Understanding Turkish Foreign Policy in a Changing World: An Analysis of Turkish Foreign Policy from 1980 to 2014 through the Perspectives of Role Theory and Operational Code Analysis

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ABSTRACT

This thesis examines Turkish national role conceptions (NRCs) during 1980–2014 based on the official policy statements of eighteen Turkish foreign policy-makers. It questions change and continuity in Turkish foreign policy behavior by evaluating 'pre-AKP' and 'AKP' (Justice and Development Party, Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi) periods. The NRCs that Turkish foreign policy makers adopted in these periods suggests that there has been both a change and continuity of Turkish foreign policy.

K. J. Holsti's adaptation of role theory and leaders perception of states' NRCs is utilized as a main theoretical framework to explain changes in Turkish foreign policy behaviors. This thesis also utilizes operational code analysis as another at-a-distance leadership assessment method to complement role theory. The thesis asserts that both methods have explanatory powers to identify changes in Turkish foreign policy behaviors. Utilizing both role theory and operational code analysis explains Turkey's NRCs based on its leaders' beliefs on, perceptions of the political universe and the strategies that they have adopted. The qualitative and quantitative content analysis methods are combined to analyze leaders' official documents to see whether leaders' perception of NRCs and belief system led different foreign policy behaviors. The research results help to understand changing Turkish foreign policy behaviors in Turkey from 1980 to 2014.

Keywords: Turkish foreign policy, role theory, national role conceptions, operational code analysis.

ÖZ

Bu tez on sekiz Türk dış politika yapıcısının siyasi konuşmalarını analiz ederek 1980-2014 dönemindeki Türk ulusal rol kavramlarını incelemektedir. Bu tezde 'AKP öncesi' ve 'AKP' (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi) dönemleri incelenerek Türk dış politikasındaki değişiklik ve süreklilik kavramları sorgulanmaktadır. 1980 yılından bu yana Türk dış politikası yapıcılarının benimsediği ulusal rol kavramları Türk dış politikası davranışlarında hem değişikliği hem de sürekliliği ortaya koymaktadır.

K. J. Holti'nin Dış Politika Analizine uyguladığı rol teorisi ve liderlerin algıladığı ulusal rol kavramları tezin ana teorik çerçevesi olarak kullanılmıştır. Tezde aynı zamanda bir diğer liderleri uzaktan değerlendirme metodu olan operasyonel kod anlizi rol teorisini tamamlayıcı bir yöntem olarak kullanılmıştır. Her iki araştırma yönteminin de Türk dış politikası davranışlarındaki değişimleri açıklama gücü vardır. Rol teorisi ve operasyonel kod analizi Türkiye'nin ulusal rol kavramlarını liderlerin inançlarına ve benimsedikleri stratejilere dayanarak açıklamaktadır. Niteliksel ve niceliksel içerik analizi yöntemleri liderlerin resmi belgelerini analiz etmek için kullanılmıştır. Böylece liderlerin ulusal rol kavramları algılarının ve inanç sistemlerinin farklı dış politika davranışlarına yol açıp açmadığı incelenmiştir. Araştırma sonuçları, 1980 ve 2014 yıllarında Türkiye'de değişen Türk dış politika davranışlarını anlamaya yardımcı olmaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Türk dış politikası, rol teorisi, ulusal rol kavramları, operasyonel kod analizi.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ANAP	Anavatan Partisi, Motherland Party
AKP	Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, Justice and Development Party
CHP	Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, Republican People's Party
DSP	Demokratik Sol Partisi, Democratic Left Party
DYP	Doğru Yol Partisi, True Path Party
EEC	European Economic Community
EU	European Union
FPA	Foreign Policy Analysis
G-20	Group of 20
IR	International Relations
MENA	Middle East and North Africa
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NSC	Milli Güvenlik Kurulu, National Security Council
NGO	Non-governmental Organisation
NRC	National Role Conception
NSC	National Security Council, Milli Güvenlik Kurulu
NVM	National View Movement, Milli Görüş Hareketi
OIC	Organisation of Islamic Conference
PKK	Kurdistan Workers Party, Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan
RP	Refah Partisi, Welfare Party
SHP	Sosyaldemokrat Halkçı Parti, Social Democratic Populist Party
TAF	Genelkurmay Başkanlığı Turkish Armed Forces
TGNA	Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi, Turkish Grand National Assembly

TIKA	Turkish International Cooperation and Development Agency
TRNC	Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus
TÜSİAD	Turkish Industrialists and Businessmen's Association
U.S	United States of America
UN	United Nations
UNSC	United Nations Security Council

Chapter 1

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Introduction

The thesis aims to examine changing Turkish foreign policy orientations from 1980 to 2014. To this end, K. J. Holsti's adaptation of role theory is combined with operational code analysis as distance assessment methods to analyze the dynamic nature of Turkish foreign policy which has undergone transformation since 1980. This thesis combines role theory and operational code analysis in its theoretical framework in order to identify the main national role conceptions (NRCs) that Turkey adopts in its' international relations. Role theory explains Turkey's position in global affairs through NRCs. On the other hand, operational code analysis helps to identify the core beliefs of Turkey's leaders and the influence of these beliefs in the formation of Turkey's NRCs. In this way, the thesis aims to assess the numerous NRCs of different administrations since 1980 in order to evaluate changing Turkish foreign policy behaviors.

Role theory was first introduced in sociology in the 1920s. R. E. Park claims that "everyone is always and everywhere more or less consciously playing a role."[1] He also confirms that "it is in these roles that we know each other; it is in these roles that we know ourselves"[2]. Thus, roles are part of everyday life which determine people's

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[1] R. E., 1926 Park, "Behind our Mask". Survey, New York, See also Biddle, Bruce J. (1979) Role Theory: Expectations, Identities and Behaviors. New York: Academic Press.

[2] Ibid.

behavior and who they are. Later, it was adopted by foreign policy analysts to explain states' foreign policy behaviors and the roles they adopt in global affairs. Role theory pays special attention to leaders in order to reveal certain NRCs based on leaders' perceptions. This thesis looks at the concept of foreign policy change in the case of Turkey through its leaders' belief systems and NRCs. Role theory and operational code analysis methods are employed to explain and predict changes in Turkish foreign policy behaviours. Therefore, the thesis promises to reveal factors that cause the change and how the change occured through the perspective of role theory and operational code analysis. The recent studies on Turkish foreign policy changes focuses on the Justice and Development Party's (*Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi*, AKP) foreign policy making which mainly looks at Turkey's relation with the West. This study by looking at leaders' perception of the political universe and its strategies, aims to identify Turkish foreign policy changes in terms of adopted NRCs both in the regional and global context. During the AKP's second term, the AKP policy makers aimed to implement some revolutionary foreign policies by introducing new foreign policy principles. The AKP elite pursued more active foreign policy agenda than previous administrations in Turkey's regions by initiating rapprochement with Iran, Syria and Russia. This change in Turkish foreign policy was driven by the changed perception of the new leadership in Turkey; namely Ahmet Davutoğlu. His vision, beliefs and interpretation of the political universe led Turkey to change its understanding of the international system. Turkish policy makers in this new era, have aimed to integrate Turkey to the world politics based on a different perception, understanding, and definition of Turkey's role in achieveing a desirable outcome. This has led scholars to question the paradigm shift in Turkish foreign policy. The paradigm shift discussion refers to the redirecting of Turkish

foreign policy during the AKP administration, one which is different than that of previous administrators. This thesis aims to contribute to this discussion by testing this paradigm shift assumption. In this light, the incumbent AKP administration is compared to previous administrations between 1980 and 2002. In thesis these administrations are identified as the 'pre-AKP governments'. This thesis, studies the 'pre-AKP' and the 'AKP' administartions separetly in order to identify changing Turkish foreign policy behavioral patterns.

Both theoretical frameworks; role theory and operational code analysis use individual levels of analysis to identify Turkish foreign policy change. However, explaining foreign policy change requires both individual levels of analysis and a systemic-level analysis. Therefore, this study by adopting actor-centered point of views aims to link leaders' perception of their states' position and the impact of the external variables to change/shape leaders perceptions and beliefs systems. Role theory states that adoption and formulation of certain NRCs is based on leaders' expectation of what the appropriate role for their country is. However, as the internatuionsl system changes, leaders try to adapt to these changes. They aim to (re)locate their country's position in the international system by taking changing systemic variables into consideration. Thus, a change in NRCs indicates that micro level analysis has correlation with macro level changes. As a theoretical framework, role theory also can establish a bridge between different levels of analysis. Thus, it is possible to combine individual levels of analysis with the state and systemic levels of analysis in a single study by employing role theory.[3]

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[3] Ebere Richard Adigbuo, "National Role Conceptions: A New Trend in Foreign Policy Analysis," p. 1, http://www.wiscnetwork.org/porto2011/papers/WISC_2011-647.pdf (accessed on May 5, 2013)

It is important to underline the limitations of individual levels of analysis in foreign policy decision making. Leaders' belief systems cannot be studied directly due to the lack of direct access to an individual's mind. However, utilizing distance leadership assessments methods through the analysis of leaders' speeches and interviews, it is possible to make a statement about an invidual's assement of the political world, state relations and the role of systemic changes in the position of states.

In this study role theory and operational code analysis methods do not try to explain the formulation process of NRCs by looking at domestic role contestation. Both methods do not also look at domestic factors that influence role conception such as, the role of public opinion, coalition groups, group decision making and clashes between government and opposition groups. Although NRCs partly developed as a result of domestic consternation, the thesis focuses on the main assumption that role theory is based on leaders' inter-subjective understanding of world politics and Turkey's NRCs. Therefore, the theoretical frameworks of the thesis focus on leaders' perceptions, expectations, and the 'self' and 'other' relations rather than focusing on domestic factors in foreign policy decision making.

The study of foreign policy primarily aims to understand and explore foreign policy behaviors of actors in global affairs to describe and analyze international phenomenon. In order to understand complex foreign policy processes, analysts study foreign policy making from different theoretical perspectives and through different levels of analysis. There are various International Relations (IR) theories which are used in foreign policy analysis (FPA) such as; realism (and its variants), liberalism (and its variants), constructivism, post-modernism and marxism. In

addition to these paradigms there are also other approaches used in FPA such as decision-making theory and theories which focus on the individual level (rational actor model and leadership traits).

There are many factors that influence foreign policy making including; leaders, domestic politics and systemic variables. According to Hudson the role of individuals as the "most micro of all explanatory levels"[4] became one of the most important explanatory levels of analysis at the end of the Cold War when systemic levels of analysis lost its power to explain states behaviors.[5] In analyzing foreign policy decisions, the individual level theories tend to focus on the effects of a leaders' personality on the decision making process in order to thoroughly understand and explain it. There are various theoretical frameworks which can be used to study individuals in order to understand their effects on state foreign policy making, such as; rational choice theory, group think, poliheuristic theory, bureaucratic politics, and prospect theory. Mintz argues that rational choice calculation is the most significant paradigm for understanding individual decision making.[6] With his "Essence of Decision" published in 1971, Graham Allison became one of the first leading scholars to apply rational choice theory to FPA with the aim of explaining states' foreign policy behaviors. In his explanation, Allison claims that states' foreign policy results are based on the "purposive choices of consistent

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[4] V.M. Hudson, (2007) *Foreign Policy Analysis: Classic and Contemporary Theory*. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, p. 22.

[5] See also Walter Carlsnaes, (2008) Actors, Structures, and Foreign Policy Analysis. *In:* Dunne, Tim et al., eds. *Foreign Policy: Theories, Actors, Cases*. New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 85-100, p. 94.

[6] Alex Mintz, (2004) How Do Leaders Make Decisions?: A Poliheuristic Perspective. The Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 48, No. 1, pp. 3-13.

actors"[7] and these actors "calculated solution to a strategic problem."[8] Therefore, the decision making process is based on value maximization and the evaluation of all alternatives based on subjective expected utility.[9] In this case, there is no room for personal beliefs in assessing foreign policy options. However, it is important to note that rational choice theory provides limited explanation compared to the individual level theory which takes into consideration psychological biases, limited human capabilities, and the ever changing international environment.

The cognitive approach is more useful for understanding the complex psychology of individuals in decision making.[10] Unlike rational choice theory which assumes an objective perception of the environment on the part of the individual, the cognitive approach argues that due to their beliefs, individuals simplify decision making processes by processing information. Therefore, individuals perceive the environment differently from each other because they operate within their own "psychological environment".[11] Hudson believes that individuals employ filters as a

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[7] Graham Allison (1971) Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis, 1ed. Little Brown, p. 11.

[8] Ibid. p. 13.

[9] Allison (1971), p. 29-35; Herbert Simon, (1983). Reason in Human Affairs. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, p. 12-17.

[10] See K.E. Boulding, (1956) *The Image: Knowledge in Life and Society*. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press; H.A. Simon, (1957) *Models of Man: Social and Rational*. New York: Wiley; R.C., Snyder, H.W. Bruck, and B. Sapin, (1962) *Foreign Policy Decision-Making*. New York: Free Press; Steinbruner, J.D. (1974) *The Cybernetic Theory of Decision*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press; O.R. Holsti, (1976) Foreign Policy Formation Viewed Cognitively. In R. Axelrod (ed.), *Structure of Decision: The Cognitive Maps of Political Elites*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, pp. 18–54; R. Jervis, (1976) *Perception and Misperception in International Politics*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press; A.L. George, (1980) *Presidential Decisionmaking in Foreign Policy: The Effective Use of Information and Advice*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press; Tetlock, P.E. (1998) Social Psychology and World Politics. In D.T. Gilbert, S.T. Fiske, and G. Lindzey (eds.), *The Handbook of Social Psychology*. Boston: McGraw-Hill, pp. 868–912. *Foreign Policy: The Effective Use of Information and Advice*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.

[11] Sprout, Harold and Margaret Sprout (1965) The Ecological Perspective on Human Affairs. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

way of perception of their environment.[12] As a result, individuals try to understand the world by relying on their beliefs through cognitive consistency in order to maintain their beliefs. As Bem argues "individuals do not merely subscribe to random collections of beliefs but rather they maintain coherent systems of beliefs which are internally consistent."[13] In this sense, individuals' personal beliefs influence decision making processes and results.[14] Scholars propose different methods to assess individual belief systems. For instance, Alexander George introduced operational code analysis, Larson proposed schemas, and Lisa Carlson and Raymond Dacey proposed the poliheuristic theory to better understand the role of beliefs in the formulation of decisions.[15]

The cognitive approach helps one understand the role of individuals' perceptions and beliefs in analyzing state foreign policy processes. Rosati argues that individual cognition is based on past experiences, inherent belief systems, and individual perceptions, which explain how individuals perceive the world and why they take certain decisions.[16] Hermann indicates indirect measures to explain the role of an individual's personality and character in decision making such as press conferences,

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[12] Hudson (2007), p. 40.

[13] D.J. Bem (1970) *Beliefs, Attitudes, and Human Affairs*. Belmont, CA: Brooks, Cole, p. 13.

[14] Mintz, (2004) p. 3.

[15] Alexander George (1969) The "Operational Code": A Neglected Approach to the Study of Political Leaders and Decision Making. International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 13, No. 2, pp. 190–222; Deborah Welch Larson, (1994) The Role of Belief Systems and Schemas in Foreign Policy Decision-Making. Political Psychology, Vol. 15, No. 1, pp. 17-33; Lisa Carlson and Raymond Dacey, (2004) Traditional Decision Analysis and the Poliheuristic Theory of Foreign Policy Decision Making. Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 48, No. 1, pp. 38-55.

[16] Rosati, J.A. (1995) 'A Cognitive Approach to the Study of Foreign Policy' in Neack, L., J.A.K. Hay and P.J. Haney eds. Foreign Policy Analysis: Continuity and Change in Its Second Generation, pp. 49-70. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall.

official statements, public speeches, past experiences and positions, as well as childhood records.[17] This thesis seeks to link role theory and operational code analysis in a bid provide an understanding of foreign policy behaviors assessments of at-a-distance leadership by employing both qualitative and quantitative content analysis methods.

Turkish foreign policy has undergone a great deal of transformation since the establishment of the Republic in 1923. It has also adopted a number of different NRCs under different governments. After the 1980 Coup d'état, a military regime was established in Turkey and a new Turkish constitution entered into force in 1982. Heper and Evin underline that Atatürk's legacy forbids army officers from involvement in legislation, but assigns ultimate guardianship of the state and of Atatürk's reforms to the military.[18] Therefore, military intervention can be explained as the military's self-identification of its guardianship status within the Republic. Dağı agrees with Heper and Evin about the military's self-perceived role as 'the guardian of the secular Turkish state.'[19] Due to a lack of trust because of corrupt politicians, the military sees itself as the only uncorrupted institution loyal to the Atatürk reforms. Dağı underlines that after the 1980 coup, the military allowed the transition back to a civilian regime because the military elite did not want to establish a permanent military regime which would have been incompatible with Kemalist ideology. One reason for this is because they do not identify themselves as "rulers"

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[17] Margaret G. Hermann, (1980) Explaining Foreign Policy Behavior Using the Personal Characteristics of Political Leaders. International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 24, No. 1, pp. 7-46.

[18] Metin Heper and Ahmet Evin (1988) eds., State, Democracy and the Military: Turkey in the 1980s, Berlin, de Gruyter, pp. 7-174.

[19] Heper and Evin (1988)

but rather as "guardians" of the state and of Kemalist ideology.[20] Furthermore, Heper and Evin argue that there are two components behind the military dominated Turkish politics; "the historical-political guardianship in the Kemalist tradition of modern Turkey, and participation in decision-making through membership in the National Security Council, which gives advise to the government on matters of internal as well as external security".[21] The military has always been an important determinant of both Turkish domestic and foreign policy which have been rooted in the state building process from the very beginning of the Turkish Republic.

Following the coup in 1980, the military regime decided to dismantle the multi-party system by banning all existing parties and their leaders from politics.[22] This provided an opportunity for new parties and politicians like Turgut Özal. He exploited this political vacuum by establishing the Motherland Party which was the first successor of the military regime after the transition of power from military to civilian rule. The Motherland Party won the general elections in 1983 and came to power as the ruling party. Özal's foreign policy objectives mainly focused on Turkey's good relations with its neighbors and the West.

The end of the Cold War brought the end of the bipolar system and the beginning of the transition of world politics to a multipolar system. During this period, Turkey aimed to maintain its good relations with the U.S as a faithful ally as it had done during the Cold War era. During the 1980s and 1990s Turkey struggled with

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[20] Frank Tashau and Metin Heper (1983) "The State, Politics, and the Military in Turkey" *Comparative Politics* 16, pp. 17-33, p. 19.

[21] Heper and Evin, p. 227.

[22] Ersin Kalaycıoğlu, (2002) "The Motherland party: the challenge of institutionalization in a charismatic leader party", *Turkish Studies*, Vol.3, No.1, p. 41.

domestic problems such as the violence initiated by the PKK (*Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan-Kurdish Workers Party*), as well as its problems with Iran and Syria which were largely perceived as supporters of the PKK. These two neighboring countries and the PKK problem were perceived as the major threats to Turkish national security and remained the main concern of Turkish leaders during the post-Cold War period.[23] Turkish foreign policy until the late 1990s had been influenced and shaped by both external and internal security concerns. Although the military remained as the strongest actor in shaping both domestic and foreign policy, political Islam began to emerge in Turkey in the early 1990s when the Islamist Welfare Party led by Necmettin Erbakan came to power as senior partner in the coalition government.[24] As a result of political instabilities, concerns over potential terrorist attacks and the emergence of political Islam, the military intervened in Turkey once more - though not through a military regime this time around - on February 28, 1997. This indirect military intervention was retrospectively labeled a "post-modern" coup.[25] The military forced the democratically elected government to resign through the National Security Council (NSC) by releasing a memorandum.[26] Erbakan stepped down, the Welfare Party was banned and the military indirectly took control of policy making.

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[23] Dietrich Jung, (2003), "The Sèvres Syndrome: Turkish Foreign Policy and Its Historical Legacies," *American Diplomacy*, Vol. 8, No, p. 2.

[24] Since the establishment of the Republic of Turkey for the first time Islamist party came under the Islamic leadership (Necmettin Erbakan as Prime Minister) to power, for more info see Angel Rabasa and F. Stephen Larrabee (2008) The Rise of Political Islam in Turkey, RAND Corporation: Santa Monica, California, p. 42.

[25] Angel Rabasa and F. Stephen Larrabee (2008) The Rise of Political Islam in Turkey, RAND Corporation: Santa Monica, California, p. 44.

[26] Prime Minister Necmettin Erbakan forced to resign (head of the Welfare Party, *Refah Partisi*), Begüm Burak (2011) The Role of the Military in Turkish Politics: To Guard Whom and From What? *European Journal of Economic and Political Studies*, Vol. 4, No.1, 143-169, p. 152.

At the beginning of the twenty first century, the Turkish economy was highly affected by the 2001 financial crisis. Until 2002, "Turkish foreign policy became a prisoner of chronic domestic instability and frequent economic crises."[27] After the 2002 general elections, the AKP came to power. In the two successive general elections held in 2007 and 2011, the AKP government remained in power and even increased its number of votes.

Since 2002, there have been significant changes in Turkey's foreign policy formation through a new set of foreign policy principles. However, it is important to note that it is difficult to assess any change or continuity in Turkish foreign policy without first analyzing those of previous administrations. Under AKP leadership, Turkish foreign policy has become more proactive in regional issues through new foreign policy principles. Ahmet Davutoğlu's appointment as the Foreign Minister in May 2009, confirmed Turkey's new poractive and asstertive stance in its international relations. Prior to this, Davutoğlu had been chief advisor to the Prime Minister in November 2002. However, his appointment as Foreign Minister in 2009 accorded him the opportunity to implement some of the foreign policy theories he had outlined in his *Strategic Depth* book. Davutoğlu is widely accepted as one of the strongest figures in Turkish foreign policy literature. He formulated a set of foreign policy principles to exploit Turkey's geopolitical and historical strategic depth.[28] This new foreign policy approach proposed by Davutoğlu aim to transform Turkey into a regional if not a

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[27] Ahmet Sözen, (2006), "Changing Fundamental Principles in Turkish Foreign Policy Making," Paper prepared for presentation at the 2006 Annual Conference of the International Studies Association in San Diego, USA, March 22 – 25, Also see Ahmet Sözen, (2010), "A Paradigm Shift in Turkish Foreign Policy: Transition and Challenges," *Turkish Studies*, Vol. 11, No. 1, pp. 103-123, p. 8.

[28] Ahmet Davutoğlu, (2001) "Stratejik Derinlik: Türkiye'nin Uluslararası Konumu," İstanbul: Küre yayınları.

global power.[29] According to Davutoğlu and the AKP ruling elite; these principles aim to increase Turkey's role in world affairs and turn Turkey into a global player in the near future by adopting more active and adopting multiple national roles simultaneously. However, implementation of his policies was interrupted due to the challenges posed by the popular uprisings that erupted across the Middle East and North Africa in 2011.

Role theory and operational code analysis offer an understanding of the changing nature of Turkish foreign policy since the 1980s through the comparison of pre-AKP and AKP periods to see if such changes are noticeable.

1.2 Literature Review

The literature review part of the thesis is divided into two. The first part explains the evolution of role theory in the field of foreign policy analysis. This part also introduces NRCs. The second part deals with the application of role theory among Turkish scholars and its application in Turkish foreign policy literature.

1.2.1 Role Theory in International Relations Literature

Role theory was developed in the field of sociology and psychology. It focuses on the characteristics of human behavioral patterns according to given positions and expectations of others.[30] Recently, there has been increasing attention given to role theory in the social sciences. Holsti's article, "National Role Conceptions in the Study of Foreign Policy"[31] is one of the most important works in FPA which aims to

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[29] Ibid.

[30] Lisbeth Aggestam, "Role Conceptions and the Politics of Identity in Foreign Policy," ARENA Working Papers, No. 99/8 http://www.deutsche-aussenpolitik.de/resources/seminars/gb/approach/document/wp99_8.htm (accessed on May, 7 2013)

[31] K. J. Holsti, (1970) "National Role Conceptions in the Study of Foreign Policy", *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 14, No. 3, pp. 233-309.

address new ways of carrying out FPA by applying role theory. His research aims to clarify characteristics of the international system by focusing on the roles of states through NRCs. In his article, Holsti aims to create a typology of the several roles assumed by states within the international system and states' leaders' perceptions of their national role(s). He claims that in the international system states are capable of adopting several roles simultaneously. In his article he reviewed official speeches, parliamentary debates, and press conferences of state leaders. In this way, he emphasizes on the rols of individuals in decision making and also on how these individuals'/leaders' perceptions and their worldviews shape the roles of states in the international system.

Before Holsti, only a few scholars had used role theory in International Relations (IR) literature. According to the typology of one of these scholars Hans Morgenthau, the national roles of states are driven by three policies "status quo, imperialism, and policies of prestige."[32] After the Second World War, policies of non-alignment became popular with the emergence of new states. According to Morton A. Kaplan's typology "27 states are seen as having only a single function or role within the system"[33] which means that states cannot adopt two or more roles simultaneously. However, this idea was rejected by Holsti. In fact, the multiplicity of states' roles goes back to the time of Chanakya Kautilya - an Indian political strategic thinker 370-283 BC. In his book titled *Arthaashastra* which deals with war and diplomacy, he argues that states' foreign policy decisions might have multiple roles via "double

[32] Ibid. p. 251.

[33] Ibid, p. 253.

policy".[34] According to role theorists, states are able to adopt different/multiple role conceptions towards different states arising from different role expectations.

Before Holsti, nine NRCs had been introduced by role theorists. These are; revolutionary leader-imperialist, bloc leader, balancer, bloc member (ally), mediator, non-aligned, buffer, isolate, and protectee.[35] Holsti came up with eight more national role conceptions and introduced seventeen NRCs based on his research of seventy-one states. He uncovered these roles by analyzing official statements of state leaders. In his work, Holsti used nine hundred and seventy-two different sources (leaders' official statements) from seventy-one states between January 1965 and December 1967.[36]

Holsti's Typology of NRCs is as follows; bastion of revolution-liberator, regional leader, regional protector, active independent, liberation supporter, anti-imperialist agent, defender of faith, mediator-integrator, regional sub-system collaborator, developer, bridge, faithful ally, independent, example, internal development, isolate, protectee.[37] All these NRCs are specifically analyzed to differentiate between the national roles that states adopt. According to Holsti, some of these roles overlap with each other. For instance, the role of regional defenders which requires protection of states in specific regions and the role of protectee which refers to protection of other countries clearly overlap. In addition to these seventeen roles, Holsti mentions other

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[34] Indian Strategic Thinking: A Reflection Of Kautilya's Six Fold Policy, Eurosia Review, http://defence.pk/threads/indian-strategic-thinking-a-reflection-of-kautilya%C2%92s-six-fold-policy.100906/ (accessed on May 20, 2014)

[35] Holsti (1970), p. 255, see Table 1.

[36] Holsti (1970), p. 256-257.

[37] See Holsti, pp. 261-271. For detail description of these national role conceptions and additional role conceptions see Table 6 in Chapter 3.

national role conceptions which he observed in official documents but did not include in his typology, due to a lack of repetition of these roles. Some of these roles are; balancer, anti-imperialist agents, and anti-communist agent roles.[38]

Holsti points out that there are external and internal factors as sources of NRCs and these factors affect or change policy makers' decision or formulation of NRCs.[39] Thus, each role conception is a result of different sources. Holsti calls state leaders and high level policy makers "guardians of one or more NRCs."[40] He claims that it is highly possible to accurately predict states' foreign policy decisions by analyzing their NRCs.[41] Thus, the identification of states' roles help to shed light on their foreign policy orientations, and it could also be explanatory tools that help in the understanding of certain foreign policy decisions and possible future directions in foreign policy making.[42] Turkey is one of the states in Holsti's analysis, he reveals two NRCs for Turkey based on the official speeches of Turkish decision makers. These roles are: "active independent" and "faithful ally" roles.[43] In the "active independent" role conception, Turkish decision makers underline that Turkish foreign policy is based on its national interests and by so doing extend its diplomatic relations to establish new friendships. On the other hand, the "faithful ally" role conception is based on Turkey's commitment to the West.

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[38] Holsti 1970), p. 271.

[39] Ibid., p. 294.

[40] Ibid., p. 298.

[41] Ibid.

[42] Ibid., p. 308.

[43] Holsti (1970), pp. 263-282. "active independent" role refers to statement by Prime Minister Demirel at press conference, April 22, 196; "faithful ally" roles

1.2.2 Role Theory in Turkish Foreign Policy Literature

After the end of the Cold War, many studies on Turkish politics have focused on identity formation. However, only very few researchers have focused on role theory and its influence on Turkish foreign policy roles in global affairs. Also, none of the existing studies provide empirical resultson NRCs or analyze how it affects Turkish foreign policy patterns.

In Turkish foreign policy literature, Aras and Görener's 'National role conceptions and foreign policy orientation: the ideational bases of the Justice and Development Party's foreign policy activism in the Middle East'[44] is the first published journal article that involves the application of role theory in Turkish foreign policy analysis. In this article they describe Turkey's new foreign policy towards the Middle East under the AKP administration by analyzing the NRCs that the AKP government adopts. They underline that in the post-Cold War period, Turkey abandoned its isolationist policies in its surrounding regions.[45] They point out that under the AKP leadership, Turkish foreign policy has undergone transformation, and by abandoning passive policies Turkey has started to engage with global issues and also became more active in the region. However, authors claim that this new orientation does not constitute a departure from the Western oriented policies but a construction of multiple identities and roles without leaving its Western identity. They employ role theory and a constructivist approach to highlight multiple identities and NRCs that Turkey adopted towards the Middle East from 2002 to 2010 under the AKP leadership. They also utilized the content analysis method to analyze the speeches of

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[44] Bülent Aras and Aylin Görener (2010) "National role conceptions and foreign policy orientation: the ideational bases of the Justice and Development Party's foreign policy activism in the Middle East", *Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies*, 12: 1, 73-92.

[45] Ibid.

two main decision makers; Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu. They underline that these two important actors' understanding/perceptions and expectation of others in world politics have shaped Turkish foreign policy behaviors in the international arena. Aras and Görener borrow Holsti's NRCs based on the AKP' ruling elites official speeches. These NRCs are; "'regional leader', 'regional protector', 'regional subsystem collaborator', 'example' and 'bridge.'"[46] According to Aras and Görener NRCs explain Turkish foreign policy behaviors towards the Middle Eastern countries. They also claim that some of the NRCs of the AKP are similar to or are continuations of Özal's identification of Turkish national roles.[47] Aras and Görener used only existing NRCs from exsisting literature (Holsti's typology) and they use the speeches of leaders to explain Turkish national role conceptions without providing emprical results.

In 2014, Dal and Erşen published an article titled 'Reassessing the "Turkish Model" in the Post-Cold War Era: A Role Theory Perspective,'[48] and employed role theory as a framework to asses "Turkish Model" NRCs during three different periods; 1991–93, 2003–05 and 2010–12.[49] However, their work did not provide any empirical results and focused on single role assumptions.

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[46] Aras and Gorener, p. 81.

[47] Ibid, p. 80.

[48] Emel Parlar Dal and Emre Erşen (2014): Reassessing the "Turkish Model" in the Post-Cold War Era: A Role Theory Perspective, Turkish Studies, Vol. 15, No. 2, pp. 258-282.

[49] Ibid.

Başer's article titled 'Shift-of-axis in Turkish Foreign Policy: Turkish National Role Conceptions Before and During AKP Rule'[50] aims to couple Turkish NRCs with a 'shift of axis' argument in Turkish foreign policy. To this end, the author investigates the period between 1992-2012 to justify gradual changes in Turkish foreign policy through the evolution of NRCs rather than a shift of axis in Turkey's policies. Although this article introduces new NRCs for Turkey such as 'Great Power Candidate' and 'Integration with the Turkic World,' the author limits the scope of the study to analyze/investigate the gradual changes in Turkish foreign policy in a bid to contribute to Turkey's drift "from West to the East" argument.

The most recent publication on role theory is Özgür Özdamar's book chapter titled 'Domestic Sources of Changing Turkish Foreign Policy towards the MENA during 2010s: A Role Theoretic Approach'[51] in Christian Cantir and Juliet Kaarbo's edited volume. In this study Özdamar points out AKP's changing foreign policy preferences and roles towards Middle Eastern and North African countries by focusing on domestic role contestations between AKP elites, institutions and opposition parties. In this chapter, he also illustrates how the AKP neutralized these institutions and oppositions to eliminate disagreements over domestic contestation for adoption of new roles.

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[50] Ekrem T. Başer, (2015): Shift-of-axis in Turkish Foreign Policy: Turkish National Role Conceptions Before and During AKP Rule, *Turkish Studies*, Vol. 16, No. 3, pp. 1-19.

[51] Özgür Özdamar (2016), 'Domestic Sources of Changing Turkish Foreign Policy towards the MENA during 2010s: A Role Theoretic Approach'. In Contested Roles and Domestic Politics. Eds. Christian Cantir and Juliet Kaarbo.

Moreover, Ovalı and Bozdağlıoğlu in their work titled used role theory to examine the concept of securitization and Turkey's relation with Israel.[52] They utilize role theory as a conceptual tool to analyze leaders' threat perceptions in the context of securitization.[53] In addition to these works, academic studies in Turkey on role theory literature are mostly based on the single-role assumption of Turkish foreign policy that Turkey adopted or played in international affairs. For instance; recently scholars pay attention to Turkey's mediator role in regional conflicts such as, the Arab-Israeli conflict, Syria, Israel, and Iran's nuclear negotiations. Aras explores Turkey's mediation efforts in his 'Turkey's Mediation and Friends of Mediation Initiative,' article. On the other hand, there are many other scholars who focus on the 'Turkish model' as an alternative secular and Muslim country to the Middle Eastern countries especially with regards to Turkey's candidacy into the EU as was declared at the Helsinki Summit in 1999. Additionally, there is an increasing number of publications which make reference to the Turkish model in the wake of the popular uprisings, commonly known as the Arab Spring in late 2010, as well as perceptions of Turkey as a regional leader/power.[54] Altunışık's article titled 'Turkish Model and Democratization in the Middle East' and Levack and Perçinoğlu's report on 'Turkey and the Middle East: A Sub-regional View' are examples of this trend.[55] These articles emphasize Turkey's increasing prominent role in regional politics by

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[52] Şevket Ovalı and Yücel Bozdağlıoğlu (2012) Role Theory and Securitization: An Agency Based Framework for Decoding Turkey's Diplomatic Offensive against Israel, The Turkish Yearbook of International Relations, Vol. 43, pp. 1-28.

[53] Ibid.

[54] Joshua W. Walker, (2009) "Turkey's Imperial Legacy: Understanding Contemporary Turkey through its Ottoman Past," Perspective on Global Development and Technology, pp. 494-508.

[55] Meliha Benli Altunışık. (2005) "The Turkish Model and Democratization in the Middle East." Arab Studies Quarterly, Vol. 27, No. 1-2, pp. 45–64; Jonathan Levack and GökçePerçinoğlu (2012) "Turkey and the Middle East: A Sub-regional View" TESEV Publications http://www.tesev.org.tr/assets/publications/file/A%20subregional%20view.pdf (accessed on August 29, 2015)

employing single NRCs. İşeri and Dilek, without employing the role theory, investigate the possibility of Turkey being a "regional hegemon" in order to overcome the instabilities in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region by projecting its model unto the region.[56] Although Holsti's NRCs formed the basis of their work, the authors opted to apply Galtun's 'regional powerhood' and 'positive peace' environment theories as their theoretical framework to analyze the success of the Turkish model's capacity to transform the MENA region. Erşen's article titled 'Turkey as "Regional Stability Contributor" in the South Caucasus'[57] employs role theory to assess Turkey's increasing role in bringing about stability to the South Caucasus region by focusing on a single NRC; "Regional Stability Contributor".

There are many other scholars who have contributed to the development of Turkish foreign policy literature. Keyman and Öniş's book *Turkish Politics in a Changing World: Global Dynamics and Domestic Transformations,* also provides an analysis of the transformation and development of the Turkish political system in various fields since 1980 but without examining certain roles that top policy makers subsume.[58] In addition to this, Kösebalan, in his book *Turkish Foreign Policy, Islam, Nationalism and Globalization*, focuses on the role of identity groups in foreign policy formulation and in the evolution of Turkish foreign policy. He argues that foreign policy decisions are deeply rooted in domestic issues which are related with

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[56] Emre İşeri & A.Oğuz Dilek, (2012) Beyond a Turkish Model in Transforming the Penetrated Middle East: The Nexus of Domestic Authority and International Prestige, Ortadoğu Etütleri, Volume 3, No 2, pp.119-142.

[57] Emre Erşen, (2013) "Turkey as "Regional Stability Contributor" in the South Caucasus", Journal of Central Asian & Caucasian Studies, Vol. 8, No 15, pp. 1-19.

[58] Feyzi Baban, (2008) Book Review: Keyman, E. Fuat & Onis, Ziya (2007) Turkish Politics in a Changing World: Global Dynamics and Domestic Transformations, İstanbul: Bilgi University Press.

ideational conflicts between different identities in Turkey.[59] Thus, identity groups shape Turkish foreign policy during various times and he also underlines that throughout Turkish history there has always been conflict between "Islamic nationalists and secularist nationalists."[60] In his book, Kösebalan points out that Turkish foreign policy have been re-defined under different governments as a consequence of this ideational conflict in its history. He emphasizes the re-definition of policy formation and Turkish identity under different doctrines and international developments. Ahmet Davutoğlu, also as an academician, contributed to Turkish foreign policy with his works. He mainly writes about Turkey's increasing role in global affairs as a rising power.[61] He believes that if Turkey adopts a more pro-active foreign policy in regional and global affairs it will become a regional or global actor because, in his view, Turkey has the geopolitical and historical depths to achieve this goal.[62]

The use of operational code analysis in Turkish foreign policy literature is very new and limited, there is no peer reviewed published articles or books on Turkish foreign policy in which operational code analysis is employed. There are only a few conference presentations; one of these presentations belongs to Balkan Devlen. He used operational code analysis to analyze Turkish foreign policy in his conference

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[59] Hasan Kösebalan (2011). Turkish Foreign Policy, Islam, Nationalism and Globalization. Palgrave Macmillan.

[60] Ibid.

[61]Ahmet Davutoğlu, (2008) "Turkey's Foreign Policy Vision: An Assessment of 2007," *Insight Turkey*, Vol. 10, No. 1, pp. 77-96, p. 96. See also; Ahmet Davutoğlu, (2012) "Transformation of NATO and Turkey's Position," Perceptions, Vol. 17, No. 1, pp. 7-17; Ahmet Davutoğlu, (2012) "Principles of Turkish Foreign Policy and Regional Political Structuring," Turkish Policy Brief Series, TEPAV, 2012, third edition.

[62] Davutoğlu, (2001).

paper titled 'AKP vs. "Old Guard"? The Operational Codes of Turkish Foreign Policy.'[63]

Additionally, in Turkish foreign policy literature none of the existing works combine role theory and operational code analysis in a single research. Thus, this is one of the unique contributions of this thesis to Turkish foreign policy literature.

1.3 Thesis Outline

This thesis is divided into six chapters. The first chapter is introductory and also contains a section for literature review.

The second chapter elaborates on the conceptual frameworks of the thesis; role theory and operational code analysis. This part describes role theory's integration into FPA, the latest developments in the field, the definitions of key concepts, role theory and its relations with political psychology, and operational code analysis. It also includes a brief explanation which links role theory and operational code analysis as the theoretical frameworks of this thesis.

The third chapter deals with the design of the research and introduces triangulation methods. The hypotheses are laid down and the thesis' contribution to existing literature is explained. This chapter explains how qualitative and quantitative content analysis methods are conducted in the thesis.

In chapter four, I discuss the research results of role theory in the "pre-AKP" period and Turkey's national role formation between 1980 and 2002. This part covers both

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[63] Balkan Devlen, (2010) "AKP vs. "Old Guard"? The Operational Codes of Turkish Foreign Policy, paper presented at the annual meeting of the Theory vs. Policy, New Orleans.

the Cold War and the post-Cold War periods and also investigates the national role assumptions for the following governments; (1) Military Regime 1980-1983, (2) Motherland Party 1983-1991, (3) True Path Party Coalition Government 1991-1995, (4) Welfare Party Coalition Government 1996 - 1997, (5) Motherland Party Coalition Government 1997 - 1999, (6) Democratic Left Party Coalition Government 1999–2002. These periods cover the 1980 coup, the transition to civilian government, adaptation to a new world order in the post-Cold War era until the early Millennium.

The objective of chapter five is to explore the research results of role theory and operational code analysis of the "AKP period" which covers national role formation between 2002 and 2014. The AKP's three consecutive terms are analyzed as one government. This chapter looks at NRCs through the doctrine of strategic depth and a new set of foreign policy principles under the AKP administration. The section compares the "pre-AKP" and the "AKP" periods and concludes by assessing both change and continuity in Turkish foreign policy.

The chapter six, which is the concluding section of the thesis reviews the findings of the research and other thesis chapters. This part re-visits the thesis hypotheses and discusses how this thesis can be expanded in future researches. Based on the findings, this part also speculates on possible future Turkish foreign policy behaviors.

Chapter 2

ROLE THEORY AND OPERATIONAL CODE ANALYSIS

2.1 The Origin of Role Theory

The origins of role theory are rooted in sociology, psychology and anthropology. The main works in role theory were published in the 1930s. Three important scholars are credited with the development of role theory, namely: Ralph Linton, Herbert Mead, and Jacob Moreno.[64] Herbert Mead's *Mind, Self and Society* published in 1934, introduces the concept of symbolic interactionism and highlights the role of the "self" and the "alter" ego.[65] In 1936, Ralph Linton published *The Study of Man*[66]. Linton was an anthropologist as well as one of the earliest social philosophers. In this work he focuses on the 'status of roles' and patterns of human behaviors in society. Finally, Jacob Moreno in his work titled *Who Shall Survive?* Published in 1934, places emphasis on the roles of individuals within social networks. As role theorists they all essentially focus on the role of the individual within a social structure. Since the 1950s role theory has attracted more attention in the field of sociology and many scholars have been contributing to the evolution of the field ever since.[67]

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[64] Martin Beres, Role Theory in the Social Work in the Context of Gender Stereotypes," pp. 174-198, p. 176 http://www.pulib.sk/elpub2/FF/Matulayova2/pdf_doc/12.pdf (accessed on August 26, 2015)

[65] Herbert Mead (1934) Mind, Self and Society. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

[66] Ralph Linton. (1936) The Study of Man: An Introduction. New York: Appleton.

[67] See Martin Beres, Role Theory in the Social Work in the Context of Gender Stereotypes"; Talcott Parsons, Talcott. 1951. *The Social System*. Glencoe, IL: Free Press; Robert K. Merton (1957), The Role-Set: Problems in Sociological Theory. British Journal of Sociology 8: 106-120; Ralph

Bruce J. Biddle a Professor of psychology and Psychologist Edwin J. Thomas are perhaps the most notable contributors in the development of the field. In their work 'Role Theory: Concepts and Research'[68] Biddle and Thomas claim that theatre and social life have similar characteristics. In theatre, a play generally consists of script and director, but there are also other factors influencing the outcome of the play such as talent of the player and the performance of other actors.[69] Actors aim to fulfill the obligations and expectations derived from the script. Similarly, in real life, individuals' behaviors are guided by social norms and expectations of others. Just like the actor's script, society predetermines the yardstick against which we measure our performance.[70] Although there are international norms there is lack of written script in politics.

Another significant work of Biddle was published in 1986; Recent Developments of Role Theory.[71] In this work he insists on his previous argument, which is that role theory is the study of behavioral patterns of social life. He argues "that persons are

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Dahrendorf (1958) Toward a Theory of Social Conflict, the Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 2, No. 2. pp. 170-183; Edwin J. Thomas and Bruce J. Biddle (1966) Role Theory: Concepts and Research, John Wiley & Sons; 1St Edition; Erving Goffman (1961) Asylums: Essays on the Social Situation of Mental Patients and Other Inmates, Anchor Books / Doubleday; 1st edition; Ralph H Turner and Lewis M Killian (1956) Collective behavior, Englewood Cliffs, N.J. : Prentice-Hall; Michel Crozier and Erhard Friedberg (1977), L'acteur et le système: Les contraintes de l'action collective (Actors and Systems) Chicago University Press; Raewyn Connell (1979) Complexities of fury leave...A critique of the Althusserian approach to class. *Theory and Society*, vol. 8, 303-345; Bruce J. Biddle, (1979) Role Theory: Concepts and Research, Krieger Pub Co.

[68] Bruce J. Biddle and Edwin J. Thomas (1966) Role Theory: Concepts and Research. New York: John Wiley and Sons.

[69] Sofiane Sekhri (2009) The role Approach as a Theoretical Framework for the Analysis of Foreign Policy in Third World Countries," *African Journal of Political Science and International Relations* Vol. 3, No. 10, pp. 423-432, p. 426.

[70] Ibid.

[71] Bruce J. Biddle (1986) Recent Developments of Role Theory, *Annual Review of Sociology*, Vol. 12, pp. 67-92.

members of social positions and hold expectations for their own behaviors and those of other persons."[72]

Linton still remains as the most popular scholar in role theory. He argues that for societies to be fully functioning it is necessary to construct a structure which is based on reciprocal behaviors between individuals.[73] There are two sides to this structure; "status" and "role".

2.1.1 Status and Role

In order to understand individual's behavior and structure of the society it is important to analyze status and role.[74] Social roles are extrapolated from theater where actors perform a role on the stage. William Shakespeare in his play "As You Like It" describes the stages of the life of man from birth until death. The beginning of the monologue of Act II, Scene VII becomes one of the most important references for role theory:

> *All the world's a stage,*
> *And all the men and women merely players;*
> *They have their exits and their entrances,*
> *And one man in his time plays many parts.*[75]

In this illustration of the social structure, individuals are simply the role players and they play many different social roles simultaneously.

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[72] B. J. Biddle, (1986), "Recent Developments of Role Theory," *Annual Review of Sociology*, Vol. 12, pp. 67-92, p. 67.

[73] Linton (1936,) p. 113.

[74] See Linton; The Role Theory Chapter V, Prepared by Bee Hive Digital Concepts Cochin for Mahatma Gandhi University Kottayam, (2010), p. 87. http://shodhganga.inflibnet.ac.in/bitstream/10603/521/12/12_chapter5.pdf (accessed on August 26, 2015)

[75] William Shakespeare (1623) "As You Like It", Act II, Scene VII.

The status refers to the position of particular human behavioral pattern and also the sum of total positions that individuals occupy.[76] Linton argues that there are two types of statuses; achieved statuses and ascribed statuses. He explains that ascribed statuses are automatically assigned to the individuals when they are born such as sex, race, and nationality. Therefore individuals can not choose ascribed statuses because they have lack of control over them.[77] On the other hand, achieved status are chosen or earned by individual's effort, such as getting a Ph.D, which is achieved through competition or effort.[78] Thus, while ascribed status comes naturally, achieved status is a result of accomplishment. Linton underlines that "many statuses are assigned to individuals on the basis of easily determined biological factors such as sex, age, and various kinds and degrees of biological relationship"[79] and being born into a particular culture or religious group requires certain role behaviors. In everyday life majority of statuses in society belongs to the ascribed status category. Linton argues that individuals' positions are in relation with the total society and individuals can occupy various statuses at the same time such as being lawyer, father and husband. Although individuals have many statuses in society, their strongest status (master status) defines them socially.[80] It is impossible to separate roles and statuses from each other; they are meaningless without each other because there are certain expectations for certain statuses.[81] There are various definitions of roles, while Bates

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[76] Linton (1936,) p. 113.

[77] Ibid., p. 115.

[78] Ibid.

[79] Ibid., p. 253.

[80] James W. Vander Zanden (1990) Sociology: The Core, McGraw-Hill Publishing Company, 43.

[81] Linton (1936) p. 114.

and Harvey define it as a particular set of norms, Turner describes it as comprehensive pattern for behavior, and Allen and Van de Vliert define it as "behavior linked to normative expectations of the social system".[82] Although they all have differing understandings of the definition of the role, they all agree on the assumption that expectation is the main element of the concept of role. Sanford Labovitz states that sociologists agree about the positive impact of the social role in society, they believe that roles provide stability in society and establish cohesiveness among people.[83]

Social positions have two components; obligations/duties and rights so while "role" refers to the duties and obligations, "status" refer to the rights.[84] According to Linton role is dynamic aspects of status and individuals are assigned to occupy certain statuses to perform roles by fulfilling obligations that status requires.[85] There are expected behaviors from individuals occupying a status such as; a lawyer should defend his client or a mother needs to take care of her children. Some of the basic differences between status and role are; role as concept in social psychology is structural and depends on personalities, but status as a concept in sociology is behavioral and depends on social structure. However, both concepts are inseparable in social structure because individuals need status to perform their role in society and

[82] Biddle (1986), p. 69. See, Frederick L. Bates and Clyde C. Harvey (1975) The Structure of Social Systems, Gardner Press: distributed by Halsted Press; V. I. Allen and Van de Vliert E. (1984) Role Transitions, Explorations and Explanations, Plenum Press: London.

[83] Sanford Labovitz (1977) An introduction to Sociological Concepts. New York: John Wiley and Sons, p. 95 extract from The Role Theory Chapter V, Prepared by BeeHive Digital Concepts Cochin for Mahatma Gandhi University Kottayam.

[84] Linton (1936), p. 100.

[85] Allan D. Coult (1964) Role Allocation, Position Structuring, and Ambilineal Descent' Vol. 66, No. 1, pp. 29-40, p. 29.

society needs individuals to occupy statuses to create hierarchical order.[86] Status and role are different sides of the same coin because within social structures there are behavioral expectations for individuals. Individuals occupy statuses which require 'role play' to carry out expected behaviors in the society.[87] In order to explain differences between individuals occupying the same status, Linton uses the metaphor of "the driver" (status holder) and "the driver's seat" (status) of the car. The "driver's seat" and "the car" are always the same but "the driver" who occupies the seat might use the car very well or badly, so different drivers can use the car differently.[88] Thus, occupation of every status by any individual requires fulfillment of certain obligations but the same status could be occupied and performed differently by individuals. Statuses are occupied and roles are played by individuals so whatever the individual does in the occupied status is called as the 'role'.

To sum up, when individuals occupy certain statuses (ascribed or achieved) they play roles through a collection of rights and obligations because role play requires the fulfillment of certain obligations. For instance, if a woman has a child, she occupies status of 'mother' (collection of right) and this status requires taking care of the child (obligation).

2.2 Limitations of Existing IR Theories to Explain Foreign Policy Phenomenon

Deborah J. Gerner claims that FPA should be studied from various actors and perspectives including; various levels of analysis, external and internal variables, and

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[86] Linton, (1936), p. 107.

[87] Ibid., p. 100.

[88] Ibid., 113.

a wide range of IR theories and approaches.[89] Role theory offers multidisciplinary research agenda by integrating sociology, psychology and anthropology to FPA since the 1970s as an alternative to mainstream IR theories (Realism, Liberalism, Marxism and other existing theories and approaches of IR discipline) based on the national role conceptualization of Holsti'. Role theorists build on the assumption that analyzing human behaviors (that is, the behaviors of leaders), explain state foreign policy behaviors and could reasonably provide predictability in world politics. One of the most significant characteristics of role theory is its focus on human behaviors. Laura Neack underlines that foreign policy is a combination of actors' interests in domestic and international politics which aim to analyze complex foreign policy processes and behaviors of actors.[90] Therefore, the roles of decision makers ought to be positioned and studied in today's complex domestic and international politics in order to understand states' foreign policy behaviors. This thesis argues that existing mainstream IR theories have pitfalls and limitations which hinder their capacity to thoroughly explain Turkish foreign policy and prevents their understanding of Turkey's conception of its position and roles in global affairs. On that account, it is necessary to highlight some of the limitations of mainstream IR theories as well as other approaches in attempting to explain Turkish foreign policy between 1980 and 2014.

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[89] IR Theories and approached applicable to the FPA: "Decision-Making Approach, Rosenau's Pre-Theory, The Theory of Bureaucratic Politics with Allison's models of (i) Rational Actor, (ii) Organizational Processes and (iii) Governmental/Bureaucratic Politics, Cognitivism, The notion of Cognitive Mapping, The concept of belief System, The Approach of Domestic Political Explanation, The notion of Two-level Games, Nested Games, The Role Approach, Discourse Analysis, Social Constructivism and so on", Sekhri, p. 423.

[90] Laura Neack (2013) The New Foreign Policy: Complex Interactions, Competing Interests (New Millennium Books in International Studies) Rowman & Littlefield Publishers; Third Edition edition.

Realism (and its variants) focuses largely on state-centered power politics in anarchic international system. Realism absolutely fails to take into account the role of individuals and the influence of domestic politics on foreign policy making and state behaviors. Kegley and Wittkopf underline the fact that realism as a theoretical framework lacks the capacity to explain increasing international cooperation and multilateralism since the 1980s in world affairs especially on economy G-20 (The Group of Twenty), the European Union (EU), and other emerging national economic forms such as BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa), and global problems (climate change, weapons of mass destruction, terrorism).[91] More also, realism fails to explain Turkish foreign policy especially at the end of the Cold War when Turkey started to adopt new trends such as greater respect for human rights, free trade, free market, and desires to be part of the European Community. Additionally, increasing civil society groups (NGOs) in Turkey also challenge the state-centered position of realism. States are no longer seen as sole actors to conclude decision making unilaterally, especially during the AKP administration. A new set of foreign policy principles were introduced by the AKP through multi-track (rise of new actors in decision making) and multi-dimensional policies focusing on economy and cultural issues that transcend the security oriented policies in the post-Cold War period were also implemented. As a result, NGOs and emerging business groups, such as TÜSİAD (Turkish Industrialists and Businessmen's Association) wield considerable influence in Turkish foreign policy making. Therefore, multi-dimensional policies through new actors partly become influential in policy making during AKP administration. Therefore, realism could reasonably explain neither the

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[91] Kegley and Wittkopf. (2001), p. 35-38.

changing dynamics of Turkish foreign policy nor the rise of new actors in decision making in last decade.

Liberalism and its variants focuses on change, free market, international institutions, international law, the freedom from state in economic matters, and soft power is preferred as an alternative to military power. According to neoliberalism the rise of international institutions contributed to international cooperation and further aided the rise of institutions by increasing complex interdependency between states.[92] During 1980s there was an institutional oppression of the Turkish military that influenced both Turkish domestic politics and foreign policy making. Therefore, as a theoretical framework liberalism fails to explain Turkish foreign policy especially during 1980s and 1990s when the military played a significant role in the decision making and prevented the implementation of neo-liberal policies and hindered the democratization process in Turkey. Only recently, the AKP administration succeeded in transforming military dominated politic to civilian one by reducing the military's role in foreign policy making.

Constructivism as an approach helps to explain Turkey' certain foreign policy behaviors in the international system. Constructivism emphasized on the role of norms, ideas and values as main determinant of the international structure. Onuf introduced constructivism in IR in 1989.[93] Wendt claims that there are two core assumptions of constructivism: first, international politics is based on social structures; and second, these social structures shape not only actors' behaviors but

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[92] Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye (1969) Power and Interdependence, Newyork: Harper Collins.

[93] Nicholas G. Onuf (1989), World of Our Making. Columbia: University of South California Press.

also their interests and identities.[94] Therefore, actor identities and interests are mutually constructed in the social structure, and "identities are the basis of interests"[95] that shape state preferences and actions. Since the establishment of the Republic of Turkey, national identity was constructed based on secularism and Westernism, which were part of Kemalist ideology. Copeland argues that constructivists cannot sufficiently analyze the issue of uncertainty in international relations.[96] Bozdağlıoğlu argues that one of the weaknesses of Wendt argument is the concept of change; he claims that Wendt's theory also cannot explain nature of change in states' relations therefore constructivism does not have predictive power over the global politics.[97] Therefore, constructivism is not useful to understand Turkey's future positions in world affairs as a result of lack of predictability of the approach. It can also be argued that Wendt definition of constructivism suffers from certain structural biases through its state-centric view to explain state behaviors.[98]

Through the development of FPA as a subfield and the cognitive revolution, the role of the individual becomes the center of decision making. As briefly reviewed in previous chapter an alternative approaches emerged to explain foreign policy phenomena such as rational actor model, dependency theory and decision making theory through their special attention on individual level of analysis. Rational actor

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[94] Alexander Wendt, (1992) "Anarchy is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics," International Organization, Vol. 46, No. 2, pp. 391-425. See also Emanuel Adler (2005). Communitarian International Relations: The Epistemic Foundations of International Relations. London and New York: Routledge.

[95] Ibid., p. 398.

[96] D. Copeland (2000) "The Constructivist Challenge to Structural Realism", *International Security*, Vol. 25, No. 2, pp. 187-212, p. 200.

[97] Ibid.

[98] Wendt (1992), p. 423.

model focuses on the role of individuals based on rational choice.[99] Allison's book *Essence of Decisions,* analyzes the decision making process of the deployment of Russian missiles in Cuba in 1962 and also the U.S perspectives through assessment of personal views of foreign policymaking actors through the rational actor model. Rational actor model is concerned with maximizing value and considering all available options to achieve best feasible outcomes. However, rational actor model is challenged by Herbert A. Simon's 'bounded rationality' argument. He argues that rationality of individuals has certain limitations including limited capabilities of individuals, complexity of environmental constraints, incomplete information about alternatives, risks and uncertainty.[100] According to Simon, human beings have limitations in decision making due to their biases that led to the establishment of belief systems through filtering and screening systems of individuals to understand complex issues by simplifying the situation. Strein argues that rational actor model excludes the beliefs of the leader which is accepted as influential factors in explaining state foreign policy.[101] Evidently, applying rational actor model on Turkish foreign policy analysis model fails to take belief system of individuals into account.

The above mentioned IR theories and approaches can partly explain certain time periods of Turkish foreign policy from their perspectives and interpret the political world differently. However, most of these theories neglect the role of individuals and

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[99] Mintz (2004).

[100] Herbert A. Simon (1972) Theories and Bounded Rationality, Chapter 8 in C. B. McGuire and R. Radner, eds., Decision and Organization, Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing Company, p. 163-164.

[101] Janice Gross Strein, (2008). Foreign Policy Decision-Making: Rational, Psychological, and Neurological Models. *In:* Dunne, Tim et al., eds. *Foreign Policy: Theories, Actors, Cases.* New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 101-116, p. 103.

their belief system in foreign policy decision making and that they are insufficient to explain Turkish foreign policy between 1980 and 2014. Since 1980 and especially in the aftermath of the Cold War, Turkish foreign policy has undergone a substantial transformation which becomes more visible in the early 2000s during the AKP administration. I argue that changing Turkish foreign policy since 1980 can be best explained through role theory, the transformation of Turkey's NRCs and Turkey's positions in the international system, based on leaders' perception. In addition to this, leaders' belief system regarding to Turkey's position in world affairs can be best identified through operational code analysis. Therefore, combining these two approaches established substantial methodology to explain Turkish foreign policy. Both the systemic structure and the ideologies of Turkish leaders have changed since 1980. During the Cold War period, Turkish foreign policy making focused on security issues and perhaps it can be explained better from the realist perspective but it fails to explain the rise of new actors and economic growth during 2000s. Thus, imposing a single IR theory to analyze Turkish foreign policy limits the objective of the thesis to analyze several administrations to explain Turkish foreign policy behaviors and its position in the international system. In this context, role theory offers a more comprehensive theoretical framework than the existing IR theories because it is applicable to both the Cold War and the post-Cold War periods. The NRCs may change, disappear or evolve in different periods and leaderships. This is one of the major strengths of the role theory because as a theoretical framework role theory is applicable to different administration, different periods and multiple leaders and allows the analyst to simultaneously compare and contrast the evolution of NRCs between different periods and leaderships.[102] Therefore, role theory can be

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[102] Ulrich Krotz (2002) National Role Conceptions and Foreign Policies: France and Germany Compared. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Center for European Studies, p. 7

adaptable to any period and leader to reveal the evolution of Turkish foreign policy and its roles and positions in the international system since 1980.

Sebastian Harnisch argues that role theory can be defined differently according to type of government, and such versatility is important for NRCs. He underlines that "while autocratic governments may or may not define their role conceptions through the ''will of one or a few individuals,'' democratic societies regularly disagree domestically as to what the role of their polity in world affairs should be."[103] Based on this claim, the thesis builds on the assumption that Turkish NRCs are defined through the will of one or a few individuals (ruling elites). It can be observed that since the beginning of Turkish Republic, the decision making mechanism of Turkish foreign policy is mostly based on leaders. Sabri Sayarı believes that in Turkish politics generally leaders, especially party leaders occupy important positions and shapes political outcomes in decision making process. [104]

Mesut Özcan outlines influential factors and actors in Turkish foreign policy as follows; between 1980-1983 the September 12th Coup was the determinant factor, between 1983-1991 business community emerged in foreign affairs, and during 1990s military continued to dominate to foreign affairs.[105] Due to the centralized political authority in Turkey, decision making mechanism is centralized around a few

http://aei.pitt.edu/9291/1/Krotz.pdf (accessed on August 26, 2015)

[103] Sebastian Harnisch, (2012) Conceptualizing in the Mine field: Role Theory and Foreign Policy Learning, *Foreign Policy Analysis*, Vol. 8, No. 1, pp. 47-69, 55-56, p. 51.

[104] Sabri Sayarı, "Introduction" in Political Leaders and Democracy in Turkey, eds. Metin Heper et al. (Lanham MD: Lexington Books, 2002), p. 3.

[105] Mesut Özcan (2008) Harmonizing Foreign Policy: Turkey, the EU and the Middle East, Ashgate Publishing, Ltd, p. 91.

individuals. Therefore, public opinion and interests groups cannot sufficiently influence and shape foreign policy formation. Interest groups and civil society organizations began to exercise influence only recently during the AKP government, but still leaders are the most influential actors in foreign policy making. Ahmet Davutoğlu and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan are the most influential figures in foreign policy making in Turkey since 2002. Erdoğan's political leadership is often described as 'single man administration' or 'one-man rule' by critics due to his desire to shift from a parliamentary system to a presidential system for the purpose of consolidating his political power.[106]

Sebastian Harnisch, Cornelia Frank, Hanns W Maull's edited book *Role Theory in International Relations*, underline increasing interest to role theory in FPA and IR. They claim that role theory can resolve long-standing intractable IR theory problems between actors and the system.[107] Walker, Stryker and Statham insist that role theory is applicable to both the individuals and the system. Therefore, role theory provides cross levels of analysis between individuals, states and the international system and it can bridge the gap between the most controversial issues in international relations; the agent and structure divide.[108] By focusing on human behaviors, role theory provides the opportunity to analyze certain foreign policy behaviors at the individual,

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[106] See Osman Ulagay (2014) 'Some AK Party members are aware of corruption' *Todays Zaman*, November 22.

[107] Sebastian Harnisch, Cornelia Frank, and Hanns W. Maull, eds. (2011) Role Theory in International Relations: Approaches and Analyses. Oxon: Routledge, p. 1.

[108] See *S. Stryker, & Statham, A. (1985). Symbolic interaction and role theory. In G. Lindzey & E. Aronson (Eds.),Handbook of social psychology, Vol. I, 3rd ed. (pp. 311–378). New York: Random House, 33.* Marijke Breuning, (2011) "Role Research: Genesis and Blind Spots," in Sebastian Harnisch, Cornelia Frank, Hanns W. Maull (eds.), Role Theory in International Relations: Approaches and Analyses, London: Routledge, pp. 16-35; Cameron Thies (2009) "Role Theory and Foreign Policy." International Studies Association Compendium, Foreign Policy Analysis Section. http://myweb.uiowa.edu/bhlai/workshop/role.pdf p. 13 (accessed on August 26, 2015)

state and systemic levels of analysis simultaneously. Role theory focuses on individuals who shape states' policies and preferences and states' position in the international system. In this way, using role theory also explains the interconnectedness between all levels of analysis. See *Figure 1* for the independent variable that shape NRCs.

(A)

Foreign policy
role performance
(decisions and
actions)

(E)

Policymakers'
national role
conceptions

(B)

Nation's status

(C)

Alter's role
prescriptions

sources of

sources of

location, resources
    of state
capabilities
socio-economic needs
national values,
    ideology
traditional roles
public opinion
personality,
    political needs

system structure
system-wide values
general legal
    principles
treaty commitments
informal understandings
"world opinion"

Figure 1: Role Theory and Foreign Policy: National Role Conceptions and
Prescriptions as Independent Variables

Source: K. J. Holsti, National Role Conceptions in the Study of Foreign Policy, International Studies
Quarterly, Vol. 14, No. 3 (Sept., 1970), p. 245.

Above figure explains independent variable of role theory that shape NRCs in
foreign policy making. Therefore, foreign policy role performance or decisions are
result of individuals' perception of NRCs and nation status, and others' expectations.

2.3 Role Theory and Foreign Policy: First and Second Wave Role Theorists

Since the 1950s FPA has been developed as a subfield of IR and the origin of the field is based on the three paradigmatic works in the 1950s and the 1960s; (1) Richard C. Snyder, H.W. Bruck, and Burton Sapin, *Decision Making as an Approach to the Study of International Politics*, 1954 and 2002 (ed.), (2) James Rosenau, *Pre-theories and Foreign Policy* (1964) and *Approaches in Comparative and International Politics*, 1966, (3) Harold and Margaret Sprout, *Man-Milieu Relationship Hypotheses in the Context of International Politics*, as an article in 1957, as a book in 1965.[109] One of the most common characteristics of these works is their focus on the human dimension which cannot be neglected (as positivists erroneously do) when analyzing foreign policy decision making of states. However, none of these works aim to link levels of analysis but focus on only individual levels of analysis. Thereby, role theory offers to connect individual levels of analysis to state and systemic levels of analysis in order to understand state foreign policy behaviors based on NRCs.

The concept of 'role' was borrowed from the theater. Later, during 1930s the concept is adopted in social psychology, sociology and anthropology, and later integrated to foreign policy analysis in 1970s. In foreign policy the definition of the 'role' refers to

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[109] Snyder, Bruck, and Sapin the book focuses on decision making process and explanations by looking below state level of analysis to understand role of individuals in decision making who actually did choices. See Richard C. Snyder, H. W. Bruck, and Burton M. Sapin (1962) *Foreign policy decision-making; an approach to the study of international politics*. New York: Free Press of Glencoe; Rosenau's study emphasizes on development of actor-specific theory to explain behavior of specific actors and integration of various levels of analysis. Harold and Margaret Sprout work focuses on the role of individual and psycho-milieu (psychological, political and social contexts) factors to explain decision making process (how decision makers perceive and interpreted the world events), Sprout, Harold and Margaret Sprout (1956) Man-Milieu Relationship Hypotheses in the Context of International Politics. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press. See Steve Smith, Amelia Hadfield, Tim Dunne (2012) Foreign Policy: Theories, Actors, Cases, OUP Oxford.

the perception of the decision makers regarding the duties and obligations of states in the international system.[110] Holsti initiates the conceptualization of role theory from sociology and adaptation to the FPA. His work focuses on the role of leaders to explain behavior of states in the international structure through NRCs.[111] In FPA, role theory refers to the study of NRCs of states' positions and foreign polices by focusing on leaders. Holsti emphasizes the importance of the "Self" (which here refers to the leader of the state) because state leaders have various beliefs about the role and the identity of their country in their inner world.[112] Leaders are the representatives of the states at the international level, so their views and perceptions of the roles that their nations ought to play in the system is important because of their self-view influence in determining whether to continue with existing roles or to change them.[113] Since 1970s both the number of role conceptions and the number of role theorists have increased. However, Holsti's NRCs are still the basis of both first and second waves of role theorists. Chafetz points out Holsti's empirical work and argues that actors can adopt multiple roles."[114] However, most foreign policy analysts still adopt the single-role assumptions and focus on the most shared and coherent roles over time historically and culturally in analyzing the foreign policy behavior of states.[115]

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[110] Sekhri, p, 424-25.

[111] Vit Benes, (2011) "Role Theory: A Conceptual Framework for the Constructivist Foreign Policy Analysis?" paper presented at the Third Global International Studies Conference "World Crisis: Revolution or Evolution in the International Community?" hosted by the University of Porto, Portugal, 17-20, p. 3.

[112] Thies, (2009), p. 2

[113] Krotz (2002).

[114] Glenn Chafetz, (1997): The Struggle for a National Identity in Post-Soviet Russia. *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 111, No. 4, pp. 661-688, p. 664.

[115] Breuning (2005); Chafetz (1997); Harnisch, 2001; Thies (2009), 5-7; Benes (2011), p. 4.

During the 1980s and the 1990s, Walker and Le Prestre followed Holsti's typology and way of analysis. Walker, Wish, Hermann, Rosenau, Breuning, and Le Prestre are known as the very first role theorists in FPA. In general, in their work they focused on understanding and analyzing states NRCs.[116] Walker was one of the most important followers of Holsti, his most important contribution to the role theory literature was published in 1979, titled *National Role Conceptions and Systemic Outcomes*.[117] His other work which is an edited volume, *Role Theory and Foreign Policy Analysis*. In this work he introduced a new dimension to the role theory approach and upgraded it within the FPA field.[118] During the 1980s, Jonsson and Ulf examined role theory and foreign policy analysis from the cognitive perspective.[119] Walker and Thies attempted to integrate role theory into the IR scholarship but it did not give desired results.[120]

On the other side of the transatlantic, European scholars choose to use role theory in IR theory context by employing a structural approach instead of a cognitive

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[116] Walker (1979), (1987); Wish 1980; James N. Rosenau, (1987) "Roles and Role Scenarios in Foreign Policy," in Role Theory and Foreign Policy Analysis, edited by S. G. Walker, pp. 44-65. Durham, NC: Duke University Press; Chih-yu Shih, (1988) National Role Conception as Foreign Policy Motivation: The Psychocultural Bases of Chinese Diplomacy. Political Psychology 9(4): 599-631; Breuning (1995); Philippe G. Le Prestre, ed. (1997): Role Quests in the Post-Cold War Era: Foreign Policies in Transition. Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press; Margaret G. Hermann (1987) Assessing the Foreign Policy Role Orientations of Sub-Saharan African Leaders. In Stephen G. Walker (ed.), Role Theory and Foreign Policy Analysis. Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press.

[117] Walker (1979).

[118] Holsti, 1987, Thies (2009), p. 2.

[119] Christer Jonnson and Ulf Westerlund. (1982). Role Theory and Foreign Policy Analysis. In Christer Jonnson, ed., Cognitive Dynamics and International Politics, pp. 122-157. London: Frances Pinter.

[120] Walker, (1987).

approach.[121] Role theory has been neglected by foreign policy analysts due to the popularity of dominant IR theories in analyzing and explaining foreign relations during the Cold War period. Thies claims that role theory during the 1970s and the 1980s adopted the realist tradition which can be observed in Holsti's empirical study, his national role typology reflects the realist tradition.[122] He used roles like "balancer", "faithful ally", "aggressor" as component of balance of power and realist theory.[123] In addition to this, Walker continued this tradition and in his work focused on the Waltz's neorealism during 1980s. Schweller used such a roles like ""rogue," "revisionist," or "status quo" states, and even "wolves, foxes, ostriches, and jackals.""[124]

At the end of the Cold War scholars started working on role theory and NRCs again. In 1999, Steven J. Campbell published his seminal work *Role Theory, Foreign Policy Advisers and U.S. Foreign Policy-Making*. In this work he used role theory to analyze the role of U.S foreign policy advisors in decision making process based on their role perception and role expectation.[125] In last couple of years role theory has been re-credited as a theoretical framework and an innovative method in foreign policy analysis to analyze and understand current international affairs and states

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[121] See Tonra, Ben and Thomas Christiansen, Eds. 2004. Rethinking European Union Foreign Policy. Manchester: Manchester University Press; Ole Elgstrom and Michael Smith, eds. (2006) The European Union's Roles in International Politics: Concepts and Analysis. London: Routledge.

[122] Cameron G. Thies (2003) Sense and Sensibility in the Study of State Socialization: A Reply to Kai Alderson. *Review of International Studies*, Vol. 29, No. 4, pp. 543-550.

[123] Thies, (2009), p. 31.

[124] Randall L. Schweller (1996) "Neorealism's status-quo bias: What security dilemma?", *Security Studies*, Vol. 5, No. 3, pp. 90-121. Sten Rynning and Jens Ringsmose. (2008) Why Are Revisionist States Revisionist? Reviving Classical Realism as an Approach to Understanding International Change. International Politics 45: 19-39. Extract from Thies, (2009), p. 31.

[125] Sekhri, (2009), p. 426.

positions in the systemic structure.[126] Maull's and Harnisch's work aimed to integrate role theory by using constructivist IR framework. Their work provides a theoretical integration of FPA and IR through role theory.[127] Mostly, scholars from Europe choose to focus on the constructivist methodology which places emphasis on the social interactions of actors (based on institutional structure) and social orders.[128]

In recent years, the International Studies Association (ISA) provides discussion platforms to bring FPA and IR theorists from Europe and the U.S. through a series of innovative workshops designed to bridge the FPA and IR divide. The first of these workshops was organized in 2010 by Thies, one of the most significant scholars of the second wave role theorists. The workshop titled 'Integrating Foreign Policy Analysis and International Relations Through Role Theory' was essentially aimed at bridging the gap between FPA and IR scholarship. Another catalytic workshop was organized in 2013 during ISA annual convention by Stephen G. Walker and Paul A. Kowert which was titled 'Bridging the Gap between Role Theory and "Role Practice" in Foreign Policy'. Additionally, Juliet Kaarbo and Cameron Thies launched a new Routledge book series which focused on evolution and the roots of role theory to bridge gap between FPA and IR. Although the recent debates in role

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[126] Second wave role theorists: Harnisch, Frank, and Maull (2011); Cristian Cantir and Juliet Kaarbo (2012) Contested Roles and Domestic Politics: Reflections on Role Theory in Foreign Policy Analysis and IR Theory, Foreign Policy Analysis Vol. 8, No. 1, pp. 5-24; Thies (2011); David McCourt (2012)The roles states play: a Meadian interactionist approach, Journal of International Relations and Development, Vol. 15, No. 3, pp. 370-392.

[127] Cameron G. Thies and Marijke Breuning (2012) "Integrating Foreign Policy Analysis and International Relations through Role Theory." *Foreign Policy Analysis*, Vol. 8, No. 1, pp. 1–4, p. 2-3.

[128] Sebastian Harnisch, (2011) "Role Theory: Operationalization of Key Concepts." In Role Theory in International Relations: Approaches and Analyses, edited by Sebastian Harnisch, Cornelia Frank and Hanns W. Maull, 7–15. Oxon: Routledge, p. 3.

theory focus mainly on constructivism and identity to bridge the gap between IR and FPA,[129] these ongoing theoretical debates are beyond the scope of this thesis.

Holsti was inspired by Mead's symbolic interactionism which studies human behavior and the impact of "others" as the determinant factor in human behaviors.[130] According to Harnisch symbolic interactionism is still the most popular role theory approach among role theorists.[131] Biddle emphasizes the importance of the analysis of state leaders because state's role conceptions are products of leaders' ideology, political experience, historical heritage, philosophical orientation, socioeconomic strengths, leadership quality, and people's choices.[132] Individual's ideational and belief system plays an important role in foreign policy decision making process. Walker and Schafer follow Snyder, Bruch and Sapin's ideas on the importance of the individual and cognitive thinking in global politics. They claim that individuals do matter in decision making by putting forth their own interpretations and definitions of the political world. Therefore, it is important to note that leaders potentially are capable of shaping state foreign policy and its position in the systemic structure.[133]

Cantir and Kaarbo' article titled "International Role Contestation and International Politics," highlights the domestic political contestation of foreign policy roles. They aim to reveal possible domestic factors that influence the role conception such as role

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[129] Benes (2011).

[130] Holsti (1970), p. 237.

[131] Harnisch (2011); Benes (2011), p. 3.

[132] Biddle, (1986)

[133] See also Snyder, Bruck, and Sapin (1962), Mark Schafer, Stephen G. Walker (2006) Belief and leadership in World Politics,- Methods and Application of Operational Code Analysis, Palgrave Macmillan, p. 190.

of public opinion, coalition groups, group decision making and clashes between government and opposition groups. However, Breuning argues that NRCs partly built as a result of domestic consternation but mostly external expectation of other actors, and international system is the main determinant factor of these roles because of the relational process between self and others.[134] Therefore, the thesis focuses mostly on leaders' perceptions, expectations, and the 'self' and the 'other' relations rather than focusing solely on domestic factors influencing foreign policy decision making.

Both first and second wave of role theorists are subject to criticism due to the weakness of its methodological toolbox. Walker claims that role theory is methodologically poor and opines that there is a lack of systemic ways of studying role theory. In their recent article titled 'Role Theory, Narratives, and Interpretation: The Domestic Contestation of Roles', Leslie E. Wehner and Cameron G. Thies attempt to address this criticism by using narratives and interpretation methods to enrich the role theory toolbox. In this work, the authors offer narrative analysis technique as a promising and alternative method to collect and analyze the data. On the other hand, Sofiane Sekhri underlines that in general, role theory has been criticized because of its reductionist focus on role analysis. She claims that in today's complex world, role theory's reductionist perspective is insufficient for explaining states' foreign policies.[135] However, despite these criticisms she provides two relevant explanations which perhaps make role theory more effective and practical in foreign policy analysis. Firstly, from the theoretical perspective, role theory is a

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[134] Breuning (2011), p. 24.

[135] Sekhri (2009), p. 427.

flexible approach and can be combined with multiple paradigms and tools from various disciplines to explain foreign policy behaviors.[136] Secondly, role theory reduces the problem of lack of common agreement in the definition of foreign policy by dividing it into policy procedures to provide a clearer understanding of foreign policy processes.[137]

2.4 Defining and Conceptualizing Key Concepts of Role Theory

Role is simply obligations attached to statuses. "Obligation" refers to the expectation of others from the individual.[138] In the context of international relations it refers to the set of expectations attached to state behavior in world affairs. In the social structure, roles originate from certain obligations in foreign affairs**.**

Role set is the attachment of a single status with multiple roles, so it is the collection of roles (obligations) within the given status.

Role expectation is the compromise between ego (self) and alter's (other) expectation. "Ego" expectation refers to the individual's expectation of what the appropriate role is, on the other hand, "alter" expectation refers to the expectation of others.[139] Thus, actors perception about the appropriate behavior and expectation of others determine certain roles.[140] The "expectation" consists of norms and beliefs and

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[136] Ibid.

[137] Ibid.

[138] Jon M. Shepard, (1993) "Sociology", West Publishing Company: Fifth edition, p. 113.

[139] Harnisch, Frank, and Maull (2011), p. 8.

[140] Benes, (2011) "Role Theory: A Conceptual Framework for the Constructivist Foreign Policy Analysis?", p. 6. http://www.wiscnetwork.org/porto2011/papers/WISC_2011-768.pdf (accessed on June 15, 2015); Rikard Bengtsson and Ole Elgström, (2011) "Self-conceptions, expectations, and performance," p. 114 in Role Theory in International Relations: Approaches and Analyses, ed. Sebastian Harnisch, Cornelia Frank, Hanns W Maull. Oxon: Routledge.

the individuals' status is relative to the statuses of others in society. For instance, role of "teacher" has been built around his/her relation with "students" and the role of "husband" has been built around a set of ideas about his relation to "wife". There are expected behaviors from husband status to other status holders (wife and children) in the social structure. In politics, expectations come from self (leaders) and others (other actors in international structure).[141]

Role conception; Judith Goldstein and Robert Keohane define the role conceptions as a guiding road map based on normative principles that help decision makers to realize expected foreign policy behaviors from themselves and others. Basically, role conceptions help decision makers to simplify political issues.[142] They claim that national conceptions rely on very rich sources such as culture, history, ideology, both domestic and international structure, personality, existing traditional roles, and the perception of other states.[143]

Role Performance is the behavior of individuals who occupy a status, and how they implement their rights associated with their role. It refers to the Erving Goffman's description of the role play of an actor on the stage. He describes "self" in everyday life by using the term "dramaturgy", he claims that social life of an individual is similar to play and series of dramatic performances on the stage because the

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[141] Theodore R. Sarbin and Vernon L. Allen (1968) Role Theory.‖ In Handbook of Social Psychology, 2nd ed., edited by Gardner Lindzey and Elliot Aronson, pp. 488-567. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, 497; Stryker and Statham, (1985), 330-331; Biddle, (1986); Thies (2009), p. 9-10.

[142] Judith Goldstein and Robert Keohane, (1993) Ideas and Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions, and Political Change (Cornell Studies in Political Economy), Cornell University Press; Sekhri (2009), p. 427. See also Shih (1988).

[143] Sekhri (2009), p. 427.

interactions between actor and audience is similar with the interaction of the individual with the others in everyday life.[144] There is relational interaction between individuals in a social context and Erving uses the performance of an actor in theatre as the quintessential analogy to describe the social life of individuals. In foreign policy analysis, Holsti and Walker define role performance as policy makers' foreign policy decisions and actions to implement NRCs as a result of both internal and external factors.[145] Leaders' perceptions guide them to carry out expected role performance to achieve desired position on the international stage. Role performance for states is the way an actor in position is expected to act in the international arena.

Role Enactment is related with role performance. According to Thies role enactment means "how well an individual performs a role in a social setting once it is selected, which may be dependent upon the number of roles held by the individual, the effort expended upon a particular role, and the time spent in one role in relative to others."[146] He underlines impacts of number of performed roles and time spent in these roles on role performances.

Role location refers to the individual locating himself/herself in society through cognitive process, while individuals locate themselves in social structure through

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[144] Erving Goffman (1959) Presentation of Self in Everyday Life. Garden City, Ney York: Anchor, p. 252-3, extract from The Role Theory Chapter V, Prepared by Bee Hive Digital Concepts Cochin for Mahatma Gandhi University Kottayam, (2010) http://shodhganga.inflibnet.ac.in/bitstream/10603/521/12/12_chapter5.pdf (accessed on August 26, 2015)

[145] Sekhri (2009), p. 427.

[146] Cameron G. Thies (2014) "Role Theory and Foreign Policy Analysis in Latin America," *Foreign Policy Analysis*, pp. 1-20, p. 5.

interactional process they locate self and other in this structure as well.[147] Thies defines role location in politics as a "socialization of states", new states locate themselves in a suitable role in the international system according to the demands of the other states in the system and the location process in the beginning of the establishment of NRCs by state leaders.[148]

Role conflict is the clash of the performance of one role with other, it occurs when individuals fail to fulfill expectations of all statuses as a result of the simultaneous occupation of two or more statuses. A psychologist, for example, when witness to a potentially malicious confession from his/her patient is required to keep that information confidential as a psychologist, but as a citizen he has an obligation to inform the police (clashes of obligations and expectations of one role with another role).[149] Walker defines role conflict as conflict between role conceptions as a result of competing expectations, difficulties to fulfill obligations and limited resources following the multiple role adoption.[150] When states aim to perform incompatible roles or set of behaviors this situation puts them in role conflict, so in foreign affairs leaders' confusion among many roles is identified as role conflict.[151]

Role strain basically means having too many role obligations and experiencing difficulties in fulfilling them, the incompatibility of the expectations of one role with the expectations of another may cause the individual to fail to perform the role. One

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[147] Sarbin and Allen (1968), 507; Thies (2009), p. 12.

[148] Thies (2009), p. 12.

[149] Shepard (1993), p. 116.

[150] Benes (2011), p. 7-9.

[151] Sekhri, (2009), p. 427.

of the challenges of multiple role adoption is the "role strain"[152]; it is the result of having multiple roles and too many obligations and consequently experiencing difficulties in fulfilling these obligations that statuses require.[153] Rosenau underlines that in order to overcome the role strain problem, decision makers create role scenarios which aims to help them choose the best role for particular situations according to his/her country's position in world affairs.[154] These scenarios are also flexible and adaptable to changing expectations and the international system.[155]

Role Learning and Role Taking; Role learning is result of environment and reciprocal behavior between individuals' set of behaviors, rights and duties assigned to individuals. Jack Levy's definition is based on the behavioral approach and he defines it as changes in the belief system of individuals or developments of new belief system as a result of experience and changes of environmental structure.[156] Harnisch claims that role learning occurs when role holders change both the structure and the content of their role conception according to received information and experiences.[157]

Role Making refers to the production or reproduction of new roles. Turner develops Mead's ideas on role making and suggests that there are three factors of role making; firstly, individuals are faced with a cultural environment that leads them to play a

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[152] W. J. Goode, (1960) A theory of role strain. *American Sociological Review*, Vol. 25, pp. 483-496.

[153] Thies (2009), p. p. 5-6-7.

[154] Ibid.

[155] Ibid.

[156] Harnisch, Frank, and Maull, (2011), p. 10.

[157] Harnisch, (2011), p. 10.

role, secondly, individuals believe that others also play roles in society and aims to understand their roles by analyzing their actions, thirdly, individuals want to play roles in social situations by claiming or sending signs to others on particular roles.[158]

National Role Conception was added to the role theory literature by Holsti. According to him NRC is:

> policymakers' own definitions of the general kinds of decisions, commitments, rules and actions suitable to their state, and of the functions, if any, their state should perform on a continuing basis in the international system or in subordinate regional systems. It is their "image" of the appropriate orientations or functions of their state toward, or in, the external environment.[159]

This definition has been met with widespread acceptance among role theorists. They agree that state leaders are a reflection of NRC because they are the head of the state and act in international system on behalf of the state.[160] Study of NRCs of states is based on the domestically shared ideas that help to analyze the role of states in the system. So, role conceptions are the perception of the leaders with regards to their country's position in the international structure and they are capable of shaping the positions of their states in global affairs. To this end, decision makers/political elites act as surrogates of states and national role conceptions.[161] Krotz claims that NRCs are a combination of shared ideas and a product of history and memory.[162] State's

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[158] Jonathan H. Turner, (1999) The Structure of Sociological Theory, 4th ed. Jaipur: Rawat Publications, p. 372.

[159] Holsti, (1970) 246; See Le Prestre (1997); Wish, (1980). Naomi Bailin Wish defines NRCs as foreign policy makers' perceptions of their nations' positions in the international system, policy makers' perception of the state's function in their external environment. See Beneš (2011), p. 3-4.

[160] Cantir and Kaarbo. (2012), p. 7.

[161] Thies (2009), p. 15-16.

[162] Krotz (2002), p. 6-9.

NRCs is based on the leaders' inter-subjective understanding of the world and the decision that their state should perform certain expected role conceptions of other actor'. Adopting these roles makes it easier for leaders to carry out decision making because the stipulation of roles subconsciously guides them towards making 'easier' policy choices among a variety of complex world issues.

Naomi Wish insists that studying NRCs is a powerful method to explain a variety of foreign policy behaviors. There is lack of universally accepted vision of nation states' role conceptions; role conceptions are unique for each country depending on the leaders' subjective judgment, interpretation and understanding of world affairs. Policy makers have the capacity to introduce role conceptions as guiding principles in foreign affairs according to their perceptions about what are the appropriate roles that their state should play in global affairs and that these role conceptions are shared among the society. There are two important components of role conception, namely; the 'ego' and 'alter ego. The 'ego' refers to the self-expectation and self-conceptualization of a state's position through leadership ability.[163] On the other hand, the 'alter ego' is related to the expectations of other role holders (institutions, government agencies or public).[164]

2.5 Typology of Role Theory

In 1986, Bruce Biddle in his seminal article "Developments of Role Theory" introduces five theoretical traditions of role theory: (1) Symbolic Interactionist Role Theory, (2) Structural Role Theory, (3) Organizational Role Theory, (4) Cognitive

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[163] Sebastian Harnisch (2011)

[164] Ibid.

Role Theory, and (5) Functional Role Theory.[165] In general, most of the scholars from sociology and psychology followed symbolic interactionism and structural role theory.

Symbolic interactionist and cognitive model refers that "roles as-repertoires of behavior, inferred from others' expectations and one's own conceptions, selected at least partly in response to cues and demands."[166] Biddle argues that although role theory offers integration of different levels of analysis in scrutinizing foreign relations, an inability to integrate the works of role theorists led to a theoretical divide among role theorists.[167]

2.5.1 Symbolic Interactionist Role Theory

Symbolic interactionism is a term derived from sociology and was introduced by social psychologist and philosopher George Herbert Mead in his work; *Mind Self and Society.*[168] Mead's main focus here was on the role of individuals and relations with social interaction from a social-psychological perspective. In his works, Mead generally focused on symbolic interactionism and human interpretation. In symbolic interactionism, "symbol" represents ways of communicating meanings. So basically, human beings attach meanings to the actions of others through symbols (language,

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[165] Biddle, Bruce J. (1986) Recent Developments in Role Theory. *Annual Review of Sociology*, No. 12, pp. 67-92, 67 extract from Sekhri (2009), p. 426.

[166] Stephen G. Walker (1992) Symbolic Interactionism and International Politics: Role Theory's Contribution to International Organization. In Contending Dramas: A Cognitive Approach to International Organizations, edited by M. Cottam and C. Shih, pp. 19-38. New York: Praeger, p. 23; Cameron G. Thies (2013) The United States, Israel, and the Search for International Order: Socializing States (Role Theory and International Relations), Routledge, p. 30.

[167] Thies (2013), p. 30.

[168] Mead (1934).

gestures or body language) in order to interpret those actions and consider appropriate reactions of their own.

Symbolic interactionism has three premises; first, human beings act towards physical objects in their world that has meaning for them such as trees, friend and mother; second, arises from the meanings deduced from social interaction; third, human beings use derived meanings through interpretations and use those interpretations in everyday life as the basis of his/her interaction with the social world.[169] So, social actors can interpret their own actions as well as the actions of others through social interactions based on observations as a qualitative methodology. Consequently, symbolic interaction focuses on the interpretation of events.

One of the most useful features of symbolic interaction is helping people to define and interpret each other's behaviors through interaction in society.[170] Herbert Blumer explains Mead's social interaction theory in two ways; non-symbolic interaction and symbolic interaction. He defines non-symbolic interaction as simple interactions between individuals through gestures; on the other hand symbolic interaction refers to the interpretation of the gestures and response on the basis of the interpreted meaning.[171]

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[169] Blumer, Herbert. (1969) *Symbolic Interactionism; Perspective and Method.* Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, p. 2.

[170] Blumer (1969), p. 68.

[171] Blumer (1969), p. 66.

Harnisch points out the fact that symbolic interactionism is still the source of inspiration for role theorists and foreign policy analysts, studying individual to understand human behavior is used by foreign policy experts to understand behavior of states.[172] As a symbolic interactionist Philippe Le Prestre argues that one of the main objectives of nation states in world politics is to define NRCs and expect others to accept these roles because the roles are meaningless if others do not accept them, when others accept these roles they play counter-roles.

2.5.2 Structural Role Theory

The structural role theory is based on the Talcott Parson's work on relations between individuals and the social structure.[173] Martin and Wilson argue that structural role theory is based on the shared norms in society because individuals share common sense about the expectations of others in shared values.[174] It is also inspired by Linton's work on role concepts and social structure and led to the eventual development of structural role theory. According to structural role theorists, the main focus is the social structure and environment, not the individual.[175]

2.5.3 Organizational Role Theory

It focuses on the organized social system and in this system identified social positions/roles are based on preplanned, task-oriented, and hierarchical order, roles

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[172] Benes (2011), p. 3.

[173] Parsons (1951).

[174] Beres, 177 http://www.pulib.sk/elpub2/FF/Matulayova2/pdf_doc/12.pdf (accessed on August 26, 2015); Daniel D. Martin and Janelle L.Wilson (2005). Role Theory. pp. 651 – 655. In Ritzer, George (ed.). 2005. Encyclopedia of Social Theory. Volume II. Thousand Oaks – London – New Delhi : Sage Publications, p. 651-52.

[175] Biddle, (1986), p. 73; Lemay (1999), p. 224.

exist in this order depend on normative expectations.[176] Biddle suggests that organizational role theory can be applied in business and industrial organizations.[177]

2.5.4 Cognitive Role Theory

Role theory always associated with cognitive psychology and it is mainly interested in the relationship between the behavior of individuals and social conditions that create role expectation.[178] It is concerned with the perceptions of the individual, that is, how s/he sees the environment and acts according to his/her own understanding of the other's expectations, so the individual's behavior is relational with cognitive understandings of the expectations of others.[179] Cognitive theorists focus on behavior and expectations and their interactive relations in society. Symbolic interactionist and cognitive approaches are common in the sense that both refer roles as a collection of human behavior that highly relies on the expectations of others to respond to role demands.[180]

2.5.5 Functional Role Theory

The functional role theory started with Linton's work in 1936 however Talcott Parson is the one who formalized the concept in his work in 1951.[181]

Unlike the symbolic interaction, functional role theory focuses on characteristic behaviors of human beings in society; therefore, roles are shared through normative

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[176] Biddle, (1986), p. 73.

[177] Lemay (1999), p. 224.

[178] Biddle, (1986), p. 73

[179] Lemay (1999), p. 224.

[180] Walker (1992), p. 23; Thies (2009), p. 4.

[181] Parson (1951); Talcott Parsons and Edward Shils (1951) Toward a General Theory of Action Cambridge: Harvard University Press ; Biddle, (1986), p. 70.

expectations which help to understand human behaviors.[182] Parson identifies social system as a collection of social statuses and roles applied to shared norms to achieve a functioning system.[183] Therefore, the social system is the institutional pattern of norms. Statuses exist in these systems, Parsons defines a social system as a place where group of people interact based on shared values. The total number of interacting people creates positions and structure, and the total number of roles creates the role structure in a given social structure. [184]

2.6 Political Psychology and Foreign Policy Analysis

In FPA literature, studying leaders is important to understanding foreign policy decision making. Political psychology was developed during the 1930s from the discipline of psychology and was applied in IR. It helps foreign policy analysts to understand decision makers, especially heads-of-state who by virtue of their executive powers usually make the final foreign policy decisions, by analyzing their psychology. There is interconnectedness between the disciplines of psychology and IR, the combination of these two disciplines has produced several study areas such as "political leadership, political judgment and decision making, public opinion and voting behavior, the impact of emotion on behavior, the interaction between individual processes and group behavior, and the formation and maintenance of dominant values in society."[185] Dual agendas between these disciplines are used mainly by FPA scholars to understand individuals and states decision making mechanisms and policies.

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[182] Biddle, (1986), p. 70.

[183] Ibid.

[184] Parson (1951), p. 70; Coult (1964), p. 31.

[185] Rose McDermott. (2004) Political Psychology in International Relations. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, p. 2.

The American political scientist Harold Lasswell is one of the most significant scholars in the initiation and development of political psychology and he is widely regarded as the father of American political psychology. [186] In his works Lasswell focused on the political ideology, belief system, and political behaviors of state leaders.[187] His direction of the role of the individual's psychology in decision making and in determining political outcomes inspire for future researches in this field. Rose McDermott notes that political psychology is important to explain state policies through individuals' psychological processes because understanding state behavior and political outcomes depends on the prior understanding of the perceptions and psychology of the individual.[188] Therefore, "psychology cannot be divorced from politics in explanations of foreign policy."[189]

During the Cold War, systemic analysis was sufficient to explain state behaviors in analyzing the formulation of state foreign policies. However, after the end of the Cold War it became difficult to understand states' intentions and behaviors due to the changing systemic environment. The study of individual's and belief systems became

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[186] Some of his studies of political leaders; Fromm's (1941) Escape from Freedom, Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik, Levinson and Sanford's (1950) The Authoritarian Personality, George and George's (1956) Woodrow Wilson and Colonel House and Lane's (1962).

[187] Some of his studies of political leaders; "Fromm's (1941) Escape from Freedom, Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik, Levinson and Sanford's (1950) The Authoritarian Personality, George and George's (1956) Woodrow Wilson and Colonel House and Lane's (1962)," For more details see Howard Lavine, A Sketch of Political Psychology, Editor's Introduction, p. 20 http://www.sagepub.com/upm-data/33601_Lavine.pdf (accessed on August 26, 2015)

[188] Ross McDermott (2004), 3.

[189] Jack S. Levy (2013). Political Psychology and Foreign Policy. The Oxford Handbook of Political Psychology, 2nd ed. Edited by Leonie Huddy, David O. Sears, and Jack S. Levy. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 3. https://www.surrey.ac.uk/politics/research/researchareasofstaff/isppsummeracademy/instructors%20/Levy%20-%20Psychology%20and%20Foreign%20Policy%20Decision-Making.pdf (accessed on August 26, 2015).

popular among scholars as a result of the failure of existing theories to predict and explain the end of the Cold War. Walker and Schafer agree that understanding the belief system of political leaders is important to understanding the causal mechanisms of today's world.[190] Therefore, in foreign policy analysis, analyzing the role of psychological factors and belief systems is widely accepted as one of the most useful methods to understanding policy making processes in today's global affairs.[191] Rosati underlines that political psychology and cognitive approach contributes understanding both foreign policy and global politics.[192] In recent years, the number of scholars studying the process of cognition in foreign policy analysis has rapidly increased.

A cognitive approach deals with the role of individual's psychology in decision making process and reasoning. Margaret G. Hermann explains political psychology as the combination of followings: "perceptions, beliefs, motives, opinions, values, interests, styles, defenses and experiences of individuals."[193] Leaders perceive and

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[190] Irving Jervis (1976) Iyengar and Kinder's (1987) cognitive theory of media priming, Lodge and colleagues' (Lodge et al., 1989; Lodge and Hamill 1986) work on schemas and on-line processing, Larson's (1985) research on Soviet containment, Lau's (1985, 1989), Conover and Feldman's (1984, 1989) work on belief systems and inference processes and Tetlock's (1986, 1992, both included in this volume) work on foreign policy decision making and the relationship between cognitive style and political ideology. McGraw's (2000) article on the development of the cognitive perspective in political psychology provides a concise review of this area (see also Taber 2003) extract from http://www.sagepub.com/upm-data/33601_Lavine.pdf "(Bueno De Mesquita and Lalman 1992; Geva and Mintz 1997; Johnston 1995a; Keohane and Martin 2003; Schweller 2003)", *Stephen G. Walker and Mark Schafer* "Beliefs and Leadership in World Politics, p. 4-7. Stephen G. Walker and Mark Schafer "Beliefs and Leadership in World Politics, p. 7.

[191] Recent contributions; Walker and Schafer, (2006); A. Mintz, and DeRouen, K., Jr. (2010). Understanding foreign policy decision making. New York: Cambridge University Press; S. G. Walker, A. Malici and M. Schafer ed, (2010) In Rethinking Foreign Policy Analysis: States, Leaders, and the Micro foundations of Behavioral International Relations, Routledge; 1 edition.

[192] J.A. Rosati (2004) The Frustrating Study of Foreign Policy Analysis. *Featured book review essay on Christopher Hill's The Changing Politics of Foreign Policy (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003). International Studies Review* (6), p. 109–11.

[193] Howard Lavine. A Sketch of Political Psychology, Editor's Introduction, p. xx, http://www.sagepub.com/upm-data/33601_Lavine.pdf (accessed on August 26, 2015); Margaret G.

interpret international and national developments which shape state foreign policy. Hermann and Hagan point out that leader's interpretation of political events arises mainly from their beliefs.[194] By use of beliefs, individuals tend to simplify complex situations through information processing and filtering, each individual perceive the environment differently depending on their cognitive perspective and psychology. Therefore, analyzing individuals through the cognitive approach helps to understand how individuals shape decision making based on their subjective psychological environment around them rather than any objective reality.[195] Snyder, Bruck, and Sapin focus on leaders within a state by assessing psychological and belief patterns as causal mechanisms of state behaviors and decision making factors. In this context, each leader possess a unique belief system and diverse political views, so their decision making process, information processing and leadership style is different to each other.[196]

Employing role theory requires one to gain access into the decision makers mind to understand the psychological and cognitive ways of the decision making process.[197] Therefore, foreign policy analysts should consider leaders' belief system to

Hermann, (1986). Prologue: What is Political Psychology. In Margaret G. Hermann (Ed.), *Political Psychology*, pp. 1–10, San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, p. 2.

[194] Margaret G. Hermann and Joe D. Hagan (1998) International Decision Making: Leadership Matters, *Foreign Policy*, No. 110, pp. 124-137, p. 126.

[195] Sprout and Sprout (1956).

[196] Jerel A. Rosati, Joe D. Hagan, and Martin W. Simpson (1994) Foreign Policy Restructring: How Governments Respond to Global Change. Columbia: University of South Caroline Press; P. Suedfeld, & Tetlock, P. (1977). Integrative complexity of communications in international crises. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 21, 169-184; Jonathan W. Keller (2005) Constraint Respecters, Constraint Challengers, and Crisis Decision Making in Democracies: A Case Study Analysis of Kennedy versus Reagan, *Political Psychology*, Vol. 26, No. 6, pp. 835–867; Jervis (1976).

[197] For more details see Snyder, Bruck, and Sapin (1954, 1962); P.E. Tetlock and McGuire, C.B. Jr., (1985) Cognitive Perspectives on Foreign Policy. In S. Long (ed.), *Political Behavior Annual*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, pp. 255–73; Nathan Leites, (1951) *The Operational Code of the Politburo*. New York: McGraw-Hill; Jervis (1976); Sekhri, (2009), p. 428.

understand Turkish foreign policy. I attempt to employ operational code analysis to understand the belief system of decision makers, to understand and explain Turkish foreign policy behaviors and formulation of NRCs. In this sense, I choose to focus on symbolic interactionism role theory and cognitive role theory. I focus on human behaviors through interpretations (symbolic) and psychology (cognitive) of leaders due to their special attention to human behaviors and expectation of others which is the basis to understanding role theory and operational code analysis.

2.7 Operational Code Analysis

Operational code analysis emerged during early 1950s as a distance leadership assessment tool to study political leaders' belief systems that were embedded in leaders' personalities. The study of operational code analysis was developed at RAND by Nathan Leites' in 1951 and 1953 to analyze Soviet leaders' sets of beliefs and strategies (operational code created by cultural and psychological sources). In this project, Leites aimed to identify the operational code of the Soviet Politburo and the beliefs system that explain political power in the Bolshevik ideology, based on political culture in Russia and Lenin's character.[198] In 1969, that is sixteen years later, Alexander George developed Leites' work by identifying a set of questions to reveal the philosophical and instrumental beliefs of leaders.[199] He highlights the importance of belief systems which filter incoming information from the outside world and influence the perceptions of individuals as well as their preferences by establishing a systemic study method of leaders' operational codes.[200] Tetlock argues

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[198] S. G. Walker, Schafer, M., & Young, M. D. (2003). Profiling the Operational Codes of Political Leaders. In J. M. Post (Ed.), The psychological assessment of political leaders: with profiles of Saddam Hussein and Bill Clinton (pp. 215-245). Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, p. 215.

[199] George (1969).

[200] Stephen G. Walker and Mark Schafer "Beliefs and Leadership in World Politics, p. 7

that "beliefs as subjective representations of reality matter in the explanation of world politics."[201] Therefore, it is important to analyze inter-subjective belief systems of leaders in order to understand world politics. Stephen G. Walker and Mark Schafer note that "the president's beliefs about the world around him affect how he processes and interprets available information."[202] They believe that a leader's belief system is influenced by external developments which shape foreign policy decision making. Holsti, Stoessinger, and Lebow, argue that leaders' belief systems establish self-image (state) and image of others so leaders' "beliefs about their nation and its relationship with the world, colored their perceptions and expectations concerning policy choices."[203] In his work George focused on philosophical and instrumental beliefs of individuals and introduced ten sets of research questions to establish a typology of operational code in order to analyze belief systems and cognitive process of leaders.[204] These questions aim to establish a link between leaders' belief system and foreign policy behaviors of states. *See Table 1* for George's typology.

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[201] Tetlock (1998), 876; see also Simon (1957), Stephen G. Walker and Mark Schafer "Beliefs and Leadership in World Politics, p. *4.*

[202] Mark Schafer and Stephen G. Walker (2006) Belief and leadership in World Politics,- Methods and Application of Operational Code Analysis, Palgrave Macmillan, p. 190.

[203] American Foreign Policy and the Utopian Imagination By Susan M. Matarese, p. 4.

[204] George (1969).

Table 1: George's Ten Questions about Philosophical and Instrumental Beliefs

The Philosophical Beliefs in an Operational Code	The Instrumental Beliefs in an Operational Code
P-1. What is the "essential" nature of political life? Is the political universe essentially one of harmony or of conflict? What is the fundamental character of one's political opponents? P-2. What are the prospects for the eventual realization of one's fundamental values and aspirations? Can one be optimistic, or must one be pessimistic on this score; and in what respects the one and/or the other? P-3. Is the political future predictable? In what sense and to what extent? P-4. How much "control" or "mastery" can one have over historical development? What is one's role in "moving" and "shaping" history in the desired direction? P-5. What is the role of "chance" in human affairs and in historical development?	I-1. What is the best approach for selecting goals or objectives for political action? I-2. How are the goals of action pursued most effectively? I-3. How are the risks of political action calculated, controlled, and accepted? I-4. What is the best "timing" of action to advance one's interests? I-5. What is the utility and role of different means for advancing one's interests?

Source: George, A. (1969). The 'operational code': A neglected approach to the study of political leaders and decision-making. International Studies Quarterly, 23: 190-222.

Philosophical beliefs aim to explain how leaders identify other actors and view the external environment (political universe) and instrumental beliefs specify leaders' preferences for the most effective strategies or tactics to achieve certain goals. Foreign policy analysts use George's questions to carry out a distance psychological assessment of leaders to reveal their belief system. In order to understand state behaviors and the subjective belief systems of leaders, scholars developed the methods of content analysis associated with operational code analysis.[205] In 1998 Schafer, Walker and Young developed a revolutionary computer software program for automated coding and operational code analysis regained popularity as a useful tool to understand the political world. The computer program, Verbs In Context System (VICS) analyzes leader's belief systems. In this way, it becomes more practical and easier to employ operational code analysis which also increases

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[205] Schafer and Walker (2006), p. 7.

reliability of results from a methodological perspective.[206] Since its introduction in 1998, VICS has been used to determine the belief systems of several world leaders.[207] This method has four main characteristic identifications for each verb and its context: subject, tense of the verb, domain, target and context. These characteristics are illustrated in the following *Table 2*. The VICS indices are calculated according to the self–other designation and the levels of intensity.[208]

Both George and Holsti used cognitive consistency theory as a guiding perspective in their studies. Cognitive consistency theory assumes that leader's decisions and their operational code beliefs were consistent with each other.[209]

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[206] Before VICS scholars were using hand coding for content analysis method which was one of the challenge to study operational code analysis as time consuming method. VICS has led to a proliferation of operational code analysis research agenda and get attention of foreign policy analysis: R. Bzostek, & Robison, S. B. (2008). U.S. Policy toward Israel, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia: An Integrated Analysis, 1981-2004. *International Studies Perspectives, Vol. 9*, No. 4, pp. 359-376; Akan Malici, (2008). When leaders learn and when they don't : Mikhail Gorbachev and Kim Il Sung at the end of the Cold War. Albany: State University of New York Press; Akan Malici & Malici, J. (2005). The Operational Codes of Fidel Castro and Kim Il Sung:The Last Cold Warriors? *Political Psychology, Vol. 26*, No. 3, pp. 387-412; J. Renshon, (2009). When Public Statements Reveal Private Beliefs: Assessing Operational Codes at a Distance. *Political Psychology, Vol. 30*, No. 4, pp. 649-661.

[207] Works after the introduction of of VICS in 1998; Carter (Walker, Schafer, and Young 1998), Clinton (Walker, Schafer, and Young 1999), George W. Bush (Renshon 2008), George H. W.Bush (Walker, Schafer, and Young 1999), Kennedy (Renshon 2009); Peres and Rabin (Crichlow 1998); Gorbachev (Malici 2008) and Putin (Schafer and Walker); Castro (Malici and Malici 2005); Hu Jintao (Feng 2006) and Mao Zeodong (Feng 2005); Chen Shuibian (Feng 2006); Kim Il-Sung (Malici and Malici 2005), Tony Blair (Schafer and Walker 2006), Bashar al–Asad (Malici and Buckner 2008), and Ahmadinejad (Malici and Buckner 2008).

[208] Walker, Schafer, Young, (2006), p. 226.

[209] Walker, Schafer, Young, (2006) p. 217.

Table 2: VICS Steps in Coding A Verb

STEPS IN THE VERBS IN CONTEXT SYSTEM

1. INDETIFY THE SUBJECT AS

SELF   OR   OTHER

2. IDENTFY THE TENSE OF THE TRANSITIVE VERB AS

PAST   PRESENT   FUTURE

AND IDENTIFY THE CATEGORY OF THE VERB AS

POSITIVE (+)   OR   NEGATIVE (-)

APPEAL, SUPPORT (+1)   OPPOSE, RESIST (-1)

WORDS   OR   OR

PROMISE BENEFITS (+2)   THREATEN COSTS (-2)

DEEDS   REWARDS (+3)   PUNISHMENT (-3)

3. IDENTIFY THE DOMAIN AS

DOMESTIC   OR   FOREIGN

4. IDENTIFY THE TARGET AND PLACE IN CONTEXT

An example

A quote taken from President Carter's January 4, 1980, address to the nation:
"Massive Soviet military forces have invaded the small, non-aligned, sovereign nation of Afghanistan…"

1. **Subject.** The subject is "Massive Soviet military forces" which is coded as the other, that is, the speaker is not referring to his or her self or his or her state.

2. **Tense and Category.** The verb phrase "have invaded" is in the past tense and is a negative deed coded, therefore, as punish.

3. **Domain.** The action involves an actor (Soviet military forces) external to the speaker's state (the United States); therefore, the domain is foreign.

4. **Target and Context.** The action is directed toward Afghanistan; therefore. The target is coded as Afghanistan. In addition, we designate a context: Soviet-Afghanistan-conflict-1979-88.

The **complete data line** for this statement is: other-3 foreign past Afghanistan soviet-afghanistan-conflict-1979-88.

Source: Walker, Schafer, and Young (1998: 183), Walker, Schafer, and Young (2003: 224).

Instead of focusing on George's ten questions for the scope of this research, the thesis focuses instead first two essential questions in philosophical (P-1 and P-2) and instrumental (I-1 and I-2) beliefs in order understand the influence of leaders' belief systems (in shaping NRCs of Turkey). These main questions are; P1- nature of the political universe (image of others) and P–2: Prospects for realizing fundamental values; I-1- approach to goals (direction of strategy) and I–2: Intensity of tactics. Walker and Schafer identify the first questions in philosophical and instrumental parts (P–1 and I–1) as 'master beliefs' of leaders that are followed by other beliefs in the same category.[210] The aim of this thesis is to explain the philosophical indices to understand leaders' perception of states' NRCs within that world. Leaders' perceptions of the nature of the political world and how they should act according to perceived inter-subjective environment, indelibly influences the decision making processes as well as outcomes and state NRCs. On the other hand, instrumental beliefs are used to define leaders' strategies and choices employed to achieve desired political objectives. In this context, instrumental beliefs reveal desired NRCs and employed strategies to achieve these roles. These philosophical and instrumental questions have numerical indices which are calculated by VICS coding scheme through the analyses of leaders' official speeches. *See Table 3* for the calculation of the VICS indices.

Table 3: Verbs in Context Belief Indices in a Leader's Operational Code

PHILOSOPHICAL BELIEFS

	Elements	Index	Interpretation
P-1.	NATURE OF THE POLITICAL UNIVERSE (Image of Others)	%Positive minus %Negative Transitive Other Attributions	+1.0 friendly to -1.0 hostile
P-2.	REALIZATION OF POLITICAL	Mean Intensity of Transitive	+1.0 optimistic to

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[210] Walker, Schafer (2006), 33.

VALUES (Optimism/Pessimism)		Other Attributions divided by 3	–1.0 pessimistic

INSTRUMENTAL BELIEFS

	Elements	Index	Interpretation
I-1.	APPROACH TO GOALS (Direction of Strategy)	%Positive minus %Negative Self Attributions	+1.0 high coop-eration to –1.0 high conflict
I-2.	PURSUIT OF GOALS (Intensity of Tactics)	Mean Intensity of Transitive Self Attributions divided by 3	+1.0 high coop-eration to –1.0 high conflict

Source: P-1 and I-1 indices vary between –1.0 and 1.0. (Walker, Stephen G., Mark Schafer, and Michael D. Young. 1998. Systemic Procedures for Operational Code Analysis: Measuring and Modeling Jimmy Carter's; Operational Code. International Studies Quarterly 42:175–190. Walker, Stephen G., Mark Schafer, and Michael Young, eds. 2003.Profiling the Operational Codes of Political Leaders.).

P–1: The nature of the political universe

As a master belief of philosophical belief category this index explores leaders' perceptions of the political universe and other actors. According to leaders' view, they define the political universe as friendly, mixed or hostile. The index varies between -1 and +1, while positive scores identify leaders' view as friendly (+) the negative scores indicate that leaders have a hostile (-) view of political universe.[211] Walker, Schafer, and Young propose the following score range for the P–1 index[212]:

HOSTILE								FRIENDLY
Extremely	Very	Definitely	Somewhat	Mixed	Somewhat	Definitely	Very	Extremely
–1.0	–.75	–.50	–.25	0.0	+.25	+.50	+.75	+1.0

P–2: Prospects for realizing fundamental values

The P-2 index for realization of fundamental political values explains leaders' anticipation for success in that regard. Walker, Schafer, and Young underline that leader's realization of fundamental values and his/her optimism and pessimism are

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[211] Mark Schafer and Stephen G. Walker and (2006). "Operational Code Analysis At A Distance: Verbs in Context System of Content Analysis," p. 33, in Beliefs and leadership in world politics: methods and applications of operational code analysis, M. Schafer & S. G.Walker (Eds.), New York: Palgrave Macmillan, p. 33.

[212] Walker, Schafer, and Young, (2003), p. 227.

important to understand sustainability of leaders' perception of the political universe as temporary or contemporary.[213] The P-2 index calculation is based on the intensity of conflictual and cooperative transitive verbs of other intensity values ranging from -3 to +3, then total number of verbs attributed to the other is divided by three to place similar score index of P-1 from -1 to +1. While negative scores of indices are pessimistic (-), positive scores indicate optimistic results (+). The following is score range for the P–2 index:

PESSIMISTIC								OPTIMISTIC
Extremely	Very	Definitely	Somewhat	Mixed	Somewhat	Definitely	Very	Extremely
−1.0	−.75	−.50	−.25	0.0	+.25	+.50	+.75	+1.0

I–1: Direction of strategy

This is the master belief of instrumental belief index category which identifies direction of strategy index. This belief aims to reveal strategic policy actions that are identified as conflictual and cooperative. Therefore, leaders' indication of cooperation in their speeches identifies his/her direction of strategy and vice versa. This master belief follows the same patterns of P-1, while negative scores of indices indicate conflictual strategy (-), positive scores indicate cooperative strategy (+). Following is the score range for the I–1 index[214]:

CONFLICT								COOPERATION
Extremely	Very	Definitely	Somewhat	Mixed	Somewhat	Definitely	Very	Extremely
−1.0	−.75	−.50	−.25	0.0	+.25	+.50	+.75	+1.0

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[213] Walker, Stephen, Mark Schafer, and Michael Young (1998) Systemic Procedures for the Operational Code Analysis. *International Studies Quarterly, Vol.* 42, pp. 175-190, p. 178.

[214] S. G. Walker, Schafer, M., & Young, M. D. (2003). Profiling the Operational Codes of Political Leaders. In J. M. Post (Ed.), *The psychological assessment of political leaders: with profiles of Saddam Hussein and Bill Clinton* (pp. 215-245). Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, p. 227.

I–2: Intensity of tactics

The I–2 index clarifies intensity of tactics that s/he pursues regarding to the I-1. Therefore, I-2 as choice propensity seeks to address use of effective methods to achieve political goals and intensity of these tactics to achieve their strategy. The calculation of I-2 index is similar to P-2 index, first intensity of self conflictual and cooperative attributions are calculated based on the values ranging from -3 to +3, then total number of verbs attributed to the other is divided by three to place similar score index of I-1 from -1 to +1. While negative scores of indices very conflictual tactics (-), positive scores indicate very cooperative tactics (+). Following is the score range for the I–2 index:

CONFLICT								COOPERATION
Extremely	Very	Definitely	Somewhat	Mixed	Somewhat	Definitely	Very	Extremely
−1.0	−.75	−.50	−.25	0.0	+.25	+.50	+.75	+1.0

2.8 Linking Role Theory and Operational Code Analysis

There are criticism and skepticism against the use of individual levels in foreign policy analysis. However, the recent developments in the field and increasing interest of scholars for at-a-distance assessment methods as individual levels of analysis such as role theory, operational code analysis, and leadership trait analysis shows that these skeptical views does not have solid ground.

There is increasing attention among scholars regarding Turkey's changing roles in world politics. In order to reveal Turkey's NRCs it is important to analyze the political psychology and belief systems of some of its leaders. Leaders' perceptions and beliefs play an important role in shaping state policies within the international system, therefore this thesis utilizes two distance assessment methods; role theory and operational code analysis. It is important to note rather than absolute determinant

factors in foreign policy making, NRCs more like accepted as guiding principles and beliefs as causal mechanism in foreign policy formation influence formation of these guiding principles and state foreign policy behaviors.

Although there are other environmental factors that one must take into consideration to understand decision making policies and outcomes, beliefs are generally accepted as one of the most essential elements in understanding political psychology which establishes certain coding systems to simplify the complex external environment. Leaders' beliefs systems do matter in decision making due to the limitations of rational choice theory (bounded rationality). Beliefs influence individuals' foreign policy decision making and states policies. Hudson notes that 'filters' can be employed to increase human capability by establishing certain perceptions through screening huge amounts of information.[215] Bueno de Mesquita explains complexity of bounded rationality concept. He claims that in foreign policy decisions rationality is bounded by individual's subjective beliefs, psychology and elements of uncertainty.[216] On the other hand, Hermann points out that personal belief is unlikely to lead foreign policy choices unless individuals possess authority in politics.[217] In this sense, analysis of the belief system of a leader who possesses authority in foreign policy making provides a basis for deeper analysis of the state's behaviors. George's philosophical and instrumental beliefs indicate that individuals establish certain images for other states which constitutes the actors' position in world affairs and

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[215] Hudson (2007), p. 40.

[216] Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, (1997). "A Decision Making Model: Its Structure and Form." *International Interactions*, Vol. 23, No.3/4, pp. 235-266.

[217] Margaret G. Hermann, (ed.) (2001) Special issue on "Leaders, Groups, and Coalitions: Understanding the People and the Processes in Foreign Policymaking." *International Studies Review* (3), p. 85.

positions others in accordance to his/her beliefs. Leader's beliefs and perceptions of others have played an important role in Turkish foreign policy decision making mechanisms and Turkey's status in global affairs. One of the most important examples is the *Sèvres Syndrome*[218] which became the basis of the security culture in Turkish politics. Both domestic policy and foreign policy were shaped by leaders' perceptions based on past fears of imminent territorial disintegration of the Republic. Therefore, the perceptions and psychological inclinations of the state leaders have been overwhelmed by the Serve Syndrome after the traumatic experience of the Treaty of Sèvres on August 10, 1920 at the end of the WWI. Hence, without analyzing Turkish leaders' perceptions and belief systems, it would be difficult to understand why they adopted certain NRCs in international relations.

Belief systems do not only explain current issues but can also be utilized to predict the future behaviors of actors. Leaders' perceptions of the outside world, future behaviors and perceptions of self and other are similar characteristics both in role theory and operational code analysis. George's formulation of philosophical and instrumental beliefs reflects the leaders' image of the 'self' and the 'others'. While philosophical beliefs refer to the image of others (how leaders see others/political world/politics), instrumental beliefs refers to the self-image of the leader (political objectives desired, and ways/strategies/tactics to achieve these goals). Therefore, George's philosophical and instrumental beliefs are similar with role theory in the context of the perception of self and other relations, both theoretical framework

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[218] See Jung, (2003); Fatma Müge Göçek, "Why is there still a 'Sèvres Syndrome'?: An analysis of Turkey's uneasy association with the West" Chapter 4, Transformation of Turkey: Reinterpreting State and Society from the Empire to the Republic (London; New York: I.B. Tauris, 2011); Şahin Alpay, "What keeps the 'Sèvres Syndrome' alive and kicking?" *Today's Zaman*, July 06, 2009. http://www.todayszaman.com/columnist/sahin-alpay/what-keeps-the-s-vres-syndrome-alive-and-kicking_180032.html (accessed on October 20, 2014)

position states roles and others in international systems.[219] Operational code analysis reveals how leaders' inter-subjective understanding of world politics shapes Turkish foreign policy and its NRCs in world affairs. Therefore, linking role theory and operational code analysis provides a correlation between two different methods for identifying Turkey's position and NRCs in world affairs based on its leaders' belief systems. Role theory emphasizes the inter-subjective factors that shape NRCs and to this end, operational code analysis is used to construct leaders' belief systems in order to understand this process as to how they see the political world, what their preferences are, and how these preferences shape particular NRCs. Therefore, the use of operational code analysis helps to interpret decision makers' conceptions of states' roles in the international arena by focusing on the extent to which their belief systems influences their decisions.

George pointed out that in studying belief systems; cognition and character are usually inseparable. This is also relevant for role theory because cognition is an important part of decision making process.

I assume that leaders' belief systems could explain shifts in states' foreign policy and changes in its NRCs over time. Thus, operational code analysis is used to complement role theory to explain the evolution of Turkey's NRCs since 1980 based on its leaders' beliefs systems.

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[219] George, (1969), p. 190–222.

Utilizing operational code analysis for AKP period helps to understand how leaders adapt to the changing international environment.[220] This is important for the time frame of the thesis which comprises one of the most significant debates in Turkish politics that is known as "paradigm shift" debate rose in late 2000s. Therefore, the use of operational code analysis helps to understand how Turkish foreign policy makers adapted to changing international system and how their beliefs were shaped NRCs and also how these roles evolved through time.

It is also important to underline that both role theory and operational code analysis are applicable to states where decision making mechanisms are centralized around leaders. Leaders who possess authority can shape foreign policy outcomes based on their perception and belief systems. The thesis based on the assumption that Turkish leaders tend to possess more authority to shape foreign policy making and outcomes. Therefore, employing role theory and operational code analysis on Turkish decision makers through correlations between them is an efficient method to analyze Turkish foreign policy decisions and its roles in world affairs. Both role theory and operational code analysis explain how Turkish foreign policy makers identify Turkey (self) and others (expectation of other actors) in the system. Each leader possesses a unique set of belief systems but not necessarily a well-defined single belief system. Both George and Holsti believe that leaders may change their belief systems over time and so do NRCs.

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[220] Malici and Malici (2005).

Chapter 3

RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY

3.1 Introduction

In this chapter, I outline the research design and the methodology of the thesis. I discuss the data collection for both role theory and operational code analysis. This is followed by the explanation of the methods employed for data analysis. Finally, the hypotheses are stated, and the significance of this research design for role theory and operational code analysis is discussed.

The thesis employs multiple methods to assess leaders' perception of Turkey's role and influence of their belief systems in foreign policy behaviors since 1980. Although role theory is rich in conceptualization, its tool boxes are methodologically poor.[221] There is no systematic way of studying national roles and like most social theories, a methodological clarity or consensus does not exist among role theorists. However, this could be an advantage in the sense that it provides the user the opportunity to apply various theoretical and methodological tools simultaneously. Therefore, the methodological openness of role theory provides for the use and combination of different approaches and methods to analyze states' NRCs. In order

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[221] Leslie Wehner and Cameron G. Thies (2014) Role Theory, Narratives and Interpretation: The Domestic Contestation of Roles. International Studies Review, No. 16, pp. 411-436, p. 413; Walker, (1987), p. 2.

to contribute to the development of role theory, this thesis uses operational code analysis to complement the theoretical structure of role theory.

3.2 Data Collection

The thesis proceeds in four stages. The first stage is the collection of relevant official policy speeches, press conferences and interviews that cover the period between 1980 and 2014 to lay the groundwork for the next stage of the thesis. In the second stage, qualitative content analysis method is employed to analyze leaders' public speeches/interviews based on the prepared codebook to investigate NRCs of Turkey. The third stage employs automated content analysis for operational code analysis in order to identify belief systems of the key policy makers in Turkey. The final stage correlates and compares findings in the second and third stages.

3.3 Triangulation: Quantitative and Qualitative Research Methods

Both quantitative and qualitative methods of analyses are used in this thesis. The use of triangulation was initiated by Campbell and Fiskel and developed by Web during 1960s. It could be argued that it was Norman K. Denzin really developed the concept of triangulation.[222] Denzin in his work titled 'The Research Act in Sociology', introduces and distinguish between four types of triangulation techniques but for the purpose of this thesis only three of them are utilized. These are; *theoretical triangulation* by adopting multiple theoretical approach, *methodological triangulation* by adopting different research methods, and *data triangulation* by

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[222] D. Campbell and Fiskel, D. (1959) Convergent and Discriminant Validation by the Multitrait-Multimethod Matrix, Psychological Bulletin, No. 56, pp. 81-105; E. Webb, (1966) Unobtrusive Measures: Non-reactive Research in the Social Sciences, Chicago: Rand McNally; N. Denzin, (1970) The Research Act in Sociology, Chicago: Aldine; Sabina Yeasmin and Khan Ferdousour Rahman (2012) 'Triangulation' Research Method as the Tool of Social Science Research, *BUP Journal*, Vol. 1, No. 1, pp. 154-163.

collecting data from different sources.[223] See *Figure 2* for the triangulation research

model of the thesis.

Figure 2: Triangulation research model of the thesis

Although the most important reason for using triangulation is to increase validity and

credibility of study results, Shih argues that there are two important rationales for

using triangulation. The first rationale is for confirmatory purpose (confirmation of

qualitative data analysis with quantitative data analysis results). The second rationale

is to use triangulation for completeness purposes - i.e., to increase the depth and

understanding of the study by combining a variety of methods, theories and

approaches.[224] These two reasons are the basis of the use of triangulation in this

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[223] Denzin's other technique is; investigator triangulation (using more than one observer to gather and interpret data) http://www.bup.edu.bd/journal/154-163.pdf (accessed on August 26, 2015)

[224] While Web (1966), Smith & Kleine (1986) and Denzin (1978), Webb, Campbell, Schwartz, & Sechrest, (1966) see conformity as a main reason of triangulation, Olsen (2004) believes the idea of completeness is the main reason. See Denzin, N. (1978) The Research Act: A Theoretical Introduction to Sociological Methods, New York: McGraw-Hill; Smith, M. and Kleine, P. (1986) Qualitative

thesis. It is important to note that if reliability is established by employing triangulation uncertainty and incredibility of the research findings will be reduced.[225] Therefore, multiple theoretical perspectives, data sources, and analysis methods are utilized to study Turkish NRCs in order to establish the validity and reliability of findings.

3.4 Content Analysis

The content analysis is "a technique for making psychological inferences about politically relevant aspects of the personality of political actors from the systematic, objective study of written and transcribed oral material."[226] In this thesis, content analysis is employed to help understand actors' political objectives through a psychological assessment of written and verbal materials. Particularly, content analysis method is employed to examine Turkish decision makers' official statements for the purpose of interfering in their political perceptions regarding Turkey's roles in its international relations. Leaders' political world views and beliefs help to shape Turkey's national roles. For this reason, the thesis aims to understand and identify how leaders locate self and others within the system. In this sense, this thesis simultaneously aims highlight noticeable shifts in Turkish foreign policy by focusing on the interplay between the personality (political psychology)

Research and Evaluation: Triangulation and Multimethods Reconsidered, in Williams D. (ed), Naturalistic Evaluation (New Directions for Program Evaluation), San Francisco: Jossey-Bass; Olsen, Wendy (2004) Triangulation in Social Research: Qualitative and Quantitative Method Can Really be Mixed, in Holborn M. (ed), Developments in Sociology, Ormskirk: Causeway Press.

[225] Webb, (1966), p. 3.

[226] D. G. Winter and Stewart, A. J. (1977). Content analysis as a method of studying political leaders. In M. G. Hermann (Ed.), A psychological examination of political leaders (pp. 27-6 I), p. 29, New York: Free Press. Excerpt from, Rose McDermott (2004) Political Psychology in International Relations, p. 31, The University of Michigan Press. For historical background of content analysis see K. Krippendorff (1980). *Content analysis. An Introduction to its Methodology*. Beverly Hills: Sage; K. Merten (1983). *Inhaltsanalyse. Einführung in Theorie, Methode und Praxis*. Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag.

and beliefs systems of political leaders. Additionally, the use of content analysis method helps to explain past and future foreign policy decision making processes and the political objectives of individuals (leaders).[227] Through content analysis, the thesis utilizes current and past speeches of key decision makers in Turkey to assess and compare foreign policy behaviors (NRCs and belief systems) of different administrations since 1980.

The thesis analyzes speeches of eighteen central political figures, see *Table 4* for the list of key political figures in Turkish foreign policy between 1980-2014, from different governments since 1980 in order to understand and reveal the state's NRCs and the underlying philosophical and instrumental beliefs of Turkey's foreign policymaking elite, as well as assess continuity and changes in Turkish foreign policy through the use of role theory and operational code analysis. Official statements of these political figures are examined through the rigorous lenses of both quantitative (automated) and qualitative (hand coding) content analysis methods. Some of the leaders' statements and policy documents are readily available online and have been gathered from official government websites.[228] However, most of the documentation prior to the 2000s were not available electronically so they were collected from the National Library in Ankara, Turkey, and were transformed into digital format for coding purposes. All collected documents focus primarily on foreign policy issues.

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[227] McDermott (2004), p. 22.

[228] Official Turkish government web pages: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, http://www.mfa.gov.tr/default.en.mfa; Presidency, http://www.tccb.gov.tr/, and Prime Ministry, http://www.basbakanlik.gov.tr/Forms/pg_Main.aspx

In the analysis part, all governments since 1980 are studied in two parts; 'pre-AKP governments' and 'AKP governments'. The 'pre-AKP' period comprised the analysis of six cabinets; (1) *Military,* 21 September1980 - 13 December 1983, (2) *Motherland Party*, 13 December 1983 – 21 December 1987; *Motherland Party*, 21 December 1987 – 31 October 1989, *Motherland Party*, 9 November 1989 – 23 June 1991, *Motherland Party*, 23 June 1991 - 20 November 1991, (3) *True Path Party* (coalition government, coalition partner with the Social Democratic Populist Party) , 20 November 1991 – 16 May 1993 - *True Path Party* (coalition government, coalition partner with the Democratic Party, the Republican People's Party *and* the Social Democratic Populist Party *)*, 25 June 1993 – 5 October 1995, (4) *Welfare Party* (coalition government, coalition partner with The Democratic Party), 28 June 1996 - 30 June 1997, (5) *Motherland Party* (coalition government, coalition partner with Democratic Left Party and Democrat Turkey Party), 30 June 1997 -11 January 1999, (6) *Democratic Left Party* (coalition government, coalition partner with Nationalist Movement Party and Motherland Party), 28 May 1999 – 18 November 2002. On the other hand, 'AKP governments' period covers the AKP administrations from November 18, 2002 to August 28, 2014. For the AKP period data collection ends in August 28, 2014 when Davutoğlu became Prime Minister and Erdoğan became the President.

Table 4: Key Political figures in Turkish foreign policy, 1980-2014

Political Figures	Time Period	Title	Cabinet
Bülend Ulusu	September 21, 1980 –December 13, 1983	Prime Minister	Military
İlter Türkmen	September 21, 1980- November 24, 1983	Foreign Minister	Military
Kenan Evren	November 9, 1982 - November 9, 1989	President	Military
Vahit M. Halefoğlu	December 13, 1983- December 21, 1987	Foreign Minister	Motherland Party

Turgut Özal	December 13,1983 – October 29, 1989	Prime Minister	Motherland Party
	November 9, 1989 - May 16, 1993	President	
Yıldırım Akbulut	November 9, 1989 – June 23, 1991	Foreign Minister	Motherland Party
Ali Bozer	February 22, 1990- December 12, 1990	Foreign Minister	Motherland Party
Süleyman Demirel	November 20, 1991–May 16, 1993	Prime Minister	True Path Party
	May 16, 1993 - May 16, 2000	President	
Tansu Çiller	June 25, 1993–March 6, 1996	Prime Minister	True Path Party
Necmettin Erbakan	June 28, 1996–June 30, 1997	Prime Minister	Welfare Party
Mesut Yılmaz	June 30, 1997–January 11, 1999	Prime Minister	Motherland Party
İsmail Cem	June 30, 1997- July 11, 2002	Foreign Minister	Motherland Party
Bülent Ecevit	January 11, 1999–November 18, 2002	Prime Minister	Democratic Left Party
Ahmet Necdet Sezer (Independent)	May 16, 2000 - August 28, 2007	President	Democratic Left Party
Abdullah Gül	March 14, 2003- August 28, 2007	Foreign Minister	Justice and Development Party
	November 18, 2002 – March 14, 2003	Prime Minister	
	August 28, 2007- August 28, 2014	President	
Recep Tayyip Erdoğan	March 14, 2003– August 28, 2014	Prime Minister	Justice and Development Party
Ali Babacan	August 29, 2007- May 2, 2009	Foreign Minister	Justice and Development Party
Ahmet Davutoğlu	May 2, 2009- August 28, 2014	Foreign Minister	Justice and Development Party

The thesis studies 'pre-AKP' cabinets' separately.[229] On the other hand, three consecutive terms of 'AKP administration from 2002 until 2014 are studied together because the thesis makes the assumption that AKP administrations tend to adopt different NRCs than previous administrations. In order to test this assumption, the

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[229] In 'pre-AKP' period Motherland Party and True Path Party served more than one period consecutively, therefore these periods are analyzed as single period. Caretaker governments are not studied separately instead included in following ways: Caretaker government under Tansu Çiller leadership (True Path Party and the Republican People's Party) until establishment of the coalition government: October 30, 1995 – March 6, 1996 and Mesut Yılmaz caretaker government, March 6, 1996 – June 28, 1996 included to Welfare Part period; DSP minority government under Bülent Ecevit until scheduled elections: January 11, 1999 – May 28, 1999, included to the Democratic Left Party coalition government.

incumbent AKP administration is compared to all other governments between 1980 and 2002. The thesis also provides a comparative analysis of NRCs adopted under different governments and leaderships. In this way, it is possible to observe particular national roles assigned by different administrations and observe possible changes in NRCs and leader's belief systems over a period of time.

The thesis chooses to rely only on official speeches of leaders to explain and understand national role conception of states. One of the most important reasons for this is because speeches are written by scriptwriters to achieve a certain political and symbolic effects.[230] An official speech of a key decision maker is the mirror of his/her worldview and ideologies; it reflects parts of the decision maker's program and agenda. The most influential scholars in the field; Winter, Hermann, Weintraub, and Walker believe that leaders' speeches can be accepted as their own words. They underline that "leaders' speeches, whoever the author of speech might be, are considered as the leader's own words."[231] Because if leaders accept these speeches it means that what is written on the text is compatible with their world view and by delivering them, they indicate full acceptance of their contents and total agreement with the texts. Therefore, official speeches can be coded and interpreted to understand Turkey's NRCs in relation to its foreign policy objectives based on its leaders' perceptions. However, it is important to note possible objections to the use of official speeches because even though these speeches are written by speech

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[230] Kerem Öktem, (2014) "The Nation State's Blurred Borders: Erdoğan and the Emergency of Kurdistan in Turkey," Istanbul Policy Center, IPC-Mercator Policy Brief, p. 5 http://ipc.sabanciuniv.edu/en/wp-content/uploads/2014/01/IPC_BLURRING-THE-BORDERS_web.pdf (accessed on August 26, 2015)

[231] D. G. Winter, Hermann, M. G., Weintraub, W., & Walker, S. G. (1991). The Personalities of Bush and Gorbachev Measured at a Distance: Procedures, Portraits, and Policy. Political Psychology, Vol. 12, No. 2, pp. 215-24, p. 218-219.

writers whose world views and political ideologies are compatible with those of the decision makers, these texts are written not by a leaders who deliver the speeches but by speech writers. Therefore, it can be argued that it could be difficult to directly gain access into the 'state of mind' (psychology of leaders) to examine leaders' perceptions on world issues and state's position and role in international system.[232] In order to overcome this challenge, the thesis draws from a wider variety of sources besides official speeches including interviews (assuming that interviews usually elicit spontaneous statements that provide insights into leaders' own views) and transcripts of press conferences.

The thesis utilizes both qualitative and quantitative content analysis methods in order to complement role theory with operational code analysis which helps to understand Turkish foreign policy behavior and its status within the international system. In qualitative content analysis technique in total 1437 official speeches of eighteen leaders are analyzed.[233] This thesis aims at analyzing all available official speeches of the targeted leaders. The thesis looks at the population of all speeches except those that do not fit the criteria. Therefore, no random sampling strategies were used; instead purposive selection strategy is utilized. Yasar Yakis, Mumtaz Soysal and Sukru Sina Gurel were discarded from this research because they did not have any

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[232] See Jervis, 1989; David G. Winter, "Things I've Learned About Personality From Studying Political Leaders at a Distance," Journal of Personality 73:3, June 2005; Hermann, M. G. (1980). Explaining foreign policy behavior using the personal; Krippendorff 1980; Mayring 1994; Jervis, 1989 characteristics of political leaders. International Studies Quarterly, 24, 7–46; Winter, D. G. (1992). Content analysis of archival data, personal documents, and everyday verbal productions. In C. P. Smith (Ed.), Motivation and personality: Handbook of thematic content analysis (pp. 110–125). New York: Cambridge University Press; Winter, D. G., Hermann, M. G., Weintraub, W., & Walker, S. G. (1991b). The personalities of Bush and Gorbachev measured at a distance: Procedures, portraits, and policy. Political Psychology, No. 12, pp. 215–245.

[233] Total number of speeches is 1437, original population of speeches were larger than this number of sources. During the coding some statements were considered ambiguous after several readings and these speeches were discarded and not included the total number of speeches.

speeches available in national library or government official web pages. The thesis relies on the specific criteria for the selection of speeches that is used in qualitative content analysis;

(a) Only official speeches and interviews relevant to foreign policy and international relations.

(b) Transcripts both in Turkish and English language.

(c) Speeches delivered in various situations and places including parliamentary speeches, annual press conferences, invitational events, conferences, forums and symposiums.

(d) No limit in length of speeches.

Qualitative content analysis is utilized through hand-coding technique. This method aims to reveal frequency of NRCs led by Turkish decision makers based on the reading and interpretation of texts. The qualitative content analysis part of the coding is conducted with the assistance of ATLAS.ti data analysis software, for official speeches and interviews.

The hand-coding procedures follow as creating pre-defined code book (see *Table 5* for the thesis code book). Then, all available texts/data have been read. In this part the coder decides which selected part(s) of the text (words/phrases/patters) is relevant through interpretation, and attaches a related code to the text that includes the data. The code book consists of two units of analysis; list of NRCs and eighteen political figures whose speeches are coded in Turkey, for detailed definition of NRCs see *Table 6*.

Table 5: Codebook used in Atlas.ti programme

ROLES (National Role Conceptions)	ACTORS
|R1.Bastionofrevolutionliberator|	|A1.BulendUlusu|
|R2.RegionalLeader|	|A2.İlterTurkmen|
|R3.RegionalProtector|	|A3.KenanEvren|
|R4.ActiveIndependent|	|A4.TurgutÖzal|
|R5.LiberationSupporter|	|A5.VahitHalefoglu|
|R6.Antiimperialistagent|	|A6.YildirimAkbulut|
|R7.Defenderoffaith|	|A7.MesutYilmaz|
|R8.Mediatorintegrator|	|A8.AliBozer|
|R9.Regionalsubsystemcollaborator|	|A9.SuleymanDemirel|
|R10.Developer|	|A10.TansuCiller|
|R11.Bridge|	|A11.IsmailCem|
|R12.FaithfulAlly|	|A12.NecmettinEr
|R13.Independent|	|A13.BulentEcevit|
|R14.Example|	|A14.NecdetSezer|
|R15.InternalDevelopment|	|A15.RecepTayyipErdoğan|
|R16.Isolate|	|A16.AbdullahGul|
|R17.Protectee|	|A17.AliBabacan|
|R18.CentralCountry|	|A18.AhmetDavutoğlu|
|R19.Militarypower|	
|R20.Civilianpower|	
|R21.Softpower|	
|R22.Strategicpartner|	
|R23.PeacePromoter|	
|R24.GlobalActor|	
|R25.EnergyHub|	
|R26.RisingPower|	
|R27.Faciliator|	
|R28.AntiTerrorismAgent|	
|R29.TradingState|	
|R30.KinCountry|	
|R31.RegionalIntegrator|	
|R32.SmartPower|	
|R33.LeaderofMuslimWorld|	
|R34.ProAmerican|	
|R35.VirtuousPower |	
|R36.GlobalSub-sytemCollabrator|	
|R37.Regional Power|	
|R38.DefenderoftheMuslimWorld|	
|R39.DevelopingCountry|	

Table 6: Typology of Thesis National Role Conceptions

1. ***Bastion of revolution-liberator***: states feel responsible to organize revolutionary movements to liberate other states for instance as a responsible state, China's support for communist states in the fight against capitalism is evident in its leaders' speeches as they aim to inspire others ideologically.
2. ***Regional Leader:*** states feel responsible to handle situation and feel responsible for other states in the region.
3. ***Regional Protector:*** states feel special responsibility to handle regional issues and provide secure environment in the region.
4. ***Active Independent:*** states formulate their foreign policies independently according to their own national interest rather than the interests of others (as non-aligned states).
5. ***Liberation Supporter:*** informal support for liberation movements abroad and in this national role conception state does not have responsibility to support it like bastion states.
6. ***Anti-imperialist agent:*** state believes that they need to fight against imperialist evil states.
7. ***Defender of faith:*** states feel responsible to protect ideologies of other states against any attack such as ideological imperialism.
8. ***Mediator-integrator:*** states feel responsible to resolve conflicts between states as a third party.
9. ***Regional-subsystem collaborator:*** states feel commitments to cooperate in order to achieve wider and better communities.
10. ***Developer:*** states feel responsible to help or assist underdeveloped countries.
11. ***Bridge:*** states offers as a common communicator between different countries and cultures and provide exchange of ideas and values.
12. ***Faithful Ally:*** states have commitment to support policies of other governments in the form of special alliance.
13. ***Independent:*** In this form of non-alignment self-determination concept is important, states take policies in order to reach their national interest without looking at other states interests or objectives.
14. ***Example:*** states aim to promote their own policies and values in order to increase their influence and prestige in international affairs which refers to be a model for other state.
15. ***Internal Development:*** states are concerned with domestic issues and developments rather than international ones except economic and technical cooperation which are important for internal development. Thus states preferred not to involve into any international problems.
16. ***Isolate:*** states prefer not to contact with external world and this role basis for non-dependency and totally self-sufficient state profile.
17. ***Protectee:*** states feel responsible to provide security and protect other states
18. ***Central Country:*** this concept was introduced by Davutoğlu to Turkish foreign policy literature. According to him central country includes multiple regional identities in the center of different regions.[234]
19. ***Military power***: states' capacity to use force or the threat of force to influence other states.
20. ***Civilian power:*** states aim to achieve certain goals through non-military instrument by exerting influence, promoting democracy and human rights.
21. ***Soft power:*** states' possess "the ability to shape the preferences of others"[235] which is the ability to attract rather than use force. The concept refers to the means of persuasion to resolve international conflicts.

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[234] Davutoğlu, (2008), p. 78.

22. **Strategic Partner:** states that shares policy views on important issues such as economy, regional stability, nuclear nonproliferation, and terrorism*.*

23. **Peace Promoter:** states feel responsible to promote peace by sponsoring or facilitating the integration between conflicting parties.

24. **Global Actor:** states aim to gain more influence in global arena by intervening in global issues and using international platforms

25. **Energy Hub:** states have geostrategic advantage and located between energy rich countries and energy dependent countries.

26. **Rising Power:** states show increasing prominence in their region and play significant role in global affairs; political strength and economic growth.

27. **Facilitator:** states' effort to facilitate peace talks to maintain dialogue.

28. **Antiterrorism Agent:** states' fight against terrorism both in national and international level.

29. **Trading state:** states' increasing trade activities, bilateral and multilateral trade agreements.[236]

30. **Kin-country:** states or groups belonging to one civilization naturally try to support from other members of their civilization when they involve in an armed conflict with states or groups from a different civilization.[237]

31. **Regional integrator:** states integrate different regions through economic and political treaties.

32. **Smart Power:** states balance its soft power and hard power through smart strategies.[238]

33. **Leader of Muslim World:** states feel responsible to handle situations related with Muslim countries and feel responsible for Muslim people around the world.

34. **Pro-American:** states have favorable opinion towards America.

35. **Virtuous Power:** states act beyond pragmatic mentality for the best interest of the region beyond its national interest*.*

36. **Global Sub-system collaborator:** states feel commitments to cooperate in order to achieve wider and better communities in global context.

37. **Regional Power:** states have power within a geographic region to shape regional developments.

38. **Defender of the Muslim World:** states feel responsible to protect Muslim countries against any attack.

39. **Developing Country:** states have lower living standards and lower industrial production, and highly dependent on foreign financial and technical aid.

Source: K. J. Holsti, National Role Conceptions in the Study of Foreign Policy, International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 14, No. 3 (Sept., 1970), pp. 261-271.

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[235] According to Nye there are three ways to influence behaviors of others to get desired outcomes; coercion, payment, and attraction. He introduced the soft power concept in 1980s. He defines soft power as "the ability to get what you want through attraction rather than coercion or payments." Therefore, use of persuasion is used to convince others. See Joseph Nye, (2004) *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics* (New York: Public Affairs, p. 5.

[236] The trading concept introduced Turkish foreign policy literature by Kemak Kirişci. See Kemal Kirişci, (2009) "The Transformation of Turkish Foreign Policy: The Rise of the Trading State", *New Perspectives on Turkey,* No. 40, pp. 29-57.

[237] Samuel P. Huntington, (1993) *The Clash of Civilizations?*, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 72, No. 3, pp.22-49.

[238] See Joseph Nye, (2009) "Get Smart. Combining Hard and Soft Power", *Foreign Affairs*, p. 20 http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/65163/joseph-s-nye-jr/get-smart?page=1 (accessed on August 27, 2015)

The first seventeen roles are Holsti's typology of NRC, others have been found in the official documents.

Qualitative content analysis method is used to reveal NRCs based on the perceptions of Turkey's policymaking elites. In this part of the thesis automated coding procedure would not be useful because it can only provide descriptive results by providing word frequency results that reduces reliability and validity of research outcomes. Previous research/literature underlines that national roles are embedded in leaders' policy speeches and sometimes requires interpretation of relevant texts because NRCs can only be indicated through the use of symbolic interactions and cognitive messages within the text that requires interpretation of written or verbal materials. In order to establish inter-coder reliability in qualitative content analysis, two coders (coders trained, isolated from each other and coded separately) are used to see whether they select the same code for the same unit of text.[239]

In operational code analysis on the other hand, the quantitative content analysis method is employed through automated coding with the use of ProfilerPlus program.[240] The ProfilerPlus, Social Science Automation 2008, automated computer software system is designed as 'at–a–distance' contents analysis method to construct individuals/leaders profile through automated coding of text based on the words s/he uses. The use of automated text analysis leads quantification and proliferation of operational code analysis method among foreign policy scholars in the last decade. For operational code analysis, ProfilerPlus follows the author for each text and

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[239] Krippendorff (2004), p. 217; Roel Popping, (2010) ''Some Views on Agreement To Be Used in Content Analysis.'' *Quality and Quantity*, No, 44, pp. 1067-78, p. 1069.

[240] ProfilerPlus, Social Science Automation 2008, https://profilerplus.org/ (accessed on August 27, 2015)

makes the 'self–other' assessment and also provides automated coding based on grammatical coding rules.

The Verbs in Context System (VICS) is one of the available coding schemes to analyze operational codes of individuals. It aims to quantify/measure leaders' beliefs (philosophical and instrumental beliefs) by aiming to answer ten questions posed by Alexander George. The VICS coding scheme was developed by Stephen G. Walker, Mark Schafer, and Michael D. Young in 1998 as a content analysis method to assess leaders' beliefs by analyzing verbal or written materials. The VICS coding is available only in English language so only official translations of leaders' public documents and interviews are used in this part of the analysis. Operational code analysis is based on the assumption that beliefs as causal mechanisms define foreign policy decision making. Therefore, the identification of key decision makers' belief systems is used for explanatory purposes in assessing the adoption of particular NRCs in Turkey. Walker (et al., 1998) proposes that in order to have meaningful results, each text should contain at least 15–20 verbs for coding[241]. Therefore, only speeches which satisfy this criterion are used for analysis.

ProfilerPlus is available only in English language and text only usage. Due to the lack official English translation and electronic version of leaders' speeches I limit operational code analysis for three AKP decision makers: Ahmet Davutoğlu, Abdullah Gül, and Ali Babacan.

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[241] Schafer and Walker (2006), p. 34-6.

Hand-coding and automated coding methods both have advantages and disadvantages. Although automated coding could provide more reliable results, it does not provide sufficient room for interpretation of words/paragraphs/phrases like hand-coding. On the other hand, hand-coding suffers from human/coder biases. In order to avoid these disadvantages and challenges, this thesis aims to utilize the strengths of these two methods in order to achieve more reliable and valid results by complementing each other's weaknesses. A correlation between role theory and operational code analysis is discussed at the end of the chapter five.

3.5 Hypotheses, Key Questions and Contribution

The research design of the thesis aims to compare different Turkish governments to assess adoption of NRCs. In this way, it is possible to observe policy shifts between different administrations. The thesis aims to use role theory and operational code analysis to explain Turkish foreign policy behaviors. Therefore, role theory and operational code analysis seek to explain NRCs that Turkey adopted and the impacts of its leaders' belief systems in the formation of these roles. Based on this assumption, the thesis has three main hypotheses:

Hypothesis 1: There is change (of NRCs) in Turkish foreign policy during the AKP administration.

Hypothesis 2: Role theory and NRCs explain changes in Turkish foreign policy between 1980 and 2014.

Hypothesis 3: Operational code indices explain changes in foreign policy behavior (in this context, it explains adoption of certain NRCs in Turkey).

These hypotheses are tested through content analysis method (both hand-coding and automated coding). In order to investigate these hypotheses the thesis aims to answer the following questions:

a-To what extent does role theory explain the formulation of Turkish foreign policy and what are the main NRCs that Turkey has adopted in world politics between 1980 and 2014?

b-How do role theory and operational code analysis correspond to foreign policy behaviors of Turkey?

c-What benefit is there to utilize role theory and operational code analyses together in explaining (Turkish) foreign policy behaviors?

d- By assessing a state's NRCs and its leaders' belief systems, is it possible to speculate/make predictions about its foreign policy behaviors with any degree of accuracy?

e- Is it possible to explain change or continuity in Turkish foreign policy by using assigned NRCs?

The research questions have aimed to achieve two objectives. First, they intend to investigate possible NRCs that Turkey has adopted in international affairs. To this end, the thesis analyzes Turkish leaders' speeches and correlates findings (NRCs) with their operational codes (philosophical and instrumental beliefs). In this way, research questions aim to reveal prominent NRCs that shape Turkish foreign policy under different governments as well as highlight the role of the leaders' beliefs in the foreign policy decision making process. Secondly, the research questions aim to speculate on Turkish foreign policy behavior by investigating determinant factors and NRCs based on research results. Individuals do matter in foreign policy

formulation. It is important to note that, the thesis does not claim that role theory and leaders' belief systems exclusively explain all Turkish foreign policy behaviors and decisions by themselves or that they are indeed capable of it. Yet, the thesis covers a 34 years' time period and different governments without any sampling strategies and consequently not only provides valuable explanatory insights on shifts in Turkish foreign policy behavior, but also makes deterministic generalizations on the underlying nature of such shifts. Additionally, the thesis is also aware of the limitations of individual levels of analysis but still it is impossible to neglect the role of individuals in foreign policy decision making.[242] It is also important to state the limitations of the study of cognitive approaches and beliefs of individuals because these beliefs cannot be observed directly and it is impossible to have direct access to an individual' mind.[243] It is difficult to have direct psychological assessments by bringing leaders to laboratory environment and doing a set of experiments.[244] However, King, Keohane and Verba underline that the concept can be studied through observable consequences.[245] Therefore, observable consequences can be achieved by studying leaders' belief systems through distance assessments using

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[242] Difficulty to explain individual levels of analysis as a source of foreign policy behaviors, see J.A. Rosati, (1984) The Impact of Beliefs on Behavior: The Foreign Policy of the Carter Administration. In D.A. Sylvan and S. Chan (eds.), Foreign Policy Decision Making: Perception, Cognition, and Artificial Intelligence. New York: Praeger, pp. 158–91, p. 161; S.G. Walker, (1977) Cognitive Maps and International Realities: Henry Kissinger's Operational Code and the Vietnam War. Journal of Conflict Resolution, No. 21, pp. 129–68, p. 155; J. Kaarbo, (1997). Prime Minister Leadership Styles in Foreign Policy Decision-Making: A Framework for Research. Political Psychology, Vol. 18, No. 3, pp. 553-581, p. 577.

[243] F.A.W.J. Van Esch (2007). 'Mapping the Road to Maastricht'. Wageningen: Ponsen & Looyen B.V., p, 116; S.T. Fiske and S.E. Taylor (1991) *Social Cognition, (2nd eds.).* New York: McGraw-Hill.

[244] M. D. Young, and Schafer, M. (1998). Is There Method in Our Madness? Ways of Assessing Cognition in International Relations. *Mershon International Studies Review, Vol. 42*, No. 1, pp. 63-96, p. 67.

[245] Gary King, Robert O. Keohane, & Sidney Verba (1994) Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research, Princeton University Press, p. 41.

their speeches and interviews. Hence, operational code analysis relies on leaders' words to understand their perceptions of self and other through a set of questions which identify their philosophical and instrumental beliefs.

It is important to study every administration in Turkey since 1980 because the decision makers' perception of the environment, world views and personality differ in every government during this period. There are certain statuses within the government that are definitely occupied by decision makers such as Presidency, Prime Ministry and Foreign Ministry statuses. However, every government and set decision makers have their own ideologies. Thus, each decision makers who occupies these statuses sees and interprets the world differently. In this way, they take different decisions regarding the position of Turkey in world affairs by assuming different NRCs. The main focus in is to reveal number of NRCs that were introduced by leaders under different administrations in order to capture the static and changing dynamic of Turkish foreign policy. By focusing on the different administrations, the thesis also aims to find out the dominant NRCs and the evolution of NRCs over time.

Scholars emphasize on the role of operational code analysis analyzing NRCs. However, there is a paucity of research in relation to the application of the qualitative and quantitative methodologies to combine these two approaches for better understanding of state's foreign policy behaviors. Therefore, this thesis contributes a new research agenda in foreign policy analysis and role theory by offering a way to relate these two approaches in a single research to establish correlation between role theory and operational code analysis. Furthermore, this thesis aims to contribute to

Turkish foreign policy literature in four ways. First, the application of role theory in Turkish foreign policy analysis is scarce so the thesis contributes the development of the role theory in the Turkish FPA literature. Second, the thesis differs from existing works by using a large set of data and providing valid empirical results (both qualitative and quantitative results). Third, the thesis reveals an increasing number of NRCs for Turkey than previous works. Fourth, the thesis uses findings to speculate on future Turkish foreign policy directions by analyzing NRCs and leader's belief systems.

Chapter 4

NATIONAL ROLE CONCEPTIONS OF PRE-AKP ADMINISTARTIONS: 1980-2002

4.1 Introduction

Cabinet and leadership change is important in understanding policy changes and foreign policy formulations, especially considering the fact that policy making processes and outcomes change as new people come into leadership positions. Therefore, it is important to analyze the administrative changes between 1980 and 2002 under different leaderships because of the differences in ideas, visions, opinions and state policies as well as state foreign policies of the various leaders during these periods.[246]

It is important to bear in mind that the systemic change at the end of the Cold War influenced the foreign policy orientation of almost all states. Coplin argues that the dynamics of the international system determines how a state would behave[247] because changes in the system may cause a significant impetus in the international environment which changes state foreign policy or policies.[248] Hence, the end of the

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[246] Mustafa Aydın, (2005) Turkish Foreign Policy at the End of the Cold War: Roots and Dynamics, *The Turkish Yearbook*, Vol. 36, p. 3.

[247] W. D. Coplin (1971) *Introduction to International Politics: A Theoretical Overview.* Chicago: Markham Pub. Co, p. 140.

[248] The external factors play a greater role in system transformation then they do in the other change processes. See L. N. Lindberg, and S. Scheingold, (1970) Europe's Would-be Polity: Patterns of Change in the European Community. Princeton, NJ: Prentice-Hall, p 137-8.

Cold War generated important changes in states' policies. Smith points out two important elements that play influential role in determining state's foreign policy: the international system and states' geo-political position in this system.[249] Thus, in order to understand changes in Turkish foreign policy it is important to study its policies before and after the Cold War. As Holsti, Siverson and George underline, transformation of the international political system may led significant policy changes in country's foreign policy objectives by abandoning previous commitments or adopting new ones.[250] In this context, it is possible to observe NRCs of Turkey because the change in the system might require adopting new policies that are compatible with the changing environment. Since the 1980s there have been dramatic changes in Turkish foreign policy such as; the September 12 coup d'état, the end of the Cold War, the First Gulf War, tensions with Syria and Greece, the February 28 decisions, and the financial crises of the early 2000s. All these developments have transformed Turkey's domestic policy and foreign policy. During these periods, Turkish policy makers assumed new roles and commitments vis-a-vis its surrounding regions in a bid to meet and fulfill expectations through different NRCs.

This part of the thesis covers the pre-AKP governments and investigates the evolution of Turkish foreign policy behaviors and NRCs. See *Table 7* for the list of pre-AKP administrations. The eight hundred and twenty-nine sources for 1980-2002

[249] P. E. Dougherty and R. L. Pfatzgraff, (1974) The Role of Environment in International Relations' in J. Barber and M. Smith (eds.), *The Nature of Foreign Policy,* Edinburg, p. 87-8 excerpt from Aydın, (2005), p. 27.

[250] Stephen Genco, (1980) 'Integration Theory and System Change in Western Europe: The Neglected Role of System Transformation Episodes' in Ole Holsti et.al., eds., Change in the International System, Boulder, Colo.: Westview. p. 68.

periods provide evidence on the thirty NRCs that these leaders emphasized on. See *Figure 3* for the distribution of NRCs.

Table 7: List of Administrations between 1980-2002

President	Cabinet	Foreign Minister
Kenan Evren Head of the State and the NSC September 13, 1980- November 7, 1982 President November 7, 1982- November 9, 1989	Bülend Ulusu Cabinet September 21, 1980 –December 13, 1983 **Military**	İlter Türkmen August 27, 1980- October 24, 1983
	I.Turgut Özal Cabinet December 13, 1983 – December 21, 1987 **Motherland Party**	Vahit Halefoğlu December 13, 1983-December 21, 1987
	II.Turgut Özal Cabinet December 21, 1987 – October 31, 1989 **Motherland Party**	Ahmet Mesut Yılmaz December 21, 1987- February 20, 1990
Turgut Özal November 9, 1989-April 17, 1993	Yıldırım Akbulut Cabinet November 9, 1989- June 23, 1991 **Motherland Party**	
		Ali Bozer February 20, 1990- October 12, 1990
		Ahmet Kurtcebe Alptemoçin October 12 1990-June 23 1991
	I.Mesut Yılmaz Cabinet June 23, 1991- November 20, 1991 **Motherland Party**	İsmail Sefa Giray June 23, 1991-November 10, 1991
	VII.Demirel Cabinet November 20, 1991- June 25-1993 **True Path Party coalition with Social Democratic Populist Party**	Hikmet Çetin November 20, 1991- July 24, 1994
Süleyman Demirel May 16, 1993-May 16, 1999	I.Tansu Çiller Cabinet June 25, 1993-October 15, 1995 **True Path Party coalition with Democratic Party, the Republican People's Party and the Social Democratic Populist Party**	
		Mümtaz Soysal July 27 1994- November 23, 1994
		Murat Karayalçın December 21, 1994, March 27, 1995
		Erdal İnönü March 27, 1995- October 5, 1995
	II. Tansu Çiller Cabinet October 15, 1995-November 5, 1995 **Caretaker Government**	Coşkun Kırca October 5, 1995- October 30, 1995
		Deniz Baykal October 30, 1995- March 6, 1996
	III. Tansu Çiller Cabinet November 5, 1995- March 12, 1996 **Caretaker Government**	Emre Gönensay March 6, 1996- June 28, 1996
	II.Mesut Yılmaz Cabinet March 12 1996-July 8, 1996 **Caretaker Government**	Tansu Çiller June 28, 1996- June 30, 1997
	Necmettin Erbakan Cabinet July 8 1996- June 30, 1997 **Welfare Party Coalition with True Path Party**	
	III.Mesut Yılmaz Cabinet June 30, 1997- January 11, 1999 **Motherland Party Coalition with Democratic Left Party and Democrat Turkey Party**	İsmail Cem June 30, 1997-July 11, 2002
	IV.Bülent Ecevit Cabinet January 11, 1999- May 28, 1999 **Caretaker Government**	
Ahmet Necdet Sezer May 16, 2000	V.Bülent Ecevit Cabinet May 28, 1999- November 18, 2002 **Democratic Left Party coalition with Nationalist Movement Party and Motherland Party**	Şükrü Sina Gürel July 12, 2002-November 19, 2002

The analysis of these administrations provides a basis to understand how national roles are constructed, located, and performed by different administrations and decision makers. It is also important to analyze political regimes to understand state foreign policies. According to Goldmann political regimes are the main determinants of states' foreign policies.[251] The political regime shows the policy maker's perception of the external environment and his/her expectations shape states' policies.[252] Thus, each administration has to fulfill different expectations/obligations depending on the international structure.

[251] Kjell Goldmann, (1988) Change and Stability in Foreign Policy; The Problems and Possibilities of Detente. Princeton University Press, p. 4. Excerpt from Aydın, (2005), p. 10.

[252] Ibid.

Figure 3: Distribution of NRCs in pre-AKP period

4.2 Military Regime 1980 -1983

The Turkish Armed Forces' (TAF) have played a significant role in Turkish foreign policy since the establishment of the Republic in 1923. Since the beginning of the Republic, the TAF presumed the "guardian role" by defending the Kemalist ideology in particular, in the secular nation state. Since the early republic military elites refer to themselves as the only guarantors of the Turkish state.[253]

An example is the September 12 1980 Coup d'état in which was broadcasted on state television.[254] The National Security Council (NSC, Milli Güvenlik Kurulu-MGK) members stated that the military was imposing martial law, and dissolved the parliament and government.[255] It also suspended the Constitution and banned all political parties and trade unions. Burak describes the 1980 Coup d'état as a 'Guardian Regime' and the longest complete military rule in Turkish politics.[256] She claims that in the Guardian Regime military established direct control over politics.[257] In this kind of regime military officers cleaned the messed up of politicians through restrictions of civil liberties.[258] Evren justified the military takeover in 1980 as a result of the civilian government's failure to overcome

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[253] Burak, (2011), p. 143

[254] The military take-over in 1980 is not the first intervention in Turkey; the first intervention was in 1960 and second one in 1971. There were signs of upcoming military intervention. In September 1979, Kenan Evren, the Chief of the General Staff, assigned Haydar Saltık, Commander of Chief, to investigate whether there is need for military coup or is it better to warned politicians. See Kenan Evren, (1990) Kenan Evren'in Anıları, 1. Cilt, İstanbul: Milliyet, p. 283.

[255] "Timeline: A history of Turkish coups" Aljazeera April 4, 2012
 http://www.aljazeera.com/news/europe/2012/04/20124472814687973.html (accessed on August 26, 2015)

[256] Burak (2011), p 156.

[257] Ibid.

[258] William Hale, (1996) Türkiye'de Ordu ve Siyaset. İstanbul: Hil Yayınları, p. 260; Burak (2011), p 156.

increasing terror activities. Military members of the NSC decided to implement legislative and executive power.[259] On the State Tv broadcast, Evren promised to return civilian rule and limited the role of military until the establishment of the new constitution and a democratic transition. According to Hale, the 1980 military intervention not only lived longer than the 1960 and the 1971 coups but it was also more successful.[260]

Heper and Tachau underline that ın 1980 the government already lost its authority and legitimacy through economic breakdown and increased civil violence.[261] Also, separatism of political parties, anarchy, terror, and, economic instabilities have helped military staff to justify these interventions in order to restore political and economic stability.

Following the intervention, military officers took control of Turkish politics and assumed the control of the state through the NSC. Evren became the chairman of the NSC and later the Head of the State and finally President in 1982; naval officer Bülend Ulusu became the Prime Minister and İlter Türkmen was appointed as Foreign Minister. Birand underlines that at the beginning of the coup, military leadership had in mind to appoint a civilian cabinet to run the country under their authority but, politicians were unwilling to be a part of the coup. Eventually, Ulusu's

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[259] The military members of the National Security Council is; Kenan Evre Chief of the General Staff, General Nurettin Ersin the commander of land forces, General Tahsin Sahinkaya air force commander , Admiral Nejat Turner navy commander and General Sedat Celasun gendarmerie commander, see Hale (1996), p. 247.

[260] Hale (1996), p 246.

[261] Tachau and Heper (1983), p. 25.

Cabinet was formed on September 21, 1980.[262] Apart from Ulusu, five of the ministers were also retired military staff. In addition to this, Turgut Özal was appointed as deputy prime minister responsible for economic affairs.

This military intervention changed the nature of Turkish politics fundamentally in terms of its economy, domestic politics and foreign policy. Aydın points out that the political orientation between the military staff and civilians are quite different. He claims that military personnel's' aim to defend the country, therefore their perception of Turkey's national interest and the ways to achieve it are different than those of civilians.[263] Therefore, the military elite made fundamental changes in Turkish politics. For the military regime period alone, a total of fifty-nine official speeches were coded. See *Figure 4* for the distribution of NRCs of the military regime.


Figure 4: NRCs of Military Regime

[262] Mehmet Ali Birand, (1987), The General's Coup. London: Brassey's Defence Publishers, p. 200-2.

[263] Aydın, (2005), p. 9.

According to the above figure the most significant NRC of the military elite was its relationship and commitment to the Western alliance and NATO (faithful ally role). The Islamic revolution in Iran in 1979 and invasion of Afghanistan by Soviet Union in the same year enhanced Turkey's strategic importance for the West. Therefore, despite the fact that there had been a military coup and criticisms on human right abuses, Turkish-American relations instead rapidly grew during the military regime, and Turkey continued to receive foreign aid during the 1980s. Between the period 1980-1990 Turkey received a total of 1 billion 629 million U.S. dollars in economic aid and 5 billion and 266 million U.S. dollars in security assistance.[264] Ulusu underlined that:

> Turkey's peaceful foreign policy has gained more importance in today's international political conjuncture. The basis of Turkish foreign policy is national security and maintenance of international peace. In this framework, NATO membership continues to preserve its importance in our foreign policy. The deterrence power of the alliance is important for the preservation of both national security and international security. We consider our alliance membership and obligations in this context that we faithfully fulfill.[265]

Therefore, military elites continuously state that Turkey will continue to be part of the Western alliance despite its increasing relations with Middle Eastern countries.

One of the most significant changes in Turkish foreign policy was its relation with the European Community (EC). Turkey was isolated by the EC; the EC also toughened its policies toward Turkey by suspending financial aid packages on

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[264] See Sedat Laçiner,(2009) Turgut Özal Period in Turkish Foreign Policy: Özalizm, *Usak Yearbook*, Vol. 2, pp. 153-205, p. 174.

[265] Bülend Ulusu (1983) "IV Press Conference," speech given at the press conference on January 20, (unofficial translation).

January 22, 1982, abolished the Joint Turkish-European Parliamentary Committee, and froze the Fourth Protocol.[266]

As a response to Turkey's isolation from the West, Evren and Ulusu indicated Turkey's desire to balance against the European criticism of military intervention by turning to Middle Eastern states. The military elite aimed to established closer relations with Middle Eastern countries. To this end, the military regime also decided to downgrade its diplomatic relations with Israel in order to gain sympathy from the Arab world and members of the Organization of the Islamic Conference (IOC).[267] They attended almost all of the ICO meetings. When Ulusu attended the third Islamic Summit in January 25-28, 1981 in Saudi Arabia, he delivered a speech on January 27; in his speech he explained changing Turkish foreign policy in the age of détente. He defended the right of Palestinians by adopting a liberation supporter NRC stance. Ulusu believed that:

> Palestinian people's basic rights including that of self-determination define the essence of the Middle Eastern conflict. A partial or comprehensive solution represents justice for Palestinian people. Turkey is connected to Jerusalem through history and spiritual bounding. Turks always defend Jerusalem's Islamic character and Palestinian people's right from foreign interventions.[268]

In this way Ulusu provided informal support for the Palestinian liberation. Turkey feels it has a responsibility to handle the Arab-Israeli conflict to provide a secure environment in the region. Therefore, it also assumed a regional protector role by

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[266] Laçiner (2009), p. 157-8.

[267] Ibid.

[268] Bülend Ulusu (1981) "The Third Islamic Summit Conference," speech given at the 3rd Islamic Summit on January 27 (unofficial translation).

supporting the Palestinian people against Israel. Ulusu underlined Turkey's regional

protector role by emphasizing on Turkey's increasing support to the Middle Eastern

countries. He further argued that:

> Turkey supports Arab countries politically in the Middle Eastern problem. Following the latest Israeli attacks on Lebanon, Turkey proved that it stood with brother Arab countries with which it shares historical and cultural ties. In this context, Turkey provided 10 Million TL worth of medicine and medical equipment to help Lebanese and Palestinians wounded in Lebanon. Additionally, we preserved quotas for the treatment of wounded Palestinians and Lebanese in our hospitals. [269]

On the other hand, Foreign Minister Turkmen underlined Turkey's dual bridge and

regional-subsystem collaborator roles. He said that:

> In every way Turkey is a bridge country, a connection. It is a bridge between developing countries and developed countries; it is a bound between continents, and civilizations. It is impossible for Turkey to turn its back to the West while increasing relations with Middle East, or to end its relations with the Middle Eastern countries while establishing economic integration with the West. This would be meaningless and oppose our country's socio-economic structure. [270]

In his speech Turkmen indicates that Turkey as a bridge country is not only

establishing connection between the East and the West but also creating civilizational

integration to achieve regional cooperation for a better community. Until November

6, 1983, the military regime consolidated its power and remained the leading force in

Turkish politics.

4.3 Motherland Party 1983–1991

Three years later after the September 12 coup d'état, direct military rule ended with

the re-establishment of a multi-party parliamentary system in Turkish politics. Özal

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[269] Bülend Ulusu (1981) "IV Press Conference," speech given at the press conference on August, 15 (unofficial translation).

[270] İlter Türkmen (1982) "Foreign Policy and Economy," speech given at the press conference on March 29, (unofficial translation).

formed a Motherland Party, (*Anavatan Partisi,* ANAP) on May 20, 1983. Although the military government was not in favor of his party, they tolerated the party and did not ban it from politics. The military coup turned out to be advantageous for Özal because it prepared a suitable basis for the implementation of his ideas especially during the period of military rule when all political parties had been banned. In the general election on November 6, 1983 ANAP won 45% of the votes and gained 212 seats in the parliament. The assembly was convened on November 24 and the military junta officially ended on December 6, 1983. This was the beginning of the Özal era that would transform Turkey for the following decade.

Kalaycıoğlu believes that Özal's party orientation represents the interest of the middle class society (*Orta Direk*) and ideologically brings together conservative Islam, nationalism and economic liberalism.[271] Göle interprets this process as 'Islamic social engineering' project.[272] Additionally, Kalaycıoğlu explains that Özal's social engineering project as the liberal economic rationality is based on export led growth in a globalized world which opens Turkish markets to the free market economy.[273] In order to do that Özal aimed to establish a new social structure based on both Sunni moral religious values and the competitive strength of companies by creating a new form of modern Turkish society devoted to conservative values.[274] Özal believed that synthesizing Islamic values is important for re-integrating Turkey to the Europe and the West.

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[271] Kalaycıoğlu (2002), p. 45.

[272] Nilüfer Göle, (1996) "Authoritarian Secularism and Islamist Politics: The Case of Turkey," in Augustus Richard Norton (ed.). *Civil Society in the Middle East*, New York: E.J. Brill.

[273] Kalaycıoğlu (2002), p. 46.

[274] Ibid.

Özal's government had to face the reality that Turkey was isolated both from the West and the East, inherited from the military regime. Therefore, in order to recover Turkey's position in the international arena Özal aimed to implement revolutionary ideas to end Turkey's economic and political isolation in the region through his liberalized and globalized economic policies. Özal aimed to integrate the Turkish economy to the world economy and economic priorities and foreign direct investment strategies became important components of Turkish foreign policy.[275] However, President, Evren, continued to dominate foreign policy making because the 1982 constitution gave more power to the NSC and empowered the president against the cabinet.[276] Although the military regime ended in 1983, the military continued to be an important and effective force in Turkish politics.

During the ANAP government Turkey counties to establish stronger ties with Middle Eastern countries. Evren, became the first president to attend the OIC meetings, he attended the Fourth OIC summit in January 1984 in Casablanca. He was appointed as president to the Chairmanship of the Standing Committee on Economic and Commercial Cooperation (COMCEC). In November 1984 Turkey hosted the Economic Development and Cooperation Committee of the IOC meeting. During the ANAP tenure, three hundred and twenty speeches were coded. *See Figure 5* for the distribution of NRCs of ANAP between 1983 and 1991.

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[275] Aydın, (2005), p. 22.

[276] See Kemal H. Karpat, (1988) 'Military Interventions: Army-Civilian Relations in Turkey before and After 1980', in Metin Heper and Ahmet Evin (eds.), State, Democracy and the Military. Berlin: Walter de Gryter, p. 153.

Figure 5: NRCs of Motherland Party 1983–1991

The above figure highlights that the most significant NRC that Özal's administration constantly emphasized was Turkey's bridge role between the East and the West. According to Vahit Halefoğlu, Minister of Foreign Affairs:

Turkey's foreign policy has been influenced by its geographic location. Being situated at the crossroads of three major continents, the Anatolian Peninsula has been subject to a tremendous amount of interaction between Europe, Middle East and Asia, which, in fact has helped shape its culture and identity. In return Anatolia has provided a vital link between them. This role of a bridge also helps explain why Turkey has always attracted so much interest in the region.[277]

Turkey's unique geopolitical position makes it both a European and a Middle Eastern country. Therefore, Özal's leadership emphasized on Turkey's bridge NRC, and defined Turkey as a bridge between the developed Western countries and developing world. Evren emphasized on Turkey's bridge role as being both a Muslim and a secular state. He claims that:

Turkey's relation with Europe does not challenge Turkey's relation with other countries. On the contrary, it makes Turkey to play a important role. Turkey is a bridge between Islamic countries, the Middle East, Asian countries and the EC. In other words, Turkey is not only geographically but also a political and cultural bridge between these regions.[278]

As a bridge country Turkey's relation with the West is not contradictory with its relation with the Islamic countries.

Halefoğlu emphasized on Turkey's regional sub-system collaborator role by pointing out Turkey's increasing efforts in regional cooperation. He underlines that:

We are trying to negotiate with Iran for an oil pipe-line and a gas pipe-line crossing Turkey. With this project, natural gas extracted from Qatar would be transferred through Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Iraq and Turkey to reach Western Europe. If we make this happen Turkey will approach the Middle East and the Europe and serve regional peace.[279]

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[277] Vahit Halefoğlu (1985) "World Economic Form" speech given at the roundtable meeting in Istanbul, on March 21, (official translation).

[278] Kenan Evren, (1989) "Malaysia TV Interview" speech given for TV interview on February 1, (unofficial translation).

[279] Vahit Halefoğlu (1985) "Interview with Belgium TV, La Libre Belqique," speech given for TV interview on July 17, (unofficial translation).

Özal also believed that economic cooperation is the best way to achieve peace and stability in the region and Turkey as a bridge country should play the role of a regional subsystem collaborator in order to achieve better communities in its regions. Özal underlines that:

> Turkey is a big market and through its close relations it still bridges for Europe. These developments naturally provide interest for EC countries. For instance, through investments in Turkey it is possible to reduce the unemployment rate, and free movement will no longer be a problem for member countries.[280]

During Özal's tenure, despite its military alignment, Turkey continued to stand against Israel and defended the Palestinian people. As a liberation supporter, Özal, underlined Turkey's support for the Palestinian liberation movement during Yasser Arafat' visit in October 1988. He said; "with a historic period of struggle of our Palestinian brothers for the achievement of their legitimate rights, including that of establishing an independent state of their own."[281] In another speech Özal underlined importance of the withdrawal of Israel from Arab territories and called for the recognition of the legitimate rights of the Palestinians, as well as establish an independent state.[282]

In the 1987 general elections, the ANAP gained 36.3% of votes. On April 14, 1987, Turkey officially applied for official membership to the EC. However, two years later on December 18, 1989 the EC rejected Turkey's application without specifying

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[280] Turgut Özal, (1988) "Work Week" speech given at the Turkey and Europe community commissions joint meeting on September 12, (unofficial translation).

[281] Turgut Özal (1988) "Dinner for the Honor of Palestine Revolutionary Forces Leader Yaser Arafat." Speech given on October 24, (official translation).

[282] Turgut Özal "Dinner for the Honor of Jordan Prince Hassan Bin Tallal," speech given on November 15, (official translation).

any time limit for future negotiation talks.[283] Although Özal succeeded to integrate Turkey with the external world through growing exports, he could not implement his foreign policy objectives until the early 1990s.

Özal served as the Prime Minister from 1983-1989 and later as the President 1989-93. During the first part of Özal's tenure, Turkey's economic relations dominated Turkish politics. He focused on the domestic issues and tried to balance between the military and civilian regime and was mostly concerned about the economy in order to restore Turkey's external relations and reduce its economic isolation. Evren dominated Turkey's external and internal security and foreign policy issues. On the other hand, the civilian cabinet was mainly responsible for economic related matters. The 1987 military government continued to dominate Turkish politics and identified Turkey as faithful ally to the West. Evren claimed that "Turkey and the US were faithful allies and shared the same world vision with common values and interests. NATO membership was the beginning of this alliance."[284] By the end of the Cold War, "Özal had become the undisputed political leader of Turkey (1989-1991)."[285]

The end of the Cold War offered both challenges and opportunities for Turkey. Aydın explains the uncertainty of this new era as a ; "game that Turkey played for 45 years ended and was replaced by a new game, the rules of which were not yet

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[283] See Commission of the European Communities (1989) Commission opinion on Turkey's request for accession to the Community, SEC (89) 2290 final. Brussels: December 20, 1989 http://aei.pitt.edu/4475/1/4475.pdf (accessed on August 26, 2015)

[284] Kenan Evren (1987) "Interview with Politique Internationale," speech given on February 11, (unofficial translation)

[285] Ibid., p. 34.

known."[286] The decline of the Soviet threat with the rise of Mikhail Gorbachev and the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan weakened Turkish-American relations and raised the question of Turkey's importance for the West. On the one hand, many argued that Turkey's strategic importance would decline. On the other, others argued that Turkey's position is constantly rising due to its geographic location (being at the center of Europe and the Middle East).[287]

With the dissolution of the Soviet Union Turkey found itself surrounded by regional conflicts especially in the Middle East, such as; the First Gulf War and conflicts in former Soviet Union regions such as; the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict in the Caucasus, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo in the Balkans. According to Aydın in post-Cold War era Turkish foreign policy shifted from isolationist policies from regional conflict to the active participation.[288] During the First Gulf war, Özal desired to side with the Americans which lead to clashes with the military elite. However, as President Özal continued to control domestic political developments as well as the political superiority over the military. In this new period, Özal acted independently of the military in foreign policy matters.[289] After the Iraq annexation of Kuwait in August 2, 1990, UN Security Council Resolution 661 was adopted on August 6, 1990. The resolution aimed to impose sanctions against Iraq but this would

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[286] Mustafa Aydın, (2004), Turkish Foreign Policy Framework and Analysis, p. 62, http://www.sam.gov.tr/perceptions/sampapers/mustafaaydin.pdf (accessed on July 20, 2015).

[287] See Stephen C. Calleya, (2006) EU-Turkish Relations: Prospects and Problems, *Mediterranean Quarterly*, Vol. 17, No. 2, pp. 40-47, p. 43.

[288] Aydın, (2005), p. 31.

[289] Özal's succeeded to transformed domestic politics and foreign policy which is mostly referred as Özalism or neo-Ottomanism Due to the Turkey's increasing activism in the Middle East Motherland Party members were labeled as an 'Islamist' by the secularist circle. See Laçiner (2009) p. 157-8.

not have been possible unless Turkey closed the Kirkuk-Ceyhan petrol pipeline.[290]

Özal closed down the Iraqi-Turkish pipeline and supported the economic embargo on Iraq as a faithful ally of the West. Özal aimed to exploit opportunities arising from the First Gulf War. According to Özal, all these developments eventually will remind the West of Turkey's geostrategic significance. In January 17, 1991 the Turkish Grand National Assembly authorized the deployment of Turkish armed forces into foreign countries and also allowed foreign troops deployment in Turkey. This gave Özal extra power and he not only opened the İncirlik airbase for coalition forces but also deployed Turkish forces to the southeast of Turkey to fight against the insurgency of the PKK and other threats from Iraq.[291] Özal was trying to persuade the West about Turkey's significance in the Balkans, the Middle East, Caucasia, the Black Sea and Central Asia.

However, the military was against Turkey's involvement in these wars. Chief of the Staff Necip Torumtay criticized Özal's foreign policy and called it 'adventurist' which endangered Turkey's security.[292] Nevertheless, Özal was effectively controlling foreign policymaking and this caused unrest in military. As a result of Özal's dominance and centralization in policy and decision making, Foreign Minister

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[290] William Hale, (1992) "Turkey, the Middle East and the Gulf Crisis," *International Affairs*, Vol. 68, No. 4, pp. 679-692, p.684.

[291] A. Karaosmanoğlu, (2000) "The Evolution of the National Security Culture and the Military in Turkey" Journal of International Affairs 54, pp. 199-216, p. 211; Mehmet Özkan (2006) Turkish Activism in the Middle East after 1990s: Towards a Periodization of Three Waves, *Turkish Review of Middle East Studies*, 17, 157-186, p. 167.

[292] See, Philip Robins, (1992) "Turkish Policy and the Gulf Crisis: Adventurist or Dynamic?" in Clement H. Dodd, ed., Turkish Foreign Policy: New Prospects, Cambridgeshire, UK: Eothen Press; Laçiner (2009), p. 198

Ali Bozer, Defense Minister Sefa Giray and Chief of Staff General Necip Torumtay resigned from their positions.[293]

Irrespective of what was happening domestically, Özal seized the opportunity to develop good neighborly relations with new emerging states at the end of the Cold War. After the collapse of the Marxist-Leninist model, the Turkish model of liberal democracy was proposed as the only model reasonably possible for former Soviet countries. Due to the international transformation in its neighborhood newly independent countries like Bosnia, Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan turned their face towards Turkey.[294] Turkey's historical and civilizational bonds with these newly independent republics made Turkey into an economic and political model for these new republics especially for the Turkic world. The changes in Turkey's neighbourhood shaped Özal's perception about Turkey's possible new role in the region. Therefore, changes in systemic level indirectly shaped individual level decision making and led Özal to pusruse certain roles to enhance Turkey's geopolitical significance. In post-Cold War period, Özel exploited this opportunity and aimed to unite these newly emerging countries with Turkey through various telecommunication and transportation projects such as; the Balkan Highway Project between Albania, Bulgaria, and Turkey.[295] Özal also belived that the Turkish model was more suitable for these contries compared to the Russian, Iranian or Saudi

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[293] Ertan Efegil, (2001) "Foreign Policy-Making in Turkey: A Legal Perspective," *Turkish Studies*, Vol. 2, No.1, pp. 147-160, p.156; Alan Makovsky, "The New Activism in Turkish Foreign Policy," SAIS Review, Winter-Spring 1999; Alan Makovsky (1999) The New Activism in Turkish Foreign Policy, http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/the-new-activism-in-turkish-foreign-policy (accessed on August 26, 2015)

[294] Laçiner (2009), p. 185-6.

[295] Laçiner (2009), p. 190.

models.[296] According to Laçiner, Turkey's relation with the West, economic development, secular and democratic values can play positive role to decrease fundamentalism and conflict in the region.[297] Turkey also increased its investments and exports to newly established republics. Özal believed that Turkey's economic and cultural cooperation with these countries could put an end to Turkey's isolation. Ali Bozer believed that Turkey's example NRC was depending on Turkey's EC membership process. He said that

> Turkey has set her sights firmly on EC membership and has pursued policies consistent with her European ambitions for nearly seven decades. Apart from major and manifold economic benefits that the Community is to secure from Turkey joining the former, will be the inspiration this would give to moderate Islamic countries. The Turkish example, "demonstrating that a country whose majority is of Islamic faith can be built on modern, democratic and secular principles without losing its cultural heritage, would be immense of value to the entire Western world at a time when interreligious dialogue is increasingly threatened by fundamentalist bigotry.[298]

This was the beginning of active Turkish foreign policy in early 1990s. Turkey was the first country to recognize the independence of these emerging states in the region.[299] Turkey abandoned its traditional policies to avoid foreign tension and conflicts and became an active participant in regional issues to maintain international order. Especially in the Bulgarian case where Turkey adopted the protectee NRC. Özal underlined that Turkey "is a nation that cherishes oppressed people including Iraq and Bulgaria. Turkey is capable of giving help to Turkic citizens. Turkey will stand with its Bulgarian brothers; look after their rights and properties left behind by

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[296] Laçiner (2009), p. 192.

[297] Ibid.

[298] Ali Bozer (1990) speech given at the permanent committee for foreign affairs of Dutch Parliament on May 29, (official translation).

[299] Sedat Laçiner and M. Türker Arı, (1993) '21. Yüzyılın Eşiğinde Türk Cumhuriyetleri' (Turkish Republics at the Threshold of the 21st Century), Milliyet (daily, Istanbul), 10-15 May 1993.

using national and international means."[300] To this end, Turkey followed the open door policy for Bulgarian Muslim refugees. By using all its resources the Turkish government tried to cover the emergency needs of these refugees. Turkey did not only adopt a protectee role but also raised an awareness of Turkey's capability as a defender of the Muslim world. Özal also started negotiations to "end assimilation politics and to make a refugee agreement for those who came or will come to Turkey."[301]

During the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, the Turkish administration was faced with a number of difficulties. Although Turkish decision makers wanted to remain neutral, the fact that they shared common values, history, and sympathy towards the Azeri people, Turkish policy makers sided with Azerbaijan. This attitude could be explained using Huntington's kin country syndrome.[302] Turkey's neutral stance in the beginning did not fulfill the expectation of others including Turkish citizens and Azerbaijan. There was an expectation from the Azeri people and Turkish people for Turkey to play a more active role in the conflict. Aydın underlines that Turkish officials aimed to coordinate with other regional actors such as NATO and the UN to avoid being labeled as 'pan-Ottomanist'. However, Turkey's stance during the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict was highly criticized by Turkish public opinion.

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[300] Turgut Özal (1989) "Press Conference" speech given on the 35th press conference on June 18, (unofficial translation).

[301] Turgut Özal (1989) "Press Conference" speech given on the press conference on July 5, (unofficial translation).

[302] See Huntington (1993).

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At the end of the Cold War Turkey aimed to play a more determined role regionally by being a bridge state, a developer state, a regional sub-system collaborator, and a protectee NRC.

Özal developed a very active Turkish foreign policy in regional issues by challenging traditional Turkish policies especially in the Middle East. Turkey's changing policies was identified as Turkey's departure from passive approach to more active policies in the post-Gulf War era.[303] During Özal's tenure both as Prime Minister (1983-1989) and later as President (1989-1993), Turkey adopted active and self-confident policies and re-positioned itself in the region. The changing economic structure in the post-Cold War period led to important changes in Turkish foreign policy agenda and prompted Turkey's change to regional sub-system collaborator by leaders who were willing to exploit Turkey's strategic position. Özal aimed to put an end to Turkey's isolationist policies towards these regions and also Turkey's own isolation by establishing new bounds with the Turkic world.

Finally, after all the political and economic instabilities Turkish policy makers started describing Turkey as a 'rising power' during this period. The rising power NRC was frequently used by Özal. He underlined that:

> Export quickly increased and inflation dropped. Negative growing rates became positive and as a result of the economic policies implemented, Turkey became the fastest growing country in the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries.[304]

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[303] Stephen F. Larrabee and Ian O. Lesser. (2003) Turkish Foreign Policy in an Age of Uncertainty, RAND National Security Research Division, p. 4.

[304] Turgut Özal, (1988) "Work Week" speech given at the Turkey and Europe community commissions' joint meeting on September 12, (unofficial translation).

It is also important to note that Özal's assertive polices during the First Gulf War launched unforeseen troubles such as the rise of PKK insurgency in the region. Turkey remained neutral in the Iraqi-Iranian war of 1980-88 and successfully maintained its trade relations with both countries. However, the end of the First Gulf War created a power vacuum in Northern Iraq which led to the PKK, Turkey's biggest domestic and external threat having a stronghold in the region.[305]

4.4 True Path Party (coalition government) 1991 –1995

Özal's departure from the ANAP weakened the party and in the 1991 general elections, the True Path Party (*Dogru Yol Partisi*-DYP) got 27% of the total vote and received 178 seats in the Assembly.[306] The DYP program was based on economic liberalism, free market, social welfare, and democratization. One of the most important aspects of the party was its anti-militarism stance by questioning the role of the NSC and the necessity to establish civilian control over the military.[307] Demirel described Özal's ANAP as "the emanation [kuyruk] of the coup…using…the political influence of the military for furthering its political fortunes."[308]

Between 1991 and 1995 the DYP established a series of coalition governments as senior partner. In its first term it established a coalition with the Social Democratic Populist Party on November 20, 1991 – May 16, 1993 under Süleyman Demirel's

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[305] Baskın Oran eds. (2001), Türk Dış Politikası II: Kurtuluş Savaşından Bugüne Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar Cilt II:1980-2001, Iletişim Yayınları: Istanbul, p. 15.

[306] True Path Party was established on June 23, 1983.

[307] Ümit Cizre, (2002) "From Ruler to Pariah: The Life and Times of the True Path Party," *Turkish Studies*, Vol. 3, No.1, pp. 82-101, p. 87-8.

[308] Süleyman Demirel, (1988) Türk Demokrasisi Meydan Okuyor. Ankara: DYP Basın ve Propaganda Başkanlığı.

leadership. After the unexpected death of Özal, Demirel was elected as the new President by the National Assembly. Therefore, a new coalition government was established under Tansu Çiller's leadership with the following three parties; the Democratic Party, the Republican People's Party and the Social Democratic Populist Party. This coalition government served during the 25th of June 1993 to the 5th of October 1995. During the post-Cold War era Turkey started giving priority to regional cooperative security and multilateralism in foreign affairs.[309] In order to adapt to the transforming region Turkey initiated the establishment of the Organization of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation on June 4, 1992.[310] For the DYP (coalition government) a hundred and eighty-three speeches were coded. *See Figure 6* for the distribution of NRCs of DYP (coalition government) between 1991 –1995.

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[309] Karaosmanoğlu, (2000), p. 211.

[310] See Berdal Aral, (2002) "Black Sea Economic Cooperation: What Went Wrong?," *Alternatives: Turkish Journal of International Relations*, Vol. 1, No. 4.

Figure 6: NRCs of True Path Party (coalition government) 1991 –1995

During the DYP coalition governments Turkey's example NRC continued to be used as the most frequently used NRC amongst the decision making elite. In order to promote Turkey both as a developer and an example, President Özal led the establishment of a Turkish Cooperation and Development Agency (TIKA) in order to increase relations with the Turkic world. The TIKA was established in 1992 as a

technical organization under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to implement Turkish foreign policy objectives in diverse areas and countries.[311] The aim of the organization is to provide development assistance to emerging Turkic Republics after the disintegration of the Soviet Union.[312]

Çiller underlined that "after their independence Turkey provide in total 1.5 billion dollars of financial aid to Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan and Armenia. We also provided food and education assistance to these countries. Besides, we are also trying to help Russia and we will continue our efforts."[313] Turkey as a developer country provided various aids to regional countries including Palestine and emerging former Soviet countries. Çiller pointed out that:

> The Palestinian people need our help urgently. Along with the Government, the private sector should be encouraged to make investments in the region. Turkey is ready to fulfill its own responsibility. We provide 2 billion dollars to Gaza and Eriha for economic reconstruction besides the promise for a 50 million dollar Eximbank credit.[314]

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[311] Republic of Turkey, Prime Ministry Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency (TIKA), http://www.tika.gov.tr/en/page/about_us-14650 (accessed on August 26, 2015)

[312] TIKA was first established in accordance to the Statutory Decree Law no. 480 on January 27, 1992 http://www.tika.gov.tr/en/page/history_of_tika-8526 (accessed on August 26, 2015)
"Main operational activity of TIKA is technical cooperation for development of institutional capacity and human resources in partner countries. This is accomplished by providing training and advisory services in the fields where Turkey has a comparative advantage in terms of know-how and experience. These services are complemented by donations for capacity building. Another component of TIKA activities is the financing of infrastructure projects such as irrigation, sanitation and transportation projects, as well as, the construction or renovation of schools, hospitals, architectural objects of cultural heritage, etc. TIKA also extends humanitarian assistance." See http://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkey_s-development-cooperation.en.mfa (accessed on August 26, 2015)

[313] Tansu Çiller (1994) "Interview with Le Figaro," speech given on January 9, (unofficial translation).

[314] Tansu Çiller (1994) "Middle East and North Africa Summit," speech given as keynote speaker at the Middle East and North Africa Summit in Casablanca on October 30, (unofficial translation).

Çiller also underlined that Turkey provide 60 million dollars of humanitarian aid to Azerbaijani refugee camps.[315] She noted that:

> Under the difficult circumstances Turkey has provided more than 50 million dollars to Palestinians. Turkey brings together 320 million people from 11 countries with the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Council…Turkey provides 4 billion dollar investments, 900 million dollar credits and 600 million dollar trade relations with newly independent Central Asian Republics.[316]

Turkey concluded more than 300 agreements with Turkic countries in diversified areas including civil aviation and the prevention of double taxation. They organized Turkic summits, established TIKA, created joint ventures in banking and financing, provided scholarships to Central Asian and Azerbaijani students, encouraged Turkish business firms to invest in these countries and increased trade in volumes.[317] Turkish decision makers believed that Turkey's developer policy will eventually make Turkey into a regional leader.

During the DYP coalitions, the Turkish model became even more popular. Demirel underlines the Turkish model by emphasizing on Turkey's secular values. He claimed that Turkey is "a democratic country, free country and has adopted a free market economy. All these values are compatible with Muslim values through secularism. As a secular model, Turkey proves to the world that Muslim countries could adopt the Western economic style and social policies."[318] Demirel argued that Turkey's example and bridge NRCs go hand in hand. He claimed that:

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[315] Tansu Çiller (1995) speech given at Esenboga Airport before visiting Uzbekistan and Azerbaijan on July 9, (unofficial translation).

[316] Tansu Çiller (1995) "Western Europe Community Assembly," speech given in Paris on June 20, (unofficial translation).

[317] E. Zürcher, (2003) Turkey: A Modern History. I. B. Tauris (Third Edition), p. 328-9.

[318] Süleyman Demirel (1992) speech given at Istanbul Bosporus University on April 9, (unofficial translation).

Turkey with a 60 million population and various opportunities is a bridge between the West, Asia and the Middle East. It is also a good model for Muslim countries. Eventually, human rights and democracy will conquer these countries as it did in the Soviet Union. Here is model independent country, democratic and secular which has adopted a free market economy model. Turkey is the only model.[319]

Çiller continued to emphasize on the Turkish model as Turkey's most important role in the new world order. Çiller further argued that Turkey was the only secular country among 56 Muslim countries. Çiller underlined Turkey's significance in the new world by emphasizing that "Turkey is the only secular and Muslim model for surrounding regions and Middle Eastern countries. Turkey cherishes these countries, consolidates its past and Turkish values to integrate these countries with the West, Turkey is the only inspiration for these countries."[320] During the intensified regional conflicts in the Caucasus, Turkey's model aspiration increased its popularity among Turkish policy makers because these people shared a common history and religion with Turkey, and by adopting the Turkish model they would be able to resolve their conflicts as well.

After Özal's death in 1993, the military re-gained its power through "success in the counterinsurgency campaign against the PKK and a continuing central role in opposing religion in political life."[321] Çiller focused on solving the Kurdish issue and the European integration issue through a Custom Union,[322] and in 1995, it was

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[319] Süleyman Demirel (1992) "Interview with German Ard Radio," speech given on March 29, (unofficial translation).

[320] Tansu Çiller (1995) "DYP Istanbul Province Congress," speech given on August 9, (unofficial translation).

[321] Larrabee and Lesser (2003), p. 28.

[322] Cizre, (2002), p. 84.

agreed that Turkey would create a Custom Union between Turkey and the EU that will be effective January 1, 1996.

Altunışık argues that following the First Gulf War the Kurdish issue was regionalized and moved beyond the Iraqi border especially into Syria, and also became the center of Turkey's Middle East policy.[323] In order to gain political victory in the Kurdish issue Çiller needed the military. Therefore, she changed the party line manifesto regarding civilian rule over the military and avoided taking any initiative on the subject.[324] Additionally, the defense and security expenditures rose to 17.3 percent in the 1996 budget proposal.[325]

Turkey's role as an exemplary regional subsystem collaborator was the second most significant issue among the political elite. Demirel underlines Turkey's geopolitical significance as a regional subs-system collaborator as follows;

> The new international environment following the end of the cold War and adaptation to this new world order is possible with peace and cooperation. Turkey recognizes opportunities, risks and its own potential for regional and global cooperation and is ready to contribute to the new world order…Turkey is European, Caucasus, Black Sea, the Mediterranean and Middle Eastern countries simultaneously. Only a very little number of countries in the world have this kind of a unique location. Therefore, Turkey is aware of its responsibilities and has started regional cooperation initiatives. Turkey as an active founder of the new world order believes that regional stability is possible only through cooperation.[326]

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[323] Meliha Benli Altunışık (2004) "Turkey's Middle East Challenges: Towards a New Beginning?," in Idris Bal (ed), Turkish Foreign Policy in Post-Cold War Era, Florida: Brown Walker Press, p.363-65.

[324] Cizre, (2002), p. 92-3.

[325] "Merhaba Asker," (1995) *Hurriyet* (Istanbul daily), January 28, 1995.

[326] Süleyman Demirel (1992) "World Economic Forum," speech given on June 30, (unofficial translation).

Çiller stressed on regional stability and trade relations. She argued that as a regional sub-system collaborator and developer Turkey provided enormous amount of humanitarian aid and loans to these countries.[327]

Turkish-Azerbaijani relations were described as "one nation, two states" by Heydar Aliyev, former Azerbaijani President. Turkey was the first country to recognize Azerbaijan's independence. Turkey's historical ties were referred to as kinship/brother. Since its independence Turkey has supported Azerbaijan economically, politically and militarily and also provides significant humanitarian assistance. However Turkey's relation with Azerbaijan is not only based on the kinship role. During the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict Turkey and the International community stood next to the Azerbaijan against Armenia. Demirel underlines this protectee and kin-country relationship during the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict "We expect Armenia to withdraw from occupied Azeri lands immediately and without any condition. There is no other way to achieve peace. We will continue to support our Azeri brothers in their just cause. We always will be on their side."[328] Turkey supported Azerbaijan both financially and politically. Turkey even supported Azerbaijan politically in international platforms by raising the Nagorno-Karabakh issue on every opportunity. Huntington identifies this relation as a kin-country syndrome.[329]

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[327] Daniel Pipes and Patrick Clawson (1995) Interview with Tansu Çiller: "Secularism is an Indispensable Principle for Turkey", *Middle East Quarterly* http://www.danielpipes.org/6306/tansu-ciller-secularism-indispensable-turkey (accessed on August 26, 2015)

[328] Süleyman Demirel (1994) speech on the Occasion of the Commencement of the New Legislative Year of the TBMM on September 1, (unofficial translation).

[329] See Huntington (1993).

4.5 Welfare Party (coalition government) 1996 – 1997

The Social democratic coalition partner left the government and forced Çiller to hold early elections on December 24, 1995. During this period a coalition caretaker government was formed under Çiller's leadership by the DYP and the Republican People's Party. The caretaker government served from the 30th October 1995–6 March 1996. During the caretaker government Turkey and Israel signed the first agreement on military cooperation in February 1996 and increased their level of alignment in different fields including the exchange of military information and military exercises as well as economic, cultural, and educational exchanges.

In 1994 the Welfare Party (Refah Partisi, RP) gained political victories in the municipal elections in Istanbul and Ankara. The party's success continued in the December 24, 1995 general election. The party got 21.4% of votes as leading party and formed a coalition government. Since the beginning of the secular Republic, an Islamic background party won the election for the first time. According to Aydın oppression by the military regime during the 1980s led to the growth of Islam in the Turkish society.[330] Therefore, when the RP came to power unexpectedly, it was interpreted as an Islamic revival.[331] After the collapse of the caretaker government; Necmettin Erbakan was able to form a new coalition government with the DYP that served from the 28 June 1996 - 30 June 1997. Although Çiller criticized the RP for abusing religion for its own political interests, distancing Turkey form the EU, and collaborating with the PKK, surprisingly she formed a coalition government with

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[330] Aydın, (2005), p. 22

[331] Ibid.

Erbakan.[332] Zürcher claims that Çiller decided to form a coalition with the Welfare Party "because the WP offered to suspend the parliamentary investigations into her financial dealings in exchange for her support."[333]

This period was a significant turning point for Turkish politics because Erbakan became the first Islamist Prime Minister in Turkish history.[334] Sayari believes Erbakan's success was as a result of the failure of political parties to address Turkey's economic and political problems.[335] Before the general election Erbakan advocated significant changes in foreign policy such as downgrading relations with Israel and withdrawal from NATO but, he did not change prominent Turkish foreign policy objectives.[336] On the contrary, Erbakan's administration signed the $600 million military deal with Israel on December 5, 1996.[337] Erbakan's attitude towards the EU was also very positive. He was against the Custom Union agreement which

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[332] Cizre, (2002), p. 893.

[333] Zürcher, (2003), p. 298-9.

[334] Aryeh Shmuelevitz, (1999) Turkey's Experiment in Islamist Government, 1996-1997, Tel Aviv: The Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies, Tel Aviv University; Erbakan established the first Islamist party in Turkish history, the National Order Party (Milli Nizam Partisi) in 1970 but the party was banned following the 1971 military intervention. Later he formed National Salvation Party to pursue his Islamic agenda; this party was also banned in 1980 coup. Finally he established Welfare Party in 1983.

[335] Sabri Sayari, (1996) "Turkey's Islamist Challenge," The Middle East Quarterly, Vol. 3, No. 3, pp. 35-43; Haldun Gulalp, (1999) "Political Islam in Turkey: The Rise and Fall of the Refah Party," The Muslim World, pp. 22-41; Haldun Gulalp (2001) "Globalization and Political Islam: The Social Bases of Turkey's Welfare Party," International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 33, No. 3, pp. 433-448; Ziya Onis, (1997) "The Political Economy of Islamic Resurgence in Turkey: The Rise of the Welfare Party in Perspective," Third World Quarterly, Vol. 18, No. 4, pp. 743-766; Nilufer Narli, (1999) "The Rise of Islamist Movement in Turkey," Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA), Vol. 3, No. 3.

[336] Frank Tachau (2000) Turkish Political Parties and Elections: Half a Century of Multiparty Democracy, *Turkish Studies*, Vol.1, No.1, pp. 128-148, p. 141.

[337] *Turkish Daily News*, 6 December 1996; Özkan (2006), p. 174.

was also the part of his election manifesto in 1995 but he did nothing on this issue either.[338]

For the RP coalition government sixty-two speeches were coded. *See Figure 7* for the distribution of NRCs of RP coalition government between 1996 and 1997.


Figure 7: NRCs of Welfare Party (coalition government) 1996 – 1997

The Islamic agenda of the party aimed to transform Turkey into a more Islamic directed state. Öniş underlines that in terms of economy, the party was in favor of heavy state interventionism, and in foreign policy issues followed an anti-European approach by deepening relations with other Muslim countries.[339] Erbakan gave priority to Turkey's foreign relations with the Islamic countries in the Middle East such as Syria, Iran and Iraq through regional collaboration. He extended Turkey's

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[338] Özkan (2006), p. 174.

[339] Ziya Öniş, (2006) "Globalization and Party Transformation: Turkey's Justice and Development Party in Perspective". In Peter Burnell, ed., Globalizing Democracy: Party Politics in Emerging Democracies. London: Routledge ,Warwick Studies on Globalization, p. 7-8 http://file.setav.org/Files/Pdf/globalization-and-party-transformation-ziya-onis-2005-2006.pdf (accessed on August 26, 2015)

relations radically to the Islamic world by establishing D-8 (Developing-8, the Organization for Economic Cooperation) among the Muslim countries.[340] Erbakan's Islamic agenda was very clear from the beginning of the coalition government. In June 7, 1996 he presented the government's program to the National Assembly. In his speech he underlined that;

> Turkey will continue to participate in the IOC , and the Standing Committee for Economic and Commercial Cooperation of the Organization of the Islamic Cooperation (COMCEC-Ekonomik ve Ticarî İşbirliği Daimi Komitesi , İSEDAK) meetings actively…the government will further develop and enhance bilateral economic and commercial relations with Islamic countries. In order to have a stable structure we will take necessary measures in the coming periods.[341]

Erbakan paid formal visits to Muslim countries such as Iran, Libya, Malaysia and Pakistan. Frank explains Erbakan's Islamic agenda by focusing on Erbakan's rapprochement with the Muslim world:

> In Iran, he signed a natural gas pipeline deal which the United States opposed. In Malaysia, he declared solidarity with Muslims all over the world over. In Libya, he remained silent in the face of Muammar Gaddafi's harsh criticism of Turkey's treatment of the Kurds.[342]

In July 1996, Erbakan concluded a $23 billion gas deal with Iran over 25 years in order to diversify Turkey's energy dependency from Russia.[343] Although he insisted that his administration wanted to strengthen relations both with the West and the Muslim world he emphasized on his desire to further extend Turkey's relation with

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[340] D-8 was formed under the Erbakan leadership following the "Cooperation in Development" conference held in Istanbul in October 1996. D-8 is cooperation among the most populous Muslim countries: Turkey, Bangladesh, Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, Malaysia, Nigeria, Pakistan.

[341] Erbakan' Government Program, 7 June 1996 https://www.tbmm.gov.tr/hukumetler/HP54.htm (accessed on August 26, 2015)

[342] Frank (2000), p. 141.

[343] Stephen Larrabee, (2007) 'Turkey Rediscover the Middle East, *Foreign Affairs*,' July-August.

Muslim countries. By signing a gas deal with Iran Erbakan emphasized on Turkey's active independent NRC. He claimed that "Americans will understand that…Turkey is an independent country. We are responsible for resolving our national problems. Therefore we do our duty. This is as natural as natural gas."[344] Erbakan believed that rapprochement with Syria and Iran could solve the Kurdish problem and help Turkey act independently from the U.S based on its own national interest.

The most significant NRC during the Erbakan government was the regional sub-system collaborator role. Erbakan believed that Turkey was ready to cooperate with cooperation councils with every country in every region, especially with Muslim countries. He calimed that;

> Turkey was selected as a base due to its loaction between the EU, the Middle East and other Far East countries. In other words from Turkey, there will be exports to Europe, Russia, and Muslim countries. It has decided to establish an Asia Islam Investment Devlopment Bank. Therefore, in order to foster mutual cooperation and finance world trade, Malaysian petrol company PETRONAKS decided to invest in Turkey.[345]

Erbakan foresaw a regional cooperation for regional peace and security particularly with Muslim countries. During the Erbakan government, Turkey's faithful ally role was emphasized only by the President Demirel. Despite Erbakan's desire to get closer with the Muslim world, as a result of Turkey's active independent policy Demirel continued to emphasize on 'Turkey's faithful ally role'. Difference of opinion over the NRCs indicates a clash in perspectives of Turkish leaders regarding Turkey's role and priorities in its foreign policy relations. Demirel claimed that;

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[344] Necmettin Erbakan (1996) speech given on the press conference, on August 21, (unofficial translation).

[345] Ibid.

America is an important country both in world politics and also an important factor in conflict resolutions that also affect Turkey. Therefore, our relationship with this country is of strategic importance. Our relations at the end of the Cold War were strengthened and enriched through common interests and activities. We are cooperating with America for the maintenance of international peace and security in all regions from European security to stability in the Balkans; from the Caucasus and Central Asia to Eurasia; the Black Sea, the Mediterranean and the Middle East. A strengthened relationship between us benefits both countries. In the expansion of the geography of democracy both countries have mutual benefits.[346]

During Erbakan's government there was a rising religious trend in Turkey and emerging religious societies in favor of Islamism, such as; a growing number of students registering for state-sponsored religious school, increasing religious courses and clerics, and independent mosques free of state control which violated Constitutional Law.[347]

Erbakan's visits to Muslim countries and increasing religious sentiments intimidated the military elites. The relationship between the military and the Islamic-oriented RP had begun to deteriorate rapidly. The Baqeri crisis was the most important development that triggered tension between Erbakan and the military. The Islamist Mayor of the Ankara suburb of Sincan, Bekir Yıldız had organized the 'Jerusalem Memorial Night' to support the Palestinians, and that same day was also the anniversary of the Iranian revolution. Iranian Ambassador Mohammad Reza Baqeri was invited to deliver a speech. He gave an anti-Western speech and criticized Israel. On 4th February "the military responded with a massive display of force, sending a

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[346] Süleyman Demirel (1996) speech given on the annual press conference, on December 28, (unofficial translation).

[347] For the English text of 28 February military recommendations and its analysis sees Niyazi Günay (2001) Implementing the 'February 28' Recommendations: A Scorecard, the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, No. 10, pp. 1-20, p. 2 http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/uploads/Documents/pubs/ResearchNote10-sm.pdf (accessed on August 26, 2015)

column of tanks rumbling through Sincan, allegedly on maneuver."[348] Following this tension the Iranian ambassador was declared *persona non grata* by Turkish authorities which caused a diplomatic crisis between Turkey and Iran.[349] In addition to this, a couple of days later Deputy Chief-of-Staff Çelik Bir, during his trip to Washington referred to Iran as a 'state that supports terrorism'[350] and accused Iran of exporting its anti-secular regime to Turkey.[351] This was a clear sign of the difference in opinions between the state and the government. Following this incident "the army announced that it had formed a 'Task Force West' (Batı Çalışma Grubu) in the naval staff to collect evidence about fundamentalist threats to the state."[352] Shortly after this declaration, the NSC held a meeting on February 28th, 1997.[353] The military presented an ultimatum to the Islamist-dominated Erbakan government and came up with a memorandum consisting of eighteen points and demanded the implementation of these policies.[354] Erbakan's new policy directions in the Middle East region, challenging the military's dominance and shifting away from secularism triggered the February 28 process. The military's in-direct intervention in Turkish politics was

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[348] Frank (2000), p. 142.

[349] Süleyman Elik (2013) Iran-Turkey Relations, 1979-2011: Conceptualising the Dynamics of Politics, Religion and Security in Middle-Power States, Routledge, p. 47.

[350] Ibid.

[351] Ali Balci and Tuncay Kardas (2012) The Changing Dynamics of Turkey's Relations with Israel: An Analysis of 'Securitization', *Insight Turkey,* Vol. 14, No.2, pp. 99-120, p.104.

[352] Zürcher, (2003), p. 300.

[353] See Günay (2001), p. 2 http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/uploads/Documents/pubs/ResearchNote10-sm.pdf (accessed on August 26, 2015); see also Zürcher, (2003), p. 300-301.

[354] See Günay (2001), p. 2 http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/uploads/Documents/pubs/ResearchNote10-sm.pdf (accessed on August 26, 2015); "The most conspicuous demand was about the introduction of compulsory eight-year primary education in state schools. The idea behind this was that this would put the schools for preachers and prayer leaders (imamhatip okulları) at middle school level out of business." Zürcher, (2003), p. 300.

later labeled as a "post-modern coup" which forced the government to resign through the NSC. According to Burak, the "post-modern coup" of 1997 can be referred to as a 'Veto Regime'. She claims that in the 'Veto Regimes' the military avoid to take direct military control but exercise certain veto power over the government' decision making process.[355]

According to Kongar, in the post-Cold War period military elites replaced the communist threat with the threat of 'İrtica' which refers to "an existential threat" to the secular regime.[356] After the 28 of February decisions, the military elites declared that the threat of 'İrtica' became the number one threat to state security.[357] 'İrtica' refers to Islamic extremism. In this context the rise of political Islam and the RP was a threat as well as Islamic fundamentalism. For the first time in Turkish history the military defined the internal threat of 'İrtica' as the primary threat rather than the usual external threats.[358] The 1997 indirect military intervention was not an attempt to overthrow the Islamic regime but rather to make it function under military guardianship.[359]

February 28 decisions aimed to limit WP's power. Rubin and Kirişçi believe that "the document dealt mostly with a domestic threat, it deliberately humiliated the WP by criticizing Iran for its efforts "in destabilizing the regime" and called for the

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[355] Hale, (1996) 260; Burak (2011), p. 156.

[356] See Elvan Feyzioğlu, (1994), "İnönü'den Laiklik Uyarısı," *Milliyet*, October 30.

[357] Burak (2011), p. 160.

[358] "Ordu: Öncelik İç Tehdit," Milliyet, April 30, 1997; "Genelkurmay'dan basına irtica brifingi," *Zaman*, April 30, 1997.

[359] A. Bayramoğlu (2006) "Asker ve Siyaset" In A. Bayramoğlu, A. İnsel (eds.), Bir Zümre Bir Parti: Türkiye'de Ordu, İstanbul : Birikim Yayınları., pp. 59-118, p. 13.

taking of necessary precautions to prevent such. Prime Minister Erbakan initially attempted to reject these demands on the ground that the government policies were formed in the parliament, not at the NSC, but he later backed down and signed the document."[360] The government officially accepted the 28 February recommendations on March 13th. Erbakan's government did survive the confidential voting of May 20th as well, but the military still monitored the government, and not surprisingly, was not happy about the implementation of the eighteen recommendations. In order to put pressure on Erbakan the military cooperated with different sections of society against the government.[361] By June, the army started briefing journalists and members of the judiciary on the fundamentalist threat posed by the Erbakan government.[362] These briefings were presented to the members of the judiciary and the Turkish media who then put pressure on the government by alarming the secularist circles of the Islamic threat to secular and democratic values.[363] These briefings in a way aimed to justify the military's intervention and its role as the sole guardian of the Turkish Republic.[364] Aydınlı describes the February 28th process as a result of absolutist officials in the military such as Çevik Bir, who believed in untraditional intervention. He believes that military officials such as Bir were in favor of untraditional intervention by groups called "unarmed forces".[365] The post-modern coup was carried out through campaigns organized by civil society

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[360] Barry M. Rubin and Kemal Kirişci (2001) Turkey in World Politics: An Emerging Multiregional Power, Lynne Rienner Publishers, p. 19.

[361] Zürcher, (2003), p. 300-301.

[362] Ibid.

[363] M. Erdoğan, (1999) 28 Şubat Süreci. Ankara: Yeni Türkiye Yayınları, p. 258.

[364] Ibid.

[365] See Ersel Aydınlı, (2011) Ergenekon, New Pacts, and the Decline of the Turkish "Inner State", *Turkish Studies*, Vol. 12, No. 2, pp. 227-239.

organizations, the media and the support of the judges. The TAF mobilize various groups and affiliations including higher education, business groups, and media to block the existing government to exercise its power.[366] As a result, Erbakan's success was short lived. The NSC "handed the government a list of measures to clamp down political Islam, causing its eventual resignation"[367] on June 16, 1997.

4.6 Motherland Party (coalition government) 1997 – 1999

After Erbakan stepped down, President Demirel asked Mesut Yılmaz to form a new government.[368] Under Yılmaz's leadership, the Motherland Party established a coalition government with the Democratic Left Party and the Democrat Turkey Party that served from June 30, 1997 - January, 11 1999. The new government was committed to reforming the economy. To this end, "a letter of intent was signed with the IMF on the 2nd July in which the government committed itself to tight fiscal policies and privatization in exchange for loans."[369] However, in terms of foreign policy, the coalition government was not successful. The EU did not declare Turkey as a candidate country during the Luxembourg Summit of 1997 and stressed on its necessity to reform. Additionally, Turkey's rapprochement with Israel worked against Turkey's relation towards the Middle Eastern countries. During the Arab League meeting on September 16th, 1997, the league condemned Turkey's alliance with Israel. In addition to this, a couple of months later in December 1997, the OIC condemned Turkey's ties with Israel. Bacık pointed out that the Middle Eastern

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[366] Ertuğrul Özkök, (1996) "Bu Kez 'Silahsız Kuvvetler' Hal Etsin" [This Time let the "Unarmed Forces" Handle it] Hürriyet, (daily newspaper) December 20; Özkök attributed the phrase "unarmed forces" to an unnamed highranked officer. This commander was later revealed to have been Commander of the Naval Forces Admiral Güven Erkaya, one of the top architects of the February 28th process. Excerpt from Aydınlı, (2011), p. 229.

[367] Cizre, (2002), p. 93.

[368] Zürcher, (2003), p. 300-301.

[369] Zürcher, (2003), p. 303.

countries started criticizing Turkey of promoting the U.S and Israel's interest and being part of the US-sponsored security project in the region.[370] Bacık also underlined growing anti-Arab attitudes in Turkey's external relations and its alienation from the region which was replaced with stronger pro-Israeli and pro-American approaches.[371]

Turkey had tension during the Motherland Party coalition with Greece and Syria. There were three main sources of this tension with Greece; the Aegean dispute[372], airspace continental shelf and airspace, and militarization of the Greek Islands.[373] Cyprus problem was important for all Turkish administrations. A divided island partly under Turkish control was in the best interest of Turkey rather than seeing Cyprus controlled entirely by Greece. Another Turkish-Greek confrontation occurred over the S-300 missiles. When Greek Cypriots decided to get S-300 missiles from Russia, Turkish foreign policy makers criticized this attempt. Following this, Turkish decision makers openly threatened to use of force to prevent the deployment of S-300 missiles on the island.[374] Finally, the crisis was resolved between Turkey and the Republic of Cyprus through U.S and E.U pressure and the missiles were deployed in Crete rather than the Cyprus Island.

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[370] Gökhan Bacık, (2001) "The Limits of an Alliance: Turkish-Israeli Relations Revisited," *Arab Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 23, No. 3, pp. 49-63, p.56.

[371] Bacık, (2001), p.56.

[372] See Andrew Wilson (1980) The Aegean Dispute, London: International Institute for Strategic Studies.

[373] Larrabee and Lesser. (2003), p. 75-6.

[374] See Madeleine Demetriou, (1998) "On the Long Road to Europe and the Short Path to War: Issue-Linkage Politics and the Arms Build-Up in Cyprus," Mediterranean Politics, Vol. 3, No. 3, pp. 38–51.

For the Motherland Party coalition government ninety-one speeches were coded. *See Figure 8* for the distribution of the NRCs of the Motherland Party coalition government between 1997 and 1999.


Figure 8: NRCs of Motherland Party (coalition government) 1997 – 1999

The Syrian crisis was the most important problem on the coalition government's agenda. Turkey and Syria had problematic relations during the 1980s and 1990s, mostly centered on their water dispute, Syria's support for the PKK and the dispute about Hatay. The two countries came to the brink of war over Syria's support for the PKK. On October 7th, 1998 Yılmaz openly accused Syrian authorities for its support of the PKK and its provision of a base for its leader, Öcalan. During its long standing fight against the PKK, Turkey assumed an anti-terrorism agent NRC. Yılmaz addressing the Parliament over the Syrian crisis, claimed that;

> PKK leaders coordinate their activities from Damascus… Turkey demands
> the return of Öcalan, warns Syria to take the necessary measures to prevent
> attacks against Turkey from Syrian lands, punish criminals, stop providing
> logistical and financial support to the PKK, and should not allow terrorist
> organizations to make propaganda from Syria. As long as Syria allows these
> PKK activities, Turkey reserves the right to take necessary measures allowed
> by international law…Syria is supporting terrorism and waging an indirect
> war against Turkey…I would like to remind you that the UN in accordance

with Article 51 of the Law gives right to legitimate self-defense measures for Turkey against Syria.[375]

Yılmaz further warned Damascus and underlined "that the Turkish army is on stand-by, 'awaiting orders' to attack".[376] On October 9, 1998, in order to avoid war Syrian authorities expelled the PKK leader, Öcalan, from their territory and declared that they had stopped supporting the PKK. On October 20, 1998, the two countries signed the Adana Agreement and established a joint agenda to fight the PKK and improve their political, economic and security relations. This was an important development as these former enemies started cooperating to fight terrorism. Therefore, state levels relations between Turkey and Syria shaped Turkey's assertive policies as being an anti-terrorism agent.

Although Turkey was not declared as a candidate country in the Luxemburg Summit, Turkish foreign policy makers continued to emphasize on Turkey-EU relations and Turkey's example NRC. They believed that the EU needs the Turkish model because Turkey is the gate way to the Muslim world. With his appointment as foreign minister, İsmail Cem focused on Turkey's example NRC. He was also one of the first leaders to underlines Turkey's global actor capability by exploiting this role's conception.[377] According to Cem, Turkey does not have any agenda to export or enforce its model to any country but rather share its historical experience with other societies especially the Islam world and 1.5 billion people can benefit from the

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[375] Mesut Yılmaz (1998) speech given on the Parliament regarding to the development on Syrian crisis on October 7, (unofficial translation).

[376] Daniel Pipes (1998) Why Syria and Turkey Gird for War, Wall Street Journal Europe http://www.danielpipes.org/299/why-syria-and-turkey-gird-for-war (accessed on August 26, 2015)

[377] Ismail Cem (1997) "Preface for Perception Journal" Vol. 2, No. 3, (official translation).

Turkish experience.[378] He believed that the Turkish model was a tool to promote its proactive foreign policy in global politics. Cem was assertive about Turkey's increasing role and he argued that the goal of Turkish foreign policy is to be a global actor.[379] According to him Turkey was abandoning its historical bridge role towards the beginning of new millennium, so it will no longer be a passage/gate just for trade but it will be a central country and energy hub between Europe and Asia as the center of Eurasia. This way, the Silk Road will be reactivated and Turkey will be at the center to play a regional sub-system collaborator role.

4.7 Democratic Left Party (coalition government) 1999 –2002

Before the general elections Bülent Ecevit established a caretaker government under the Democratic Left Party's (Demokratik Sol Partisi, DSP) leadership that served from January 11, 1999- May 28, 1999. One of the most important accoplishments of the caretaker goverenment was capturing Öcalan in February 1999 in Nairobi, Kenya. This development increased Ecevit's popularity, and his party got the highest votes in the April 1999 general elections. However, no party was able to get enough votes to form a government. The DSP got 22% of the votes. Ecevit's DSP led the coalition government with the Nationalist Movement Party and the Motherland Party. This coalition government served from 28 May 1999 – 18 November 2002.

The coalition government after Erbakan's period signified the growing nationalist orientation following the religious experiences in Turkish politics. Therefore, nationalist movements in Turkey pursued principally Turkey's national interests through an assertive foreign policy which can be observed in Turkey's Syria policy.

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[378] İsmail Cem (1998) "Interview with NTV," speech given for the "gündemdekiler" program on October 1, (unofficial translation).

[379] İsmail Cem (1998) "Preface for 'Turkey 2010-2020' on July 22, (official translation).

Additionally, "it could be seen in the strong Turkish reaction to a proposed Armenian genocide resolution in the U.S. Congress in the fall of 2000." [380]

For the DSP (coalition government) a hundred and thirteen speeches were coded. *See Figure 9* for the distribution of NRCs DSP coalition government between 1999 and 2002.

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[380] Larrabee and Lesser. (2003), p. 10-11.

Figure 9: NRCs of Democratic Left Party (coalition government) 1999 –2002

During the 1990s the coalition governments' policies were shaped by both
international and domestic developments. During these years political instability and
weak coalition covernments dominated Turkish foreign policy and empowered the
military with influence on Turkish foreign policy areas like external ethnic conflicts
(Muslim) both in the Balkans and the Caucasus such as Bosnia and Kosovo and the
Armenian-Azerbaijani war. On the other hand, domestically, increasing Kurdish

insurgency became a problem for Turkey. In his early days Ecevit successfully implement the IMF led economic restructuring programs, and the government was able to decrease inflation and provide economic stability.[381] As a result of successful foreign policy initiations, during the EU Helsinki Summit in 1999 Turkey was declared as an EU candidate country. The EU had therefore changed its previous stance on Turkey.[382]

After the declaration of Turkey as a candidate country, its regional subsystem-collaborator and example NRCs became the most important components of Turkish foreign policy. Cem described Turkey's foreign policy vision in Europe as ermging pivotal player in Eurosian reality.[383] Cem countinued to underline the Turkish model as a secular and democratic country for other Muslim countries.[384]

The 'Baku–Ceyhan Pipeline' agreement between Turkey, Georgia and Azerbaijan was concluded on November 18, 1999.[385] Demirel, the President, underlined

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[381] Suat Kınıklıoğlu, The Democratic Left Party: Kapıkulu Politics Par Excellence, pp. 2-24. P. 6, http://podcast.zirve.edu.tr/sandbox/groups/economicsandadministrativesciences/wiki/ff77d/attachments/f20a3/W3-Kinikoglu.pdf?sessionID=1105e6e9e067728748d88b7cef525392d7cacc05 (accessed on August 26, 2015)

[382] See Ziya Öniş, (2000) "Luxembourg, Helsinki and Beyond: Towards an Interpretation of Recent Turkey-EU Relations," Government and Opposition, Vol. 35, No. 4, pp. 403-483; and William Park (2000) "Turkey's European Union Candidacy: From Luxembourg to Helsinki—to Ankara?" Mediterranean Politics, Vol. 5, No. 3, pp. 31–53. 12; Presidency Conclusions, Paragraph 12, Helsinki European Council, December 10–11, 1999, available at http://europa.eu.int/council/off/conclu/dec99/dec99_en.htm (accessed on August 26, 2015). See Statement of Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit In Helsinki On Turkey´s Candidacy To The EU, December 11, 1999 http://www.mfa.gov.tr/statement-of-prime-minister-bulent-ecevit-in-helsinki-on-turkey_s-candidacy-to-the-eu_br_december-11_-1999-.en.mfa (accessed on August 26, 2015)

[383] İsmail Cem, (2002); Turkish foreign Policy: Opening new Horizons for Turkey at the beginning of a new Millennium, Turkish Policy Quarterly, Vol. 1, No. 1, p.2.

[384] Mesut (2008), p. 97.

[385] Zürcher, (2003), p. 330.

Turkey's increasing regional subs-system collaborator role even before this agreement. He believed that;

> The restoration of the historic Silk Road, the establishment of new telecommunications network with the help of Turkish satellites in space, and East-West Communications Corridor passing through the Caspian and Baku-Ceyhan, Kars-Tbilisi Railway are some of the basic infrastructural projects which contribute to the integration of the region with the world through Turkey by means of a short, secure, economic path. This is a concrete fact which bestows on Turkey her strategic importance. With the completion of their regional infrastructure, the Caspian Sea, The black Sea and the Mediterranean will be waters bringing people, cultures and common prosperity together rather than parting them.[386]

Demirel claimed that Turkey's interaction with other regions through economic and commercial relations is important for Turkey's changing position in the region. He pointed out that;

> Turkey can export goods to 135 countries with entrepreneurs investing 55 countries, and cannot remain indifferent to developments far away. Turkish foreign policy initiatives launched towards South East Asia, Africa and Latin America are aimed at finding new markets for the Turkish economy and increasing its share in the World today by transforming it into a global player.[387]

Demirel further argued that the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline will turn Turkey to the energy hub in the region.[388] President, Ahmet Necdet Sezer also underlined Turkey's regional sub-system collaborator and energy-hub NRCs in his speech. He claimed that:

> One of the most important contributions of Turkey in the post-Cold War order is in the energy sector as being next to the region which has 70 percent

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[386] Süleyman Demirel (1999) speech given at the Opening session of the second legislative year of the 21st congregation of the Turkish Grand National Assembly on October 1, (official translation).

[387] Ibid.

[388] Süleyman Demirel (2000) speech given on the special occasion of "Turkey New Horizons Of Turkish Foreign Policy In The Year 2000 And Beyond," on March 24, (official translation); see also Süleyman Demirel (2000) speech given on 3rd World Businessman Convention on April 10.

of the world's total energy resources. Turkey coordinates with the U.S to create a reliable East-West corridor by being an energy terminal to deliver oil and gas resources from Asia to the Western market. In this context, the Aktau-Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipe line project has increased Turkey's strategic importance. We believe that this project, together with the implementation of the transport infrastructure in the same route, will be an important contribution to the prosperity, stability and peace in the region.[389]

In this way Turkey would turn into a worldwide energy hub by transferring energy resources to world. Therefore, its regional sub-system collaborator and energy hub roles transform Turkey into a peace bridge in the region. Sezer believed that "the inclusion of Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and in the later phases Uzbekistan into the Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum project was of great importance in terms of strengthening regional cooperation."[390] However, he noted that any proposed regional cooperation is not possible without Turkey's participation as a key country.

In August 1999, the earthquake in İzmit demonstrated that the government' was weak to implement effective civil emergency management. "The earthquake may not have spelled the end of the strong state, as many predicted at the time, but it had certainly left an enduring legacy of dissatisfaction."[391] Ecevit's government was shaken by the two economic crises in November 2000 and February 2001. Thus, growing domestic dissatisfaction in the society coupled with economic instabilities through a series of economic crisis changed the power politics in Turkey. During this period it became difficult to maintain economic stability, enhance democratization and the reform process, and implement successful foreign and security policies.

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[389] Ahmet Necdet Sezer (2001) speech given at Dutch Parliament on April 4, (unofficial translation).

[390] Ahmet Necdet Sezer (2002) speech given at Groundbreaking Ceremony of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan Pipeline on September 18, (unofficial translation).

[391] Larrabee and Lesser (2003), p. 25.

In February 2001, Sezer who was known for his independent and critical attitude towards the cabinet confronted with Ecevit "with files on corruption in government circles and accused him of neglecting this for political reasons during a meeting of the National Security Council."[392] The confrontation between Sezer and Ecevit triggered an economic crisis in Turkey. The coalition government lost its legitimacy in the eyes of the Turkish population by being responsible for the biggest financial crisis in Turkey. Larrabe believes that a proxy cause of the February crisis was the political clash between Ecevit and the President Ahmet Necdet Sezer on national TV on February 19 2001.[393] The IMF and the World Bank provided a $16 billion rescue package during the 2000-2001 attached with conditions of austerity, privatization, and reforms in the Turkish banking system.[394] The rescue package was not enough to prevent further bailouts. "The Turkish lira lost almost 50 percent of its value, virtually overnight, and nearly 65 percent by October 2001." [395] "The radical devaluation of the Turkish lira and the complete withdrawal of public support from the government seriously discredited the party and its functionaries."[396] As Zürcher underlines, "as a result of a public row between President Sezer and Prime Minister Ecevit about the latter's alleged refusal to combat corruption in February 2001, confidence disappeared overnight and the program collapsed." [397] Even Kemal

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[392] Zürcher, (2003), p. 304-5.

[393] Larrabee and Lesser. (2003), p. 15-17.

[394] Ibid.

[395] Ibid.

[396] Suat Kınıklıoğlu, The Democratic Left Party: Kapıkulu Politics Par Excellence, pp. 2-24, p. 7, http://podcast.zirve.edu.tr/sandbox/groups/economicsandadministrativesciences/wiki/ff77d/attachments/f20a3/W3-Kinikoglu.pdf?sessionID=1105e6e9e067728748d88b7cef525392d7cacc05 (accessed on August 26, 2015)

[397] Zürcher, (2003), p. 315.

Derviş, the Mister of the Economy's led structural reforms was not enough to rescue the collapse of the coalition government.

Ecevit's weak physical appearance became a concern during this period. There was a debate over Ecevit's age and health problems and his capability to manage an extremely complex and dynamic country at the age of 76. Kınıklıoğlu underlined that after two economic crisis speculations over Ecevit's health issue had increased and by November 2000, diplomatic circles started discussing the possibility of the General Staff preparing contingency plans in the event of Ecevit's death.[398]

It is important to note that, the September 11 attacks in 2001 influenced Turkey's strategic importance for the West. Kardaş argues that Turkey's position being at the center of the West and the Middle East enhanced Turkey's strategic importance.[399] The strategic partnership between Turkey and the U.S was further consolidated by the U.S led global war on terrorism.[400]

4.8 Conclusion

During the military regime Turkey was isolated by Western countries and looked for cooperation with the Middle Eastern countries. As a result of this policy Turkey adopted a liberator supporter NRC for Palestine's right to self-determination

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[398] Suat Kınıklıoğlu, The Democratic Left Party: Kapıkulu Politics Par Excellence, pp. 2-24, p. 8, http://podcast.zirve.edu.tr/sandbox/groups/economicsandadministrativesciences/wiki/ff77d/attachments/f20a3/W3-Kinikoglu.pdf?sessionID=1105e6e9e067728748d88b7cef525392d7cacc05 (accessed on August 26, 2015)

[399] Şaban Kardaş, (2002) "The strategic importance of Turkey after September 11," Turkish Daily News, May 29.

[400] Larrabee and Lesser. (2003), p. 7.

Nevertheless, during this period, the military elite strongly emphasized on allying with the West due to the Cold War politics.

Even after the end of the military regime, military elites continued to consolidate their existence in Turkish politics. Evren dominated foreign policy making and Özal mostly focused on domestic issues and economic reconstruction during the Motherland Party period. For Özal's Turkey economic growth was the most important component of Turkish foreign policy which in turn transformed Turkey gradually into a regional power. The ANAP strongly emphasized on Turkey's bridge role between the West and the East. Additionally Turkey's regional sub-system collaborator NRCs became popular during this period. It was followed by Turkey's 'protectee', rising power and faithful ally NRCs.

The end of the Cold War transformed Turkish foreign policy and raised both the risks and opportunities for Turkey. Turkish policy making elite frequently started using Turkey's historical, cultural and linguistic commonalities toward former Soviet countries as an example for these countries. Both Özal, between 1990 and 1993, and Çiller, from 1993 to 1995, promoted Turkey's example NRC by focusing on pan-Turkist cooperation. However, during this period Turkey's relation with the West and the EU was still the priority for Turkish policy makers.

On the other hand, during the RP under the Erbakan leadership, Turkey established closer relations with Muslim countries through a regional-subsystem collaborator role. Following the February 28 decisions and Erbakan's resignation Turkey's relations with Middle Eastern countries rapidly deteriorated.

The ANAP led coalition government experienced a series of failures in foreign policy related issues such as in Luxemburg as well as with its relations with Syria. During this period Turkish policy makers mainly had to deal with an increasing violent conflict with the PKK. Therefore, Turkey's anti-terrorism agent role dominated Turkish politics during the Motherland Party coalition government.

Energy was the most important component of the DSP led coalition government foreign policy program. The Baku-Ceyhan pipeline project promoted both Turkey's interest in the region and regional cooperation. This project highlighted Turkey as an emerging key actor in the region and as an energy hub. The Kurdish issue, domestic polarization between secular and religious segments, and economic instabilities branded the pre-AKP period.

Turkish foreign policy has gradually been transformed since 1980. While Turkish policy making elite saw Turkey only as a developing country in early 1980, in 1990s Turkish leaders started to exploit Turkey's geostrategic position during the post-Cold War era as a regional leader. Although Turkish leaders frequently used Turkey's increasing regional power and global power desire they could not achieve it during these years. The coalition governments of 1991-2002 had to manage economic instability, the Kurdish problems and the economic crises. Turkish foreign policy during the 1990s has been characterized as "muddling through"[401]. It is also possible to analyze NRCs during 1980 and 2002 from different perspective. The period covers the very important systemic change, the end of the Cold War, which is a very

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[401] Larrabee and Lesser. (2003), p. xv.

significant turning point for Turkey foreign policy. Therefore, it is important to evaluate various Turkish NRCs in two terms; 'Cold War' and 'post-Cold War' periods. The Cold War Turkish foreign policy part covers the military period and Motherland Party governments during 1980-1991. On the other hand, the post-Cold War Turkish foreign policy part consists of various coalition governments during 1991-2002. By analyzing Turkish NRCs during these years it is possible to observe evolution of Turkish NRCs and Turkey's changing policies. See *Figure 10* for the comparative analysis of the Cold War and the post-Cold War Turkish NRCs.

Figure 10: Comparative analysis the Cold War and the post-Cold War Turkish NRCs

The above figure compares and also summarizes Turkish NRCs between 1980 and 2002 periods based on qualitative content analysis findings. During the 'Cold War' period the most significant NRCs were the 'faithful ally', 'bridge', 'regional sub-system collaborator', 'liberation supporter', and 'protectee'. Especially during the ANAP, Turkish foreign policy activism became more visible in international platforms. At the end of the Cold War, coalition governments focused on Turkey' 'example' NRC, and by so doing the Turkish model became the main driving factor

of Turkish foreign policy. The DYP government followed Özal's activism in the regional context through the 'regional sub-system collaborator' and 'bridge country' NRCs. During the late 1990s the ANAP led coalition government continued to emphasize on Turkey's 'example' NRC. In post-Cold Period, Turkish policy makers assumed 'regional leader' NRCs by feeling responsible to handle situations in its region. In post-Cold War period, Turkish leaders' policy formation was based on the shift from 'bridge' country to 'example' and 'central country'. One of the significant declines of Turkish NRCs is Turkey's 'facilitator' role. During the Cold War Turkish leaders were willing to facilitate peace talks to maintain dialogue between conflicting parties in its neighborhood. However, increasing domestic instability and priority of certain role (such as being an 'example') in post-Cold War period facilitating to peace talks efforts lose its significance among Turkish policy makers. Although the DSP's coalition government started with foreign policy successes such as capturing Öcalan and being declared as an EU candidate country during the Helsinki Summit, it failed to maintain stability domestically. During this period, despite the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline agreement, mostly as a result of domestic problems such as the 1999 earthquake and financial crisis, the government focused more on domestic issues.

Chapter 5

NATIONAL ROLE CONCEPTIONS OF AKP ADMINISTARTION: 2002-2014

5.1 Introduction

Since the AKP ascended to power in 2002, Turkey's foreign policy elites have reshaped the country's domestic and foreign policies. In this new era, the AKP's foreign policy makers sought to exploit Turkey's geostrategic significance by developing and improving its relations with all regions based on soft power and the countries' economic interdependencies.[402] The AKP governments have aimed to redefine Turkish position in global affairs by establishing a new set of foreign policy principles. In this new period, Turkey's Muslim background became the basis of the interests that shaped the country's foreign policy strategies and NRCs. In addition, emerging economic and social actors during the AKP administration have helped to reshape Turkish national interest. These religious and social actors favor Turkey's Muslim neighborhood. Therefore, the ruling elites' aim to reshape the security perception based on hostility to the cooperation. In this context, Turkish foreign policy makers seek to normalize Turkey's relations with Islamic countries such as Syria and Iran since 2002. However, Turkey's recent domestic problems have become paired with its foreign policy challenges as a result of a rapidly changing political environment. Therefore, it is important to analyze Turkey's responses to these developments in order to understand the country's changing foreign policy

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[402] Meliha Benli Altunışık, and Lenore G. Martin, (2011) "Making Sense of Turkish Foreign Policy in the Middle East under AKP," *Turkish Studies, Vol.* 12, no. 4, pp. 569-587, p. 578.

agenda and NRCs. This part of the thesis investigates Turkey's evolving policies, especially concerning the Middle Eastern region, by examining Turkish NRCs. The following parts explain the AKP's new foreign policy activism, the Arab Spring challenge to this activism, policy maker's belief system through operational code analysis and correlations with NRCs, and assessment of pre-AKP and AKP periods by providing comparative analysis of NRCs. See *Table 8* for the AKP administrations since 2002. For the AKP period in total six hundred and eight official speeches were coded. See *Figure 11* for the distribution of NRCs of AKP Period.

Table 8: AKP Administrations between 2002-2014

| President	Cabinet	Foreign Minister
Ahmet Necdet Sezer May 16, 2000-August 28, 2007	Abdullah Gül Cabinet November 19, 2002-March 12, 2003 **Justice and Development Party**	Yaşar Yakış November 19, 2002-March 14, 2003
	I.Recep Tayyip Erdoğan Cabinet March 14, 2003-August 29, 2007 **Justice and Development Party**	Abdullah Gül March 14, 2003-August 28, 2007
Abdullah Gül 28 August 2007 – 28 August 2014	II.Recep Tayyip Erdoğan Cabinet August 29, 2007-July 6, 2011 **Justice and Development Party**	Ali Babacan August 29, 2007-May 2, 2009
		Ahmet Davutoğlu May 2, 2009- 29 August 2014
	III.Recep Tayyip Erdoğan Cabinet July 6,2011-August 28, 2014 **Justice and Development Party**	

Figure 11: NRCs of AKP Period

5.2 Historical Background of Justice and Development Party

At the beginning of his political career Erbakan initiated the Nationalist View Movement (Milli Görüş Hareketi). Eligur underlines that Erbakan's Nationalist View Movement as a "proposed a national culture, and education, industrialization and social justice based on the principles of Islam."[403] All previous pro-Islamist parties adopted the Islamist National View Movement had been banned from politics through military intervention or closed through constitutional court decisions.[404]

After the closure of the RP, the National View Movement members united under the Virtue Party. However, the party was closed in 2001 and Erbakan was banned from politics. During this period the pro-Islamist National View Movement members split into two. Erbakan's followers established the Felicity Party. On the other hand, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Abdullah Gül established the AKP on August 14, 2001. Erdoğan and Gül became the symbol of a new initiative (yenilikçiler) of the Islamic movement. They realized the risks of pro-Islamist parties pursued by Erbakan and learned from the February 28 experiences. The February 28 process and closure of the RP showed that the military and secular circle were not going to tolerate Erbakan style pro-Islamist parties and would not hesitate to express their reaction against any rising party that had Islamic fundamentalist tendencies. Therefore, Erdoğan and Gül decided to follow a moderate Islamic ideological line than that of previous Islamist

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[403] Necmettin Erbakan, (1975) Milli Görüş. İstanbul: Dergah Yayınları. Extract from Banu Eligür (2014) The Mobilization of Political Islam in Turkey. Cambridge University Press, p. 66.

[404] Milli Görüş was initiated by Necmettin Erbakan in 1969 to carry out religious vision beyond Turkish borders. These Islamist parties were; National Order Party (Milli Nizam Partisi) banned after 1971 military intervention, National Salvation Party (Milli Selamet Partisi) banned after 1980 military intervention, Welfare Party (Refah Partisi) closed in 1998 by the Constitutional Court, Virtue Party (Fazilet Partisi) closed in 2001 by the Constitutional Court. Hapiness Party (Saadet Partisi) was founded in 2001 but failed to pass %10 thresholds in any of the general elections. See Barry Rubin and Ali Çarkoğlu, (2009). Religion and politics in Turkey. Routledge.

parties. They initiated a new Islamic movement without crossing the secularism hardline by integrating their Islamist movement into mainstream politics. Erdoğan called his party ideology as "conservative democracy" rather than "Muslim democrats" and set his political agenda based on political liberalization.[405]

One of the most important differences between Erbakan and Erdoğan's style is that, while Erbakan's pro-Islamist party opposed Turkey's EU membership, the AKP as a part of its election manifesto strongly emphasized on Turkey's entry into the EU.[406] The AKP's leaders chose to focus on democratization and Europeanization of the Turkish political system. The other significant difference is the AKP's moderate view on civil liberties. The party's program was committed on equality for all by claiming that "nobody can be free unless everybody is free,"[407] Sümer underlines that the AKP was trying to protect rights of both believers and the non-believers.[408] The AKP was in favor of EU membership and aimed to exploit economic globalization in the global market by advancing social justice and individual rights and freedom (including religious freedom) and reformation within the borders of secular state.[409]

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[405] Ömer Taşpınar (2012) Turkey: The New Model?, The Brookings Institution http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2012/04/24-turkey-new-model-taspinar (accessed on August 27, 2015)

[406] For a comparative analysis of the AKP's and RP's programs, see Serdar Şen (2004) *AKP Milli Görüşçü Mü?: Parti Programlarında Milli Görüş*, Istanbul: Nokta Kitap.

[407] Murat Somer (2004) Muslim Demcrats in the Making? Explaining Turkey's AKP, Paper presented at the Annual Convention of the International Studies Association, Montreal, Quebec, Canada, March 17-20, 2004, p. 11.

[408] Ibid.

[409] Öniş (2006), p. 13-14.

By February 2001 Ecevit's health problem, his confrontation with President Sezer, domestic dissatisfaction and a split within his party (for instance Ismail Cem established a New Party), Ecevit was forced to call for an early election. The AKP successfully capitalized on the ineffectiveness of state institutions to fulfill public expectations and state ineffectiveness especially in civil emergency management during the 1999 earthquake. Larrabe believes that "the earthquake may not have spelled the end of the strong state, as many predicted at the time, but it had certainly left an enduring legacy of dissatisfaction."[410] Additionally, the financial and economic crisis of 2001 had weakened existing political parties' electoral fortunes in 2002 general elections.

The general election on November 3, 2002 was a political earthquake for Turkish politics because none of the last coalition government members (the Democratic Left Party, Nationalist Action Party and the Motherland Party) were able to surpass the 10% threshold. Thus, previous coalition parties found themselves isolated from Turkish politics. The AKP got an absolute majority in the National Assembly by taking 34% of votes. For the first time since the 1987 general election a party secured the majority of seats (363 seats) in Parliament. The Republican People's Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi-CHP) was the only other party that surpassed the 10% threshold to gain seats in the Parliament along with the AKP. After a decade of political instability of coalition governments, a religious conservative party came to power in Turkey. Erdoğan was an important factor for the AKP's crucial success. He came from a working class background and therefore was able to appeal to the

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[410] Larrabee and Lesser. (2003), p. 25.

masses. Also, his success as Istanbul's former Mayor was also known by society. [411] Zürcher underlines Erdoğan's success and claims that even his conviction for citing his political polarization and religious hatred could not prevent him from becoming a credible administrator who could end poverty and corruption.[412]

Öniş underlines three influential factors as the evolution of AKP and its success. He claims that: (1) successfully constructing a cross-class electoral alliance by exploiting the neo-liberal globalization process, getting business associations support and constructing a broad inter-class of winners and losers to gain widespread electoral appeal; (2) the corruption scandal and financial crisis in 2000 and 2001, the IMF's conditions discredited the existing center-right and center-left parties and created a political space for the AKP benefit from; (3) globalization and EU membership transformed the party to speed up its electoral success. [413] This way, despite the party's Islamic roots and background, the AKP successfully managed to present itself as a new face in Turkish politics.[414] In addition to all these factors, an absence of a powerful rival or alternatives from either the right or the left in adapting to the changing parameters of Turkish politics allowed the AKP to consolidate its power in the years to come.[415]

In order to achieve democratic liberalization, the AKP focused on democratic reforms by following EU guidelines, getting legitimacy in the eyes of the military

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[411] Zürcher, (2003), p. 305- 6.

[412] Ibid.

[413] Öniş (2006), p. 2.

[414] Ibid,. p. 12.

[415] Ibid,. p. 13-14.

and supporting "Turkey's business community, liberal intellectuals, and pragmatic middle class."[416] After the general election in 2002, Erdoğan underlined that resolving headscarf issue was not the priority in party agenda but instead the AKP speed up the EU accession process which was called as "the Christian Club" by the National View movement.[417] In this way, the AKP distinguished itself from old school Islamist movements and gained secularist circle confidence. Dağı points out that new Islamist stands on Turkey's EU membership and relations with the West is clearly a break from the National View Movement's open 'crusade' against the West, suspicious of Western values, and criticism of the Westernization of Turkey.[418] The AKP avoided direct confrontation with the TAF and followed confrontation avoidance strategy.[419] In this way, AKP elites refrained from issues that was sensitive for the military and also hesitated to criticizing military in sensitive issues.[420]

5.3 Strategic Depth Doctrine: Davutoğlu's Impact on Turkish Foreign Policy

Davutoğlu began his political career as the chief advisor of the Prime Minister, a position he held from 2002-2009. He then became the Foreign Minister in May 2009, and finally, in August 2014, he became Prime Minister. Even as an advisor, he was

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[416] Ömer Taşpınar (2012) "Turkey: The New Model?," The Brookings Institution http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2012/04/24-turkey-new-model-taspinar (accessed on August 27, 2015)

[417] Dağı, (2005), p.12.

[418] Ibid,. p. 14.

[419] Ümit Cizre, (2008). "The Justice and Development Party and the Military: Recreating the Past after Reforming it?" In Ümit Cizre (ed.) Secular and Islamic Politics in Turkey: The making of the Justice and Development Party, London: Routledge, pp.132- 171.

[420] Metin Heper, (2005) "The Justice and Development Party Government and the Military in Turkey" *Turkish Studies*, Vol. 6, No. 2, pp. 215-231.

an influential figure in the formulation of Turkey's foreign policy. He was even described as the secret foreign minister.[421]

Davutoğlu is widely accepted as one of the strongest figures in Turkish foreign policy literature and the main architect of important policies that have a global influence. He was ranked as one of the 100 global thinkers in 2010 by Foreign Policy Magazine for being the brains behind Turkey's global reawakening.[422] When he became Foreign Minister, he was able to put into practice the foreign policy arguments presented in his book *Strategic Depth*.[423] In his book, he describes a new strategic vision for a potential increased role for Turkey in the international system by re-assessing the country's strategic position in the context of the systemic transformation of world politics. This new approach, "strategic depth", aims to establish regional integration with Turkey's neighboring countries, which share a long common history.[424] Davutoğlu emphasizes to enhance Turkey's foreign policy capabilities by bringing a fresh look to Turkey's history and geography to underscore Turkey's true potential in global affairs. In his book he underlines that the strategic depth approach:

> Calls for integration of the regions neighboring Turkey, since all people living in this wide region share the same destiny, based on their long common history. Thus, my book is a call for developing a new strategic mind-set and

[421] Şeker, Nimet (2009) "Turkey's Strategic Depth: A Shift in Turkish Foreign Policy," Qantara.de, August 7, http://en.qantara.de/webcom/show_article.php/_c-476/_nr-1201/i.html (accessed on August 15, 2014)

[422] Andrew Swift (2010) the FP Top 100 Global Thinkers, Foreign Policy, November 28, http://foreignpolicy.com/2010/11/28/the-fp-top-100-global-thinkers-6/ (accessed on December 25, 2014)

[423] Davutoğlu, (2001).

[424] Alexis Papachelas interview with Ahmet Davutoğlu (2011) "Turkish FM sets out terms for Aegean," on March 6. Full text of the interview is available at http://www.mfa.gov.tr/data/ENFORMASYON/Turkish%20FM%20sets%20out%20terms%20for%20Aegean.pdf (accessed on December 20, 2014).

foresees a strong role for Turkey to play toward this end. The role that Turkey is advised to play is one of promoting security for all, enhanced political dialogue, increased economic interdependence as well as cultural harmony and mutual respect. [425]

Davutoğlu's vision of strategic depth aims to "place Turkey right at the center of many geopolitical areas of influence"[426] by exploiting the country's historical and geopolitical importance. In his *Strategic Depth* book Davutoğlu established the roots of a new Turkish foreign policy by analyzing the transformation of world politics. He underlines that Turkey needed a new strategic approach at the end of the Cold War to establish good relations by adapting changing variables of international conjectures by having new diplomatic and practical policies compatible with the necessities of dynamic international conjectures. Davutoğlu focused on Turkey's embedded potential in the changing paradigm of global politics. In this new vision of Turkey as both a secular and a Muslim nation state, the country is capable of playing a greater role in other regions, such as Eurasia and the Middle East.

Davutoğlu's strategic depth doctrine promotes Turkey's both regional and global sub-system collaborator NRCs. According to Davutoğlu Turkey's strategic depth through its geography and history is the basis of Turkey's multiple identities which allow Turkey to adopt multiple NRCs simultaneously. Davutoğlu claims that Turkey's geostrategic position connects it to all major regions in all directions: the Balkans, the MENA, the Caucasus, Europe, and Central Asia. In this way "strategic depth is all about, overcoming the old animosities and deepening and widening a

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[425] Ahmet Davutoğlu (2011) "World's a stage for Turkey," on March 6, Interview by Davutoğlu published in The Australian Newspaper (Australia) on 21 January 2012, (official translation).

[426] Alexander Murinson, (2006) "The Strategic Depth Doctrine of Turkish Foreign Policy," Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 42, No. 6, pp. 945–964, p. 947.

strategic horizon through new geopolitical imagination".[427] Hence, it is not an understatement to say that Davutoğlu's vision has guided Turkish foreign policy for more than a decade. He established the AKP's new foreign policy principles before even becoming Foreign Minister.[428]

Davutoğlu introduced the strategic depth concept to the Turkish foreign policy literature but he is not the first Turkish policymaker to use this concept to define Turkey's position. In 1998, during his annual press conference Demirel used this concept to illustrate Turkey's rising significance in the region. He claimed that:

> An imitation of the historical silk road, the construction of new telecommunications networks through Turkish satellites in space, a transportation corridor from Varna to Durres, Baku-Ceyhan and the East-West energy corridor through the Caspian Sea, the Kars-Tbilisi railway infrastructure, all provide a safe and the shortest way to integrate the world's economy through Turkey. This is a concrete reality that Turkey gains a new strategic depth.[429]

Demirel defined Turkey's regional sub-system collaborator and energy hub NRCs as a source of Turkey's strategic depth. Turkey is neither an energy rich country nor has access to energy. However, its unique location gives it the potential to turn Turkey to an energy hub through bilateral treaties such as the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline project, which is the center of the East-West energy corridor that connects trans-Caspian to Turkey and also enables Turkey to access Central Asia.

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[427] Ibrahim Kalın (2011) Turkish foreign policy in 2011: an assessment, in: Bechev, Dimitar (Hg.): What does Turkey think? *European Council on Foreign Relations*, pp. 51-56, p. 52.

[428] Davutoğlu (2007).

[429] Süleyman Demirel (1998) speech given at the annual press conference on December 26, (unofficial translation).

Davutoğlu emphasized on Turkey's regional subs-system collaborator role. In this regard, Turkey's multiregional foreign policy aimed to transform Turkey into a regional power and eventually into a global power.[430]

To a certain extent, Davutoğlu's policies represent an emancipation of Turkish foreign policy from the security-oriented policies that were inherited from both the Ottoman period and the early Republican era. Özkan underlines Davutoğlu's pan Islamic approach as expansionist foreign policy formulation based on Islamic values, he points out that "Davutoğlu was therefore the first scholar to establish an Islamist foreign-policy vision that provided a viable alternative to Erbakan's rhetorical, populist discourse."[431] Özkan believes that as Chief Adviser to the Prime Minister between 2002-09 Davutoğlu had limited power to implement his pan-Islamist vision to shape Turkish foreign policy. [432]

In his book *Strategic Depth* Davutoğlu rejects Turkey's bridge country role which simply connects continents or the Western and the Eastern blocs. He defines Turkey's geopolitical NRC as a central country and rejects Turkey's bridge role. According to Davutoğlu "Turkey should be seen neither as a bridge country which only connects two points, nor a frontier country, nor indeed as an ordinary country, which sits at the edge of the Muslim world or the West."[433] He believes that a bridge is a passive and an artificial in creation. Instead Turkey's unique geo-political

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[430] Davutoğlu, (2001), p. 501-57.

[431] Behlül Özkan, (2014) Turkey, Davutoğlu and the Idea of Pan-Islamism, *Survival: Global Politics and Strategy*, Vol. 56, No. 4, pp. 119-140, p. 120.

[432] Ibid., p. 132.

[433] Davutoğlu (2008), pp.78-79.

location between multiple regions transforms Turkey to a central country. Turkey is located in the center of various regions including Middle Eastern, Balkan, Mediterranean, and Black Sea countries.

The AKP elites aimed re-connecting Turkey with former Ottoman territories. Therefore, Turkey's national interest gained priority in Turkish foreign policy agenda than other responsibilities such as that of a faithful ally NRC. In this sense Davutoğlu's strategic depth doctrine challenges Turkey's faithful ally role because Davutoğlu pursues a more self-confident and independent foreign policy based on Turkey's national interest as an active independent actor. Since the beginning of the AKP rule, decision making elites pursue active independent policies such as the Turkish Parliament's rejection of the March, 1st 2003 Bill. Four months after the general elections on March 29, 2003 Erdoğan evaluated Turkish foreign policy regarding Turkey's position in the Iraq War, in 2003. Erdoğan believed that being a faithful ally to the West does not clash with Turkey's active independent NRC. He stated that:

> As long as Turkey has protects its sensitivity on certain issues there is nothing more natural than to respond positively to our allies. Turkey is not a country which acts independently off its allies. Our country is strong and an active member of the world-system and America's ally…while taking the steps on various issues, there is nothing more natural than pursuing certain sensitivities. I state this openly: it should definitely be known that the Republic of Turkey is an independent state, which does not take orders from anyone... Our government takes into considerations the realities of the world, it gives great importance to its relations with its allies; but when we make decisions for our nation's interests and welfare, our relations with our allies does not conflict with the reality that we only get order from real owner of oursovereignty ; our saint nation.[434]

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[434] Recep Tayyip Erdoğan (2003) speech given at the Grand National Assembly on the occasion of the presentation of 2004 annual budget resolution on March 29, (unofficial translation).

Although there was a difference of opinion between the U.S and Turkey over the Iraq war in 2003, Turkish policy makers continued to underline Turkey's alliance with the U.S by also following active independent policies.

Davutoğlu set Turkey's five important foreign policy goals as part of his strategic depth doctrine; to become an EU member by 2023, to promote regional cooperation in security and economic related issues, to play a significant role in regional conflicts, to participate in global platforms, to be one of the top ten largest economies and playing a determinant role in international organizations.[435] In this way, Turkey could contribute to the world community to achieve global stability. Davutoğlu underlines that Turkey's historical and geographical richness will turn Turkey into a global actor in this century.[436] Davutoğlu believes that in this way Turkey will get its deserved position in global order as an emerging power.

5.4 AKP' New Foreign Policy Principles

Davutoğlu outlines three methodological principles of Turkey's new foreign policies. The first methodological principle is to become 'vision oriented.'[437] At the end of the Cold War, Turkey abandoned its crisis-oriented policies. He points out that Turkey's new vision is based on multiculturalism with dialogue, mutual respect, stability, peace and prosperity.[438] During the 2000s, the country became a diplomatic asset through its policies in the Middle East.

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[435] Ahmet Davutoğlu, (2010) "Turkey's Zero-Problems Foreign Policy", Foreign Policy Magazine, May 20. Full text is available at: http://www.mfa.gov.tr/article-by-h_e_-ahmet-Davutoğlu-published-in-foreign-policy-magazine-_usa_-on-20-may-2010.en.mfa (accessed on August 26, 2015)

[436] Ibid.

[437] Ahmet Davutoğlu, interviewed by Nuh Yılmaz, Principles of Turkish Foreign Policy, p. 6. Full text available in http://arsiv.setav.org/ups/dosya/14808.pdf (accessed on December 25, 2014).

[438] Ibid.

The second methodological principle is to use a 'systemic framework.'[439] This principle focuses on consistency and continuity of Turkish foreign policy under the AKP following the vision-oriented approach. Davutoğlu notes that the AKP governance since 2002 establishes vision oriented policies towards all regions in harmony by having good relations both with the Western countries (the U.S and the EU) and also establishing relations with Iran, Iraq, Syria, and Russia.[440] Turkey's relationship with any region is complementary to its relationships with other regions to maintain consistency with the country's vision.

The third methodological principle is based on a new style of political rhetoric through the instrument of 'soft power.'[441] Davutoğlu emphasizes the importance for military power as a result of Turkey's insecure neighborhood but also strives for a balance between soft power and hard power. He underlines that in its regional and international politics Turkey has increasingly adopted a soft power rather than hard power by following the EU's footsteps.[442] Davutoğlu's soft power NRC has been put in practice by AKP foreign policy makers. Gül was one of the first Turkish leaders who used the soft power concept in his speeches when he was a Foreign Minister. In May 22, 2004 he claimed that "we are showing that Turkey's foreign policy is been transformed to soft power through the use of persuasion, incentives,

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[439] Ibid.

[440] Ibid.

[441] Ibid. Soft power has become an important element of Davutoğlu's discourse and Turkey's neoliberal policies; soft power is defined as getting what you want by convincing others through persuasive policies.

[442] Yılmaz, (2009), p. 7.

and as a leading model for others rather than coercive policies."[443] In this way, Turkey was accepted as a rising power in the region as a source of its rising soft power capability. Gül points out that consolidated democracy, respect for human rights, superiority of the rule of law and a free political economy make Turkey a soft power and a center of attraction.[444] Turkey's rapidly growing economy, cultural diversity, democratic values, and historical ties to the surrounding region became sources of its soft power NRC.[445]

These methodological principles are the basis of Turkey's new vision for international platforms, and they are complemented by five new operational foreign policy principles. Davutoğlu's assertive foreign policy principles aim to establish a new style in the country's foreign policy making. Through these policies, Davutoğlu established a new set of foreign policy principles which is based on the normalization and de-securitization[446] of Turkish foreign policy to change the security perceptions embedded in the country's political culture.[447] He aims to reintegrate Turkey into its

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[443] Abdullah Gul, (2004) "Foreign Policy and New Horizons," speech given on the meeting organized by Bosporus Managers' Foundation on May 22, (unofficial translation).

[444] Abdullah Gül, (2005) speech given at the "First Global International Studies Conference" Organized by Bilgi University, İstanbul, August 25.

[445] Alexis Papachelas interview with Ahmet Davutoğlu (2011) "Turkish FM sets out terms for Aegean," on March 6. Full text of the interview is available at http://www.mfa.gov.tr/data/ENFORMASYON/Turkish%20FM%20sets%20out%20terms%20for%20Aegean.pdf (accessed on December 20, 2014).

[446] *Desecuritization* refers to returning to normal politics and deconstructing a threat realm based on new forms of cooperation. Wæver (2000: 253) outlines three phases of desecuritization: (1) a lack of speech acts about a security object(s), (2) ending security dilemmas, and (3) bringing security issues into normal politics. See O. Wæver (1995) Securitization and Desecuritization. Chap. 3 In: Lipschutz RD (ed.) On Security. New York: Columbia University Press; O. Wæver (2000) The EU as a Security Actor: Reflection from a Pessimistic Constructivist on Post-Sovereign Security Order', in Morten Kelstrup & Michael C. Williams, eds, International Relations Theory and the Politics of European Integration: Power, Security, and Community. London: Routledge.

[447] Bülent Aras and Rabia Karakaya Polat (2008). From conflict to cooperation: Desecuritization of Turkey's relations with Syria and Turkey. *Security Dialogue, Vol.* 39, No. 5, pp. 495–515.

immediate neighborhood and particularly into the Islamic world. Under Davutoğlu's principled foreign policies, the "AK Party is abandoning [the] old security-centric perspective that viewed [the] environment as surrounded by enemies and is moving to a new perspective that sees in this neighborhood not adversaries but allies, friends, and partners."[448] The AKP foreign policy makers operationalize five foreign policy principles and put them in practice. AKP elites believe that these principles do not only serve Turkey's national interest but also creates an international environment based on cooperation and dialogue.

5.4.1 Balance between Freedom and Security

The balance between freedom and security refers to the balance between citizens' freedom and democracy and national security. Davutoğlu underlines that since the AKP came to power, the primary goal of the government has been to increase civil liberties without undermining national security in the post-September era.[449] Davutoğlu claims that Turkey's policy under the age of terror does not limit people's freedom. For instance, military operations towards PKK in Iraq in 2007 did not create any negative impact on people's liberties in Turkey's cities such as Ankara and Istanbul Diyarbakir or Van. [450] During the war against terror people continued their normal life without any government restrictions on civil liberties. Davutoğlu believes that the AKP administration successfully settled the balance between democratic and security issues, for instance, there have been no state of emergency cases or the postponement of elections or threats to the nation's security.[451] In order

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[448] İhsan Dağı, (2013) "Turkey's Foreign Policy Challenges," Rethink Institute Conference, September 24, p. 14.

[449] Ahmet Davutoğlu (2010) speech given at the 133rd Meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the Member States of the Arab League in Cairo on March 3, (official translation).

[450] Ibid.

[451] Ibid.

to increase national security Davutoğlu underlines the necessity of the normalization of Turkish foreign policy with its neighbors. In this new era, Turkey has started to view its "neighborhood through the prism of opportunities rather than a perception of threat".[452] Turkey's new perception for its neighbors creates new areas of cooperation. In this way Turkey provides more freedom to its citizens without any immediate concerns about its national security.

5.4.2 Zero Problem Policy toward Turkey's Neighbors

This principle aims to improve Turkey relations with all neighbors. According to Davutoğlu the 'zero problems with neighbors' policy has a deeper meaning than simply resolving problems or improving Turkey's relation with all neighbors. He claims that this policy aims to create a historical transformation in Turkey's instable and problematic neighborhood to establish a friendship and cooperation that serves the interest of all regional countries.[453] This way, Turkey could contribute to international stability and security in the regional context.

Turkish policymakers believe that the best way to have zero problems with neighbors is through regional cooperation. Therefore, Turkey's regional sub-system collaborator NRC helps to achieve a peaceful region for all.

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[452] Ahmet Davutoğlu (2012) interview with Davutoğlu, published in AUC Cairo Review (Egypt) on March 12. Full text available at http://www.mfa.gov.tr/interview-by-mr_-ahmet-davuto%C4%9Flu-published-in-auc-cairo-review-_egypt_-on-12-march-2012.en.mfa (accessed on August 20, 2014) (official translation).

[453] Ahmet Davutoğlu (2012) interview with Davutoğlu, published in AUC Cairo Review (Egypt) on March 12. Full text available at http://www.mfa.gov.tr/interview-by-mr_-ahmet-davuto%C4%9Flu-published-in-auc-cairo-review-_egypt_-on-12-march-2012.en.mfa (accessed on August 20, 2014) (official translation).

Turkey seeks maximum cooperation with its neighboring countries through economic interdependency. To this end, Turkey established high strategic council meetings with countries that had problems such as Russia, Greece, Syria and Iraq, and is also preparing to establish the same mechanism with other neighboring countries. Davutoğlu points out Turkey's increasing regional collaboration by pointing out Turkish policy to abolished visa requirements with neighboring countries such as Syria, Libya and Russia, as well as increased its trade relations with its neighboring countries and beyond.[454]

Davutoğlu particularly focused on Turkey's foreign relations with the Middle Eastern countries. He sees the advantage of trade relations as the basis of a zero problem policy. Therefore, zero problems with neighbors' established trade partnerships for regional cooperation and welfare. Erdoğan believes that Turkey's increasing trade relations with its neighboring countries is as a result of its zero problems with neighbors' policy and this is a win-win for all regional actors and only way to achieve regional peace, solidarity, peace and prosperity.[455] He underlines that Turkey embraces and collaborates with all regional actors. Erdoğan supports his argument by giving increasing trade volumes with neighboring countries between 2002 and 2009: "in 2002, our exports to Syria were $ 267 million; by the end of 2009 it reached $ 1.4 billion. In 2003, our export to Iraq was $ 829 million, by the end of the 2009 it rose to $ 5 billion. In 2002, export to Russia was 1 billion 172 million dollars and at the end of 2009 it reached to $ 3 billion. In Greece exports volume was

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[454] Ahmet Davutoğlu, (2010) "Turkey's Zero-Problems Foreign Policy", Foreign Policy Magazine, May 20. Full text is available at: http://www.mfa.gov.tr/article-by-h_e_-ahmet-Davutoğlu-published-in-foreign-policy-magazine-_usa_-on-20-may-2010.en.mfa (accessed on August 26, 2015)

[455] Recep Tayyip Erdoğan (2011) speech given at the Grand National Assembly on the occasion of the presentation of 2012 annual budget resolution on December 13, (unofficial translation).

$ 590 million in 2002, in 2009 it reached to 1.6 billion."[456] In this context, the zero problem policy has also promoted Turkey's regional sub-system collaborator role.

Davutoğlu claims that Turkey succeeded to improve its problematic relations in its neighborhood with Syria through a free trade agreement; with Iran as a result of its efforts on nuclear talk; and with Bulgaria after joining the EU. Davutoğlu believes that Turkey's achievement to resolve its problems with its neighbors proves that Turkey builds its relations with its neighbors based on substantial trust.[457]

Undoubtedly TIKA and Turkish Airlines (Türk Hava Yolları, THY) played an important role in Turkey's active engagement in its neighborhood and beyond. The TIKA's visibility and activities has been increased since 2002. It provides development assistance as a part of Turkish foreign policy expansions to establish a peaceful environment in its immediate neighborhood, especially to Turkic countries and beyond. Erdoğan states that through TIKA, Turkey provided only 52 million dollars in assistance to the Caucasus and Turkic countries in between 1992 to2002.[458] After the AKP ascended to power TIKA's assistance increased to 128 million dollar from 2003-2009.[459] Compared to 2002, the number of Programme Coordination Offices increased from 12 to 25 in 2011, and to 33 in 2012.[460] Through TIKA the

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[456] Ibid.

[457] Davutoğlu (2008), p. 80.

[458] Turkish Grand National Assembly press release, December 26. 2010. https://www.tbmm.gov.tr/develop/owa/haber_portal.aciklama?p1=105525 (accessed on August 20, 2015)

[459] Ibid.

[460] Republic of Turkey, Prime Ministry Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency (TIKA), http://www.tika.gov.tr/en/page/about_us-14650 (accessed on August 26, 2015)

AKP plays a developer role by being a donor. Turkey's Official Development Assistance (ODA) from 2006 to 2009 was around 700 million dollar and by 2010, it had provided 996 million dollars in development assistance to 131 countries.[461] Turkey's developer role increased Turkey's visibility in the world and established good relations especially with developing countries.

5.4.3 Diplomatic Discourse

This principle involves developing relations with neighboring counties and beyond through diplomatic discourse and engagement in mediation and political dialogue. This way, Turkey will be able to extend its influence to other regions, such as the Balkans, the Middle East, the Caucasus and Central Asia. Davutoğlu believes that Turkey does not have the luxury to adopt a wait-and-see policy in international crises caused by emerging conflicts in its surrounding region. He argues that that diplomatic discourse principle is active rather than reactive. Through diplomatic discourse Turkey takes preventive steps to maintain international peace and security in various regions and in this way there is no need to react to conflicts in their aftermath.[462]

By using proactive peace diplomacy, Turkey aims to engage in conflict resolution in all regions, ranging from Afghanistan to the Balkans and from the Caucasus to the Middle East. For instance, involving itself in the Russo-Georgian war; its support in the Minsk Process between Azerbaijan and Armenia, actively engaging Cyprus

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[461] Republic of Turkey, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Turkey's Development Cooperation: General Characteristics And The Least Developed Countries (LDC) Aspect," http://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkey_s-development-cooperation.en.mfa (accessed on August 26, 2015)

[462] Ahmet Davutoğlu (2012) interview with Davutoğlu, published in AUC Cairo Review (Egypt) on March 12. Full text available at http://www.mfa.gov.tr/interview-by-mr_-ahmet-davuto%C4%9Flu-published-in-auc-cairo-review-_egypt_-on-12-march-2012.en.mfa (accessed on August 20, 2014) (official translation).

during the 2004 Annan Plan, facilitating the participation of Sunnis in the 2005 Iraqi parliamentary election, mediating in direct peace talks between Israeli-Syria, Iraq-Syria, and also on Iran's nuclear program.[463] During Kosovo and Bosnia-Herzegovina crises Turkey became active player in the Balkans together with NATO, the EU and the West. Davutoğlu describes Turkish leaders' efforts in the Middle Eastern conflicts at the societal level. He also pointed out that Turkey did not take sides in the Shia and Sunni division in Iraq but instead as a result of its s active policy developed good relations both with the Shia-backed Maliki government in Iraq and the Sunni opposition group as well as having good relations both the Shia opposition and Sunni groups in Lebanon.[464]

Turkey's mediator-integrator NRC locates Turkey at the center of Afro-Eurasia. This way, Turkey has an opportunity to a play proactive role in conflict resolutions especially being at the center of global security threats in this age of globalization and the post-Cold War era. During the AKP, Turkey also acted as facilitator in conflicts by arranging meeting points to enable conflicting parties to resolve their problems. Therefore, as a credible partner Turkey fosters dialogue to achieve reconciliation and cooperation between parties to achieve peaceful agreements. In its region and beyond Turkey actively engaged in conflict resolution to establish reconciliations in Iraq, Lebanon and Kyrgyzstan; launched two separate trilateral cooperation with Serbia and Croatia to settle peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina; established trilateral cooperation mechanism with Afghanistan and Pakistan,

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[463] See Ahmet Davutoğlu, (2010) "Turkey's Zero-Problems Foreign Policy", Foreign Policy Magazine, May 20. Full text is available at: http://www.mfa.gov.tr/article-by-h_e_-ahmet-Davutoğlu-published-in-foreign-policy-magazine-_usa_-on-20-may-2010.en.mfa (accessed on August 26, 2015); Ahmet Davutoğlu (2009) article published in Nine o'Clock and Adevarul Newspapers (Romania) on October 29.

[464] Davutoğlu, (2008), p. 82.

launched a resolution process between the conflicting parties in Somalia.[465] In this same line, Turkey also launched the "Mediation for Peace" initiative with Finland in 2010 which was also adopted as a UN General Assembly resolution.[466]

Since 2006, Turkish decision makers have acted as facilitators between Iran and the West and as a mediator between Iran and the 5+1 group (five permanent members of the UN Security Council and Germany). Iran's acceptance of Turkey's mediation role can be identified as the beginning of their close relationship and the end of distrust between the two countries[467]. On May 17, 2010, Iran signed a uranium exchange deal (1200 kg low-enriched uranium) with Turkey and Brazil. Following this deal, as non-permanent members of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Turkey and Brazil voted against UNSC Resolution 1929 regarding implementing further economic sanctions against Iran.[468] Some of the most important factors that have led Turkey to support Iran's nuclear program are energy dependency on Iran and the AKP's Islamic roots.[469]

Davutoğlu bears in mind the motto of Atatürk's legacy "Peace at home, peace in the world", and claims that in order to have peace at home Turkey needs to actively

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[465] Republic of Turkey, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Resolution of Conflicts and Mediation" http://www.mfa.gov.tr/resolution-of-conflicts-and-mediation.en.mfa (accessed on August 26, 2015)

[466] The UN General Assembly Resolution, (2010) "Strengthening the role of mediation in the peaceful settlement of disputes, conflict prevention and resolution," Sixty-fifth session, June 22, (A/65/283) http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/65/283 (accessed on August 26, 2015)

[467] Rahman G. Bonab, (2009) "Turkey's Emerging Role as a Mediator Role on Iran's Nuclear Activities," *Insight Turkey,* Vol. 11, No. 3, pp. 161-175, p. 161.

[468] United Nations (2010) Security Council Imposes Additional Sanctions on Iran. Security Council Resolution 1929, S/RES/1929 (2010), New York.

[469] Aylin Güney Gürzel and Eyüp Ersoy, (2012) "Turkey and Iranian Nuclear Program," *Middle East Policy,* Vol. 19, No. 1, pp. 37-50, p. 39.

engage in its regions to resolve conflict, so that everyone can benefit.[470] He reminds critics that Turkey's new vision, which is based on soft power and political dialogue, was rewarded by the international community and the UN General Assembly, where Turkey was elected a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council for the 2009-2010 tenure.[471] The last time Turkey sat at that table was in 1961.

5.4.4 Multi-dimensional and Multi-track Policies

The multidimensional policy refers to moving beyond security issues and adding economic, cultural, and political values to promote cultural co-existence. On the other hand, multi-track policies emphasize beyond a state-centric understanding toward plurality.

Turkey's relation with global actors such as NATO, the EU and the U.S is complementary with Turkey's relation with other actors such as Russia. In a multi-dimensional policy context Turkey aims to establish relations with countries like Russia at the cultural and economic level. Davutoğlu underlines that increasing relations with Russia is not an alternative to Turkey's relations with the West.[472] Therefore, through multi-dimensional policies Turkey aims to establish regional cooperation by being a regional sub-system collaborator between Europe and Russia in order to achieve regional stability without undermining Turkey's faithful ally role with the U.S.

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[470] Ahmet Davutoğlu (2009) speech delivered at the 28th Annual Conference on US-Turkish Relations Organized by ATC-DEIK: "Turkey-US relations: A Model Partnership, Global and Regional Dimensions" in Washington DC, June 2, (official translation).

[471] General Assembly Elects Austria, Japan, Mexico, Turkey, and Uganda to Two-year Terms on Security Council, October 17, 2008. United Nations Press Release http://www.un.org/press/en/2008/ga10768.doc.htm (accessed on December 20, 2014).

[472] Ahmet Davutoğlu, (2010) "Turkey's Zero-Problems Foreign Policy", Foreign Policy Magazine, May 20. Full text is available at: http://www.mfa.gov.tr/article-by-h_e_-ahmet-Davutoğlu-published-in-foreign-policy-magazine-_usa_-on-20-may-2010.en.mfa (accessed on August 26, 2015)

Turkey's historical responsibility in all regions is accompanied by a multi-dimensional foreign policy by engaging all actors in all regions. Davutoğlu underlines that Turkey's trade relations between 2002 and 2012 increased from 13 billion dollars to 86 billion dollars; trade volume with Iran was 1.2 billion dollar in 2002, in 2012 it became 16 billion dollars and with Russia it increased from 6 billion dollars to 30 billion dollars."[473]

Turkey's trading state NRC is as a result of Turkey's zero problems with neighbors' policy. In this regard, through trade partnership with Iran and Russia, Turkey normalizes its relations by abandoning its security oriented single-dimensional foreign policy.

Turkish business groups also began to affect the country's foreign policy by encouraging the establishment of economic and diplomatic relations in the MENA region to strengthen its presence in those countries.[474] Turkish business groups help to move beyond single-track and state centric policies.

5.4.5 Rhythmic Diplomacy

This principle encourages Turkey to play a more active role in global and regional matters on the international platform and to contribute to peace and prosperity.[475] Davutoğlu's rhythmic diplomacy principle is consistent with its soft power, regional and global sub-system collaborator NRCs. In this way, Turkish foreign policy

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[473] Ahmet Davutoğlu (2012) speech delivered in the Parliament addressed to the Planning and Budget Committee on November 6, (unofficial translation).

[474] Jonathan Head (2011) Libya: Turkey's troubles with Nato and no-fly zone *BBC News*, March 25.

[475] See Davutoğlu (2008); Yılmaz (2009); Bülent Aras, (2009) "Davutoğlu Era in Turkish Foreign Policy," *SETA Policy Brief*, No. 32; Davutoğlu (2010).

makers were capable to follow vision based soft power strategies and implement a consistent foreign policy through increasing representation in international organizations. Today, Turkey has become a member in many regional and international organizations; and also a non-permanent member of the UNSC for the 2009-10 tenure, member of G-20 (Group of 20), member of OIC and NATO, OSCE (Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe) to ECO (Economic Cooperation Organization), has an observer status in the African Union, the Gulf Cooperation Council and in the Arab League.[476] Turkey's multilateral diplomacy prompts it into a global actor role. Rhythmic diplomacy overlaps Turkey's regional subs-system collaborator, global sub-system collaborator and developer NRCs. As a rising power and developer state Turkey becomes more visible in international platforms. Turkey's contribution to the UN budget has tripled during the 2013-2015 period. As a result of this, "Turkey's rank among the top contributors to the UN budget rose from 25th to 16th. Turkey is now a full member of the "Geneva Group" bringing together countries which contribute more than one percent to the regular budget of the United Nations."[477] Turkey's developer role as a commitment to help developing countries has become its responsibility as a global actor. For instance, Turkey's financial aid to the Pacific Island States is proof of that. Ali Babacan stated that "Turkey has decided to allocate 5 million Dollars specifically for the Pacific Island States. This fund is designed for the implementation of small and medium scale development projects in the Pacific Island States through the Turkish

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[476] Ahmet Davutoğlu (2012) interview with Davutoğlu, published in AUC Cairo Review (Egypt) on March 12. Full text available at http://www.mfa.gov.tr/interview-by-mr_-ahmet-davuto%C4%9Flu-published-in-auc-cairo-review-_egypt_-on-12-march-2012.en.mfa (accessed on August 20, 2014) (official translation).

[477] Ahmet Davutoğlu (2014) speech given at the Meeting of Turkey-CARICOM Consultation and Cooperation Mechanism, July 18, İstanbul, (official translation)

International Cooperation Agency (TIKA)."[478] Turkey's contribution for the development of the Pacific Island States in which it has no interest is evident of Turkey's increasing sensitivity globally as a developer state.

Turkey contributes to African countries as a developer state and provides humanitarian and technical assistance in many areas including agricultural development, energy, and education. Turkey's capability and commitment to the region also promotes' Turkey's rising power aspirations. Erdoğan underlines that "the rising power Turkey, cooperates with 37 African countries through TIKA to contribute to the development of African countries. While until 2005 TIKA's financial aid was only 3 million dollars, by the end of 2011 it reached 156 million dollars."[479] Turkey also provides humanitarian assistance for natural disasters to build international solidarity as was evident in Southeast Asia after the tsunami disasters in 2004, in Pakistan following the October 2005 earthquake, and in Lebanon after the crisis of July 2006. [480] Turkey's humanitarian assistance and financial aid to Turkic states exceeded 250 million dollars in 2005 and 2006.[481] Additionally Turkey plays a developer role as being a donor for various international organizations such as a 12 million dollar donation to the UN World Food Programme (WFP) and the UN between the years 2005 and 2006 and six

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[478] Ali Babacan (2008) speech delivered at the Turkey-Pacific Island States Ministerial Conference, Istanbul, April 9, (official translation.

[479] Recep Tayyip Erdoğan (2013) "New Turkey Road", addressing the nation under the on January 31, (unofficial translation).

[480] Republic of Turkey, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Humanitarian Assistance by Turkey" http://www.mfa.gov.tr/humanitarian-assistance-by-turkey.en.mfa (accessed on August 26, 2015).

[481] Ibid.

hundred thousand dollars to the newly-founded "Central Emergency Response Fund."[482]

Erdoğan underlines that Turkey's support for developing countries through TIKA increased between 2002 and 2011. In 2002 foreign development aid was 86 million dollars, by 2011 this number reached 2 billion 363 million dollars.[483] Turkey provides assistance to countries in different parts of the world. Turkish foreign policy aims to contribute to global peace and security through its zero problems with neighbors' policy, diplomatic discourse, multi-dimensional and rhythmic diplomacy foreign policy principles by enhancing political dialogue towards all directions. To this end, Turkey and Spain jointly sponsored the 'Alliance of Civilizations' forum to promote harmony and peaceful co-existence among cultures in 2005. This was later adopted by the Secretary General as a UN initiative.[484] As one of the foundation of AKP's foreign policy the 'Alliance of Civilizations' represents that differences between civilizations should not be the source of conflicts, but rather that mutual respect and cultural harmonization is possible. Turkey's civilizational discourse can be interpreted as a response to Huntington's "clashes of civilizations" thesis.

Another prominent NRC during the AKP tenure is that of the 'defender of the Muslim world' NRC. Davutoğlu states that Turkey has a responsibility and commitment to protect Muslim countries under oppression. This role is consistent with the 'leader of the Muslim world' NRC. A leader of the Muslim world NRC is

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[482] Ibid.

[483] Recep Tayyip Erdoğan (2012) speech given at the Grand National Assembly on the occasion of the presentation of 2013 annual budget resolution on December 10, (unofficial translation).

[484] Republic of Turkey, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "The Alliance of Civilizations Initiative," http://www.mfa.gov.tr/the-alliance-of-civilizations-initiative.en.mfa (accessed on August 26, 2015).

based on Turkish leaders' perception of Turkey's responsibility to handle situations related with Muslim countries and its commitment towards Muslim people around the world. During the OIC conference he underlined the responsibility of the Islamic world to defend the rights of the Palestinian people from Israeli aggression and the necessity for delivering humanitarian aid to Gaza. He said that Turkey, "for its part, is ready to lead and cooperate on such a humanitarian aid effort to our fellow Muslim nations."[485] He believes that the problem of any Muslim nation in any part of the world from Gaza to Baghdad to Damascus to Mosul to Basra and to Karbala is Turkey's problem.[486] He also claims that Turkey cannot neglect "Muslim brothers and sisters in the midst of the African continent. We cannot leave these people to their destiny like orphans."[487] Therefore, Turkey's regional leadership and global actor role includes that of being the leader and defender of the Muslim world.

5.5 Turkish Foreign Policy in post-Arab Spring Period

The popular uprisings known as the "Arab Spring" which started in December 2010 in the MENA had a significant impact on Turkey's economic and political relations in the region. Since the uprisings, Turkey's regional policy has gone through a transformation as the Middle East region became the center of its foreign policy agenda. Until this political earthquake, Turkey's proactive foreign policies had successfully positioned the country as a rising power in the region. Davutoğlu believed that Turkey could promote democratic values without compromising its

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[485] Ahmet Davutoğlu (2014) speech delivered at the Expanded Extraordinary Meeting of OIC Executive Committee, August 12, Jeddah, (official translation).

[486] Ahmet Davutoğlu (2014) speech delivered at the World Muslim scholars of peace, moderation and common sense initiative meeting, July 18, İstanbul, (unofficial translation).

[487] Ahmet Davutoğlu (2014) speech delivered at the OIC Executive Committee Meeting on the Latest Developments in the Central African Republic, February 20, Jeddah, (official translation).

national interests or its commitment to shape and contribute to regional development and conflict resolution.[488]

In Egypt, it was easy for Turkish leaders to call on Hosni Mubarak to step down because of the lack of strong economic or political relations with his regime. Turkish leaders were among the first to call for Mubarak's resignation on February 2, 2011.[489] However, as popular uprisings spread through the region, Turkey's economic and political relations were challenged. Hence, these challenges tested Turkey's assertive regional policy vision. The country's relations with authoritarian regimes put it in a difficult position. "Turkey's response became more complex, as Turkey's interests were at stake,"[490] mostly due to investments in Libya and Syria.

Turkey's foreign policy makers adopted policies based on the country's national interests. Turkey had $15 billion worth investments in Libya, and over 25,000 Turkish citizens lived there.[491] Hence, due to concerns about the safety of the Turkish population in Libya and the country's economic investments, Turkish decision makers were more cautious and neutral toward the Kaddafi regime. Meanwhile, as the International Community discussed a possible NATO intervention in Libya, Davutoğlu stated Turkey's opposition to a no-fly-zone and to military

[488] Ahmet Davutoğlu, (2012b) "Principles of Turkish Foreign Policy and Regional Political Structuring," *Center for Strategic Research*, No. 3, p. 3.

[489] Stephen Larrabee, (2011) "Arab Spring and its Effect on Turkey's Regional Policy," *Seta Policy Debate*, No. 3, p. 8 http://www.setav.org/ups/dosya/94100.pdf (accessed on December 12, 2014).

[490] Meliha Benli Altunışık, (2011) "Challenges to Turkey's 'Soft Power' in the Middle East," TESEV Foreign Policy Programme. Istanbul: TESEV, pp. 1-4, p. 3.

[491] Fatma Demirelli, (2011) "Turkey in Minefield as Popular Uprisings Engulf Arab World," *Today's Zaman*, 21 February; Tocci, Nathalie, (2011) "Turkey and the Arab Spring: Implications for Turkish Foreign Policy from a Transatlantic Perspective," *Mediterranean Paper Series*, p. 3. Available at: http://www.iai.it/pdf/mediterraneo/GMF-IAI/Mediterranean-paper_13.pdf (accessed on January 10, 2015)

intervention by claiming that any external intervention would make the situation worse. Later, Turkey changed its indecisive non-interventionist policy in Libya and supported the NATO-led operation. Davutoğlu claims that Turkey opposed unilateral NATO action, but when the UN and Arab League supported the no-fly-zone, Turkey joined the International Community as a faithful ally.

In Syria, Turkey under the leadership of the AKP, avoided isolating and marginalizing the Assad regime and instead developed strong economic and political relations with the regime. However, the popular uprising and the Assad regime's violence against civilians brought Turkish-Syrian relations to a stalemate. Turkey adopted a wait-and-see policy during the early phase of the Syrian crisis. Additionally, the situation in Syria posed a challenge to Turkey's Kurdish problem in terms of "the fear of instability along the 877 kilometer Turkish-Syrian border and of the sectarian ramifications of the Syrian uprising (particularly as regards the Kurdish question)."[492]

Öniş believes that Turkish decision makers faced "ethic versus self-interest trade-off"[493] in Libya and Syria due to the country's strong political and economic relations with those regimes. However, he recognized that in the Syrian case, Turkey's response was very similar to that of the EU and the U.S. The Western powers also failed to implement coherent policies in Syria, unlike in Libya due to the trade-off between Syria's need for reforms and Western economic interests.[494] Since

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[492] Tocci (2011), p. 3.

[493] Ziya Öniş, (2012) "Turkey and the Arab Spring: Between Ethics and Self-Interest," *Insight Turkey*, Vol. 14, No. 3, pp. 45-63, p. 50-51.

[494] Ibid., 61.

his appointment as the chief advisor to the PM and later as Foreign Minister, Davutoğlu has visited Syria sixty-two times, and he has visited three times after the beginning of the Syrian unrest in March 2011, in an attempt to convince Assad to take steps to implement urgent reforms.[495] Davutoğlu even presented Assad with a road map for reforms in the country. Thus, Turkey relied on its soft power and initiated bilateral diplomacy with Syria. National security concerns led Turkey to employ diplomatic channels with Syria to encourage reforms rather than calling for Assad to step down. However, in his last visit in August 2011, Davutoğlu realized that Assad did not have any intention of initiating a democratization process or implementing credible reforms. When their attempts failed, Turkish policy makers agreed to launch a regional initiative together with the Arab League, and they later supported the UN Security Council resolution. However, both of these initiatives have failed to convince Assad to implement reforms in Syria.[496] In 2012, economic relations dropped by 74 percent ($566 million) compared to 2012.[497] Turkey closed its embassy in Syria on March 26, 2012 and a few days later hosted the second 'Friends of Syria' meeting, in Istanbul.[498] By hosting the conference Turkey showed its support to the Syrian opposition group (the Free Syrian Army, FSA). In this regard, Turkey played a liberation supporter role. Davutoğlu claims that "as a responsible and friendly neighboring country, Turkey has made tremendous efforts to

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[495]Ahmet Davutoğlu (2012) interview with Davutoğlu, published in AUC Cairo Review (Egypt) on March 12. Full text available at http://www.mfa.gov.tr/interview-by-mr_-ahmet-davuto%C4%9Flu-published-in-auc-cairo-review-_egypt_-on-12-march-2012.en.mfa (accessed on August 20, 2014) (official translation).

[496] Davutoğlu, (2012b), p. 7-8.

[497] Henri J. Barkey, "Turkish–Iranian Competition after the Arab Spring," *Survival: Global Politics and Strategy,* Vol. 54, No. 6 (2012), p. 152.

[498] These conferences were formed to help Syrian opposition as a response to the UN Security Council's inability to take actions against Assad regime due to the veto of China and Russia.

divert the Syrian Administration to the right path…The only interlocutor for Turkey in Syria is now the Syrian people and their representatives, that is, the Syrian opposition."[499] Gül also supported the liberation movements in Syria.[500] Turkey decided to support Syrian rebels not only to achieve a more democratic Syria but to prevent a spillover into Turkish territory.[501]

As a regional actor, Turkey tried to guide developments in favor of its interests. However, the country eventually abandoned its initial policies toward Libya and Syria and started to openly support democratic movements in these countries.[502] Turkey realized the limitation of its vision (to contribute to regional order), especially in Syria. Turkey's inability to resolve regional problems in the wake of popular uprisings demonstrates Turkey's relative lack of capabilities and tools to shape regional events through its foreign policy. Öniş argues that Turkish foreign policy makers have very limited control of the rapidly unfolding events in Syria. Öniş proposes that a political transformation in the region could challenge Turkey's soft power potential, and the country could have difficulties with its 'zero problems with neighbors' policy if they do not update it.[503] Furthermore, Altunışık sees

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[499] Ahmet Davutoğlu (2012) speech delivered at the Syrian Opposition Conference, July 2, Cairo, (official translation).

[500] Abdullah Gül (2012) speech delivered at Chicago Global Affairs Council on May 22, (unofficial translation).

[501] Damla Aras, (2012) "Turkey-Syrian Relations Go Downhill: The Syrian Uprisings," *Middle East Quarterly,* Vol. 19, No. 2, pp. 41-50, p. 41.

[502] Şaban Kardaş, (2011) "Turkey and the Arab Spring: Coming to Terms with Democracy Promotion?", The German Marshall Fund, Foreign Policy Programme. Available at: http://www.gmfus.org/publications/turkey-and-arab-spring-coming-terms-democracy-promotion (accessed on December 10, 2014)

[503] Altunışık, (2011), p. 46.

difficulties in implementing soft power policies via political dialogue and mediation in a region that is currently dominated by hard power.[504]

However, the Arab Spring provided new opportunities for Turkey as well. Turkey successfully reconciled its Muslim identity and Western values, followed a somewhat independent foreign policy and created economic growth. These positive developments could even make Turkey a model for regional states that are undergoing political transformations.[505] These events represent an opportunity for Turkey to promote its policies in the Muslim world. The U.S. and the EU have promoted the 'Turkish Model' to establish friendly political structures in the region. In this context, worsening Turkish-Israeli relations and Turkey's stand against Israel to defend Palestine increased the country's popularity among Arab nations and promoted its model. Davutoğlu underlined that "if needed, Turkey remains ready to share her own democratic experience with all interested countries." [506]

Turkish foreign policy makers stated that the country was not willing to be a model but could possibly be an inspiration by helping to provide the Turkish experience to those who desired it. Therefore, Turkey as a rising power and an example in the post-

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[504] Ibid., p. 2-3.

[505] See Dal and Erşen (2014) "Reassessing the "Turkish Model" in the Post-Cold War Era: A Role Theory Perspective." First time was in the early 1990s, the model metaphor was applied to the Turkic world in the former Soviet space. Second time in the 2000s, the Bush (and then Obama) administrations have referred to Turkey as a model, an example, and a source of inspiration for the Muslim Middle East after Turkey declared as the EU Candidate state.

[506] Ahmet Davutoğlu (2012) interview with Davutoğlu, published in AUC Cairo Review (Egypt) on March 12. Full text available at http://www.mfa.gov.tr/interview-by-mr_-ahmet-davuto%C4%9Flu-published-in-auc-cairo-review-_egypt_-on-12-march-2012.en.mfa (accessed on August 20, 2014) (official translation).

Arab Spring period became a source of inspiration to other countries.[507] Öniş argues that Turkey is a predominantly Muslim population but, due to its previous democratic deficits Turkey could not be a model for political liberalization for Middle Eastern countries until the AKP.[508] He believes that Turkey's political and economic transformation through the globalization process helped to increase the popularity and credibility of the Turkish experience.[509]

On July 3, 2013, General Abdelfattah al-Sisi toppled Egypt's democratically elected government. Turkish policy makers opposed the overthrow of the democratically elected Muslim Brotherhood rule of President Morsi's government due to the AKP's religious roots and solidarity with Muslims around the world as well as Turkey's traumatic political experiences with several coups.[510] The Syrian crisis and the military intervention in Egypt and a difference of opinion with Iran over the crisis in Syria weakened Turkey's prestigious 'zero problem with neighbors' policy'. Turkey's 'zero problems with neighbors' policy is ironically called by critics as an "only problems with neighbors" or a "no neighbors without problems" policy[511] Erdoğan's chief foreign policy adviser, İbrahim Kalın, responded to these claims and evaluated Turkey's position as one of "precious loneliness" [*değerli yalnızlık*].[512] On the one hand, Bekdil believes that Turkey's loneliness in the region is caused by

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[507] Nye' 'soft power' concept beyond the military power includes cultural influences to through movies and soap operas In this way Turkey promotes a positive image and Turkish way of life that aspires to the Middle Eastern countries. See Nye, (2004)

[508] Öniş, (2006), p. 3.

[509] Ibid.

[510] Mustafa Akyol, (2013) Turkey Condemns Egypt's Coup, *Al-Monitor*, August 21.

[511] Cengiz Çandar, (2013) "No Longer 'Sick Man,' Turkey Is Lonely, Tired," *Al-Monitor*, June 18.

[512] "Zero problems' policy supplanted by 'precious loneliness' approach," *Today's Zaman*, August 25, 2013.

miscalculations and overconfidence by its decision makers.[513] On the other hand, Walker interprets Turkey's loneliness differently and states that "Turkey may now believe it is better to be 'preciously alone' than to have friends like Assad and the Egyptian military."[514]

In the post-Arab Spring period, Turkish foreign policy makers adopted smart power policies according to the changing environment.[515] Gül underscores that neither hard power nor soft power is sufficient to resolve problems in world politics; rather, a mix of these two forms of power is necessary based on the circumstances.[516] Davutoğlu used a "smart power" NRC to identify a new Turkish foreign policy in the post-Arab Spring period. He underscored Turkey's smart power capacity as a response to Syria shooting down a Turkish jet in 2012.[517] After this incident, Turkey changed its rules of engagement toward Syria. On September 16, 2013, Turkey shot down a Syrian helicopter, and on March 23, 2014, the military shot down a Syrian jet when it violated Turkish airspace. These actions indicate a major transformation of Turkish foreign policy. Kardaş notes the use of coercive language and the use of a more militaristic dimension as part of the Turkish political discourse since 2012.[518]

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[513] Burak Bekdil, (2014) "Erdogan's Egyptian Nightmare," *Middle East Forum*, December 30.

[514] Ibid.

[515] The concept of smart power was developed by Joseph Nye to describe the concept of power as a balance between soft power and hard power. According to Nye, there are three ways to influence the behavior of others to obtain a desired outcome: coercion, payment, and attraction. Nye argues that if a state desires to shape the preferences of others, it must follow smart strategies to blend hard power and soft power tools. See Nye (2004, 2009).

[516] Abdullah Gül (2009) speech delivered in Global Relations Forum, November 18, (unofficial translation).

[517] Metehan Demir, (2012) "Smart Power'ız," *Hurriyet Daily News,* July 1.

[518] "Egypt in Transition and Turkey-Egypt Relation in New Era," (2012) ORSAM Minutes of Meeting, No. 14, p. 59. Coercive diplomacy as a political-diplomatic strategy combines political and military strategies to influence an adversary through the threat of force and the willingness to use it if

Another significant example of Turkey's changing discourse is its role in NATO's missile defense plan and the deployment of a NATO-backed early-warning radar system in Kürecik, Malatya against a potential Iranian missile attack.[519] Erdoğan responded to the jet incident by saying that "every military element approaching Turkey from the Syrian border and representing a security risk and danger will be assessed as a military threat and will be treated as a military target"[520]. Later, Turkey requested NATO Patriot missiles be deployed on its territory to deter possible missile attacks from Syria, and since January 2013 six Patriot missile stations have been operational in the country.[521] Increasing military activities and incidents on the Turkish-Syrian border have further escalated tension between the two countries.

Richard Falk notes that in the post-Arab Spring period Davutoğlu's policies represent an effort to combine principled policy and pragmatism in Turkey's foreign policy.[522] Therefore, Davutoğlu seeks to maintain his principled Turkish foreign policy while he simultaneously tries to implement opportunistic policies based on Turkey's national interest. Therefore, Turkey increasingly adopted smart power strategies in its foreign policy.

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necessary. See Jack S. Levy (2008) "Deterrence and Coercive Diplomacy: The Contributions of Alexander George," Political Psychology, Vol. 29, No. 4, pp. 537-552, p. 539.

[519] Thom Shanker, (2011) "U.S. Hails Deal with Turkey on Missile Shield," *The New York Times*, September 15.

[520] "Turkey PM Erdoğan Issues Syria Border Warning," *BBC News,* June 26, 2012.

[521] The U.S, German and Dutch Patriot missiles have been deployed in Adana, Kahramanmaras, and Gaziantep provinces. See "NATO support to Turkey: Background and timeline" (2013). http://www.nato.int/cps/en/SID-E6526D70-39BD4AD0/natolive/topics_92555.htm? (accessed on August 25, 2014).

[522] Richard Falk, (2014) "Ahmet Davutoğlu as Turkish Foreign Minister, and Now Prime Minister," August 30 https://richardfalk.wordpress.com/category/arab-spring/ (accessed on January 10, 2015)

Following these developments, the discussion of resetting Turkey's foreign policy has surfaced. Davutoğlu has rejected these claims and has stated that "Turkey is not resetting its foreign policy," adding that "the Middle East is undergoing a transformation, while Turkey's policies remain the same…When there is a need, foreign policy can be revised, relations [with certain countries] can be revised and [Turkey] can conform with new conditions [in the international arena]. But we don't feel the need to reset [at the moment]. Turkey has not changed its policies, but the region has changed."[523] He underscored that Turkey's foreign policy is principled and that the AKP would stick to its existing foreign policies, which can be revised but not reset.

5.6 Cracking the Code: Operational Code Analysis of Babacan, Gül and Davutoğlu

In this part of the thesis, first I present operational code profiles of AKP elites then correlate the operational code analysis results with NRCs. As a distance psychological assessment model I utilize George's philosophical and instrumental questions through the ProfilerPlus program. The VICS automated content analysis method aims to understand state behaviors by analyzing the subjective belief systems of leaders through their speeches. I investigate leaders' belief systems to understand how they filter incoming information from the outside world and implement foreign policies based on their perceptions. By looking at both philosophical and instrumental beliefs I attempt to present decision makers' belief about the political universe and their perceptions and expectations concerning policy choices or strategy directions. In this way, it is possible to establish a link between leaders' belief

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[523] "Davutoğlu: No reset for Turkish foreign policy," *Today's Zaman*, November 25, 2013.

systems and foreign policy behaviors of states because leaders' world views and strategies shape the NRCs of states'.

Table 9: Operational Code Profiles of AKP Elites

	Ahmet Davutoğlu	Abdullah Gül	Ali Babacan
Philosophical Beliefs			
P-1 Nature of the political universe	.517	.445	.616
P-2 prospects for realization of political values	.298	.253	.358
Instrumental Beliefs			
I-1 approach to goals (direction of strategy)	.720	.750	.748
I-2 pursuit of goals (intensity of tactics)	.339	.383	.381

Ahmet Davutoğlu total word count: 111760, speeches gathered between 2009-2014; Abdullah Gül total word count: 101484, speeches gathered between 2003-2014; Ali Babacan total word count: 88145, speeches gathered between 2007-2009.

The above table summarizes the average profiles and average operational code indices and profiles of AKP decision making elites. Philosophical beliefs summarize leaders' perceptions of the political universe and other actors. According to the philosophical beliefs of all three leaders, their general profile is a mixture of definitely/very friendly view of the political universe (P-1) and they have a mixture of a somewhat/definitely optimistic about political goals (P-2). According to VICS scale, Davutoğlu, Gül and Babacan's view of the political universe sees cooperation with an optimistic view. As regards their beliefs about the nature of the political universe (P–1), Babacan has the highest value; followed by Davutoğlu and then Gul. Babacan has a very friendly view of the universe. On the other hand, Davutoğlu has a moderate friendly view of the world; Gül has a less friendly view of the world.

Instrumental beliefs indices summarize leaders' preferences in achieving his/her political objectives and strategic policy actions and tactics. In instrumental believes all the leaders perceive a cooperative strategy, they all pursue a very cooperative direction in strategy (I-1). The intensity of their tactics is a mixture of a somewhat/definitely cooperative (I-2). In master instrumental beliefs (I-1) Gul's direction of strategy is very cooperative. Babacan comes second with a slight difference. Davutoğlu is at the end of I-1 rank with a very cooperative leaning in the direction of his strategy; however, the intensity of the cooperation of his tactics is not very cooperative.

Overall, they share similar views on cooperative strategies in a friendly international environment. Their perception of the political universe for Turkish foreign policy in the last decade is a very cooperative strategy. There is only one noticeable difference among these leaders, a gap of .17 point exist between Babacan and Gül in the P-1 index.

How does the role theory and operational code profiles of AKP elites match with each other? These two approaches do not necessarily measure the same beliefs of an individual but some particular aspects are quite similar and complement each other.

Leaders' perceptions of the nature of the political universe and direction of strategies based on a perceived inter-subjective environment influences foreign policy decision making processes as well as outcomes and state NRCs. In terms of instrumental beliefs leaders' strategies in achieving desired political objectives explain their desired NRCs and employed strategies in attaining these NRCs. Operational code

analysis explores leaders' belief system by analyzing leaders' views of a political world and the strategies they pursue. In this way, it is helpful to understand inter-subjective factors that shape the NRCs of states. Leaders' belief system also explains possible shifts in NRCs because by analyzing the changing perception of the political universe and strategy directions, it is possible to reveal the changing NRCs of Turkey.

Since the beginning of the AKP period, mainly the beliefs and perceptions of Davutoğlu and Gül have played important roles in shaping Turkish foreign policy. Their operational code average profiles indicate that both leaders' perception is based on a cooperative political universe and cooperative foreign policy strategies for Turkey in its international relations. AKP elites' operational code analysis results are somewhat similar with their NRCs results. The most significant NRCs of these leaders are the regional and global sub-system collaborator, developer, and mediator-integrator NRCs. See *Figure 12* for the distribution of these NRCs among Davutoğlu, Gül and Babacan.

Figure 12: NRCs of Davutoğlu, Gül and Babacan

According to the above figure all three leaders are in favor of cooperative strategies, multilateralism, diplomacy and mediation. Gül has the highest value on the regional sub-system collaborator role and Davutoğlu comes second. Therefore, Gül believes that Turkey's main NRC is the regional sub-system collaborator role. According to him Turkey has commitments to cooperate in order to achieve wider and better communities in all regions. On the other hand, Davutoğlu's perceptions of Turkey's NRCs indicate that all these roles are equally important. He believes that all these NRCs; regional sub-system collaborator, developer, global sub-system collaborator, and mediator-integrator are means to turn Turkey into a global actor.

Based on the operational code analysis and NRC results, multilateralism and cooperative polices are important parts of AKP foreign policy strategies. Therefore, leaders' NRCs are consistent with their VICS indices results.

5.7 Change and Continuity in Turkish Foreign Policy: Evaluating Pre-AKP and AKP Periods NRCs

Foreign policy change literature is rare and there is a lack of commonly agreed indicators to explain foreign policy change.[524] Holsti and Hermann categorize different types of foreign policy changes. Holsti defines foreign policy change as restructuring, non-incremental, geographic and functional factors.[525] On the other hand, Hermann classifies primary foreign policy change agents as: leader driven, bureaucratic advocacy, domestic restructuring, and external shock.[526] These primary agents influence changes in different ways; in the *leader driven* model, the head of the state imposes certain foreign policies and is capable to impose changes (mostly in authoritarian governments); in *bureaucratic advocacy*, state policies are as a result of bargaining between government agencies (a group within a government advocate for foreign policy redirection); *domestic restructuring*, a certain segment of the society becomes an agent for policy change; *external shock,* dramatic international events and leaders' perception of a new environment becomes a redirection for foreign policy change.[527]According to Hermann these factors lead to four levels of foreign policy change; (1) *adjustment change*; minor change in a foreign policy; what is done, and how it is done changes but purpose remains unchanged, (2) *program change*, changes of methods and a means for the problem that is addressed (for

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[524] "Despite the promising advances in the construction and use of social indicators, there has been little application to the formulation, monitoring, or evaluation of foreign policy" J. David Singer and Melvin Small (1974), "Foreign Policy Indicators: Predictors of War in the State of the World Message," *Policy Sciences*, 5, 271-96, p. 271.

[525] Kalevi J. Holsti, (1982), Why Nations Realign: Foreign Policy Restructuring in the Postwar World. London: Unwin, p. 2.

[526] Charles F. Hermann, (1990) 'Changing Course: When Governments Choose to Redirect Foreign Policy', *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 34, No. 1, pp. 3–21, p. 3-5.

[527] Hermann (1990), p. 11-12.

instance; pursing a goal through diplomatic negotiations rather than military force); what is done and how is done change but purpose remains unchanged (3) *problem/goal change*; purpose and goals themselves are replaced; (4) *international orientation change*; fundamental changes of foreign policy, redirections' of actors entire orientation in its international relations.[528]

NRCs are socially and historically shared concepts and their change and continuation also depends on administrative changes. Therefore, it is important to explain the level of foreign policy changes in order to understand the change and continuity of NRCs. Ideational, structural and material factors are able to affect NRCs but "policy makers' perceptions of the state's capability and opportunity to act in the international system"[529] remain the main determinant of NRCs. However, the international environment provides opportunities for states and decision makers' perception to change. The role of the international environment cannot be undermined as it helps to change states' positions on NRCs.[530]

Herman underlines four conditions that promote major redirection in foreign policy as; (1) domestic political system (system change or systemic change could trigger government' foreign policy change), (2) bureaucratic decision making (new leadership), (3) cybernetics (setting the government agenda), and (4) learning approach (redefinition of the problem).[531] Hermann's modeling of foreign policy

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[528] Ibid., p. 5.

[529] Marijke (2011), p. 26-28.

[530] Harold and Margaret Sprout introduced the 'psycho-milieu' concept to define decision makers' interpretation and perception of international and operational environment which is important component for shaping NRCs. See Sprout, and Sprout (1956).

[531] Hermann (1990), p. 8-11.

agents and policy outcomes are quite helpful to understand both the evolution of Turkish foreign policy changes and NRCs since 1980. In this way it is also possible to compare foreign policy orientation and NRCs of pre-AKP and AKP periods.

During the 1980s, leader driven and bureaucratic advocacy agents played a determinant role in Turkish foreign policy. The 1980 military intervention proves that Evren and the NSC were the main factors shaping state policies, especially after the 1982 constitution that empowered President Evren over the cabinet. Due to Turkey's isolation by the West, the military elite re-set the agenda by changing the goals of Turkish foreign policy based on rapprochement with Middle Eastern countries. Therefore, during the military regime both a program and problem/goal change took place in Turkish foreign policy.

During Özal's tenure, bureaucratic advocacy (the military) remained the main determinant until 1989. Therefore there were only minor foreign policy changes in Turkish foreign policy. However, during and after the First Gulf War, the leader driven model dominated the formation of Turkish foreign policy under Özal. During this period, Özal suppressed the military and changed the problem and goals, and aimed to redefine Turkey's relations toward a more Western direction by joining the Western alliance during the First Gulf War. In 1990, the end of the Cold War which can be referred to as external shock did not change entirely the orientation of Turkey in its international relations. Through the leader driven model along with a few adjustments and program change, Turkish foreign policy adapted to a changing international system.

During the DYP coalition, Özal continued to dominate Turkish foreign policy until his death in 1993. After his death, bureaucratic advocacy led foreign policy change.

During the RP leader driven model under Erbakan leadership, Turkey aimed to redirect its international orientation in foreign policy (leaving NATO and downgrading relations with Israel, and EU membership). However, at the end Erbakan changed the goals and objectives of Turkish foreign policy by getting closer to Muslim countries. The February 28th process was the result of bureaucratic advocacy and domestic restructuring. The military once again indirectly intervened in Turkish politics. During this process, civil society organizations and secularist groups advocated for foreign policy redirection toward a Western alignment. Therefore, it was a change of goals and objectives of Turkish foreign policy by both bureaucratic advocacy and domestic restructuring.

During the Motherland Party coalition and the Democratic Left Party coalitions from 1997-2002, bureaucratic advocacy and the military, dominated Turkish foreign policy especially during the Syrian crisis. There was only adjustment change and program change in Turkish foreign policy. During these periods Turkey's domestic problems such as the PKK and the financial crisis dominated Turkish politics.

The 'learning approach' is one of the most important conditions that set the agenda for AKP elites who came from the RP. They learned from the RP's failures and reformed party ideology in a more Western direction. During the AKP's first term from 2002-2007, it was leader driven (Davutoğlu, Erdoğan, and Gül) as well as bureaucratic advocacy, without any major changes. What was done and how it was

done changed, but the purpose remained unchanged. AKP elites emphasized, on the use of soft power and the mediator-integrator NRC in Turkey's foreign policy implementation. In its second term, the new AKP leadership changed the program. The EU membership aspirations and alliance with the West remained unchanged but some new goals were added; zero problems with neighbor policy and Turkey's rapprochement with Syria, Iran and Russia. During this period, through multi-dimensional and multi-track policies, domestic restructuring and business circles played a part in policy change with relations with the Middle East.

Davutoğlu's new foreign policy principles and Turkey's re-engagement with the Middle East, especially the country's rapprochement with Syria and Iran, have been perceived as moving Turkey away from the West and closer to the East.[532] Turkey's foreign policy activism, especially in the Middle East, has triggered a debate about a "paradigm shift" (or axis shift) in Turkish foreign policy,[533] which was fed by a series of events. In March 2003 Turkey refused to allow American troops to be deployed on its territory during the Iraq war. Also, Erdoğan stormed out of a World Economic Forum debate in Davos after a clash with Israeli President Simon Peres over the Gaza issue in 2009; and on May 31, 2010, relations between Turkey and

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[532] See Tarık Oğuzlu, (2008) "Middle Easternization of Turkey's Foreign Policy: Does Turkey Dissociate from the West?," *Turkish Studies*, Vol. 9, No. 1, pp. 3-20; Soner Çağaptay, (2009) "Turkey's Turn from the West," *The Washington Post*, February 2; Kılıç Buğra Kanat, (2009) "AK Party's Foreign Policy: Is Turkey Turning away from the West?" *Insight Turkey*, Vol. 12, No. 1, pp. 205-225.

[533] See Sözen (2010). Also see Cengiz Çandar, ''Turkey's Axis Shift: A Western Dilemma'', Conference paper submitted at the International Conference Turkey as a new regional power: Perspectives of Turkey's Foreign and Security Policy, Berlin, 29-30 June 2010; Soli Özel, (2009) ''The Back and Forth of Turkey's Westerness'', German Marshall Fund of the United States, 29 January; Mehmet Babacan, (2010) ''Whither Axis Shift: A Perspective from Turkey's Foreign Trade'', *SETA Policy Report*, No. 4; Kılıç Buğra Kanat (2010); ''A Country's Welcome Rise: Is Turkey turning its back on the West'', *Economist*, 21 October 2010; Nick Danforth, (2009) ''How the West Lost Turkey'', *Foreign Policy*, 25 November; Joschka Fischer, (2010) ''Who Lost Turkey'', *Project-Syndicate*, July 1.

Israel further deteriorated after the flotilla crisis, which is also known as the Mavi Marmara incident. Turkey's rapprochement with Iran has also been interpreted as realignment with Islamic states, especially when Turkey voted against a UN Security Council resolution for further economic sanctions against Iran.[534] Some of the most important factors that have led Turkey to support Iran's nuclear program are energy dependency on Iran and the AKP's Islamic roots.[535] These developments have increased the belief that Turkey is moving away from its Western alliances and toward new alignments with the Muslim world.

Sözen defines Turkey's "paradigm shift" as a systemic change at the end of the Cold War that provided both new foreign policy opportunities and threats for the country.[536] He believes that Davutoğlu's aim to transform Turkey from a "wing" country to a "pivotal" country and eventually into a "global actor" represents a paradigm shift in the country's foreign policy.[537] Turkey has redefined its traditional foreign policies that were based on an alliance with the West and has prioritized its Islamic roots.[538] However, Davutoğlu strongly emphasizes that Turkey's new vision is not a departure from its previous Western-oriented policies. He rejects the characterization of Turkey's foreign policy as a paradigm shift and defines this change as simply an adaptation to changing variables based on the realities of a changing international system. He identifies the EU and NATO as the main fixtures

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[534] United Nations (2010) Security Council Imposes Additional Sanctions on Iran. Security Council Resolution 1929, S/RES/1929 (2010), New York.

[535] Gürzel and Ersoy (2012), p. 39.

[536] Sözen, (2010), p. 103.

[537] Ibid., p. 112.

[538] Ibid., p, 120.

in Turkey's new foreign policy vision.[539] He also believes that Turkey's vision in its region and its involvement in Syria, Iran, Iraq and Afghanistan are compatible with its strategic alliances. Davutoğlu indicates that the EU progress reports on Turkey and Turkey's increasing involvement in NATO in the previous 40 years is proof of Turkey's commitment to the West.[540] Davutoğlu emphasizes on a comprehensive "model partnership" between the U.S and Turkey beyond a strategic partnership.[541] He claims that Turkey's ability to access many regions simultaneously due to its geographical depth makes Turkey a valuable asset in world politics, especially for its allies.

Although the AKP elites claim that there has been no shift in Turkey's Western alignment, Erdoğan's third traditional balcony victory speech provided signals of a changing foreign policy in a non-Western direction. During his speech, he mentioned the importance of elections not only for Turkey but also for other nations eagerly awaiting results in "Baghdad, Cairo, Sarajevo, Baku, Nicosia, and others".[542] He underscored that the AKP's victory was also a gain for "the Middle East, the Caucasus, and the Balkans as much as for Turkey."[543] During his speech, he referred to the former Ottoman territories, but he did not mention EU membership or the

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[539] Yılmaz, (2009).

[540] Ahmet Davutoğlu, (2010) "Turkey's Zero-Problems Foreign Policy", Foreign Policy Magazine, May 20. Full text is available at: http://www.mfa.gov.tr/article-by-h_e_-ahmet-Davutoğlu-published-in-foreign-policy-magazine-_usa_-on-20-may-2010.en.mfa (accessed on August 26, 2015)

[541] Ahmet Davutoğlu (2009) speech given at the 28th Annual Conference on US-Turkish Relations Organized by ATC-DEIK: "Turkey-US relations: A Model Partnership, Global and Regional Dimensions," Washington DC, June 2, (official translation).

[542] The full text of Erdoğan's balcony speech: "We will be the government of 74 million," [Erdoğan'ın 3. balkon konuşmasının tam metni: 74 milyonun hükümeti olacağız,] June 12, 2011. Available at: http://t24.com.tr/haber/erdoganin-3-balkon-konusmasinin-tam-metni-74-milyonun-hukumeti-olacagiz,150677 (accessed on December 25, 2014).

[543] Ibid.

West at all. Thus, his speech also promotes Turkey as a model for other Muslim countries by mainly citing Muslim and former Ottoman territories. Yanık evaluated the AKP's election manifesto in 2011 and asserted that in the foreign policy section, "the AKP primarily envisions a Turkey with more commonalities with the East than with the West but yet ranked Turkey's relations with Europe and the West higher."[544] Turkey's de-securitization policies established new activism in Turkish foreign policy in the Middle East.[545]

By playing the key role in the nation building process, military elites consolidated their existence in Turkish political life until the 2000s, mostly as a result of bureaucracies. The AKP gradually decreased the military's influence from both domestic policy and foreign policy making through EU harmonization packages. Additionally, Turkish decision makers' emphasis on soft power also contributed to the decreasing role of the military in foreign policy making. Domestically the AKP further strengthened its power over the military after receiving half the votes in the general elections on June 12, 2011 and a couple of weeks later on July 29, 2011, the military chief of staff resigned and the heads of the army, navy and air forces requested early retirement from their duties. After eliminating the military – long considered the guardians of the secular Republic – in government decision-making mechanisms, the AKP was able to increase Turkey's relations with the Middle East.

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[544] Lerna K. Yanık (2012) "Foreign Policy During 2011 Parliamentary Elections in Turkey: Both an Issue and Non-issue," *Turkish Studies*, Vol. 13, No. 2, pp. 213-227, p. 224.

[545] Aras Bülent and Rabia Karakya Polat (2007), "Turkey and the Middle East: Frontiers of the New Geographic Imagination," *Australian Journal of International Affairs*, Vol. 61, No.4, pp. 471-88, p. 472-74.

Since 2002, in every general election the AKP has strengthened its domestic position and increased its votes by taking 46,6% in 2007 and 49.8% of the votes in 2011.[546]

The Arab Spring also helped Turkey to redefine its relations with the West through its cooperation on Libya and Syria. Turkey's cooperation with its Western allies re-raised the 'paradigm shift' debate during the early phases of the uprisings. Since the 1980s there had only been minor adjustments, program, and purpose/goal program change in Turkish foreign policy. Turkey's Western alliance is still the main fixture of Turkish foreign policy. Although the AKP has followed a Turkish traditional line as being allied with the West, it has also followed more independent policies through active independent NRCs. As Hermann defines; "international reorientation is changes of actors' relations with external entities including shift in alignment with other nations".[547] It is not possible to define Turkish foreign policy in this way. However, it is possible to say that there has both been a change and continuity of Turkish foreign policy.[548] See *Figure 13* for the comparative NRCs of the AKP and Pre-AKP Periods.

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[546] Çarkoğlu (2011), p. 48.

[547] Hermann, (1990), p. 6.

[548] See Kılıç Buğra Kanat, (2012), "Continuity and Change in Turkish Foreign Policy under the JDP Government: The Cases of Bilateral Relations with Israel and Syria," *Arab Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 34, No.4, pp. 230-49.

Figure 13: Comparative NRCs of AKP and Pre-AKP Periods

The above figure shows the NRCs of pre-AKP and AKP periods. This comparative chart indicates major changes in Turkish foreign policy between the AKP government and previous governments since 1980. The most significant difference

between the AKP and previous administration is its regional sub-system collaborator NRC. In their speeches, the AKP foreign policy making elite strongly emphasized cooperative strategies and Turkey's increasing role in regional cooperation. Accordingly, regional protector, mediator-integrator, developer, facilitator, rising power, and global sub-system collaborator NRCs are ranked higher by the AKP administration than previous governments. The most significant difference between AKP and pre-AKP periods is Turkey's bridge NRC. While the bridge role was very popular during the 1980s and 1990s, in the last decade the AKP's decision making elite has replaced bridge role with that of a central country NRC. In addition, the AKP elites emphasized on Turkey's national interest over its responsibilities as a faithful ally but have paid special attention not to jeopardize their relations with their allies. Although the soft power concept was introduced by Nye in the late 1980s, it was never used by pre-AKP elites to define Turkish foreign policy. Due to Turkey's insecure neighborhood and serve syndrome Turkey could not employ soft power strategies during the 1980s and 1990s. However, AKP foreign policy making elite aim to normalize Turkey's relation through a new set of foreign policy principles by employing the soft power concept. Not surprisingly, Turkey has also turned into a mediator-integrator in the regional conflicts as well as a credible actor.

During the AKP governments the decision making elite have changed the foreign policy program and problem/goal rather than redirecting the Turkish foreign policy orientation. The AKP has followed more assertive and self-confident policies without changing traditional foreign policy lines on Western alliance. The AKP, under Davutoğlu's leadership, aims to transform Turkish foreign policy in order to adapt to post-Cold War realities. Davutoğlu believes that the international environment is

changing so Turkey's expectations and also others expectations from Turkey are changing. In the post-Cold War period, its surrounding region and the new emerging Turkic countries, namely former ottoman territories, expect Turkey to play a more proactive role as a regional sub-system collaborator and developer. Therefore, Davutoğlu aims to exploit Turkey's geographic and historical depth to fulfill Turkey's responsibilities to those regions as well.

5.8 Conclusion

The conservative democrat AKP came to power by leaving the National View Movement's pro-Islamist policies. Through cross-class electoral alliance, an absence of rivals or alternatives due to the financial crisis, and the EU membership aspiration, during the November, 3 2002 elections, the AKP won highest representation in the Parliament. Despite the party's Islamic roots and background, AKP elites distanced themselves from other pro-Islamist parties. In this same light, the AKP elites focused on democratic liberalization and economic reforms. They also successfully stabilized civil-military relations. In terms of foreign policy both Gül and Erdoğan implemented Davutoğlu's policies until Davutoğlu himself became the foreign minister in 2009. Davutoğlu emphasized on Turkey's geographic and historical depth to transform Turkish foreign policy. By so doing, Turkey will get its deserved position in the regional and global context. In order to achieve this aim, he set forth five foreign policy principles; (1) balance between freedom and security (i.e., balance between national security and citizens' freedom); the (2) "zero problem policy toward Turkey's neighbors" by improving relations with all neighbors; (3) developing relations with neighboring regions and beyond through diplomatic discourse and engagement in mediation and political dialogue; (4) using multidimensional (i.e., moving beyond security issues and adding economic, cultural,

and political values to promote cultural co-existence) and multi-track (i.e., moving beyond the state-centric understanding toward plurality) policies; (5) rhythmic diplomacy, which involves participating in global and regional matters on international platforms to contribute to peace and prosperity.[549] These new foreign policy principles are operationalized through three methodologies; 'vision oriented (Turkey abandoning crisis-oriented policies); 'systemic framework' (establishing relations with all regions, Turkey's relationship with any region is complementary to its relationships with the regions); 'soft power.' These methodological principles are the basis of Turkey's new vision for international platforms. Through these policies Turkey became more visible in international platforms and the AKP foreign policy making elite strongly emphasized on Turkey's increasing role as regional and global sub-system collaborator, developer and mediator and integrator NRCs. The new Turkish activism and normalization policies with Syria and Iran triggered a 'paradigm shift' in Turkish politics. In this new era, the AKP foreign policy making elites were accused of shifting Turkey's foreign policy from the Western direction to the East. The AKP's assertive foreign policy implementation was challenged by the Arab Spring. Turkey's 'example' NRC became popular again and in order to adapt to the changing region, Turkish foreign policy makers revised some of their policies such as the emphasis on soft power. In the last couple of years, the AKP elite have decided to adopt smart strategies by blending Turkey's soft power and hard power capabilities. This attempt was and is visible especially during the Syrian crisis. The AKP policy makers' decision to shift Turkey's policies from soft power to smart power shows that how leaders (re)formulate countries' NRCs depending on the changing variables in the systemic level. Therefore, the role theory and formulation

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[549] See Davutoğlu, "Turkey's Foreign Policy Vision: An Assessment of 2007,"; Ahmet Sözen, "A Paradigm Shift in Turkish Foreign Policy: Transition and Challenges," *Turkish Studies*, Vol. 11, No.1, 2010, p. 103-123.

of NRCs go beyond the micro level analysis and links leaders' perception of political universe and impact of changing international environment because both levels of analysis play determinant role in Turkish foreign policy changes and NRCs.

Despite the Arab Spring and Syrian crisis the NRCs analysis results and operational code profile results show that the AKP policy making elite perceive a friendly and cooperative environment and follow cooperative strategies. Therefore, Turkey is willing to support international peace and order by playing a more active role in regional and global issues in order to establish a stable and cooperative environment which prompts Turkey to a global sub-system collaborator.

Taşpınar suggests that the ANAP and AKP policies were similar in terms of conservative democracy. Their leaders led to the rise of Muslim bourgeoisie, (during the AKP it was defined as "Anatolian Tiger") that have been more concerned about maximizing profits and maintaining political stability rather than implementing Islamic law.[550]

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[550] Taşpınar, (2012).

Chapter 6

CONCLUSION

6.1 Conclusion

This part of the thesis briefly summarizes the chapters, reviews findings, re-visits the hypotheses, speculates on plausible future Turkish foreign policy behaviors based on findings and proposes future research directions.

The thesis aimed to achieve two objectives: (1) to investigate changing NRCs that Turkey has adopted in its international affairs under different administrations and correlate findings with leaders operational code analysis (philosophical and instrumental beliefs), and (2) to speculate on Turkish foreign policy behavior by investigating determinant factors and NRCs based on research results. To achieve these objectives I collected official policy statements of eighteen high level policy makers between 1980 and 2014. In the section on role theory, Atlas.ti data analysis software was utilized for the qualitative content analysis. In this part, I utilized qualitative content analysis techniques through the hand coding of the official speeches and interviews of different leaders. For the operational code analysis, ProfilerPlus, Social Science Automation 2008, and automated computer software system were used. For the operational code analysis, this research made use of the speeches of the three leaders that are available online on government websites: Davutoğlu, Gül and Babacan. This is because, the ProfilerPlus automation program is available only in English language and most of the speeches that are available do not have official English language translations. Also, most of the speeches prior to

the 2000s were colletcted from the National Library in Ankara by scanning the speeches. The ProfilerPlus system does not allow one to upload scanned copies to the system for the analysis.

Chapter one is introductory, it also briefly provides a literature review of role theory both in the field of IR and Turkish foreign policy literature.

Chapter two explains the conceptual framework of the thesis. In this part, the main theoretical framework of the thesisis explained; the role theory's development, its key concepts, and its integration to foreign policy analysis fields. Thereafter, the thesis links political psychology and foreign policy analysis. It also reviews operational code analysis literature which is a complementary theoretical framework of the thesis. In the final part of this chapter a link is established between role theory and operational code analysis in order to analyze and understand Turkish foreign policy from 1980 to 2014.

Chapter three explores the research design of the thesis. The hypotheses, key questions and thesis contribution were introduced in this part. The chapter also explained the code book and content analysis methods that were used in data analysis.

Chapter four reviewed each administration between 1980 and 2002, and discussed the results of the NRCs in all of these administrations. The NRC results of the pre-AKP administrations were also presented in this chapter.

In chapter five the historical background of the AKP party was introduced, as well as its strategic depth doctrine and its new set of foreign policy principles. The AKP period NRCs and the operational code indices of three AKP leaders were also elaborated. This section also compared the findings of NRCs and operational code analysis indicies. Accordingly, an evaluation of the change and continuity in Turkish foreign policy since 1980 based on the 'paradigm shift' debate was provided.

The hypotheses of this thesis were; *(Hypothesis 1)* there is change (of NRCs) in Turkish foreign policy during the AKP administration, *(Hypothesis 2)* role theory and NRCs explain changes in Turkish foreign policy between 1980 and 2014, *(Hypothesis 3)* operational code indices explain changes in foreign policy behavior (in this context, it explains adoption of certain NRCs in Turkey).

The research findings explore the change (Hypothesis 1) in Turkish foreign policy as well as the continuity. The role theory and the operational code analysis help to establish a link between individual inter-subjective perception and state foreign policy behaviors. The findings of 'pre-AKP' and 'AKP' periods indicate that there has been a gradual change in Turkey foreign policy during the AKP tenure. However, NRCs and operational code indice of leaders underline that this change is related with increasing activism of Turkey in international platforms rather than a change in its overall orientation. The AKP has followed the traditional line as being allied with the West by following more independent policies which make Turkey more visible in international platforms. Therefore, there has been both change and continuity in Turkish foreign policy during the AKP period.

The findings indicate that NRCs since 1980 explain changes and evolution of Turkish foreign policy behaviors. Through their speeches, leaders underlined their desired roles for Turkey. For instance, during the 1980s-90s, decision makers believed that Turkey was the bridge between the West and the East. Therefore, leaders shared ideas about Turkey's bridge role was complementary to other NRCs with related roles (such as regionsl-subsystem collaborator) in order to fulfill Turkey's obligation as a bridge country. Accordingly, example role conception dominated Turkish foreign policy making during the 1990s, and during the 2000s regional protector NRC adopted by the AKP policy making elite along with Turkey's regional subsystem collaborator NRC. Therefore, NRCs *(Hypothesis 2)* explains changing Turkish foreign policy behaviors and the evolution of Turkish NRCs as measured in Atlas.ti.

Three AKP elites' operational code indices are consistent with their NRCs as measured in ProfilerPlus. Therefore, operational code analysis (Hypothesis 3) explains changes in Turkish foreign policy behaviors that can be observed through the adoption of certain NRCs. Three leaders' perception of the political universe and the direction of strategies explain Turkey's optimistic and cooperative foreign policy behaviors between 2002 and 2014. For instance, leaders' perceptions of friendly and an optimistic view of the international environment encouraged them to adopt cooperative strategies in its international relations such as a mediator-integrator and developer NRCs. Hence; Turkey also found a way to normalize its relation with its neighbors by adopting cooperative strategies to develop regional and global collaborations in its international relations.

Both role theory and operational code analysis are built on the assumption that analyzing human behaviors explains state foreign policy behaviors and could reasonably provide predictability in world politics. Therefore, the thesis assumes that Turkish foreign policy behaviors are mainly leader driven. Thus, analysis of leaders could provide future Turkish foreign policy directions. It is important to note that, there are some changes in the AKP ruling elite; Gül was distanced from politics when Erdoğan became the President, and Davutoğlu resigned on May 22, 2016. These developments are very critical for Turkey and also make it difficult to understand its future foreign policy behaviors as well. These two political figures played very significant roles in implementing some revolutionary foreign policies as well as NRCs for Turkey. Therefore, it is quite difficult to predict future NRCs in the absence of these figures. However, it is important to underline that countries' NRCs are a combination of shared ideas and a product of history and memory. Therefore, leaders' perception for the future roles for Turkey will be based on enhancing Turkey's geopolitical significance in global politics. Both the qualitative and quantitative research results indicate that Turkish policy makers will continue to stress on Turkey's regional and global subsystem collaborator, developer, and regional protector NRCs by exploiting Turkey's geographical position and historical past.

Since the AKP ascended to power in 2002, Turkish policy makers have aimed to increase Turkey's sphere of influence in all regions by establishing new vision and following proactive policies. These new policies and vision are explored mainly by Davutoğlu. He describes Turkey's new strategic vision based on the country's

historical and geopolitical importance. Therefore, the AKP decision making elite focused on Turkey's increasing role in world politics. The AKP's multilateral diplomacy prompts Turkey into a 'global actor' role by emphasizing on Turkey's 'rising power'. However, some of the roles frequently mentioned by AKP elites were already mentioned several times during the 1990s especially by İsmail Cem. He emphasized on 'global actor' NRCs and turning Turkey to the center of attraction by reactivating the Silk Road that allowed Turkey to play a 'regional sub-system collaborator' role between different regions. Turkish foreign policy has become more visible in international platforms during the tenure of the AKP. However, in the last couple of years Turkey has been surrounded by emerging conflicts and an evolving security environment in its immediate neighborhoods. These developments challenge Turkey's ambitions to play a greater role in regional and global issues.

The thesis claims that role theorists follow certain traditional NRCs based on the defined international structure. During the 1970s and the 1980s role theorists adopted the realist tradition which can be observed in Holsti's empirical study, his national role typology includes balancer, faithful ally, aggressor NRCs. In order to adapt to the changing environment in its immediate neighborhood, Turkish policy makers have initiated a revision of their existing NRCs for Turkey. One of the most significant changes in Turkey's NRCs can be observed through Turkey's shift from soft power NRC to smart power NRC in order to cope with ongoing instabilities in the region. This shift in NRCs can also be linked to the changing international system especially as Turkey's immediate neighborhood is increasingly shaped by realist traditions. Therefore, Turkish policy makers have tried to revise existing NRCs in a

bid to adapt to the changing international environment in its immediate neighbourhood which is currently dominated by hard power.

Since 1970, both the number of role theorists and NRCs has increased and especially in the last decade, role theory has been re-credited as a theoretical framework by foreign policy analyst in studying states foreign policy behaviors. The thesis follows this growing trend in foreign policy analysis in contributing to role theory literature. Holsti's typology of seventeen NRCs was used as the basis of this study and during the analysis part, twenty-two new NRCs were found in the official statements of Turkish policy makers.

Role theorists mainly adopt symbolic interactionism in their analysis, which focuses on the interpretation of events. Based on this symbolic interaction, Turkish policy makers' interpretation of world politics has shaped Turkish NRCs as a result of their social interaction from a social-psychological perspective. Turkish policy makers interpreted other actors' actions and have implemented appropriate reactions of their own by adopting certain NRCs. As Harnisch underlined, symbolic interactionism is still the source of inspiration for role theorists and foreign policy analysts in studying individuals to understand human behavior as well as the behavior of states. This thesis utilized eighteen Turkish policy makers interpretation of world politics and expectations, which helped explain Turkish NRCs through symbolic interactionism.

Biddle has underlined that leaders are the source of states' NRCs because role conceptions are products of leaders' ideology, political experience, historical heritage, philosophical orientation, socioeconomic strengths, leadership quality, and

people's choices. In this same line of thought, Turkish policy makers ideational and belief systems played significant roles in foreign policy decision making processes and the adoption of certain NRCs. For instance, Davutoğlu's personality and ideology about world politics led him to abandon the crisis-oriented policies of the Cold War era and adopt vision-oriented policies. His ideology of reconstructing Turkish foreign policy was based on multiculturalism with dialogue, mutual respect, stability and peace. In his speeches he promoted these values and aimed to assign certain NRCs for Turkey to follow his vision. Some of these NRCs were; mediator-integrator, facilitator, peace promoter, regional and global subsystem collaborator NRCs.

There are multiple conclusions and future directions to draw from this thesis. First of all, the thesis aims to address the role of individuals in foreign policy making in Turkey by focusing on both the Cold War and the post-Cold War periods. I collected the foreign policy statements of the different administrations; in the future I can conduct comparative research with this data. For instance, if I collect the speeches of Adnan Menderes I can conduct a comparative study on Menders, Özal, and Erdoğan's tenures by utilizing role theory and other distance leadership assessment methods such as Leadership Trait Analysis. However, it is important to note the limitation of such a research agenda. First of all, it is difficult to find official English translations of the speeches for the various administrations, and it is also challenging to find digital copies of speeches in text formats. Secondly, some leaders' speeches are not available, and in some cases when available, might be too little to work on because they might not have made enough public statements. For instance, I had difficulties collecting Erdoğan's speeches, lack of availability of some of his

speeches on governmental web pages as well as a lack of official English translations for the available speeches. There are also legal obstacles in accessing some leaders' speeches as well. For instance, I had difficulties when I wanted to obtain access to all of Erdoğan's speeches as a result of the legal restrictions in Article 8 of Law No. 4982.[551]

In last couple of years, both the international system and Turkish foreign policy have been very dynamic. This study can expand future research agenda to analyze changing Turkish NRCs in post-Davutoğlu and the post-coup d'état attempt (15th of July 2016) in order to provide explanations to Turkish foreign policy behaviours. In this research agenda, formulation and evolution of single or multiple NRCs can be studied to describe the transformation of Turkish foreign policy.

This thesis contributes to the role theory literature and growing Turkish foreign policy literature. Although role theory and foreign policy analysis goes back to the 1970s, the use of role theory is quite new in Turkish foreign policy literature.

My future research agenda which will be derived from this thesis will focus more on the political psychology of the different study areas of human cognition including the linguistic and the neuro scientific dimensions and their implications in foreign policy decision making. In Chapter two, I briefly mentioned the ongoing debate in role theory literature. It is also possible to use available official statements to combine role theory with other approaches or theories since role theory is a very flexible

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[551] This was the official reply of Prime Ministry Press representative to decline my request to access Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's all speeches. For the related by Law see http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/eskiler/2003/10/20031024.htm (accessed on August 26, 2015)

approach that can be combined with multiple paradigms and tools from various disciplines.

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