypriot politics got considerable reaction from the opposition parties in North Cyprus. The Economic Intelligence Unit expressed in its year 2000 report that the opposition groups at large considered themselves as an arbiter to take their domestic political decisions and they do not want any interference from Turkey in this way.¹⁵⁷

Serdar Denktash who is the son of the Turkish Cypriots' old leader Denktash and the president of the Democratic Party notably evaluated the Turkish Cypriots' worries with relation to Turkey's interference. According to his interview, after 1974, Turkish Cypriot established their state in the north of the island but they could not be a ruling power. Ankara always assumed a role and intervened for the political decisions of the Turkish Cypriots. Turkish representatives enforced Turkish Cypriot authorities to consult with Turkey before the application of any administrative decisions on the island.¹⁵⁸

Denktash and Ankara relations have disapproved by the opposition parties such as the Communal Liberation Party (TKP) and Republican Turkish Party (CTP). They have

¹⁵⁷ *The Economist Intelligence Unit*, Country Report: Cyprus, December 2000.

¹⁵⁸ *Radikal*, (24 February 2003). Istanbul.

charged Denktash with trying to solve the problem under the auspices of Turkey rather than supporting a federal solution with the EU membership of Turkish Cypriots.¹⁵⁹ However, in 2002, Ankara's AK Party regime backed Turkish Cypriots for the resolution of the problem and equal EU membership process of Turkish Cypriots together with the Greek Cypriots. In this respect, the Turkish Cypriot non-governmental organizations and opposition parties gave great support for the admission of United Nations Annan Plan in order to achieve EU membership of Turkish Cypriots as the same status of Greek Cypriots.¹⁶⁰

Ankara's encouragement of the Turkish Cypriots for approval of UN plan and accession into the EU reduced domestic consensus among the left and right wing political parties of Turkish Cypriots because of the right wing's security worries on the island. The plan importantly decreases Turkish military and enables for the Greek Cypriots to return into the conceived Turkish Cypriot territories. Thereby, nationalist Turkish Cypriots reminded the public that the 1955-1974 bloody events between Greek and Turkish Cypriots could repeat itself, and they stress that the Turkish Cypriots would never want to live the painful days of the past again.

According to public surveys between the years 1997 and 2002 very few Turkish Cypriots approved the integration with Turkey.¹⁶¹ Furthermore, the Ak Party officials and other Turkish bureaucrats also expressed that Turkish Cypriots' integration with Turkey or adding the north part of the island to Turkish province would not be

¹⁵⁹ Interview, Talat, Mehmet Ali, 8 February 2000, Nicosia, Cyprus.

¹⁶⁰ *The Economist Intelligence Unit*, Country Report: Cyprus, 1 December 2002.

¹⁶¹ *Yeniduzen*, 3 October 2002, Nicosia.

reasonable solution for the problem and that could impose diplomatic, economic and social sanctions on Turkey.

Scott Pegg evaluated in his book the approaches of the international community for the de facto states. Turkish Cypriots live in TRNC and it is considered as an unrecognized country. The international community pursues three main courses of action: applies sanctions and embargoes; disregards their existence; and gives limited acknowledgement to their presence.¹⁶²

Pegg points out that TRNC as de facto state actively confronted with the sanctions and embargoes of the international community. In fact, economic embargoes prevented the development of its economy because it is considered as a 'pariah state.'¹⁶³After 1974 the international community's efforts were towards the reunification of Cyprus. While the secession approach has changed post-Cold War, the international recognition of the divided states did not accept by the international community. For instance; in 1990 after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Azerbaijan gained its independence and established good relations with Turkey. Azerbaijan was challenged by Armenia because of the separatist actions in the region Nagorno-Karabakh; therefore Azerbaijan hesitated to accept the independency of TRNC. In this respect, TRNC was only recognized by Turkey and the Turkish Cypriot's expectation to establish diplomatic cooperation with the Central Asian Turkic states did not materialize.

¹⁶² Pegg, S. (1998). *International Society and the De Facto State*. (Aldershot, UK: Ashgate), 177.

¹⁶³ Ibid, Bahcheli, T., Bartmann, B., & Srebrnik, H., 183.

Turkish Cypriots disenchanted because of the unexpected economic challenges to survive their state. EU and the international community also opposed to the sovereign status of the Turkish Cypriots apart from the Republic of Cyprus. The EU's participation for the resolution of the Cyprus problem has not been supported the independent status of Turkish Cypriots. Besides, the Brussel's perspective has seriously hurt the independent state expectations of the Turkish Cypriot community. Brussel's proposed the advantage of collective citizenship under the unified island and the EU membership. The EU has confirmed an articulation between the Cyprus problem and the membership admission process of Turkey, thereby pressed on Ankara to solve the Cyprus matter before starting the accession talks. According to the New York Times remarks Turkey should follow positive steps towards the resolution of the problem in order to get accession into EU.¹⁶⁴ Guenther Verheugen who was the former EU Enlargement Commissioner also emphasized that the current status would create some challenges to open the accession talks with Ankara.¹⁶⁵

International pressures enforced Turkey to support negotiations between the Turkish and Greek Cypriots on 19 February 2004, which enabled both communities to go to referenda on the UN Annan Plan on 24 April 2004. However the referenda results surprised the unification expectations of international community because the Turkish Cypriots accepted the plan by 65 per cent and the Greek Cypriots refused it by 76 per cent. Nevertheless, the EU unilaterally accepted the Greek Cypriots for full membership before the resolution of problem and the reunification of the island. The

¹⁶⁴ New York Times, 9 March 2003.

¹⁶⁵ Ibid, New York Times.

north part of the island where the Turkish Cypriot Community lives remained outside of the EU acquis. The international community, Brussel and Washington welcomed warmly the Turkish Cypriots' strong support for the UN Annan Plan. The European Commission commended the Turkish Cypriots' decision towards the acceptance of Annan Plan and considered it as a positive willingness to solve the Cyprus problem. The Commission also announced to be an intention to support The Turkish Cypriots in the North part of island in order to advance their economic development.¹⁶⁶ However, this created false expectations that economic sanctions would be removed and the isolations of Turkish Cypriots would end. After the referenda some international press organizations emphasized the 'Taiwan' model solution for the Turkish Cypriots in order to provide free travel and trade without giving the international recognition for the TRNC but this was not supported by the international community.

3.2 Turkey's Natural Leader Role

AKP has played a protector role to pursue the rights of Muslim minorities in order to support religious leaders, educate them and restore the mosques in Balkans and Eastern Europe¹⁶⁷. Turkey has not only undertaken a historical "protector" role for Muslim minorities but also AKP has self-assigned "big brother" role with a "model" in order to democratize and develop states in the region¹⁶⁸. However, the wrong policies of the AKP administration such as breakdowns in gender equality and human rights reform, censorship of the media and imprisoning of journalists frustrate the

¹⁶⁶ European Commission, (retrieved 19 September 2011). "Commission statement following the outcome of the referendum in Cyprus".

¹⁶⁷ Bryant & Hatay, 2013, 15.

¹⁶⁸ Ibid., 17.

expectations of regional states that how to Turkey apply its “big brother” role as the foreign policy of “Turkish model.”¹⁶⁹”

The former Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s statements and policies related to the demolition of Gezi Park in Central Istanbul had been protested by the majority of young Turkish population, and that lead to great implications over the role assumptions of Turkish foreign policy and “Turkish Model”.

Turkey has rapidly developing economy, which leads to follow foreign policy role with the ambition of world leadership. Justice and Development Party (AKP) have offered more stable economy. The party’s vision is to democratize the country has failed because of the judiciary decisions to jail academicians; journalists and students have restricted the reliability of the Turkish democtatization process. However, aftermath the Arab Spring movement, “Turkish model” has been advertised for the Muslim states to regulate application of democracy as political regime from the Gulf region of Middle East to North Africa. The definition of “Turkish model” means execution of institutional democracy by promotion of infrastructure and economic development with secular, conservative religious ruling party¹⁷⁰. The mission of the “Turkish model” was to harmonize Western policies in Eastern states to achieve democracy in Islamic states¹⁷¹

¹⁶⁹ Ibid., 17.

¹⁷⁰ Ibid, 1.

¹⁷¹ Ibid, 7.

Karl Holsti points out that “regional subsystem collaborator” refers to “far-reaching commitments to cooperative efforts with other states to build wider communities, or to crosscutting subsystems...”¹⁷² In other words, it refers to a Turkey’s conception of a role to build regional systems of cooperation.

“Turkish model” represents democratic changes in political life and foreign policy of Turkey to promote Turkish vision and stability in the new international order. The judiciary applications such as jailing of journalists, academics and students have raised questions regarding Turkish democratization. In other words, the huge economic growth, infrastructure developments and secular institutional governance policies with religiously ruling party has introduced the “Turkish model” to international relations.

After Arab Spring, “Turkish model” seems to be a Turkish moment that creating a great impact in terms of adopting democratic practices in the Arab countries of North Africa and the Gulf region of Middle East. Turkish foreign policy has been developed in a visible manner since the period of last ten years but the regional intricacies such as Iran nuclear threat, Armenia crisis, Syrian civil war and Israel diplomatic crisis had been restricted Turkish foreign policy to play active role. Turkey tended to follow proactive foreign policy in the Central Asian Turkic countries and the Muslim countries of north and sub-Saharan Africa. New trade agreements and free visa applications have strengthen commercial relations between those countries and

¹⁷² Holsti, K. J., “National Role Conceptions in the Study of Foreign Policy”, *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 14, No 3, 1970, p. 266.

Turkey and such a new foreign business markets, created important growth in the Turkish economy.¹⁷³

The new Turkish foreign policy role has sometimes been considered as “Neo-Ottomanism”, because of the Turkey’s old historical and cultural relations in order to be a Muslim leader of the world. The former Foreign Minister Davutoğlu emphasizes that rather than Neo-Ottomanist aspirations, Turkey would be a “natural” leader of the region. Turkish foreign policy has picked up with the economic development and involved business opportunity, moral authority and geo-strategic vision to introduce Turkey as the regional leader of the Arab World. For instance, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s reaction to President Shimon Peres in Davos, or Turkey’s accusation of the Israeli dealing with the Mavi Marmara incident, could be considered as the new foreign policy role of Turkey in order to be a Muslim leader in the Middle East.¹⁷⁴

Turkey has unclear aspirations in the way of its potential global role but its regional superiority bounded around the South Caucasus, Middle East and Balkans. The Turkish President Ahmet Davutoğlu noticed in his 2009 Sarejevo speech during his foreign ministry that Turkish foreign policy intended to achieve regional and global stability in the Caucasus, Middle East and Balkan region for all of the humanity.¹⁷⁵ The new approach of the Turkish foreign policy wants to follow a proactive policy in order to be a legitimate actor in regional conflicts. However, while AKP considers Turkey as a “natural” leader of these regions, the other regional leaders such as EU,

¹⁷³ Bryant & Hatay, 2013, 22.

¹⁷⁴ Ibid,2.

¹⁷⁵ Ibid,9.

Egypt, Iran, and Russia claim their own historical and cultural interests to compete with Turkey.¹⁷⁶ Since the post-Soviet era, Turkey-Russia trade relations follow a “competitive cooperation” relationship in Central Asia, Caucasus and the Black Sea. After the dissolution of Soviet Union Turkey has tended to establish good relations with “Turkic” countries in Central Asia. Turkey has also followed close ethnic relations with Azerbaijan and even recently changed its ethnic policy to provide convergence with neighbor countries Armenia and Georgia in the Caucasus. Turkish foreign policy role on South Caucasus held up Muslim minorities with ethnic policies to obtain nationalist asserts but that created unreliable and confused regional relations with Russia.¹⁷⁷

Turkey appeals to historical, cultural and geographical relations coming from the Ottoman Empire to highlight its “natural” role in the Balkans.¹⁷⁸ The amazing economic developments of Turkish economy trigger Turkey to aspire and play a regional role.¹⁷⁹ Turkey follows soft power politics for the resolution of regional disputes.

The future of the Cyprus hydrocarbons issue is ambiguous. There is not any consensus between the Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots on the issue of comprehensive federal solution of Cyprus problem and equal sharing of offshore Cyprus hydrocarbons. The ambiguity related to the future of the Cyprus hydrocarbons has affected foreign and security relations in the region. While Turkish authorities of

¹⁷⁶ Ibid, 10.

¹⁷⁷ Ibid, 11.

¹⁷⁸ Ibid, 15.

¹⁷⁹ Ibid, 9.

Ankara and Turkish Cypriot authorities of Nicosia support comprehensive federal solution of Cyprus problem and equal shearing of offshore Cyprus hydrocarbons under the UN auspices, the Greek Cypriots authorities reject any discussion or corporation on the hydrocarbons. Greek Cypriot authorities rather than solution of the matter, they acted unilaterally to collaborate with American company Noble Energy to take Americans' support in the region. They also collaborated with Israel in the security affairs to prevent Turkey's intervention in the region. However Turkey has stressed the equal rights of Turkish Cypriots on the offshore Cyprus hydrocarbons. It is important that the international community such as EU and UN should encourage Greek Cypriots to compromise with Turkish Cypriots on the issues of comprehensive federal solution of Cyprus problem and equal sharing of offshore Cyprus hydrocarbons. NATO has played a new role to secure energy resources in Somalia. It may also play a role to encourage Turkey and Greece for regional cooperation. If NATO does not get involved, the regional peace and stability may be at stake. Thus, NATO should provide energy security to the region.

Chapter 4

ENERGY SECURITY ON OFFSHORE HYDROCARBONS IN THE EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN

4.1 NATO's evolving and Expanding Role

Since the 1999, the NATO has started a strategic concept in order to play active role in the energy security. The strategic concept stipulated that the strategic environment is evolving; therefore NATO has to play a new role to strengthen Euro-Atlantic security cooperation.¹⁸⁰

During the 2006, NATO Riga Summit, NATO announced its intention to arrange international attempt to evaluate the risks of energy infrastructures in terms of sustainable energy security. According to former U.S. Senator Richard Lugar the Alliance has taken a decision to prevent any threat related to the energy security, otherwise it would lead to confusion and vulnerability among the international actors of energy suppliers.¹⁸¹ NATO leaders also announced their objectives dealing with the importance of energy security by emphasizing the energy intelligence sharing, energy management and securization of energy infrastructure in Bucharest Summit in April 2008. Energy security is an increasingly important issue for the future of the EU. Thereby it is obligatory to act collectively with the all NATO Member Countries

¹⁸⁰ The Alliances Strategic Concept, 1999.

¹⁸¹ The Riga Conference: Transforming NATO in a New Global Era, 27 Nov. 2006, Lugar: Attack on Allies' Energy Supplies is Attack on NATO Alliance, <http://www.rigasummit.lv/en/id/newsin/nid/239/>

and International Organizations to support reasonable defense strategies and infrastructure protections in order to prevent terrorist attacks on the energy suppliers and installations.¹⁸²

In 2010, NATO expanded its announcement related to the Strategic Concept that the energy security requires superior international efforts to provide more secure conditions for the transportation of energy supplies. In this respect the alliance decided to promote collaboration among the partner states in order to achieve the safety of energy lines and energy infrastructure. NATO made a great effort to provide traditional energy security in the world but it could not be successful because of the major separations between the member states. The main reason for those separations was the new alliance member states of the Eastern and Central Europe that still remained under the pressure of Soviet regime. They actively and adamantly participated about the energy security agenda of 2006 Riga Summit, but they did not contribute any coherent, practical security policies for the future of energy infrastructure and energy suppliers.

In this Summit, several old Western European NATO member countries opposed to energy security policies of the alliance. Some member countries argued that this is national task and NATO should not be involved in the critical energy infrastructure protection. Furthermore, some other Western European members emphasized that the NATO's energy security meetings unnecessarily increases military actions in the non-military regions and provokes military tension with Russia. Although those divergences, dealing with the NATO's energy security approaches the alliance

¹⁸² Atlantic Treaty Association, (2011). CEIP for XXI Century. <http://www.ata-sec.org/projects/ceip-for-xxi-century>

achieved narrow improvement in the scope of operational energy security. For instance, NATO improved a Smart Energy Team (SENT) which observes promising technologies to prepare standardization agreements. Moreover, the alliance founded an Energy Center of Excellence in Lithuania in order to organize training programs about the operational energy security.

Those intergovernmental exertions of NATO are really the only achievement to provide operational efficiency of the alliance members' over the energy security. However, some traditional alliance members consider those efforts to serve on behalf of U.S. military interests. There are some reasons that U.S. Defense Department emphasis on NATO partnership for operational energy security. First of all, U.S. national defense policies prefer to combat in coalitions due to its low operational costs, high operational capacity and greater energy efficiency. Secondly, the U.S. is the biggest contributor country among the NATO allies in terms of military equipment and technology but it has also in an expectation to learn other allies' capacity. For instance, the German hydrogen fuel cell technology, Dutch photovoltaic solar panels and LED lamps, British intelligent and management systems are the most important themes that concerned by U.S. Defense Department to know more about the new technologies. Thirdly, U.S. and NATO collaboration provide best practices and new alternative technologies to motivate alliances for operational and tactical cooperation in order to sustain global stability.¹⁸³

NATO may assume a new role in the region by providing energy security in the Eastern Mediterranean hydrocarbons. Thus, it can contribute to settlement in Cyprus

¹⁸³ Deni, 2015, 323-338.

because both actors involved in the Cyprus dispute, namely Greece and Turkey are members of NATO. Since 1963, Turkey and Greece could not provide permanent resolution in the island. Turkey as guarantor country of island intervened in 1974 and initiated good offices for the resolution of problem, but it could not achieve it yet.

Discovery of Cyprus offshore hydrocarbons complicated relations between the Turkish and Greek Cypriot communities and from time to time increased tension between their mother lands Turkey and Greece. Sometimes tensions climbed leading to 'casus belli.' Both the Turkish authorities of Ankara and the Turkish Cypriot authorities of Nicosia have declared their opposition for the Greek Cypriot's hydrocarbon exploration actions. They also accused the Greek Cypriot administration as acting against for the 1960-international agreements of Republic of Cyprus. Both Turkey and Turkish Cypriots together have signed their own continental self-delimitation agreement. They have started to explore oil and gas at the land of Turkish Cypriot controlled part of Cyprus and they also expressed their intention of starting exploration in some declared Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) offshore parcels of Republic of Cyprus. Turkey also pressed Egypt, Lebanon and Israel to reevaluate their EEZ agreements with the Republic of Cyprus. Turkey pointed out some warnings and threats that the drilling actions in the Eastern Mediterranean will cause serious problems in the region and Turkish vessels patrolled in the Eastern Mediterranean Sea.¹⁸⁴

Tit-for-tat strategies between the Greek Cypriots and Turkey, led to declaration of a new Navtex by Turkey in order to maintain seismic surveys by the Turkish vessel

¹⁸⁴ Faustmann et. al., 2012.

Barbaros on behalf of the Turkish Cypriots. However, that situation created stalemate and ambiguity in the Cyprus negotiations and postponed the solution expectations between the Turkish and Greek Cypriot communities. Thereby, those circumstances seriously require NATO initiatives in the region to encourage Turkey and Greece and other regional actors such as Israel, Egypt to cooperate for the resolution of Cyprus problem and to solve energy dilemma of the Cyprus offshore hydrocarbons in the Eastern Mediterranean.

Turkey and Greece are the member countries, and Israel as the ally of U.S. is the partner country of NATO. Greek Cypriots also want to be member of the alliance as the representatives of Republic of Cyprus. In this respect, European Coal and Steel Community model could be employed. NATO security umbrella could also help regional powers to achieve energy cooperation, and secure energy resources in the Eastern Mediterranean. In 1951, The Coal and Steel Community was established by Belgium, France, West Germany, Netherlands and Luxemburg to put an end to wars between France and Germany. Later on, the Community also aimed to achieve regional integration and common market among the European states.¹⁸⁵

In case, NATO cannot facilitate cooperation between the regional powers, the problem is likely to increase in the region. Moreover, the Navtex crisis that created by Turkish seismic vessel Barbaros would lead to a larger scale of tensions between the Turkey and Greece.

¹⁸⁵ Europa Summaries of EU Legislations, (2010). Treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel Community, ECSC Treaty. http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/institutional_affairs/treaties/treaties_ecsc_en.htm.

4.2 Energy Security in the Eastern Mediterranean Region: Possibility of NATO's new role

Security and the guarantees issues have not comprehensively discussed in the recent Cyprus negotiations which started after February 2015. However, the interveners suggest unofficial ideas that the NATO could be a path for reconciliation on the island. In this respect; Turkish side has developed two scenarios; one was the providing guarantee only for the Turkish Cypriot builder state and the other alternative idea was the determining a transition period and calendar to dissolve all intervention rights of the Turkish military existence. Both scenarios are towards to deploy NATO power on the island and to put Turkish military forces under the auspices of NATO umbrella. The first general content of the interview on the basis, The Turkish Cypriot side wants to continue the guarantee system but they seems to leave open the possibility that some changes might be made. Ankara has made clear that they do not waive his guarantor rights. The Turkish Cypriot side also says that since the beginning of the new procedure.

On the other hands, the third parties want to get involved NATO through the guarantor powers Turkey, Greece and Britain. They also alternatively support another thesis to totally discharge the guarantees, to make a new security settlement to undertake protection either by the European Union or the United Nations Security Council on the island. The inventers seek the ways to participate the NATO formula in the security and the guarantee issues of the Cyprus negotiations, but the Greek Cypriot's Communist AKEL Party does not support NATO protection. Once settlement is reached to submit referenda they don't ignore the AKEL's opposition.

The Greek Cypriot side insists that no issue of to accept an agreement to include guarantees and assumes it as a red line. Nicosia in this regard, is investing in and

relies on the EU, and the other two guarantor powers, Greece, and England. Greece does not want to be a guarantor, even announced that fashion on the past. Britain forever wants to maintain its presence on the island, only through an agreement dealing with the bases. If progress in talks on Cyprus, foreign diplomats says such ideas could be revised under the new circumstances.¹⁸⁶

NATO Secretary General's remarks explain that the Alliance cannot take more active role in the current Cyprus negotiations.¹⁸⁷ NATO does not want to get involve dealing with the energy problems and the other political crises of its alliances. In Cyprus case, NATO could not take any sides between its alliances Turkey and Greece. The Alliance has kept on same stance on the Gibraltar matter which caused territorial dispute in Gibraltar waters between the two NATO members United Kingdom and Spain. NATO strongly supports peaceful initiatives under the auspices of United Nations and European Union to achieve permanent solution on the Cyprus dispute. The Organiation does not consider taking sides among its alliances to solve the matters and tensions.

¹⁸⁶ Demokrat Bakış, Garantilerle ilgili perde gerisi, 25 August 2015, 18.

¹⁸⁷ Stoltenberg, J., (28 October 2014). Excerpts from NATO's Secretary General speech (from 41st minute and on), available at http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_114179.htm

Chapter 5

ZURICH AND LONDON AGREEMENTS AND THE ROLE OF GREECE, UK AND TURKEY WITH RESPECT TO CYPRUS

The anti-colonial struggle, related to self-determination had started after 1945 in Cyprus. When the issue brought to the agenda of United Nations by Greece in 1945, the situation gained an international qualification. Britain realized that the established order not more sustained in Cyprus. Britain wanted to make reasonable his existence on the island. He used different ethnic identity the people of Cyprus in order to party Turkey into question to face him with Greece. However this policy could not gave expected result to Britain. The armed struggle among the Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots intensified in 1955. While the Turkey argued Taksim (division of island between Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots), on the other hand the Greece had argued enosis (unification of island with Greece). Both Turkey and Greece could not find a common point to solve Cyprus problem. Alone solve a problem; their bilateral relations of friendship that was at the top in 1950s began to deteriorate. Deterioration of relations between the two countries, U.S. in particular, has troubled western allies, because of a crisis of confidence created by the southern wing of the NATO. U.S. intervention at this point was encountered. U.S. warned both Turkey and Greece who were economically, politically and militarily dependent on the U.S., that the Cyprus problem would be solved by the agreements and the strategic interests of the Britain would not be hurt. The geopolitical structure of Cyprus was important for the Britain.

According to British policies, Cyprus Island was important base to protect oil resources of the Britain. A few years before the independence of the Cyprus, the British Prime Minister Anthony Eden had announced that “No Cyprus, no certain facilities to protect our supply of oil. No oil unemployment and hunger in Britain. It is as simple as that.”¹⁸⁸ Thus, the legal document, regardless of independent Republic of Cyprus, 1959 Zurich-London Agreements was adopted at the end of the process. In that period, while the Greek Cypriots were satisfied with the formula of independent Republic the Turkish Cypriots had gained important privilege at the administration of the independent Republic. Britain protected the ownership of his bases where they had vital importance in terms of the strategic interest of the Britain. British bases in Cyprus were important alternative for the British Government.¹⁸⁹ As guarantor countries, The Turkey and The Greece maintained their legal rights on the Cyprus Island.¹⁹⁰

Before the Zurich and London Agreements, Britain encountered with two important political problems on the Cyprus. The first was that Greek Cypriots desire for the unification with Greece. The second problem was to keep balance both Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots, because while Greek Cypriots desiring for union with Greece, the Turkish Cypriots were encouraged for the partition to protect themselves being Hellenized.¹⁹¹ Greece wanted to gain international acceptance at United Nations, to achieve unification of Cyprus with Greece. Britain did not support such a

¹⁸⁸ Eden’s speech 1956, 11.

¹⁸⁹ Dodd, 1993, 5.

¹⁹⁰ Firat, 1997, 56-57.

¹⁹¹ Dodd, 1993, 3.

Greek perspective, because Hellenization of Cyprus would prevent the existence of the British forces in the Cyprus. Firstly in 1950s, Greek Cypriots took support from the Greece and they started a terrorist campaign, organized by EOKA against for Britain, to success enosis. Meanwhile, Turkish Cypriots respond to enosis, had begun to calling for partition in the island. When the Greek Cypriots realized the strong partition demand of the Turkish Cypriots, they intensified their terrorist attacks on Turkish Cypriots. This situation motivated Turkey to protect the rights of the Turkish Cypriots in the island. At the end, both Greece and Greek Cypriots understood that Turkey really interested in the dispute and there was no way to except him in the solution process. Especially Greek Cypriots strongly conceived that the Turkish Cypriot problem had urged by the Britain in order to stop succession of the enosis.¹⁹²

At the Zurich and London Agreement (1959) Turkey and Greece compromised on bi-communal constitutional structure for Cyprus that accepted the political and cultural equality of the both Turkish Cypriots and the Greek Cypriots. Bi-communal structure of the constitution provides considerable representation for the Turkish Cypriots in the institutions of the government. The Turkish Cypriot Vice-President had veto right in order to protect the political equality of the Turkish Cypriot community.¹⁹³ The Greek Cypriot leader Makarios did not want to accept Zurich and London Agreements because according to him those agreements were an obstacle towards to achieve enosis. Greece encouraged him to approve those agreements. The constitutional structure was protected by the Treaties of Alliance and Guarantee and Britain, Greece and Turkey accepted as the guarantor countries of the island. The Zurich and London

¹⁹² Dodd, 1993, 4-5.

¹⁹³ King, 1963.

Agreements forbade enosis for Greek Cypriots and also forbade partition for the Turkish Cypriots. The Turkish Cypriot community who were about one fifth of the Cyprus population had gained legal political equality at the foundation of the new state. The Republic of Cyprus had been established on 16th August 1960 and Britain transferred sovereignty to new state.¹⁹⁴

5.1 Zurich and London Agreements

Main legal documents related to the foundation of the Republic of Cyprus were signed at a summit between Greece and Turkey at Zurich on 11th February 1959.¹⁹⁵ Karamanlis was the Greek Prime Minister who participated at the Zurich. Turkey was represented by the Turkish Prime Minister Mr. Menderes. Mr. Karamanlis and Mr. Menderes compromised three draft instruments: “a) Draft Treaty of Guarantee between the Republic of Cyprus, on the one hand, and Turkey, Greece and the United Kingdom, on the other. b) A draft Basic structure of the Republic Cyprus; c) A Draft Treaty of Alliance between Cyprus, and Turkey.”¹⁹⁶

Turkish Cypriot and Greece Cypriot representative were not participated at the Zurich Agreement. Their motherlands Turkey and Greece participated at Zurich Agreement in order to solve conflict in the island and establishing new republic in the island with considering the equal rights of the both Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots. Besides finding a viable solution in the Cyprus, the aim of the mother lands (Turkey and Greece) was to obtain exclusive rights in terms of military and geopolitically by preserving the balance of power among themselves.

¹⁹⁴ Dodd, 1993, 5-6.

¹⁹⁵ Zacharia, 1995-1999.

¹⁹⁶ Necatigil 1996, .9-10.

Within the same day after the signing of the Zurich Agreement the Foreign Minister of Greece and Turkey, Mr. Averoff and Mr. Zorlu, went to London to argue the secretary of state for Foreign Affairs of the United Kingdom. As a result of these arguments, Greece, Turkey, and Britain agreed among themselves that decided territories of Cyprus would be remained under the sovereignty of the Britain. That would be an additional article in order to put into the draft Treaty of Guarantee, and the sides would respect for the unity of these territories as well as use and enjoyment rights of the Britain.¹⁹⁷

The London Conference launched at on 17th February 1959. At Lancaster House, Britain, Greece and Turkey were participated by their Foreign Minister; the Turkish Cypriot community represented by Dr. Fazıl Kutchk (Küçük) and the Greek Cypriot community represented by the Archbishop Makarios. On 18 February Makarios opposed to the Zurich Agreement which was not adopt by the Greek Cypriots. He also opposed to the Turkish Vice-President's veto right, intervention right of Turkey and the defense alliance which provided Turkey the right to install soldiers in Cyprus. Another opposed issue of Makarios was the number of seats given to the Turkish Cypriots in the House of Representatives. He also opposed to the territory of the bases to be remained under the control of Britain. Although, all those opposition of the Makarios, the conditions in that time, forced him to accept the Zurich and London Agreements.¹⁹⁸

¹⁹⁷ Necatigil 1996, p.10.

¹⁹⁸ Necatigil 1996, 10.

The leader of Greek Cypriots, Archbishop Makarios was reluctant to accept Zurich and London Agreements. According to those agreements both Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots accepted to set up a Cyprus state in association. However, Greek Cypriots considered that agreements preventing their objectives to achieve Enosis.¹⁹⁹ While Makarios accepting the Zurich and London Agreements unconditionally, he believed and talked his Greek Cypriot Community to convince them that those agreements would be an important step to success Enosis in the near future times. In 1960, when Makarios elected as the President of the Republic Cyprus he announced that “the struggle of the people of Cyprus will go on”²⁰⁰ and he continued his announcements “the Zurich and London Agreements were starting point and bastion for future struggles...”²⁰¹ He continued his speech that “... Greek Cypriots must continue to march forward to complete the work begun by the EOKA heroes... The struggle is continuing in a new form and will go on until we achieved our goal” he also declared clearly to Unsi Suomi of Stockholm on 5 September 1963 that: “It is true that the goal of our struggle is to unite Cyprus with Greece.”²⁰² All those speeches of the Makarios indicated that he disregarded the Zurich and London Agreements and he collaborated with Greece to encourage Greek Cypriots to achieve unification with Greece.

According to Turkey Foreign Minister Mr. Zorlu, The Zurich and London Agreements were the best solution for Turkish Cypriots and the interests of the

¹⁹⁹ Arım 2002, 1-2.

²⁰⁰ Gazioğlu, 1997, 207-225.

²⁰¹ Ibid., 207-225.

²⁰² Ibid., 207-225.

Turkey. Those agreements would prevent the annexation of Cyprus by another foreign state. Those agreements were also important for Turkish Cypriot community to progress their development and to prevent the consideration of their status as a minority. Furthermore the Cyprus Island had geopolitical and strategic importance for the security of Turkey. Zurich and London Agreements provided right for Turkey to protect the security of the Island.²⁰³

The Zurich and London Agreements was signed at Lanchester House of Britain on 19 February 1959. British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan, Greek Prime Minister C. Karamalis and Turkish Prime Minister A. Menderes was signed a memorandum which comprised nine documents. The first three of those documents were accepted at Zurich on 11 February 1959. Both representatives of Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities declared separately that they accepted the documents of Zurich and London Agreements.²⁰⁴

On February 1959, after the acceptance of the Zurich-London Agreements, three committees were set up by the Foreign Ministers of Turkey, Greece and Britain, to prepare constitution of Republic of Cyprus and final treaties to put into force those instruments. The first committee was the Transitional Committee which was concerned with the carrying over authority from the colonial state Britain to the Republic of Cyprus. The second committee, the Joint Commission authorized to draft the constitution of the Republic of Cyprus. The last one, Joint Committee was

²⁰³ Fırat 1997, 68.

²⁰⁴ King, 1963; Ertekün 1984, 145-146.

accredited to arrange the final treaties related to the conclusion of the London Conference.²⁰⁵

The republic of Cyprus was set up by acceptance of the Zurich and London Agreements (1959) and the Treaty of Guarantee (1960) which authorized UK, Greece and Turkey as guarantors of the Cyprus Island in the situation of any violation to change the constitution of the Republic of Cyprus.²⁰⁶

Treaty of Guarantee stipulates that the Republic of Cyprus and the three guarantor powers are responsible for the independence, territorial integrity and the security of the Republic of Cyprus.²⁰⁷ The Republic of Cyprus is also responsible to obey its constitution. The articles of constitution are recognized and guaranteed by the guarantor powers. Unilateral unification of island with any organization or another state and division of the island was forbid by the Treaty of Guarantee. The guarantor powers undertake to protect the situation in the Cyprus. The Republic of Cyprus is also under obligation not to join any political or economic integrity with any state or organization.²⁰⁸

The treaty of Guarantee is important for the existence of the Republic of Cyprus. It provided military intervention right to the guarantor powers in any violation of the

²⁰⁵ Arim 2002, 12.

²⁰⁶ Eralp et al.2005, 178.

²⁰⁷ King, 1963.

²⁰⁸ Arim, 2002, 13.

constitution and integrity of the Republic of Cyprus.²⁰⁹ The Nationalist Greek Cypriots were in the tendency to marginalize Turkish Cypriots and to unify island with Greece. The Turkish Cypriots were aware of this situation, so that they never accepted to participate in the 1960 Republic, if the Greek Cypriots had not approved the intervention right of the Turkey, under the necessary conditions, of the Treaty of Guarantee. As a guarantor country, they believed and trusted on only Turkey, to guarantee their security rights in the Republic of Cyprus.

In 1963, when the constitutional dispute occurred between the Turkish Cypriots and the Greek Cypriots, the guarantor countries could not act together to maintain the operation of the Republic of Cyprus in accordance with the Treaty of Guarantee. Neither UK nor Greece send any condemnation or protest against for unilateral amendment of the Constitution by the Greek Cypriot leader Makarios who was the president of the Republic of Cyprus in 1963. Turkey protested Greek Cypriots related to the unilateral amendment of the Constitution. Britain as a guarantor power of the Cyprus was reluctant to concern with Makarios to prevent his initiative related to unilateral constitutional change. Britain preferred to concern with security interest of its sovereign bases in Cyprus. As the guarantor country, Britain could not take any certain diplomatic responsibility to restore the constitutional problem of the Republic of Cyprus proper to political interest of both Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots. It accepted the matter as constitutional problem of Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots and considered the issue as the internal problem of the Republic of Cyprus. Britain also collaborated with the Republic of Cyprus, which was represented by Greek Cypriots after the 1963 constitutional dispute, to get credence related to the territorial

²⁰⁹ Müftüleri, 2005, 282-283.

integrity and sovereignty of its bases on the island. Of course the security of the Turkish Cypriots were important for Britain, even many of Turkish Cypriots took refuge in his bases and he protected them against for the attacks of Greek Cypriots but it remained inactive to use its guarantor rights to find solution for the constitutional problems of the Republic of Cyprus.²¹⁰

During this period Greece as another guarantor country of the Cyprus, had not acted to secure constitutional structure of the Republic of Cyprus accord with the Zurich and London treaties. Greece instead of founding a remedy for the constitutional problem of the Republic of Cyprus it supported Makarios who was in the desire to achieve enosis.²¹¹ In 1964, Greece violated the Treaty of the guarantee Agreements and it secretly assisted Greek Cypriots supporting by weapons and approximately 20,000 Greek troops, in order to organize Greek Cypriots to success enosis. It also continued to violate the agreements in 1974, because expected enosis was not achieved by the Archbishop Makarios and Greece's military assistance transformed to Greek Junta's coup d'état in order to overthrow Makarios.²¹² Such an approach Greece was in contradiction with the provisions of the Treaty of Guarantee. Greece as a guarantor power ignored the independence, territorial integrity and the security of the Republic of Cyprus.

On the other hand, Turkey strongly protested Greek Cypriot Administration related to unilateral amendment of the constitution. It also put pressure on UK, to act together,

²¹⁰ Moran, 2009, 9-10.

²¹¹ Ibid., 9-10.

²¹² Negatigil, 1985 6.

to declare that the constitutional changes of Makarios, was illegal related to the Zurich and London Agreements. Turkey could not take assistance from the UK to stop the constitutional change attempt of the Greek Cypriots administration. After end of the 1963, Greek Cypriots attacks were intensified on Turkish Cypriots. In this situation, Turkey as the guarantor country of island persisted to apply military intervention on the Cyprus. It used its air forces to provide the security of the Turkish Cypriots. Like Greece and UK, Turkey also was not considered the provisions of the Zurich and London Treaties to reestablish the constitution of the Republic of Cyprus, accordingly the interests of the both Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots.²¹³

Britain and Greece as the guarantor countries of Cyprus and EU have ignored international law, the Zurich and London Agreements and the Treaty of Guarantee by accepting to start membership negotiations with the Republic of Cyprus.²¹⁴ The conditions of the Treaty of Guarantee required that Cyprus cannot enter international, political and economic organizations, if Turkey and Greece were not members in these organizations. During the membership process of Republic of Cyprus, Greece was the full member of the EU, but Turkey was not, so that EU could not start negotiations with Republic of Cyprus to fulfill their admission process into European Union. After the 1963 constitutional dispute, the Turkish Cypriot community was not represented in the institutions of the Republic of Cyprus. EU has disregarded the 1959-1960 Agreements and he could not force the Greek Cypriot community primarily to solve the Cyprus question with the Turkish Cypriot community. According to Turkey; Greece forced EU in order to accept Republic of Cyprus as a

²¹³ Moran, 2009, 9-10.

²¹⁴ Eralp et al. 2005 183.

full member.²¹⁵ Britain also as the member of the EU and the guarantor country of the Cyprus could not act to warn EU and the Greece that the membership process of the Republic of Cyprus was illegal with respected to the Treaty of Guarantee. Although Britain knew that the Republic of Cyprus consisted of Greek Cypriot administration and the Turkish Cypriot community were not represented there, he surrendered the inaccurate Greek Cypriot propaganda and not prevented the unilaterally admission of the Republic of Cyprus into European Union. Britain has ignored the Treaty of Guarantee, and supported Greek Cypriots and Greece to isolate the Turkish Cypriots.²¹⁶

5.2 Treaty of Establishment

The Treaty of Establishment determines the territorial integrity of the Republic of Cyprus. It also stipulates that the liability of the guarantor countries to protect the status of the both Turkish Cypriot community and the Greek Cypriot community under the framework of Republic of Cyprus.²¹⁷ The Articles of the Treaty of Establishment defines the sovereignty of the Britain over the two military bases in Akrotiri and Dheklia.²¹⁸ According to the provisions of the Establishment Treaty the Republic of Cyprus should collaborate with the Britain to protect the security and the operation of those bases in the island.²¹⁹ The treaty also organized the authority of the Britain and British forces in the sovereign bases and arranged the privileges and the

²¹⁵ Müftüler et al.2005, 288.

²¹⁶ Moran,2009, 19.

²¹⁷ Treaty no. 5476. United Kingdom of great Britain and Northern Ireland, Greece and Turkey and Cyprus 1960, 2.

²¹⁸ Ibid, 2.

²¹⁹ Ibid, 2.

rights of the Britain in the Cyprus.²²⁰ The provisions of the Treaty of Establishment are important for the Britain because it is clearly determines that Britain has legal authority on sovereign bases of the island to protect western interests. By this treaty the main objective of the Britain which was taking strategic locations and authority on the island, had been succeeded.

5.3 The Treaty of Alliance

The Treaty of Alliance was signed by Turkey, Greece and Republic of Cyprus to protect the independence and the territorial integrity of the Republic of Cyprus. The sides compromised to act together in the situation of any offense or threat to the Republic of Cyprus.²²¹ The Treaty of Alliance allowed Turkey to deploy 650 Turkish soldiers and also allowed Greece to deploy 950 Greek soldiers in Cyprus. The basic aim of deploying those soldiers was set up a tripartite headquarters to train Cyprus army. They couldn't succeed to train Cyprus army as collectively, instead of acting together to protect the security of the Republic of Cyprus, each side organized their actions to protect their own communal security.²²² After end of the 1963, the outbreak of the constitutional dispute between the Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots, both Turkey and Greece ignored the provisions of the Treaty of Alliance. Greece secretly gave extremely military aid for Greek Cypriots to support them in order to achieve unification with Greece. However, Turkey also secretly sent military weapons for Turkish Cypriots to promote their resisting power against attacks of Greek Cypriots. Turkey and Greece as guarantor countries of Cyprus, instead of finding a diplomatic solution for the constitutional problems of the Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots,

²²⁰ Arim 2002, 14.

²²¹ Necatigil, 1982, 7.

²²² Reddaway 1986, 63.

they preferred to solve problems by the military struggle. Between 1963-1974 Greek Cypriots with support of Greece intensified their military attacks on Turkish Cypriots. Turkish Cypriots also counteracted for the attacks of the Greek Cypriots. Both communities suffered because of the inter-communal conflict and many innocent people lost their life dramatically.

5.4 The Macmillan Plan

After the 1955, the violence between the Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots had raised increasingly. Greek Cypriots established the terrorist organization EOKA to eliminate Turkish Cypriots in the island. Greece also applied to United Nations and supported Greek Cypriots insisting for self-determination.²²³ Meanwhile The Turkish Cypriots set up an anti-terrorist organization Volkan to organize and defense Turkish Cypriot community against for the attacks of the Greek Cypriots.²²⁴ All these events motivated Turkey to call for, taking back the island from Britain or division of the island (Taksim) between the Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots.²²⁵

The independence struggles between the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities troubled Britain, because it was threatening the existence of Britain in the island. The new British Prime Minister Mr. Harold Macmillan had offered his Macmillan Plan to provide stability in the administration of island in 19th June 1958. According to Macmillan Plan, a partnership was offered for Cyprus between the two communities and also among the administration of the Britain, Greece and Turkey.²²⁶ The plan was

²²³ Dodd,1999, 5.

²²⁴ Necatigil, 1996, 7.

²²⁵ Dodd, 1999, 5.

²²⁶ Necatigil, 1982, 3; Negatigil, 1996, 9.

proposing limited self-government related to restricted partition but no authorization for the unification with Greece.

The main aim of the Britain, by submitting the “Macmillan Plan” was balancing administration policy of Cyprus, between the governments of Britain, Greece and Turkey and getting a strategic sovereign base in the Cyprus. Neither Greece nor Turkey was adopting the “Macmillan Plan”. Greece persisted on the formula “independence” without unification with Greece. The Turkey’s expectation was absolute Turkish participation in the administration.²²⁷ The Greek Cypriot leader Makarios announced that the plan was rejected by the Greek Cypriots. On the other hand, Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots declared that they are reluctant for the admission of the Macmillan Plan.²²⁸

Britain understood that The Plan would not work. Turkey persisted that the administration rights of the Turkish Cypriots should be absolute equal partnership with the Greek Cypriot Community. Such an approach of Turkey responded positively by the Britain. British interest had focused on to have a sovereign base or bases on the island. Britain encouraged both Turkey and Greece to negotiate about the basic structure of the constitution of the new state.²²⁹ At Zurich on February 11, 1959 the outline of the constitution was agreed by the Greece and Turkey. They also argued with the both Turkish and Greek Cypriot communities, during the negotiations.²³⁰

²²⁷ Dodd, 1999, 6.

²²⁸ Necatigil, 1982, 3.

²²⁹ Dodd, 1999, 6.

²³⁰ Necatigil, 1996, 12.

Greek and Turkish Cypriots were not participated in the negotiations of the constitution. However both Turkish and Greek Cypriot communities admitted provision of the new constitution even they were not participated in the framework of the new state. The Basic Articles of the Constitution could not change unilaterally but if the Turkish and Greek communities accept together to amend or rehabilitate provisions of constitution, then they could make changes related to constitution of the new state. Republic of Cyprus was established as a bi-communal but not bi-zonal federation between the Turkish and Greek Cypriot communities on 16 August 1960.²³¹

5.5 Constitution of Republic of Cyprus

The 1960 Constitution was formed by the foreign ministers of Greece and Turkey under the structure of the Zurich and London Agreements, on February 11, 1959. The constitution was the Basic Structure of the Republic of Cyprus.²³² It was the presidential electoral system between the separated electoral rolls of the Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots. Head of the state was shared by a Greek Cypriot president and a Turkish Cypriot vice-president. Both the president and the vice-president had authority to get final decision related to his own community. The vice-president could not represent the president in the situation of nonattendance of the president. Only the president of House of Representative could represent president, but he must be Greek.²³³ President and vice-president had right to use veto power, on

²³¹ Dodd, 1999, 6.

²³² King, 1963; Sözen, 2002, 9; Reddaway, 1986, 121.

²³³ Necatigil, 1996, 16.

the determinations of the council of minister, related to security, defense and foreign issues.²³⁴

The Legislature, the Judiciary, the Public Service and the Army were arranged in the central government. The Greek and Turkish Cypriot members were represented their national communities in the central government. The Council of Ministers was comprised of ten ministers, the seven of them would be the Greek Cypriot and the rest three would be the Turkish Cypriot²³⁵. One of the ministries related to ministry of Foreign Affairs, Defense or Finance would be entrusted to a Turkish Cypriot Community.²³⁶ The legislative power was in the hand of the House of Representatives. The members of the House were composed of 35 Greek Cypriot and 15 Turkish Cypriot Communities. In the House of Representatives, the decision making process was required two-thirds majorities of separate members of the two communities.²³⁷ However, the Zurich and London Agreements clearly stipulate that the basic articles of the Constitution of Republic of Cyprus could not be change by any community or any guarantor country.²³⁸

The Judiciary was authorized in the Supreme Constitutional Court and the High Court. The Constitutional Court was formed by three judges. Each community would have one judge and also there would be one neutral president judge. The neutral

²³⁴ King, 1963; Sözen,2002, 1 .

²³⁵ King, 1963.

²³⁶ King, 1963; Necatigil, 1996, 16.

²³⁷ King, 1963; Sözen,2002, 1.

²³⁸ King, 1963; Sözen,2002, 10.

president would not be Greek or Turkish Cypriot. The High Court was formed by a neutral president judge who had two votes right, and two Greek Cypriots and one Turkish Cypriot judge.²³⁹ The District Courts were the dependent courts that judging Turkish cases by Turkish judges, Greek cases by Greek judges and the mix cases by the mixed courts.²⁴⁰

The public services were shared between the Greek Cypriots and the Turkish Cypriots as well as same proportion of the Council of Ministers and the House of Representatives. The public service of the Republic of Cyprus was consisted of 70% Greek Cypriots and 30% Turkish Cypriots.²⁴¹

The police security forces were also same ratio with the public service. The republic would have 2000 police force comprised of 70% Greek Cypriot and 30% Turkish Cypriot communities. The military personnel of The Republic would be 2000 men but their ratio would be 60% Greek Cypriot and 40% Turkish Cypriot communities.²⁴²

Both communities had separate Communal Chambers dealing with religion, education, culture and teaching, personal status, family issues and so on. Each Community has right to regulate its own taxes and charges according to the needs of

²³⁹ Sözen, 2002, 1.

²⁴⁰ Necatigil, 1996, 17.

²⁴¹ Sözen, 2002, 10.

²⁴² Ibid, 10.

their society. The chambers had legislative and executive powers about the related issues.²⁴³

1960 Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus had provided limited independence between Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities. The Republic of Cyprus was set up by the Zurich and London Agreements as an independent, bi-communal state and Greece, Turkey and Britain were the guarantor countries of the new state. The population of the Republic of Cyprus had consisted of 80% Greek Cypriots and 20% Turkish Cypriots. Both communities had equal rights in the constitution of state and they were collective founder of the state. The constitution of the new state had reconciled collectively between the Turkish and Greek Cypriots, instead of the other alternatives such as unification of island with Greece (ENOSIS), delivering the island its first owner-Turkey, division of the island among Greece and Turkey (TAKSIM) or accepting British administration on the island. However it was limited independence because compromising on the constitutional solution would provide two sovereign bases for Britain and it also led to deploy restricted number of military force on the Cyprus by the guarantor countries Greece and Turkey.²⁴⁴

The 1960 Constitution was based on bi-communal structure between the Turkish and Greek Cypriot communities but its allowances were so complicated. It was also criticized that the Constitution was impractical.²⁴⁵ The Republic of Cyprus was established under the 1960 Constitution. Both communities should respect the

²⁴³ King, 1963; Necatigil, 1996, 17.

²⁴⁴ King, 1963; Sözen, 2002, 3.

²⁴⁵ Ibid, 11.

constitutional rights of each other in order to provide the sustainability and livability of the Republic of Cyprus. Their accommodation for application of the Constitutional provisions would require time, goodwill and joint cooperation among the two communities.²⁴⁶ However, the desires and the aspirations of the two communities were different from each other. The Greek Cypriots aim was the unification of island with the Greece but the Turkish Cypriots counteraction was either the island should be left its first owner-Turkey or it should be divided among the Turkey and Greece. Those aspirations of two communities were balanced by the 1960 Constitution, Treaty of Establishment and Treaty of Guarantee. As a motherland countries both Turkey and Greece, because of the ethnic differences and the geopolitical importance of the island, had get involved in constitutional compromise of the Republic of Cyprus. Therefore the 1960 Constitution was so complicated in order to balance relations between Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots. It was also finely-balanced in order to protect geopolitical importance of the island between Turkey and Greece.²⁴⁷

5.6 Violation of Constitution and Agreements

There have been three different reasons for the constitutional failure of the Republic of Cyprus. The first reason, the complex structure of the constitution was not practical. Second, even if it were ideally applicable, it could not be applicable because the leaders of the both communities were incomplete from the goodwill. And third, it was destroyed either by the Greek Cypriots desire of enosis or by the Turkish Cypriots willingness of partition or both.²⁴⁸ After the establishment of Republic of

²⁴⁶ Necatigil, 1996, 19.

²⁴⁷ Sözen, 2002, 11.

²⁴⁸ Reddaway, 1986, 127.

Cyprus in 1960, its bi-communal constitutional existence continued very short time.²⁴⁹

The Greek Cypriot side did not carry out real provisions of the constitution.

Greek Cypriots did not want bi-communal independence.²⁵⁰ They wanted to use that independence in order to achieve enosis.²⁵¹ 1960 Constitution had provided harmonized rights for the Turkish Cypriots in order to protect their equal political status in the administration of the Republic of Cyprus. The provisions of the constitution never exactly applied.²⁵² The Greek Cypriots aim was to get political power on the constitution. The Zurich and London Agreements had imposed on as an equal partnership between the Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots. However, according to the Greek Cypriot community it was injustice because they were majority of the population and their national desires which were unification with Greece, had been prevented by those Agreements. The basis of the dispute, between the Greek Cypriot majority and the Turkish Cypriot minority were the equal partnership and the equal power sharing on the institutions of the Republic of Cyprus.²⁵³

Britain as a guarantor country had ignored the Zurich and London Treaties and the Greek Cypriot leader Makarios were supported by the British High Commissioner of

²⁴⁹ Necatigil, 1996, 20.

²⁵⁰ Ibid, 18.

²⁵¹ Ibid., 19.

²⁵² Ibid., 20.

²⁵³ Reddaway, 1986, 130.

Nicosia to change the constitution.²⁵⁴ That was the strategic objective of Britain, decided together with USA. According to Makarios, the 1960 Constitution was not workable and he had tended to set up diplomatic relations with Soviet Union in order to get Russian support to amend the Constitution of Republic of Cyprus. This situation had disturbed both Britain and USA because Cyprus could turn another Cuba. Britain, by the advice of the USA changed his politics and started to support Makarios and enosis. That was the strategic alternative of Britain to protect security of the British Bases.²⁵⁵

On the Turkish Cypriots side, some nationals had always persisted on the partition of the island. Greeks and Greek Cypriots accused Turkish Cypriots that the constitutional breakdown had occurred because of the partition desire of the Turkish Cypriots. However, that was not true because the Turkish Cypriot Community had struggled to stop enosis instead of advancing their partition desires. The Zurich and London agreements had provided important privileges for the Turkish Cypriots. Their security was also guaranteed by the Turkey. In the 1960 Constitution, the Turkish Cypriots status were equal partnership and their power sharing were determined according to proportion of their population. They had achieved to protect their recognition in the constitution of the Republic of Cyprus.²⁵⁶

However, the Turkish Cypriot community had their own secret plans to protect themselves in the situation of constitutional breakdown or against aggression of the

²⁵⁴ Ibid., 126-127.

²⁵⁵ Dodd, 1999, 8.

²⁵⁶ Reddaway, 1986, 135.

Greek Cypriot community. At the beginning of the 1963 according to Greek secret service reports, the Turkish Cypriots had exercised approximately 2,500 armed men against for the Greek Cypriot Community. On the Contrary of the Turkish Cypriots secret armed activities, the Greek Cypriots had also trained nearly 10,000 Greek Cypriots against for the Turkish Cypriot community. The Turkish Cypriots were in the expectation that the Greek Cypriots could terminate the constitution unilaterally. They had planned that if the Greece Cypriots terminate the constitution unilaterally, they would be demand division of island between two communities.²⁵⁷

Short time after the establishment of the Republic of Cyprus, some disputes, related to administration issues, had started between the partners of the Republic. For example, the Turkish Cypriots had persisted on preserving the separate municipalities in the five major cities (Nicosia, Limasol, Famagusta, Larnaca, Paphos). They also wanted assurance for the 30% public service staff of the Turkish Cypriot Community.²⁵⁸ However, the 30% Turkish Cypriot attendance in the public service posts of the Republic of Cyprus had never been achieved.²⁵⁹ Another dispute was the elimination of the Turkish Vice-President from the foreign relations and the military affairs. The last important conflict was over the taxation of the two communities.²⁶⁰

In November 1963, the Greek Cypriot leader Makarios unilaterally suggested thirteen- points changes in the constitution. The important changes on the constitution

²⁵⁷ Ibid., 135.

²⁵⁸ Dodd, 1999, 7.

²⁵⁹ Necatigil, 1996, 20.

²⁶⁰ Dodd, 1999, 7.

were; the president and the Vice-President of the republic would be elected by the whole members of the House of Representatives. This means that the Turkish and Greek Cypriots would not elect their communal members separately after that. The veto rights of both the President and Vice-President had been cancelled. Makarios also had arranged inefficient public and military governmental rights for the Turkish Cypriot Community. Affiliation of the municipalities and removing separate communal voting system on financial, elective issues were another important amendments related to the constitution.²⁶¹

The basic aim of the constitutional changes was decreasing Turkish Cypriots position into minority status. Greek Cypriots wanted to convert bi-communal state to unitary state. They claimed that the provisions of the 1960 Constitution and Zurich and London Agreements were enforced by the guarantor countries (Turkey, Greece and UK) and the Greek Cypriot authorities signed those agreements under the pressure of the external countries. According to Greek Cypriot leadership, the 1960 constitution should be amended in accordance with the desires of the Greek Cypriot side.²⁶²

The Turkish Cypriots did not accept the constitutional changes of the Greek Cypriots.²⁶³ Makarios unilaterally changed the constitution in 1964.²⁶⁴ On January 1964 he declared that the Treaty of Alliance and the Treaty of Guarantee were

²⁶¹ Dodd, 1993, 7.

²⁶² Sözen, 2002, 3.

²⁶³ Ibid., 3.

²⁶⁴ Ibid., 2002, 4 .

terminated by the Greek Cypriots.²⁶⁵ He also applied Akritas Plan in order to terminate the treaties and to pay attention that the constitution was not work. Another objective of the Akritas Plan was to decrease political status of Turkish Cypriots into minority position.²⁶⁶ Thereby, in December 21, 1963, the inter-communal attacks between the Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots had been started to rise.²⁶⁷ The breakdown of the constitution and the violation of the treaties by the Greek Cypriot leader Makarios led to long period inter-communal clashes between the Turkish and Greek Cypriot communities.

The United Nations were also violated the Zurich and London Agreements in 1964. On 4 March 1964 the United Nations decided to set up a UN peace keeping force in Cyprus (UNFICYP). The UN function in Cyprus was to protect international security between two communities and to help the sides in order to achieve normal conditions in the island. However, the UN force accepted the Republic of Cyprus as a legal recognized country in the island.²⁶⁸ This situation was illegal in terms of the Zurich and London Agreements because after the constitutional breakdown of 1963 the Turkish Cypriots were not represented in the Republic of Cyprus.

Another violation of the Treaties was committed by the Greece. The Greece and Greek Cypriots had made a secret agreement in order to send the Greek army to

²⁶⁵ Necatigil, 1996, 46.

²⁶⁶ Reddaway, 1986, 134.

²⁶⁷ Sözen, 2002, 5.

²⁶⁸ Necatigil, 1996, 49.

island.²⁶⁹ Their aim was to success enosis (unification of island with Greece) in the island.²⁷⁰ After the second half of 1960s, Greece and Greek Cypriots had problem related to unification process of Cyprus. Makarios preferred slow process to achieve enosis in the island. On the other side the Greek Military regime persisted to use absolute power to success enosis. This competition led to coup d'état by the Greek Military regime on June 15, 1974. Their aim was to overthrow Makarios regime and unify island with Greece.²⁷¹ On July 20, 1974, Turkey had organized military intervention to defend Turkish Cypriot community against for the Greek military regime and halt the Greek military regime in order not to achieve enosis in the island. The Greek Cypriots were accused the Turkey related to invasion of one third of the Cyprus by Turkish troops. Turkey had used his intervention rights according to the 1960 – Treaty of Guaranty Agreement.²⁷² However, since the 1974 the Greek Cypriot side has been accused Turkey for the current divided situation in the Cyprus. Furthermore the Turkish Cypriot Community has been blamed by the international community that they did not want to turn back before the situation of 1963. Hence; the Greek Cypriot community accepted as a legal government of Cyprus and its unconstitutional actions has been endured by the international community.²⁷³

²⁶⁹ Ibid., 56.

²⁷⁰ Sözen, 2002, 5.

²⁷¹ Ibid., 6.

²⁷² Ibid., 7.

²⁷³ Özersay, 2005, 65.

5.7 Instruments of Law to Achieve a More Secure Region: Possibility of Reconstructing New Security

NATO should find a way to activate the instruments of law in order to achieve a more secure region in the Eastern Mediterranean because Greek Cypriot Administration rather than the resolution of the Cyprus problem concentrated on the exploring offshore hydrocarbons of Cyprus, which created further tensions. After their unilateral acceptance to the EU they were no longer interested in negotiating with the Turkish Cypriots and because they considered the Turkish Cypriots as a minority they did not negotiate with the Turkish Cypriots, but chose to lobby in the international arena to pressure Turkey to withdraw its military from the island.

The unilateral hydrocarbon exploration activities of the Greek Cypriots started in 2006. Egypt and Israel promoted their surveys in Eastern Mediterranean before the Republic of Cyprus. Egypt has important hydrocarbon reserves in the region. Israel also discovered hydrocarbon reserves in its Exclusive Economic Zone which is very close to Greek Cypriots' Twelfth Parcel reserves. All those developments pushed Egypt, Israel Republic of Cyprus and Greece to act collectively in order to find better ways for the marketing of those hydrocarbon resources under the best safety circumstances.

The regional instabilities that occurred around the Eastern Mediterranean did not permit the coastal states of the region to perform Exclusive Economic Zone proper to international law of the sea rules. Only Republic of Cyprus has attempted to sign an Exclusive Economic Zone Agreement with Egypt, Israel and Lebanon to determine its continental shelf. However, the unilateral continental self-delimitation attempts of the

Republic of Cyprus disturbed the Turkish Cypriots and Ankara, and they also signed a continental self-delimitation agreement. On the other hand, the Syria because of its civil war and the Gaza because of the Palestine problem did not attempt any continental self-delimitation agreement related to their Exclusive Economic Zones.

Russia aspires to obtain military bases in the EU member country Cyprus. The news channels inform that the Cyprus permitted the Russia to deploy its air and navy forces in the strategic bases on the island. The Greek Cypriot president, Nicos Anastasiades also stated that the Russian aviation and war ships would be welcomed in his country. Thereby, in this way a military agreement was signed by Cypriot and Russian Foreign Ministers Mr Ioannis Kasoulides and Mr Sergei Lavrov on 25 February 2015.²⁷⁴ Greek Cypriot Foreign Minister Mr Ioannis Kasoulides has announced that the agreement is not issue for the Russian military bases in Cyprus and towards this way there is not any request from Russia.²⁷⁵ It is going to be allocated in the Cyprus ports to restock and repair the Russian warships.²⁷⁶ Kasoulides also stated that the agreement is subject to civilian and humanitarian purposes to remove the Russian

²⁷⁴ Famagusta Gazette Cyprus, (25 February 2015). Russia - Cyprus agreements - full details. Cyprus. <http://famagusta-gazette.com/russia-cyprus-agreements-full-details-p27672-69.htm>; The BRICS POST, (14 February 2015). Russia-Cyprus eye military agreement renewal. BRICS Media Limited. Registered in England and Wales. <http://thebricspost.com/russia-cyprus-eye-military-agreement-renewal/#.ViqHn9UrKUI>; Grove, T., Kambas, M., & Balmer, C., (2015). Russia, Cyprus sign military deal on use of Mediterranean ports. Reuters (26 February 2015). <http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/02/26/us-russia-cyprus-military-idUSKBN0LU1EW20150226#VJIZ6muekkFTqc7E.99>; Stratfor., (27 February 2015). Sample Article: Amid Sanctions Battle, Russia Courts Cyprus. <https://dub130.mail.live.com/?tid=cmNuaP2e6F5RGoRwAiZMJIOA2&fid=flinbox>

²⁷⁵ BBC News, (9 February 2015). Cyprus denies 'Russia deal on military bases'. <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-31293330>; Karanasopoulou, E. (2015). No issue of Russian bases in Cyprus, Foreign Minister says. Cyprus News Agency (9 February 2015). Retrieved 24 October 2015, from <http://www.cna.org.cy/webnewsEN.asp?a=18efb79817de4325928f9c6009e19044>

²⁷⁶ Stratfor., (27 February 2015). Sample Article: Amid Sanctions Battle, Russia Courts Cyprus. <https://dub130.mail.live.com/?tid=cmNuaP2e6F5RGoRwAiZMJIOA2&fid=flinbox>

citizens from the Middle East if any urgent conditions persist.²⁷⁷ This new agreement would be renewal of the old defence agreement between the both countries.²⁷⁸ It also explains a memorandum between the defence ministers and governments of countries to ensure the naval and military cooperation.²⁷⁹

When Russian naval base on the port of Tartus was threatened by the Syrian rebel groups, it needed to sign a military cooperation agreement with Cyprus in order to use Limassol port and Paphos air base.²⁸⁰ Cyprus-Russia military cooperation imposed a diplomatic pressure on the government of Cyprus by Eastern European countries such as Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo which support Turkey's aspirations in the Eastern Mediterranean. The British Cyprus envoy has expressed that the agreement is not in line with EU policies.²⁸¹ He also warned the Greek Cypriot President Nicos Anastasiades concerning the offshore hydrocarbon crisis in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Russian military deployment on the island. However, Anastasiades claims that providing military facilities to Russian warships would be same with the other facilities that before supported for the French planes and the

²⁷⁷ CyprusUpdates, (9 February 2015). No agreement for Russian military bases in Cyprus. <http://www.cyprusupdates.com/2015/02/no-agreement-russian-military-bases-cyprus/>; Anastasiou, A., (2015). Russia keen to use military bases in Cyprus. Cyprus Mail. Retrieved 1 November 2015 from, <http://cyprus-mail.com/2015/01/21/russia-keen-to-use-military-bases-in-cyprus/>

²⁷⁸ Holodny, E. (2015). Russia reportedly getting military bases in an EU state. Business Insider Inc. <http://www.businessinsider.com/russia-military-agreement-in-cyprus-2015-2>; Durden, T., (2015). Russia's Newest Military Base In Europe Will Be Just 40km From NATO Facilities In Cyprus. <http://www.zerohedge.com/news/2015-02-09/russias-newest-military-base-europe-will-be-just-40km-nato-facilities-cyprus>

²⁷⁹ Pozzebon, S., (2015). Russia just signed a military agreement with an EU state. Business Insider Inc. Retrieved 15 October 2015, from <http://uk.businessinsider.com/russia-signs-military-deal-with-cyprus-2015->

²⁸⁰ Ibid., Grove et. Al., 2015; Stratfor, 27 February 2015

²⁸¹ Ibid., The BRICS POST, 14 February 2015

German warships.²⁸² However if Cyprus government provides military bases for Russia that would make Britain anxious because it has two important base on the island to support NATO operations in terms of military equipments, air forces and intelligence services. In this respect, a high-ranking British Army commander considers that the Russian military existence in Cyprus could lead to a new cold war in the region.

On the other hand, The British Foreign Office has also responded immediately from London to criticise Anastasiades and stated that “in light of the current problems it is not the time to extend a hand of friendship to Russia until it shows willingness to fulfil the Minsk agreement.”²⁸³ The US and EU imposed harsh restrictions against Russia because of the Ukraine crisis. Cyprus-Russia cooperation is not proper to Cyprus-EU policies because EU applies a unanimous vote system to regulate sanctions on Russia.²⁸⁴ While Anastasiades was signing the agreement, he expressed his opposition to apply restrictions on Russia and he also stressed to keep away from the further decline relations between Russia and EU.²⁸⁵ He considered Russia as trustworthy partner of Cyprus. Moreover Anastasiades also stated that Cyprus and Russia have good relations and they intend to promote the political and military cooperation. Moscow always backed Cyprus in the resolutions of the UN Security

²⁸² Ibid.,

²⁸³ Helmer, J., (2015). How Important Is Cyprus to Russia? Russia Insider. <http://russia-insider.com/en/2015/03/02/4035>

²⁸⁴ Hazou, E., (2015). Walking a fine line with Russia. Cyprus Mail. <http://cyprus-mail.com/2015/02/26/walking-a-fine-line-with-russia/>

²⁸⁵ Durden, T., (2015). Russia's Newest Military Base In Europe Will Be Just 40km From NATO Facilities In Cyprus. <http://www.zerohedge.com/news/2015-02-09/russias-newest-military-base-europe-will-be-just-40km-nato-facilities-cyprus>

Council and Russian authorities supported the Cyprus government to terminate the guarantees issue that coming from the 1960 Zurich and London Agreements. Russian envoy to Cyprus Stanislav Osatchiy expressed that the guarantees issue could be offered by the UN Security Council. Thereby, Cyprus tries to follow strategic politics to keep the balance between the Russia and West but it knows that allowing Moscow a military base on the island would lead to confusion. Russia is interested in Cyprus to enforce the EU towards the reduction of restrictions on Moscow. It is aware that Cyprus has limited political influence in EU and Russian authorities want to establish good relations with the other strategic countries of EU such as Hungary, Greece, Austria and Italy to take their supports in order to form a continental block to prevent the restrictions against it. In this respect, Russia considers Cyprus as a strategic partner and Nicosia follows a tit-for-tat strategy but that could lead to deterioration of relations between Cyprus and EU members as well as the United States.

Cyprus tries to follow a sensitive balance of politics in its US and Russia relations in order to protect its economic development and regional security. After the 2013 economic recession, Cyprus banking sector seriously needed bailout and it rested on the US and European investments to rehabilitate its economy. Cyprus approved free accession of the Russian naval ships in its ports but both countries also decided to restructure the €2.5 billion financial help which was given by Moscow in 2011. Its economy greatly based on the Russian assets.²⁸⁶ However, the Cypriot authorities' priority was to take foreign investment in energy sector to explore and exploit Eastern Mediterranean offshore hydrocarbons.

²⁸⁶ Grove et. Al., 2015

According to Charles Wald, who is a Pentagon activist and old US Air Force general the new agreement may seem harmless but it permits Putin to enter into a Mediterranean port and also allows Russia to collect intelligence in order to observe the British activities in Cyprus base at Akrotiri.²⁸⁷ American, Greek and Israeli military experts state that Anastasiades follows a strategy to enter into NATO and wants to take Israelis' and Americans' support in order to protect the Republic of Cyprus against Turkey.

Cyprus government has anxious relations with Turkish authorities in terms of Cyprus problem and Exclusive Economic Zone of the island. Cyprus authorities want to succeed reunification of island and in this respect they need to take political support from Russia and US. In May 2015, Joseph Biden as the U.S. Vice President, made an official visit to island and that was remarkable political event for the Cyprus. However, Cypriot authorities expect from the U.S. officials to prevent Turkish naval threats related to the Exclusive Economic Zone of the island. Establishing good relations with Russia such as Anastasiadis Putin meeting and signing a military agreement with Russia; are strategic policies of the Cyprus government to make more pressure on U.S. in order to take its support on Cyprus problem. Republic of Cyprus follows a strategic interest and balance of politics between Russia and U.S. to gain their political and military protection against for Turkey.

Andreas Stergiou who is from the University of Crete, considers that after 2008, Turkish-Israeli relations deteriorated and Cyprus, Israel and Greece have collaborated

²⁸⁷ Helmer, 2015

extraordinary in the fields of military, politics and energy.²⁸⁸ The main reason for that cooperation was the significant discovery of hydrocarbons in the sea bed of Eastern Mediterranean. In February 2002, Cyprus signed a military agreement with Israel to collaborate with the Israeli Air Force in order to protect the vital energy resources of the island. However, this geostrategic challenge has created a new rivalry among the regional players. Turkey and Russia attempted to collaborate on hydrocarbon and nuclear power to balance the US-EU supported association but it promoted a new regional conflict between the US and Russia.

Another policymaker George Papadopoulos expressed in his report that the Israel and US supported a military collaboration with Cyprus for preventing the growing relations between Russia and Turkey.²⁸⁹ Israel intends to establish a gas liquefaction plant in Cyprus to store its gas and export it by vessel to Europe, but there is need to protect Limassol port by Israel and NATO.²⁹⁰ However, Cyprus not only interested in military issues to cooperate with Russia, it is also interested in collaborating with the Russian companies on energy fields. Russian President Putin clearly expressed during his meeting with Anastasiades; Russia is ready to explore the sea bed gas of the Cyprus to provide a new energy supply for Gazprom and transport it to southern Europe through a pipeline on Turkey.

According to both Cypriot and Russian sources; the island may be open to Russian operations to refuel its air forces and naval ships but providing a military base for

²⁸⁸ Ibid.,

²⁸⁹ Ibid.,

²⁹⁰ Ibid.,

Russia would be a great threat for British bases and its alliance with Americans.²⁹¹ Thus, Britain and America strongly oppose to the Cypriot authorities in order to prevent Russian military deployment on the island. It seems to be under these circumstances deploying the Russian forces on the island would be very difficult. However, if a permanent base is given to Russia, the Republic of Cyprus President Anastasiades will seriously be criticised by the anti-Russian extremists of his own party.

While Cyprus leads oil and gas exploration in the Mediterranean offshores, Israel wants to set up its energy supremacy in the region. Cyprus tries to get Russian's support on Cyprus problem but that may lead to increase political and military ambition of Russia in the Eastern Mediterranean. Greece also wants to develop economic and military relationship with Russia. In this respect the new Greek Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras expressed in Nicosia that "Greece and Cyprus can become a bridge of peace and cooperation between the EU and Russia."²⁹² After the Ukraine crisis, Russia wanted to establish closer relations with some European Union member countries such as Cyprus, Greece and Hungary. However, Russia's that policy worried the Brussel officials in terms of weakening imposed sanctions on Moscow. It seems that Turkey is an only key NATO member country to keep balance in the region and if other NATO members could not support it on this matter the regional stability would be uncertain for following years in the Eastern Mediterranean.

²⁹¹ Ibid.,

²⁹² Financial Mirror, (09 February 2015). CYPRUS: No question of Russia bases, Britain should stand down. <http://www.financialmirror.com/news-details.php?nid=33812>

Russia has strong army and its neighbour countries could not alone overwhelm Russia. It started to show its political and military influence in Middle East and the Eastern Mediterranean. Turkey alone cannot balance Russia. Thus only western alliance or NATO power could balance the Russian influence and Turkey's geography has great importance in NATO and Ankara is also aware of this. After the dissolution of Soviet Union the West were in sluggishness but now Russia has gained its old power and that would affect the balance of power in Europe and the World.²⁹³

Cyprus has geostrategic importance in the Eastern Mediterranean and because of its location and security dynamics; East and West struggle to obtain influence on the island. Even though Cyprus is not a NATO member country, the island has played an important role in the Middle East and Mediterranean operations of the alliance. It would be a strategic headquarters of NATO military operations in the Levant, North Africa and Middle East. Britain holds roughly 8,000 armed forces and two sovereign military air bases on the south coasts of the island. The America also considers Cyprus as significant partner to control its naval superiority in the Mediterranean waters.

Additionally, Russia and China have been pursuing naval operations in the Mediterranean Sea and Russian air force and military deployment in Syria illustrate that in the future Russia may want to have more control in the Eastern Mediterranean offshore hydrocarbons. Russia also wants to deploy its navy force in the Mediterranean in order to undertake strategic political role in the region. This would create a new challenge for the energy security in the Eastern Mediterranean. Thereby,

²⁹³ Kemal, İ. (2015). Rusya'nın artan askeri gücü. Kıbrıs (18 October 2015). Nicosia.

NATO should reinforce the collective defence of its members to protect regional stability and energy security in the region. NATO may enhance energy security with its member countries such as Turkey and Greece to resolve the long standing Cyprus problem, which in turn could enable perpetual settlement.

NATO has already assumed a role in energy security in different regions in the world. NATO has set up a flotilla to protect maritime security and energy security around the 12500 mile offshore of Africa on July30, 2007. First time in the history, NATO maritime group has collaborated in a work with the South African Navy to protect the dangerous attacks of pirates on the coast of Somalia. The purpose of the NATO was to determine its military competence to provide secure navigation corridor for transporting vital energy resources and securization of international maritime law on the offshore seas.²⁹⁴

In Riga Summit, NATO Heads of State and Government provided a consensus and emphasized the NATO's strategic interest to secure the transportation of vital energy supplies of the Alliances. NATO organized an international struggle to evaluate the regional risks of energy infrastructures to secure energy supply and provide safe guard for the energy security. NATO task force on Energy Security has obliged to reply those questions before arranging any policy for securization of energy supplies. First and foremost, NATO has engaged in the securization energy supply and infrastructure. Secondly, NATO attempts to provide secure transshipment for oil

²⁹⁴ Luft G., Korin A., (2009), Energy Security Challenges For The 21st Century, Greenwood Publishing Group, 261

production. Thirdly, NATO tries to integrate member countries' security policies on energy supply.²⁹⁵

NATO's Strategic Concept is to provide protection for the vital energy supplies of its allies in critical regions. Paragraph 24 of the NATO's Strategic Concept clearly expresses that the Alliance security interested in to secure its Allies from organized any armed attack to prevent transportation of vital energy resources. NATO tries to avoid potential energy security crises that could happen in future in the Arctic region. The region has roughly 25 percent undiscovered energy resources. In the near future, the energy interests of the international actors such as Canada, Denmark, Norway, United States and 27-members NATO-Russia Council will focus on Barents Sea to pursuit their stakes and to exploit the vast oil and gas reserves.²⁹⁶

Coordinating NATO and the EU roles are crucial to encourage international actors to act in a consensus on securization of energy resources, transportation and infrastructure equipment. NATO operates critical energy infrastructure protection in 12 NATO nations. The Central Europe Pipeline System is the most crucial and long term operated energy transportation infrastructure by NATO.²⁹⁷

There are some experts that argue NATO should be in a political and strategic cooperation with European Union and North America to ensure political consultation over the security coordination of vital energy supplies. NATO member countries also

²⁹⁵ Ibid., 263

²⁹⁶ Ibid., 266-267

²⁹⁷ Ibid., 267-268

should coordinate other nongovernmental and intergovernmental organizations on energy security matters to produce strategic policies over the securization of energy transportation.²⁹⁸

Energy security is important for the economic future of the nations; because of this many countries focused on to find a way about how to protect the future of their vital energy resources. “If it is compared today’s world energy consumption, by 2030 the world energy needs will increase roughly 45 percent.” The world’s political environment concentrated on the global energy challenge to invest huge moneys to satisfy their increasing energy consumption.²⁹⁹ The Strait of Hormuz, the Panama Canal, the Suez Canal, Bab-el Mandap, the Turkish Straits and the Strait of Malacca are crucial critical sea ways for the transportation of energy supply.³⁰⁰

Hydrocarbon exploration actions in the Eastern Mediterranean Offshores will lead to installation of pipeline systems to transport sea bed resources into World Market within 8-10 years. The existence of the energy resources in the region would require energy Security Corporation between the Greek Cypriots, Turkish Cypriots, Israel and Turkey to enable the safety of energy transportation. However, NATO can undertake an evolving and expanding role to control power challenges dealing with the energy security on offshore hydrocarbons in the Eastern Mediterranean. NATO supported energy security in Eastern Mediterranean means protection of the interests of all

²⁹⁸ Ibid., 269

²⁹⁹ Ibid., 1-2

³⁰⁰ Ibid., 3

producers to provide secure transportation of regional offshore energy resources in the world market.

Chapter 6

CONCLUSION

Discovery of the Cyprus offshore hydrocarbons in the Eastern Mediterranean has affected the regional policies between both Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots. After the year 2003, the Greek Cypriot Administration rather than the solution of the Cyprus problem focused on the unilateral EU membership process of Cyprus and unilateral hydrocarbon exploration and exploitation tendencies in the offshore of island. Greek Cypriot authorities excluded the Turkish Cypriots and authorized an American company, Noble Energy to explore oil and gas in the assigned parcels of the Eastern Mediterranean. They also signed Exclusive Economic Zone delimitation agreements with Egypt, Lebanon and Israel to determine the continental shelf in the south part of the island.

Republic of Cyprus Foreign Ministry declared that the Republic of Cyprus is a recognized country in the international arena and according to the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea it has legal rights to explore and exploit natural resources within its Exclusive Economic Zone. However, Turkey and Turkish Cypriot authorities have opposed to the Greek Cypriot's unilateral hydrocarbon exploration actions before the solution of the Cyprus Problem. Turkey which is not a party of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea does not accept Republic of Cyprus's unilateral policies.

Turkish and the Turkish Cypriot authorities considered that those unilateral policies are not proper to the provisions of the 1960 international agreements of the Republic of Cyprus. Turkey used its guarantor status in order to protect the rights of Turkish Cypriots on the island and to follow its strategic balance of politics in the region. However, increased tension between the Turkish and Greek Cypriots confronts Turkey and Greece as the guarantor powers of the island and creates confusion and regional instability between two NATO member countries. In this respect, the NATO's evolving and expanding role model could be decisive factor in the region to reconstruct the regional stability and regional security between the sides.

Greek Cypriots expect to obtain high hydrocarbon revenue and they reassured to share those hydrocarbon revenues with the Turkish Cypriots after the solution of the problem. However, the Greek Cypriot government never wanted to negotiate with Turkish Cypriots about the exploration and the exploitation of the Cyprus offshore hydrocarbons. They acted as the legal government of the whole island and they followed unilateral strategic policies to urge Turkey and Turkish Cypriots for the resolution of problem. In this context, the Greek Cypriot government tended to license an American company, the Noble Energy to take the US support while exploring the natural resources in the offshores of Cyprus. Furthermore they cooperated with Israel and Greece in the energy and security issues to discover the best alternative way in order to provide the transportation of the Cyprus hydrocarbons in the European markets.

Hydrocarbon crisis made Cyprus problem more complex than before. Ankara claimed the rights of Turkish Cypriots on Cyprus hydrocarbons and started initiatives to

prevent the unilateral drilling actions of Greek Cypriots in the Eastern Mediterranean. Turkey also sent its seismic vessel Barbarous Hayrettin and a navy to show its decisiveness on behalf of the Turkish Cypriots but that led to unilateral suspension of the Cyprus negotiations by the Greek Cypriots.

Republic of Cyprus wants to cooperate with Israel to send those hydrocarbons to European Countries but most experts argue that a pipeline project on Turkey would be the best alternative way to export those hydrocarbons to European markets. However the Greek Cypriot authorities prefer other ways to carry out that transfer because they do not want to be dependent on Turkey. Israeli and Greek Cypriot gas reserves are very close area so that Greek Cypriot government wish to take advantage of the deteriorating relations between Turkey and Israel to persuade Israeli authorities to select other alternative ways except Turkey in order to collectively export those Eastern Mediterranean hydrocarbons. Nevertheless Greek Cypriots were disappointed from the US initiatives that arbitrating between Turkey and Israel to maintain their deteriorating diplomatic relations because of the Mavi Marmara incident. US support Turkey-Israeli partnership in order to provide regional settlement and security in Middle East and Eastern Mediterranean. In this respect, Israel apology to Turkey could facilitate energy cooperation between Turkey and Israel and that could also enforce the Greek Cypriot Administration to think how to cooperate with Turkey and Turkish Cypriots on solution of the Cyprus problem and equal distribution of the hydrocarbon reserves between the two communities.

Greek Cypriot authorities seek to find out alternative ways such as Cyprus-Crete-Greece or Cyprus-Greece-Italy routes to project the exportation way of Cyprus

hydrocarbons to Europe. Egypt is also another alternative route for the transportation of those hydrocarbons but a pipeline project through Turkey seems to be more reasonable way to send the Eastern Mediterranean hydrocarbons at cheaper cost to European countries. Hydrocarbon installation projects are very expensive and discovering new technology replacing the hydrocarbon systems with the shell gas energy. U.S. discovered the shell gas energy which is cheaper than the hydrocarbon energy and some European countries particularly Poland started to use the shell gas instead of the hydrocarbon energy. In this context; the Greek Cypriot government should undertake an active role to solve primarily the Cyprus problem and after that marketing the hydrocarbons collectively with Turkish Cypriots otherwise if shell gas replaces the hydrocarbon energy market then the Cyprus hydrocarbons could not be sent to the European countries.

The unilateral policies of the Greek Cypriot administration were constrained the Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots to regulate their own political strategies on the Cyprus hydrocarbon issue. They signed the continental self-delimitation agreement to determine the sea borders between the Turkey and the North Cyprus to authorize the Turkish companies such as TPAO (Turkish Petroleum Cooperation) in order to explore natural resources around the Cyprus on behalf of the Turkish Cypriots.

Turkey and the Turkish Cypriot political authorities insisted on the bi-communal federal political settlement on the island. They also offered the cooperation and establishment of the “technical committees” between the Turkish and Greek Cypriots to achieve permanent settlement under the U.N. auspices. Turkish Cypriots rather than the equal distribution of hydrocarbon revenues wish to obtain equal political rights

with the Greek Cypriots. International actors and even Greek Cypriots accepted the equal rights of the Turkish Cypriots on Cyprus hydrocarbons but the sides cannot reach any peaceful settlement on the island.

Hydrocarbons issue could be unifying factor between the sides but all Turkish Cypriots' offers were rejected by the Greek Cypriot administration. International actors encouraged the Greek Cypriots to explore and exploit hydrocarbons around the offshores of Cyprus but there is not any agreement between the Turkey and the Greek Cypriot administration to determine the continental-self borders in the region. The Turkish Cypriot authorities disregarded by the Greek Cypriots to collectively take place in the decision making process of the hydrocarbon resources. Thereby, Turkish Cypriots tended to cooperate with Turkey but that started a 'cold war' conditions between the Turkey and Greek Cypriots and damaged the continuing negotiation process.

The UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon demanded from the sides to decrease tension and he emphasized that the natural resources of Cyprus are belong to "all Cypriots" who live on the island. Lisa Bittenheim who is the Special Representative of the UN Secretary General on Cyprus has also confirmed the Greek Cypriots' good will to share those hydrocarbons with Turkish Cypriots aftermath the resolution of the Cyprus problem. The UN Secretary-General's Special Adviser on Cyprus, Alexander Downer, expressed that the sides willingly should ask from the U.N. to negotiate on the hydrocarbons otherwise it could not enforce the sides to undertake a mediator role on the issue. In this respect, the Turkish Cypriots accept the U.N. initiatives to

arbitrate on hydrocarbons issue but the Greek Cypriot side do not want to negotiate hydrocarbons on the U.N. platform.

The U.N. permanent members have not undertaken any initiative towards the resolution of the Cyprus Hydrocarbons issue. Russia, U.S., U.K. and France as the permanent members of the U.N. Security Council have supported the RoC's hydrocarbon exploration activities. China has followed a different policy than the other permanent members. It considered the issue as the domestic problem of the RoC and avoided to make any comment related to the unilateral hydrocarbon exploration actions of the Greek Cypriots. U.N. and the international community could not undertake an initiative to enforce the Greek Cypriots in order to negotiate the hydrocarbon issue with the Turkish Cypriots. The international community except Turkey do not want to enforce the Greek Cypriots for the resolution of the hydrocarbons. U.S. support Greek Cypriot-Israel cooperation and rather than the solely solution of hydrocarbons issue it prefers the comprehensive resolution of the Cyprus problem in the island.

Turkey follows a strategic policy with Zolu Group to persuade Israel to set up a pipeline project in order to send the Eastern Mediterranean Hydrocarbons to Europe. If Turkey maintains its political relations with Israel that project could be applicable in the region. Turkey-Israel cooperation on the Eastern Mediterranean hydrocarbons may enforce the Greek Cypriot authorities to take place in this cooperation. It may also contribute to the peace negotiations in Cyprus to find permanent resolution on the island. Thereby, the Greek Cypriot, Israel, Turkish Cypriot and Turkey cooperation

on the Eastern Mediterranean hydrocarbons could generate the economic wealth and regional security in region.

After the Justice and Development Party (AKP) government came to power, Turkey increasingly promoted its economic development and the regional status. Turkey followed a big brother role as the foreign politics to solve the Cyprus problem and to protect the rights of Turkish Cypriots on the Cyprus offshore hydrocarbons. After the Greek Cypriot's unilateral hydrocarbon drilling and exploration efforts, Turkey has practiced on the "Drinking Water Supply Project" to solve the water scarcity problem on the island. In October 2015, the inauguration of project was made by the Turkish President Tayyip Erdogan and Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoglu. The Turkish Cypriot leader Mustafa Akinci also declared in the inauguration that the pipeline water project may be "peace project" for the resolution of the Cyprus problem. This project demonstrates the Turkey's assumed big brother role to meet the needs of the North Cyprus.

Turkish Cypriots trusted on Turkey and considered the Turkish authorities and Turkey as their "big brother" because of the nationalist aspirations of the Greek Cypriots. Greek Cypriots were 80 percent of the island population and during the British administration they wished to unify island with Greece in order to achieve their enosis dream. However, the Turkish Cypriots were opposed to the Greek Cypriots challenges and they received support from the Turkey in order to prevent the Greek Cypriots' enosis activities.

Today the Turkey's big brother role is affective on the Turkish Cypriots. Turkey as the guarantor country of Cyprus is the unique country that supporting the Turkish Cypriots in terms of the economy, politics and military issues. Turkish Cypriots resist the international economic embargoes through the Turkey's financial aids. Historically the starting point of the Turkey's big brother role on the Turkish Cypriots is based on aftermath the 1955. Turkey has strategic interest on Cyprus because of its regional competition with the Greece. Thereby, Turkey gives importance to protect the Turkish Cypriots existence on the island and it also strategically considers the island as an outpost in order to protect its south coast security. In this respect, during the establishment of the Republic of Cyprus Turkey undertook an active role in the 1960 Zurich-London negotiations to provide legal acquisitions for Turkish Cypriots. Nevertheless, the Turkish and Greek Cypriots because of the population structure, ethnic differences and nationalist aspirations could not achieve the jointly administration of Republic of Cyprus. Uprising ethnic clashes between the both communities prompted the guarantor country Turkey to assign stability on the island. In this context, Turkey carried out a military intervention in 1974 but that lead to separation between Turkish and Greek Cypriots.

Turkey long term supported the old Turkish Cypriot leader Denktash to negotiate the confederal settlement as two equal states between the Turkish and Greek Cypriot communities. It also still supports the bi communal bi zonal federal solution on the island. However the long-time dissolution on the Cyprus problem led to cultural assimilation policy of Turkey on the Turkish Cypriots. Turkey controls the economy of North Cyprus and undertakes a big brother role in the political decisions of the Turkish Cypriots.

On the other hand, the Greek Cypriots cooperate with the Greece but they do not care the existence of the Turkish Cypriots to create proximity between the two communities to promote the negotiation process in order to achieve the permanent settlement on the island. They also use the hydrocarbons issue as trump against the Turkey and Turkish Cypriots to cooperate with Israel and Greece in the energy and the security issues. In this respect, the majority of the Turkish Cypriots never trusted the unification calls of the Greek Cypriots and they do not in an expectation that the Greek Cypriot side really wants to negotiate the Cyprus problem with the Turkish Cypriots. Much rather the Turkish Cypriots trusted on Turkey to protect their rights against the Greek Cypriots. They also expected positive relations between the Turkey and EU to contribute the solution of the problem. Thereby, the former AKP prime minister, President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has always emphasized that the Turkish policies would be one step ahead of the Greek Cypriot policies in order to obtain better resolution on the Cyprus matter.

The Warsaw Pact has come to an end and the USSR has dissolved but NATO is still evolving. This is so because NATO has not only been a military alliance, but also a community of shared principles and values. Two possible scenarios for NATO: The alliance may assume a new role for security as well as energy policies in the Eastern Mediterranean. NATO may not assume a new role in the Eastern Mediterranean because of the Russian involvement in Cyprus. As a result of this thesis; due to the Russia factor in Cyprus the NATO may not assume a new role to ensure the settlement and security on island.

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