

**State of the Union: Innovations and Illusions in the  
March towards African Integration**

**Nguh Nwei Asanga Fon**

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Approval of the Institute of Graduate Studies and Research

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Assoc. Prof. Dr. Ali Hakan Ulusoy  
Acting Director

I certify that this thesis satisfies the requirements as a thesis for the degree of Master of Arts in International Relations.

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Prof. Dr. Ahmet Sözen  
Chair, Department of Political Science and  
International Relations

We certify that we have read this thesis and that in our opinion; it is fully adequate in scope and quality and as a thesis for the degree of Master of Arts in International Relations.

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Asst. Prof. Dr. Nuray Ibryamova  
Supervisor

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Examining Committee

1. Asst. Prof. Dr. Nuray Ibryamova

2. Asst. Prof. Dr. Berna Numan

3. Asst. Prof. Dr. Sertaç Sonan

## ABSTRACT

The birth of the African Union (AU) in July 2002 was welcome as a milestone in the continent's drive towards regional integration. Emerging from the ashes of the moribund Organisation of African Unity (OAU), the AU was envisioned with structural, institutional and policy innovations that was supposed to put the continent's political and economic integration back on the rails.

Structures such as the Peace and Security Council (PSC) with its Panel of the Wise; African Standby Force and Peace Support Operations was supposed to strengthen the institution's capacity in conflict prevention, management and resolution in a continent often plagued by political instability. The Pan-African Parliament (PAP) was envisioned as a legislative body that will articulate the voice of ordinary Africans at the continental stage. Fifteen years after its creation, the question is how far has the African Union gone with its engagements?

This research work delves into a critical assessment of the creation and functioning of the structures of the African Union and the institution's pursuit of its agenda. The research question guiding this study is how far has the AU delivered on the structural and policy reforms that necessitated its emergence?

**Keywords:** Neofunctionalism, African Integration, African Union, AU Institutions, Case Studies.

## ÖZ

Afrika Birliđi'nin Temmuz 2002'de dođuşu, kıtanın bölgesel bütünleşme yolunda bir dönüm noktası olarak kabul edilmektedir. Afrikalı Birlik Örgütü'nün (ABÖ) küllerinden ortaya çıkan bu birlik kıtanın siyasi ve ekonomik entegrasyonunu yeniden raylara oturtmasını sağlayacak yapısal, kurumsal ve politika yeniliklerini öngörmektedir.

Barış ve Güvenlik Konseyi ve Afrika Bekleme Gücü ve Barış Destekleme Operasyonları gibi yapıların çatışmayı önleme, yönetme ve çözme konusundaki kurumların kapasitelerini güçlendirmesi beklenmektedir. Pan-Afrika Parlamentosu, sıradan Afrikalıların sesini kıtasal evrede ifade edecek bir yasama organı olarak öngörülmektedir. Kurulmasından on beş yıl sonra, soru şu ki, Afrika Birliđi ne kadar ileriye gitti?

Bu araştırma, Afrika Birliđi'nin yapılarının kurulması ve işleyişi ile kurumun gündemi üzerine eleştirel bir değerlendirme yapmaktadır. Bu çalışmayı yönlendiren araştırma sorusu: Afrika Birliđi ortaya çıkmasını sağlayan yapısal ve politika reformlarını ne kadar ilerletti?

**Anahtar Kelimeler:** Yeni işlevcilik, Afrika Entegrasyonu, Afrika Birliđi, Afrika Birliđi Kurumları, Vaka Çalışmaları.

# DEDICATION

To my family (Mom, Dad, Collins, Emmanuel, Irene, Sylvia, Asanga, Fri and  
William)

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## **LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS**

AfCHPR:	African Court for Human and People's Right
AMU:	Arab Maghreb Union
APSA:	African Peace and Security Architecture
ASF:	African Standby Force
AU:	African Union
AUC:	African Union Commission
CEWS:	Continental Early Warning System
CFTA:	Continental Free Trade Area
DEA:	Department of Economic Affairs
DPA:	Department of Political Affairs
DSA:	Department of Social Affairs
EAC:	East African Community
ECOWAS:	Economic and Monetary Community for West Africa
EU:	European Union
PAP:	Pan-African Parliament
PSC:	Peace and Security Council
PSD:	Peace and Security Department
RECs:	Regional Economic Communities
RM:	Regional Mechanism
SADC:	Southern Africa Development Community
UNECA:	United Nations Economic Commission for Africa

# Chapter 1

## STATEMENT OF PROBLEM

The birth of the African Union (AU) in July 2002 was welcomed as a milestone in the continent's drive towards integration. By integration reference is being made to regional integration of states. Regional integration generally refers to the process by which two or more states enter an agreement to cooperate for the achievement of peace, stability and wealth (McCormick, 1999). Schmitter (1970:836) adds that it has to do with "how national units come to share part or all of their decisional authority with an emerging international organization".

Emerging from the ashes of the moribund Organisation of African Unity (OAU), the AU was envisioned with structural, institutional and policy innovations that was supposed to put the continent's political and economic integration back on the rails. Structures such as the Peace and Security Council (PSC) with its Panel of the Wise; African Standby Force and Peace Support Operations was supposed to strengthen the organisation's capacity in conflict prevention, management and resolution in a continent often plagued by political instability. The Pan-African Parliament (PAP) was envisioned as a legislative body that will articulate the voice of ordinary Africans at the continental stage and help pursue the agenda of an African Economic Community. Judicial and human rights institutions like the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights, the African Court on Human Rights and Justice were supposed to adjudicate or resolve the numerous cases of human rights violation on

the continent. Financial institutions like the African Central Bank and African Monetary Fund on their part were supposed to forge a common monetary policy and a single African currency as a catalyst to economic integration. Fifteen years after its creation, the question is how far the African Union gone with the process of integration?

This research work delves into a critical assessment of the role played by the institutions or structures of the AU in the pursuit of continental integration. The theoretical framework to I employ in my analysis is neo-functionalism given the fact that the African Union was modelled after the European Union and sought similar goals as that of European integration. Mattli (1999) identified neo-functionalism as a crucial framework in explaining integration. Neo-functionalism involves the transfer of competence and loyalties from the national to the supranational authority or institutions. Using the lenses of neo-functionalism, this study sought to know the extent to which competences and loyalties have been transferred from member countries to the African Union as part of the process of integration.

## **1.1 Research Questions**

The research question guiding this study is: To what extent have the institutions of the AU contributed to the advancement of continental integration in Africa? Our case study is focused on the following key institutions of the AU: The African Union Commission (AUC), the Peace and Security Council (PSC), the Pan African Parliament (PAP), and the African Court on Human and Peoples' Right (AfCHPR).

## **1.2 Purpose of Study**

In a bid to add impetus to the efforts towards continental integration, the African Union was framed with structural innovations which brought forth new institutions such as: The Executive Council; The Peace and Security Council (PSC); The Pan-African Parliament; The Commission; The Permanent Representatives Committee; The Specialized Technical Committees; The Economic, Social and Cultural Council; The Court of Justice (African Court of Justice) and The Financial Institutions (African Central Bank, African Investment Bank, African Monetary Fund).

The purpose of this study is to critically examine the contributions of the institutions of the African Union in promoting continental integration in Africa.

## **1.3 Hypothesis**

This study is predicated on the following hypothesis:

The structural innovations (new institutions) of the African Union have accelerated the pace of continental integration as envisaged in their creation.

By definition, institutions as mentioned in the hypotheses and used in this thesis encompass intergovernmental structures and the international regime, regulatory norm or treaty guiding its operation.

Continental integration as employed in this thesis refers to the process through which African states agree to cooperate through shared institutions to promote their social, economic welfare and political unity.

To provide an appropriate gauge with which the aforementioned hypotheses will be measured the following will constitute our operational definition: the effectiveness of

the institutions of the African Union in promoting continental integration is contingent on the achievement of the purpose and goals for which they were established and the overall level of progress of the African Union in the process of the creation of the African Economic Community (which is projected as the final catalyst for full political integration). Jawooden (2010) outlines the stages through which the African Economic Community is envisaged to be created: the creation of regional blocs by 1999; the strengthening of intra-regional integration and inter-regional harmonisation by 2007; the establishment of free trade area and customs union in each regional bloc by 2017, the establishment of a continental-wide African Common Market by 2035 and the establishment of a continent-wide economic and monetary union, including a currency union and a parliament by 2028.

#### **1.4 Literature Review**

Regional integration has been the object of captivating and intriguing debate among scholars of International Relations (IR). Depending on the theoretical framework underpinning their analysis, IR scholars offer divergent approach on how to attain integration among states in the same region. Some take a pessimistic outlook while others are optimistic depending on the theoretical lenses from which they view integration. With its successful evolution overtime, the European Union stands out as a model and laboratory from which most international relations scholars source and test theories explaining regional integration. Before exploring the state-of-the-art in integration literature and how it relates to the subject of African integration, it is imperative to review how IR scholars define integration and how it applies to the African context.

One of the most prominent neofunctionalists, Ernst B. Haas defines integration as:



the process whereby political actors in several distinct national settings are persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectations and political activities towards a new centre, whose institutions possess or demand jurisdiction over pre-existing national states. The end result of a process of political integration is a new political community, superimposed over the pre-existing ones. (Haas, 1958:16 as cited in Niemann and Schmitter, 2009)

Haas' definition conceives integration as a transfer of loyalty with the end result of the creation of a supranational entity with authority over the pre-existing entities. His contemporary, Leon Linberg though sharing the general neo-functional approach to integration differed on the process and the results or ends. Linberg defines integration as:

(1) The process whereby nations forego the desire and ability to conduct foreign and domestic policies independently of each other, seeking instead to make joint decisions or to delegate the decision-making process to new central organs: and (2) the process whereby political actors in several distinct settings are persuaded to shift their expectations and political activities to a new center. (Linberg, 1963:6 as cited in Niemann and Schmitter, 2009)

Unlike Haas, Lindberg notes concerning the process that political actors shifts their expectations not their loyalties and that the end process of integration is undetermined.

When writers define the concept of regional integration (McCormick, 1999; Schmitter 2009), it is generally assumed that the term "regional" is used to represent an entire continent as is the case with Europe. However, the concept of region has a different connotation in the African context with the existence of Regional Economic Communities (RECs) among states in various geographical sections of the continent like ECOWAS in West Africa, SADC in Southern Africa, EAC in East Africa and CEMAC in Central Africa. That is why applying the concept of regional integration as used in European studies drawn from the European perspective should be nuanced

with some contextual explanation. That is why this research study distinguishes "continental integration" as the dependent variable rather than "regional integration". The latter (regional integration) tend to receive more scholarly attention than the former (continental integration) given the fact that it is the less ambiguous among the two leaving a gap which this study hopes to fill.

Scholars have used various theories to explain integration in general and European integration in particular. Among them we have major theories like neo-functionalism, intergovernmentalism, and liberal intergovernmentalism. Other mid-range theories have emerged which captures recent stages of European integration like New institutionalism (subdivided to rational choice institutionalism, sociological institutionalism and historical institutionalism) and multi-level governance (CIVITAS, 2015).

The theory of Neo-functionalism emerged in the second half of the 1950s built on the work of two American political scientists: Ernst B. Haas and Leon Lindberg. McGowan (2007) notes that Neo-functionalism was conceived in a bid to explain the distinct form of political regional integration process that emerged in Western Europe during the 1950s. Neo-functionalism underline "spill-over" as the major driving force behind the process of integration (Ibid). Schmitter (2005 ) on his part underscores that though neo-functionalism recognizes the important role states play in the establishment to regional organisations, it lays emphasis on two other set of actors as those providing the impetus for further growth: the "secretariat" of the organisation in question and the interest associations and social movements it engenders at the regional level.

Fabbrini (2017) describes intergovernmentalism (within the European context) as the role played by member state governments in the EU decision making framework. He distinguishes two forms of intergovernmentalism: one balanced by supranational institutions and the other (intergovernmental union) consisting of a stable but evolving set of institutions and procedures which are established in Brussels.

Moravcsik and Schimmelfennig (2009) define liberal intergovernmentalism as a "grand theory" that tries to account for the wide evolution of regional integration. The theory argues that integration cannot be explained with a single factor. The theory therefore seeks to merge several theories and factors to form a coherent approach suitable to bring understanding to the direction integration takes over time.

Liberal intergovernmentalism (LI) rest on two basic assumption: first is that states are the critical actors in the process of integration and second that states are rational actors. Proponents of LI argue it is through intergovernmental negotiations and bargaining rather than centralized institutions that states achieve their aims. This line of thought is contested by New institutionalists who on their part emphasis the role of institutions in the process of integration.

New institutionalism is a theory void of a unified thought pattern. Hall and Taylor (1996) distinguish three different analytical approach or strands of New institutionalism: historical institutionalism, rational choice institutionalism, and sociological institutionalism. They point out that all these approaches were developed in a bid to explain the role of institutions in the determination of social and political outcomes. Historical institutionalism looks at long run impact of institutions and how they can restrict the actions of their authors. Sociological

institutionalism emphasizes the way broader norms and general rules shape the preferences of actors in the integration process. Rational choice institutionalism on its part focuses on the way in which actors pursue their individual preferences within the context of institutional rules (CIVITAS, 2015).

Of prime relevance to my research is neo-functionalism which constitutes the theoretical framework of this study. There are two fundamental reasons justifying the choice of neofunctionalism over other alternative theoretical framework mentioned above. The first is the fact that the continental integration in Africa is relatively at its infancy stage when compared with that of Europe. Though newer theories of regional integration like New institutionalism (in its various strands); multi-level governance and liberal intergovernmentalism may harbour better explanatory value within the context of contemporary European integration (given its complexity), it may not provide similar explanatory virtues when it comes to the present level of continental integration in Africa.

In spite of recent rebuttal and rejection by several scholars (Schmitter, 2003), Neofunctionalism still contain enormous explanatory values as a theoretical framework in understanding the early stages of European integration. To this end, Rosamond (2000; p.50) underscores “the neofunctionalist project was evidently bound up with the strategies of the founding architects of the EC.” He also underlines a nexus between the 'Monnet method' of integration and the neofunctionalist propositions developed by proponents of neofunctionalism like Haas. Neofunctionalism sought to give a theoretical expression of the method espoused by Jean Monnet and other elites of post-war European integration which revolved around achieving political (federal) union through a strategic and incremental route.

The creation of a supranational structure and sector integration leading to functional spillover stood as essential elements. This strategy is akin to the gradualist approach adopted by the precursors of African unity both with the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) and the African Union (AU).

Secondly, most of the other integration theories tend to be reductionist given their epistemological bias towards the aspects the emphasis. Intergovernmentalism and liberal intergovernmentalism for instance, emphasis the role of governments and states. New intuitionism lacks a unified thought pattern. It is sub-divided into historical intuitionism which emphasis the impact of institutions and their restriction on their authors; sociological institutionalism that focuses on the impact of general rules and broader norms on the preferences of actors in the integration process, and rational choice institutionalism that emphasis the individual preferences of actors in the context of institutional rules. Neofunctionalism offers a more encompassing theoretical framework especially in understanding regional integration as a process which is very much the case of African integration.

Though very largely discredited, discarded or substituted in recent theoretical explanations on European integration, the basic assumptions of neo-functionalism forms the basis of African integration. Neo-functionalism is premised on the assumption that economic integration a sector will prompt integration to other sectors (spillover effect) and will ultimately necessitate political integration. In it important to underscore here that as concerns contentious issue of shift in loyalty emphasized in Haas original conception, this thesis stand more with Lindberg's moderate conception of shift in expectations to the institutions of the new center.

Economic integration in Africa was seen as means to propel political integration. To this end De Melo and Tsiakata (2014) note that the Lagos Plan of Action adopted by OAU heads of states in 1980 proposed a framework for integration of the continent into pan-African unity through the division of the continent into Regional Economic Communities (RECs).

Another fundamental assumption of neo-functionalism which could also be applied to the context of African integration is conception of integration as a process. In this regard, neo-functionalists differ from intergovernmentalists who tend to interpret integration as isolated events usually in the form of treaty negotiation which they see as an enactment of power politics (Niemann and Schmitter, 2009). The establishment of RECs in different parts of the continent was part of a grand strategy to create an African Economic Community (Jawoodeen, 2008) which would ultimately lead to greater political integration.

Another important factor in neo-functionalism with implication in this study is institutions. Haas emphasis the crucial role of institution in the process of political integration in the following words:

Then came along the political project of creating a united Europe, which had the result of creating a myriad of institutions in which very, very many people participated . . . These institutions developed a permanence through which both French and German . . . learned to do routine business with each other every day. A problem which they experienced was a common problem . . . first comes the traumatic lesson, then comes the institution for learning to deal with each other. (Haas 2000:16 as cited in in Niemann and Schmitter, 2009)

The transition from the OAU to the AU came along with new institutions which were meant to strengthen economic and political integration.

In summary, the use of “neo-functionalism” in this thesis as a theoretical framework to examine the impact of AU institutions on African integration should not be misconstrued. Neo-functionalism as used in this study is not premised from the original conception in the mind of Haas as a grand theory of integration with the pretention of applicability in every context and location. This research employs a reformulated or moderate version of neo-functionalism more in the light of Lindberg than Haas. While acknowledging the works of previous authors who concentrated on regional integration in Africa through RECs, this thesis delves into another aspect of African integration—continental level institutions and their impact on the integration process. It examines the viability of the model of integration through spill-over and institutions in the African context.

### **1.5 Methodology**

This study is an empirical analysis into how far the institutions of the AU have contributed in accelerating the pace of integration in the African continent. Qualitative methods are used both in data collection and data analysis. It makes use of both primary sources (treaties, conventions and survey responses) and secondary sources (mostly book, journal articles and other published works). A structured online survey was carried out to gauge public awareness and opinion about the phenomenon under study and results were triangulated with data from other opinion surveys. The study relies on document analysis as its method of analysis data gotten from the two aforementioned sources.

It employs case study design that focuses on the institutions of the AU. The goal in this case is to examine the effectiveness of the neo-functional approach (through institution-building) in achieving regional (continental) integration in Africa. From the creation of the OAU to its transformation into the AU, neo-functionalism appears

to have been the principal theoretical foundation and approach towards integration. With the relatively slow pace of integration witnessed in the continent some actors and scholars are now questioning the effectiveness of the neo-functional approach. Using four principal institutions of the AU as a case-study (AUC, PSC, PAP and AfCHPR), this research throws light on the aforementioned interrogation. The choice of case study analysis in the methodology of this thesis was motivated by three factors. As a qualitative research method, case study avails the researcher an opportunity to carry out an in-depth analysis of a phenomenon. Case study by definition has in-depth analysis as its best quality as we see in the definition of one of its prominent proponent Robert Yin (2009:14): “an empirical enquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon in depth and within its real-life context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident”.

Secondly, it constitutes a good method to test the validity and reliability of a theoretical assumption which falls in line with the object of the present study. Thirdly, the constraints of time and resources renders case study more feasible within the context of an MA thesis time frame than other methods or designs.

This study uses qualitative methods and relies largely on secondary sources. It uses both content and discourse analyses in analysing the qualitative data gathered.

## **1.6 Significance of Study**

The lethargic pace of African integration has been a source of concern for many Africans and an object of diverse interpretations by scholars and actors in international relations. The advent of the African Union and the structural



innovations it engendered was viewed as a harbinger of better days ahead for African integration. After a decade and a half of functioning, the moment appears very auspicious to make an assessment of the effectiveness of the institutions of the AU as a catalyst for integration. Such an assessment, which constitutes the prime focus of this study, will provide useful information to decision makers (African leaders), scholars and students of international relations about the strides and setbacks of the institutions of the AU in promoting African integration.

Another contribution this study makes to the corpus of knowledge in the domain of regional (continental) integration is an assessment of the viability of neo-functionalism as the theoretical framework driving integration within the African Union. With the AU closely sculpted after the EU which was largely influenced by neo-functionalism, the present study provides an assessment as to whether the neo-functional approach have been able to deliver for the AU what it did for the EU.

The present study therefore draws its significance in the perspective of providing a source of inspiration for a sound institutional analysis and policy review on continental integration for AU member states and scholars in International Relations.

### **1.7 Scope and Limitation**

This research is focused on examining the impact of institutions in regional (continental) integration. It examines the applicability of the two of the fundamental assumptions of neo-functionalism (spillover and shift of expectations to new institutions of the center) as catalyst to the process of integration. The institutions of the African Union are used as a case study for my analysis. In this regard, this thesis examines existing literature on neo-functionalism and African integration to situate

this study in the general scholarship on regional integration. In terms of operationalization, it lays emphasis on the specific aspects of the neo-functionalism theory which forms its theoretical framework—spillover and shift of expectation to new institutions of the center.

The major limitation of this study is its inability to cover all the institutions of the AU which would have enhanced its generalizability. Allied to this is the inability to combine other quantitative and qualitative research methods to generate more useful data and make a more accurate and comprehensive analysis of causality between our dependent (continental integration) and independent (AU institutions) variables. While acknowledging that such a thorough empirical research enterprise lays beyond the scope of the present study it is worthwhile mentioning that these limitations were mitigated by the choice of strategic institutions at the heart of the continental integration project.

## **Chapter 2**

# **HISTORICAL BACKGROUND TO CONTINENTAL INTEGRATION IN AFRICA**

### **2.1 Introduction**

Continental integration in Africa is a process deeply rooted in history. To understand the present nature and level of integration, there is need to explore the historical context. This chapter journeys memory lane to trace the origins and evolution of the idea of African unity. It starts with the pan-Africanist movements of the 19th Century and looks at the conflict in approach among leaders on the form of integration to be pursued (federation versus confederation). It also looks at the transition from the OAU to the AU.

### **2.2 Pan-Africanism and African Unity**

The march towards continental integration in Africa traces its origins to the Pan-Africanist movement of the 19th Century among Africans in the Diaspora (Afro-Americans and Afro-Caribbean) like W.E.B Du Bois, Henry Sylvester Williams and others (Masabo, 2010). Pan-Africanism is a philosophical movement that sought the political, economic, social and cultural liberation of continental and Diaspora Africans (Araia, 2006) and their reconstitution into a unified nation (Britannica Online, 2017). Pan Africanism had both philosophical and political dimensions which played a role in shaping the minds of the precursors of Africa's integration. Philosophically, it was a cultural renaissance that celebrated the "African

personality" and shared "Negro identity". Politically, it sought the establishment of united political entity (United States of Africa).

Among those who championed the cause of political unification was Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana who together with Sékou Touré of Guinea and Modibo Keita of Mali espoused a federal approach to continental integration viewed by some of his contemporaries as radical (South African History Online, 2011). Nkrumah saw an immediate federal government as the most effective strategy to the continent's emancipation and integration. Julius Nyerere of Tanzania on his part advocated a more functionalist approach to African integration. Nyerere argued that an incremental approach will enable agreement among equals which is vital to bring about unity (Moshi, 2013).

This dichotomy in approach among African leaders at the dawn of independence engendered a split among African countries into three policy approaches on the issue of continental integration: On the one hand was the Casablanca Group (comprising Ghana, Morocco, Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Guinea and Mali) which called for full continental integration (a federal polity). On the other hand were the Monrovia Group (comprising among others: Ethiopia, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Nigeria, Tunisia, Somalia, Togo and Sudan) who called for an incremental approach to continental unity and the Brazzaville Group (comprised entirely of former French colonies led by Ivory Coast and Senegal) which called for a gradualist approach to continental integration through regional economic and cultural co-operation (Manelisi and Stephen, 2000).

The bone of contention between the aforementioned camps hinged on the issue of sovereignty and territorial integrity. While most African leaders embraced the idea of continental unity, they were weary of the overbearing reach of a "United State of Africa" which will entail forfeiting their hard-fought and newly won sovereignty and territorial integrity (South Africa History Online, 2011). The outcome of this ideological rift was the establishment of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) by leaders of 32 African countries in May 1963. The OAU was a compromised version of a continental union which tilted overwhelmingly in favour of the "incrementalists" or "gradualists" over the "federalists."

The overriding goal of the OAU was to achieve continental integration through an incremental or step-by-step approach. In spite of significant strides made towards decolonisation, the OAU failed to live to expectation and was finally abandoned for the African Union (AU) in 2002.

Modelled after the European Union, the AU represented an express attempt by African leaders to utilise the European model (predominantly a neo-functionalist approach) to galvanise the drive towards African continental integration. The identity (African Union), structure and new institutions outlined in the Constitutive Act of the AU (The Executive Council, The Commission, The Pan-African Parliament, The Court of Justice, The Financial Institutions etc) constituted for a large part a mimicry of EU institutions.

The journey from Pan Africanism in the 19th Century to the present day African Union was therefore marked by an ideological confrontation between a "federation" and a "confederation" approach towards African Unity. This contention among the

African leaders at independence has remained a subject of hair-splitting debate among politicians and scholars on African integration till date. This phenomenon is therefore given some analytical attention in the paragraphs that follows.

### **2.3 Federation versus Confederation**

The two prominent ideological and philosophical approaches that emerged on the orientation of African integration were Federation and Confederation. The "Federation" or "Federal" Approach focused on immediate creation of a "Union Government of African States" at independence. (Hazlewood, 1988). Such a union government will require newly independent African states to surrender their sovereignty for the creation of a "United States of Africa" which was the primordial goal of Pan Africanism. This approach was advocated by the Casablanca Group of independent and African countries undergoing independent struggles. This group was made up of Ghana, Mali, Guinea, Egypt, Algeria, Libya and the Kingdom of Morocco. This approach was perceived to as radical (Manelisi and Stephen, 2000) by some African leaders. The Casablanca Group was spearheaded by Ghanaian President Kwame Nkrumah, the most outspoken advocate of the federal approach to African unity. Nkrumah unequivocally and emphatically defended the drive towards a federation of African States during the May 1963 Conference which led to the birth of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU). Nkrumah enunciated his famous "Seek ye first the political kingdom" doctrine both in his book *Africa Must Unite* (published in prelude to the conference and distributed among delegates) and his speech at the conference. Nkrumah underscored:

African Unity is above all a political Kingdom which can be gained by political means. The social and economic development of Africa will come only with the political Kingdom, not the other way round. The United States of America, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, were the political decisions of revolutionary peoples

before they became mighty realities of social power and material wealth.  
(Hazlewood, 1988 p.55)

Nkrumah went as far as conceiving a four programme vision for the achievement of African unity in line with his federalist approach. As Francis (2006; p.19) points out, Nkrumah's four-point programme consisted of:

1. A common foreign policy and diplomacy for Africa. In effect, a platform to speak with one voice on international affairs and at the same time overhaul the negative effects of a divided Africa.
2. Common continental planning for economic and industrial development in Africa.
3. Common currency, a monetary zone and a central bank.
4. Common defence and security system with an African High Command to ensure the security and stability of Africa. That is, an all-African military force to secure the liberation of colonial territories and to replace foreign military bases in Africa.

Nkrumah's role as the icon of African political unification (Federation) has been acknowledged by several scholars (Okhonmina, 2009; Adogamhe, 2008, Olaosebikan, 2011, Biney, 2011 & 2008; and Saaka, 1994). Commenting on Nkrumah's role in the pursuit of a federation of African states, Kumah-Abiwu and Ochwa-Echel (2013) underscored that he grasped the potentials to be derived from political unity and saw in it the best remedy to the socio-economic challenges newly independent African states were confronted with.

Nkrumah's contribution in the quest for an African Federation was best summarized in the following statement by Kenyan scholar Ali Mazrui:

Nkrumah's greatest bequest to Africa was the agenda of continental unification. No one else has made the case for continental integration more forcefully, or with greater sense of drama than Nkrumah. Although most African leaders regard the whole idea of a United States of Africa as wholly unattainable in the foreseeable future, Nkrumah even after death has kept the debate alive through his books and through the continuing influence of his ideas.

(Kumah-Abiwu and Ochwa-Echel, 2013, pp. 123)

Nkrumah's federal approach to African unity did not resonate with most of his contemporaries as an overwhelming number of African states considered it too radical. Most African countries preferred a "confederal" or what became known as gradualist approach to African unity. A confederation, confederal approach refers to what President Julius Nyerere (one of its prominent advocate) termed a "step-by-step" path towards African integration (Francis, 2006; Kumah-Abiwu and Ochwa-Echel, 2013). It was the platform espoused by the Monrovia Group of states (a rival to the Casablanca Group) comprising: Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Togo, Ivory Coast, Cameroon, Senegal, Dahomey, Malagasy Republic, Chad, Upper Volta, Niger, People's Republic of Congo, Gabon, Central African Republic, Ethiopia, Somalia and Tunisia (Manelisi, Francis and Stephen, 2000). Most of these states were not ready to pay the price of abandoning their newly won sovereignty for a federal political union. Some of the leaders of states who opted for the confederal approach expressed their opposition to the federation approach which will jeopardise their sovereignty.

Gathering in Monrovia (Liberia) in May 1961, the "Monrovia Group" affirmed their commitment to maintaining their sovereignty through a non-interference declaration which barred states from interfering in the domestic jurisdiction of African states. The conference's final declaration rejected the idea of political unity (federation). The conference ended with the following declaration: "The unity that is aimed to be achieved at the moment is not a political integration of sovereign states, but unity of aspirations and of action considered from the point of view of African social solidarity and political identity" (Hazlewood, 1988, p.54). It is also important to



mention that there were a few other African states that opted for a pluralist option (neither federalist nor gradualist). The opinion of these states was well represented in the statement made by the Malagasy President Tsiranana:

We intend to conserve the total sovereignty of our states... I should underline that our adhesion means by the same token a rejection of a formula for Federation of African States because federalism presupposes the surrender of a large part of national sovereignty. Similarly, we would reject a confederal formula seeing that the authority we superimpose on the states might impose demands which would be unacceptable for certain of us.  
(Ibid)

The OAU was does conceived as a compromise much in favour of the "confederal approach". Nkrumah and the Casablanca group had to concede their federal approach to that of a confederation advocated by the Monrovia group. This compromise was articulated by one of the spokesperson for the gradualists (confederal approach) Nigerian Prime Minister, Abubakar Tafawa Balewa who underscored:

Some of us have suggested that African unity should be achieved by a political fusion of the different states in Africa; some of us feel that African unity could be achieve by taking practical steps in economic, educational, scientific and cultural co-operation and by trying first to get Africans to understand themselves before embarking on the more complicated and more difficult arrangement of political union. My country stands for the practical approach to the unity of the African continent.  
(Mangwende, 1984, p. 24)

Nkrumah himself conceded to the compromise of a confederal approach. In what could somewhat be characterised as a concession speech to his peers gathered in Addis Ababa in May 1963, the indefatigable champion of federalist school pointed out: "unite we must. Without necessarily sacrificing our sovereignties, big or small, we can here and now forge a political union based on defence, foreign affairs and

diplomacy, and a common citizenship, an African currency, an African monetary zone and an African central bank." (Dersso, 2013).

It is however important to mention, as Mangwende (1984, p.24) highlighted, that the compromise that enabled the creation of the African Union "did not mean an outright repudiation of political union as a long-term goal." In other words, the creation of the OAU could be seen in some sort not as an end itself but a means to achieve an ultimate end which is a federation of African states longed for by Pan-Africanists.

From 1963 - 2002 therefore, the OAU came to represent the aspiration of African states towards unity. The purposes, structure, evolution, strides and setback of the OAU and its collapse and its replacement in 2002 will be analysed below.

## **2.4 From the OAU to the AU**

The Organisation of African Unity (OAU) saw the light of day on 25 May 1963 in Addis Ababa Ethiopia as a compromise between the Casablanca and the Monrovia groups. It had 32 member states at inception. The purposes or fundamental objectives of the organisation as enshrined in its Charter were:

- (a) To promote the unity and solidarity of the African States;
  - (b) To coordinate and intensify their cooperation and efforts to achieve a better life for the peoples of Africa;
  - (c) To defend their sovereignty, their territorial integrity and independence;
  - (d) To eradicate all forms of colonialism from Africa; and
  - (e) To promote international cooperation, having due regard to the Charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
- (AU, n.d.).

To achieve the aforementioned objectives, member states agreed to a neo-functional approach captured as follows in sub-section 2 of Article II of the Charter:

To these ends, the Member States shall coordinate and harmonize their general policies, especially in the following fields:

- (a) Political and diplomatic cooperation;
  - (b) Economic cooperation, including transport and communications;
  - (c) Educational and cultural cooperation;
  - (d) Health, sanitation and nutritional cooperation;
  - (e) Scientific and technical cooperation; and
  - (f) Cooperation for defence and security.
- (Ibid.)

As concerns structure, the OAU started with four principal institutions: The Assembly of Heads of States and Government; The Council of Ministers; The General Secretariat; The Commission of Mediation, Conciliation and Arbitration. The OAU Charter upheld the Assembly of Heads of States and Government as the OAU's supreme organ charged with deliberating on matters of common concern to Africa in the perspective of coordinating and harmonizing the general organisational policy. The Council of Ministers was set up to prepare conferences of the Assembly of Heads of States and Governments and implement its decisions. The General Secretariat, under the leadership of a Secretary General, was in charge of the running the bureaucracy of the organisation (administration). The establishment of the Commission of Mediation, Conciliation and Arbitration which was a materialisation of the pledge by member states to use peaceful means to settle disputes that may occur among themselves. Its composition and conditions of service were to be define by a separate Protocol to be approved by the Assembly and integrated into the Charter.

Alongside the aforementioned institutions, the OAU Charter also made provision for three specialised commissions: Economic and Social Commission; Educational, Scientific, Cultural and Health Commission and Defence Commission.

To the aforementioned structure were later added three new institutions. The first was the African Commission on Human and People's Rights which went operational in 1987 after its establishment within the framework of the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights in 1982. This eleven members' commission was a treaty monitoring institution charged basically with the promotion and protection of human and people's rights.

The second institution was the OAU Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution established in 1993. The purpose of the structure was to prevent, manage, and resolve conflicts in Africa by: anticipating and preventing potential conflict situations from fledging into full-blown conflicts; undertaking, in the occurrence of full-blown conflicts, peacemaking and peace-building efforts and also extending peacemaking and peace-building activities in post-conflict situations (Muyangwa and Vogt, 2000).

The third institution was the African Court on Human and People's Rights (the Court) which was established in 1998 (under the OAU) but came into force in 2004 (under the AU). The Court was established under Article 1 of the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and People's Right in order to ensure the protection of human and people's rights in Africa.

The focus of the OAU shifted with its evolution over time and the organisation registered diverse fortunes. At inception, the primordial objective and priority of the OAU was to synergize its efforts to assist African states involved in independence struggles and the fight against Apartheid in South Africa. Within this framework, the OAU Coordinating Committee for the Liberation of African Countries was created to

coordinate diplomatic support and convey logistical, financial and military assistance to liberation movements across the continent (Moshi, 2013). Efforts towards this end proved successful as independence was secured for countries like Guinea Bissau, Angola and Mozambique. This focus was maintained up till 1990 when Namibia secured its independence and in 1994 with the election of Mandela as President of South Africa and the incorporation of South Africa as the 53rd member of the OAU.

Another area where the OAU focused its energy and was in a large part successful was the resolution of boundary conflicts. Through its multiple interventions in different parts of the continent, the OAU successfully defended the territorial integrity of its member state from internal or external attacks. During the first year of its existence, the OAU successfully mediated a border conflict between Morocco and Algeria (New African, 2002). Such was the case for Nigeria in 1970 when the Biafra civil war threatened cohesion in the Federal Republic of Nigeria. The OAU weighed its support to sustain unity and continued internal stability (Moshi, 2013). A majority of African states backed the Nigerian Federal government in the fight against the "Biafra Secessionist" (New African, 2002).

The post independent struggle period was more focused on issues of development and economic cooperation. Against this backdrop, OAU heads of states in 1980 adopted the Lagos Action Plan (supported by the UN Economic Commission on Africa) which proposed the division of the continent into Regional Economic Communities (REC) to promote continental industrialisation and integration. Three RECs saw the light of day within this framework: the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in May 1978; the Economic Community for Central African States (ECCAS) in October 1983 and the Common Market for Eastern and

Southern Africa (COMESA) in December 1994 (De Melo and Tsikata, 2015; Hartzenberg, 2011).

Another area where the OAU made significant strides was that of human rights with the adoption of the African Charter of Human and People's Rights in 1981 and the creation of the African Commission on Human and People's Rights in 1986 and subsequently the African Court on Human and People's Rights in 1998. All these institutions have provided the much legal instrument to address the violation of human rights in the continent.

In spite of the aforementioned strides the OAU was far from being a success story as the organisation experience several setbacks which led it to a spiral of decline. The delay in the ratification of the African Court on Human and People's right meant the institution could only come into full forces after the demise of the OAU. Member states used the principle of "non-interference" in the internal affairs to prevent the OAU from playing an objective role in internal conflicts with the institution often appearing as a shield to the governing party. As Legum (1975, p. 212) pointed out:

The OAU is, as one might expect, weakest and at its most disappointing when it comes to dealing with serious internal problems of its member-states. Thus there has never been any question of the OAU expressing even mild criticism of the 'double genocide' that has scarred the life of Burundi; or of seeking to ameliorate the conditions in the Sudan caused by the long rebellion of the Southern Sudanese before, happily, they were able to find an amicable settlement of their differences. And when ex-President Milton Obote of Uganda-a founder- member of the OAU-sought to have his accusations of mass murder against General Amin discussed, his offending document was hastily withdrawn from circulation among delegates.

While the end of colonialism and the demise of the Apartheid Regime in South Africa were seen as a milestone, it also had the undesired effect placing the OAU on

the precipice of uncertainty. The struggles for independence and against Apartheid had stood for a long time stood as a common cause around which OAU members bonded. Successes on both fronts (the struggle for independence and the fight against Apartheid also veiled the economic woes the continent was facing especially in the 1980s and 1990s (the period of structural adjustment for a number of African countries). Uncertainty loomed over the future of the "Liberation Committee" and the role the OAU now had to embrace as the driver of regional cooperation (Schalk, Auriacombe and Brynard, 2005).

## **1.5 Conclusion**

The inability of the OAU to handle the dictatorships and "kleptocracies" wrecking the continent; its incapacity to manage conflicts, poverty and underdevelopment, and overall failure to respond to the challenges of globalisation (Adogamhe, 2008), rendered it an organisation that had far outlived its usefulness at the turn of the century. The reforms needed for its revival was so drastic and profound that African leaders opted for the creation of a new continental organisation to replace the OAU. It was against this backdrop that the Assembly of Heads of States and Governments of the OAU meeting in an extraordinary session in Sirte, Libya in July 1999 lay to rest the OAU and replaced it with the AU. The institutions of the AU will constitute the focus of analysis in the next Chapter.

## **Chapter 3**

### **INSTITUTIONS OF THE AFRICAN UNION**

#### **3.1 Introduction**

The African Union was officially launched in Durban in South Africa in 2002 during its inaugural Assembly of Heads of States. This was the culmination of a process which began with the decision taken by African Heads of States in an extraordinary meeting in Sirte in 1999 to put replace the OAU with the AU. The vision of the AU is to work towards: “An integrated, prosperous and peaceful Africa, driven by its own citizens and representing a dynamic force in the global arena.” (African Union Handbook, 2017). The major innovation of the AU in relation to the defunct OAU was the new institutions it was endowed with. This chapter focuses on the structure and functioning of the case-study AU institutions (PAP, PSC, AUC and the AfCHPR).

#### **3.2 Structure and Function of AU Institutions: The AU Commission, PAP, PSC and AfCHPR**

The birth of the AU was in some sort the crystallisation of the institutional transformation of the defunct OAU to embrace the challenges of African integration and development at the dawn of the new millennium. Beyond the rhetoric of change and enthusiasm expressed by African leaders, nowhere was the transformation (of the OAU to AU) more evident than in the institutional innovations of the AU. Before highlighting the new structures and institutions, it is worthwhile mentioning that some structures and institutions of the AU were either a replicate or mere change of



names from those under the OAU. Such is the case of the Assembly which was retention of the Assemblies of Heads of States of the OAU and the Executive Council that replaced the OAU Council of Ministers.

The new institutions or structural innovations of the AU comprised: The Pan-African Parliament (PAP); The African Court on Human and Peoples Rights (ACHPR), The Peace and Security Council (PSC), The African Union Commission, African Court of Human Rights and Justice, African Central Bank, African Investment Bank, African Monetary Fund, Economic, Social and Cultural Council, New Partnership for Africa's Development, African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM). Four of these institutions are yet to go operational: The African Court of Human Rights and Justice, African Central Bank and African Investment Bank.

For our case-study, we shall focus on the following institutions: The African Union Commission, the Pan African Parliament, The Peace and Security Council (PSC) and the African Court of Human Rights and Justice. We shall look into the structure and functioning of these institutions before examining their role or contribution towards continental integration.

### **3.3 The AU Commission**

The AU Commission was established under Articles 5 and 20 of the Constitutive Act of the AU. It is the constitutional successor of the OAU General Secretariat and it that respect acts as the Secretariat of the AU. However, the AU Commission witnessed significant innovation (from the OAU General Secretariat) in terms of composition with the creation of the position of commissioners in eight different portfolios: peace and security, political affairs, infrastructure and energy, social

affairs, trade and industry, rural economy and agriculture, human resources, science and technology, and economic affairs. The eight commissioners are charged with implementing the decisions, policies, and programmes of the AU in their various portfolios (Commission Statutes, Article 11) and assist the Chairperson of the AU Commission in running the commission through their assigned portfolios. The functions ascribed to the AU Commission include:

- Represent the AU and defend its interests under the guidance of and as mandated by the Assembly and Executive Council
- Initiate proposals to be submitted to the AU's organs as well as implement decisions taken by them
- Act as the custodian of the AU Constitutive Act and OAU/AU legal instruments
- Provide operational support for all AU organs
- Assist Member States in implementing the AU's programmes
- Work out AU draft common positions and coordinate Member States' actions in international negotiations
- Manage the AU budget, resources and strategic planning
- Elaborate, promote, coordinate and harmonise the AU's programmes and policies with those of the Regional Economic Communities (RECs)
- Ensure gender mainstreaming in all AU programmes and activities (AU Handbook, 2014).

The AU Commission is based at the AU headquarters in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia and comprises a chairperson, deputy chairperson, eight commissioners and administrative staff.

### **3.4 The Pan-African Parliament (PAP)**

The Pan-African Parliament (PAP) was conceived in 1991 as one of the nine proposed organs of the Abuja Treaty which establishing the African Economic Community (AEC). Its constitutive protocol was adopted by OAU Heads of States in a summit in Sirte Libya in 2001 (AU Handbook, 2014) and was officially inaugurated on 18 March 2004 at the AU headquarters in Ethiopia. The institution is based in Midrand, Johannesburg, South Africa and comprises 250 representatives

elected by the legislature of the 50 AU member countries (five members per state party to the protocol with at least two female representatives) that have ratified its constitutive protocol and not by direct suffrage citizens of AU member states.

The objectives of the PAP as enshrined in its constitutive protocol include among others to:

- a) give a voice to the African peoples and the Diaspora;
  - b) facilitate the effective implementation of the policies and objectives of the AU;
  - c) promote the principles of human and peoples' rights and democracy in Africa;
  - d) encourage good governance, respect for the rule of law, transparency and accountability in Member States;
  - e) familiarize the peoples of Africa and the African Diaspora with the objectives and policies aimed at integrating the African Continent within the framework of the African Union;
  - f) promote peace, security and stability;
  - g) contribute to a more prosperous future for the peoples of Africa by promoting collective self-reliance and economic recovery;
  - h) facilitate cooperation and development in Africa;
- (African Union, 2004 p. 4 – 5)

Though the long term goal of the PAP is to exercise full legislative powers, its current mandate is to exercise advisory and consultative roles. The PAP is made up of two organs: the Bureau comprising a president and four vice-presidents and 10 Permanent Committees. The Bureau is in charge of its administration and management meanwhile the duties of the technical committees correspond to those of the AU Specialised Technical Committees. The PAP holds at least two ordinary sessions annually which can last up till a month. Extraordinary sessions are also allowed under rule 29 of the PAP's Rules of Procedure. Meanwhile the Permanent Committees hold two statutory sessions a year and are allowed to meet more often during parliamentary sessions or to hold non-statutory meetings when need arises (AU Handbook, 2017).

### **3.5 Peace and Security Council (PSC)**

The Peace and Security Council is the pillar of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) which is the AU's mechanism for the promotion of peace, security and stability in the African continent. The PSC is the AU standing organ for the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts in the continent. Established under Article 5(2) of the AU Constitutive Act, the PSC was conceived as a collective security and early warning arrangement with the goal of facilitating prompt and efficient responses to crisis and conflict situations in the African continent (AU Handbook, 2017). The functions of the PSC outlined in article 6 of the Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union shall include:

promotion of peace, security and stability in Africa; early warning and preventive diplomacy; peace-making, including the use of good offices, mediation, conciliation and enquiry; peace support operations and intervention, pursuant to article 4 (h) and (j) of the Constitutive Act; peace-building and post-conflict reconstruction; humanitarian action and disaster management; any other function as may be decided by the Assembly.

(African Union Peace and Security, 2016, p. 8)

While exercising the aforementioned functions, article 7 endows the PSC with a number of prerogatives some of which are to:

Anticipate and prevent disputes and conflicts, as well as policies, which may lead to genocide and crimes against humanity; Undertake peace-making, peace-building and peace-support missions; Recommend intervention in a Member State in respect of grave circumstances, namely war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity; Institute sanctions; Implement the AU's common defence policy.

(Ibid.)

The PSC comprise 15 members all elected by the Executive Council of the AU with the endorsement of the Assembly of Heads of States and Governments. The 15 membership seats are distributed among the five regional representations of the AU (Central Africa, Eastern Africa, Northern Africa, Southern Africa and Western Africa) on the principle of equitable regional representation and national rotation (with each usually receiving three seats). The PSC also contain other subsidiary bodies like the "Panel of the Wise"; the Continental Early Warning System (CEWS), and an African Standby Force (ASF). The PSC hold meetings in continuous session and all its members are required to a permanent presence at the AU Headquarters. Decisions are taken on the principle of consensus with possibility of derogation to simple majority on procedural matters and two-third majority for substantive matters.

### **3.6 African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights (AfCHPR)**

The AfCHPR is one of the key judicial institutions of the AU. It was conceived under article 1 of the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and People's Rights on the Establishment of an African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights, adopted by members of the defunct OAU in June 1998. It officially came into existence on 25 January 2004 after its ratification by the required quorum (15 states). The Court (as it is otherwise known) went operational in Addis Ababa before moving to its present seat in Arusha, Tanzania.

This continental judicial institution has as mandate to ensure the protection of human and people's right in Africa as well as complementing and reinforcing the functions of the African Commission on Human and People's Rights (African Court, 2017). The jurisdiction of The Court covers all cases and disputes it receives relating to the application or interpretation of the following: the African Charter on Human and

Peoples' Rights; the Protocol that established The Court, and any other relevant human rights instrument ratified by the State Party concerned. Article 5 of the 1998 Protocol establishing The Court and the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Right (ACHPR) allows State Parties to the Protocol and African inter-governmental organisations to submit cases to the court. Meanwhile article 34(6), permits Non-governmental organisations (NGOs) having observer status before the Commission and individuals from State Parties (who have adhered to the jurisdiction of the court through a declaration) to submit cases directly to the court. (AU Handbook 2017).

The African Court comprise eleven judges (of AU member states) elected (for a six year term) after nomination (in their personal capacity) by their countries. The President and Vice-President of the Court are elected by the judges among themselves to serve a two-year term, renewable once (African Court, 2017).

### **3.7 AU Institutions and Continental Integration**

The overriding goal of AU Institutions is to promote continental integration. Old and new institutions were retained or created to tackle the challenge of uniting the continent from different sectorial and technical domains. As the AU's Secretariat, the African Union Commission (AUC) plays a pivotal role in forging a continental bureaucracy that integrates technocrats and experts from different regions and nationalities in Africa. The principle of regional and gender representativeness enshrined in the statutes of the AUC (Article 6 subsections 2 & 3) ensures that all the five regions of the continent are equally represented and that at least one of each Commissioner elected from the region is a woman. The AUC had as staff strength of 1612 (659 regular and 953 interim) drawn from different member countries of the AU as of August 2016 (AU Handbook, 2017).

Another area where the AUC works towards continental integration is the harmonization of the position of AU member states in international forums and coordination of their actions in international negotiations. Through the AUC, African countries are expected to frame unified platforms in intergovernmental organisations like the UN and during international negotiations like those in trade under the World Trade Organisation.

The AUC is also expected to promote the agenda of continental integration by serving as ensuring that there is proper coordination and harmonization between the policies of the Regional Economic Communities and the AU's programmes. Overall, the AUC is expected to play a crucial role in continental integration (Ibid).

Another institution that is also expected to contribute enormously towards continental integration is the Pan-African Parliament (PAP). Its role in continental integration was well defined in article 17 of the Constitutive Act of the AU: “to ensure the full participation of African peoples in the development and economic integration of the continent”. The PAP was there for intended to be the platform that engages the people all across the African continent in deliberations and decision-making on crucial issues confronting the continent. Though not yet playing a legislative role like the European Parliament, the PAP nonetheless is still supposed to integrate the continent through representative democracy. MPs of the PAP are supposed to represent the people of the continent and not the governments of their respective states.

Like the case with the AUC, the PAP also follows the principle of representativeness (this time of individual State Parties not Regions) and gender inclusiveness. Each

AU Member State that has ratified the Protocol establishing the PAP (50 as of 2017) is entitled to five parliamentarians at least two of which should be women. Presently, PAP MPs are designated by the legislature of their member state of which they are supposed to be serving as MPs. It is hoped that in the future PAP MPs will be elected by direct universal suffrage across the African continent. The achievement of this goal will enable the PAP to fully endorse the designation and responsibility of being the representative of the African People. The exercise of full legislative powers would enable the PAP to effectively actively pursue continental integration by deliberating on issues and enacting laws that hold sway in every part of the continent.

In the domain of peace, security and stability, the Peace and Security Council (PSC) was also expected to play a key role in continental integration. Through core functions like early warning, preventive diplomacy, peace-making, peace-building and peace-support missions, the PSC is tasked with providing a continental infrastructure for conflict prevention, resolution and stability. In a continent rife with civil war and political instability any effective effort towards integration must first be able to allay such worries to create an enabling environment. The PSC is also in charge of implementing the AU's common defence policy and provide coordination between regional mechanisms and the AU concerning peace security and stability. These functions are crucial in promoting integration in the sense that it enables the AU to operationalize a continental defence mechanism and also avoid or resolve potential conflicts arising from regional initiatives (undertaken by RECs) and continental actions in specific conflict situations.



Another area where the PSC is expected to play a role in continental integration is with peace-keeping operations and intervention in member states in respect of grave circumstances (war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity). To exercise these roles, article 4 (h) and (j) of the Constitutive Act of the AU endows the PSC with an African Standby Force (a subsidiary body) comprising standby multidisciplinary contingents (with military and civilian components from their countries of origin prepaid for rapid deployment). The effective creation and running of such a body will demand maximum cooperation, collaboration and cohesion from defence forces from the different AU Member States. If successful, this Standby Force will constitute a hallmark in efforts to create a continental defence and peace-keeping mechanism.

The African Court on Human and Peoples' Right (AfCHPR) was the first attempt towards establishing a continental wide judiciary institution. So far it is the only one that is operational (since the African Court of Justice is yet to see the light of day). Its role in fostering continental integration derives from its continental wide jurisdiction on all litigations concerning cases of human violations, interpretation and application of the ACHPR brought to it by State Parties, individuals from State parties who have accepted its jurisdiction by declaration or competent African IGOs or NGOs. The functioning of the AfCHPR therefore will effectively harmonize procedures and provide adjudication that will address human rights violations which has proliferated within the continent.

The causal logic between the aforementioned and other AU institution is no doubt the concept of "spill over" which is at the core of Neo-functionalism. Neo-functionalism is predicated on Jean Monnet's approach towards European integration

which sought to integrate individual sectors of the European society with the goal of achieving spill-over effects on other areas. The same approach belies the institutional innovations that came with the establishment of the AU. By modelling or remodelling its structures and institutions closely after those of the EU, it was hoped that the causal effect of spill-over can be achieved.

### **3.8 Conclusion**

This chapter has provided insights on the structure and functions of the case-study institutions of this research work (AUC, PAP, PSC, and AfCHPR). The responsibilities and composition of each structure was reviewed. The AUC, The PAP, the PSC and the AfCHPR amongst others were all created in bid to integrate functional sectors with the ultimate goal of spill-over in economic and political integration of the continent which the defunct OAU could not achieve. About a decade and a half after, how far has these institutions delivered in the neo-functional expectations? What are the achievements and shortcomings? These issues are handled in the next chapter that deals with functional and non-functional cases of the theory of neo-functionalism in the institutions of the AU.

## Chapter 4

# NEOFUNCTIONALISM IN AU STRUCTURES AND INSTITUTIONS

### 4.1 Introduction

Central to the theory of neofunctionalism are two concepts: shift of loyalties and expectations, and that of spill-over. With the creation of supranational institutions, neofunctionalism presupposes that member states in a regional organisation will shift or transfer "their loyalties, expectations and political activities towards a new centre, whose institutions possess or demand jurisdiction over pre-existing national states" (Haas, 1958: 16 cited in Niemann and Schmitter, 2009: 47). In the same vein, member states will have to delegate decision-making on policy issues (both domestic and foreign) from their national institution to the central (supranational) institution which will now be in charge of making collective decisions for member states. (Lindberg, 1963: 6 cited in Niemann and Schmitter, 2009: 47). The concept of spillover is based on the assumption that integration in a particular policy area will create pressure for integration in a related area (CIVITAS, 2015). Within the context of the AU, specific attention shall be given on how has integration in the case-study institutions have created a spillover in overall continental integration. This chapter analyses the functionality of the theory of neofunctionalism within AU institutions using the two aforementioned concepts as the analytical foundation.

## **4.2 Neofunctionalism within the African Union Commission (AUC)**

As the institution that serves as the coordinating organ of the AU, the AUC is expected to play a strategic role in the achievement of the ideals of neofunctionalism. How functional is neofunctionalism within the AUC? Going by the first underlying assumption of neofunctionalism (transfer of loyalties, expectations and political activities towards a new center with overriding jurisdiction over on member states), the AUC has made considerable strides. The full establishment and effective functioning of this structure is in itself is a milestone in the fulfilment of the aforementioned assumption.

The African Union Commission came into being in July 2002 with Amara Essy from Ivory Coast as its first Chair during its transitional years. The first elected chairperson of the AUC Alpha Oumar Konaré and the first badge of Commissioners of the AUC did a commendable job in moulding a continental bureaucracy and articulating the AU's role as Africa's spokesperson or representative on continental affair (Laporte and Mackie, 2010). The Commission currently has a Chairperson and a Deputy as well as eight commissioners handling eight key policy areas: peace and security; political affairs; infrastructure and energy; trade and industry; social affairs; rural economy and agriculture; human resources, science and technology; and economic affairs (AUC, n.d.). The Commission comprise 1612 staff (659 fulltime and 953 part-time) as of 2016 (AU Handbook, 2017).

The creation and functioning of the commission and its endowment with prerogatives to represent and defend the interest of the AU, draft common positions and coordinate member states action international organisation, coordinate and

harmonise AU programmes and policies with those of Regional Economic Communities (RECs) has brought to being a centralised bureaucracy which wields authority and over member states and shifts expectations of actors in the continent from national to the continental. Sembeye (2016) notes that the transition from a "General Secretariat" (OAU) to a Commission (AU) was motivated by the desire to have the organisation to play a vibrant role in tackling the needs of the African people. According to Laporte and Mackie (2010, p.10), this motivation required a "...strong AU Commission or Authority, endowed with the necessary political clout, capacities and resources... to enable it to ...to assume a driving role in the continental integration process..." Thus, the advent of the AUC marked a shift in the expectations of African citizens from their governments to a supranational structure to address their needs and welfare.

Concerning spillover into continental integration, the AUC has made some strides in contributing towards continental integration. These strides can be perceived in three domains: policy coordination, activities of the commissioner on their respective policy portfolios and continental bureaucracy. Two of the responsibilities ascribed to the AUC involve a high level of policy coordination. There are: "Drafting AU common positions and coordinating Member States' actions in international negotiations, and Representing the AU and defending its interests under the guidance of and as mandated by the Assembly and Executive Council" (AU Handbook, 2017 p.76).

To achieve these, the AUC works together with the Assembly of the AU to define common positions on policy issues and ensure that Africa speaks as one voice on the continental stage. Thanks to the efforts of the AUC, Africa has been able to construct

common positions on pertinent continental and global challenges such as: migration and development drafted by the AUC Experts' Meeting on Migration and Development in Algiers (African Union, 2016); The Common African Position on the Proposed Reform of the United Nations dubbed "The Ezulwini Consensus"(African Union, 2005); Common African Position (CAP) on the Post-2015 Development Agenda (African Union, 2014) and the Draft African Union Strategy on Climate Change (African Union, 2014). Both scholars like Ndikumana (2016); Ramsamy et al (2014) and politicians like Rwandan President Paul Kagame (Brookings, 2017) and Nigerian President Muhammadu Buhari (Akande, 2016) have underscored the need for Africa to speak as one voice at the global stage. The articulation of common positions and policies of the continent therefore constitute a significant parameter to measure integration. In this domain, the AUC has indeed been a functional case of neofunctionalism.

Another area where neofunctionalism is seen in the AUC is through the work of the eight African Union Commissioners in their various portfolios (departments). Each of the department assigned to the commissioners covers one or more key policy area in which the AU seeks to develop and implement common policies and strategies. The Department of Economic Affairs (DEA) headed by Commissioner Victor Harison from Madagascar has as mandate: the promoting policies and strategies aimed at strengthening coordination, the harmonisation of continental initiatives concerning economic integration and the development of regional cooperation (African Union, n.d.).

The work of the DEA can be seen in four domains: First is economic policy and research where the DEA produces the AU's Annual Economic Reports and the runs

an interdisciplinary journal dubbed "African Integration and Development Review" (published biannually). The second is regional integration and cooperation where the DEA holds two annual joint expert coordination meetings between the AU, RECs, UNECA, AFDB, NEPAD and ACDF. The third area is that of statistics where the DEA has developed the Strategy for the Harmonization of Statistic in Africa (SHaSA) and statistical development frameworks for the continent. The fourth is private sector development, investments and resource mobilization where the DEA spearheaded the Africa-India Trade Ministers Meetings (Ministry of Commerce and Industry India, n.d.) and the Africa - Turkey Economic and Business Forum in 2016 (African Union, n.d.). Through these activities the DEA is able forge common policies in key economic sectors that creates the need to further networking and strengthens economic cooperation among member states.

The Department of Political Affairs (DPA) led by Commissioner Cessouma Minata Samate of Burkina Faso has as mandate to promote share values of the AU, implement AU instruments on governance, elections, democracy and humanitarian affairs, coordinating AU election observation and monitoring missions, providing technical support to electoral bodies as well as the implementation of sustainable solutions of humanitarian and political crisis (AU Handbook, 2017). In line with the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance adopted in 2007, the DPA has routinely deployed election observation missions to cover elections in all AU member states (Chiwanza, 2017). In terms of electoral policy coordination, the DPA has so far held four continental forums of election management bodies (which seeks to enhance relationships among AU member state election management bodies and enable them share good practices). It has also held five humanitarian symposiums bringing together policy makers and practitioners from AU member states and RECs

to deliberate on how to improve the delivery of humanitarian responses in Africa (African Union, 2017).

The Department of Rural Economy and Agricultural (DREA) under the leadership of Angolan-born Sacko Josefa Leonel Correa has as mandate to rural economy development and agricultural productivity of AU member states based on appropriate environmental management and the encouraging the adoption by member states of suitable measures, strategies, policies and programmes on agriculture (AU Handbook, 2014). In the area of formulation and implementation of a common policy for AU member states, the DREA has held two meetings of the Specialized Technical Committee (STC) on Agriculture, Rural Development, Water and Environment (African Union, 2017b) and the Ministerial Segment of the STC (African Union, 2017c) both focused on the implementation of the Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme (CAADP). CAAP is a continental policy framework for agricultural transformation, food security, wealth creation, nutrition, economic growth and prosperity adopted by the AU in 2003 during its summit in Maputo, Mozambique (United Nations, n.d.).

The Trade and Industry Department headed by Commissioner Albert Muchanga has mandate to transform Africa into a competitive trade partner in the world economy and an integrated continental trading bloc. Its major responsibilities are amongst others: to ensure the formulation, implementation and harmonisation of trade and investment policies as well as promoting trade within and outside Africa. The most significant achievement of the Department of Trade and Industry has been the successful organisation of four negotiation rounds of the Technical Working Groups (TWGs) of the Continental Free Trade Area (CFTA). The fourth meeting of the



TWGs of the CFTA took place in Abuja, Nigeria in November 2017 to draft the text of the CFTA Agreement (African Union, 2017d). It was followed by the fourth meeting of African Trade Ministers in Niamey Niger in December 2017 during which draft agreement for the establishment of the CFTA was approved to be tabled to African Heads of States in January 2018. The CFTA Agreement is expected to be signed by African Heads of States in March 2018 (Ssali, 2017). This will be a landmark accomplishment in the domain of trade harmonisation and a monumental step towards the creation of the African Economic Community (the ultimate goal of the AU in terms of economic integration).

The Department of Social Affairs (DSA) which has as Commissioner Amira El Fadil from Sudan has as mission to oversee the general coherence of social development programs in member states as well as promoting the monitoring and evaluation of associated policies and strategies. In terms of policy harmonisation, the DSA played an instrumental role in the re-evaluation of the African Health Strategy (AHS) of 2007 - 2015 and the development of a new AHS for 2016 -2030 (Union, 2016 p.11). Other common policy programs or frameworks to which the DSA initiated or contributed to include: The Social Policy Framework (SPF) for Africa adopted by African Ministers in charge of Social Development in 2008 (African Union, 2008), AU Plan of Action on Drug Control 2013 - 2017 (African Union, 2013) and the Migration Policy Framework for Africa (African Union, 2006).

The Peace and Security Department (PSD) led by Commissioner Smail Chergui from Algeria has been entrusted the mandate of supporting the AU Peace and Security Council in its responsibilities and the Commission in matters that relate to peace, security and stability within the African continent. The PSD has taken some

initiatives to integrate the policies of member states in terms of defence and security. One of such is the creation of a Specialised Technical Committee on Defence, Safety and Security (STCDSS) which held its tenth session in January 2018. The goal of the STCDSS is to address peace and security issues in the continent (African Union Peace and Security, 2018). The PSD also established, within the framework of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA), a Gender, Peace and Security Programme 2015 - 2020. The program seeks to work out strategies to integrate gender mainstreaming into peace and security (African Union Peace and Security, 2016).

The Department of Human Resources, Science and Technology (DHRST) led Commissioner Agbor Sarah Mbi Enow Anyang from Cameroon is responsible for coordinating AU human resource programmes and development matters. It is also in charge of promoting science, technology and youth (AU Handbook, 2017). In terms of the formulation and implementation of common policy, the DHRST has developed an African Space policy and put in place a Space Working Group for the continent. It has also conceived what has been termed the Continental Education Strategy for Africa (CESA 16-25) and an African Youth Decade Plan of Action (DPoA) 2009 - 2018.

The Department of Infrastructure and Energy headed by Amani Abou-Zeid from Egypt is in charge of the coordination, promotion, implementation and monitoring of programmes and policies on transport, energy, telecommunication and information in collaboration with African RECs and specialised institutions of the AU. Given the need to harmonize regional and continental policies, legislation, institutional and regulatory framework to address the challenges facing the electricity sector in Africa,

the Directorate of Infrastructure and Energy came out with a "Harmonised Regulatory Framework for Electricity Market in Africa" in 2016 (African Union, 2016).

Some of the policies developed by the AUC as well as conventions, and protocols adopted by African heads of states are yet to go into force. These include: Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights; African Union Convention on Cross-Border Cooperation (Niamey Convention); Protocol on the Amendments to the Constitutive Act of the African Union and the Protocol to the OAU Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism (African Union, n.d. b). In the same vein, all the financial institutions of the African Union: the African Monetary Fund, African Central Bank and African Investment Bank (whose establishment the Department of Economic Affairs was supposed to contribute to) are yet to see the light of day.

Like its European counterpart (the European Union Commission), the AUC also suffers from a democratic deficit with little high centralisation and poor representativeness of members states and the African people. According to Ayittey (2016), the AUC hold sway over the AU's "purse strings, and member states have little influence over the drafting of proposals and initiatives". He further notes that this centralization of authority only militates for a sense of intrigue and suspicion that pushes member states to resist the institutions decisions.

### **4.3 Neofunctionalism within the Pan-African Parliament**

Conceived as a platform to engage citizens from all African countries in deliberations and resolutions on the issues and challenges confronting the continent,

the Pan-African Parliament (PAP) is an ideal test ground for the effectiveness of neofunctionalism. The PAP currently suffers a huge deficit in its intrinsic characteristic as a representative institution. It is not yet endowed with legislative powers and presently plays a consultative, advisory and budgetary oversight role in the AU. Equally, PAP members are not elected by direct universal suffrage by the African people but rather designated by the legislative bodies of its member states (African Union Handbook, 2017; Cilliers and Mashele, 2004). These two weaknesses are a major impediment in the attainment of the ideals of neofunctionalism especially when it comes to the shifting of loyalties and expectations to a new center.

Irrespective of the aforementioned structural limitation, the PAP has still been able to make significant contribution to continental integration. Presently, the PAP is composed of 250 Members of Parliament (MPs) from all the 50 AU member countries that have ratified its constituent document. Each of such state is represented by five MPs elected by their national legislature, at least two of whom are women. Its present bureau has as President, Hon. Roger Nkodo Dang from Cameroon (representing the Central African Regions); its first Vice President is Joaquim Mulembwe from Mozambique (representing the Southern African Regions); Hon. Safia Elmi Djibri from Djibouti (representing the Eastern African Regions), Hon. Suilma Hay Emhamed Saleh from Saharawi Republic (representing the Northern African Regions) and Hon. Dr. Bernadette Lahai from Sierra Leone as second, third and fourth Vice-Presidents respectively. The composition of the PAP reflects a high degree of regional integration, gender representativeness and sovereign equality of African states. This in itself at least constitutes some level of continental integration.

The existence of parallel institutions at the regional level is a potential impediment in the PAP's bid to assert itself as a supranational institution that attracts expectations and commands loyalty from national peripheries. Parallel regional institutions in the African legislative landscape include: the Economic Community of West African States Parliament (ECOWAS-P); the East African Legislative Assembly EALA (which has full legislative powers); the Inter-Parliamentary Union of Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IPU-IGAD); the Network of Parliamentarians of the Economic Community of Central African States (REPAC); the Southern African Development Community Parliamentary Forum (SADC-PF) and the "Parliament de l'Union Economique et Monetaire Quest Africaine UEMOA" P-UEMOA (Ogbonnaya and Ogujiuba, 2015).

#### **4.4 Neofunctionalism within the African Court on Human and People's Rights**

The establishment of the African Court on Human and People's Rights (AfCHPR) was in itself a practical case of neofunctionalism. The AfCHPR which began its operations in November 2006 was a spillover from the African Commission on Human and People's Rights (ACHPR). The AfCHPR was created to complement and strengthen the duties of the (ACHPR) in terms of human right protection in the continent (Udombana, 2000; African Court, n.d.).

The AfCHPR has so far been solicited by individuals and organisations from state parties to the court's protocol as well as AU institutions like the ACHPR. As already noted the court has delivered judgement on 43 cases and has over 100 cases pending. This significant level of adjudication of cases from different countries in the continent is eloquent testimony of the shift of expectations of African peoples from

national to this new supranational structure to address their human rights issue. The ratification of the Protocol by 30 African states also denotes a transfer of loyalty on the part of these states to the AfCHPR.

However, neofunctionalism within the AfCHPR cannot be said to be flawless. The institution is yet to extend its jurisdiction to all AU member states. Out of the 55 member states of the AU, 52 have signed the Protocol creating the AfCHPR but only 30 out of the 52 states have ratified the said Protocol as of June 2017 (African Union, 2017e). In this respect, it can be said the transfer of loyalty and expectation by AU member states and African people to this new institution is still a little slow. This problem is further compounded by the establishment of parallel institutions at the regional level which also compete for loyalty and expectations transfer on related issues. The ECOWAS Community Court of Justice (ECCJ) based in Lagos, Nigeria for instance have jurisdiction over issues of human rights in the 15 ECOWAS member states (Ebobrah, 2010). The East African Court of Justice (EACJ) on its part has provision for the extension of its jurisdiction to include human right by the Council of the East African Community at an appropriate time (EACJ, 2018).

#### **4.5 Neofunctionalism within the Peace and Security Council**

The establishment of the Peace and Security Council (PSC) in 2004 crystallised the aspirations of Africans towards a continental institution that could ensure their peaceful coexistence. In a continent plagued by civil unrest, violent revolts and wars, the PSC was installed as the AU decision-making body in terms of conflict prevention, management and resolution. In terms of transfer of loyalty an overwhelming majority of AU member state have already manifested their adherence to this new supranational institution through the ratification of its Protocol. As of

December 2017, 52 out of the 53 AU member states signatory to the protocol had already completed its ratification (African Union, 2017f). The composition of the PSC reflects the AU's principle of equitable representation which facilitates integration. The PSC has 15 members drawn from the five regions of the continent (Northern, Southern, Central, Eastern and Western regions) each with equal voting rights (African Union Handbook, 2017).

The establishment of the PSC also had a spillover effect with the putting in place of subsidiary structures that were to facilitate its smooth functioning as well as cooperation among member states to address conflict issues. These structures include the Continental Early Warning System (CEWS) and the Panel of the Wise. The CEWS was established in 2002 with the responsibility of feeding the AUC Chairperson with early warning information that would be helpful to the PSC in addressing latent conflicts and potential security threats (African Union, 2002). It has two units: a monitoring and observation unit dubbed the "Situation Room" located at the Conflict Management Division of the PSD in Addis Ababa and a unit for observation and monitoring within the RECs and Regional Mechanisms (RMs). The CEWS provided early warnings of the potential conflict in Mali and Guinea-Bissau in 2012 (Noyes and Yarwood, 2013). The Panel of the Wise came into existence in 2007 the task of assisting the PSC and the AU Chairperson in promoting and maintaining peace, security and stability especially through mediation and preventive diplomacy. It is comprised of eminent personalities from all the five regions of Africa. There have been three panels from 2007 - 2017(African Handbook, 2017).

Though the PSC has made some progress a supranational conflict prevention and management structure capable of responding to the challenges of African states, it

still faces significant challenges in its efficiency. The African Standby Force, a key element in the PSC and APSA is still to go operational. After the successful implementation of a continental field exercise dubbed "ASF-AMANI Africa II", the ASF was declared operationally fit in January 2016. However, it has not yet been deployed in spite of the opportunities around. Darkwa (2017) blames this situation to its overdependence on RECs and RMs which have so far been reluctant to support its operationalization.

#### **4.6 Conclusion**

This Chapter set out to review the effectiveness of neofunctionalism within the selected case-study institutions of the African Union (AUC, PAP, AfCHPR and PSC). It is apparent from the foregone analysis that apart from the AUC that can be seen as a fairly efficient case of neofunctionalism and continental integration, the other structures still have challenges in attracting the loyalty and expectations from AU member states and African citizens and generating spillover to the attainment of the overall goal. Before drawing a general conclusion to this study it would be important to examine the perception and awareness of Africans on the effectiveness of the institutions of the African Union. The Chapter that follows presents a data analysis of an opinion survey carried out in the aforementioned endeavour.



## Chapter 5

### DATA ANALYSIS FROM SURVEY

#### 5.1 Introduction

Going by Linberg (1963), a key component of functionalism is the shift of expectations from a domestic sphere to the new center (supranational institutions). Within the framework of this study, an attempt was made to gauge the effectiveness of this factor in relation to the expectation of Africans towards the AU and its institutions. As a representative institution the ultimate goal of the AU is to enhance the welfare and safeguard the interests and aspirations of the African people. Ipso facto, a key determinant of its progress within the framework of functionalism and or in the context of continental integration would be the perception of African citizens about the effectiveness of the organisation and its institutions in the aforementioned drive. To apply this key factor in the present study an opinion survey on the awareness and perception of Africans on the institutions of the AU was carried out. The outcome of this survey is analysed in this Chapter. The result of the aforementioned survey is triangulated with data from similar surveys carried out by Afrobarometer.

It is imperative to mention that the survey on the awareness and perception of Africans about the institutions of the African Union was conducted among a limited sample of university educated Africans (mostly African students at Eastern Mediterranean University, Famagusta, North Cyprus). The sample size comprised 53

respondents from seven African countries (representing all the five regions of Africa: Northern, Western, Eastern, Central and Southern Africa). Given its numerical restriction, the sample cannot be said to be representative of the African population.

## **5.2 Analysis of Results of the Survey on the Awareness and Perception of Africans about the institutions of the African Union**

The goal of the online survey was to assess the level of acquaintance with and impression of Africans about the institutions of the AU using our selected case-study (AUC, PSC, AfCHPR and PAP). It was conducted using a structured questionnaire with closed-ended questions that allowed multiple choice selection on questions on knowledge of AU institutions, their function and opinion about continental integration.

In terms of demographics, the sample survey group comprised 53 respondents from seven countries representing all the five regions of Africa: Libya for Northern Africa; Nigeria, Senegal and Ghana for Western Africa; Kenya for Eastern Africa; Cameroon for Central Africa; Zimbabwe for Southern Africa (See Figure 1). In terms of gender, 41.5% of the respondents were female and 58.5% men (see Figure 2).



### Age group

53 responses




Figure 5.3: Age group of respondents. Source: Google forms

### Level of education

53 responses




Figure 5.4: Educational level of respondents. Source: Google forms

The online survey sought to gauge participants' awareness and perception in the following critical areas concerning the AU: knowledge of AU institutions; perception on the functioning of AU institutions; perception about the relevance of AU institutions to the welfare of Africans; perceptions about the contribution of AU institutions to African integration and perception of the on public support for continental integration. A majority of respondents portray limited knowledge of AU institutions. On the question of how many institutions the AU possess (12) up to

59.2% had no idea while 36% answered inaccurately. Only 4.8% answered correctly (see Figure 5).

### How many institutions does the African Union have?

49 responses




Figure 5.5: Number of institutions in the African Union. Source: Google forms

Concerning the institution that serves as the AU Secretariat (the AUC), 40.4% of respondents had no idea and 25% chose wrong answers (see Figure 6). Most of the respondents demonstrated good knowledge of the where the AUC is based with 75.5% going for the right answer—Addis Ababa (See Figure 7). 50.9% of respondents had no idea on the name of the current chairperson of the AUC (Moussa Faki Mahamat) while 26% answered wrongly (See Figure 8). 78.8% of respondents answered correctly on the name of the AU institution in charge of conflict prevention, peace-making and peace-building—the PSC (See Figure 9).

### Which institution serves as the African Union Secretariat

52 responses




Figure 5.6: African Union Secretariat. Source: Google forms.

### Where is the institution serving as the African Union Secretariat located?

53 responses




Figure 5.7: Location of the African Union Secretariat. Source: Google forms

### Who is the chairperson of the African Union Commission?

53 responses




Figure 5.8: Chairperson of the African Union Commission. Source: Google forms

**What is the name of the African Union institution in charge of conflict prevention, peace-making and peace-building?**

52 responses




Figure 5.9: AU institution in charge of peace. Source: Google forms

Meanwhile, 71.2% of respondents were either ignorant or inaccurate on the name of the legislative institution of the African Union and its location--the PAP located in Midrand South Africa (See Figure 10). 76.9% of respondents had no knowledge of or answered inaccurately when it came to the competence of the PAP (See Figure 11).

**What is the name of the legislative institution of the African Union and where is it located?**

52 responses




Figure 5.10: Name and location of the legislative institution of the AU. Source: Google forms

### What is competence does the legislative institution of the African Union have?

52 responses




Figure 5.11: The competence of the legislative institution of the African Union. Source: Google forms

Only 28.8% of respondents were accurate on which of the judicial institution of the AU was operational—the AfCHPR (See Figure 12). 56% were either ignorant or inaccurate on the issue of entities permitted to bring cases before the AfCHPR (See Figure 13).

### Which African Union judicial institution is fully operational?

52 responses




Figure 5.12: African Union judicial institution. Source: Google forms



### Who can bring cases before the African Union (AU) judicial institution?

50 responses




Figure 5.13: Entities capable of bringing cases before AU judicial institution. Source Google forms

Concerning perceptions on the functioning of AU institutions, respondents had a low rating for most of the institutions (poor). The AUC and the PAP respectively had the most favourable ratings while the AfCHPR and the PSC were bottom of the chart in terms of performance rating. However, it is important to also point out that the number of respondents not having sufficient knowledge to respond was significant (See Figure 14).

### How will you rate the performance of the following African Union institutions?




Figure 5.14: The performance of AU institutions. Source: Google forms

In the aspect of relevance of AU institutions to the welfare of Africans most respondents converged on their necessity with the PSC and the AfCHPR topping the chart (See Figure 15).

### How will you rate the relevance of the following institutions to the welfare of Africans




Figure 5.15: Relevance of AU institutions to Africans. Source: Google forms

On the contribution of AU institutions in promoting continental integration, all the case study institutions had a relatively balance favourable view from the respondents (See Figure 16).

### What is the contribution of the following African Union institutions in promoting continental integration?




Figure 5.16: Contribution of AU institutions in promoting continental integration. Source: Google forms

Concerning public support for continental integration, 68.6% of respondents were of the opinion that continental integration was necessary for Africa's development and prosperity with a significant proportion of 17.6% opting to be neutral on the issue (See Figure 17).

For those in favour of continental integration, 49% prefer a Federation (United States of Africa), 30% went for a confederation and 20.4% prefer that continental integration be limited to regional integration through RECs (See Figure 18).

### Continental integration necessary for Africa development and prosperity.

51 responses




Figure 5.17: The necessity of continental integration. Source: Google forms

### If you agree to continental integration what type do you think best suit the needs of the continent?

49 responses




Figure 5.18: What type of integration best suit Africa. Source: Google forms

### 5.3 Afrobarometer Surveys on Perception of Africans towards Regional and Continental integration

Afrobarometer (a pan-African research network that carries out survey on attitude towards economic conditions, democracy and governance) carried out two surveys on public attitude towards regional and continental integration whose results are relevant to this study. The first, carried out in November 2015, was focused on the attitude of Moroccans on the issue of regional integration and responsibilities (Jacobs and Isbell, 2017). The findings points to a low perception by Moroccans on the utility of the AU and the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU) to their country. One out of three Moroccans were of the opinion that both organisations are not doing anything to help their country while four out of 10 do not have enough knowledge to make an informed opinion. Only 15% of Moroccans believed the AU helps somewhat or a lot compared to a continental aggregate of 38% (See Figure 19). This finding is in contrast with the overall positive opinion about the relevance of the case-study institutions in my perception survey. This variation can perhaps be explained by Morocco's over 30 years absence from the African Union.





Figure 5.19: Perceived helpfulness of regional organisations and AU | Morocco and 36-country average | 2014-2015 Source: Afrobarometer

The second Afrobarometer survey published on May 25 2016 was focused on public support for regional integration in Africa (Olapade, Selormey and Gninafon, 2016). The survey results indicate a low support for integration within the 36 countries surveyed. 34% of respondents agree to governments intervention to help ensure the respect of human rights and free elections in nearby states whereas 58% rather underscore the need safeguard state sovereignty (See Figure 20). This indicates a limited public support for the transfer of competence from domestic to supranational entities dealing with such issues (in these case AU institutions).



**Respondents were asked:** Which of the following statements is closest to your view? Choose Statement 1 or Statement 2.

*Statement 1: The governments of each country in [this region] have a duty to try to guarantee free elections and prevent human rights abuses in other countries in the region, for example by using political pressure, economic sanctions or military force.*


*Statement 2: Each country in this region should respect the independence of other countries and allow them to make their own decisions about how their country should be governed.*

(% who "agree" or "agree very strongly" with each statement)

**Figure 5.20: Regional responsibility vs. national sovereignty | by region | 36 countries | 2014/2015. Source: Afrobarometer**

On the relevance of the AU and Regional institutions to their needs, an estimated six of 10 citizens within the 36 countries surveyed are of the opinion that the AU (with

58%) and their various RECs (61%) are at least somewhat helpful to their countries (See Figure 21).




**Respondents were asked:**

- In your opinion, how much does [the regional organisation for your region] do to help your country, or haven't you heard enough to say?
- In your opinion, how much does the African Union do to help your country, or haven't you heard enough to say?

Figure 5.21: Perceived helpfulness of African Union and regional organisations | by region | 36 countries | 2014/2015. Source: Afrobarometer

Another area of interest is that of free movement which would be crucial to the operationalization of the Continental Free Trade Area the AU hopes to create in 2018. Here support is not overwhelming. Though a majority of Africans in the 36 countries surveyed expressed positive opinion about free movement over international borders (for work or trade) support was less than half among citizens in 15 countries (See Figure 22).



**Respondents were asked:** Which of the following statements is closest to your view?  
*Statement 1: People living in [region] should be able to move freely across international borders in order to trade or work in other countries.*  
*Statement 2: Because foreign migrants take away jobs and foreign traders sell their goods at very cheap prices, governments should protect their own citizens and limit the cross-border movement of people and goods.*  
 (% who "agree" or "agree very strongly" with each statement)

**Figure 5.22: Support for free movement across borders | by region | 36 countries | 2014/2015 Source: Afrobarometer**

## 5.4 Conclusion

This Chapter has offered a statistical perspective on the public awareness and opinion about the functioning of AU institutions and continental integration. Though the generalizability of the conclusions of the online survey is limited by survey sample size, some tendency can be deducted when triangulated with the broader Afrobarometer survey. From both my online survey and the Afrobarometer survey is it evident that a significant number of Africans are unacquainted with the AU and its institutions. African differs in their assessment on the functioning of institution and their relevance to their needs. Some institutions are more effective and relevant than the others. This statistical analysis would be helpful as I move to the general conclusion of this study in the next and final Chapter.

## Chapter 6

### SUMMARY CONCLUSION

Scholars of integration have mostly focused their attention on the most successful model that exist so far—the European Union. There is an abundance of literature tackling various aspects of European integration (theories and approaches, institution building, policy harmonization etc). The EU in many ways been projected as the "Gold standard" in terms of regional integration. Modelled after the EU, the African Union emerged in 2002 to revitalise and accelerate the process and pace of integration in Africa. To achieve this daunting challenge, the AU was endowed with new institutions in much respect mimicry of those of the EU. It was hope that the effects of neofunctionalism (principally shift in expectations and loyalties from the domestic sphere to new supranational institutions and spillover effect in integration) which catalysed integration among European states at the early stages of the "European project" would be replicated in AU.

A decade and a half after its creation, this study attempts an assessment of the how much the AU has delivered on its aforementioned fundamental mission. It probed into the effectiveness of functionalism within the organisation using four case-studies (the AUC, the PSC, the AfCHPR and the PAP) and their contribution towards continental integration. Given the conceptual similarities of AU and EU institutions, this thesis used neofunctionalism as its theoretical framework. Of particular



relevance was the concept of spillover and shift of loyalty and expectation underscored by Haas (1958) and Linberg (1963).

A distinction was made between regional and continental integration in the literature review to clarify any ambiguity related to the assumption the term "regional" to invariably connote "continental" (McCormic, 1999, Schmitter 2009). With the presence of RECs, regions in Africa refers to the geographical sub-components of the continent (partition into northern, western, central, eastern and southern areas) around which RECs have been built. Regional integration therefore refers to integration at the level of RECs meanwhile continental integration (which is the principal focus of this study) takes into consideration the continent as bloc.

The origins of the idea of continental integration was traced back in history to the concept of Pan-Africanism that emerged in the 19th Century and the split over the federation and confederal approaches to integration among African leaders at independence (The Casablanca and Monrovia Camps). The creation of the OAU in 1963 was seen as a compromise between the two-blocks towards a step-wise process of continental integration. The failure of the OAU to deliver on this process led to its demise and replacement by the African Union.

A review of the structure and functioning of the various case-study institutions of the AU (AUC, PSC, PAP and AfCHPR) was also done. An appraisal of the effectiveness of neofunctionalism in the aforementioned case-study showed that apart from the AUC most of the other AU institutions are still lagging behind. Some structures, policies and conventions which would speed up continental integration have largely

remained on the drawing board. The work of other institutions like the AfCHPR and the PAP are being overshadowed by that of parallel institutions at the regional level.

Two perception surveys on the awareness of AU institution and perception about their effectiveness and relevance were analysed. An online perception survey was triangulated with two similar Afrobarometer surveys on the issue. It emerged from both surveys that there is a significant deficit of knowledge among Africans on the institutions of the African Union. While their evaluation of the necessity and expectations towards these institutions are positive their assessment of their effectiveness is mostly negative.

Generally it can be deduced from this study that there has been a significant lack of progress in the process of integration and the effectiveness of neofunctionalism among the institutions of the AU. Some of the important subsidiary bodies which were to result as a spillover of the integration process (like the African Central Bank, the African Investment Bank, the African Monetary Fund and the African Court of Justice and Human Rights) are still to see the light of day. RECs that were created to speed up the process of continental the emergence of an African Economic Community seems to have taken a trajectory of their own creating parallel structure with a more conflicting than complementary relationship with their continental counterparts.

With the aforementioned challenges and weaknesses, many scholars have been voiced strong criticisms of the AU. Leading the charge are Ayittey (2016) and Shaw (2013) who are outrightly calling for the disbanding of the AU. In an article to that effect on *Foreign Policy* magazine, Ayittey unequivocally stated: "African leaders

should admit that a caricature of the European Union can't possibly work for Africa" (Ayittey, 2016). Though they differ with this radical indictment, African leaders have tacitly recognised the fact lapses of the AU in the attainment of the ideals of continental integration. This is evidence by their decision to adopt a reform structure placed under the supervision of Rwandan President, Paul Kagame who is to work in collaboration with current and former AU Chairpersons towards the implementation of reforms within the structure within the proposed timeline of January 2017 - January 2019(African Union, n.d. c). An institutional reform unit was also put in place to perform the daily activities of the reform agenda. This unit is headed by Prof. Pierre Moukoko Mbonjou (former External Relations Minister of Cameroon) and Ms. Ciru Mwaura (former Senior Adviser with the Intergovernmental Authority on Development) as deputy head (African Union, n.d.d).

The overall dismal performance of the AU institutions in the achievement of continental integration tacitly acknowledged by the decision of AU leaders to engage reforms within the institutions lends more credence to a null hypothesis rather than the alternative hypothesis of structural innovations (new institutions) of the African Union having accelerated the pace of continental integration as envisaged in their creation.

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## **APPENDICES**



## **Appendix A: Online Survey Questionnaire**

### **SURVEY ON THE AWARENESS AND PERCEPTION OF AFRICANS ABOUT THE INSTITUTIONS OF THE AFRICAN UNION**

*Institutions: The African Union Commission, The Peace and Security Council (PSC), the Pan African Parliament (PAP), and the African Court on Human and Peoples' Right (ACHPR)*

#### **Demographics**

##### **Age group**

- a. 15 – 30
- b. 30-45
- c. 45 – 60
- d. 60 and above

##### **Sex**

- a. Male
- b. Female

##### **Educational level (highest education attained)**

- a. Primary school
- b. Secondary school
- c. Bachelors
- d. Masters
- e. PhD

##### **Nationality**

#### **A. KNOWLEDGE OF AU INSTITUTIONS**

##### **1. How many institutions does the AU have?**

- a. Nine
- b. Six
- d. Twelve
- e. No idea

##### **2. Which institution serves at the Secretariat of the AU?**

- a. The African Union General Secretariat (AUGS).
- b. Office of the Secretary General.
- c. The African Union Commission

##### **3. Where is the institution serving as the AU Secretariat located?**

- a. Durban, South Africa
- b. Lome, Togo

- c. Arusha, Tanzania
- d. Addis Ababa, Ethiopia

**4. What is the name and nationality of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission?**

- a. Dr Nkosazana Dlamini Zuma, South Africa.
- b. Alpha Condé, Guinea
- c. Moussa Faki Mahamat, Tchad
- d. Thomas Yayi Boni, Benin

**5. What is the name of the AU institution in charge of conflict prevention, peace-making and peace-building?**

- a. The African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA).
- b. Continental Early Warning System (CEWS).
- c. Peace and Security Council (PSC).
- d. African Standby Force (ASF).

**6. What is the name of the legislative institution of the AU and where is it based?**

- a. Parliament of the African Union (PAU) based in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.
- b. African Union Parliament (AUP) based in Cairo, Egypt.
- c. Assembly of the African Union (AAU) based in Durban, South Africa.
- d. Pan-African Parliament (PAP) based in Midrand, South Africa.

**7. What powers does the legislative institution of the AU have?**

- a. To make laws
- b. Advisory and consultative role.
- c. A & B.
- d. To ensure the respect of the AU Charter.

**8. How are AU MPs elected?**

- a. Direct universal suffrage in AU Member States.
- b. Selected from the legislature of their respective countries.
- c. Selected by the heads of states of their respective countries.
- d. Selected by the Assembly of Heads of States and Government.

**9. Which is AU judicial institution is fully operational?**

- a. African Court of Justice
- b. African Court of Human Rights and Justice
- c. African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights.

**10. Who can bring forth cases in the AU judicial institution you choose in the previous question?**

- a. AU State Parties only.
- b. AU State Parties, African International governmental organizations and non-governmental organizations.
- c. The African Union Commission.

**B. PERCEPTION ON THE FUNCTIONING OF AU INSTITUTIONS.**

How will you rate the performance of the following AU Institutions?

- i. African Union Commission (AUC).**
  - a. Highly efficient.
  - b. Efficient.
  - c. Average.
  - d. Below average.
  - e. Not enough knowledge of the institution to make an informed opinion
  
- ii. Pan African Parliament (PAP)**
  - a. Highly efficient.
  - b. Efficient.
  - c. Average.
  - d. Below average.
  - e. Not enough knowledge of the institution to make an informed opinion
  
- iii. African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights (AfCHPR)**
  - a. Highly efficient.
  - b. Efficient.
  - c. Average.
  - d. Below average.
  - e. Not enough knowledge of the institution to make an informed opinion
  
- iv. Peace and Security Council (PSC)**
  - a. Highly efficient.
  - b. Efficient.
  - c. Average.
  - d. Below average.
  - e. Not enough knowledge of the institution to make an informed opinion

### **C. PERCEPTION ABOUT THE RELEVANCE OF AU INSTITUTIONS TO THE WELFARE OF AFRICANS.**

How will you rate the following AU Institutions in terms of relevance to the welfare of ordinary Africans?

- i. African Court on Human and Peoples Rights**
  - a. Very necessary
  - b. Necessary.
  - c. Not necessary.
  - d. I can tell because of lack of knowledge about the institution.
  
- ii. Pan African Parliament (PAP)**

- a. Very necessary
- b. Necessary.
- c. Not necessary.
- d. I can tell because of lack of knowledge about the institution.

**iii. African Union Commission (AUC)**

- a. Very necessary
- b. Necessary.
- c. Not necessary.
- d. I can tell because of lack of knowledge about the institution.

**iv. Peace and Security Council (PSC)**

- a. Very necessary
- b. Necessary.
- c. Not necessary.
- d. I can tell because of lack of knowledge about the institution.

**D. PERCEPTION ABOUT THE CONTRIBUTION OF AU INSTITUTIONS TO AFRICAN INTEGRATION.**

In your opinion, are the following AU Institutions helping to promote continental integration in Africa?

**i. African Union Commission**

- a. Yes to a large extent
- b. Yes but to a limited extent.
- c. No
- d. Not having enough knowledge to determine.

**ii. Peace and Security Council (PSC)**

- a. Yes to a large extent
- b. Yes but to a limited extent.
- c. No
- d. Not having enough knowledge to determine.

**iii. Pan African Parliament (PAP)**

- a. Yes to a large extent
- b. Yes but to a limited extent.
- c. No
- d. Not having enough knowledge to determine.

**E. PERCEPTION ON PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR CONTINENTAL INTEGRATION.**

- i. Do you think continental integration is good for Africa?  
Yes  No

- ii. If yes, what type of continental integration do you think is good for Africa?
  - a. Federation (a United States of Africa).
  - b. Regional integration (Regional Economic Communities) alone.
  - c. A & B.
  - d. Confederation (loose union like in the OAU),

## Appendix B: Online Perception Survey results

Timestamp	Nationality	Sex	Age group	Level of education	How many institutions do
07/01/2018 00:09:54	Nigerian	Female	15 - 30	University	No idea
07/01/2018 01:11:46	Zimbabwean	Female	15 - 30	University	Twelve
07/01/2018 01:14:28	Cameroonian	Female	15 - 30	University	Nine
07/01/2018 01:23:36	Nigeria	Female	15 - 30	University	No idea
07/01/2018 13:27:38	Caneroonian	Male	30 - 45	University	No idea
07/01/2018 13:29:19	Cameroonian	Male	15 - 30	University	Six
07/01/2018 14:04:04	Cameroonian	Female	30 - 45	University	No idea
07/01/2018 15:09:47	Nigerian	Female	15 - 30	University	No idea
07/01/2018 16:06:16	Cameroon	Male	30 - 45	University	Nine
07/01/2018 16:17:24	Cameroonian	Female	30 - 45	University	No idea
07/01/2018 17:14:21	Senegalese	Male	15 - 30	University	Six
07/01/2018 17:28:09	Nigerian	Male	15 - 30	University	Six
07/01/2018 18:04:41	Cameroonian	Male	30 - 45	University	Twelve
07/01/2018 18:07:50	Cameroon	Male	15 - 30	University	No idea
07/01/2018 20:26:06	Cameroonian	Female	30 - 45	Secondary	No idea
07/01/2018 21:18:37	Cameroonian	Male	30 - 45	University	
07/01/2018 23:22:10	Nigerian	Female	15 - 30	University	No idea
07/01/2018 23:23:35	Nigerian	Female	15 - 30	University	Twelve
07/01/2018 23:23:36	Nigerian	Female	15 - 30	University	Twelve
07/01/2018 23:27:21	Nigerian	Female	15 - 30	University	No idea
07/01/2018 23:40:30	Nigerian	Male	30 - 45	University	No idea
08/01/2018 00:08:33	Nigeria	Female	15 - 30	University	No idea
08/01/2018 00:09:00	Nigerian	Male	30 - 45	University	No idea
08/01/2018 00:19:18	Cameroon/Ambazonia	Male	30 - 45	University	Six
08/01/2018 00:42:35	Nigerian	Female	15 - 30	University	No idea
08/01/2018 03:16:18	Nigerian	Female	15 - 30	University	Nine
08/01/2018 08:36:39	Nigeria	Female	15 - 30	University	Twelve
08/01/2018 08:45:51	nigeria	Male	30 - 45	University	No idea
08/01/2018 09:41:14	Nigerian	Male	15 - 30	University	No idea

Timestamp	Nationality	Sex	Age group	Level of education	How many institutions do
08/01/2018 10:09:07	Cameroonian	Male	30 - 45	University	No idea
08/01/2018 10:54:18	Cameroonian	Male	15 - 30	University	No idea
08/01/2018 11:37:43	Nigeria	Female	15 - 30	University	
08/01/2018 13:17:44	Cameroonian	Male	15 - 30	University	No idea
08/01/2018 16:44:16	Cameroonian	Male	15 - 30	University	No idea
08/01/2018 17:35:57	Cameroonian	Male	30 - 45	University	Six
08/01/2018 18:13:16	Nigeedian	Female	15 - 30	University	Six
08/01/2018 18:13:53	libyan	Male	15 - 30	University	Six
08/01/2018 18:36:03	Libya	Male	15 - 30	University	No idea
08/01/2018 19:16:34	Ghanaian	Male	15 - 30	University	Six
08/01/2018 20:14:52	Angolan	Female	15 - 30	University	Nine
10/01/2018 09:28:04	kenyan	Male	15 - 30	University	No idea
10/01/2018 10:25:01	Zimbabwean	Male	15 - 30	University	No idea
10/01/2018 11:26:09	Cameroonian	Male	30 - 45	University	Nine
10/01/2018 12:01:24	Camerooniab	Female	15 - 30	University	No idea
10/01/2018 12:41:28	Cameroonian	Female	15 - 30	University	
10/01/2018 12:59:20	Cameroon	Male	15 - 30	University	No idea
10/01/2018 13:47:40	Senegal	Male	30 - 45	University	
10/01/2018 14:16:56	Nigeria	Male	30 - 45	University	Six
11/01/2018 01:25:38	Cameroonian	Male	30 - 45	University	No idea
11/01/2018 18:42:34	Nigeria	Male	15 - 30	University	Six
11/01/2018 18:54:51	Cameroonian	Male	30 - 45	University	No idea
12/01/2018 09:07:49	Nigerian	Female	30 - 45	University	No idea
12/01/2018 11:08:38	Cameroonian	Male	30 - 45	University	No idea

Which institution serves a	Where is the institution se	Who is the chairperson of	What is the name of the A	What is the name of the le	What is competence does
The African Union Commi	Addis Ababa, Ethiopia	No idea	Peace and Security Coun	Pan-African Parliament (F	No idea
The African Union Commi	Addis Ababa, Ethiopia	Alpha Condé	Peace and Security Coun	Pan-African Parliament (F	No idea
The African Union Commi	Addis Ababa, Ethiopia	Dr. Nkosazana Dlamini Z	Peace and Security Coun	Pan-African Parliament (F	A & B.
The African Union Commi	Addis Ababa, Ethiopia	Moussa Faki Mahamat	Peace and Security Coun	Pan-African Parliament (F	No idea
The African Union Gener	Addis Ababa, Ethiopia	Alpha Condé	Peace and Security Coun	Parliament of the African	Advisory and consultive r
The African Union Gener	Addis Ababa, Ethiopia	Moussa Faki Mahamat	The African Peace and St	Parliament of the African	Full legislative powers.
The African Union Gener	No idea	No idea	Peace and Security Coun	Pan-African Parliament (F	Advisory and consultive r
I don't know	No idea	No idea	Peace and Security Coun	No idea	No idea
The African Union Gener	Addis Ababa, Ethiopia	Moussa Faki Mahamat	Peace and Security Coun	Pan-African Parliament (F	Ensure checks and balan
I don't know	Addis Ababa, Ethiopia	No idea	African Standby Force (A	No idea	No idea
The African Union Commi	Addis Ababa, Ethiopia	Alpha Condé	Peace and Security Coun	Pan-African Parliament (F	Advisory and consultive r
I don't know	No idea	No idea	Peace and Security Coun	No idea	No idea
The African Union Commi	Addis Ababa, Ethiopia	Alpha Condé	Peace and Security Coun	Pan-African Parliament (F	Full legislative powers.
I don't know	Addis Ababa, Ethiopia	Alpha Condé	The African Peace and St	No idea	No idea
I don't know	Durban, South Africa	No idea	African Standby Force (A	Parliament of the African	A & B.
The African Union Gener	Addis Ababa, Ethiopia	Dr. Nkosazana Dlamini Z	Peace and Security Coun	Pan-African Parliament (F	Ensure checks and balan
The African Union Commi	Addis Ababa, Ethiopia	Alpha Condé	Peace and Security Coun	Parliament of the African	Ensure checks and balan
The African Union Commi	Addis Ababa, Ethiopia	Dr. Nkosazana Dlamini Z	Peace and Security Coun	Parliament of the African	No idea
The African Union Commi	Addis Ababa, Ethiopia	Dr. Nkosazana Dlamini Z	Peace and Security Coun	Parliament of the African	No idea
I don't know	Addis Ababa, Ethiopia	No idea	Peace and Security Coun	Parliament of the African	Full legislative powers.
The African Union Commi	Addis Ababa, Ethiopia	No idea	Peace and Security Coun	Parliament of the African	Advisory and consultive r
I don't know	Addis Ababa, Ethiopia	No idea	Peace and Security Coun	Parliament of the African	A & B.
I don't know	No idea	No idea	The African Peace and St	No idea	No idea
The African Union Gener	Addis Ababa, Ethiopia	Moussa Faki Mahamat	The African Peace and St	Parliament of the African	Ensure checks and balan
The African Union Gener	Addis Ababa, Ethiopia	No idea	Peace and Security Coun	Parliament of the African	Advisory and consultive r
The African Union Commi	Addis Ababa, Ethiopia	Moussa Faki Mahamat	Peace and Security Coun	Pan-African Parliament (F	Ensure checks and balan
I don't know	Addis Ababa, Ethiopia	No idea	African Standby Force (A	Parliament of the African	No idea
Office of the Secretary Ge	Addis Ababa, Ethiopia	No idea	Peace and Security Coun	Parliament of the African	No idea
I don't know	No idea	No idea	Peace and Security Coun	No idea	No idea

How are African Union Me	Which African Union judic	Who can bring cases bef	How will you rate the perf	How will you rate the perf	How will you rate the perf
No idea	No idea.	No idea	Fair	Fair	Fair
	African Court of Justice.				
Selected from the legislat	African Court on Human ε	AU State parties, African	Fair	Fair	Satisfactory
Selected from the legislat	African Court of Human R	AU State parties only	Fair	Fair	Satisfactory
Selected by the heads of	African Court on Human ε	AU State parties only	Poor	Fair	Fair
Direct universal suffrage i	African Court on Human ε	African Union Commissio	Fair	Fair	Poor
No idea	African Court of Human R	AU State parties only	Poor	Poor	Poor
No idea	No idea.	No idea	Not enough knowledge of	Not enough knowledge of	Not enough knowledge of
Selected from the legislat	African Court on Human ε	AU State parties, African	Poor	Poor	Poor
No idea	No idea.	AU State parties, African	Not enough knowledge of	Not enough knowledge of	Not enough knowledge of
Selected by the heads of	African Court on Human ε	AU State parties, African	Poor	Fair	Poor
No idea	African Court on Human ε	AU State parties, African	Satisfactory	Fair	Very good
No idea	No idea.	No idea	Fair	Fair	Fair
Selected from the legislat	African Court of Justice.	African Union Commission and Council of Ministers			
Selected from the legislat	African Court on Human ε	AU State parties, African	Poor	Poor	Poor
Selected by the heads of	African Court of Human R	African Union Commissio	Fair	Fair	Poor
Selected by the heads of	No idea.	No idea	Poor	Poor	Poor
Selected by the heads of	No idea.	No idea	Poor	Poor	Poor
Selected by the heads of	African Court of Human R	AU State parties only	Fair	Satisfactory	Poor
Selected by the heads of	No idea.	AU State parties, African	Poor	Poor	Poor
Direct universal suffrage i	African Court of Human R	AU State parties, African	Not enough knowledge of	Not enough knowledge of	Not enough knowledge of
No idea	No idea.	AU State parties, African	Fair	Fair	Poor
Direct universal suffrage i	African Court on Human ε	AU State parties, African	Poor	Poor	Fair
No idea	African Court on Human ε	AU State parties, African	Fair	Fair	Poor
Selected by the heads of	African Court on Human ε	AU State parties, African	Fair	Fair	Satisfactory
Selected by the heads of	No idea.	No idea	Fair	Fair	Fair
No idea	African Court of Human R	No idea	Fair	Not enough knowledge of	Very good
No idea	African Court of Justice.	No idea	Satisfactory	Satisfactory	Satisfactory

How will you rate the performance of the organization?	How will you rate the relevance of the organization's mission?	How will you rate the relevance of the organization's vision?	How will you rate the relevance of the organization's strategy?	How will you rate the relevance of the organization's policies?	What is the contribution of the organization to the community?
Poor	Necessary	Necessary	Very necessary	Very necessary	Minimal
Poor	Necessary	Necessary	Very necessary	Very necessary	Insignificant
Satisfactory	Necessary	Necessary	Necessary	Necessary	Minimal
Poor	Necessary	Necessary	Necessary	Necessary	Minimal
Poor	Not necessary	Not necessary	Not necessary	Necessary	Insignificant
Poor	Necessary	Necessary	Very necessary	Very necessary	Insignificant
Not enough knowledge of the organization's performance	Not enough knowledge of the organization's mission	Not enough knowledge of the organization's vision	Not enough knowledge of the organization's strategy	Not enough knowledge of the organization's policies	Not enough knowledge of the organization's contribution
Poor	Not necessary	Not necessary	Not necessary	Not necessary	Insignificant
Not enough knowledge of the organization's performance	Not enough knowledge of the organization's mission	Not enough knowledge of the organization's vision	Not enough knowledge of the organization's strategy	Not enough knowledge of the organization's policies	Not enough knowledge of the organization's contribution
Fair	Necessary	Necessary	Necessary	Very necessary	Significant
Very good	Necessary	Very necessary	Very necessary	Very necessary	Significant
Fair	Necessary	Necessary	Necessary	Necessary	Significant
	Necessary	Necessary	Necessary	Necessary	Minimal
Poor	Necessary	Necessary	Necessary	Necessary	Minimal
Fair	Necessary	Necessary	Necessary	Necessary	Minimal
Poor	Very necessary	Very necessary	Very necessary	Very necessary	Significant
Poor	Very necessary	Very necessary	Very necessary	Very necessary	Significant
Poor	Not necessary	Necessary	Necessary	Necessary	Minimal
Poor	Very necessary	Not enough knowledge of the organization's mission	Very necessary	Very necessary	Monumental
Not enough knowledge of the organization's performance	Very necessary	Necessary	Very necessary	Very necessary	Monumental
Poor	Necessary	Not necessary	Very necessary	Very necessary	Significant
Poor	Very necessary	Very necessary	Very necessary	Very necessary	Insignificant
Poor	Not necessary	Not necessary	Not necessary	Not necessary	Insignificant
Fair	Very necessary	Very necessary	Very necessary	Very necessary	Significant
Satisfactory	Necessary	Necessary	Necessary	Necessary	Significant
Excellent	Very necessary	Necessary	Very necessary	Very necessary	Monumental
Satisfactory	Necessary	Necessary	Necessary	Necessary	Minimal

What is the contribution of the organization to the community?	What is the contribution of the organization to the economy?	What is the contribution of the organization to the environment?	Continental integration necessary?	If you agree to continental integration what type do you prefer?
Minimal	Significant	Significant	Strongly agree	Confederation (African Union)
Minimal	Minimal	Insignificant	Strongly agree	Regional integration through Regional Economic Communities
Minimal	Minimal	Minimal	Strongly agree	Confederation (African Union)
Minimal	Minimal	Minimal	Agree	Federation (United States of Africa)
Insignificant	Insignificant	Insignificant	Strongly agree	Federation (United States of Africa)
Insignificant	Insignificant	Insignificant	Agree	Federation (United States of Africa)
Not enough knowledge of the organization's contribution	Not enough knowledge of the organization's contribution	Not enough knowledge of the organization's contribution	Strongly agree	Federation (United States of Africa)
Insignificant	Insignificant	Insignificant	Strongly disagree	Federation (United States of Africa)
Not enough knowledge of the organization's contribution	Not enough knowledge of the organization's contribution	Not enough knowledge of the organization's contribution	Agree	Regional integration through Regional Economic Communities
Significant	Significant	Significant	Neutral	Federation (United States of Africa)
			Neutral	Confederation (African Union)
Minimal	Minimal	Significant	Agree	Confederation (African Union)
Significant	Significant	Significant	Neutral	Federation (United States of Africa)
Insignificant	Minimal	Minimal	Disagree	Federation (United States of Africa)
Minimal	Minimal	Minimal	Strongly disagree	Federation (United States of Africa)
Minimal	Minimal	Minimal	Strongly agree	Confederation (African Union)
Minimal	Significant	Significant	Strongly agree	Confederation (African Union)
Minimal	Significant	Significant	Strongly agree	Confederation (African Union)
Significant	Minimal	Minimal	Agree	Confederation (African Union)
Significant	Monumental	Significant	Strongly agree	Federation (United States of Africa)
Monumental	Monumental	Monumental	Strongly agree	Confederation (African Union)
Minimal	Significant	Significant	Agree	Confederation (African Union)
Insignificant	Insignificant	Insignificant	Strongly disagree	Federation (United States of Africa)
Insignificant	Insignificant	Insignificant	Strongly disagree	Federation (United States of Africa)
Significant	Significant	Significant	Neutral	Federation (United States of Africa)
Significant	Significant	Significant	Strongly agree	Federation (United States of Africa)
Minimal	Insignificant	Monumental	Strongly agree	Regional integration through Regional Economic Communities
Minimal	Minimal	Minimal	Neutral	Federation (United States of Africa)



How are African Union Me	Which African Union judic	Who can bring cases bef	How will you rate the perf	How will you rate the perf	How will you rate the perf
No idea	No idea.	No idea	Poor	Poor	Poor
Selected by the heads of	African Court on Human &	AU State parties, African	Poor	Poor	Poor
No idea	African Court of Justice.	AU State parties, African	International governmental	International governmental	International governmental
Selected by the heads of	African Court of Justice.	AU State parties, African	Not enough knowledge of	Not enough knowledge of	Not enough knowledge of
No idea	African Court on Human &	AU State parties, African	Fair	Not enough knowledge of	Not enough knowledge of
Selected from the legislat	African Court on Human &	AU State parties, African	Fair	Satisfactory	Fair
Selected by the heads of	African Court of Human R	African Union Commissio	Satisfactory	Excellent	Excellent
No idea	African Court of Justice.	AU State parties, African	Satisfactory	Satisfactory	Poor
No idea	No idea.	No idea	Poor	Poor	Poor
Selected from the legislat	African Court of Human R	AU State parties, African	Fair	Poor	Poor
Selected by the heads of	No idea.	AU State parties, African	Satisfactory	Poor	Fair
Selected by the heads of	African Court of Human R	No idea	Very good	Satisfactory	Fair
No idea	No idea.	No idea	Satisfactory	Satisfactory	Poor
Direct universal suffrage i	African Court on Human &	AU State parties, African	Fair	Fair	Fair
No idea	No idea.	AU State parties only			
No idea	African Court of Human R	No idea	Not enough knowledge of	Not enough knowledge of	Not enough knowledge of
No idea	No idea.	No idea	Not enough knowledge of	Not enough knowledge of	Not enough knowledge of
Selected from the legislat	African Court of Justice.	AU State parties only	Not enough knowledge of	Not enough knowledge of	Not enough knowledge of
Direct universal suffrage i	African Court of Human Rights and Justice.				
No idea	No idea.	African Union Commissio	Fair	Fair	Fair
Selected from the legislat	African Court of Human R	AU State parties, African	Satisfactory	Satisfactory	Satisfactory
No idea	No idea.	No idea	Not enough knowledge of	Not enough knowledge of	Not enough knowledge of
Direct universal suffrage i	African Court of Human R	AU State parties only	Satisfactory	Very good	Very good
Selected by the heads of	No idea.	AU State parties only	Poor	Poor	Poor

How will you rate the perf	How will you rate the rele	How will you rate the rele	How will you rate the rele	How will you rate the rele	What is the contribution o
Poor	Not necessary	Not necessary	Not necessary	Not necessary	Insignificant
Poor	Not enough knowledge of	Not enough knowledge of	Very necessary	Very necessary	Insignificant
Not enough knowledge of	Not enough knowledge of	Not enough knowledge of	Not enough knowledge of	Not enough knowledge of	Not enough knowledge to
Poor	Not enough knowledge of	Not enough knowledge of	Not enough knowledge of	Not enough knowledge of	Not enough knowledge to
Fair					
Excellent	Very necessary	Very necessary	Very necessary	Very necessary	Significant
Poor	Necessary	Necessary	Necessary	Necessary	Insignificant
Poor	Not necessary	Not necessary	Not necessary	Not necessary	Insignificant
Poor	Necessary	Necessary	Necessary	Necessary	Insignificant
Satisfactory	Very necessary	Necessary	Not enough knowledge of	Very necessary	Significant
Very good	Necessary	Necessary	Very necessary	Very necessary	Monumental
Fair	Not enough knowledge of	Not enough knowledge of	Very necessary	Very necessary	Not enough knowledge to
Fair	Necessary	Necessary	Very necessary	Very necessary	Minimal
Not enough knowledge of	Very necessary	Very necessary	Very necessary	Very necessary	Minimal
Not enough knowledge of the institution to make an informed opinion					
Not enough knowledge of	Not enough knowledge of	Not enough knowledge of	Not enough knowledge of	Not enough knowledge of	Not enough knowledge to
					Minimal
Fair	Necessary	Necessary	Necessary	Necessary	Minimal
Satisfactory	Necessary	Necessary	Necessary	Necessary	Monumental
Not enough knowledge of	Not enough knowledge of	Not enough knowledge of	Not enough knowledge of	Not enough knowledge of	Not enough knowledge to
Fair	Very necessary	Very necessary	Very necessary	Not enough knowledge of	Significant
Fair	Necessary	Not necessary	Very necessary	Very necessary	Minimal

What is the contribution o	What is the contribution o	What is the contribution o	Continental integration ne	If you agree to continental integration what type do y
Insignificant	Insignificant	Insignificant	Neutral	Federation (United States of Africa)
Insignificant	Insignificant	Minimal	Strongly agree	Confederation (African Union)
			Neutral	
Not enough knowledge to	Not enough knowledge to	Not enough knowledge to	Agree	Confederation (African Union)
Not enough knowledge to	Not enough knowledge to	Not enough knowledge to	Agree	Federation (United States of Africa)
Significant			Agree	Federation (United States of Africa)
Significant	Minimal		Neutral	Confederation (African Union)
Insignificant	Insignificant	Insignificant	Strongly agree	Confederation (African Union)
Insignificant	Insignificant	Insignificant	Neutral, Agree	Federation (United States of Africa)
Insignificant	Insignificant	Insignificant	Strongly agree	Regional integration through Regional Economic Co
Monumental	Monumental	Monumental	Agree	Regional integration through Regional Economic Co
Significant	Significant	Monumental	Strongly agree	Federation (United States of Africa)
Not enough knowledge to	Not enough knowledge to	Not enough knowledge to	Agree	Confederation (African Union)
Minimal	Minimal	Minimal	Agree	Regional integration through Regional Economic Co
			Strongly agree	Regional integration through Regional Economic Co
Significant	Significant	Minimal	Agree	Federation (United States of Africa)
Not enough knowledge to	Not enough knowledge to	Not enough knowledge to	Agree	Regional integration through Regional Economic Co
Minimal	Minimal	Minimal	Disagree	Federation (United States of Africa)
Minimal	Minimal	Minimal	Agree	Federation (United States of Africa)
Significant	Significant	Monumental	Disagree	
Not enough knowledge to	Not enough knowledge to	Not enough knowledge to	Strongly disagree	Federation (United States of Africa)
Significant	Significant	Significant	Agree	Regional integration through Regional Economic Co
Insignificant	Insignificant	Minimal	Agree	Regional integration through Regional Economic Co