

The EU Future Role in Libya's Conflict Resolution

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ABSTRACT

The violent conflict in Libya and the international community's involvement has led to political, economic, social instability and the dislocation of peace and security. Relevant actors with stakes in Libyan peace and security have to agitate for involvement in the reconstruction efforts. Libya lies south of Europe's borders on the Mediterranean Sea. It is strategically the gateway to Africa and the Middle East to and from Europe. This strategic relevance ignites an interest in the European Union's participation.

This research project investigates EU policies in Post-Gaddafi Libya and its efforts towards the political, economic and security reconstruction. The project utilized relevant literature, Elite interviews, memos, factsheets and other relevant documents, to evaluate EU policies and their impact on Post-conflict reconstruction after the demise of Gaddafi. This research established that, the EU policies suffer inconsistencies in implementation in relation to the role of the national interest of some EU member states. The intervention was more for the protection of European security from migrants and terrorist than a genuine concern for fundamental policy intervention that could bring peace, security, political and economic stability.

Keywords: EU policies, Post-Gaddafi Libya, Security, Post-conflict reconstruction, EU member states' national interests.

ÖZ

Libya'daki şiddetli çatışmalar ve uluslararası toplumun Libya'ya müdahalesi, barış ve güvenliğin siyasi, ekonomik, sosyal olarak tamamen yerinden etmesine yol açmıştır. Libya barış ve güvenliğine giren ilgili aktörler bu kadar endişeliydi ve yeniden yapılandırma çabalarına karışmak için tedirginlik duyuyorlardı. Libya, Akdeniz'in güneyindeki Avrupa güney sınırlarının güneyinde bulunuyor. Bu yüzden, stratejik olarak Afrika'ya, Ortadoğu'ya ve Avrupa'ya açılan kapıdır. Bu stratejik önem, Avrupa Birliği'nin müdahaleye olan ilgiyi de beraberinde getiriyor.

Bu araştırma projesi, Kaddafi Sonrası Libya'daki AB politikalarını ve politik, ekonomik ve güvenlik yeniden yapılandırma çabalarını inceliyor. Projede, Kaddafi'nin dağılmasından sonra AB politikalarını ve çatışma sonrası yeniden yapılanma üzerindeki etkileri değerlendirmek için ilgili edebiyat, elit röportaj, notlar, bilgi tabloları ve diğer ilgili belgeler kullanıldı. Bu araştırma, AB politikalarının Birliğin bazı güçlü bireysel üye ülkelerinin ulusal çıkarlarını yansıtacak modelleme rolleri nedeniyle uygulamada tutarsızlıklar yaşadığını tespit etmiştir. Müdahale, barış, güvenlik, siyasi ve ekonomik istikrar getirebilecek temel politika müdahalesine karşı gerçek bir endişe olmaktan çok, Avrupa devletlerinin göçmenlerden ve teröristlerden gelen güvenlik çıkarlarını korumak için gerçekleştirilmiştir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: AB politikaları, Kaddafi sonrası Libya, Güvenlik, Çatışma sonrası yeniden yapılanma, AB üyesi ülkelerin ulusal çıkarları.

DEDICATION

To my father SulimanAbudabos,

To my mother Fatima Abudabos,

To my brother MohamedAbudabos,

To my sisters Honiwa, Salwa, Arwa,

Taqwa,&FadwaAbudabos

TO my beloved country LIBYA

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Chapter 1

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Objective of the Study

This study attempts to evaluate the role of the EU in resolving the conflict in Libya and the possible mutual interests of stabilizing the situation in Libya. The goal of this research is to evaluate and analyze the role of the EU as part of resolving the conflict in Libya, and examine whether it has had any positive implications for the future peace process in Libya. The analysis takes in its consideration the decisions taken by some EU member states and their motivations during the period leading up to the political agreement between the Libyan disputants.

The study refers to the role of the EU in its participation in the military intervention to topple the Gaddafi regime and protecting civilians as an academic basis of drawing the literature review on the EU foreign policies towards Libya, and as an examination of the roots of this relationship between the EU and post-Gaddafi Libya. Whilst studying a period which already is a part of history, the intention of this research is to engage in long and careful consideration on how individual states were affected as well as whether they react and respond according to the collective interests of the Union or in accordance to the national interest of each state.

1.2 Scope and Limitations

This study will take into consideration the main issues and events that will be categorized in interviews and the literature review. The period that is analyzed is from the beginning of the military process against Libya in 2011 up to the late efforts taken by the EU to help stabilize Libya in 2017. The study will discuss the motivational interests of some EU member states that might help resolve the Libyan conflict as well as the EU's capability to support the peace process in Libya. The final chapter will be based on the previous discussion; will suggest a number of areas of cooperation between the EU and Libya in relation to regional security and stability.

1.3 Research Questions

This study aims to answer the following questions; A) Can the EU play a positive role in peace building and post conflict reconciliation in Libya? B) In what context do member states share an interest in the stabilization of the Libyan state?

1.4 Hypothesis

The varying national interests of individual member states of the EU help to determine its objectives and the foreign policies during periods of conflict, and the EU's actions are decided by those interests, not by the common framework of this union.

1.5 Methodology

The research is a qualitative study based on a comprehensive literature review regarding the EU's reaction to the uprising in Libya intervention, and draws comparison with other conflicts regional and continental. It analyses the EU's security and interests, the coherence among its member states in policy application, as well its military capability, and the possible areas of cooperation with Libya. This

involves textual analysis of news coverage, EU memos, fact-sheets, reports and EU official's speeches. Crucially, it also includes open-ended interviews with Libyan decision makers who had a close relationship with the EU practitioners and high officials of the member states. The responses given to questions in these interviews are analyzed by making comparisons with the literature and the EU statements. The researcher met with officials and experts in Libya during the period from July - September 2016. The interviewees were granted anonymity to assure that they would be comfortable to express their opinions and points of views without restrictions. In order to ensure confidentiality to my interviewees, I have codified their names in the analysis section. This codification simply refers to the first and last letters of their names. For example, SE stands for Saleh Elgatar. The sample is eight Libyan officials with different high level posts in the Libyan government, who have been engaged with European decision makers and officials. They include; Two parliamentarians, one member of the Supreme Council of State also former member of the General National Congress, a brigadier-general in the Libyan Ministry of Defense, a high official in the Libyan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, one mayor of a municipality, a high level official in a municipality, and a consultant in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. During the interview, I took notes while they are expressed their points of view. Those notes are attached in the appendix.

1.6 Theoretical Framework

This study uses the theory of realism in its theoretical frame to analyze the European Union as an international Organization with contested interests among its member states in post-Gaddafi Libya. The study argues that realism is the most effective approach to the research questions. The liberal internationalist perspective was considered as the basis for the project as the Libyan intervention was justified

through a humanitarian narrative. However, as the research revealed, state interests were observed to be primary in the undoing of the intervention project. Hence, as state interests played a leading role, realism provides the most durable approach to this research. The study is objective in the sense of seeking answers to the questions without presuming the outcome. Though it is recognized that the researcher is constrained by experience, and thus cannot claim complete objectivity in the philosophical sense, the research was nonetheless guided by methods which sought to find objective answers through engagement with experienced practitioners. As such the research was initially guided by the liberal approach but the findings of the study made it clear that realism in this particular case was a more appropriate guiding theoretical perspective.

Realists argue that strong states are playing a critical role in global organizations to guarantee they remain powerful and relevant (Mearsheimer: 1994: 13). They argue that international organizations are always principally ineffective, as they are not able to stop their member states from engaging in power politics and self-interest. John Mearsheimer argues that international organizations have little power, leading to a power competition among states, motivating the states to reflect the power distribution in the world system (Mearsheimer: 1994: 13).

Mearsheimer states that institutions enhance peace through influencing the actions of their member governments. Institutions support cooperation in a highly competitive system, and it is only natural that states use this pretext to benefit from each other (Mersheimer: 1995: 82). To this end, Mersheimer emphasizes the irrelevance of global organizations, because he assumes that they do not change the anarchic

system. As such, the initiatives of international organizations are often subject to state interests (Crockett, 2012).

1.7 Structure of the Study

This study will be divided into five chapters. First chapter will introduce the topic. The second will briefly narrate the historical background of the EU position towards the Libyan uprising and the post-conflict support mechanism and reactions. The third chapter will review the literature regarding the EU's role in Kosovo, Africa, and its role in Libya with a comprehensive review from different aspects. It will start with analyzing the intervention method; examine the EU's normative power and its ineffectiveness and finally presents and analysis of with the security issues and the migrant crisis. The fourth chapter will discuss and analyze the data regarding the EU role in post-conflict reconstruction and peace building in Libya. The analysis will be based on the data collected from EU official statements and data, as well as the interviews with Libyan decision makers. The final chapter will conclude the study the major findings of this research.

Chapter 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1 Introduction

This chapter attempts to shed light on existing academic literature concerning the EU role in conflict management, post conflict reconstruction and peace building in different areas, which are of strategic interest to Europe. The chapter reviews the literature on conflicts in Kosovo, Africa broadly, and Libya in order to build a clearer vision of the EU response to conflicts. This section starts with the conflict in Kosovo, in realization of the strategic consideration that Kosovo represents Europe as a matter of geography. It then observes modern conflicts in Africa such as those in Rwanda, Burundi, Zaire, and South Sudan. This comparison seeks to determine how the EU views conflicts which are nearby and those which are further afield. The chapter then concludes with conflict in Libya.

2.2 The EU Response to Kosovo's Conflict

Kosovo is a southwestern Balkan state. It was one of the Serbian parts of the former union of Yugoslavia. Kosovo's territory has been a disputed area between Albania and Serbia for years, but this region was basically inhabited by minorities of Albanians. Kosovo, before 1989, was enjoying a comparatively high level of self-government and autonomy in the former Yugoslavia. However, when Milosevic was elected, many things changed rapidly. The autonomy of Kosovo was severed when Belgrade asserted its authority over the territory. Consequently, masses of Albanians arranged demonstrations asking for more freedom and civil rights. Kosovo's Serbs

Albanians were increasingly separated and isolated. Four hundred thousand or more Kosovo Albanians escaped the country due to the suppression and the increased pressure on the social and economic situation. Peaceful opposition and protests were shortly substituted by the use of violence when nationalist activities increased in Kosovo. Increasing tensions resulted in militant confrontation (Spasov, 2014).

The international community expressed condemnation of the escalating situation and urged the disputants to ceasefire directly calling on Serbian forces to withdrawal immediately, reflecting the fear that the conflict might extend to other Balkan states. Resolution 1199 was adopted by the UNSC in September 1998 denouncing all violent actions by all parties, and the use of terrorist activities to pursue political aims. A month later, this resolution was followed by resolution 1203 in October 1998, which called for a direct ceasefire and the founding of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) as a mission of observation (UNSC Resolution 1203, 1998).

In spite of these procedures, in 1999, the situation became more intense and large numbers of armed confrontations occurred. The presence of observers from the OSCE despite some success was not preventative and the problem became worse. Diplomatic talks reached no conclusions and the Serbian military forces extended their presence in Kosovo. The US administration issued a warning to Milosevic but there was no compliance. On March 23, NATO's Coalition Force Operation began. It continued for 77 days and finished on June 10, 1999.

The consequences of the armed confrontations between Kosovo Albanians and Serbian armed forces were assumed to be more than three thousand missing and

more than thirteen thousand killed, most of them Albanians, according to the International Committee of the Red Cross statistics. More than 800,000 refugees returned back to their homes by November 1999 (US Department Report, 1999).

2.2.1 The EU Military Role in Kosovo

NATO is still the key organization providing security for Europe after the Cold War. The military mission that was undertaken against the government of Serbia in the 1999 Kosovo conflict was a significant example that illustrates the changing role of NATO. For the first time since its foundation, NATO launched a war against the Milosevic regime. The Alliance considered the conflict between Kosovo's ethnicities as a significant challenge to Europe. Atrocities and violations of human rights against the Albanian ethnical groups in Kosovo made the European Union concerned that a greater crisis would ensue. For the member states of NATO and the European Union and their competent authorities, the stakes were high (Spasov, 2014).

Since the Cold War ended, the existence of NATO and, more essentially, NATO's objectives, have been greatly questioned. After the conflict escalated, leaders from the European Union and the US administration quickly condemned the use of force and imposed policies to restore universal security and regional peace. Even though the UN did not authorize the intervention due to the veto of Russia and China, it was justified to be legitimate because of humanitarian considerations (Spasov, 2014).

In spite of this, NATO, on 24 March 1999, launched air strikes against the government of Serbia. The operation was strongly criticized by Russia because it did not comply with the UN Security Council protocols and it violated both the sovereignty of Serbia and international law, since Kosovo was within Serbian sovereign territory. The other essential powers in the international community,

namely Russia, were concerned about the military operation led by NATO and the US government. On the other side, since the objective of NATO, according to NATO's own definition, was to prevent genocide, many in the European Union and the USA were astonished by the Russian reaction (Spasov, 2014).

2.2.2 The Kosovo War Impact on the EU

A common European Union, defense force has long been the subject of debate. EU member states, in the Cologne summit conference, reached an agreement to create a project that facilitates the deployment of military forces by the EU. At the time the Serbs' defeat against NATO – after 77 days of air strikes – provided desirable conditions to implement that scheme. Accomplishing a more coherent and effective Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) via more improved institutional strategy and developed military powers is a critical challenge for the European Union. The ineffectiveness and incoherence of the EU CFSP is one of its critical failures (Grant, 1999).

During the Kosovo crisis all of the governments and, public opinion broadly, were concerned about refugee flows, terrified by the ethnic cleansing of Albanians, and determined that Milosevic must be constrained. EU officials realized that if they were to make a cooperative effort, they would probably have a better opportunity to accomplish their goals. Political and social disorder that starts in the Balkans could potentially pass to Turkey, the Middle East and Northern Africa affecting refugee flows and threats to European citizens. If EU states disregard hostilities, racial cleansing or human rights violations in the near neighborhood of the European Union, the European citizens would probably discredit both the member states and the EU in general. So the probability of the EU willing to intervene in its backyard

increased (Grant, 1999).

Military and diplomatic incompetence of the European Union were clearly highlighted in Kosovo's crisis. The EU which was to a lesser degree militarily weak should have been more powerful in diplomatic conditions. Europe could have made conflicts in Croatia, Bosnia, Slovenia and Kosovo avoidable if the European Union had taken a more consolidated and stronger decision when Yugoslavia split up in 1991. Tony Blair's disappointment about the inability of the European Union to play a key role in diplomatic rounds of Kosovo motivated him to put new plans to work for a capable defense mechanism for the EU. The defeat of the Serbian army by NATO encouraged those ambitious ideas to establish such powers. A clear justification of the little weight that EU's diplomatic statements carry is that those declarations would not be supported with armed actions. The EU is not able to deploy armed troops impressively, quickly and easily. The core of the new justification is, the Europeans must be capable to utilize NATO to manage the use of force for their interests if a crisis that needs a military operation arises and the USA is unwilling to intervene. The scheme should also permit the EU the possibility to manage autonomous armed operations which do not include NATO (Grant, 1999).

2.3 The EU Role in Conflict Resolution in Africa

The African continent has had its share of conflicts in the pre-colonial period, as well as challenges related to the slave trade, colonialism and neo-colonialism. The concern here though is not historical issues, but contemporary events that have generated conflicts and how these conflicts are resolved or managed with the help of the European Union. The literature points to the fact that EU intervention in Africa has been limited. African countries between the late 1980s to the late nineties 1990s

had been searching for African solutions to African problems (Achankeng, 2013) Even though it is the most vulnerable conflict prime continent in the world.

The problem of conflict resolutions in Africa is quite challenging because numerous actors are often involved; some of which are external to Africa. These external actors are promoting an approach to conflict resolution that fundamentally resonates with their values and world views (Achankeng, 2013). If such challenges are understood, why have African countries not evolved an indigenous approach away from the strategic reach of these external actors? Arguably, poor state governance and institutional failure play a key role in exacerbating African problems (Obasanjo, 1991). However, scholars have often argued that, the roots of most post-colonial conflicts, including the current crisis in South Sudan, can only be conceptualized within the historical context and experiences with colonialism and the process of the de-colonization itself. Modern African states were created by European powers in disregard to ethnic and regional differences creating imbalanced power relations and structural distortions (Cohen, 1995). These structures subsisted following independence, allowing problems to carry over from colonial times (Duala-M'Bedy, 1984).

These conflicts have transformed Africa and such transformations are shaped by new forms of domination manifesting in the post-colonial periods. This can be seen clearly in the conflicts in Rwanda, Burundi, Zaire, South Sudan and are directly impacted by colonial activities (Cohen, 1995). It is often agreed that, the colonialists have departed long ago, so why are African problems still blamed on them? Arguably, they departed symbolically, but the African economy is still strongly tied to western economies as much as the political impact of the political architecture be

quitted to these African leaders. A careful look into the nature of African conflicts would reveal specific patterns and conflict trends; the conflicts are either economic or political masked as ethnic, religious or sectarian in nature. A careful observation reveals these concerns. To this extent, it is very difficult to exonerate the West and still analyze the conflict properly. The understanding of the conflict arguably is connected to an understanding the source of the conflict. From this argument, Europe cannot be completely blameless even with their symbolic disengagement from Africa.

2.3.1 The European Countries Approach to African Conflict Resolution

The most clear European involvement in African conflicts is Britain supporting its former colonies sometimes with the aid of America. The United Kingdom department for international development (DFDI) in 1995 introduced a stakeholder framework. This approach involved the mapping of key stakeholders and their lines to root causes of such conflicts, their agenda, capacities and existing peace efforts (Rugumamu, 2002). These efforts are essentially policy oriented and fall short of significant practical approach to reach a conflict resolution.

The French government is much more proactive. They sent troops to keep peace and resolve conflicts and challenges in their former colonies. The French government has been involved in quite a number of peace missions in Africa, Mali, Chad and the Central African Republic. In 2008, troops were sent to Chad, and 1600 troops have been sent into Central African Republic (Andrew, 2014). The French government has made significant material and human sacrifices for peace and conflict resolution in Africa. The individual European countries approach could be logically explained as continual imperial influence. The West sees Africa as it used to see it under

colonialism. This possibly is the only reason that could explain the conspicuous absence of interest in an African conflict resolution strategy by European Union as a whole.

2.3.2 The Role of the EU Response to African Conflict Resolution

The European Union does not have a coordinated program with a strong commitment to conflict resolution in Africa. The European Union had proposed to send 500 troops to Central African Republic at the peak of the crisis to back up the over stretched French troops in Mali and Central African Republic. The Central African Republic contingent would be coordinated and commanded from a military base in Greece. The EU does not have a standing force. It relies on individual states' contribution. In the Central African Republic mission, Estonia, Poland, Belgium, and Sweden expressed clear readiness to contribute. However, the United Kingdom and Germany reneged promising to contribute only logistics and other forms of support (Andrew, 2014).

The European Union entered into a partnership with African Union on peace and security; democracy, good governance and human rights. Other areas of partnership include, human development, sustainable and inclusive development as well, growth, continental integration, global and emerging issues (Rein, 2015b). The European Union support for Amison are in three main areas; restoring the rule of law, encouraging democracy and reconciliation. Also the reconstruction of the country (Ibid), in spite of these efforts, the EU seems not to be ready to help Africa in peacekeeping. The EU approach is good but the strategic consequences remain very little. The European Union had signed a political commitment with the African

Union in 2014, which will lapse in 2017. The African Union would be assisted by providing funds, intelligence and training and logistics (Anwitt, 2010).

2.4 The EU and Libya

Most of the literature is on the Libyan intervention is taken from a legal, geopolitical and humanitarian point of view (Ramoin, 2011; Lindström&Zetterlund, 2012; Morini, 2011; and Kuperman, 2013). Some has discussed the norms that have been adapted by the EU such as the Responsibility to Protect and the impartiality of EU normative power (Brockmeier *et al.*, 2014; Dembinski&Reinold, 2011; Franco&Rodt, 2015; Schimmelfennig *et al.*, 2006; Pace, 2007; Manners, 2002; &Schimmelfennig *et al.*, 2003) Other scholars and intellectuals (Brachet, 2016; Shore et al. 2011; Squire, 2011; & Rancière, 2006) have analyzed the role of EU policies in regard to the migration issues and its impact on conflict creation and conflict resolution in Libya. Others have discussed the security issues that have evolved during the uprisings following the toppling of Gaddafi's regime. The security consequences that might impose a direct threat on the EU member states' national security were outlined as well (Spasov, 2014; Seeberg, 2014). What is more, there has been much discussion of the EU as incoherent and incapable in crisis management (Menon, 2011; Koenig, 2011; Gottwald & Curie, 2012; Spasov, 2014; Michalski & Norman, 2015; and Seeberg, 2014).

2.4.1 Setting the Stage for a Military Intervention

To start with, the Libyan case is considered as a guiding model for future relative cases. Some are still debating over the legality of interfering militarily in Libya. Although Libyans took leadership of their revolution since it began, it would have not been successful if the international community did not respond to deter Gaddafi's crimes against civilians (Ramoin, 2011).

In addition, some researchers have concentrated on the process of decision-making that has consequently led to the military intervention. They have analyzed if there were any implications to be extracted for the future capability of the EU and NATO for future military actions. The positions of some significant NATO member states, like the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany and France have been given particular importance. The Libyan case has specified both new and current predispositions regarding the cohesion of international defense cooperation in global relations, the United States' and the EU member states' function in future conflicts (Lindström & Zetterlund, 2012).

What is more, it is of interest to take into consideration whether the resulting events of military interference in Libya have in any way provided a change to the framework of international security strategy. This might lead the decision makers to wonder whether there is the potential to reshape international politics as the Libyan conflict and its conditions were unique in many prospective (Lindström & Zetterlund, 2012). The military mission and the prior decision-making procedures confirmed and highlighted particular conditions of international security affairs and tendencies. Some of these issues were not newly emerging aspects, but the Libyan case rather proved them. For example, one issue was precisely the lack of confidence in *Common Security and Defense Policy* (CSDP). Actually, a general perception of exhaustion with cosmopolitan institutions could be comprehended (Lindström & Zetterlund, 2012).

The critique is that the aspect of Responsibility to Protect demonstrates Western double-standards understandings of humanitarian issues and the realist point of view (Morini, 2011). In addition, other points of view believed that NATO's intention to

participate in this mission did not aim basically to protect civilians or for humanitarian purposes, but rather to overthrow Gaddafi's government, even if it was at the expense of expanding the level of suffering to Libyans (Kuperman, 2013).

Some think that the international community should conclude lessons from the Libyan crisis. For example, the states should be aware of propaganda that calls for intervention by the international community, or to intervene in humanitarian problems in a way that exposes civilians' lives to risks which should be avoided, except if the regime is already targeting noncombatants. Further, some consider the disposition of intervening for humanitarian purposes may be to morph into changing the regime, which puts extra risks on civilians' lives (Kuperman, 2013). On the other hand, those who advocate the inaction, strategic restraint or patience and not get involved in autocrat' domestic issues, should also assess the costs of these decisions—because they have a direct relation to the safety of doing nothing in the short-term (Morini, 2011).

What is more, the researchers who argue in opposition to armed interventions by Western states must begin recognizing the fact that intervening in other country's domestic issues or civil wars out of supposed or perceived human rights fears is not a neo-colonial strategy. This policy has been implemented, on the other hand, by such different states such as Russia when it has intervened in Georgia in 2008, Tanzania intervention in Uganda in 1979, Vietnam intervention in Cambodia in 1978, and additionally, the Kurds in Iraq supported by Iran until 1975, and more. In the same context, those who allegedly argue that getting involved in Libya's domestic affairs was a political and strategic mistake, no matter the essential humanitarian necessity

and UN-sanctioned legitimacy, must take in their account the credible alternatives to the military intervention and provide a solid debate (Morini, 2011).

2.4.2 The EU and the Responsibility to Protect

During the Libyan conflict, it has been argued by many scholars that the European Union applied the norm of Responsibility to Protect, mixing its own explanation of the concept while merging it into its current security policies, cultures and frames (Brockmeier *et al.*, 2014; Dembinski & Reinold, 2011; Franco & Rodt, 2015). The EU accomplished this by adjusting the Responsibility to Protect with what suited its own requirements, practices and interests. Thus, intervention in Libya reinforced the position of those within the European Union pressing for more powerful explanations of the norm (Dembinski & Reinold, 2011), and with those who claimed it might have interrupted EU unanimity on Responsibility to Protect completely (Brockmeier *et al.*, 2014). The EU has integrated parallel norms such as Responsibility to Protect and Protection of Civilians with its inclusive strategy in a way that is coherent with its original strategy to human security, as a part of its improvement strategy and crisis management activities. (Franco & Rodt, 2015) Where human security slogans were employed to support the Responsibility to Protect discourse, the method in which Responsibility to Protect was employed in Libya associate with the Protection of Civilians illustrates both adoption and adaptability of the Responsibility to Protect norm (Franco & Rodt, 2015).

The EU asserts its duty to intervene under the R2P model. However, R2P as a justification for intervention was chosen for the Libyan conflict, but it was simultaneously appropriate to the EU's current normative agenda and incorporated into the improvement of the inclusive strategy of conflict and crisis. The integration

of R2P with other relative practices has put most of the norm's importance in the EU's most agreed agenda among its institutions and member states since 2005 and up to 2015. By doing so, the EU should contribute to change the concept of the Responsibility to Protect, which no longer frames the same challenge to conventional concepts of sovereignty, and consequently to European implementations of preventing mass atrocities that are still present – instead of human rights concentrated and mixed into improvement policies and operations of crisis management instead of intervening for humanitarian reasons (Franco & Rodt, 2015).

2.4.3 The level of Effectiveness of EU Normative Power in Conflicts

Whilst an effective construction of Normative Power of the European Union (NPEU) in conflict cases would ensure a part for the EU internationally and provide legality for its liberal principles and norms (Schimmelfenniget *al.*, 2006), obstacles to the EU's Normative Power exist based on some EU engagements as the conflict between Israelis and Palestinians shows. Therefore, some of the ideas explored by Pace's work would optimistically shed some light on more explanations about the accurate inwardness of the 'normative' aspect in the European Union's normative power (Pace, 2007).

Although many scholars have stated that there is a difference between normative power and civilian power, Pace's work did not support different interpretations of the EU's normative power. For example, the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership and the European Neighborhood Policy which are methods for the European Union to manage its business through political dialogue, diplomacy, development strategy, and security (Manners, 2002; Pace, 2007).

The normative power of the European Union includes examining the actual expansion of the democratic peace ideology to conflict zones outside the delimited borders of the EU. This has often not been effective in conflict cases, such as the Middle East. As such, it remains a challenge for analysts and policy-makers (Pace, 2007).

It has been argued that the construction of EU normative power has its own constraints. The European Union is an actor that excels at avoiding a great deal of accountability for its actions. It presents itself as a normative actor, however, often without considering the necessary political procedures. There is a continuous need for examining what is required to be a normative power, if the European Union is to design a reliable image of being a normative actor in cosmopolitan affairs (Pace, 2007). If the European Union's assumptions of normative power are built on moral rules, then, it requires an investigation of whose political society is availed by such assumptions (Manners, 2002).

While normative rules confirm democratization which needs competition and involvement, the Muslim Brotherhood's victory in the 2006 elections does not appear to signal on the normative radar of the European Union (Pace, 2007). Despite the fact that Palestinians seemed take their first steps toward a democratization process according to EU norms, the European reaction to this is completely contrasting to the EU's logical implementations concerning the significance of fair, transparent and free elections as decisive features of democracy. This proposes that the EU's perception of the meaning of "normative" in this situation does not give room for its prompting to back up the Muslim Brotherhood in their interaction with their political rivals as a way of socialization via political integration (Manner, 2002;

Manner, 2006; Pace, 2007). This is as well a far cry from the supposed grounds for constructions of EU's normative power which puts an emphasis on the significance of dialogue with all sides of any conflict (Schimmelfenniget *al.*, 2006). This might be clear evidence that EU's efforts towards conflict resolution in this case may not be compatible with the European Union constructions of normative power. Probably, it is time for European actors to take on self-criticism regarding being normative, particularly in the European Union's role in conflict cases as an international actor (Schimmelfenniget *al.*, 2003; Schimmelfenniget *al.*, 2006; Pace, 2007).

2.4.4 The EU and its Migration Policies in Libya

It has been argued that the justification of intervening for humanitarian purposes can simply become a fig leaf that facilitates the enforcement of migration strategies, which in Europe, are to an increasing extent criticized by many institutions and NGOs, despite the general consensus of international public opinion (Squire, 2011; Brachet, 2016). The role of international institutions in enforcing EU migration policies has been discussed and debated by many scholars regarding the conflict in Libya (Brachet, 2016; Shore et al. 2011; Squire, 2011; & Rancière, 2006). Intervention for humanitarian reasons and crisis management are therefore not solely endeavors to bring back a situation of normalcy, but also methods of combining distant regions into bigger governance and dominance projects, thereby greatly reorganizing them on the ground. Declaring themselves to be merely managing the situation, the interim governments take care to deny the democratic complement (Brachet, 2016). By creating supra-state institutions, which are not states nor responsible to any people, they serve their own ends: They depoliticize issues, keep them for places that leave no room for democratic discourse. So the state and its experts can softly accept this among themselves (Rancière, 2006). Global institutions

to an increasing extent seem to be tools to make disputes and conflicts governable, without the need to directly rule (Shore et al. 2011), and without the need to give people a voice (Rancière, 2006). By doing this, they reconfigure the features of the areas where a country or a common sovereignty is symbolically practiced; expanding spatially of the dominion of their and their patrons' at the expense of domestic and regional desires and practices (Brachet, 2016).

For the Libyan case, it is related to this practice. For years, militarizing the borders the existence of external operational police agents, collecting preemptive information and media propaganda have shaped the real practices of European migration policies in Libya (Brachet, 2016). In a sense, then, the Libyan conflict has merely sped up the enforcement of migration policies that for many years. By replacing domestic politics with cosmopolitan crisis management strategies, this gradually transformed the Sahara from an integrated region into a harsh territory of normalized exclusion (Brachet, 2016).

2.4.5 The EU-Libya Security Issues

The Libyan uprising has created a serious security threat for Europe. The outflow of refugees towards the southern states of Europe led NATO to interfere and stop this process. The EU could not ignore the emergence of a civil war in its own backyard, although the Libyan uprising did not impose a direct threat to the security of Europe (Spasov, 2014). The pragmatic foreign policy of the EU enables working with non-democratic governments in the Middle East and North Africa region such as Libya. This works for mutual interests in maintaining and improving oil production, security in the Mediterranean related to the potential dangers refugees, migrants and terrorism. Libya has received a large number of migrants from Egypt, Tunisia, and

from the southern Sahara in Africa who are seeking employment. After signing a treaty with Italy in 2009, the illegal migrants reaching Italy and Malta from the Libyan coasts decreased significantly (Seeberg, 2014).

When the conflict began in 2011, a large number of migrants created a real refugee problem. An estimated one million workers left Libya by the end of 2011. Sub-Saharan Africans constitute the largest group of stranded migrants in Libya. They are the most vulnerable group and have always been exposed to harsh policies. The essential aim of the European Union was to make Libya a part of its foreign system for protecting Europe's Mediterranean borders against illegal migrants from Africa (Seeberg, 2014). The location of the North African state is very close to Southern European states like France, Greece and Italy which were anxious about the massive outflow of displaced persons that prevailed through South Europe, particularly in France, Malta and Italy (Spasov, 2014). Many migrant workers escaped the conflict but lost their jobs and had to leave behind their possessions and most of their assets. When the conflict took place in Libya in 2011, the country sheltered an estimated two million foreign workers; most of them were irregular migrants.

The legal migrants in Libya came originally from states such as Eritrea, Côte d'Ivoire, Somalia, Iraq, Ethiopia and Sudan. Hundreds of thousands of Libyans were internally displaced by escalating armed conflict and the situation was chaotic and complex. Gaddafi utilized migration as an instrument of political pressure on Europe. Plainly, the collapse of his regime has not prevented the flow of migrants from the Sahara attempting to arrive in Europe through Libya (Seeberg, 2014).

The refugee crisis became more serious when the numbers witnessed a significant increase. Refugees were issued just provisional residence permits and were not permitted to stay or work despite the fact that most of them were educated and competent to work. The EU states were already passing through a difficult time with growing unemployment and social concerns towards refugees (Spasov, 2014). It has been argued that the EU could solve these problems and assist the new Libyan government, via controlling the Mediterranean in collaboration with the current Libyan authorities. This would significantly decrease regional security threats. In the long term, the previous mutual interests between the EU and Gaddafi's regime in relation to transit migration from southern Sahara will require a renegotiation of the processes in the scope of the common security interests of Libya and the European Union (Seeberg, 2014).

2.4.6 Incoherent EU

The Libyan crisis has revealed both inconsistency in practice and military incapability to deal with the regional crisis in neighboring states. It is noticeable that the Libyan crisis aroused a manifold of responses from the different states and impacted the EU. This case illustrated the effect of an absent independent EU actor. To start with, it has been argued that the EU's inconsistent response was very clear in the unilateral decisions or actions of its member states towards the crisis in Libya (Menon, 2011; Koenig, 2011; Gottwald & Curie, 2012; Spasov, 2014; and Michalski & Norman, 2015). The cohesion of the EU's reaction to the Libyan uprising illustrated different types of EU cohesion, horizontal, the inter-institutional, vertical and multilateral aspects. The EU nature of multi-level system of governance and the wider multi-actor situation of crisis management in which the EU runs, put a frame to analyze and separate between the four aspects of coherence. The first

aspect, horizontal cohesion indicates the range to which the varied policies of EU crisis management are consistent with each other.

The non-cohesion between many EU security strategies, and a long-term lack of the hardware needed for efficient armed intervention are the main obstacles. EU member states control martial policies and their success or failure relies basically on national governments providing the support to push forward the Union's military aspirations (Menon, 2011). We can say that the reaction towards the Libyan crisis has been overall horizontally coherent, but the tools of one strategy have not permanently been sufficient to back up the aims of another. Although there have not been many inter-institutional disagreements, this has not signified true synergetic collaboration (Koenig, 2011).

The second aspect is inter-institutional cohesion related to the cooperative interaction among varied EU institutional actors accountable for the EU-level crisis reaction. (Koenig, 2011) It has been argued that the 2011 conflict in Libya marked the effective end of the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) and a miserable failure on the EU's part. Institutional Europe has not been up to the task. It was not able to agree on taking a bold decision regarding managing the crisis in issues related to recognizing the opposition to and legality of the military operation (Menon, 2011). For example, The Libyan crisis made more problems for the Southern European states. Italy asked for assistance from the European Union to transfer and provide humanitarian aid for the migrants. The European states, however, did not reach an agreement regarding this issue and came up with the conclusion that each concerned member state had to manage the situation on its own (Spasov, 2014).

The third aspect, vertical coherence, illustrates the extent to which national policies of member states are consistent with the EU-level crisis reaction. British, French, Italian and German national policies have been investigated and analyzed in the Libyan crisis. (Koenig, 2011) The interests of EU's member states were affected by the civil war in Libya. Libya is oil rich and is the 3rd biggest oil exporter to Europe, it was considered as essential for the security of the EU's energy.

EU states had extra motivation to intervene and save their energy, to expand its impact in Libya and help its oil corporations to earn a larger quantity of Libyan oil outcome. With France and the UK leading the operation, for instance, the British government indicated its leadership through supporting an arranged NATO reaction with aid from the US and restricted EU participation. France, which considered itself as a leader also, acted unilaterally at the beginning, but later engaged with other EU states in planned response in a binary armed cooperation with Britain. Italy, initially took a high unclear position regarding the problem, presented a skeptical attitude towards a suggested EU-led armed mission but, finally, accepted to be involved in the military intervention by offering its airships, naval forces and military bases. It was evident that the most interested states were the most invested ones. Germany, however, refrained from voting on UN Security Council Resolution 1973 that imposed a no-fly zone over Libya, trying instead to support armed efforts for the European Union's human sector action (Michalski & Norman, 2015; Spassov, 2014).

Moreover, the strategic importance of Libya is far more essential to NATO's major EU states, with the confirmed presumption that states respond in accordance with their national interests with a lot of protracted unresolved conflicts in the world. States often take advantage of humanitarian intervention actions to maximize their

benefit based on their national interests (Spasov, 2014). In addition, the EU's reaction to the Libyan conflict was not in general prosaic or fruitless. The European Union has been thanked for its fast and essential distribution of aid and for its comprehensive sanctions on Gaddafi's regime. These achievements, on the other hand, have been dwarfed by the lack of vertical coherence in other policy fields. Emerging trends of degradation, unilateral actions, and mutual allegations are mostly responsible for the EU's realized inconsistency (Koenig, 2011).

The fourth aspect, multilateral cohesion indicates the level to which the EU's crisis reaction is compatible with the reaction of other global actors such as UN, NATO, and the AU. (Koenig, 2011) Protecting civilians has been the EU's major goal in responding to the Libyan problem. The European Union utilized the R2P as the frame to act in accordance with its normative perception of human security which was practically restrained by the interstate foundation of the CSDP in its probable reaction (Menon, 2011). In the sitting of multi-party crisis management, the EU's function has been noticed as business as accustomed. The EU has carried out the UN decisions and has provided the delivery of UN human assistance, despite the fact that the necessity for such help has been contested. The Libyan conflict has not disrupted the relationship between the EU and NATO: while the institutions' strategies have not been incoherent, the wider political stalemate between both has restrained combined efforts in the Libyan case. It is argued that NATO, in the Libyan conflict, was utilized as an instrument for declaring most of EU's members foreign and security interests (Spasov, 2014).

2.4.7 Incapable EU

Coherence has been a real obstacle for security plans of the European Union, but the most sensitive problem has been the production of enough military power to enable the Union to implement its strategy. From the very beginning, the EU's collective position towards the conflict in Libya was represented by declaring their serious condemnation of the suppression against peaceful demonstrations and urged the Libyan government to directly stop the use of force and atrocities against civilians. The EU presumed its responsibility to protect civilians, but only when Libyans asked for help. The wider use of violence in Libya has aroused a considerable humanitarian problem in Europe's neighboring northern African states. European values insist on a decisive act to target the needs of suffering people either inside Libya or those who escaped from the conflict (Gottwald & Curie, 2012).

In the same context, the EU is not able to act alone without a coordinated and comprehensive global reaction towards the situation in Libya. This coordination must be with other regional states and organizations such as the Arab League, NATO, the UN and the US (Gottwald & Curie, 2012). Such insufficient military capabilities to respond to a crisis at its backyard is not mainly the outcome of under-investment, but the main problem is rather that expenditure becomes unsuccessful in addressing the criteria of modern warfare, which is to an increasing extent expeditionary and multinational. For example, about 70% of the land forces of the European Union member states cannot operate outside national territory, although they have more than 500,000 more soldiers than the US does. The consequential abilities shortages have had noticeable practical impacts (Menon, 2011).

It has been argued that the remit of Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) was developed to involve collective disarmament processes, stabilization processes after conflicts and the war on terrorism. However, the Libyan revolution proved that no intervention was seriously taken under the frame of the CSDP (Menon, 2011). The conflict in Libya has illustrated the EU's soft' security response was its main focus such as protecting civilians and human aid (Gottwald & Curie, 2012).

The European Union has backed a diplomatic decision to recognize the oppositional Transitional National Council (TNC) as the legitimate government in Libya instead of Gaddafi's regime. What is more, the EU reconfirmed its political intention to help the TNC in improving its ability to assume its responsibilities and back up the rule of law. The European Council subscribed their responsibility to support Libyan authorities building the new Libya, and to be with the Libyan people in encountering the enormous obstacles and challenges (Gottwald & Curie, 2012). Although the EU response has been implemented with a complete collection of crisis management instruments (humanitarian help and protection of civilians, military and civilian measures, diplomatic procedures, and activities related to trade and migration), the inconsistent response and dependent military capabilities expressed the level of differences among EU's member states' national foreign policies that could not be changed by the Union (Koenig, 2011).

Chapter 3

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

3.1 The EU's Response to the Libyan Crisis

In February 2011, Libya was one of the North African states that had not been excluded from the revolutionary waves that have pervaded the region. The story started in February 15, 2011, in the city of "Benghazi" in the eastern part of Libya where people demanded from the government some political and economic reforms. The regime dealt with the protests by using military force to deter the protesters, most of them were either killed, injured or arrested (France 24, 2011). Then the demonstrations pervaded in other cities in the east and the west of the country demanding the toppling of the regime (BBC 2011; Aljazeera 2011). The regime's crucial reaction towards the protesters led many Libyan officials such as ambassadors and diplomats as well as some ministers to resign (DW, 2011; Aljazeera, 2011; Mostakbaliat, 2011).

After that the peaceful demonstrations turned into armed conflict when the protesters broke into the military stores and started fighting against the security forces. The regime used all the military resources such as tanks and machine guns to deter the armed rebels. Air strikes against the civilians in Benghazi were used as well. At the same time, the Libyan opposition created The National Transitional Council (NTC) that represents the opposition politically and as a diplomatic channel to deal with the international community. As an international reaction towards the violence against

civilians was committed by the Libyan government, the United Nations Security Council issued resolution (1970) to offer a "No fly zone" over Libya. As well as the resolution (1973) that authorized the use of force against the Al-Gaddafi regime.

By issuing a declaration expressing the EU denunciation of suppression against peaceful demonstrations and stating its discontent of the violence and death of civilians, Catherine Ashton, performing on behalf of the joint position of the European Union member governments, the EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (HR) first responded to the prevailing uprisings in Libya on February 20, 2011 (Ashton, 2011). Moreover, the EU persistently advised Gaddafi's regime to directly stop the use of violence. It argued that Gaddafi's government posed a threat to the safety of the Libyan people. Shortly afterwards, the European Union also assumed its responsibility to take actions, but not before Libyan people ask for help from the EU (Ashton, 2011).

On February 23, 2011, Herman Van Rompuy -President of the European Council- declared that the EU must not be condescending, but must also not avoid meeting its moral and political responsibility. While the EU's duty is to help, the future of Libya ought to be decided by its people. The HR, from the early reactions of the EU to the uprisings in Libya, insisted on the priority of human rights as well as the human-centered standpoint within EU crisis responses (Rompuy, 2011).

Ashton considered human rights the silver thread that engaged in everything related to the External Action Service and it is the center of their reaction towards the developing events in Libya. In the same line she put an emphasis on the necessity of a coordinated and inclusive multilateral response towards the crisis in Libya (Ashton,

2011). Catherine Ashton stated that they are working cooperatively with other state and regional organizations such as the Arab League, the UN, NATO, and USA. She reaffirmed that the EU cannot act unilaterally, but would be more effective if the international community worked jointly (Gottwald, 2012). Furthermore, Kristalina Georgieva, European Commissioner for Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection (European Commission, 2012), urged the European Union to not only protect its people but to secure Libyans as well. She declared that Europe's interests and values insist on them to act crucially and described that this is what they were doing. Europe has taken rapid coordinated steps to vacate EU and non- EU citizens, either those who escaped from Libya or held captive inside, as well as addressing the dreadful necessities of suffering people (European Commission, 2012).

In the same context, the Heads of States, at the exceptional meeting of the European Council on 11 March, 2011, stated that Colonel Muammar Al-Gaddafi had lost his legal status to be an interlocutor and advised him to stand down from power. They expressed their encouragement and support of the Transitional National Council (TNC) in Benghazi which was henceforward regarded a political interlocutor, while not getting the recognition as the only representative of Libya by the international community (European Council, 2011). Ashton on May22, 2011, opened a contact office in Benghazi to back “the just beginning democratic Libya in security reform, education, health, the economy, constructing civil society, and in wider management”(BBC, 2011).

The reaction of the European Commission to the events in Libya was through starting two mechanisms of its essential emergency tools: the mechanism of protecting civilians and human relief. The mechanism of protecting civilians, which

was activated on February 23, 2011, made the consular operations of the member states easier through collecting and picking out different means of transportation in order to evacuate more than five thousand European citizens (European Commission, 2011). The Commission and the member states, on 30 May, had granted more than €144 million for civil protection and human help, putting the EU on the top of the list of human donors to Libya. The EU has deployed civil protection and humanitarian aid field experts inside Libya and also on its frontiers with Algeria, Egypt, and Tunisia (European Commission, 2011).

The European Union implemented the UNSC sanctions against Gaddafi's regime and exceeded them with its own. On 28 February, the CFSP Council adopted decree 2011/137 executing United Nations Security Council Resolution 1970, implementing an embargo against Libya on weapons and arms, and imposing other sanctions such as an asset freeze and a visa ban on 26 individuals in the Libyan authorities. On 10 and 21 March, 2011, the European Union widened these restricted policies to major Libyan fiscal institutions and another 11 regime individuals (Council of the European Union, 2011).

Van Rompuy and Ashton, after UNSC Resolution 1973 in March 17, 2011, came to an agreement that the resolution gives an obvious lawful basis for the international community to meet its obligations in protecting Libyan civilians. The EU within its mandate and capacities is ready to carry out the UNSC Resolution (Council of the European Union, 2011). Catherine Ashton, furthermore, affirmed, a day after declaring the Resolution 1973, that it means that the required conditions that the European Council designed are now achieved (Council of the European Union,

2011). On 24 March, 2011, after the UNSC adopted the resolution 1973, the European Union implemented more sanctions.

CFSP Council decree 2011/137 was modified with the purpose of imposing a No-fly zone and widening the asset freeze to further individuals, to the National Oil Corporation as well as to five of its subordinate companies. The EU, on 12 April 2011, expanded the scope of frozen assets to include further energy companies accused of supporting Gaddafi's government financially, thereby implementing a *de facto* embargo on oil and gas sector in Libya.²⁵ On June 7th, 2011, it imposed more sanctions on Libyan port administrations (Council of the European Union, 2011).

In March 2011, the EU -with the representations of 21 states and other regional and international organization such as the UN, NATO, the Arab League, the OIC, and the CCG- participated in the conference of contact group for Libya that was chaired by the UK and Qatar in order to direct the inter-world intervention in Libya (The Guardian, 2011). On April 1st, 2011, EUFOR Libya, an armed operation to provide humanitarian help missions in Libya, was adopted by the Council of the European Union. If "the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs" (OCHA) formally requested the assistance provided by EUFOR Libya, it would be located in Libya to insure a secured movement, safely vacate displaced people, and to back humanitarian organizations in their missions. EUFOR Libya has not been requested to be activated by the OCHA until now (The Guardian, 2011).

Libya Contact Group, in July 2011, reached an agreement- with the support of the EU- to recognize the TNC as the "legitimate representative of Libya. On 20 June 2011, the EU within the meeting of Foreign Affairs Council welcomed the "TNC

Road map to Democratic Libya" and showed its willingness to support the TNC in improving its capacity to impose the power of law and undertake its responsibilities (Government, 2011). Catherine Ashton thus indicated that the TNC is responsible of protecting the Libyan people. She also expressed that universal human rights and humanitarian law must be respected by the TNC as well as acting accountably to maintain stability and peace all over Libya (Gottwald - 2012).

Thereby, the EU returned back to the first concept of R2P where it argues that sovereign states must be accountable for protecting their own people. Coming closer before the armed conflict ends and before the regime of Gaddafi collapses, Rompuy declared that as the Union assumed its responsibility to protect, it should similarly assume its responsibility to help Libyans rebuilding their state. He stated that the Union was, is, and will be with Libya in encountering the massive difficulties and challenges (Gottwald, 2012). On 24 August 2011, NTC forces took over Tripoli and the EU opened its office in the Libyan capital (The Guardian, 2011). On October 20, 2011, Muammar Gaddafi and his son Mutassim have been killed in an armed confrontation with the opposition forces in Sirte (The Guardian, 2011). Just 3 days after, the NTC declared the liberation of all the Libyan territory from the control of the Gaddafi regime from the city of Benghazi, and then on October 25, 2011, it assigned Dr. Abdul Rahim Alkeeb to form a new transitional government which would run the country during the transitional period of eight months (The European commission, 2013).

On July 7, 2012, Libyans for the first time since 1969 participated in electing their legislative institution which was known as the General National Congress (GNC). In terms of democratic transformation, the GNC elections were the main event for the year. The EU Election Assessment Team (EU EAT), which has spread in the country

to cover this historic election, has assessed those elections and considered that the election process has been managed effectively, was characterized by pluralism and was generally peaceful (European Commission, 2013).

A month later, the National Transitional Council handles the power to the GNC. Mohammed Magariaf was elected as the GNC president and the real president of Libya. The General National Congress was combined of many parties, but was basically dominated by two main parties that were in a total ideological disagreement. The Justice and Construction Party was basically the political wing of the Libyan Muslim Brotherhood, while the National Forces Alliance party was based on the liberal ideology. The GNC rejected the government formation as proposed by Prime Minister Abu Shagor, so then Ali Zeidan was elected as a new cabinet prime minister instead of Abu Shagor in November, 2012. This delay led to a delay in key files policies such as the constitutional drafting process (European Commission, 2013). The GNC could not work effectively because of the disagreements between its parties. In May 2013, the General National Congress issued a law of political isolation, which aimed mainly politically isolating and prohibiting any person worked with the Gaddafi regime to be assigned in higher governmental positions. This law has created many sociopolitical problems and increased the gap between the political disputants. This was considered by many observers as the beginning of the political division in Libya. (European Commission, 2013) Since July 2013, the exporting ports of oil in the region of the oil Crescent were closed by the former commander of the oil institutions guard, who split from the government when he was dismissed by the government and substituted by another (European Commission, 2013).

By the beginning of February in 2014, many public protests spread in eastern Libya demonstrated against the GNC decision to extend to its mandate. They refused the extension mandate of the General National Congress, which expires on February 7, 2014, with accordance to the constitutional proclamation issued by NTC in August 2011 (Reuters, 2014). And by the Mid-month, a retired military officer Khalifa Haftar announced his control on most of the state institutions through a TV broadcast, in what some of his opponents called as a "TV coup and not real. General Haftar is a political opponent to Gaddafi regime, but he has returned from the US when the revolution started (BBC, 2014). On February 18, 2014, Qaqaa militia, which has had a clear opposition to the Muslim Brotherhood group (MB), issued a statement offering the GNC members a period of 5 hours to resign or to be arrested. In 2014, armed conflicts led to the creation of two separate governments, one in the east and the other in the west. The dispute parties are the General National Congress (GNC) and the other party is the House of Representatives, which was elected in June 2014 and started its work in Tobruk city in the east of Libya. The conflict started in June 2014 when the General National Congress called for electing the House of Representatives (HoR). The results were out and declared that the Muslim Brotherhood Party was defeated by the liberal coalition's party that alerted its political victory in those elections (Pargeter, 2014).

On February 2014, a retired military officer called KhalifaHaftar, in a military coup attempt, called for the dissolve of the General National Congress. And on May 2014, he started a military operation known as Dignity Operation against the Muslim Brotherhood party in the GNC in Tripoli and against AnsarAlsharia'a armed group in Benghazi (Aljazeera America, 2014). On July 2014, there was another military

operation in Tripoli known as Dawn Libya Operation lead by Misrata brigades affiliated to the GNC against Alzintan brigades that are affiliated to Haftar (Aljazeera America, 2014).

On June, new elections to a House of Representatives were called for by the GNC: Muslim Brotherhood parties rejected the results of the election after being defeated with only a turnout of 18% (El-Kikhia, 2014). The House of Representatives violated the constitutional proclamation by holding its first parliamentary session in Tobruk instead of the Benghazi and without the protocols of authority handover from the GNC. The GNC argued that this is contrary to the constitutional declaration and makes the House of Representatives illegitimate (Whewell, 2014). Consequently, a number of members of the Tobruk Parliament boycotted the sessions and declared their condemnation. Although the Libyan Supreme Court in Tripoli dissolved it and considered it illegitimate, the international community declared its recognition of the House of Representative as the legitimate authority represents the Libyan people (The Guardian, 2014).

The House of Representatives and its government played a very crucial role in providing all sorts of aid and legitimacy to Haftar and the armed forces under his control. This parliament has gathered to issue a decree to call the international community to intervene in Libya to protect civilians from the deadly conflict between the rival armed groups. 111 deputies out of 124 voted for the decree (BBC, 2014). What is more, the government of Abdullah Althini in many occasions required the international community to intervene militarily against Ansar Al-Sharia'a groups that declared its loyalty to the GNC (Mezran and Toaldo, 2015).

The UAE and Egypt have been accused of being involved in military, financial and logistic aid to pro-Dignity Operation against pro-GNC forces. The Egyptian jet fighters lunched civilian targets in Darna and Sirt with the HoR authorization, claiming that they help striking training camps of ISIS. The Egyptian army is implicated in sending ground troops fighting with Hafter that were targeting Libyan civilians and soldiers (The New Arab, 2015). In a cooperative military campaign, UAE jet fighters took off from Egyptian airbases towards Tripoli, where they launched the pro- GNC Libya Dawn forces positions resulted in many casualties and damage of its weapons and ammunition. The pro-GNC armed forces declared that the UAE is extremely involved in supporting pro- Dignity operation in the west by military equipments and financially. Military vehicles and ammunition from the UAE was found by Dawn forces in Al-zintan camps, when they were expelled from their positions, which led to more tensions and more escalation of the conflict (Tharoor& Taylor, 2014).

On July, Libya Dawn military operation took place in Tripoli between pro HaftarAlqaqa'a and Alsawiq Brigades from Al-Zintan and the pro GNC. After a month of armed conflict, Tripoli fell to pro- GNC fighters. Dawn Operation forces declared their consolidation over Tripoli and neighboring towns after expelling rival Alqaqa'a and Alsawaiq Brigades out and forced to withdraw from the capital (Daleh, 2014). The House of Representatives condemned the offensive and described pro-GNC forces as "terrorist Groups", but they insisted that they are revolutionary forces and not terrorists. Although they were not recognized and supported by the international community, they were widely supported by most of the cities in the western region of Libya from Misrata up to the borders with Tunisia. Dawn

Operation leaders called for the reconvention of the former Muslim Brotherhood-dominated GNC as their legitimate government (Daleh, 2014). The Dawn leaders declared their non-recognition of Tobruk's government. The GNC, upon Dawn leaders' request, members gathered again and formed a government called "National Salvation government" formed by its Prime Minister Omar Al- Hassi on August 2014.

The armed forces of Dawn Operation controlled the southwestern region of Libya as well. The anti-Haftar armed group in Benghazi called AnsarAlsharia'a declared its support to this operation and its subordination to the GNC as their legitimate authority. On the international level, the GNC was greatly supported by regional actors that provided political and financial facilities to the pro-Dawn Operation armed groups. Qatar and Turkey were the international partners of the GNC. They supported the Brotherhood group with financial and media facilities during the conflict. Turkey was accused by pro- Dignity officials of supporting the Brotherhood armed groups and AnsarAlsharia'a jihadist groups of secret ships of weapons and ammunitions, while Qatar was very well-known of its backup of the Muslim Brotherhood during and after the Arab spring. Qatar has facilitated the media propaganda of the dawn operation through its Aljazeera broadcasting channel, as well as providing the pro- GNC fighters with money according to officials in the House of Representatives' government (Tharoor& Taylor, 2014).

3.2 The United Nations Support Mission in Libya

The negotiation process was held under the auspices of the UN between boycotting members of the House of Representatives the rest of the MPs and took place in the Libyan city of Ghadames in early October 2014. The aim was to reach an agreement

and end the civil war. Negotiations were at first not accepted by some members in both camps. Some members from the western cities boycotted the negotiations, considering it to be a betrayal to negotiate with those responsible for a foreign intervention. Some members of the camp of the Tobruk parliament rejected negotiating with those they described as outlaws (Hadeed, 2015). This escalation made it very difficult for the UN Special Representative Bernardino Leon to persuade the two rivals to come to the negotiating table to end this crisis peacefully.

The process of how to reach an agreement remained controversial. In particular, the fundamental disagreement revolved around the constitutional chamber of the Supreme Court and how it was presented by the boycotting members in the media as the problematic solution. However, the reality actually reflected the opposite as the conflict was not legal in nature, but political (Hadeed, 2015). As a rule, the interference of the judicial system in a political dispute will not resolve it, but instead would make it more complex, especially if one party refuses the judgment when it does not serve their goal. A judgment of this type would empower one party and weaken the other, which would enlarge the gap between the conflicting sides, decrease the opportunities for reconciliation and impose a threat on the success of peaceful solution. Directly after the Ghadames negotiations round, new positions and segmentations began to emerge between those who thought that the negotiations would not represent their interests or would never serve their aims.

The positional bargaining between the disputants obliged the UN mediator to reorient the negotiators towards concentrating on the common interests of forming a government of national consensus. This process took one year of negotiations in

different places with different sponsors, from Ghadames to Geneva to Algeria and finally in Alskhirat- Morocco (Stitou, 2015).

Those different rounds of talks witnessed the interference of new actors that helped change the track of negotiations. Leon's invitation of new actors to interact in facilitating the talks process such as Misrata Municipality, which represents a heavy military and political weight in the Libyan scene, with providing their goodwill in positive participation to help supporting the talks to be reoriented towards reaching a resolution (Eljarh, 2015).

However, in November 2015, a reveal of secret emails showed that UN Libya mediator accepted a job offered by the UAE to be the director general of UAE diplomatic academy with a salary of 35 thousand pound a month. His acceptance of this job led the GNC party to question his neutrality as the UN Special Mediator in the Libyan crisis as the UAE is considered as a strong supporter of the House of Representatives side in Tobruk (Ramesh, 2015).

Bernardino Leon sent an email to Sheikh Abdullah bin Zayed, the UAE's foreign minister, dated 31 December 2014, from his personal account just 5 months after he was appointed as the UN Special Envoy to Libya. In this email, Bernardino informs Bin Zayed that the US and Europe, due to the slow advancement of negotiations, were asking for a classical peace conference as an alternative plan. Leon considered this suggestion to be a worse option than a political dialogue, because both sides would be treated as equal actors. León admitted that his plan is to reinforce the HOR and break the alliance between the Misrata wealthy merchants and the Muslim Brotherhood group that empower the GNC (Ramesh, 2015). The UN replaced the

Spanish Bernardino Leon with the German diplomat Martin Kobler would replace (Johnston, 2015).

Martin Kobler actually started his mission from where Leon stopped. He worked on the same path of draft editing to reach to a consensus agreement. Kobler was successful in persuading the conflict parties to sign the compromise Libyan Political Agreement on December 17, 2015 (UNSMIL, 2015). This agreement was known also as Alskhirat agreement, which drew a transitional period towards peaceful settlement in the Libyan conflict. Under the terms of this agreement, National Accord Government was formed with a presidential council led by its Prime Minister Fayez Al-Sarraj as a temporary government which would perform the executive duties and his president performs the functions of the Supreme Commander of the Libyan National Army. This government has been unanimously endorsed by the UNSC, supported and recognized by the international community as the only legitimate government that represents the Libyan people (UNSMIL, 2015).

The role of the EU after the political division was mainly political support to the peace talks and support of the Libyan political Agreement that was signed on December 17, 2015, and created a new construction of the legitimate political institutions. The political Agreement distributed the power and authorities on three main bodies, with bicameral legislative institution that combines the two bodies in Tubrok and Tripoli, and a Presidential Council that serves as the executive branch.

Chapter 4

FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION

4.1 Introduction

The discussion is guided by the research question; can the EU play a positive role in peace building in Libya? To address this, the objectives and actual positive role are assessed, especially in peace building. The rebuilding of security structures, health and education provision, and economic and investment sectors were identified as important in rebuilding Libya. This chapter discusses these issues with a view to addressing the question guiding the study.

4.2 The European Position towards the Libyan Crisis

This part attempts to examine and evaluate the European Union's framework for taking part in the Libyan crisis. It critically presents the Union's declarations and potential plans of support and compares this role with the evaluation of the Libyan officials regarding the effectiveness of the role that the European Union is playing.

4.2.1 The EU Role and Position

The position of the EU can be read, generally, through the declaration of its Ambassador to Libya, Bettina Moshade, when she stated, on March 23rd, 2017, that “there is a unified European position to support stability in Libya.” Moshade asserted that the “Libyan Political Agreement is the only alternative through which stability is achieved and the state of law and institutions is established” (Libyas Channel, 2017).

The EU Ambassador declared that the Libyan crisis is a top priority for the Union. She asserted that the EU will provide support programs that would cover a wide range of areas. In particular: the education and health sectors supplying hospitals, schools and fuel stations; the construction and rehabilitation of police stations; securing the southern border; the implementation of the agreed program on scholarships for Libyan youth in European universities; dedicated support to municipalities that would be present in services and development projects (Libyas Channel, 2017).

In the same context, the Libyan side, represented by the Head of the Presidential Council Fayiz Alsarraj, called for the European Union Mission to return and work with all its capacities from within Libya. He pointed out that there is a lot of joint work with the European Union and many agreements to be urgently implemented. Al-Serraj clearly declared that the Libyan crisis cannot be divided or that the security situation is separate from the political and economic situation, pointing to the political agreement encountering the intransigence of the Presidency of the Council of Representatives and its insistence on obstructing it (Libyas Channel, 2017).

He added that regional and international parties that have contacts with the obstructers should exert pressure on them, so that everyone joins the reconciliation path and puts an end to the citizens' suffering. Alsarraj stressed the importance of Europe to pay attention to resolve the Libyan crisis through tangible economic and political support on the ground. So the EU's attention should not be limited only to the illegal immigration issue, of which Libya is also a victim of (Libyas Channel, 2017).

The European Union officials claim that the Union's policy towards Libya, during the post Gaddafi period, aims at helping to build a stable, democratic and modern state. They assume that their policy includes enhancing democratic transition, establishing accountable, strong and transparent institutions, and nourishing a competitive private sector.

4.2.2 Libyan Officials' Opinion

The Libyan evaluation of the European role in this thesis is derived from the opinion of decision makers in the Libyan authority that I conducted interviews with. They vary from parliamentary members, to municipality officials, and officials in ministries of defense, foreign affairs, and oil and gas.

FB, a Parliamentary Member, considers the EU's position, in 2011, was clear through its participation in Resolution 1973 to protect civilians. However, after the military victory and the overthrow of Gaddafi's regime in 2011, it was clear that the EU did not have a clear plan to help Libya and Libyans to build institutions through technical assistance. They understand that Libya has institutions but they are worn out by the administration of the former regime and the great political strife after the revolution inside and outside of Libya.

In the same context, MI; a Consultant in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, thinks that the European Union is hesitant about the Libyan issue. At first there was a process of absolute support for the process of overthrowing the Gaddafi regime, but it was followed by absolute volatility and a shy attitude towards building Libyan institutions in post-conflict and peace building process.

FB stated that the European Union and the United States left the Libyan government to deal with regional rivals pursuing negative interventions. Here lies the danger, which has fueled the conflict in Libya and brought it to its present state. For example, Libya has become a battlefield in a proxy conflict between the UAE and Qatar.

MA a High official in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, also claims that the neighboring countries create a barrier to the EU in interacting with the Libyan crisis. The Union is working to balance its interests in Libya with its interests in the neighboring countries and the Gulf States. There are parties supported by regional countries that have not been deterred by imposing sanctions on them. The EU is taking into account its interests with neighboring and regional countries not to be lost after taking positions contrary to the positions of these countries. For example, the interest of the European Union with neighboring Egypt lies in Egypt's relationship with Israel, and the gas discoveries issue... etc. These interests cannot be reconciled with what is good for Libya. The EU's interest in Libya is framed through three primary objectives, fighting terrorism, illegal immigration and economic interests. It is difficult to achieve all of these interests simultaneously. The balance of power is always changing with the changing variables in the international arena, creating further obstacles.

Actually, MI argues that the terror bubble that has reached France and Belgium has prompted member states to restore life to the Libyan file and try to resolve it building on initial efforts. He then added that the EU's return to the Libyan arena is somewhat positive. MI argued that Libya's stability is directly linked to European Union concerns regarding illegal immigration and the threat of terrorism.

SA a Parliamentary Member, argues that Libya does not need money, but needs to stop illegal interference or negative support from regional countries. This intervention was not a first obvious, but its effects nevertheless were seriously felt. In 2014, the EU renewed its interest in Libya by sending an envoy and holding several meetings with the parties to the conflict. After the split, the intervention of the regional countries became blatant and the EU's position became weak and shy towards the Libyan case.

All in all, it can be seen that the EU is attempting to be an effective partner in helping Libya in its transitional period. However, it is argued that this role is to some extent exaggerated compared with the reality on the ground. To understand the European role in depth, we should attempt to understand how the EU is providing support and the level of that support. This also would help us examine the effectiveness of those policies in the post-conflict period, and whether those policies meet with expectations by both parties.

4.2.3 The Political & Diplomatic Support

The European Union has supported diplomatic talks to reach an agreement on Libya since October 2014. The support was mainly based on helping and backing the UNSG Special Representatives to Libya to facilitate signing the agreement among the Libyan interlocutors and forming a National Accord Government. The Libyan Political Agreement, signed on December 17, 2015, in Skhirat-Morocco, has reformulated more than finding a resolution to the domestic conflict (Crisis group, 2016). In 2014, the strife was mainly between competitive parliaments and their governments; currently it is largely between the National Accord opponents and its advocates. The roadmap of the National Accord Government, which is based on the

fact that a temporary government consolidating the two legislative bodies and their supporters, could create a new political framework and reincorporate militias. However this cannot be achieved without modification.

The EU considers the forming of the National Accord Government as a crucial tool to resolve the Libyan conflict and start the transformation process towards peaceful state building (EEAS Press, 2015). However, new negotiations including the main Libyan security players are necessary to give the Accord Government an equiponderant boost. The EU, via diplomatic means, is helping facilitate the comprehensive and stable democratic transition of Libya. It also assists the UN mission of mediation in this respect. The EU considers the political process to be directed by Libyans and essential that all political actors are engaged in this process. The diplomatic assistance provided by the European Union to Libya is implemented through a framework of particular measures, such as backing the peaceful political transition and a negotiation-based solution agreed by all legal actors in Libya. The assistance includes binary help, such as human aid and migration, targeted help, and the targeted support provided via the operations and missions of the EU Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP), particularly EUBAM and EUNAVFORMED Operation Sophia (EEAS Press, 2015).

The diplomatic steps taken by the EU towards Libya illustrate its above mentioned political objectives, claimed by its high level officials. To start with, the diplomatic recognition of the National Accord Government, led by Fayiz Alsarraj, as the legitimate representative body of the Libyan people demonstrates how determined the EU is to unify the Libyan authorities under one legitimate government. The importance of unifying the sovereign bodies would insure Libya to be one integrated

state, particularly after the political cleavage that followed the military operations of Libya Dawn and Dignity in 2014.

After proposing the formation of the National Accord government in November 2015, the European Union High Representative for Security and Foreign Policy Federica Mogherini has announced its readiness to support this proposed government in Libya with a 100 million Euros aid package to support the provision of services urgently needed by the Libyan people. Mogherini expressed the European Union's support to the new UN Special Representative, Martin Kobler, for his efforts to mobilize the necessary support for the National Accord Government in order to restore stability and preserve the unity of the country. In the same context, Mogherini called upon all parties in Libya to show the necessary courage to reach an agreement on the National Accord Government, which is being sought by the UN representative (Eanlibya, 2015).

In the same context, three high Libyan officials were put on the list of individuals subject to European Union constrictive procedures against Libya. The president of the House of Representatives, the president of the General National Congress, and the prime minister of the Tripoli-based Salvation government were added on the EU punishment list for their obstructing actions of forming a National Accord Government and of implementing the negotiated items of the 2015 Sokhiraat political Agreement (Council of the EU, 2015). This procedure also refers to the European Union's readiness to implement all necessary measures to support the outcomes of the UN mediation mission in Libya and the resolutions of the United Nations Security Council. The EU support role to the UNSC and UN mediation mission decisions and strategies to resolve the Libyan conflict strengthens the EU

position in Libya with both legitimacy and neutrality. The European Council of Ministers in Brussels, in March, 2017, extended the coercive measures taken against the President of the House of Representatives, Aqila Saleh, former National Congress President Nuri Abu Sahmeen and the Prime Minister of the Salvation Government, Khalifa Al-Ghwail, for another six months. European sanctions include freezing the assets of those concerned and preventing them from traveling within the European security space (Afrigate news, 2017).

On the other hand, the unity bloc in the House of Representatives denounced the extension of the European Union sanctions against the President of the Libyan House of Representatives Aqila Saleh. The bloc stated that the sanctions were built on loose and unfair considerations and in a way that negates the reality of his personal position in supporting the political dialogue. The unity bloc considered the European Union's decision to impose sanctions on Aqila Saleh “an unacceptable behavior by the European Union, which is preoccupied with Libyan affairs and is intervening in a flagrant and suspicious manner” (Afrigate news, 2017).

Even though the Government of National Accord was not capable of resolving most of the Libyan problems and was not given the vote of confidence by the Tubrok-based House of Representatives, the EU was still determined to recognize this government and support the Libyan Political Agreement outcomes as the only method to end the Libyan crisis. The EU puts in its priorities supporting one legitimate body, but with the compromise support of the other effective social and political actors. The European Union, in the same line, takes into consideration dealing with the National Army led by Haftar, with the effective municipal councils, Militia leaders, the Tubrok government as well as the Tripoli-parallel government.

After the member states began to declare their positions in favor of finding a place for the Army commander of the Tubrok-based House of Representatives, the High Representative for Security and Foreign Policy Federica Mugereny, in the context of what she called expanding the political process, declared the Union's support for this position. This served as indicating that the Union is ready to play the role of mediator in bringing together the President of the Presidential Council Fayeze Al-Sarraj and the Commander of the "Armed Forces of the Interim Government" Khalifa Haftar (Libya-al-Mostakbal, 2017). On the international level, the European Union attempts to manage the Libyan problem through the coordinated multilateral efforts with other regional and international actors. The Union has held many meetings with the Arab League, the African Union and other bordering countries like Egypt, Algeria and Tunisia.

From a Libyan perspective, FB stated that the United Nations intervened after the conflict intensified in Libya and Libya was politically divided. The EU's position was positive, clear and supportive of the UN mission, but member states played a mixed role between countries. The European Union provided financial and logistical assistance to the dialogue and did not miss the dialogue sessions and played the role of mediator among the Libyan parties. MS a Mayor of a Municipality, considers the period of dialogue and political agreement as the best period in which the European Union worked and was positive and effective in its pressure on all parties involved in the political agreement, including the parliament, the General National Congress and the participating municipalities. The European Union envoy was holding meetings with all parties in an extensive manner to find out the reasons for the dispute between the parties and the causes of dispersion and conflict and to identify these reasons and

a statement and the parties' attention to the Libyan problem. The European Union, acting as one bloc through its ambassador to Libya, had a positive role in reaching a political agreement with good results. The presence of the EU mission with the UN mission in the rounds of dialogue gave positive results to ensure neutral and objective results to find a solution to the crisis.

Based on the above mentioned details, we can observe a tangible support to the political agreement, dialogue among all affective actors, and the agreed outcomes of the Libyan Political Agreement. On the other hand, although, one year passed since signing the agreement, we did not observe any progress in the status of the political stalemate that divided the legislative and executive bodies of the Libyan government.

4.2.4 Economic and Investment Interests

EU- Libya trade relations can be traced back to the negotiations on a Framework Agreement between the EU and Libya that began in 2008. This formal agreement between Europe and Libya was considered to have a strong possibility to improve in-depth cooperation, facilitating the conditions for a solid political co-partnership and to raise the investments and trade between Europe and Libya (European Commission, 2008). The agreement actually was considered as opening a new page with the neighbouring Mediterranean countries of the EU, and was to create more commercial and investment opportunities in the Mediterranean zone. The framework agreement created a cooperative environment built on inter-state relations between Libya and the European Union.

However, after the 2011 uprisings in Libya, context of the relationship changed from inter-state status into post conflict state rebuilding. As the relationship changed, the outcomes of trade-based cooperation will change as well. In other words, the EU-

Libya relationship, before the state collapse in Libya, was built on mutual interests between the two parties. For example, the EU would benefit from increased investments in the oil and gas sectors of the Libyan market and the transit trade through the Libyan gate to Africa. On the other hand, Libya would have enjoyed from the European experience developing the infrastructure and benefiting the transit market between Europe and Africa through its territories.

According to the European Commission (2017), Libya and Syria are still the only states in the Mediterranean that have not established a Free Trade Agreement with the European Union. Libya is not a member of the World Trade Organization as well. Negotiations between Libya and the World Trade Organization began in 2004. The negotiations that began in 2008 between the EU and Libya for the trade Framework Agreement would have facilitated the WTO accession for Libya. But the February 2011 events in Libya suspended the negotiations. The EU-Libyan relations have so far occurred outside a binary lawful frame governing binary relations (European Commission, 2017).

EU imports from Libya are dominated by energy. Libya exports to Europe petroleum and gas products. Libya, at the same time, imports machinery, spare parts, mining equipment and agricultural goods (European Commission, 2017). Before the Libyan revolution and the Arab Spring, the European Union, in 2010, was an essential commercial associate for Libya reaching 70% of the state's aggregate trade that equated to €36.3 billion in that year. On the other hand, Libyan exports to Europe have sharply fallen by 38% between 2012 and 2014. In spite of the significant reduction of Libya's exports, it still remains a major oil and gas exporter to the neighboring European Union zone (European Commission, 2017).

MI suggests that the European Union should work to reestablish the partnership with Libya in all sectors, train the cadres of Libyan institutions, support their institutions and create security and economic partnerships as well as sustainable development. Technical support should be provided to the Government of National Accord because destabilizing Libya's security and stability poses a real threat to the EU. While MS argues that the relationship between Libya and the European Union, through the political agreement and after ending the period of political division within the Libyan state, will be a peer relationship. He claims that this relationship could be achieved through the opening of a new market in Libya and free market projects such as the free zone and transit trade to Africa. He insists that this depends on the Libyan side if they rebuilt their country and it becomes a sovereign state with strong and transparent institutions.

I do think that the economic and investment sector is a very essential one and would motivate European and non-European actors to be engaged with Libya in this context. However, I do not think that the current Libyan imports and exports would make a real attraction for foreign investments. I mean that the strategic location of Libya attracts many European corporations, but investing in such area is not preferred because of the security and political instability. From a different perspective, Europe is not highly dependent on Libyan Oil and Gas, because of other alternatives such as Algeria and Russia.

4.2.5 Security and Military Support

Through the Joint Statement on the Mediterranean Way, the Malta Declaration and the EU Trust Fund for Development in Africa, the European Commission approved a € 90 million program to enhance the protection of migrants and the management of

migration from Libya. The European Union's Trust Fund for Development in Africa, aimed to stabilize the situation and address the root causes of irregular migration and displacement from Africa. The EU adopted a comprehensive program of € 90 million to strengthen the protection of migrants, refugees and host communities in Libya. The EU is claiming to provide a support package of 120 million Euros to assist the authorities and the population of Libya, training the Coast Guard and building its capacity to save lives in the Mediterranean (European Commission, 2017).

At the initiative of the European Commission, the African Development Trust Fund has accelerated this urgent priority for the countries of the European Union and the partner countries. In addition, the programs will support the improvement of the social and economic conditions of all the people of Libya, thereby contributing to reducing irregular migration factors and making it more difficult for smugglers (European Commission, 2017).

The new program addresses several aspects of migration challenges in Libya and along the middle of the Mediterranean: promoting the protection of migrants and refugees in Libya, including the most vulnerable; improving the conditions of host communities and the conditions of internally displaced persons, Social and economic difficulties experienced by Libya; and to facilitate the voluntary repatriation of migrants from Libya to their homes.

The program includes the following two processes. The first process is protection. This part concludes 48 million Euros to help migrants and refugees and to protect them with access to accommodation centers in urban area. There is the provision of primary health care, primary psychological assistance and efforts to identify

vulnerable people, including children. There is the provision of humanitarian assistance to voluntary returnees and reintegration of migrants in their place of origin. There are also efforts to establish "safe spaces" as an alternative to accommodation centers (European Commission, 2017).

The second process is social and economic development at the municipal and local government levels which, covers 42 million Euros. This includes strengthening the capacity of local authorities to provide services and promote local development and stability. This is done by providing access to high-quality services for Libyans and migrants, including health and education facilities and the restoration of local infrastructure through local economic development that facilitates access to employment. The program will be implemented through five partner organizations selected on the basis of their capacity to intensify rapid fieldwork based on ongoing operations. These include the International Organization for Migration, United Nations Development Program, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, UNICEF, and the German Agency for International Cooperation (European Commission, 2017).

In this context, Mogherini declared that the European Union, through EUNAVFOR MED Operation Sophia, is confirming its commitment to train the Libyan Coast Guard (European External Action Service, 2017).The EU should step forward in equipping and training the Libyan coast guard to support measures to restrict the illegal migrant trafficking in the southern Mediterranean waters (Euractiv, 2017).But the EUNAVFORMED, also called Operation Sophia, is still not approved by either the Tripoli Government or by the United Nations to work in Libyan waters. In other words, this might be questioned to be a realist political procedure to operate EU

naval forces within Libyan waters in the coming days (Euractiv, 2017). Therefore, the EU must take into consideration to establish a parallel protection defense line very nearer to the smugglers' ports of source. In the same time, Libyan naval forces would stand as frontline operators within Libyan waters. This must, of course, be supported by the European efforts. Actually, the growing prop could be achieved through the existing Operation Sophia program of equipping and training, but the financial aspects are assumed, by the European officials, to be necessarily discussed as a matter of primacy for upcoming training programs.

Ending the years of chaos that followed the 2011 uprisings is a priority of the Libyan National Accord Government, but this government is obstructed by the power struggle with a competitive government in the east of Libya (Euractiv, 2017). Therefore, cracking down on migrant trafficking could be achieved through the use of EU diplomatic ties with neighboring Egypt and Tunisia. In February 2016, EUBAM Libya, the EU border management assistance mission, was amended by the European Union in a way that facilitates providing civil planning capabilities to its Southern Mediterranean neighbors (European External Action Service, 2016). This amendment qualifies EUBAM Libya to help in designing support missions of crisis management for reforming the security sector. The new amended project will collaborate carefully with, and participate with, efforts by the UNSMIL, cooperating with the lawful authorities and other related security groups in Libya. The EUBAM Libya, with its €4.475 million budget, aids capacity-building promoting Libyan borders security by air, sea, and land as a part of Europe's plan that attempted to help Libya in its transitional era (European External Action Service, 2016).

I would say that the operation budget is not enough to cover the expenses of controlling vast territorial borders of such a country like Libya. Depending on this budget certainly would not bring effective results, and might be a waste of time and money. The ineffective results of this program will lead to serious negative security, humanitarian and economic impacts in both Libya and the EU.

From a Libyan perspective, Fayeze al-Sarraj, President of the presidential council of the National Accord government, stated that his government is in real need of more technical assistance to protect and monitor our coast. He stressed in previous media statements that the EU had not kept its promises to Libya, and requested the international community to do more to help stabilize Libya (Oliphant, 2017). We should refer to the main objective that motivated the EU to intervene in Libya, migrants and security, issues that emerged from the conflict. So the EU is attempting to stabilize the situation in Libya in order to tackle the illegal migration flow to Europe through open and uncontrolled borders. But this process cannot be divided or partially managed. The EU would not be able to stop the migrant flows if the Libyan security forces and intelligence units are not strengthened and politically unified. Unfortunately, the migrant issue is not a concern for all the member states of the EU. As such no consensus has been reached between the member states regarding the method of supporting the Libyan authorities, and which authorities to support (Oliphant, 2017).

I would argue that the Libyan crisis cannot be divided, or partially managed. Tackling the illegal migration processes would not be truly achieved unless there are strong Libyan security and intelligence units that can control and trace the roots of such illegal processes. In addition, MA argues that the European Union has not

adopted any policies within Libya directly except the Sofia Operation and the illegal immigration tackling program. The illegal immigration file is important for all countries of the southern coast of Europe. The EUBAM Libya process was formed under Italian pressure and with the support of Britain and France. All of the EU's interventions and contributions came in this form; initiatives are taken by one of the member states to adopt one of the programs. The European Union is committed to the implementation and funding mechanism. But the first step always comes from one of the Member States interested in the Libyan case. The main role played by the EU in the first place was to support the institutions of the civil society and not in a political framework. This is due to the bureaucracy within the Union.

One of the points that indicate the lack of seriousness of the European Union in dealing with the Libyan file is that the project of the EUBAM Libya does not exceed the funding of 15 or 20 million Euros annually. This is insufficient to combat migration from a country with a coastline of 2000 kilometers overlooking the Mediterranean. There should be greater seriousness from the European Union in dealing with the issues of illegal immigration and the fight against terrorism. The technical and financial support provided by the EU to these programs does not exceed to meet the threat facing Europe. In other words, the support on the ground does not reflect the seriousness of the Union in solving these problems. The seriousness lies in supporting the Government of National Accord in building the security institutions to protect the borders, extend security and train its personnel.

MN a Brigadier-General in the Libyan Ministry of Defense, argues that in general there is the will by the European Union to intervene in Libyan affairs in the matter of resolving the dispute. After the overthrow of the Gaddafi regime and the

establishment of a transitional government, the EU began to work through several organizations on a variety of issues. First there was a working group of the European Union working with the Ministries of Interior and Defense, primarily aimed at assisting the demining of the land and even the navy, which may be on the Libyan coast. The program was funded by the European Union and also by some countries such as the Netherlands, which played a key role in this program in coordination and cooperation with the Ministries of Interior and Defense. Another program, which lasted until 2015, was to assist the Libyan security services in combating crime, especially electronic crime. A workshop was held in Italy aimed at training elements of the various security services to deal with, detect and investigate this type of crime, which is considered difficult.

He also added, “the EU tried to be a supporter of Libya in the period of transition from the revolution to the state, but according to my assessment as a person who assumes responsibility for the training of the Libyan army in 2012-2013, I believe that this role is modest compared to the capabilities of the European Union or the technological and technical capabilities of some advanced countries such as France, Britain and Germany.

4.2.6 Support to Health and Education Sector

The Libyan authorities and the EU agreed on concrete steps to promote cooperation on two important sectors for Libyans, higher education and health, at an EU-Libya ministerial Meeting in Tunis on 5-6 April, 2017. The meeting included the EU's Head of Mission in Libya, Bettina Moshaidet, and the Director of International Cooperation in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Mohammed Al-Koni, and more than fifty delegates from the Libyan Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Local Government,

Planning, Education and Health. Also present were delegates from EU Headquarters in Belgium and the EU Delegation to Libya, as well as Libyan practitioners and experts in the field (Libya-business news, 2017).

All parties agreed to strengthen EU support for the health and higher-education sectors in Libya. The European Union ensured its commitment to the immediate launch of the program of establishing health care clinics, which will be launched in the first phase in the cities of Greian, Zliten, Tripoli and Benghazi. This program aims to develop best practices in this sector to all parts of the country (Libya-business news, 2017). The program will also help train staff in the Ministry of Health by exchanging visits with other countries and sharing best practices among mental health and psychosocial support in Libya. The EU will seek, through the same program, the field of maternal health, mental health, cancer care, diabetes and blood safety. Close collaboration with practitioners in the field will ensure that all programs are in line with local conditions (Libya-business news, 2017).

In the field of education, the EU will support the rehabilitation of the universities of Benghazi and Sirte as partners in the Stability Support Mechanism program. It will also support the training of international relations offices in Libyan universities as well as electronic educational programs. The union, together with the Libyan Ministry of Education, will work to enhance the access of Libyans to scholarships. This will include the Erasmus + program. The European Union, in cooperation with UNICEF, is awaiting opportunities to support the rehabilitation of schools, review of primary and secondary school curricula and teacher training. The meeting focused on the health and education sectors at the request of Fayez Al-Sarraj, President of the Presidential Council of the Reconciliation Government, and Foreign Minister

Mohamed Sayala (Libya-business news, 2017). In this field, Brigadier-General MN stated the existing of an educational program which is currently in place. It is an attempt by the European Union and a group of Libyan universities to facilitate the transfer and selection of some students to complete their studies at European universities. The scholarships have not reached students and the implication is that, it may or may not be accomplished any time soon. This meeting could be categorized under the promises and declarations that have ha been released by the European Union officials, but the real tangible effect of those promises is not felt by the ordinary Libyan citizens who are suffering. It is quite obvious how miserable the medical and health centers in Libya are, where the simple equipment of a hospital are not available. This is in addition to the lack of the necessary emergency equipment and medicines to treat serious chronic diseases.

It is the same case with the education sector. We cannot say that this sector is totally ignored, but the efforts of the EU in this field are not up to a sufficient level. There are not any ongoing projects between the Libyan Higher Education and the European universities on the ground at this time. The EU promised the Libyan authorities that they would be a real partner in rebuilding the education sector since the 2011, but during the last 6 years, there was no actual implementation of the scheduled plans. The EU might not be capable of supporting projects within Libya because of the security status of Libya and increased corruption within the governmental structure of the country. However, the EU is capable of providing a number of annual scholarships to qualified Libyan students, or at least facilitating the study-visa procedures to the willing students that are studying on their own expenses.

In conclusion, there are signs of support in all areas of political, military, education, economic and security through programs and projects, but they are not complete and are limited. This is attributed to fragmentation and political division in Libya. The presence of two parliamentarians, two governments and two central banks has reduced EU support for these programs until the political and security situation in the country stabilizes.

4.3 Position of Member States

AA- a Municipality high official- stated; "In fact, the European Union in general shows to all that it behaves as one unit and with one voice. This is true in general matters, but, in special issues, it is different. What we have seen in the Libyan crisis is that they act as states. There is great flexibility in this union." He claimed that the EU member states deal as a unified union and a single word in hard and difficult situations that may affect everyone, and they all look for the interests of their national states in particular without affecting the interests of other member states or the union in general. Here comes the political flexibility in this union, he declared.

AA suggests that in the stages of state-building, politics has become effective and each country has its own interests which it tries to preserve. He argued that Italy's interests differ from those of France and Britain. Italy has common interests with those of Libya. It wants the stability of Libya and the preservation of its existing interests such as ENI Gas Company, and its imports of gas and so on, that is, it wants to preserve its interests and has no greed or negative interference. Rather, it supports the framework of joint cooperation with Libya. This is unlike France, which we felt that its relations with Libya were in the form of domination, especially in the region

of southern Libya and its border with southern neighboring states, the former colonies of France.

He added, no one wants chaos in Libya, but everyone wants to exploit the period of instability to crystallize the greatest interests by putting some pressure on some disputant parties to form the situation in its final position implicitly in their interests in order to benefit from this imbalance. It is not a problem for the European countries to search for their interests, but this is only acceptable through an existing sovereign state with strong institutions. But under these circumstances, chaos, terrorism and crime will spread and increase and no one will benefit.

Based on the above, I argue that the EU member states are part of the Libyan conflict, and are part of the solution as well. So the protracted conflict in Libya illustrates that the member states of the European Union are in a competition to shape the new Libya in accordance with their own national interests. Furthermore, Brigadier General MN considered that the European Union is trying to place Italy as the leader of any role in Libya. Italy wants to play this role and wants to take the initiative, but everyone knows that Italy is going through an economic crisis and its technical capabilities are not like those of Britain, France and Germany in the European Union.

MN also adds, for the EU, when we look closely, we find that there are many differences in terms of their power and influence in decision-making. Of course, this was touched on during a three day visit to the European Union headquarters in Brussels. I noticed that the members of this union are in a competition, each according to their interests and influence. For example, France has interests in Libya

as the countries of the Libyan southern borders mostly have an ex-colonial relationship with France, especially Mali, Niger and Chad. France believes that it is more privileged than others to secure its interests there, and considers that the southern province of the Libyan Fezzan was under its administration before. On the other hand, France considers itself the one taking the initiative to topple Gaddafi's regime in 2011 and believes that it is more privileged than others in everything, including investments and reconstruction contracts for Libya. Hence the conflict within the EU is to share Libya's cake. On the other side, the Brigadier-General assumes that Italy's intervention is positive because of illegal immigration, which affected it the most, and also its desire to reopen the Libyan market. But France, as we have noticed, has a political confusion in its positions and its way of supporting the parties of the conflict from the Tripoli government to the Tobruk government. This is in addition to its attempts to find a foothold in Libya and play a key role in the region.

I would say that some states are attempting to positively intervene in the Libyan crisis, because of reasons related to their national security and negative consequences of the crisis. Italy is showing the best example in practicing the pressure on the European Union, in order to run anti-migration programs. Although Italy's influence and power are not comparable with the other member states like France and Germany to act this role, the security dimension that threatens Europe, through Italy, strengthens Italy's position within the Union.

From the same perspective, MA presumes that the role of the European Union is secondary and not essential in the Libyan case. That is, the member states are the ones that were most influential in making decisions in 2011 or after, or even in the

political dialogue, because there is a very big difference in priorities. For example, Italy puts Libya on its list of priorities, unlike Germany. He confirms that this disparity within the Union of member states will draw the policies of the Union based on the priorities and interests of these countries. Italy's interaction with the Libyan case is more than other member states. But Italy alone is not capable to implement its agenda without the support of other European countries or the United States of America.

I think that the differences of interests among the member states of the European Union effects the Union as a whole to take a real and strict position to end the chaos in the southern backyard of the Union. From another point of view, FB assumes that Italy has a unique historical relationship with the Libyans and there is satisfaction from the Libyan side on Italy, because it is clear that Italy has no desire to abandon the Libyan situation in a negative way. Unlike France, which the Libyans fear because it has a permanent link with the southern region of Libya as well as some doubts that accompany France's policies. In my estimation, I suggest that the Libyan state should work to balance these interests and protect the interests of European countries. He also claims that one of the most important factors of stability in Libya is the partnership with the European countries and the European Union ,individually or jointly, would give confidence and motivation to these countries. Furthermore, these countries will be a positive factor in preventing negative interventions in Libya, because they will protect their interests and protect their businesses there.

Empirically speaking, I could not find evidence that proves those claims. How can we justify the Italian position in Libya while condemning and doubting the French one. Sure the Italian interests are in correlation with the Libyan national interests,

because both work on the aim of achieving stability. However, the French interests might be in correlation with Italians and the Libyans, but in different way of achieving them. France requires stability to increase its influence in the region, and to obtain a foothold in the Northern gate of Africa.

What is more, MS thinks that the role of the EU member states was clearly different. The parties of the conflict have used this disparity to gain support for their agenda. Each of the conflict parties was trying to find an international partner to support its position, their party and their vision. Meanwhile, SA assured that the member states of the EU have different positions. For example, Germany has a neutral position of all parties and has hosted the dialogue teams more than once. Italy has a role as well, the security factor, the factor of division and instability in Libya is not welcomed by Italy. I assume that the role of the member states shapes the actions and policies taken by the European Union. The neutral position of Germany, the economic power in EU, illustrates that the EU policies are not that much empowered and financed in many projects.

BG, a member of the Supreme Council of State, considers it difficult to imagine the European Union without its member states. In his opinion, the EU has supported Libya over the past period and they have had many meetings with the EU foreign affairs representative Frederica Mugerini in the last two years. There is support from the EU, but we see a clearer role from member states such as Britain, France and Italy, that is, the role of countries is clearer and more obvious than the Union itself. He stated that the EU always tends to take more cautious and moderate positions than its members. The Union has a positive but less influential role than other regional and international countries such as Qatar, Egypt, the United Arab Emirates

and the United States. Most of these countries are biased to support the conflict parties, unlike the European Union, which is neutral and positive but with little influence. The Union provides political support and its embassy acts as an organizer of meetings between the Libyans and the active countries. It also has made great diplomatic efforts in this field, while military and technical support is not noticeable.

Hence, the negative interventionist role played by the regional states was not refrained by the European Union. This might be related to the mutual interests with those countries, or might be in the framework of common aims they share with the EU regarding Libya. However, I assume that the influence of the regional states is more than that of the EU in Libya. The regional actors have direct contact with the conflict parties and they support them with all necessary means. This support is effective and more tangible than the support presented through the EU. BG also assumes that Italy is active in the Libyan case and we feel the existence of enthusiasm. Although it is incited in the Libyan affairs, but we have not noticed its bias towards one of the parties, other than France and Britain, which claim to bias to one of the parties indirectly. Italy has also led several conferences about Libya.

He continued by stating that Italy and France have a strong interest in the stability of Libya. Unstable Libya means the spread of terrorism and chaos in Europe. The interest of Europe in Libya is within the framework of the prevention of risks, i.e. security rather than economic interests. Investment opportunities exist in Libya, but they do not constitute a great incentive. Italy has huge economic interests in oil and gas fields in Libya, but can be compensated by other markets such as Russia and the Gulf. However, the presence of 2,000 km of Mediterranean coastline off Europe's southern coast is really chaotic. Illegal immigration and terrorism pose a major threat

to EU security and safety. The only channel to support Europe for Libya is that there is one strong government in Tripoli to deal with European support. Otherwise, Europe cannot support Libya, and EU will not be able to avoid the negative consequences of this instability.

To sum up, I assume that the European Union position and policies towards Libya is evaluated as a positive role in different areas and sectors. However, the level of support is assessed as not effective and not serious. The Libyan officials claim that the EU role and policies are very shy and humble compared with its capabilities. This humble position is justified due to many reasons. First of all, the EU did not find a true Libyan partner that would coordinate and facilitate providing the help and achieving the potential projects. Secondly, the political and security division in the Libyan government did not make it easy for the EU to provide the help to the accurate governmental channel, especially with the existence of two disputant legislative and executive bodies. Finally and most importantly, the disparity and rivalry among the member states of the EU creates confusion in its policies towards Libya. The different national interests of the member states in Libya shape different channels and perspectives of how to settle the Libyan conflict in accordance with their national interests. This rivalry protracted the conflict and brought negative consequences on the member states' national security. We notice that this outcome motivated the member states, under the umbrella of the European Union, to pay more attention to the Libyan issue and to attempt to end the political division before suggesting the future interests. So from that we conclude that the Union's policies are determined and shaped by the competing policies and interests of its member states, and each state and its level of power and influence within the Union. We must take in

consideration that this rivalry, as we observed, would not threaten the interests of the European Union or the national interest of the other member states. I would say that the Libyan case has been getting special attention and support from Italy. Italy is playing a vital role in orienting and guiding the EU policies towards Libya. The two main areas that we see the EU is heavily supporting, the political issue and the illegal migration issue, are suggested and lobbied by Italy. These issues are very critical in both the Italian foreign policy and the Italian national security. So in other words, the EU policies, in crisis management, are determined by the interests of its member states, and those interests determine the level of intervention and support the EU will implement.

Chapter 5

CONCLUSION

This study has investigated EU conflict-management and peace building in different areas. The Kosovo conflict and the conflicts in Africa were typical cases that revealed the role of the EU in conflict and post-conflict management. Then the literature on the Libyan conflict was reviewed shedding more light and understanding of this phenomenon. The Kosovo crisis revealed obvious dimensions upon which EU foreign policy interest stands. Substantially, the external policy interests are similar for member states. All the EU governments and citizens were concerned about the flow of refugees, horrified by ethnic cleansing practices and determined that Slobodan Milosevic must be constrained by any mean necessary. Political and social disorder would affect the EU negatively and impact security. Equally if EU states disregard hostilities, racial cleansing and human rights violations in the near neighborhood, the legitimacy of the Union would be brought into question. Hence the justification for intervention in the Kosovo case seems clear and given popular public support.

In Africa, the European Union does not have a coordinated program with strong commitment to conflict resolution in Africa. The European Union had proposed to send 500 troops to Central African Republic to restore peace during and after the crisis as a support or back up to the over-stretched French troops in Mali and Central African Republic. The Central African Republic contingent would be coordinated

and commanded from a military base in Greece. The EU does not have a standing force. It relies on individual states' contribution. This creates obstacles when member states interests are not involved.

In the Libyan Case, most of the literature sheds light on the intervention from a legal, geopolitical and humanitarian point of view. The military mission and the prior decision-making procedures confirmed and highlighted particular tendencies states regarding international security. Some of these issues were not newly emerging aspects, but the Libyan case rather proved them. For example, one issue was precisely the lack of confidence in a *Common Security and Defense Policy* (CSDP).

Other sources discussed norms that have been adopted by the EU such as the Responsibility to Protect and the impartiality of EU normative power. The European Union applied the norm of Responsibility to Protect, mixing with it its own explanation of the arising norm while merging it into its current security policies, cultures and frames. The EU accomplished this by adjusting the Responsibility to Protect with what suits its own requirements, practices and interests. The EU has firmly integrated in parallel norms such as Responsibility to Protect and Protection of Civilians with its inclusive strategy in a way that is coherent with its original strategy to human security as a part of its improvement strategy and crisis management activities.

The normative power of the European Union includes examining the actual expansion of the democratic peace ideology to conflict zones outside the borders of the EU. It also questions the reasons for constructing an external player's power that

has often not been effective in conflict cases, such as the Middle East, not inside Europe. This remains a challenge for analysts and policy-makers.

The role of some EU policies has been analyzed in regard to the migration issues and its impact on conflict resolution in Libya. The outflow of refugees towards southern Europe led NATO to interfere and stop this process. Others have discussed the security issues that have evolved during the uprising period and after the toppling of Gaddafi's regime. This is in addition to the security consequences that might impose a direct threat on the EU member states' national security. The location of Libya is very close to Southern European states like France, Greece and Italy that were anxious about the massive outflow of displaced persons. What is more, there was a lot of ink spilt on the EU as an incoherent and incapable union in terms of crisis management. The incoherence of decision making process among its member states, and the military incapability of the Union that enables it act during crisis periods. The EU is dependent on the NATO military power to act in such cases.

This research studied the EU supportive role in Libya through its intervening policies that attempt to implement peace building and post-conflict reconstruction strategies as claimed by the EU officials. The EU declarations claim to spread democracy and assist Libya in rebuilding its institutions. However, those claims have been examined through analyzing the effectiveness of the projects and programs that are designed by the European Union to help Libya.

This research, which shed the light on the EU-Libya relations during the period between 2012 and April 2017, attempted to evaluate the peace building and post-conflict reconstruction measures taken by the EU in Libya. This study finds that the

EU's role in Libya is positive, but shy and humble at the same time. The EU technical and financial capabilities are not capable of applying tangible support to the Libyan case. We found out that the EU has cooperated with Libya in different fields, such as the political dialogue, economic cooperation, health and education sectors, and tackling illegal immigration. We noticed that some issue areas have been given extra attention by the EU. Such issue areas like the illegal immigration and refugee crisis have had the real concern, by the EU, and motivated Europe to take serious actions regarding the chaos in their southern backyard.

What is more, we found out that the EU policies regarding Libya are designed and supported by its member states. In other words, there is a rivalry among different policies presented by the concerned member states, and the most supported policies after the competition determine the EU actions towards Libya. We should take into account that there are mutual interests that draw a general vision of the European Union. The security aspect shapes attention and draws a common goal for the member states of the European Union in Libya. We can notice that the economic and political interests can be the main contending interests between France and Italy, which made it slow for the EU to have a clear and accurate decision regarding Libya. Meanwhile, illegal immigration and fighting terrorism created an area of agreement between those states to support the political unification of the Libyan governmental institutions and a potential strategy of strengthening those institutions after ending the political disparity. We argue that the EU peace building and post-conflict reconstruction policies are based on its member states' national interests, and that, those national interests draw and determine the actions and the policies of the EU regarding Libya.

To sum up, the core assumption of realism argues that institutions only enhance peace through influencing the actions of their member governments. Institutions support cooperation in a highly competitive system, and it is only natural that States use this pretext to benefit from each other.

To this end, I conclude that the EU as an international institution is less effective as it cannot change the anarchic system defined by state sovereignty and self-interest. The EU member states deal with the Libyan case in accordance with their own national interests, but not with a collective vision of the European Union. So the European Union's policies in Libya are drawn and implemented in accordance to the national interests of its strongest member states.

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APPENDIX

Appendix A: Interviewees' Coded Names and Positions

AA: a high official in a Libyan Municipality

BG: a member of the Supreme Council of State, and a former member in the General National Congress.

FB: a Parliamentary Member/Member in the House of Representatives.

MA: a High official in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

MI: a Consultant in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

MN: a Brigadier-General in the Libyan Ministry of Defense.

MS: a Mayor of a Municipality.

SA: a Parliamentary Member/Member in the House of Representatives.