

# **Education, Identity, and Conflict: A Comparative Study of Northern Ireland and Cyprus**

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## **ABSTRACT**

Groups experiencing intractable identity-based conflicts often find ways of reproducing the dynamics of said conflicts to younger generation via the socialization process and its agents. One such agent is institutionalized education systems which are used, either through their structure, which might be segregated and therefore conflict-sustaining, or content which might espouse conflict-supporting narratives that simultaneously present a biased view of the conflict, and demonize the ‘other’ community. Using the cases of conflict in Northern Ireland and Cyprus, this study explores the extent to which the structure and content of education respectively are either conflict mitigating or sustaining by looking into how educational reform correlates with, and is reflected in public opinion trends.

Findings indicate that following structural educational reform in Northern Ireland, there was a positive trend towards reconciliatory and co-habitant attitudes in both communities in Northern Ireland although the communities did not fare equally on all indicators. In Cyprus, the Turkish Cypriot community proved to be responsive to changes in the official narrative from conflict-sustaining to conflict-mitigating consistent with what was expected. The Greek Cypriot community however, although having not experienced any reform did display a positive trend as well which was attributed to exogenous factors.

The study is divided into 8 chapters: an introductory first chapter, a background of both conflicts in the second chapter; overviews of education systems in both cases within the context of reform in chapters three and four; public opinion trends in both

cases in chapters five and six; the study's hypotheses are tested in chapter seven while chapter eight provides a conclusion and summary of findings.

**Keywords:** Cyprus, Northern Ireland, Identity-based Conflict, Education, Public Opinion.

## ÖZ

Kimlik temelli çatışmaların yaşandığı gruplar genellikle sosyalleşme süreci ve diğer aracı etkenlerin de yardımı ile bu aktif çatışmaları genç nesillere aktarmanın yollarını bulur. Bu araçlardan biriside yapısı itibari ayrılmış ve çatışmayı devam ettiren veya içerik bakımından çatışma destekleyen anlatılar savunan ve diğer toplumu şeytanlaştırarak ön yargılar üzerine kurulu bir çatışma sunan kurumsal eğitim sistemleridir. Bu tez Kuzey İrlanda ve Kıbrıs çatışmalarını inceleyerek eğitim yapısı ve içeriğinin çatışma azaltılmasında veya çatışma devam ettirme üzerindeki etkisini araştırmaktadır. Bu nedenle tez eğitim reformlarının kamuoyu eğilimlerindeki yansımalarını incelemektedir.

Bulgular topluluklar tüm göstergelere eşit olmamasına rağmen Kuzey İrlanda'da yapısal eğitim düzenlemeleri sonrasında iki toplumda uzlaşmacı ve birlikte yaşama tutumlarına karşı olumlu eğilim olduğunu göstermektedir. Kıbrıs'ta, Kıbrıs Türk toplumu çatışmayı destekleyen resmi anlatımlardan çatışmayı azaltan anlatım değişikliklerine beklendiği gibi karşılık verdiğini kanıtladı. Kıbrıs Rum toplumu herhangi bir yeniden düzenleme deneyimine sahip olmamasına rağmen dış faktörlerin etkisiyle olumlu sonuçlar göstermiştir.

Çalışma sekiz bölüme ayrılmıştır: birinci bölüm giriş niteliğindedir, ikinci bölüm her iki çatışmanın genel bilgilerini vermektedir; üçünü ve dördüncü bölüm her iki ülkenin eğitim sistemlerinin ve yapılan düzenlemeleri kısaca anlatılmaktadır; beş ve altıncı bölümler kamuoyu eğilimleri incelenmiştir; çalışmanın hipotezleri yedinci

bölümde test edilmektedir; sekizinci ve son bölüm sonuç ve bulguların özetini sunmaktadır.

**Anahtar Kelimeler:** Kıbrıs, Kuzey İrlanda, Kimlik-bazlı Çatışma, Eğitim, Kamuoyu.

# DEDICATION

To Samuel

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## **LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS**

ACT	All Children Together
ARK	Access Research Knowledge
CH	Cultural Heritage
CSJ	Council for Social Justice
CTP	Republican Turkish Party
DENI	Department of Education for Northern Ireland
EMU	Education for Mutual Understanding
EOKA	National Organisation of Cypriot Fighters
ERO	Education Reform (Northern Ireland) Order
EU	European Union
GC	Greek Cypriots
GMI	Grant Maintained Schools
NICIE	Northern Ireland Council for Integrated Education
SCORE	Social Cohesion and Reconciliation
SeeD	Centre for Sustainable Peace and Democratic Development
SEP	Shared Education Programme
TC	Turkish Cypriots
TMT	Turkish Defence Organisation
TRNC	Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus
UBP	National Unity Party
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme

UNDP – ACT	United Nations Development Programme – Action for Cooperation and Trust
UNESCO	United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNFICYP	United Nations Peace Keeping Force in Cyprus
YLT	Young Life and Times Survey

# Chapter 1

## INTRODUCTION

This chapter offers an introduction into the study to be undertaken explaining the rationale behind said study, a review of the literature thus far, hypotheses, research questions, the method of study, justification of the study and finally an outline of the proceeding chapters.

Hailing from a largely multicultural society with a plethora of ethnic, religious and linguistic groups, I was often perplexed to find that such a society in which people were hardly lacking in reasons to antagonise themselves on the basis of their different identities, was, and remains far less polarised than other, less diverse societies where even the main identity groups shared a lot more similarities than they cared to admit. Some sociologists have argued that this is because the lack of diversity makes the minute differences seem existential in nature which I believe to be an agreeable claim. I was still however shocked to find that even after the conflicts in such societies had subsided and multiple opportunities for peace presented, such conflicts tended to persevere in the minds of society's members. Even younger generations<sup>1</sup> who themselves had no first hand knowledge of the 'dark' times tended to develop belligerent attitudes leading me to wonder why exactly it is that an individual would wish ill upon a neighbour who had personally done nothing to deserve it especially given their proximity and similarities. The

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<sup>1</sup> See Huber & Spyrou (2012) for insight into the ways in which interethnic relations affect children's lives.

answer is simple, the belligerence rather than being innate, is acquired and so I set out to understand this process of acquisition and the influences of socializing agents on it choosing to direct my focus on one wide-ranging agent in particular, institutionalized mass education.

Operating under the assumption that education does indeed exert an influence on conflict, the central questions to which this thesis is dedicated to addressing are: To what extent does education, as a tool of socialization, reproduce the dynamics of conflict? How exactly does education reproduce the conflictual dynamics? and Is educational reform reflected in changes in public attitudes? Answering these questions is pivotal to understanding the ways in which an institution of the state might be used to propagate conflict-sustaining practices.

While the relationship between education and conflict has been extensively researched from a wide array of angles and in different contexts, most of this research has been limited to the level of theoretical abstraction leading to conclusions that are arguably normative for the most part as few studies have been accompanied by concrete evidence to substantiate their claims while the few that do tend to be case specific limiting their wider applicability. It is precisely this gap between theory and reality/practical applicability that this research hopes to address by assiduously exploring the relationship between institutionalized socialization processes (in the form of education and more specifically schools) and societal trends. A clear understanding of this relationship will prove an invaluable contribution to the field of conflict resolution and the wider field of conflict studies in a broader sense.



## **1.1 Limitations**

By focusing specifically on education as a socializing agent, this study at its onset seems limited in that not only does it fail to take into account not only the other socializing agents, it also seems to ignore other seemingly apparent reasons for the reproduction/sustenance of conflictual dynamics such as the non-resolution of the conflicts themselves. This first prospective criticism is easily addressed.

Departing from the notion that education does not act upon the individual in the classical liberal sense, but on “the person as bearer of a social role” (Bryant 2001, p. 599), education is chosen as a specific reference point because it is the only socializing agent that falls under the purview of the state thus making it an effective political tool, particularly in situations of conflict with other socializing agents such as the family falling almost exclusively within the ‘private sphere’. Despite this justifiable rebuttal, it does follow that this study is somewhat limited in that it fails to extensively account for the influence of the other socializing agents in sustaining conflict and also because it fails to exclusively address the ways in which conflictual dynamics are reproduced by virtue of their mere existence in that an individual born into a society in conflict might be resistant to resolution/ alternative non-conflictual configurations of the same society.

One final limitation of this research lies is its inordinate reliance on secondary sources and data; this was due mainly to temporal and linguistic limitations as well as the unlikelihood of conducting field research for the collection of primary data. This was overcome however by using information from somewhat credible and

authoritative sources which were cross-checked with other sources to confirm their viability.

## 1.2 Methodology

The method of study for this research is mixed, combining qualitative as well as quantitative research methods in an attempt to confirm my hypotheses while following Clifford Geertz's tradition of "thick description" where, by undertaking a detailed description of the issues in question, the emphasis is placed on "achieving a 'depth' of understanding" (Hughes *et al.* 2007, p. 39).

Content analysis, a form of qualitative research, is used here to explore the means through which the *content* of education is conflict sustaining by probing the narratives embodied in the official educational texts (textbooks) through an examination of the texts to answer the basic question: what does the text say? Due to linguistic limitations as the official books are in the local vernacular, secondary sources who have already undertaken such an analysis of the texts were used to 'extract' the themes and narratives of the books. The extraction process was based on UNESCO's "basic questions for textbook analysis" (Pingel 2010, p. 38) from which the guiding questions were adopted.

To explore the ability of the *structure* of education to be conflict sustaining, guided by Gordon Allport's 'contact hypothesis' which posits that under certain conditions<sup>2</sup>, contact between conflicting groups can mitigate bias and implicitly inter-group conflict (Allport, 1954), I address the means through which separate non-inclusive

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<sup>2</sup> Thomas Pettigrew has since expanded Allport's original hypothesis and concluded that all that is needed to address inter-group conflict is contact between the groups, period. (See Pettigrew, 1997; 1998; Pettigrew & Tropp, 2006).

parallel education systems might, by virtue of their very existence, be conflict sustaining.

Following the analysis of the education systems, I then take a look into societal public opinion trends (and in one case, identity configurations) with an aim to determine how these have advanced overtime, specifically in the post-educational reform period with the guiding assumption that general public opinion about the conflict and issues pertaining to it such as perceptions of the other community, the communities' dividing factor, prospects for resolution etc. reflect the extent to which conflictual dynamics are being mitigated or sustained. Additionally, as argued by Irwin (2005), public opinion is important for the success of any peace process giving trends within it more salience within the context of intractable conflict.

It is noteworthy however that the purpose here is not to claim that there is a *causal* link between education and conflict, rather, the analysis merely provides a means to illustrate how changes in one variable (education) *correlate* with changes in another variable (public opinion) (See Lamont 2015, p. 109).

### **1.3 Literature Review**

In a seminal article titled "The Clash of Civilizations?", Samuel Huntington made the famous assertion that the primary sources of conflict in the new world would be based on *cultural* differences between civilizations (Huntington 1993, p. 22, emphasis added). This assertion seems to have, at least to some degree, materialized in that while the civilizational clashes Huntington predicted have yet to occur, many commentators have observed that there has been a significant global rise in the level of conflicts characterized by clashes between groups defined by some sort of

social/group identity, be it culture, nationality, religion, ideology, race, or ethnicity in recent decades (Fisher, 2001; Eidelson & Eidelson, 2003; Pratt, 2003; Connor, 1994; Johnson & Stewart, 2007; Peters, 2007).

These clashes/conflicts tend to be intra-state<sup>3</sup> rather than inter-state<sup>4</sup> in that take place primarily within (opposed to across) national borders (Rothman & Olson 2001, p. 289; Paulson & Rappleye 2007, p. 341) and are, in some cases further complicated by majority-minority dynamics where the “majority may be tempted to seek control and [the] minority seeking protection through autonomy, secession, or external intervention.” (Joseph 1997, p. 6). The rise in these intergroup intra-state conflicts sparked a debate as to what exactly their rise could be attributed to.

Some authors have taken to laying blame for the rise in conflicts of this nature either with the end of the Second World War (Horowitz, 2000) or the more recent Cold war (Byrne, 2001). Their primary argument is that these wars provided a stable structural system within which conflicts of these nature were not allowed to thrive but following the end of these wars, the Cold War in particular with the demise of the Soviet Union, such intergroup conflicts were allowed to thrive as the war’s end engendered an increase in ethnic consciousness and also caused a change in global patterns of conflict (Hutchinson & Smith, 1996; Joseph 1997, p. 7; Lindh *et al.* 1999, p. 26; See also Brown 1993, p. 3; Zurcher, 2007).

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<sup>3</sup> While the conflicts themselves are intra-state, since identity boundaries tend not to be coterminous with state boundaries, such conflicts have been known to occasionally transcend state boundaries. See Bakshi & Dasgupta (2016) for a discussion.

<sup>4</sup> As Bar-Tal *et al.* (in press) point out however, such conflicts might occur between states e.g. India and Pakistan.

Others however, such as Ayres (2000) argue the opposite and are of the opinion that the post-cold war period is neither specifically characterized by violent inter-state conflicts nor has the end of the war caused an unprecedented rise in such conflicts. In fact, Ayres draws the conclusion that many such conflicts were resolved in the ten years after the end of the Cold War; more than had been “in any comparable period in recent history.” (p. 107). Similarly, Wallensteen & Sollenberg (2001) argue that although major wars and armed conflicts did not show any significant decline in the post-cold war era, a clear trend can be seen in the case of minor conflicts which were actually in decline (p. 11) adding that the majority of said conflicts, in terms of patterns, tended to occur in Africa and Asia (See Sollenberg & Wallensteen 2001, p. 23).

Gurr (1994; 2000) occupies somewhat of a middle-ground arguing instead that although there was a peak in ethnic conflicts in the immediate aftermath of the Cold War, this wasn't directly linked to the Cold War itself but was the culmination of a general trend that had began in the 1950's [after the second world war] but, in terms of general patterns, ethnic warfare appeared to be on the decline.

Regardless of the debate over the effect the end of the second world war and the cold war had on the occurrence of inter-group intra-state conflicts, a number of scholars have recognized the salience of addressing this phenomenon and have, in the process of theorizing it, coined various titles for these sort of conflict. Edward Azar for example used the phrase *Protracted Social Conflict* to describe belligerent struggles for a group identity on the basis of race, ethnicity, religion, or culture (Azar, 1983; 1990 cited in Fisher 2001, p. 308). Jay Rothman, using the term *identity-based conflicts*, goes a step further to describe such conflicts as being resistant to resolution

because they are fundamentally rooted in "...the underlying human needs and values that together constitute people's social identities, particularly in the context of group affiliations...." (Rothman 1997, p. 6).

Identity based conflicts, where parties "fight across an existential divide", revolve around the identities of the groups involved, involve abstract issues, and involve intangible desired outcomes, differ from interest-based conflicts which conversely, are relatively well defined with the groups involved in conflict over how to share a proverbial pie (Rothman & Olson 2001, p. 297). Identity-based conflicts, while not exclusively based on identity issues, contain elements of tangible interests with the primary distinction being that parties advocate for their interests on the basis of some sort of identity such that while all identity-based conflicts contain interests, not all interest-based conflicts carry elements of identity (*ibid.*; Rothman 1997, p. 11).

The relationship between identities, interests and conflict has sparked a debate as to how exactly it is that interest based issues get to be projected on the basis of identity or whether the interest side of identity based conflicts is marginal seeing as identity-based conflicts tend to be existential with the tangible interests playing only a supporting role. While an in-depth exploration of this debate is beyond the scope of this paper, the arguments of the two main schools of thought are worth mentioning. Some authors are of the opinion that cultural differences "form the basis for deep psychological distrust or enmity." (Gartzke & Gleditsch 2006, p. 54; See also Huntington, 1993). Therefore, identity conflicts are just that, about identity.

The opposing camp, instrumentalism, argues that identity-based conflicts do not arise from cultural [identity] differences but these conflicts arise because identities are

manipulated for some political or economic gain (Brass 1991, cited in Ozkirmli 2010, p. 89; Varshney 2007, p. 282). Identities therefore are merely *instruments* used as a means to some economic or political end by societal elites such that conflicts seemingly based on identity only occur when there is conflict either between indigenous and external elites, or among the indigenous elites themselves (Brass 1996, p. 89) with a 1999 Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs Publication also noting the role that self-interested political leaders play in escalating conflicts which it argued rarely occur without warning (See Lindh *et al.* 1999, p. 37).

Pieterse (2004), himself a proponent of the instrumentalist belief that identity-based conflicts are at their base interest conflicts admits however that a clean distinction between identity politics and interest politics is a practical impossibility especially as interests are “*culturally* constructed, mediated, and articulated.” (p. 30; emphasis added) thus illustrating the intrinsic nature of the relationship between identities, interests, and implicitly, conflict.

Based on Rothman’s theories on identity-based conflict, it is possible to deduce two inter-related ways in which these conflicts are distinct: their *intractability* and the influence of *identity* on both their emergence and continuance. Fiol *et al.* (2009) define intractable conflicts as “...protracted and social conflicts that resist resolution.” (p. 33). These (intractable) conflicts have certain characteristics that distinguish them from other types of conflicts. In addition to their protractedness and resistance to resolution, they are also characterized by their totality, centrality, low levels of contact/interaction between the affected parties, cemented positions, zero-sum/win-lose conceptualizations and the compounding of both identity and resource

based issues (Rouhana & Bar-Tal 1998, pp. 761-762; Bar-Tal & Salomon 2006, p. 20; Northrup 1989, p. 62-63; Fiol *et al.* 2009, p. 34).

Identity, although not the sole cause of intractability, has been implicated as playing a crucial role in rigidifying positions in conflicts as they (conflicts) tend to resist resolution when the parties concerned feel that their identity is being threatened or altogether denied and since identity is not a tangible resource that may be negotiated over, the conflicts become intractable (Northrup, 1989; Fisher, 2001; Rothman & Olson, 2001; Fiol *et al.*, 2009). Additionally, political socialization tends to begin at a very young age in societies experiencing intractable conflict (Bar-Tal *et al.*, in press) due to the all-encompassing nature of such conflicts.

### **1.3.1 Theoretical Framework**

From a theoretical standpoint, given the nature of the study to be undertaken, the post-positivist denial of an observable *objective* reality advocated by positivist approaches and contrasting advocacy of a *subjective* reality seems to be an apt point of departure. One of the many theories which share this<sup>5</sup> post-positivist belief is the Constructivist theory/approach of/to international relations which invokes the histories of “socio-cognitive processes to uncover collective meaning, actors’ identities and the *substance* of political interests.” (Adler 1997, p. 335; original emphasis).

It is noteworthy however that, as Viotti & Kauppi (2010) put it, constructivism is a middle-ground between the other conceptual approaches to international relations with positivist theories such as realism and liberalism on the one hand and radical

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<sup>5</sup> While the Constructivist paradigm does share the post-positivist belief in the subjective nature of reality, it is not in its entirety a post-positivist theory itself.



post-positivist theories such as post-modernism and post-structuralism on the other (p. 277). Given this argument, it is necessary to further enunciate on exactly what it is that this 'subjective reality' entails. Alexander Wendt, one of the foremost authorities on constructivism, makes the distinction that while social structures (reality) present themselves as "externally existing social facts", are objective and can as such have objective knowledge created about them, it is impossible to make a clean distinction between the object and the subject in that there is an interplay between our *observation* of reality and existing theories we hold of it (Wendt 1995, p. 75). The argument here, simply put, is that observations of reality are subjective in that their objectivity is contingent upon shared knowledge; reality therefore is *intersubjective* because it is not reducible to individuals and is shaped by ideational factors rather than purely material ones (Finnemore & Sikkink 2001, p. 393).

Admittedly, constructivist thought scarcely resembles a homogenous group with the different sub-groups and their corresponding authors/theorists focusing on different aspects of what it is they believe guides the intersubjective reality they all agree exists. Zehfuss (2002) extensively distinguishes between what she calls the "three constructivisms" via her analysis of the works of the prominent author within each. Friedrich Kratochwil represents one camp which emphasizes the perceived prominence of rules and norms for political activity and thus use the rules and norms, which are intersubjectively constructed, as their tools of analysis (Zehfuss 2002, p. 15-19).

Similarly, Nicholas Onuf emphasizes the role of rules for social reality but differs in that he is only interested in rules insofar as they guide deeds, by which he means either "speech acts or physical actions" which construct reality as they have

meaning, which he believes, in human relations, depends on the existence of rules (cited in Zehfuss 2002, p. 20). Alexander Wendt represents the last constructivism. Arguably the most widely accepted constructivist outlook and especially pertinent for this paper, Wendt's constructivism emphasizes the construction of identities and interests, with the former receiving more attention as it is "construed as more basic than interests." (Zehfuss 2002, p. 12). In a similar manner, Hopf (1998) also distinguishes between *conventional* and *critical* constructivism with the former treating identity as a possible cause of action and the latter more concerned with the processes of identity formation (p. 184).

The main arguments of the constructivist theory of international relations, from which Wendt originates (and shares some similarities with Hopf's two constructivisms), are that: international politics, specifically the identities and interests of the actors within it are socially constructed as opposed to being givens and are therefore subject to change by the actors themselves as they interact with others; the international structure, understood as a social structure, influences the interests and identities of actors; the world, rather than 'being', is a project constantly under construction; and finally, as stated above, pure objectivity is an impossibility (Barkin 2010, p. 26; Viotti & Kauppi 2010, pp. 277, 288; See also Wendt, 1992; 1999).

Wendt's constructivism contrasts with other constructivists like Peter Katzenstein on one major point and that is the weight of external and internal environment in shaping identities. Wendt opts for more structural approach and thus places more emphasis on the exogenous dynamics of identity acquisition while Katzenstein sees

identity more as an endogenous attribute of the agent/actor (See Finnemore & Sikkink 2001, pp. 398-399).

Generally speaking however, for constructivists, there is an interplay between actors' identities and interests which reinforce on another, in that an actor's identity determines how its interests are defined and its (perceived) interests also serve to buttress its 'identity of self', because both are contingent upon social interaction whose power lies in its constituent social practices and "their capacity to *reproduce* the intersubjective meanings that constitute social structures and actors alike": actors through identity and the intersubjective social structure through repetitive practices (Hopf 1998, p. 178; emphasis added). The key constructivist concepts therefore are: intersubjectivity, identities, interests, and behaviour (Larson 2012, p. 62). The constructivist arguments are particularly salient here because "...constructivism is related to an exploration or at least appreciation of the issue of identity" in politics. (Zehfuss 2001, p. 316).

### **1.3.2 Identity and Socialization**

Understanding the relationship between identities on the one hand and interests and/or conflict on the other hand warrants further explanation of the concept of identity itself as "a certain form of identity...constitutes the point of departure for any and all relations with others." (Burgess, 2002 cited in Tawil & Harley 2004, p. 11). A comprehensive definition of identity or even a universally accepted conceptualization of what it entails as been impossible to achieve.

Some commentators such as Northrup (1989) and Gocek (2002) have taken to understanding identity as a *sense of self* in relation to the world which in social contexts allows for the inclusion of some and exclusion of others. Others have taken

to understanding identity as mix of *narratives/discourse* (especially in social contexts) which actively distinguish the self through the creation of an other/others implicitly distinguishing the individual/collectivity from other individuals/collectivities (Eidelson & Eidelson, 2003; Pratt, 2003; Hall, 1990 cited in Pavlenko & Blackledge 2004a, p. 13).

While convergence on defining the concept of identity seems elusive, at least three points exist on which there seems to be some level degree of agreement: identities, rather than being fixed, are dynamic, fluid, and understood within the context of social relations with other actors making them a relational concept as well (Northrup, 1979; Pavlenko & Blackledge, 2004b; Zehfuss, 2001); as such, they serve to distinguish the ‘self’ from the ‘other’ or in terms of collectives, the ‘in-group’ [the group(s) to which the individual belongs] from the ‘out-group’ [groups to which the individual does not belong] to the point where in extreme situations, identities become “negatively interdependent” where the in-group’s identity is based on the negation of that of the other/out-group (Fiol *et al.* 2009, p. 34) or put differently, in-group solidarity becomes directly related to hostility towards out-groups (Stewart & Glynn 1985, p. 50); and finally and arguably most importantly, there is an overarching consensus that the various forms of identities are the products of social processes and can as such be termed social constructs (Vermeer 2010, p. 110).

How then are actors’ identities, defined as somewhat stable “role-specific” understandings and expectations of the self (Viotti & Kauppi 2010, p. 286) constructed? The constructivist belief is that an actor acquires an identity by “...interacting with or defining the self in relation to a social structure composed of social relationships, shared meanings, rules, norms, and practices.” (*ibid.*). This

understanding therefore, implies that actors' identities are constructed/acquired via their interaction with both the social structure and other actors within it at different levels of society beginning and continuing from an individuals' early days (Douglas, 1997 cited in Kunze 2015, p. 4) in a process termed socialization; a particularly arresting notion if one accepts the *tabula rasa* argument that human's are at birth born void of any knowledge and or understanding, just the capacity for them leaving knowledge and understanding to be imprinted by experience (See Locke, 1841) embodied by the process(es) of social interaction. Before elaborating further on the socialization process and its relationship to identities and implicitly interests, it is necessary at this juncture to briefly introduce the concept of 'social identity'.

A social identity, according to Henri Tajfel, includes the characteristics that denote an individual's membership in a collective such as nationality, religion, or ethnicity. It is the individual's knowledge that he belongs to a certain social group. The social identity differs from personal identity which includes characteristics specific to a person (Tajfel, 1972 cited in Northrup 1989, p. 65). An individual's social identity derives from the individual's knowledge and feelings about the group which are shared with the other members of the group (Pettigrew 2007, p. 35). Within the framework of Tajfel's Social Identity Theory, identity is understood to encompass three dimensions: *self-categorization*, which involves the identification of the self as a member of a group; an *evaluative dimension*, where one evaluates various aspects of group membership (albeit with a degree of in-group bias); and an *affective commitment* which involves "the extent to which one feels emotionally involved within a given group" (Furey *et al.* 2016, p. 3). Identifying with a given group as a member i.e. self-identification, remains the "most salient aspect of [a] social identity" (*ibid.*, p. 7).

A similar concept, of “large-group identity” is proposed by Volkan (2001). He defines this “as the *subjective* experience of thousands or millions of people who are linked by a *persistent sense of sameness*” (p. 81; emphasis added). I found it necessary to introduce this concept in addition to that of the social identity because Volkan expressly highlights the subjective nature of group identities in that they are for the most part endogenous. One particularly arresting point of the social/group identity is worth mentioning and that is that in situations involving inter-group conflict, the social identity tends to supersede the personal/individual identity (Northrup 1989, p. 66) which somewhat explains the pervasiveness of such conflicts as individuals are willing to sacrifice themselves for the collective.

As regarding their acquisition, Ochs (1993) noted that social identities as social constructs, are both inferred, and interactionally achieved. He further noted that the social constructivist approach to social identity offers the best means of understanding it as it captures the process of identity construction over interactional and historical time (p. 291; 298). These identities are also particularly important as they guide intent [and actions] (Kowert 2012, p. 32). The inability to agree on a widely accepted understanding of identity is also evident in the inability to reach a consensus on exactly what social processes result in it’s creation. Different groups of authors posit different theories on what they perceive to be the most salient factor(s) that influence the process of identity acquisition/how identities come to be constructed.

One such group is those who emphasize the role of *narratives/discourse* in the formation of group identities. For them, societal groups have certain master narratives that serve to unite them and thus increase group solidarity through the creation of an identity contrasted to that of the ‘other’ (Gocek, 2002; Pratt, 2003;

Rotberg, 2006; Varshney, 2007) which is one characteristic of the nation-building process in particular (Latif 2010, p. 36). These narratives serve to “justify the in-group’s attitude towards the *enemy*.” (Bar-Tal & Salomon 2006, p. 31).

Another group sees identities as being the product of *language* and other *linguistic practices* (Pavlenko & Blackledge, 2004b; Ochs, 1993). As Gellner (1983) puts it, in circumstances involving high social mobility, “the culture in which one has been taught to communicate in becomes the core of one’s identity” (cited in Ozkirimli 2010, p. 103). Ochs (1993) goes a step further in her assertion that language not only constructs one’s own identity but also denotes that of the ‘other’ (p. 289).

A third and final group, the one this paper is allied with<sup>6</sup>, instead places the mantle of identity formation with the various forms of *collective group interactions* which serve as socializing agents. As Schopflin (2000) put it, “identities are formed by collective human activity” (p. 29). Alexander Wendt offers a parallel view with his argument that actors acquire their identities via their participation in *collective meanings* (Wendt, 1992 cited in Zehfuss 2001, p. 318; emphasis added).

Speaking on *culture*, a social identifier, Cohen (1997), notes that in addition to being a quality of the society of which individuals are a part rather than that of the individuals themselves, it is also acquired, through socialization, by individuals from their respective societies. He goes further to argue that this ‘socialization’ process refers to the “methods by which society *implants* its way of life in its members.” (p. 9, emphasis added). In a chapter aptly named “The Preservation of Societies:

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<sup>6</sup> This however is not a rejection of the arguments of the other groups but it is my belief that the arguments espoused by those belonging to this groups are better suited for use in the field of international relations.

Socialization”, Elbert Stewart & James Glynn conceptualize socialization as a means by which individuals assimilate/internalize/learn the various aspects of their culture [and implicitly their cultural identity] via their interaction with others (Stewart & Glynn, 1985; See also Vermeer 2010, p. 110). The socialization process, as one of transference or implantation, is linked to a key component of the constructivist social construction conviction, ‘intersubjectivity’, which refers to collective knowledge that “persists beyond the lives of individual social actors, embedded in social routines and practices as they are reproduced by interpreters who participate in their production and workings.” (Adler, 1997, cited in Barkin 2010, p. 26).

According to Berger & Luckmann (1991), the individual is “not born a member of society” but rather is born with a “predisposition towards sociality, and he *becomes* a member of society.” (p. 149; emphasis added). The individual becomes a member of society through the process of socialization at the end of which he is expected to internalize the concept of the generalized ‘other’ (and all the implicit ramifications) (*ibid*, p. 157). Socialization as a process could occur via a number of socializing agents involved both in the formation and maintenance of both the individual and social identity.

Arguably however, the most important socializing agents, are the family, schools, peers, and more recently, mass media. All of which influence the process of identity formation. The focus of this paper is on schools (and education systems in general) because while the influence of the other agents of socialization should not be underestimated (nor should that of education/schools be erroneously overestimated), *formal* education consists of theories of socialization *institutionalized* at the collective level or as traditional socialization theory defines it: “an *organized* set of



socializing experiences.” (Meyer 1977, p. 65; 58, emphasis added). Education therefore is a unique agent because it is both formal and institutionalized which is especially salient in co-consideration with the fact that education, rather than being neutral, functions in a political domain especially in conflict-affected societies where schools are organized around identity factors (Tawil & Harley 2004, p. 9; Smith 2014, p. 117).

### **1.3.3 Education, Identity, and Conflict**

Education has been cited as one of the means of socialization through which societies transmit their social and cultural norms and values into the individual who in turn internalizes them to the extent that education, and socialization in general, essentially reproduces society and its corresponding social identity and the relational dynamics that entails (Smith 2014, p. 114; Cohen 1997, p. 9; Stewart & Glynn 1985, p. 423; Smith, 2005 cited in Novelli & Cardozo 2008, p. 479; Vermeer 2010, p. 104, 106, 108). Matusov & Marjanovic-Shane (2016) view education as “a process of shaping people to allow them participate in a *culture as pattern*” which they define as “a particular stable way of acting, behaving, doing knowing, and mediating things and relating to and communicating with other people”. The student therefore is viewed as material, an object of socialization upon which a “given cultural shape” is socialized (pp. 2-3).

In a similar vein, Anderson (2006) cited the educational system as one of the means of systematically instilling the nationalist [social/group] ideology [and implicitly identity] into the individual (p. 114; See also, Tawil & Harley 2004, p. 9) with national narratives also used to justify the very existence of the nation/national group (POST 2010, p. 7) while for Harklau (2003) educational institutions socialize individuals into taking particular roles in society (p. 84). Summarily,

Mass education creates a whole series of social assumptions about the common culture of society...reifies a given national history...constructs a common civic order...with some shared cultural symbols.... Mass education defines and builds the nation [and its corresponding national identity]. (Meyer 1977, p. 69-70; See also Smith 2003b, pp. 39-41)

A number of authors have mentioned the interplay between education and social identity formation within the context of conflict and the influence the latter has on the former both through its *structure* which could take the form of either segregated education or co-existence education, and its *content* which similarly could either promote integration and co-existence or identity differentiation/cultural superiority (Johnson & Stewart 2007, p. 247; Tawil & Harley 2004, p. 3) leading me to posit two analogous (general) hypotheses:

*H<sub>1</sub>: In societies suffering from intractable conflict, void of large-scale violence, the structure of education should be expected to be used in reproducing the dynamics of conflict.*

*H<sub>2</sub>: In societies suffering from intractable conflict, void of large-scale violence, the content of education should be expected to be used in reproducing the dynamics of conflict.*

Due to the vastly different forms of social identification and their propensity towards both instigating and sustaining conflict based on social identifiers such as linguistic, cultural, racial, or religious differences, it is necessary at this juncture to introduce a comprehensive definition of one particular form of social identity which somewhat encompasses most of the various versions of identities pertinent to this paper, ethnicity. For Horowitz (1985) “ethnicity as a term designates a sense of collective belonging, which could be based on common descent, language, history, culture,

race, or religion (or some *combination* of these).” (cited in Varshney 2007, p. 277, emphasis added).

According to Johnson & Stewart (2007), ethnicity, understood in this all encompassing form, is critical to identity and also increasingly a tool for political mobilization (p. 247). On the topic of the origin/nature of the ethnic group, some commentators such as Geertz (1996) sees ethnic group membership/ethnic identities as a form of *primordial* attachment assumed to be a *given* of social existence with a seemingly “ineffable, and at times, overpowering coerciveness in and of themselves.” One is therefore bound to the other members of the ethnic group “by virtue...[of] the very tie itself.” (p. 40; 42) thus making ethnic identity/membership a powerful mobilizing tool especially in conflictual situations.

For others such as Brown (2007) & Horowitz (2000), ethnicity is based on the *myth* of cultural sameness derived from a belief in the common ancestry Geertz espouses with the difference being that they deny the accuracy of such claims arguing instead that the perceived common ancestry is merely a myth rather than fact while at the same time being careful not to downplay the reality of ethnicity itself as ethnic groups share a “strong sense of similarity” that allows them to subvert their own personal identities for the collectivity and elicit more loyalty than the other forms of group membership thus making them particularly prone to engaging in severe conflict (See Thayer 2004, p. 231). In the same vein, Smith (1996) argues that ethnic survival is contingent upon “active cultivation” by members of the ethnic group to

preserve their cultural values and heritage (p. 189) through socializing practices for example.<sup>7</sup>

Before venturing into the relationship between education and conflict in more detail. I find it necessary at this juncture to briefly introduce Social Identity Development Theory developed by Drew Nesdale which posits four stages of intergroup attitude development with a view to the importance of social identification in inter-group (especially conflictual) contexts (See Nesdale 1999; 2004; Nesdale & Flessler, 2001). In the first stage children are oblivious to racial and/or ethnic differences between people (before age 2/3). Following this stage comes ‘ethnic awareness’ where the processes of ethnic/racial differentiation of self-identification begin. The third stage begins around age 4 and involves children developing a sort of in-group bias where they not only identify with but prefer their in-group to other groups. In the final stage, which occurs around age 7, this bias is transformed into full blown out-group prejudice. The theory does however warn that not all children develop the negative out-group orientation that occurs in the final stage although I would argue that is a moot point within the context of identity-based conflicts especially because the “conflict is critical in defining and strengthening group identities [as] communal and national identities become more salient in response to external challenges” (Gurr 1993, p. 162).

Arguably one of the most influential work done that studies the relationship between education and identity-based conflicts is that of Bush & Saltarelli (2000) in which they explored, in depth, the positive and negative ‘faces’ of education in ethnic

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<sup>7</sup> See Smith (2003b) for a review of theories on the relationship between ethnicity and nationalism and nationalism itself in general.

conflict. Their work has served as a reference point for almost every study conducted in the field since it was published. On the negative side, they argued that education could work towards protracting conflict through: its use as a tool of cultural repression, transmission of manipulated history for political purposes, manipulating textbooks, or even the use of segregated education to ensure inequality and/or stereotyping.

Education could conversely mitigate such conflicts by: promoting a tolerant climate, de-segregating the mind, disarming history and cultivating inclusive citizenship. Subsequent authors have enunciated further on various aspects of these theories on education's role in ethnic conflict. It is worth pointing out that, as Brown (2011) puts it, education and conflict have a rather complicated relationship and rather than being a direct contributor to conflict, education often affects conflict via its interaction with other "structural causes of conflict" (cited in Acedo 2011, p. 182) or via its content by neglecting the conflictual relationship between communities altogether (Johnson & Stewart 2007, p. 249).

On the positive side, some commentators have highlighted education's potential for good in that it could lead to a decline in ethnocentric attitudes by allowing students to accept the differences that exist between groups (Stewart & Glynn 1985, p. 52; See also Bush & Saltarelli 2000, p. 20) or changing the [perceived] social divisions and realities (Paulson & Rappleye 2007, p. 346). Others have focused on the negative 'face' of education and its ability to: amplify/reinforce or exacerbate social divisions and realities (Gallagher, 2004; See also Tawil & Harley 2004, p. 3); influence certain perceived 'essentialist' identities which it inculcates/reinforces (Johnson & Stewart 2007, p. 247, 249; Novelli & Cardozo 2008, pp. 478-479); or

manipulate history for political purposes which when combined with segregated education further deepens the effects of the different accounts of both historical and current events (Huyse 2003, p. 28).

This final point, that education could negatively influence identity-based conflicts by disseminating certain ‘edited’ and biased accounts of history or societal narratives, is particularly significant as the influence of narratives over the children they inevitably socialize cannot be underestimated (Ochs 1993, p. 295) especially within the context of intractable conflicts or any contemporary conflicts for that matter which are undoubtedly influenced by past events (Rydgren, 2007) leading Lindh *et al.* (1999) to argue that in addition to intolerance, racism, and other issues, contrasting views of history should be given greater recognition within the wider context of conflict prevention (p. 42), a view which I would argue has since become a reality, at least in the adjoining fields of conflict resolution and post-conflict reconstruction.

#### **1.3.4 Historical Narratives, Education, Identity, and Conflict**

Ahonen (2014) defines history as “a broad social phenomenon, comprising different representations of the past...” (p. 75). It “consists of literary artefacts, most of which do not obey the *positivistic* rules of knowledge acquisition.” (White, 1971, cited in Ahonen 2014, p. 75, emphasis added) and are thus subject to manipulation. This manipulation is evident in the codification of history which primarily involves highlighting certain stories/events while simultaneously ignoring others (Bush & Saltarelli 2000, p. 12). Ahonen further describes post-conflict history as consisting of *contradicting narratives* of the conflict held by the various parties (2014, p. 75) which also tend to remain uniform within groups and vastly different between groups due to ‘ethnic homophily’ where group members tend to marry within their ethnic

group and minimize interaction with others, a phenomenon that is not exclusive to conflictual situations (Rydgren 2007, p. 233).

Historical narratives, understood to be shared socially constructed accounts of a group's collective experiences, not only form the basis for, but also strengthen the social identity of the group (Bar-Tal & Salomon, 2006; Bar-Tal *et al.*, 2014; See also Ahonen 2014, p. 77) and are loaded with meaning to the extent that they have both moral and *practical* implications. These accounts are not necessarily true but are useful for the group to function, unite into a political community, or exist altogether (Bar-Tal & Salomon 2006, p. 23; Gocek 2002, p. 4).

Eidelson & Eidelson (2003) argue that collective historical narratives are a means of transferring what they term "group-level worldviews" via socialization which effectively influence/aid in understanding in-group - out-group relations. Bar-Tal *et al.* (2014) note that these narratives are particularly important for intractable [identity-based] conflicts as they contribute both to the eruption of such conflicts and their persistence (p. 663) especially because they are *subjectively constructed*. It is important to note that narratives of this nature are not formed exclusively in cases of inter-group conflict but actually develop whenever a group, or society, experiences any form of collective trauma, natural or man-made, which is shared by the collective as a whole and affects the very structure of the society itself (See Zeka 2015, p. 142). Departing from the notion that national memory is important for the nation building process and the nation is merely a community of myths (See Smith, 1999b), Kizilyurek (1999) argues that the "national historiography [narrative] reproduces the national memory" the aim of which "is not the accurate account of

history but an effective and efficient contribution to national goals and unity” (p. 387).

Narratives, during times of conflict are used to perform certain functions such as the mobilization of the collective on the basis of its shared social identity which is especially arresting since the collective the identity belongs to constitutes what Anderson (2006) calls an “imagined community” as it is not based on face to face interaction between the members of the in-group but the sentiments the group’s social identity promotes have practical (un-imagined) repercussions. Additionally, narratives usually tend to depict the in-group as the sole victims of the conflict in an effort to legitimize and justify its contentions while at the same time increasing group solidarity (Eidelson & Eidelson, 2003; Ahonen, 2014).

As such, they also justify the use of collective violence by the in-group against the out-group (Bar-Tal & Salomon, 2006; Bar-Tal *et al*, 2014; Bush & Saltarelli, 2000) who they portray as ‘different’ in a continual process of rigidification by exaggerating and highlighting the differences between the groups which in turn also contributes to the dehumanization and delegitimation of the other making violence against ‘it’ more tolerable thereby entrenching the conflict even further (Northrup 1981, p. 74; See also Rotberg, 2006; Bar-Tal *et al*, 2014; Eidelson & Eidelson, 2003).

Davies (2010) refers to this particular phenomenon within the context of institutionalized education as “hate curriculum” in which the other group is portrayed in textbooks as dangerous or subhuman (p. 492). The institutionalization of these kind of narratives consolidates them thus making them that much harder to dispute



and the prospects for reconciliation mitigated. Stuart Koffman actually lists “myths justifying hostility” as one of the preconditions for identity-based violence (cited in Desrosiers 2015, p. 124). Likewise, Schopflin (2000) noted that myths play a pivotal part in determining how collectivities define themselves and their surrounding universe, are crucial for cultural reproduction and identity transfer, enhance division in ethnically divided societies and are put forth as a narrative similar and parallel to history (pp. 79-85). Rydgren (2007) used the term “narrativization” to describe the process through which experiences are arranged into interconnected sequences or coherent narratives (p. 232).

The influence that history, myths and narratives in general have for identity formation is better understood if viewed through the lens of framing theory. Desrosiers (2015) describes framing as a form of ‘strategic communication’ in which frames are used as tools to project certain events or people in a particular manner to achieve a specific objective. The framing process is influenced by pre-existing social structures such as identity which guide and constrain it (p. 128). Narratives that depict the in-group as the victim for example are constructed within injustice or victimization frames where events are portrayed to have occurred to the detriment of the group in that some great injustice was done against it these frames work in parallel with adversarial frames which serve to lay the blame for the aforementioned injustices with the out-group (See Desrosiers 2015, p. 130; Noor, Shnabel, Halabi & Nadler, 2012).

To recapitulate, education propagates identity-based conflicts in two important ways: as a tool of socialization, it socializes individuals into society playing a direct role in the acquisition of their social identity; it also reproduces the dynamics of conflict by

transmitting certain narratives, historical accounts and myths alike, which serve to institutionalize the conflict and a biased view of it in which the in-group is the blameless victim contrasted against the adversarial out-group. Northrup (1989) argues that one arresting feature of intractable conflicts is that eventually, parties begin to “collude in maintaining the conflict” where the conflict becomes a *defining* part of their identity and eventually institutionalized (p. 75) such as in the form of society-wide formal education systems.

This institutionalization of the conflict is arguably the most important role education plays as it “interweaves the importance of the conflict with the importance of the self” to a stage where ending the conflict threatens the identity of both the individual and the collectivity (ibid, p. 76) which is particularly enthralling because, as has been argued earlier, conflicts tend to arise where threats to identity are perceived. This institutionalisation may take place at a structural level, the level/means of instruction (content), or both.

As a concluding point, it is important to note that education’s influence over the transmission of narratives could also be used as a tool for peace-making if the narratives it conveys are accurate and truthful to the end that they aid reconciliation efforts (Jeong, 2005; See also Bloomfield *et al*, 2003).

#### **1.4 Organization of the Thesis**

This thesis is organized into eight chapters. Following this introductory chapter which provides an initial look into the nature of the study to be undertaken, its limitations, methodology, and an overview of the existing literature on the relationship between identity, conflict, education and historical narratives which are

linked to the study's research questions and hypotheses, the second chapter provides an introduction to the case study's chosen for the study to be undertaken in the form of both the historical, and and contemporary nature of the conflicts in Northern Ireland and Cyprus.

The third chapter explores the structural nature of education in Northern Ireland and how it has evolved overtime within the context of educational reform. Similarly, the fourth chapter, in addition to the general nature of education in Cyprus, explores the historical narratives, as embodied by educational texts, of both the Turkish and Greek Cypriot communities; both pre and post-reform in the case of the former within the political context.

The fifth and sixth chapters explore the means in which public opinion has trended over the years on Northern Ireland and Cyprus respectively paying particular attention to whether the observed trends are consistent with what is to be expected following educational reform (or lack thereof).

The seventh chapter, using the information provided in chapters 3 through 6, looks for evidence that leads either to an acceptance, or rejection of the hypotheses H<sub>3</sub> & H<sub>4</sub> while the eighth and final chapter summarizes the study's findings as well as provides recommendations and a direction for further study into the relationship between education and conflict.

## Chapter 2

### THE CASES

This chapter introduces (and justifies) the cases chosen for the study providing the context needed in understanding both the conflicts themselves and education's role in them.

As had been noted earlier, a large number of identity-based conflicts have occurred in recent decades such as the infamous Rwandan civil war, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the decade long Yugoslavia wars and the numerous conflicts that erupted in the territories of the former Soviet Union. This study however focuses on two conflicts whose roots extend farther than the disputed end of the cold war: The Northern Ireland conflict & the Cyprus conflict. These two conflicts were chosen primarily because they are for the most part, relatively non-violent, and are thus better poised to exemplify the influence of a socializing factor in sustaining the inter-group animosity (in addition to their differences of opinion) *ipso facto* impeding resolution. An argument might be made that the 1998 Belfast Agreement signalled an end to the Northern Ireland conflict in its entirety to which I would counter that while paramilitary groups have laid down arms, there are still sporadic instances of civilian violence and large scale violence in Northern Ireland even ended more recently than the 'unresolved' Cyprus conflict.

At first glance, the conflicts in Northern Ireland and Cyprus scarcely seem to share many, if any, similarities besides the fact that they are both instances of protracted identity-based conflict. A closer look at the dynamics surrounding either of them however (both from their onset and in their contemporary form) reveals a number of commonalities between the two cases. In addition to their protractedness, resistance to resolution, and the fact that both cases have garnered a significant level of external/international attention, in both cases, the conflict has permeated almost every level of social life and no less in relatively ‘advanced’ European societies; education has been, and in one instance continues to be, *actively* used to sustain the conflict; there is a less than ideal level of contact/or interaction between the conflicting parties; the education systems are essentially segregated; and finally, both conflicts are essentially instances of competing ethno-nationalist aspirations.

Some other points are worth noting as to why these particular conflicts were chosen for this study. Firstly, there has been a reform of the education system in Northern Ireland with one of the parties in the Cypriot case also having undergone educational reform thus making the job of analysing the ways in which education might be conflict sustaining and/or otherwise that more uncomplicated given the two points of reference i.e. pre-reform and post-reform. Additionally, the fact that only one of the parties in the Cypriot case has enacted reform allows for an intra-case comparison while simultaneously introducing a quasi-*control*<sup>8</sup> case, to borrow positivist terminology.

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<sup>8</sup> A Control experiment is one in which a hypothesis is tested by studying the changes brought upon by changes to a particular variable (Business Dictionary, n.d.), which is in this case, education, in a set of otherwise similar or even sometimes identical cases.

Secondly, both cases present perfect examples of what Galtung (1969) terms *negative peace* in that while there is an absence of personal/direct violence, there exists in its stead structural violence or social injustice which is executed by the social structure and more importantly for current purposes, social institutions. Lastly, both cases serve as a testament to the Hutchinson & Smith's assertion that *religion* and *language* are pre-eminent markers & attributes of ethnicity (Hutchinson & Smith 1996, p. 187) as group distinction in Northern Ireland is based primarily on religious affiliation while in Cyprus, although there is a distinction between the dominant religion in both communities (due to the processes of national identity formation), the language differences, in addition to other cultural differences, between both have arguably become more prominent particularly following the decreased inter-communal contact.

Additionally, both cases are especially positioned to explore the effects of education via its structure and content for the primary reason that while the segregated education system in Northern Ireland does implicitly involve the transmission of two different narratives (content), the history books are for the most part balanced with their only major shortcoming being that they fail to link the past to the present (Emerson 2012, p. 282). The content of education in Northern Ireland therefore, while embodying competing narratives, is not expressively conflictual as in the case of Cyprus where conflictual narratives are being transmitted in textbooks and the split structure of the education system is seldom an active process but rather a symptom of the nature of the conflict itself with the communities being *de facto* split into two different states.

Summarily, the focuses of this study would be on the *structure* of education for Northern Ireland and the *content* of education in the case of Cyprus although references will be made to the content and structure of education in both the former and latter case where necessary. The specific hypotheses being tested in this particular study therefore are:

*H<sub>3</sub>: In Northern Ireland, a society suffering from intractable conflict, and void of large-scale violence, the reform of the structure of education should be expected to hinder the reproduction of the dynamics of conflict.*

*H<sub>4</sub>: In Cyprus, a society suffering from intractable conflict, void of large-scale violence, changes in the official educational narrative should be reflected in changes in social attitudes.*

As a final note, because both of these cases have been extensively researched making the presentation of any ‘new’ perspective or insight unlikely when taken exclusively, the novelty of this particular study lies in the very nature of the study itself in that it is comparative. The hope is that by comparing these two cases through fresh interpretive lenses, the new insight would prove to be an addition to the already existing literature.

## **2.1 The Northern Ireland Conflict**

*Northern Ireland offers a paradigmatic example of a territory where the conditions for successful conflict regulation are lacking.*

*(O’Duffy 1993, p. 128)*

The conflict in Northern Ireland is at its most basic form a dispute over the political status of the 6 (out of 9) counties of Ulster that make up Northern Ireland and are considered territory of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland

(hereafter referred to simply as the United Kingdom). These 6 counties remain under her majesty's jurisdiction while the remaining 3 counties of Ulster belong to the sovereign Republic of Ireland in the south. The primary conflicting parties are the Protestants, the majority of whom identify politically as Unionists/Loyalists<sup>9</sup> and generally consider themselves to be British, and the Catholics, who predominantly identify politically as Nationalists/Republicans<sup>10</sup> and consider themselves to be of Irish nationality (Emerson 2012, p. 279). The rigidity of the identity boundary between the in-group (us) and the out-group (them) has been extensively homogenized in Northern Ireland thus making it, on a foundational level, a "clash of identities" (Whyte, 1990, cited in Byrne 2001, p. 329; 330).

Lustick (1985) has classified the primary historic causes of the conflict as state and nation building failures on the part of both the British and Irish governments (cited in O'Duffy 1993, p. 129). In a similar vein, Emerson (2012) ascribed the origins of the conflict to the exogenous role of Britain as well as capitalism and the endogenous communal tensions combined with the contrasting territorial/national aspirations of both communities (p. 280).

As per their objectives, the majority Unionists (most of whom are Protestant) wish for Northern Ireland to remain part of the United Kingdom while the Nationalists (mostly Catholics) wish to break from the union and form part of a re-united Irish state (the Republic of Ireland). The difference of opinion may be explained by what Bush & Saltarelli (2000) call the *double minority complex* in that while the Protestant

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<sup>9</sup> The terms 'Unionists' and 'Protestants' may be used interchangeably to refer to the same group of people denoting political or religious identity/affiliation respectively depending on the context.

<sup>10</sup> Similarly, the terms 'Nationalists' and 'Catholics' refer to the same group denoting political and religious identity/affiliation respectively.



community constitutes the majority in Northern Ireland, it perceives itself, and rightly so, as a minority in all of Ireland. Similarly, the Catholic community sees itself as a minority in Northern Ireland although it is the majority in the whole of Ireland (p. 6). The Protestants therefore wish to retain their union membership for fear of their imminent assimilation if they were to join the predominantly Catholic Republic of Ireland. Conversely, but somewhat similarly, Cronin (2001) argues that most of the problems in Northern Ireland stem from the 1920 partition of the island as, fearing their assimilation, Catholics in the north abstained from the government and politics in Northern Ireland in its formative state leaving it to be fashioned to the will of the majority Protestants (p. 208).

Two noteworthy features of the Northern Ireland conflict are worth mentioning. First, is the interplay between the often interchangeable religious [ethnic], national, and political identities (Gallagher 2016, p. 362) both of the individual and his/her respective community which Arlow (2004) describes as being parallel to one another (p. 267). A feature which is unique not only to Northern Ireland but the Republic of Ireland as well where religion and the religious identity are “intrinsically linked” to the country’s national identity (Williams, 1999) with the former, sectarian, identity permeating the political realm without creating new “cross-segmental identities” (Kunze 2015, p. 5).

For this reason some authors have taken to viewing religion as a fundamental component of the conflict thus basing the conflict on the refusal of the Protestant community to fall under the Republic of Ireland which is governed by Catholic doctrines creating some potentially contentious problems policy wise such as the issue of abortion (See Hickey, 1984; Bruce, 1986). Others such as MacDonald

(1986) view religion merely as a means of distinguishing the indigenous Irish and their descendants from those of British origin. Similarly, O'Duffy (1993) claims that rather than being the locus of the conflict itself, religion merely reinforces and sustains the ethnic cleavages that exist between the two communities (p. 130), or as Barnes (2005) puts it, the conflict is basically as a case of political aspirations subsequently entrenched by religious differences of both communities (p. 129). Notwithstanding, the interchangeability of the national, religious, and political identities leads to a sense of homogeneity of the out-group which perpetuates hostility between the groups (Hughes *et al.* 2007, p. 42).

The other noteworthy feature of the conflict lies in the vary nature of society in Northern Ireland itself. Although not territorially divided, there is limited contact between the two communities as most areas are segregated residentially, in education, in workplaces and other social contexts in general (Hayes, McAllister & Dowds 2007, p. 455) which itself has undoubtedly contributed to the intractability of the conflict (See Schmid *et al.*, 2008). This segregation ensures the prevalence of negative emotions by reinforcing mutual ignorance (Hughes *et al.* 2007, p. 36).

### **2.1.1 Historical Background**

The conflict in Northern Ireland has roots that go back centuries into the history of the entire island of Ireland itself. Known to the locals as 'The Troubles', the conflict has its historic roots with the arrival of British colonial settlers to the island in 1609 during which the incoming Protestant English and Scottish 'planters' confiscated land owned by the native predominantly Catholic Irish in the northern part of the island, specifically a province known as Ulster where the British immigrants also settled in the 'unplanted' areas leading to clashes between the planters and the native Irish population in the form of two ethno-religious conflicts from at the end of which

the planters emerged victorious and “cracked down on the political and religious freedoms of the indigenous Irish.” (Delaney 2008, para. 21).

The enmity between the the Catholic and Protestant communities continued into and became entrenched in the 1700’s as sectarianism was on the rise in Irish society with both communities establishing exclusive organizations. One such organization, the Loyal Orange Institution also know as the Orange Order (est. 1795), a Protestant organization, still exists to this very day (BBC, 2001).

The ‘Acts of Union’ (1801)<sup>11</sup> formally united the Kingdoms of Great Britain and Ireland via the incorporation of the latter to create the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland. The acts also abolished the Irish parliament thus directly contributing to the evolution of the conflict into its current form as from the late 19<sup>th</sup> century, a ‘home rule’ movement emerged in Ireland that decisively delineated the divide between the Nationalists, who desired the restoration of the Irish Parliament and implicitly self-governance for Ireland, and the Unionists who supported a continued union with Britain (See English, 2003).

At the beginning of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, Protestants and Catholics divided into warring camps over the issue of home rule with both sides forming paramilitary groups such as the Unionist Ulster Volunteer Force (1913-1922) and the Nationalist Irish Volunteers (1913-1921). The sectarian tensions culminated in the 1916 Easter Uprising which “sparked a chain of events leading to civil war and partition of the island.” (BBC, n.d.). As Lecky (1892) noted, “If the characteristic mark of a healthy Christianity be

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<sup>11</sup> The acts were passed in 1800 but became effective from 1801.

to unite its members...then there is no country where Christianity has more completely failed than Ireland” (cited in Austin *et al.* 2015, p. 508).

The 1920 Government of Ireland Act partitioned the island into two separate entities, Northern Ireland and Southern Ireland with the former consisting of the 6 counties of Ulster with a greater proportion of protestants (McMahon 2004, p. 11). In the following year, following violence between the Irish Republican Army (IRA) and British forces, the Irish Free State was created from the 23 counties in the south and 3 counties from the north by the Anglo-Irish treaty which also gave Ireland dominion status (Imbornoni, Brunner & Rowen n.d., paras. 4-5; Cronin 2001, p. 206). According to Hoppen (1989) the partitioning border made it “glaringly obvious” that Catholics were the minority in Northern Ireland but Protestants were the minority in Ireland as a whole thus preventing the emergence of a shared sense of identity between the communities (p. 203). In 1949, the Irish Free State (26 counties) became the independent Republic of Ireland while Northern Ireland (6 counties) remained part of the United Kingdom.

Although the Anglo-Irish treaty somewhat pacified both Unionists and Nationalists, violence continued sporadically culminating in the eruption of ‘The Troubles’ in 1968.

### **2.1.2 The Northern Ireland Conflict in Its Contemporary Form**

While the conflict between the Catholics and Protestants in Northern Ireland has raged for centuries, the conflict in its modern form emerged in the late 1960’s in the form of ‘the Troubles’, a period of intercommunal violence that lasted for 3 decades and represent the conflicts “most violent era” (Niens & Cairns 2005, p. 338).

The Troubles began in 1968 as a civil society uprising with protests and riots under the auspices of civil society groups such as the Council for Social Justice (CSJ) which were initially aimed at *highlighting* the discrimination against the Catholic minority in Northern Ireland for whom “discrimination was an everyday, permanent feature”. These protests eventually descended into sectarian violence with ‘us’ vs. ‘them’ dynamics coming to the forefront. By 1969, attacks on the “wrong religion” were so frequent and widespread that residential demographics were altered as many were forced to flee their homes and reside amongst “their own kind” (Cronin 2001, pp. 229-232) leading to the religion-specific segregation present today<sup>12</sup>. By 1972, the violence had reached such a peak that the Northern Ireland parliament was suspended and direct rule from London was reintroduced. During the 3 decades that it lasted, the Troubles claimed the lives of 3% of the population of Northern Ireland (Arthur 2000, p. 60).

A turbulent peace process involving Catholic, Protestant, British and Irish officials began in the late 1980’s which culminated in the Belfast Agreement signed on the 10<sup>th</sup> of April, 1998 which so happened to be Good Friday, a Christian holiday. Consequently, the agreement is commonly referred to as the Good Friday Agreement. The Belfast Agreement changed the political landscape of Northern Ireland as it gave it its own democratic institutions and created a devolved assembly based on power-sharing principles guaranteeing representation of all the main political parties (Catholic and Protestant alike) contingent upon their acceptance of

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<sup>12</sup> Ironically, recent research by Balcells *et al.* (2016) has suggested that segregation along ethnic lines is unlikely to prevent the occurrence of inter-group violence.

democratic principles and renunciation of violence<sup>13</sup> (McMahon 2004, p. 7; Cronin 2001, p. 248). The peace process leading up to the agreement itself also saw the decommissioning of arms by the majority of the paramilitary groups involved in the conflict.

The Belfast Agreement is often credited as marking the end of the Troubles and signifying an end to the conflict in Northern Ireland although many authors have taken to challenging this assumption. McMahon (2004) for example is of the opinion that the agreement did not deliver peace but rather “imperfect peace” as the absence of war is supplanted with continued violence albeit for the most part confined to interface areas (p.7). In the same vein, Balcells *et al.* (2016) argue that the Belfast agreement merely *changed* the nature of violence which has since evolved into ‘low-intensity intergroup violence’ concentrated in areas where the mostly segregated communities come into contact with one another.

For the most part, the claim that the conflict in Northern Ireland rather than having being resolved has merely changed form seems to hold true when evidence is considered. One example is the outbreak of riots that occurred in July 2013 following customary Protestant parades with the ensuing mob violence being likened to that of the Troubles (Rutherford, 2013 cited in Balcells *et al.* 2016, p. 33). That same year, two Protestant men were sentenced to life imprisonment for their 2006 killing of a Catholic teenager simply because he was a Catholic (BBC, 2013).

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<sup>13</sup> Some of the political parties in Northern Ireland had paramilitary arms that participated in the troubles such as the Nationalist political party Sinn Fein and its military wing, the Catholic Irish Republican Army.

Even more problematic is the changing demography of the island as the Protestant community ceased to constitute an overall majority falling from 53% in 2001 to 48% in 2011 with the Catholic ‘minority’ trailing closely behind at about 46% due to the declining Protestant and growing Catholic communities (Hughes, 2013). This changing demography will no doubt have implications for the conflict itself as, in a hypothetical reality, where the Catholic population becomes equal to, or even surpasses, the Protestant population, Nationalist factions may resurface. As recently as 2016 even, British Intelligence upgraded the terror threat from the Irish Republican Army from moderate, where it had stood for 4 years, to substantial (Dunn, 2016); indicating the strong possibility of an attack on the British mainland thereby illustrating the continued possibility for an eruption of sectarian tensions in Northern Ireland. The conflict therefore can be seen as Hoppen (1989) described it, one with an outcome but without a solution (p. 254).

As a concluding point, I consider it worth mentioning that a significant number of commentators such as Hayes & McAllister (2009) have argued, and rightly so, that society in Northern Ireland has in the aftermath of the Belfast Agreement become more, rather than less, polarised (See also Hughes & Donnelly 2002; 2003).

## **2.2 The Cyprus Conflict**

Although the Cyprus conflict has evolved over the years, it has however remained for the most part primarily political with the island’s two major ethnic groups, who are also the two parties to the conflict, the Greek Cypriots and the Turkish Cypriots failing to converge on a number of issues. Initially a dispute over the political status of the island, with the nationalist goal of the Greek Cypriots pursuing the *enosis* ideal of uniting the island with Greece and the Turkish Cypriots reactive nationalist

demand for *taksim* i.e. the partition of the island into separate Greek and Turkish entities, the conflict has overtime evolved into a dispute over the status of each community within a single federal Cypriot state which the Turkish Cypriot minority is particularly sceptical of for a number of reasons related to the history of the conflict itself which is covered below. The Cyprus conflict is particularly serious due to what Joseph (1997) calls “ethnic politization” i.e. the fusion of ethnicity and politics in the pursuit by different ethnic groups of incompatible goals (p. 6) with the ethno-nationalism of each community playing a determining role *vis-à-vis* relations between them.

A survey conducted by Hadjipavlou (2007) examined the root causes of the conflict and concluded that they could be “mapped” into 5 categories: external factors, which are widely considered to be the most important such as the occupation of the island by various nations over historical time due to its strategic location and more recently the divide-and-rule policies of the British colonial era which “produced mistrust and fear” between the communities (p. 352); internal (self vs. other) factors such as the nationalisms of both communities; the influence of the extended stakeholders particularly the ‘motherlands’, Greece and Turkey; contextual factors in the form of religious, cultural and ethnic differences as well as the social and economic inequalities that exist between the communities; and social psychological factors such as the lack of trust between the communities, the use of the nationalist symbols of the respective motherlands and most importantly for present purposes, “the different values and beliefs *cultivated by the separate educational systems*” (*ibid*, p. 353; emphasis added).



The conflict is often understood to be a symptom, or even an extension of, the wider tenacious rivalry between the ‘motherlands’ themselves, Greece and Turkey (Yavuz 1991, p. 60) which has its roots in the Ottoman’s conquer of Constantinople in 1453 and the subsequent Greek war of independence (1821-1831) at the end of which the Greeks liberated themselves from nearly 4 centuries of Ottoman Turk domination. Interestingly, the rise of Greek nationalism during that period coincided with the rise in Greek Cypriot nationalism as well (Uzer 2004, p. 56) with the first revolt against the Ottomans in Cyprus occurring around that time. Both Greek and Turkish Cypriots fought in the 4 Greco-Turkish wars that occurred between 1880 and 1922 taking the psychological effects of those wars back to the island with them (Yilmaz 2005, p. 81). Also interestingly, as Sozen (2008) notes, negotiations at the conflicts onset were primarily concerned with preventing a Greek-Turkish confrontation (p. 72) thus highlighting the importance of Greece and Turkey themselves for the conflict especially as kinship relations are transposed onto the nations [Greek and Turkish] while simultaneously accommodating a kinship with the land [Cyprus] itself (Bryant 2002, p. 509). It is this amalgamation that allows for both communities to link Cyprus itself to either Greece or Turkey respectively.

Following the independence from the Ottomans, the Greek identity became contingent upon a denial of the Ottoman legacy (Veremis 2001, p. 42) and a representation of the Turks as barbaric, a sentiment that is returned by the Turks. As Heraclides (2012) summarily puts it, the crux of the Greek-Turkish antagonism lies in “(a) their chosen collective identities which are built on slighting and demonizing the other party and (b) the concomitant imagined history...solidified in their respective national historical narratives.” (p. 119). The juxtaposition of the other in the constitution of the Greek and Turkish national identities is also reflected in the

ethnic identities of the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities and so, by the very idea of ‘otherness’, the constitution of the cultural/ethnic identity is “bound” to the ‘adversary’ (Bilsel *et al.* 2010, p. xi). The conflict has had many adverse effects least of which on the indigenous Cypriot population with the events of 1964 and 1974 leading to internally displaced Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot refugees respectively, along with many other economic ramifications (for which see Mullen *at al.*, 2014).

### **2.2.1 Historical Background**

The 1570 Ottoman Turkish invasion, and subsequent conquest of Cyprus introduced ethnic Turks to the predominantly Orthodox-Christian Greek-speaking population of Cyprus as land was given by the Ottoman conquerors to Turkish soldiers and peasants who “became the nucleus of the island’s Turkish community.” (Tocci 2004, p. 42; U.S. Library of Congress n.d., para. 4). Although under the Ottoman Empire, the Greek population of Cyprus was granted a certain degree of autonomy under the Ottoman *millet* system where it was recognized as a religious minority under Ottoman domination. The ‘Rum Millet’ as it was called fell under the control of the Greek Orthodox Church as the head of the Church of Cyprus was also the leader of the Greek Cypriot population.

Ottoman control of the island *de facto* ended after three centuries in 1878 when the British Empire took over the administration of the island (although it remained under Ottoman sovereignty until Britain formally annexed it in 1914 amidst the first world war). Demography played a crucial role in power contests on the island during the British colonial period (and continue to till this very day) as representation of the communities in the colonial administration was based on the proportionality of their respective populations (Hatay 2007, p. 1; 15).

Kizilyurek (2008) argues that nationalism politicized the religious groups of the Ottoman millet system, in Cyprus, the Ottoman Muslims themselves and the Orthodox Christians, reconstructing the identities of such linguistic-religious groups and transforming them into ethno-national communities, Turkish and Greek respectively (p. 96; Kizilyurek 1999, p. 390) both of which, in Cyprus, took the form of “Anschluss-nationalismus” i.e. union with motherlands (*ibid.*, p. 97). It therefore was the 1821 Greek Liberation movement that birth “the nationalism of the Christian bourgeoisie in Cyprus” who declared themselves Greek (Kizilyurek, 1990 cited in POST 2010, p. 15) with the Turkish Cypriot nationalism following suit a century later (Kizilyurek 1999, p. 390).

Calls for *enosis* had already began against the Ottomans at the beginning of the war for independence of mainland Greece and corresponding rise of Greek nationalism but only began to intensify once British colonial rule began in 1915 peaking with civil unrest and the burning down of a British government house in 1931 (Mallinson 2010; p. 35) by which time even, the number of mixed villages on the island had fallen to about 36% (Hensinger 2010, para. 14). The British instituted “*illiberal laws*” in response which only exacerbated the feelings of the Cypriot [particularly Greek] community. The start of the second world war in 1939 however “cast a heavy shadow” on all the issues of the 1930’s temporarily especially as both Greek and Turkish Cypriots fought side by side in British war regiments (Panteli 2005, p. 129; 137; 146).

In the aftermath of the war, a plebiscite organized by the Greek Cypriot Orthodox Church was held in January 1950 with an overwhelming percentage (95.7%) signing a petition for *enosis* although the plebiscite and its implications were rejected by the

British (*ibid.*, p. 168; Gazioglu 1997, p. 18). The National Organization of Cypriot Fighters (EOKA), a secret organization aimed at ending British rule, removing communist Cypriot elements and achieving *enosis* (Kangasniemi 2016, p. 23) was established in January 1955. Led by George Grivas under mandate from then Archbishop Makarios, it began on the 1<sup>st</sup> of April, 1955 with a series of explosions rocking the island thus marking the beginning of hostilities between the Greek Cypriots and the British with the Turkish Cypriots for the most part on the side of the British as they preferred colonial rule to union with Greece (Panteli 2005, p. 171; Mallinson 2010, p. 57).

The ‘anti-imperialist’ struggle eventually (d)evolved into intercommunal battles/civil war between the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities, due in part to the creation by the British of a purely Turkish Cypriot reserve force to fight EOKA thus highlighting tensions and simultaneously instigating clashes between members of the two communities. In 1957, the Turkish Defence Organization (TMT) was proscribed and was determined to achieve the partition (*taksim*) of the island claiming that co-habitation with the Greek Cypriots was an impossibility (Panteli 2005, p. 202) marking the beginning of Turkish Cypriot nationalism which in addition to being defensive, was a reaction to, and grew in “direct proportion” to that of the Greek Cypriots (Kangasniemi 2016, p. 23; Markides, 1977 cited in Yilmaz 2005, p. 81).

Migration of Turkish Cypriots to ‘safer areas’ started by the summer of 1958 (Gazioglu 1997, p. 25) with the simultaneous expulsion of Greek Cypriots from majority Turkish Cypriot villages. By the end of 1958, Greece, Turkey and Britain began talks aimed towards the establishment of an independent Cyprus (acquiescing to neither *enosis* nor *taksim*) which culminated in the London and Zurich

Agreements of 1959 in response to American pressure on the British to prevent another Greco-Turkish confrontation (Kangasniemi 2016, p. 25).

As a concluding point, it is important to note that (ethno-)nationalism of the Greek and Turks in Cyprus was and to some degree remains unique in that unlike the majority of other nationalisms the world over, Cypriot nationalism did not seek the establishment of an independent Cypriot state on Cypriot soil (Kizilyurek 2008, p. 95). In fact, Karayanni (2011) similarly remarked that the Cypriots loathed their independence as it was the goal of neither community leading the occasion (independence day) to not be celebrated on the island for the 3 decades preceding it (p. 203).

### **2.2.2 The Contemporary Cyprus Conflict**

On the 16<sup>th</sup> of August 1960, Cyprus became an independent republic, the Republic of Cyprus, a state which was to be based on the principle of power-sharing between the *equal* Greek Cypriot community and the smaller Turkish Cypriot community with each community's participation in the central government, legislature, judiciary and public service proportional to its population size. Accompanying the establishment of the Republic of Cyprus were 3 interlinked documents, the Treaties of Guarantee and Trustee and the Constitution. A partnership state, the bicommunality and dichotomy of powers between the central government and the communal chambers were ensured by the constitution (Nejatigil 1985, p. 3) which also created separate Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot Communal Chambers to deal with matters relating to religion, culture, and more importantly, education. The end of the colonial administrated forced the Turkish and the Greek Cypriots, having no prior self-governance experience to face each other for the first time (Kangasniemi 2016, p. 63).

The creation of the Republic of Cyprus meant that members of the hitherto belligerent EOKA and TMT organizations had to collaborate in order to run the new state within the context of a limited sense of ‘Cypriotness’ and still strong ethnic affiliations (Fisher 2001, p. 309). Panteli (2005) notes that such co-operation was nearly impossible for a number of reasons such as the opposing Greek and Turkish nationalisms and the “*imposed rifts*” between the two communities which were not conducive to the promotion of a Cypriot consciousness. The constitution of the state he argues, also institutionalized “[g]overnmental dualism and ethnic separatism between the communities” (p. 216; emphasis added). Bureaucratic disputes soon arose between the communities on communal and state levels as the Turkish Cypriots had an effective veto and used it whenever they felt their rights were being impeded upon by the Greek Cypriots as they did with regards to taxation laws in 1961 and separate municipalities in 1962 (Tocci 2004, pp. 48-49).

By 1963, the Republic of Cyprus, as envisioned in 1959 ceased to exist following a thirteen-point proposal by then Greek Cypriot President of the Republic Archbishop Makarios for amendments of the ‘unworkable’ constitution which led to a constitutional crisis following the Turkish Cypriot rejection of the proposals and their subsequent withdrawal from all public institutions (*ibid.*, p. 51). Also worth mentioning is the infamous secret<sup>14</sup> Akritas plan<sup>15</sup> which outlined the means through which the *enosis* ideal was to be realised, either constitutionally, or forcefully using both external and internal tactics.

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<sup>14</sup> The plan became public in 1966 following its publication in Greek Cypriot newspaper, ‘Patris’.

<sup>15</sup> Available at: [http://www.atcanews.org/archive/akritas\\_plan.pdf](http://www.atcanews.org/archive/akritas_plan.pdf)

Amidst the constitutional crisis, and in line with the Akritas plan, Greek Cypriot attacks on Turkish Cypriots began in December 1963 leading to the death of numerous Turkish Cypriots and the destruction of their property with as many as 25,000 made into refugees, a vast majority of whom withdrew to enclaves on which the Greek Cypriots imposed additional restrictions (Nejatigil 1985, pp. 5-6). At the end December, the 'green line' was established to separate the two communities effectively limiting intercommunal contact in the form of *de facto* segregation of the island. Mertan (2011) contends that this period of friction between the two communities reinforced their loyalty to their respective ethnic identities which, aided by their exclusive symbols and emblems, created a "large distance between perceptions of the "self" and the "other." With their respective education systems reinforcing such antagonisms (p. 76).

By the time the first round of negotiations between the two communities began in 1964 following the arrival of the United Nations Peace Keeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP), the 13 proposed amendments proved insufficient with the Greek Cypriots, specifically President Makarios, seeking to establish a new unitary republic within which the Turkish Cypriot enjoyed minority status (Tocci 2004, p. 51). Turkey threatened military intervention to protect the Turkish Cypriots but within the context of the Cold War, the United States threatened not to assist in the event of a Soviet Union attack thus curbing Turkish intentions (and feeding anti-US sentiments in Turkey) (Panteli 2005, pp. 237-238). Negotiations between the two communities, mediated by the United Nations (UN) continued for the next decade with no concrete results especially as the intercommunal clashes even resumed, albeit briefly, in 1967.

During this period, Makarios' government's position shifted from that of *enosis* to the “*attainable solution*’ of a peaceful, independent, sovereign Cyprus” which proved unacceptable both to radical Greek Cypriots as well as the mainland Greek junta. As a result, a new organization, EOKA-B, was created in 1972 to counter Makarios who was now viewed by Greece as an impediment to *enosis* and attempts on his life became a frequent occurrence (Panteli 2005, p. 254). EOKA-B's anti-government activities grew in intensity culminating in the *coup d'etat* of July 1974 which forced Makarios to flee the country and provoked Turkey, who feared Greek control of the island, to, acting within its rights as stipulated by the Treaty of Guarantee, intervene and eventually occupy 37% of the island's territory (Tocci 2004, p. 54) consequently cementing the segregation of the island which persists to this day. The intervention somewhat reversed the dynamics that were the result of the events of 1963-1964 as it led to the displacement of numerous Greek Cypriots resident in the north of the island (Panteli 2005, p. 265).

The Turkish Federated State of Cyprus was proclaimed in 1975 (with a population exchange agreement solidifying the Greek Cypriot – South, Turkish Cypriot – North demography occurring that same year) and was intended to be an interim entity pending its incorporation into a federal Cypriot state with an exchange of populations occurring in the same year (Nejatigil 1985, p. 14; 25). A meeting between Turkish Cypriot Leader Rauf Denktash and Makarios in 1977 produced what are known as the ‘4 Guidelines’ which, supplanted by the ‘Ten Point Agreement’ reached between Denktash and Makarios' successor, Spyros Kyprianou in 1979, formed the basis



upon which all future negotiations were to be predicated<sup>16</sup> (See Sozen 2008, pp. 75-76).

Following a United Nations resolution calling for the withdrawal of all “occupation forces” from Cyprus in 1983, Denktash made good on a previous threat and declared all the areas in the north under Turkish (Cypriot) control to be the independent Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) which till date remains recognized only by Turkey. A move that was met not only with international criticism but also with a responding UN resolution calling on all states “not to recognize any Cypriot other than the [*de facto* Greek Cypriot] Republic of Cyprus.” (Panteli 2005, p. 296). It is important to note that the proclamation of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus was not intended to be permanent nor secessionist as it emphasized that the new republic “will not unite with any other state, except with the southern unit to form a federal republic of Cyprus.” (Nejatigil 1985, p. 77).

UN-mediated negotiations resumed in 1984 and continued intermittently eventually culminating in the UN-sponsored ‘Annan Plan’ of 2004 which was put to simultaneous referenda in the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities. During negotiations over the details of the Annan plan, the Turkish Cypriot authorities opened some border crossings to Greek Cypriots in 2003 allowing those that had fled their homes in 1974 to return once more ending the period of essentially non-existent interaction between the two communities that was 1974-2003 (Talas, 2003; Webster 2005, p. 79). Hadjipavlou (2008) noted that the crossings had a number of positive effects on relations between the two communities and prospects

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<sup>16</sup> The guidelines are available at [http://www.mfa.gov.cy/mfa/mfa2006.nsf/All/1974B2EDA77F8D0DC22571D30034D344/\\$file/February%201977.pdf](http://www.mfa.gov.cy/mfa/mfa2006.nsf/All/1974B2EDA77F8D0DC22571D30034D344/$file/February%201977.pdf)

for reconciliation. They led to “mutual humanization” and also allowed for younger generations, hitherto exclusively exposed to “mediated information” of the other community to get some first hand interaction experience (p. 201; 194-195).

Husnu & Lajunen (2015) however argue that despite the opening of the borders, since the communal segregation remains, the psychological borders remain untouched for the Cypriots who have taken to constructing their national self as a helpless victim in the hands of the “systematically demonized” other (Philippou & Theodorou 2014, p. 267). Also, there still remains low levels of contact as only 1% and 8% of Greek and Turkish Cypriots respectively frequently cross to the other side with the majority of crossers being from older, rather than younger generations (pp. 65-66).

The 5<sup>th</sup> and final text of the plan was the result of two years of amendments and negotiations between the leaders of the two communities guided by propositions put forwards by then UN Secretary-General, Kofi Annan. The plan aimed to established a new bi-zonal, bi-communal, federal Cypriot state which happed to be the second option of both communities as opposed to either a unitary state or two states, the initial preference of the Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots respectively (See Kaymak *et al* 2008, pp. i-v).

While approved by 65% of the Turkish Cypriot community, the plan was rejected by an overwhelming 76% of the Greek Cypriot community who were told it was a foreign imposition despite the fact that it had been jointly negotiated by representatives of both communities (Kaymak *et al* 2008, p. 1) effectively rendering it “dead and buried” (Panteli 2005, p. 310) and the search for a solution continual.

Then Turkish Cypriot leader, Rauf Denktaş remarked in a book authored by him in the aftermath of the referenda that:

the results of the referendum have clearly demonstrated, once again, that the island has two owners, two politically independent and equal peoples each with the separate right of self-determination.... (Denktas 2004, p. 9).

He further remarked that for the Greek Cypriots who enjoy international recognition as the republic of Cyprus, the status quo is the solution (*ibid.*, p. 21). Even Kofi Annan, the architect of the plan remarked that the results of the plan “has undone any rationale for pressuring and isolating them.” (the Turkish Cypriots) (Annan, 2004 cited in Denktaş 2004, p. 21).

The Republic of Cyprus joined the European Union (EU) a week after the referendum with the EU’s *acquis* being suspended in areas not under the effective control of the Republic of Cyprus [the TRNC] (Tocci 2004, p. 84) cementing the asymmetrical relationship between the isolated and unrecognized Turkish Cypriots and the recognized EU-member Greek Cypriots (Husnu & Lajunen 2015, p. 66). Following elections in the Republic of Cyprus in 2008, negotiations resumed for the umpteenth time and have continued intermittently to find a mutually acceptable solution to the conflict (See Sozen, 2008 for an in-depth overview of the negotiating process) with some positive signs in recent years such as the lifting of visa requirements for Greek Cypriots by the Turkish Cypriot authorities in 2015 (Daily Sabah, 2015).

One new dimension was added to the conflict however when the Greek Cypriot Republic of Cyprus began drilling hydrocarbons off the Cypriot coast in September 2011, escalating decade old tensions over the issue between the Greek Cypriots, Turkish Cypriots, and Turkey (Gurel *et al.* 2013, p. ix). Although the issue has

largely been left out of negotiations due to its sensitivity and capacity to stall negotiations themselves, there is consistent opposition from Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots mostly on the grounds that the Greek Cypriot administration lacks the right to act unilaterally since both Cypriot communities share sovereignty of the island as per the constitution with Turkey having an additional grievance that its continental shelf and exclusive economic zone clash with those proclaimed by the Greek Cypriots who counter that they have the right to exploration as the sole representatives of the Republic basing their arguments on international law and agreeing to share the revenues with the Turkish Cypriots although their specific position has been wavering (See Gurel *et al.*, 2013).

As at the time of writing (July, 2016), the Cyprus conflict remains unresolved leading to the conclusion that both parties have been unable to overcome the existing psychological barriers which Yilmaz (2005) sees as the first step towards resolution (p. 86) with the ethnic-nationalism and identities of both communities still playing a vital role. As recently as 2011, Greek Cypriot academic Stavros Karayanni remarked on how he often heard on Greek Cypriot radio how “Greek Cypriots are fast becoming extinct” due to increased immigration and the resulting ethnic mixing which he sums up as evidence of the persistent “nationalist paranoia” (Karayanni 2011, p. 241).

## Chapter 3

### EDUCATION IN NORTHERN IRELAND

This chapter provides an in-depth look into education in Northern Ireland as it pertains to the conflict and how it had evolved since the establishment of the Northern Irish state in 1921.

As has been noted earlier, the distinguishing characteristic of Northern Ireland's society is the fact that religion-based segregation permeates every aspect of social life from residences, to workplaces, and even football clubs which has severely reduced the opportunities for inter-group contact (Hughes *et al.* 2013, p. 763). The structure of the education in Northern Ireland has not been spared from this segregation<sup>17</sup> as two parallel systems exist with Catholic (maintained) schools on the one hand, and predominantly Protestant (controlled) State schools on the other hand. There has however in recent decades been the rise of a third education system which comprises of integrated schools, schools which have almost equal percentage of Catholic and Protestant students.<sup>18</sup>

The primary reason for the hegemony of protestants in state schools (and Northern Ireland) in general lies in the processes of state formation following the partition of

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<sup>17</sup> Hayes *et al.* (2013) make the distinction between terming the school composition as 'separate' rather than 'segregated' claiming that the former underlines the voluntary nature of single-faith education (p. 76). While I do agree with this distinction, I shall continue to use the term 'segregated' for the sake of consistency.

<sup>18</sup> It is also worth mentioning that some segregated schools (few as they may be) do however have a significant minority of students from the 'other' community.

Ireland in 1920. Following the partition of Ireland and establishment of Northern Ireland, the Nationalist party absconded from politics in the new state believing that its demise was imminent thus leaving the state and its institutions to be fashioned according to the preferences of the Unionists (Akenson 2013, p. 1881; Gardner 2016, p. 348) thus marking the beginning (or rather institutionalization) of the educational segregation that has persevered since 1921 (Hayes *et al.* 2013, p. 68).

Not only is the education system in Northern Ireland segregated along religious lines, the post-primary advancement process has also led to segregation based on gender and ability as well (See McGlynn, Niens, Cairns & Hewstone 2004, p. 150; See also Smith, 1999). Richardson (1997) argues that segregation is such a distinctive feature of education in Northern Ireland that knowing the school a person attended was an effective means of gauging the person's socio-political background i.e. whether they are Unionist/Protestant/British or Nationalist/Catholic/Irish (para. 3) which is especially important in Northern Ireland, a society where the social identity is both more important than the individual identity, and has played such a pivotal role in maintaining and exacerbating the ongoing conflict (McGlynn, Niens, Cairns & Hewstone 2004, pp. 148-9). Skilbeck (1973) even goes as far as describing culture in Northern Ireland as being "militant...expansionist, aggressive and sectarian...constrain[ing] experimentation and free thought...[and] highly reproductive in character, a good *breeding* system." (Cited in Dunn 1986, p. 273; emphasis added).

Since there is no consensus on nationality in Northern Ireland (Smith 2003a, p. 24), the fact that research has found that the divisive identities have been entrenched in children from an early age and only intensify as they advance in grade (See Smyth &

Scott, 2000; Barton, K. C. & McCully, 2005) is especially worrisome. A study conducted by Hayes, McAllister & Dowds (2007) found that by the age of 6 students already had a “negative evaluation” of the ‘other’ and by the age of 10/11, were already able to distinguish between members of the in-group and out-group with a degree of prejudice (p. 464; See also Hayes & McAllister, 1999) while another conducted by Barton, McCully & Conway (2003) found schools to be the most important influence on students understanding of national history with their religious/cultural backgrounds also emerging as the most common source of identification.

Similarly, Muldoon *et al.* (2008) explored adolescents’ reasons for involvement in paramilitary activities in Northern Ireland (and the Republic of Ireland) and found that socializing influences ranked at the forefront of their motivations for violent behaviour. As such, it goes without saying that the effects of education and that of other societal influences such as the family in the conflict cannot be overstated<sup>19</sup>. So, while segregated education is not itself a cause of sectarianism, it allows such prejudicial attitudes to flourish (Hewstone & Hughes 2015, p. 66).

In line with the belief that the segregated education structure has played a role in perpetuating the conflict in Northern Ireland, there have been three different, albeit parallel, paths taken towards dealing with it: attempts at curriculum change, the development of integrated schooling, and attempts at increasing contact between students from controlled and maintained schools (Dunn 1986, p. 235); which are discussed in more detail below.

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<sup>19</sup> Especially parental socialization which McGlynn *et al.* (2004) claim is more pervasive particularly because it occurs earlier (See also Bar-Tal *et al.*, in press).

### **3.1 Education in Northern Ireland Pre-1989 Reform**

From the time of its establishment in 1920, the government of Northern Ireland inherited a host of problems from the era before it particularly in the education sector (Akenson 2013, p. 1880). For example, all primary schools at the time of the partition, although state funded, remained under the control of [Protestant] churches and the Catholic's refusal to participate in the new government coupled with the practice of actively discouraging Catholics from attending non-Catholic [read Protestant] schools contributed to the system of dual education that persevered in near totality until the 1980's (Smith 2001, p. 561; Bush & Saltarelli 2000, p. 15; See also Richardson, 1971). It is this sort of "institutionalized bipolarity" in Northern Ireland that hampered and continues to hamper prospects for peace in the conflict as it does not allow for shared learning or experiencing the perspective of the 'other' (McEvoy 2000, p. 99; Niens *et al.* 2013, p. 129).

The first legislative instance *vis-à-vis* education came in the form of the Education (Northern Ireland) Act, 1923 which Cronin (2001) argues served to confirm the Unionist and Protestant hegemony in Northern Ireland (p. 207). The act created an inclusive *secular* education system with no outline for religious teaching (although religious education remained in the curriculum). Few schools did however become secular, choosing instead to remain either exclusively Catholic or Protestant which was a testament to the unwillingness of the communities to cross the proverbial dividing line. The 1923 Act created 3 different tiers of schools for Northern Ireland: schools entirely funded by the state that were under the control of local authorities; schools which had their capital costs covered and were obliged to find the remaining percentage of their maintenance costs; and an independent category of schools which



had a significant level of independence and were partially reimbursed for maintenance costs and salaries but received no state funds towards their capital costs (See Akenson, 2013; Smith 2001, p. 561).

Although all three tiers were open to schools of all kinds, in reality, the Protestant schools dominated the first tier coming under the control of the already predominantly Protestant state authorities while Catholic schools opted for the third tier. The act was amended twice in 1925 and 1950 effectively ensuring that state schools became essentially Protestant “in all but name” (Hoppen 1989, p. 251)<sup>20</sup>. Some commentators have argued that the unequal funding of schools served to exacerbate the conflict as it affected the quality of the Catholic schools relative to the state schools which affected the job opportunities of the graduates thereby keeping Catholics less affluent than their Protestant counterparts (See Smith 1999a, p. 4; Bush & Saltarelli 2000, p. 15); an argument that an inquiry into the economic standing of Catholics and Protestants will most likely confirm.

The emergent religion-based segregated structural education system in Northern Ireland exists at both primary and secondary levels with cross-community schooling existing only in the Universities. The schools differ not only in religious composition and management but also in curriculum with students learning the different histories that emerged as a result of the internal separation of the two communities; Irish history in maintained schools and British History in controlled schools (Arthur 2000, p. 33; Hayes, McAllister & Dowds 2007, p. 457) with the latter Unionist narrative

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<sup>20</sup> This trend was mirrored in southern Ireland also post partition as apart from the few Protestant primary schools, the rest were controlled by Catholic Priests with the segregation present even up to the university level as the Catholic Church discouraged members from attending even tertiary institutions with Protestant origins (Hoppen 1989, p. 438).

emphasizing the history of Northern Ireland [and Ulster] as part of Britain while the former Nationalist narrative focuses instead on Irish cultural and political autonomy; these sectarian accounts were/are found to have been absorbed by students and remain(ed) with them for the rest of their lives (Barton & McCully 2005, pp. 86-88).

According to McCully & Waldron (2013) while the use of education for political purposes prior to the outbreak of the Troubles in the '60's was less apparent, it was no less pervasive (p. 153) and the dual system remained unaltered with no significant occurrences up until a paper published by All Children Together (ACT) in 1976 which outlined proposals for the shared management of schools along with an early model for the integration of existing schools (NICIE, n.d.). ACT lobbied for legislation that adopted the proposals from their paper, legislation that took the form of another education act in 1978 which allowed for state schools to become integrated although it was "only invoked on one occasion as an attempt to prevent a school closure" (Smith 1999a, p. 5) leading to the establishment of the first integrated school (which aimed to educate children of all faiths, and none, together), Lagan College, in 1981 with the unequal funding of schools also ending in the same year (Bush & Saltarelli 2000, p. 16). The Northern Ireland Council for Integrated Education (NICIE) was established in 1987 by which time 7 new integrated schools had already been established (NICIE, n.d.) reflecting the rising support for integrated schooling which holds the greatest potential for implementing peace education (Hewstone *et al.* 2006, p. 115).

With reference to the content of education during this period, the separate systems and their separate curricula as had been noted earlier, taught different histories. These histories however, although competing were not expressly conflictual in that

they did not especially aim at antagonising the ‘other’ side so much as they were concerned with glorifying their own national past. One point is worth noting however in regards to the process of teaching these histories; as Barton (2001) noted, learning history in Northern Ireland is less about learning the chronological links between the past and present but more about learning the connections and relationships among *societal patterns* (p. 49; emphasis added). I would argue therefore that history teaching in Northern Ireland placed emphasis on reproducing/transferring the (conflictual) societal patterns in an effort to maintain group solidarity which no doubt in addition to influencing in-group attitudes, also affected perceptions of the out-group as well especially considering that segregated schools are not only concerned with transmitting religious beliefs but also values resonant with the British and Irish national Identities (Furey *et al.* 2016, p. 2).

Gallagher (1998) summarizes the relationship between pre-reform education in Northern Ireland and the conflict with two hypotheses: one *cultural*, that the different curricula reinforce difference(s) and one *social* which posits that the community divisions “might be encouraged by the very existence of separate systems.” (cited in McGlynn, Niens, Cairns, & Hewstone 2004, p. 150).

### **3.2 The 1989 Reform**

By 1983, the umbrella term, Education for Mutual Understanding (EMU) had been used to encapsulate the Department of Education for Northern Ireland (DENI)’s “educational programmes to encourage better community relations” such as citizenship and peace education also instituting a “*voluntary* inter-school Cross Contact Scheme” in 1987 (Richardson 1997, paras. 5-6; emphasis added). Such was the nature of the ensuing interventions into the education system that touched both

“the process of education (through curriculum reforms and increased contact between Catholic and Protestant pupils) and the structure of education (through consideration of equity issues between existing, segregated schools and support for the creation of new, integrated schools)” (Smith 1999a, p. 2).

The crowning moment of these interventions came in the form of the Education Reform (Northern Ireland) Order (ERO) of 1989 which led to the utilization of the integrated scheme that had been provided for in legislation in 1986 (NICIE, n.d.).

The ERO embodied:

statutory support [of the DENI] for integrated education, enabling government to fund the development role of the Northern Ireland Council for Integrated Education (NICIE) and introduced day one funding for Grant Maintained Integrated (GMI) schools provided they met government criteria for the establishment of new schools...[and] also provided for existing controlled or maintained schools to ‘transform’ into integrated schools following a ballot among parents of pupils in attendance at the school. (Montgomery *et al.* 2003, p. 2).

The ERO also introduced a new national curriculum that was to be common in subjects believed to be associated with relations between the two communities such as history and religious education (Niens & Cairns 2005, p. 229) with the aim to ‘phase-out’ the effects of the differing curricula of the pre-reform era. This new curriculum incorporated 6 new “*mandatory* educational (cross-curricular) themes” (Richardson 1997, para. 7) including EMU and Cultural Heritage (CH) with the statutory requirement for all schools to implement them coming into force in 1992 (Smith 1999a. P. 3); EMU and CH embodied the aim of the new curriculum which was to develop a culture of co-habitation and tolerance among the students.

### **3.3 Education in Northern Ireland Post-1989 Reform**

Although the ERO made integrated education a distinct sector, established two new categories of integrated school: Controlled Integrated (transformed schools) and Grant Maintained Integrated (newly established schools) (Donnelly & Hughes 2006, p. 494), declared government support for integrated schooling, and saddled the DENI with the responsibility to encourage the development of integrated education, the delivery thus far has been questioned (O'Connor, 2002) and the primary impetus for integrated education continues to come from the same source as it had pre-reform, the parents, who through their established organizations such as ACT had lobbied for legislation allowing schools to be come integrated towards the end of the 1970's (McGlynn *et al.* 2004, p. 151) and took it upon themselves to establish the first integrated school in 1981.

This has directly contributed to the current situation as evidenced by the fact that the integrated sector serves only a minute percentage of students in Northern Ireland catering to approximately 4% in 2000 (Montgomery *et al.* 2003, p. 2; Smith 2003a, p. 21), a decade after the ERO, two decades after the establishment of the first integrated school and even after the call for integrated schooling had been reiterated in the spirit of the Belfast Agreement. McGlynn (2007) argues that the agreement institutionalized sectarianism leading to the lack of a long-term vision to guide the education reform process (p. 274) despite its support for integrated schooling. Additionally, Hansson *et al.* (2013) note that despite the support integrated education received in the Belfast agreement, it has received little to no mention in subsequent policy and education documents (p. 51).

By the late 1990's there was a shift towards, rather than establishing fresh integrated schools, converting previously segregated schools; this practice however saw more Protestant schools becoming integrated while Catholic schools retained their make-up (Smith 1999a, p. 6). In fact, the Catholic church has been (and remains) the primary opposition to integrated education although the church's position has been modified and is "now more often a matter of defending the merits of Catholic education, rather than an open attack on an inferior system" (O'Connor 2002, p. 73) with the Church even going as far as to argue that segregated schools are just as poised to promote community reconciliation as are integrated schools (Catholic Bishops of Ireland, 2001 cited in Hayes & McAllister 2009, p. 439; See also Hayes *et al.* 2013, p. 75). A rationale supported by Short (2002) who "challenges the notion that secular schools are better placed to promote tolerance in the UK" (cited in Smith 2014, p. 118).

Climbing very slowly in the years following its innovation, the integrated sector still accounted for a mere 6% of the education system in 2014 rising to only 7% in 2015/16 with a significant rise unlikely in the near future (Hughes & Loader 2015, p. 1142; Furey *et al.* 2016, p. 2; Gallagher 2016, p. 364; See also Stringer *et al.*, 2009). This increase however is less due to a rise in number of integrated schools themselves, as the number of post-primary integrated schools has remained the same since 2011, but more due to a decline in the number of controlled and maintained schools (See Matthews, 2015).

Two primary reasons have contributed to the sluggish growth; in addition to the unwillingness of many parents to send their wards to integrated schools with controlled and maintained schools still receiving the majority of enrolments

particularly at the primary level (Arlow 2004, p. 271), there is also the issue of the sheer lack of such schools with the demand for them far outweighing enrolment options especially as support for integrated education is continually on the rise<sup>21</sup> (See McGlynn *et al.* 2004, p. 152; Hayes *et al.* 2007, p. 476; Hansson *et al.* 2013, p. 48). A challenge not easily addressed given the surplus in the education system in general which amounted to about 71,000 unfilled spaces or 20% of capacity in 2015 (Gallagher *et al.* 2003, p. 16; NIAO, 2015). The extra spaces in the controlled and maintained sectors provide a convenient reason to not open any new schools in the integrated sector leaving the transformation of schools as the only option which itself is inhibited by the lack of significant ‘other’ enrolments to begin the transformation process as the DENI requires at least 10% of the ‘other’ to being the transformation process with the school also needing to show potential of increasing that to 30% over the long-term (See DENI, n.d.).

Implementation of EMU and CH in segregated schools has remained equally as unsuccessful as has been the project of integrated schooling. Smith & Robinson (1992) attribute this to the fact that links between the segregated schools as envisioned by the cross-contact scheme remained voluntary thus providing little impetus for participation while the implementation of the mandatory cross-curricular themes varied among different schools.

They latter attribute this ‘conservative approach’ to EMU in particular to resistance based on the fact that it was a governmental imposition; the implementation process was overly tedious as it permeated every aspect of the curriculum and a number of

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<sup>21</sup> See Gardner (2016, p. 350) for a table containing the number of schools in Northern Ireland (sorted by type) and their number of enrolments (sorted by religious affiliation of the students).

other objections originating mostly from teaching staff (Smith & Robinson, 1996) who themselves have had their views shaped by the conflictual society.

Montgomery *et al.* (2003) reached a similar conclusion as regarding the most recent integrated schools finding that there was no single integrative model with integration practices varying by schools with some even just considering the integrated status merely as an add-on rather than the ethos of education (See also Hayes *et al.* 2007, p. 477). Hughes *et al.* (2013) also reached a similar conclusion, but regarding the process of 'integration' itself claiming that there are varied degrees of mixing in said integrated schools with percentages of the 'other' ranging from as low as 5% to 40% whereas even some not-formally-integrated schools boast percentages of up to 20% (particularly controlled, protestant, schools<sup>22</sup>) when over half of the integrated schools at present are unable to meet the minimum 30% required by the DENI (Gallagher 2016, p. 364). It is interesting though that schools, integrated and segregated, are able to maintain such percentages of the 'other' given the level of wider societal (especially residential) segregation (Gallagher *et al.* 2003, p. 8) as it means that some students, especially those attending transformed controlled integrated schools have to venture into 'the turf' of the other community.

A new initiative, the Shared Education Programme (SEP), was launched in 2007 and is intended to allow students from maintained, controlled, and integrated schools to experience sustained, curriculum-based contact. Critics of integrated schooling itself tend to be more supportive of SEP as it allows for the contact that integrated schooling is aimed at, without necessitating the structural changes allowing single-

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<sup>22</sup> Which is interesting because Catholics tend to report more positive out-group attitudes than Protestants do (Hewstone *et al.* 2006, p. 103).



faith schools to remain as such (Hewstone & Hughes 2015, p. 66; Gallagher 2016, p. 367) and research into the effects of SEP (e.g., Hughes, 2014) are showing positive results in support of it. Research however does also speak to the efficacy of the practice of integrated education and even EMU and CH as long-term studies have noted a number of positive effects such as increased inter-community friendships and contact both in and out of school (Irwin, 1991; Stringer *et al.*, 2009); the development of a new integrated superordinate Northern Ireland identity as opposed to the divisive Protestant/Catholic predecessors which aids reconciliation processes (McGlynn *et al.*, 2004; See also Cehajic *et al.*, 2008); and an increase in reconciliatory, tolerant, and co-habitant attitudes (*ibid.*; McClenahan, 1995), amongst others.

Some former integrated school students found the environment of such schools to be critical to fostering tolerance and respect for the ‘other’ seeing the lack of such an environment for mixing as a catalyst for conflict (Furey *et al.* 2016, p. 10). A study conducted by Schubotz & Robinson (2006) found that of the 77% of 16-year olds surveyed who had had contact with students from the ‘other’ community, 59% of them said their contact had been under the auspices of various inter-school projects which have only increased in the decade since. A new ‘Shared Education Bill’, introduced in November 2015, is currently on the floor of the Northern Ireland Assembly and is expected to be passed later on this year<sup>23</sup>.

Two points are worth noting in conclusion. The first is that post-reform state schools, although attended almost exclusively but Protestant children, should not be equated with ‘Protestant schools’, at least not in the same sense as Catholic schools are

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<sup>23</sup> See <http://www.niassembly.gov.uk/assembly-business/committees/education/legislation---committee-stage-of-bills/shared-education-bill/>

regarded as such especially as church representatives in state schools now constitute the minority and greater emphasis is being placed on the secular rather than the religious (Barnes 2005, p. 129). Secondly, McCully & Waldron (2013) report that although a number of students show interest in identity issues, there is a tendency for teachers to, particularly when dealing with issues relating to history or community relations in general, avoid controversial topics thus leaving students in the hands of outside sources (p. 148).

## Chapter 4

### EDUCATION IN CYPRUS

This chapter explores the nature of education in Cyprus through time by referring not only to the content of education exclusively but also the nature (structure) of the education system in general and specifically for the Turkish and Greek Cypriots.

*“Greeks and Turks have been educated to become antagonists and opponents.” (Millas 1991, p. 23)*

Although commenting on the nature of history education in Greece and Turkey, Millas’ observation in the quote above is mirrored in the case of the Greek and Turkish Cypriots who have been educated in separate, segregated, education systems since the arrival of Turks to the island during the Ottoman period (Habes 2006, p. 8; Zembylas 2010, p. 1377) with the British colonial period seeing the groups also dealt with separately in matters relating to education (Fisher 2001, p. 309) leaving the school curriculum to be a forum constructing national identities although the colonial administration did attempt some reform in 1935 as a means to suppress the rising nationalism (Ozmatyatli & Ozkul 2013, p. 3). Education has always been of particular significance for the Cypriots. Least because of the value getting an education itself carried but mostly because it was/is the process of getting an education that one “became more fully what one was, in ethnic terms.” i.e. education was a prerequisite to becoming a true Greek or Turk (Bryant 2001, p. 587).

As stipulated by its founding constitution, education in the newly independent 1960 Republic of Cyprus fell within the competences of the Greek and Turkish communal chambers rather than the state itself such that education continued to be aimed towards strengthening the respective Greek and Turkish national identities rather than the development of a common Cypriot identity (Ministry of Education, 1995 cited in Papanastasiou & Koutselini-Ioannidou 1999, p. 173; See also Habes, 2006) leading Karagiorges (1986) to conclude that from the onset, education in the Republic of Cyprus “undermined the very existence of the State which it was meant to serve.” (cited in Makriyianni & Psaltis 2007, p. 52) by reinforcing the antagonisms of both communities (Mertan 2011, p. 76).

The highly politicized schools, which interestingly enough were at some point staffed by teachers ‘imported’ from Greece and Turkey, were used to diffuse the respective nationalist historiographies that stressed commonality with the respective ‘motherlands’ with the ‘history of Cyprus’ presented as an extension of Greece/Greek history or as an extension of Turkey/Turkish history for the Turkish Cypriots which, since Greek and Turkish nationalisms were already antagonistic, only served to widen while simultaneously institutionalizing the gap between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots, a process which has begun during the colonial period (Habes 2006, p. 8; Papadakis 2008a, p. 131; Makriyianni & Psaltis 2007, p. 44; Vural & Ozuyanik 2008, p. 139).

“Cypriots rejected changes not only in educational content but also in pedagogy because they saw education as an aesthetic enterprise”; not just a community affair, but a representation of the *true* community itself such that it was seen as necessary for the attainment of full humanity provided that full humanity was understood to mean being Greek or Turkish (Bryant 2001, pp. 596-597; 600) and so no noteworthy

changes occurred in the field of history education up until the eruption of inter-communal tensions and violence that occurred in 1963-64 and again in 1974 culminating in the Turkish military intervention of the same year (Christou 2006, p. 288) after which the respective historiographies were ‘revised’ to reflect the new status quo, one of partition with the island being divided into two homogenous zones signifying a solidification of the process of separation and segregation that had began a decade earlier in 1963 (Fisher 2001, p. 310) following Volkan’s (2001) assertion that following trauma, there is need of the group to evaluate [and appropriately amend] its shared identity (cited in Zeka 2015, p. 143).

The post-1974 identity formation process reinforced ethnic estrangement and heightened Greekness and Turkishness (Zembylas *et al.* 2016, p. 22) which is particularly menacing considering the fact that post-1974 Cypriot children were (and I would argue still somewhat are, albeit to a lesser degree) particularly susceptible to indoctrination due to their lack of direct contact with the other side (Mertan 2011, p. 76). On the Greek Cypriot side, two major changes occurred post-1974: the abandonment of the *enosis* rhetoric in favour of viewing Cyprus as a distinct, independent state especially given that the Turkish intervention was a reaction to the Greek sponsored coup which was engendered by the ideal itself, and a “distinct focus” on educating the new generation about the areas of the island occupied by Turkish forces (*ibid.*, p. 289). On the Turkish Cypriot side, the post-1974 era was characterized by history education being used to “indoctrinate children” into maintaining the “‘self-other’ confrontation” (Vural & Ozuyanik 2008, p. 134) as a means towards justifying and implicitly legitimating the partition (POST, 2007 cited *ibid.*).

One common effect of the historiographies of the Greek and Turkish Cypriots post-1974 was that the younger generation was “socialized” into laying blame for the conflict in Cyprus solely at the foot of the ‘other’ (Habes 2006, p. 5) while also developing a distinct identities based on the villainization of said ‘other’ which Kizilyurek (2008) warns have been solidified beyond the point where they can be subverted and any attempt to subordinate them to a common [read Cypriot] identity would likely backfire as threats to the national identity are perceived (p. 98) as they did in the case of the Turkish Cypriots (See the section on Turkish Cypriot Education below).

On the whole, both the Greek and Turkish Cypriot systems share their trans-generational transmission of trauma (of 1964 and 1974 for the Turkish and Greek Cypriots respectively), one of the phases of collective trauma (See Kellerman, 2007; Volkan, 2001), to the younger generations who although did not experience the event are given the task of mourning it and also fearing and mistrusting one another (Zeka 2015, p. 143-144; 150) thus becoming the ones actually affected by the trauma. The ‘past’ being transferred here, rather than being the “actual past”, is the “remembered past” which is selectively conjured, has political and social currency, and “can be used culturally, to help define group boundaries and collective memories” as well as politically for nation building (Brewer & Hayes 2015, p. 512). Volkan (2001) remarked that overtime these chosen traumas change form as historical accuracy loses importance. What becomes important however is the increased group cohesion that comes from *sharing* the chosen trauma.

As ‘forgetting’ is aligned with evil forces that threaten the identities of both communities (Karahassan & Zembylas 2006, p. 702), in addition to communal remembrance, they also share their mutual indoctrination of children into viewing the

other as the primary antagonist as a defence strategy because “each side, as a group, fears that it would become [a] victim once again” (Yilmaz 2005, p. 86). Remarking on why her son has refused to cross over to the South of the island or even touch anything from there, Fatma, a Turkish-Cypriot, faulted formal education saying “Our schools have poisoned our children’s mind. It will take a long process for some people to accept the other as human themselves.” (cited in Hadjipavlou 2008, p. 216). Similarly, a study by Lordos *et al.* (2009) found high levels of mistrust towards each other in both communities and the peace process in general with younger voters seeming more likely to vote ‘no’ in a future referendum (see p. 3; 15). So, while the discourse for re-approachment is available at the societal level, it is still missing from the institutional (educational) level causing many Greek and Turkish Cypriots to still see themselves a “historically incompatible” (Charalambous *et al.* 2013, p. 71).

The following sections of this chapter take an analytical look into the nature of the Greek and Turkish Cypriot historical narratives, which, acquired at an early age eventually come to influence the behaviour of adult segments of society (Bar-Tal *et al.*, in press). These narratives, as embodied by instructional texts, mirror one another by constructing blame, ignoring and delegitimizing the pain of the other (Latif 2010, p. 36) and are examples of what Kristeva (1986) calls *intertextuality* in that the history is inserted into the text and the text itself is inserted into history (cited in Charalambous *et al.* 2014, p. 80).

Papadakis (2008a) describes them as being ‘from above’, male centred, and focusing on the island’s political rather than social history (p. 137)<sup>24</sup>. These accounts of the

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<sup>24</sup> Ozkaleli & Yilmaz (2015) offer a detailed account of how female experiences are excluded from the official Turkish Cypriot narrative.

past (in the case of the Turkish Cypriots, pre-reform accounts) have also been “distorted beyond recognition” by both the educational institutions and political propaganda (Broome 1998, cited in Makriyianni & Psaltis 2007, p. 50) for use by the Cypriots who Kaymak *et al.* (2008) describe as “fundamentally distrustful” (p. 5) with the narratives of either community even differing in their understandings of seemingly simple matters such as the terminology used in addressing the ‘two halves’ of the island, while referred to as ‘North’ and ‘South’ by the Turkish Cypriots, the Greek Cypriots instead employ the delineation ‘Occupied’ and ‘Free’ areas (Christodoulou 2015, p. 328).

The ensuing analysis is guided by 6 questions ‘extracted’ from the UNESCO guidebook on textbook research and textbook revision (See Pingel 2010, pp. 37-42); *How is the group identity represented and confirmed?; How are the differences between ‘us’ and ‘them’ represented?; How is the ‘other’ portrayed? (particularly in terms of delegitimation and exclusion); How is the ‘self’ portrayed?; What is the general relation of the ‘self’ to the ‘other’?; How is historical continuity used to legitimize political claims?; and finally, How is the conflict in general and its defining moments in particular being portrayed?*

#### **4.1 Greek Cypriot Education**

*Greek Cypriot students hold negative stereotypes about the Turks and tend to construct their sense of self in opposition to this perception of the enemy.  
(Philippou, 2004 cited in Christou 2006, p. 291).*

Before delving into the content of the Greek Cypriot narratives, I would be remiss not to comment on the nature of the Greek Cypriot educational system itself and how



it has evolved overtime. Initially domineeringly Hellenic<sup>25</sup>, the Greek Cypriot education system was, and according to former [Greek] Cypriot President Tasos Papadopoulos in 2003, remained (cited in Habes 2006, p. 11), closely linked to that of Greece. As Uzer (2004) put it, the Greek Cypriot education system was guided by both Hellenic and Christian ideals especially in respect to “the creation of the national identity of Greek Cypriot children.” (p. 59) with teachers and instructional material initially<sup>26</sup> even being sent by the Greek government essentially turning schools into “indoctrination centres for Greek nationalism” (Oberling, 1982 cited *ibid.*) with the establishment of schools with a “genuine Greek character” even being the stated purpose of the education system as laid out by the first Greek Cypriot Ministry of Education in 1965 (Karagnorges, 1986 cited in Christou 2006, p. 289).

This ‘Hellenocentric’ education has itself been instrumental in making a solution to the Cyprus problem even more difficult acting as a barrier to rapprochement with the Turkish Cypriots and promoting “the concept of the enemy as part of what anything labelled as Turkish might represent.” i.e. Turkey (country), Turkish people, and Turkish Cypriots (Stavrinides & Georgiou 2011, p. 88). Schools themselves are decorated with the slogan ‘I Know, I Don’t Forget, and I Struggle’ supplanted with images from the ‘occupied’ part with the goal of constructing and preserving memories of the north/occupied area (Christou 2006, p. 289; Karahassan & Zembylas 2006, p. 702).

The centralized Greek Cypriot education system, which “is involved in the task of naturalizing [the] otherwise discursively constructed social categorization” (Spyrou

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<sup>25</sup> The word ‘Hellenic’ is understood to be synonymous with Greek.

<sup>26</sup> This practice ended with independence in 1960.

2006, p. 98) that is the superior Greek<sup>27</sup> self juxtaposed against the Turk other, for the most part ignored/ignores the life and culture of the Turkish Cypriots with a wider lack of multicultural education in general being a distinctive characteristic of the system (Papanastasiou & Koutselini-Ionnidou 1999, p. 168) with only 8% of Greek Cypriots themselves of the opinion that ethnic diversity enriches life (See fig. 17 in Kaymak *et al.* 2008, p. 23).

Accordingly, the system also performs an exclusion of “the minority” (Turkish Cypriots and other Turkish speaking groups in Cyprus such as the Roma)<sup>28</sup> although a new multicultural ethos has emerged with Turkish Cypriot students enrolling in the south (Zembylas 2011, p. 1374; 1378). The current Greek Cypriot educational system, according to Christou (2006), is characterized by a “national imaginary...[that] maintains conflicting desires by declaring both a vision of peace in a unified Cyprus and a nostalgic attachment to previous nationalistic struggles.” (p. 286) as evidenced by the fact that although an educational reform committee was established in 2003, there has still been no revision to date despite the fact that it found the *entire* educational system to be culturally monolithic and ethnocentric (See Papadakis 2008b, p. 11), a system which goes against established EU interculturalism norms of which Cyprus is a member resulting in a society where even the youngest of members already have negative perceptions of ‘the Turks’ highlighting the active process of identity construction underway (Spyrou 2006, p. 95; See also Spyrou, 2002; Stevens, 2014). Kangasniemi (2016) similarly accused the pre-1974

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<sup>27</sup> Karahassan & Zembylas (2006) additionally note that the system “promotes the use of more inclusive categories” i.e. Greeks and Turks rather than the more synthetic ‘Greek-Cypriot’ & ‘Turkish-Cypriot’ leaving students unable to deal with such complex categorizations (p. 704). See also Brewer *et al.* (2012) for a discussion on the ‘Social Identity Complexity’ engendered by ‘multiple-category’ identities.

<sup>28</sup> Lumping all Turkish speaking groups into one category leads to a perception of out-group homogeneity that is also believed to foster hostility (See Hughes *et al.* 2007, p. 42)

Greek Cypriot narratives of being contradictory in that while it claimed the Hellenocentric nature of Cyprus to legitimize *enosis*, it claimed Cyprus was distinct as a means to delegitimize partition (p. 41).

The Greek Cypriot Ministry of Education began teaching Turkish language following the border opening in 2003 (Charalambous *et al.* 2013, p. 72). Many of those who have opted for these Turkish classes have been termed traitors highlighting the anti-Turkish attitude in Greek Cypriot society and since discourse plays a critical role in securitization (understood as the institutional process of declaring a particular group to be an existential threat), many of those who are taking the Turkish classes have even identified less than optimal reasons for doing so such as being able to ‘infiltrate’ the Turkish Cypriots or being able to speak the language of the enemy (See Charalambous *et al.*, 2015 for more on the (de)securitization of Turkish in the Greek Cypriot community).

Although the Ministry of Education also sent out a circular placing peaceful-coexistence with the Turkish-Cypriots as a new educational priority in 2008 (See Zembylas *et al.* 2016, p. 23), it has been poorly implemented facing fierce resistance from political parties, the church, media, etc. For example, a study conducted by Charalambous *et al.* (2013) concluded that teachers may not be willing to implement peace initiatives such as the Ministry of Education’s ‘Peaceful Coexistence’ initiative especially when they clash with dominant discourses (See also Charalambous *et al.*, 2014) while another conducted by Stevens *et al.* (2016) noted racism by Greek Cypriot students, including those from middle and upper classes, against Turkish Cypriots even in mixed, English medium schools in the island’s (and Europe’s last) divided capital, Nicosia. A larger reform process beginning in 2009/2010 aimed at

Europeanizing the education system began implementing a revised curriculum [without actually altering the narrative] (Philippou & Theodorou 2014, p. 185).

#### **4.1.1 Greek Cypriot Educational Narratives**

As has been stated earlier, the Greek Cypriot education system and the narratives it embodies was primarily Hellenic and as such was cultivating a collective identity for the Greek Cypriots who “see themselves only as Greeks.” (Uzer 2004, p. 56). Evidence of this lies in the fact that the Greek Cypriot school books use the identifiers ‘Cypriots’ and ‘Greeks’ interchangeably (Papadakis 2008a, p. 132) which serves the dual function of making Cyprus analogous with Greece and Greek Cypriots analogous with mainland Greeks while at the same time implicitly rejecting any notion of and excluding the identities/existence of other non-Greek Cypriot groups such as, and arguably most importantly, the Turkish Cypriots (See Kizilyurek 1999, p. 389).

Using an ‘us vs. them’ structure to guide its accounts of events (Habes 2006, p. 73), the Greek Cypriot narrative juxtaposes the Greeks against the Turks historically through time while simultaneously being guided by the “transhistorical category” that is Hellenism which is used to posit continuity between ancient Greeks and modern Greeks (including Greek Cypriots) based on the “*Megali* idea” aimed at uniting all Greeks (Papadakis 2008b, p. 5; Kangasniemi 2016, p. 9, original emphasis).

One way through which this is done is by presenting the medieval Greek Byzantine empire as a period of economic and social advancement as opposed to the following Ottoman empire which, in addition to being a catastrophe, was marked by economic mismanagement and is depicted in “exclusively negative terms” (Brouwer 2009, p.

23; Papadakis 2008a, p. 133). The notion of continuity is not only used to posit Greek continuity but also that of the Turks. According to Spyrou (2006), one indirect strategy used in constructing the Turk as the ‘other’ involves collapsing time and decontextualizing the Turkish identity thereby making it ahistorical such that the expansionist characteristic of Ottoman Turks is transferred to modern Turks who are believed to be analogous to their predecessors (pp. 99-100); after all, they all belong to one self-identified group, Turks.

This negative representation is not limited to the Turks but rather applies to all the other civilizations that have passed through Cyprus over time with the Greek adjective *kratia*, meaning domination/oppression, used “for everyone but (ancient) Greeks or Byzantines” (Papadakis 2008b, p. 7). The historical narrative therefore is I would argue, basically an account of the woes of the powerless, morally sound Greeks who have been time and time again subjugated to the rule of different empires overtime with this “victim ideology”, according to Greek Cypriot academic Michalinos Zembylas, serving to justify aggression against the other, establish coherence, and “mask the anxiety of seeing the similarities with the Other” (Karahassan & Zembylas 2006, p. 704). In this case, beginning said narrative with the arrival of Greeks to the island which Papadakis (2008a) terms the ‘Hellenization of Cyprus’ and ending it with the 1974 Turkish intervention seems to be an effective timeline (See *ibid.*, p. 137).

The primary antagonists of the Greek Cypriot narrative, the Turks, are “generally represented in extremely negative ways as a result of the historical conflict between Greeks and Turks” (Spyrou, 2006 cited in Zembylas 2011, p. 1377; See also Heraclides, 2012) with the Cyprus conflict itself presenting another example of this

historical animosity. The narrative conveniently ignoring the periods of cooperation and coexistence that the two major Cypriot populations enjoyed as such instances are at odds with the official narrative (Karahassan & Zembylas 2006, p. 704). Turks are portrayed as “barbarians” (Habes 2006, p. 74), nothing more than a group of “expansionist and bestially savage people” (Papadakis 2008a, p. 133) as they are Eastern Orientals as opposed to the civilized Western Europeans the Greek Cypriots identify as (Spyrou 2006, p. 101). A notion the Greek Cypriots’ ascendance to the EU only serves to legitimize.

As noted earlier, Turkish Cypriots, mainland, and Ottoman Turks are slumped into the same ‘bestial’ category as a means to delegitimize the political claims of the former. As a means to the same ends of denying their identity and debunking their political claims, the Greek Cypriot narrative even claimed that Turkish Cypriots were not even ‘real Turks’ but instead were, including the Turks from Ottoman Anatolia, of Greek origin. So, rather than constituting a distinct group of people, they were simply ‘Islamized Greeks’ who had been converted during the Ottoman period of “forced Islamization” (Papadakis 2008b, p. 10; Kizilyurek 1999, p. 390). Portraying the Turkish Cypriots as Greeks also serves to lend more credence to the *enosis* ideal as uniting the island with Greece remained a legitimate claim if the largest minority on the island were themselves of Greek origin.

The ‘Turkish Cypriots are Greeks’ stance was abandoned however along with the *enosis* ideal after the 1974 intervention as unification of the island, and of the Greek and Turkish *Cypriots*, became the new goal thus necessitating a differentiation between the Turkish Cypriots and the new wave of Turkish immigrants (*ibid.*, pp. 11-12) such that one respondent in a study conducted by Anagiotos & Schieds

(2013) remarked that the problem in Cyprus was not the Turkish Cypriots, but the Turks themselves (p. 10; See also Spyrou 2006, pp. 104-105). The post-1974 distinction between Turkish Cypriots and Turkish settlers was also a means to legitimize the Republic of Cyprus itself with the post-1974 narrative even mentioning some instances of inter-communal *coexistence* [interestingly not cooperation] such as the mixed villages of old albeit from an exclusively Greek Cypriot perspective. The notion is that Cyprus only recently became multicultural but has historically been Greek (Philippou & Klerides 2010, p. 224; 226).

Regarding the conflict itself, the Greek Cypriot narrative systematically avoids delving too deep into the nature of the violence that occurred from 1963-1964 and the killing, enclavement and displacement of the Turkish Cypriots during that period (Latif 2010, p. 39), and even mentions of this period tend to blame the Turks who, according to this account, are accused of having provoked the violence with aggression against the Greeks who were the sole/primary victims (Christodoulou 2015, p. 328) with the Turkish Cypriot leadership apparently telling the people to move to the enclaves and enforce *de facto* partition (Ozkaleli & Yilmaz 2015, p. 141); in a letter to the Security Council in 1964, the Greek Cypriot representative blamed the disturbances on foreign Turks who had infiltrated the island for partitionist reasons (Kangasniemi 2016, p. 39-40). In fact, a study conducted by Christou (2004) concluded that the inter-communal tensions that characterized the decade preceding 1974 are largely ignored.

The conflict's genesis is instead presented as being the Turkish intervention of 1974 which interrupted the peaceful coexistence of the Cypriots (Philippou & Klerides 2010, p. 225) and is presented as an "invasion" and subsequent occupation by

Turkish forces trying to help the (now distinguished) Turkish Cypriots achieve their partitionist goals (Papadakis 2008b, p.10) while failing to mention that that was simply a reaction to their own unionist goals, more specifically the coup that caused the invasion (Zeka 2015, p. 148). Presenting the 1974 invasion and subsequent occupation as the barbaric Turks against the powerless Greek Cypriots secures the prejudices against the Turks in the minds of subsequent Greek Cypriot generations (Habes 2006, pp. 75-77; See also Christodoulou 2015, p. 328).

As Papadakis (2008b) concluded, Greek Cypriot students from as early as primary school already hold negative stereotypes about mainland Turks and Turkish Cypriots with an inability to differentiate between them. Their negative stereotypes at that stage even extend towards other non-Western European groups such as Arabs (p. 12). Stevens *et al.* (2014) reached similar conclusions finding less positive out-group perceptions among students who identified as Cypriot rather than Greek, and more negative perceptions of Turkish-Cypriots among those who identified as Greek-Cypriot rather than Greek.

## **4.2 Turkish Cypriot Education**

The Turkish Cypriot education system, termed an “ideological organization” by Latif (2010; p. 39) followed a similar pattern to that of the Greek Cypriots emphasizing ethnic purity and presenting the ‘History of Cyprus’ in such a way that the “suffering of others is silenced, their historical coexistence questioned, and sociocultural interactions are ignored.” (Papadakis 2008a, p. 128). The primary difference between both however was that the Turkish Cypriot education system was used by the political arena to intentionally legitimize and justify the island’s *partition* (POST 2007, cited in Vural & Ozuyanik 2008, p. 134; emphasis added) while strategically



excluding any sense of Cypriotness from cultural and political discourses (Vural & Rustemli 2006, p. 333). One stated objective of the Turkish Cypriot National Education and Culture Ministry was to develop a “citizen with knowing the origin and struggle for [the] existence of [the] Turkish Cypriot community (Nasim, 2000 cited in Habes 2006, p. 53). One example of the ‘Turkish orientation’ is the fact that Turkish Cypriots students had to recite the pledge of allegiance to Turkey and the Turkish flag (Mertan 2011, p. 76).

The ability of the educational system to successfully indoctrinate such politically charged dogma into younger generations was further aided by the fact that not only are the narratives used in history teaching controlled by the authorities, but as in Turkey as well, teachers are given directives regarding the “political and ideological frame” to be used in the process of instruction (See Coupeaux, 2002). A study by Mertan (2011) found Turkish Cypriot children to have strong national identifications even when describing themselves (the individual rather than collective self), negative evaluations of Greek Cypriots, and having internalized the official identity discourse (with female students interestingly showing higher levels of internalization than male students).

#### **4.2.1 Turkish Cypriot Education Narratives Pre-2004 Reform**

Beginning with the arrival of the Ottomans to Cyprus which is seen as a glorious event as it marked the very beginning of the existence of Turkish Cypriots (Brouwer 2009, p. 23), group identity in the pre-reform Turkish Cypriot narrative denounced any and all notions of a common Cypriot identity or of a Cypriot people choosing instead to use labels such as Greek/Turk or the “Greeks of Cyprus” and “Turks of Cyprus” (Vural & Ozuyanik 2008, p. 142) in describing either community as a means of emphasizing the ‘origin’ of the groups with the members being at the basis

of it either Turks or Greeks while also denying a unified territorial cultural identity as a means towards justifying partitionist goals. While emphasizing the Turkish character of the Turkish Cypriots who despite being descendants of Ottoman Turkish immigrants had “maintained their Turkish character” (Serter & Fikretoglu, 2002 cited *ibid.*, p. 145), the narrative also made attempts towards implying that not only are Cyprus itself and its history somehow analogous to and integral for Turkey and its history (Papadakis 2008a, p. 135) but they both share a range of geological similarities (Vural & Ozuyanik 2008, p. 143; Latif 2010, p. 41).

The narrative presents Greek Cypriots as an inferior group of barbarians (Habes 2006, p. 67) and the “eternal enemy, which spreads distress and suffering” (Brouwer 2009, p. 26). As the Greek Cypriot narrative does with the Byzantine empire, the Turkish Cypriot narrative glorified the Ottoman period with the revolts against the empire by both Greeks and Greek Cypriots being cited as instances of ungratefulness for the Sultan’s generosity (Papadakis 2008b, p. 13). History is recounted in such a way that presents co-existence between the Turkish and Greek Cypriots as being impossible due to the ‘historical enmity’ that characterized relations between the communities (POST 2007, cited in Vural & Ozuyanik 2008, p. 146) as such making partition a logical *political* aspiration within the context of the *natural division* that exists between the communities while all the time being careful to avoid comparing their ‘partitionist-nationalism’ with the ‘unionist-nationalism’ of the Greek Cypriots (See *ibid.*, p. 147).

Presenting the division as natural is of particular importance as it both lends credence to the *taksim* ideal while at the same time presenting a common ‘other’ around which to rally, for this reason the influence of the colonial era on relations between the

communities is largely ignored. The influence which Pollis (1973) claimed sharpened communal cleavages by not engaging the “many requisites” that existed “for the development of a Cypriot nationalist movement that did not differentiate between Greeks and Turks.” (cited in Vural & Rustemli 2006, p. 331).

As the primary antagonists of the narrative, the Greek Cypriots are represented as being the greatest threat to the existence of the Turkish Cypriots. This rhetoric is supplanted by the fact that the narrative focuses primarily on the most conflictual periods in the island’s history i.e. 1963-64 and 1973-74 especially the latter which is presented as the “barbaric onslaught of “Rums” against the “Turks” in Cyprus...designed to eradicate the “Turks”” (Papadakis 2008a, p. 136) ending with the glorious victory by the ‘Heroic Turkish Army’ (unlike the Greek Cypriot narrative where 1974 is depicted as a calamitous ending).

Addressing the Greek Cypriots as “Rum” in of itself serves to delegitimize the Greek Cypriot identity as it identifies them as former Ottoman subjects of the Greek Orthodox ‘Rum millet’ and different from mainland Greeks implicitly making any calls for union with Greece nonsensical (See Papadakis 2008a, p. 136; Papadakis 2008b, pp. 13-14). In fact, the origins of the Greek Cypriots in general are “regarded with suspicion” positing them not to be “real Greeks” but rather a hybrid who had lost their original character as opposed to the Turkish Cypriots who maintained their ethnic purity (Vural & Ozuyanik 2008, p. 146) when the ‘un-real’ Greeks became nothing but relics of Cyprus’ previous conquerors (Kizilyurek 1999, p. 391; Latif 2010, p. 41),

This quasi-genocidal rhetoric ends with intervention of '74 which is presented as a victory for the Turkish troops sent to liberate the Turkish Cypriots from the barbarians (Habes 2006, p. 68) in the “Happy Peace Operation”, entirely ignoring the suffering of the many Greek Cypriots who were either killed or displaced during the ‘happy operation’ (focusing instead on the Turkish Cypriot losses of the coup; Zeka 2015, p. 149) with the few mentions of such instances presented as a “natural punishment for their crimes and violence” (Vural & Ozuyanik 2008, p. 148) against the blameless Turkish Cypriot victims; a classic instance of group self-victimization as a means towards maintaining cohesion and rationalizing political circumstances. Emphasis is also placed on the coup that engendered the ‘intervention’ which the Turkish Cypriots perceived as a real threat to their existence (Zeka 2015, p. 148).

Vural & Ozuyanik (2008) accurately summarize the gist of the pre-reform narratives which socialized Turkish Cypriots into viewing their identity as being incompatible with that of the Greek Cypriots; the island’s political division as a natural occurrence as are the conflicts between the communities; Turkey as their ‘motherland’; and co-habitations with the Greek Cypriots both as an unattainable and additionally undesirable ideal (p. 141). According to Kizilyurek (1999) one of the authors of the narrative “‘charge[d]’ history with connecting the past-present-future in a national narrative, in the most selective way, which...serves the legitimization of this “new future”, of partition.” (p. 392).

#### **4.2.2 The Context of the Reforms**

A dramatic political change occurred within the Turkish Cypriot community in 2003 with the coming to power of the pro-solution Republican Turkish Party (CTP) as the larger partner in the new coalition government set to rule the Turkish Cypriots who

had been hitherto governed by pro-separation ethno-nationalist right-wing parties such as the National Unity Party (UBP) (See Carkoglu & Sozen, 2004).

The new CTP-led government came into power with a goal to develop a new national identity that was, rather than based on the ethnic ‘Turkishness’ of the Turkish Cypriots, on the territorial aspect of their identity, ‘Cypriotness’ “and improves beliefs about the ‘other community’ on the island.” (Vural & Ozuyanik 2008, p. 134). This new civic nationalism differs from the previous ethnic nationalism in that allegiances are constructed to be to the territorial entity that is the state and its institutions rather than the ethnic group (See Smith 2003b, p. 193-195) signifying a switch from nation building (in which citizenship is defined on the basis of ethnic identity often transcending state boundaries e.g., Turkish nation that encompasses Turks in Cyprus, Turkey and diaspora) to state building which places emphasis on the equal rights of all citizens irrespective of identity (Smith 2014, p. 115).

This reflected a shift in the conception of identity from being an essentialist phenomenon to a more idealistic notion of it being an historical construct that could be “reformulated within a joint future state”. (Papadakis 2008a, p. 142). So, while the old books and narrative were “a simple reflection of nationalistic policies” based on an “ethnocentric perception of history” and justified the island’s partition by instrumentalizing the past (POST 2010, p. 22), the new narratives were a departure from such ethnocentrism. Emphasis on identification on such a superordinate level (i.e., Cypriot) according to Cehajic *et al.* (2008) increases group readiness to forgive past wrong-doings as a path to reconciliation.

Aimed at developing a “culture of peace”, the new approach to history teaching championed by the CTP also highlights “cultural interactions, internal divisions, and discontinuities.” (Papadakis 2008b, p. 1). The primary objective therefore was the re-definition of what constituted the Turkish Cypriot identity through its “de-ethnization” and “de-militarization” (Vural & Ozuyanik 2008, p. 149). This goal of developing a new ethos of cultural peacefulness involved two parallel activities of not only changing the narrative embodied in the school’s books via a complete revision of said books which is covered in the next section, but also, with the overarching support of the teachers’ unions (Latif 2010, p. 41), a re-structuring of the education system in line with the belief that “the person should be educated with the education system that is suitable for how a community is foreseen” (Kıbrıs Türk Eğitim Sistemi, 2005 cited in Habes 2006, p. 54).

Similar to the case of the Greek Cypriots, Vural (2012) argues that mere revision of the texts is insufficient in transforming inter-communal relations especially when teachers do not incorporate reconciliatory practices in classroom activities (p. 424) which presents a particular challenge considering the fact that the majority of teachers were themselves socialized and had their views shaped by their respective communities and so might be inclined to transfer said views to the students if unchallenged (See Weinstein *et al*, 2007).

#### **4.2.3 Turkish Cypriot Education Narratives Post-2004 Reform**

As Vural & Rustemli (2006) note, collective identity is particularly pertinent for the Cyprus conflict because the eventual peaceful resolution of the conflict is contingent upon the development of “a common civic identity comprising *all* people of the island” (p. 332; emphasis added). Such an identity is exactly what the new Turkish Cypriot narrative intends to cultivate. This is done by stressing the ‘Cypriotness’

rather than ‘Turkishness’ of the Turkish Cypriots while simultaneously distinguishing them from mainland Turks (POST 2010, p. 24; Habes 2006, p. 71).

In the same vein the new textbooks even attempted to (albeit in a limited sense), introduce the idea of a Turkish Cypriot dialect of the Turkish language develop a sense of pride in the [Cypriot-Turkish]<sup>29</sup> identity (POST 2010, p. 116) and loyalty to Cyprus itself. In addition to having no obvious delineation of a national enemy (*ibid.*, p. 23), the Greek Cypriots also cease to be presented exclusively in terms of ‘otherness’ and are instead portrayed as political *partners* rather than the barbaric enemy (Vural & Ozuyanik 2008, p. 146) with whom they also share certain similarities such as common cultural elements and perhaps most importantly, a common identity. Arguable, the overarching theme of the new narrative *vis-à-vis* the Greek Cypriots is its depiction of the Greek Cypriots as a group *equal* to the Turkish Cypriots as opposed to the previous narrative which depicted them as inferior.

Continuity is no longer used as a means towards legitimating the contemporary political situation as the Turkish Cypriots are presented as being distinct from mainland Turks. The new narrative offers an *objective* narration of the origin of the Turkish (Vural & Ozuyanik 2008, p. 145) who are no longer presented as an ethnically pure group but rather presents the origin in a way that highlights how Muslims came to, due to the effects of nationalism, identify as Turks in the same way that Christians came to identify as Greek and as such are not monolithic going as far as to present accounts of the internal divides that although historically present, were previously ignored (Papadakis 2008b, p. 18; 20; 21).

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<sup>29</sup> The placement of ‘Cypriot’ before ‘Turkish’ here was a conscious attempt to emphasize the Cypriot aspect of identity over the Turkish one.

This distinction extends beyond identity delineation in the narrative and influences how the relationship between the Turkish Cypriots and Turkey itself is presented. Unlike the previous narrative which presented Turkey as the homeland/motherland of the Turkish Cypriots, the new narrative is more neutral in the terminology used in addressing Turkey denouncing any geological attachments and Cyprus is, rather than being presented as an extension of Turkey, a distinct entity and common homeland for the Turkish and Greek Cypriots; “*our* island” (Papadakis 2008b, p. 18; emphasis added) with the novel addition of the social history of the island (POST 2010, p. 24).

The new narrative almost entirely altered the way in which the conflict is presented; rather than being used to justify the partition, the conflict is now depicted in negative terms. Firstly, rather than the conflict being presented as a naturally occurring phenomenon, the new narrative highlights the periods of cooperation and coexistence that both communities shared such as their cooperation in Britain’s world war two Cyprus regiment (Dembinska 2016, p. 7) and highlights the impact that nationalism and the colonial policy of ‘divide-and-rule’ had on deteriorating community relations (Papadakis 2008a, p. 138; Vural & Ozuyanik 2008, p. 148). If the conflict is no longer understood to be a fact of nature, the legitimacy of partitionist claims also comes into question. Since the conflict and implicitly the partition are not natural, it is possible to envision a society without either.

Secondly, both the Greek Cypriot *enosis*-fuelled nationalism and the Turkish Cypriot *taksim* nationalism are mentioned using “neutral elaborations” (Vural & Ozuyanik 2008, p. 147) even presenting the latter as well in negative terms (although the fact that it was a reactionary movement is used as a subtle justification) (Papadakis 2008b, p. 21). Thirdly, the new narrative places less emphasis on the 1963-74 period



which is even no longer taken as a period of purely continual strife with now *limited* attention being placed on the gruesome violence with mentions careful to emphasize that they were carried out by *certain* [rather than all] Greek Cypriots (*ibid.*) so as to not overemphasize conflict. Lastly, the Greek Cypriots are no longer held solely responsible for the conflict with both communities sharing the blame (although a greater proportion remains allocated to the Greek Cypriots) (Papadakis 2008a, p. 139). Additionally, the narrative is also more empathetic towards and recognizes the losses suffered by the Greek Cypriots, particularly during the 1974 Turkish intervention which itself is no longer presented using the “strong ‘victory’ and ‘heroic’” rhetoric (Habes 2006, p. 69).

Vural & Ozuyanik (2008) however note that although the new narrative recognizes the losses of the Greek Cypriots, the account still remains unbalanced (p. 148). They go further to argue that the new narrative even still contains elements that “help maintain the conventional political confrontation between the two communities.” (*ibid.*, p. 149). A similar argument is put forward by Papadakis (2008a) who argues that the new narrative still remains ethnocentric to an extent although this is now from a *Turkish Cypriot* rather than Turkish perspective (p. 140).

#### **4.2.4 2009 And Turkish Cypriot Education**

Following a heated 2009 election campaign in the Turkish Cypriot north of Cyprus during which education was one of the foremost topics with the new books stirring up a lot of controversy between the left and right political wings (Latif 2010, p. 44), the right-wing UBP regained power and almost immediately cancelled the printing of the post-reform books carrying the reformed narrative opting instead for a revised version of the old, pre-2004 books it released later that year (*ibid.*; POST 2010, p. 28) signalling a reconstruction of the *taksim* cause (Dembinska 2016, p. 2).

According to a POST Research Institute report that compared the 2004 and 2009 books, the 2009 books returned to the Turkish-centred approach with the Greek ‘other’ dogma returning to the forefront along with an overarching emphasis on the Turkishness of Turkish Cypriots (See POST, 2010). All this with the aid of “new pedagogical methods” (Dembinska 2016, p. 7).

Interestingly, a study conducted by Husnu & Lajunen (2015) into the predictors of out-group bias among Turkish Cypriots found right-wing political affiliation to be a predictor which is not very surprising considering the right-wing’s opposition to many re-approachment efforts specifically the text book revision which it accused of being an attempt to pacify the Greek Cypriots, EU, and other foreign powers (See Vural 2012, p. 407).

## Chapter 5

### **PUBLIC OPINION IN NORTHERN IRELAND**

This chapter explores the direction in which public opinion has trended in Northern Ireland with a focus to how perceptions towards the conflict, religion, religious segregation and the ‘other’ community have developed overtime, both society-wide, and for each community.

The ensuing analysis is based on data sourced from the Young Life and Times Survey (YLT), a constituent part of Access Research Knowledge (ARK) which provides public access to social and political information on Northern Ireland. The YLT initially ran between 1998 and 2000 during which it surveyed respondents between ages 12-17. Following a brief hiatus, the survey was resumed (and somewhat standardised) in 2003 from where it began to scope the attitudes on 16-year olds only and has continued to this day with the results of the most recent survey, YLT 2015, having been released in May, 2016.

Although ARK does also conduct two other surveys<sup>30</sup>, the Kid’s Life and Times Survey and the Northern Ireland Life and Times Survey which measure attitudes amongst 10-11 year olds and the adult population respectively, the YLT seemed the best choice for this study due to its focus on a demography whose members are mostly students, advanced enough in age to have at least formed independent

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<sup>30</sup> An ARK report that covers the nature of its three surveys as well as the nature of the ARK framework in general is available at: <http://www.ark.ac.uk/intro/ARKsurveys.pdf>.

opinions which are, at least to some degree, entrenched but still young enough to have said opinions and attitudes 'reshaped' as they are at . Additionally, respondents in the YLT's demography also experience first-hand the effects of educational reform, not just in the integrated context but other initiatives such as the Shared Education Programme and also represent(ed) the next generation of adults responsible for shouldering the peace process post-Belfast.

Due to the fact that the YLT was not standardized up until its re-launch in 2003, after which the yearly questionnaires still remained different to a large degree as the goal was the measure a number of socio-political attitudes pertinent at the time of the individual surveys, it proved nearly impossible to study changes in one particular social attitude across the whole 1998-2000/2003-2015 period. The only question repeated every year the survey was conducted is 'Do you think that religion will always make a difference to the way people feel about each other in Northern Ireland?' [RELGALWY] which I believe to be an insufficient, though relevant, measure of societal attitudes.

The focus of this chapter therefore is on the particular module/section within the surveys comprising the question above and was repeated year after year, 'Community Relations'. Although the individual questions within the community relations module were not identically replicated for each year with some questions, such as those measuring attitudes towards the catholic and protestant communities specifically, included in some years and not others, since our concern here is the trends rather than specific measures for each year, this proves less of an obstacle than it would have otherwise as it allows us look at changes in each relevant question within the module for the years they were included in the survey. Apart from the

question “Do you think most people in Northern Ireland would mind or not mind if a suitably qualified person of a different religion were appointed as their boss?” [OBOSSRLG] which was only asked in the 1998 survey, all other questions included in this analysis were repeated for a minimum of 4 (not necessarily consecutive years). All YLT data and questionnaires are available from the ARK’s website at: [www.ark.ac.uk/ylt](http://www.ark.ac.uk/ylt).

Below is a list of the specific questions (variables) within the community relations module used in the following analysis (along with their variable names within the YLT) with the years for which they are relevant included in brackets.<sup>31</sup>

1. RELGALWY: Do you think that religion will always make a difference to the way people feel about each other in Northern Ireland? (1998-2000, 2003-2015).
2. OWNMXSCH: Would you prefer to send your children to a school with children of only your own religion or to a mixed-religion school? (1998, 1999, 2003-2015).
3. MXRLGNGH: Would you prefer to live in a neighbourhood with people of only your own religion, or in a mixed-religion neighbourhood? (1999, 2000, 2004-2015).
4. MXRLGWKR: Would you prefer a workplace with people of only your own religion, or a mixed-religion workplace? (2003-2015).
5. FEELCATH: How favourable or unfavourable do you feel about people from the Catholic community? (2003, 2005-2007, 2011-2015).

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<sup>31</sup> Although repeated, the specific formulations of the questions sometimes varied between years. However, the questions themselves and their variable names remained the same for each year they were included.

6. FEELPROT: How favourable or unfavourable do you feel about people from the Protestant community? (2003, 2005-2007, 2011-2015).
7. OMARRRLG: Do you think most people would mind if a close relative were to marry someone of a different religion? (1998, 2003-2006).
8. SMARRRLG: Would you mind if a close relative were to marry someone of a different religion? (2003-2006).

### **5.1 Attitudes Towards Community Relations Overtime**

An initial look at the nature of public opinion amongst the teenage population in Northern Ireland reveals that from 1998, the year of the Belfast Agreement which put an official end to hostilities and also established governmental support for Integrated Education with an aim to bridging the gap between the Catholic and Protestant communities, to 2015, the communities have, gradually, in line with the predictions of H<sub>3</sub> become less polarised.

All the variables outlined above, despite their occasional fluctuations, displayed altogether positive trends. The percentage of respondents who were of the opinion that religion would not always be a determinant factor in how people (individuals) felt towards one another for example, despite always remaining well below the number of those who believed religion would always play a dominant role with the smallest difference between 'Yes' and 'No' responses to RELGALWY standing at 47.4% in 1999 (65.9% Yes – 18.5% No), displayed an irregular, although somewhat upward moving trend following a drop between 1999 & 2000 becoming relatively stable between 2005 & 2015 with the number of 'Yes' responses also declining slightly during this period. The changes observed however were relatively marginal with the percentages for the base year 1998 (76.2% - Yes, 13.2% - No) and 2015

(78.4% - Yes 12.0% - No) being almost identical. This however is to be expected considering the fact that, as had been noted earlier, religion lies at the very foundation of society in Northern Ireland and is therefore expected to remain, or be perceived to remain, as a primary source of group affiliation (See also Appendix A).

The other variables however, provide better evidence of the de-polarization of the minds of Northern Ireland's teenagers over the years, particularly in the period following the early-2000's before which some variables experienced changes indicative of inter-group hostility. Considering however that this period (1998-2005) was the immediate period following the cessation of the inter-communal hostilities and violence to which many respondents were no doubt exposed in one way or another, it is understandable if evidence is found of in-group prejudice and out-group mistrust during this period particularly considering the positive trend following it as exposure to violence has been known to negatively affect levels of trust (Hewstone *et al.* 2006, p. 116).

The percentage of respondents who preferred 'own religion', segregated, schooling to integrated settings (OWNMXSCH) although increasing between 1998 (30.3%) & 2004 (47.3%) began to decline relatively steadily afterwards particularly after 2006 (45.2%) ending at 32.9% in 2015 while the percentage of respondents who opted instead for mixed-religion schooling increased with relative stability especially in the past decade with over-half of the respondents in 2015 (53.6%) opting for integrated education. Interestingly, the percentage of respondents who chose integrated rather than segregated education in 2015 stands slightly less than the percentage in 1998 (54.1%) which was also the highest value recorded for all 15 years OWNMXCH was included in the survey, the lowest standing at 43.2% (2004). This implies that even in

the immediate aftermath of the conflict, young people in Northern Ireland recognized the benefits to be realized from the de-segregation of learning spaces, evidently just as much as the current generation does.

Similar trends are also reported in relation to both MXRLGNGH and MRLGWRK which both experienced gradual increases in the percentage of respondents who preferred mixed, rather than own, religion neighbourhoods and workplaces respectively. The positive trends of both were however marred by intermittent declines, some more significant than others. For example, the number of respondents who preferred to live in own-religion (segregated) neighbourhoods increased by 9.9% between 1999 (30.3%) and 2000 (40.2%) while the percentage of those who preferred integrated neighbourhoods declined by 7.9% between 2011 (63.8%) and 2012 (55.9%). Overall, in addition to their upward trend, the percentage of respondents who preferred mixed to own-religion neighbourhoods and workplaces remained steadily in the majority throughout the recorded period.

A comparative look into the percentages reported for OWNMXSCH, MXRLGNGH, and MRLGWRK however revealed some insights I'd like to address at this juncture. Looking at the percentage of respondents who expressed a preference for mixed-religion schooling (53.6%), mixed-religion neighbourhoods (62.5%), and mixed-religion workplaces (75.4%) in 2015 reveals a pattern that is repeated every year all three questions were included in the survey. In addition to the fact that they follow nearly identical patterns, the percentage of respondents who preferred mixed-religion workplaces remained consistently above that which preferred mixed neighbourhood which was in turn consistently above those who preferred mixed-schooling (See Figure 1).



This pattern implies that young people in Northern Ireland, and arguably people in Northern Ireland in general, are more open to mixing in workplaces, where the setting is professional and people are for the most part gainfully occupied, limiting the opportunities for ‘sensitive’ issues to come to the forefront altogether reducing the possibility of group-based tensions to arise, than they are to mixing in residential areas where the proximity is extended and are supposed to be ‘safe spaces’; and are even less open to allowing their children be educated together. An average person from Northern Ireland therefore, while she might be comfortable interacting with people from the ‘other’ community at work, is less open to interacting with them outside of work and even less likely to condone their children being educated together. The general implication here is that people are, while increasingly open to mixing between the communities, are not entirely open to all types of mixing and would prefer to limit it to certain contexts.




Figure 1: Mixed Religion responses to OWNMXSCH, MXRLGNGH & MXRLGWRK 2004-2015 (ARK, Young Life and Times Survey, 2004-2015)

This sentiment is echoed by survey respondents themselves with the percentage of respondents who believed that most people would not mind if a member of their family married someone from a different religion (implicitly from the other main religious community) standing at a low 23.5% in 2006, even lower than it was in 1998 (37.6%). This argument becomes even more salient if we consider two additional factors.

In addition to the fact that the number of respondents who believed that more people would mind an inter-community marriage increased by 14% during this period, from 55.8% in 1998 (14.6% mind a lot, 41.2% mind a little) to 69.8% in 2006 (19.3% mind a lot, 50.5% mind a little), the percentage who stated that they themselves would not mind a member of their own family marrying someone from another religion stood at 72.9% in 2006. So, while teenagers in Northern Ireland are themselves open to inter-religious (and implicitly inter-communal marriages), with an upward moving trend underway (2.6% & 3.1% increases between 2004 – 67.2%, 2005 – 69.8% and 2006 – 72.9%), it is their perception that people in society in general are increasingly unlikely to accept them (2% & 2.4% increases for the same period, 2004 – 19.1%, 2005 – 21.1% and 2006 – 23.5%).

Regardless of their perceptions on the direction of society in general, the overall trend amongst young people in Northern Ireland is towards less-polarization with attitudes towards mixing between the two communities on the rise as evidenced by trends in OWNMXSCH, MXRLGNGH, MXRLGWRK, and SMARRRLG. This section took an aggregate look at trends within each for Northern Ireland as a whole. While this does provide some much needed insight, it does not account for

differences between the two main religious communities, the Catholics and the Protestants, to which we now turn briefly.

Communal differences in responses seem to provide evidence that Catholic respondents view community relations more positively than their Protestant counterparts. For example, while 83.1% of Catholic respondents in 2006 said they would not mind interreligious marriage, barely half of the Protestant respondents (56.3%) responded similarly. In fact, the highest percentage of Protestant respondents who said they would not mind inter-religious marriages stood at 59.0% in 2005 (while Catholic respondents, at 73.5% were even higher than the highest total percentage of 72.9% in 2006).

Similar trends can be found in other other variables with Catholics generally tending to be more mixing-oriented than Protestants with a few exceptions. However, while Catholic respondents were generally more open to mixing in marriages and workplaces, Protestant respondents were significantly more open to mixing in schools and residences, particularly the latter with the difference between Catholic and Protestant 'mixed-religion' respondents to MXRLGNGH in 2015 standing at 22.7% (Catholics – 60.7%, Protestants – 83.4%) while 52% of Protestant respondents to OWNMXSCH, as opposed to 38.3% of the Catholic Respondents opted for mixing in schools.

The discrepancy in community responses to MXRLGNGH and OWNMXSCH in comparison to others I would argue is more symptomatic of structural issue than anything else. The fact that more Protestant respondents opted for mixed-schooling than Catholic respondents for example is easily explained by the fact that the

majority of 'mixed-schools' (integrated or otherwise) in Northern Ireland tend to be state schools which also tend to have Protestant majorities. Additionally, the Catholic church actively discourages non-Catholic education for catholic children which is an example of what Donnelly & Hughes (2006) refer to when they argue that the conflict-mitigating contact process is influenced by prevailing cultural conditions (p. 512).

Regardless of the differences between both communities, they both tended to display positive trends, consistent with general societal movements.

## **5.2 Attitudes Towards the Communal 'Other'**

Responses to FEELCATH and FEELPROT reveal that Protestant respondents seem to view Catholics more unfavourably than Catholics see Protestants (See Appendices C & D). Evidence of this lies in the fact that while the highest recorded percentage of Protestants who saw Catholics as very unfavourable/unfavourable stood at 13.8% for the year 2006, the highest percentage recorded for Catholics (towards Protestants) stood at 8.6% in 2003 with the percentage of Protestants who viewed Catholics as very unfavourable/unfavourable still being higher (9.4%) for the same year. 2011, the year in which the very unfavourable/unfavourable percentages for both Catholics and Protestants began trending downwards steadily, and 2013 were the only two years in which more Catholics saw Protestants negatively (5.9% & 6.3% respectively) than Protestants saw Catholics negatively (4.8% & 5.3% respectively).

Although prior to 2013, the majority of both Catholic and Protestant responded neither favourable nor unfavourable to both FEELPROT & FEELCATH respectively, majorities in both communities responded very favourable/favourable

in 2015 (49.8% - Catholics, 53.8% - Protestants) for which negative responses tallied at 4.8% for Catholics and 6.2% for Protestants. So, while more Protestants viewed Catholics negatively, more Protestants also viewed Catholics positively. This is due to the high number of 'neutral' Catholic respondents (42.3% in 2015 while Protestants stood at 35.8%).

Accepting the notion that neutrality is preferable to negativity, it seems safe to conclude that Protestants remain relatively more belligerent than Catholics in regards to how the 'other' is perceived. The fact however that both communities are experiencing relatively stable upward trends towards positive feelings regarding the other (more-so for Protestants than Catholics) is consistent with findings in the previous section, and a step in the right direction.

## **Chapter 6**

### **PUBLIC OPINION IN CYPRUS**

This chapter looks into the ways in which public opinion in Cyprus has moved overtime with a specific focus on how the ‘other’ community, the self, and the conflict are perceived.

Due to a lack of publically accessible island-wide public opinion data on Cyprus which only began following the opening of borders in 2003, the following analysis is grossly restricted as it is only able to provide a glimpse into the nature of societal perceptions in Cyprus for the relatively brief period that is 2009-2015. A look into shifts during this period however might still prove useful as it could lend some insight into the differences between the two communities over this period in time as represented by changes in communal attitudes. Additionally, the base year 2009 was also the year in which the right-wing UPB regained power in the north (and the official narrative re-revised) signalling, I would argue, a trend in the Turkish Cypriot community towards less reconciliatory attitudes.

The following analysis relies primarily on data from two inter-linked sources. The first, the Centre for Sustainable Peace and Democratic Development (SeeD) is a regional think-tank that grew out of the ‘Cyprus 2015’ project and is concerned with linking public opinion and policy makers within the context of the Cyprus peace process. SeeD is supported by Interpeace and the United Nations Development Programme – Action for Cooperation and Trust (UNDP-ACT) in conjunction with

whom developed the second source for this analysis, the Social Cohesion and Reconciliation (SCORE) Index, which measures social cohesion and reconciliation, believed to be preconditions for peace, in multi-ethnic societies (See UNDP, 2015). Although initially developed for Cyprus (2013), the SCORE Index has also been applied in Bosnia-Herzegovina (2014) and Nepal (2015).

The data sourced from SeeD is gotten from specific SeeD publications spanning 2009-2015 available from its official website<sup>32</sup> while the findings of the SCORE Index (2013-2015) are sourced from both the SCORE website itself<sup>33</sup> as well as UNDP & SeeD publications using the findings of the index. Due to the variety and temporal brevity of the information available, the ensuing analysis aims to, in addition to providing insight into perceptual trends in Cypriot society, combine the information available in a way that makes it more cohesive.

The following sections of this chapter look into different elements of Greek and Turkish Cypriot public opinion both individually, and then comparatively. As a final note, as the SCORE Index measures both Social Cohesion and Reconciliation individually using a number of key indicators I have chosen to utilize the information provided on a dual front. Firstly, since social cohesion measures coexistence *within* groups, I have chosen to focus instead exclusively on the reconciliation, defined as “on-going efforts to establish peace between groups which were previously engaged in a dispute or conflict” (Louise *et al.* 2015, p. 17) component exclusively. Secondly, in addition to the aggregate reconciliation scores of both communities, their scores

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<sup>32</sup> [www.seedsofpeace.eu](http://www.seedsofpeace.eu)

<sup>33</sup> All figures from the score index may be found at [www.scoreforpeace.org](http://www.scoreforpeace.org) (See also UNDP, 2015)

on the individual indicators that make up the reconciliation component are also taken into account (See Table 1; Ioannou 2015a, p. 29; 33).

Table 1: Overall Reconciliation and Selected Reconciliation Indicator Scores of Turkish and Greek Cypriots (SCOREIndex)

Reconciliation	2013	2014	2015
GC	5.9	6.3	6.8
TC	6.9	6.2	5
<b>Negative Stereotypes</b>			
GC	4.4	4.2	3.6
TC	3.4	4.1	5.3
<b>Intergroup Contact</b>			
GC	2.4	5.6	2
TC	1.7	3.8	2.5
<b>Intergroup Anxiety</b>			
GC	4.8	4.5	3.5
TC	3.3	3.2	4.5
<b>Social Threat</b>			
GC	5.6	5.1	4.7
TC	4.5	4.7	6.4

## 6.1 Greek Cypriot Trends

Before delving fully into the observed public opinion trends in the Greek Cypriot community, I find it necessary to at first discuss the identity transformations that occurred within the community between 2008 and 2014 as it goes without saying that changing perceptions of identity no doubt affect perceptions on a plethora of other issues considering, as had been argued earlier, that the Cyprus conflict is essentially an identity-based conflict. As such, it is expected that trends in identity



perception (i.e. within the spectrum of the more divisive Greek and inclusive Cypriot identifiers<sup>34</sup>) should be consistent with societal trends on other issues.

As at 2008, the majority of Greek Cypriots (55%) identified as being equally Cypriot and Greek while 42% considered themselves to be either only, or mostly Cypriot and 4% considered themselves to be only/mostly Greek. In the following years, there was a steady upward trend towards an inclusive exclusively Cypriot identity with more Greek Cypriots self-identifying as either only, or mostly Cypriot with the number having reached 50% by 2011 (See Cyprus2015<sup>35</sup> 2009, p. 9; 2011, p. 8). As at 2014, 58% of Greek Cypriots identified ‘Cypriot’ as their primary identity as opposed to the 4% who identified primarily as Greek in the same year (Ioannou *et al.* 2015b, p. 123). Interestingly, although the percentage of Greek Cypriots who identified primarily as Greek did fluctuate within the 2008-2014 period, it remained comfortably below 10% the whole time with the highest points being 7% in 2009 and 6% in 2013. Overall however, the trend amongst the Greek Cypriots towards a more inclusive Cypriot identity is at the very least indicative of the development of more reconciliatory attitudes. It is therefore expected that other indicators such as those of the SCORE Index follow a similar pattern (See Appendix E).

Interestingly, the rise in the ‘Cypriotness’ of the Greek Cypriots is also mirrored by the number of Greek Cypriots who consider themselves to have Greek cultural roots. High as that number was in 2008 (85%; with only 50% of Greek Cypriots that year also claiming to have much in common with Turkish Cypriots), it still managed to

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<sup>34</sup> It is worth noting that since ‘Cypriot’ is sometimes construed as being analogous with ‘Greek’ in the Greek Cypriot community that it is possible a trend towards a Cypriot rather than exclusively Greek identity is not necessarily *ipso facto* symbolic of more reconciliatory attitudes.

<sup>35</sup> Henceforth cited as “Cyp15”.

climb all the way to 92% in 2011 (Cyp15 2011, p. 6). Now, while it is impossible to juxtapose this figure against the percentage of Greek Cypriots who consider themselves as having Cypriot cultural roots since the question was not framed within a context of mutual exclusivity (i.e. Greek or Cypriot cultural roots), it is however possible to infer, albeit with caution, that the increases in the number of Greek Cypriots identifying as Cypriot and those identifying with Greek cultural roots provides evidence of the efficacy of the Greek Cypriot narrative in presenting Cyprus as Hellenic<sup>36</sup> and being Cypriot as being, at the very least, similar to being Greek and at most presenting the Cypriot and Greek identities as interchangeable rather than different. Further research however is warranted into the pervasiveness of the 'Hellenic Cyprus' notion.

The number of Greek Cypriots who saw Greece as their 'mother country' remained relatively the same although somewhat rising at 52%, 53% & 54% for the years 2008, 2009, and 2011 respectively (Cyp15 2011, p. 6). Although following this particular trend overtime would have been of great assistance in determining whether the Greek Cypriot narrative successfully maintained the notion of Cypriot Hellenism over time, the data was unfortunately not reported again post-2011. If trends did continue however as they had spanning 2008-2011 period, it is possible that at least 50% of Greek Cypriots still consider Greece as their mother country although major political and economic shifts since then make an accurate or even reliable prediction impossible.

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<sup>36</sup> 83% of Greek Cypriots in 2008 somewhat/strongly agreed with the notion that 'Cyprus is Historically Hellenic' as opposed to the 5% that somewhat disagreed and 4% that strongly disagreed (Cyp15 2009, p.7).

A comprehensive look at the SCORE Index's reconciliation component results for the Greek Cypriots points to the fact that the general positive trend observed earlier seems to hold true with the Greek Cypriots ranking 5.9, 6.3, & 6.8 out of 10, where 10 is the maximum level of reconciliation reportable, for the years 2013, 2014, and 2015 respectively (UNDP 2015, p. 114; SeeD 2015, p. 11). A look into the figures of each reconciliation indicator also confirms this trend as while, apart from the level of intergroup contact which increased from 2.4 (2013) to 5.6 (2014) and then declined sharply to 2 (2015), there were no drastic changes in any of the other variables which for the most part maintained an upward trend.

Active discrimination against Turkish Cypriots maintained a low 0.5 in both 2013 and 2015 while there were marked declines in intergroup anxiety, perceived social threat, negative stereotypes, amongst others. The demography of both the individual and aggregate results of the reconciliation component however reveal that both right-wing supporters and people of lower education tend to be more prejudicial than their counterparts.

## **6.2 Turkish Cypriot Trends**

As with the Greek Cypriots, the point of departure is that identity transformations in the Turkish Cypriot community are also expected to be consistent with other societal trends. The rationale is simple, and the same as with the Greek Cypriots. As more Turkish Cypriots tend to identify as 'Cypriots', it is expected that there should be a trend towards re-approachment and reconciliation given the inclusive nature of the 'Cypriot' identity. Additionally however, unlike the Greek Cypriots where it was expected (or at least suspected) that more members of the community would choose outright Cypriotness rather than a combination of their Greek and Cypriot cultural

identities due to the Greek Cypriot narrative's equation of the two combined with the 'Hellenic Cyprus' dogma which was the basis for *enosis* itself, it is expected in the Turkish Cypriot community to see more people identifying as 'Turkish Cypriot' rather than simply 'Cypriot'.

Consistent with the prediction outlined above, 2008, the year before the right-wing's return to power and revision of the official narrative saw 56% of Turkish Cypriots identifying as being Turkish and Cypriot to the same degree while 24% and 20% identified as being only or mostly Turkish or Cypriot respectively. By 2009, the percentage of those identifying as 'Turkish Cypriot' has risen to 62% (20% only/mostly Turkish, 18% only/mostly Cypriot) (Cyp15 2011, p. 7).

Following UBP's return, it would be expected that a decline (if any) in the number of Turkish Cypriots self-identifying as such would be met by a corresponding increase in the number of those identifying as mostly/only Turkish given the nationalist stance of the party and its popular appeal at the time. This however was not the case in reality as although there was a decline in the percentage of those self-identifying as 'Turkish Cypriot' (62% in 2009 – 53% in 2011), the significant increase was in the percentage of those identifying as only/mostly Cypriot (18% in 2009 – 25% in 2011) although there was a minor increase for those identifying as Turkish (20% in 2009 – 22% in 2011) (Cyp2015 2011, p. 7).

By 2013, the majority of Turkish Cypriots (43%) identified primarily as 'Cypriot' with a close 41% identifying primarily as 'Turkish Cypriot' while, interestingly, equal percentages (8%) identified 'Turkish' and 'European' as their primary identities. The percentage of Turkish Cypriots who identified primarily as such

however increased by 2014 to 61% with the gains met with corresponding declines in those identifying primarily as ‘Cypriot’ (43% in 2013 – 30% in 2014) and ‘European’ (8% in 2013 – 1% in 2014) while the percentage of those whose primary identity is ‘Turkish’ remained the same at 8% (Ioannou *et al.* 2015b, pp. 122-123; See also Appendix F).

At first glance, the nature of Turkish Cypriot identity configurations overtime reveals the lack of a particular trend overtime with fluctuations between the years seeming to be void of a recognizable pattern. The simple explanation for these shifts in the Turkish Cypriot community’s identity perceptions I would argue is that they are reflective of the political and social changes that occurred within the Turkish Cypriot community. The data itself provides evidence of this claim. The decrease in the percentage of Turkish Cypriots identifying as Turkish and Cypriot to the same degree between 2009 and 2011 coincides with the return of the nationalist UPB (although admittedly the corresponding increase in those identifying primarily as Turkish in the same period is significantly less than those identifying primarily as Cypriot – 2% and 7% increases respectively). The return of the left-wing CTP to power in 2013 however was met with a 20% increase in the percentage of those who identified primarily as Turkish Cypriot.

At the very least, this speaks to the fact that the adult segment of Turkish Cypriot society is susceptible to changes in official discourse (UBP’s Turkish nationalism & CTP’s Cypriotism) which makes it possible to prematurely point to the efficacy of H<sub>2</sub> (at least in terms of identity configurations) especially as Mertan (2011) found that Turkish Cypriot children internalize official conceptualizations of their identity (cited in Husnu & Lajunen 2015, p. 66). A sentiment that is evidenced by Vural

(2009)'s findings on identity configurations amongst a sample of Turkish Cypriot students in 2008 which was consistent with Cyprus2015's findings amongst the adult population for the same year. As with the adult population, the majority of Turkish Cypriot students sampled identified as 'Turkish Cypriots' (37.1%) followed by those who identified as 'Turkish' (27.2%), 'Cypriot' (20.7%), 'Muslim' (12.2%) and 'Other' (2.7%) (Vural 2009, p. 414). This similarity allows us to infer, albeit with a degree of caution, that the trends in the adult and student populations are somewhat parallel to one another.

The identity fluctuations outlined above, however erratic, seem to be indicative however of an overall trend towards the less belligerent identifiers, 'Turkish Cypriot' and 'Cypriot' with the majority tending to oscillate between the two over the years. During a recent study, Anagiotos (2015) found that not only did none of the participants identify as Turkish, some even rejected the notion of being Turkish entirely. It then follows that at worst, corresponding fluctuations, or at best, a similar, progressive, pattern should be observed in relation to other social indicators and in the SCORE Index.

As expected, there were corresponding fluctuations in the percentages of Turkish Cypriots who considered themselves as having Turkish cultural roots and those who considered Turkey as their 'mother country' in the 2008-2011 period with declines in both indicators (3% & 4% decreases respectively) between 2008 and 2009 (CTP regime) and significant increases (11% & 9% respectively) in both between 2009 and 2011 (UBP regime) (See Cyp15 2011, p. 6). The trend in Turkish Cypriot society towards the use of the inclusive identifier 'Cypriot' [either as Turkish Cypriot or out rightly Cypriot] however, is "slightly inconsistent" with the results of the SCORE

Index, particularly in terms of reconciliation and cultural distance (Ioannou *et al.* 2015b, p. 122).

Comprehensively, the trend amongst the Turkish Cypriot community in relation to reconciliation was negative with the SCORE Index reporting reconciliation to be at 6.9, 6.2, and 4.9 for the years (2013, 2014 & 2015 respectively). Apart from the level of intergroup contact (which is measured positively on a scale of 1-10) which increased between 2013 (1.7) and 2014 (3.8) and declined again by 2015 (2.5) and intergroup anxiety (measured negatively on a scale of 1-10), which declined slightly between 2013 (3.3) and 2014 (3.2) going back up to 4.5 in 2015, all other indicators displayed negative trends corresponding to the overall reconciliation component of the SCORE Index.

Overall, the identity trend amongst the Turkish Cypriot community towards more inclusivity is at odds with the trend towards less reconciliation. A report on the SCORE findings for 2015 however attributes this decline in reconciliatory attitudes to negative contact experiences experienced by the Turkish Cypriots particularly on the ‘Greek side’ of the island (SeeD 2015, p. 11) rather than problems within the community itself.

## Chapter 7

### HYPOTHESIS TESTING

This chapter attempts to prove the hypotheses of this study by considering the trends of public opinion in both Northern Ireland and Cyprus within the context of educational reform.

#### 7.1 Education and Public Opinion in Northern Ireland

In line with  $H_1$  it was expected that public opinion in Northern Ireland should unequivocally display an upward trend towards greater community relations. Not just due to the rise of integrated education and the other educational programmes aimed at bridging the gap between the two communities specifically targeted towards the demography of the sample used, but also because the conflict itself had an agreement reached about it nearly 2 decades ago. Therefore, as the integrated sector expands and the segregated sector becomes less segregated,  $H_3$  (in line with contact theory) predicts that the dynamics of conflict cease to be reproduced as religious mixing is expected to improve community relations over the long-term (Hayes *et al.* 2013, p. 74).

The overall picture from Northern Ireland allows for an acceptance of  $H_3$  because, despite some outliers such as the percentage of respondents who prefer own-religion to mixed-religion schooling (the reasons for which have been explained earlier) which remained relatively stable over-time, the evidence displays a general upward moving trend towards societal cohesion and communal reconciliation as embodied



by increases in the number of respondents who expressed a preference for mixed neighbourhoods (especially important given persistent segregation in this area), mixed workplaces, inter-religious marriages and the increases in positive inter-communal feelings, as predicted.

The hypothesis is further supported by the increases in positive feelings towards the communal 'other' observed in both the Catholic and Protestant communities leading to the conclusion that the education reform process in Northern Ireland did indeed exert not only a negative influence on the process of 'conflict reproduction', in line with H<sub>1</sub>, but also a corresponding positive influence on inter-communal relations as well as inter-communal perceptions as predicted by H<sub>3</sub>.

## **7.2 Education and Public Opinion in Cyprus**

Comparatively, while the picture of the Greek Cypriot community seems to indicate a general trend towards re-approachment, with steady (albeit gradual) increases both in the percentage of Greek Cypriots that identify primarily as 'Cypriot' and also in the reconciliation component of the SCORE Index, the fluctuations in the Turkish Cypriot society seem to be symptomatic of the political changes it experienced although this does not explain the steady decline in reconciliatory attitudes between 2013 and 2015 during which period the left-wing, pro-unification CTP was the dominant party in government which is instead the result of the negative contact experiences of the Turkish Cypriots.

Overall however, the 'boom-and-bust' movements in Turkish Cypriot public opinion seem to be consistent with the predictions of H<sub>4</sub> although in a limited sense given the insufficiency of the information available which makes a long-term, wide-ranging

comparison possible. Additionally, the fact that the data consulted refers to the adult, rather than student population makes an absolute acceptance of the hypothesis in relation to the Turkish Cypriot community impossible.

However, if we depart from the notion that the responses of the adult population to the official discourse and dominant political party ideology are parallel to the responses of the student population to the official educational narrative which themselves are produced based on the dominant party's ideology (Nationalism or Cypriotism) then  $H_4$ , and  $H_2$ , hold true in that the negative trend experienced following the end of the CTP regime and return of UBP in 2009 would be replicated following the return to the conflict-sustaining pre-reform narrative that same year.

According to  $H_4$ , it is expected that the lack of any wide-ranging educational (or even general societal) reform in the Greek Cypriot community should have kept reconciliatory attitudes either on the same level, or on a downward trend. While the evidence seems to contradict this prediction at first glance, an intricate analysis of the different societal trends in the Greek Cypriot society proves the hypothesis to be true.

Between 2008 & 2011, the percentage of Greek Cypriots who considered themselves to have Greek cultural roots, and more importantly, saw Greece as their mother country remained in the majority experiencing additional increases during the same period. This I would argue is indicative of the persistence of Greek nationalism in the official Greek Cypriot discourse. Furthermore, in addition to my earlier argument that the fact that the Greek Cypriot narrative posits being Greek and being Cypriot as the same renders the steady increase in the number of Greek Cypriots who identify primarily as Cypriot over time at the very least questionable, the increase in

reconciliatory attitudes recorded for the 2013-2015 period is also explained by exogenous rather than endogenous factors.

The increase in reconciliatory attitudes is symptomatic of the gradual adoption of “European values of tolerance and multiculturalism” by the Greek Cypriots (SeeD 2015, p. 11). Therefore, it is possible that barring the exogenous intervention, the lack of any endogenous changes would have caused societal trends among both the adult and student Greek Cypriot populations to have remained relatively consistent overtime with only minute changes (largely limited to the adult population) in response to the political climate.

Overall therefore both H<sub>2</sub> & H<sub>4</sub> hold true in the Turkish Cypriot case to the extent that changes in the official narrative correspond to changes in public opinion overtime which reflect whether or not conflictual dynamics were being replicated or not. It is not possible at this time to draw a similar conclusion regarding the Greek Cypriots given a lack of adequate information and the influence of external interventions.

### **7.3 A Comparative Look at Northern Ireland and Cyprus**

At first glance, the most obvious conclusion to be drawn looking at the influence of education in the Northern Ireland (structure) and Cyprus (content) conflicts is that the structural reform in Northern Ireland seemed less effective than the content reform enacted by the Turkish Cypriot’s as evidenced by the fact that while increasingly positive, public opinion in Northern Ireland changed more sluggishly than in Cyprus, at least during the period this study covered. Drawing such a conclusion however would be in error.

This is because the so-called structural reform in Northern Ireland was and for the most part remains largely limited to the development and expansion of the integrated sector rather than an overhaul of the system as a whole somewhat forcing the majority of schools to be at least informally integrated. As a result of this cautionary approach, the integrated sector still accounts for less than 10% of school enrolments which means the majority of students are not exposed to the mixing that integration is intended to encourage as opposed to Cyprus where, following the enactment of the reforms, all Turkish Cypriot students, public or private, were directly exposed to the new narrative and so expecting to see the same level of changes in both cases would be unrealistic.

However, an argument might be made that the fact that public opinion percentages in Northern Ireland on a significant number of variables as far back as 1998 remained relatively similar to percentages in 2015 actually points to the sluggishness of attitudinal changes. However, as I had just mentioned, the percentage of respondents who had themselves been directly exposed to the influence of the reform is minute.

Overall, I would still argue that the Turkish Cypriot content reform in Cyprus was somewhat more effective than the structural reform in Northern Ireland for the simple reason that the changes in educational reform were also met with a general change in societal position as reflected by political and implicitly ideological changes. As such, students were, after being exposed to a reconciliatory narrative in schools, met with similar positions (at least to a marginally significant degree in the general public).

## Chapter 8

### CONCLUSION

Based on the premise that there are at least two distinct types of inter-group conflict: resource based conflicts, where the point of contention is the division of a proverbial 'pie' and so, because their primary grievances tend to be related to the allocation of resources, are easily resolved following mutual compromise by the parties involved and the second type of group-based conflicts, identity-based conflicts which have become the most prominent type of conflict in the post-war era.

Identity-based conflicts are unique because they are existential in that rather than being over the allocation of resources, the crux of such conflicts is the (perceived) incompatibility of the identities of the groups involved. These conflicts therefore tend to be intractable in that since grievances are based on cultural, religious, ethnic and racial differences which are neither easily negotiated over, nor even open to compromise as they lie at the very core of both the individual and the group's existence.

As such, even following the cessation of large-scale violence, such conflicts tend to be sustained by the process of socialization. This is so because it is the socialization process which denotes an individual's place in society and imbues him both with his individual and perhaps more importantly his collective identity and all the accompanying implications. Individuals born into societies experiencing intractable

identity-based conflicts tend therefore to be socialized into the conflict by agents such as the family, schools, religious institutions, peers and the mass media. All of which individually, and collectively, imbue the individual with his social identity, of which one aspect is the knowledge of the collective ‘other’ against which his identity is constructed.

Within the theoretical framework of social constructivism which posits that actors’ identities, social constructs acquired via interaction with social structures, drive their actions, this study set out to explore the means through which one particular socializing agent, the education system, might be conflict sustaining through the generational transmission of conflictual dynamics such as espousing the notion of a collective enemy against which the in-group is to rally. The implication here is that even decades after the conflict itself has ended, or after violence has ended, tensions still remain as high as they were at the height of the conflict between a new generation of in-group members who themselves have little to no first hand knowledge of conflict or the ‘evil’ out-group.

To explore this relationship, two persistent conflicts in which education has, and continues to play an important role in the search for peace, and which have also undergone the process of educational reform were chosen: The Northern Ireland conflict and the Cyprus conflict. As the education system itself is made up of two distinct tiers, the overall *structure* which determines the very nature of schooling, and the *content* which comprises what it taught, the study focuses on the most salient aspect of the education systems in Cyprus and Northern Ireland in relation to the conflict in both societies i.e. the segregated structure of education in Northern Ireland and the conflict-oriented historical narratives taught in Cypriot schools.

Guided by the presumption that societal public opinion trends in both societies should respond to changes in the structure and content of their respective education systems, this study set out to explore whether attempts at desegregating the education system in Northern Ireland, which by virtue of its very existence is conflict-sustaining in that, in addition to the general societal segregation, it keeps members of the Protestant and Catholic communities separate allowing negative stereotypes to flourish, and an attempt at historical curricular reform in the Turkish Cypriot community in Cyprus, were reflected in public opinion trends in both societies (with a positive upward trend to be expected for both communities in Northern Ireland and the Turkish Cypriot community in Cyprus as the Greek Cypriot community has not yet, as at the time of writing, undergone any reform).

Understanding that education reform itself is insufficient to alter societal attitudes, the study did not set out to prove causality between education reform and positive public opinion movements, but rather a correlation between the two variables i.e. to explore whether a relationship exists between the two variables (Lamont 2015, p. 109).

The study found in the case of Northern Ireland that the educational reform process did indeed correlate with the trends in public opinion amongst teenagers in Northern Ireland. Still a heavily segregated society, the fact that teenagers (most of which were/are students) were consistently feeling more positively regarding the 'other' community speaks volumes. The results from Cyprus were less clear-cut. The Greek Cypriot community, which had not experienced education reform experienced consistent positive upward movements both in terms of reconciliation and in relation to identity configurations within the community with more members tending to

choose the inclusive identity category ‘Cypriot’ although this can be accorded to the adoption of European norms of multiculturalism. Trends within the Turkish Cypriot community on the other hand were consistent with what is to be expected with a negative trend following the return to right-wing official narrative (amongst the adult population) which is expected to have replicated by the student population following the parallel return to the re-reform narrative in the education system.

Overall however, while H<sub>3</sub> which predicts that educational de-segregation in Northern Ireland would lead to a positive trend, is easily accepted in the case of Northern Ireland, H<sub>4</sub> which predicted that a reform of the official narrative in Cyprus would lead to a positive trend does not hold with the Greek Cypriot community due to exogenous interventions. It is however acceptable in the case of the Turkish Cypriots who experienced a downtrend in the immediate aftermath of a return to the pre-reform conflict-sustaining narrative.

## **8.1 Recommendations**

In Northern Ireland, although the desegregation of the education is a step in the right direction, my primary recommendation is that the schools be used as a spring-board for other community-relations programmes for young people which, rather than being geared towards providing *generic* contact between members of the Catholic and Protestant communities be used to foster inter-communal *friendships* which have been found to be more positively associated with inter-group forgiveness (See Voci *et al.*, 2015). In fact, even if the number of participants in such programmes remains low, there are still benefits to be realized as “extended contact”, an indirect form of contact characterized by knowing that a member of the in-group has direct



contact with out-group members has also been shown to reduce out-group prejudice (Hewstone & Hughes 2015, p. 65).

Also, although community-relations programmes are underway in Cyprus aimed at bridging the gap between the Turkish and Greek Cypriot communities, these are unlikely to be optimally effective considering the fact that the student participants are still taught in school what the overall societal position regarding the ‘other’ community is, which remains extremely negative. The most important step for the Cypriots therefore would be for both communities to listen to each others’ narratives and attempt to understand the position of the other as one of the primary problems the communities have faced overtime is that while each wants to be listened to, neither wants to listen (Zeka 2015, p. 150). Therefore, both communities’ education systems need to be reformed in line with what Zembylas & Boler (2002) called the “Pedagogy of Discomfort” which problematizes the way in which the ‘other’ is represented in both communities (cited in Karahassan & Zembylas 2006, p. 706).

Overall however, both communities in Northern Ireland and Cyprus need to move from ‘thin recognition’ to ‘thick recognition’ with an aim to accepting “the other’s identity and history” and re-narrate the understanding of identity and of self (Stromborn, 2014 cited in Kunze 2015, pp. 7-8). The goal here is to change the communities’ understanding of their social identities in an effort to make them more accepting and co-habitant (as opposed to identity homogeneity).

## **8.2 Direction for Further Study**

Similar to this particular study, further research is needed to adequately assess the extent to which education does indeed affect societal perceptions especially in cases

on intractable conflict. The best way to go about this would be a Large-N comparative study looking at a number of factors across different conflict configurations.

Such a study should be, in addition to horizontal extensiveness, be vertically extensive in that it should take into account various variables in addition to the ones explored in this study such as the adult populations perceptions on changing perceptions of the future generations or even students' perceptions of what they think of other members of society (rather than their own individual opinions) on issues etc.

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


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Zurcher, C. (2007) *The Post-Soviet Wars: Rebellion, Ethnic Conflict, and Nationhood in the Caucasus*. New York: New York University Press.


## **APPENDICES**

## Appendix A: Responses to RELGALWY (1998-2000; 2003-2015)




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## Appendix B: Responses to MXRLGNGH (1999-2000; 2004-2015)




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**Appendix C: Responses to FEELCATH (2003; 2005-2007; 2011-2015)**




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**Appendix D: Responses to FEELPROT (2003; 2005-2007; 2011-2015)**




Source: YLT

**Appendix E: Greek Cypriot Identity Configurations (2008-2009; 2011; 2013-2014)**



Sources: Seed & UNDP

**Appendix F: Turkish Cypriot Identity Configurations (2008-2009; 2011; 2013-2014)**



Sources: SeeD & UNDP