

**A Neo-Realist Approach to the Challenges Facing the
United Nations in Conflict Resolution:
Rwanda as a Case Study**

Abosedo Stella Adeyeye

Submitted to the
Institute of Graduate Studies and Research
in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of

Master of Arts
in
International Relations

Eastern Mediterranean University
January 2018
Gazimağusa, North Cyprus

Approval of the Institute of Graduate Studies and Research

Assoc. Prof. Dr. Ali Hakan Ulusoy
Acting Director

I certify that this thesis satisfies the requirements as a thesis for the degree of Master of Arts in International Relations.

Prof. Dr. Erol Kaymak
Chair, Department of Political Science and
International Relations

We certify that we have read this thesis and that in our opinion it is fully adequate in scope and quality and as a thesis for the degree of Master of Arts in International Relations.

Asst. Prof. Dr. Nuray Vasfieva Ibryamova
Supervisor

Examining Committee

1. Assoc. Prof. Dr. Mohamed Moncef Khaddar _____

2. Asst. Prof. Dr. Nuray Vasfieva Ibryamova _____

3. Asst. Prof. Dr. John Albert Turner _____

ABSTRACT

The United Nations has been faced with a lot of challenges pertaining to different conflicts since its establishment in 1945. In particular, these challenges concern the plethora of intrastate conflicts that emerged after the Cold War ended in the late 1980s, which exposed many countries to conflicts that found their basis in a variety of issues, such as power sharing, ethnicity, and resource control and distribution.

Today, most especially in Africa, the United Nations (UN) is facing challenges with many problems, such as conflicts around the world, human rights issues, environmental problems, and terrorism. While the United Nations as an international organization for the maintenance of peace and security around the world has made some positive impact in dealing with these conflicts, like in the cases of Liberia and Cambodia, its failure in Rwanda remains a stain on its peacekeeping record.

The Rwandan case was chosen for present purposes to examine certain critical issues related to the conflict in Rwanda as they relate to the role played by the UN. Another major concern of this thesis is to argue that the UN cannot function without the full support of its member states. The Rwandan case was also purposefully chosen in order to reveal some of the main reasons that led to the failure of the United Nations in conflict resolution and how the factors behind the failure of the mission have affected other peacekeeping missions.

The objective of this thesis is to explain the Rwanda conflict and the role the UN played in the conflict as well the challenges the United Nation Peacekeeping Mission

in Rwanda (UNAMIR) faced during intervention. The thesis will employ the Neo-realist theory in order to critically explain the factors behind the failures of the UN's peacekeeping operation in Rwanda.

Keywords: Rwanda, United Nations, Peacekeeping, Conflict Resolution

ÖZ

Birleşmiş Milletler, 1945'teki kuruluşundan günümüze çeşitli zorluklarla ve bu zorlukların yarattığı farklı anlaşmazlıklarla karşı karşıya kalmıştır. Özellikle, 1980'li yılların sonlarında, Soğuk Savaş Dönemi sonrasına ait zaman diliminde güç paylaşımı, etnik köken, kaynak kontrolü ve dağıtımı ile alakalı konularda yaşanan anlaşmazlıklardan dolayı çeşitli ülkelerde iç savaşların yaşandığını ifade etmek mümkündür.

Günümüzde, özellikle Afrika'da Birleşmiş Milletler (BM), Dünya genelindeki anlaşmazlıklar, insan hakları, çevresel problemler ve terörizm gibi birçok farklı sorunla karşı karşıya kalmaktadır. Dünya barışının ve güvenliğinin korunması amacıyla kurulan uluslararası bir örgüt olan BM, Liberya ve Komboçya 'da yaşanan çatışmalara yapmış olduğu müdahalelerle takdir toplarken Ruanda yaşanan çatışmalara müdahalesinin yetersiz kalmasından ötürü bölgede barış ve güvenliği sağlamada etkili olamamıştır.

Tezde, Ruanda vakası BM'nin üstlenmiş olduğu role bağlı kalarak, orada çatışmaya yol açan önemli hususları mercek altına almak amacıyla seçilmiştir. Mevcut çalışmanın bir başka önemli noktası ise BM'in üye devletlerin tam desteğini almadan randımanlı olarak çalışamayacağını tartışmaktır. Öte yandan, çalışmada BM'in Ruanda'da yaşanan çatışmalara çözüm üretmedeki başarısızlığının altında yatan önemli nedenler de irdelenmiş olup, bu nedenlerin BM'in üstlendiği barışı koruma misyonunu nasıl etkilediği de ele alınmıştır.

Mevcut çalışmanın amacı Ruanda'daki yaşanan çatışmayı ve BM'nin bu çatışmadaki rolünü ele alıp, BM'in Ruanda'da üstlendiği Barış Gücü Misyonu'nun (UNAMIR) yaşanan çatışmaya müdahale ederken yaşamış olduğu güçlükleri açıklamaktır. Çalışma, BM'in Ruanda'da gerçekleştirdiği barış operasyonunun başarısız olmasına yol açan etkenleri Neo- Realist Teori ışığında eleştirel bir dille açıklamıştır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Ruanda, Birleşmiş Milletler, Barışı Koruma, Çatışmaların Çözülmesi

DEDICATION

To My Parents

ACKNOWLEDGMENT

First and foremost, my appreciation goes to Almighty GOD for granting me the grace to accomplish this thesis. I would also like to record my gratitude to my supervisor, Asst. Prof. Dr. Nuray Ibryamova for her supervision, advise, contribution and guidance throughout the period of writing this thesis, without her, this work would be impossible. Most importantly, she provided me constant encouragement and support in various ways. Her ideas, experiences, and passions has truly inspire and enrich my growth as a student. I am truly indebted to her more than she knows.

My gratitude generally goes to all the International Relations staffs for making me achieve my goals in EMU, without their help and knowledge they impacted to me, I would not have reached this far. My appreciation goes to Assoc. Prof. Erol Kaymak, head of the department of international Relations for all of his recommendations and support.

Most importantly, I acknowledge my dear family, with more appreciation going to my dad, Mr Gbenga Adeyeye and my mum, Mrs Kemi Adeyeye for their parental support right from my childhood till what I am today. I cannot just thank them enough. A sincere appreciation goes to Mr Victor Adedeji for his support, encouragement and advices on this thesis and generally throughout my stay in Cyprus. Special thanks goes to my friend, Samuel Akoni, for his support in guiding this work. God bless you all.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT	iii
ÖZ	v
DEDICATION	vii
ACKNOWLEDGMENT	viii
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS	xii
1 INTRODUCTION	1
1.1 Background to the Study	1
1.2 Research Problem and Research Question.....	3
1.3 Purpose of the Study	3
1.4 Hypotheses	4
1.5 Significance and Importance of the Study	4
1.6 Case Study Design and Justification.....	5
1.7 Research Method.....	6
1.8 Sources of Data/Methods of Data Collection	6
1.8.1 Content Analysis	6
1.9 Theoretical Framework	6
1.10 Research Limitations.....	9
1.11 Structure of the Study.....	9
2 LITERATURE REVIEW.....	11
2.1 What Is Conflict?	11
2.2 Conceptualizing Conflict Resolution	15
2.3 Theories of Conflict Resolution.....	18
2.3.1 John Burton: Human Needs Theory and Problem Solving Approach	18

2.3.2 Zartman’s Ripeness Theory and Hurting Stalemate	19
3 BACKGROUND TO THE RWANDA CONFLICT AND THE ROLE PLAYED BY THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY IN THE CONFLICT	23
3.1 Introduction	23
3.2 Rwanda Conflict – Background	24
3.3 Rwanda’s Colonia Era – Ethnic Relations	26
3.3.1 Ethnic Conflict Begins	27
3.4 Arusha Peace Agreement of 1993.....	30
3.5 The Genocide	31
3.6 International Community Role in the Rwanda Genocide	32
4 THE ROLE AND PURPOSE OF THE UNITED NATIONS IN THE MANAGEMENT AND RESOLUTION OF THE RWANDAN CONFLICT.....	39
4.1 Introduction	39
4.2 The Role of the Security Council.....	40
4.3 The Role of the UN Secretary General	41
4.3.1 Activities of Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali vis-à-vis the Rwanda Conflict.....	42
4.4 The International Court of Justice (ICJ).....	43
4.5 Establishment of United Nation Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) and its Mandate	47
4.5.1 Mandate.....	47
4.5.2 Analysis of Situation and the Role of UNAMIR in Rwanda.....	48
4.6 Challenges Faced by UNAMIR in the Rwandan Conflict and the Reasons Behind its Failure	50
5 CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION	57

REFERENCES..... 63

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

BBC	British Broadcasting Co-operation
CNN	Cable News Network
DPKO	Department of Peacekeeping Operations
ICJ	International Court of Justice
ICTR	International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
OAU	Organization of African Unity
PKM	Peacekeeping Mission
PKO	Peacekeeping Operation
RPF	Rwanda Patriotic Front
UN	United Nations
UNAMIR	United Nations Peacekeeping Mission in Rwanda
UNSC	United Nations Security Council

Chapter 1

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background to the Study

The significance of global peace and security following World War II led to the establishment of the United Nations in 1945. Overtime, the United Nations and the international community have been faced with a lot of challenges pertaining to different conflicts. In particular, these challenges concern the plethora of intrastate conflicts that emerged after the Cold War ended in the late 1980s, which exposed many countries to conflicts that found their basis in a variety of issues (such as power sharing, ethnicity, and resource control and distribution) due to the division brought about by the indirect confrontations between the Soviet Union and the United States. While the United Nations as an international organization for the maintenance of peace and security has made some positive impact in dealing with these conflicts, like in the cases of Liberia and Cambodia, its failure in Rwanda remains the most shameful example of its peacekeeping ability and a challenge to the international community.

The Rwandan case is also a testament to the fact that without the support and intervention of the international community and the United Nations' member states, the United Nations itself cannot function effectively.

Furthermore, the contradictory norms and principles of the international system, which places more emphasis on state sovereignty, territorial integrity, and non-intervention, has been a challenge to conflict resolution (Oliver P, 1999:185) whereby emphasis on state sovereignty has made the international community believe that intrastate conflict, war, and genocide are basically the concern of the state where such conflicts are taking place and not the concern of the international community. However, this is changing as Article 1 of the Genocide convention emphasis on how sovereignty no longer exclusively protects states from foreign interference, and this places an interfering role in the hands of the UN and international community to prevent and halt genocide in the international system (UNDPKO, 2012). Regardless, states still show less intervention in intra-states conflicts due to the anarchical structure of the international system, which is based on self-interest and calculations. Hence, UN member states' lack of interest in any conflict that may affect international peace results in their failure to provide necessary financial and military assistance needed to resolving such conflicts. This has provided proof in support of the Neo-realist view on international institutions.

This, therefore, shows clearly that international organizations, most especially the United Nations, have been facing lots of challenges in dealing with intra-state conflicts. Hence, the focus of this thesis is to explain the reasons behind the failures of the UN in intra-state conflicts using the case of Rwanda, by explaining the UN's practices in the Rwandan conflict in an effort to figure out their challenges and provide recommendations on how the UN can best deal with intra-state conflicts.

1.2 Research Problem and Research Question

It is most appropriate to emphasize that the United Nations can do little (or even nothing in some cases) to aid the prevention of conflict or the resolution of conflicts. Rather, they are best at offering states opportunities to reduce or end hostilities through conflict negotiation. Even though the United Nations has successfully made a positive impact in few instances of conflict resolution, like in Cambodia and Liberia, the reasons behind its failures in other missions, as in Rwanda, need to be identified so as to create room for improvement in both present and future missions. Therefore, my research seeks to answer the question: What explains the failures of the UN Peacekeeping operation in Rwanda?

In answering this research question, I intend to examine the background of the Rwanda conflict, examine the early warning signs and the conflict ripe moment which is an essential component for prevention, identify if there was a ripe moment prior to the United Nations' intervention. Also, I intend to make an attempt at identifying and explaining the reasons behind the United Nations' failures in the Rwandan conflict, as well as the UN's reasons for its late intervention and the reasons behind the reluctance of the member states.

1.3 Purpose of The Study

The purpose of this thesis is to critically analyse the United Nations' role as an international organization by laying more emphasis on its ineffectiveness in conflict prevention and conflict resolution in the case of Rwanda. Rwanda's case has been a challenge to the international community and was chosen for present purposes so as to examine certain critical issues related to the conflict in Rwanda and in relation to the role played by the UN. Another major concern of this thesis is to argue that the

United Nations – as an international organization for the maintenance of peace and security – cannot function alone without the full support of its member states. The case of Rwanda was also purposefully chosen in order to reveal some of the main reasons that led to the failure of the United Nations in conflict resolution and how the factors behind the failure of the mission have affected other peacekeeping missions.

1.4 Hypotheses

H1: The United Nations Peacekeeping Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR) failed due to reluctance on the part of its member states to provide necessary assistance for the mission.

H2: The United Nations, as an international organization, cannot independently perform the function of conflict resolution and management without the support of its member state and the international community.

H0: There is no relationship between the failure of UNAMIR and the behaviour of the United Nations' member states and the international community at large.

1.5 Significance and Importance of the Study

This thesis is important because it embodies an attempt to add to the existing literature on the role(s) of the UN, as well as the challenges faced by the United Nations in conflict resolution, especially in intra-state conflicts. The work is also significant because it will critically examine the underlying factors behind the failures of the United Nations Peacekeeping Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR). In other words, the research will provide actual analyses of different obstacles hindering the UN's effective functioning in terms of conflict resolution.

In sum, this thesis will be of importance to the United Nations because the researcher will provide recommendations and suggestions on how to improve its effectiveness as an international institution for the maintenance of peace and security.

1.6 Case Study Design and Justification

In international relations, case study research has been one of the used research methods. It is mostly used along with qualitative research as well as comparative methods. This research design has been used by the majority of international relations realists in proving most of their theoretical claims. Lamont (2015) argued that “case study research design is a historical study of an event”. Also, Gerring (2004: 342) added that case study design “is an intensive study of single unit for the purpose of understanding a large class of similar unit”. It also allows for detailed examination.

Therefore, case study design will be used in this thesis by focusing solely on the Rwandan conflict, and this is because the Rwanda conflict has been a major challenge to the international community and one of the well-known cases where the United Nations failed to maintain peace and security as an international organization. Also, Rwanda is known to be the last country that was declared to have experienced a genocide where the intervention and efforts of the UN failed. The case of Rwanda was also purposely chosen in order to reveal some of the main reasons that led to the failure of the United Nations in conflict resolution and how the factors behind the failure of the mission have manifested in other peacekeeping missions.

1.7 Research Method

The research of this thesis will be based on qualitative methods in explaining and analyzing the phenomena behind the United Nations' failure as an international institution for the maintenance of peace and security in Rwanda, and this will help to develop important observations and current issues on why the United Nations has failed in other peacekeeping missions. The importance of this research method is that it affords an alternative way of providing new recommendations for the UN.

1.8 Sources of Data/Methods of Data Collection

This thesis will rely primarily on secondary data collected from existing data sources, which will include publicly available academic articles, books, academic policy reports, and academic journals.

1.8.1 Content Analysis

This thesis will also rely on content analysis as a source of data analysis and presentation. Neuman (2007) explained that content analysis “could be viewed as a mechanism for gathering and analyzing documents which involves words, pictures, symbols and text. This text includes written, visual or spoken which could be used as a tool of communication”. Hence, content analysis is most appropriate for this research in that it is used mostly to explore secondary data rather than primary data, as well as UN documents, statements by decision makers, etc., especially as the Rwandan conflict is over two decades old. Therefore, content analysis is more suited so as to assess the impact and challenges faced by the United Nations during the course of its intervention.

1.9 Theoretical Framework

Having identified my research problem and research question, it is appropriate to elucidate a theoretical framework to serve as a guide and source of direction for the

research, as well as providing justification and a foundation that supports the research. A theory is explained to be “a set of interrelated constructs, definitions and proposition that present a systematic view of phenomena by specifying relations among variables with the purposes of explaining the predicting phenomena” (Kerlinger, 1973 in Nnabugwe, 2010).

The theoretical framework tends to be an important characteristic of various studies. It underpins the studies’ analyses, description, and interpretation. In recognition of this, this thesis will employ the Neo-realist theory (also known as Structural realism), which is associated with different scholars like John Mearsheimer and Kenneth Waltz, amongst others. Neo-realist theory emphasizes more on power and argues that power is the most essential factor in international relations whereby every state in the international community strives to increase its power – understood in terms of military and economic standing. States, especially great powers, are more concerned with the amount of military and economic power they have relative to others, and tend to try to increase their power by whatever means. In order words, all states want power and want to increase the amount of power they have due to the anarchical structure of the international system (Dunne et al., 2013).

The Neo-realist theory argues that institutions do not have any effect on maintaining world peace and security, but rather “institutions are a reflection of the distribution of power in the world” (Mearshiemer J 1995: 7).

In relation to international organizations, Neo-realism rejects the importance of international organizations because they believe these institutions are formed on the basis of relative gains and self-interest calculations. Neo-realist theory argues that

these institutions' rules only reflect the calculations of states' self-interest, which are based on the distribution of power. In the international system, only powerful states create and shape the functions and rules of these institutions for the reason of maintaining and increasing their own share of world power. Burchill (2005: 65) explains that neo-realists, such as Waltz, argue that states are more concerned with relative gains when it comes to cooperating with one another, rather than absolute gains, and this explains why states see no possibility of banding together to form institutions for maintaining peace and stability.

Mearsheimer argued that conflicts and the problem of cheating among or within states in the international system are commonly exploited and most times geared towards deriving national interests or gains (Mearsheimer, 2001: 30). The late intervention of the United Nations and a few member states like the United States demonstrated their lack of interest. The US for example, focuses more on security and economic issues that interest and matter most to her, and it explains better why the US failed to provide the necessary logistic support to the UN intervention in the Rwandan Genocide, which influenced and destructed the actions of the United Nations mission in Rwanda. The genocide was ignored by almost all the permanent members of the UN because the US and France for example, was more concerned with its own interests and its allies; it even had to withdraw its allies over the course of the intervention. This is why Kenneth Waltz argued that states act according to their own self-interest. When states face or put more interest in relative gains rather than absolute gains, cooperation becomes impossible or difficult (Viotti and Kauppi, 1999). Neo-realists do not believe in international institutions, such as the United Nations, as a force for maintaining peace and security because they believe the rules

of these institutions reflect state calculations of self- interest, which are basically about the distribution of power (Mearsheimer. J, 1995:13).

The reluctant actions of member states led to the shortcomings and the ultimate failure of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Rwanda. Obviously, international institutions are used as a tool of service for great and super powers. The UN Security Council's actions towards the Rwanda Genocide were informed by the calculations of its constitutive members. In other words, the UN's actions towards the conflict were a function of the behavior of its member states. The UN failed, in this respect, to demonstrate the objectives for which it was established – conflict resolution and the provision of humanitarian assistance to its member states.

1.10 Research Limitations

This thesis is limited in at least two respects. In the first instance, the use of a singular case study effectively reduces the generalizability of its results in addition to restricting the capacity for a comparative outlook.

Secondly, the fact that over two decades have passed since the 1994 Rwandan genocide means that access to information regarding activities at the time is somewhat limited. This, however, does not present as much of a challenge as one would expect as the aim of the study is to explicate the challenges facing the UN at the time and so even dated information should suffice for present purposes.

1.11 Structure of The Study

This thesis is divided into five distinct chapters. This, first, chapter provided a brief introduction to the United Nations' role in conflict resolution and its ineffectiveness in the Rwandan Genocide. This first chapter embodies an overview of the thesis,

starting from the introduction to the study, the research problem and research question, purpose of the study, hypotheses, objective and significance of the study, case study design and justification, research methods and data collection, content analysis, theoretical framework of the research, and the limitations of the research.

The second chapter will examine and review of the literature on conflict and conflict resolution in general. Different theories on conflict resolution, with particular emphasis on William Zartman's Ripeness theory, will also be examined.

The third chapter will give a general background on the Rwandan conflict/genocide, the Arusha Peace Agreement (1993). The third chapter will further expand on the role of the international community in the Rwanda conflict with much emphasis on the UN Permanent members (P5).

The fourth chapter of this thesis will examine the UN's peacekeeping activities in Rwanda starting with the role of the UN's constitutive organs and followed by an outline of the establishment of UNAMIR, its mandate, and its effectiveness in fulfilling its mandate in Rwanda. The chapter will further examine the problems faced by UNAMIR and examine the factors behind its failure, which will generally provide answers to the thesis' research question. The chapter will conclude with an exploration of the few successes achieved by UNAMIR even in light of its general failure in Rwanda. Chapter five contains the thesis' findings, conclusion, and recommendations.

Chapter 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

The purpose of this chapter is to examine and review the literature on conflict and conflict resolution in general. The chapter will also provide a review on related literature covering the various theories of conflict. As the current research is focused on the challenges facing the United Nations in conflict resolution, this chapter will therefore review the literature on the concept of conflict by providing an overview of the definitions of conflict, followed by a review of select theoretical approaches, as well as the work of scholars on what conflict resolution entails/should entail. Among the theories of conflict resolution, the focus will be on specific theories that are considered the most important in the field, and have also been a subject of practice to peacemakers: William Zartman's Ripeness Theory, John Burton's Human Need Theory, and the Problem Solving Approach propounded by Roger Fisher and Peter Wallensteen, amongst others.

2.1 What Is Conflict?

The word conflict is most commonly used as a way of expressing a situation in which there are two or more opposing and disagreeing sides or views about a specific matter, such as conflicts between clients, parties, and within or between states. All conflicts have their own features and cannot be explained or categorized in the same way. Wallensteen (2002: 16) defines conflict as "a social situation in which a minimum of two actors (parties) strive to acquire at the same moment in time an available set of scarce resources." Obviously, Wallensteen's definition of conflict

places more emphasis on resources, or more specifically, the availability of scarce resources. This conception, however, is rather narrow as not all conflicts are about resources, scarce resources, and the availability of said resources. Conflicts could also center on non-resource based issues, such as identity, although even such conflicts do tend to be underwritten by resource considerations (Northrup, 1989). Regardless, identity-based conflicts and resource-based conflicts are fundamentally different both in their causes and their dynamics with the latter notoriously more resistant to resolution. In sum, while all identity-based conflicts might have resource considerations built into them, not all resource-based conflicts carry elements of identity (Rothman 1997: 11).

In every aspect of human life, conflict is inevitable. This is why Zartman (1996: 370) described it as something that happens in our everyday life. Stagner (1967: 16) defines conflict as:

“a situation in which two or more human beings desire goods which they perceive as being obtainable by one or the other, but not both ...each party is mobilizing energy to obtain a goal, a desired object or situation, and each party perceives the other as a barrier or threat to that goal”.

While Stagner’s definition of conflict provides a general definition of the concept, it explains the deep root behind conflict between parties and this however can make us understand why parties, groups and even states get involved in conflicts.

While there are numerous conflicts related to, or caused by cultural differences, religious issues, ideological differences and many more, for the purpose of this thesis, our concern is centred on conflicts that involve societies or groups of people within, or between states. Hence, more emphasis will be placed on the common

component that explains both actions and reactions in regards to reasons why conflicts occur and what makes conflicts different from one another. For instance, Kriesberg's definition of conflict – as a “situation of tension which was caused by a number of factors including the degree to which the needs of a person were in a ‘state of hunger’ or ‘satisfaction’” – makes us understand that tensions exist and there are dissatisfactions over needs, which often result in conflict. However, the definition failed to clarify the extent to which needs could be determined (Kriesberg. L 2000: 143).

Conflict emerges when parties are plagued by differences, opposing wishes or contradicting wants, or desires that are irreconcilable (Boulding, 1963; Mannix & Jehn, 2001). Jehn (1995) opined that “conflict is ubiquitous across teams with a high level of task interdependence”. These definitions, when taken in unison, make us understand that conflict is incited by opposing values as well as different goals of team members and when different groups within a state or different states have different strategies for achieving the same goals.

The different definitions of the concept of conflict provided above help us to understand what conflict is, and its significance. In my own words however, I define conflict to be “whenever incompatible activities, interests, or goals emerge between two or more parties; both parties obstructing, distracting, or interfering with each other's activities, and in one way or the other make each other less effective and in most cases not been able to achieve their interest. This definition of conflict provides a general conception of what conflict is in the real sense, what it comprises, and the attendant components. It is noteworthy that even as the concept of conflict is often misconstrued as war or violence, even though they are related, differences abound

even though most conflicts end up leading to violence and war like in the case of the Cyprus conflict. The tension between the Turkish and Greek Cypriots in 1963, when the Republic of Cyprus' first president decided to make an amendment to the constitution, can be regarded as a situation of conflict. By the mid-1960s, the tension escalated to include violence and war between the two communities, which are seen as the primary actors.

In Africa, conflict has continued to exist as a major security problem. The high rate of conflict in Africa and the inability of the peacekeeping operation (PKO) to resolve these conflicts, as in the case of Rwanda, has remained a critical challenge not just to African Governments, but also the United Nations. While most of these conflicts are internal conflicts, they end up spilling over into neighbouring countries, which results in insecurity and instability in the region, despite the presence of UN Peacekeepers. In 1992, Salim Ahmed, then General Secretary of Organization of Africa Unity emphasized that:

“Conflicts have cast a dark shadow over the prospects for a united, secure and prosperous Africa which we seek to create... Conflicts have caused immense suffering to our people and, in the worst case, death. Men, women and children have been uprooted, dispossessed, deprived of their means of livelihood and thrown into exile as refugees as a result of conflicts. Conflicts have engendered hate and division among our people and undermined the prospects of the long term stability and unity of our countries and Africa as a whole. Since much energy, time and resources have been devoted to meeting the exigencies of conflict, our countries have been unable to harness the energies of our people and target them to development” (OAU, 1992).

Now, even as conflict occurs when two or more actors have different views or ideologies on the same issues, which most times lead to violent actions and war, this does not mean conflicts are unsolvable. Conflicts can either be managed or resolved. The next part of this chapter will conceptualize conflict resolution.

2.2 Conceptualizing Conflict Resolution

In political science, the concept ‘conflict resolution’ has been used as a term that deals with peaceful coexistence, and a concept with deeper meanings. It does not only involve the settlement of disputes but also involves enticing parties to a conflict to accepting and respecting one another, and perhaps most importantly, abiding by the rules that govern them (Wallensteen 2002: 13).

The conflict resolution concept has been developed all through the history of mankind in line with the complicated relationship that has existed between human societies, which manifests itself in their interactions with one another. The consistency of conflict has led to the development of new approaches on how to deal with conflict. Conflict Resolution is the continuation of peace studies which evolved after the failure of other peace study fields, such as “socialist and liberal internationalist movements”, after the First World War. The post-1945 period shifted attention towards conflict research and institutional peace, and while the field of conflict resolution began to expand during 1970s & 1980, it was still connected to other disciplines. The 1990s however, paved the way for new opportunities in the field of conflict resolution.

Having briefly looked at the historical context and evolution of conflict resolution, I hereby move forward by giving some of the different definitions of conflict resolution offered by different scholars.

According to Bercovitch and Jackson (2009:1), conflict resolution “encompasses all that might usually be done formally or informally by those involved in the conflict, and outsiders where necessary”. They went further to argue that “conflict resolution

is designed to limit and reduce the level of violence... and to achieve some understanding of the key issues.” This definition offered by Bercovitch and Jackson has identified that for conflict resolution, there need be a conflict which involves some parties, and that said conflict mostly involves outsiders, like the United Nations, who are willingly to resolve or manage the conflict for the conflicting parties in order to reduce the level of violence that might have been occurring in such a conflict. The authors added that conflict resolution could be concluded with “a form of agreement, be it an imposed political solution, or a commonly accepted decision as to where the future interactions will lead” (Bercovitch & Jackson, 2009: 19-59).

Peter Wallensteen, (2002) gave two definitions of conflict resolution in his book *‘Understanding Conflict Resolution’*. In his first definition of conflict resolution, he argues that conflict resolution involves “a situation where the conflicting parties enter into an agreement that solves their central incompatibilities, accept each other’s continued existence as parties and cease all violent action against each other.” Wallensteen, like Bercovitch and Jackson, also identified the presence of a conflict that leads to resolution. Wallensteen went further to argue that an ‘agreement’, either formal or informal, and typically in the form of a hidden document between the parties in conflict; has to exist, and that said agreement is fundamental to the resolution. The last phrase of the definition, which says ‘accept each other’s continued existence as parties and cease all violent action against each other’, does not mean that just one of the conflicting parties will be submissive to the other but instead, there will be a mutual willingness and understanding from both conflicting parties in resolving their differences and also put an end to all violent actions, and direct or indirect confrontations.

Wallensteen (2002) later reformulated this definition of conflict resolution as “a social situation where the armed conflicting parties in a (voluntary) agreement resolve to peacefully live with- and/or dissolve- their basic incompatibilities and henceforth cease to use arms against one another”. The difference between the first and second definitions of conflict resolution offered by Wallensteen is that the second shows the existence of an ‘armed conflict’, and that the resolution of conflict does not need a voluntary agreement by the conflicting parties without the intervention of a third party. In this sense, there are some conflicts that are resolved without the intervention of a third party.

However, in some conflicts, direct confrontation is not really needed for a resolution to take place. Hence, it is quite important to take a look at other definitions of conflict resolution besides Wallensteen. Kriesberg argues that conflict resolution as a discipline, tries to create solutions to very problems that caused the conflict; that is, conflict resolution deals with and identifies deep-rotted human needs and there are different means and opinions in resolving such conflicts (Kriesberg 2002: 16).

Conflict resolution is a broad term that covers a wide spectrum of concepts, models, as well as processes that have found important agreement among scholars. These concepts include negotiation, arbitration, mediation, adjudication, amongst others. Article 33, Chapter VI of the UN charter asserts that “the parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, shall first of all, seek a solution by negotiation, mediation, enquiry, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangement; or other peaceful means of their own choice...”. The article of the UN charter above identifies the various means of conflict resolution available to

conflicting parties. The article went further to add that if the parties in conflict are not voluntarily amenable to resolving their conflict by these means, then “the Security Council when it deems necessary, call upon the conflicting parties to settle their dispute by such means”. Relating this to Rwanda conflict, General Romeo Dallaire, UNAMIR force commander, requested from the UN Security Council, that he should be allowed to use force in making the conflicting parties (Tutsi and Hutus) put an end to the wars and killings, after so many attempts to establish peace has failed. But the request of the mission force commander was denied, which led to more killings during the genocide (Dallaire and Poulin 1995).

The next section of this chapter will discuss various theories of conflict resolution.

2.3 Theories of Conflict Resolution

The discipline of conflict resolution has developed different theoretical insights into the sources of conflict and how to resolve conflicts through different peaceful methods. As the different theories that deal with conflict resolution cannot all be widely discussed in this thesis, the focus will be on the main theories that have been the subject of practice for peacemakers. This includes the literary work of scholars in the field of conflict resolution, such as John Burton, William Zartman, Roger Fisher, Peter Wallensteen, amongst others.

2.3.1 John Burton: Human Needs Theory and Problem Solving Approach

Burton emphasizes the different causes of conflict, in particular, that the deep roots of conflict must be identified and resolved in order to determine a viable solution to such conflict. He further argued that conflict, most times, is caused by the denial of an individual identity, equal participation within the society, security, recognition, and of equal rights. Therefore, in order to resolve such conflicts, it is quite important

that the needs that are threatened be identified and reconstructed in such a way that the needs of the individuals or groups are accommodated.

To deal with a conflict, most especially with the presence of a third party, the third party needs to carefully understand what the actors' view of reality is and interact within the context of said views, arguments and realities of the conflicting parties.

Burton opined that:

“conflict resolution seeks to be the study by protagonists of the patterns of their own overt behaviours in an intimate and analytical interaction in which there can be detailed checking. The only reality that is relevant is that of participants. It is not for the third party, or some specialist, to define the reality. It maybe that the reality as perceived by the protagonists may alter as a result of increased knowledge; but it is their reality that must be accepted in any problem solving process” (Burton 1990: 203).

Burton's major point here is that the third party to a conflict, like the United Nation, is to bring to the attention of the conflicting parties the core issues of the conflict that have caused a deterioration in relations. Furthermore, the third party should try to understand the differences of the conflicting parties and never be carried away with the historical arguments of the conflicting parties or actors. The third party should also show neutrality and stay attentive to the languages and expression of the conflicting parties.

2.3.2 Zartman's Ripeness Theory and Hurting Stalemate

William Zartman's theoretical approach is drawn from his publications on conflict resolution and intervention in Africa during the period between the late 1980s to early 2000s. While Zartman's study is referenced to Africa, this does not mean that the relevance of his approach is not useful to other continents. Zartman's Ripeness theory is one of the most influential theories in the conflict resolution field today

along with its emphasis on three core concepts: ‘ripe moment’, ‘hurting stalemate’, and ‘ripe for resolution’ (Zartman, 1991).

Ripeness theory explains why, and also when, conflicting parties are ready at their own will to turn towards accepting a third party for negotiation or mediation, and by this, why previous efforts by the conflicting parties to resolve the conflict or get each party what it wants, might have failed. The concept of a ripe moment centers on “the parties’ perception of a mutually hurting stalemate (MHS), optimally associated with an impending, past, or recently avoided catastrophe” (Zartman and Berman, 1982; Zartman, 1983; Touval and Zartman, 1985). The main idea behind the concept of the ripe moment is that when conflicting parties find themselves lost and locked in a conflict whereby they can no longer boast of winning or achieving victory and the present situation is mutually hurting for them, they in turn seek a way out with the help of a third party. The 1994 Rwandan Genocide was ripe for settlement because the conflicting parties were both suffering and had lost hope of prevailing through escalation--a situation known as a “mutually hurting stalemate”.

Zartman (1996), also argues that good timing must be awaited by peacekeepers for a conflict to be resolved, and such a timing occurs when both parties are hurting and when the conflict is perceived to be ripe, most especially when conflicting parties call for a resolution from a third party. Therefore, when the perfect opportunity arises, it must be grabbed by peacekeepers together with the conflicting parties. In line with this, one of the reasons behind the failure of the UN was that they did not intervene in the conflict on time, in other words, the perfect timing for intervention had past ahead and thousands of people had been killed. The massacre did not

happen overnight, it was process, so there were enough opportunities for intervention but instead the UN intervened after the conflict has escalated into Genocide.

Third parties to a conflict, like the United Nations, can do little or nothing in resolving a conflict between conflicting parties when the parties to the conflict are not ready for a resolution (Zartman 2001: 8-9). Zartman argues that “the success of mediation is tied to the perception and creation of a ripe moment in the conflict—either when the parties are locked in a mutual, hurting stalemate marked by a recent or impending catastrophe...or when the ‘ups’ and ‘downs’ start to shift their relative power positions.” (Zartman 1989: 272). This means that the ripe moment in a conflict should attract third party intervention. Also one party to the conflict cannot act coercively to resolve the existing differences as any resolution has to be a mutual agreement and to the acceptance of both parties. This can only happen when there is a situation of ‘hurting stalemate’, but if both parties do not experience a clear evidence of deadlock (that is, when one side is unable to achieve its aim), then the mutually hurting stalemate has not come yet, neither is the conflict ripe for resolution.

Other theorists who advocate conflict resolution include Roger Fisher and Peter Wallensteen. Fisher gave four principles for an effective resolution of conflict by third parties; the most important principle is the principle of separating the people from the problem, which helps the conflicting parties understand exactly what their problem is. However, separating people from their problem could make the matter or conflict complicated if the problem is based on human needs and this is most common in ethnic conflicts in that most groups feel their security, equal participation, and recognition needs are being neglected. In relation to this,

Wallensteen (2002) also argues that for a conflict to be resolved, the third party to a conflict needs to first of all identify the problems or issues causing the conflict, in other words, the third party needs to have an adequate understanding of the causes of the conflict before interfering; this is what the United Nations failed to do in their intervention as a third party in the Rwandan Genocide, they interpreted the conflict as a civil war instead of a genocide. UNAMIR neither understood Rwanda nor the conflicting parties and their reasons for being in conflict, forces were only disbursed to Rwanda with little equipment and limited personnel with the belief that the conflict was just a civil war between groups in the country.

In conclusion, this chapter has tried to explain the different literature on the concept of conflict as well as concept of conflict resolution, which has exposed some gaps this thesis intends to close. The chapter also explained and gave different theories of conflict resolution. The next chapter will give a general background on the Rwandan conflict/genocide, the 1993 Arusha Peace Agreement, the role and purpose of the United Nations as an international organization for conflict resolution, the UN and the peaceful settlement of disputes, and the role of the Security Council, General Assembly, and the International Court of Justice (ICJ).

Chapter 3

BACKGROUND TO THE RWANDA CONFLICT AND THE ROLE PLAYED BY THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY IN THE CONFLICT

3.1 Introduction

In 1994, a tensions between the two most influential groups in Rwanda – the Tutsi and the Hutu escalated into full-blown conflict. The conflict between these two groups resulted in the emergence of the Rwandan genocide, which started on the 7th of April, 1994 and ended in July 1994. Lasting for approximately 100 days, the genocide was responsible for the deaths of between five-hundred thousand and one million Rwandans, primarily from the Tutsi population and moderate Hutus (Remier, 2011). A number of universal truths and ideas can both be seen and studied over the course of the Rwandan conflict and genocide. In tracing and understanding the roots of the Rwandan conflict, one needs to look at the historical inhabitants of this country, particularly, their pre-colonial and colonial history.

Hence, this chapter will broadly focus on the Rwandan conflict/genocide by outlining the nature of pre-colonial and colonial Rwanda, how the conflict began, and how it escalated into a genocide. Other sections of the chapter will provide an overview of the role the international community played vis-à-vis the conflict.

3.2 Rwanda Conflict – Background

Rwanda is one of the smallest countries on the African mainland and is bordered by Tanzania, Uganda, Burundi, and the Democratic republic of Congo. With an overwhelmingly agricultural economy, Rwanda's population is predominantly rural and young; it also has one of the highest population densities on the African continent. Rwandans are from one linguistic and cultural group – the Banyarwanda. Within this cultural-linguistic group, however, are three subgroups: the Twa, Hutu, and Tutsi. The Hutu consist about 85 percent of the total population and the Tutsi about 14 percent of the total population, while the Twa maintain a very small one percent of the population (Adekunle Julius, 2007). The Twas are Rwandan. The original inhabitants, they are also a forest dwelling people. There are many arguments among scholars about the differences and origins of the Tutsi and Hutus. Most historical accounts understand the Hutus to be people who migrated from present-day Chad, and the Tutsis from the Southern Ethiopian highlands. The Tutsi and Hutu arrived in Rwanda separately from their different locations. The Hutus are known to be the first to come into the country in the 11th century after conquering the original settlers, the Twas (Reimer, 2011). The Tutsi arrived in Rwanda much later and subjugated the Hutus to their rule during the 15th century (Modern History project, 2012). Irrespective of the debate about the migration times of both the Hutus and Tutsis to Rwanda, some scholars like Newbury argue that these two groups, throughout history, have gone back and forth for the dominant position within Rwandan society. Newbury argues that as at the end of the colonial period in Rwanda, most of those who were powerful and wealthy were Tutsi (Newbury 1995: 12).

Rwanda's pre-colonial era demonstrates an "ethnic" diversity, which was based on a client/patron relationship, occupational status, and also on the ancestry of the Hutu and Tutsi. The three ethnic groups (Tutsi, Hutu, and Twa) were coterminous with occupational categories during the pre-colonial period before the 19th century. The Hutus were farmers, while the Tutsi were cattle-herders, administrators, and soldiers. The Twa were generally seen as insignificant and were also treated badly by other groups. It is without a doubt that the Tutsi were the most dominant group in pre-colonial Rwandan society. Some writers argue that in the hierarchical system, the Tutsi occupied the higher strata, while others have similarly argued that the Tutsi overrode the Hutus and Twas' categorization up until the middle of the nineteenth century (D. Newbury, 1980; C. Newbury, 1978).

The Tutsi took over the original language of the Hutu, as well as incorporated the cults and traditions of the Hutu. The ethnic stratification between the Twas, Hutus, and Tutsis during Rwanda's pre-colonial period was clear; this was noted by the first European travelers to Rwanda. They noted that, although the Twa, Hutu, and Tutsi shared the same language (which was basically *Kinyarwanda*, the Hutu's main language), the same religion, and also the same Hutu settlements, there were differences in their economic activities, their origins, physical appearance, as well as their social status. Therefore, their meaning of ethnic identity varied overtime (Saucier, J, 1974).

An important observation that can be made from the Rwanda's pre-colonial history is that the Tutsi dominated the Rwandan state structure and controlled political power, whereas the Hutus were left to participate only in the lower levels of administration. The Hutus only received orders and norms made by the makers of order, the Tutsis.

The Rwandan pre-colonial system had a lesser degree of ‘ethnic’ integration, especially in the upper echelons of the state apparatus, and was built on contradictory settings whereby the Tutsis and Hutus had to depend on same land resources for their live hood. (Lema, 1993). Hence, ethnic and social relationships between these groups were based more on class and social stratification rather than ethnicity. Ethnicity skewed power control and inequitable access to natural resources and appalling rural poverty are basically the underlying factors of the ethnic conflict in Rwanda.

3.3 Rwanda’s Colonia Era – Ethnic Relations

In 1916, as a result of the East African campaign against Germany during World War I, Belgium occupied Rwanda and administered Rwanda after World War I under the mandate of the League of Nations. Belgium’s colonial rule strengthened the existing status quo in Rwanda by ‘reinforcing’ a Rwandese institution; they gave support to the Tutsi and Hutu division and strengthened it. The colonizers also introduced forced labour, described as ‘corvee’, where the Hutus were made to grow coffee beans on their land under the control of Tutsi officials (Modern History project, 2012).

The Belgians played on the existing ethnic stratification by supporting the Tutsi political power, aggravated ethnic tensions, which created more instances of the domination of the Hutus by the Tutsis, and also gave the Tutsis more power in Rwandan society with more work and wages. In addition to being given much control of the society, the Tutsis were the only ones who had access to schooling, could move freely, and were appointed into different political offices in the society. The Belgians understood all of this to be a way of giving more power to the Tutsi as

the minority in the country and this created more resentment and frustration on the part of the Hutus (van Beurden, 2012).

Based on the superiority of the Tutsis, colonial leaders institutionalized social stratification and introduced a pseudo-scientific system of identification whereby skull and nose measurements were taken to determine if one was Tutsi or Hutu.

Also, the discrimination introduced in Catholic schools further limited the range of educational possibilities for the Hutus. During the colonial period, Catholic schooling was the only educational system and only Tutsi children were enrolled in these Catholic mission schools while the Hutus were neglected. The Catholic Church also made some adjustments to its educational policies and this was when the educational discrimination between the Hutus and Tutsi became most obvious. Tutsi were favoured more by the Catholic schools and received every necessary education requirement needed to work, they were favoured in terms of employment and education over the Hutus (C. Newbury, 1988). Generally, colonial intervention created a lot of discrimination between the Rwandan groups and caused the groups to become distinct political categories.

3.3.1 Ethnic Conflict Begins

Ethnic conflict erupted on the 1st of November, 1959, which marked the start of what was called the “Hutu Peasant Revolution”. The violent incidents lasted from 1959 to 1961, their genesis as a result of a Hutu Party leader being assaulted and abused by Tutsi youth. This resulted in a Hutu uprising which took hundreds of Tutsi lives and caused the displacement of thousands of Tutsi to neighbouring countries. The Belgian government did not crush the Hutu revolt but responded to the violence by sending troops to the country and also replacing the Tutsi officers and chiefs, who

were deposed, with newly appointed Hutu chiefs and sub-chiefs. The Belgian government also set up an indigenous military based on ethnic proportionality – 15% Tutsi and 85% Hutu (Sellstrom.T & Wohlgemuth. L, 1973: 29).

With the emergence of the United Nations after World War II, Rwanda became a UN Trust Territory, which gave Belgium leeway to make some new democratic reforms in line with its trusteeship. These reforms allowed the integration of some Hutus into the colonial administration. Also, the colonial leaders authorized the creation of some political parties. Hutus were able create some political parties and, with the help of these parties, win the elections of September 25th, 1961. This victory gave the Hutus a new high position and they subsequently requested for self-determination, political power, and territorial freedom from the colonial powers. Between November 1959 and September 1961, there was a revolutionary transition from the Aristocracy administration of the Tutsis to a Hutu-led republic, and the historical tables were turned, that is, power was shifted from the privileged ruling class (Tutsi), to the Hutus. The Belgian colonizers also shifted their support and attention from the minority Aristocracy Tutsi to the Majority Hutus (Sellstrom.T & Wohlgemuth. L, 1973: 29).

In 1959, The Belgian authorities totally abandoned their indirect rule policy and gave Rwanda independence; they also gave the country to Hutu majority rather than the Tutsi minority because they no longer cared about the minority and were more concerned with avoiding uprising and conflict in the country. This whole process of both transition and independence, as argued by Linden (1995), “marked the beginning of a cycle of turbulent clashes for power, where capture of the Rwandan

state from political opponents has been a violent zero-sum game in which the winner takes all”.

During 1959-1961, a leveling down of the ruling Tutsi Aristocracy which included their land resources occurred. There was a quasi-geometrical redistribution of resources and land among Hutus families that were landless. These inequalities in natural and state resources control facilitated more violence between the Rwandan groups (Alfred Nduricimpa, 1995).

After independence, ethnic conflict and violence between the two groups came in a new cycle. Tutsi refugees organized attacks on Hutus as well as the leader of their government, who was a Hutu as well, President Habyarimana. Violence erupted in schools and business enterprises, which led to a bloody series of events in 1972 where the Hutu were the victims of the genocidal killings (UN Rights Commission, 1972).

The underlying factor behind the violence is related to inequality of access to natural resources that is inherent in a skewed control of power. Therefore, any effort to reduce the ethnic conflict should first address the structures and institutions that led to the inequality of addressing of accessing land and state resources, and also address the causes of the inter-state conflict, but this the UN mission in Rwanda failed to do, they had little or no idea about the historical ethnic relations of Rwanda.

In 1988, the refugees began a rebel movement called the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) in Kampala, the capital of Uganda. RPF was composed mainly of Tutsi exiles in Uganda. The mission was to secure the repatriation of Rwandans in exile,

reforming the Rwanda government in a manner which includes power sharing, and most importantly, regaining their homeland. In 1990, RPF began an attack on Rwanda. Targeted primarily at the Hutu regime, it was crushed with French and Belgian military support, although several serious attacks followed until 1993.

3.4 Arusha Peace Agreement of 1993

In August 1993, the Rwanda's two warring factions, the officials of the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) and the Government of Rwanda, led by President Habyarimana, signed the Arusha Peace Accords through the peacemaking efforts of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), and the Governments of France, the United States, and Belgium. The agreement was signed following a series of peace negotiations overseen by Tanzania and other neighboring governments. The Arusha Peace Agreement was supposed to put an end to the civil war that had taken over 10,000 Rwandan lives. The Agreement also sought to put an end to the Hutu political hegemony over the Tutsi and bring thousands of Tutsis that had gone on exile back into Rwanda. The agreement, lastly, sought to democratize the Rwandan government that had been controlled by the Hutu elite group for over 20 years and create a power sharing agreement between the Hutus and Tutsis. In October 1993, the Security Council established a Peace Keeping force in Rwanda, the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) (Sellstrom.T, Wohlgemuth. L, 1973: 42).

After the signing of the agreements, there appeared to be an end to the Tutsi-Hutu conflict. However, the agreements' role in sustaining peace between the two Rwandan warring factions was disrupted by some political parties in Rwanda, that took part in the agreement, and this was because of the unequal distribution and spilt of cabinet posts in transitional government among the political parties within the

Rwandan government delegation. Also, the delay in the implementation of the agreements led to more human rights violations and insecurity in the country. Hutu extremists, desperate to stop the power sharing, subsequently began a genocide (ibid).

3.5 The Genocide

Intense and systematic massacres and the killing of over one million people followed after the death of the Rwanda president Habyarimana and Burundi president, Cyprien Ntaryamira in a plane crash caused by a rocket attack before it could land in the Rwandan capital city on the 6th of April, 1994. The plane crash left no survivors, although, till date, it has never been determined who the culprits were. Many pointed to the Hutu extremists, others blamed the RPF leaders. Less than an hour after the President's plane crash, the Rwandan armed forces together with some Hutu military groups set up barricades and roadblocks to identify and slaughter Tutsis. On the 7th of April, the Hutu Prime Minister, (Agathe Uwilingiyimana) and ten of her Belgian bodyguards were killed. This increased the rate of violence and an estimated 160,000 to 200,000 women were raped during the genocide (C. Newbury, 1995).

The genocide spread from the capital of Rwanda, Kigali, to other parts of the country where many more people were slaughtered. The RPF kept on fighting and waging war alongside with the genocide and some moderate Hutu leaders were assassinated as well. RPF forces took charge of most parts of the country – including the capital, Kigali – by early July and this made lots of Hutus flee Rwanda to other neighbouring countries and some refugee camps in Congo. The RPF eventually gained control of the whole country and created a coalition and power sharing government in line with

the Arusha agreement, where the president was Pasteur Bizimungu, and vice president a Tutsi, Paul Kagame, who later took over as the president when his predecessor Pasteur Bizimungu resigned.

The former government's party that played a vital role in organizing the genocide was later outlawed. By 2003, a new constitution had already been adopted, which cleared every reference to ethnicity and enhanced legislative elections in the country (C. Newbury, 1995).

3.6 International Community Role in the Rwanda Genocide

The political and economic power capabilities of member states within the UN differ. Some have more power and influence than others. But obviously, the US influence within the organization is greater than those of other member states due to its unrivalled military and economic might, which gives it considerable more clout within the UN in relation to the other permanent members.

The major problem from the beginning of UN intervention in the Rwanda conflict was the fact that the Western powers were unwilling to contribute their troops to the mission and even showed no financial support for an international force. Apart from moral obligation regarding issues of conflicts and genocide, there are also legal requirements. It is stated in the 1948 Genocide Convention that the "international community is obliged to act if genocide occurs anywhere in the world" (Genocide Convention, 1948). However, there are numerous and different reasons why the international community thoroughly failed to stop the 1994 atrocity in Rwanda. Part of the international community's inaction was due to national interest; this was quite obvious on the part of US because there was no national interest at stake. Another

reason is the Somalia conflict, which was happening simultaneously with the Rwanda Genocide. Lastly, the media's failure to provide reports on the genocide added to the inaction of the international community. This thesis will only cover the role of the major actors in the conflicts which were, however, the US, France, Belgium and UN Secretary General.

Therefore, to generally understand the role the international community played in the Rwanda Genocide, the major actors need to be accessed. The role of the UN Secretary General is covered in the next chapter as part of a wider discussion on the role of the UN in general.

Belgium, having had a close connection with Rwanda and knowing about the ethnic and political killings in the country, contributed the largest number of western troops to the peacekeeping mission in Rwanda – UNAMIR (UNDPI 1996: 231). Belgium also supported the request for a stronger UNAMIR mandate, but at this time, states had already lost interest in supporting the mission. During the period of early warnings, Belgium notified the UN about how the Hutus planned on killing the Tutsis, but these early warning signs by the Belgium were ignored (Des Forges 1999: 176). Following the death of ten Belgian members of the peacekeeping force at the residence of the Prime Minister Agathe Uwilingiyimana a few days after the genocide had begun, Belgium began to lobby for the peacekeepers to return home and requested for the complete withdrawal of the mission. Belgium disengaged with the mission, retrieved and rescued their soldiers as well as other foreigners from Rwanda and with the support of the Security Council since no other states had an interest in the mission (Des Forges, 1999: 618).

The *United States* (as part of the Security Council) is often blamed as being most responsible for inaction in Rwanda because since the end of Cold War, “no international action can be taken without the US taking the leading role” (Destexhe, 1995: 49). The US’ involvement in Somalia and the consequent death of its rangers prevented the US from participating in the Rwanda genocide. It also resulted in the US decision to “stop placing the agenda of the UN before the interests of the US” (Clinton in Melvern, 2000: 78).

Before the Rwanda killings started, the US knew that something terrible was about to happen in Rwanda and genocidal killings had been planned. By April 20, 1994, the US already knew about the Genocide but took no positive action (Kuperman, 2000: 101). The US refused to intervene in the Rwanda genocide because it had never had any ‘national interest’ in Rwanda. It was obvious that the Clinton Administration had no political or economic interest in Rwanda since Rwanda is a small country in Africa with neither minerals nor economic value. The knowledge of the genocide was purposely withheld by the Clinton Administration, even as detailed reports reached the president and his cabinet at each stage of the killings; the president decided not to use the word genocide nor accepted that the massacre was a genocide until May 25 (Union, 2000). Nobody, including the US, wanted to get involved. It was easier to refer it as a civil war, save for the 100,000 Rwandan victims.

Reports about conflicts illustrate western misunderstandings of African conflicts, whereby westerners believe that African conflicts occur frequently because due to ethnic differences or human rights violations. Therefore, instead of taking the conflicts and killings to be serious occurrences and cause for immediate attention, they prefer to see conflicts on the continent as something that occurs relatively

frequently and thus nothing too out of the ordinary (Power, 2003: 351). However, be it ethnic conflict or intra-state conflicts, in Africa, as long as it affects international peace, it deserves the quick attention of the international community.

On the 8TH of April 1994, after the killing of the Rwandan government and few American troops, the US called for every American to return home. The Britain's ambassador to the UN, Sir David Hannay, proposed that the UN pull out its force; the US agreed and instructed its UN Ambassador, Madeleine Albright, to push for the further withdrawal of the UN Peacekeeping forces in Rwanda even after Ibrahim Gambari, the Nigerian Ambassador to the UN, argued that “running and cutting would be callous” and contrary to the spirit of the UN charter, which says the Security Council is responsible for the maintenance of peace and security anywhere in the world, including Africa. This was ignored by the US. With the support of Britain, the US further instructed all western troops and UN peacekeepers not to evacuate ordinary (black) Rwandans. This meant that anybody that was white-skinned got to get on a flight to safety and anybody that was black-skinned got to stay in Rwanda and get killed (NCF Documentary, 2014). It was not until six weeks after the genocide began that the US sent 50 armed personnel carriers to UNAMIR; moreover, it took three months for these to arrive at Rwanda due to the cost of transport and training. The US requested \$15,000 from the UN before the military resources could be delivered to the mission in Rwanda. Both US and Britain played similar role in the conflict. They both went out of their ways to ensure that the UN did not use the word ‘genocide’ in describing the 1994 massacre.

In March, 1998, Clinton visited the capital of Rwanda, Kigali and apologized for his inaction during the genocide (ibid).

France, being an ally to Rwanda's Hutu government and having a special relationship with Francophone Africa of which Rwanda was a part, gave military political and military support to Rwanda and supported the interim government, and that contributed to the genocide. Before the genocide, France was highly involved in Rwanda because France knew there were ethnic killings going on in Rwanda. France supported the interim government against the RPF, who they regarded as an Anglo-Saxon invasion. France saw the RPF as a threat to Rwanda and quickly got involved in Rwanda

During the genocide, French soldiers handed out firearms, controlled checkpoints, and demanded to see identity cards to see if anyone was Tutsi. Tutsis were arrested and handed over to the Rwandan army. France also provided troops and weapons for Hutus militias and this partiality on the part of France is seen to have contributed to the genocide (ibid).

China and Russia international role in the conflict is related to the role France played. China and Russia also supplied the interim government with military arms and fuelled the genocide by helping the Hutu regime in power flee the country. If adequate prevention of the genocide was taken seriously by the UN, it could have in a way prevented France and China from funding and fuelling the genocide (Prunier, 1997: 101; Wallis, 2006: 104).

From what has been explored above, it is obvious that the major powers or actors who were supposed to influence the UN, were frustrated by other issues or even unintentionally aided the genocide itself. The US for example, was still concerned about the loss of its forces in Somalia and thus, had no interest in intervening in

Rwanda. Belgium also couldn't stop the genocide and instead opted out of Rwanda following the deaths of its soldiers. France, which happened to be a member of the UNSC got involved in Rwanda before the genocide but could not do anything when the genocide started, instead they aggravated the genocide by supporting the Hutu militias in the killing of the Tutsi.

Furthermore, the non-permanent members of the UNSC who relied on the UN Secretariat for information about what was happening in Rwanda never heard the truth about the killings. Instead of speaking about the genocide, only reports concerning the breakdown of the ceasefire were given. Also included were questions about how to withdraw the peacekeepers, which led to the great powers' decision not to intervene (Wheeler, 2000: 220).

In conclusion, this chapter has tried to give a general background of the Rwandan conflict/genocide by explaining the features of Rwanda's pre-colonial and colonial eras, how the conflict began, and how it escalated into a genocide. The latter parts of the chapter gave an overview of the role of the US, Britain, Belgium, France and China in relation to the conflict.

The next chapter of this thesis will examine the UN's peacekeeping activities in Rwanda starting with the role of the UN's constitutive organs and followed by an outline of the establishment of UNAMIR, its mandate, and its effectiveness in fulfilling its mandate in Rwanda. The chapter will further examine the problems faced by UNAMIR and examine the factors behind its failure, which will generally provide answers to the thesis' research question. The chapter will conclude with an

exploration of the few successes achieved by UNAMIR even in light of its general failure in Rwanda.

Chapter 4

THE ROLE AND PURPOSE OF THE UNITED NATIONS IN THE MANAGEMENT AND RESOLUTION OF THE RWANDAN CONFLICT

4.1 Introduction

The UN's role as an international organization in conflict resolution has different dimensions, which depend on provisions outlined by the UN charter and the various approaches that can be used in instances of conflict. Learning from the weakness of its predecessor (the League of Nations) the UN was created in 1945 as an international organization for the purpose of promoting international cooperation. According to Article 1 of the UN charter, the UN has the role of maintaining international peace and security through peaceful means, and respecting international law and the principles of Justice (UN A-Z site index, 2017).

The UN is currently comprised of 194 member states, and its involved in a range of activities around the world. Peacekeeping has been the most widely-known activity of the UN, where forces commonly known as 'blue helmets' are deployed to maintain peace in turbulent parts of the world. However, the consent of the parties in conflict is required before the UN can deploy peacekeeping forces to an area for the purposes of conflict management. Peacebuilding, conflict prevention, conflict resolution, and humanitarian intervention are part of the roles of the UN. The UN

provides different approaches to resolving conflicts among different parties. For instance, Article 33, Chapter IV of the UN Charter places emphasis on the peaceful settlement of disputes among conflicting parties without the use of force. However, Chapter VII of the UN Charter focuses on taking immediate action when international peace is at stake or when there is an act of aggression.

The UN is structurally divided into: The Security Council, which is concerned with the issues of war and peace, the General Assembly, the Secretary General, the Economic and Social Council, the International Court of Justice, and lastly, Trusteeship council (ibid).

4.2 The Role of the Security Council

The UN Security Council was established in 1946 under the UN Charter. The Security Council, is the most powerful organ of the UN and is responsible for taking resolutions for the purpose of international peace and security. The Council establishes peacekeeping and other special political missions. The most important role of the UN Security Council is the governance of the UN system. Either a member state, the Secretary General, or the General Assembly brings conflicts to the attention to the Security Council and upon ascertaining the legality of the conflict, the Security Council tends to pursue a peaceful means to resolve such a conflict. But most times, however, due to the notion of sovereignty, states object to the UN decision to intervene because these states see intervention as interfering in their internal affairs (UN A-Z site index, 2017).

The Council investigates disputes and provides different methods of settling disputes among conflicting parties, including, amongst others, mediation, negotiation, and

arbitration, before such a conflict escalates into threatening international peace and order (Article 33, Chapter IV of the UN Charter). Additionally, the General Assembly and the office of the Secretary General of the UN are also complementary bodies that play similar roles to that of the Security Council in terms of conflict resolution. If necessary coercive measures need to be taken, probably when global peace is at stake, then this is a decision taken by the Security Council (ibid).

The five permanent members of the UNSC also known as the P5 (China, France, Russia, UK and the US) played major role in the Rwanda conflict as explained in the previous chapter under the role of the international community. Generally, the Security Council (SC), during the Rwandan genocide, established United Nation Assistance for Rwanda (UNAMIR) in October 1993, which was intended to assist in the implementation of the Arusha Accords

4.3 The Role of the UN Secretary General

The Secretary General is the chief administrative officer of the organization and has historically been majorly active as a third party in different conflicts around the world. The chief administrative officer performs functions entrusted to him by other United Nations organs. The UN Secretary General can also bring to the attention of the Security Council matters (s)he thinks may affect or distract international peace and security or the maintenance of international order. Thomas M. Frank in his book *'The Secretary-General's Role in Conflict Resolution: Past, Present And Pure Conjecture'* explains that even though the other organs of the UN can authorize a peacekeeping force and approve funds for such peacekeeping operations, the Secretary General takes the lead in preventing the occurrence of armed conflicts between the conflicting parties that might threaten peace both between the concerned

nations and internationally. And this is because he serves and plays the role of a third party to conflicting parties and negotiates cease-fire (Thomas, M. Frank, 1995: 60).

Also, the Security Council has the power to mediate or encourage parties in conflict to end their differences peacefully with the help of the international community in achieving the goal of resolving conflicts. New waves of internal and domestic conflicts in countries in Africa and East-Central Europe, and to a larger extent the end of Cold War, expanded the role of the UN Secretary General. However, there are times the UN member states, in pursuing their own interests, interfere and influence the UN Secretary General's role in preventing armed conflicts (ibid).

4.3.1 Activities of Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali vis-à-vis the Rwanda Conflict

Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali was Secretary General of the United Nations from January 1992 to December 1996, meaning that he was the UN Secretary General during the Rwandan Genocide. The Rwandan Genocide was one of the most daunting challenges for SG Ghali. He was accused of turning his back on the mass slaughter of the moderate Hutus and Tutsi which lasted for 100 days. He was also accused of playing a role in supplying weapons to the Hutus who carried out the massacres. Linda Melvern, a British investigative journalist, accused SG Ghali of aiding an arms deal worth over \$26 million from Cairo to Rwanda in 1990, during his time as Egypt's Vice Foreign Minister; these arms were smuggled into Rwanda with the claim of their being relief materials. SG Ghali further accepted these claims in approving the arms deal, but with the excuse that it was his duty to sell weapons for Egypt as Foreign Minister (Buchanan Elsa, 2016).

Nevertheless, following the plane crash involving the Rwandan and Burundi Presidents, and the massacre of thousands of Rwandans, SG Ghali undertook different measures to ensure a cease-fire and humanitarian assistance for victims (United Nations, 1994: 2). To handle the situation at the time, SG Ghali proposed three different alternative courses of action. The first alternative proposed by SG Ghali called for immediate reinforcement and modification of the UNAMIR mandate to coercively bring the conflicting parties to a cease-fire to stop the killings and restore peace and order in Rwanda (ibid, p.3). The second alternative was to assist in humanitarian assistance, while the third alternative had to do with the withdrawal of the mission from Rwanda in order get a commitment of the parties to ensure civilians protection in their various areas of control. However, the SG advised against the idea of withdrawal because there was no sign that the conflicting parties were ready for a cease-fire (ibid, p.5).

4.4 The International Court of Justice (ICJ)

The ICJ, which was established through the adoption of the UN Charter in June, 1945 is known and recognized as the UN's judicial body and an institution for the peaceful settlement of disputes. The court has two functions: in line with international law, the ICJ settles legal disputes that are submitted to it by states; and secondly, the ICJ gives advisory opinions on legal questions that are presented to it by UN organs and other specialized agencies.

4.4.1 International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR)

In response to the genocide, the UN Security Council established the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda on November 8, 1994 through Resolution 995, with a mandate to “prosecute persons responsible for genocide and other serious violations of international humanitarian law committed in the territory of Rwanda and

neighboring States, between 1 January 1994 and 31 December 1994”. The international court was located in Arusha, Tanzania (Corinne Dufka, 1994).

It is important to note that the ICTR was also mandated by the Security Council to deal with crimes contrary to international humanitarian law committed on Rwandan territory and in neighboring states between January and December, 1994. The ICTR therefore played a significant role in the establishment of a credible international system. The ICTR stands out as the first international tribunal to deliver adjudication in relation to genocide, interpret the meaning of genocide set forth in the 1948 Geneva Conventions, and see rape as an act of genocide (ibid). The trial of Jean-Peau Akayesu was the first legal example that genocidal rape was also an act of genocide. The tribunal found that the rape of Tutsi women in Taba reflected the determination to manipulate and kill those women (Grunfeld & Anke, 2007).

The ICTR also initiated trials against “hate media” in October, 2000. The media was charged with encouraging the 1994 genocide and this led to the life imprisonment of Ferdinand Nahimana, Jean Bosco Barayagwiza (who was in charge of Radio television des Mille Collines) and Hassan Ngeza (the director of Kangura newspaper). These three, were found guilty of inciting the genocide (ibid).

Perhaps the most significant failure of the ICTR remains its partiality to prosecute the war crimes and crimes against humanity the RPF committed in 1994. Even though both were clearly stated in the ICTR mandate, it failed to prosecute even a single RPF case. It can be understood that the ICTR’s exclusive focus on genocide was as a result of its reluctance to offend the Rwandan government, combined with the fear of jeopardizing cooperation between the two or the flat out refusal of the

RPF to cooperate. Relations between the Rwandan Government and ICTR came to an end in 2002 when the Rwandan Government realized that the ICTR carried out some investigations into RPF crimes, which led to the refusal of further cooperation on the part of the Rwandan government. Nevertheless, in spite of evidence that the RPF under the command of the Paul Kagame, the Present Rwandan president who was the leader of RPF, committed crimes against humanity, he still has not been persecuted (Corinne Dufka, 1994).

In short, the major role and aim of both the UN and its organs or structures centers primarily on the maintenance of international peace and security. Following the destructive consequences of WWI and WWII, the UN as an international organization has served as a force of peacekeeping around the world. The organs of the UN – the office of the Secretary General, Security Council, General Assembly, amongst others – use the various avenues for the peaceful settlement of disputes in managing and resolving different nations' conflicts. While there are times, however, when the UN finds it difficult to interfere in intrastate conflicts because states emphasize sovereignty as entailing non-interference, the main challenge facing the UN today concerns not just intrastate conflicts, but also the problem of inadequate resources whereby the UN has had to depend solely on its member states for both financial and man-power resources that would be used in their different peacekeeping missions. This shortcoming has led to the failure in some of its missions, such as in the case of the Rwandan genocide in 1994, the Somalia conflict, amongst others. These failures, in part, were because the contribution of resources by member states typically depends on their own national interest in the conflict.

Having reviewed the roles and purpose of the UN as an international organization in conflict resolution above – which leads us to believe that the UN is one of the international organizations that have been trying to reduce and resolve conflict between and within countries and as well seek global peace and security – an important question can then be raised here: Why did the United Nations fail in resolving the Rwanda conflict/genocide?

In spite of the UN's remarkable progress, describing it as an effective international organization that maintains peace and security has always been challenging. The utility of the UN as an international organization that reflects peace has been questioned by commentators and scholars alike both at the end of the Cold War and the beginning of the new era. International Relations and Political Science scholars have been writing on UN reform and its changing activities in conflicting zones, most especially in Africa – where the majority of armed conflicts, human rights issues, and refugee crises are concentrated. Overtime, the UN has failed in tackling some of these African conflicts that could have possibly affected international peace, take for instance, Somalia, Congo and worst of all, the Rwandan Genocide that lasted for 100 days.

The next section, therefore, focuses on the UN's peacekeeping activities in Rwanda. It reviews the post-genocide activities of the UN, starting from the establishment of UNAMIR and its mandate, its effectiveness, and the problems faced by UNAMIR in fulfilling its mandate in Rwanda. The chapter will conclude with an exploration of the few successes achieved by UNAMIR even in the light of its overall failure in Rwanda.

4.5 Establishment of United Nation Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) and its Mandate

The UN Security Council established UNAMIR in October, 1993 through Resolution 872 (1993) and had the mandate to help implement the Arusha Peace Agreement signed in August, 1993. UNAMIR's existence lasted from October, 1993 to March, 1996 (UNSC 1993). UNAMIR's activities were meant to help create peace between the conflicting parties: the Hutu and the Tutsi-dominated Rebel Patriotic Front (RPF). The Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG) and Head of Mission was a Cameroonian named Jacques-Roger Booh Booh, while the Mission Force Commander was Canadian General Romeo Dallaire (Dallaire and Poulin, 1995). It is noteworthy that prior to October, 1993, the UN Security Council had passed Resolution 846 authorizing the establishment of the U.N. Observer Mission Uganda-Rwanda (UNOMUR), which began operations in July of the same year but later failed (Dallaire and Poulin, 1995).

4.5.1 Mandate

The mandate of UNAMIR was to monitor and observe the cease-fire agreement; monitor and contribute to the security in the capital city of Rwanda, Kigali; monitor and observe the security situation during elections of the transitional government; coordinate humanitarian assistance activities together with relief operations; assist mine-clearance through training programs; and monitor and observe the resettlement of people who were displaced and repatriation of Rwandese refugees (DPK, 2015).

UNAMIR's mandate was later extended on April 5, 1994 till 29 July 1994 due to a delay in establishing the broad-based transitional government and the deterioration of security in the capital city. The mandate was further expanded by the Security

Council on the 17th of May, 1994 to include the security of refugees and ordinary civilians whose lives were at risk in Rwanda, and providing security for relief supplies (Ibid).

4.5.2 Analysis of Situation and the Role of UNAMIR in Rwanda

The various mandates of UNAMIR seem easily attainable at first glance, especially as the 1993 October Resolution provided for 2,500 military personnel with the initial mandate of implementing the Arusha Accords. While the forces didn't all get to Rwanda till the end of February and some even arrived with limited supplies, this problem was due largely to the limited amount of personnel in the Department of Peacekeeping operations (Dallaire and Poulin, 1995).

The civil war that erupted in April, 1994 after the death of the Rwandan President was the first sign of crisis that the mission was faced with, and can retrospectively be seen as an early warning sign of the genocide. The mission could do nothing since it had no power akin to that of sovereign state, and also, required the consent of the international community and authority of the Security Council. Over 60,000 government and rebel soldiers were involved in the civil-war while the mission had just 2,500 poorly trained military personnel (Ibid).

The early days of the genocide saw the killing of 10 Belgian citizens operating as part of UNAMIR, which led to the announcement of the withdrawal of Belgium's troops from the mission. In an attempt to establish peace, Dallaire encouraged the government forces to stop the violence and give UNAMIR the chance to stop the killing, but neither side was ready for a cease-fire. Simply put, UNAMIR shifted focus to the cease-fire negotiations between the warring parties but the government forces were not ready because the government itself was completely controlled by

the genocidaires and the RPF preferred fighting the government forces in order to put a stop to the killings. General Romeo Dallaire called for heavier weapons and over 4,500 well-trained troops for the mission with a mandate authorizing them to forcefully stop the killings. However, while Dallaire's request could have been fixed into UNSCR 872, it was opposed by the United States and Britain because they saw it as a robust and expensive mandate (Stanton, 2009). On April 21, the Security Council (spearheaded by the US and UK, and with a strong backup from China, Russia and France) ordered for a reduction of the UNAMIR forces even after the Independent Organization of Human Rights had made it known to the Security Council that an estimated 100,000 people had been killed in Rwanda and it was equally known that the civil war has escalated to the category of genocide (Stephanie, 2009). The troops Dallaire asked for were immediately made available, not for use in reinforcing UNAMIR, but instead to immediately evacuate troops out of Rwanda.

UNAMIR's Chapter VI mandate rendered it powerless to militarily intervene in the genocide. As most of its troops were killed and some were redeployed back home, the few troops that remained were from Africa and this limited its ability to operate and caused Dallaire to label the mission a 'failure'. He also told State Department officials the Fall of 1994 that the UN "did a Pontius Pilate" while over 500,000 Rwandans were murdered and "that a peacekeeping force that is trying to stop genocide must expect to take casualties, or it is worthless" (Stanton,2009:17).

It was not until May, 1994 after much controversy that the UN finally concluded that the conflict, which had hitherto been seen as an ongoing civil war, was actually a genocide and agreed to send down over 5,500 troops and personnel carriers to

UNAMIR under the title UNAMIR II (Dallaire and Poulin,1995). Unfortunately, however, roughly half a million people had died already and the new troops did not even arrive in Rwanda until June because no troops were immediately available. The role of UNAMIR II, following the end of the genocide, was based on the maintenance of security and stability in Rwanda. UNAMIR was finally withdrawn from Rwanda by the UN on March 8, 1996 after the Rwandese government emphasized the failure of the mission. The withdrawal of the mission was finalized in April, 1996.

The most significant contribution and role UNAMIR played in the Rwandan genocide was the provision of humanitarian services to thousands of Tutsi and moderate Hutu at secured areas controlled by the UN, for example, its headquarters in Amahoro Stadium (DPK, 2015).

4.6 Challenges Faced by UNAMIR in the Rwandan Conflict and the Reasons Behind its Failure

The failure of the United Nations Mission in Rwanda to prevent and stop the Rwanda Genocide was a failure of the United Nations system as a whole. It is important to note that the guiding principle of the international system which emphasizes sovereignty and the concept of self-determination in internal conflicts, has always been a constraint to Peacekeeping Missions (PKM). As a result of this, there has been a limit to how the UN and the international community in general intervene in states' internal conflicts, most especially ethnic conflicts. Zacarias (1996) argued that the consideration of "sovereignty in the international system has often made the UN incapable of seizing the initiative to intervene in the chases of chaos and non-

government that have led to the abuse of human rights and genocide” (Zacarias, 1996:205).

The chief problem facing the United Nation Peacekeeping Operation (UNPKO) is the problem of resources. It has been quite impossible for the UN to undertake enforcement mandates without the endowment of its own personal resources (Zacarias, 1996:152). Regardless, the international community is not ready to provide the UN with its own resources to undertake enforcement tasks because each individual state would have to surrender some of its sovereignty for the creation of a strong military structure in the UN and this seems impossible because the world powers would not even want to see this happen (ibid, p 154).

In the field, UNAMIR was ill-equipped and lacked the necessary resources to stop the killings (Department of Peacekeeping Operation, 1996:6). Of the 2,500 UN personnel that were first sent to Rwanda, only a few were adequately equipped and this does not guarantee effective operation. “A full battalion from Ghana was deployed for two weeks without equipment” (Dallaire, 2003: 319). It was so difficult for the mission to fulfill its mandate when they were confronted with populated and advanced weaponry fighters. In any operation, the size of armies or troops determines the success or failure of the mission. Even when the Belgian soldiers were withdrawn from the mission, Dallaire stated that “UNAMIR does not have heavy weapons systems, ammunition, let alone secure transport. [...] Troops [...] were very tired and sickly because of the lack of proper food and medicine” (Dallaire, 2003: 319). The mission had to do nothing but watch helplessly as Rwandans kept killing each other right before their eyes. Six weeks after the genocide, the UNSC authorized over 5,000 peacekeepers to be deployed to Rwanda,

but none were immediately made available and this is because member states were not ready to sentence their troops to possible death. If the UN had its own military troops, the late entry of the requested 5,000 troops to Rwanda could have been prevented. And to an extent, if the troops were immediately available, UNAMIR could have stopped one of the worst killings of the past century (Carnegie Corporation, 1997: 68). However, the United States' lack of an interest in Rwanda resulted in the withdrawal of its troops from the mission and its late response in sending in more troops. This illustrates the Neo-realist position on international institutions which postulates that states place national interest over co-operation. The UN cannot function independently without the approval of its member states and this explains why the UN ends up fulfilling the interests of its member states rather than maintaining international peace.

Another problem is that the UNAMIR mission did not have a sufficient mandate. Each peacekeeping mission has its own specificity and Rwanda was considered a second-class operation because it was a small country. At that time, the UN assumed that it will be successful in bringing peace to Rwanda and therefore, created a weak mandate which restricted UNAMIR to simply assist, investigate, and monitor the conflict under a Chapter VI mandate (UNDPI, 1996: 232). This stopped the mission force commander from applying force to make the parties sign a cease-fire agreement. The only time Dallaire was allowed to use force, other than self-defence, was when he was asked to evacuate foreign nationals in Rwanda from 7-10 April, 1994. This clearly shows how much more value is placed on the lives of white people over Africans (Power, 2003: 352).

In addition, the UNAMIR mandate did not evolve in accordance with Rwanda's existing circumstances. The mission was only provided with the prescriptions and training for a civil war. Therefore, the operation of the mission was disorganized when the massacre began. The mission was only prepared to tackle a civil war in the country and was never prepared for a genocide, not until they got Rwanda. When the genocide started, all effort of the mandate to call for a ceasefire and a return to Arusha Accord failed because neither party was ready for a ceasefire. Therefore, achieving a ceasefire failed because both parties never gave in for it. And there was no other effort to set up a new mandate that could tackle the genocide.

The UN is faced with the problem of command and control. Command and control are both military and political concepts, and for any military operation to function well, it requires that both military and political command and control be embodied in a unitary form. Therefore, both the military and the political power need to find unity in command and control. The UN Secretary General, Boutros Boutros Ghali, highlighted the importance of unity of command in saying that "Unity of command is a necessary condition for the operational effectiveness, especially in difficult missions...and if an operation fails to function as an integrated whole, both the mission's ability to reach its objective and safety of its personnel are jeopardized" (cited in Raevsky, 1995:195). This, however, was absent in the case of UNAMIR. UNAMIR was supposed to be under the control of the Secretary General – political command – and under the control of the field commander, General Dallaire – military command. From the onset, it was quite obvious that the mission was neither fully under the control of UN Secretary General nor the field commander. This was obvious in the way France and Belgium withdrew from UNAMIR without consent from either the field commander or the Secretary general. It was also difficult for the

UN to exercise full control over the UNAMIR troops. Due to a combination of national allegiance on the part of the individual battalions and scant political control, the mission suffered from a lack of operational responsibility and this contributed to its failure in preventing the genocide.

It is quite important to talk about the UN's information network when explaining the challenges the UN faces in managing and resolving conflicts. The UN's information network is very problematic and this is due to the fact that news coverage by the main television broadcasters – like the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), Cable News Network CNN) and others – influence the decision-making centers of the United Nations (Zacarias, 1996:158). According to Raevsky (1995:194), one of the problems of UNPKO is its dependence on contributing countries for information. He further argues that some of these countries frequently withhold information that would be quite important for the UN's operations because of security/national interests or existing conflicts between these countries and the UN. The UN mission in Rwanda faced these sorts of problems. A lot of information regarding the genocide got to countries like the US and France but these countries withheld such information and never disclosed them at the Security Council meetings because they never wanted any country to get involved.

In relation to the above point is the problem of intelligence information on the battlefield. Sun Tzu, in his book *“the art of war”*, said in a quote which was later edited and forwarded by James Clavell (1983: chapter 3) that “to fight and to conquer in all your battles is not supreme excellence; supreme excellence consists of breaking the enemy's resistance without fighting”. This means that military commanders should be involved in developing and gathering quality information

about the strength and weakness of their enemies. With enough information, operation commanders can determine the strengths and weaknesses of any mission they are embarking on and also determine the necessary strength of their own personnel. Conversely, the lack of adequate knowledge and information about the Rwanda conflict led to its failure in preventing the genocide. The forces deployed to Rwanda had little or no information regarding, and a limited understanding of Rwanda. UNAMIR had no information about what had taken place in the country before and after independence; as the military assistant to General Dallaire, Major Brent Beardsley, stated “we have very little information of the background to Rwanda, its history, culture, what had taken place in the country since its independence and before, and especially even in the last couples of years” (NCF documentary 2014). It is therefore necessary for UNPKO to have adequate information, which includes the history, culture, and language of every area in which they intend on embarking on a mission, as well as those involved in the peace process. It is quite important for the UNPKO missions to have an independent and operational source of information that can offer timely service to the command control unit and decision centers.

From the given analyses, it can be concluded that the UN Security Council gave UNAMIR the responsibility to maintain peace in Rwanda but ignored providing it with the means to provide and facilitate security for the people of Rwanda. UNAMIR was denied the necessary resources it needed to put a stop to the genocide. From the start of the genocide till the end, the Security Council gave no commitment to end the genocide because Rwanda held no strategic importance for the powers who were able to intervene. Few of the UNSC members had no interest in Rwanda. Rwanda was not on the US’s priority list and the US is known not to pursue whatever is not in

its interest. This clearly proves the Neo-realist view of international institutions which it sees as based on relative gains and national interests. It also shows the division that exists in the UN system, particularly when it comes to dealing with third-world peacekeeping issues.

In spite of this failure, UNAMIR did the best it could under the circumstances with the help of the force commander, Dallaire. In the aftermath of Belgium and France's withdrawal of their troops from the mission, UNAMIR was only left with approximately 270 peacekeepers. The peacekeepers who were present during the genocide included Dallaire and some African contingents who tried to save the lives of so many Rwandans, especially children, even at the expense of their own lives.

Chapter 5

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

The creation of UN peace-keeping forces, referred to as “blue helmets”, who are legally under UN authority and controlled by member states has been an important, if not the most important, development in contemporary conflict management. These forces are deployed by the UN to conflict-ridden zones in the world with a mandate. While the particularities of each mission’s mandate differ, UN peace-keeping missions are generally intended to perform the dual functions of preventing the further escalation of conflict and they facilitate conflict resolution where possible. One such mission (UNAMIR) was deployed to Rwanda in the wake of the genocide in 1994, and is believed by all accounts to have been severely limited in the execution of its mandate.

From the research analyses, it can be concluded that responsibility for the limitations of UNAMIR’s original mandate lies primarily with the General Secretary, Secretariat and responsible officials within the DPKO for the mistaken analysis that underpinned their recommendations to the Security Council, and for recommending that the mission be composed of fewer troops than the field mission office had considered necessary. The UN Security Council (UNSC) and Member states also bear part of the responsibility in that they were also complicit in limiting the proposed number of troops. The UNSC gave UNAMIR the responsibility but not the means to prevent and stop the genocide. From the start of the genocide till the end,

the UNSC never showed any semblance of togetherness or cooperated to stop the genocide. This clearly shows the division within the UN system, most especially when it comes to dealing with third world peacekeeping issues.

The Rwandan case is also a testament to the fact that without the support and intervention of the international community and the United Nations' member states, the United Nations itself cannot function effectively. The international community is an entity difficult to define and characterized by a quasi-polarized system, whereby some have greater influence than the others (like the US).

The UN's action towards the conflict were a function of the behaviour of its member states. The UN is known to be dependent on the goodwill of its member states, with sometimes disastrous consequences, as can be seen in the withdrawal of Belgian peacekeepers in Rwanda during the 1994 Genocide.

While the UN remains important in the world today, there are some problems of the system that continue to be neglected and without these disadvantages and problems being addressed, the UN will continue to fail in its handling of complex conflicts and genocides where adequate resources are needed. Such a level of resource demand requires the full attention and support of the permanent members, non-permanent members, and the international community as a whole.

Politically, the UN is undemocratic – the Security Council, even as the minority, imposes its views on the General Assembly that constitutes the majority. The veto right gives sweeping powers to the permanent members of the Security Council. UN operation is often debilitated by the misuse of the veto by the competing and rival

powers. There have been numerous criticisms of the representativeness of the Security Council, mostly from third world states, Germany and even Japan.

Militarily, there has been a rapid increase in conflicts around the world since 1945 and most of these conflicts have posed serious threats to international peace. Despite this, the response to these conflicts by the UN has been slow, reactionary, or even altogether avoided. The UN contingent group is slow to respond to emergencies, partly because the UN has no standing army soldiers of its own. All decisions to send troops to a mission depend on the interests of the great powers and the states contributing troops. In the case of Rwanda, the strength of UNAMIR could neither prevent nor effectively curtail the Rwandan genocide. Even when the force commander demanded for more troops, they weren't made available until after the genocide. Basically, the UN, together with the permanent members of the UNSC (veto powers) delayed intervening in the genocide due to national interest. This clearly proves the Neo-realist view about international organizations. In line with the expectations of neo-realists, the UN was driven primarily by the interests of its permanent members and, consequently, failed in its duty to provide peace and security in Rwanda. Its actions were largely based on the decisions of the veto powers and this resulted in the non-prevention of the 100 days massacre in 1994.

On the social-economic dimension, the UN is facing financial difficulties and this will continue to happen as long as its heavy operating expenses are coming from the voluntary contributions of its member states, and access is based on the member states' level of contribution and capacity. Their respective economic weight will allow the member states with the largest contributions to impose their positions and interests on that of the UN.

Therefore, to avoid these financial and other resource-related difficulties, the UN and its members need to make enough organizational security troops available for the UN – these troops should be immediately available for peace-keeping missions that might threaten international peace and security. The permanent five (P5) members needs to be guided on issues that pertain to international peace and security so as to avoid unnecessary vetoes.

The overview on the theoretical debates about conflict resolution in chapter two of this thesis explains that for a conflict to be resolved, the third parties to the conflict need to be granted the consent of the conflicting parties before getting involved and as well, identify the problems or issues underlying the conflict by having adequate knowledge of the causes of the conflict before interfering (Wallenstein, 2002). It is noticeable that whenever the UN tries to send in third parties to mediate a conflict, the institution usually focuses more on their own reality of the conflict rather than getting to know the deeper roots of the conflict. For instance, as explained in chapter four, the UN assumed the Rwandan genocide was a civil war, they had no concrete analysis of what was happening and what had happened, and this was why they handled the genocide like any other conflict and sent down an inadequate number of troops to Rwanda. It is therefore necessary for the UN, as an international organization for the maintenance of peace and security, to understand that knowing the deep causes behind any conflict before interfering is more important than simply getting involved with their own assumptions about the conflict.

In addition, the effective coordination and co-operation of all components of a peacekeeping operation (PKO), which includes the Security Council, the Secretariat and even troop-contributing countries, is important for the overall success of any

mission. Clearly defined objectives and common goals that will guide all the components of a PKO must be provided for and made available.

The UN Peacekeeping Operation missions should have an independent operational source of information that can offer timely service to the command control unit and decision centers as a well-managed intelligence and information analysis program can greatly assist a peacekeeping mission or operation. The problem of command and control in UN peacekeeping operations can also be avoided when there is a clear chain of command between a peacekeeping mission and its Headquarters.

Most importantly, for the effective intervention in intra-state conflicts, the UN needs to be developed on a comprehensive peacebuilding approach which will go beyond the inclusion of the undoubtedly important security components and include development, political, judicial, and humanitarian components, which would have to involve the whole UN system. This will help the UN to intervene effectively (with the consent of the conflicting parties) in intra-state conflicts and fragile countries in general.

Also, there is a need to establish strong co-operation between the UN and Regional Agencies that are in one way or the other engaged in peace operations. Both the UN and Regional Organizations need each other; they should assume shared responsibilities for resolving key securities problems and collectively provide the key future form of global security governance.

The Rwandan Genocide was never the concern of the UN in all its integrity, the resolutions of the Security Council on the conflict were based more on the

deployment of UN peacekeeping forces. The genocide is a catastrophe that should never have happened, especially because it was preventable. The massacre did not happen overnight; it was a process and so there were many opportunities for an intervention to be made before it escalated into a full-blown genocide. This was very much not the case, not only in Rwanda but also in other genocides that have taken place in the world even after the Rwandan genocide, such as Cambodia, Bosnia, Darfur, amongst others. Unfortunately, the list of conflicts where the UN's involvement was sub-optimal continues and so, unless the UN starts to do more in terms of management and prevention, such conflicts will continue to happen over and over again.

It is certain that the UN still has a role to play in the realization of a truly peaceful and conflict-free world. The Charter of the UN and other fundamental documents like the Universal Declaration of Human Rights stand as important references that reflect the hope or will for a better world. Therefore, such disappointing experiences should become the reference model for the UN's role in conflict resolution in the modern international system in that it can draw from its shortcomings in the past as a not-to-do list for the future.

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