

# JCS

Journal of Cyprus Studies

Kıbrıs Araştırmaları Dergisi

اسكان قبرس



18/19

*Cover:* The cover artwork and creative design are an artist's interpretation of Cypro-Minoan writing based on a clay tablet found at Enkomi (c. 1200 BC), and the map *Eschkjal Qybrys*, "shapes of Cyprus" (c. 1522 AD), from the *Bahriye* (maritime atlas) of the Ottoman admiral and cartographer Piri Reis. On the map a mountain range (either the Troodos or the Kyrenia range) appears in the center, seen in elevation from the north (i.e. looking up from the lower left corner of the cover); significant harbors are enlarged to provide guidance to sailors; and towns are seen in elevation from the side of approach by sea. Towns marked include Larnaca (*Tuzla*), Kyrenia (*Quala 'a-i Kernia*), and Famagusta (*Quala 'a-i Bagusa*). [*Sources:* John Chadwick, *Reading the Past: Linear B and related scripts* (British Museum Publications, 1987, p. 51); A. Stylianou and J. A. Stylianou, *The History of the Cartography of Cyprus* (Nicosia: Zavallis Press, 1980, pp. 13-14, 192); the original Piri Reis MS is in the manuscript collection of the Österreichische Nationalbibliothek, Vienna, Cod. H.O. 192, fol. 145v.]

*Kapak:* Kapak tasarımı ve resmi bir sanatçının yorumu olup Enkomi harabelerinde ortaya çıkarılan M.Ö. 1200 yıllarına ait Kıbrıs-Miken yazılı kil tablet, ve Osmanlı Amiralî ve haritacısı Piri Reis tarafından yapılan (M.S. 1522) ve *Bahriye* adlı denizcilik atlasında bulunan *Eşkâl-i Kıbrıs* haritası resimleri yorumlanarak yapılmıştır. Haritanın ortasında, Kuzeyden bakıldığında (kapağın sol alt köşesinden yukarı bakıldığında) yükselen sıradağlar görünmektedir (Troodos veya Girne Sıradağları). Önemli limanlar denizcilere kolaylık sağlamak amacı ile büyütülmüş; ve şehirler deniz tarafından yaklaşıldığındaki görüş açısından çizilmişlerdir. Haritada Larnaka (*Tuzla*), Girne (*Hala 'a-i Kernia*) ve Gazimağusa (*Hala 'a-i Bagusa*) şehirleri gösterilmiştir. [*Kaynaklar:* John Chadwick, *Reading the Past: Linear B and related scripts* (British Museum Publications, 1987, s. 51); A. Stylianou and J. A. Stylianou, *The History of the Cartography of Cyprus* (Nicosia: Zavallis Press, 1980, s. 13-14, 192.); Piri Reis'in bu haritası Avusturya Milli Kütüphanesi elyazmaları koleksiyonundadır, Cod. H.O. 192, fol. 145v.]

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Eastern Mediterranean University

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# JCS Journal of Cyprus Studies Kıbrıs Arařtırmaları Dergisi

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Kıbrıs Araştırmaları Merkezi, Kıbrıs'ın kültürel tarihi ve siyasi sorunları ile ilgili bilimsel araştırmaları teşvik etmek amacı ile Doğu Akdeniz Üniversitesi bünyesinde kurulmuştur. Araştırma alanları arkeolojiden antropolojiye, ekonomiden tarihe, dilbilimden folkloru uzanan geniş bir yelpazeye yayılmıştır.

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The *Journal of Cyprus Studies* is a refereed, international, interdisciplinary Journal whose primary purpose is twofold: i) to develop an authoritative archive and bibliography of sources for the study of ideas on social, cultural, historical, political and legal matters relevant to the past, present or future of the island of Cyprus; and ii) to provide a scholarly, academic forum for the analysis, development, exchange and critique of ideas on these matters.

The *Journal* is bilingual, and publishes material in English and/or Turkish. Articles submitted for consideration must focus on subject matter specific to the island of Cyprus, and may include (but are not restricted to) the following topics and areas of interest: analysis of archeological artifacts; the culture of the Egyptians, Romans, Persians; the Eastern Roman Empire, the Crusades; Lusignans, Venetians and Ottomans; art, literature, music; cartography, military history and technology; trade routes, water and natural resources; the geopolitics of the Eastern Mediterranean, Cold War, EU and superpower concerns, contemporary developments in international law, conflict resolution, war; race, religion, ethnicity, nationhood, colonial and post-colonial perspectives, identity. Suggestions for other subject areas will be considered by the Editor.

Material published in the *Journal* may include original critical essays or studies, statements of reasoned opinion, sustained critical responses to published material, book reviews, translations, photographs, reproductions of works of art or cultural artifacts, interviews, official documents, transcripts of media broadcasts, or reprints of significant texts. The *Journal* does not publish partisan material dealing with the internal administration or politics of Eastern Mediterranean University, the Turkish Republic of North Cyprus, or the Republic of Turkey.

Because of the unique legal and political contexts of the peoples of Cyprus, problems of ideological and methodological bias in the writing of history are a central issue for the *Journal*, and one of its primary objectives is to establish definitive and authoritative texts for primary source material in the history of Cyprus. Accordingly, each issue of the *Journal* contains an archive of significant historical, legal, political and cultural documents related to this history, meticulously copy-edited and authenticated; annotations are provided where significant textual variants exist. The purpose is to make these documents available to researchers, without censorship, and foregrounding problems of distortion caused by translation or other forms of interpretation.

The *Journal of Cyprus Studies* does not discriminate against contributions on the basis of the nationality, race, ethnicity, religion or gender of the contributors; nor on the basis of their points of view or conclusions, provided that they are conveyed by careful, reasoned argument and discussion. Submissions are sent anonymously for review to readers whose identities also remain confidential. The Editor may, where complex issues are concerned, invite other contributors to submit critical evaluations and responses to an article, or alternative perspectives; and these may be published simultaneously.

## Derginin Amacı

*Kıbrıs Araştırmaları Dergisi* içerik bakımından çok yönlülüğe sahip uluslararası bir dergi olup temel misyonu şöyle özetlenebilir: i) Kıbrıs adasının geçmişi, geleceği ve bugünü ile ilintili toplumsal, kültürel, tarihsel, siyasi, hukuksal konular ve sorunlar ile ilgili çalışmalara etkin bir arşiv ve kaynakça oluşturmak; ii) sözü edilen konular ve sorunlarla ilgili fikirlerin geliştirilebileceği, tartışılacağı, görüş alışverişinde bulunulabileceği, bilimsel ve akademik bir forum oluşturmak.

*Dergi* İngilizce ve Türkçe olarak iki dilde yayınlanmaktadır. İncelenmek üzere dergiye gönderilen makaleler içerik bakımından Kıbrıs adası ile ilgili olmalıdır. *Dergi* ye gönderilen makaleler, belirtilen konularla kısıtlı olmamakla birlikte şu konuları içerebilir: arkeolojik eserlerin incelenmesi; Mısır, Roma ve Pers kültürleri; Doğu Roma İmparatorluğu ve Haçlı Seferleri; Lusinyanlar, Venedikliler ve Osmanlılar; sanat, edebiyat, müzik; haritacılık, askeri tarih ve teknoloji; ticaret yolları, su ve doğal kaynaklar; Doğu Akdeniz'in siyasi coğrafyası; Soğuk Savaş, Avrupa Birliği, Süpergüçlerin bölgesel çıkarları, uluslararası hukuk ile ilgili yeni gelişmeler, çözüm önerileri, savaş; ırk, din, etnik köken, ulus kavramı, sömürgecilik ve sömürgecilik sonrası yaklaşımlar, kimlik sorunu. Diğer konularla ilgili öneriler Editör tarafından değerlendirilecektir.

*Dergi* de yayınlanacak olan yazılar özgün eleştirel denemeler veya araştırmalar, uslamlamaya dayanan kişisel fikirler, önceden yayınlanmış yazı ve yapıtlara yönelik eleştirel yanıtlar, kitap tanıtım ve incelemeleri, çeviriler, fotoğraflar, sanat ve kültür eserlerinin baskıları, söyleşiler, resmî belgeler, medya yayınlarının kopyaları, basın açıklamaları, veya önemli metinlerin yeni baskıları olabilir. *Dergi*, Doğu Akdeniz Üniversitesi, Kuzey Kıbrıs Türk Cumhuriyeti veya Türkiye Cumhuriyeti'nin işleri ve siyaseti ile ilgili yanlı yazıları yayınlamaz.

Kıbrıs'ta yaşayan halkların kendilerine özgü ve siyasi koşulları nedeniyle ideolojik veya yönetsel önyargının tarihin yazılmasındaki etkin rolü *Dergi* için ana meseleyi oluşturduğundan, *Dergi* nin temel amaçlarından biri, Kıbrıs tarihinde kesin ve yetkin yazılardan meydana gelen bir ana kaynakça oluşturmaktır. Bu nedenle, *Dergi* nin her sayısı Kıbrıs tarihi ile ilgili, tarihsel, hukuksal, siyasi ve kültürel belgelerden oluşan titiz bir çalışma sonucu elde edilmiş, dikkatle kurgulanmış ve doğrulanmış bir arşiv içerecek ve gereken yerlerde çeşitli ve değişik belgelerle ilgili dipnotlar verilecektir. Amaç, bu belgeleri sansürden uzak bir biçimde araştırmacıların kullanımına sunmak ve bunu yaparken çeviriden veya yorum farklılıklarından kaynaklanan sorunlara da dikkat çekmektir.

*Kıbrıs Araştırmaları Dergisi*, milliyet, ırk, etnik köken, din veya cinsiyet farkı gözetmeksizin, bakış açıları veya vardıkları sonuçlar itibarı ile, itinalı ve mantıklı tartışma içeren yazılara açıktır. *Dergi* ye gönderilen bütün yazılar, değerlendirilmek üzere incelenirken yazarın olduğu kadar hakemin de kimlikleri saklı tutulur. Tartışmaya açık konular söz konusu olduğunda, Editör herhangi bir makaleye ilişkin eleştirel değerlendirmeler, yanıtlar veya alternatif yaklaşımlar için başka araştırmacılarından görüş isteyebilir ve bu konudaki bütün görüşler *Dergi* nin aynı sayısında yer alır.



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J. P.

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- 203 **Resolution 585 (1986)—13 June** [*extending the mandate of UNFICYP to 15 December, 1986; requesting continuation of the Secretary-General's mission of good offices*]
- 204 **Resolution 593 (1986)—11 December** [*extending the mandate of UNFICYP to 15 June, 1987; requesting continuation of the Secretary-General's mission of good offices*]
- 205 **Resolution 597 (1987)—12 June** [*extending the mandate of UNFICYP to 15 December, 1987; requesting continuation of the Secretary-General's mission of good offices*]
- 206 **Resolution 604 (1987)—14 December** [*extending the mandate of UNFICYP to 15 June, 1988; requesting continuation of the Secretary-General's mission of good offices*]
- 207 **Resolution 614 (1988)—15 June** [*extending the mandate of UNFICYP to 15 December, 1988; requesting continuation of the Secretary-General's mission of good offices*]
- 208 **Resolution 625 (1988)—15 December** [*extending the mandate of UNFICYP to 15 June, 1989*]



- 209 **Resolution 634 (1989)—9 June** *[extending the mandate of UNFICYP to 15 December, 1989; requesting continuation of the Secretary-General's mission of good offices]*
- 210 **Resolution 646 (1989)—14 December** *[extending the mandate of UNFICYP to 15 June, 1990; requesting continuation of the Secretary-General's mission of good offices]*
- 211 **Resolution 649 (1990)—12 March** *[calling for the leaders of the two communities to pursue efforts towards a constitutionally bicomunal and territorially bizonal settlement]*
- 213 **Resolution 657 (1990)—15 June** *[extending the mandate of UNFICYP to 15 December, 1990; requesting continuation of the Secretary-General's mission of good offices]*
- 214 **Resolution 680 (1990)—14 December** *[extending the mandate of UNFICYP to 15 June, 1991; requesting continuation of the Secretary-General's mission of good offices]*
- 215 **Resolution 682 (1990)—21 December** *[deciding to examine the problem of costs and financing of UNFICYP]*
- 216 **Resolution 697 (1991)—14 June** *[extending the mandate of UNFICYP to 15 December, 1991; requesting continuation of the Secretary-General's mission of good offices]*
- 217 **Resolution 698 (1991)—14 June** *[requesting further study of the financing of UNFICYP]*
- 219 **Resolution 716 (1991)—11 October** *[reaffirming support for a bicomunal, bizonal federation; requesting a high-level international meeting of the two communities, Greece and Turkey, chaired by the Secretary-General]*
- 221 **Resolution 723 (1991)—12 December** *[extending the mandate of UNFICYP to 15 June, 1992; requesting continuation of the Secretary-General's mission of good offices]*
- 222 **Resolution 750 (1992)—10 April** *[reaffirming support for a settlement based on a State of Cyprus comprising two politically equal communities, in a bicomunal, bizonal federation; requesting the Secretary-General to pursue efforts to complete the "set of ideas" as a prelude to the convening of a high-level international meeting]*

- 225 **Resolution 759 (1992)—12 June** [extending the mandate of UNFICYP to 15 December, 1992; requesting specific proposals from the Secretary-general on the restructuring of UNFICYP; requesting continuation of the Secretary-General's mission of good offices]
- 226 **Resolution 774 (1992)—26 August** [reaffirming support for a settlement based on a State of Cyprus comprising two politically equal communities, in a bicomunal, bizonal federation; endorsing the Set of Ideas; urging the parties to negotiate towards an overall framework agreement based on the Set of Ideas]
- 228 **Resolution 789 (1992)—25 November** [reaffirming endorsement of the Set of Ideas; calling on the Turkish Cypriot side to adopt positions consistent with the Set of Ideas; urging commitment to confidence-building measures, including reduction of foreign troops transfer of control of Varosha to UNFICYP, and proposal of bi-communal projects]
- 231 **Resolution 796 (1992)—14 December** [extending the mandate of UNFICYP to 15 June, 1993; requesting a report from the Secretary-general on the restructuring of UNFICYP; requesting continuation of the Secretary-general's mission of good offices]
- 232 **Resolution 831 (1993)—27 May** [on the restructuring of UNFICYP]
- 234 **Resolution 839 (1993)—11 June** [extending the mandate of UNFICYP to 15 December, 1993; requesting continuation of the Secretary-General's mission of good offices; calling on both sides to take measures to lower tension along the cease-fire lines, and to carry forward the intercommunal talks]
- 236 **Resolution 889 (1993)—15 December** [extending the mandate of UNFICYP to 15 June, 1994; calling for a reduction in the number of foreign troops and defence spending in the Republic of Cyprus; calling on the military authorities on both sides to begin discussions with UNFICYP; encouraging efforts to achieve agreement on confidence-building measures; welcoming Turkey's support of the confidence-building measures]

#### **A.iv. Security Council Resolutions 1994-2001**

- 241 **Resolution 902 (1994)—11 March** [on confidence-building measures; welcoming the acceptance in principle by both parties of measures relating to Varosha and Nicosia International Airport]

- 243 **Resolution 927 (1994)—15 June** [*extending the mandate of UNFICYP to 31 December, 1994; calling on the military authorities on both sides to prevent incidents along the buffer zone; stressing urgent need for implementation of confidence-building measures*]
- 246 **Resolution 939 (1994)—29 July** [*reaffirming the benefits of confidence-building measures; noting substantial agreement on both sides regarding the substance of the confidence-building measures; requesting new reflection on ways of approaching the Cyprus problem*]
- 248 **Resolution 969 (1994)—21 December** [*extending the mandate of UNFICYP to 30 June, 1995; urging reduction of foreign troops and defence spending in the Republic of Cyprus; calling on the military authorities on both sides for mutual commitments; on implementation of confidence-building measures*]
- 250 **Resolution 1000 (1995)—23 June** [*extending the mandate of UNFICYP to 31 December, 1995; expressing concern about the modernization and upgrading of military forces in the Republic of Cyprus; reaffirming the importance of implementing confidence-building measures*]
- 252 **Resolution 1032 (1995)—19 December** [*extending the mandate of UNFICYP to 30 June, 1996; calling on the military authorities of both sides to help restore confidence between the two communities; welcoming UNFICYP's humanitarian review, and its initiative in organizing bicomunal events*]
- 255 **Resolution 1062 (1996)—28 June** [*extending the mandate of UNFICYP to 31 December, 1996; deploring the fatal shooting of a Greek Cypriot inside the UN buffer zone and the hindering of UNFICYP activities by Turkish Cypriot soldiers; calling for restoration of confidence between the two communities; recognizing that accession negotiations with the European Union should facilitate a settlement*]
- 259 **Resolution 1092 (1996)—23 December** [*extending the mandate of UNFICYP to 30 June, 1997; deploring violent incidents which resulted in deaths of three Greek Cypriots and one Turkish Cypriot, and injuries to civilians and UNFICYP personnel; expressing concern at excessive levels of military buildup in the Republic of Cyprus and military exercises in the region; reaffirming the potential contribution of EU accession negotiations towards a settlement*]

- 263 **Resolution 1117 (1997)—27 June** [*extending the mandate of UNFICYP to 31 December, 1997; calling on the military authorities of both sides to refrain from actions likely to exacerbate tensions; welcoming efforts by UNFICYP and others to promote bicomunal activities; reaffirming the potential contribution of EU accession negotiations towards a settlement*]
- 266 **Resolution 1146 (1997)—23 December** [*extending the mandate of UNFICYP to 30 June, 1998; calling on the military authorities of both sides to refrain from actions likely to exacerbate tensions; welcoming efforts by UNFICYP and others to promote bicomunal activities; reaffirming the potential contribution of EU accession negotiations towards a settlement*]
- 270 **Resolution 1178 (1998)—29 June** [*extending the mandate of UNFICYP to 31 December, 1998; calling on the military authorities of both sides to refrain from actions likely to exacerbate tensions; welcoming efforts by UNFICYP and others to promote bicomunal activities*]
- 272 **Resolution 1179 (1998)—29 June** [*calling on the leaders of the two communities, in particular the Turkish Cypriot side, to commit themselves to the process of negotiations and to resume direct dialogue*]
- 274 **Resolution 1217 (1998)—22 December** [*extending the mandate of UNFICYP to 30 June, 1999; calling again for the leaders of the two communities to commit themselves to the process of negotiations*]
- 277 **Resolution 1218 (1998)—22 December** [*requesting the Secretary-General to work intensively with the two sides on limiting and reducing the level of troops and armaments in Cyprus, on UNFICYP measures aimed at reducing tensions along ceasefire lines and other confidence-building measures, and on efforts towards a comprehensive Cyprus settlement*]
- 279 **Resolution 1250 (1999)—29 June** [*calling on the two leaders to support a comprehensive negotiation based on principles including “no preconditions” and “all issues on the table”*]
- 281 **Resolution 1251 (1999)—29 June** [*extending the mandate of UNFICYP to 15 December, 1999; urging the Greek Cypriot side to agree to implementation of the UNFICYP package of measures; on implementation of confidence-building measures*]
- 284 **Resolution 1283 (1999)—15 December** [*extending the mandate of UNFICYP to 15 June, 2000*]

- 285 **Resolution 1303 (2000)—14 June** [*extending the mandate of UNFICYP to 15 December, 2000*]
- 286 **Resolution 1331 (2000)—13 December** [*extending the mandate of UNFICYP to 15 June, 2001; urging the Turkish Cypriot side and Turkish forces to rescind restrictions on UNFICYP operations, and to restore the military status quo ante at Strovolia*]

#### **B. General Assembly Resolutions**

- 289 **Resolution 2077 (XX)—18 December, 1965** [*calling on all States to refrain from any intervention directed against the Republic of Cyprus; recommending continuation of UN mediation work*]
- 291 **Resolution 3212 (XXIX)—1 November, 1974** [*urging withdrawal of all foreign armed forces from the Republic of Cyprus; requesting continued UN humanitarian assistance to all parts of the population of Cyprus*]
- 293 **Resolution 3395 (XXX)—20 November, 1975** [*demanding withdrawal of all foreign armed forces from the Republic of Cyprus; calling for facilitation of the return of all refugees to their homes; calling for a resumption of negotiations*]
- 295 **Resolution 3450 (XXX)—9 December 1975** [*on missing persons*]
- 296 **Resolution 31/12 (1976)—12 November, 1976** [*demanding implementation of General Assembly Resolutions 3212 (XXIX) of 1 November 1974 and 3395 (XXX) of 20 November 1975*]
- 298 **Resolution 32/15 (1977)—9 November, 1977** [*calling for a resumption of negotiations; demanding that the parties refrain from any unilateral actions which might adversely affect prospects for peace*]
- 300 **Resolution 32/128 (1977)—16 December 1977** [*on missing persons*]
- 301 **Resolution 33/15 (1978)—9 November, 1978** [*demanding immediate withdrawal of all foreign armed forces; calling for a resumption of negotiations; recommending examination of measures to ensure implementation of UN resolutions on Cyprus*]
- 303 **Resolution 33/172 (1978)—20 December, 1978** [*on missing persons*]

- 304 **Resolution 34/30 (1979)—20 November, 1979** [*demanding immediate withdrawal of all foreign armed forces; calling for a resumption of negotiations; welcoming the proposal for the total demilitarization of Cyprus*]
- 308 **Resolution 36/164 (1981)—16 December, 1981** [*on missing persons*]
- 309 **Resolution 37/181 (1982)—17 December, 1982** [*on missing persons*]
- 310 **Resolution 37/253 (1983)—13 May, 1983** [*demanding the immediate withdrawal of all occupation forces from the Republic of Cyprus; calling for meaningful negotiations; reiterating its recommendation to examine measures to ensure implementation of UN resolutions on Cyprus*]

#### **C. Secretary-General's Reports to the Security Council**

- 317 Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Cyprus, for the period from 11 December 1995 to 10 June 1996  
**(7 June 1996— S/1996/411)**
- 328 Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Cyprus, for the period from 11 December 1995 to 10 June 1996—  
Corrigendum  
**(7 June 1996— S/1996/411/Corr. 1)**
- 329 Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Cyprus, for the period from 11 December 1995 to 10 June 1996—  
Addendum  
**(27 June 1996— S/1996/411/Add. 1)**
- 330 Report of the Secretary-General on his Mission of Good Offices in Cyprus  
**(25 June 1996— S/1996/467)**
- 336 Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Cyprus, for the period from 11 June to 10 December 1996  
**(10 December 1996— S/1996/1016)**
- 344 Report of the Secretary-General on his Mission of Good Offices in Cyprus  
**(17 December 1996— S/1996/1055)**

- 350 Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Cyprus, for the period from 11 December 1996 to 5 June 1997  
**(5 June 1997—S/1997/437)**
- 358 Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Cyprus, for the period from 6 June 1997 to 8 December 1997  
**(8 December 1997—S/1997/962)**
- 368 Report of the Secretary-General on his Mission of Good Offices in Cyprus  
**(12 December 1997— S/1997/973)**
- 371 Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Cyprus, for the period from 8 December 1997 to 8 June 1998  
**(10 June 1998— S/1998/488)**
- 380 Report of the Secretary-General on his Mission of Good Offices in Cyprus  
**(16 June 1998— S/1998/518)**
- 382 Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Cyprus, for the period from 9 December 1998 to 9 June 1999  
**(8 June 1999— S/1999/657)**
- 387 Report of the Secretary-General on his Mission of Good Offices in Cyprus  
**(22 June 1999— S/1999/707)**
- 389 Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Cyprus, for the period from 10 June 1999 to 29 November 1999  
**(29 November 1999— S/1999/1203)**
- 394 Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Cyprus, for the period from 10 June 1999 to 29 November 1999  
**(15 December 1999— S/1999/1203/Add.1)**
- 397 ***Guidelines for the submission of manuscripts/  
Yazı göndermek isteyen yazarların dikkatine***

# Abstracts

## Ö Z E T L E R



## Article Abstracts

**Nathalie Tocci,** "The 'Cyprus Question': Reshaping community identities and elite interests within a wider European framework"

Since 1963 the 'Cyprus question' has proved one of the most intractable inter-communal conflicts within the international system. Despite the assiduous involvement of the United Nations, the long list of negotiations and inter-communal talks have failed to yield any concrete agreement. What are the roots and causes of the 'Cyprus question' and what explains the international community's repeated failures to resolve it? This paper argues that the causes of the 'Cyprus question' comprise two crucial dimensions. First, the conflict is caused by the underlying inter-communal dispute between Greek and Turkish Cypriots, which is in turn triggered both by real and by imaginary conditions of division and disparity. Second, the 'Cyprus question' is the product of a delicate balance of elite interests. Clearly, a solution to the problem must reflect both dimensions. An initial settlement that represents more preferable payoffs than the current status quo to both community elites, must be brokered. Thereafter it is possible to tackle the real conditions of division and disparity, which cause the underlying inter-communal conflict. The overarching framework of prosperity and stability provided by the European Union could contribute in both respects more by facilitating the formulation and implementation of an initial inter-elite settlement and accelerating the ultimate eradication of the underlying conflict between peoples.

**Mustafa Besim,** "The Underground Economy in the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus: Significance and Consequences"

This paper attempts to evaluate the significance of the underground economy in the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC). A conceptual framework has been developed to analyze the phenomenon, and two methods—those of Gutmann and Tanzi—have been tested. The resulting estimates of the scope of the underground economy, which range between 23% and 61.2% for the years 1977 to 1997, indicate that its size is too great to be ignored. The increasing burden of taxes and other regulations are the driving forces behind the increase in underground economic activities; and the growth of the underground economy will have significant consequences, in terms of tax-revenue losses, information distortion, misallocation of resources and crowding-out, migration, and involuntary unemployment, for the future of the TRNC.

**Abdullah Saydam,** “The Settlement of Turkish Immigrants in Cyprus and the Reaction of the Greek Cypriots (1864-1878)” [in Turkish]

This study examines immigration to Ottoman territories during the period 1864-1878, focusing on immigration to the island of Cyprus. The Ottomans wanted to settle Caucasian and Rumelian immigrants on the island, and implemented policies to this end. The initial reaction of the Greek Cypriots to this action was one of neutrality; however, by 1878 they began to evince great resistance to the settlement policy, and in this they were also supported by the Consulates on the island. Of considerable historical importance is the fact that the British, who at first did not encourage the settlement of Turkish immigrants, became uneasy about the population of Greek Cypriots and began, later on, to support Turkish immigration to the island.

**Doğan İbrahim,** “Global Positioning System (GPS) Studies in the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus”

The Global Positioning System (GPS) is now widely used in many land, sea, and air-based navigation applications. A GPS receiver enables the user to determine the latitude and the longitude of his or her position very accurately anywhere on Earth. With the removal of Selective Availability (SA), the GPS is currently a much more accurate and a very popular navigational instrument. This paper discusses the important features of the GPS systems and presents the results of a study carried out in the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) to assess the potential applications, performance, and accuracy of such navigational tools in the TRNC.

## Makale Özetleri

**Nathalie Tocci,** “Kıbrıs Meselesi’: Toplum Kimliğinin Tekrar Şekillen-  
dirilmesi ve Geniş Avrupa Çerçevesinde Elitlerin Çıkarları”  
[İngilizce]

Kıbrıs meselesi 1963 ten bugüne uluslararası sistemde çözüme kavuşturulamayan en zor toplumlar arası çatışmalardan biri olmuştur. Birleşmiş Milletlerin büyük bir gayretle meseleye müdahil olmasına karşın defalarca yapılan görüşmeler ve toplumlar arası oturumlar somut bir antlaşma ile neticelendirilememiştir. Bu aşamada şu sorular akla gelebilir: Kıbrıs meselesinin kökleri ve nedenleri nedir ve uluslararası topluluğun bu meseleyi çözüme bağlama çabalarının her defasında başarısızlıkla sonuçlanması nasıl açıklanabilir? Bu makale nedenleri itibari ile “Kıbrıs meselesinin” iki önemli boyutu olduğunu ileri sürmektedir. Birincisi, çatışmanın Türk ve Rum toplumları arasındaki toplumlararası anlaşmazlıktan meydana gelişi ve buna bağlı olarak gerçek ve hayali ayırım ve farklılık duygusudur. İkinci neden ise Kıbrıs meselesinin elit çıkarlara bağlı hasas bir dengeye oturtulmuş olmasıdır. Açıkcası bu sorunun bir çözüme kavuşturulması, bahsedilen her iki boyutun ele alınmasını gerektirmektedir. Her iki toplum elitine mevcut statükonun getirdiklerinden daha tercih edilebilir kazanımları olan bir ön antlaşma sunulmalıdır. Ancak bu tür bir antlaşmadan sonra altta yatan toplumlar arası çatışmayı oluşturan ayırım ve farklılığı yaratan gerçek koşulların ele alınması mümkün olacaktır. Avrupa topluluğunun sunduğu refah ve istikrar çerçevesi iki açıdan katkı sağlayabilir. Bu çerçeve elitler-arası bir antlaşmanın formüle edilmesi ve uygulanmasını kolaylaştıracağı gibi her iki halk arasındaki çatışmanın altında yatan nedenlerin nihai bir şekilde ortadan kalkmasını hızlandıracaktır.

**Mustafa Besim,** “Kayıtdışı Ekonominin Kuzey Kıbrıs Türk Cumhuriyetindeki Gerçeği ve Yarattığı Sorunlar” [İngilizce]

Bu çalışmada Kuzey Kıbrıs Türk Cumhuriyetindeki (KKTC) kayıtdışı ekonomi gerçeği değerlendirilmiştir. Kayıtdışı ekonominin kavramsal çerçevesi tanımlanarak, Gutmann ve Tanzi yaklaşımlarıyla test edilmiştir. Yapılan analizler sonucunda KKTC’ndeki kayıtdışı ekonominin hiçde küçümsenemeyecek boyutlarda; 1977-97 yılları arasında Gayri Safi Milli Hasılanın %23 ile % 61 oranlarında gerçekleştiği saptanmıştır. Bunun yanında bu çalışma sayesinde, artan vergi yükünün ve regülasyonların kayıtdışı ekonominin büyümesine neden olan hususlar olduğu ortaya çıkmıştır. Ayrıca bu gerçeğin, vergi geliri kayıplarına, kaynak tahsisinde etkinsizliğe, kayıt sisteminin bozulmasına, özel sektörün ekonomiden dışlanmasına, gönülsüz işsizliğin ve göçün artmasına neden oldukları ortaya konulmuştur.

**Abdullah Saydam,** “Kıbrıs’a Göçmen İskânına Yönelik Çalışmalar ve Rumların Tepkileri (1864-1878)”

Bu çalışmada 1864-1878 yılları arasında Osmanlı memleketlerine yapılan göçlerin Kıbrıs boyutu incelenmektedir. Osmanlı Devleti, Kafkasya ve Rumeli’den gelen göçmenleri süratle yerleştirmek amacıyla Kıbrıs’a da göçmen gönderdi. Önceleri bu olaya karşı tarafsız kalan Rumlar, 1878’deki göçmen iskânına şiddetli tepki gösterdiler Kendilerine konsoloslar da destek oldu. İlginç olan nokta ise, Kıbrıs’a Türk göçünü istemeyen İngiltere’nin adayı ele geçirdikten sonra Rum çoğunluktan rahatsızlık duymasındır. Hatta bazı İngilizler, adaya Türk göçünün desteklenmesi görüşündeydi.

**Doğan İbrahim,** “Küresel Yer Bulum Sistemleri Üzerine Kuzey Kıbrıs Türk Cumhuriyeti’nde Çalışmalar” [*İngilizce*]

Küresel Yer Bulum Sistemleri (KYS) günümüzde kara, deniz ve hava yer bulumu uygulamalarında geniş olarak kullanılmaktadırlar. Bir KYS ile kullanıcı bulunduğu yerin enlem ve boylamını çok hassas bir şekilde elde eder. Bu makale, KYS sistemlerinin önemli özelliklerini ve bu sistemlerin KKTC’deki uygulama alanlarını, hassasiyetini, ve potansiyelini yapılmış olan deneyler sonucu araştırır ve bu konuda önerilerde bulunur.

# Articles

**MAKALELER**

# The 'Cyprus Question': Reshaping community identities and elite interests within a wider European framework

*Nathalie Tocci*

## **Introduction**

Studies of the 'Cyprus question' often focus on the recent history of the island particularly since the last years of British colonial rule. As a result policy conclusions have tended to be based upon specific interpretations of history. Views favoring the Turkish Cypriot interpretation of events have called for two separate states joined at most through a loose confederation, in the light of the injustices committed by the Greek Cypriots between 1963 and 1974. Arguments favoring Greek Cypriot versions of the past have favored a unified federal state, given that anything but single and indivisible sovereignty would imply an implicit acceptance of what was in their view an illegal and immoral military intervention by the Turkish forces in 1974. Given the near impossibility of briefly reviewing the historical evolution of the conflict in a non-contentious manner and the diversion of attention from forward-looking analysis this implies, this paper abstains from an historical introduction to the 'Cyprus question' and begins with an analysis of the causes of the problem today.<sup>1</sup>

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## **I. Causes of the 'Cyprus question': community and elite conflicts**

Examining the roots and causes of the 'Cyprus question' and the reasons behind failed attempts at settlement negotiation is fundamental to any study of conflict resolution on the island. The approach adopted in this paper is that modern intra and inter state conflicts are neither inevitable nor irrational incidents, but rather stem both from tangible conditions and realities on the ground and from the rational calculation of interests of the actors involved.<sup>2</sup> This is not to say that hatred and fear play no role in the creation and continuation of conflict. However, what appear to be irrational ethnic hatreds and fears are often driven by a set of concrete conditions, which render such sentiments not as irrational as they may first appear. On top of such conditions

and the subsequent formation of popular attitudes and sentiments, elites articulate their interests adding a second crucial dimension to each conflict. Following this logic, it is clear that conflicts cannot be settled in a durable and non-coercive manner unless both the underlying conditions giving rise to particular popular attitudes are eradicated and elite interests in the conflict are accounted for.

## 1. The causes of the 'Cyprus question' today

Historical factors ranging from the Ottoman *millet* system of governance to British 'divide and rule' strategies, the traditional Greek Cypriot aim of *enosis* (union between Greece and Cyprus), Turkey's strategic interest in the island and the role of external powers in the Cold War context, go far in explaining the initiation of ethnic conflict in Cyprus. But these do not explain its continuation to the present day. Additional and arguably more powerful factors have emerged since the 1960s and early 1970s hugely exacerbating the inter-communal dispute between a new generation of Cypriots. Real conditions of division and the total absence of multiethnic society complemented by irrational fear and prejudice, together with further complicating factors such as extensive militarization and immigration flows, explain the persisting inter-communal conflict on the island. The inability of negotiators to address these real *and* imaginary divisions partly explains their failure to resolve the 'Cyprus question.'

### a) Inter-communal divisions, the absence of a Cypriot identity and the failure of negotiations

Persisting inter-communal conflict in Cyprus is driven by real conditions of division and disparity, which, exacerbated by the accompanying deep-rooted fears and misperceptions of the 'other,' have rendered the emergence of either a shared Cypriot identity or two peacefully coexisting and complementary identities increasingly distant prospects. Let us single out the precise conditions of division spurring the inter-communal conflict.

#### i. Separate governance

The first condition of division is the existence of a clear division in governance. Since 1967 Cyprus has witnessed two systems of governance: the formally recognized Republic of Cyprus governing the Greek Cypriot people and the de facto Turkish Cypriot government, governing the Turkish Cypriot community. In the light of persisting conflict, the latter was transformed from being an administration serving the Turkish Cypriots in 1967-1974, to being a de facto state since 1983 when Denktaş declared the formation of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC). The emergence of two distinct

states with separate and non-communicating governments, administrations, judiciaries, police and military forces has greatly exacerbated division between peoples, wiping away all experience of joint governance and shared political culture.

## **ii. Lack of social, cultural or economic relations**

The second condition of division has been the virtual absence of any social, cultural or economic links between the two communities. The existing limited links between Greek and Turkish Cypriots began to be severed in 1963, when over 30,000 Turkish Cypriots were relegated to enclaves. The government, regarding the enclaves as a state within the state, imposed an economic embargo of strategic goods and services upon the enclaves and restricted the latter's free movement. Thereafter, following the 1974 Turkish military intervention and the resulting territorial separation of the two communities on opposite sides of the impenetrable 'green line,' contact between the two parties virtually disappeared. In the social and cultural spheres, linkages between the two peoples are inhibited by the territorial separation preventing relations between groups or individuals from opposing sides of the boundary. In the economic sphere, the economic embargo of the Republic of Cyprus on its northern counterpart has rendered economic linkages through trade and joint initiatives almost non-existent. Hence, new generations of Cypriots are growing without any form of contact with the opposing community. This in turn has encouraged radical political opinions based on biased evidence and prejudice and therefore hampered prospects of peace based at most upon the peaceful coexistence of the two communities on the island.

## **iii. Inter-communal economic disparities and the integration of the TRNC with Turkey**

The third condition fostering contrasting identities and purposes is the wide disparity in standards of economic development between the two communities. Even prior to the overt emergence of the inter-communal conflict, economic levels of the two communities differed substantially. However, disparities greatly increased in the decades following 1974. The 1974 military intervention and the subsequent partition of the island left both ethnic communities in a state of total economic disarray. However, while the Greek Cypriot economy in the south experienced a successful recovery and subsequent economic prosperity, the Turkish Cypriot north remained stagnant and undeveloped.

The Greek Cypriot economic success has been facilitated by the status of the Republic of Cyprus as the only internationally recognized state on the island. As a small economy it has hugely benefited from trade and investment flows and it has been able to reconstruct its economy based on international markets and division of labor. This has enabled it to develop its two major



comparative advantages, the light manufacturing industry aimed at the European public and tourism. The Republic of Cyprus has also successfully developed an offshore financial service sector. These three branches of economic activity contributed to an average growth rate of approximately 7% and an unemployment rate of 3% in the 1990s. The south also manifests well-managed public accounts and stable money markets. Average public deficits in southern Cyprus amounted to 1.3% in 1987-1997 and in 1997 the public debt was approximately 54% GDP, discount rates were 7% and inflation was 2.6%.<sup>3</sup> The Cypriot pound has been stable since it was anchored to the DM with a +/-1.25% fluctuation bound in 1992 and thereafter to the euro in 1999 with a fluctuation bound of +/-2.25%.

On the other hand, the northern regions present a starkly opposed scenario. Although northern Cyprus is fully equipped with the necessary infrastructure for tourism and has considerable potential for agricultural development, its economy lags a long way behind the southern one. The productivity of the TRNC amounts to only 38% of the productivity of the Republic of Cyprus.<sup>4</sup> Agriculture remains undeveloped and largely subsistence based. Despite adequate infrastructure and noteworthy environmental, cultural and architectural attractions, tourism is under-exploited and largely consists of visitors from Turkey.<sup>5</sup> The economy is dominated by an unproductive public sector which leads to serious fiscal imbalances that are only partially rectified by Turkish transfers. This stagnant and unproductive economy has been to a large extent a result of the TRNC's international non-recognition and the economic blockades imposed by the Republic of Cyprus and Greece and recently led by the EU.<sup>6</sup> This has induced both the under-exploitation of the economic potential of this small economy and the close ties between northern Cyprus and Turkey. Blockades have seriously limited trade opportunities in the north. Turkish Cypriot investment is deterred by the uncertain legal status of the region, inflation and the inconvertibility of the Turkish lira. Finally, tourism is minimal given the fear of travelling to an internationally deemed 'illegal' state and the absence of international air-links from destinations other than Turkey.

International ostracization has led to the growing economic affiliation of the TRNC to Turkey. Economic ties with Turkey have taken the form of regional economic co-operation, Turkish credit facilities to northern Cyprus and numerous joint transport networks and industrial development projects. In 1997 Turkey formed an Association Council with the TRNC foreseeing a close union in trade outlets, political solidarity and budgetary support. However, economic links to Turkey have not only been insufficient to compensate the costs of international isolation, but have also implied the inheritance of Turkish macroeconomic and in particular monetary imbalances. Standing in sharp contrast to figures in the southern economy, in the TRNC inflation fluctuates around 60% and real bank lending rates and market interest rates are approximately 30%. The absence of a large capital market and the lack of control over monetary policy have also implied that the TRNC's public deficits depend upon transfers from the Turkish Republic for rectification.<sup>7</sup>

Imported fiscal and monetary instability has further hindered trade, investment and therefore overall growth.

**Table 1: Comparison between the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities: 1976-95**

	Republic of Cyprus	TRNC*
Annual average GNP growth	6.8%	3.8%
GDP per capita 1997	\$12,850	\$4,158
Employment in primary sector 1997	12%	23%
Employment in public sector 1997	3%	18%
Tourists per year 1994	2,069,000	361,692
Public deficit %GDP 1997	1.3%	14%
Annual inflation 1995-1999	2.1%	60%
Discount rates 1999	7%	31%
Unemployment 1996	3.1%	25%

*\*real figures for northern Cyprus are higher in the light of the level of unrecorded economic activity. Source: Planning Bureau, Republic of Cyprus (1996).*

These wide and all-encompassing economic disparities add to the conditions of inter-communal division, which in turn breed conflict. Economic disparities imply radically different ways of life and standards of living, which impose tight constraints on inter-communal contact and relations.

#### iv. The underlying Greek-Turkish rivalry

The final cause of division between the two ethnic communities on the island is the underlying conflict between the motherland countries: Greece and Turkey. Since the Ottoman conquest of Constantinople in 1453 and the subsequent four centuries of Ottoman rule over Greece tensions between the two nations have been high. Rivalries were reinforced in the late 19<sup>th</sup> and 20<sup>th</sup> centuries with the wars of 1897, 1912-13 and 1919-23 and since 1974 by conflicts over oil drilling rights in the Aegean off the Greek island and Thassos close to the Turkish border. In 1996 the two states were once again at the brink of war over the disputed islands of Imia/Kardak. As long as these rivalries persist and the two ethnic communities in Cyprus identify with Greece and Turkey respectively, the creation of constructive and complementary identities will remain unfulfilled.

#### v. Inter-communal misperceptions and fears and the 'securitisation' of the conflict

Real conditions of division and difference have fueled a set of illusory fears and misperceptions, and the widespread 'securitisation'<sup>8</sup> of the 'Cyprus question,' which have further reduced the likelihood of conflict resolution. Real conditions have transformed the mindset of both peoples, in a manner precluding a long-lasting solution based either upon a shared Cypriot identity or upon the peaceful and complementary coexistence of two communities. Media and books have selected primordial elements of division and antagonism such as ethnicity, language and religion to define and legitimize respective communities while neglecting other aspects such as the shared colonial history, customs and traditions. People's attitudes towards the 'other' community were illustrated by a recent poll carried out in March 2000 in the Republic of Cyprus.<sup>9</sup> The poll revealed for example that 75% of the interviewed Greek Cypriots stated they would not accept a member of their family marrying a Turkish Cypriot and over 80% stated that in the event of a federal solution they would not live in the Turkish Cypriot unit. Conditions of division have also triggered the 'securitisation' of the conflict, i.e. the depiction of the 'other' and the issues at stake in the conflict as an essential threat to one's own identity and existence. Consequently, the conflict has been transferred in the realm of security, legitimizing words and actions lying beyond the sphere of 'normal political debate'<sup>10</sup> and thus reducing the scope for conflict resolution.

#### vi. Militarization of the island and the settler problem

The process of 'demonization of the other' gained a momentum of its own in the light of extensive militarization of the island and the substantial influx of Anatolian settlers in the north. First, militarization in Cyprus has exacerbated mutual fears and suspicion between the two communities, particularly on the Greek Cypriot side given the disproportionate presence of Turkish troops on the island. In an island with less than 800,000 inhabitants there are 30,000 Turkish troops and 4,500 Turkish Cypriot troops in northern Cyprus. Militarization in the TRNC considerably outweighs that in the Republic of Cyprus. Tsardanidis and Nicolau<sup>11</sup> claim that ratios of military manpower are 3.5:1. The Turkish Cypriots favor the extensive presence of Turkish troops, which they regard as a guarantee for their physical survival. However, the knowledge of such extensive militarization in the north exacerbates the fears of Greek Cypriots and confirms in their eyes the view that the 'Cyprus question' is determined by the Turkish occupation of the island. In turn since 1997 Greek Cypriots have been undergoing significant military upgrading through the 'Joint Defence Doctrine' placing the Republic of Cyprus under the Greek military umbrella and increasing annual defence expenditure to \$300m, i.e., 7% of Greek Cypriot GNP. Glafcos Clerides decided in 1998 to run his presidential election campaign on a pledge to

ignore warnings from the international community and deploy Russian S-300 missiles.<sup>12</sup>

Second, the influx of poor and landless Anatolian settlers has added a further dimension to the Cyprus conflict. In the past three decades between 30,000 and 80,000 immigrants from Southeast Anatolia and the Black Sea coastal area have settled in northern Cyprus. The settlers have been encouraged by northern Cyprus authorities primarily because they are viewed as a form of security and legitimization for their disproportionate territorial occupation. Faced with an overwhelming Greek Cypriot demographic majority and its disproportionately low ratio of land to ethnic inhabitants, northern Cypriot governments have encouraged a massive influx of Turkish settlers on the island. Hence, the increase of Turkish population from 18.5% to 24% of the overall population of the island. The influx of settlers and their deep affiliations to motherland Turkey have in turn exacerbated fears and prejudices amongst the Greek Cypriot population, who fear that such a deliberate demographic alteration is intended to encourage the domination of Turkish Cypriots over their Greek compatriots.

Real and imaginary conditions of divisions ensure the persistence of the Cyprus conflict and explain its intractability. The inability of the international community and the negotiating parties to adequately address these conditions represents a major cause of the failure of settlement talks. International mediation has concentrated on formulating feasible structures of a federal settlement while often neglecting the existing conditions of separation and disparity which represent the ultimate barrier to a true resolution of the problem. It was not until 1993 that the UN proposed a set of CBMs intended to reverse some of the very conditions mentioned above but the measures have not yet been implemented. Moreover, the international community has fueled the dynamics of the conflict by widening the economic disparities between northern and southern regions. Economic isolation has exacerbated division and has induced the progressive integration of the 'TRNC' into Turkey. Until these conditions are rectified to 'desecuritize' the conflict and induce the two communities to live, trust and cooperate with each other, a long-lasting resolution of the 'Cyprus question' will remain a utopian prospect.

#### **b) Elite interests in the 'Cyprus question' and the failure of negotiations**

The balance of elite interests in the 'Cyprus question' presents another important dimension of the conflict explaining why the problem persists and why settlement negotiations have failed to resolve it. Existing inter-elite bargaining positions create a set of constraints which seriously limit the viable options open for bargaining. Negotiations are carried out in a second best world in which feasible solutions must offer both negotiating parties preferred payoffs than the best possible arrangement without a negotiated settlement. Regardless of what the 'ideal' or 'first best' solution to the conflict may be, the means to attain it must pragmatically account for the current state of elite positions and alternatives. Understanding these positions is therefore crucial

to a thorough appreciation of the dynamics of the 'Cyprus question' upon which a lasting settlement can be built.

In order to understand elite positions in the negotiating process it is necessary to understand first what are the ultimate aims and second what are the current payoffs. These two factors together determine elite bargaining positions, crucial to the determination of a political settlement. Turkish Cypriot elites aim at a political settlement in which the two communities effectively run their own affairs as two separate sovereign states within either a loose confederation or two separate states. They fiercely resist a settlement based on single sovereignty and territoriality in which, due to demographic realities, they fear that Turkish Cypriots would be at best be granted full individual rights and community minority rights. Due to their reliance on Turkey, the Turkish Cypriot elite also calls for a retention of Turkey's guarantor status. Turning instead to the current status quo, it is imperative to account for the reality that, despite international ostracization, the Turkish Cypriots *have* been governed by a *de facto* state since 1974, effectively secured by a large mainly Turkish military force. It follows that Turkish Cypriot negotiating elites *will not* settle for a compromise in which their *de facto* achievements will be substantially removed without adequate compensation in terms of first and foremost international recognition and then economic gains. Hence, Denktas' persistent refusal of majority rule within a federal arrangement<sup>13</sup> and his rejection in 1998 of a federal arrangement in favor of a confederation. The Greek Cypriot negotiating elite aims at a settlement based on the single sovereignty and territorial integrity of an independent Cyprus. They accept a bi-communal and bi-zonal federation but nonetheless call for a relatively strong central government, in which, due to demographic realities, they would represent a strong majority. The political equality of the two communities would be represented at the level of the federated states and not explicitly at the federal level.<sup>14</sup> In terms of current achievements it is important to realize that the Republic of Cyprus is both a *de facto* and a *de jure* state, the only state in Cyprus recognized by the international community. It thus enjoys a superior political status compared to its northern counterpart. The Republic of Cyprus is also a prosperous state whose per capita GNP is three to four times that of the TRNC. Hence; Clerides' insistence on a tight federal arrangement, refugee return, the withdrawal of Turkish troops and a redefinition of territorial boundaries.

However, the 'Cyprus question' is not simply determined by the inter-communal conflict and Cypriot elite bargaining positions. A much wider international dimension comprising Greece, Turkey, the EU and the wider international community also shapes the conflict in two distinct ways. First, external actors have their own positions on the conflict, which influence and pressurize elites on the island. Second, their actions and decisions affect the bargaining field of negotiating elites. Beginning with Greece, the political elite in Athens strongly backs the Greek Cypriot cause and condemns the illegality of the TRNC imposing an economic blockade on it together with the EU. Greece calls for a political settlement in which the Republic of Cyprus is

recognized as the only sovereign state within a bi-communal and bi-zonal federation. Furthermore, it firmly supports the Greek Cypriot incorporation in the European Union. Hence, its pressure within the EU exerted through the threat of continued veto on the EU-Turkey customs union in 1995 to ensure the initiation of accession talks with the Republic of Cyprus.

This leads us to the EU position regarding the 'Cyprus question.' In the past the Union has been relatively uninvolved with the Cyprus conflict merely supporting UN initiatives and resolutions. However following the Republic of Cyprus' application for EU membership, its involvement has had to necessarily intensify, becoming an internal party to the conflict. Positions within the Union are notoriously divided on the issue. France, Germany, Italy and Holland have repeatedly called for a political settlement prior to Cyprus' EU accession. However, Greece has stood firm on its position, threatening to veto the entire eastern enlargement if Cyprus is not admitted to the Union on the grounds of the persisting 'Cyprus question.' Such a firm stance has proved to act as the determinant of the overall EU position on the issue, prevailing over other member states' position. Hence, the Union, while advocating a settlement based on UN recommendations prior to membership, is ready to admit a divided Cyprus to the European family. The Helsinki European Council of December 1999 formally removed any precondition of political settlement to Cyprus' EU membership.

Turkey under the present leadership of Bülent Ecevit, i.e., the leader responsible for the 1974 Turkish military intervention, is overwhelmingly supportive of Denktaş' call for the TRNC's international recognition. Turkey regards its 1974 intervention as a responsibility under the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee and holds that a phased withdrawal of Turkish troops will only be possible following political settlement. It also repeatedly declares its strategic interest in the island, maintaining the 'Cyprus question' near the top of its foreign policy priorities. In the past, external developments facilitated Turkey's hard stance regarding the 'Cyprus question.' The 1997 Luxembourg Summit's rejection of Turkey enabled the latter to support more firmly the Turkish Cypriot cause. Until Ankara's way to EU membership was blocked, its incentives to compromise on Cyprus were non-existent. With the 1999 Helsinki Summit this freedom could have been viewed as being reduced. First because Turkey's prospect of EU membership rose with its recognition as a candidate to EU membership. Second, because with the EU entry of a divided Cyprus before Turkey, the latter would be left in the uncomfortable position of being an EU candidate invading EU territory. These two factors could have softened Turkey's position on the 'Cyprus question.' However, Turkey's road to the European Union is long and difficult and the 1999 optimism quickly faded.<sup>15</sup> Turkey's position vis-à-vis Cyprus is thus more likely to remain unaltered.

Finally, turning to the UN's role in the 'Cyprus question,' the UN, being itself a reflection of the international system of clear-cut states, has traditionally supported the Greek Cypriots' call for a single independent state with one indivisible sovereignty and territorial integrity. All UN resolutions so far have

called for a political settlement along these lines and rejected the self-proclaimed TRNC.

But let us draw these diverse external factors together and analyse their cumulative impact on the negotiating process in Cyprus. On the one hand, the removal of any precondition on Cyprus EU membership effectively means that if a settlement cannot be found, a divided Cyprus is likely to enter the Union with the Republic of Cyprus as its only recognized government. Hence, the reduced incentives of the Greek Cypriots to compromise on their positions. On the other hand, the Helsinki decision implies that Denktas has no veto over the island's EU membership. This in turn greatly increases his need to broker a settlement in the next four to five years. Nonetheless, Turkey's support for the TRNC's claim to sovereignty is likely to persist and therefore Turkish Cypriot bottom line demands would probably remain unaltered. The cumulative effect of elite interests in Cyprus highlights the reality that not only are the options open for compromise restricted but also that both sides are relatively content with the status quo and thus incentives to compromise are low. Paradoxically elite incentives to compromise have been at times further reduced by the involvement of external actors. In particular relations with the EU have further reduced incentives to compromise by allowing the possibility of an accession of a divided Cyprus to the Union.

Another issue to be considered when analysing elite interests is the dynamic nature of the conflict. After almost thirty-seven years of conflict, the questions to be tackled remain unaltered. However, given that *de facto* conditions and consequently elite interests have significantly changed, viable answers have been considerably transformed. It is therefore not surprising that official elite demands have changed accordingly. Inter-communal negotiations between 1964 and 1974 were based upon the joint objective of a unitary state. Agreement was not found because the Greek Cypriots refused the concept of Turkish Cypriot autonomy in local government, claiming this would signify a concealed federation.<sup>16</sup> Following the *de facto* partition of the island in 1974, the common aim stated in the 1977 and 1979 high level agreements was that of a bi-communal and bi-zonal federation. In the absence of any agreement, Denktas explicitly refuted in 1998 even the idea of a federal arrangement in favor of a confederation in which the two states would retain separate sovereignties. These changes can be explained once the dynamic nature of the conflict is accounted for. Although prior to territorial partition an agreement based on a unitary state had been feasible, following *de facto* bi-zonality and separate governance, a federal solution became the new common ground. Similarly, while after three years of partition Denktas regarded a bi-communal federation an appealing solution, after over thirty years of a *de facto* Turkish Cypriot state, a preferred payoff would require the *de facto* and *de jure* recognition of the TRNC. This reality highlights the gravity of inaction. The more settlement is delayed and proposals ignore the realities of changing elite interests, the more the conflict acquires additional momentum and positive sum options become increasingly scarce.

## II. Moving towards a resolution of the 'Cyprus question'

The above analysis suggests that moving towards peace in Cyprus requires a three-step process incorporating the two dimensions of the Cyprus conflict, i.e. the inter-communal and the inter-elite conflict. A first and immediate step could foresee a series of independent measures aimed at increasing confidence between the two communities. Second and most important the two negotiating elites must agree to an initial settlement proposal. To achieve such an agreement it is crucial to account for the interests of the negotiating parties. Finally, one would foresee the dynamic evolution of the constitutional agreement. The Cyprus conflict cannot be truly resolved with an initial agreement between state elites, but will involve a dynamic process, where the constitutional system and the erosion of the inter-communal conflict will evolve together.

### 1. Independent confidence building measures prior to an agreement

An agreement between the two authorities on the island is not expected in the very near future. Nonetheless, some action which does not require any agreement between the parties could be undertaken immediately to gradually bridge divisions and misperceptions between communities and thus erode the inter-communal conflict. This would in turn encourage an agreement between elites.

#### a) Increasing social and cultural inter-communal relations

Social and cultural contact should be encouraged by both sides independently in order to bridge divisions between communities and reduce misperceptions and fears. The importance of social and cultural ties between the communities has been recognized and some progress in deepening and widening such links has been made. For example there are three bi-communal educational groups which organize bi-communal choir and drama activities, public lectures, exhibitions and student exchanges. Such activities should certainly be encouraged and supported by both authorities on the island. Furthermore, inter-communal discussion groups could be established as an integral element of conflict resolution. Inter-communal groups could meet regularly to discuss elements of similarity between the two communities in terms of history, culture, traditions and way of life, gradually building upon those elements of a joint Cypriot identity which could form essential and constructive elements of the separate communal identities and thus contribute to the 'desecuritisation' of the conflict.



**b) Increasing economic relations and re-balancing economic disparities**

Second, economic relations should be encouraged by immediately lifting the Greek Cypriot embargo on the north and allowing the employment of Turkish Cypriots in the Republic of Cyprus. Inter-communal economic cooperation over water and sewage projects for example would not only foster peace by representing another route of inter-communal contact, but it would also increase economic efficiency. Moreover, the employment of Turkish Cypriots workers in the more prosperous Republic of Cyprus would also contribute to a rebalancing of regional inequalities.

**2. An initial agreement between state elites**

While initial confidence building measures would be desirable in so far as they would prepare the ground for the future settlement, the resolution of the conflict ultimately hinges upon an initial agreement between the two conflicting authorities. Despite the merits of a UN favored bi-zonal and bi-communal federation, such a solution would be both unviable if one accounts for the matrix of elite positions, and above all unsustainable once one foresees the likely consequences of its immediate implementation. A state without the backing of a nation fails in the context of an underlying 'securitised' ethnic conflict. In Cyprus a solution based on a unitary sovereign state failed in 1963 and would be even more likely to do so today. It is therefore crucial to propose a settlement which is both viable in terms of an initial agreement and sustainable in terms of its subsequent implementation.

**a) An initial constitutional settlement**

Given an initial agreement must account for the constraints imposed by the current status quo of elite positions, a second best solution must entail an improvement from the situation for both negotiating parties. Currently the leaderships on the island appear to stand for opposed and seemingly unmoveable positions. The Greek Cypriots call for a federation comprising two politically equal federal units and a more or less strong sovereign federal authority. The Turkish Cypriots on the other hand stand for a confederation between two sovereign states in Cyprus who may jointly determine their policies in certain areas of government on the basis of unanimity. On the basis of negotiating actors' interests, a possible solution for Cyprus could be one which moves away from these standard constitutional recipes firmly rooted in the nation-state language of sovereignty and territorial integrity, and selects elements of both models coherently fitting them in a wider regional framework, i.e. the European Union.

Let us turn first to the internal features of a constitutional settlement in Cyprus. In the context of the 'Cyprus conflict,' employing the terms federation and confederation appears particularly fruitless not simply because of the

current diametrically opposed elite positions, but also because as cases such as Belgium suggest, workable solutions exist with marked elements of both models. An interesting solution in Cyprus could be the 'common state,' a term used in the constitutional debate of the two major conflicts in the South Caucasus: Nagorno Karabakh and Abkhazia. The 'common state' has neither a clear legal definition nor it has ever been implemented in practice. However it may be defined as a confederal model in which member states do not have a unilateral right to secede, and where foreign policy is delegated to the confederal authorities. The common state model does not fit in easily with conventional state models as it would essentially imply a federation (given the single external sovereignty of the state) driven by an essentially confederal logic. It may nonetheless be a useful model in the case of Cyprus particularly if projected into the post-nation state world of the European Union.

In Cyprus, arguably, the most important constitutional principle included in the 'common state' proposal would be that of non-hierarchical relations between authorities and the dominant use of unanimity rule within central institutions. Non-hierarchical relations in cases where one community represents a distinct numerical majority are fundamental in order to ensure the respect of the principle of political equality often cited in UN resolutions for Cyprus but interpreted in contrasting ways by the two conflicting parties. The two entities in the island, recognising their potential common interests could discuss and develop common policies in a number of government areas and consequently form a central authority in which the principle of unanimity would prevail. Hence, the crucial difference between such an arrangement and a classic federation, in which sovereignty unambiguously lies in the central level and in which majority rule prevails.

However, the 'common state' solution would envisage that secession would only be permitted if agreed by both units. Here one can notice how the proposed solution also differs from a classic confederation, which resting upon an international treaty may be unilaterally broken by any of the sovereign entities at any time.

In the case of a Cyprus, Greek and Turkish Cypriot units would be recognized *within* the common state structure and not as separate sovereign states. Both units would have separate, mutually recognized yet linked constitutions. Hence, a Turkish Cypriot entity would become internationally recognized, but the Greek Cypriots and the international community would not be called to recognize the TRNC's independence, but to recognize a Turkish Cypriot unit *within* the 'common state' of Cyprus. On the grounds of their status, asymmetric relations could also be established between the units and foreign states in particular spheres of competence. Hence, Turkish Cypriots could formalize links with Turkey and Greek Cypriots with Greece independently of each other and on an equal standing as the independent and recognized states.

In terms of citizenship, one could envisage a single but differentiated citizenship. Although the peoples of the island would have a Cypriot passport, the latter would be issued by the separate units and would indicate the entity

of residence of the passport holder.

As far as foreign representations and membership of international organizations and the EU are concerned, Cyprus would be treated as a single entity, which would nonetheless include voices from both units. In the case of EU membership, intra-EU institutional realities imply that the Union could only afford one new member standing for Cyprus and thus the two distinct units. How could a single membership operate? In areas such as regional funds and the Committee of the Regions, similar arrangements as those existing for other countries with defined regional structures could be envisaged, whereby one representant from each unit would be present. As far as membership of the Council of Ministers and the European Commission, where only one representant could be present, either a system of rotation or one of division of posts would have to be agreed upon. In either case, the central level in the 'common state' would have to provide the necessary forums in which to ensure either common stances or effective coordination.

Turning to the role of a central authority in Cyprus in greater detail, in the initial stages of the settlement, other than foreign representation, the central authority would be responsible for providing experience of joint governance and minimising conflict. It would thus provide inter-communal forums for conflict resolution and policy discussion particularly on issues which in the long-run *could* be determined and managed by the same. One could also foresee that in order to ensure the efficacy of these policy forums at central level, a High Representative appointed by the international community could be permanently based on the island to carry out a mediating role. Depending on what the 'first best' or 'unconstrained' constitutional arrangement may be, in the longer term as the bases of conflict gradually erode, the central government could develop competence in foreign trade policy, customs policy, monetary and fiscal policy and possibly also public health and infrastructure policy. If this were to occur, it would have to be accompanied with the creation of an all-island parliament as well as a central level constitution compatible with the separate constitutions of the units. However, the main innovation of this approach is that a devolution of power to the central level would only occur if, as the bases of the conflict erode, the two separate units agree that optimality calls for a strong central government. Below we will expand further on the dynamics of such an agreement, a major argument for its desirability.

Such a solution appears to be one if not the only viable option for the Turkish Cypriot elites. As stated above the Turkish Cypriot political elite, having effectively governed as a de facto state for twenty-six years, would not agree to an immediate renunciation of their control over the TRNC and thus agree to anything but a horizontal constitutional arrangement. This would represent a two-fold gain for the Turkish Cypriots who would not only retain control over their de facto state and gain international recognition as an entity in Cyprus, but would also enjoy a significant boost to their economy. Recognition would revamp the potentially competitive agricultural sector, removing restrictions on international tourism and increasing foreign aid receipts.

Such a constitutional arrangement also offers some attractions to the Greek Cypriot elite. For example, retaining a two-unit system would imply lower economic costs to the Greek Cypriot community. Under a federal arrangement, federal taxation and redistribution would imply a considerable burden on the more prosperous Greek Cypriot community, which could hamper peace and reconciliation.<sup>17</sup> A looser system instead would offer the Greek Cypriots the economic gains that can be derived from increased economic contact without the costs of having to continuously redistribute to their poorer partners. Furthermore, the constraints on secession would ensure Greek Cypriot elites that such an arrangement would not simply represent a first step to a permanent and legally sanctioned division of the island.

#### **b) The desirability of a dynamic 'common state' solution**

Any static agreement would be undesirable in so far as it would not necessarily represent the 'ideal' or 'unconstrained' arrangement within a conflict-free situation. Such a proposition seems particularly relevant for Cyprus, which unlike most other cases of ethnic conflict, has witnessed explicit dispute and division for thirty-seven years. An initial arrangement should only represent the first step towards the elimination of inter-communal barriers which would in turn allow the natural establishment of the first-best solution. Once the inter-communal conflict erodes and elements of shared identity are enhanced, constitutional arrangements could further evolve. Hence, it is possible to imagine that with growing experience of joint governance, the authority of the central government could grow accordingly. History includes several cases of federations evolving by aggregation rather than disaggregation. Examples include the Netherlands (1579-1795), the US (1776-1787), Switzerland (1815-1848) and Germany (1815-1866). The possibility of transforming into a tighter federal state would clearly depend upon the gradual dissolution of the inter-communal conflict.

The time involved in such a process explains why both initial unilateral secession clauses and the immediate creation of powerful central institutions would be undesirable. On the one hand, initial restrictions on secession would be necessary to allow a sufficient period of time for the two political entities to constructively learn to work together. One cannot exclude however, that as conflict erodes, the two units mutually agree to disengage and transform into separate states. On the other hand, the immediate creation of a tight federation would be unsustainable. A successful federation, while not necessarily requiring the backing of a single nation should at least be supported by peacefully coexisting communities. In the words of Andrew Mango: 'a marriage cannot be valid, let alone be happy, without mutual consent.'<sup>18</sup> History from the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia teaches that artificial and involuntary federations are likely to fail in the long-term. A similar lesson can be learnt from Cyprus itself in the 1960s. In the case of Cyprus, immediate close contact in governance and communal living could create deadlocks in decision-making and inter-communal tension, which may ultimately destroy

the bases of the settlement itself. Hence, the desirability of a fluid arrangement which would allow the two community elites to gradually proceed to the first best arrangement when constraints imposed by the existing dynamics of the conflict are removed.

**c) Territorial readjustment, refugee questions, demilitarization, immigration policy and the three freedoms of movement, settlement and property**

A 'common state' arrangement without additional elements of a solution would be entirely unacceptable particularly to the Greek Cypriot elites, who would lose their international political and economic supremacy without adequate compensation. Other issues need to be considered.

First, on the question of territory allocation, an initial solution would imply land redistribution between the two communities. As it stands the territorial distribution ratio between Greek and Turkish Cypriots is 63:37 although population ratios are 74:24. Moreover, the Turkish Cypriots are in control of the island's two water springs (Kythrea and Lapithos), a high proportion of the potential of total cultivated land (including the cereal producing Mesaoria Plain, the tobacco growing Karpass Peninsula and the citrus rich Kyrenia district), the largest port on the island (Famagusta) and the potentially major tourist resorts along the coast of Kyrenia and Famagusta. In return for the Turkish Cypriot international recognition and in the light of the Greek Cypriot strong bargaining position post-Helsinki, compromise would include substantial alteration of land allocation ratios. Land reallocation could in general follow the map proposed by the 1992 'Set of Ideas' which reallocates territory on a 29:71 basis and allows boundaries to run across Famagusta and Nicosia up to the southern tip of the Morphou Bay. However, in return for international recognition of a Turkish Cypriot entity in Cyprus, there could be greater territorial concessions to the Greek Cypriots than those suggested by the Ghali map. In particular, it could be argued that territorial readjustments could give Greek Cypriots 73-5% of all territory. The additional 2-4% of territory could come from the Morphou Bay

Land redistribution would resolve automatically a substantial part of the pressing refugee question. Under the Ghali map around 100,000 Greek Cypriots<sup>19</sup> could automatically return to their home land. This figure would be clearly higher under a 27-5:73-5 ratio where additional land would be transferred from the Morphou area formerly densely inhabited by Greek Cypriots. This leaves unsolved the questions of remaining Greek Cypriot displaced people and of old and newly created Turkish Cypriot displaced people. On these questions, some of the proposals of the 'Set of Ideas' could be endorsed. First, there could be a voluntary exchange of property between Greek Cypriot property in the Turkish Cypriot administered zone and Turkish Cypriot property in the Greek Cypriot administered zone. Second, there could be adequate compensation for those who own property in the opposing unit but do not wish to live under the latter. Compensation could take the form of

comparable property and housing in one's own unit. Third, there could be the right of return to Greek Cypriots driven from northern territories where they owned property and vice versa for Turkish Cypriots. However, in cases where former property is occupied by displaced people *including* Anatolian settlers *rooted* in Cyprus, compensation could be provided in the form of housing and property either in the same area or in the area administered by one's own community.

On the question of the militarization, while both parties would be expected to make concessions, Turkish Cypriots could be called to make greater adjustments. Although a final settlement of the problem of militarization may not be stipulated immediately, initial demonstrations of goodwill would be imperative. Both communities could demonstrate their commitment to peace by diminishing their military spending, reducing the presence of Greek and Turkish troops under the supervision of international forces and not allowing new weapons on the island. Given the greater extent of militarization in the north, a settlement could envisage the re-scaling of foreign troops as stated in the 1960 Treaty of Alliance as well as a plan for the longer-term demilitarization of the island monitored by international forces.

On the question of Anatolian settlers, an initial agreement would have to include the Turkish Cypriot commitment repatriate to Turkey a proportion of Anatolian settlers who have not yet taken root in Cyprus. Such a provision would be crucial for a long-lasting peace in Cyprus for three principal reasons. First because settlers alter the demographic structure of the island and thus induce Greek Cypriots' fear and suspicion. Second, Anatolian settlers are closely linked to Turkey and therefore hinder the enhancement of those elements of shared identity which could complement separate communal identities. Third, a partial repatriation of settlers would increase availability of property to be employed for compensation to displaced people.

Finally, on the question of the 'three freedoms,' as proposed by the 'Set of Ideas' an initial settlement could envisage the full liberalization of the freedom of movement for all citizens subject to normal police functions, but continued restrictions on freedoms of settlement and property in the medium term. Freedom of movement appears to be a pressing necessity of everyday life on a small Mediterranean island and should thus be incorporated immediately in an initial settlement. It would also foster social, cultural and economic links between the two communities as well as encourage the phased reduction of inter-communal economic inequalities by allowing migrant Turkish Cypriots to work in the more flourishing southern economy. However, the liberalization of freedoms of settlement and property, while equally desirable in the long term, would prove problematic in the short-run if incorporated in an initial settlement, given the glaring economic disparities between the two communities. Turkish Cypriots would refuse an initial liberalization of these freedoms fearing the total domination of the richer Greek Cypriots over their land. Hence, for the first five to ten years, until material conditions are sufficiently re-balanced it is unrealistic to expect a full liberalization of the freedoms of settlement and property throughout the island of Cyprus.

### 3. Confidence building measures following an agreement

Long-lasting settlement to the 'Cyprus question' can only be attained with the comprehensive 'desecuritisation' of the underlying inter-communal conflict. In order to 'desecuritize' the inter-communal conflict it is crucial to eradicate those conditions of division and disparity causing and exacerbating the 'Cyprus question' and rendering its deep-rooted resolution increasingly difficult. Some measures could be taken prior to an agreement between the conflicting parties. However, more comprehensive action could and should be taken immediately after an initial agreement.

#### a) Building experience of shared governance

First, on the question of separate governance, an initial solution could encourage cooperation and the development of shared norms and values between governing elites by institutionalizing inter-communal dialogue and consultation at the central authority level supported by the mediating role of a High Representative. In addition there should also be important institutional mechanisms to encourage increased joint political participation at lower levels of the political system. The central authority could be responsible for the creation and coordination of joint policy forums between top-level state representatives as well as between lower-level political authorities and between external bodies such as trade unions and other lobbying groups. It is crucial to involve as many sectors of the population as possible in joint workshops and discussion groups on the political resolution of the conflict and the possible areas of shared governance on the island. These micro-level initiatives would allow peoples to understand each other and endorse wider perspectives on the conflict, thus serving both an educational and a political purpose.

#### b) Increasing social and cultural inter-communal relations

Until an agreement is found, inter-communal contact will remain restricted by the green line separating the two peoples. Once this line begins to be severed through an initial settlement and the accompanying freedom of movement, a comprehensive program designing and organizing joint activities and exchanges between sporting, social, cultural and educational institutions should be enacted thus beginning to give life to a shared civil society on the island. Integrated schools should be also established and books, press and media should be carefully screened to eliminate biased perceptions and opinions.

### c) Re-balancing economic disparities

Opening the Republic of Cyprus' labor market would indeed contribute to the reduction of socio-economic inequalities. However, the progressive narrowing of economic inequalities would be greatly facilitated with effective termination of international ostracization of northern Cyprus following an agreement. International trade would allow the potential comparative advantages of northern Cyprus to be fully exploited. Northern Cyprus would benefit substantially from foreign direct investment, which is currently deterred by the political status of the self-declared state and the persisting conflict. Settlement would also increase aid receipts in northern Cyprus, given the Turkish Cypriot administration would begin to administer a proportionate share of overall foreign aid.

### d) Eliminating the Greek-Turkish rivalry

Fourth and final is the overarching Greek-Turkish conflict, which would have to be reduced or eliminated to ensure an ultimate resolution of the Cyprus question. The increased rapprochement between Greece and Turkey since August 1999 is a crucially important development. Beginning with the 'earthquake diplomacy' over the summer of 1999 and developing into nine agreements on cooperation in economic, technological, scientific, environmental, tourism, investment, customs, education and anti-terrorism matters, confidence between the two historical rivals is rapidly building up. Initial cooperation on relatively unproblematic issues should be encouraged in order to avoid the mistakes made in 1988, when the 'Davos spirit' evaporated once the two parties began linking their discussions to their most pressing area of discord, namely Cyprus.<sup>20</sup> Strong international support for such a process and most crucially the development of the adequate framework within which the two countries could gradually come to discuss their disputes would facilitate the enhancement of shared elements of communal identity thus aiding the dissolution of the 'Cyprus question.'

## 4. The role of the EU in promoting peace in Cyprus

The changes necessary to build durable peace in Cyprus are numerous and all-encompassing and require an irrevocable effort and commitment. The task of bringing about a permanent settlement of the Cyprus conflict could be rendered both speedier and less costly if incorporated in the overall framework of the EU.

But what has been the role of the European Union in the 'Cyprus question' so far? Up until the 1990s, the EU's approach to the 'Cyprus question' was one of caution and unequivocal support for the UN resolutions.<sup>21</sup> The situation reversed in the 1990s, when following the Republic of Cyprus application to EU membership the Union was effectively internalized in the con-



flict. The application was accepted in the 1993 Commission Opinion on Cyprus. Cypriot membership would be possible following a resolution of the conflict. The Opinion was followed by technical talks between Cyprus and the Union in order to allow the former to familiarize with the *acquis* and then by a structured accession dialogue between 1995 and 1998. In 1998 the Republic of Cyprus began accession negotiations with the Union as agreed in the 1995 Madrid Summit's 'historic' package deal brokered by the French presidency, which linked Cyprus' accession negotiations to Greece's removal of the veto on the EU-Turkey customs union. So far Cyprus has participated in two rounds of ministerial negotiations which provisionally closed ten chapters of the negotiations. Since the initiation of accession negotiations, the precondition of conflict resolution prior to EU membership has not been discussed. In December 1999 the Helsinki European Council formally abandoned this condition.

What explains the Greek Cypriot application for EU membership in 1990? There are two principal reasons behind the Republic of Cyprus's aim to incorporate the entire island in the European integration project. First, there is a strong economic rationale behind the Republic of Cyprus's application to the Union. EU membership would ensure free access to a large and dynamic market for the small and open economy of Cyprus, a market with whom the Republic of Cyprus already carries out 47% of its total trade.<sup>22</sup> Second, and most important there are political strategic reasons why the Republic of Cyprus would gain from EU membership. The inclusion of Cyprus in the Union with the Republic of Cyprus acting as the spokesman for the country would further discredit the self-proclaimed TRNC and strengthen the Greek Cypriot position in the bargaining process. Furthermore, it would increase the likelihood of a settlement on Greek Cypriot terms by encouraging a liberalization of the freedoms of movement, settlement and property and it would reduce the likelihood of a retention of the treaties of Guarantee and Alliance. The Turkish Cypriots on the other hand strongly reject Cyprus' application to the EU and the evolution of relations between the southern Republic and the Union for three principal reasons. First, they regard the application illegitimate given it was submitted by the Republic of Cyprus on behalf of the whole island, although the Turkish Cypriot population recognizes the TRNC as their legitimate authority. Second, they regard the application illegal because it violates the 1959 Treaty of Guarantee which states that Cyprus would not participate either wholly or in part in any political or economic union with another state, or in any international organizations unless *both* Greece *and* Turkey participated as well.<sup>23</sup> Third, they reject the application given the Union's position vis-à-vis the 'Cyprus question.' The EU's support for UN resolutions implied its non-recognition of the TRNC and its exclusive relations with the Greek Cypriot Republic. This in turn led to the Turkish Cypriot refusal to participate in accession talks, and induced their deeper integration with Turkey. Although the Turkish Cypriot community favors EU accession in the long-run, it holds that accession should only take place following a resolution of the conflict.

Currently therefore the introduction of the EU variable into the complex dynamics of the 'Cyprus question' has merely served to exacerbate the conflict by reducing Greek Cypriot incentives to broker a political settlement, consolidating political, social, cultural and economic inter-communal divisions and inducing the TRNC's closer ties with Turkey. The EU has thus further 'securitised' rather than 'desecuritised' the conflict in the 1990s.<sup>24</sup> Since the Republic of Cyprus initiated accession negotiations in 1998 direct relations between the two community elites have been absent. Nonetheless the Union could ultimately act as one, if not the principal factor facilitating peace on the island. Via which routes could the EU play a constructive role in conflict resolution?

**a) Including Turkish Cypriots in relations with the EU**

The EU's role in the Cyprus conflict can only be constructive if it is balanced. The first imperative is therefore to incorporate the Turkish Cypriots in any relations but especially in accession negotiations between Cyprus and the Union. Given political constraints, this could be possible once an initial agreement is brokered and the Turkish Cypriot administration is recognized as a political equal to the Greek Cypriot administration in accession negotiations and ultimately within the Union. An additional incentive for the Turkish Cypriots is provided by a rapprochement between Turkey and the Union. Although political and economic realities suggest that Cyprus may become an EU member before Turkey, greater ties between the latter country and the Union reversing the post-Luxembourg deadlock, could be conducive to the establishment of relations between the Turkish Cypriots and the EU. Once both communities are incorporated in relations with the EU and are ultimately included as one Union member, a constructive role of the latter could be envisaged.

Concretely, the EU could foster peace in Cyprus in the following ways.

**b) The EU's role facilitating the functioning of an initial agreement**

First, the EU could facilitate the implementation of an initial agreement between the two inter-communal elites by taking some of the pressure off the units. Four problematic areas of the above mentioned solution would be the role of the military, the operation of monetary policy, status of displaced people and the liberalization of the three freedoms of movement, settlement and property.

**i. The EU's role in the defence and security of Cyprus**

On the question of the military, we have already noted that a long-run solution cannot be attained in the short-term while inter-communal divisions

are still wide. However, the EU could both render this interim period smoother and shorter, and ensure the successful attainment of longer-run goals. During the interim period, military forces in Cyprus could be incorporated in the wider European defence arrangement, where a European Rapid Deployment Force could be stationed in the presently British bases of Dhekelia and Akrotiri in order to monitor the activities of Greek, Turkish and Greek and Turkish Cypriot military forces. Clearly both Greece and Turkey would contribute to a European defence initiative in Cyprus despite the latter's non-membership of the EU in the medium term. This is first and foremost necessary to ensure the Turkish Cypriot acceptance of the plan and compliance with the terms of the Treaty of Alliance and Article 3 of the Treaty of Establishment. Moreover, the participation of both Greek and Turkish troops would also provide an additional arena of cooperation between the two historic rivals within an EU structure. In the longer term, European forces could assist the gradual demilitarization of the island, as specified in the initial agreement creating the desirable environment for stability and security in Cyprus.

#### **ii. The EU's role in the monetary policy of Cyprus**

A preferred solution to two distinct monetary policies in Cyprus would be the immediate adoption of the euro and thus ECB determined monetary policy throughout the island prior to EU membership. The Cypriot pound is already pegged to the euro on a 2.25% fluctuation bound since 1999. The Turkish lira could enter a similar arrangement until 2002 when both currencies are replaced by the euro. Financial circles in northern Cyprus have frequently advocated the replacement of the Turkish lira by a stronger currency such as the Cypriot pound, which is often used in estate transactions. But persisting political conflict renders such an economically rational policy unviable. The adoption of the euro in Cyprus could break this impasse by offering both a politically viable and an economically sound alternative inducing the gradual convergence of the two Cypriot economies.

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#### **iii. The EU's role in speeding up the liberalization of the 'three freedoms' and resolving the refugee problem in Cyprus**

If both Greek and Turkish Cypriot authorities participate in accession negotiations and ultimately attain full membership, the Union could provide the adequate framework to resolve the problems of the restricted freedoms of movement, property and settlement and of displaced people on the island. Clearly, until economic disparities are bridged, the full liberalization of the freedoms of settlement and property cannot be attained, and the EU would have to account for the specificity of the Cyprus case in the short and medium term. Nonetheless, if both Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities adopted the Community *acquis* and operated within the EU single market frame-

work, hidden restrictions deriving from diverse communal systems would be more easily overcome accelerating the ultimate attainment of full freedoms of settlement and property.

This, together with Cyprus' incorporation in the EU's third pillar of Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) would also contribute to the resolution of the refugee problem on the island. As mentioned above, one measure undertaken to resolve the refugee question would be to allow the voluntary return of Greek Cypriots to their property in the north and vice versa for Turkish Cypriots with property in the south if these are not occupied by displaced people. The liberalization of the three freedoms under the overarching framework of the EU single market and the incorporation of Cyprus in the JHA pillar would thus aid the rapid implementation of this measure. The EU could also ease the refugee problem by contributing to the refugee compensation fund mentioned above. This would be critical especially in the early days of an agreement when freedoms of property and settlement would remain limited and therefore the persisting psycho-political problem of displaced people could threaten the success of the peace settlement.

#### **c) The EU's role in resolving the underlying inter-communal conflict**

By encouraging the eradication of the underlying conditions fuelling inter-communal division, the EU could enhance elements of shared identity and thus help to desecuritize the conflict. First, participating in supra-national European institutions would add a second dimension to that provided by a central government within which Greek and Turkish Cypriots could learn to cooperate in joint governance. Especially in the light of the EU institutional constraints allowing only one single Cypriot membership, Greek and Turkish Cypriots would have an additional incentives to work together and find common ground. Working together to support the national Cypriot interest within a wider context of European cooperation would increase the scope or common goals between inter-communal elites and accelerate the formation of shared norms and values. This may be particularly true within an enlarged EU, in which broad regional coalitions may form on the basis of shared interests within the European forum.

Second, the EU could encourage and finance numerous social and cultural initiatives through which members of the two communities could enhance their relations and contacts. Under the European Social Fund, EU member states decide whether and how to give priority to their cultural programmes. Such programs are eligible to EU funding either under objective 1<sup>25</sup> or under the new objective 2 in which cultural programs are accepted if they are shown to be a source of employment enabling local and regional development. This implies that programs have to cover one of the following policy fields, namely: active labor market policies to counter unemployment, the promotion of social cohesion, education and training systems to promote employability and the anticipation and facilitation of social change and equal opportunities for men and women. These goals could to a large extent be com-

patible with social and cultural programs, serving to create inter-communal links in Cyprus.

Third the EU could encourage inter-communal economic contact and the reduction of economic disparities. While a resolution to the 'Cyprus question' may not be a precondition to the Republic of Cyprus' EU accession, the EU could include the lifting of the Greek and Greek Cypriot economic blockades on northern Cyprus as a precondition to accession.<sup>26</sup> Hence, economic contact would resume and disparities would begin to even out. Following the EU membership of a 'resolved' Cyprus, inclusion in the EC single market would then imply even closer economic relations between Greek and Turkish Cypriots as well as an acceleration of economic development in the north. Inclusion in a European single market would benefit economically both communities. But in the light of the existing disparities between the regions caused to a large extent by the TRNC's international non-recognition, EU accession is bound to benefit the northern regions in particular and thus contribute to a progressive narrowing of inter-communal economic disparities. In addition to trade, the Turkish Cypriot economy would also gain from proportional shares of EU aid and structural funds following EU accession. As calculated in annex 5, the Turkish Cypriot community would benefit from approximately 500 euro per capita, implying a rise of 12.5% GDP per capita. Finally, the EU could contribute to a reduction of the underlying Greek-Turkish rivalry by integrating Turkey closely in EU affairs. So far the Union has appeared to act as an additional arena in which the Greek-Turkish rivalry could be fought. Since the mid-1980s, Greece has directed its foreign policy vis-à-vis Turkey towards incorporating the disputes between Athens and Ankara within the wider EU framework. Hence, its veto on the 4<sup>th</sup> Financial Protocol to Turkey and on the Turkey-EU customs union until 1994. However, the rapprochement between Greece and Turkey, which began in August 1999, paved the way for Turkey's formal incorporation in the EU enlargement process. Turkey's closer links with the Union could in turn facilitate the ultimate resolution of Greek-Turkish territorial disputes. The Helsinki Council conclusions called for the resolutions of territorial disputes preferably through political settlement, but failing that through recourse to the International Court of Justice. One week before the December 1999 Council, former Turkish President Demirel accepted the possibility of an ICJ adjudication of Greek-Turkish territorial conflicts. Hence, the increased likelihood of Turkey's EU membership could create positive dynamics towards a resolution of Greek-Turkish points of contention. But the EU's role could go well beyond the encouragement of Greek-Turkish territorial settlements. As Turkey gradually approaches the EU family, Greece and Turkey would be able to conduct bilateral affairs within the shared economic, security and civil society structure of the Union. Hence, the progressive elimination of covered and unspoken differences between the two historical rivals and the subsequent encouragement to a unification of the peoples of Cyprus.

#### d) The EU's role in creating a post-modern state in Cyprus

More generally, the EU could contribute to a lasting settlement in Cyprus by remoulding Cyprus as a 'post-modern state.'<sup>27</sup> The transformation of Cyprus from a 'pre-modern' state in which 'state' and 'nation' do not coincide, into a modern state with single independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity as advocated by UN resolutions is an unlikely outcome, which has prevented conflict resolution for over three decades and which is becoming increasingly obsolete as time passes and inter-communal division is further entrenched. However, the international system's language of the modern state has difficulty accepting fuzzier constitutional solutions, which may more adequately capture realities on the ground. For example, in the rigid language of the modern state, the proposal of a 'common state' implies an effective constitutional contradiction. A 'common state' implies a union by treaty. But a voluntary treaty between states, which may not be revoked unilaterally, would limit the external sovereignty of the member states and thus be internally inconsistent.

Yet such a constitutional solution could be possible if incorporated in the regional environment of the EU. As the Belgian and Northern Irish models teach, the EU allows an easing of perennial tensions between different 'nations' within one 'state,' through the transformation of the meaning of statehood itself as well as of key concepts such as sovereignty and territorial integrity. When placed within the economic, monetary, and future security and civil structures of the EU, rigid concepts of indivisible sovereignty and territoriality gradually lose meaning. Hence, with the prospect and subsequent reality of Cyprus' accession to the Union, more complex 'post-modern' constitutional solutions for Cyprus could be foreseen. This could be possible through two inter-related effects.

First, the prospect of Cyprus' full EU membership and thus of the EU's decision-making roles in the economic, monetary, foreign, defence and justice policies of Cyprus, would encourage the two parties' acceptance of a non-hierarchical arrangement within one formally recognized state. Generally one would envisage that Greek Cypriot elites would view favorably the transfer of competences from the units to the European level, while Turkish Cypriot elites would be more willing to devolve power to the supra-national than to the central level.

Second, the transformation of Cyprus into a 'post-modern state' would facilitate the ultimate creation of an optimal constitutional arrangement by reducing the importance of separate sovereignties and systems of governance. Within the all-encompassing European umbrella in which the mutual interference in domestic affairs is the norm and the philosophy of subsidiarity is rapidly developing, the distinctions between confederations, federations and unified states will become increasingly blurred. Secession from a state but not from the Union or reintegration in a unified state with regions retaining not only internal competences but also external roles in an enhanced Europe of the Regions would both become relatively unproblematic.

The prospect of EU membership would thus facilitate the attainment of

an initial non-hierarchical settlement, while the reality of membership would act as a catalyst for the attainment of an optimal solution in which the two peoples of Cyprus peacefully coexist.

### Summary and Conclusions

Many approaches to the 'Cyprus question,' including that of the UN itself, envisage a resolution of the conflict based on a reunification of the island and the close interaction between the communities sharing a same identity and purpose. However, agreeing upon and thereafter operating such a solution after over thirty years of conflict is first of all unfeasible and second it is arguably undesirable. The approach adopted in this study involves an analysis of the conflict from two distinct levels.

First, it is important to recognize that the conflict in Cyprus is not simply one between states, but above all one between peoples. The inter-communal conflict can only be resolved if the underlying conditions fostering it are eradicated. Hence, the need to build experience of shared governance, to increase and deepen inter-communal social, cultural and economic links, to work towards the economic equality of the two communities and to ease the underlying Greek-Turkish rivalry. But many of these conditions can only be removed once an initial settlement between the negotiating parties is brokered. This takes us to the second dimension of the 'Cyprus question': the inter-elite conflict. This study shows that an initial proposed settlement must represent a preferred alternative to the status quo for both parties in order to be viable.

Hence, the suggestion of a non-hierarchical 'common state' arrangement together with territorial readjustments and clauses concerning refugee statuses, military capabilities and the 'three freedoms.' The initial 'common state' solution could first be viable in so far as it could represent a preferred solution for all parties than the current status quo. Second, the solution would be desirable in so far as it provide the bases for important measures to tackle the underlying inter-communal conflict and allow the 'desecuritisation' of the question. The solution would also be sustainable and preferred to the traditional UN approach to the conflict because it would both diminish potential for conflict during the initial stages of the settlement, and represent a fluid arrangement encouraging inter-communal contact and ensuring constitutional adjustments. In other words, a flexible initial solution would imply an inbuilt virtuous circle, as growing experience of living and governing together would be followed by accompanying shifts in institutional and legal arrangements until the most rational constitutional solution would naturally arise. Efforts aimed at eradicating the underlying conditions fostering inter-communal conflict would represent an additional momentum to this ongoing process of settlement evolution, whose natural end point would be the peace and prosperity of the peoples of Cyprus.

The European Union is in a unique position to play an active role in promoting peace in Cyprus. While the UN can at best represent a microcosm of

the international system and as such stresses notions of sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence, the European Union could successfully alter the context of the Cyprus conflict by opening up the framework of the post-nation state order, thus offering new and more complex solutions of power-sharing and division of sovereignties. First, the prospect of EU membership could act as a facilitating factor in the agreement and implementation of an initial solution by endorsing competences in many crucial policy areas. Second, the reality of membership could act as a catalyst for the attainment of an ultimate elimination of the conflict, both by encouraging the elimination of those political, social, cultural and economic conditions of division and by narrowing the substantive differences between formally opposed constitutional arrangements. In this way Cyprus' EU membership and the resolution of the deep-rooted 'Cyprus question' could evolve together, reinforcing each other in a virtuous circle of peace and prosperity.

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### Notes

<sup>1</sup> Many thanks to M. Emerson, C. Heinze, H. Kabaalioglu, A. Larson and A. Theophanous for their useful comments on earlier drafts.

<sup>2</sup> Keen, D. 'A Rational Kind of Madness,' *Oxford Development Studies* Vol 25 no 1 (1997)

<sup>3</sup> International Financial Statistics, (09/1999).

<sup>4</sup> Dodd, C. H. *The Political, Social and Economic Development of Northern Cyprus* (1993)

<sup>5</sup> Over 80% of all tourists in northern Cyprus are Turkish.

<sup>6</sup> In 1994 the ECJ passed a ruling prohibiting the acceptance of goods deriving from Cyprus without accompanying certificates from the authorities of the Republic of Cyprus (Anastasiou case). Hence; the effective EU economic ban on products from the TRNC.

<sup>7</sup> In 1990 budget transfers from Turkey amounted to 12% of the TRNC's GNP. Dodd, C. H. (1993)

<sup>8</sup> Diez, T. *Last Exit to Paradise? The EU, the Cyprus Conflict and the Problematic Catalytic Effect*, COPRI Working Paper 2000

<sup>9</sup> Christou, J. Cyprus Mail, 10 April 2000

<sup>10</sup> Buzan, B. de Wilde, J. and Wæver, O. *Security: A New Framework for Analysis* (1997)

<sup>11</sup> In Stavridis, S., Coulumbis, T., Veremis, T. and Waites, N. (1999).

<sup>12</sup> In January 1999 Greek Cypriot President Clerides decided against the deployment of the Russian S-300 anti-aircraft missiles. The missiles were transferred to Crete.

<sup>13</sup> Dodd, C. (10/1999) argues that in so far as a federation implies majority rule and thus could harm the smaller state within the federal arrangement, the Turkish Cypriots have always called for a confederation in so far as they have always advocated the principle of unanimity.



<sup>14</sup> In the 1989 Greek Cypriot 'Outline Proposals for the Establishment of a Federal Republic and the Solution of the Cyprus Problem' interpreted political equality at the level of the federated states: 'each community will administer a province, which will have equal status vis-à-vis the other province. The two Provincial Governments, will be equal to each other and coordinate with the Federal Government'

<sup>15</sup> for example following the EU's decision to exclude Turkey from ESDI decision-making prior to membership, the publication of the Accession Partnership Document in November 2000 and the neglect of Turkey at the December 2000 Nice Summit.

<sup>16</sup> Clerides, G. *Cyprus: My Deposition* Volume 2 (1989) p.381.

<sup>17</sup> It can be shown that under a federation redistribution aiming to increase Turkish Cypriot GDP by 50% or reduce the difference between Greek and Turkish Cypriot GDP by 20% would amount to 5% and 4% of Greek Cypriot GDP; i.e. \$320m and \$256m respectively. Clearly, these magnitudes would represent a minimal expense for a larger entity such as the EU.

<sup>18</sup> Mango, A. A. *Cyprus and the European Union: the relevant factors* forthcoming

<sup>19</sup> Including a 1% annual population growth since 1974.

<sup>20</sup> Mango, A. forthcoming

<sup>21</sup> European Foreign Affairs Council decision (1974), European Parliament Resolution (1993 and 1995).

<sup>22</sup> Figures for 1994, Dodd, C.H. *The Cyprus Issue: a Current Perspective* (1994)

<sup>23</sup> 'The Greek Cypriot Administration is not entitled in international law to apply to join or join the European Union whilst Turkey is not a member. Greece and the United Kingdom are under obligation to prevent such accession.' Mendelson.M.H. Q.C. *Opinion of Professor M.H. Mendelson Q.C. on the Application of the 'Republic of Cyprus' to join the European Union* (1998)

<sup>24</sup> Diez, T.(2000)

<sup>25</sup> i.e. areas with per capita GDP below 75% of the EU average

<sup>26</sup> This would imply a reversal of the ECJ's ruling on the question.

<sup>27</sup> Cooper, R. *The Post-Modern State and the World Order* (1996)

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# The Underground Economy in the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus: Significance and Consequences

*Mustafa Besim*

It is generally accepted today that not all of the economic activities in a state take place in full view of state or government officials, who would be able, if this were the case, to record them in national accounts, or to tax and regulate them. The magnitude of concealed economic activities, which creates added value, differs between states, depending on their economic structures and patterns of development. The growing literature in this area argues that the quantity and scope of concealed economic activities are increasing around the world as a result of growing tax burdens and over-regulation (Johnson, Kaufmann, and Shleifer, 1997).

This argument implies that the National Income measures such as GDP (or GNP) published by state officials are subject to measurement errors, which fall broadly into two categories: inaccuracies resulting from the inability to take into account the activities generated in the informal sector, and inaccuracies resulting from the inability to assess unrecorded activities stemming from tax evasion and avoidance. The existence of such measurement errors will clearly have important consequences in studies where national incomes are used as explanatory variables; and the information distortion will also have negative effects on a state's long-term development policies and plans. There is therefore a need for an estimation of the measurement errors, with a view to determining the extent and scale of this omitted part of the economy; and as a necessary precondition of such a determination, a standard definition is required of what is to be measured.

This paper begins by attempting to provide a conceptual framework for understanding and analyzing underground economy. The second part reviews the different techniques that have been developed, in the literature, to measure the growth and the size of underground economy. Monetary approaches, found to be more feasible for measuring the size of the underground economy in the case of Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC), are the focus of the third part; and in the fourth, the size of the underground economy in the

TRNC is estimated using monetary techniques. The analysis concludes with a discussion of the significance and main consequences of underground economy in the TRNC.

### I. Defining Underground Economy: A Conceptual Framework

The term “underground economy” means different things to different people—there is still no general agreement on what to call this phenomenon—and the variety of definitions for what is called “underground economy” introduces considerable confusion in the literature: for although it is a widespread phenomenon, its treatment differs conceptually depending on the priorities of the users. From the perspective of an individual discussing public financing or insufficient tax revenues, for example, the concept tends to refer tax evasion and tax revenue losses. Statisticians typically use the term “underground economy” in regard to income factors that have not been included in the national accounts. Those involved in banking and finance use it to describe the quantity of money that is not under control mechanisms, and money-laundering. Individuals dealing with security and protecting people from illegal activities use the same expression to mean drug-pushing, narcotics, weapon trading. And “underground economy” seems to be used, in the literature of this area, more or less interchangeably with a number of other expressions: hidden economy, black economy, subterranean economy, cash, unofficial, informal, dual, unrecorded, parallel, unregistered, moonlight, twilight, grey, shadow, marginal, unobserved, and so on.

More importantly, there is no consensus regarding the exact definition of the phenomenon. Pyle defines it as “economy that refers to all those perfectly legitimate activities, resulting in transactions (either in kind or for payment) between individuals, which are then hidden from the authorities, principally the tax authorities” (Pyle 1989, p. 81); these concealed activities compose the “hidden economy.” According to the definition proposed by Blades, “the hidden economy consists of the production of goods that is quite legal in itself, but one or more parties involved try to conceal from the public authorities, to avoid paying taxes or similar charges, production of illegal goods and service and concealed income in kind”. (Blades 1982, p. 29) Blades’ definition is rather broader than Pyle’s, as it includes illegal production as well. In its broadest sense, “hidden economy” has been defined by Feige (1989) as including those economic activities that go unreported or are unmeasured by the society’s current techniques for monitoring economic activity. This definition extends beyond currently accepted definitions of National Income measures such as GNP or GDP.

Thus it seems that Blades’ 1982 definition includes non-marketed activities such as “household economy” (gardening, DIY and child care) and voluntary work (such as work for charity, political parties, sports clubs, etc.). On the other hand, some scholars have chosen to adopt a narrower definition, which is conventionally accepted within an accounting framework. Tanzi defines the hidden economy as “GDP that, because of underreporting and/or

unreporting, is not measured by official statistics" (Tanzi 1982, p. 70). Britain's Central Statistical Office defines the hidden economy as "the economic activities generating factor incomes which cannot be estimated from the regular statistical sources used to compile the income measure of gross domestic product" (Macafee 1980, p. 81).

Now there are indeed certain forms of economic activity which are excluded from the operational definition of GNP because they are restricted in order for the measurement to be carried out. In the measurement process, there is an idealized objective of some quantity, which one desires to measure; and the difference between the idealized objective and the operational measure constitutes bias. There are also some errors which will occur in the process of conducting the actual measurement; and these will constitute measurement errors. The distinction is presented in Figure 1.

In this representation, the full circle on the left represents the total economic activity: only a portion of the total economic activity is measured and officially registered in the determination of aggregate economic activity. The rest constitutes the "hidden economy," the unobserved part of the economy, which is made up of two parts: Non-Marketed Activities and Underground Economy.

"Non-Marketed activities" involve household production, recreation clubs, sports, DIY and child care. These activities are excluded from GNP and reflect bias (Carter, 1984). The "Underground Economy" is made up of those economic activities which are embraced by current definitions of measurable economic activity but that are not captured by current measurement techniques—such as tax evasion and avoidance, avoiding economic legislation, avoiding regulation bureaucracy, and social security fraud.

There is some debate as to whether illegal activities such as narcotics production and distribution, prostitution, and gambling, should be considered as belonging to underground economy. Smith and Weid-Nebbeling (1986) have separated criminal production from underground economy under the heading "hidden economy." The clarification made by Pyle (1989), as defined above, also argues that the definition of underground economy should not include illegitimate activities such as drug -pushing, prostitution, etc. And the broader definition proposed by Feige (1989) and Britain's Central Statistical Office also includes some illegal activities other than tax evasion.

On the other hand, Tanzi (1982) argues that this omitted part of the economy should be taken into account to the extent that it is taxable income, and that it should be associated with a loss in tax revenue. Tanzi frames his own definition accordingly, arguing that two main factors—taxes and restrictions—create underground economy. This definition will be taken as foundational for the purposes of this paper, where it is assumed that underground economy is created by taxes and restrictions and where, moreover, the focus is on taxable income that is not included in National Accounts.

## II. Methods for Estimating Underground Economy

There are extraordinary problems involved in estimating such a complex phenomenon as the unobserved economy, where participants themselves make a strong effort to conceal their income-producing activity. Economists have developed a variety of ingenious methods of responding to these problems, and so, although it is very difficult to compute the size of the underground economy directly and exactly, the traces which it leaves may be measured and analyzed to some extent.

Some economists have devoted a great deal of attention to trying to measure the size of the underground economy. According to the literature, much of the early work was undertaken in the United States. Cagan, the first to devise a simple currency ratio method, obtained a rough quantitative measure of underground economy in 1956 (Feige, 1989); interest in this field was renewed in later decades by Gutmann (1977), Feige (1979) and Tanzi (1982). In the early 1980s many other economists in the Western world, including some employed by state governments, began to produce estimates of state and national underground economies; and as the number of scholars in this field has increased, the number of different methods used has also increased. The literature shows that economists have attempted to establish their methodologies following one of two broad approaches—the “direct” and the “indirect” (Tanzi and Shome 1993).

### II.1 Direct Approaches

Among the direct methods one can identify the use of the following: national accounts, direct controls, household budget survey, and direct surveys of taxpayers' behavior.

#### II.1.1. National Accounts Method

This method begins by establishing the difference between the tax base reported to the tax authorities and the base estimated by the national accounts office, a difference which, after making due adjustments for deductions and exemptions, gives an indication of unreported income. Once the estimated size of unreported income is at hand, the amount of tax evaded can easily be calculated using a measure of the effective tax rate. Determining the effective tax rate depends on the complexity of the tax system: if the tax system is fully proportional, this unreported income automatically and directly provides an estimate of the unpaid tax; however, if the tax system is progressive—which is usually the case for income taxes—then unreported income should be allocated among the tax brackets. This method can be used for major tax categories such as Individual Income Tax, Corporate Income Tax, and VAT.

### II.1.2. Sampling Method

The second method of estimation, which is also called the "tax compliance measurement method," has been used widely in the United States (Pyle, 1989). In this method, random samples of taxpayers are selected from the data available to taxing authorities and the social security administration. The samples are closely examined for possible tax evasion by the taxpayers chosen. The average tax evasion for the sample is then used to make an inference for the whole population. The unpaid income taxes are called the "gross gap" or "tax gap," and these evasions represent unpaid income taxes on legally earned individual and corporate income.

### II.1.3. Budget Survey (at household level)

This method relies on household budget surveys, which show the relationship between the spending of families and their declared income: a family that earns its declared income and spends much more than that income can be suspected of tax evasion. Many difficulties are encountered in this approach, most notably in figuring out the sources of consumption, as these may take the form of accumulated wealth or borrowing against future income.

### II.1.4. Direct Taxpayer Survey

In this method—which has been used especially by the Nordic countries—a random sample of taxpayers is chosen and they are asked, among other things, to describe their tax reporting behavior (Tanzi, 1982). The method has been criticized on various grounds, ranging from the question of whether individuals remember their past tax behavior accurately, to that of whether an individual would be willing to convey accurate information about activities that may be considered anti-societal, even when he or she is assured anonymity. The latter criticism in particular tends to lend support to the belief that tax evasion is often underestimated by direct taxpayer surveys, even when they guarantee anonymity for taxpayers.

All of these methods based on "direct approaches" are limited, in that they measure tax evasion rather than underground economy. While there is certainly an overlap between the concept of tax evasion and that of underground economy, the two are not equivalent, and the difference becomes clear in the philosophies and methods which are based on "indirect approaches."

## II.2. Indirect Approaches

Indirect methods essentially relate to the qualification of what is called "underground economy." While the details of these methods require extensive elaboration,<sup>1</sup> they are sketched and discussed briefly below in order to provide a context for what follows.

### II.2.1. Expenditure-Income Discrepancy

This method, which is commonly used in the United Kingdom, relies upon discovering discrepancies between expenditure and income, with the assumption that the hidden income will show up as expenditure. In principle, therefore, the difference between the national accounts measured from income flows and national accounts measured from expenditure flows can indicate the size of the underground economy. Macafee (1980) proposed that to the extent that the two sides of the accounts are measured by relatively independent methods, the discrepancy between the expenditure side and the income side of an estimate of national income might be used to estimate the size of underground economy.

### II.2.2. Labor-Market Studies

The basic of the labor-market approach, which was first applied in Italy, has been to try and estimate, by means of survey, the number of workers who are active in the underground economy, and/or the number of hours worked. This is then converted into a monetary figure by multiplying the number of hours worked, by the average productivity of workers in the irregular market (Contini, 1989). Contini argues that the starting point for estimating the size and the growth of the underground labor market is the phenomenon of rapid decline in the labor force participation rate. Any decline in the participation rate should reflect an increase in the number of people involved in underground activities.

### II.2.3. Monetary Approaches

Indirect approaches rely upon discovering the traces which the underground economy leaves in its wake, and the literature shows that the approaches most frequently used to calculate the size of the underground economy are monetary. Monetary approaches base their findings on the money in circulation, because, it is argued, cash is used for most transactions in the underground economy in order to reduce the chances of detection (Pyle, 1989); growing underground activities should therefore manifest themselves in terms of growing demand for cash.

Monetary approaches have been developed in various forms. Feige (1989) mentions that it was Cagan, in 1956, who first suggested that the variation in the ratio of cash to money supply could be due to tax evasion; this approach became popular after Gutman published an article on the subject in 1977 (Gutmann, 1977). Gutmann was followed by Feige (1979) and Tanzi (1980), with each developing different methodologies based on money holding.

#### II.2.4. Soft Modeling

This is an econometric technique with a twist. A structural function is specified where the dependent variable is the size of the underground economy, and explanatory variables are observed items such as tax rates, income, tax attitude, etc. The approach focuses on multiple causes leading to the development of the underground economy as well as the multiple effects of such activity. According to Pyle (1989), Frey and Weck-Hanneman in their 1982, 1983 and 1984 papers predicted that an increase in the burden of taxation and regulation would encourage the development of underground economy, as would a decline in tax morality. The effect of an increase in unemployment is thought to be ambiguous, because while it increases the incentive to work in the underground economy, it simultaneously reduces the demand for such services. Moreover, Frey and Weck-Hanneman argue, the impact of economic development upon underground economy cannot be predicted unambiguously in any case.

As discussed earlier, there is often confusion in the definition of "underground economy." In some cases, people refer to taxes not paid; in other cases, they refer to the alleged underestimation of the national accounts. And very often they do not specify which of these two definitions they have in mind. The confusion is problematic, because in many cases one could have tax evasion with no underestimation of the national accounts; or, alternatively, little or no tax evasion with underestimation of the national accounts. A further problem arises from the fact that the attempt to evade taxes is not the single, isolable cause of an underground economy: corruption, regulations, and various forms of prohibitions are also important contributing factors. However, despite these problems, the underground economy is still often taken as a proxy for tax evasion.

(As we are not in a position to take a sample survey, and the State Planning Organisation (SPO) of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) does not undertake independent expenditure-based and income-based estimates of GNP, the present study has attempted to measure the underground economy of the TRNC by using monetary approaches which focus on the development of stock of currency; it is assumed that most of the concealed activities in the TRNC are conducted on a cash basis.)

### III. Monetary Methods Reviewed

As we remarked earlier (Section II.2.3), the methods most frequently used to estimate the size of the underground economy are those based on monetary indicators, and the use of these methods is based on the assumption that most payments for underground economic activities are cash payments, which are difficult to detect. The concealed activities should be reflected in the monetary aggregates, and in particular, in the amount of currency in circulation. The approaches to measuring these activities have evolved from



Gutmann's "Currency Ratio Method," to Feige's "Transaction Method," to Tanzi's "Econometric (Modified Currency Ratio) Method."

### III.1 The Currency Ratio Method

Gutmann (1977) framed his methodology for estimating the size of what he called the "subterranean economy" in the United States, by assuming that as economies develop, the use of cash declines and use of checking accounts grows. He observed that in 1892 there was \$352 of currency per \$1,000 of demand deposits (0.352 as a ratio), and by 1937-1941, this ratio had declined to \$271 of currency per \$1000 of demand deposits (0.217). However, "with the war came high taxes, rationing and controls. As black markets and tax avoidance mushroomed, currency shot up faster than demand deposits" (Gutmann, 1977, p. 26). By the year 1976, the ratio had risen to 0.344. Gutmann took this rise in the currency-to-demand ratio as a growth in the amount of currency used for the underground economy; and so he simply assumed that there should not be any change in the ratio since the period he considered as benchmark for his method. In other words,

Total Demand Deposits in USA 1976	=	\$226.2 billion
Currency needed for legal activities	=	\$49.1 billion (226.2 * 0.217, assuming that currency-to-demand ratio does not change)
Currency in circulation in 1976	=	\$77.8 billion
Currency being held for illegal activities	=	\$28.7 billion (77.8 - 49.1)

Gutmann further argued that if 226.2 billion dollars of deposits and 49.1 billion dollars of legitimate cash were producing a GNP of \$1693 billion (one dollar producing approximately six dollar of GNP), then—assuming that the income velocities were the same in both economies, legal and underground—\$28.7 billion dollars in currency should produce an underground economy of \$176 billion (which was about 10 percent of the United States' GNP in 1976). This method is open to some criticism. First, it is debatable whether one can assume that there was no underground economy for the years 1937 and 1941. Pyle (1989) has argued that there was a great deal of underworld activity in the United States during the period leading up to the Second World War; and if this is the case, Gutmann has underestimated or miscalculated the growth of underground economy. Another weakness of the method is that it does not take into consideration at all the fact that the currency ratio can be influenced or changed by other factors like interest, inflation, and real GDP. A rise in interest rates would mean a rise in the opportunity cost of money, which logically forces individuals to shift, from currency holding or demand deposits, towards time deposits where they could be earning interest for their money. It seems that this currency ratio needs to be taken under control in a better way. Gutmann also did not take into account the use of US currency outside the

country; an indeterminable amount of dollars could have been used by foreigners abroad, and not by citizens of the United States in a domestic context (Feige, 1994).

### III.2. The Transaction Method

Feige proposed an alternative approach in 1979 for estimating the volume of unobserved monetary transactions and total monetary unrecorded income (Feige, 1989). Feige was particularly doubtful of the validity of one of Gutmann's assumptions—the assumption that underground activities use currency as their sole medium of exchange— and so he developed a model called the “transaction method,” that would allow bank deposits to be used in the unrecorded transactions. The conceptual basis for this “transaction method” is rooted in Irving Fisher's equation of quantity theory money:

$$M V = P T \quad (1)$$

where  $M$  = money (currency and checks);  
 $V$  = transaction velocity of income;  
 $P$  = average price level for all goods exchanged; and  
 $T$  = index of the physical volume of all transactions.

This theory really specifies the equality between the total volume of payments ( $MV$ ) and the total volume of transactions ( $PT$ ). Feige tried to use this Fischer payment-transaction identity to check on the recorded volume of transactions. In this way, he believed, in the absence of estimates of the total volume of (recorded and unrecorded) transactions ( $PT$ ), one can obtain estimates of the total volume of payments ( $MV$ ), which can in turn be used to estimate the volume of the unrecorded income:

i.e. if	$(PY)^*$ = total income	$C$ = currency
	$(PY)_r$ = recorded income	$V_c$ = currency velocity
	$(PY)_u$ = unrecorded income	$D$ = demand deposits
		$V_d$ = demand deposit velocity
		$PT$ = total transactions,

then

$$(PY)^* = (PY)_r + (PY)_u \quad (2)$$

and

$$C V_c + D V_d = PT \quad (3)$$

If total transactions are assumed to be proportional to total income, then the equation of exchange implies that

$$(PT)/(PY)^* = k^* = (CV_c + DV_d)/(PY)^* \quad (4)$$

and

$$(PY)_u = [(CV_c + DV_d) / k^*] - (PY)_r = (PY)^* - (PY)_r \quad (5)$$

By substitution of the estimates of total payments and recorded income, it is possible to obtain estimates of unrecorded income, given the benchmark parameter  $k^*$ . The benchmark parameter ( $k^*$ ) can be obtained either by assuming that there exist some periods during which all incomes are properly recorded, or from an independent estimate of the proportion of total income that is unrecorded in any given year. In other words, if one can identify a period in which the black economy did not exist, then a benchmark total transactions/income ratio can be established. Dividing this ratio into observed total transactions for any later year gives an estimate of the income level generated by the official and underground economies in that year. Then, if there is to be any change in the ratio which may be attributed to a change in the size of the black economy, subtracting measured income from this total will give the estimate of underground economy.

As stated in Equation (5) above, the transition method needs a period (benchmark) where it is assumed that an underground economy does not exist. In Feige's analysis within the context of the United States, "[t]he benchmark is taken to be 1939. It is assumed that in 1939 the ratio of net transactions to private sector recorded monetary income equalled  $k^*$ " (Feige, 1989, p.48). Operating under these assumptions, Feige calculated the total value of transactions in 1939 as \$934.9 billion with a measured GNP of \$90.8 billion, which gives a transaction ratio of 10.29. Estimating the value of transactions in 1976 as \$19,899.4 billion, he then divided this total by the ratio obtained in 1939 (19,899/10.29) and obtained a figure of \$1932 billion. Comparing this estimated GNP of \$1932 billion with the (officially) measured GNP of \$1706.5 billion, gives a difference of \$225.5 billion dollars (13 percent of GNP), which is Feige's estimation of the size of the underground economy for 1976. These findings showed that the size of the underground economy was much larger than calculated by Gutmann and Tanzi (Thomas, 1992).

Feige argues that with this transaction method, most of the problematic assumptions of the currency ratio method are avoided. The currency ratio method relies upon the changes in the relative stock of currency to indicate the growth of underground economy; whereas the transaction method focuses on the total volume of payments that are not recorded in the official statistics, meaning that they are underground activities (Feige, 1989). Feige's method, he claims, avoids the basic assumption of the currency ratio method—that currency is the sole medium of cash transactions—and he argues that payments made by check for underground activities are also taken into account.

There are, however, several weaknesses in Feige's method. Many researchers have criticized his assumption that there were no underground activities in 1939, the year taken as the benchmark.<sup>2</sup> According to Molefsky

(1982), an even more serious objection arises when time-series estimates are calculated; in particular, before the year 1969, when the computations show that the underground economic value is negative. Feige's estimates are quite sensitive to assumptions about the length of life of currency, and to changes in some of these factors his assumptions seem unable to account for; it also seems that Feige himself believes that his results are questionable on various grounds (Derdiyok, 1991).

### III. 3. The Econometric Method (Modified Currency Ratio)

Tanzi has attempted to derive a more firmly based estimate of the underground economy by making the demand for currency explicitly a function of several variables such as tax, income, interest rate, etc (Tanzi, 1982). Believing that there is a need to control for the various influences on the demand of currency, Tanzi has created various econometric models for measuring underground economy.

According to Tanzi, Cagan clarified the factors that affect the ratio of currency, as follows: (1) the opportunity cost of holding money; (2) expected real income per capita; (3) volume of retail trade; (4) volume of travel per capita; (5) degree of urbanization; (6) the level of income tax.

Cagan tried to link the sixth factor, "level of income tax," to the currency ratio and to the extent of tax evasion. Arguing that "people would be involved in large amounts of evasion by making transactions and not reporting them to the tax authorities if the tax rate is high enough to create sufficient incentive" (Pyle, 1989, p. 19, quoting Cagan, 1958, p. 312), Cagan did a time-series regression analysis for the years 1919-1955, where the ratio <sup>3</sup> of currency (C) to M2 was dependent on the following:

- 1) Interest paid on time, and until the Depression years (1929-1933), on demand deposits;
- 2) Expected or permanent per capita real income;
- 3) The ratio of personal income taxes to personal income.

The conclusion of the analysis was that "[t]he findings of regression analysis were statistically significant and had their expected signs" (ibid, p. 312).

Tanzi (1983) attempted to measure the relationship between tax evasion and currency using the same principles as Cagan. He defined the currency ratio (C/M2) to be a function of:

W = share of wages and salaries in personal income;

R = interest rate on time deposits;

Y = real per capita income from national accounts (measured or permanent income);

T = the tax rate.

Or,

$$(C/M2)_t = \alpha_0 + \alpha_1 T_t + \alpha_2 W_t + \alpha_3 Y_t + \alpha_4 R_t + u_t \quad (6)$$

where  $t$  refers to the specific year, and  $u$  is the error term (Tanzi, 1982).

Tanzi defined the per capita income to refer to all developments such as the introduction and increase use of credit cards, the volume of travel per capita, the degree of urbanization, and the spreading of commercial banks throughout the country. It was hypothesized that increases in real per capita income would bring a decrease in the currency ratio. It was also argued that salaried people would be paid by check, while workers in construction, agriculture and mining would usually be paid in cash. Because Tanzi was not in a position to break down the compensation of employees with regard to wages and salaries, he used the total wages and salaries in personal income. He hypothesized a positive relation between this ratio and currency ratio. With regard to projecting the tax rate, Tanzi used three different measures:<sup>4</sup>

- 1) The ratio of personal taxes to personal income net of transfers;
- 2) The top-bracket statutory tax rate;
- 3) The weighted average tax rate on interest income.

Tanzi used log-linear for the regression equation, estimated for the periods 1929-76. The findings show that the model established was capable of explaining most of the variables. The adjusted  $R^2$  was 0.968, clearly explaining most of the variance:

$$\ln C/M2 = -5.3751 + 0.3395 \ln T - 0.2181 R + 1.7059 \ln W - 0.0849 \ln Y \quad (7)$$

(4.54)      (8.31)      (6.98)      (6.01)      (1.31)

$$\text{Adjusted } R^2 = 0.968$$

And with lagged variable,

$$\ln C/M2 = -5.2163 + 0.2618 \ln T - 0.1715 \ln R + 1.5989 \ln W - 0.0955 \ln Y + 0.2042 \ln (C/M2)_{-1} \quad (8)$$

(5.13)      (6.62)      (5.39)      (6.53)      (1.64)      (2.98)

$$\text{Adjusted } R^2 = 0.971$$

These estimations were calculated by applying different tax rates (as explained above). Tanzi found most significant the cash with weighted average tax rate on interest income. Most of the variables have their expected signs in the equations. The variable indicating composition of income,  $W$ , has a positive sign, meaning that larger share of wages and salaries in national income brings about a greater relative use of currency. At the same time, the rate of interest variable  $R$  has a negative sign, indicating that as the opportunity cost of money increases, use of it decreases. However, income ( $Y$ ) does not have the expected sign. Tanzi explains: "since by 1929 the United States was already a highly developed country, this particular result might simply indicate that all development-induced shift between  $C$  and  $M2$  had already

occurred before 1929, so that no further change should have been expected from this factor" (ibid., p.81).

Tanzi followed Gutmann's underlying principle, of estimating the amount of money presumed to be used for illegal activities; and then multiplying that amount by the ratio of measured GNP to legal money, to estimate underground economy. So, by using the regression equation (7), and substituting the values, given the amount of M2 in 1976, a predicted currency ( $C'$ ) can be obtained. Similarly, Equation (8) can be used to estimate currency ( $C''$ ). Tanzi's estimated currency ( $C'$ ) with Equation (7) was \$77.3 billion, and with Equation (8) was \$78.0 billion for 1976; he then used both equations, (7) and (8), to estimate what the level of  $C$  would be if:

- 1) The tax rate took its lowest value over the period 1929-1976 ( $C''$ );
- 2) The tax rates were zero ( $C'''$ ).

Tanzi argued that the difference between the predicted currency at the 1976 tax level and predicted currency with lowest tax over the period indicated how much extra currency was being injected into underground economy, because the 1976 taxation level was higher than the lowest rates that had been operating during the period 1929-1976. At the same time, the difference between the predicted currency at the 1976 tax level and predicted currency with zero tax determined how much currency was being used in the underground economy as a result of having the 1976 level of taxation rather than having no income taxes at all.

In this way, Tanzi was able to separate legal and illegal money. Assuming that "the relationship between tax-induced currency holding and underground economy is the same as legal money holdings used for transactions (including currency and demand deposits) and legal and measured GNP, one can multiply illegal money by the income velocity of legal money to obtain an estimate of the underground economy" (ibid., p.86).

Applying the same income velocity to estimated currency, Tanzi estimated the size of underground economy in the United States in 1976 at 5.1 percent of GNP with lowest taxes, and 11.7 percent of GNP with zero taxes. According to his estimates, rises in taxes caused the underground economy to grow to between 3.4 per cent and 5.1 per cent of GNP, and tax evasion to increase from \$4.5 billion to \$6.7 billion. The estimations with zero tax rates indicate that the existence of taxes generated a total underground economy of between 8.1 per cent and 11.7 percent of GNP, and a tax evasion of between \$10.6 billion and \$15.4 billion.

Tanzi's approach avoids some problems posed by Gutmann's; and it has become popular around the world.<sup>5</sup> Using demand and time deposits in the denominator, for example, overcomes the problem of switching from demand to time deposits. More importantly, Tanzi takes into account the factors that have an influence on currency ratio, such as interest rates, income, wages and salaries, etc.

However, there remain problems with this method, which continues to rely on some of Gutmann's assumptions—in particular, the assumptions that

all underground economic transactions are paid in cash, and that the income velocity of circulation is identical in the formal and the underground economy. In this context, Pyle has argued that focusing on tax rate alone for determining the size of underground economy is not sufficient: "Degree of involvement can also be affected by penalty rates, probability of detection amount of government regulations and so on" (Pyle, 1989, p. 24).

#### **IV. Monetary Estimates of Underground Economy in the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC)**

##### **IV.1. The Currency Ratio Method**

In the currency ratio method, the changing relation between currency and demand deposits is used to estimate the size of underground economy. However, when the currency ratio (currency divided by demand deposits) is considered for the case of the TRNC, it does not seem to be very significant. As can be seen from Figure 2, the ratio values are quite large. Only up to the year 1983 is the amount of currency less than the total amount of demand deposits. For example, in 1977, there was 400 million Turkish Lira (TL) in currency and 794 million TL in demand deposits.<sup>6</sup> In other words, for every 1 billion of demand deposits, there was 503 million of currency.

But after 1983, the amount of currency in circulation is greater than the total of demand deposits. Specifically, in the years between 1986 and 1994, the amount of currency in circulation was more than twice the demand deposits. In 1991, the amount of currency in circulation was 547 billion TL, whereas the total of demand deposits was only 123 billion TL. An explanation could be that Turkish Cypriots for the period considered, did not prefer and did not use demand deposits much, but instead used cash and time deposits. The amount of cash is found to be very high compared with the level of demand deposits. The ratio is greater than 1 after 1983 and never decreases below 1 for the rest of the time period.

This was not quite the case for Gutmann, however: in the context of the United States, as in most cases, the level of demand deposits was higher than that of currency in circulation (Gutmann, 1977). It would seem that the methodology used by Gutmann does not produce the most useful possible results when applied to the case of the TRNC. Nevertheless, if we compare the currency in circulation with total deposits (Figure 3), it seems possible to make a preliminary analysis.

The ratio of currency to total deposits started to grow from 1978 until 1986, when it reached a peak and then started to decline. It is very difficult to choose a base year for applying Gutmann's approach to the TRNC case. Gutmann assumes the benchmark should be the year where the currency ratio is at its lowest level, arguing that there is no underground economy in the benchmark year. For the case of the TRNC, this would be 1977, where the ratio (currency divided by total deposits) is at its lowest, equivalent to 0.223. This ratio can be accepted as "normal," but it is questionable whether one can

say without qualification that there was no underground economy in that year. In the case of the TRNC, the years before 1980 were those immediately following the Turkish Peace Operation of 1974; Turkish Cypriots were moved to the north of the island, state offices with public administration were not yet well established, and the control in tax administration was low. It can also be argued that as the administrative system came to be established, it became more complex, leading people to conceal their economic activities in order to save tax or to avoid administrative complications.

These qualifications aside, and assuming 1977 as the benchmark (base) year, the actual level of total deposits for the years 1977 to 1997 has been multiplied by the benchmark cash ratio (0.223) to give an estimated level of the currency holdings that would have been required for normal transaction purposes. The difference between the computed level of currency and the actual level in the hands of the public is taken as a measure of currency in circulation for the underground economy. In this way, the underground economy has been estimated and compared with the total production of the economy, Gross National Product (GNP). The results indicate that the size of the underground economy, expressed as a percentage of GNP, was **42.8 %** in 1980, **68.7 %** in 1985, **62.9 %** in 1990 and **51.9 %** in 1997. By this method, the underground economy has been estimated to be **49.8 %** on the average for the period, 1977-1997.<sup>7</sup>

#### IV.2. The Transaction Method

The transaction method developed by Feige is based on estimating the volume of unobserved transactions. In order to apply this method in the TRNC, it would be necessary to know the value of total transactions supported by currency and demand deposits. In addition, the benchmark year GNP has to be chosen to determine the ratio of total transactions to GNP that is used as the reference point for later years. Because of the lack of availability of sufficient data on currency transactions, Feige's method has not been applied in this paper for the case of the TRNC.

#### IV.3. The Econometric Method (Modified Currency Ratio)

Applying this method for the TRNC, we specified a relation between the ratio<sup>8</sup> of currency (C) to M2 and explanatory variables such as the following:

- 1) Aggregate taxes as percentage of GNP (T);<sup>9</sup>
- 2) Public sector wages and salaries as a percentage of public sector expenditure (PWS/PEXP);<sup>10</sup>
- 3) Interest rates on time deposits (R);<sup>11</sup>
- 4) Real per capita GNP expressed in 1977 prices (Y); and
- 5) Inflation rates measured by the changes in retail price indexes (E).



Inflation has also been used as an explanatory variable in the special case of the TRNC, because it is a determining factor in the demand for the Turkish Lira (TL), and the rate of inflation has been quite high (see Figure 4).

In general, the quantity of nominal money demanded is proportional to the price level. That is, if the price level increases by 10%, people will want to hold 10% more nominal money than before. So the higher the price level, the more demand there will be for money (Parkins, 1999). But if the interest rates on time deposits were higher than the prevailing inflation rate, people would be encouraged to hold their money in time deposits. At the same time, with a high inflation rate, the real return on bank deposits may fall, and other forms of asset holding, such as real estate, automotive investments, etc., would be more attractive. An analysis of Figure 4 clearly shows that for the most part, the rate of inflation has been higher than the rate of interest. It seems more reasonable to expect that the sign of (**E**) will be positive with respect to the C/M2 ratio. It is also expected that the sign of (**R**) will be negative, indicating that as the opportunity cost of money increases, use of it decreases.

In the American context, Tanzi (1982) used per capita income as a proxy for developments such as the introduction and increasing use of credit cards, volume of travel per capita, degree of urbanization, and the spreading of branches of commercial banks throughout the country, arguing that increases in per capita income would bring about a decrease in the currency ratio of the United States.

In the case of the TRNC, these developments have not occurred, except for the spread of commercial banks though the country. This means that expected sign of (**Y**) would be positive. On the other hand, the sign of (**PWS/PEXP**) is expected to be negative, because unlike in Tanzi's case, all the wages and salaries for people working in the public sector are paid by check and not by cash. Since the intention is to determine the order of magnitude of tax- and regulations-induced currency holding, it is expected that the sign of (**T**) will be positive. It is assumed that the extent of tax evasion is directly related to some measure of tax rate (**T**), and the greater the scale of tax evasion the greater the demand for currency.

In the empirical analysis the model can be specified as:

$$\text{LogC/M2} = a_0 + a_1 \log T_t + a_2 \log R_t + a_3 \log (\text{PWS/PEXP})_t + a_4 \log E_t + a_5 \log Y_t + e_t \quad (9)$$

where **t** refers to the specific year and **e** is an error term.

Based on data from the period 1977-1997,<sup>12</sup> the following results were obtained from a regression analysis:

$$\text{LogC/M2} = -0.6591 + 0.5931\text{logT} - 0.7016\text{logR} - 0.9523\text{log(PWS/PEXP)} + 0.2587\text{logE} +$$

(0.1021)    (1.014)            (2.018)            (1.387)            (1.216)

$$0.8216\text{logY} - 0.4137\text{DR} - 0.1402\text{DE} \quad (10)$$

(0.552)            (3.17)            (0.9543)

$$\text{DW} = 1.416 \quad \text{R}^2 = 0.598$$

where **DR** = dummy variable for interest rates on time deposits;  
**DR** = 1 for 1977-1983, as interest rates were fixed to 7% which is quite low compared with other years;  
**DE** = dummy variable for inflation rate;  
**DE** = 1 for only 1994 in which inflation rate was 215% (very high compared with other years) and, the **t-ratios** are in parentheses.

One must first of all obtain an estimate of the amount of currency which is used for underground activities. Using the equation introduced, the currency holding for underground economy transactions was estimated by assuming that either (a) the tax variable takes a value of **8.00** which is its lowest value over the period **1977-1997**; or (b) The tax variable takes a value of zero. These figures were then multiplied with the income velocity of money (following Tanzi, 1982).

The regression model performed fairly well, with 0.598 adjusted  $R^2$ . Since the Durbin Watson is 1.416, it indicates that variables do not have any problems of serial correlation and multicollinearity. All signs are as expected, and most of the estimates are statistically significant. For instance, the estimate for (**R**) is statistically significant at a 5% level while the estimates for (**T**), (**PWS/PEXP**), and (**E**) are significant at the 10% level. The estimate for (**Y**), however, is non-significant. The results obtained from the equation look fairly reasonable. The tax variable is significant at the 10% level, and it has the right sign, which indicates that an increase in the tax rate would bring a greater use of currency as a result of an evasion effect.

By applying Tanzi's (1983) procedure, the estimates of underground economy are derived as follows:

- i) For each year, the predicted level of currency ratio **C/M2** is calculated by using the regression equation given above;
- ii) Given the actual figures of the **M2** for each year, the predicted level of currency holdings **C'** is calculated;
- iii) The equation is solved in the same way, assuming that the tax variable is either at its lowest level or zero while the coefficients of other variables remain unchanged. The calculated value of currency with lowest tax rate is defined as **C''** and the calculated value of currency with zero tax rate is defined as **C'''**.

- iv) The difference between  $C'$  and  $C''$  and between  $C'$  and  $C'''$  will provide an estimate of how much money is tax-induced. This will also represent the currency used for underground activities.
- v) By multiplying the currency used for underground activities by the velocity of legal money ( $V$ ), the size of the underground economy is estimated annually.

The yearly estimates of the underground economy are represented for the TRNC in Table 1.

Table 1: Underground Economy Estimated with the Lowest and Zero Tax Rate

YEARS	Lowest Tax Rate		Zero Tax Rate	
	Million TL	%OF GNP	Million TL	%OF GNP
1977	447	11.73	2,094	54.95
1978	725	13.72	3,046	57.68
1979	829	9.74	5,894	69.30
1980	0	0	7,193	41.00
1981	733	2.98	10,047	40.96
1982	3,463	10.14	18,665	54.65
1983	11,692	24.85	31,832	67.67
1984	22,829	30.87	62,564	84.61
1985	32,324	25.47	90,578	71.39
1986	44,672	22.89	131,213	67.23
1987	78,034	26.89	178,781	61.83
1988	119,181	24.53	248,005	51.04
1989	271,387	29.82	585,690	64.35
1990	583,264	37.68	1,100,471	71.09
1991	636,112	27.98	1,317,350	57.93
1992	1,182,271	29.28	2,547,368	63.08
1993	2,801,001	40.35	5,562,827	80.14
1994	3,613,769	21.79	7,474,418	47.07
1995	9,698,185	28.37	21,254,438	62.18
1996	17,592,079	27.67	38,106,478	59.93
1997	42,878,484	36.26	71,375,364	45.07

This study followed two alternative and conceptually different paths. To measure the size of the underground economy brought about by the increases in aggregate taxes (tax burden) over 1977-1997 period, the study used the lowest tax burden to calculate the underground activities that were induced by the increases in tax burden between 1977-1997. Table 1 (columns 2 and 3) indicates that underground economy varied between **2.98** and **40.3** percent of GNP. On the average the underground economy has been **23** percent of GNP.

Figure 5 also shows that there is an upward trend for underground economic activities up to the beginning of the 1990s, then a sharp decrease in 1994, after which there is a growing trend again. As was indicated earlier, there is a positive relation between the tax rates and use of currency which Figure 5 explains. The tax aggregates (burdens)<sup>13</sup> are directly related to the size of the underground economy. These results seem to prove that higher tax burdens have led to higher level of underground activities.

If it is assumed that the average tax liability for underground incomes is the same as legal incomes, one could calculate the tax evasion for a specific year as well. Thus, for example, in 1997, the last year of the period, the calculated amount for underground activities is 42,878,484 million TL. If the average tax (21% of GNP) is applied to this income, the amount of tax evasion would be 9,004,481 million TL. This evasion would have been able to pay 57 percent of the budget deficit, which was 15,775,772 million TL (SPO, 1998,p.8).

**Table 1** also shows the estimates of the underground economy, which is entirely dependent on each year's tax rate. In this case, the total underground economy caused by the tax burden is calculated. If a one percent rise in the tax rates means a higher burden to tax payers, and higher tax rates induce underground activities, what will the level of underground economy be when the tax rate is **zero**? (Tanzi, 1982). This alternative approach does not concentrate on changes over time, but attempts a measure of the total underground economy with the level of taxation for each year. As can be seen in Table 1 (columns 4 and 5), this approach gives a higher estimated value of underground economy, and here the underground economy lies between **40.9** percent of GNP (lowest) and **84.6** percent of GNP (highest) during the period 1977-1997. On the average, the underground economy with zero tax rates has been **61.2** percent of GNP between 1977 and 1997.

As discussed in Section II, the expression "underground economy" signifies different concepts depending on the priority of the user. It is therefore important to make the clarification that with regard to the methodology used in this study, these measured activities are the economic activities which have not been taxed at all, or the activities that have not been taxed properly.

In short, the estimates of underground economy in this study do not reflect incomes excluded from the national income accounts. According to the literature, there are three main approaches to measuring the national income of a country: income, expenditure, and production (value added) approaches (Parkins, 1998). The State Planning Organization (SPO) of the TRNC uses the production (value added) approach; the SPO estimates the national income of the country from the input-output tables, by summing up the creat-

ed value added by each sector (SPO, 1998). So it would be wrong to argue that the estimated underground economic activities should be added on to national income measures.

These estimates show us that the fiscal policies implemented by the state have not been very efficient or effective enough.

Throughout the period considered, the size of the underground economy has been at high levels. As Figure 6 illustrates, between the years 1983 and 1997, the size of the underground economy has been over 50% of GNP. This bulk of economy that is not being taxed and regulated should create considerable problems. The results show that the significance of the underground economy is so large that it cannot be ignored. If the calculated size of the underground economy is compared with that in OECD countries where the same methods also have been used, at 1997 values (Figure 7), it can easily be seen that the TRNC's figure is very high compared with that of OECD countries.

If approximately 50% of the economy is not under the control of the state, this suggests that fiscal and financial policies cannot be as effective as might be expected. This bulk of economy needs to be taken under control by a reorganization of fiscal policies in a more effective and efficient way. And, more importantly, the large scale of the underground economy, which is not taxed and regulated, has consequences for the economy in general.

## V. Conclusions: Remarks on the Consequences of Underground Economy in the TRNC

The lack of consensus in the literature on a conceptual framework for "underground economy" draws attention to the need for a standard definition of the phenomenon, so that scholars will know exactly what they are measuring. Most of the work in this field has concentrated on determining the size of the income or economic activities that are not registered, taxed and regulated. So the purpose of estimation should be to determine the extent to which the measured activities can be taxed and regulated; accordingly, attention should not be focused on activities that are non-marketed, such as growing one's own vegetables, DIY home repairs, voluntary work for charities, and so on.

Because of the limitation of approaches in determining the methodology for estimating underground economy in the special case of the TRNC—i.e. as it was not possible to test and apply direct approaches; and since neither a means of survey for the labor market nor sufficient data was available for the use of an indirect Expenditure-Income Discrepancy approach—this study attempted to measure the underground economy of the TRNC in terms of monetary approaches. Two methods were used: those of Gutmann and Tanzi. Since the currency-to-demand deposits ratio does not give a significant relation, the ratio of currency to total deposits was used (Gutmann's method). Even though the results found in the case of the TRNC using Gutmann's approach are similar to those found using Tanzi's approach, the former does not have an economic theory underlying it which would provide reasons for

why there is an underground economy. It does not take into account—as Tanzi's method does—the factors that influence currency and deposits such as interest, income, etc. Besides, in applying Gutmann's method to the case of the TRNC, it is not easy to find a benchmark year during which it can be argued that no underground economic activities exist at all. Despite these drawbacks, this study took 1977 as the benchmark year where the currency to deposits were at their lowest levels, and estimated the underground economy to be 42.8 percent, 68.7 percent, 62.9 percent and 51.9 percent of GNP in 1980, 1985, 1990, and 1997 respectively.

The econometric method (Tanzi) was found to be significant for the case of the TRNC. Results were obtained by applying two different approaches. Firstly, measuring the size of the underground economy produced by increases in aggregate taxes (by applying lowest taxes), the underground economy was found to vary between 2.98 and 40.3 percent of GNP during the period 1977-1997; on the average, the underground economy is estimated to have been 23 percent for this period. Secondly, by applying the zero tax rate, the underground economy caused by the entire taxing system was calculated, with the results indicating that the underground economy varied between 40.9 per cent and 84.6 percent of GNP during this period; on the average, the underground economy constituted 61.2 percent of GNP for the period 1977-1997. The crucial finding here is the fact that developments in the underground economy are exactly the same as the developments in tax burdens; and specifically, in recent years, that the increase in size of the underground economy in the TRNC can be explained in terms of the rise in the burden of tax.

One obvious consequence of the existence of the underground economy is tax-revenue losses. The large size of the underground economy means less tax collection by the government; and the tax revenue losses cause budget deficits, or lead to larger budget deficits. In the case of the TRNC, the estimated value for the underground economy at the lowest tax rate in 1997 was 71 trillion Turkish Lira (TL), which is about 45% of the GNP. If these activities were taxed at the average rate of income tax in that year (21%), they would have contributed approximately 14.9 trillion TL in extra funds to the budget. This would have amounted to about 94.5% of the budget deficit in that year.

As the size of the underground economy has been so high for the other years, it is clear that the extent of the tax revenue losses has had serious consequences for the state. The inability of the state to collect taxes has increased the need for public borrowing; and the borrowing of the state has tended to decrease the sources available to be used by the private sector. In a situation such as this, in other words, the private sector will tend to be "crowded out." The tax revenue losses due to the underground economy have also affected the construction of the infrastructure of the country, which is crucial for economic and social development.

At the same time, as a consequence of economic and social developments in the TRNC, there is a serious problem with clandestine employment. The individuals who make up this unregistered labor force are most migrants

from Turkey, who do not pay their social security premiums and other needed fees to the state—with the result that the social security financial structure has become corrupt. There are also people who have taken advantage of early retirement opportunities, and claim that they are not working when in fact they are. These factors have also contributed to the increase in the underground economy.

On a large scale, underground economy makes the state's task of running the economy more difficult; the existence of an unobserved economy makes it impossible for the state to properly determine the structure of the economy and identify its problems, because information on macro-economic measurements such as national income, unemployment, and inflation, is distorted. Policies made on the basis of distorted information will clearly produce unexpected results, or deviations from the policy targets.

Another serious consequence of the underground economy is that it is affecting the competitive market conditions. A legitimate, registered business, which is not involved in any underground activity such as tax evasion or employing unregistered labor, has a higher cost of production than a business which is evading tax or employing unregistered labor. The existence of a large-scale underground economy leaves legitimate businesses at a disadvantage if they are competing with businesses involved in underground activity in the same market. As a result, legitimate businesses are being forced to leave the sector or become involved in underground economic activities.

The labor market is also being affected by the underground economy. The presence of clandestine and unregistered labor is both creating an unjust, involuntary unemployment of registered labor in the country, and adding to the demographic problems of the island.

The preliminary results of this study indicate, on a macro-level, that the underground economy is significant in the TRNC, and that it exists on such a scale that it cannot be ignored. Its consequences—such as tax revenue losses, the crowding-out effect, corruption of the social security system, unjust competition in markets, and the creation of involuntary unemployment—are serious problems that need to be recognized and addressed by policy makers. A first step in this direction would be further research, aimed at developing a comprehensive theoretical and empirical approach to search for answers to fundamental questions—in particular, to identify who is involved in the underground economy in the TRNC, and for what reasons.





Figure 1




Figure 2



Source: TRNC Prime Ministry (1998), TRNC Central Bank (1998), Galip (1994).

Figure 3


The Ratio of Currency to Total Deposits



Source: TRNC Prime Ministry (1998), TRNC Central Bank (1998), Galip (1994).

Figure 4

Inflation Rates and Interest Rates Over The Period 1977 - 1997



Source: TRNC Prime Ministry (1998, p. 68), and TRNC Central Bank (1998).

Table 1

## Underground Economy Estimated with the Lowest and Zero Tax Rate

## Lowest Tax Rate

## Zero Tax Rate

YEARS	Million TL	%OF GNP	Million TL	%OF GNP
1977	447	11.73	2,094	54.95
1978	725	13.72	3,046	57.68
1979	829	9.74	5,894	69.30
1980	0	0	7,193	41.00
1981	733	2.98	10,047	40.96
1982	3,463	10.14	18,665	54.65
1983	11,692	24.85	31,832	67.67
1984	22,829	30.87	62,564	84.61
1985	32,324	25.47	90,578	71.39
1986	44,672	22.89	131,213	67.23
1987	78,034	26.89	178,781	61.83
1988	119,181	24.53	248,005	51.04
1989	271,387	29.82	585,690	64.35
1990	583,264	37.68	1,100,471	71.09
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1992	1,182,271	29.28	2,547,368	63.08
1993	2,801,001	40.35	5,562,827	80.14
1994	3,613,769	21.79	7,474,418	47.07
1995	9,698,185	28.37	21,254,438	62.18
1996	17,592,079	27.67	38,106,478	59.93
1997	42,878,484	36.26	71,375,364	45.07

Figure 5


Underground Economy With Lowest Tax Rate



Source: TRNC Prime Ministry (1998, p. 31)


Figure 6

Estimates of Underground Economy as a share of GNP



Source: Values of Table. 1 on p. 26 have been used to plot Figure 6.

Figure 7 Comparison with OECD Countries (1997)



Source: Schneider and Enste (2000, p. 49)

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**Notes**

<sup>1</sup> These methods are discussed in more detail in Pyle (1989), Feige (1989), Tanzi (1982) and Altuğ (1994).

<sup>2</sup> See Tanzi (1982), Pyle (1989) and Molefsky (1982) for more details.

<sup>3</sup>  $M2 = \text{Currency in circulation (C)} + \text{Demand deposits} + \text{Time deposits in commercial banks}$ .

<sup>4</sup> For more discussion, see Tanzi (1982), p. 79.

<sup>5</sup> See Schneider (1999), where this approach has been used and the size of underground economy has been calculated for many countries.

<sup>6</sup> See TRNC Prime Ministry (1998), pp. 27-28; TRNC Central Bank (1998); and Galip (1994).

<sup>7</sup> The first attempt to measure the size of underground economy in the TRNC was made by Besim (1995).

<sup>8</sup> See note 3 above:  $M2 = \text{currency} + \text{demand deposits} + \text{time deposits}$ .

<sup>9</sup> The tax variable consists of all the tax revenues including direct (Income, Corporation, Inheritance and Real Estate tax) and indirect taxes (Import, Value added, Bank and Insurance transaction tax). Aggregate tax measure has been used to measure the effect of the increase in tax burden with respect to demand of currency (see TRNC Ministry of Finance, 1994).

<sup>10</sup> Since the only the data available concerns the wages and salaries from the public sector, and data on the wages and salaries in the private sector is not available, this study used the ratio of public sector wages and salaries to public sector expenditure (see Prime Ministry [1998], pp. 27-28)

<sup>11</sup> The rate of interest on time deposits has been determined by taking the average rates of five major banks in the TRNC. (TRNC Central Bank, 1998)

<sup>12</sup> Data gathered and figures calculated from TRNC Prime Ministry (1998), pp. 1, 27-27, 68; Galip (1995), pp. 7-11; and TRNC Central Bank (1998).

<sup>13</sup> Direct and Indirect tax revenues are considered as tax burden as defined in note 9.

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## Kıbrıs'a Göçmen iskânına yönelik çalışmalar ve Rumların tepkileri (1864-1878)

*Abdullah Saydam*

Kıbrıs adasına Müslüman nüfusun iskânı ile ilgili olarak bilinenler, genellikle fetihten hemen sonraki yıllarda meydana gelen ve Anadolu'nun muhtelif bölgelerinden nakledilen nüfusu kapsamaktadır. Bilhassa 1571-1580 yıllarında fethe katılan ve idarede görev alanların ailelerinin yanı sıra, belirli ölçüde muhtelif mesleklerden ailelerin Kıbrıs'ın çeşitli köy, kasaba ve şehirlerine yerleştirilmiş olduklarını görmekteyiz. Müteakip yıllarda da bu iskân faaliyetleri değişik ölçülerde devam etmiş olup ortalama XVIII. yüzyıla kadar göç hadiselerinin varlığı çeşitli araştırmalarda söz konusu edilmiştir.<sup>1</sup> Bu araştırmaya konu olarak seçtiğimiz göç ve iskân hadisesi ise pek üzerinde durulmamış olan bir devri kapsamaktadır. Zaman olarak birbirine yakın iki önemli dönemde meydana gelen göçmen sevkı ve iskânı ile buna yönelik tepkiler ve konunun uluslararası boyutlara varmasını inceleyeceğiz. Bu çerçevede ilk olarak Kırım Savaşı ve Şeyh Şamil hareketinin bitmesinden sonra meydana gelen göç hareketleri ile bunun Kıbrıs'a yansımaları; ikinci olarak da 1877-1878 Savaşıyla birlikte Rumeli'den yapılan göç hareketleri ve bir kısım göçmenlerin Kıbrıs'a yerleştirilmesine yönelik çalışmalar ile ortaya çıkan tepkilerin üzerinde duracağız.

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### **Osmanlı iskân siyaseti genel bakış**

Nüfus hareketi bakımından Osmanlı tarihinin genel olarak iki farklı özellik arz ettiği bilinmektedir. Birincisi XIV. yüzyıldan başlayarak adalara ve Avrupa'ya doğru meydana gelen, büyük fetih hareketleri neticesinde yeni ele geçirilen yerlere doğru göç hareketlerinin ortaya çıkmasıdır. İkincisi ise kaybedilen topraklarda yaşayan eski fatihlerin torunlarının, anavatana doğru geri çekilmek suretiyle meydana getirdikleri göç ve iskân hareketleri olup bütün bu sosyal hareketlilik sırasında pek çok yerleşim birimleri kurulmuştur.<sup>2</sup>

Osmanlı Devleti ele geçirilen bölgeleri idare etmek, şenlendirmek ve nihayet Türk yurdu haline getirmek için muhtelif bölgelerden yeni topraklara gönüllü ya da zorunlu göçleri organize etmekteydi.<sup>3</sup> XIV. ve XV. yüzyıllarda

bu maksada dayalı iskân faaliyetleri bilhassa Rumeli bölgesinde oldukça yoğundu.<sup>4</sup> Nitekim Yıldırım Bayezit'e iltica eden bir grup Tatar, Filibe yöresine nakledilirken, 1418 yılında da Filibe'ye bağlı Konuşhisar'a İskilip yöresinden bazı Tatar ailelerinin göçürüldüklerini görmekteyiz. Bu iskân hareketlerinin yoğunluğu o derece fazlaydı ki, bazı şehirler tamamen Türklerle meskûn idi.<sup>5</sup>

Şüphesiz bu konuda en dikkat çeken yerleşim birimleri büyük şehirler, özellikle de İstanbul olmuştur. Fetihden önce İstanbul'un nüfusunun 30-40 bin dolaylarına düştüğü bilinmektedir. Fatih, fetih esnasında ve sonrasında kentin yağmalanmasını önlemeye çalıştı. Onun amacı İstanbul'u ülkenin bütün ırk ve dinlerini bünyesinde toplayan bir merkez haline getirmektir. Nitekim vakfiyesinde; "Bir şehir kurmak, ulvî bir harekettir; insanların kalbinin kazanılmasını ve yüzünün güldürülmesini mucip olur" demektedir.<sup>6</sup> İlk iş olarak Sultanı tanımaları ve belirli bir vergi ödemeleri şartıyla kent halkının mal ve canlarının korunacağını belirten fermanlar yayımlandı.<sup>7</sup> Öte yandan Fatih, her tarafa fermanlar yollayarak, İstanbul'a yerleştirilmek üzere Rumeli ve Anadolu'dan ailelerin gönderilmesi çağrısında bulundu.<sup>8</sup> Gerek Padişah gerekse diğer devlet adamları tarafından yapılan muhtelif sosyal kuruluşlar sayesinde İstanbul bir cazibe merkezi haline geldi. Nitekim 1478 yılında Kadı Muhyiddin Efendi tarafından yapılan nüfus sayımı iskân siyasetinin ne derece hedefine ulaştığını göstermekte ve bu tarihte İstanbul'un nüfusu seksen-doksan bin civarında olup % 60'a yakını Müslüman'dı. Üstelik bu sayıya İstanbul'da önemli bir yekûn tutan askerî sınıf dahil değildi.<sup>9</sup>

Bu iskân hareketlerinde XIII. ve XIV. yüzyıllarda Anadolu'da bulunan inançlı, fedakâr ve idealist dinî toplulukların, tekke ve tarikatların çok önemli rol oynadıkları görülmektedir. Bu topluluklar bilhassa yeni fethedilen bölgelerde İslâm dininin ve Türk kültürünün kökleşmesi için devletten bağımsız ama devletin desteğinde oldukça etkili faaliyetlerde bulunmaktaydılar.<sup>10</sup> Kolonizatör dervişler denilen gazi - dervişler, cihât alanlarında uygun mekânlar seçerek tekke ve zaviyeler kurup çevrelerinde geniş bir yerleşim birimi oluşmasına çalışırlardı. Devlet de muhtelif yollarla tekkelerin gelişmesine, dolayısıyla nüfusun önemli bölgelere yerleşmesine gayret etmekteydi. Bu nüfus hareketleri sayesinde yeni topraklar ekime açılıyor, tarımsal üretim artıyordu. Daha da önemlisi fethedilen bölgelerde yeni bir toprak düzeni kuruluyor ve böylece Osmanlı egemenliği güçleniyordu. Dervişlerin yerleştikleri yerler, ıssız bir yer bile olsa, zaman içerisinde bir emniyet alanı haline geliyordu.<sup>11</sup>

Etkili iskân yöntemlerinden biri de herhangi bir sebeple buldukları bölgede daha önce isyan etmiş yahut da isyan etme ihtimali olan toplulukların, ayaklanmaya imkân bulamayacakları yerlere sürgün edilmeleri ya da yeni fethedilen yerlere toplulukların zorunlu iskânlarını sağlamaktı. Bu ikinci grup için sürgün uygulaması salt bir cezalandırma vasıtası değildi.<sup>12</sup> Zaman zaman başvurulan bu yöntem de iki yönden çok etkiliydi: Birincisi asayişin temini bakımından, ikincisi de sürgün olarak gidenlerin nüfus dengesi için önemli rol oynamaları açısından.<sup>13</sup> Sürgün yöntemi ilk olarak Orhan Gazi devrinde uygulamaya konuldu. Bu dönemde bazen göçebe bir aşiretin, bazen

de devlete karşı ayaklanan bir köy veya kasaba halkının toptan sürgüne yollandığı görülmektedir. Örneğin Şeyh Bedreddin isyanına katılan Batı Anadolu halkından bir kısmı Arnavutluk'a sürgün edilmiştir.<sup>14</sup> Anadolu'dan Rumeli'ye doğru nüfus nakletme politikası XV. yüzyılın ortalarına doğru yavaşlamakla birlikte fethedilen yerlere nüfus iskânı ihmal edilmemiştir. Nitekim Kıbrıs'ın fethinden hemen sonra bazı Anadolu vilayetlerindeki her on aileden birinin adaya iskân edilmesi kararlaştırılmıştır. Böylelikle topraksız veya az topraklı köylüler, konar-göçer aşiretler, bir kısım hükümlüler, hatta tefecilik yapmakla suçlanan kişiler Kıbrıs'a gönderilerek tarımla uğraşmak üzere yerleştirilmişlerdir.<sup>15</sup>

XIX. yüzyıl ortalarından itibaren ortaya çıkan bir iskân biçimi de yabancı sermayesi ve bilgisini Osmanlı memleketlerine çekmek şeklinde olmuştur. Gelişen Batı sanayii ve tekniğini temin etmek isteyen Osmanlı hükümeti, Osmanlı tâbiyetine girmek kaydıyla belirli miktar sermayesi olanlara toprak vererek ülkede yerleşmelerini sağlamak gibi yollara başvuruyordu. Buna dair hazırlanan 7 Ağustos 1856 tarihli "Kabul-u tâbiyet ile haricîten Devlet-i Aliye memleketine tavattun etmek arzu eden familyalar hakkında tanzim buyrulan nizamnâme"ye göre; ziraat ve sanatı bilen, 60 Mecidiye altını (1500 Fransız Frangı) sermayesi olan yabancılara gereken kolaylıklar gösterilecekti.<sup>16</sup> Nizamnâme hükümlerinden faydalanmak isteyen birtakım Avrupalı grupların Kıbrıs'ta dahil olmak üzere bazı Osmanlı memleketlerine yerleşmek üzere başvurduklarını görmekteyiz. Nitekim Kıbrıs Valisi Aziz Paşa'nın diğer bölgelerde kurulan kolonilerin benzerlerinin Kıbrıs'ta tesisi için yabancılara teşvik etti. İsviçre ordusunda subay olan Dormann Gasparini, Osmanlı topraklarına göç konusuna ilgi göstererek 2.000 İsviçrelinin gelebileceğini garanti ederken, Larnaka'daki İngiliz Konsolosu Thomas Lames, 300 İrlandalı ailenin yerleşebilmesi için adada 130.000 dönüm toprak istedi. Onun ölümü üzerine mesele ile kardeşi ilgilenmişti.<sup>17</sup> Gerçi bu gruplardan Kıbrıs'a ne kadar ailenin gelip yerleştiğini tam olarak tespit edemedikse de adanın yabancı yerleşmeciler tarafından daima dikkate alındığını görmekteyiz.<sup>18</sup>

Osmanlı Devleti'nin zamanla zayıflaması göç ve iskân hareketlerinin çevreden merkeze doğru bir görünüme bürünmesine yol açtı. Osmanlı orduları bir kısım toprakları terk etmek zorunda kalınca, orada yaşayan halk daha içerideki vilayetlere iltica ettiklerini görmekteyiz. Bazı savaşlardan sonra bu tür göç hareketlerinin boyutları oldukça geniş oluyordu. Özellikle XVIII. yüzyılın ikinci yarısından sonra meydana gelen hemen her savaş çok sayıda insanın elden çıkan toprakları bırakarak Osmanlı Devleti'ne göç etmesine yol açtı. Hatta sadece Müslümanlar değil, Osmanlı hakimiyetinde yaşamaktan memnun kalan gayrimüslimlerin de göç etmek zorunda kaldıklarını görmekteyiz. 1783 yılında Kırım'ın kaybedilmesiyle meydana gelen göçler veya 1806-1812, 1828-1829 Türk-Rus savaşları bu konuda önemli örnekleri teşkil etmektedir. Hatta bu son savaştan sonra Rusya ile yapılan 1830 Edirne Antlaşması'yla iki taraf tebaasından olup da diğerine göç etmek isteyenlere 18 ay süre tanınmak suretiyle göç hareketlerine devletlerarası hukukî bir nitelik kazandırılmıştı.<sup>19</sup> Rus işgalleriyle Kafkasya'dan ve Balkanlardan; Bakan

ülkelerinin bağımsızlıklarını elde etmeleriyle de buralardan göç ederek Osmanlı topraklarında yerleşmek isteyen insanların sayısı milyonları bulmaktaydı.<sup>20</sup> Hükümet bunları en az masrafla, en kolay ama verimli, yaşanabilir alanlara yerleştirmeyi bir devlet siyaseti haline getirdi. Böylelikle pek çok yeni köy, şehir ve kasaba kuruldu.<sup>21</sup>

### Kırım Savaşı'ndan sonraki göçler

Kırım Savaşı Osmanlı Devleti'nin de içinde bulunduğu müttefik orduları tarafından kazanılmış olmasına rağmen, ne Kırım'daki ne de Kafkasya'daki Türklere ve Müslümanlara kurtuluşlarını sağlayabilecek bir sonuç temin edilebildi. Bir süre sonra Osmanlı ordularının Kırım'dan çekileceğinin anlaşılması üzerine önce Kırım'dan önemli sayıda göçmen Osmanlı topraklarına sığındı. Kırım'daki yenilginin intikamını alabilmek için bütün gücüyle Kafkasya'ya saldıran Rus ordusu karşısında, buradaki bağımsızlık savaşı yapanlar dayanamadılar ve 1859 yılında Şeyh Şamil teslim olmaya mecbur kaldı. Bu durum Kafkasya'dan da göçleri zorunlu kıldı. Çünkü Ruslar ele geçirdikleri köy ve kasabalardaki halkı, toparlanmalarına fırsat dahi vermeden, Sibiryaya taraflarına sürmekteydiler. Bölge halkı ise sonu belirsiz bir sürgün hayatına katlanmaktansa Osmanlı topraklarına göç etmeyi tercih edince, Bâbıali'yi oldukça meşgul eden göçmen meselesi ortaya çıkmış oldu.<sup>22</sup> Bu sırada göç edenler arasında halifenin memleketlerine yerleşmek isteyen Müslümanların yanında Yahudi, Hıristiyan Gürcü, Rus asıllı Malakan toplulukları da bulunmaktaydı.<sup>23</sup> Hatta Türklerin boşalttığı yerlere yerleştirilmek üzere Rus ajan ve temsilcileri tarafından kandırılarak götürülen Osmanlı tebaası Bulgar, Rum ve Ermeni unsurların, bir süre sonra yeniden Türk topraklarına gelip yerleşmek üzere ısrarlı taleplerde buldukları görülmektedir. Bâbıali bu tür müracaatları yapanları, geçmişte devlete ne ölçüde zarar verdiklerine pek fazla dikkat etmeden, yeniden vatandaşlığa almakta asla tereddüt göstermemekteydi.<sup>24</sup>

1856-1876 yılları arasındaki yirmi yıllık süre zarfında bu şekilde göç edenlerin sayısını kesin olarak belirlemek mümkün değilse de 1.200.000'den fazla olduğu tahmin olunmaktadır. Osmanlı Devleti gelen göçmenleri süratle muhtelif köy ve kasabalara yerleştirerek sefaletlerine son vermeye gayret etti. Bu amaçla çeşitli örgütlenmelere gitti. İskân yapılırken öncelikle Rumeli ve Anadolu'nun Karadeniz'e yakın olan bölgelerindeki devlet arazileri tercih edildi. Elbette yerleşme sırasında göçmenlerin de düşünceleri sorulmaktaydı. Yeni yerleşim birimleri kurulurken, mümkün olduğu kadar coğrafi konumunun yaşama, geçinme ve korunma imkânlarını kolaylıkla temin edecek şekilde olmasına dikkat edilmekteydi. Talimatnamelerde yeni bir köy tesis edildiğinde dikkate alınacak hususlar genel olarak şöyle sıralanmaktaydı:

- 1) Havasının ılımlı, suyunun bol, ulaşım imkânının yeterli olması yani denize, ırmağa veya ana yollara yakın, bağlantı kurulabilir nitelikte olması.<sup>25</sup>
- 2) Komşularla tartışma çıkmaması. Meselâ tamamen Hıristiyanlardan

oluşan bir yere Müslümanlar yerleştirilirken onların huzur ve güveninin bozulmamasına, bir tedirginlik meydana getirilmemesine dikkat edilmekteydi.<sup>26</sup>

- 3) Yerleşecek olan göçmenlerin isteklerinin dikkate alınması.<sup>27</sup>
- 4) Köy veya kasabanın gelişmeye müsait olması.
- 5) Çağdaş standartlara uyulması yani caddelerin planlı yapılması. Özellikle Tanzimat yıllarından itibaren kurulacak köy ve kasabalarda her evin doğrudan caddeye açık olması, yerleşim planının geometrik bakımdan düzgün, caddelerin birbirine paralel yapılması hükümet tarafından istenmekteydi.<sup>28</sup>
- 6) Eğitim, ibadet, tüketim ihtiyaçlarının karşılanabileceği imkânların sağlanması.
- 7) Muhafazasının kolay olması.

Göçmen sayısının oldukça arttığı 1864 - 1865 yıllarında daha uzak bölgelere de göçmen yerleştirilmesi söz konusu oldu. Bu tarihte göçmen sevk edilecek bölgeler arasında Kıbrıs başta olmak üzere, Rodos ve diğer bazı adalar de dahil edildi.<sup>29</sup>

Tespit edebildiğimiz arşiv kayıtlarına göre Kıbrıs'a ilk olarak 1864 yılı sonu ve 1865 yılı başlarında 2.600 civarında göçmen sevk edildi. Ancak kayıtlara göre bu göçmenlerden yarıya yakını yolculuk sırasında hayatını kaybettiğinden denize bırakıldı. Bunların hayatlarını kaybetmelerinin sebebi kış ortasında Kafkasya'dan kaçmak zorunda kalmalarıydı. Göçmenlerin tamamı aç ve çıplak bir halde olduklarından, çoğunlukla kolera, tifüs, dizanteri gibi hastalıklara yakalandılar. Adaya gelebilen 1.300 kadar nüfus da, başlarına bir hekim ile Müslüman ve Hıristiyanlardan oluşan 12 kişilik bir komisyon tayin edilerek tedavi ve idarelerine çalışıldı ise de çoğu, hastalıkların yanı sıra ada iklimine uyum sağlayamamaları yüzünden vefat etti. Nihayet kadın ve erkek olarak toplam 218 göçmen tamamen iyileştirilerek iskânlarına teşebbüs edildi.

Kıbrıs'daki yönetim, hükümet politikası doğrultusunda,<sup>30</sup> bunları muhtelif yerlere birer ikişer aile olarak yerleştirmeyi plânlamaktaydı. Ancak göçmenler ayrı yerleşmeyi reddederek topluca iskân olunmalarını talep ettiler. Kafkas toplulukları arasındaki akraba bağlılığına olan düşkünlük, kaybettikleri yakınlarının acıları ve adanın yabancı olması dolayısıyla talepleri müspet karşılandı. Öte yandan tamamen Hıristiyanlardan oluşan köylere ya da bu köylerin yakınlarına göçmen yerleştirmemek Bâbıali'nin genel politikasıydı.<sup>31</sup> Böylece Hıristiyanların rahatsız olmaları engellenmek istenmekteydi.<sup>32</sup>

Göçmenlere topluca yerleşebilecekleri bir kısım yerler gösterildiyse de, bazılarının suyunun olmayışı veya toprağının verimsizliği, bazı yerlerde ise yeterli miktarda boş arazi olmayışı sebebiyle kabul görmedi ve iskânları bir süre gerçekleştirilemedi. Nihayet Limasol kazasında Pavlaki adlı bir Hıristiyan'ın büyük bir çiftliği olduğu kaza meclisi tarafından Lefkoşe'ye bildirilince bir heyet marifetiyle burası incelendi. İnceleme sonucunda çiftlikte toplam 2.080 dönüm işlenmiş, bin dönüme yakın boş arazi, 4-5 dönüm limon bahçesi, 18 dönüm bağ, 40-50 adet muhtelif meyve ağacı, çok sayıda tek ve

çift katlı bina, samanlık ve ahır bulunduğu, ayrıca içinde akarsu olduğu görüldü. Göçmen yerleştirmek için bundan daha elverişli bir alan bulunamayacağını dikkate alan yönetim; bu çiftliği rayiç bedelle sahibinden satın almaya karar verdi. Pavlaki'nin rızası temin edilerek 100.000 kuruşa mal edilen çiftlikteki bina ve arazi, daha sonra ilgili talimatlar doğrultusunda taksim edilerek göçmenlere paylaştırıldı. Böylelikle 60 ailenin iskânı gerçekleştirildi. Bütün bu işler için 13.502 kuruş 20 para harcandı. Her ne kadar açıkta 5-10 aile daha kalmış idiyse de kış yaklaştığından kerpiç ile ev inşası mümkün değildi. Taştan bina yapmak da pahalıya mal olacağından Mart 1866 ayı içerisinde girdiğinde gereği yapılmak üzere kalan on ailenin de Limasol kazasında geçici olarak kiralanmış evlere yerleşmeleri temin edildi. Bunlardan 63 kişi 14 Mayıs 1865 günü bazı merhamet sahibi zenginlere verilerek idare ettirilmiştir. Birazı da o tarihten sonra vefat ettiği için 21 Aralık 1865 tarihi itibarıyla Limasol kazasındaki çiftliğe veya diğer yerlere iskân olunan toplam göçmen sayısı 218 kişiye ulaşmıştı.

Bütün bu işler için harcanan meblağ toplam olarak 113.502 kuruş, 20 para idi. Bunun 72.170 kuruşluk kısmı açılan yardım kampanyası sonucunda devlet memurları, meclis azaları, eşraf ve diğer yardımsever insanlar tarafından, geri kalan kısmının da devlet bütçesinden karşılanması düşünüldü. Ancak malî sıkıntı sebebiyle 26.332 buçuk kuruşluk bir açık ortaya çıktı. O sırada Müslüman ahalinin çekirge mücadelesi<sup>33</sup> ve yol yapımı için külliyetli miktarda masrafa girmeleri yüzünden kendilerinden daha fazla yardım istenmesi mümkün olamadı.<sup>34</sup> Bu durum karşısında hükümete müracaat edilerek daha önce adada gerekli ıslahatların yapılabilmesi için gönderilmiş olan 500 bin kuruştan söz konusu meblağın karşılanması uygun görüldü.<sup>35</sup>

Yukarıda bahsedilen göçmenlerin büyük kısmının idarenin çabalarına rağmen hayatlarını kaybetmesi, sonraki yıllarda, diğer bölgelere nazaran Kıbrıs'a göçmen naklinin pek düşünülmemesine yol açtı. Bununla birlikte gelen göçmenlerin sayısının çokluğu 1870 yılında Abaza göçmenlerinden bir kısmının Kıbrıs'a iskânları konusunu yeniden gündeme getirdi. Hükümetin bununla ilgili yazısına Kıbrıs Mutasarrıflığı tarafından verilen cevapta; her ne kadar adada boş arazi bulunabilir ise de ziraata elverişli olmadığından göçmenlerin huzur ve refahlarının temin edilemeyeceği, ayrıca Abazaların sert karakterleri dolayısıyla yerli halk ile uyum sağlayamayacakları endişesi dile getirilerek meseleye olumlu bakılmadı, hükümet de bunun üzerine yeni göçmen göndermekten vazgeçti.<sup>36</sup>

Fakat çok geçmeden Kıbrıs'a göçmen nakli yeniden ele alındı. Diğer bölgelerde meydana gelen aşırı yığılma üzerine hükümet ada yöneticileriyle yeniden yazışarak, özellikle eskiden iskân birimi iken sonradan çeşitli sebeplerle harap hale gelen yerleri tekrar imar etmek için göçmenlerin bir kısmının adaya gönderilmesine karar verdi. Mahallî yöneticilerden tapu kayıtlarına müracaat ederek eskiden yerleşim birimi iken artık kimsenin yaşamadığı yerlerin tespiti istendi. Merkezde de bu doğrultuda arşiv çalışmaları yapıldı. Araştırmalar sonucunda Yani kazasına bağlı Hirsofi'de eskiden köy olduğu halde, zamanla halkı dağılarak üç yüz seneden beri boş kalan ve ormanlık bir bölge olan Akame(?) denilen yerin çiftlik haline sokulabileceği ve istekli göçmenlere verilebileceği belirlendi. Konu Şurây-ı



Devlette görüşüldükten sonra buraya göçmen iskânının faydalı olabileceği düşünülerek, ormanlara zarar verilmemek şartıyla iskâna yeterli, tarım yapmaya elverişli arazi bulunup bulunmadığı, bulunduğu takdirde meselâ iki yüz göçmen iskân edildiğinde ortaya çıkacak masrafın ne kadar olabileceği yetkililere soruldu.

Kıbrıs'tan yazılan cevapta şu görüşlere yer verildi: Belirtilen yerde iskâna yeterli ve tarıma elverişli hazır arazi bulunmamaktadır. Ayrıca buranın bir buçuk-iki saat yakınında birkaç Hıristiyan köyü olup bunlar göçmenlere karışmayacaklarından aralarında uyum sağlanamayacaktır. Öte yandan göçmenlerin kavim ve kabileleriyle topluca iskâna alışmaları sebebiyle, mükemmel şekilde iskân olunmadıkları takdirde az vakitte dağılacaklardır. Bütün bu sakıncalara rağmen bölgenin az masrafla temizlenmesi mümkün olan ve yeterli suyu bulunan kısımlarına, aralarında bir-bir buçuk saat mesafede olmak üzere, her birinde cami bulunan ellişer hanelik iki köy kurulabilecektir. Mevcut arazi temizlendiği takdirde hane başına en azından ellişer dönümden beş bin dönüm arazi verilebilecektir. Göçmenler için yapılacak evler bölgenin usulüne uygun olarak duvarları taş, kerpiç ve ahşaptan yapılacak ve bir de ahır inşa edilecektir. Böyle bir evin maliyeti 750 kuruş civarında olup tamamı 75.000 kuruşa ulaşacaktır. Camiler için de 5.000 kuruş harcanacaktır. Her aile üretici oluncaya kadar verilecek yiyecek, çift hayvanı, ziraî araç-gereç masraflarından başka, arazideki ormanların kırdırılması da 15.000 kuruşa mal olacaktır ki, toplam maliyet 90.000 kuruş olacaktır. Bu görüşler üzerine hükümet; bölgede göçmen iskânı halinde 5-6 sene zarfında oranın kazanacağı mamuriyet sebebiyle, zaman içinde elde edilecek öşür ve diğer vergilerden dolayı hazineye menfaat sağlanacağını, ev yapımı için gereken taşların tedariki amacıyla yapılacak hafriyat sırasında eski eserlerin meydana çıkmasının mümkün olacağını, böylelikle yapılacak masrafın elde edilecek menfaate nazaran cüz'î kalacağını düşündü. Neticede bundan böyle Osmanlı Devleti'ne göç edecek olanlardan yüz hanenin iki köy halinde buraya yerleştirilmesi münasip görülerek keyfiyet Kıbrıs Mutasarrıfına bildirildi.<sup>37</sup> Ancak bu iki köye daha sonra göçmen yerleştirilip yerleştirilmediğine dair herhangi bir belge temin etmek mümkün olamamıştır.

### 1877-1878 Savaşı'ndan sonraki göçler

Kırım Savaşı, Osmanlı Devleti için bir felâket olmadığından devletin kurum ve kuruluşları göçmen yerleştirmek için nispeten daha iyi organize edilebilmişti. İmkânlar daha iyi idi. Halbuki 1877-1878 savaşı Türkler için tam anlamıyla bir felaket halini aldı. Yenilgi ile sonuçlanan bu savaş ile birlikte Osmanlı Devleti'nin düşman işgaline uğramayan bölgelerine doğru yoğun göçler başladı.<sup>38</sup> İstanbul, Selanik, Edirne gibi şehirlere yığılan binlerce insanın oluşturduğu sefalet tablosu karşısında hükümet, bu insanları süratle muhtelif vilayetlere dağıtarak perişanlığı ve sefaleti hızla önlemeye gayret etti. Bu çerçevede olarak işgale uğramamış bölge olduğundan iskân edilmek üzere Kıbrıs'a Mart 1878'de 600 kadar Rumeli göçmeni nakledildi. Bu grubun Kıbrıs'a gelişi ile birlikte Rumların göçmenlerin iskânına karşı

çıkmaya başladıklarını görmekteyiz.<sup>39</sup>

Dikkat çekici olan hususlardan biri de ülkenin başka taraflarında göçmenlere Müslüman halkın yanı sıra gayrimüslim halkın da yardım etmekte oluşudur. Halbuki elimizdeki arşiv belgelerine göre; Kıbrıs'taki Hıristiyan nüfus; her şeyini, bağını, bahçesini, çiftini, çubuğunu, kısacası bütün mal varlığını ve bu arada sevdiği insanları bırakarak göç etmek durumunda kalan bu insanlara gereken yardımı yapmak bir tarafa, memlekete sokulmalarına dahi tahammül edememekte idiler. Bunun da sebebi; Yunanistan'ın bağımsızlık hareketi sonrasında Kıbrıs Rumları arasında "enosis" fikrinin yerleşmeye başlaması, dolayısıyla Kıbrıs'a Müslüman nüfus naklinin rahatsızlık doğurması idi. Halbuki Osmanlı Devleti'nin buradaki amacı nüfus artırma düşüncesi değildi. Kışın ortasında yüz binlerce göçmen perişan bir vaziyette belirli şehirlere dolmuşlardı. Göçmenler arasında kolera, tifüs, dizanteri gibi hastalıklar yayılmış; bunlardan kimisi anne ve babalarını, kimisi çocuklarını yitirmiş durumdaydı. Devlet ise bir büyük savaştan ağır bir mağlubiyetle çıkmıştı. Bütçe tükenmiş, asker kalmamış, iç istikrar bozulmuştu. Bu şartlar altında kimsenin, belirli bir bölgede stratejik amaçlı olarak nüfus artırma gibi bir politikayı düşünecek hali yoktu. Dolayısıyla Kıbrıs'a göçmen gönderilmesinin sadece ve sadece bir tek amacı vardı: Tamamıyla insanî düşüncelere bağlı olarak göçmenleri bir an önce yığın halinde buldukları büyük şehirlere taşıyarak dağıtmak ve böylece perişanlığı mümkün mertebe azaltmak idi. Fakat bu zor durumda Rumların niyetlerinin, yıllarca birlikte yaşadıkları Türklere yardım etmek yerine enosisi gerçekleştirmek için fırsat aramak olduğu anlaşılmaktadır.

Sonraki günlerde İstanbul'dan Kıbrıs'a 3.000 göçmen gönderileceği haberi üzerine Larnaka ve Lefkoşe Rumları huzursuzluk çıkararak protesto hareketlerine kalkıştılar ve İngiltere'nin Larnaka Konsolosu Watkins, durumu 5 Mart 1878 tarihli bir yazı ile İstanbul'daki Büyükelçi Layard'a, 6 Mart 1878 tarihli bir yazı ile de Dışişleri Bakanı Derby'ye bildirdi.<sup>40</sup> Bu yazıların ekinde ayrıca Larnaka halkı adına yazıldığı iddia edilen 130 kişi tarafından imzalanmış bir yazı yer almaktaydı. Bu yazıda Rumlar; Kıbrıs'a 3.000 Tatar göçmeninin gönderileceğinin haberi ile şaşkına döndüklerini, adada kıtlık yaşandığı bir sırada bu sefil insanları kabul etmelerinin adaya felaket getireceğini, ayrıca gelecek olan insanların "vahşi ve kan içici" olduklarını ileri sürerek konsoloslardan göçmenlerin sevk edilmelerini önlemeleri için aracılık talebinde bulunmaktaydılar. Bu yazı 4 Mart 1878 tarihli olup Kıbrıs'taki Avrupa konsoloslarına hitaben yazılmıştı.<sup>41</sup>

Konsolos Watkins, Rumların verdikleri dilekçeleri bir taraftan Layard'a yollarken, diğer taraftan da bir an önce göçmen sevkıyatının önlenmesi için normal usule aykırı olarak doğrudan Dışişleri Bakanına da göndermişti. Nitekim Lord Derby hemen Layard'a bir yazı yazarak Kıbrıs'a göçmen gönderilmesi hususunda Türk hükümetinin dikkatinin çekilmesini istemiştir. Yalnız Derby, 21 Mart 1878 tarihli yazısında göçmen gönderilmesinin engellenmesini değil de, adada huzursuzluk yaratmalarının önlenmesi için gereken tedbirlerin alınması yolunda Bâbiali nezdinde teşebbüs yapılması talimatını vermiş ve ne gibi tedbirler alındığının bildirilmesini istemiştir.<sup>42</sup>

Bu sıralarda yani Mart 1878'de Kavala'dan Lazkiye'ye 3.000 kadar göçmen götüren "Sphinx" adlı bir Avusturya gemisi Karpas yakınlarında kazaya uğradı. Bölgedeki İngiliz ve Fransız gemileri yardıma koştular. Bu kaza sırasında sağ kurtulan yaklaşık 2.500 kişi karaya çıkarılarak uygun alanlara yerleştirilmeye çalışıldı.<sup>43</sup> Göçmenlerin Rumeli'den taşınan Türkler olmasına karşılık İngiltere'nin Larnaka Konsolosu tarafından yazılan yazıda bu göçmenlerden "Çerkez" diye söz edilmesi dikkat çekmektedir. Muhtemelen böyle davranılmasının sebebi, İngiltere'nin bu husustaki politikasının Rumlar lehine oluşmasını sağlamak için, bu tarihlerde Batı kamuoyunda Çerkezlere karşı mevcut olan tepkinin kullanılmak istenmesiydi. Nitekim bu hususu Beyrut Başkonsolosu Eldridge 3 Mart 1878 tarihli yazısıyla Layard'a yazmakta ve Çerkez olarak adlandırılmalarına rağmen gerçekte gelen göçmenlerin Rumeli Müslümanları olduğunu ifade etmekteydi.<sup>44</sup> Öte yandan Batılı konsolosların sıkça kullandıkları iddialardan biri de göçmenlerin karışıklıklar çıkardıkları iddiasıydı. Bu gerekçelerle adadaki konsoloslar, kazazede olan göçmenlere kucak açılmasına şiddetli tepki gösterdiler ve bunu ada halkı adına, daha doğrusu Rumlar adına yaptıklarını ifade ettiler.<sup>45</sup>

Rumlar ile konsolosların giriştikleri protesto hareketi kısa sürede yankı buldu. Paris'teki İtalya Büyükelçisi, Fransa Dışişleri Bakanına 6 Mart 1878'de nota vererek Şam ve Kıbrıs gibi Hıristiyan mahallere Çerkez göçmen yerleştirilmemesi için Osmanlı hükümeti nezdinde ortak teşebbüste bulunmayı önerdi.<sup>46</sup> Fransa'nın İstanbul Büyükelçisi Fournier'den Dışişleri Bakanı Waddington'a gönderilen 19 Mart 1878 tarihli yazıda da Suriye ve Kıbrıs'a göçmen gönderilmesinin önlenmesi gerektiği ifade edildi. Yabancı diplomatların bu destekleri sayesinde Rumlar, Bâbıali'yi baskı altına aldılar. Fransız Büyükelçisi bir taraftan bu sıralarda İstanbul'da günde ortalama 900 göçmenin hayatını kaybettiğini ve Rusların Balkanlardan Türkleri temizlemek niyetinde olduğunu yazıyor; diğer taraftan da İstanbul hükümetinin sırf bir an önce göçmenleri ölüm tehlikesinden kurtarmaya yönelik iskân çalışmalarını, sanki Kıbrıs ve Suriye'de bir demografik üstünlük kurma mücadelesi yapıyormuş gibi göstererek karşı çıkıyordu.<sup>47</sup> Avrupalı diplomatların baskıları üzerine Kıbrıs'a göçmen iskân edilmesi plânları askıya alındı ve Larnaka'ya yerleştirilmek üzere yola çıkarılan 2.000 kadar kişiyi taşıyan Avusturya bandıralı bir gemideki göçmenler, Sadrazam Ahmet Vefik Paşa'nın emriyle yarı yolda çevrilerek Antalya'ya çıkarıldılar.<sup>48</sup>

Böylelikle Batılı devletlerin tepkileri üzerine ilk aşamada Kıbrıs'a göçmen iskânı hükümetin gündeminden çıkarılmış ise de İstanbul, Varna, Tekirdağ, Selanik, Trabzon, Samsun gibi şehirlere toplanan yüz binlerce göçmen arasında salgın hastalıklar yüzünden büyük ölçüde ölümler söz konusu olmaktadır. Dolayısıyla hükümet bir an önce bu grupları uygun mahallere dağıtmaktan başka çare bulamamaktaydı. Bu yüzden tepkilere rağmen Bâbıali, Temmuz 1878'de yaptığı planlama ile Kıbrıs'a tekrar göçmen sevkini ele aldı ve 2.000 hâne yani yaklaşık 10.000 kişinin burada yerleştirilmesine karar verdi.<sup>49</sup> Fakat çok geçmeden adanın İngilizlere devri konusunun ortaya çıkması bu çalışmaların durdurulmasına sebep oldu.

İngilizler, Kıbrıs'ı ele geçirme kararını 10 Mayıs 1878 tarihinde vermiş

ve diplomatik faaliyetlerini buna göre düzenlemişlerdi. Nihayet 12 Temmuz'da Vali Besim Paşa'nın adayı resmen İngiliz Amirali John Hay'a devrederek Osmanlı bayrağının indirilip yerine İngiliz bayrağı asılması ile Kıbrıs'ın idaresi İngiltere'ye geçti.<sup>50</sup> Olaya şahit olan Jorj Kepiades bu gelişmeyi "Kıbrıslıları tam bir bağımsızlık ve ekonomik refaha kavuşturacak" hadise olarak yorumlamaktaydı. 22 Temmuz'da İngiliz Yüksek Komiseri Sir Garnet Wolseley adaya geldiği sırada kendisini karşılayanlardan Kition (Çite) Piskoposu olan Kyprianos, Rum toplumuna yaptığı konuşmada; "Adadaki hükümet değişikliğini kabul ettiğimiz kadar, Büyük Britanya'nın tıpkı İyonyen adalarında olduğu gibi, Kıbrıs'ı da tabii bağları olan Anavatan Yunanistan'la birleştirmek için kolaylık göstereceğine itimadımız vardır"<sup>51</sup> diyerek yeni hükümet değişikliği ile "enosis" in daha da kolaylaşacağına işaret etmekteydi. Nitekim Wolseley, Larnaka'ya geldiğinde aynı doğrultuda bir konuşmayı da Başpiskopos Sofronios yapmıştı. O şöyle demiştir: "Büyük Britanya Yunan adalarının anavatan Yunanistan'a bağlanmasında yardımını esirgememiştir, İngilizlerin şimdi de millî bakımdan Yunanistan'a bağlı bulunan Kıbrıs'ın Yunanistan'la birleşmesine yardım edeceğinden emin olduğumuz için idaredeki değişikliği sevinçle karşılıyoruz."<sup>52</sup>

Rumların enosisi sağlamaya matuf bu niyetlerini sezen Layard, Ağustos 1878'de Salisbury'yi şöyle uyarmaktaydı: "Bana öyle geliyor ki, adanın nüfusunu Rumların değil, Müslümanların lehine çoğaltmakta fayda vardır. Baring, bana yazdığı mektupta Türklerin yeni idareyi kabule hazır ve barışsever uyruklar olacaklarını, Rumların ise adanın İngiltere'ye verilmesinden memnun kalmadıklarını belirtmektedir. Rumlar, Türkleri her şeyden mahrum etmek, hatta adadan sürmek için ellerinden geleni yapacaklardır. Adadaki bütün toprakları ellerine geçirmek için entrika çevirecekler ve amaçlarına ulaşıncaya Kıbrıs'ın Yunanistan'la birleşmesini sağlamak yoluna gideceklerdir... Dolayısıyla çok sayıda Türk ailesinin adada yerleşmesini temin için ortaya güzel bir fırsat çıkmıştır ve onlar derhal tarım sektöründe çalışmaya başlayabilirler."<sup>53</sup>

Başlangıçta adaya göçmen nakline engel olan Layard'ın, ada İngiliz yönetimine geçtikten sonra Rumların gerçek niyetlerini anlaması ve adada Türk nüfusunu artırmaya meyletmesi dikkat çekicidir. Hatta Büyükelçi, İstanbul'daki mültecilerin nakledilebilmesi için Bâbıali'nin maddi imkânlarının yetersizliğini görerek Kıbrıs'a göçmen yerleştirmek üzere, İngiltere'deki yardım kuruluşlarının gönderdikleri parayı kullanmak ve işin organizesi için de o sırada İstanbul'da bulunan rahip Hanson'dan yararlanmak istedi. Ancak bu düşünceleri gerçekleştirmedi. Layard'a göre; Gladstone iktidara geldiği anda adayı Yunanistan'a verecekti. Bunu önlemek için şimdilik uygulanacak siyaset, Müslümanların ada yönetiminde daha fazla görev almalarını sağlamak, Türk okullarının sayısını artırmak üzere yardım etmek ve en azından 1.000 kişilik bir grubun adaya iskânına izin vermek idi.<sup>54</sup> Öte yandan Rumeli'den gelen bazı göçmenlerin özellikle Kıbrıs'a yerleşmeyi talep ettikleri görülmektedir. Bu bilgiler Dr. Dickson tarafından 24 Temmuz ve 31 Temmuz 1878'de Layard'a verilen raporlarda yer almaktaydı.<sup>55</sup> Ancak ortaya çıkan yeni statüko ve İngiltere'nin iç politikasındaki dinamikler yüzünden Londra'nın çekimser kalmasının yanı sıra, müşavirlik görevi yapan Baring'in

Türkçesinin yetersizliği ve Wolesley'in Osmanlı örf ve âdetlerine olan yabancılığı dolayısıyla Türklerle sağlıklı irtibat tesisi edemeyişi, bu düşüncelerin gerçekleşmesini engelledi.

İngilizler adanın idaresini ele aldıklarında Kıbrıs'ın nüfusu 186.000 olup bunun üçte ikisi Rum, geri kalanı Türkler, Araplar, Ermeniler ve diğer ırklardan insanlardı. Wolseley, adadaki nüfus yapısının Rumlar lehine olmasından rahatsız idi. Zira Rumlar daha ilk anlardan itibaren saldırgan bir tavır sergilemeye başladılar. Adadaki İngiliz yetkilileri, buradaki asayişin, ancak Türkiye'den ve Malta'dan yapılacak göçlerle oluşturulacak demografik denge sayesinde temin edilebileceğinin farkındaydılar. Bununla birlikte Wolseley, Salisbury'nin Almanya'dan göçmen kabul etmek şeklindeki teklifine ise sıcak bakmamaktaydı.<sup>56</sup> Böylece ilk andan itibaren demografik yapının ne şekilde olması gerektiği konusunda İngiliz yöneticiler arasında derin görüş ayrılıkları ortaya çıktı. Bu durumdan en fazla Rumlar yararlandı. Bir süreden beri enosisi sağlamaya yönelik amaç ve çalışmalarını artık gizlemeye dahi ihtiyaç duymayan Rum kilisesi ile mahallî otoriteler, nüfus dengesini değiştirmek için ortamı çok elverişli buldular. Müteakip yıllarda meydana gelen her göç hareketi Rumların lehine, Türklerin ise aleyhine cereyan etti. Neticede yüz binlerce Türk adayı terk etmek zorunda kalırken, Rumlar istedikleri gibi politika geliştirmeye, Batılıların da desteği ile, meydan buldular.

**EK-1. Kıbrıs'ta görev yapan memurların göçmenler için yaptıkları yardımlar (1865)**

Bağış yapanın kimliği	Miktarı (Kuruş)
Mutasarrıf	1500
Naip Ömer Fehmi Efendi	750
İkinci rütbe sahibi Evkâf Müdürü Arif Efendi	500
Topçu Binbaşısı Arif Ağa	150
Üçüncü rütbe sahibi Muhasebeci Hüseyin Hüsnü	250
Üçüncü rütbe sahibi Tahkikat Meclisi Reisi Kâmil Efendi	200
Alay Kâtibi Veliyüddin Efendi	40
Kolağası Hasan Ağa	50
Defter Nâzırı Adem Efendi	150
Ziraat Müdürü Kûfi Efendi	150
Tahrirat Kâtibi Raif Efendi	100
Meclis Kâtibi Avni Efendi	100
Meclis-i Liva Azasından Baştüccar Hacı Mehmet Efendi	500
Azadan Giryazade Hacı Mehmet Efendi	500
Zabıta Ser-memuru İbrahim Efendi	250
Sandık Emimi Naim Efendi	250
Tuzla Kazası Müdürü Cenap Efendi	120
Baf ve Kukla Kazaları Müdürü Muhsin Ağa	1500
Hirsofi Kazası Müdürü Ahmet Hulusi Efendi	120
Girne Kazası Müdürü Yusuf Ağa	150
Lefke ve Omorfe Kazaları Müdürü Mustafa Hıfzı Efendi	120
Mesarya Kazası Müdürü İbrahim Efendi	400
Karpas Kazası Müdürü Yusuf Ağa	270
Mağusa Müdürü İsmail Ağa	150
Gilan ve Evdim kazaları Müdürü Sadık Efendi	200
Dağ Kazası Müdürü Hafız Mustafa Efendi	220
Değirmenlik Kazası Müdürü Hüseyin Edip Efendi	200
<b>TOPLAM</b>	<b>9170</b>

Kaynak:: **Boa, İrade, Meclis-i Vâlâ**, nr. 24600.

**EK-2. Kıbrıs'taki Müslüman halk tarafından göçmenlere yapılan yardımlar (1865)**

Kaza adı	Yardım miktarı (Kuruş)
LEFKOŞE	7.500
TUZLA	6.750
LİMASON	5.500
HİRSOFİ	6.000
LEFKE VE OMORFE	8.000
KARPAS	3.000
DEĞİRMENLİK	3.000
DAĞ	1.500
MAĞUSA	1.500
MESARYA	7.500
GİLAN VE EVDİM	3.000
BAF VE KUKLA	6.750
GİRNE	3.000
<b>TOPLAM</b>	<b>63.000</b>

Kaynak:: *Boa, İrade, Meclis-i Vâlâ*, nr. 24600.

**Notlar ve Kaynaklar**

<sup>1</sup> Gazioğlu, Ahmet C., *Kıbrıs'ta Türkler (1570-1878)*, Lefkoşa, Kıbrıs Araştırmaları ve Yayın Merkezi (CYREP), 1990, s.100-118.

<sup>2</sup> Bu hususta çok daha ayrıntılı bir araştırma için bkz. Çiçek, Kemal, Saydam, Abdullah, "Ferman ile Tebdil-i Mekân: Osmanlı Devleti'nin İskân Siyaseti," *Kıbrıs'tan Kafkasya'ya: Osmanlı Dünyasında Siyaset, Adalet ve Raiyyet*, Trabzon, Derya Kitabevi, 1998, s.1-42.

<sup>3</sup> Teşvikler genellikle ücretsiz arazi temini, süreli ya da süresiz olarak vergi muafiyeti veya düşük vergilendirme, devlete yapılması zorunlu askerlik gibi bazı hizmetlerden muafiyet gibi alanlarda yoğunlaşmaktaydı. Meselâ Rumeli'nin bereketli fakat seyrek nüfuslu bölgelerine Anadolu'dan göçe yardımcı olmak üzere, Rumeli'de alınan çift vergisi Anadolu taraflarında alınanın neredeyse yarısı kadardı. Rumeli'de 22 akçe olan çift resmi Suriye'de 40, Karaman'da 37, Erzurum, Diyarbakir ve Malatya'da 50 akçeydi. Emecen, Feridun, "Çift Resmi," *Diyanet İslâm Ansiklopedisi*, VIII, İstanbul, Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı yayınları, 1993, s.310.

<sup>4</sup> Bkz. Aktepe, M. Münir, "XIV. ve XV. Asırlarda Rumeli'nin Türkler Tarafından İskânına Dair," *Türkiyât Mecmuası*, 10, İstanbul Üniversitesi yayınları, 1953, s.299-312.

<sup>5</sup> Şahin, İlhan, "XV. ve XVI. Yüzyıllarda Sofya-Filibe-Eski Zağra ve Tatar Pazarı'nın Nüfus ve İskân Durumu," *Türk Dünyası Araştırmaları*, 48, İstanbul, Türk Dünyası Araştırmaları Vakfı yayınları, (Haziran 1987), s.250, 255; Hammer, Joseph Von, *Osmanlı Tarihi*, II, Haz. M. Çevik-E. Kılıç, İstanbul, Üçdal Neşriyat, 1983, s.418-419'da Çelebi Mehmed'in Samsun seferinden Bursa'ya dönerken yolda bu topluluğa rastladığını ve sükûnet içerisinde yaşadıklarını görerek "Ben harb ederken bu Tatar beğleri düğün peşinde koşuyorlar ve bâb-ı hümayunumda görünmüyorlar. Siz Rumeli'ye naklolunacaksınız" dediğini yazmaktadır.

<sup>6</sup> İnalçık, Halil, "Fatih Sultan Mehmed Tarafından İstanbul'un Yeniden İnşası," Çev. Fahri Unan, *Ondokuzmayıs Üniversitesi Eğitim Fakültesi Dergisi*, 3, Ondokuzmayıs Üniversitesi yayınları, 1988, s.219.

<sup>7</sup> Meselâ bkz. Şakiroğlu, Mahmut H., "Fatih Sultan Mehmet'in Galatalılara Verdiği Fermanın Türkçe Metinleri," *Tarih Araştırmaları Dergisi*, 25, Ankara Üniversitesi yayınları, 1982, s.211-224.

<sup>8</sup> Bu sırada meydana gelen gelişmeleri Aşıkpaşazade şöyle anlatmaktadır: "Sultan Mehmed Han Gazi ki İstanbul'u fethetti, sübaşılığını kulu Süleyman Beğ'e verdi. Bütün ülkesine kullar gönderdi ki: 'İsteyen gelsin. İstanbul'da evler, bağlar ve bahçeleri gelip mülk olarak tutsun' dedi. Her kim ki geldiyse verdiler. Bu şehir bununla mamur olmadı. Bu defa padişah hükmetti ki her ilden zengin ve yoksullardan evler süreler. Her ilin kadısına ve sübaşısına hüküm ile kullar gönderdiler. Bu gelen halka dahi evler verdiler. Bu sefer şehir mamur olmaya yüz tuttu." *Aşıkpaşaoğlu Tarihi*, Haz. H. N. Atsız, Ankara, Kültür ve Turizm Bakanlığı yayınları, 1985, s.139.

<sup>9</sup> İnalçık, A.g.m., s.223.

<sup>10</sup> Geniş bilgi için bkz. İnalçık, Halil, *The Ottoman Empire, The Classical Age (1300-1600)*, Trans. by N. Itkowitz - C. Imber, London, George Weidenfeld and Nicholson Ltd. 1973, s.186-202.

<sup>11</sup> Meselâ Niğbolu'da Hezargrad civarında Bâli Bey oğlu Yahya Bey'in tekkesi, Tutrakan gibi Rumeli'de şekavet bölgesi olarak tanınan bir yerde kurulmuştu. Burası o derece vahşi bir yerdi ki, halk arasında kaba olunmadığını ifade etmek için "Tutrakan'dan gelmiyorum" yani "o kadar kaba değilim" sözü son zamanlara dek bir deyim olarak yerleşmiştir. Ancak daha sonra söz konusu tekkenin açılışı ile birlikte buralar emniyetli olup, bunun üzerine padişah tarafından zaviyeye vakıf yoluyla güç kazandırılmıştır. Barkan, Ömer Lütfi, *Kolonizatör Türk Dervişleri*, Ankara, (tarihsiz), s.48.

<sup>12</sup> Kunt, Metin, "Siyasal Tarih (1300-1600)," *Türkiye Tarihi*, II, İstanbul, Cem yayınları, 1995, s.50.

<sup>13</sup> Bkz. Barkan, Ömer Lütfi, "Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nda Bir İskân ve Kolonizasyon Metodu Olarak Sürgünler," *İktisat Fakültesi Dergisi*, XI, XIII, XV. ciltler, İstanbul, İstanbul Üniversitesi yayınları, 1951-1955.

<sup>14</sup> Pamuk, Şevket, *Osmanlı - Türkiye İktisadî Tarihi (1500-1914)*, İstanbul, Gözlem yayınları, 1990, s.27.



<sup>15</sup> Kıbrıs'ın fethinden sonraki ilk on yılda yapılan iskân çalışmaları hakkında geniş bilgi için bkz. Orhonlu, Cengiz, "Osmanlı Türklerinin Kıbrıs'a Yerleşmesi (1570-1580)," *Milletlerarası 1. Kıbrıs Tetkikleri Kongresi-Türk Heyeti Tebliğleri*, Ankara, Türk Kültürü Araştırmaları Enstitüsü, 1971, s.91-97.

<sup>16</sup> *Cerîde-i Havadis*, Sayı 887. Bu nizamnâmeyle ilgili uygulamalar hakkında bkz. Karpat, Kemal, *Ottoman Population (1830-1914)*, Wisconsin, The University of Wisconsin Press, 1985, s.62 vd.; Can, B. Bülent, "Almanya'nın Türkiye'de Koloni Kurma Planları," *Toplumsal Tarih*, 8, İstanbul, Tarih Vakfı yayınları, Ağustos 1994, s.50-54.

<sup>17</sup> Karpat, A.g.e., s.62.

<sup>18</sup> Bâbıali'nin kalifiye eleman göçünü temin etmek üzere çıkardığı nizamname zamanla bazı sıkıntılar doğurdu. Bu müsaadeyi siyonist gruplar, Filistin bölgesine yerleşip çoğunluğu ele geçirmek amacıyla tatbik etmek isteyince hükümet yer yer kısıtlamalar getirmek zorunda kaldı. Filistin'de bir vatan kurmaya yönelik Yahudi göçü hk. bkz. Öke, Mim Kemal, *Kutsal Topraklarda Siyonistler ve Masonlar*, İstanbul, Çağ yayınları, 1990. Buna karşılık bir yandan Batılıların desteklemeleri ve hükümet üzerindeki baskıları, öte yandan hacca gitmek gibi bahaneler kullanmaları dolayısıyla Yahudi göçü kontrol altına alınamadı. Nitekim II. Abdülhamit'in bütün titizliğine rağmen 1908'e gelindiğinde, 1876'ya oranla, Filistin'deki Yahudi nüfusu üç misli artarak 80.000'e ulaşmış, 40.000 dönüm toprak satın alınarak 33 yerleşim merkezi kurulmuştur. Kodaman, Bayram, İpek, Nedim, "Yahudilerin Filistin'e Yerleşmeleriyle İlgili Olarak II. Abdülhamid'e 1879'da Sunulan Layiha," *Bellekten*, 219, Ankara, Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1993, s.574.

<sup>19</sup> *Muahedât Mecmuası*, İstanbul, 1298, IV/2, s.78-79.

<sup>20</sup> Bu konu ile ilgili yapılan araştırmalardan birkaçını zikretmekle yetineceğiz: Saydam, Abdullah, *Kırım ve Kafkas Göçleri (1856-1876)*, Samsun, Ankara, Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1997; İpek, Nedim, *Rumeli'den Anadolu'ya Türk Göçleri*, Ankara, Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1994; Erkan, Süleyman, *Kırım, Kafkasya ve Doğu Anadolu Göçleri (1878-1908)*, Trabzon, KTÜ yayınları, 1996; McCarthy, Justin, *Ölüm ve Sürgün*, çev. B. Umar, İstanbul, İnkılâp yayınları, 1998; Halaçoğlu, Ahmet, *Balkan Harbi Sırasında Rumeli'den Türk Göçleri*, Ankara, Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1995; Orhonlu, Cengiz, "Yunan İşgalinin Meydana Getirdiği Göçler," *Bellekten*, 148, Ankara, Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1973, s.485-495.

<sup>21</sup> Meselâ bugün Bulgaristan sınırları içerisinde kalan Mecidiye, Kırım Savaşı yıllarında göç edenler için kurulmuştur. Bkz. Karpat, Kemal, "Ottoman Urbanism: The Crimean Emigration to Dobruca and the Founding of Mecidiye, 1856-1878," *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, III/1, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, (1984-1985), s.1-25. Ayrıca bkz. Saydam, Abdullah, "Tanzimat Devrinde Dobruca'da İskân Faaliyetleri," *Ondokuzmayıs Üniversitesi Eğitim Fakültesi Dergisi*, 7, Ondokuzmayıs Üniversitesi yayınları, 1992, s.199-209.

22 Saydam, A.g.e., s.63-93.

23 *Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi* (Bundan sonra *Boa*), *İrade, Hariciye*, nr.6857; *Maliyeden Müdevver Defterler*, nr.23109.

24 *Boa, İrade, Hariciye*, nr.12463; *Rûznâme-i Ceride-i Havâdis*, Sayı 115; *Karpat, A.g.e.*, s.64.

25 Bir grup göçmenin Dobruca taraflarına yerleştirilmesi için çıkarılan talimat için bkz. *Boa, İrade-Dahiliye*, 22622. Daha sonraları Mecidiye adını alan ve bugün Bulgaristan sınırları içerisinde bulunan kasabanın kuruluşunda bu hususlara dikkat olunduğunu görmekteyiz. *Boa, İrade-Dahiliye*, 22844. *Karpat, A.g.m.*; *Saydam, A.g.m.*

26 Bununla ilgili olarak 1860 tarihli bir talimatnâmede yer alan şu ifadeler hükümetin titizliğini göstermektedir: “(Göçmenlerin) sırf Hıristiyan-dan ibaret olan kurâyâ pek yakın olarak tavn ve iskân oldukları halde hüsn-ü imtizâç edemeyerek ileride hud’ayı mucib olacağı misüllü teba-ı gayr-ı müslimenin tevahhuşlarını dahi istilzâm edeceğinden bu dakikaya sarf-ı enzâr-ı dikkat olunarak mahzûr-u mezbûrdan vâreste olacak suretle tavn ve iskânlarına itinâ kılınacaktır”. *Boa, İrade-Dahiliye*, 30579, lef 2.

27 Buna dair çeşitli bilgiler için bkz. *Boa, İrade-Dahiliye*, 27766; *Rûznâme-i Ceride-i Havadis*, Sayı 662, 679, 714; *Tasvir-i Efkâr*, Sayı: 391.

28 Meselâ Plevne-Rahova-Lofça-Sofya yolları üzerinde kurulan ve Aziziye adı verilen 500 hânelik yerleşim biriminin krokisi için bkz. *Boa, İrade-Dahiliye*, 31797. Benzeri yapılanmalara başta İstanbul olmak üzere Selanik, Manastır, Bursa gibi diğer pek çok ilde rastlanmaktadır. Bkz. Dumont, Paul ve Georgeon, François, (ed.), *Modernleşme Sürecinde Osmanlı Kentleri*, İstanbul, Tarih Vakfı yayınları, 1996.

29 *Boa, İrade, Dahiliye*, nr.32799, 44541; *Ayniyat Defteri*, 1139, s.19; *Yıldız Esas Evrak*, Kısım:18, Evrak: 553/151, Zarf: 93, Karton: 34.

30 *Saydam, A.g.e.*, s.137-153.

31 *Boa, İrade, Dahiliye*, nr.30579, lef-2.

32 Bu yaklaşım tarzı yeni olmayıp Osmanlıların geleneksel idare anlayışının belirgin bir vasfı idi. Kıbrıs’taki Türk idaresinin öteden beri adaletli ve Rumların dahi hoşnutluğunu kazanacak nitelikte olduğu hk. bkz. Çiçek, Kemal, “Osmanlılar Zamanında Kıbrıs’ta Türk Adaleti ve Rumlar,” *Kıbrıs’tan Kafkasya’ya Osmanlı Dünyasında Siyaset, Adalet ve Raiyyet*, Trabzon, Derya Kitabevi, 1998, s.67-97; *Gazioğlu, A.g.e.*, s.119-149.

33 Çekirge istilasını Kıbrıs için daima önemli bir tehlike kaynağı olup buraya gönderilen Türk yöneticilerinin tarım alanlarını bu zararlıdan korumak için, zorunlu yükümlülük olarak halka “çekirge yumurtası toplama” görevi yüklediğini yahut da toplanan yumurtaları bedeliyle satın alıp imha ettiklerini ve böylece çekirgelerin kökünü kazımaya çalıştıklarını görmekteyiz. *Gazioğlu, A.g.e.*, s.167-177.

34 *Boa, İrade, Meclis-i Vâlâ*, nr. 24600, lef 3. Kıbrıs Meclisinin 3 Şaban 1282/8 Kânunuevvel 1281 (20 Aralık 1865) tarihli mazbatası.

35 *Boa, İrade, Meclis-i Vâlâ*, nr. 24600. 20 Şevval 1282 tarihli arz tezkeresi ve 21 Şevval 1282 (9 Mart 1866) tarihli irade.

36 *Boa, Ayniyat Defteri*, nr.1140, s.140. 26 Şaban 1287/7 Teşrini

sâni 1286 (19 Kasım 1870) tarihli olarak Sadaretten Muhacirîn İdaresine yazılan yazı.

<sup>37</sup> *Boa, Ayniyat Defteri*, nr.1139, s.34. 2 Recep 1290 (26 Ağustos 1873) tarihli olarak Sadaretten Muhacirîn İdaresine yazılan yazı.

<sup>38</sup> Ayrıntılar için bkz. İpek, *A.g.e.*; Kocacık, Faruk, "Balkanlardan Anadolu'ya Yönelik Göçler (1878-1890)," *Osmanlı Araştırmaları*, I, İstanbul, Enderun Kitabevi, 1980, s.137-190.

<sup>39</sup> Luke, Harry, *Cyprus Under The Turks (1571-1878)*, London, C. Hurst & Company Ltd., 1989, s.258.

<sup>40</sup> Şimşir, Bilâl, *Rumeli'den Türk Göçleri*, I, Ankara, Türk Kültürü Araştırmaları Enstitüsü 1968, s.364, 365-366.

<sup>41</sup> Şimşir, *A.g.e.*, I, s.367-368.

<sup>42</sup> Şimşir, *A.g.e.*, I, s.394.

<sup>43</sup> Şimşir, *A.g.e.*, I, s.389-390 (Gemi kaptanının raporu).

<sup>44</sup> Şimşir, *A.g.e.*, I, s.357.

<sup>45</sup> Şimşir, *A.g.e.*, I, s.385. Konsolosların adadaki işlere karışmaları sadece bu olayla ortaya çıkmış olan bir durum değildi. Onların ikide birde adanın yönetimine yaptıkları müdahaleler hk. Bkz. Gazioğlu, *A.g.e.*, s.300-305. Yabancı konsolosların yönetime müdahalelerine sadece Kıbrıs'ta rastlanmamaktaydı. Kapitülasyonların etkisi ile ülkenin pek çok yerinde siyasî, dinî, adlî ve hatta ekonomik amaçlı müdahaleler meydana gelmekteydi. Meselâ 1830'da Mevali ve Aneze aşiretlerinin şeyhleri, 1850'de Dürziler, 1882'de Halep'te büyük bir deprem olunca şehrin ileri gelenleri, birtakım problemlerinin halli için Fransız veya İngiliz konsoloslarına müracaat etmişlerdi. Hourani, Albert, "Ottoman Reform and the Politics of Notables," *Beginnings of Modernization in the Middle East, The Nineteenth Century*, Ed.:William R. Polk and Richard L. Chambers, Chicago and London, The University of Chicago Press, 1968, s.66-68. Paris Kongresi'nde Âli Paşa, konsolosluk tercümanlarının mahkemelere yaptıkları müdahalelerden rahatsız olduğunu belirtince Avrupalılar, Osmanlı mahkemelerindeki işleyişi gerekçe göstermişlerdi. Ahmed Cevdet Paşa, *Ma'rûzât*, Haz.: Yusuf Halaçoğlu, İstanbul, Çağrı yayınları, 1980, s.198. Kıbrıs'la ilgili bazı misâller için bkz. Çiçek, Kemal, "Osmanlı Devletinde Yabancı Konsolosluk Tercümanları," *Kıbrıs'tan Kafkasya'ya...*, s.172-183; Bu çerçevede yine bkz. aynı yazar, "Osmanlı Adliye Teşkilâtında Mahkeme Tercümanları," *Kıbrıs'tan Kafkasya'ya...*, s.184-195.

<sup>46</sup> Şimşir, *A.g.e.*, I, s.363.

<sup>47</sup> Şimşir, *A.g.e.*, I, s.391-392.

<sup>48</sup> Şimşir, *A.g.e.*, I, s.235, 364-369, 387; Luke, *A.g.e.*, s.258-259.

<sup>49</sup> *Boa, Meclis-i Mahsus*, nr. 2786, lef-5; *Yıldız Tasnifi, Sadaret Resmî Maruzatı*, nr.1/41, lef-9. İpek, *A.g.e.*, s.173.

<sup>50</sup> Zia, Nasim, *Kıbrıs'ın İngiltere'ye Geçişi ve Adada Kurulan İngiliz İdaresi*, Ankara, Türk Kültürü Araştırmaları Enstitüsü, 1975, s.18. Adanın İngilizlere devrine yol açan gelişmeler hakkında bkz. s.29-48, 79.

<sup>51</sup> Kurat, Yuluğ Tekin, *Henry Layard'ın İstanbul Elçiliği (1877-1880)*, Ankara, Ankara Üniversitesi yayınları, 1968.

<sup>52</sup> Zia, A.g.e, s.124.

<sup>53</sup> Kurat, A.g.e, s.101-102. Türklerden almaya yönelik çalışmaların tarihi çok öncelere gitmekte olup 1821 yılında meydana gelen ve sonraki yıllarda da aralıklarla devam eden isyanlar hakkında bkz. Gazioğlu, A.g.e, s.334-379.

<sup>54</sup> Kurat, A.g.e, s.102-103.

<sup>55</sup> Şimşir, A.g.e, I, s.552, 563.

<sup>56</sup> Zia, A.g.e , s.99.

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# Global Positioning System (GPS) Studies in the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus

*Doğan İbrahim*

## Introduction

The Global Positioning System (GPS) is a U.S. military-based electronic navigation system<sup>1,2,3</sup> which became fully operational in 1995. The system is funded and controlled by the U.S. Department of Defense. The GPS system consists of three segments: *Space Segment*, *Control Segment*, and the *User Segment*.

The Space Segment consists of 24 satellites (SVs) in six orbital planes using the NAVSTAR constellation, and provides real-time position, velocity, and time information to users free of charge anywhere in the world 24 hours a day. The GPS satellites orbit the earth twice a day, at an altitude of 20,000 km above Earth. The GPS orbital planes of the satellites are equally spaced, and inclined at about fifty-five degrees with respect to the equatorial plane. This arrangement enables between six and eight satellites to be visible at any time from any unobstructed site on Earth.

The Control Segment consists of a number of earth stations. The Master Control and Monitoring Network is located at Schriever Air Force Base in Colorado. These stations monitor the GPS satellites and upload ephemeris and clock data to the satellites whenever necessary.

The User Segment consists of the GPS receivers. A GPS receiver is a small, portable electronic unit (see *Figure 1*) which receives signals from the GPS satellites and measures the time interval between the transmission and reception of the signal in order to determine the distance between the receiver and the satellite. Once the receiver has calculated this data for at least three satellites, its location on the Earth's surface can be determined.

Four satellites are required to compute the horizontal position (latitude and longitude) as well as the vertical position (altitude). The primary function of a GPS receiver unit is to help navigate in three dimensions. GPS receivers are available either as small hand-held battery operated devices or as cards for Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM) applications. The hand-held devices are no bigger than the size of a mobile phone and they feature large LCD graphical displays. Some new GPS units incorporate street-atlas maps

and they help the user to navigate to any unknown address. Card-type GPS units can either be fitted into the back-plane of a standard Personal Computer (PC) bus, or they can be incorporated into dedicated OEM designs.

GPS services are available at two levels: the *Precise Positioning Service* (PPS), and the *Standard Positioning Service* (SPS). PPS signals are encrypted, and can only be decoded by special military GPS receivers which are available only to the U.S. and the allied military, certain U.S. Government agencies, and to selected civilian users licensed by the U.S. Government.

Ordinary GPS receivers can acquire and decode the SPS service signals free of charge or restrictions. The horizontal accuracy of an ordinary GPS receiver is now typically 15 meters. (This accuracy used to be around 100 meters due to a deliberate error introduced by the U.S. Department of Defense but the error was removed in May, 2000.)

An ordinary GPS receiver can be purchased for around \$200. This is usually a hand-held, portable battery-operated unit with a large LCD display and a small detachable antenna. The display updates continuously and can show the latitude, longitude, altitude, time and speed. Most units accept an external antenna so that the device can be used in vehicles and in areas of poor satellite visibility. Some GPS receivers (e.g. GPS III Plus<sup>9</sup>) provide built-in maps where the position can be shown dynamically on a map of the area, and updated every second.

Although the accuracy of a GPS receiver is comparable to the accuracies obtained using traditional methods, there are many applications where the 15-meter accuracy may not be acceptable (e.g. when landing a plane, spraying a field or entering a narrow harbour). Differential GPS (dGPS)<sup>4,5</sup> techniques have been developed to reduce some of the errors of ordinary GPS receiver units. dGPS works by placing a high-performance GPS receiver at a precisely known location on earth (the reference station). Since this reference receiver knows its exact location, it can determine the errors in the received satellite signals. The error data for each tracked satellite is formed into a correction message and is transmitted to ordinary GPS users. The GPS receivers apply these differential corrections into their calculations in order to improve their accuracies. The level of accuracy obtainable with dGPS depends upon many factors, such as the quality of the GPS receiver unit, distance to the reference station, and the atmospheric conditions. Accuracies in the range of 5 to 10 meters can easily be obtained using cheap ordinary GPS receivers with attached dGPS receivers. Sophisticated GPS receivers can achieve sub-meter, even centimeter level accuracies. The dGPS correction messages follow the standard established by the *Radio Technical Commission for Maritime Services Committee (RTCM-SC104)*.<sup>6</sup> The disadvantage of the dGPS system is that it usually costs as much as, and sometimes more than, the GPS receiver itself. Also, it may be difficult to pick up strong dGPS signals in urban areas.

Another method used to improve the GPS accuracy is the Radio Data System (RDS), which is a European-developed standard for transmitting data over a broadcast FM sub-carrier. In this method, the dGPS signal is transmitted by conventional FM radio channels and is picked up by special receivers.

The decoded output of these receivers is then used to provide corrections to standard GPS units. The positional accuracy of a RDS-based system is usually in the sub-meter range.

dGPS correction data is also sent using geo-stationary satellites. In this technique, master control stations collect data from a number of reference stations and these stations calculate the error broadcasted by each visible satellite. The calculated error is uploaded to geo-stationary satellites using near land earth stations. These corrections are then broadcast by the geo-stationary satellites and suitable, licensed GPS receivers can receive and correct their errors.

In most countries, dGPS services are provided free of charge by government agencies in the form of marine beacon transmitters, located near coast lines. Such services are mainly aimed for the mariners but can usually be received in parts of the land as well. Some dGPS services are owned and operated by commercial firms, such as *Landstar*,<sup>7</sup> and *Omnistar*<sup>8</sup> services. Both of these services are very accurate geo-stationary dGPS error correction services which can be received anywhere on earth, 24 hours a day. These services require special receiver units and also subscription and license are required to use such services.

Most GPS receivers provide RS232 type serial output signals conforming to the *National Marine Electronics Association (NMEA)* standards.<sup>9</sup> Thus, a GPS with NMEA 0183 output will enable the unit to be connected to other equipment with serial ports, such as computers, plotters, printers, radars and so on. The data output from a GPS is in printable ASCII code preceded by special "sentences" to identify the type of the data.

### GPS Applications in the TRNC

GPS application areas in the world have been growing at a high rate in recent years and a typical GPS receiver is mostly used in the following fields: *marine navigation; fishing; car route guidance; tourism; military applications; accurate timing; vehicle tracking; and Geographic Information Systems (GIS) applications*. There is potential for development of applications in all of these fields in the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC).

*Marine navigation:* This is one of the most popular areas in which GPS receivers are used world-wide. Nearly all mariners in developed countries own GPS receivers, and these units help boats and ships to locate their positions very accurately in the sea, and to sail to their destinations with minimum navigational effort. GPS receivers are especially extremely useful in foggy weather when the visibility is rather poor. Boat and ship owners in the TRNC will benefit from GPS receivers since such systems will enable them to navigate accurately and reliably, without any fear of getting lost.

*Fishing:* The TRNC has a long and sunny coastline, and one would expect fishing to be one of North Cyprus's major sources of income. Unfortunately, this is not the case, since fishing is currently carried out in an

unprofessional way in small boats, employing rather primitive methods. GPS receivers would, for example, enable fishermen to return to an exact location where large quantities of fish may once have been sighted. The fishermen would also be able to plot, on a map, the exact location of the fish stocks for the different seasons of the year, and thus would be able to improve their productivity tremendously by continuing to return to such spots on subsequent occasions.

*Car Route Guidance:* One of the major applications of GPS receivers is in car navigation. A GPS-based car navigation system helps a driver to go to an unknown destination without referring to a map or to any other resources. Most new and expensive cars in many countries are nowadays equipped with GPS based navigation units. Although Cyprus is a small island, the potential of a GPS-based car route guidance system should be investigated, since such a system could be useful to emergency services and motorists, tourists in particular.

*Tourism:* The TRNC is a touristic country and a large number of foreign tourists visit the island each year. At present there are over 70 hotels, motels, and holiday homes in the TRNC, situated mainly in Nicosia, Kyrenia, and Famagusta. The way-points (latitudes and longitudes) of touristic sites, hotels, and other important places should be compiled and made available in the form of touristic guides and hand-books. Such a resource would be an invaluable aid to tourists equipped with a GPS receiver. The way-points of some historic and touristic places in Nicosia are shown in *Table 1* as an example.

*Military Applications:* As a result of the continuing potential conflict between the Turkish Cypriots and the Greek Cypriots, there is currently a large Turkish military presence on the island. It is not known to this author but is highly likely that the military on the island is using GPS systems. GPS receivers would prove very useful for the military in accurately determining the co-ordinates of strategic locations on the island. Differential GPS techniques could also be employed in order to increase the accuracy and the reliability of military navigation.

*Accurate Timing:* GPS satellite systems operate with atomic clocks, and they transmit very accurate timing pulses every second. The timing pulses can be received and decoded by the GPS receivers, and as a result, computers and other electronic devices can be synchronized to these pulses to obtain accurate and universal timing information. For example, the radio and television stations in the TRNC could use the GPS-based timing signals to synchronize all of their equipment to a single, accurate time source (currently, the equipment at the national television stations of BRT is synchronized using the timing pulses transmitted by the BBC radio station). Accurate timing services could also be used by the Internet service providers and other organizations on the island which require precise, universal timing reference signals.

*Vehicle Tracking:* Vehicle-tracking applications are used to determine the geographical locations of vehicles. Basically, vehicles are equipped with a GPS and a transmitter (or a mobile phone) which transmits the exact locations (latitude and longitude) of the vehicles to a base station. The base station receives the vehicle locations, displays them on a map and processes the



received data as required. Such systems are useful to large organizations with many vehicles who wish to know the exact locations of their vehicles at any time. Emergency services (e.g. ambulance and police) also use vehicle tracking systems in order to attend an emergency point as quickly as possible. Vehicle tracking systems are usually expensive, and their use may not currently be justified in the TRNC.

*Geographical Information Systems (GIS):* "Geographical Information Systems"<sup>10,11</sup> (GIS) is the collective term commonly used to describe computer system manipulation of map-based geographic data. GIS systems are implemented with computer hardware and software. Hardware such as scanners and digitizers is used to convert paper-based maps into computer readable digital format. Special software is then used to process this data and to provide answers to questions, involving say, the distribution of a selected geographical phenomena, the relationships between various geographical entities, and so on. GIS is currently used in many countries to process a large number of geographical data. For example, farmers can use the GIS techniques to determine fertile fields and to have close control over their crops. The TRNC has a very serious water shortage problem, and GIS techniques can be used to analyze the water distribution on the island. There are many other potential applications of GIS in the TRNC, including the analysis of earthquake movements, the plotting of the distribution of fertile land, the study of environmental effects, the movement of birds and other animals, and so on.

Çukurova University in Turkey is carrying out a GIS-based study in the TRNC in co-operation with the Ministry of Agriculture and several other government organizations. This project is currently at the feasibility study stage, waiting to be financed, and the project aims to include detailed maps of the TRNC with GIS and GPS interface, using the ArcInfo<sup>12</sup> mapping application software. There have also been Fulbright and United Nations project proposals on GPS- and GIS-based land surveying and water resource mapping applications.

### Developing GPS Systems in the TRNC

A standard GPS receiver will work anywhere on earth, 24 hours a day. This service is provided free of charge by the U.S. Department of Defense. If the GPS is to be used to simply read off the latitude and the longitude co-ordinates of any point in the TRNC, then the only required investment will be the purchase of a hand-held GPS receiver. The cost of such a receiver varies between \$150 and \$3000. At the lower price end, the receivers are designed mainly for mariners and for general-purpose positioning applications. *Garmin International Inc.*<sup>13</sup> is one of the companies manufacturing receivers such as *GPS 12*, *GPS 48*, *GPS II*, *GPS III Plus*, etc., for this end of the market. These receivers provide the standard 10-15 meter accuracy but their accuracies can be improved by several meters by using differential dGPS techniques. At the higher price end, the receivers manufactured by *Trimble Navigation*,<sup>14</sup> such as *GPS Pathfinder Pro XR System*, are designed mainly for accurate and sen-

sitive surveying applications. Although the accuracy of these receivers is around 10 meters, this accuracy can be improved to better than sub-meter by using differential dGPS techniques, such as *Landstar* or *Omnistar*.

In most land- or marine-based applications (e.g. route guidance), GPS systems are linked to digital maps of the area of interest and the overall system is used together with a PC. These maps are usually created by scanning or digitizing the original paper maps. Usually, several layers of mapping are used, with scales ranging from 1:25000 to 1:2500. One of the problems in obtaining such maps in the TRNC is that all of the maps in this scale range are currently classified by the military authorities and are not available for civilian use. Without such detailed maps, the GPS applications are currently rather limited.

Another investment which will be required is a map-based computer application program which can be used to display, edit, zoom-in, zoom-out and manipulate the map data. There are several choices here, but ArcInfo<sup>12</sup> and MapInfo<sup>14</sup> are probably two of the most commonly used Windows-based map application programs available in the market. The basic cost of such programs is around \$1800 per user license. In a typical application, up to ten or more user licenses may be required, and this will increase the overall cost of the software investment. In addition, optional software "add-on" products will be required for various mapping application requirements, and this will again increase the cost of software investment.

Vehicle-tracking applications require a GPS and a transmitter (or a mobile phone) on the vehicles. At the receiving station, a receiver and a map-based application program will be required. The costs of such applications are usually high and they may not be economically suitable investments at present in the TRNC.

Differential GPS systems (dGPS) require the purchase of a high-quality GPS receiver, and a land-based GPS transmitter system which will transmit the GPS errors every second. The cost of such a system is around \$20,000 to cover an area with a radius of 200 km. Although a dGPS system will improve the GPS accuracy, the use of such a system in TRNC cannot at present be justified, since there are only a handful of GPS receiver systems in use in the TRNC.

The investment required for GPS-based hardware and software, however, is not more than several thousands of dollars and it is believed that such funding can easily be provided by the Universities on the island.

### Assessing GPS Accuracy in the TRNC

The overall accuracy of a GPS system depends upon several factors, including atmospheric conditions, receiver accuracy, and orbit accuracy. In order to assess the accuracy of GPS systems in the TRNC, an experiment was carried out at several different parts of the island within the TRNC.

## Experimental Setup

A GPS III Plus<sup>15</sup> type GPS receiver was used during the experiment. This is a 12-channel, low-end, hand-held receiver, manufactured by Garmin. The receiver is differential-ready and it provides NMEA compatible serial output data. A magnetic base, GA26 type antenna<sup>15</sup> was used to receive the satellite signals. The output of the GPS receiver was connected to the serial input port of a laptop PC. This was a 200 MHz Pentium system with 32 MB of memory and a 1.8 GB hard-disk, running under the Windows 95 operating system. During the tests, data was collected and analyzed by the PC using the *SA Watch* software package.<sup>16</sup> *SA Watch* collects GPS data in NMEA format and provides a position information window that indicates real-time accuracy by plotting the latitude/longitude pairs as a position cluster diagram. In addition, a tabular summary of moving averages, time, drift, and expected accuracies to 99%, 95%, 68% and 50% is provided. The position cluster diagram can be very useful in estimating the expected horizontal position accuracy.

## Results

Data was collected for a period of one hour in Nicosia and Kyrenia. The collected data was plotted, using the *SA Watch* software, as position cluster diagrams. *Figure 2* shows the results obtained in Nicosia. Three concentric circles have been defined at 10m, 20m, and 30m. The latitude and longitude of the collected points are plotted within these circles. It is clear from this figure that all of the data points were within the 10m range. The tabular data on the left hand side shows that 99% of the time the position was within 5.8 meters, and 95% of the time it was also within 5.8 meters.

*Figure 3* shows the position cluster diagram obtained in Kyrenia. Here, all the data points were within the 20m range. The tabular data shows that 99% of the time the position was within 15 meters, and 95% of the time it was within 9.6 meters.

Although no data was collected in Famagusta, similar results are expected.

## Conclusions

The results show that a horizontal accuracy of better than 10 meters (95% of the time) can be obtained in the TRNC by using a standard low-cost GPS receiver. This accuracy is sufficient for most Intelligent Transportation System (ITS) applications, especially for street-level route-guidance and navigation. A GPS based car route-guidance system can be developed in the TRNC, and such a system will be an invaluable aid to general motorists as well as to tourists. The accuracy obtained can be improved by using a differential GPS system. This will require the design and installation of a land-

based dGPS station in the TRNC which will broadcast GPS corrections, covering the TRNC land areas as well as most of the Mediterranean sea in the North of the island. Such a system will be extremely useful to mariners, fishermen and to land users (e.g. the military and civil services).

Although GPS systems are used in some applications in the TRNC, there are many more interesting and useful potential applications of such navigational tools in the TRNC. These applications areas, some of which have been sketched above, should be investigated in detail with suitable funding, primarily at the Universities; and the results should be made widely available to the interested parties and organizations.

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Table 1. Way-points of some touristic places in Nicosia

Place	Latitude	Longitude
Kyrenia Gate	35.1821°N	33.3622°E
Arab Ahmet Mosque	35.1771°N	33.3578°E
Dervish Pasha Mansion	35.1762°N	33.3588°E
Yenicami Mosque	35.1786°N	33.3662°E
Selimiye Mosque	35.1765°N	33.3638°E
Haidarpasha Mosque	35.1772°N	33.3660°E

Figure 1. A typical GPS receiver unit




Figure 2. Position cluster diagram obtained in Nicosia





Figure 3. Postion cluster diagram obtained in Kyrenia



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## Resolution 155 (1960)—24 August

[admission of new members to the UN: Cyprus]

*The Security Council,*

*Having examined* the application of the Republic of Cyprus,

*Recommends* to the General Assembly that the Republic of Cyprus be admitted to membership in the United Nations.

*Adopted unanimously at the 892<sup>nd</sup> meeting.*

## Resolution 186 (1964)—4 March

[recommending creation of a UN Peace-Keeping Force in Cyprus and designation of a mediator]

*The Security Council,*

*Noting* that the present situation with regard to Cyprus is likely to threaten international peace and security and may further deteriorate unless additional measures are promptly taken to maintain peace and to seek out a durable solution,

*Considering* the positions taken by the parties in relation to the Treaties signed at Nicosia on 16 August 1960,

*Having in mind* the relevant provisions of the Charter of the United Nations and its Article 2, paragraph 4, which reads: "All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations",

1. *Calls upon* all Member States, in conformity with their obligations under the Charter of the United Nations, to refrain from any action or threat of action to worsen the situation in the sovereign Republic of Cyprus, or to endanger international peace;
2. *Asks* the Government of Cyprus, which has the responsibility for the maintenance and restoration of law and order, to take all additional measures necessary to stop violence and bloodshed in Cyprus;
3. *Calls upon* the communities in Cyprus and their leaders to act with the utmost restraint;
4. *Recommends* the creation, with the consent of the Government of Cyprus, of a United Nations Peace-Keeping Force in Cyprus. The composition and size of the Force shall be established by the Secretary-General, in consultation with the Governments of Cyprus, Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom. The commander of the Force shall be appointed by the Secretary-General and report to him. The Secretary-General, who shall keep the Governments providing the Force fully informed, shall report periodically to the Security Council on its operation;

5. *Recommends* that the function of the Force should be in the interest of preserving international peace and security, to use its best efforts to prevent a recurrence of fighting and, as necessary, to contribute to the maintenance and restoration of law and order and a return to normal conditions;
6. *Recommends* that the stationing of the Force shall be for a period of three months, all costs pertaining to it being met, in a manner to be agreed upon by them, by the Governments providing the contingents and by the Government of Cyprus. The Secretary-General may also accept voluntary contributions for the purpose;
7. *Recommends further* that the Secretary-General designate, in agreement with the Government of Cyprus and the Governments of Greece, Turkey and United Kingdom a mediator who shall use his best endeavours with the representatives of the communities and also with the aforesaid four Governments, for the purpose of promoting a peaceful solution and an agreed settlement of the problem confronting Cyprus, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, having in mind the well-being of the people as a whole and the preservation of international peace and security. The mediator shall report periodically to the Secretary-General on his efforts;
8. *Requests* the Secretary-General to provide, from funds of the United Nations, as appropriate, for the remuneration and expenses of the mediator and his staff.

*Adopted unanimously at the 1102nd meeting.*

## Resolution 187 (1964)—13 March

[establishment of a UN Peace-Keeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP)]

*The Security Council,*

*Having heard* the statements of the representatives of the Republic of Cyprus, Greece and Turkey,

*Reaffirming* its resolution 186 (1964) of 4 March 1964,

*Being deeply concerned* over developments in the area,

*Noting* the progress reported by the Secretary-General in regard to the establishment of a United Nations Peace-Keeping Force in Cyprus,

*Noting* the assurance from the Secretary-General that the United Nations Peace-Keeping Force in Cyprus envisaged in resolution 186 (1964) of 4 March 1964 is about to be established, and that advance elements of that Force are already en route to Cyprus,

1. *Reaffirms* its call upon all Members States, in conformity with their obligations under the Charter of the United Nations, to refrain from any action or threat of action likely to worsen the situation in the sovereign Republic of Cyprus, or to endanger international peace;
2. *Requests* the Secretary-General to press on with his efforts to implement Security Council resolution 186 (1964) of 4 March 1964 and requests Member States to cooperate with the Secretary-General to that end.

*Adopted unanimously at the 1103rd meeting.*

## Resolution 192 (1964)—20 June

[extending the mandate of UNFICYP to 26 September, 1964]

*The Security Council,*

*Noting* that the report of the Secretary-General (S/5764 and Add. 1) considers the maintenance in Cyprus of the United Nations Peace-Keeping Force, created by Security Council resolution 186 (1964) of 4 March 1964, for an additional period of three months to be useful and advisable,

*Expressing its deep appreciation* to the Secretary-General for his efforts in the implementation of Security Council resolution 186 (1964) of 4 March and 187 (1964) of 13 March 1964,

*Expressing its deep appreciation* to the States that have contributed troops, police, supplies and financial support for the implementation of resolution 186 (1964),

1. *Reaffirms* its resolutions 186 (1964) and 187 (1964);
2. *Calls upon* all States Members of the United Nations to comply with the above-mentioned resolutions;
3. *Takes note* of the report of the Secretary-General;
4. *Extends* the stationing in Cyprus of the United Nations Peace-Keeping Force, established under Security Council resolution 186 (1964), for an additional period of three months, ending 26 September 1964.

*Adopted unanimously at the 1139th meeting.*

## Resolution 193 (1964)—9 August

[calling on the Governments of Turkey and Cyprus for a cease-fire]

*The Security Council,*

*Concerned* at the serious deterioration of the situation in Cyprus,

*Reaffirming* its resolutions 186 (1964) of 4 March 1964, 187 (1964) of 13 March and 192 (1964) of 20 June 1964,

*Anticipating* the submission of the Secretary-General's report on the situation,

1. *Reaffirms* the appeal just addressed by the President of the Security Council to the Governments of Turkey and Cyprus, worded as follows:

“The Security Council has authorised me to make an urgent appeal to the Government of Turkey to cease instantly the bombardment of and the use of military force of any kind against Cyprus, and to the Government of Cyprus to order the armed forces under its control to cease firing immediately”;

2. *Calls for* an immediate cease-fire by all concerned;
3. *Calls upon* all concerned to cooperate fully with the Commander of the United Nations Peace-Keeping Force in Cyprus in the restoration of peace and security;
4. *Calls upon* all states to refrain from any action that might exacerbate the situation or contribute to the broadening of hostilities.

*Adopted at the 1143rd meeting by 9 votes to none, with 2 abstentions  
Czechoslovakia, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.*



## Resolution 194 (1964)—25 September

[extending the mandate of UNFICYP to 26 December, 1964]

*The Security Council,*

*Taking note of the report of the Secretary-General (S/5950 and Add. 1 and 2), and noting in particular, that the Secretary-General considers necessary that the stationing in Cyprus of the United Nations Peace-Keeping Force created by Security Council resolution of 186 (1964) of 4 March 1964 should be extended beyond 26 September 1964,*

*Noting that the Government of Cyprus had indicated its desire that the stationing of the United Nations Force in Cyprus should be continued beyond 26 September 1964,*

*Renewing the expression of its deep appreciation to the Secretary-General for his efforts in the implementation of the Security Council resolutions 186 (1964) of 4 March 1964, 187 (1964) of 13 March 1964 and 192 (1964) of 20 June 1964,*

*Renewing the expression of its deep appreciation to all the States that have contributed troops, police, supplies and financial support for the implementation of resolution 186 (1964).*

*Paying tribute to the memory of Sakari Tuomioja for the outstanding services that he rendered to the cause of the United Nations.*

*Expressing satisfaction that a new Mediator has been appointed by the Secretary-General in conformity with the resolution 186 (1964).*

1. *Reaffirms its resolutions 186 (1964) of 4 March 1964, 187 (1964) of 13 March 1964, 192 (1964) of 20 June and 193 (1964) of 8 August 1964 and the consensus expressed by the President at its 1143rd Meeting on 11 August 1964;*
2. *Calls upon all States Members to comply with the above-mentioned resolutions;*
3. *Extends the period in which the United Nations Peace-Keeping Force (UNFICYP) shall be stationed in Cyprus for another three months ending 26 December 1964, in conformity with the terms of resolution 186 (1964) of 4 March 1964;*

4. *Requests* the Secretary-General to keep the Security Council informed regarding the compliance of the parties concerned with the provisions of this resolution.

*Adopted unanimously at the 1159th meeting.*

## Resolution 198 (1964)—18 December

[extending the mandate of UNFICYP to 26 March, 1965]

*The Security Council,*

*Noting* that the report of the Secretary-General (S/6102) recommends the maintenance in Cyprus of the United Nations Peace-Keeping Force, created by Security Council resolution 186 (1964) of 4 March 1964, for an additional period of three months,

*Noting* that the Government of Cyprus has indicated its desire that the stationing of the United Nations Force in Cyprus should be continued beyond 26 December 1964,

*Noting with satisfaction* that the report of the Secretary-General indicates that the situation in Cyprus has improved and that significant progress has been made,

*Renewing* the expression of its deep appreciation to the Secretary-General for his efforts in the implementation of Security Council resolutions 186 (1964) of 4 March 1964, 187 (1964) of 13 March 1964, 192 (1964) of 20 June and 194 (1964) of 25 September 1964,

*Renewing* the expression of its deep appreciation to the States that have contributed troops, police, supplies and financial support for the implementation of resolution 186 (1964).

1. *Reaffirms* its resolutions 186 (1964), 187 (1964), 192 (1964) and 194 (1964) and the consensus expressed by the President at the 1143rd meeting on 11 August 1964;
2. *Calls upon* all States Members of the United Nations to comply with the above-mentioned resolutions;
3. *Takes note* of the report of the Secretary-General;
4. *Extends* the stationing in Cyprus of the United Nations Peace-Keeping Force, established under Security Council resolution 186 (1964), for an additional period of three months, ending 26 March 1965.

*Adopted unanimously at the 1180th meeting.*

## Resolution 201 (1965)—19 March

[extending the mandate of UNFICYP to 26 June, 1965]

*The Security Council,*

*Noting* that the report of the Secretary-General (S/6228 and Add. 1) recommends the maintenance in Cyprus of the United Nations Peace-Keeping Force, created by Security Council resolution 186 (1964) of 4 March 1964, for an additional period of three months,

*Noting* that the Government of Cyprus has indicated its desire that the stationing of the United Nations Force in Cyprus should be continued beyond 26 March 1965,

*Noting* from the report of the Secretary-General that, while the military situation has on the whole remained quiet during the period under review and while the presence of the United Nations Force has contributed significantly to this effect, nevertheless the position remains one of uneasiness in several points with the consequent danger of a renewal of fighting with all of its disastrous consequences,

*Renewing* the expression of its deep appreciation to the Secretary-General for his efforts in the implementation of Security Council resolutions 186 (1964) of 4 March, 187 (1964) of 13 March, 192 (1964) of 20 June, 194 (1964) of 25 September and 198 (1964) of 18 December 1964,

*Renewing* the expression of its deep appreciation to the States that have contributed troops, police, supplies and financial support for the implementation of resolution 186 (1964),

1. *Reaffirms* its resolutions 186 (1964), 187 (1964), 192 (1964), 193 (1964) of 9 August 1964, 194 (1964) and 198 (1964) and the consensus expressed by the President at the 1143rd meeting, on 11 August 1964;
2. *Calls upon* all States Members of the United Nations to comply with the above-mentioned resolutions.
3. *Calls upon* the parties concerned to act with the utmost restraint and to cooperate fully with the United Nations Force;
4. *Takes note* of the report of the Secretary-General (S/6228 and Add. 1).

5. *Extends* the stationing in Cyprus of the United Nations Peace-Keeping Force, established under Security Council resolution 186 (1964), for an additional period of three months, ending 26 June 1965.

*Adopted unanimously at the 1193rd meeting.*

## Resolution 206 (1965)—15 June

[extending the mandate of UNFICYP to 26 December, 1965]

*The Security Council,*

*Noting* that the report of the Secretary-General (S/6426) recommends the maintenance in Cyprus of the United Nations Peace-Keeping Force, created by Security Council resolution 186 (1964) of 4 March 1964, for an additional period of six months,

*Noting* that the Government of Cyprus has indicated its desire that the stationing of the United Nations Force in Cyprus should be continued beyond 26 June 1965,

*Noting* from the report of the Secretary-General that, while the military situation has on the whole remained quiet during the period under review and while the presence of the United Nations Force has contributed significantly to this effect, nevertheless the quiet which prevails in the island is tenuous and, in fact, it is very likely that without the Force there would be an early recurrence of fighting,

*Renewing* the expression of its deep appreciation to the Secretary-General for his efforts in the implementation of Security Council resolutions 186 (1964) of 4 March, 187 (1964) of 13 March, 192 (1964) of 20 June, 194 (1964) of 25 September and 198 (1964) of 18 December 1964 and 201 (1965) of 19 March 1965,

*Renewing* the expression of its deep appreciation to the States that have contributed troops, police, supplies and financial support for the implementation of resolution 186 (1964),

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1. *Reaffirms* its resolutions 186 (1964), 187 (1964), 192 (1964), 193 (1964) of 9 August 1964, 194 (1964) and 198 (1964) and 201 (1965) and the consensus expressed by the President at the 1143 meeting, on 11 August 1964;
2. *Calls upon* all States Members of the United Nations to comply with the above-mentioned resolutions.
3. *Calls upon* the parties concerned to continue to act with the utmost restraint and to cooperate fully with the United Nations Force;
4. *Takes note* of the report of the Secretary-General (S/6426);

5. *Extends* the stationing in Cyprus of the United Nations Peace-Keeping Force, established under Security Council resolution 186 (1964), for an additional period of three months, ending 26 December 1965.

*Adopted unanimously at the 1224th meeting.*

## Resolution 207 (1965)—10 August

[on the increased tension in Cyprus]

*The Security Council,*

*Noting* the report of the Secretary-General on 29th July 1965, (S/6569) stating that recent developments in Cyprus have increased tension in the island,

*Noting* further the reports of the Secretary-General of 2nd August (S/6586) and 5th August (S/6569/Add. 1), and 10 August 1965, (S/6569/Add. 2)

*Having heard* the statements of the interested parties,

1. *Reaffirms* the resolution 186 (1964) of 4th March, 1964;
2. *Calls upon* the parties, in conformity with the above resolution, to avoid any action which is likely to worsen the situation.

*Adopted unanimously at the 1236th meeting.*



## Resolution 219 (1965)—17 December

[extending the mandate of UNFICYP to 26 March, 1966]

*The Security Council,*

*Noting* that the report of the Secretary-General dated 10 December 1965 (S/7001) states that the United Nations Peace-Keeping Force is needed in Cyprus,

*Noting* that the Government of Cyprus has agreed that in view of the prevailing conditions in the island it is necessary to continue the Force beyond 26 December 1965,

1. *Reaffirms* its resolutions 186 (1964) of 4 March, 187 (1964) of 13 March, 192 (1964) of 20 June, 193 (1964) of 9 August, 194 (1964) of 25 September and 198 (1964) of 18 December 1964, 201 (1965) of 19 March, 206 (1965) of 15 June and 207 (1965) of 10 August 1965 and the consensus expressed by the President at the 1143rd meeting, on 11 August 1964;
2. *Extends* once again the stationing of the United Nations Peace-Keeping Force, established under Security Council resolution 186 (1964), for an additional period of three months, ending 26 March 1966.

*Adopted unanimously at the 1270th meeting.*

## Resolution 220 (1966)—16 March

[extending the mandate of UNFICYP to 26 June, 1966]

*The Security Council,*

*Noting* that the report of the Secretary-General of 10 March 1966 (S/7191) that in the present circumstances the United Nations Peace-Keeping Force in Cyprus is still needed if peace is to be maintained in the island,

*Noting* that the Government of Cyprus has agreed that in view of the prevailing conditions in the island it is necessary to continue the Force beyond 26 March 1966,

*Noting* that the basic problem, according to the Secretary-General's report remains unsolved,

1. *Reaffirms* its resolutions 186 (1964) of 4 March, 187 (1964) of 13 March, 192 (1964) of 20 June, 193 (1964) of 9 August, 194 (1964) of 25 September and 198 (1964) of 18 December 1964, 201 (1965) of 19 March, 206 (1965) of 15 June, 207 (1965) of 10 August and 219 (1965) of 17 December 1965, and the consensus expressed by the President at the 1143rd meeting, on 11 August 1964;
2. *Urges* the parties concerned to act with the utmost restraint and to make determined efforts with a view to achieving the objectives of the Security Council;
3. *Extends* once again the stationing of the United Nations Peace-Keeping Force, established under Security Council resolution 186 (1964), for a period of three months ending 26 June 1966, in the firm hope that by the end of this period substantial progress towards a solution will have been achieved.

*Adopted unanimously at the 1275th meeting.*

## Resolution 222 (1966)—16 June

[extending the mandate of UNFICYP to 26 December, 1966]

*The Security Council,*

*Noting* from the report of the Secretary-General of 10 June 1966 (S/7350 and Add. 1) that in the present circumstances the United Nations Peace-Keeping Force in Cyprus is still needed if peace is to be maintained in the island,

*Noting* that the Government of Cyprus has agreed that in view of the prevailing conditions in the island it is necessary to continue the Force beyond 26 June 1966,

1. *Reaffirms* its resolutions 186 (1964) of 4 March, 187 (1964) of 13 March, 192 (1964) of 20 June, 193 (1964) of 9 August, 194 (1964) of 25 September and 198 (1964) of 18 December 1964, 201 (1965) of 19 March, 206 (1965) of 15 June, 207 (1965) of 10 August and 219 (1965) of 17 December 1965, and 220 (1966) of 16 March 1966, and the consensus expressed by the President at the 1143rd meeting, on 11 August 1964;
2. *Urges* the parties concerned to act with the utmost restraint and to make determined efforts with a view to achieving the objectives of the Security Council;
3. *Extends* the stationing in Cyprus of the United Nations Peace-Keeping Force, established under Security Council resolution 186 (1964), for a period of six months ending 26 December 1966, in the firm hope that by the end of this period substantial progress towards a solution will have been achieved so as to render possible a withdrawal or a substantial reduction of the Force.

*Adopted unanimously at the 1286th meeting.*

## Resolution 231 (1966)—15 December

[extending the mandate of UNFICYP to 26 June, 1967]

*The Security Council,*

*Noting* from the report of the Secretary-General of 8 December 1966 (S/7611 and Corr. 1 and Add. 1) that in the present circumstances the United Nations Peace-Keeping Force in Cyprus is still needed if peace is to be maintained in the island,

*Noting* that the Government of Cyprus has agreed that in view of the prevailing conditions in the island it is necessary to continue the Force beyond 26 June 1966,

1. *Reaffirms* its resolutions 186 (1964) of 4 March, 187 (1964) of 13 March, 192 (1964) of 20 June, 193 (1964) of 9 August, 194 (1964) of 25 September and 198 (1964) of 18 December 1964, 201 (1965) of 19 March, 206 (1965) of 15 June, 207 (1965) of 10 August and 219 (1965) of 17 December 1965, and 220 (1966) of 16 March 1966, and 222 (1966) of 16 June 1966, and the consensus expressed by the President at the 1143rd meeting, on 11 August 1964;
2. *Urges* the parties concerned to act with the utmost restraint and to continue determined co-operative efforts to achieve the objectives of the Security Council;
3. *Extends* the stationing in Cyprus of the United Nations Peace-Keeping Force, established under Security Council resolution 186 (1964), for a further period of six months ending 26 June 1967, in the expectation that by then sufficient progress towards a solution will make possible a withdrawal or substantial reduction of the Force.

*Adopted unanimously at the 1338th meeting.*

## Resolution 238 (1967)—19 June

[extending the mandate of UNFICYP to 26 December, 1967]

*The Security Council,*

*Noting* from the report of the Secretary-General of 13 June 1967 (S/7969) that in the present circumstances the United Nations Peace-Keeping Force in Cyprus is still needed if peace is to be maintained in the island,

*Noting* that the Government of Cyprus has agreed that in view of the prevailing conditions in the island it is necessary to continue the Force beyond 26 June 1967,

1. *Reaffirms* its resolutions 186 (1964) of 4 March, 187 (1964) of 13 March, 192 (1964) of 20 June, 193 (1964) of 9 August, 194 (1964) of 25 September and 198 (1964) of 18 December 1964, 201 (1965) of 19 March, 206 (1965) of 15 June, 207 (1965) of 10 August and 219 (1965) of 17 December 1965, and 220 (1966) of 16 March 1966, 222 (1966) of 16 June and 231 (1966) of 15 December 1966, and the consensus expressed by the President at the 1143rd meeting on 11 August 1964;
2. *Urges* the parties concerned to act with the utmost restraint and to continue determined co-operative efforts to achieve the objectives of the Security Council;
3. *Extends* once more the stationing in Cyprus of the United Nations Peace-Keeping Force, established under Security Council resolution 186 (1964), for a further period of six months ending 26 December 1967, in the expectation that by then sufficient progress towards a solution will make possible a withdrawal or substantial reduction of the Force.

*Adopted unanimously at the 1362nd meeting.*

## Resolution 244 (1967)—22 December

[extending the mandate of UNFICYP to 26 March, 1968; parties invited to avail themselves of the Secretary-General's proffer of good offices]

*The Security Council,*

*Noting* that the appeals addressed by the Secretary-General to the Governments of Greece, Turkey and Cyprus on 22 November (S/8248/Add. 3), 24 November (S/8248/Add. 5) and 3 December (S/8248/Add. 6, para 1) and the report of the Secretary-General of 8 December 1967 (S/8286),

*Noting* the replies of the three Governments concerned (S/8248/Add. 7-9) to the appeal of the Secretary-General of 3 December in which the Secretary-General proffered his good offices, and their replies (S/8248/Add. 6 paras 3 and 4) to his previous appeals,

*Noting* from the said report of the Secretary-General that circumstances continue to require the presence of the United Nations Peace-Keeping Force in Cyprus for a further period,

*Noting* that the Government of Cyprus has agreed that it is necessary to continue the Force beyond 26 December 1967,

1. *Reaffirms* its resolutions 186 (1964) of 4 March 1964 and its subsequent resolutions as well as its expressions of consensus on this question;
2. *Extends the stationing* in Cyprus of the United Nations Peace-Keeping Force established under the Council's resolution 186 (1964) for a period of three months ending on 26 March 1968;
3. *Invites* the parties promptly to avail themselves of the good offices proffered by the Secretary-General and requests the Secretary-General to report on the results to the Council as appropriate;
4. *Calls upon* all the parties concerned to continue to show the utmost moderation and restraint and refrain from any act which might aggravate the situation;
5. *Urges* the parties concerned to undertake a new determined effort to achieve the objectives of the Security Council with a view, as requested in the Council's consensus of 25 November

1967, to keeping the peace and arriving at a permanent settlement in accordance with Security Council resolution 186 (1964) of 4 March 1964:

6. *Decides* to remain seized of this question and to reconvene for the further consideration as soon as circumstances and developments so require.

*Adopted unanimously at its 1386th meeting.*

## Resolution 247 (1968)—18 March

[extending the mandate of UNFICYP to 26 June, 1968]

*The Security Council,*

*Noting* from the report of the Secretary-General of 9 March 1968 (S/8446) that in the present circumstances the United Nations Peace-Keeping Force in Cyprus is still needed if peace is to be maintained in the island,

*Noting* that the Government of Cyprus has agreed that in view of the prevailing conditions in the island it is necessary to continue the Force beyond 26 March 1968,

*Noting* from the observations in the report, the new conditions prevailing in the island,

1. *Reaffirms* its resolutions 186 (1964) of 4 March, 187 (1964) of 13 March, 192 (1964) of 20 June, 193 (1964) of 9 August, 194 (1964) of 25 September and 198 (1964) of 18 December 1964, 201 (1965) of 19 March, 206 (1965) of 15 June, 207 (1965) of 10 August and 219 (1965) of 17 December 1965, 220 (1966) of 16 March, 222 (1966) of 16 June, 231 (1966) of 15 December 1966, 238 (1967) of 19 June and 244 (1967) of 22 December 1967; and the consensus expressed by the President at the 1143rd meeting on 11 August 1964 and at the 1383rd meeting of 25 November 1967;
2. *Urges* the parties concerned to act with the utmost restraint, and to continue determined co-operative efforts to achieve the objectives of the Security Council by availing themselves in a constructive manner of the present auspicious climate and opportunities;
3. *Extends* once more the stationing in Cyprus of the United Nations Peace-Keeping Force established under Security Council resolution 186 (1964), for a further period of three months ending 26 June 1968, in the expectation that by then sufficient progress towards a final solution will make possible a withdrawal or substantial reduction of the Force.

*Adopted unanimously at the 1398th meeting.*



## Resolution 254 (1968)—18 June

[extending the mandate of UNFICYP to 15 December, 1968]

*The Security Council,*

*Noting* from the report of the Secretary-General of 11 June 1968 (S/8622 and Corr. 1) that in the present circumstances the United Nations Peace-Keeping Force in Cyprus is still needed if peace is to be maintained in the island,

*Noting* that the Government of Cyprus has agreed that in view of the prevailing conditions in the island it is necessary to continue the Force beyond 26 June 1968,

*Noting* from the observations in the report, the encouraging recent developments in the island,

1. *Reaffirms* its resolutions 186 (1964) of 4 March, 187 (1964) of 13 March, 192 (1964) of 20 June, 193 (1964) of 9 August, 194 (1964) of 25 September and 198 (1964) of 18 December 1964, 201 (1965) of 19 March, 206 (1965) of 15 June, 207 (1965) of 10 August and 219 (1965) of 17 December 1965, 220 (1966) of 16 March, 222 (1966) of 16 June, 231 (1966) of 15 December 1966, 238 (1967) of 19 June and 244 (1967) of 22 December 1967 and 247 (1968) of 18 March 1968, and the consensus expressed by the President at the 1383rd meeting, of 25 November 1967;
2. *Urges* the parties concerned to act with the utmost restraint, and to continue determined co-operative efforts to achieve the objectives of the Security Council by availing themselves in a constructive manner of the present auspicious climate and opportunities;
3. *Extends* once more the stationing in Cyprus of the United Nations Peace-Keeping Force established under Security Council resolution 186 (1964), for a further period ending 15 December 1968, in the expectation that by then sufficient progress towards a final solution will make possible a withdrawal or substantial reduction of the Force.

*Adopted unanimously at the 1432nd meeting.*

## Resolution 261 (1968)—10 December

[extending the mandate of UNFICYP to 15 June, 1969]

*The Security Council,*

*Noting* from the report of the Secretary-General of 4 December 1968 (S/8914) that in the present circumstances the United Nations Peace-Keeping Force in Cyprus is still needed if peace is to be maintained in the island,

*Noting* that the Government of Cyprus has agreed that in view of the prevailing conditions in the island it is necessary to continue the Force beyond 15 December 1968,

*Noting* from the observations in the report, the encouraging recent developments in the island,

1. *Reaffirms* its resolutions 186 (1964) of 4 March, 187 (1964) of 13 March, 192 (1964) of 20 June, 193 (1964) of 9 August, 194 (1964) of 25 September and 198 (1964) of 18 December 1964, 201 (1965) of 19 March, 206 (1965) of 15 June, 207 (1965) of 10 August, 219 (1965) of 17 December 1965, 220 (1966) of 16 March, 222 (1966) of 16 June, 231 (1966) of 15 December 1966, 238 (1967) of 19 June, 244 (1967) of 22 December 1967, 247 (1968) of 18 March 1968, 254 (1968) of 18 June and the consensus expressed by the President at the 1143rd meeting on 11 August 1964 and at the 1383rd meeting of 25 November 1967;

2. *Urges* the parties concerned to act with the utmost restraint, and to continue determined co-operative efforts to achieve the objectives of the Security Council by availing themselves in a constructive manner of the present auspicious climate and opportunities;

3. *Extends* once more the stationing in Cyprus of the United Nations Peace-Keeping Force established under Security Council resolution 186 (1964), for a further period ending 15 June 1969, in the expectation that by then sufficient progress towards a final solution will make possible a withdrawal or substantial reduction of the Force.

*Adopted unanimously at its 1459th meeting.*

## Resolution 266 (1969)—10 June

[extending the mandate of UNFICYP to 15 December, 1969]

*The Security Council,*

*Noting* from the report of the Secretary-General of 3 June 1969 (S/9233) that in the present circumstances the United Nations Peace-Keeping Force in Cyprus is still needed if peace is to be maintained in the island,

*Noting* that the Government of Cyprus has agreed that in view of the prevailing conditions in the island it is necessary to continue the Force beyond 15 June 1969,

*Noting* from the observations in the report, that the improvement of the situation in Cyprus has been maintained during the period under review,

1. *Reaffirms* its resolutions 186 (1964) of 4 March, 187 (1964) of 13 March, 192 (1964) of 20 June, 193 (1964) of 9 August, 194 (1964) of 25 September and 198 (1964) of 18 December 1964, 201 (1965) of 19 March, 206 (1965) of 15 June, 207 (1965) of 10 August, 219 (1965) of 17 December 1965, 220 (1966) of 16 March, 222 (1966) of 16 June, 231 (1966) of 15 December 1966, 238 (1967) of 19 June, 244 (1967) of 22 December 1967, 247 (1968) of 18 March 1968, 254 (1968) of 18 June and 261 (1968) of 10 December 1968 and the consensus expressed by the President at the 1143rd meeting on 11 August 1964 and at the 1383rd meeting of 25 November 1967;
2. *Urges* the parties concerned to act with the utmost restraint, and to continue determined co-operative efforts to achieve the objectives of the Security Council by availing themselves in a constructive manner of the present auspicious climate and opportunities;
3. *Extends* once more the stationing in Cyprus of the United Nations Peace-Keeping Force established under Security Council resolution 186 (1964), for a further period ending 15 December 1969, in the expectation that sufficient progress towards a final solution will make possible a withdrawal or substantial reduction of the Force.

*Adopted unanimously at its 1474th meeting.*

## Resolution 274 (1969)—11 December

[extending the mandate of UNFICYP to 15 June, 1970]

*The Security Council,*

*Noting* from the report of the Secretary-General of 3 December 1969 (S/9521) that in the present circumstances the United Nations Peace-Keeping Force in Cyprus is still needed if peace is to be maintained in the island,

*Noting* that the Government of Cyprus has agreed that in view of the prevailing conditions in the island it is necessary to continue the Force beyond 15 December 1969,

*Noting* from the observations in the report, that the improvement of the situation in Cyprus has continued during the period under review,

1. *Reaffirms* its resolutions 186 (1964) of 4 March, 187 (1964) of 13 March, 192 (1964) of 20 June, 193 (1964) of 9 August, 194 (1964) of 25 September and 198 (1964) of 18 December 1964, 201 (1965) of 19 March, 206 (1965) of 15 June, 207 (1965) of 10 August, 219 (1965) of 17 December 1965, 220 (1966) of 16 March, 222 (1966) of 16 June and 231 (1966) of 15 December 1966, 238 (1967) of 19 June, 244 (1967) of 22 December 1967, 247 (1968) of 18 March 1968, 254 (1968) of 18 June and 261 (1968) of 10 December 1968, 266 (1969) of 10 June 1969, and the consensus expressed by the President at the 1143rd meeting on 11 August 1964 and at the 1383rd meeting of 25 November 1967;
2. *Urges* the parties concerned to act with the utmost restraint, and to continue determined co-operative efforts to achieve the objectives of the Security Council by availing themselves in a constructive manner of the present auspicious climate and opportunities;
3. *Extends* once more the stationing in Cyprus of the United Nations Peace-Keeping Force established under Security Council resolution 186 (1964), for a further period ending 15 June 1970, in the expectation that by then sufficient progress towards a final solution will make possible a withdrawal or substantial reduction of the Force.

*Adopted unanimously at the 1521st meeting.*

## Resolution 281 (1970)—9 June

[extending the mandate of UNFICYP to 15 December, 1970]

*The Security Council,*

*Noting* from the report of the Secretary-General of 1 June 1970 (S/9814), that in the present circumstances the United Nations Peace-Keeping Force in Cyprus is still needed if peace is to be maintained in the island,

*Noting* that the Government of Cyprus has agreed that in view of the prevailing conditions in the island it is necessary to continue the Force beyond 15 June 1970,

*Noting* also from the report the conditions prevailing in the island,

1. *Reaffirms* its resolutions 186 (1964) of 4 March, 187 (1964) of 13 March, 192 (1964) of 20 June, 193 (1964) of 9 August, 194 (1964) of 25 September and 198 (1964) of 18 December 1964, 201 (1965) of 19 March, 206 (1965) of 15 June, 207 (1965) of 10 August and 219 (1965) of 17 December 1965, 220 (1966) of 16 March, 222 (1966) of 16 June, 231 (1966) of 15 December 1966, 238 (1967) of 19 June, 244 (1967) of 22 December 1967, 247 (1968) of 18 March 1968, 254 (1968) of 18 June, 261 (1968) of 10 December 1968, 266 (1969) of 10 June 1969, 274 (1969) of 11 December 1969, and the consensus expressed by the President at the 1143rd meeting on 11 August 1964 and at the 1383rd meeting of 25 November 1967;
2. *Urges* the parties concerned to act with the utmost restraint and to continue determined co-operative efforts to achieve the objectives of the Security Council by availing themselves in a constructive manner of the present auspicious climate and opportunities;
3. *Extends* once more the stationing in Cyprus of the United Nations Peace-Keeping Force established under Security Council resolution 186 (1964), for a further period ending 15 December 1970, in the expectation that by then sufficient progress towards a final solution will make possible a withdrawal or substantial reduction of the Force.

*Adopted unanimously at the 1543rd meeting.*

## Resolution 291 (1970)—10 December

[extending the mandate of UNFICYP to 15 June, 1971]

*The Security Council,*

*Noting* from the report of the Secretary-General of 2 December 1970 (S/10005), that in the present circumstances the United Nations Peace-Keeping Force in Cyprus is still needed if peace is to be maintained in the island,

*Noting* that the Government of Cyprus has agreed that in view of the prevailing conditions in the island it is necessary to continue the Force beyond 15 December, 1970,

*Noting* also from the report the conditions prevailing in the island,

1. *Reaffirms* its resolutions 186 (1964) of 4 March, 187 (1964) of 13 March, 192 (1964) of 20 June, 193 (1964) of 9 August, 194 (1964) of 25 September and 198 (1964) of 18 December 1964, 201 (1965) of 19 March, 206 (1965) of 15 June, 207 (1965) of 10 August, 219 (1965) of 17 December 1965, 220 (1966) of 16 March, 222 (1966) of 16 June, 231 (1966) of 15 December 1966, 238 (1967) of 19 June, 244 (1967) of 22 December 1967, 247 (1968) of 18 March 1968, 254 (1968) of 18 June and 261 (1968) of 10 December 1968, 266 (1969) of 10 June 1969, 274 (1969), of 11 December 1969 and 281 (1970) of 9 June 1970, and the consensus expressed by the President at the 1143rd meeting on 11 August 1964 and at the 1383rd meeting of 25 November 1967;
2. *Urges* the parties concerned to act with the utmost restraint and to continue determined co-operative efforts to achieve the objectives of the Security Council by availing themselves in a constructive manner of the present auspicious climate and opportunities;
3. *Extends* once more the stationing in Cyprus of the United Nations Peace-Keeping Force established under Security Council resolution 186 (1964), for a further period ending 15 June 1971, in the expectation that by then sufficient progress towards a final solution will make possible a withdrawal or substantial reduction of the Force.

*Adopted unanimously at its 1564th meeting.*

## Resolution 293 (1971)—26 May

[extending the mandate of UNFICYP to 15 December, 1971]

*The Security Council,*

*Noting* from the report of the Secretary-General of 20 May 1971 (S/10199), that in the present circumstances the United Nations Peace-Keeping Force in Cyprus is still needed if peace is to be maintained in the island,

*Noting* that the Government of Cyprus has agreed that in view of the prevailing conditions in the island it is necessary to continue the Force beyond 15 June 1971,

*Noting* also from the report the conditions prevailing in the island,

1. *Reaffirms* its resolutions 186 (1964) of 4 March, 187 (1964) of 13 March, 192 (1964) of 20 June, 193 (1964) of 9 August, 194 (1964) of 25 September and 198 (1964) of 18 December 1964, 201 (1965) of 19 March, 206 (1965) of 15 June, 207 (1965) of 10 August, and 219 (1965) of 17 December 1965, 220 (1966) of 16 March 1968, 222 (1966) of 16 June, and 231 (1966) of 15 December 1966, 238 (1967) of 19 June, and 244 (1967) of 22 December 1967, 247 (1968) of 18 March 1968, 254 (1968) of 18 June and 261 (1968) of 10 December 1968, 266 (1969) of 10 June 1969, 274 (1969) of 11 December 1969, and the consensus expressed by the President at the 1143rd meeting on 11 August 1964 and at the 1383rd meeting of 25 November 1967;
2. *Urges* the parties concerned to act with the utmost restraint and to continue determined co-operative efforts to achieve the objectives of the Security Council by availing themselves in a constructive manner of the present auspicious climate and opportunities;
3. *Extends* once more the stationing in Cyprus of the United Nations Peace-Keeping Force established under Security Council resolution 186 (1964), for a further period ending 15 December 1971, in the expectation that by then sufficient progress towards a final solution will make possible a withdrawal or substantial reduction of the Force.

*Adopted unanimously at its 1567th meeting.*

## Resolution 305 (1971)—13 December

[extending the mandate of UNFICYP to 15 June, 1972]

*The Security Council,*

*Noting* from the report of the Secretary-General of 30 November 1971 (S/10401), that in the present circumstances the United Nations Peace-Keeping Force in Cyprus is still needed if peace is to be maintained in the island,

*Noting* that the Government of Cyprus has agreed that in view of the prevailing conditions in the island it is necessary to continue the Force beyond 15 December 1971,

*Noting* also from the report the conditions prevailing in the island,

1. *Reaffirms* its resolutions 186 (1964) of 4 March, 187 (1964) of 13 March, 192 (1964) of 20 June, 193 (1964) of 9 August, 194 (1964) of 25 September and 198 (1964) of 18 December 1964, 201 (1965) of 19 March, 206 (1965) of 15 June, 207 (1965) of 10 August, 219 (1965) of 17 December 1965, 220 (1966) of 16 March, 222 (1966) of 16 June and 231 (1966) of 15 December 1966, 238 (1967) of 19 June, 244 (1967) of 22 December 1967, 247 (1968) of 18 March 1968, 254 (1968) of 18 June and 261 (1968) of 10 December 1968 and 266 (1969) of 10 June and 274 (1969), of 11 December 1969 and 281 (1970) of 9 June 1970 and 291 (1970) of 10 December 1970, 293 (1971) of 26 May 1971 and the consensus expressed by the President at the 1143rd meeting on 11 August 1964 and at the 1383rd meeting of 25 November 1967;
2. *Urges* the parties concerned to act with the utmost restraint and to continue determined co-operative efforts to achieve the objectives of the Security Council by availing themselves in a constructive manner of the present auspicious climate and opportunities;



3. *Extends* once more the stationing in Cyprus of the United Nations Peace-Keeping Force established under Security Council resolution 186 (1964), for a further period ending 15 June 1972, in the expectation that by then sufficient progress towards a final solution will make possible a withdrawal or substantial reduction of the Force.

*Adopted at the 1612th meeting by 14 votes to none. One member (China) did not participate in the voting.*

## Resolution 315 (1972)—15 June

[extending the mandate of UNFICYP to 15 December, 1972]

*The Security Council,*

*Noting* from the report of the Secretary-General of 26 May 1972 (S/10664), that in the present circumstances the United Nations Peace-Keeping Force in Cyprus is still needed if peace is to be maintained in the island,

*Noting* that the Government of Cyprus has agreed that in view of the prevailing conditions in the island it is necessary to continue the Force beyond 15 June 1972,

*Noting* also from the report the conditions prevailing in the island,

1. *Reaffirms* its resolutions 186 (1964) of 4 March, 187 (1964) of 13 March, 192 (1964) of 20 June, 193 (1964) of 9 August, 194 (1964) of 25 September and 198 (1964) of 18 December 1964, 201 (1965) of 19 March, 206 (1965) of 15 June, 207 (1965) of 10 August and 219 (1965) of 17 December 1965, 220 (1966) of 16 March 1968, 222 (1966) of 16 June, 231 (1966) of 15 December 1966, 238 (1967) of 19 June, 244 (1967) of 22 December 1967, 247 (1968) of 18 March 1968, 254 (1968) of 18 June and 261 (1968) of 10 December 1968 and 266 (1969) of 10 June and 274 (1969) of 11 December 1969, 281 (1970) of 9 June 1970 and 291 (1970) of 10 December 1970, 293 (1971) of 26 May and 305 (1971) of 13 December 1971 and the consensus expressed by the President at the 1143rd meeting on 11 August 1964 and at the 1383rd meeting of 25 November 1967;
2. *Urges* the parties concerned to act with the utmost restraint and to continue and accelerate determined co-operative efforts to achieve the objectives of the Security Council by availing themselves in a constructive manner of the present auspicious climate and opportunities;

3. *Extends* once more the stationing in Cyprus of the United Nations Peace-Keeping Force established under Security Council resolution 186 (1964), for a further period ending 15 December 1972, in the expectation that by then sufficient progress towards a final solution will make possible a withdrawal or substantial reduction of the Force.

*Adopted at the 1646th meeting by 14 votes to none with 1 abstention (China).*

## Resolution 324 (1972)—12 December

[extending the mandate of UNFICYP to 15 June, 1973]

*The Security Council,*

*Noting* from the report of the Secretary-General of 1 December 1972 (S/10842), that in the present circumstances the United Nations Peace-Keeping Force in Cyprus is still needed if peace is to be maintained in the island,

*Noting* that the Government of Cyprus has agreed that in view of the prevailing conditions in the island it is necessary to continue the Force beyond 15 December 1972,

*Noting* also from the report the conditions prevailing in the island,

1. *Reaffirms* its resolutions 186 (1964) of 4 March, 187 (1964) of 13 March, 192 (1964) of 20 June, 193 (1964) of 9 August, 194 (1964) of 25 September and 198 (1964) of 18 December 1964, 201 (1965) of 19 March, 206 (1965) of 15 June, 207 (1965) of 10 August and 219 (1965) of 17 December 1965, 220 (1966), of 16 March, 222 (1966) of 16 June and 231 (1966) of 15 December 1966, 238 (1967) of 19 June, 244 (1967) of 22 December 1967, 247 (1968) of 18 March 1968, 254 (1968) of 18 June and 261 (1968) of 10 December 1968 and 266 (1969) of 10 June and 274 (1969) of 11 December 1969, 281 (1970) of 9 June and 291 (1970) of 10 December 1970, 293 (1971) of 26 May and 305 (1971) of 13 December 1971 and 315 (1972) of 15 June 1972, and the consensus expressed by the President at the 1143rd meeting on 11 August 1964 and at the 1383rd meeting of 25 November 1967;
2. *Urges* the parties concerned to act with the utmost restraint and to continue and accelerate determined co-operative efforts to achieve the objectives of the Security Council by availing themselves in a constructive manner of the present auspicious climate and opportunities;

3. *Extends* once more the stationing in Cyprus of the United Nations Peace-Keeping Force established under Security Council resolution 186 (1964), for a further period ending 15 June 1973, in the expectation that by then sufficient progress towards a final solution will make possible a withdrawal or substantial reduction of the Force.

*Adopted at the 1683rd meeting by 14 votes to none with 1 abstention (China).*

## Resolution 334 (1973)—15 June

[extending the mandate of UNFICYP to 15 December, 1973]

*The Security Council,*

*Noting* from the report of the Secretary-General of 31 May 1973 (S/10940 & Corr. 1) that in the present circumstances the United Nations Peace-Keeping Force in Cyprus is still needed if peace is to be maintained in the island,

*Noting* that the Government of Cyprus has agreed that in view of the prevailing conditions in the island it is necessary to continue the Force beyond 15 June, 1973,

*Noting* also from the report the conditions prevailing in the island,

1. *Reaffirms* its resolutions 186 (1964) of 4 March, 187 (1964) of 13 March, 192 (1964) of 20 June, 193 (1964) of 9 August, 194 (1964) of 25 September and 198 (1964) of 18 December 1964, 201 (1965) of 19 March, 206 (1965) of 15 June, 207 (1965) of 10 August and 219 (1965) of 17 December 1965, 220 (1966) of 16 March, 222 (1966) of 16 June and 231 (1966) of 15 December 1966, 238 (1967) of 19 June, 244 (1967) of 22 December 1967, 247 (1968) of 18 March, 254 (1968) of 18 June and 261 (1968) of 10 December 1968 and 266 (1969) of 10 June and 274 (1969) of 11 December 1969, 281 (1970) of 9 June and 291 (1970) of 10 December 1970, 293 (1971) of 26 May and 305 (1971) of 13 December 1971, 315 (1972) of 15 June and 324 (1972) of 12 December 1972 and the consensus expressed by the President at the 1143rd meeting on 11 August 1964 and at the 1383rd meeting of 25 November 1967;
2. *Urges* the parties concerned to act with the utmost restraint and to continue determined co-operative efforts to achieve the objectives of the Security Council by availing themselves in a constructive manner of the present auspicious climate and opportunities;

3. *Extends* once more the stationing in Cyprus of the United Nations Peace-Keeping Force established under Security Council resolution 186 (1964), for a further period ending 15 December 1973, in the expectation that by then sufficient progress towards a final solution will make possible a withdrawal or substantial reduction of the Force.

*Adopted at the 1727th meeting by 14 votes to none with 1 abstention (China).*

## Resolution 343 (1973)—14 December

[extending the mandate of UNFICYP to 15 June, 1974]

*The Security Council,*

*Noting* from the report of the Secretary-General of 1 December 1973 (S/11137) that in the present circumstances the United Nations Peace-Keeping Force in Cyprus is still needed if peace is to be maintained in the island,

*Noting* that the Government of Cyprus has agreed that in view of the prevailing conditions in the island it is necessary to continue the Force beyond 15 December, 1973,

*Noting* also from the report the conditions prevailing in the island,

1. *Reaffirms* its resolutions 186 (1964) of 4 March, 187 (1964) of 13 March, 192 (1964) of 20 June, 193 (1964) of 9 August, 194 (1964) of 25 September and 198 (1964) of 18 December 1964, 201 (1965) of 19 March, 206 (1965) of 15 June, 207 (1965) of 10 August and 219 (1965) of 17 December 1965, 220 (1966) of 16 March, 222 (1966) of 16 June and 231 (1966) of 15 December 1966, 238 (1967) of 19 June, 244 (1967) of 22 December 1967, 247 (1968) of 18 March, 254 (1968) of 18 June and 261 (1968) of 10 December 1968 and 266 (1969) of 10 June and 274 (1969) of 11 December 1969, 281 (1970) of 9 June and 291 (1970) of 10 December 1970, 293 (1971) of 26 May and 305 (1971) of 13 December 1971 and 315 (1972) of 15 June and 214 (1972) of 12 December 1972 and 334 (1973) of 15 June 1973 and the consensus expressed by the President at the 1143rd meeting on 11 August 1964 and at the 1383rd meeting of 25 November 1967;
2. *Urges* the parties concerned to act with the utmost restraint and to continue determined co-operative efforts to achieve the objectives of the Security Council by availing themselves in a constructive manner of the present auspicious climate and opportunities;



3. *Extends* once more the stationing in Cyprus of the United Nations Peace-Keeping Force established under Security Council resolution 186 (1964), for a further period ending 15 June 1974, and in the expectation that by then sufficient progress towards a final solution will make possible a withdrawal or substantial reduction of the Force.

*Adopted at the 1759th meeting by 14 votes to none with 1 abstention (China).*



## Resolution 349 (1974)—29 June

[extending the mandate of UNFICYP to 15 December, 1974]

*The Security Council,*

*Noting* from the report of the Secretary-General of 22 May 1974 (S/11294), that in the present circumstances the United Nations Peace-Keeping Force in Cyprus is still needed if peace is to be maintained in the island,

*Noting* that the Government of Cyprus has agreed that in view of the prevailing conditions in the island it is necessary to continue the Force beyond 15 June 1974,

*Noting* also from the report the conditions prevailing in the island,

1. *Reaffirms* its resolutions 186 (1964) of 4 March, 187 (1964) of 13 March, 192 (1964) of 20 June, 193 (1964) of 9 August, 194 (1964) of 25 September and 198 (1964) of 18 December 1964, 201 (1965) of 19 March, 206 (1965) of 15 June, 207 (1965) of 10 August and 219 (1965) of 17 December 1965, 220 (1966) of 16 March, 222 (1966) of 16 June and 231 (1966) of 15 December 1966, 238 (1967) of 19 June, 244 (1967) of 22 December 1967, 247 (1968) of 18 March, 254 (1968) of 18 June and 261 (1968) of 10 December 1968 and 266 (1969) of 10 June and 274 (1969) of 11 December 1969, 281 (1970) of 9 June and 291 (1970) of 10 December 1970, 293 (1971) of 26 May and 305 (1971) of 13 December 1971 and 315 (1972) of 15 June and 324 (1972) of 12 December 1972, 334 (1973) of 15 June 1973 and 343 (1973) of 14 December 1973 and the consensus expressed by the President at the 1143rd meeting on 11 August 1964 and at the 1383rd meeting of 25 November 1967;
2. *Urges* the parties concerned to act with the utmost restraint and to continue determined co-operative efforts to achieve the objectives of the Security Council by availing themselves in a constructive manner of the present auspicious climate and opportunities;
3. *Extends* once more the stationing in Cyprus of the United Nations Peace-Keeping Force established under Security Council resolution 186 (1964), for a further period ending 15 December 1974, in the expectation that by then sufficient

progress towards a final solution will make possible a withdrawal or substantial reduction of the Force.

*Adopted at the 1771st meeting by 14 votes to none with 1 abstention (China).*

## Resolution 353 (1974)—20 July

[deploring the violence and bloodshed; calling for a cease-fire and the end of foreign military intervention in Cyprus; calling on Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom to enter into negotiation]

*The Security Council,*

*Having considered* the report of the Secretary-General at its 1779th meeting about the recent developments in Cyprus,

*Having heard* the statement made by the President of the Republic of Cyprus and the statements by the representatives of Cyprus, Turkey, Greece and other Member States.

*Having considered* at its present meeting further developments in the island,

*Deeply deploring* the outbreak of violence and continuing bloodshed,

*Gravely concerned* about the situation which led to a serious threat to international peace and security, and which created a most explosive situation in the whole Eastern Mediterranean area,

*Equally concerned* about the necessity to restore the constitutional structure of the Republic of Cyprus, established and guaranteed by international agreement,

*Recalling* its resolution 186 (1964) of 4 March 1964 and its subsequent resolutions on this matter,

*Conscious of* this primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security in accordance with Article 24 of the Charter of the United Nations,

1. *Calls upon* all States to respect the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of Cyprus;
2. *Calls upon* all parties to the present fighting as a first step to cease all firing and requests all States to exercise the utmost restraint and to refrain from any action which might further aggravate the situation;

3. *Demands* an immediate end to foreign military intervention in the Republic of Cyprus that is in contravention of paragraph 1 above;
4. *Requests* the withdrawal without delay from the Republic of Cyprus of foreign military personnel present otherwise than under the authority of international agreements, including those whose withdrawal was requested by the President of the Republic of Cyprus, Archbishop Makarios, in his letter of 2 July 1974;
5. *Calls upon* Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to enter into negotiation without delay for the restoration of peace in the area and constitutional government in Cyprus and to keep the Secretary-General informed;
6. *Calls upon* all parties to cooperate fully with the United Nations Peace-Keeping Force in Cyprus to enable it to carry out its mandate;
7. *Decides* to keep the situation under constant review and asks the Secretary-General to report as appropriate with a view to adopting further measures in order to ensure that peaceful conditions are restored as soon as possible.

*Adopted unanimously at the 1781st meeting.*

## Resolution 354 (1974)—23 July

[demanding a cease-fire]

*The Security Council,*

*Reaffirming* the provisions 353 (1974) of 20 July 1974,

*Demands* that all parties to the present fighting comply immediately with paragraph 2 of Security Council resolution 353 (1974) calling for an immediate cessation of all firing in the area and requesting all States to exercise the utmost restraint and to refrain from any action which might further aggravate the situation.

*Adopted unanimously at the 1873rd meeting.*

## Resolution 355 (1974)—1 August

[requesting appropriate action and a full report from the Secretary General]

*The Security Council,*

*Recalling* its resolutions 186 (1964) of 4 March 1964, 353 (1974) of 20 July 1974 and 354 (1974) of 23 July 1974,

*Noting* that all States have declared their respect for the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of Cyprus,

*Taking note* of the Secretary-General's statement made at the 1788th meeting of *The Security Council,*

*Requests* the Secretary-General to take appropriate action in the light of his statement and to present a full report to the Council, taking into account that the cease-fire will be the first step in the full implementation of Security Council resolution 353 (1974).

*Adopted at the 1789th meeting by 12 votes to none with two abstentions (Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics). One member (China) did not participate in the voting.*



## Resolution 357 (1974)—14 August

[demanding a cease-fire and calling for resumption of negotiations]

*The Security Council,*

*Reaffirming* its resolutions 353 (1974) of 20 July 1974, 354 (1974) of 23 July 1974 and 355 (1974) of 1 August 1974,

*Deeply deploring* the resumption of fighting in Cyprus contrary to the provisions of its resolutions 353 (1974),

1. *Reaffirms* its resolution 353 (1974) in all its provisions and calls upon the parties concerned to implement those provisions without delay;
2. *Demands* that all parties to the present fighting cease all firing and military action forthwith;
3. *Calls for* the resumption of negotiations without delay for the restoration of peace in the area and constitutional government in Cyprus in accordance with resolution 353 (1974);
4. *Decides* to remain seized of the situation and on instant call to meet as necessary to consider what more effective measures may be required if the cease-fire is not respected.

*Adopted unanimously at the 1792nd meeting.*

## Resolution 358 (1974)—15 August

[deploring the non-compliance with Resolution 357 (1974); insisting on compliance with Resolutions 353, 354, 355 and 357 (1974)]

*The Security Council,*

*Deeply concerned about the continuation of violence and bloodshed in Cyprus,*

*Deeply deploring the non-compliance with its resolution 357 (1974) of 14 August 1974,*

1. *Recalls its resolutions 353 (1974) of 20 July, 354 (1974) of 23 July, 355 (1974) of 1st August and 357 (1974);*
2. *Insists on the full implementation of the above resolutions by all parties with the immediate and strict observance of the cease-fire.*

*Adopted unanimously at the 1793rd meeting.*

## Resolution 359 (1974)—15 August

[deploring deaths and injuries of members of the UN Peace-Keeping Force; demanding that all parties cooperate with and respect members of the Peace-Keeping Force]

*The Security Council,*

*Noting with concern* from the Secretary-General's reports on developments in Cyprus, in particular documents S/11353 Add. 24 and 25, that casualties are increasing among the personnel of the United Nations Peace-Keeping Force in Cyprus as a direct result of the military action which is still continuing in Cyprus,

*Recalling* that the United Nations Peace-Keeping Force in Cyprus was stationed in Cyprus with the full consent of the Governments of Cyprus, Turkey and Greece,

*Bearing in mind* that the Secretary-General was requested by the Security Council in resolution 355 (1974) of 1 August 1974 to take appropriate action in the light of his statement made at the 1788th meeting of the Council in which he dealt with the role, functions and strength of the United Nations Peace-Keeping Force in Cyprus and related issues arising out of the most recent political developments in respect of Cyprus,

1. *Deeply deplores* the fact that members of the United Nations Peace-Keeping Force in Cyprus have been killed and wounded;
2. *Demands* that all parties concerned fully respect the international status of the United Nations Peace-Keeping Force and refrain from any action which might endanger the lives and safety of its members;
3. *Urges* the parties concerned to demonstrate in a firm, clear and unequivocal manner, their willingness to fulfil the commitments they have entered into in this regard;
4. *Demands further* that all parties cooperate with the United Nations Force in carrying out its tasks, including humanitarian functions, in all areas of Cyprus and in regard to all sections of the populations in Cyprus;

5. *Emphasises* the fundamental principle that the status and safety of the members of the United Nations Peace-Keeping Force in Cyprus, and for that matter of any United Nations Peace-Keeping Force, must be respected by the parties under all circumstances.

*Adopted at the 1793rd meeting by 14 votes to none. One member (China) did not participate in the voting.*

## Resolution 360 (1974)—16 August

[recording formal disapproval of the unilateral military action undertaken against the Republic of Cyprus; urging compliance with previous Resolutions; requesting reports from the Secretary-General]

*The Security Council,*

*Recalling* its resolutions 353 (1974) of 20 July, 354 (1974) of 23 July, 355 (1974), of 1 August, 357 (1974) of 14 August and 358 (1974) of 15 August 1974,

*Noting* that all states have declared their respect for the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of the Republic of Cyprus,

*Gravely concerned* at the deterioration of the situation in Cyprus resulting from the further military operation, which constituted a most serious threat to peace and security in the Eastern Mediterranean area,

1. *Records* its formal disapproval of the unilateral military actions undertaken against the Republic of Cyprus;
2. *Urges* the parties to comply with all the provisions of previous resolutions of the Security Council, including those concerning the withdrawal without delay from the Republic of Cyprus of foreign military personnel present otherwise than under the authority of international agreements;
3. *Urges* the parties to resume without delay, in an atmosphere of constructive co-operation, the negotiations called for in resolution 353 (1974) whose outcome should not be impeded or prejudged by the acquisition of advantages resulting from military operations;
4. *Requests* the Secretary-General to report to it as necessary with a view to the possible adoption of further measures designed to promote the restoration of peaceful conditions;
5. *Decides* to remain seized of the question permanently and to meet at any time to consider measures which may be required in the light of the developing situation.

*Adopted at the 1794th meeting by 11 votes to none, with 3 abstentions (Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Iraq, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics). One member (China) did not participate in the voting.*

## Resolution 361 (1974)—30 August

[on humanitarian assistance for Cyprus and the problems of refugees]

*The Security Council,*

*Conscious of its special responsibilities under the United Nations Charter,*

*Recalling its resolutions 186 (1964) of 4 March, 353 (1974) of 20 July, 354 (1974) of 23 July, 355 (1974), of 1 August, 352(1974) of 14 August and 358 (1974) and 359 (1974) of 15 August , 360 (1974) of 16 August 1974,*

*Noting that a large number of people on the island have been displaced, and are in need of humanitarian assistance,*

*Mindful of the fact that it is one of the foremost purposes of the United Nations to lend humanitarian assistance in situations such as the one currently prevailing in Cyprus,*

*Noting also that the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees has already been appointed as Co-ordinator of United Nations Humanitarian Assistance for Cyprus with the task of co-ordinating relief assistance to be provided by United Nations programmes and agencies and from other sources,*

*Having considered the report of the Secretary-General contained in document (S/11473),*

1. *Expresses its appreciation to the Secretary-General for the part he has played in bringing about talks between the leaders of the two communities in Cyprus;*
2. *Warmly welcomes this development and calls upon those concerned in the talks to pursue them actively with the help of the Secretary-General and in the interests of the Cypriot people as a whole;*
3. *Calls upon all parties to do everything in their power to alleviate human suffering, to ensure the respect to fundamental human rights for every person and to refrain from all action likely to aggravate the situation;*

4. *Expresses* its grave concern at the plight of the refugees and other persons displaced as a result of the situation in Cyprus and urges the parties concerned, in conjunction with the Secretary-General, to search for peaceful solutions of the problems of refugees, and take appropriate measures to provide for their relief and welfare and to permit persons who wish to do so to return to their homes in safety;
5. *Requests* the Secretary-General to submit at the earliest possible opportunity a full report on the situation of the refugees and other persons referred to in paragraph 4 above and decides to keep that situation under constant review;
6. *Further requests* the Secretary-General to continue to provide emergency United Nations humanitarian assistance to all parts of the population of the island in need of such assistance;
7. *Calls upon* all parties, as a demonstration of good faith to take, both individually and in co-operation with each other, all steps which may promote comprehensive and successful negotiations;
8. *Reiterates* its call to all parties to cooperate fully with UNFICYP in carrying out its tasks;
9. *Expresses* the conviction that the speedy implementation of the provisions of the present resolution will assist the achievement of a satisfactory settlement in Cyprus.

*Adopted unanimously at the 1795th meeting.*

## Resolution 364 (1974)—13 December

[reaffirming previous Resolutions; extending the mandate of UNFICYP to 15 June, 1975]

*The Security Council,*

*Noting* from the report of the Secretary-General of 6 December 1974 (S/11568), that in the existing circumstances the presence of the United Nations Peace-Keeping Force in Cyprus is still needed to perform the tasks it is currently undertaking if the cease-fire is to be maintained in the island and the search for a peaceful settlement facilitated,

*Noting* from the report the conditions prevailing in the island,

*Noting* also the statement by the Secretary-General contained in paragraph 81 of his report that the parties concerned had signified their concurrence in his recommendation that the Security Council extend the stationing of the United Nations Force in Cyprus for a further period of six months,

*Noting* that the Government of Cyprus has agreed that in view of the prevailing conditions in the island it is necessary to keep the Force in Cyprus beyond 15 December 1974,

*Noting* also the letter dated 7 November 1974 (S/11557) from the Secretary-General to the President of the Security Council together with the text of resolution 3212 (XXIX) entitled "Question of Cyprus" adopted unanimously by the General Assembly at its 2275th plenary meeting on 1 November 1974.

*Noting* further that General Assembly resolution 3212 (XXIX) enunciates certain principles intended to facilitate a solution of the current problems of Cyprus by peaceful means, in accordance with the purposes and principles of the United Nations,

1. *Reaffirms* its resolutions 186 (1964) of 4 March, 187 (1964) of 13 March, 192 (1964) of 20 June, 193 (1964) of 9 August, 194 (1964) of 25 September and 198 (1964) of 18 December 1964, 201 (1965) of 19 March, 206 (1965) of 15 June, 207 (1965) of 10 August and 219 (1965) of 17 December 1965, 220 (1966) of 16 March, 222 (1966) of 16 June and 231 (1966) of 15 December 1966, 238 (1967) of 19 June and 244 (1967) of 22 December 1967, 247 (1968) of 18 March, 254 (1968) of 18



June and 261 (1968) of 10 December 1968 and 266 (1969) of 10 June and 274 (1969) of 11 December 1969, 281 (1970) of 9 June and 291 (1970) of 10 December 1970, 293 (1971) of 26 May and 305 (1971) of 13 December 1971, 315 (1972) of 15 June and 324 (1972) of 12 December 1972, 334 (1973) of 15 June and 343 (1973) of 14 December 1973, 349 (1974) of 29 May 1974, and the consensus expressed by the President at the 1143rd meeting on 11 August 1964 and at the 1383rd meeting of 25 November 1967;

2. *Reaffirms* also its resolutions 353 (1974) of 20 July, 354 (1974) of 23 July, 355 (1974) of 1 August, 357 (1974) of 14 August, 358 (1974) of 15 August, 359 (1974) of 15 August, 360 (1974) of 16 August and 361 (1974) of 30 August;
3. *Urges* the parties concerned to act with the utmost restraint and to continue and accelerate determined co-operative efforts to achieve the objectives of the Security Council;
4. *Extends* once more the stationing in Cyprus of the United Nations Peace-Keeping Force, established under Security Council resolution 186 (1964), for a further period ending 15 June 1975, in the expectation that by then sufficient progress towards a final solution will make possible a withdrawal or substantial reduction of the Force;
5. *Appeals* again to all parties concerned to extend their full co-operation to the United Nations Force in the continuing performance of its duties.

*Adopted at the 1810th meeting by 14 votes to none. One member (China) did not participate in the voting.*

## Resolution 365 (1974)—13 December

[endorsing UN General Assembly Resolution 3212 (XXIX) on the “Question of Cyprus”]

*The Security Council,*

*Having received the text of resolution 3212 (XXIX) of the General Assembly on the “Question of Cyprus” (S/11557),*

*Noting with satisfaction that the above resolution was adopted unanimously,*

1. *Endorses* General Assembly resolution 3212 (XXIX) and urges the parties to implement it as soon as possible;
2. *Requests* the Secretary-General to report on the progress of implementation on the present resolution.

*Adopted at the 1810th meeting by consensus.*

## Resolution 367 (1975)—12 March

[regretting the unilateral decision of 13 February declaring part of Cyprus a “Federated Turkish State”; requesting a new mission of good offices from the Secretary-General]

*The Security Council,*

*Having* considered the situation in Cyprus in response to the complaint submitted by the Government of the Republic of Cyprus,

*Having* heard the report of the Secretary-General and the statements made by the parties concerned,

*Deeply concerned* at the continuation of the crisis in Cyprus,

*Recalling* its previous resolutions, in particular resolution 365 (1974) of 13 December 1974, by which it endorsed General Assembly resolution 3212 (XXIX) adopted unanimously on 1 November 1974,

*Noting* the absence of progress towards the implementation of its resolutions

1. *Calls* once more on all States to respect the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and non-alignment of the Republic of Cyprus and urgently requests them, as well as the parties concerned, to refrain from any action which might prejudice that sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and non-alignment, as well as from any attempt at partition of the island or its unification with any other country;
2. *Regrets* the unilateral decision of 13 February 1975, declaring that a part of the Republic of Cyprus would become a “Federated Turkish State”, as, inter alia, tending to compromise the continuation of negotiations between the representatives of the two communities on an equal footing, the objective of which must continue to be to reach freely a solution providing for a political settlement and the establishment of a mutually acceptable constitutional arrangement, and expresses its concern over all unilateral actions by the parties which have compromised or may compromise the implementation of the relevant United Nations resolutions;
3. *Affirms* that the decision referred to in paragraph 2 above does not prejudge the final political settlement of the problem of

Cyprus and takes note of the declaration that this was not its intention;

4. *Calls* for the urgent and effective implementation of all parts and provisions of General Assembly resolution 3212 (XXIX), endorsed by Security Council resolution 365 (1974);
5. *Considers* that new efforts should be undertaken to assist the resumption of the negotiations referred to in paragraph 4 of General Assembly resolution 3212 (XXIX) between the representatives of the two communities;
6. *Requests* the Secretary-General accordingly to undertake a new mission of good offices and to that end to convene the parties under new agreed procedures and place himself personally at their disposal, so that the resumption, the intensification and the progress of comprehensive negotiations, carried out in a reciprocal spirit of understanding and of moderation under his personal auspices and with his direction as appropriate, might thereby be facilitated;
7. *Calls* on the representatives of the two communities to cooperate closely with the Secretary-General in the discharge of this new mission of good offices and asks them to accord personally a high priority to their negotiations;
8. *Calls* on all the parties concerned to refrain from any action which might jeopardise the negotiations between the representatives of the two communities and to take steps which will facilitate the creation of the new climate necessary for the success of those negotiations;
9. *Requests* the Secretary-General to keep the Security Council informed of the progress made towards the implementation of resolution 365 (1974) and of this resolution and to report to it whenever he considered it appropriate and, in any case, before 15 June 1975;
10. *Decides* to remain actively seized of the matter.

*Adopted at the 1820th meeting without a vote.*

## Resolution 370 (1975)—13 June

[extending the mandate of UNFICYP to 15 December, 1975; requesting continuation of the Secretary-General's mission of good offices]

*The Security Council,*

*Noting* from the report of the Secretary-General of 9 June 1975 (S/11717), that in the existing circumstances the presence of the United Nations Peace-Keeping Force in Cyprus is still needed to perform the tasks it is currently undertaking if the cease-fire is to be maintained in the island and the search for a peaceful settlement facilitated,

*Noting* from the report the conditions prevailing in the island,

*Noting* further that, in paragraphs 67 and 68 of his report, the Secretary-General has expressed the view, in connection with the talks in Vienna between representatives of the two communities held pursuant to resolution 367 (1975) of 12 March 1975, that the negotiating process should be maintained and, if possible, accelerated and that its success would require from all parties determination, understanding and a willingness to make reciprocal gestures,

*Noting* also the statement by the Secretary-General contained in paragraph 69 of his report that the parties concerned had signified their concurrence in his recommendations that the Security Council extend the stationing of the Force in Cyprus for a further period of six months,

*Noting* that the Government of Cyprus has agreed that in view of the prevailing conditions in the island it is necessary to keep the Force in Cyprus beyond 15 June 1975,

1. *Reaffirms* the provisions of resolution 186 (1964) of 4 March 1964, as well as subsequent resolutions and decisions on the establishment and maintenance of UNFICYP and on other aspects of the situation in Cyprus;
2. *Reaffirms* once again its resolution 365 (1974) of 13 December 1974, by which it endorsed General Assembly resolution 3212 (XXIX) adopted unanimously on 1 November, 1974, and calls for their urgent and effective implementation and that of its resolution 367 (1975);

3. *Urges* the parties concerned to act with the utmost restraint and to continue and accelerate determined co-operative efforts to achieve the objectives of the Security Council;
4. *Extends* once more the stationing in Cyprus of the United Nations Peace-Keeping Force, established under Security Council resolution 186 (1964) for a further period ending 15 December 1975, in the expectation that by then sufficient progress towards a final solution will make possible a withdrawal or substantial reduction of the Force;
5. *Appeals* again to all parties concerned to extend their full co-operation to the United Nations Peace-Keeping Force in the continuing performance of its duties;
6. *Requests* the Secretary-General to continue the mission of good offices entrusted to him by paragraph 6 of resolution 367 (1975) to keep the Security Council informed of the progress made and to submit an interim report by 15 September 1975 and a definite report not later than 15 December, 1975.

*Adopted at the 1830th meeting by 14 votes to none. One member (China) did not participate in the voting.*

## Resolution 383 (1975)—13 December

[extending the mandate of UNFICYP to 15 June, 1976; requesting continuation of the Secretary-General's mission of good offices]

*The Security Council,*

*Noting* from the report of the Secretary-General of 8 December 1975 (S/11900 and Add. 1), that in the existing circumstances the presence of the United Nations Peace-Keeping Force in Cyprus is still needed to perform not only to maintain the cease-fire but also to facilitate the continued search for a peaceful settlement,

*Noting* from the report the conditions prevailing on the island,

*Noting* further that, in para. 68 of his report, the Secretary-General has expressed the view, that in the present circumstances the best available means of making progress towards a settlement is through continued talks between the representatives of the two communities and that such talks can be fruitful only if the interlocutors are ready and authorised to engage in meaningful negotiations on all essential aspects of a settlement of the Cyprus problem,

*Noting* also the concurrence of the parties concerned in the recommendation by the Secretary-General that the Security Council extend the stationing of the Force in Cyprus for a further period of six months,

*Noting* that the Government of Cyprus has agreed that in view of the prevailing conditions in the island it is necessary to keep the Force in Cyprus beyond 15 December 1975,

*Noting* that General Assembly resolution 3395 of 20 November 1975 reaffirmed the urgent need for continued efforts for the effective implementation in all parts of General Assembly resolution 3212 of 1 November 1974 which was endorsed by the Security Council in its resolution 365 (1974) of 13 December 1974,

1. *Reaffirms* the provisions of resolution 186 (1964) of 4 March 1964, as well as subsequent resolutions and decisions on the establishment and maintenance of the United Nations Peace-Keeping Force in Cyprus and on other aspects of the situation in Cyprus;
2. *Reaffirms* its resolutions 365 (1974) of 13 December 1974, and

367 (1975) of 12 March 1975 and calls for their urgent and effective implementation;

3. *Urges* the parties concerned to act with the utmost restraint and to continue and accelerate determined co-operative efforts to achieve the objectives of the Security Council;
4. *Extends* once more the stationing in Cyprus of the United Nations Peace-Keeping Force, established under Security Council resolution 186 (1964) for a further period ending 15 June 1976, in the expectation that by then sufficient progress towards a final solution will make possible a withdrawal or substantial reduction of the Force;
5. *Appeals* again to all parties concerned to extend their full co-operation to the Force in its continuing performance of its duties;
6. *Requests* the Secretary-General to continue the mission of good offices entrusted to him by para. 6 of resolution 367 (1975) to keep the Security Council informed of the progress made and to submit a report not later than 31 March 1976.

*Adopted at the 1863rd meeting by 14 votes to none. One member (China) did not participate in the voting.*



## Resolution 391 (1976)—15 June

[noting restriction of movement of the UN Force in the north of the island; extending the mandate of UNFICYP to 15 December, 1976; requesting continuation of the Secretary-General's mission of good offices]

*The Security Council,*

*Noting* from the report of the Secretary-General of 5 June 1975 (S/12093), that in the existing circumstances the presence of the United Nations Peace-Keeping Force in Cyprus is essential not only to help maintain quiet in the island but also to facilitate the continued search for a peaceful settlement,

*Noting* from the report the conditions prevailing in the island,

*Noting* also from the report that the freedom of movement of the United Nations Peace-Keeping Force in Cyprus and its civil police is still restricted in the north of the island and that progress is being made in discussions regarding the stationing, deployment and functioning of the Force and expressing the hope that those discussions will lead speedily to the elimination of all existing difficulties,

*Noting* further that, in paragraphs 70 of his report, the Secretary-General expressed the view, that the best hope of achieving a just and lasting settlement of the Cyprus problem lies in negotiations between the representatives of the two communities and that the usefulness of those negotiations depends upon the willingness of all parties concerned to show the necessary flexibility, taking into account not only their own interests but also the legitimate aspirations and requirements of the opposing side,

*Expressing* its concern at actions which increase tension between the two communities and tend to affect adversely the efforts towards a just and lasting peace in Cyprus,

*Emphasising* the need for the parties concerned to adhere to the agreements reached at all previous rounds of the talks held under the auspices of the Secretary-General and expressing the hope that future talks will be meaningful and productive,

*Noting* the concurrence of the parties concerned in the recommendation by the Secretary General that the Security Council extend the stationing of the Force in Cyprus for a further period of six months,

Noting that the Government of Cyprus has agreed that in view of the prevailing conditions in the island it is necessary to keep the Force in Cyprus beyond 15 June 1976,

1. *Reaffirms* the provisions of resolution 186 (1964) of 4 March 1964, as well as subsequent resolutions and decisions on the establishment and maintenance of the United Nations Peace-Keeping Force in Cyprus and other aspects of the situation in Cyprus;
2. *Reaffirms* once again its resolution 365 (1974) of 13 December 1974, by which it endorsed General Assembly resolution 3212 (XXIX) adopted unanimously on 1 November, 1974, and calls once again for their urgent and effective implementation and that of its resolution 367 (1975) of 12 March 1975;
3. *Urges* the parties concerned to act with the utmost restraint to refrain from any unilateral or other action likely to affect adversely the prospects of negotiations and to continue and accelerate determined co-operative efforts to achieve the objectives of the Security Council;
4. *Extends* once more the stationing in Cyprus of the United Nations Peace-Keeping Force, established under Security Council resolution 186 (1964) for a further period ending 15 December 1976, in the expectation that by then sufficient progress towards a final solution will make possible a withdrawal or substantial reduction of the Force;
5. *Appeals* again to all parties concerned to extend their fullest co-operation so as to enable the United Nations Peace-Keeping Force to perform its duties effectively;
6. *Requests* the Secretary-General to continue the mission of good offices entrusted to him by paragraph 6 of resolution 367 (1975), to keep the Security Council informed of the progress made and to submit a report on the implementation on this resolution by 30 October 1976.

*Adopted at the 1927th meeting by 13 votes to none. One member, (China) did not participate in the voting.*

## Resolution 401 (1976)—14 December

[noting continuing restriction of movement of the UN Force in the north of the island; extending the mandate of UNFICYP to 15 June, 1977; requesting continuation of the Secretary-General's mission of good offices]

*The Security Council,*

*Noting* from the report of the Secretary-General of 9 December 1976 (S/12253), that in the existing circumstances the presence of the United Nations Peace-Keeping Force in Cyprus is essential not only to help maintain quiet in the island but also to facilitate the continued search for a peaceful settlement,

*Noting* from the report the conditions prevailing in the island,

*Noting* also from the report that the freedom of movement of the United Nations Peace-Keeping Force in Cyprus and its civil police is still restricted in the north of the island, that progress is being made in discussions regarding the stationing, deployment and functioning of the Force and expressing the hope that ways will be found to surmount the remaining obstacles,

*Noting* further that the Secretary-General expresses the view, that the best hope of achieving a just and lasting settlement of the Cyprus problem lies in negotiations between the representatives of the two communities and that the usefulness of those negotiations depends upon the willingness of all parties concerned to show the necessary flexibility, taking into account not only their own interests but also the legitimate aspirations and requirements of the opposing side,

*Expressing* its concern at actions which increase tension between the two communities and tend to affect adversely the efforts towards a just and lasting peace in Cyprus,

*Emphasising* the need for the parties concerned to adhere to the agreements reached at all previous rounds of the talks held under the auspices of the Secretary-General and expressing the hope that future talks will be meaningful and productive,

*Noting* also the concurrence of the parties concerned in the recommendation by the Secretary-General that the Security Council extend the stationing of the United Nations Peace-Keeping Force in Cyprus for a further period of six months,

Noting that the Government of Cyprus has agreed that in view of the prevailing conditions in the island it is necessary to keep the Force in Cyprus beyond 15 December 1976,

1. *Reaffirms* the provisions of resolution 186 (1964) of 4 March 1964, as well as subsequent resolutions and decisions on the establishment and maintenance of the United Nations Peace-Keeping Force in Cyprus and other aspects of the situation in Cyprus;
2. *Reaffirms* once again its resolution 365 of 13 December 1974, by which it endorsed General Assembly resolution 3212 (XXIX) adopted unanimously on 1 November, 1974, and calls once again for their urgent and effective implementation and that of its resolution 367 (1975) of 12 March 1975;
3. *Urges* the parties concerned to act with the utmost restraint to refrain from any unilateral or other action likely to affect adversely the prospects of negotiations and to continue and accelerate determined cooperative efforts to achieve the objectives of the Security Council;
4. *Extends* once more the stationing in Cyprus of the United Nations Peace-Keeping Force, established under Security Council resolution 186 (1964) for a further period ending 15 June 1977, in the expectation that by then sufficient progress towards a final solution will make possible a withdrawal or substantial reduction of the Force;
5. *Appeals again* to all parties concerned to extend their fullest cooperation so as to enable the United Nations Peace-Keeping Force to perform its duties effectively;
6. *Requests* the Secretary-General to continue the mission of good offices entrusted to him by paragraph 6 of resolution 367 (1975), to keep the Security Council informed of the progress made and to submit a report on the implementation of this resolution by 30 April 1977.

*Adopted at the 1979th meeting by 13 votes to none. Two members, (Benin and China) did not participate in the voting.*

## Resolution 410 (1977)—15 June

[noting continuing restriction of movement of the UN Force in the north of the island; extending the mandate of UNFICYP to 15 December, 1977; requesting continuation of the Secretary-General's mission of good offices]

*The Security Council,*

*Noting* from the report of the Secretary-General of 7 June 1976 (S/12342), that in the existing circumstances the presence of the United Nations Peace-Keeping Force in Cyprus is essential not only to help maintain quiet in the island but also to facilitate the continued search for a peaceful settlement,

*Noting* from the report the conditions prevailing in the island,

*Noting* also from the report that the freedom of movement of the United Nations Peace-Keeping Force in Cyprus and its civil police is still restricted in the north of the island, and expressing the hope that ways will be found to surmount the remaining obstacles,

*Noting* further that the Secretary-General expresses the view, that the best hope of achieving a just and lasting settlement of the Cyprus problem lies in negotiations between the representatives of the two communities and that the usefulness of those negotiations depends upon the willingness of all parties concerned to show the necessary flexibility, taking into account not only their own interests but also the legitimate aspirations and requirements of the opposing side,

*Noting* that due to the efforts of the Secretary-General, his staff and of the United Nations Peace-Keeping Force, and with the co-operation of the parties, there has been a relative improvement in the security situation, but that this evolution has yet to relieve the underlying tensions in the island,

*Noting also* the report of the Secretary-General of 30 April 1977 (S/12333) concerning the high-level meeting under the auspices of the Secretary-General emphasising the need to adhere to the agreement reached at this meeting as well as to the agreements reached at the previous rounds of the talks,

*Noting further* the concurrence of the parties concerned in the recommendation by the Secretary-General that the Security Council

extend the stationing of the United Nations Peace-Keeping Force in Cyprus for a further period of six months,

*Noting* that the Government of Cyprus has agreed that in view of the prevailing conditions in the island it is necessary to keep the Force in Cyprus beyond 15 June 1977,

1. *Reaffirms* the provisions of resolution 186 (1964) of 4 March 1964, as well as subsequent resolutions and decisions on the establishment and maintenance of the United Nations Peace-Keeping Force in Cyprus and other aspects of the situation in Cyprus;
2. *Reaffirms* once again its resolution 365 (1974) of 13 December 1974, by which it endorsed General Assembly resolution 3212 (XXIX) adopted unanimously on 1 November 1974, and calls once again for their urgent and effective implementation and that of its resolution 367 (1975) of 12 March 1975;
3. *Urges* the parties concerned to act with the utmost restraint to refrain from any unilateral or other action likely to affect adversely the prospects of negotiations for a just and peaceful solution and to continue and accelerate determined co-operative efforts to achieve the objectives of the Security Council;
4. *Extends once more* the stationing in Cyprus of the United Nations Peace-Keeping Force, established under Security Council resolution 186 (1964) for a further period ending 15 December 1977, in the expectation that by then sufficient progress towards a final solution will make possible a withdrawal or substantial reduction of the Force;
5. *Appeals again* to all parties concerned to extend their fullest co-operation so as to enable the United Nations Peace-Keeping Force to perform its duties effectively;
6. *Requests* the Secretary-General to continue the mission of good offices entrusted to him by paragraph 6 of resolution 367 (1975), to keep the Security Council informed of the progress made and to submit a report on the implementation of this resolution by 30 November April 1977.

*Adopted at the 2012h meeting by 14 votes to none. One member (China) did not participate in the voting.*

## Resolution 414 (1977)—15 September

[noting statements regarding developments in the new Famagusta area; expressing concern at the lack of progress at the intercommunal talks]

*The Security Council,*

*Having* considered the situation in Cyprus in response to the letter dated 26 August 1977 from the Permanent Representative of Cyprus to the United Nations (S/12387),

*Mindful* of the urgency of making progress in the solution of the Cyprus problem

*Recalling* its previous resolutions, in particular resolutions 365 (1974) of 13 December 1974 and 367 (1975) of 12 March 1975,

*Taking note* of the statements made to the Council regarding recent developments in the new Famagusta area to the effect that there is no settlement in progress in the area,

*Taking note also* of the statements made by the parties concerned as well as by the Secretary-General with regard to these developments,

1. *Expresses* concern at the situation caused by recent developments;
2. *Calls upon* the parties concerned to refrain therefore from all unilateral actions anywhere in Cyprus that may affect adversely the prospects for a just and peaceful solution of the Cyprus problem and urges them to continue and accelerate determined co-operative efforts to achieve the objectives of the Security Council;
3. *Reaffirms* once again its resolution 365 (1974), by which it endorsed General Assembly resolution 3212 (XXIX) adopted unanimously on 1 November 1974, and calls once again for their urgent and effective implementation and that of its resolution 367 (1975) of 12 March 1975;
4. *Expresses* concern at the lack of progress at the intercommunal talks;
5. *Calls on* the representatives of the two communities, under the auspices of the Secretary-General, to resume negotiations as

soon as possible meaningfully and constructively on the basis of comprehensive and concrete proposals;

6. *Requests* the Secretary-General to keep the Council informed of developments that may adversely affect the implementation of the present resolution.

*Adopted at the 2032nd meeting without a vote.*



## Resolution 422 (1977)—15 December

[noting continuing restriction of movement of the UN Force in the north of the island; noting progress of the high-level meeting; extending the mandate of UNFICYP to 15 June, 1978; requesting continuation of the Secretary-General's mission of good offices]

*The Security Council,*

*Noting* from the report of the Secretary-General of 1 December 1977 (S/12463), that in the existing circumstances the presence of the United Nations Peace-Keeping Force in Cyprus is essential not only to help maintain quiet in the island but also to facilitate the continued search for a peaceful settlement,

*Noting* from the report the conditions prevailing in the island,

*Noting* also from the report that the freedom of movement of the United Nations Peace-Keeping Force in Cyprus and its civil police is still restricted in the north of the island, and expressing the hope that ways will be found to surmount the remaining obstacles,

*Noting* further that the Secretary-General expresses the view that the best hope of achieving a just and lasting settlement of the Cyprus problem lies in negotiations between the representatives of the two communities and that the usefulness of those negotiations depends upon the willingness of all parties concerned to show the necessary flexibility, taking into account not only their own interests but also the legitimate aspirations and requirements of the opposing side,

*Noting* that due to the efforts of the Secretary-General, his staff and of UNFICYP, and with the co-operation of the parties, there has been a relative improvement in the security situation, but that this evolution has yet to relieve the underlying tensions in the island,

*Noting* also the report of the Secretary-General of 30 April 1977 (S/12323) concerning the high-level meeting under the auspices of the Secretary-General, and emphasising the need to adhere to the agreement reached at this meeting as well as to the agreements reached at the previous rounds of the talks,

*Noting further* the concurrence of the parties concerned in the recommendation by the Secretary-General that the Security Council extends the stationing of the United Nations Peace-Keeping Force in

Cyprus for a further period of six months,

*Noting* that the Government of Cyprus has agreed that in view of the prevailing conditions in the island it is necessary to keep the Force in Cyprus beyond 15 June 1977,

1. *Reaffirms* the provisions of resolution 186 (1964) of 4 March 1964, as well as subsequent resolutions and decisions on the establishment and maintenance of the United Nations Peace-Keeping Force in Cyprus and other aspects of the situation in Cyprus;
2. *Reaffirms once again* its resolution 365 (1974) of 13 December 1974, by which it endorsed General Assembly resolution 3212 (XXIX), adopted unanimously on 1 November 1974, and calls once again for the urgent and effective implementation of those resolutions and of its resolution 367 (1975) of 12 March 1975;
3. *Urges* the parties concerned to act with the utmost restraint by refraining from any unilateral or other action likely to affect adversely the prospects of negotiations for a just and peaceful solution and to continue and accelerate determined co-operative efforts to achieve the objectives of the Security Council;
4. *Extends once more* the stationing in Cyprus of the United Nations, Peace-Keeping Force, established under Security Council resolution 186 (1964), for a further period ending 15 June 1978, in the expectation that by then sufficient progress towards a final solution will make possible a withdrawal or substantial reduction of the Force;
5. *Appeals again* to all parties concerned to extend the fullest co-operation so as to enable the United Nations Peace-Keeping Force to perform its duties effectively;
6. *Requests* the Secretary-General to continue the mission of good offices entrusted to him by paragraph 6 of resolution 367 (1975), to keep the Security Council informed of the progress made and to submit a report on the implementation of this resolution by 31 May 1978.

*Adopted at the 2054th meeting by 14 votes to none. One member (China) did not participate in the voting.*

## Resolution 430 (1978)—16 June

[extending the mandate of UNFICYP to 15 December, 1978; requesting continuation of the Secretary-General's mission of good offices]

*The Security Council,*

*Noting* the report by the Secretary-General on the United Nations operations in Cyprus of 31 May 1978 (S/12723),

*Noting* also the concurrence of the parties concerned in the recommendation by the Secretary-General that the Security Council extend the stationing of the United Nations Peace-Keeping Force in Cyprus for a further period of six months,

*Noting* further that the Government of Cyprus has agreed that in view of the prevailing conditions in the island it is necessary to keep the Force in Cyprus beyond 15 June 1978,

*Reaffirming* the provisions of resolution 186 (1964) of 4 March 1964 and other relevant resolutions,

1. *Extends* once more the stationing in Cyprus of the United Nations Peace-Keeping Force established under resolution 186 (1964), for a further period ending 15 December 1978;
2. *Requests* the Secretary-General to continue his mission of good offices to keep the Security Council informed of the progress made and to submit a report on the implementation of this resolution by 30 November 1978.

*Adopted at the 2080th meeting by 14 votes to none. One member (China) did not participate in the voting.*

## Resolution 440 (1978)—27 November

[urging the representatives of the two communities to resume negotiations]

*The Security Council,*

*Having considered the situation in Cyprus in response to the letter dated 7 November 1978 from the Permanent Representative of Cyprus to the United Nations (S/12918),*

*Deeply concerned at the lack of progress in the solution of the Cyprus problem,*

*Taking note of the relevant General Assembly resolutions concerning Cyprus,*

*Mindful of the urgency of solving the Cyprus problem without delay,*

1. *Reaffirms* its resolutions 365 (1974) of 13 December 1974, 367 (1975) of 12 March 1975 and subsequent resolutions, including resolution 410 (1977) of 15 June 1977;
2. *Calls upon* the parties concerned to comply with and cooperate in the implementation of those resolutions within a specific time-frame;
3. *Urges* the representatives of the two communities to resume negotiations, under the auspices of the Secretary-General, on an agreed basis, bearing in mind the afore-mentioned resolutions;
4. *Requests* the Secretary-General to report on the efforts made with regard to the negotiations referred to in paragraph 3 and on the progress towards the implementation of its resolutions of 30 May 1979, or earlier if developments should warrant it;
5. *Decides* to remain seized of the matter and to review the situation in June 1979 in order to continue to promote a just solution to the Cyprus problem.

*Adopted at the 2100th meeting by consensus.*

## Resolution 443 (1978)—14 December

[extending the mandate of UNFICYP to 15 June, 1979; requesting continuation of the Secretary-General's mission of good offices]

*The Security Council,*

*Noting* the report by the Secretary-General on the United Nations operations in Cyprus of 1 December 1978 (S/12946),

*Noting* also the concurrence of the parties concerned in the recommendation by the Secretary-General that the Security Council extend the stationing of the United Nations Peace-Keeping Force in Cyprus for a further period of six months,

*Noting* further that the Government of Cyprus has agreed that in view of the prevailing conditions in the island it is necessary to keep the Force in Cyprus beyond 15 December 1978,

*Reaffirming* the provisions of resolution 186 (1964) of 4 March 1964 and other relevant resolutions,

1. *Extends* once more the stationing in Cyprus of the United Nations Peace-Keeping Force established under resolution 186 (1964), for a further period ending 15 June 1979;
2. *Requests* the Secretary-General to continue his mission of good offices to keep the Security Council informed of the progress made and to submit a report on the implementation of this resolution by 31 May 1979.

*Adopted at the 2107th meeting by 14 votes to none. One member (China) did not participate in the voting.*

## Resolution 451 (1979)—15 June

[extending the mandate of UNFICYP to 15 December, 1979; welcoming the 10-point agreement; urging the parties to continue with intercommunal talks; requesting continuation of the Secretary-General's mission of good offices]

*The Security Council,*

*Noting* the report by the Secretary-General on the United Nations operations in Cyprus of 31 May 1979 (S/13369 and Add. 1),

*Noting* also the concurrence of the parties concerned in the recommendation by the Secretary-General that the Security Council extend the stationing of the United Nations Peace-Keeping Force in Cyprus for a further period of six months,

*Noting* further that the Government of Cyprus has agreed that in view of the prevailing conditions in the island it is necessary to keep the Force in Cyprus beyond 15 June 1979,

*Reaffirming* the provisions of resolution 186 (1964) of 4 March 1964 and other relevant resolutions:

*Welcoming* the ten-point agreement for the resumption of the intercommunal talks which was worked out at the high-level meeting on 18 and 19 May 1979 in Nicosia, under the auspices of the Secretary-General (S/13369, para 51),

1. *Extends* once more the stationing in Cyprus of the United Nations Peace-Keeping Force established under resolution 186 (1964), for a further period ending 15 December 1979;
2. *Urges* the parties to proceed with the intercommunal talks within the framework of the 10-point agreement in a continuing, sustained and result-oriented manner, avoiding any delay;
3. *Requests* the Secretary-General to continue his mission of good offices to keep the Security Council informed of the progress made and to submit a report on the implementation of this resolution by 31 May 1979.

*Adopted at the 2150th meeting by 14 votes to none. One member (China) did not participate in the voting.*

## Resolution 458 (1979)—14 December

[extending the mandate of UNFICYP to 15 June, 1980; reiterating support of the 10-point agreement; urging the parties to resume intercommunal talks; requesting continuation of the Secretary-General's mission of good offices]

*The Security Council,*

*Noting* the report by the Secretary-General on the United Nations operations in Cyprus of 1 December 1979 (S/13672 and Add. 1),

*Noting* also the concurrence of the parties concerned in the recommendation by the Secretary-General that the Security Council extend the stationing of the United Nations Peace-Keeping Force in Cyprus for a further period of six months,

*Noting* further that the Government of Cyprus has agreed that, in view of the prevailing conditions in the island, it is necessary to keep the Force in Cyprus beyond 15 December 1979,

*Reaffirming* the provisions of resolution 186 (1964) of 4 March 1964 and other relevant resolutions:

*Reiterating* its support of the 10-point agreement for the resumption of the intercommunal talks which was worked out at the high-level meeting on 18 and 19 May 1979 in Nicosia, under the auspices of the Secretary-General (S/13369, para 51),

1. *Extends* once more the stationing in Cyprus of the United Nations Peace-Keeping Force established under resolution 186 (1964), for a further period ending 15 June 1980;
2. *Urges* the parties to resume the intercommunal talks within the framework of the 10-point agreement in a continuing, sustained and result-oriented manner, avoiding any delay;
3. *Requests* the Secretary-General to continue his mission of good offices to keep the Security Council informed of the progress made and to submit a report on the implementation of this resolution by 31 May 1980.

*Adopted at the 2179th meeting by 14 votes to none. One member (China) did not participate in the voting.*

## Resolution 472 (1980)—13 June

[extending the mandate of UNFICYP to 15 December, 1980; reiterating support of the 10-point agreement; urging the parties to resume intercommunal talks; requesting continuation of the Secretary-General's mission of good offices]

*The Security Council,*

*Noting* the report by the Secretary-General on the United Nations operation in Cyprus of 3 June 1980 (S/13972 and Add. 1),

*Noting* also the concurrence of the parties concerned in the recommendation by the Secretary-General that the Security Council extend the stationing of the United Nations Peace-Keeping Force in Cyprus for a further period of six months,

*Noting* further that the Government of Cyprus has agreed that, in view of the prevailing conditions in the island, it is necessary to keep the Force in Cyprus beyond 15 June 1980,

*Reaffirming* the provisions of resolution 186 (1964) of 4 March 1964 and other relevant resolutions,

*Reiterating* its support of the 10-point agreement for the resumption of the intercommunal talks which was worked out at the high-level meeting on 18 and 19 May 1979 in Nicosia, under the auspices of the Secretary-General (S/13369, para 51),

1. *Extends* once more the stationing in Cyprus of the United Nations Peace-Keeping Force established under resolution 186 (1964), for a further period ending 15 December 1980;
2. *Urges* the parties to resume the intercommunal talks within the framework of the 10-point agreement in a continuing, sustained and result-oriented manner, avoiding any delay;
3. *Requests* the Secretary-General to continue his mission of good offices to keep the Security Council informed of the progress made and to submit a report on the implementation of this resolution by 30 November 1980.

*Adopted at the 2230th meeting by 14 votes to none. One member (China) did not participate in the voting.*



## Resolution 482 (1980)—11 December

[extending the mandate of UNFICYP to 15 June, 1981; reiterating support of the 10-point agreement; noting resumption of intercommunal talks; requesting continuation of the Secretary-General's mission of good offices]

*The Security Council,*

*Noting* the report by the Secretary-General on the United Nations operations in Cyprus of 1 December 1980 (S/14275 and Add. 1),

*Noting* also the concurrence of the parties concerned in the recommendation by the Secretary-General that the Security Council extend the stationing of the United Nations Peace-Keeping Force in Cyprus for a further period of six months,

*Noting* further that the Government of Cyprus has agreed that, in view of the prevailing conditions in the island, it is necessary to keep the Force in Cyprus beyond 15 December 1980,

*Reaffirming* the provisions of resolution 186 (1964) of 4 March 1964 and other relevant resolutions,

*Reiterating* its support of the 10-point agreement for the resumption of the intercommunal talks which was worked out at the high-level meeting on 18 and 19 May 1979 in Nicosia, under the auspices of the Secretary-General (S/13369, para 51),

1. *Extends* once more the stationing in Cyprus of the United Nations Peace-Keeping Force established under resolution 186 (1964), for a further period ending 15 June 1981;
2. *Notes* with satisfaction that the parties have resumed the intercommunal talks within the framework of the 10-point agreement and urges them to pursue these talks in a continuing, sustained and result oriented manner avoiding any delay;
3. *Requests* the Secretary-General to continue his mission of good offices to keep the Security Council informed of the progress made and to submit a report on the implementation of this resolution by 31 May 1981.

*Adopted at the 2257th meeting by 14 votes to none. One member (China) did not participate in the voting.*

## Resolution 488 (1981)—4 June

[extending the mandate of UNFICYP to 15 December, 1981; reiterating support of the 10-point agreement; noting resumption of intercommunal talks; requesting continuation of the Secretary-General's mission of good offices]

*The Security Council,*

*Noting* the report by the Secretary-General on the United Nations operations in Cyprus of 27 May 1981 (S/14490 and Add.1),

*Noting* also the concurrence of the parties concerned in the recommendation by the Secretary-General that the Security Council extend the stationing of the United Nations Peace-Keeping Force in Cyprus for a further period of six months,

*Noting* further that the Government of Cyprus has agreed that, in view of the prevailing conditions in the island, it is necessary to keep the Force in Cyprus beyond 15 June 1981,

*Reaffirming* the provisions of resolutions 186 (1964) of 4 March 1964 and other relevant resolutions,

*Reiterating* its support of the 10-point agreement for the resumption of the intercommunal talks which was worked out at the high-level meeting on 18 and 19 May 1979 in Nicosia, under the auspices of the Secretary-General (S/13369, para 51),

1. *Extends* once more the stationing in Cyprus of the United Nations Peace-Keeping Force established under resolution 186 (1964), for a further period ending 15 December 1981;
2. *Notes* with satisfaction that the parties have resumed the intercommunal talks within the framework of the 10-point agreement and urges them to pursue these talks in a continuing, sustained and result oriented manner avoiding any delay;
3. *Requests* the Secretary-General to continue his mission of good offices to keep the Security Council informed of the progress made and to submit a report on the implementation of this resolution by 30 November 1981.

*Adopted at the 2279th meeting by 14 votes to none. One member (China) did not participate in the voting.*

## Resolution 495 (1981)—14 December

[extending the mandate of UNFICYP to 15 June, 1982; reiterating support of the 10-point agreement; noting resumption of intercommunal talks; requesting continuation of the Secretary-General's mission of good offices]

*The Security Council,*

*Noting* the report by the Secretary-General on the United Nations operation in Cyprus of 1st December 1981 (S/14778 and Add. 1),

*Noting* also the concurrence of the parties concerned in the recommendation by the Secretary-General that the Security Council extend the stationing of the United Nations Peace-Keeping Force in Cyprus for a further period of six months,

*Noting* further that the Government of Cyprus has agreed that, in view of the prevailing conditions in the island, it is necessary to keep the Force in Cyprus beyond 15 December 1981,

*Reaffirming* the provisions of resolution 186 (1964) of 4 March 1964 and other relevant resolutions,

*Reiterating* its support of the 10-point agreement for the resumption of the intercommunal talks which was worked out at the high-level meeting on 18 and 19 May 1979 in Nicosia, under the auspices of the Secretary-General (S/13369, para 51);

1. *Extends* once more the stationing in Cyprus of the United Nations Peace-Keeping Force established under resolution 186 (1964), for a further period ending 15 June 1982;
2. *Notes* with satisfaction that the parties have resumed the intercommunal talks within the framework of the 10-point agreement and urges them to pursue these talks in a continuing, sustained and result oriented manner avoiding any delay;
3. *Requests* the Secretary-General to continue his mission of good offices, to keep the Security Council informed of the progress made and to submit a report on the implementation of this resolution by 31 May 1982.

*Adopted unanimously at the 2313th meeting.*

## Resolution 510 (1982)—15 June

[extending the mandate of UNFICYP to 15 December, 1982; reiterating support of the 10-point agreement; noting resumption of intercommunal talks; requesting continuation of the Secretary-General's mission of good offices]

*The Security Council,*

*Noting* the report by the Secretary-General on the United Nations operations in Cyprus of 1 June 1982 (S/15149 and Add. 1),

*Noting* also the concurrence of the parties concerned in the recommendation by the Secretary-General that the Security Council extend the stationing of the United Nations Peace-Keeping Force in Cyprus for a further period of six months,

*Noting* further that the Government of Cyprus has agreed that in view of the prevailing conditions in the island it is necessary to keep the Force in Cyprus beyond 15 June 1982,

*Reaffirming* the provisions of resolution 186 (1964) of 4 March 1964 and other relevant resolutions,

*Reiterating* its support of the 10-point agreement for the resumption of the intercommunal talks which was worked out at the high-level meeting on 18 and 19 May 1979 in Nicosia, under the auspices of the Secretary-General (S/13369, para 51),

1. *Extends* once more the stationing in Cyprus of the United Nations Peace-Keeping Force established under resolution 186 (1964), for a further period ending 15 December 1982;
2. *Notes* with satisfaction that the parties have resumed the intercommunal talks within the framework of the 10-point agreement and urges them to pursue these talks in a continuing, sustained and result oriented manner avoiding any delay;
3. *Requests* the Secretary-General to continue his mission of good offices, to keep the Security Council informed of the progress made and to submit a report on the implementation of this resolution by 30 November 1982.

*Adopted unanimously at the 2378th meeting.*

## Resolution 526 (1982)—14 December

[extending the mandate of UNFICYP to 15 June, 1983; reiterating support of the 10-point agreement; noting resumption of intercommunal talks; requesting continuation of the Secretary-General's mission of good offices]

*The Security Council,*

*Noting* the report by the Secretary-General on the United Nations operation in Cyprus of 1 December 1982 (S/15502 and corr. 1 and Add. 1),

*Noting* also the concurrence of the parties concerned in the recommendation by the Secretary-General that the Security Council extend the stationing of the United Nations Peace-Keeping Force in Cyprus for a further period of six months,

*Noting* further that the Government of Cyprus has agreed that in view of the prevailing conditions in the island it is necessary to keep the Force in Cyprus beyond 15 December 1982,

*Reaffirming* the provisions of resolution 186 (1964) of 4 March 1964 and other relevant resolutions,

*Reiterating* its support of the 10-point agreement for the resumption of the intercommunal talks which was worked out at the high-level meeting on 18 and 19 May 1979 in Nicosia, under the auspices of the Secretary-General (S/13369, para 51),

1. *Extends* once more the stationing in Cyprus of the United Nations Peace-Keeping Force established under resolution 186 (1964), for a further period ending 15 June 1983;
2. *Notes* with satisfaction that the parties have resumed the intercommunal talks within the framework of the 10-point agreement and urges them to pursue these talks in a continuing, sustained and result oriented manner avoiding any delay;
3. *Requests* the Secretary-General to continue his mission of good offices, to keep the Security Council informed of the progress made and to submit a report on the implementation of this resolution by 31 May 1983.

*Adopted unanimously at the 2405th meeting.*

## Resolution 534 (1983)—15 June

[extending the mandate of UNFICYP to 15 December, 1983; reiterating support of the 10-point agreement; noting resumption of intercommunal talks; requesting continuation of the Secretary-General's mission of good offices]

*The Security Council,*

*Noting* the report by the Secretary-General on the United Nations operations in Cyprus of 1 June 1983 (S/15812 and Add. 1),

*Noting* also the concurrence of the parties concerned in the recommendation by the Secretary-General that the Security Council extend the stationing of the United Nations Peace-Keeping Force in Cyprus for a further period of six months,

*Noting* further that the Government of Cyprus has agreed that in view of the prevailing conditions in the island it is necessary to keep the Force in Cyprus beyond 15 June 1983,

*Reaffirming* the provisions of resolution 186 (1964) of 4 March 1964 and other relevant resolutions,

*Reiterating* its support of the 10-point agreement for the resumption of the intercommunal talks which was worked out at the high-level meeting on 18 and 19 May 1979 in Nicosia, under the auspices of the Secretary-General (S/13369, para 51),

1. *Extends* once more the stationing in Cyprus of the United Nations Peace-Keeping Force established under resolution 186 (1964), for a further period ending 15 December 1983;
2. *Notes* with satisfaction that the parties have resumed the intercommunal talks within the framework of the 10-point agreement and urges them to pursue these talks in a continuing, sustained and result oriented manner avoiding any delay;
3. *Requests* the Secretary-General to continue his mission of good offices, to keep the Security Council informed of the progress made and to submit a report on the implementation of this resolution by 30 November 1983.

*Adopted unanimously at the 2453rd meeting.*

## Resolution 541 (1983)—18 November

[deploring the declaration of a secessionist “Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus”; calling on all states not to recognize any Cypriot state other than the “Republic of Cyprus”]

*The Security Council,*

*Having heard* the statement of the Foreign Minister of the Government of the Republic of Cyprus,

*Concerned* at the declaration by the Turkish Cypriot authorities issued on 15 November 1983 which purports to create an independent state in northern Cyprus,

*Considering* that this declaration is incompatible with the 1960 Treaty concerning the establishment of the Republic of Cyprus and the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee,

*Considering* therefore that the attempt to create a “Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus”, is invalid, and will contribute to a worsening of the situation in Cyprus,

*Reaffirming* its resolutions 365 (1974) and 367 (1975),

*Aware* of the need for a solution of the Cyprus problem, based on the mission of good offices undertaken by the Secretary-General,

*Affirming* its continuing support for the United Nations Peace-Keeping Force in Cyprus,

*Taking note* of the Secretary-General’s statement of 17 November 1983,

1. *Deplores* the declaration of the Turkish Cypriot authorities of the purported secession of part of the Republic of Cyprus;
2. *Considers* the declaration referred to above as legally invalid and calls for its withdrawal;
3. *Calls* for the urgent and effective implementation of its resolutions 365 (1974) and 367 (1975);
4. *Requests* the Secretary-General to pursue his mission of good offices in order to achieve the earliest possible progress towards a just and lasting settlement in Cyprus;

5. *Calls upon* the parties to cooperate fully with the Secretary-General in his mission of good offices;
6. *Calls upon* all States to respect the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and non-alignment of the Republic of Cyprus;
7. *Calls upon* all States not to recognise any Cypriot state other than the Republic of Cyprus;
8. *Calls upon* all States and the two communities in Cyprus to refrain from any action which might exacerbate the situation;
9. *Requests* the Secretary-General to keep the Security Council fully informed.

*Adopted at the 2500th meeting by 13 votes to 1 against (Pakistan) with 1 abstention (Jordan).*



## Resolution 544 (1983)—15 December

[extending the mandate of UNFICYP to 15 June, 1984; requesting continuation of the Secretary-General's mission of good offices]

*The Security Council,*

*Noting* the report by the Secretary-General on the United Nations operation in Cyprus of 1 December 1983 (S/16192 and Add. 1),

*Noting* also the recommendation by the Secretary-General that the Security Council extend the stationing of the United Nations Peace-Keeping Force in Cyprus for a further period of six months,

*Noting* further that the Government of Cyprus has agreed that in view of the prevailing conditions in the island it is necessary to keep the Force in Cyprus beyond 15 December 1983,

*Reaffirming* the provisions of resolution 186 (1964) of 4 March 1964 and other relevant resolutions,

1. *Extends* once more the stationing in Cyprus of the United Nations Peace-Keeping Force established under resolution 186 (1964), for a further period ending 15 June 1984;
2. *Requests* the Secretary-General to continue his mission of good offices, to keep the Security Council informed of the progress made and to submit a report on the implementation of this resolution by 31 May 1984;
3. *Calls* upon all the parties concerned to continue to cooperate with the Force on the basis of the present mandate.

*Adopted unanimously at the 2503rd meeting.*



## Resolution 550 (1984)—11 May

[condemning the purported exchange of Ambassadors between Turkey and the Turkish Cypriot leadership; reiterating call for non-recognition of the “Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus”; calling for the transfer of Varosha to UN administration]

*The Security Council,*

*Having* considered the situation in Cyprus at the request of the Government of the Republic of Cyprus,

*Having* heard the statement made by the President of the Republic of Cyprus,

*Taking note* of the report of the Secretary-General (S/16519),

*Recalling* its resolutions 365 (1974), 367 (1975), 541(1983) and 544(1983),

*Deeply regretting* the non-implementation of its resolutions, in particular resolution 541(1983),

*Gravely concerned* about the further secessionist acts in the occupied part of the Republic of Cyprus which are in violation of resolution 541(1983), namely the purported “exchange of Ambassadors” between Turkey and the legally invalid “Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus” and the contemplated holding of a “Constitutional referendum” and “elections”, as well as by other actions aimed at further consolidating the purported independent state and the division of Cyprus,

*Deeply concerned* about recent threats for settlement of Varosha by people other than its inhabitants,

*Reaffirming* its continuing support for the United Nations Peace-Keeping Force in Cyprus,

1. *Reaffirms* its resolution 541(1983) and calls for its urgent and effective implementation,
2. *Condemns* all secessionist actions, including the purported exchange of Ambassadors between Turkey and the Turkish Cypriot leadership, declares them illegal and invalid and calls for their immediate withdrawal;

3. *Reiterates* the call upon all States not to recognise the purported state of the "Turkish Republic on Northern Cyprus" set up by secessionist acts and calls upon them not to facilitate or in any way assist the aforesaid secessionist entity;
4. *Calls upon* all States to respect the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity, unity and non-alignment of the Republic of Cyprus;
5. *Considers* attempts to settle any part of Varosha by people other than its inhabitants as inadmissible and calls for the transfer of this area to the administration of the United Nations;
6. *Considers* any attempts to interfere with the status or the deployment of the United Nations Peace-Keeping Force in Cyprus as contrary to the resolutions of the United Nations;
7. *Requests* the Secretary-General to promote the urgent implementation of Security Council resolution 541(1983);
8. *Reaffirms* its mandate of good offices given to the Secretary General and requests him to undertake new efforts to attain an overall solution to the Cyprus problem in conformity with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations and the provisions for such a settlement laid down in the pertinent United Nations resolutions, including Security Council resolution 541(1983) and the present resolution;
9. *Calls upon* all parties to cooperate with the Secretary-General in his mission of good offices;
10. *Decides* to remain seized of the situation with a view to taking urgent and appropriate measures in the event of non-implementation of its resolution 541(1983) and the present resolution;
11. *Requests* the Secretary-General to promote the implementation of the resolution and to report thereon to the Security Council as developments require.

*Adopted at the 2539th meeting by 13 votes to 1 (Pakistan) with 1 abstention (United States of America).*

## Resolution 553 (1984)—15 June

[extending the mandate of UNFICYP to 15 December, 1984; requesting continuation of the Secretary-General's mission of good offices]

*The Security Council,*

*Noting* the report by the Secretary-General on the United Nations operations in Cyprus of 1 June 1984 (S/16596 and Add. 1 and 2),

*Noting* also the recommendation by the Secretary-General that the Security Council extend the stationing of the United Nations Peace-Keeping Force in Cyprus for a further period of six months,

*Noting* further that the Government of Cyprus has agreed that in view of the prevailing conditions in the island it is necessary to keep the Force in Cyprus beyond 15 June 1984,

*Reaffirming* the provisions of resolution 186 (1964) of 4 March 1964 and other relevant resolutions,

1. *Extends* once more the stationing in Cyprus of the United Nations Peace-Keeping Force established under resolution 186 (1964), for a further period ending 15 December 1984;
2. *Requests* the Secretary-General to continue his mission of good offices, to keep the Security Council informed of the progress made and to submit a report on the implementation of the present resolution by 30 November 1988;
3. *Calls upon* the parties concerned to continue to cooperate with the Force on the basis of the present mandate.

*Adopted unanimously at the 2547th meeting.*

## Resolution 559 (1984)—15 December

[extending the mandate of UNFICYP to 15 June, 1985; requesting continuation of the Secretary-General's mission of good offices]

*The Security Council,*

*Noting* the report by the Secretary-General on the United Nations operations in Cyprus of 12 December 1984 (S/16858 and Add. 1),

*Noting* also the recommendation by the Secretary-General that the Security Council extend the stationing of the United Nations Peace-Keeping Force in Cyprus for a further period of six months,

*Noting* further that the Government of Cyprus has agreed that in view of the prevailing conditions in the island it is necessary to keep the Force in Cyprus beyond 15 December 1984,

*Reaffirming* the provisions of resolution 186 (1964) of 4 March 1964 and other relevant resolutions,

1. *Extends* once more the stationing in Cyprus of the United Nations Peace-Keeping Force established under resolution 186 (1964), for a further period ending 15 June 1985;
2. *Requests* the Secretary-General to continue his mission of good offices, to keep the Security Council informed of the progress made and to submit a report on the implementation of the present resolution by 31 May 1985;
3. *Calls upon* the parties concerned to continue to cooperate with the Force on the basis of the present mandate.

*Adopted unanimously at the 2565th meeting.*

## Resolution 565 (1985)—14 June

[extending the mandate of UNFICYP to 15 December, 1985; requesting continuation of the Secretary-General's mission of good offices]

*The Security Council,*

*Noting* the report by the Secretary-General on the United Nations operation in Cyprus of 31 May and 14 June (S/17227 and Add. 2) and of 11 June 1985 (S/17227/Add. 1),

*Noting* also the recommendation by the Secretary-General that the Security Council extend the stationing of the United Nations Peace-Keeping Force in Cyprus for a further period of six months,

*Noting* further that the Government of Cyprus has agreed that in view of the prevailing conditions in the island it is necessary to keep the Force in Cyprus beyond 15 June 1985,

*Reaffirming* the provisions of resolution 186 (1964) of 4 March 1964 and other relevant resolutions,

1. *Extends* once more the stationing in Cyprus of the United Nations Peace-Keeping Force established under resolution 186 (1964), for a further period ending 15 December 1985;
2. *Requests* the Secretary-General to continue his mission of good offices, to keep the Security Council informed of the progress made and to submit a report on the implementation of the present resolution by 30 November 1985;
3. *Calls upon* all the parties concerned to continue to cooperate with the Force on the basis of the present mandate.

*Adopted unanimously at the 2591st meeting.*

## Resolution 578 (1985)—12 December

[extending the mandate of UNFICYP to 15 June, 1986; requesting continuation of the Secretary-General's mission of good offices]

*The Security Council,*

*Noting* the report by the Secretary-General of the United Nations operations in Cyprus of 30 November and 11 December (S/17657 and Add. 2) and of 9 December 1985 (S/17657/Add. 1),

*Noting* also the recommendation by the Secretary-General that the Security Council extend the stationing of the United Nations Peace-Keeping Force in Cyprus for a further period of six months,

*Noting* further that the Government of Cyprus has agreed that in view of the prevailing conditions in the island it is necessary to keep the Force in Cyprus beyond 15 December 1985,

*Reaffirming* the provisions of resolution 186 (1964) of 4 March 1964 and other relevant resolutions,

1. *Extends* once more the stationing in Cyprus of the United Nations Peace-Keeping Force established under resolution 186 (1964), for a further period ending 15 June 1986;
2. *Requests* the Secretary-General to continue his mission of good offices, to keep the Security Council informed of the progress made and to submit a report on the implementation of the present resolution by 31 May 1986;
3. *Calls upon* all the parties concerned to continue to cooperate with the Force on the basis of the present mandate.

*Adopted unanimously at the 2635th meeting.*



## Resolution 585 (1986)—13 June

[extending the mandate of UNFICYP to 15 December, 1986; requesting continuation of the Secretary-General's mission of good offices]

*The Security Council,*

*Noting* the report by the Secretary-General on the United Nations operation in Cyprus of 31 May 1986 and of 11 and 12 June 1986 (S/18102/Add. 1 and 2),

*Noting* also the recommendation by the Secretary-General that the Security Council extend the stationing of the United Nations Peace-Keeping Force in Cyprus for a further period of six months,

*Noting* further that the Government of Cyprus has agreed that in view of the prevailing conditions in the island it is necessary to keep the Force in Cyprus beyond 15 June 1986,

*Reaffirming* the provisions of resolution 186 (1964) of 4 March 1964 and other relevant resolutions,

1. *Extends* once more the stationing in Cyprus of the United Nations Peace-Keeping Force established under resolution 186 (1964), for a further period ending 15 December 1986;
2. *Requests* the Secretary-General to continue his mission of good offices, to keep the Security Council informed of the progress made and to submit a report on the implementation of the present resolution by 30 November 1986;
3. *Calls upon* all the parties concerned to continue to cooperate with the Force on the basis of the present mandate.

*Adopted unanimously at the 2688th meeting.*

## Resolution 593 (1986)—11 December

[extending the mandate of UNFICYP to 15 June, 1987; requesting continuation of the Secretary-General's mission of good offices]

*The Security Council,*

*Noting* the report by the Secretary-General on the United Nations operation in Cyprus of 2 December 1986 (S/18491) and of 10 December 1986 (S/18491/Add. 1),

*Noting* also the recommendation by the Secretary-General that the Security Council extend the stationing of the United Nations Peace-Keeping Force in Cyprus for a further period of six months,

*Noting* further that the Government of Cyprus has agreed that in view of the prevailing conditions in the island it is necessary to keep the Force in Cyprus beyond 15 December 1986,

*Reaffirming* the provisions of resolution 186 (1964) of 4 March 1964 and other relevant resolutions,

1. *Extends* once more the stationing in Cyprus of the United Nations Peace-Keeping Force established under resolution 186 (1964), for a further period ending 15 June 1987;
2. *Requests* the Secretary-General to continue his mission of good offices, to keep the Security Council informed of the progress made and to submit a report on the implementation of the present resolution by 31 May 1987;
3. *Calls upon* the parties concerned to continue to cooperate with the Force on the basis of the present mandate.

*Adopted unanimously at the 2729th meeting.*

## Resolution 597 (1987)—12 June

[extending the mandate of UNFICYP to 15 December, 1987; requesting continuation of the Secretary-General's mission of good offices]

*The Security Council,*

*Noting* the report by the Secretary-General on the United Nations operation in Cyprus of 29 May 1987 (S/18880 Add. 1),

*Noting* also the recommendation by the Secretary-General that the Security Council extend the stationing of the United Nations Peace-Keeping Force in Cyprus for a further period of six months,

*Noting* further that the Government of Cyprus has agreed that in view of the prevailing conditions in the island it is necessary to keep the Force in Cyprus beyond 15 June 1987,

*Reaffirming* the provisions of resolution 186 (1964) of 4 March 1964 and other relevant resolutions,

1. *Extends* once more the stationing in Cyprus of the United Nations Peace-Keeping Force established under resolution 186 (1964), for a further period ending 15 December 1987;
2. *Requests* the Secretary-General to continue his mission of good offices, to keep the Security Council informed of the progress made and to submit a report on the implementation of the present resolution by 30 November 1987;
3. *Calls upon* the parties concerned to continue to cooperate with the Force on the basis of the present mandate.

*Adopted unanimously at the 2749th meeting.*

## Resolution 604 (1987)—14 December

[extending the mandate of UNFICYP to 15 June, 1988; requesting continuation of the Secretary-General's mission of good offices]

*The Security Council,*

*Noting* the report by the Secretary-General on the United Nations operation in Cyprus of 30 November 1987 (S/19304 and Add. 1),

*Noting* also the recommendation by the Secretary-General that the Security Council extend the stationing of the United Nations Peace-Keeping Force in Cyprus for a further period of six months,

*Noting* further that the Government of Cyprus has agreed that in view of the prevailing conditions in the island it is necessary to keep the Force in Cyprus beyond 15 December 1987,

*Reaffirming* the provisions of resolution 186 (1964) of 4 March 1964 and other relevant resolutions,

1. *Extends* once more the stationing in Cyprus of the United Nations Peace-Keeping Force established under resolution 186 (1964), for a further period ending 15 June 1988;
2. *Requests* the Secretary-General to continue his mission of good offices, to keep the Security Council informed of the progress made and to submit a report on the implementation of the present resolution by 30 May 1988;
3. *Calls upon* the parties concerned to continue to cooperate with the Force on the basis of the present mandate.

*Adopted unanimously at the 2771st meeting.*

## Resolution 614 (1988)—15 June

[extending the mandate of UNFICYP to 15 December, 1988; requesting continuation of the Secretary-General's mission of good offices]

*The Security Council,*

*Noting* the report by the Secretary-General on the United Nations operation in Cyprus of 31 May 1988 (S/19927 and Add. 1),

*Noting* also the recommendation by the Secretary-General that the Security Council extend the stationing of the United Nations Peace-Keeping Force in Cyprus for a further period of six months,

*Noting* further that the Government of Cyprus has agreed that in view of the prevailing conditions in the island it is necessary to keep the Force in Cyprus beyond 15 June 1988,

*Reaffirming* the provisions of resolution 186 (1964) of 4 March 1964 and other relevant resolutions,

1. *Extends* once more the stationing in Cyprus of the United Nations Peace-Keeping Force established under resolution 186 (1964), for a further period ending 15 December 1988;
2. *Requests* the Secretary-General to continue his mission of good offices, to keep the Security Council informed of the progress made and to submit a report on the implementation of the present resolution by 30 November 1988;
3. *Calls upon* the parties concerned to continue to cooperate with the Force on the basis of the present mandate.

*Adopted unanimously at the 2816th meeting.*

## Resolution 625 (1988)—15 December

[extending the mandate of UNFICYP to 15 June, 1989]

*The Security Council,*

*Noting* the report by the Secretary-General on the United Nations operation in Cyprus of 30 November 1988 (S/20310 and Add. 1),

*Noting* also the recommendation by the Secretary-General that the Security Council extend the stationing of the United Nations Peace-Keeping Force in Cyprus for a further period of six months,

*Noting* further that the Government of Cyprus has agreed that in view of the prevailing conditions in the island it is necessary to keep the Force in Cyprus beyond 15 December 1988,

*Reaffirming* the provisions of resolution 186 (1964) of 4 March 1964 and other relevant resolutions,

*Calls upon* all the parties concerned to continue to cooperate with the Force on the basis of the present mandate.

*Adopted unanimously at the 2833rd meeting.*

## Resolution 634 (1989)—9 June

[extending the mandate of UNFICYP to 15 December, 1989; requesting continuation of the Secretary-General's mission of good offices]

*The Security Council,*

*Noting* the report by the Secretary-General on the United Nations operation in Cyprus of 31 May 1989 (S/20663),

*Noting* also the recommendation by the Secretary-General that the Security Council extend the stationing of the United Nations Peace-Keeping Force in Cyprus for a further period of six months,

*Noting* further that the Government of Cyprus has agreed that in view of the prevailing conditions in the island it is necessary to keep the Force in Cyprus beyond 15 June 1989,

*Reaffirming* the provisions of resolution 186 (1964) of 4 March 1964 and other relevant resolutions,

1. *Extends* once more the stationing in Cyprus of the United Nations Peace-Keeping Force established under resolution 186 (1964), for a further period ending 15 December 1989;
2. *Requests* the Secretary-General to continue his mission of good offices, to keep the Security Council informed of the progress made and to submit a report on the implementation of the present resolution by 30 November 1989;
3. *Calls upon* all the parties concerned to continue to cooperate with the Force on the basis of the present mandate.

*Adopted unanimously at the 2868th meeting.*

## Resolution 646 (1989)—14 December

[extending the mandate of UNFICYP to 15 June, 1990; requesting continuation of the Secretary-General's mission of good offices]

*The Security Council,*

*Noting* the report by the Secretary-General on the United Nations operation in Cyprus of 7 December 1989 (S/21010 and Add. 1)

*Noting* also the recommendation by the Secretary-General that the Security Council extend the stationing of the United Nations Peace-Keeping Force in Cyprus for a further period of six months,

*Noting* further that the Government of Cyprus has agreed that in view of the prevailing conditions in the island it is necessary to keep the Force in Cyprus beyond 15 December 1989,

*Reaffirming* the provisions of resolution 186 (1964) of 4 March 1964 and other relevant resolutions,

1. *Extends once more* the stationing in Cyprus of the United Nations Peace-Keeping Force established under resolution 186 (1964), for a further period ending 15 June 1990;
2. *Requests* the Secretary-General to continue his mission of good offices, to keep the Security Council informed of the progress made and to submit a report on the implementation of the present resolution by 31 May 1990;
3. *Calls upon* the parties concerned to continue to co-operate with the Force on the basis of the present mandate.

*Adopted unanimously at the 2898th meeting.*



## Resolution 649 (1990)—12 March

[calling for the leaders of the two communities to pursue efforts towards a constitutionally bi-communal and territorially bi-zonal settlement]

*The Security Council,*

*Having considered* the report of the Secretary-General of 8 March 1990 (S/21183) on the recent meeting between the leaders of the two communities in Cyprus and on his assessment of the current situation,

*Recalling* its relevant resolutions on Cyprus,

*Recalling* the statement of the President of the Security Council of 22 February 1990 (S/21160) calling upon the leaders of the two communities to demonstrate the necessary goodwill and flexibility and to cooperate with the Secretary-General so that the talks will result in a major step forward toward the resolution of the Cyprus problem,

*Expressing its regret* that, in the more than 25 years since the establishment of UNFICYP, it has not been possible to achieve a negotiated settlement of all aspects of the Cyprus problem,

*Concerned* that at the recent meeting in New York it has not been possible to achieve results in arriving at an agreed outline of an overall agreement,

1. *Reaffirms* in particular its resolution 367 (1975) as well as its support for the 1977 and 1979 high-level agreements between the leaders of the two communities in which they pledged themselves to establish a bi-communal Federal Republic of Cyprus that will safeguard its independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and non-alignment, and exclude union in whole or in part with any other country and any form of partition or secession;
2. *Expresses* its full support for the current effort of the Secretary-General in carrying out his mission of good offices concerning Cyprus;
3. *Calls upon* the leaders of the two communities to pursue their efforts to reach freely a mutually acceptable solution providing for the establishment of a federation that will be bi-communal as regards the constitutional aspects and bi-zonal as regards the

territorial aspects in line with the present resolution and their 1977 and 1979 high-level agreements, and to cooperate, on an equal footing, with the Secretary-General in completing, in the first instance and on an urgent basis, an outline of an overall agreement, as agreed in June 1989;

4. *Requests* the Secretary-General to pursue his mission of good offices in order to achieve the earliest possible progress and, towards this end, to assist the two communities by making suggestions to facilitate the discussions;
5. *Calls* on the parties concerned to refrain from any action that could aggravate the situation;
6. *Decides* to remain actively seized of this situation and the current effort;
7. *Requests* the Secretary-General to inform the Council in his report due by 31 May 1990 of the progress made in resuming the intensive talks and in developing an agreed outline of an overall agreement in line with the present resolution.

*Adopted unanimously at the 2909th meeting.*

## Resolution 657 (1990)—15 June

[extending the mandate of UNFICYP to 15 December, 1990; requesting continuation of the Secretary-General's mission of good offices]

*The Security Council,*

*Noting* the report by the Secretary-General on the United Nations operation in Cyprus of 31 May 1990 (S/21340 and Add. 1),

*Noting* also the recommendation by the Secretary-General that the Security Council extend the stationing of the United Nations Peace-Keeping Force in Cyprus for a further period of six months,

*Noting* further that the Government of Cyprus has agreed that in view of the prevailing conditions in the island it is necessary to keep the Force in Cyprus beyond 15 June 1990,

*Reaffirming* the provisions of resolution 186 (1964) of 4 March 1964 and other relevant resolutions,

1. *Extends once more* the stationing in Cyprus of the United Nations Peace-Keeping Force established under resolution 186 (1964) for a further period ending on 15 December 1990;
2. *Requests* the Secretary-General to continue his mission of good offices, to keep the Security Council informed of the progress made and to submit a report on the implementation of the present resolution by 30 November 1990;
3. *Calls upon* all the parties concerned to continue to cooperate with the Force on the basis of the present mandate.

*Adopted unanimously at the 2928th meeting.*

## Resolution 680 (1990)—14 December

[extending the mandate of UNFICYP to 15 June, 1991; requesting continuation of the Secretary-General's mission of good offices]

*The Security Council,*

*Taking note* of the report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations operation in Cyprus of 7 and 14 December 1990 (S/21981 and Add. 1),

*Taking note* also of the recommendation by the Secretary-General that the Security Council extend the stationing of the United Nations Peace-Keeping Force in Cyprus for a further period of six months,

*Noting* that the Government of Cyprus has agreed that in view of the prevailing conditions in the island it is necessary to keep the Force in Cyprus beyond 15 December 1990,

*Reaffirming* the provisions of resolution 186 (1964) and other relevant resolutions,

1. *Extends* once more the stationing in Cyprus of the United Nations Peace-Keeping Force established under resolution 186 (1964) for a further period ending on 15 June 1991;
2. *Requests* the Secretary-General to continue his mission of good offices to keep the Security Council informed of the progress made and to submit a report on the implementation of the present resolution by 31 May 1991;
3. *Calls upon* all the parties concerned to continue to cooperate with the Force on the basis of the present mandate.

*Adopted unanimously at its 2969th meeting*

## Resolution 682 (1990)—21 December

[deciding to examine the problem of costs and financing of UNFICYP]

*The Security Council,*

*Recalling* its resolution 186 (1964) of 4 March 1964 establishing the United Nations Peace-Keeping Force in Cyprus for an initial period of three months,

Also recalling its subsequent resolutions extending the stationing in Cyprus of the United Nations Peace-Keeping Force in Cyprus, most recently its resolution 680(1990) of 14 December 1990,

*Reaffirming* the statement of the President of the Security Council of 30 May 1990, (S/21323) in which the members emphasised the United Nations peace-keeping operations must be launched and maintained on a sound and secure financial basis,

*Concerned* about the chronic and ever-deepening financial crisis facing the United Nations Peace-Keeping Force in Cyprus, as described in the report of the Secretary-General (S/21981 and Add. 1) and as expressed in the statement of the President of the Security Council of 15 June 1990 (S/21361),

1. *Decides* to examine the problem of the costs and financing of the United Nations Peace-Keeping Force in Cyprus, bearing in mind the financial crisis facing the Force and the report of the United Nations Secretariat Review Team of 7 December 1990 (S/21982) in all its aspects, and to report by 1 June 1991 on alternative arrangements for meeting the costs of the Force for which the United Nations are responsible, in order to place the Force on a sound and secure financial basis;
2. *Also decides* to consider, not later than early June 1991, comprehensively and favourably the results of the examination mentioned in paragraph 1 of the present resolution, with a view to putting into effect an alternative method of financing the United Nations Peace-Keeping Force in Cyprus, which could, inter alia, include the use of assessed contributions, simultaneously with the extension of the mandate on or before 15 June 1991.

*Adopted unanimously at its 2971st meeting*

## Resolution 697 (1991)—14 June

[extending the mandate of UNFICYP to 15 December, 1991; requesting continuation of the Secretary-General's mission of good offices]

*The Security Council,*

*Taking note* of the report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations operation in Cyprus of 31 May 1991 (S/22665 and Add. 1 and 2),

*Taking note* also of the recommendation by the Secretary-General that the Security Council extend the stationing of the United Nations Peace-Keeping Force in Cyprus for a further period of six months,

*Noting* that the Government of Cyprus has agreed that in view of the prevailing conditions in the island it is necessary to keep the Force in Cyprus beyond 15 June 1991,

*Reaffirming* the provisions of resolution 186 (1964) and other relevant resolutions,

1. *Extends* once more the stationing in Cyprus of the United Nations Peace-Keeping Force established under resolution 186 (1964) for a further period ending on 15 December 1991;
2. *Requests* the Secretary-General to continue his mission of good offices to keep the Security Council informed of the progress made and to submit a report on the implementation of the present resolution by 30 November 1991;
3. *Calls upon* all the parties concerned to continue to cooperate with the Force on the basis of the present mandate.

*Adopted unanimously at its 2992nd meeting*

## Resolution 698 (1991)—14 June

[requesting further study of the financing of UNFICYP]

*The Security Council,*

*Recalling* its resolution 186 (1964) of 4 March 1964 establishing the United Nations Peace-Keeping Force in Cyprus for an initial period of three months,

*Also recalling* its subsequent resolutions extending the mandate of UNFICYP, most recently its resolution 697(1991) of 14 June 1991,

*Also recalling* the report of the United Nations Secretariat Review Team of 7 December 1990 and the recommendations contained therein (S/21982),

*Further recalling* its resolutions 682(1990) of 21 December 1990, by which it decided to examine the problem of the costs and financing of UNFICYP in all its aspects, with a view to putting into effect an alternative method of financing simultaneously with the renewal of the mandate on or before 15 June 1991,

*Taking note* with appreciation of the recent consultations among Council members on the problem of the costs and financing of UNFICYP in all its aspects resulting in the report of the Group of Friends of the President of the Security Council of 31 May 1991,

*Also taking note* with concern of the latest report of the Secretary-General (S/22665 and Add. 1 and 2) which once again draws attention to the chronic financing problem of UNFICYP,

*Reaffirming* again the statement of the President of the Security Council of 30 May 1990, (S/21323) in which the members emphasised that United Nations peace-keeping operations must be launched and maintained on a sound and secure financial basis,

*Stressing* the importance of an early agreement on a resolution of the Cyprus problem,

1. *Concludes* that a method of financing of UNFICYP is needed which will put the Force on a sound and secure financial basis;
2. *Further concludes* that the question of the costs of UNFICYP needs to be studied further, with the aim of both reducing and

clearly defining the costs for which United Nations should be responsible;

3. *Requests* the Secretary-General to hold consultations with members of the Council, troop contributing countries and others concerned, on the question of costs, taking into account both the report of the United Nations Secretariat Review Team of 7 December 1990 and the report of the Group of Friends of the President of the Security Council of 31 May 1991, and to report to the Council by 1 October 1991 and undertakes to decide, in the light of this report and by the time of the next extension of UNFICYP's mandate on or before 15 December 1991, on measures to be taken to put the Force onto a sound and secure financial basis.

*Adopted unanimously at its 2993rd meeting*



## Resolution 716 (1991)—11 October

[reaffirming support for a bi-communal, bizonal federation; requesting a high-level international meeting of the two communities, Greece and Turkey, chaired by the Secretary-General]

*The Security Council,*

*Having* considered the report of the Secretary-General of 8 October 1991 on his mission of good offices in Cyprus (S/23121),

*Noting* with satisfaction the progress made in preparing a set of ideas as the basis for arriving at an agreed overall framework agreement on Cyprus,

*Noting* with concern the difficulties encountered in completing this work,

*Regretting* that it was not possible to convene the high-level international meeting foreseen in the statement by the President of the Security Council of 28 June 1991(S/22744),

1. *Commends* the Secretary-General for his efforts during the past few months and endorses his report and observations;
2. *Reaffirms* its previous resolutions on Cyprus;
3. *Reaffirms* its position on the Cyprus question, expressed most recently in resolution 649(1990) and in line with the 1977 and 1979 high-level agreements between the parties in Cyprus, that the fundamental principles of a Cyprus settlement are the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and non-alignment of the Republic of Cyprus, the exclusion of union in whole or in part with any other country and any form of partition or secession; and the establishment of a new constitutional arrangement for Cyprus that would ensure the well-being and security of the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities in a bi-communal and bi-zonal federation;
4. *Reaffirms* that its position on the solution to the Cyprus problem is based on one State of Cyprus comprising two politically equal communities as defined by Secretary-General in the eleventh paragraph of annex I to his report dated 8 March 1990 (S/21183),

5. *Calls upon* the parties to adhere fully to these principles and to negotiate within the framework of them without introducing concepts that are at variance with them;
6. *Reaffirms* that the Secretary-General's mission of good offices is with the two communities whose participation in the process is on an equal footing;
7. *Endorses* the Secretary-General's intention to resume discussions in early November with the two parties in Cyprus and Greece and Turkey to complete the set of ideas on an overall framework agreement;
8. *Considers* that convening a high-level international meeting chaired by the Secretary-General in which the two communities and Greece and Turkey would participate represents an effective mechanism for concluding an overall framework agreement on Cyprus;
9. *Requests* the leaders of the two communities and Greece and Turkey to cooperate fully with the Secretary-General and his representatives so that the high-level international meeting can be convened before the end of this year;
10. *Requests* the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council in November 1991 whether sufficient progress has been made to convene the high-level international meeting and, should conditions not be ripe, to convey to the Council the set of ideas as they will have evolved by that time with his assessment of the situation.

*Adopted unanimously at its 3013th meeting*

## Resolution 723 (1991)—12 December

[extending the mandate of UNFICYP to 15 June, 1992; requesting continuation of the Secretary-General's mission of good offices]

*The Security Council,*

*Noting* the report by the Secretary-General on the United Nations operation in Cyprus of 30 November 1991 (S/23263 and Add. 1),

*Noting* also the recommendation by the Secretary-General that the Security Council extend the stationing of the United Nations Peace-Keeping Force in Cyprus for a further period of six months,

*Noting* further that the Government of Cyprus has agreed that in view of the prevailing conditions in the island it is necessary to keep the Force in Cyprus beyond 15 December 1991,

*Reaffirming* the provisions of resolution 186 (1964) of 4 March 1964 and other relevant resolutions,

1. *Extends* once more the stationing in Cyprus of the United Nations Peace-Keeping Force established under resolution 186 (1964) for a further period ending on 15 June 1992;
2. *Requests* the Secretary-General to continue his mission of good offices, to keep the Security Council informed of the progress made and to submit a report on the implementation of the present resolution by 31 May 1992;
3. *Calls upon* all the parties concerned to continue to cooperate with the Force on the basis of the present mandate.

*Adopted unanimously at the 3022nd meeting*

## Resolution 750 (1992)—10 April

[reaffirming support for a settlement based on a State of Cyprus comprising two politically equal communities, in a bi-communal, bizonal federation; requesting the Secretary-General to pursue efforts to complete the "set of ideas" as a prelude to the convening of a high-level international meeting]

*The Security Council,*

*Having* considered the report by the Secretary-General of 3 April 1992 on his mission of good offices in Cyprus (S/23780),

*Reaffirming* its previous resolutions on Cyprus,

*Noting* with concern that there has been no progress in completing the set of ideas for an overall framework agreement since the Secretary-General's report of 8 October 1991 (S/23121) and that in some areas there has even been regression,

*Welcoming* the assurances given to the Secretary-General over the past two months by the leaders of the two communities and the Prime Ministers of Greece and Turkey of their desire to co-operate with him and his representatives,

1. *Commends* the Secretary-General for his efforts, and expresses its appreciation for his report;
2. *Reaffirms* the position, set out in resolutions 649(1990) and 716 (1991), that a Cyprus settlement must be based on a State of Cyprus with a single sovereignty and international personality and a single citizenship, with its independence and territorial integrity safeguarded, and comprising two politically equal communities as defined in paragraph 11 of the Secretary-General's report (S/23780) in a bi-communal and bi-zonal federation, and that such a settlement must exclude union in whole or in part with any other country or any form of partition or secession;

3. *Calls* again upon the parties to adhere fully to these principles and to negotiate without introducing concepts that are at variance with them;
4. *Endorses* the set of ideas described in paragraphs 17 to 25 and paragraph 27 of the Secretary-General's report as an appropriate basis for reaching an overall framework agreement, subject to the work that needs to be done on the outstanding issues, in particular on territorial adjustments and displaced persons, being brought to a conclusion as an integrated package mutually agreed upon by both communities;
5. *Requests* all concerned to cooperate fully with the Secretary General and his representatives in clarifying without delay these outstanding issues;
6. *Reaffirms* that the Secretary-General's mission of good offices is with the two communities whose participation in the process is on an equal footing to assure the well being and security of both communities;
7. *Decides* to remain seized of the Cyprus question on an on-going and direct basis in support of the effort to complete the set of ideas referred to in paragraph 4 above and conclude an overall framework agreement;
8. *Requests* the Secretary-General to pursue his intensive efforts to complete the set of ideas referred to in paragraph 4 above during May and June 1992, to keep the Council closely informed of his efforts and to seek the Council's direct support whenever necessary;
9. *Continues to believe* that, following the satisfactory conclusion of the Secretary-General's intensive efforts to complete the set of ideas referred to in paragraph 4 above, the convening of a high-level international meeting chaired by the Secretary-General in which the two communities and Greece and Turkey would participate represents an effective mechanism for concluding an overall framework agreement;
10. *Further requests* the Secretary-General to submit a full report to the Council on the outcome of his efforts by July 1992 at the latest and to make specific recommendations for overcoming any outstanding difficulty;

11. *Reaffirms* the important mandate entrusted to UNFICYP and looks forward to receiving the report on UNFICYP which the Secretary-General proposes to submit in May 1992.

*Adopted at its 3067th meeting*

## Resolution 759 (1992)—12 June

[extending the mandate of UNFICYP to 15 December, 1992; requesting specific proposals from the Secretary-general on the restructuring of UNFICYP; requesting continuation of the Secretary-General's mission of good offices]

*The Security Council,*

*Noting* the report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations operation in Cyprus of 31 May 1992 (S/24050 and Add.1),

*Noting* also the recommendation by the Secretary-General that the Security Council extend the stationing of the United Nations Peace-Keeping Force in Cyprus for a further period of six months,

*Noting* further that the Government of Cyprus has agreed that in view of the prevailing conditions in the island, it is necessary to keep the Force in Cyprus beyond 15 June 1992,

*Reaffirming* the provisions of resolution 186 (1964) of 4 March 1964 and other relevant resolutions,

1. *Extends* once more the stationing in Cyprus of the United Nations Peace-Keeping Force established under resolution 186 (1964) for a further period ending on 15 December 1992;
2. *Requests* the Secretary-General, after consulting the troop-contributing Governments as envisaged in paragraph 56 of the report, to submit specific proposals to the Security Council no later than 1 September 1992 on the restructuring of the Force, such proposals to be based on the realistic options available in current circumstances;
3. *Requests* the Secretary-General to continue his mission of good offices, to keep the Security Council informed of the progress made and to submit a report on the implementation of the present resolution by 30 November 1992;
4. *Calls upon* all the parties concerned to continue to cooperate with the Force on the basis of the present mandate.

*Adopted at its 3084th meeting.*

## Resolution 774 (1992)—26 August

[reaffirming support for a settlement based on a State of Cyprus comprising two politically equal communities, in a bi-communal, bizonal federation; endorsing the Set of Ideas; urging the parties to negotiate towards an overall framework agreement based on the Set of Ideas]

*The Security Council,*

*Having considered the report of the Secretary-General of 21 August 1992 on his mission of good offices in Cyprus (S/24472),*

*Reaffirming all its previous resolutions on Cyprus,*

*Noting that some progress has been achieved, in particular the acceptance by both sides of the right of return and the right to property, and in a narrowing of the gap by both sides on territorial adjustments,*

*Expressing concern nevertheless that it has not yet been possible, for reasons explained in the report, to achieve the goals set out in resolution 750 (1992),*

1. *Endorses the report of the Secretary-General and commends him for his efforts;*
2. *Reaffirms its position that a Cyprus settlement must be based on a State of Cyprus with a single sovereignty and international personality and a single citizenship, with its independence and territorial integrity safeguarded, and comprising two politically equal communities as defined in paragraph 11 of the Secretary-General's report of 3 April 1992 (S/23780) in a bi-communal and bi-zonal federation, and that such a settlement must exclude union in whole or in part with any other country or any form of partition or secession;*
3. *Endorses the Set of Ideas including suggested territorial adjustments reflected in the map contained in the annex to the Secretary-General's report as the basis for reaching an overall framework agreement;*
4. *Agrees with the Secretary-General that the Set of Ideas as an integrated whole has now been sufficiently developed to enable the two sides to reach an overall agreement;*



5. *Calls* on the parties to manifest the necessary political will and to address in a positive manner the observations of the Secretary-General for resolving the issues covered in his report;
6. *Urges* the parties, when they resume their face-to-face talks with the Secretary-General on 26 October 1992, to pursue uninterrupted negotiations at United Nations Headquarters until an overall framework agreement is reached on the basis of the entire Set of Ideas;
7. *Reaffirms* its position that the Secretary-General convene, following the satisfactory conclusion of the face-to-face talks, a high-level international meeting chaired by him to conclude an overall framework agreement, in which the two communities and Greece and Turkey would participate;
8. *Requests* all concerned to cooperate fully with the Secretary-General and his representatives in preparing the ground prior to the resumption of the direct talks in October to facilitate the speedy completion of the work;
9. *Expresses* the expectation that an overall framework agreement will be concluded in 1992 and that 1993 will be the transitional period during which the measures set out in the annex to the Set of Ideas will be implemented;
10. *Reaffirms* that, in line with previous resolutions of the Security Council, the present status quo is not acceptable, and, should an agreement not emerge from the talks that will reconvene in October, calls on the Secretary-General to identify the reasons for the failure and to recommend to the Council alternative courses of action to resolve the Cyprus problem;
11. *Requests* the Secretary-General to submit, prior to the end of 1992, a full report on the talks that will resume in October.

*Adopted at its 3109th meeting.*

## Resolution 789 (1992)—25 November

[reaffirming endorsement of the Set of Ideas; calling on the Turkish Cypriot side to adopt positions consistent with the Set of Ideas; urging commitment to confidence-building measures, including reduction of foreign troops transfer of control of Varosha to UNFICYP, and proposal of bi-communal projects]

### *The Security Council,*

*Having* considered the report of the Secretary-General of 19 November 1992 on his mission of good offices in Cyprus (S/24830),

*Noting* with satisfaction that the two leaders discussed all the issues in the Set of Ideas with the result that there were areas of agreement as noted in the report,

*Welcoming* the agreement by the two sides to meet again with the Secretary-General in early March 1993 to complete the work on an agreed Set of Ideas,

1. *Reaffirms* all its previous resolutions on Cyprus, including resolutions 365 (1974), 367 (1975), 541 (1983), 550 (1984) and 774 (1992),
2. *Endorses* the report of the Secretary-General and commends him for his efforts,
3. *Reaffirms* also its endorsement of the Set of Ideas including the territorial adjustments reflected in the map contained in the annex to the report of the Secretary-General of 21 August 1992 (2/S/24472) as the basis for reaching an overall framework agreement,
4. *Reaffirms* further its position that the present status quo is not acceptable and that an overall agreement in line with the Set of Ideas should be achieved without further delay;
5. *Notes* that the recent joint meetings did not achieve their intended goal, in particular because certain positions adopted by the Turkish Cypriot side were fundamentally at variance with the Set of Ideas,
6. *Calls upon* the Turkish Cypriot side to adopt positions that are consistent with the Set of Ideas on those issues identified by the

Secretary-General in his report, and for all concerned to be prepared in the next round of talks to make decisions that will bring about a speedy agreement,

7. *Recognises* that the completion of this process in March 1993 would be greatly facilitated by the implementation by each side of measures designed to promote mutual confidence;
8. *Urges* all concerned to commit themselves to the confidence-building measures set out below:
  - (a) That, as a first step towards the withdrawal of non-Cypriot forces envisaged in the Set of Ideas, the number of foreign troops in the Republic of Cyprus undergo a significant reduction and that a reduction of defence spending be effected in the Republic of Cyprus,
  - (b) That the military authorities on each side cooperate with the United Nations Peace-Keeping Force in Cyprus in order to extend the unmanning agreement of 1989 to all areas of the United Nations-controlled Buffer Zone where the two sides are in close proximity to each other;
  - (c) That, with a view to the implementation of resolution 550 (1984), the area at present under the control of the United Nations Peace-Keeping Force in Cyprus be extended to include Varosha;
  - (d) That each side take active measures to promote people-to-people contact between the two communities by reducing restrictions to the movement of persons across the Buffer Zone;
  - (e) That restrictions imposed on foreign visitors crossing the Buffer Zone be reduced;
  - (f) That each side propose bi-communal projects, for possible financing by lending and donor Governments as well as international institutions;
  - (g) That both sides commit themselves to the holding of a Cyprus-wide census under the auspices of the United Nations;
  - (h) That both sides cooperate to enable the United Nations to undertake, in the relevant locations, feasibility studies (i) in connection with the resettlement and rehabilitation of persons who would be affected by the territorial adjustments as part of the overall agreement, and (ii) in connection with the pro-

gramme of economic development that would, as part of the overall agreement, benefit those persons who would resettle in the area under Turkish Cypriot administration;

9. *Requests* the Secretary-General to follow up on the implementation of the above confidence-building measures and to keep the Security Council informed as appropriate;
10. *Also requests* the Secretary-General to maintain such preparatory contacts as he considers appropriate before the resumption of the joint meetings in March 1993, and to propose for the Security Council's consideration revisions in the negotiating format to make it more effective;
11. *Further requests* the Secretary-General, during the March 1993 joint meetings, to assess developments on a regular basis with the Council with a view to considering what further action may be needed by the Council;
12. *Requests* the Secretary-General to submit a full report after the conclusion of the joint meetings that will resume in March 1993.

*Adopted at its 3140th meeting.*

## Resolution 796 (1992)—14 December

[extending the mandate of UNFICYP to 15 June, 1993; requesting a report from the Secretary-general on the restructuring of UNFICYP; requesting continuation of the Secretary-general's mission of good offices]

*The Security Council,*

*Noting* the report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations operation in Cyprus of 1 December 1992 (S/24917 and Add. 1),

*Noting* also the recommendation by the Secretary-General that the Security Council extend the stationing of the United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus for a further period of six months,

*Noting* further that the Government of Cyprus has agreed that in view of the prevailing conditions in the island, it is necessary to keep the Force in Cyprus beyond 15 December 1992,

*Reaffirming* the provisions of resolution 186 (1964) of 4 March 1964 and other relevant resolutions,

1. *Extends* once more the stationing in Cyprus of the United Nations Peace-Keeping Force established under resolution 186 (1964) for a further period ending on 15 June 1993;
2. *Requests* the Secretary-General, to continue his mission of good offices, to keep the Security Council informed of the progress made and to submit a report on the implementation of the present resolution by 31 May 1993;
3. *Welcomes* the intention of the Secretary-General expressed in paragraph 46 of his report to pursue his consultation with the troop-contributing Governments about a restructuring of the Force and to report on this to the Council as soon as possible;
4. *Calls upon* all the parties concerned to continue to cooperate with the Force on the basis of the present mandate.

*Adopted at its 3148th meeting.*

## Resolution 831 (1993)—27 May

[on the restructuring of UNFICYP]

*The Security Council,*

*Recalling* its resolution 186 (1964) and subsequent relevant resolutions,

*Reaffirming* that the extension of the mandate of the United Nations Peace-Keeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) should be considered every six months,

*Noting* the recent communication from the Government of Cyprus to the Secretary-General (S/25647),

*Noting* that both voluntary and assessed methods of contribution are acceptable for United Nations peace-keeping operations and stressing the importance of maximising voluntary contributions,

*Stressing* the importance it attaches to the achievements of early progress towards a political settlement in Cyprus, and also to the implementation of confidence-building measures,

*Reiterating* in particular its call to both sides to cooperate with UNFICYP in order to extend the unmanning agreement of 1989 to all areas of the United Nations-controlled Buffer Zone where the two sides are in close proximity to each other,

*Reaffirming* that the present status quo is not acceptable, and concerned that the United Nations should not be entering into open-ended peace-keeping commitments,

1. *Welcomes* the report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations operation in Cyprus (S/25492);
2. *Expresses* its appreciation for past voluntary contributions to UNFICYP and for those that have recently been offered for the future, which are essential for the continuation of the Force;
3. *Stresses* the importance of the continuation of voluntary contributions to the Force and calls for maximum voluntary contributions in the future;

4. *Decides* that, with effect from the next extension of UNFICYP'S mandate on or before 15 June 1993, those costs of the Force which are not covered by voluntary contributions should be treated as expenses of the Organisation under Article 17 (2) of the Charter of the United Nations;
5. *Decides* also that UNFICYP should be restructured as a first step on the basis of the proposal in paragraphs 16-19 of the Secretary-General's report (S/25492), with the addition of a limited number of observers for reconnaissance and with a view to further restructuring in the light of the reassessment referred to in paragraph 7 below;
6. *Underlines* the responsibility of the parties for minimising tension and facilitating the operation of UNFICYP, including through the implementation of confidence-building measures, including that the number of foreign troops in the Republic of Cyprus undergo a significant reduction and that a reduction of defence spending be effected in the Republic of Cyprus, as envisaged in its earlier relevant resolutions,
7. *Decides* to conduct a comprehensive reassessment of UNFICYP at the time of the consideration of the Force's mandate in December 1993, including the implications of progress of confidence-building measures and towards a political settlement for the future of the Force;
8. *Requests* the Secretary-General to submit a report one month before that reassessment, to cover all aspects of the situation, including confidence-building measures, progress in political negotiations and possible progressive steps towards an observer force based on the proposal described in paragraph 12 of the Secretary-General's report (S/25492);
9. *Invites* the Secretary-General to take the necessary steps to implement this resolution.

*Adopted at its 3222nd meeting.*

## Resolution 839 (1993)—11 June

[extending the mandate of UNFICYP to 15 December, 1993; requesting continuation of the Secretary-General's mission of good offices; calling on both sides to take measures to lower tension along the cease-fire lines, and to carry forward the intercommunal talks]

*The Security Council,*

*Noting* the report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations operation in Cyprus of 9 June 1993 (S/25912 and Add. 1),

*Noting* also the recommendation by the Secretary-General that the Security Council extend the stationing of the United Nations Peace-Keeping Force in Cyprus for a further period of six months,

*Noting* further that the Government of Cyprus has agreed that in view of the prevailing conditions in the island, it is necessary to keep the Force in Cyprus beyond 15 June 1993,

*Recalling* its resolution 831 (1993) of 27 May 1993, and in particular its paragraphs 2, 3 and 4 on financing, as well as its paragraphs 5 and 7 on the restructuring of the Force and the comprehensive reassessment which is to be conducted in December 1993,

*Reiterating* in particular its call to both sides to cooperate with UNFICYP in order to extend the unmanning agreement of 1989 to all areas of the United Nations-controlled buffer zone where the two sides are in close proximity to each other,

*Reaffirming* the provisions of resolution 186 (1964) of 4 March 1964 and other relevant resolutions,

1. *Extends* once more the stationing in Cyprus of the United Nations Peace-Keeping Force established under resolution 186 (1964) for a further period ending on 15 December 1993;
2. *Requests* the Secretary-General, to continue his mission of good offices, to keep the Security Council informed of the progress made and to submit a report on the implementation of the present resolution by 15 November 1993 as part of the report called for in its resolution 831 (1993);



3. *Supports* the recommendation of the Secretary-General expressed in paragraph 48 of his report that both sides take reciprocal measures to lower the tension, including mutual commitments, through UNFICYP, to prohibit along the cease-fire lines live ammunition or weapons other than those which are hand-held and to prohibit also firing of weapons within sight or hearing of the buffer zone and requests the Secretary-General to negotiate the necessary agreements between the parties to implement these measures;
4. *Calls upon* all the parties concerned to continue to cooperate with the Force on the basis of the present mandate.
5. *Calls on* both parties to carry forward expeditiously and in a constructive manner the intercommunal talks under the auspices of the Secretary-General, and requests the Secretary-General to report on progress in the current round.

*Adopted at its 3235th meeting,*

## Resolution 889 (1993)—15 December

[extending the mandate of UNFICYP to 15 June, 1994; calling for a reduction in the number of foreign troops and defence spending in the Republic of Cyprus; calling on the military authorities on both sides to begin discussions with UNFICYP; encouraging efforts to achieve agreement on confidence-building measures; welcoming Turkey's support of the confidence-building measures]

*The Security Council,*

*Recalling* its resolution 186 (1964) and other relevant resolutions,

*Having* considered the report of the Secretary-General of 22 November 1993 (S/26777 and Add. 1) submitted pursuant to resolutions 831 (1993) of 27 May 1993 and 839 (1993) of 11 June 1993 in connection with the Security Council's comprehensive reassessment of the United Nations operation in Cyprus,

*Noting* the recommendation by the Secretary-General that the Security Council extend the stationing of the United Nations Peace-Keeping Force in Cyprus in its present strength and structure for a further period of six months,

*Noting* also that the Government of Cyprus has agreed that, in view of the prevailing conditions in the island, it is necessary to keep the Force in Cyprus beyond 15 December 1993,

1. *Extends* once more the stationing in Cyprus of the United Nations Peace-Keeping Force established under resolution 186 (1964) (UNFICYP) for a further period ending on 15 June 1994;
2. *Notes* the Secretary-General's conclusion that the present circumstances do not allow for any modification in the structure and strength of UNFICYP and requests him to keep those matters under constant review with a view to the further possible restructuring of UNFICYP;
3. *Calls upon* the military authorities on both sides to ensure that no incidents occur along the buffer zone and to extend their full co-operation to UNFICYP;

4. *Urges* all concerned once again to commit themselves to a significant reduction in the number of foreign troops in the Republic of Cyprus and a reduction of defence spending in the Republic of Cyprus to help restore confidence between the parties and as a first step towards the withdrawal of non-Cypriot forces as set out in the Set of Ideas;
5. *Calls upon* the military authorities on both sides, in line with paragraph 3 of resolution 839 (1993) of 11 June 1993, to begin discussions with UNFICYP without further delay with a view to entering into mutual commitments to prohibit along the cease-fire lines live ammunition or weapons other than those which are hand-held and to prohibit also the firing of weapons within sight or hearing of the buffer zone;
6. *Calls upon* the military authorities on both sides to cooperate with UNFICYP in extending the 1989 unarming agreement to cover all areas of the buffer zone where the two sides are in close proximity to each other;
7. *Urges* the leaders of both communities to promote tolerance and reconciliation between the two communities as recommended in paragraph 102 of the Secretary-General's report of 22 November 1993;
8. *Reaffirms* that the status quo is unacceptable, and encourages the Secretary-General and his Special Representative to pursue the Secretary-General's mission of good offices on the basis of the Set of Ideas and the package of confidence-building measures relating to Varosha and Nicosia International Airport referred to in paragraph 45 of the Secretary-General's report of 22 November 1993;
9. *Notes* with interest the confirmation by the team of international economic experts that the package of confidence-building measures holds significant and proportionate benefits for both sides, and looks forward to receiving the full reports of the economic and civil aviation experts;
10. *Welcomes* in this context the decision of the Secretary-General to resume intensive contacts with both sides and with others concerned and to concentrate at this stage on achieving an agreement on the package of confidence-building measures, intended to facilitate the political process towards an overall settlement;

11. *Further welcomes* the declared support of the Government of Turkey for the package of confidence-building measures, would also welcome a statement of support for that package by the Government of Greece and expresses the hope that rapid progress will now be made on achieving agreement on the package;
12. *Requests* the Secretary-General to submit a report by the end of February 1994 on the outcome of his efforts to achieve an agreement on the package of confidence-building measures;
13. *Decides* to undertake, on the basis of that report, a thorough review of the situation, including the future role of the United Nations, and, if necessary, to consider alternative ways to promote the implementation of its resolutions on Cyprus.

*Adopted at its 3322nd meeting.*

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## Resolution 902 (1994)—11 March

[on confidence-building measures; welcoming the acceptance in principle by both parties of measures relating to Varosha and Nicosia International Airport]

*The Security Council,*

*Recalling* its relevant resolutions on Cyprus,

*Welcoming* the report of the Secretary - General of 4 March 1994 (S/1994/262) on his mission of good offices in Cyprus submitted pursuant to resolution 889 (1993) of 15 December 1993,

*Recalling* its support for the Secretary-General's decision to concentrate at this stage on achieving an agreement on the confidence-building measures relating to Varosha and Nicosia International Airport, as well as the other measures outlined in annex I to his report of 1 July 1993, (S/26026),

*Reaffirming* that the confidence-building measures, while not an end in themselves, nor a substitute for the wider political process, would offer significant benefits to both communities and would facilitate the political process towards an overall settlement,

1. *Reiterates* that the maintenance of the status quo is unacceptable;
2. *Welcomes* the acceptance in principle by both parties of the confidence-building measures relating, in particular, to Varosha and Nicosia International Airport;
3. *Welcomes* the fact that intensive discussions have made it possible for the Secretary-General's representatives to bring forward ideas that should facilitate the discussions aimed at reaching agreement on the key issues for implementing the confidence-building measures, and stresses the need to conclude such an agreement without delay;
4. *Requests* the Secretary-General to submit a further report by the end of March 1994 on the outcome of his efforts to finalise that agreement;

5. *Decides to review the matter further, pursuant to paragraph 13 of resolution 889 (1993), on the basis of that report.*

*Adopted at its 3347th meeting.*

## Resolution 927 (1994)—15 June

[extending the mandate of UNFICYP to 31 December, 1994; calling on the military authorities on both sides to prevent incidents along the buffer zone; stressing urgent need for implementation of confidence-building measures]

*The Security Council,*

*Taking note* of the report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations operation in Cyprus of 7 June 1994 (S/1994/680 and Add. 1),

*Taking note* also of the recommendation by the Secretary-General that the Security Council extend the stationing of the United Nations Peace-Keeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) for a further period of six and one half months,

*Noting* that the Government of Cyprus has agreed that in view of the prevailing conditions in the island it is necessary to keep the Force in Cyprus beyond 15 June 1994,

*Expressing* concern that during the period reviewed in the Secretary-General's report, UNFICYP patrols continued to encounter interference in or around the buffer zone, that cease-fire violations continued and that no progress was made on an unmanning agreement,

*Concerned* also that there has been no progress towards a final political solution, no significant reduction in the number of foreign troops in the Republic of Cyprus and no reduction of defence spending in the Republic of Cyprus,

*Recalling* its resolution 831 (1993) of 27 May 1993, and in particular its provisions on the financing of UNFICYP,

*Recalling* also its resolution 889 (1993) of 15 December 1993,

*Reaffirming* the provisions of resolution 186 (1964) of 4 March 1964 and other relevant resolutions,

*Noting* that it is continuing its consideration of the Secretary-General's report on his mission of good offices in Cyprus of 30 May 1994 (S/1994/629) and that a further communication is awaited on the subject.



1. *Extends* the stationing in Cyprus of UNFICYP for a further period ending on 31 December 1994;
2. *Calls upon* the military authorities on both sides to ensure that no incidents occur along the buffer zone and to extend their full co-operation to UNFICYP;
3. *Requests* the Secretary-General to keep under review the structure and strength of the force with a view to possible restructuring of it;
4. *Urges* all concerned to commit themselves to a significant reduction in the number of foreign troops in the Republic of Cyprus and a reduction of defence spending in the Republic of Cyprus to help restore confidence between the parties and as a first step towards the withdrawal of non-Cypriot forces as set out in the Set of Ideas;
5. *Calls upon* once again the military authorities on both sides, in line with paragraph 3 of resolution 839 (1993) of 11 June 1993, to begin discussions with UNFICYP without further delay with a view to entering into mutual commitments to prohibit along the cease-fire lines live ammunition or weapons other than those which are hand-held and to prohibit also the firing of weapons within sight or hearing of the buffer zone;
6. *Calls* also upon the military authorities on both sides to cooperate with UNFICYP in extending the 1989 unmanning agreement to cover all areas of the buffer zone where the two sides are in close proximity to each other;
7. *Urges* also the leaders of both communities to promote tolerance and reconciliation between the two communities as recommended in paragraph 7 of resolution 889 (1993) of 15 December 1993;
8. *Stresses* the urgent need for the implementation of the confidence-building measures referred to in the report of the Secretary-General dated 1 July 1993 (S/26026);
9. *Stresses* also that it will conduct a thorough and comprehensive review of the situation, including the role of the United Nations in Cyprus and the progress achieved towards a political settlement, in the context of its consideration of the Secretary-General's report of 30 May 1994 and the further communication, and in particular a re-evaluation based upon the options proposed by the Secretary-General;

10. Requests the Secretary-General to submit a report on the implementation of the present resolution by 15 December 1994.

*Adopted at its 3390th meeting.*

## Resolution 939 (1994)—29 July

[reaffirming the benefits of confidence-building measures; noting substantial agreement on both sides regarding the substance of the confidence-building measures; requesting new reflection on ways of approaching the Cyprus problem]

*The Security Council,*

*Recalling* its relevant resolutions on Cyprus,

*Welcoming* the report of the Secretary-General of 30 May 1994 (S/1994/629) and his letter of 28 June 1994 (S/1994/785) concerning his mission of good offices,

*Reaffirming*, in this context, that the confidence-building measures, while not an end in themselves, nor a substitute for the wider political process, would offer significant benefits to both communities and would facilitate the political process towards an overall settlement,

*Recalling* the acceptance in principle by both parties of the confidence-building measures, and welcoming the acceptance by the leader of the Greek Cypriot Community of the 21 March 1994 "Draft ideas for implementing the package of confidence-building measures" (S/1994/785, annex), and welcoming also the considerable progress towards agreement made by the leader of the Turkish Cypriot community, as described in the Secretary-General's letter of 28 June 1994,

*Noting* that there is now a substantial measure of agreement on the substance of the confidence-building measures and the modalities for their implementation, but also noting with concern that neither leader is yet prepared to proceed to their implementation on the basis outlined in the Secretary-General's letter of 28 June 1994,

*Having* studied the options and ideas for future action set out in paragraphs 57 to 62 of the Secretary-General's report of 30 May 1994,

1. *Reiterates* that the maintenance of the status quo is unacceptable,
2. *Reaffirms* its position that a Cyprus settlement must be based on a State of Cyprus with a single sovereignty and international personality and a single citizenship, with its independence and territorial integrity safeguarded, and comprising two politically

equal communities as described in the relevant Security Council resolutions in a bi-communal and bi-zonal federation, and that such a settlement must exclude union in whole or in part with any other country or any form of partition or secession;

3. *Requests* the Secretary-General to begin consultations with members of the Council, with the Guarantor Powers, and with the two leaders in Cyprus with a view to undertaking a fundamental and far-reaching reflection on ways of approaching the Cyprus problem in a manner that will yield results, and reiterates its call to the parties to demonstrate their commitment by co-operating fully to this end;
4. *Urges*, in this context, the parties to cooperate fully with the Secretary-General and his Special Representative to achieve agreement on the modalities for implementing the confidence-building measures at the earliest possible time;
5. Also requests the Secretary-General to submit a report by the end of October 1994 including a programme for achieving an overall solution to the issues involved in the Cyprus problem following his consultations referred to in paragraph 3 above and on progress made towards the implementation of the confidence-building measures;
6. *Decides* to remain actively seized of the matter.

*Adopted at its 3412th meeting*

## Resolution 969 (1994)—21 December

[extending the mandate of UNFICYP to 30 June, 1995; urging reduction of foreign troops and defence spending in the Republic of Cyprus; calling on the military authorities on both sides for mutual commitments; on implementation of confidence-building measures]

*The Security Council,*

*Taking note* of the report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations operation in Cyprus of 12 December 1994 (S/1994/1407 and Add.1),

*Taking note also* of his recommendation that the Security Council extend the stationing of the United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) for a further period of six months,

*Noting* that the Government of Cyprus has agreed that in view of the prevailing conditions in the island it is necessary to keep the Force in Cyprus beyond 31 December 1994,

*Expressing concern* that during the period reviewed in the Secretary-General's report, UNFICYP patrols continued to encounter interference in or around the buffer zone, that cease-fire violations continued and that no progress was made on an unmanning agreement,

*Expressing once again its concern* that there has been no progress towards a final political solution, no significant reduction in the number of foreign troops in the Republic of Cyprus and no reduction of defence spending in the Republic of Cyprus,

*Recalling* its resolution 831 (1993) of 27 May 1993, and in particular its provisions on the financing of UNFICYP,

*Recalling also* its resolution 889 (1993) of 15 December 1993,

*Reaffirming* the provisions of resolution 186 (1964) of 4 March 1964 and other relevant resolutions,

*Noting* that a review of the situation on the Secretary-General's mission of good offices in Cyprus remains in progress and looking forward to receiving a definitive report at an appropriate time;

1. *Extends* the stationing in Cyprus of UNFICYP for a further period ending on 30 June 1995,

2. *Calls upon* the military authorities on both sides to ensure that no incidents occur along the buffer zone and to extend their full cooperation to UNFICYP;
3. *Requests* the Secretary-General to keep under review the structure and strength of the Force with a view to possible restructuring of it;
4. *Urges* all concerned to commit themselves to a significant reduction in the number of foreign troops in the Republic of Cyprus and a reduction of defence spending in the Republic of Cyprus to help restore confidence between the parties and as a first step towards the withdrawal of non-Cypriot forces as set out in the Set of Ideas, and *calls upon* the Secretary-General to promote efforts in this direction;
5. *Calls upon once again* the military authorities on both sides in line with paragraph 3 of resolution 839 (1993) of 11 June 1993, to begin discussions with UNFICYP without further delay with a view to entering into mutual commitments to prohibit along the cease-fire lines live ammunition or weapons other than those which are hand-held and to prohibit also the firing of weapons within sight or hearing of the buffer zone;
6. *Calls also upon* the military authorities on both sides to cooperate with UNFICYP in extending the 1989 unmanning agreement to cover all areas of the buffer zone where the two sides are in close proximity to each other;
7. *Urges also* the leaders of both communities to promote tolerance and reconciliation between the two communities as recommended in paragraph 7 of resolution 889 (1993) of 15 December 1993;
8. *Welcomes* the Secretary-General's decision to continue contacts with the two leaders, to make every effort to find common ground for the basis for a resumption of direct talks;
9. *Reaffirms* the importance it attaches to early progress being made on the substance of the Cyprus question, and on the implementation of the confidence-building measures referred to in the report of the Secretary-General dated 1 July 1993 (S/26026);
10. *Requests* the Secretary-General to submit a report on the implementation of the present resolution by 15 June 1995.

## Resolution 1000 (1995)—23 June

[extending the mandate of UNFICYP to 31 December, 1995; expressing concern about the modernization and upgrading of military forces in the Republic of Cyprus; reaffirming the importance of implementing confidence-building measures]

*The Security Council,*

*Welcoming* the report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations operation in Cyprus of 15 June 1995 (S/1995/448 and Add.1)

*Taking note* of his recommendation that the Security Council extend the mandate of the United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) for a further period of six months.

*Noting* that the Government of Cyprus has agreed that in view of the prevailing conditions in the island it is necessary to keep the force in Cyprus beyond 30 June 1995.

*Reaffirming* its earlier relevant resolutions on Cyprus, and in particular resolutions 186 (1964) of 4 March 1964 and 969 (1994) of 21 December 1994,.

*Expressing* its concern that there has been no progress towards a final political solution.

*Noting* that no progress has been made on extending the 1989 unmanning agreement.

*Noting* also that a review of the situation on the Secretary-General's mission of good offices in Cyprus remains in progress and looking forward to receiving a definitive report at an appropriate time

1. *Decides* to extend the mandate of UNFICYP for a further period ending on 31 December 1995.
2. *Calls upon* the military authorities on both sides to ensure that no incidents occur along the buffer zone and to extend their full cooperation to UNFICYP;
3. *Requests* the Secretary-General to keep under review the structure and strength of UNFICYP with a view to its possible restructuring, bearing in mind the possible implications of an agreement on the extension of the 1989 unmanning agreement;

4. *Expresses* concern about the modernization and upgrading of military forces in the Republic of Cyprus and the lack of progress towards a significant reduction in the number of foreign troops in the Republic of Cyprus, urges once again all concerned to commit themselves to such a reduction and to a reduction of defence spending in the Republic of Cyprus to help restore confidence between the parties and as a first step towards the withdrawal of non-Cypriot forces as described in the set of ideas (S/24472, annex), and calls upon the Secretary-General to promote efforts in this direction;
5. *Expresses* concern also about the failure by the military authorities on both sides to take reciprocal measures to prohibit along the cease-fire lines live ammunition or weapons other than those which are hand-held and to prohibit also the firing of weapons within sight or hearing of the buffer zone, and calls upon those authorities to enter into discussions with UNFICYP on this matter in line with paragraph 3 of resolution 839 (1993) of 11 June 1993;
6. *Regrets* the failure to reach agreement on the extension of the 1989 unarming agreement to cover all areas of the buffer zone where the two sides are in close proximity to each other, and calls upon the military authorities on both sides to cooperate urgently with UNFICYP to this end;
7. *Urges* the leaders of both communities to promote tolerance and reconciliation between the two communities as recommended in the relevant reports of the Secretary-General;
8. *Welcomes* the Secretary-General/s decision to continue contacts with the two leaders, to make every effort to find common ground for the basis for a resumption of direct talks;
9. *Reaffirms* the importance it attaches to early progress being made on the substance of the Cyprus question and on the implementation of the confidence-building measures as called for in resolution 939 (1994) of 29 July 1994;
10. *Requests* the Secretary-General to submit a report by 10 December on the implementation of the present resolution and on any obstacles he may have encountered;
11. *Decides* to remain actively seized of the matter.

*Adopted at its 3547th meeting,*



## Resolution 1032 (1995)—19 December

[extending the mandate of UNFICYP to 30 June, 1996; calling on the military authorities of both sides to help restore confidence between the two communities; welcoming UNFICYP's humanitarian review, and its initiative in organizing bicomunal events]

*The Security Council,*

*Welcoming* the report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations operation in Cyprus of 10 December 1995 (S/1995/1020 and Add.1),

*Taking note* of his recommendation that the Security Council extend the mandate of the United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP),

*Noting* that the Government of Cyprus has agreed that in view of the prevailing conditions in the island it is necessary to keep the force in Cyprus beyond 31 December 1995,

*Reaffirming* its earlier relevant resolutions on Cyprus, and in particular resolutions 186 (1964) of 4 March 1964 and 1000 (1995) of 23 June 1995,

*Expressing* its concern that there has been no progress towards a final political solution,

*Noting* that no progress has been made on extending the 1989 unmaning agreement,

1. *Decides* to extend the mandate of UNFICYP for a further period ending on 30 June 1996;
2. *Calls upon* the military authorities on both sides to ensure that no incidents occur along the buffer zone and to extend their full cooperation to UNFICYP;
3. *Requests* the Secretary-General to keep under review the structure and strength of UNFICYP with a view to its possible restructuring, and to present any new considerations he may have in this regard;
4. *Welcomes* the humanitarian review undertaken by UNFICYP with regard to the living conditions of the Greek Cypriots and the Maronites living in the northern part of the island and of

Turkish Cypriots living in the southern part of the island, supports UNFICYP/s recommendations contained in the Secretary-General/s report (S/1995/1020 and Add. 1), and decides to keep the matter under review;

5. *Expresses* concern about the continuing modernization and upgrading of military forces in the Republic of Cyprus and the lack of progress towards a significant reduction in the number of foreign troops in the Republic of Cyprus, urges once again all concerned to commit themselves to such a reduction and to a reduction of defence spending in the Republic of Cyprus to help restore confidence between the parties and as a first step towards the withdrawal of non-Cypriot forces as described in the set of ideas (S/24472, annex) and calls upon the Secretary-General to promote efforts in this direction.
6. *Expresses* concern also about the failure by the military authorities on both sides to take reciprocal measures to prohibit along the cease-fire lines live ammunition or weapons other than those which are hand-held and to prohibit also the firing of weapons within sight or hearing of the buffer zone, and calls upon those authorities to enter into discussions with UNFICYP on this matter in line with paragraph 3 of resolution 839 (1993) of 11 June 1993;
7. *Regrets* the failure to reach agreement on the extension of the 1989 unmanning agreement to cover all areas of the buffer zone where the two sides are in close proximity to each other, and calls upon the military authorities on both sides to cooperate urgently with UNFICYP to this end;
8. *Welcomes* the initiative of UNFICYP in organizing successful bicommunal events, urges the leaders of both communities to promote tolerance, confidence and reconciliation between the two communities as recommended in the relevant reports of the Secretary-General, and calls upon them to promote further bicommunal contacts and to remove obstacles to such contacts;
9. *Welcomes* the Secretary-General/s decision to continue contacts with the two leaders, to make every effort to find common ground for the basis for a resumption of direct talks;
10. *Reaffirms* the importance it attaches to early progress being made on the substance of the Cyprus question and on the implementation of the confidence-building measures as called for in resolution 939 (1994) of 29 July 1994;

11. *Requests* the Secretary-General to submit a report during the coming mandate period on his mission of good offices, including a full assessment of his efforts towards reaching a settlement of the situation in Cyprus;
12. *Also requests* the Secretary-General to submit a report by 10 June 1996 on the implementation of the present resolution;
13. *Decides* to remain actively seized of the matter.

*Adopted at its 3608th meeting,*

## Resolution 1062 (1996)—28 June

[extending the mandate of UNFICYP to 31 December, 1996; deploring the fatal shooting of a Greek Cypriot inside the UN buffer zone and the hindering of UNFICYP activities by Turkish Cypriot soldiers; calling for restoration of confidence between the two communities; recognizing that accession negotiations with the European Union should facilitate a settlement]

*The Security Council,*

*Welcoming* the report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations operation in Cyprus of 7 June 1996 (S/1996/411 and Corr. 1 and Add.1),

*Welcoming* also the report of the Secretary-General on his Mission of Good Offices in Cyprus of 25 June 1996 (S/1996/467),

*Taking note* of the recommendation in his report of 7 June that the Security Council extend the mandate of the United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP),

*Noting* that the Government of Cyprus has agreed that in view of the prevailing conditions in the island that it is necessary to keep the force in Cyprus beyond 30 June 1996,

*Reaffirming* its earlier relevant resolutions on Cyprus, and in particular resolutions 186 (1964) of 4 March 1964, 939 (1994) of 29 July 1994 and 1032 (1995) of 19 December 1995,

*Reiterating* its concern that there has been no progress towards a final political solution, and agreeing with the assessment of the Secretary-General that the negotiations have been at an impasse for too long,

*Regretting* that no progress has been made in introducing measures to prohibit along the cease-fire lines live ammunition or weapons other than those which are hand-held and to prohibit the firing of weapons within sight of hearing of the buffer zone, or in extending the 1989 unarming agreement,

*Expressing* concern about the restrictions placed upon the freedom of movement of UNFICYP in the northern part of the island, as described in paragraph 27 of the report of the Secretary-General of 7 June 1996;

1. *Decides* to extend the mandate of UNFICYP for a further period ending on 31 December 1996;
2. *Welcomes* the appointment of Mr. Han Sung-Joo as the new Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Cyprus and calls upon both parties to cooperate fully with him in his efforts to facilitate a comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus problem;
3. *Deplores* the tragic incident involving the fatal shooting of a Greek Cypriot National Guardsman inside the United Nations buffer zone on 3 June 1996, as well as the hindering by Turkish Cypriot soldiers of UNFICYP personnel attempting to assist the National Guardsman and investigate the incident, as documented in the report of the Secretary-General of 7 June 1996;
4. *Expresses* serious concern about the continuing modernization and upgrading of military forces in the Republic of Cyprus, the excessive levels of military forces and armaments and the lack of progress towards a significant reduction in the number of foreign troops in the Republic of Cyprus, urges once again all concerned to commit themselves to such a reduction and to a reduction in defence spending in the Republic of Cyprus to help restore confidence between the parties and as a first step towards the withdrawal of non-Cypriot forces as described in the set of ideas (S/24472, annex), stresses the importance of eventual demilitarization of the Republic of Cyprus as an objective in the context of an overall comprehensive settlement, and calls upon the Secretary-General to continue to promote efforts in this direction;
5. *Expresses* serious concern also about recent military exercises in the region, including overflights in the airspace of Cyprus by military fixed-wing aircraft, which have increased tension;
6. *Calls upon* the military authorities on both sides:
  - (a) To respect the integrity of the United Nations buffer zone, ensure that no further incidents occur along the buffer zone, prevent hostile actions, including live fire against UNFICYP, grant UNFICYP complete freedom of movement and extend their full cooperation to UNFICYP;
  - (b) To enter immediately into discussions with UNFICYP, in line with paragraph 3 of resolution 839 (1993) of 11 June 1993, with a view to adopting reciprocal measures to prohibit along the cease-fire lines live ammunition or weapons other than those which are hand-held and to prohibit also the firing of weapons within sight or hearing of the buffer zone;

(c) to clear all minefields and booby-trapped areas inside the buffer zone without further delay, as requested by UNFICYP;

(d) To cease military construction in the immediate vicinity of the buffer zone;

(e) To enter immediately into intensive discussions with UNFICYP with a view to extending the 1989 unmanning agreement to cover all areas of the buffer zone where the two sides are in close proximity to each other, on the basis of the updated proposals submitted by the UNFICYP Force Commander in June 1996;

7. *Welcomes* the measures that have been taken by the two parties in response to the humanitarian review conducted by UNFICYP, regrets that the Turkish Cypriot side has not responded more fully to the recommendations made by UNFICYP, calls upon the Turkish Cypriot side to respect fully the basic freedoms of the Greek Cypriots and Maronites living in the northern part of the island and to intensify its efforts to improve their daily lives, and calls upon the Government of Cyprus to continue its efforts to eliminate any discrimination against Turkish Cypriots living in the southern part of the island;
8. *Welcomes* the continuing efforts of the United Nations and diplomatic missions to promote bicomunal events, regrets the obstacles which have been placed in the way of such contacts, and strongly urges all concerned, and especially the Turkish Cypriot leadership, to lift and prevent all obstacles to such contacts;
9. *Requests* the Secretary General to keep under review the structure and strength of UNFICYP with a view to its possible restructuring, and to present any new considerations he may have in this regard;
10. *Reiterates* that the status quo is unacceptable and calls upon the parties to demonstrate concretely their commitment to an overall political settlement;
11. *Stresses* its support for the Secretary-General/s mission of good offices and the importance of the concerted efforts to work with the Secretary-General towards an overall comprehensive settlement;
12. *Urges* the leaders of the two communities to respond positively and urgently to the Secretary-General/s call upon them to work

with him and with the many countries who support his mission of good offices to break the present impasse and establish common ground on which direct negotiations can be resumed;

13. Recognizes that the decision of the European Union concerning the opening of accession negotiations with Cyprus is an important new development that should facilitate an overall settlement;
14. *Requests* the Secretary-General to submit a report by 10 December 1996 on the implementation of the present resolution;
15. *Decides* to remain actively seized of the matter.

*Adopted at its 3675th meeting,*

## Resolution 1092 (1996)—23 December

[extending the mandate of UNFICYP to 30 June, 1997; deploring violent incidents which resulted in deaths of three Greek Cypriots and one Turkish Cypriot, and injuries to civilians and UNFICYP personnel; expressing concern at excessive levels of military buildup in the Republic of Cyprus and military exercises in the region; reaffirming the potential contribution of EU accession negotiations towards a settlement]

*The Security Council,*

*Welcoming* the report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations operation in Cyprus of 10 December 1996 (S/1996/1016 and Add. 1),

*Welcoming* also the report of the Secretary-General on his mission of good offices in Cyprus of 17 December 1996 (S/1996/1055),

*Noting* that the Government of Cyprus has agreed that in view of the prevailing conditions in the island it is necessary to keep the United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) beyond 31 December 1996,

*Reaffirming* its earlier relevant resolutions on Cyprus, and in particular resolutions 186 (1964) of 4 March 1964, 939 (1994) of 29 July 1994 and 1062 (1996) of 28 June 1996,

*Gravely concerned* by the deteriorating situation in Cyprus and by the fact the intercommunal tensions on the island have escalated and, over the last six-month period, violence along the cease-fire lines has reached a level not seen since 1974 as stated in the report of the Secretary-General of 10 December 1996,

*Concerned* also at the increased use of and threat to use violence against the personnel of UNFICYP,

*Noting* the beginning of indirect discussions through the UNFICYP Force Commander between the military authorities of both sides on measures aimed at reduction of military tensions,

*Reiterating* its concern that the negotiations on a final political solution have been at an impasse for too long,

1. *Decides* to extend the mandate of UNFICYP for a further period ending on 30 June 1997,



2. *Deplores* the violent incidents of 11 and 14 August, 8 September and 15 October 1996, which resulted in the tragic deaths of three Greek Cypriot civilians and one member of the Turkish Cypriot Security Forces, as well as injuries to civilians and UNFICYP personnel, in particular the unnecessary and disproportionate use of force by the Turkish/Turkish Cypriot side, as well as the largely passive role played by the Cypriot police in response to civilian demonstrations;
3. *Reminds* both sides of their obligation to prevent violence directed against UNFICYP personnel, particularly those involving firearms, which inhibit UNFICYP from carrying out its mandated responsibilities, and demands that they ensure UNFICYP complete freedom of movement and extend their full cooperation to UNFICYP;
4. *Emphasises* the need to maintain law and order and, in this context, demands that both parties prevent unauthorised incursions into the buffer zone, and respond immediately and responsibly to any demonstrations which violate the buffer zone and any demonstrations near the buffer zone that might lead to an increase in tensions;
5. *Calls upon* the parties to accept as a package, without delay or preconditions, the reciprocal measures proposed by UNFICYP, namely: (a) to extend the 1989 unmanning agreement to other areas where the two sides remain in close proximity to each other; (b) to prohibit loaded weapons along the cease-fire lines; and (c) to adopt a code of conduct, based on the concept of minimal force and proportional response, to be followed by troops on both sides along the cease-fire line, and expresses its disappointment that no progress has been made towards implementing these measures thus far;
6. *Further calls upon* the military authorities on both sides;
  - (a) To clear all minefield and booby-trapped areas inside the buffer zone without further delay, as requested by UNFICYP;
  - (b) To cease military construction in the immediate vicinity of the buffer zone;
  - (c) To refrain from any military exercises along the buffer zone;
7. *Reiterates* grave concern about the excessive levels of military forces and armaments in the Republic of Cyprus and the rate at which they are being expanded, upgraded and modernised, inc-

cluding the introduction of sophisticated weaponry, as well as the lack of progress towards a significant reduction in the number of foreign troops in the Republic of Cyprus, which threaten to raise tensions both on the island and in the region and complicate efforts to negotiate an overall political settlement;

8. *Calls* again upon all concerned to commit themselves to a reduction in defence spending and a reduction in the number of foreign troops in the Republic of Cyprus to help restore confidence between the parties and as a first step towards the withdrawal of non-Cypriot forces as described in the set of ideas (S/24472, annex.), stresses the importance of eventual demilitarisation of the Republic of Cyprus as an objective in the context of an overall comprehensive settlement, and calls upon the Secretary-General to continue to promote efforts in this direction;
9. *Expresses* continuing concern about military exercises in the region, including overflights in the airspace of Cyprus by military fixed-wing aircraft, which have markedly increased political tension on the island and undermined efforts towards achieving a settlement;
10. *Reiterates* that the status quo is unacceptable and stresses its support for the Secretary-General's mission of good offices and the importance of the concerted efforts to work with the Secretary-General towards an overall comprehensive settlement;
11. *Welcomes* the efforts of the Secretary-General's Special Representative, and of those working in support, to prepare the ground for open-ended direct negotiations in the first half of 1997 between the leaders of the two Cypriot communities in order to secure an overall settlement;
12. *Calls upon* the parties to cooperate with the Special Representative to that end, as well as with his intensified preparatory work in the first months of 1997 with the objective of clarifying the main elements of an overall settlement;
13. *Underlines* that the success of this process will require the creation of genuine mutual confidence on both sides and the avoidance of actions which increase tension and calls upon the leaders of both communities to create a climate of reconciliation and confidence;
14. *Reaffirms* its position that a Cyprus settlement must be based on a State of Cyprus with a single sovereignty and international personality and a single citizenship, with its independence and territorial integrity safeguarded, and comprising two politically

equal communities as described in the relevant Security Council resolutions, in a bi-communal and bi-zonal federation, and that such a settlement must exclude union in whole or in part with any other country or any form of partition or secession;

15. *Welcomes* the continuous efforts by UNFICYP to implement its humanitarian mandate in respect of Greek Cypriots and Maronites living in the northern part of the island, and Turkish Cypriots living in the southern part, and regrets that there has been no further progress on the implementation of recommendations arising out of the humanitarian review undertaken by UNFICYP in 1995;
16. *Welcomes* the continuing efforts of the United Nations and others in the international community to promote bi-communal events, regrets the obstacles which have been placed in the way of such contacts, and strongly urges all concerned, and especially the Turkish Cypriot community leadership, to lift all obstacles to such contacts;
17. *Reaffirms* that the decision of the European Union concerning the opening of accession negotiations with Cyprus is an important new development that should facilitate an overall settlement;
18. *Requests* the Secretary-General to keep under review the structure and strength of UNFICYP with a view to its possible restructuring, and to present any new considerations he may have in this regard;
19. *Requests* the Secretary-General to submit a report by 10 June 1997 on the implementation of this resolution;
20. *Decides* to remain actively seized of the matter.

## Resolution 1117 (1997)—27 June

[extending the mandate of UNFICYP to 31 December, 1997; calling on the military authorities of both sides to refrain from actions likely to exacerbate tensions; welcoming efforts by UNFICYP and others to promote bicomunal activities; reaffirming the potential contribution of EU accession negotiations towards a settlement]

*The Security Council,*

*Welcoming* the report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations operation in Cyprus of 5 June 1997 (S/1997/437 and Corr. 1 and Add.1),

*Welcoming* also the letter of 20 June 1997 to the President of the Security Council from the Secretary-General on his mission of good offices in Cyprus (S/1997/480),

*Noting* that the Government of Cyprus has agreed that in view of the prevailing conditions in the island it is necessary to keep the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) beyond 30 June 1997,

*Reaffirming* its earlier relevant resolutions on Cyprus, and in particular resolutions 186 (1964) of 4 March 1964, 939 (1994) of 29 July 1994 and 1092 (1996) of 23 December 1996,

*Noting* with concern that tensions along the ceasefire lines remain high despite the decrease in the number of serious incidents over the last six months,

*Reiterating* its concern that negotiations on a final political solution have been at an impasse for too long,

1. *Decides* to extend the mandate of UNFICYP for a further period ending on 31 December 1997,
2. *Reminds* both sides of their obligation to prevent any violence directed against UNFICYP personnel, to cooperate fully with UNFICYP and to ensure its complete freedom of movement;
3. *Underlines* the importance of agreement by both sides to the reciprocal measures for the reduction of tension along the ceasefire lines proposed by UNFICYP as set forth in its resolution 1092 (1996), deeply regrets the fact that, in spite of the efforts

of UNFICYP, neither side has so far accepted such measures as a package, and reiterates its call on both sides to do so without further delay or preconditions;

4. *Calls upon* the military authorities on both sides to refrain from any action, particularly in the vicinity of the buffer zone, which would exacerbate tensions;
5. *Reiterates* grave concern at the continuing excessive levels of military forces and armaments in the Republic of Cyprus and the rate at which they are being expanded, upgraded and modernized, including by the introduction of sophisticated weaponry, and the lack of progress towards a significant reduction in the number of foreign troops in the Republic of Cyprus, which threaten to raise tensions both on the island and in the region and complicate efforts to negotiate an overall political settlement;
6. *Calls* again upon all concerned to commit themselves to a reduction in defence spending and a reduction in the number of foreign troops in the Republic of Cyprus to help restore confidence between the parties and as a first step towards the withdrawal of non-Cypriot forces as described in the set of ideas S/24472, annex), stresses the importance of eventual demilitarization of the Republic of Cyprus as an objective in the context of an overall comprehensive settlement, and calls upon the Secretary - General to promote efforts in this direction;
7. *Reiterates* that the status quo is unacceptable, and stresses its support for the Secretary-General/s mission of good offices and the importance of the concerted efforts to work with the Secretary-General towards an overall comprehensive settlement;
8. *Welcomes* the decision of the Secretary-General to launch a sustained process of direct negotiations between the leaders of the two Cypriot communities with the aim of securing such a settlement;
9. *Calls upon* those leaders to commit themselves to this process of negotiations, including participation in the first session of such negotiations to be held 9-13 July 1997, urges them to cooperate actively and constructively with the Secretary-General and his Special Adviser on Cyprus, Mr. Diego Cordovez, to that end, and stresses that full support of all concerned is necessary for this process to produce results;
10. *Further calls upon* the parties to create a climate for reconciliation and genuine mutual confidence on both sides, and to avoid any actions which might increase tension;

11. *Reaffirms* its position that a Cyprus settlement must be based on a State of Cyprus with a single sovereignty and international personality and a single citizenship, with its independence and territorial integrity safeguarded, and comprising two politically equal communities as described in the relevant Security Council resolutions, in a bi-communal and bi-zonal federation, and that such a settlement must exclude union in whole or in part with any other country or any form of partition or secession;
12. *Welcomes* the continuous efforts by UNFICYP to implement its humanitarian mandate in respect of Greek Cypriots and Maronites living in the northern part of the island, and Turkish Cypriots living in the southern part, and regrets that there has been no further progress on the implementation of recommendations arising out of the humanitarian review undertaken by UNFICYP in 1995;
13. *Welcomes* the efforts of the United Nations and others concerned to promote the holding of bi-communal events so as to build trust and mutual respect between the two communities, urges that these efforts be continued, acknowledges the recent cooperation from all concerned on both sides to that end, and strongly encourages them to take further steps to facilitate such bi-communal events and to ensure that they take place in conditions of safety and security;
14. *Reaffirms* that the decision of the European Union concerning the opening of accession negotiations with Cyprus is an important development that should facilitate an overall settlement;
15. *Requests* the Secretary-General to keep under review the structure and strength of UNFICYP with a view to its possible restructuring, and to present any new considerations he may have in this regard;
16. *Requests* the Secretary-General to submit a report by 10 December 1997 on the implementation of this resolution;
17. *Decides* to remain seized of the matter.

## Resolution 1146 (1997)—23 December

[extending the mandate of UNFICYP to 30 June, 1998; calling on the military authorities of both sides to refrain from actions likely to exacerbate tensions; welcoming efforts by UNFICYP and others to promote bi-communal activities; reaffirming the potential contribution of EU accession negotiations towards a settlement]

*The Security Council,*

*Welcoming* the report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations operation in Cyprus of 8 December 1997 (S/1997/962),

*Welcoming* also the report of the Secretary-General on his Mission of Good Offices in Cyprus of 12 December 1997 (S/1997/973),

*Noting* that the Government of Cyprus has agreed that in view of the prevailing conditions in the island it is necessary to keep the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) beyond 31 December 1997,

*Reaffirming* all its earlier relevant resolutions on Cyprus, and in particular resolutions 186 (1964) of 4 March 1964, 367 (1975) of 12 March 1975, 939 (1994) of 29 July 1994 and 1117 (1997) of 27 June 1997,

*Noting* with concern that tensions along the ceasefire lines remain high, despite the further decrease in the number of serious incidents in the last six months, and that restrictions to UNFICYP/s freedom of movement have increased,

*Reiterating* its concern that negotiations on a comprehensive political solution have yet to make progress, despite the efforts made at the two rounds of direct negotiations, held in July and August 1997, between the leaders of the two communities, at the initiative of the Secretary-General,

1. *Decides* to extend the mandate of UNFICYP for a further period ending on 30 June 1998;
2. *Reminds* both sides of their obligations to prevent any violence directed against UNFICYP personnel, to cooperate fully with UNFICYP and to ensure its complete freedom of movement;

3. *Underlines* the importance of early agreement to the reciprocal measures for the reduction of tension along the ceasefire lines proposed and subsequently adapted by UNFICYP, notes the fact that only one side has so far accepted this package, calls for early agreement to and rapid implementation of reciprocal measures and encourages UNFICYP to continue its efforts towards that end;
4. *Calls upon* the leaders of the two communities to continue the discussions on security issues begun on 26 September 1997,
5. *Calls upon* the military authorities on both sides to refrain from any action, particularly in the vicinity of the buffer zone, which would exacerbate tensions;
6. *Reiterates* its grave concern at the continuing excessive and increasing levels of military forces and armaments in the Republic of Cyprus and the rate at which they are being expanded, upgraded and modernized, including by the introduction of sophisticated weaponry, and the lack of progress towards any significant reduction in the number of foreign troops in the Republic of Cyprus, which threaten to raise tensions both on the island and in the region and complicate efforts to negotiate an overall political settlement;
7. *Calls upon* all concerned to commit themselves to a reduction in defence spending and a reduction in the number of foreign troops in the Republic of Cyprus to help restore confidence between the parties and as a first step towards the withdrawal of non-Cypriot forces as described in the set of ideas (S/24472 Annex), stresses the importance of eventual demilitarization of the Republic of Cyprus as an objective in the context of an overall comprehensive settlement, and encourages the Secretary-General to continue to promote efforts in this direction;
8. *Reiterates* that the status quo is unacceptable, and stresses its support for the Secretary-General's mission of good offices and the importance of concerted efforts to work with the Secretary-General towards an overall comprehensive settlement;
9. *Expresses* its full support for the intention of the Secretary-General to resume in March 1998 the open-ended process of negotiations initiated by the Secretary-General in July 1997 and aimed at achieving a comprehensive settlement;



10. *Calls upon* the leaders of the two communities to commit themselves to this process of negotiations and to cooperate actively and constructively with the Secretary-General and his Special Adviser, and urges all States to lend their full support to these efforts;
11. *Further calls* in this context upon all parties concerned to create a climate for reconciliation and genuine mutual confidence on both sides, and to avoid any actions which might increase tension, including through further expansion of military forces and armaments;
12. *Reaffirms* its position that a Cyprus settlement must be based on a State of Cyprus with a single sovereignty and international personality and a single citizenship, with its independence and territorial integrity safeguarded and comprising two politically equal communities as described in the relevant Security Council resolutions, in a bi-communal and bi-zonal federation, and that such a settlement must exclude union in whole or in part with any other country or any form of partition or secession;
13. *Welcomes* the ongoing efforts by UNFICYP to implement its humanitarian mandate in respect of Greek Cypriots and Maronites living in the northern part of the island, and Turkish Cypriots living in the Southern part, and welcomes also the progress in the implementation of recommendations arising out of the humanitarian review undertaken by UNFICYP in 1995 as mentioned in the report of the Secretary-General;
14. *Welcomes* also the agreement reached between the leaders of the two communities on 31 July 1997 on the issue of missing persons in Cyprus;
15. *Welcomes* further the efforts of the United Nations and others concerned to promote the holding of bi-communal events so as to build cooperation, trust and mutual respect between the two communities, commends the increase in such bi-communal activity in the last six months, acknowledges the recent cooperation from all concerned on both sides to that end, and strongly encourages them to take further steps to facilitate such bi-communal events and to ensure that they take place in conditions of safety and security;
16. *Recognizes* that the decision of the European Union concerning the opening of accession negotiations with Cyprus is an important development;

17. *Requests* the Secretary-General to submit a report by 10 June 1998 on the implementation of this resolution;
18. *Decides* to remain actively seized of the matter.

## Resolution 1178 (1998)—29 June

[extending the mandate of UNFICYP to 31 December, 1998; calling on the military authorities of both sides to refrain from actions likely to exacerbate tensions; welcoming efforts by UNFICYP and others to promote bicomunal activities]

*The Security Council,*

*Welcoming* the report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations operation in Cyprus of 10 June 1998 (S/1998/488),

*Noting* that the Government of Cyprus has agreed that in view of the prevailing conditions in the island it is necessary to keep the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) beyond 30 June 1998,

*Reaffirming* all its earlier resolutions on Cyprus,

*Noting* with concern that tensions along the cease-fire lines and restrictions to UNFICYP's freedom of movement continue,

1. *Decides* to extend the mandate of UNFICYP for a further period ending on 31 December 1998;
2. *Reminds* both sides of their obligations to prevent any violence directed against UNFICYP personnel, to cooperate fully with UNFICYP and to ensure its complete freedom of movement;
3. *Calls upon* the military authorities on both sides to refrain from any action, particularly in the vicinity of the buffer zone, which would exacerbate tensions;
4. *Underlines* the importance of early agreement to the reciprocal measures for the reduction of tension along the cease-fire lines proposed and subsequently adapted by UNFICYP, notes the fact that only one side has so far accepted this package, calls for early agreement to and rapid implementation of reciprocal measures and encourages UNFICYP to continue its efforts towards that end;
5. *Reiterates* its grave concern at the continuing excessive and increasing levels of military forces and armaments in the Republic of Cyprus and the rate at which they are being expanded, upgraded and modernised, including by the introduction of sop-

histicated weaponry, and the lack of progress towards any significant reduction in the number of foreign troops in the Republic of Cyprus, which threaten to raise tensions both on the island and in the region and complicate efforts to negotiate an overall political settlement;

6. *Calls upon* all concerned to commit themselves to a reduction in defence spending and a reduction in the number of foreign troops in the Republic of Cyprus to help restore confidence between the parties and as a first step towards the withdrawal of non-Cypriot forces as described in the set of ideas (S/24472, Annex) stresses the importance of eventual demilitarisation of the Republic of Cyprus as an objective in the context of an overall comprehensive settlement, and encourages the Secretary-General to continue to promote efforts in this direction;
7. *Calls upon* the leaders of the two communities to resume the discussions on security issues begun on 26 September 1997;
8. *Welcomes* the ongoing efforts by UNFICYP to implement its humanitarian mandate in respect of Greek Cypriots and Maronites living in the northern part of the island and Turkish Cypriots living in the southern part, and also the progress in the implementation of recommendations arising out of the humanitarian review undertaken by UNFICYP in 1995, as mentioned in the report of the Secretary-General;
9. *Welcomes* also the appointment of the new third member of the Committee on Missing Persons, and calls for implementation without delay of the agreement on missing persons of 31 July 1997;
10. *Reiterates* its support for the efforts of the United Nations and others concerned to promote the holding of bi-communal events so as to build co-operation, trust and mutual respect between the two communities, regrets the suspension of such activity by the Turkish Cypriot leadership and urges both sides, and in particular the Turkish Cypriot side, to facilitate arrangements within which bi-communal contacts can take place uninterrupted and without formalities;
11. *Requests* the Secretary-General to submit a report by 10 December 1998 on the implementation of this resolution;
12. *Decides* to remain actively seized of the matter.

## Resolution 1179 (1998)—29 June

[calling on the leaders of the two communities, in particular the Turkish Cypriot side, to commit themselves to the process of negotiations and to resume direct dialogue]

*The Security Council,*

*Welcoming* the report of the Secretary-General on his Mission of Good Offices in Cyprus of 16 June 1998 (S/1998/518),

*Reaffirming* all its earlier resolutions on Cyprus,

*Calling once more* upon all States to respect the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of the Republic of Cyprus and requesting them, along with the parties concerned, to refrain from any action which might prejudice that sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity, as well as from any attempt of partition of the island or its unification with any other country,

*Reiterating* its growing concern that negotiations on a comprehensive political solution have yet to make progress, despite the efforts of the Secretary-General and his Special Adviser and others in support of the United Nations efforts to promote a comprehensive settlement,

1. *Reaffirms* that the status quo is unacceptable and that negotiations on a final political solution of the Cyprus problem have been at an impasse for too long;
2. *Reaffirms* its position that a Cyprus settlement must be based on a State of Cyprus with a single sovereignty and international personality and a single citizenship, with its independence and territorial integrity safeguarded, and comprising two politically equal communities as described in the relevant Security Council resolutions, in a bi-communal and bi-zonal federation, and that such a settlement must exclude union in whole or in part with any other country or any form of partition or secession;
3. *Stresses* its full support for the Secretary-General's mission of good offices and for the efforts of his Special Adviser on Cyprus to resume a sustained process of direct negotiations aimed at achieving a comprehensive settlement on the basis of the relevant Security Council resolutions, and stresses also the importance of concerted efforts to work with the Secretary-General to that end;

4. *Welcomes* the intention of the Secretary-General to continue to explore possibilities that may lead to a new momentum in this process of negotiations;
5. *Calls* once again upon the leaders of the two communities, in particular the Turkish Cypriot side, to commit themselves to this process of negotiations, to cooperate actively and constructively with the Secretary-General and his Special Adviser and to resume the direct dialogue without further delay, and urges all States to lend their full support to these efforts;
6. *Further calls* in this context upon all parties concerned to create a climate for reconciliation and genuine mutual confidence on both sides, and to avoid any actions with might increase tension, including through further expansion of military forces and armaments;
7. *Requests* the Secretary-General to submit a report by 10 December 1998 on the implementation of this resolution;
8. *Decides* to remain actively seized of the matter.

## Resolution 1217 (1998)—22 December

[extending the mandate of UNFICYP to 30 June, 1999; calling again for the leaders of the two communities to commit themselves to the process of negotiations]

*The Security Council,*

*Welcoming* the report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations operation in Cyprus of 10 December 1998 (S/1998/1149 and Add.1),

*Welcoming* also the letter to the President of the Security Council from the Secretary-General on his Mission of Good Offices in Cyprus of 14 December 1998 (S/1998/1166),

*Noting* that the Government of Cyprus has agreed that in view of the prevailing conditions in the island it is necessary to keep the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) beyond 31 December 1998,

*Reaffirming* all its earlier resolutions on Cyprus,

*Calling once more* upon all States to respect the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of the Republic of Cyprus and requesting them, along with the parties concerned, to refrain from any action which might prejudice that sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity, as well as from any attempt of partition of the island or its unification with any other country,

*Noting* with concern that restrictions to the freedom of movement of UNFICYP continue,

*Noting* further with satisfaction that the situation along the ceasefire lines remained generally calm, notwithstanding numerous minor violations,

*Reiterating* the need to make progress on a comprehensive political solution,

1. *Decides* to extend the mandate of UNFICYP for a further period ending on 30 June 1999;
2. *Reminds* both sides of their obligations to prevent any violence directed against UNFICYP personnel, to cooperate fully with UNFICYP and to ensure its complete freedom of movement;

3. *Calls upon* the military authorities on both sides to refrain from any action, particularly in the vicinity of the buffer zone, which would exacerbate tensions;
4. *Reiterates* its grave concern at the continuing excessive levels of military forces and armaments in the Republic of Cyprus and the rate at which they are being expanded, upgraded and modernized, including by the introduction of sophisticated weaponry, and the lack of progress towards any significant reduction in the number of foreign troops in the Republic of Cyprus, which threaten to raise tensions both on the island and in the region and complicate efforts to negotiate an overall political settlement;
5. *Calls upon* all concerned to commit themselves to a reduction in defence spending and a reduction in the number of foreign troops in the Republic of Cyprus to help restore confidence between the parties and as a first step towards the withdrawal of non-Cypriot forces as described in the set of ideas (S/24472, Annex), stresses the importance of eventual demilitarization of the Republic of Cyprus as an objective in the context of an overall comprehensive settlement and encourages the Secretary-General to continue to promote efforts in this direction;
6. *Reaffirms* that the status quo is unacceptable and that negotiations on a final political solution of the Cyprus problem have been at an impasse for too long;
7. *Reaffirms* its position that a Cyprus settlement must be based on a State of Cyprus with a single sovereignty and international personality and a single citizenship, with its independence and territorial integrity safeguarded, and comprising two politically equal communities as described in the relevant Security Council resolutions, in a bi-communal and bi-zonal federation, and that such a settlement must exclude union in whole or in part with any other country or any form of partition or secession;
8. *Stresses* its full support for the Secretary-General's Mission of Good Offices and for the efforts of his Special Adviser and Deputy Special Representative for Cyprus to resume when appropriate a sustained process of direct negotiations aimed at achieving a comprehensive settlement on the basis of the relevant Security Council resolutions, and stresses also the impor-



tance of concerted efforts to work with the Secretary-General to that end;

9. *Calls* once again upon the leaders of the two communities to commit themselves to this process of negotiations, and to cooperate actively and constructively with the Secretary-General, his Special Adviser and his Deputy Special Representative and to resume when appropriate the direct dialogue, and urges all States to lend their full support to these efforts;
10. *Welcomes* the ongoing efforts by UNFICYP to implement its humanitarian mandate in respect of Greek Cypriots and Maronites living in the northern part of the island and Turkish Cypriots living in the southern part, as mentioned in the report of the Secretary-General;
11. *Welcomes* also the resumption of work of the Committee on Missing Persons, and calls for implementation without delay of the agreement on missing persons of 31 July 1997;
12. *Reiterates* its support for the efforts of the United Nations and others concerned to promote the holding of bi-communal events so as to build cooperation, trust and mutual respect between the two communities;
13. *Welcomes* the efforts made to improve the efficiency of UNFICYP, including by the establishment of a new Civil Affairs Branch;
14. *Requests* the Secretary-General to submit a report by 10 June 1999 on the implementation of this resolution;
15. *Decides* to remain actively seized of the matter.

## Resolution 1218 (1998)—22 December

[requesting the Secretary-General to work intensively with the two sides on limiting and reducing the level of troops and armaments in Cyprus, on UNFICYP measures aimed at reducing tensions along ceasefire lines and other confidence-building measures, and on efforts towards a comprehensive Cyprus settlement]

*The Security Council,*

*Reaffirming* all its earlier resolutions on Cyprus,

*Reiterating* its grave concern at the lack of progress towards an overall political settlement on Cyprus,

1. *Expresses* appreciation for the letter to the President of the Council from the Secretary-General on his Mission of Good Offices in Cyprus, in particular on the work of his Deputy Special Representative, of 14 December 1998 (S/1998/1166);
2. *Endorses* the initiative of the Secretary-General announced on 30 September 1998 within the framework of his Mission of Good Offices, with the goal of reducing tensions and promoting progress towards a just and lasting settlement in Cyprus;
3. *Expresses* appreciation for the spirit of cooperation and constructive approach the two sides have demonstrated thus far in working with the Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General;
4. *Requests* the Secretary-General, in view of the objectives of promoting progress towards a just and lasting settlement and of reducing tension set out by the Secretary-General in his initiative of 30 September 1998, and building on the serious engagement already demonstrated by the two sides, to continue to make progress towards these two objectives, on the basis of relevant Security Council resolutions;
5. *Requests* further the Secretary-General, in particular, to work intensively with the two sides on the following, taking into account resolution 1178 (1998) of 29 June 1998;

(a) An undertaking to refrain from the threat or use of force or violence as a means to resolve the Cyprus problem;

(b) A staged process aimed at limiting and then substantially reducing the level of all troops and armaments on Cyprus;

(c) Implementation of the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) package of measures aimed at reducing tensions along the ceasefire lines, and a commitment to enter into discussions with UNFICYP with a view to early agreement on further specific and related tension-reducing steps, including demining along the buffer zone;

(d) Further progress in the area of tension-reduction;

(e) Efforts to achieve substantive progress on the core aspects of a comprehensive Cyprus settlement;

(f) Other measures that will build trust and cooperation between the two sides;

6. *Calls upon* the two sides to show compliance with all the objectives in paragraphs 4 and 5 above in full cooperation with the Secretary-General;
7. *Also requests* the Secretary-General to keep the Security Council informed of progress made on his initiative;
8. *Decides* to remain actively seized of the matter.

## Resolution 1250 (1999)—29 June

[calling on the two leaders to support a comprehensive negotiation based on principles including “no preconditions” and “all issues on the table”]

*The Security Council,*

*Reaffirming* all its earlier resolutions on Cyprus, particularly resolution 1218 (1998) of 22 December 1998,

*Reiterating* its grave concern at the lack of progress towards an overall political settlement on Cyprus,

*Appreciating* the statement of the Heads of State and Government of Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America on 20 June 1999 (S/1999/711, annex) calling for comprehensive negotiations in the autumn of 1999 under the auspices of the Secretary-General,

1. *Expresses* its appreciation for the report of the Secretary-General of 22 June 1999 (S/1999/707) on his mission of Good Offices in Cyprus;
2. *Stresses* its full support for the Secretary-General’s mission of Good Offices as decided by the Security Council and, in this context, for the efforts of the Secretary-General and his Special Representative;
3. *Reiterates* its endorsement of the initiative of the Secretary-General announced on 30 September 1998, within the framework of his mission of Good Offices, with the goal of reducing tensions and promoting progress towards a just and lasting settlement in Cyprus;
4. *Notes* that the discussions between the Secretary-General’s Special Representative and the two sides are continuing, and urges both sides to participate constructively;
5. *Expresses* the view that both sides have legitimate concerns that should be addressed through comprehensive negotiations covering all relevant issues;
6. *Requests* the Secretary-General, in accordance with the relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions, to invite the leaders of the two sides to negotiations in the autumn of 1999;

7. *Calls upon* the two leaders, in this context, to give their full support to such a comprehensive negotiation, under the auspices of the Secretary-General, and to commit themselves to the following principles:
  - no preconditions;
  - all issues on the table;
  - commitment in good faith to continue to negotiate until a settlement is reached;
  - full consideration of relevant United Nations resolutions and treaties;
8. *Requests* the two sides on Cyprus, including military authorities on both sides, to work constructively with the Secretary-General and his Special Representative to create a positive climate on the island that will pave the way for negotiations in the autumn of 1999;
9. *Also requests* the Secretary-General to keep the Security Council informed of progress towards the implementation of this resolution and to submit a report to the Council by 1 December 1999;
10. *Decides* to remain actively seized of the matter.”

## Resolution 1251 (1999)—29 June

[extending the mandate of UNFICYP to 15 December, 1999; urging the Greek Cypriot side to agree to implementation of the UNFICYP package of measures; on implementation of confidence-building measures]

*The Security Council,*

*Welcoming* the report of the Secretary-General of 8 June 1999 (S/1999/657 and Add.1) on the United Nations operation in Cyprus,

*Noting* that the Government of Cyprus has agreed that in view of the prevailing conditions in the island it is necessary to keep the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) beyond 30 June 1999,

*Reaffirming* all its earlier resolutions on Cyprus, in particular resolutions 1217 (1998) of 22 December 1998 and 1218 (1998) of 22 December 1998,

*Calling once more* upon all States to respect the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of the Republic of Cyprus, and requesting them, along with the parties concerned, to refrain from any action which might prejudice that sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity, as well as from any attempt at partition of the island or its unification with any other country,

*Noting* that the situation along the ceasefire lines is essentially stable, but expressing its grave concern at the increasing practice by both sides of engaging in provocative behaviour along the ceasefire lines, which heightens the risk of more serious incidents,

*Reminding* the parties that the UNFICYP package of measures aimed at reducing tensions along the ceasefire lines was designed to reduce incidents and tensions, without affecting the security of either side,

*Reiterating* the need to make progress on a comprehensive political solution,

1. *Decides* to extend the mandate of UNFICYP for a further period ending 15 December 1999;
2. *Reminds* both sides of their obligations to prevent any violence directed against UNFICYP personnel, to cooperate fully with UNFICYP and to ensure its complete freedom of movement;

3. *Calls upon* the military authorities on both sides to refrain from any action, including acts of provocation in the vicinity of the buffer zone, which would exacerbate tensions;
4. *Requests* the Secretary-General and his Special Representative to continue to work intensively with the two sides with a view to early agreement on further specific tension-reducing steps, with full consideration of its resolution 1218 (1998) of 22 December 1998;
5. *Calls upon* both sides to take measures that will build trust and cooperation and reduce tensions between the two sides, including demining along the buffer zone;
6. *Urges* the Greek Cypriot side to agree to the implementation of the UNFICYP package of measures, and encourages UNFICYP to continue its efforts towards the rapid implementation of the package by both sides;
7. *Reiterates* its grave concern at the continuing excessive levels of military forces and armaments in the Republic of Cyprus and the rate at which they are being expanded, upgraded and modernized, including by the introduction of advanced weapon systems by either side, and at the lack of progress towards any significant reduction in the number of foreign troops in the Republic of Cyprus, which threaten to raise tensions both on the island and in the region and complicate efforts to negotiate an overall political settlement;
8. *Calls upon* all concerned to commit themselves to a reduction in defence spending, a reduction in the number of foreign troops in the Republic of Cyprus, and a staged process aimed at limiting and then substantially reducing the level of all troops and armaments in the Republic of Cyprus as a first step towards the withdrawal of non-Cypriot forces as described in the set of ideas (S/24472, annex), to help restore confidence between the sides, stresses the importance of eventual demilitarization of the Republic of Cyprus as an objective in the context of an overall comprehensive settlement, welcomes in this context any steps either side may take to reduce armaments and troops, and encourages the Secretary-General to continue to promote efforts in this direction;
9. *Calls upon* both sides to refrain from the threat or use of force or violence as a means to resolve the Cyprus problem;

10. *Reaffirms* that the status quo is unacceptable and that negotiations on a final political solution to the Cyprus problem have been at an impasse for too long;
11. *Reaffirms* its position that a Cyprus settlement must be based on a State of Cyprus with a single sovereignty and international personality and a single citizenship, with its independence and territorial integrity safeguarded, and comprising two politically equal communities as described in the relevant Security Council resolutions, in a bi-communal and bi-zonal federation, and that such a settlement must exclude union in whole or in part with any other country or any form of partition or secession;
12. *Welcomes* the ongoing efforts by UNFICYP to implement its humanitarian mandate in respect of Greek Cypriots and Maronites living in the northern part of the island and Turkish Cypriots living in the southern part, as mentioned in the report of the Secretary-General;
13. *Reiterates* its support for the efforts of the United Nations and others concerned to promote the holding of bi-communal events so as to build cooperation, trust and mutual respect between the two communities, and calls upon the Turkish-Cypriot leadership to resume such activities;
14. *Requests* the Secretary-General to submit a report by 1 December 1999 on the implementation of this resolution;
15. *Decides* to remain actively seized of the matter.



## Resolution 1283 (1999)—15 December

[extending the mandate of UNFICYP to 15 June, 2000]

*The Security Council,*

*Welcoming* the report of the Secretary-General of 1 December 1999 (S/1999/1203 and Corr.1 and Add. 1) on the United Nations operation in Cyprus, and in particular the call to the parties to assess and address the humanitarian issue of missing persons with due urgency and seriousness,

*Noting* that the Government of Cyprus has agreed that in view of the prevailing conditions in the island it is necessary to keep the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) beyond 15 December 1999,

1. *Reaffirms* all its relevant resolutions on Cyprus, and in particular resolution 1251 (1999) of 29 June 1999,
2. *Decides* to extend the mandate of UNFICYP for a further period ending 15 June 2000
3. *Requests* the Secretary-General to submit a report by 1 June 2000 on the implementation of this resolution,
4. *Decides* to remain actively seized on the matter.

## Resolution 1303 (2000)—14 June

[extending the mandate of UNFICYP to 15 December, 2000]

*The Security Council,*

*Welcoming* the report of the Secretary-General of 26 May 2000 (S/2000/496 and Corr.1) on the United Nations operation in Cyprus, and in particular the call to the parties to assess and address the humanitarian issue of missing persons with due urgency and seriousness,

*Noting* that the Government of Cyprus has agreed that in view of the prevailing conditions in the island it is necessary to keep the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) beyond 15 June 2000,

*Welcoming* and encouraging efforts by the United Nations to sensitize peacekeeping personnel in the prevention and control of HIV/AIDS and other communicable diseases in all its peacekeeping operations,

1. *Reaffirms* all its relevant resolutions on Cyprus, and in particular resolutions 1251 (1999) of 29 June 1999 and 1283 (1999) of 15 December 1999;
2. *Decides* to extend the mandate of UNFICYP for a further period ending 15 December 2000;
3. *Requests* the Secretary-General to submit a report by 1 December 2000 on the implementation of this resolution;
4. *Decides* to remain actively seized of the matter.

## Resolution 1331 (2000)—13 December

[extending the mandate of UNFICYP to 15 June, 2001; urging the Turkish Cypriot side and Turkish forces to rescind restrictions on UNFICYP operations, and to restore the military status quo ante at Strovilia]

*The Security Council,*

*Welcoming* the report of the Secretary-General of 1 December 2000 (S/2000/1138) on the United Nations operation in Cyprus, and in particular the call to the parties to assess and address the humanitarian issue of missing persons with due urgency and seriousness,

*Noting* that the Government of Cyprus has agreed that in view of the prevailing conditions in the island it is necessary to keep the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) beyond 15 December 2000,

*Welcoming and encouraging* efforts by the United Nations to sensitize peacekeeping personnel in the prevention and control of HIV/AIDS and other communicable diseases in all its peacekeeping operations,

1. *Reaffirms* all its relevant resolutions on Cyprus, and in particular resolution 1251 (1999) of 29 June 1999 and subsequent resolutions;
2. *Decides* to extend the mandate of UNFICYP for a further period ending 15 June 2001;
3. *Requests* the Secretary-General to submit a report by 1 June 2001 on the implementation of this resolution;
4. *Urges* the Turkish Cypriot side and Turkish forces to rescind the restrictions imposed on 30 June 2000 on the operations of UNFICYP and to restore the military status quo ante at Strovilia;
5. *Decides* to remain actively seized of the matter.

United Nations Document A/RES/242 (XXII)  
November 1947

Resolution 242 (XXII) adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on 29 November 1947

Final paragraph

...and to recommend the adoption of the following:

1. That the Security Council, in its resolution of 4 March 1948 (S/RES/48 (I)), its resolution of 21 June 1948 (S/RES/54 (II)), its resolution of 27 September 1948 (S/RES/59 (II)), its resolution of 15 August 1949 (S/RES/101 (II)), its resolution of 11 April 1950 (S/RES/113 (II)), and its resolution of 23 October 1950 (S/RES/124 (II)), be reaffirmed.

2. That the Security Council, in its resolution of 10 December 1948 (S/RES/60 (II)), be reaffirmed, and that the Security Council be requested to continue its work in this regard.

3. That the Security Council be requested to continue its work in this regard, and that the Security Council be requested to continue its work in this regard.

4. That the Security Council be requested to continue its work in this regard, and that the Security Council be requested to continue its work in this regard.

5. That the Security Council be requested to continue its work in this regard, and that the Security Council be requested to continue its work in this regard.

Final paragraph

6. That the Security Council be requested to continue its work in this regard, and that the Security Council be requested to continue its work in this regard.

7. That the Security Council be requested to continue its work in this regard, and that the Security Council be requested to continue its work in this regard.

8. That the Security Council be requested to continue its work in this regard, and that the Security Council be requested to continue its work in this regard.

**United Nations Documents**  
**B. General Assembly Resolutions**

## UN General Assembly Resolution 2077 (XX) —18 December 1965

[calling on all States to refrain from any intervention directed against the Republic of Cyprus; recommending continuation of UN mediation work]

*The General Assembly,*

*Having considered the question of Cyprus,*

*Recalling* Security Council resolutions 186(1964) of 4 March 1964, 187(1964) of 13 March 1964, 192(1964) of 20 June 1964, 193(1964) of 9 August 1964, 194(1964) of 25 September 1964, 198(1964) of 18 December 1964, 201(1965) of 19 March 1965, 206(1965) of 15 June 1965 and 207(1965) of 10 August 1965, and the Council's consensus of 11 August 1964 with regard to Cyprus.

*Recalling* the parts of the Declaration adopted on 10 October 1964 by the Second Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, held at Cairo, regarding the question of Cyprus,

*Noting* the report of the United Nations Mediator on Cyprus submitted to the Secretary-General on 26 March 1965,

*Noting* further that the Government of Cyprus is committed through its Declaration of Intention and the accompanying Memorandum, to:

(a) The full application of human rights to all citizens of Cyprus, irrespective of race or religion,

(b) The ensuring of minority rights,

(c) The safeguarding of the above rights as contained in the said Declaration and Memorandum,

1. *Takes cognisance of* the fact that the Republic of Cyprus, as an equal Member of the United Nations, is, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, entitled to enjoy, and should enjoy, full sovereignty and complete independence without any foreign intervention or interference;
2. *Calls upon* all States, in conformity with their obligations under the Charter, and in particular Article 2, paragraphs 1 and 4, to

respect the sovereignty, unity, independence and territorial integrity of the Republic of Cyprus and to refrain from any intervention directed against it;

3. *Recommends* to the Security Council the continuation of the United Nations mediation work in conformity with Council resolution 186(1964).

*Adopted by the UN General Assembly at its 1402nd meeting on 18 December 1965.*

## UN General Assembly Resolution 3212 (XXIX) —1 November, 1974

[urging withdrawal of all foreign armed forces from the Republic of Cyprus; requesting continued UN humanitarian assistance to all parts of the population of Cyprus]

*The General Assembly,*

*Having* considered the question of Cyprus,

*Gravely concerned* about the continuation of the Cyprus crisis, which constitutes a threat to international peace and security,

*Mindful* of the need to solve this crisis without delay by peaceful means, in accordance with the purposes and principles of the United Nations,

*Having* heard the statements in the debate and taking note of the Report of the Special Political Committee on the Question of Cyprus,

1. *Calls* upon all states to respect the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and non-alignment of the Republic of Cyprus and to refrain from all acts and interventions directed against it;
2. *Urges* the speedy withdrawal of all foreign armed forces and foreign military presence and personnel from the Republic of Cyprus and the cessation of all foreign interference in its affairs;
3. *Considers* that the constitutional system of the Republic of Cyprus concerns the Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot communities;
4. *Commends* the contacts and negotiations taking place on an equal footing, with the good offices of the Secretary-General between the representatives of the two communities, and calls for their continuation with a view to reaching freely a mutually acceptable political settlement, based on their fundamental and legitimate rights;
5. *Considers* that all the refugees should return to their homes in safety and calls upon the parties concerned to undertake urgent measures to that end;

6. *Expresses* the hope that, if necessary, further efforts including negotiations can take place, within the framework of the United Nations, for the purpose of implementing the provisions of the present resolution, thus ensuring to the Republic of Cyprus its fundamental right to independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity;
7. *Requests* the Secretary-General to continue to provide United Nations humanitarian assistance to all parts of the population of Cyprus and calls upon all states to contribute to that effort;
8. *Calls* upon all parties to continue to cooperate fully with the United Nations Peace-Keeping Force in Cyprus, which may be strengthened if necessary;
9. *Requests* the Secretary-General to continue to lend his good offices to the parties concerned;
10. *Further requests* the Secretary-General to bring the present resolution to the attention of the Security Council.

*Adopted by the UN General Assembly with 117 votes in favour, none against and no abstentions.*



## UN General Assembly Resolution 3395 (XXX) —20 November, 1975

[demanding withdrawal of all foreign armed forces from the Republic of Cyprus; calling for facilitation of the return of all refugees to their homes; calling for a resumption of negotiations]

*The General Assembly,*

*Having considered the question of Cyprus,*

*Having heard the statement in the debate and taking note of the Report of the Special Political Committee,*

*Noting with concern that four rounds of talks between the representatives of the two communities in pursuance of Security Council resolution 367(1975) of 12 March 1975 have not yet led to a mutually acceptable settlement,*

*Deeply concerned at the continuation of the crisis in Cyprus,*

*Mindful of the need to solve the Cyprus crisis without further delay by peaceful means, in accordance with the purposes and principles of the United Nations,*

1. *Reaffirms* the urgent need for continued efforts for the effective implementation in all parts of its resolution 3212(XXIX) of 1 November 1974 endorsed by the Security Council in its resolution 365(1974) of 13 December 1974 and to that end;
2. *Calls* once again upon all States to respect the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and non-alignment of the Republic of Cyprus and to refrain from all acts and interventions directed against it;
3. *Demands* the withdrawal without further delay of all foreign armed forces and foreign military presence and personnel from the Republic of Cyprus, and the cessation of all foreign interference in its affairs;
4. *Calls* upon the parties concerned to undertake urgent measures to facilitate the voluntary return of all refugees to their homes in safety and to settle all other aspects of the refugee problem;

5. *Calls* for the immediate resumption in a meaningful and constructive manner of the negotiations between the representatives of the two communities under the auspices of the Secretary-General to be conducted freely on an equal footing with a view to reaching a mutually acceptable agreement based on their fundamental and legitimate rights;
6. *Urges* all parties to refrain from unilateral action in contravention of its resolution 3212(XXIX), including changes in the demographic structure of Cyprus;
7. *Requests* the Secretary-General of the United Nations to continue his role in the negotiations between the representatives of the two communities;
8. *Also requests* the Secretary-General to bring this resolution to the attention of the Security Council and to report on its implementations, as soon as appropriate, and not later than 31st March, 1976;
9. *Calls* upon all parties to continue to cooperate fully with the United Nations Peace-Keeping Force in Cyprus;
10. *Decides* to remain seized of this question.

*Adopted by 117 votes in favour, one against, (Turkey) and 9 abstentions.*

## UN General Assembly Resolution 3450 (XXX) —9 December 1975

[on missing persons]

*The General Assembly,*

*Recalling* its resolution 3212 (XXIX) of 1 November 1974,

*Noting* resolution 4 (XXXI) of the Commission on Human Rights on 13, February 1975,

*Gravely concerned* about the fate of a considerable number of Cypriots who are missing as a result of armed conflict in Cyprus,

*Appreciating* the work of the International Committee of the Red Cross in this field,

*Reaffirming* the basic human need of families in Cyprus to be informed about missing relatives,

1. *Requests* the Secretary-General to exert every effort in close co-operation with the International Committee of the Red Cross in assisting the tracing of and accounting for missing persons as a result of armed conflict in Cyprus;
2. *Requests* the Secretary-General to provide the Commission on Human Rights at its thirty-second session with information relevant to the implementation of the present resolution.

*Adopted at the 2433rd meeting by 106 votes to none with 26 abstentions.*

## UN General Assembly Resolution 31/12 (1976) —12 November, 1976

[demanding implementation of General Assembly Resolutions 3212 (XXIX) of 1 November 1974 and 3395 (XXX) of 20 November 1975]

*The General Assembly,*

*Having considered the question of Cyprus,*

*Deeply concerned over the prolongation of the Cyprus crisis, which endangers international peace and security,*

*Reiterating, its full support for the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and non-alignment of the Republic of Cyprus, and calling once again for the cessation of all foreign interference in its affairs.*

*Deeply regretting that the United Nations resolutions on Cyprus have not yet been implemented,*

*Mindful of the need to solve the problem of Cyprus without further delay by peaceful means in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations:*

1. *Reaffirms* its resolutions 3212(XXIX) of 1 November 1974 and 3395(XXX) of 20 November 1975;
2. *Demands* the urgent implementation of the above-mentioned resolutions;
3. *Calls* upon all parties concerned to cooperate fully with the Secretary-General in this regard;
4. *Requests* the Secretary-General to continue to provide his good offices for the negotiations between the representatives of the two communities;
5. *Expresses* the hope that the Security Council will consider appropriate steps for the implementation of its resolution 365(1974) of 13 December 1974;
6. *Requests* the Secretary-General to follow up the implementation of the present resolution and report thereon to the General Assembly at its thirty-second session;

7. *Decides to include the item entitled "Question of Cyprus" in the provisional agenda of its thirty-second session.*

*Adopted by 94 votes in favour, one against (Turkey) and 27 abstentions.*

## UN General Assembly Resolution 32/15 (1977) —9 November, 1977

[calling for a resumption of negotiations; demanding that the parties refrain from any unilateral actions which might adversely affect prospects for peace]

*The General Assembly,*

*Having considered the question of Cyprus,*

*Gravely concerned over the prolongation of the Cyprus crisis, which endangers international peace and security,*

*Recalling its resolution 3212(XXIX) of 1 November 1974, 3395(XXX) of 20 November 1975 and 31/12 of 12 November 1976,*

*Deeply regretting that the resolutions of the United Nations on Cyprus have not yet been implemented,*

*Expressing concern over the lack of progress in the intercommunal talks,*

*Mindful of the need to solve the question of Cyprus without further delay by peaceful means in accordance with the purpose and principles of the Charter of the United Nations,*

1. *Calls for the urgent and effective implementation of resolution 3212(XXIX), unanimously adopted by the General Assembly and endorsed by the Security Council in its resolution 365(1974) of 13 December 1974, as the valid framework for the solution of the problem of Cyprus;*
2. *Reiterates its call upon all States to respect the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and non-alignment of the Republic of Cyprus and to cease any form of interference in its internal affairs;*
3. *Calls for the urgent resumption in a meaningful and constructive manner of the negotiations between the representatives of the two communities, to be conducted freely on an equal footing on the basis of comprehensive and concrete proposals of the parties concerned with a view to reaching as early as possible a mutually acceptable agreement based on their fundamental and legitimate rights;*

4. *Demands* that the parties concerned refrain from any unilateral actions which might adversely affect the prospects of a just and lasting solution of the problem of Cyprus by peaceful means;
5. *Recommends* that the Security Council should keep the question of Cyprus under constant review and adopt all practical means to promote the effective implementation of its relevant resolutions in all their aspects;
6. *Calls on* the parties concerned to cooperate fully with the Secretary-General in the performance of his tasks under the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly and of the Security Council as well as with the United Nations Peace-Keeping Force in Cyprus;
7. *Decides* to include the item entitled "Question of Cyprus" in the provisional Agenda of its Thirty-Third Session and requests the Secretary-General to follow up the implementation of the present resolution and to report thereon to the General Assembly at that Session.

*Adopted by 116 in favour to 6 against with 20 abstentions. The opposing votes were cast by Turkey, Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Iran, Pakistan and Uganda.*

*Separate Vote on Paragraph 5:*

*A separate vote was taken on operative paragraph 5, above, which was approved by 82 in favour, to 9 against with 48 abstentions.*

**UN General Assembly Resolution 32/128 (1977)  
—16 December, 1977**

[on missing persons]

*The General Assembly,*

*Concerned at the lack of progress towards the tracing of and accounting for missing persons in Cyprus;*

*Expressing the hope that the informal discussions now taking place to establish a joint committee to trace missing persons are successful,*

1. *Requests the Secretary-General to provide his good offices through his Special Representative in Cyprus to support the establishment of an Investigatory Body with the participation of the International Committee of the Red Cross which would be in a position to function impartially, effectively and speedily so as to resolve the problem without undue delay;*
2. *Invites the parties concerned to continue co-operating in the establishment of the Investigatory Body and work out the modalities with a view to activating it expeditiously.*

*Adopted at the 105th meeting, without a vote*



## UN General Assembly Resolution 33/15 (1978) —9 November, 1978

[demanding immediate withdrawal of all foreign armed forces; calling for a resumption of negotiations; recommending examination of measures to ensure implementation of UN resolutions on Cyprus]

*The General Assembly,*

*Recalling* its resolution 3212(XXIX) of 1 November 1974 and its subsequent resolutions,

*Greatly concerned* over the prolongation of the Cyprus crisis which continues to constitute a serious threat to international peace and security,

*Deeply regretting* that the resolutions of the United Nations on Cyprus have not yet been implemented,

*Expressing* deep concern over the lack of progress in the intercommunal talks,

*Deploring* the continued presence of foreign armed forces and foreign military personnel on the territory of the Republic of Cyprus and the fact that part of its territory is still occupied by foreign forces,

*Deploring also* all unilateral actions that change the demographic structure of Cyprus,

*Mindful* of the need to settle the question of Cyprus without further delay by peaceful means in accordance with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations,

1. *Reiterates* its full support for the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and non-alignment of the Republic of Cyprus and calls once again for the cessation of all foreign interference in its affairs;
2. *Demands* the immediate and effective implementation of resolution 3212(XXIX), unanimously adopted by the General Assembly and endorsed by the Security Council in its resolution 365(1974) of 13 December 1974, and of the subsequent resolutions of the Assembly and the Council on Cyprus, which provide the valid basis for the solution of the problem of Cyprus;

3. *Demands* the immediate withdrawal of all foreign armed forces and foreign military presence from the Republic of Cyprus;
4. *Requests* the Secretary-General to continue to provide his good offices for the negotiations between the representatives of the two communities;
5. *Calls* for the respect of the human rights of all Cypriots and the institution of urgent measures for the voluntary return of the refugees to their homes in safety;
6. *Calls* for the urgent resumption in a meaningful and constructive manner of the negotiations under the auspices of the Secretary-General between the representatives of the two communities, to be conducted freely on an equal footing on the basis of comprehensive and constructive proposals of the parties concerned with a view to reaching as early as possible a mutually acceptable agreement based on their fundamental and legitimate rights;
7. *Calls* upon the parties concerned to refrain from any unilateral action which might adversely affect the prospects of a just and lasting solution of the problem of Cyprus by peaceful means and to cooperate fully with the Secretary-General in the performance of his task under the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly and the Security Council as well as with the United Nations Peace-Keeping Force in Cyprus;
8. *Recommends* that the Security Council should examine the question of the implementation, within a time-frame, of its relevant resolutions and consider and adopt thereafter, if necessary, all appropriate and practical measures under the Charter of the United Nations for ensuring the implementation of the resolutions of the United Nations on Cyprus;
9. *Decides* to include the item entitled "Question of Cyprus" in the provisional agenda of its Thirty-Fourth Session and requests the Secretary-General to follow up the implementation of the present resolution and to report on all its aspects to the General Assembly at that session.

*Adopted by 110 in favour to 4 against with 22 abstentions. The opposing votes were cast by Iran, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Turkey.*

Separate vote on paragraph 8:

*A separate vote was taken on operative paragraph 8, above, which was approved by 80 in favour, 7 against with 48 abstentions.*

**UN General Assembly Resolution 33/172 (1978)  
—20 December, 1978**

[on missing persons]

*The General Assembly,*

*Reaffirming* its resolution 3450 (XXX) of 9 November 1975 and 32/128 of 16 December 1977 on the missing persons in Cyprus,

*Regretting* the delay in the implementation of these resolutions,

1. *Urges* the establishment of the investigatory body under the chairmanship of a representative of the Secretary-General with the co-operation of the International Committee of the Red Cross, which would be in a position to function impartially, effectively and speedily so as to resolve the problem without undue delay. The representative of the Secretary-General shall be empowered, in case of disagreement, to reach a binding independent opinion which shall be implemented;
2. *Calls* upon the parties to cooperate fully with the investigatory body and, to this effect, to appoint their representatives there-to forthwith;
3. *Requests* the Secretary-General to continue his good offices, through his Special Representatives in Cyprus, to support the establishment of the investigatory body.

*Adopted at the 90th meeting by 69 votes to 6 with 55 abstentions.*

## UN General Assembly Resolution 34/30 (1979) —20 November, 1979

[demanding immediate withdrawal of all foreign armed forces; calling for a resumption of negotiations; welcoming the proposal for the total demilitarization of Cyprus]

*The General Assembly,*

*Having considered the question of Cyprus,*

*Recalling its resolution 3212(XXIX) of 1 November 1974 and its subsequent resolutions,*

*Mindful of the principle of the inadmissibility of acquisition of territories by force,*

*Recalling the idea of holding an international conference on Cyprus,*

*Greatly concerned over the prolongation of the Cyprus crisis which poses a serious threat to international peace and security,*

*Deeply regretting that the resolutions of the United Nations on Cyprus have not yet been implemented,*

*Welcoming the ten-point agreement of 19 May 1979 (A/34/620, Annex V),*

*Expressing deep concern over the lack of progress in the intercommunal talks,*

*Deploring the continued presence of foreign armed forces and foreign military personnel on the territory of the Republic of Cyprus and the fact that part of its territory is still occupied by foreign forces,*

*Deploring also all unilateral actions that change the demographic structure of Cyprus,*

*Mindful of the need to settle the question of Cyprus without further delay by peaceful means in accordance with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations and the relevant United Nations resolutions,*

1. *Reiterates* its full support for the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity, unity and non-alignment of the Republic of Cyprus and calls once again for the cessation of all foreign interference in its affairs;
2. *Expresses* its support for the ten-point agreement of 19 May 1979, concluded under the auspices of the Secretary-General;
3. *Affirms* the right of the Republic of Cyprus and its people to full and effective sovereignty and control over the entire territory of Cyprus and its natural and other resources and calls upon all States to support and help the Government of Cyprus to exercise the above-mentioned rights;
4. *Demands* the immediate and effective implementation of resolution 3212(XXIX), unanimously adopted by the General Assembly and endorsed by the Security Council in its resolution 365(1974) of 13 December (1974), and of the subsequent resolutions of the Assembly and the Council on Cyprus, which provide the valid basis for the solution of the problem of Cyprus;
5. *Demands* the immediate withdrawal of all foreign armed forces and foreign military presence from the Republic of Cyprus;
6. *Requests* the Secretary-General to continue to provide his good offices for the negotiations between the representatives of the two communities;
7. *Calls* for the respect of the human rights of all Cypriots and the institution of urgent measures for the voluntary return of the refugees to their homes in safety;
8. *Calls* for the urgent resumption in a meaningful result-oriented and constructive manner of the negotiations under the auspices of the Secretary-General between the representatives of the two communities, to be conducted freely on an equal footing on the basis of the agreement of 19 May 1979, with a view to reaching as early as possible a mutually acceptable agreement based on their fundamental and legitimate rights;
9. *Calls* upon the parties concerned to refrain from any unilateral action which might adversely affect the prospects of a just and lasting solution of the problem of Cyprus by peaceful means and to cooperate fully with the Secretary-General in the performance of his task under the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly and the Security Council as well as with the United Nations Peace-Keeping Force in Cyprus;

10. *Welcomes* the proposal for the total demilitarisation of Cyprus;
11. *Reiterates* its recommendation that the Security Council should examine the question of the implementation, within a specified time-frame, of its relevant resolutions and consider and adopt thereafter, if necessary, all appropriate and practical measures under the Charter of the United Nations for ensuring the implementation of the resolutions of the United Nations on Cyprus;
12. *Requests* the Secretary-General to report to the General Assembly by 31 May 1980 on the progress achieved in the negotiations between the two communities on the basis of the Agreement of 19 May 1979;
13. *Authorises* the President of the Thirty-Fourth Session of the General Assembly, in the event that the Secretary-General reports lack of progress in the above-mentioned negotiations, to appoint an Ad Hoc Committee composed of no more than seven member states;
14. *Requests* the Ad Hoc Committee to maintain contact with the Secretary-General in his task of facilitating the successful conclusion of the negotiations between the two communities,
15. *Further requests* the ad hoc committee, in consultation with the Secretary General, to recommend steps for and promote the implementation of all the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly on Cyprus;
16. *Decides* to include the item entitled "Question of Cyprus" in the provisional agenda of its thirty-fifth session and requests the Secretary-General to follow up the implementation of the present resolution and to report on all its aspects to the General Assembly at that session.

*Adopted by a vote of 99 in favour to 5 against (Turkey, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Bangladesh and Djibouti) with 35 abstentions.*

Separate vote on paragraph 11:

*There was a separate vote on operative para 11 which was approved by 87 votes in favour, 10 against with 40 abstentions.*

Separate vote on para 12:

*There was also a separate vote on operative para 12 which was approved by 34 votes in favour, 8 against with 34 abstentions.*

Separate vote on paras 13, 14, 15:

*There was a separate vote on operative paras 13, 14, 15 which were approved by 83 votes in favour, 23 against with 30 abstentions.*

## UN General Assembly Resolution 36/164 (1981) —16 December, 1981

[on missing persons]

*The General Assembly,*

*Recalling* its previous resolutions on the question of the missing persons in Cyprus,

*Reaffirming* the basic human need of families to be informed, without further delay, about the fate of their missing relatives,

*Having in mind* that agreement was reached, on 19 May 1979, during the high-level meeting held in Nicosia under the auspices of the Secretary-General of the United Nations,

*Welcoming* also the agreement establishing the Committee on Missing Persons in Cyprus, referred to in the report of the Secretary-General of 27 May 1981, S/14490, including the oral agreement of 26 March 1981 concerning the attendance of representatives of the committees of relatives of missing persons at the meetings of the Committee;

*Regretting* the fact that due to procedural difficulties no progress has been achieved towards the commencement of the Committee's investigative work,

1. *Urges* that the Committee proceed without any further delay, with its investigative work for the tracing of and accounting for missing persons in Cyprus;
2. *Calls* upon the parties concerned to facilitate, in a spirit of cooperation and goodwill, the Committee on Missing Persons in carrying out its investigative task;
3. *Requests* the Secretary-General to continue to provide his good offices for the unhindered functioning of the Committee on Missing Persons.

*Adopted at the 101st meeting, without a vote.*



**UN General Assembly Resolution 37/181 (1982)  
—17 December, 1982**

[on missing persons]

*The General Assembly,*

*Recalling* its previous resolutions on the question of the missing persons in Cyprus,

*Reaffirming* the basic human need of families to be informed, without further delay, about the fate of their missing relatives,

*Expressing* concern that the Committee on Missing Persons in Cyprus, the establishment of which was announced on 22 April 1981, has failed to overcome procedural difficulties and has achieved no progress towards the commencement of its investigative work,

*Emphasising* the need for a speedy resolution of this humanitarian problem,

1. *Invites* the Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances of the Commission on Human Rights to follow developments and to recommend ways and means to the parties concerned with a view to overcoming the pending procedural difficulties of the Committee on Missing Persons in Cyprus and in co-operation with it to facilitate the effective implementation of its investigative work on the basis of the existing relevant agreements;
2. *Calls* upon the parties concerned to facilitate such investigation in a spirit of co-operation and goodwill;
3. *Requests* the Secretary-General to continue to provide his good offices with a view to facilitating the work of the Committee on Missing Persons in Cyprus.

*Adopted at the 110th meeting, without a vote.*

## UN General Assembly Resolution 37/253 (1983) —13 May, 1983

[demanding the immediate withdrawal of all occupation forces from the Republic of Cyprus; calling for meaningful negotiations; reiterating its recommendation to examine measures to ensure implementation of UN resolutions on Cyprus]

*The General Assembly,*

*Having considered the question of Cyprus,*

*Recalling its resolution 3212(XXIX) of 1 November 1974 and its subsequent resolutions on the question of Cyprus,*

*Recalling the high-level agreements of 12 February 1977 and 19 May 1979,*

*Reaffirming the principle of the inadmissibility of occupation and acquisition of territories by force,*

*Greatly concerned at the prolongation of the Cyprus crisis, which poses a serious threat to international peace and security,*

*Deeply regretting that the resolutions of the United Nations on Cyprus have not yet been implemented,*

*Recalling the idea of holding an international conference on Cyprus,*

*Deploring the fact that part of the territory of the Republic of Cyprus is still occupied by foreign forces,*

*Deploring the lack of progress in the intercommunal talks,*

*Deploring all unilateral actions that change the demographic structure of Cyprus or promote faits accomplis,*

*Reaffirming the need to settle the question of Cyprus without further delay by peaceful means in accordance with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations and the relevant United Nations resolutions,*

1. *Reiterates* its full support for the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity, unity and non-alignment of the Republic of Cyprus and calls once again for the cessation of all foreign interference in its affairs;
2. *Affirms* the right of the Republic of Cyprus and its people to full and effective sovereignty and control over the entire territory of Cyprus and its natural and other resources and calls upon all states to support and help the Government of the Republic of Cyprus to exercise these rights;
3. *Condemns* any act which tends to undermine the full and effective exercise of the above-mentioned rights, including the unlawful issue of titles of ownership of property;
4. *Welcomes* the proposal for total demilitarisation made by the President of the Republic of Cyprus;
5. *Expresses* its support for the high-level agreements of 12 February 1977 and 19 May 1979 and all the provisions thereof;
6. *Demands* the immediate and effective implementation of resolution 3212(XXIX), unanimously adopted by the General Assembly and endorsed by the Security Council in its resolution 365(1974) of 13 December (1974), and of the subsequent resolutions of the Assembly and the Council on Cyprus, which provide the valid and essential basis for the solution of the problem of Cyprus;
7. *Considers* the withdrawal of all occupation forces from the Republic of Cyprus as an essential basis for a speedy and mutually acceptable solution of the Cyprus problem;
8. *Demands* the immediate withdrawal of all occupation forces from the Republic of Cyprus;
9. *Commends* the intensification of the efforts made by the Secretary-General, while noting with concern the lack of progress in the intercommunal talks;
10. *Calls* for meaningful, result-oriented, constructive and substantive negotiations between the representatives of the two communities, to be conducted freely on an equal footing on the basis of relevant United Nations resolutions and the high level agreements, with a view to reaching as early as possible a mutually acceptable agreement based on the fundamental and legitimate rights of the two communities;

11. *Calls* for respect of the human rights and fundamental freedoms of all Cypriots, including the freedom of movement, the freedom of settlement and the right to property and the instituting of urgent measures for the voluntary return of the refugees to their homes in safety;
12. *Considers* that the de facto situation created by the force of arms should not be allowed to influence or in any way affect the solution of the problem of Cyprus;
13. *Calls* upon the parties concerned to refrain from any unilateral action which might adversely affect the prospects of a just and lasting solution of the problem of Cyprus by peaceful means and to cooperate fully with the Secretary-General in the performance of his task under the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly and the Security Council as well as with the United Nations Peace-Keeping Force in Cyprus;
14. *Calls* upon the parties concerned to refrain from any action which violates or is designed to violate the independence, unity, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Cyprus;
15. *Reiterates* its recommendation that the Security Council should examine the question of the implementation, within a specified time-frame, of its relevant resolutions and consider and adopt thereafter, if necessary, all appropriate and practical measures under the Charter of the United Nations for ensuring the speedy and effective implementation of the resolutions of the United Nations on Cyprus;
16. *Welcomes* the intention of the Secretary-General, as expressed in his report (Doc. A/37/805 of 6/5/1983), to pursue a renewed personal involvement in the quest for a solution of the Cyprus problem and, in view of this, requests the Secretary-General to undertake such actions or initiatives as he may consider appropriate within the framework of the mission of good offices entrusted to him by the Security Council for promoting a just and lasting solution of the problem and to report to the General Assembly at its thirty-eighth session on the results of his efforts;
17. *Decides* to include the provisional agenda of its thirty-eighth session the item entitled "Question of Cyprus" and requests the Secretary-General to follow up the implementation of the present resolution and to report on all its aspects to the General Assembly at that session.

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*Adopted by a vote of 103 in favour and 5 against with 20 abstentions. The votes against the resolution were cast by Bangladesh, Malaysia, Pakistan, Somalia and Turkey.*

Separate vote on paragraph 8:

*A separate vote was taken on operative paragraph 8, which was approved by 89 votes in favour, 5 against and 27 abstentions.*

Separate vote on paragraph 15:

*A separate vote was also taken on operative paragraph 15 which was approved 86 votes in favour, 8 against and 25 abstentions.*

Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Cyprus

1964-1965 (1965/10)

For the period from 1 January 1964 to 31 December 1965

INTRODUCTION

The United Nations Operation in Cyprus (UNOCYP) was established in 1964 to monitor the ceasefire between the Government of Cyprus and the Turkish Cypriot community. The operation has since been expanded to include the monitoring of the 1960 Constitution and the 1963-64 Intercommunal Agreement. The Secretary-General reports on the activities of UNOCYP during the period from 1 January 1964 to 31 December 1965.

1. THE SITUATION IN CYPRUS

The situation in Cyprus during the period from 1 January 1964 to 31 December 1965 was characterized by a continued state of tension between the Government of Cyprus and the Turkish Cypriot community.

The Secretary-General has continued to monitor the situation in Cyprus and to report to the Security Council. He has also continued to facilitate the work of UNOCYP and to provide technical assistance to the operation.

The Secretary-General has also continued to facilitate the work of the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Cyprus (UNCC) and to provide technical assistance to the commission.

A. The situation in Cyprus during the period from 1 January 1964 to 31 December 1965

The situation in Cyprus during the period from 1 January 1964 to 31 December 1965 was characterized by a continued state of tension between the Government of Cyprus and the Turkish Cypriot community.

**United Nations Documents**  
C. Secretary-General's Reports  
to the Security Council

# Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Cyprus

(7 June 1996—S/1996/411)

(For the period from 11 December 1995 to 10 June 1996)

## I. INTRODUCTION

1. The present report on the United Nations operation in Cyprus covers developments from 11 December 1995 to 10 June 1996 and brings up to date the record of the activities of the United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) pursuant to Security Council resolution 186 (1964) of 4 March 1964 and subsequent Council resolutions, most recently resolution 1032 (1995) of 19 December 1995. A separate report will be issued on the Secretary-General's mission of good offices.

## II. ACTIVITIES OF THE FORCE

2. In its resolution 186 (1964), the Security Council defined the mandate of UNFICYP as follows:

“In the interest of preserving international peace and security, to use its best efforts to prevent a recurrence of fighting and, as necessary, to contribute to the maintenance and restoration of law and order and a return to normal conditions.”

The Council has repeatedly reaffirmed that mandate. In connection with the events that have occurred since 15 July 1974, the Council has adopted a number of resolutions, some of which required the Force to perform certain additional or modified functions relating, in particular, to the maintenance of the cease-fire.

### A. Maintenance of the cease-fire and the military status quo

3. The cease-fire lines of the Turkish forces and the Cypriot National Guard extend approximately 180 kilometres, roughly from east to west across the island. The area between the lines, known as the United Nations buffer zone, has a width that varies from a few metres to 7 kilometres and covers about 3 per cent of the island (see the attached map). The United Nations buffer zone contains some of the most fertile land in Cyprus. There are six villages in the buffer zone, but only one, Pyla, is inhabited by members of both com-

munities. The total population of the villages in the buffer zone is about 8,000 Greek Cypriots and 350 Turkish Cypriots.

4. UNFICYP undertakes constant surveillance of the United Nations buffer zone from 22 permanent observation posts, daylight surveillance from 2 additional posts and periodic daily surveillance from another 19 patrol bases. UNFICYP also maintains less frequent periodic surveillance of the remainder of the buffer zone from a further 118 observation posts, carries out vehicle, foot and air patrols, and maintains surveillance of the seaward extension of the cease-fire lines for 5 kilometres.

5. During the period under review, both sides generally respected the cease-fire and the military status quo. UNFICYP exercised increased vigilance during the crisis in the Aegean at the end of January 1996. At that time, there was a short rise in tension along the cease-fire lines, which subsequently subsided. During the period under review, UNFICYP intervened in numerous minor incidents to correct violations and prevent any escalation of the situation. On a number of occasions, military and police personnel of the opposing forces were observed moving forward of their respective cease-fire lines into the buffer zone. In almost all cases, they withdrew without incident following intervention by UNFICYP.

6. The National Guard continued its extensive programme to strengthen its military positions, or to add new ones, along the whole length of the cease-fire line. UNFICYP has protested a total of 150 military constructions in the immediate vicinity of the buffer zone as violations of the spirit of the cease-fire.

7. There were again a number of overflights of Cypriot airspace by military fixed-wing aircraft. Those flights have the potential to increase tension. The Government of the Republic of Cyprus protested violations of Cypriot air space by Turkish military aircraft. The Government of Turkey and the Turkish Cypriot side protested the presence of aircraft of the Greek air force in Cypriot air space.

8. The status quo of the fenced area of Varosha remained a matter of concern to UNFICYP. Incidents of looting continued to occur during the reporting period. On two occasions (in late December 1995 and March 1996), Turkish forces broke into one of the United Nations observation posts. In addition, an unoccupied hotel was converted into student accommodations and has been occupied since 26 February 1996. These developments have been protested by UNFICYP to the Turkish forces, who were reminded once again that the United Nations holds the Government of Turkey responsible for the maintenance of the status quo in the fenced area of Varosha. The Permanent Mission of Turkey has informed the United Nations that student dormitories were being built outside the fenced area of Varosha, which will permit the above-mentioned hotel to be vacated within a few months.



9. There are 39 minefields and booby-trapped areas inside the buffer zone, and a further 71 are located on either side within 500 metres of the cease-fire lines. UNFICYP has, on numerous occasions, unsuccessfully requested their removal by the forces on the two sides.

#### **B. Implementation of paragraphs 5 to 7 of resolution 1032 (1995)**

10. In its resolution 1032 (1995) of 19 December 1995, the Security Council expressed its concern over the continued modernization and upgrading of military forces in Cyprus and urged all concerned to reduce force levels and defence spending. Despite continuous efforts by UNFICYP, no progress has been made towards that objective. On the contrary, both sides have continued to improve their military capabilities:

(a) In late January 1996, the Turkish forces embarked on a major phase of their equipment modernization programme. Approximately 80 of their M48A5 T1 main battle tanks were withdrawn from the island and were replaced by 65 of the improved T2 version from Turkey. At the same time, the Turkish forces considerably increased holdings of armoured personnel carriers (APCs) to an estimated 250 by introducing a further 80 APCs. The arrival of those tanks and APCs has significantly enhanced the capability of the Turkish forces in Cyprus. With over 30,000 Turkish and 4,500 Turkish Cypriot troops and with some 20 per cent of the area reserved for military purposes, the northern part of Cyprus remains one of the most densely militarized areas in the world;

(b) The National Guard, which remains much weaker than the Turkish forces in Cyprus, has continued its comprehensive military upgrading programme. Since my last report (S/1995/1020), the National Guard has received the remaining 25 BMP3 infantry fighting vehicles, bringing the total to 43. A further 84 Leonidas APCs arrived from Greece, bringing the total number of APCs and infantry fighting vehicles in the southern part of Cyprus to 375.

11. In resolution 1032 (1995), the Security Council again expressed concern at the failure of both sides to heed its call to prohibit live ammunition or weapons other than those which are hand-held along their respective cease-fire lines and the firing of weapons within hearing of the buffer zone. On the contrary, incidents of shooting near the cease-fire lines have increased during the reporting period. Such incidents have the potential of raising tension, with possibly serious consequences. Three incidents are of particular concern. On 8 May 1996, two tracer rounds were fired by Turkish forces towards an UNFICYP helicopter on a previously announced routine flight inside the buffer zone. On 10 May 1996, two shots were fired by Turkish forces in the vicinity of a UNFICYP patrol in the buffer zone.

12. The third incident took place on 3 June 1996. An unarmed National Guard soldier was shot and killed inside the United Nations buffer zone in central Nicosia. The investigation has revealed that the lethal round was fired by a Turkish Cypriot soldier whom UNFICYP had observed entering the buffer zone with his rifle strung across his back. Shortly thereafter a single shot was heard and the Turkish Cypriot soldier was seen running back in a crouched position to the Turkish cease-fire line holding his rifle in his right hand. UNFICYP soldiers were prevented from reaching the National Guard soldier by Turkish Cypriot soldiers who fired shots in the direction of the UNFICYP soldiers each time the latter tried to move forward. UNFICYP strongly protested to the Commander of the Turkish forces in Cyprus the unauthorized entry of an armed Turkish Cypriot soldier into the buffer zone, the shooting incident and the hostile action, including live fire against UNFICYP. UNFICYP is pursuing with the Turkish forces in Cyprus and with the Turkish Cypriot authorities the question of appropriate action and has requested that UNFICYP police investigating the killing be able to interview the Turkish Cypriot soldier involved in the incident. The military authorities on both sides have been urged once again to respect the United Nations buffer zone and ensure its integrity.

13. On numerous occasions, and most recently in its resolution 1032 (1995), the Security Council regretted that the military authorities on both sides had not yet reached an agreement with UNFICYP to extend the 1989 unmanning agreement to cover all areas where the two sides are in close proximity to each other, and called on them to cooperate urgently with UNFICYP to that end. Despite the continued efforts of UNFICYP, no progress has been made in this regard.

14. The area where the above-mentioned fatal incident occurred is among those identified in the unmanning proposal of 1994. The incident thus tragically underscores the urgent need for the two sides to comply with the repeated requests made by the Security Council to reach agreement on the prohibition of the use of loaded weapons along the cease-fire lines and on the extension of the 1989 unmanning agreement. Following the killing of the National Guard soldier, the Force Commander of UNFICYP resubmitted to both sides an updated version of the detailed proposal to unman their positions at a number of locations where the respective cease-fire lines are in close proximity to each other. The Force Commander urged the military authorities on both sides to cooperate with UNFICYP in this regard in accordance with the repeated requests made by the Security Council.

### **C. Restoration of normal conditions and humanitarian functions**

15. UNFICYP continued its efforts to promote bicomunal events with a view to increasing communication and cooperation between the two communities. In its resolution 1032 (1995), the Security Council welcomed the ini-

tiative of UNFICYP in organizing successful bicomunal events and called upon the leaders of both communities to promote further bicomunal contacts and to remove obstacles to such contacts. However, the Turkish Cypriot authorities continued to exercise tight control and often denied permission to Turkish Cypriots to participate in bicomunal activities, not only in the southern part of the island, but even in the buffer zone. Despite efforts in cooperation with interested diplomatic missions, United Nations programmes and non-governmental organizations in Cyprus, UNFICYP has not been successful in having these obstacles removed and improving the atmosphere for bicomunal activities.

16. UNFICYP continued to discharge its humanitarian functions in respect of Greek Cypriots and Maronites living in the northern part of the island. A detailed survey conducted during the reporting period has indicated that these communities now number 487 and 191 respectively. UNFICYP similarly discharged humanitarian functions with regard to Turkish Cypriots living in the southern part of the island, some 360 of whom are known to the Force.

17. Once again, during the current mandate period, the Government of Cyprus expressed to the United Nations its concern about continued desecration of the cultural and religious heritage of Cyprus in the northern part of the island. These concerns have been taken up with the Turkish Cypriot side.

18. As previously reported (S/1995/1020, para. 20), UNFICYP has, on the basis of comprehensive reviews, had extensive discussions with the authorities on both sides with regard to living conditions of Turkish Cypriots located in the southern part of the island and of Greek Cypriots and Maronites located in the northern part of the island.

19. In my last report, I summarized the main findings and recommendations concerning the situation of Turkish Cypriots living in the southern part of Cyprus. I noted that Turkish Cypriots there are accorded the same legal rights and privileges as Greek Cypriots, but that in several respects Turkish Cypriots living in the southern part of the island were often victims of capricious discrimination or police harassment. To rectify that situation, UNFICYP made four recommendations to the Government, which have been implemented to a significant extent.

20. With respect to the recommended review of the policies and procedures of the Cyprus police, the Government has undertaken an investigation of several incidents, and the District Commissioner, the Chief and the Deputy Chief of the police in Limassol were dismissed. In addition, the Attorney-General will decide, in the light of material collected by the government Ombudsman, what further action should be taken. Furthermore, measures are being considered to extend the investigative powers of the Ombudsman to include those of criminal investigation, as well as to endow the Attorney-General with the right to appoint criminal investigators for cases involving complaints against

the police. Moreover, steps are being taken to make public prosecutors independent of the police headquarters. Finally, the curriculum of the Police Academy is being strengthened to promote greater police awareness of constitutional and human rights. I welcome these and other steps taken by the Government to deal with potential police misconduct.

21. The Government has also informed UNFICYP that it has accepted the recommendation to establish a government information/liaison office in Limassol staffed by Turkish-speaking personnel where Turkish Cypriots can obtain information and assistance on their entitlements. The Government also agreed with the recommendation that UNFICYP establish a liaison post in Limassol to facilitate further the Force's mandate in carrying out its humanitarian functions with respect to Turkish Cypriots. Finally, the Government has accepted the recommendation of UNFICYP to establish a Turkish Cypriot elementary school staffed by a Turkish Cypriot teacher.

22. With regard to the Greek Cypriots and Maronites living in the northern part of the island, I had informed the Council that those communities were subjected to severe restrictions and limitations in many basic freedoms, which had the effect of ensuring that inexorably, with the passage of time, the communities would cease to exist. UNFICYP made a series of recommendations to the Turkish Cypriot authorities to improve the situation (S/1995/1020, paras. 23-25).

23. With a few exceptions, the situation of Greek Cypriots living in the Karpas area has not improved. Some improvements can be noted with respect to travel to the southern part of the island by Greek Cypriots living in the northern part and travel by Greek Cypriots living in the southern part of the island who wish to visit their close relatives in the northern part of Cyprus. Furthermore, some telephones have been installed in homes of Greek Cypriots in the Karpas area. However, the telephones do not permit direct calls to the southern part of the island, the main destination for calls by Greek Cypriots living there.

24. The key restrictions on Greek Cypriots living in the northern part of Cyprus that were noted in the UNFICYP survey remain. For example, Greek Cypriot school children over the age of 16 for boys and 18 for girls attending school in the southern part of the island may never return to their homes in the northern part of Cyprus, not even for a visit. Travel within the northern part of the island remains restricted for Greek Cypriots, as does access to holy sites. Fixed property can still not be bequeathed by Greek Cypriots living in the Karpas area to their next of kin living outside the northern part of Cyprus.

25. With respect to recommendations concerning the situation of the Maronites living in the northern part of the island, there have been some limited improvements in their freedom of movement and provision of water to them. However, a medical centre has not yet been established in Kormakiti

with Maronite doctors and nurses visiting on a regular basis, nor are the Maronites freely allowed to visit holy places located in the northern part of Cyprus. Their access to telephones remains extremely limited and does not permit direct calls to the southern part of the island, the main destination of their calls.

#### **D. Liaison with the parties**

26. UNFICYP continued to maintain close liaison and cooperation with the military and civilian authorities on both sides. The liaison arrangements worked well on the whole, although the Force's timely and unmonitored access to detainees of both sides, in particular those who have crossed the buffer zone, needs to be improved.

27. While UNFICYP has complete freedom of movement in the southern part of the island, except for restricted military areas, its movements in the northern part are subject to restrictions. On the other hand, no such restrictions apply to diplomats and tourists. UNFICYP has renewed its efforts to correct this incongruous situation, which is at variance with the spirit that should govern the relationship with a United Nations peace-keeping operation. It is hoped that the situation will be rectified without further delay.

### **III. ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL ACTIVITIES OF THE UNITED NATIONS SYSTEM**

#### **A. Economic matters**

28. UNFICYP continued to act as the intermediary between the two communities and to facilitate cooperation in such areas as the repair and equitable distribution of utilities. The electricity supply on the island has improved with the increased generating capacity in its northern part. However, the Turkish Cypriot side continues to require some supplies from the southern part of the island. With the assistance of UNFICYP, the two electricity authorities coordinate their efforts to secure adequate power. UNFICYP also continued to assist in the implementation of the bicomunal understandings on water distribution and the cooperation in the repair of infrastructure.

#### **B. Activities of the United Nations Development Programme**

29. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), as coordinator of the operational activities for development of the United Nations system, continued its activities in the framework of the Nicosia Master Plan and the coordination of activities of other United Nations agencies in the country. In particular, UNDP pursued bicomunal activities, together with other United

Nations programmes and specialized agencies, mainly in the sectors of health and environment.

### **C. Activities of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees**

30. The main bicomunal projects of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) for 1996 are in the sectors of health and sanitation and of restoration, conservation and rehabilitation of the Venetian Walls of Nicosia and the currently vacant houses adjacent to the United Nations buffer zone. UNHCR is also financing bicomunal projects in forestry, pest and disease control, and measurement of environmental pollution. During the reporting period, 20 bicomunal activities were organized and sponsored by UNHCR, including regular meetings of the bicomunal coordination teams on sewerage, forestry, plant protection, rat control, environment and disabled persons, a bicomunal seminar in cardiology and the training of veterinary surgeons in modern techniques.

## **IV. COMMITTEE ON MISSING PERSONS**

31. Following the resignation in early March of Mr. Paul Wurth as Third Member of the Committee on Missing Persons after nearly 11 years of dedicated service, I wrote to the leaders of the two communities that I was prepared to consider appointing a new Third Member provided that there was clear evidence that the Committee on Missing Persons was committed to making expeditious progress. To that end, I asked the two sides by the end of June 1996:

- (a) To agree on the definition of all categories submitted by the two sides for classifying all the 1,493 Greek Cypriot and 500 Turkish Cypriot cases of missing persons before the Committee on Missing Persons;
- (b) To agree on the sequence in which the investigations of the various categories of cases would be carried out, in line with the agreed guidelines and criteria for completing the investigation of each case;
- (c) To agree that priority attention would be given to those categories of cases that could be concluded most expeditiously;
- (d) To agree to collect expeditiously all available information on cases without known witnesses, on the basis of which the Committee on Missing Persons would conclude its work on those cases.

The two leaders informed me that they agreed with my proposals. As soon as these tasks have been satisfactorily completed, I will initiate the procedure leading to the appointment of a new Third Member.

## V. ORGANIZATIONAL MATTERS

32. As at 1 June 1996, the total strength (military personnel and civilian police) of UNFICYP was 1,197. The 1,162 military personnel were from Argentina (390), Austria (311), Canada (2), Finland (2), Hungary (39), Ireland (30) and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (388). The civilian police were from Australia (20) and Ireland (15). In addition, 40 personnel were internationally recruited and 318 locally recruited. The deployment of the Force is shown on the map attached to the present report.

33. Some time ago, Mr. Joe Clark advised me of his desire to leave his functions as my Special Representative for Cyprus as soon as a successor could be appointed. On 1 May 1996, I appointed Mr. Han Sung-Joo, former Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Korea, as my new Special Representative for Cyprus. Mr. Gustave Feissel continued as my Deputy Special Representative, resident in Cyprus, and as Chief of Mission of the United Nations Operation in Cyprus. Brigadier-General Ahti T. P. Vartiainen (Finland) continued as Force Commander.

### Financial aspects

34. On 3 June 1996, the Fifth Committee recommended that the General Assembly appropriate the amount of \$45,079,500 gross for the maintenance of the Force for the period from 1 July 1996 to 30 June 1997 (see A/50/827/Add.1, para. 6). That amount is inclusive of the pledged voluntary contributions of one third of the cost of the Force from the Government of Cyprus and of the \$6.5 million contributed annually from the Government of Greece.

35. Should the Security Council decide to extend the mandate of UNFICYP for a further period of six months as I recommend in paragraph 43 below, and subject to the decision of the General Assembly on the recommendation of the Fifth Committee, the costs for maintaining the Force would be approximately \$22.5 million. Of that amount, approximately \$12.1 million will be assessed on Member States.

36. As at 31 May 1996, the total outstanding assessed contributions to the UNFICYP Special Account amounted to \$9,483,162, which represents some 14.5 per cent of the assessment for the mission since 16 June 1993. The outstanding assessed contributions for all peace-keeping operations totalled \$1.7 billion.

## VI. OBSERVATIONS

37. During the past six months, with the cooperation of both sides, UNFICYP has continued to carry out its functions in Cyprus effectively. The overall situation on the island remained calm, although tension rose periodically. UNFICYP continued to make every effort to mitigate such situations.

38. The Security Council has repeatedly declared that the status quo is not an acceptable option. It should also be clear to all concerned that the situation is not static and that delaying an overall settlement is to the detriment of both communities, as well as to Greece and Turkey.

39. Once again, I must express serious concern at the excessive levels of military forces and armaments in Cyprus and at the rate at which they are being expanded, upgraded and modernized. This can only increase tension on the island and in the region. Furthermore, the opposing forces still have not heeded the repeated calls of the Security Council to implement specific measures aimed at reducing the risk of confrontation along the cease-fire lines. The tragic death of the young National Guard soldier sadly illustrates the urgent need to come to an agreement on the proposals made by UNFICYP concerning the unmanning of a number of locations along the respective cease-fire lines and to prohibit the use of loaded weapons there. In this context, I was dismayed at the attempt by the Turkish Cypriot Security Forces to prevent UNFICYP by the threat of force from fulfilling its duties in the buffer zone. I have requested Mr. Feissel and Brigadier-General Vartiainen to make renewed and vigorous efforts to reach agreements with the military authorities on both sides to implement the measures recommended by the Security Council to reduce tension along the cease-fire lines.

40. Bicomunal contacts can contribute significantly to facilitating an overall settlement. It is obvious that the encouragement of tolerance, trust and reconciliation between the two communities through increased contact and improved communication is an essential part of the peace process, and I strongly urge both communities, and especially the Turkish Cypriot authorities, to lift and prevent all obstacles to such contacts.

41. The situation of Greek Cypriots and Maronites in the northern part of the island continues to fall far short of the normal life they were promised under the agreement reached by the two sides at Vienna on 2 August 1975. In my last report, I welcomed the commitment by the Turkish Cypriot authorities to improving the daily lives of the persons concerned (S/1995/1020, para. 45). However, the measures implemented to date are very limited and insufficient for what is required. I welcome the measures taken by the Government of Cyprus towards normalizing the lives of the Turkish Cypriots living in the southern part of the island. UNFICYP will continue to follow these matters with the Turkish Cypriot authorities and the Government of Cyprus.



42. In the prevailing circumstances, I believe that the presence of UNFICYP on the island remains indispensable to achieving the objectives set out by the Security Council. Therefore, I recommend that the Council extend the mandate of the Force for a further period of six months to 31 December 1996. In accordance with established practice, I am consulting the parties concerned on the matter and shall report to the Council as soon as these consultations have been completed.

43. I take this opportunity to express my appreciation to the Governments contributing troops and civilian police to UNFICYP for the steadfast support they have given to this peace-keeping operation of the United Nations. I also wish to thank the Governments that have made voluntary contributions towards the financing of the Force.

44. In conclusion, I wish to express my appreciation to Mr. Joe Clark for his dedicated service over the past three years as my Special Representative for Cyprus. I also wish to pay tribute to my Deputy Special Representative and Chief of Mission, Mr. Gustave Feissel, to the Force Commander, Brigadier-General Ahti T. P. Vartiainen and to the men and women serving with UNFICYP. They have discharged with efficiency and dedication the important responsibilities entrusted to them by the Security Council.

## Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Cyprus—Corrigendum

(7 June 1996—S/1996/411/Corr. 1)

(for the period from 11 December 1995 to 10 June 1996)

### Corrigendum

#### *Paragraph 12*

The fifth sentence should read:

UNFICYP soldiers were prevented for some 25 minutes from reaching the National Guard soldier by Turkish Cypriot soldiers who fired shots in the direction of the UNFICYP soldiers each time the latter tried to move forward.

## Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Cyprus—Addendum

(27 June 1996—S/1996/411/Add. 1)

(for the period from 11 December 1995 to 10 June 1996)

### Addendum

In my report of 7 June 1996 (S/1996/411, para. 42), I recommended that the Security Council extend the mandate of the United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) for a further period of six months, and I indicated that I would report to the Council on my consultations with the parties concerned on the matter. I wish to inform the Council that the Government of Cyprus as well as the Governments of Greece and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland have indicated their concurrence with the proposed extension. The Government of Turkey has indicated that it concurs with and supports the position of the Turkish Cypriot side, as expressed in previous meetings of the Security Council on the extension of the mandate of UNFICYP.

# Report of the Secretary-General on his Mission of Good Offices in Cyprus

(25 June 1996—S/1996/467)

## I. INTRODUCTION

1. The present report is submitted pursuant to Security Council resolution 1032 (1995) of 19 December 1995. In paragraph 11 of that resolution, the Security Council requested me to submit a report during the current mandate period of the United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) on my mission of good offices, including a full assessment of my efforts towards reaching a settlement of the situation in Cyprus.

## II. MISSION OF GOOD OFFICES

2. In my last report on my mission of good offices, dated 29 October 1994 (S/1994/1229), I informed the Council, inter alia, that the leaders of the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities had accepted my proposal that they meet in informal direct talks, together with my Deputy Special Representative, Mr. Gustave Feissel, with a view to exploring in a concrete manner ways in which progress might be made both in respect of the implementation of the confidence-building measures and in respect of the overall settlement of the Cyprus problem. I informed the Council that four such meetings had taken place and that I would keep the Council apprised of developments in the light of the continuing consultations. In a letter dated 4 November 1994 (S/1994/1256), the President of the Council advised me that the members of the Council had taken note of the aforementioned report and looked forward to receiving a definitive report at the appropriate time.

3. On 9 December 1994, I told the members of the Security Council that the two leaders had met five times with my Deputy Special Representative at his residence in the United Nations Protected Area (UNPA) in Nicosia for a combined duration of over 10 hours.

4. These meetings offered a good opportunity for the two leaders to explain their positions. The Turkish Cypriot leader urged that the first priority of the talks should be to reach an agreement on the modalities for implementing the package of confidence-building measures relating principally to the fenced area of Varosha and Nicosia International Airport. The Greek Cypriot leader emphasized the importance, in the first instance, of confirming that when the two leaders each professed commitment to a bicomunal and bizonal federal solution they were indeed in agreement on the fundamental principles. He

emphasized that such a solution required acceptance of the basic principles that had been endorsed by the Security Council, most recently in paragraph 2 of resolution 939 (1994) of 29 July 1994, as well as acceptance of the definition of political equality endorsed by the Council in its resolution 750 (1992) of 10 April 1992. The Turkish Cypriot leader reaffirmed his commitment to a federal solution. However, on some aspects, notably sovereignty and political equality, his position remained at variance with Security Council resolutions.

5. During these meetings useful discussions took place on a number of other issues relevant to an overall agreement, notably security and guarantees; membership of the European Union; territory, displaced persons and property claims; the powers and functions of the federal Government; difficulties faced by the Turkish Cypriot community as a result of the Cyprus problem; and implementation of the confidence-building measures.

6. These informal discussions turned out to be inconclusive. But they ensured that each leader was well aware of the position of the other on all the main issues and they seemed to me to have opened up some encouraging prospects. I followed these up in meetings with the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot leaders on 24 November and 2 December 1994, respectively. I commended the Greek Cypriot leader for his willingness to explore possible mutual compromises (or "trade-offs") that would enable the two leaders to respond to each other's concerns across the board. I urged the Turkish Cypriot leader to respond in a commensurate manner. I underlined to both leaders the promising possibilities offered by the trade-off approach as a means of negotiating an overall settlement, stressing that this opportunity should not be lost.

7. I regret that this effort on my part did not achieve concrete results, although I continued to believe that the informal talks of October 1994 had created unprecedented opportunities for making progress towards a comprehensive negotiated settlement. My subsequent efforts have been devoted to finding a basis for the resumption of direct talks between the two leaders. I asked my Special Representative, Mr. Joe Clark, to visit the area for discussions with both leaders and with senior officials of Turkey and Greece and my Deputy Special Representative to continue his shuttle contacts with the two leaders. Mr. Clark visited Nicosia, Ankara and Athens in March and May 1995. In a briefing on 5 June 1995, Mr. Clark informed the members of the Security Council of his two visits to the area and his efforts to bring about face-to-face talks on an overall settlement, on the basis that both leaders would be willing to engage in discussion of possible trade-offs. He had not found it possible to define such a basis for the resumption of direct talks. He did not see prospects for movement in the near future, but the efforts of the United Nations would continue. Since then, numerous attempts by myself and interested Governments, both on and off the island, have not succeeded in breaking the impasse.

8. Most recently, I met personally with the Turkish Cypriot leader at Istanbul on 6 June 1996 and with the Greek Cypriot leader at Geneva on 11 June 1996. These meetings provided an opportunity to review the key aspects of the Cyprus problem. I expressed my concern that my mission of good offices had remained at a standstill for a long time and I pressed them to consider the negative consequences of this deadlock for both communities.

9. The leader of the Greek Cypriot community confirmed his commitment to a negotiated settlement arrived at through direct talks between the two leaders. However, he emphasized that in order to avoid yet another unproductive meeting, it would be necessary to ensure, through proximity talks, that sufficient common ground existed between the two sides before direct talks began. In this connection, he identified five key areas: security, membership in the European Union, territory, sovereignty and political equality. He underlined in particular that both communities felt insecure and that therefore an arrangement had to be devised that addressed with equal effectiveness the security concerns of both. The 1960 Treaty of Guarantee did not meet that objective and his community could not accept that Turkey had the right of unilateral intervention. He recalled his proposal for the demilitarization of Cyprus (see S/1994/680, paras. 25-27), coupled with an international force, which could include Greek and Turkish troops, on the basis of a revised United Nations mandate providing for the right of direct intervention to guarantee the overall agreed settlement as well as the security of each community.

10. The leader of the Turkish Cypriot community reaffirmed his readiness to meet with the Greek Cypriot leader in direct talks within the parameters of: (a) an equal partnership that would treat the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities as equal in all aspects, including in decision-making in the federal Government; and (b) the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee. He suggested that the Set of Ideas serve as the source of reference for direct talks. He voiced his opposition to any change in the 1960 Treaty, including Turkey's right of unilateral intervention, and to Cyprus joining the European Union before Turkey, which he believed would negate the bizonal and bicomunal foundation for a settlement in Cyprus as well as the Treaty of Guarantee.

11. I emphasized yet again the importance of creating as soon as possible a basis for the resumption of direct talks between the two leaders. This should consist of mutual acknowledgement of the concerns of each side and mutual expression of a willingness to compromise. To this end, I called upon both to cooperate with the efforts of my new Special Representative, Mr. Han Sung-Joo, and his Deputy, Mr. Gustave Feissel. I informed both leaders that Mr. Han would visit Cyprus during the last week of June and would then proceed to Athens and Ankara.

### III. OTHER DEVELOPMENTS

12. During the period covered by the present report, several developments occurred that could affect the prospects for achieving an overall settlement of the Cyprus problem.

13. On 6 March 1995, the Council of Ministers of the European Union decided that the negotiations for the accession of Cyprus to the Union would begin six months after the conclusion of its Inter-Governmental Conference. While there is no definite date yet, it is estimated that the negotiations of the European Union with Cyprus are likely to begin in late 1997 or early 1998. At the same time, the Council of Ministers expressed its regret at the lack of progress in the talks under my auspices on a comprehensive settlement and called upon both parties to step up their efforts to achieve that goal in accordance with Security Council resolutions and the concept of a bicomunal and bizonal federation. The Council of Ministers further considered that membership of the European Union should bring increased security and prosperity to both the Greek Cypriot and the Turkish Cypriot communities and called on the European Commission to organize contacts with the Turkish Cypriot community in order to explain the benefits of European Union accession and to allay that community's concerns.

14. During the period under review, interest in the Cyprus question has grown, in particular among the permanent members of the Security Council and members of the European Union and its Commission. This has been reflected, *inter alia*, in missions to Cyprus, Greece and Turkey by senior government officials and special representatives appointed by the Governments of Italy, in its capacity as President of the European Union, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America. From 21 to 23 May 1995, the United States, in cooperation with the United Kingdom, convened a meeting in London with representatives of the leaders of the two communities. Its objective, like that of the United Nations, was to find a basis for the resumption of direct talks. However, no progress was achieved. In addition, senior officials of France, Germany, Ireland, Spain and the European Commission also undertook fact-finding visits to Cyprus.

15. On 17 April 1996, representatives of the five permanent members of the Security Council met at United Nations Headquarters with senior members of the Secretariat. Those present exchanged views on the situation in Cyprus and reaffirmed that the status quo was unacceptable. They underlined the importance of a comprehensive approach to an overall settlement of the Cyprus problem on the basis of the relevant Security Council resolutions, the 1977 and 1979 high-level agreements and the Secretary-General's good offices mission.

#### IV. OBSERVATIONS

16. The negotiations on Cyprus have been at an impasse for too long. My report of 19 November 1992 (S/24830) described the deadlock reached in my efforts to base an overall agreement on the Set of Ideas and the map endorsed by the Security Council in its resolution 774 (1992) of 26 August 1992. Efforts during the following year and a half to reach agreement on the package of confidence-building measures related in particular to the fenced area of Varosha and Nicosia International Airport were also blocked.

17. Thirty-two years after the first involvement of the United Nations in the Cyprus conflict and 22 years after the events of 1974, the international community can reasonably demand evidence that both parties, and others concerned, are serious in their pursuit of an overall settlement on the basis the two parties agreed almost 20 years ago. The Security Council has repeatedly stated that the existing status quo is unacceptable. No one can objectively believe that it provides a viable basis for preserving the character and security of the two communities.

18. This absence of progress is especially disappointing when, as I have repeatedly pointed out, the elements required to construct an overall settlement have been identified. I refer to the 1977 and 1979 high-level agreements, to the resolutions of the Security Council, to the various ideas that have been elaborated over the years through the United Nations good offices and to the concept of mutual concessions, or "trade-offs", that emerged during the direct talks between the two leaders in October 1994 as the most promising methodology for working out an overall agreement.

19. In addition, the decision of the European Union to begin accession negotiations with Cyprus in 1997 or 1998 is an important new development that should facilitate an overall settlement. As the Council of Ministers of the European Union has pointed out, accession promises enhanced security and prosperity for Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots alike. The European Commission's efforts to explain to the Turkish Cypriot community the benefits of membership in the European Union and to allay its concerns are important in this regard. The imminence of the accession negotiations should also instil a new sense of urgency to the search for an overall agreement.

20. What is now required is a concerted effort by the international community to build on these developments and to give a new impetus to the negotiating process.

21. Greece and Turkey have a special responsibility. It is crucial that they should not only lend their active support to the search for a settlement but should also ensure that their own relations do not develop in a way that endangers that search.



22. A number of other Member States, including the five permanent members of the Security Council and the members of the European Union, have recently provided gratifying evidence of their readiness to add their weight to a coordinated effort to support my mission of good offices in a common endeavour to help the two communities in Cyprus secure peace and prosperity in their island.

23. But the main responsibility will continue to rest with the Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot communities. A lasting settlement will not be achieved unless the two leaders can persuade their communities that their interests will be better served by flexibility and compromise than by continuing confrontation. I conclude this report by calling upon the two leaders to work with me, and with the many countries that support my mission of good offices, to break the present impasse and establish common ground on which direct negotiations can be resumed.

# Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Cyprus

(10 December 1996—S/1996/1016)

(for the period from 11 June to 10 December 1996)

## I. INTRODUCTION

1. The present report on the United Nations operation in Cyprus covers developments from 11 June 1996 to 10 December 1996 and brings up to date the record of activities of the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) pursuant to Security Council resolution 186 (1964) of 4 March 1964 and subsequent Council resolutions, most recently resolution 1062 (1996) of 28 June 1996. A separate report will be issued on my mission of good offices.

## II. ACTIVITIES OF THE FORCE

### A. Maintenance of the ceasefire and the military status quo

2. The period under review has seen a level of violence and an increase in tension along the ceasefire lines unparalleled since 1974. Tension rose in early August 1996 in anticipation of a demonstration organized by the Cyprus Motorcycle Federation. First announced in January 1996, it was to take the form of a symbolic motorcycle ride, undertaken by Greek Cypriots and persons from other countries, originating in Berlin and ending in Kyrenia on 11 August. This meant that the demonstrators intended to cross the United Nations buffer zone as well as the Turkish forces ceasefire line, a course of action that was bound to cause the utmost provocation. During the period leading up to the demonstration, the media on both sides publicized a large number of increasingly acerbic statements by the demonstration's organizers and by Greek Cypriot political leaders, as well as counter statements by the Turkish Cypriot side.

3. During this period, the United Nations was in frequent contact with the government authorities, including the Cyprus Police, urging them to prevent any violation of the ceasefire lines or of the United Nations buffer zone. On the eve of the demonstration, I appealed publicly to the Government of Cyprus to take effective measures in exercise of its responsibilities to prevent any unauthorized entry into the United Nations buffer zone.

4. On the morning of 11 August, however, the demonstrators proceeded from the stadium in Nicosia, where they had assembled, to points east of Nicosia. Cyprus police were on hand, but remained largely passive. In the meantime, a major counter-demonstration had begun in north Nicosia, including a significant number of members of the "Grey Wolves", an ultra-nationalist Turkish organization, who had arrived from Turkey.

5. The Greek Cypriot demonstrators entered the United Nations buffer zone at several points, approached the ceasefire line of the Turkish forces, and clashed with Turkish troops and Turkish Cypriot police as well as with Turkish Cypriot counter-demonstrators. The most serious clash occurred near Dherinia, where a large group of Greek Cypriots were allowed to cross the National Guard ceasefire line. In the meantime, the Turkish forces allowed counter-demonstrators and Turkish Cypriot police to cross a restricted military area and to enter the United Nations buffer zone. They proceeded to beat the Greek Cypriots with batons and iron bars, killing one civilian.

6. On 14 August, following the funeral of the Greek Cypriot who had been beaten to death, some 200 Greek Cypriots entered the buffer zone at Dherinia and approached the Turkish forces' ceasefire line. Most were stopped by UNFICYP and were about to be moved out of the buffer zone when one demonstrator broke free from the main group and ran towards a Turkish Cypriot checkpoint, closely pursued by UNFICYP soldiers. While attempting to climb a flagpole flying a Turkish flag just behind the Turkish forces' ceasefire line, he was shot five times from the Turkish/Turkish Cypriot side. In addition, Turkish and/or Turkish Cypriot uniformed personnel proceeded to fire some 25 to 50 rounds indiscriminately into the crowd inside the buffer zone. As a result, two British UNFICYP soldiers and two Greek Cypriots were wounded.

7. During the clashes on 11 and 14 August, a total of 19 UNFICYP soldiers were injured.

8. Following these clashes, relations between the two sides became very tense. Gustave Feissel, my Deputy Special Representative in Cyprus, made strenuous efforts to contain the situation and to prevent further acts of violence. On 8 September, however, two Turkish Cypriot soldiers were shot by unknown persons in the area of Ayios Nikolaos, north of the link road in the Eastern British Sovereign Base Area (SBA), an area where the ceasefire line is patrolled by SBA police and UNFICYP but where there is no United Nations buffer zone. One of the soldiers was killed and the other seriously wounded. The Turkish Cypriot side has stated that this killing was carried out by Greek Cypriot or Greek military personnel, a charge denied by the Greek Cypriot side.

9. During the demonstrations in August, UNFICYP had operated at a heightened state of alert for a number of days. Following the shooting of the two

Turkish Cypriot soldiers, UNFICYP operated on an increased level of alert for 29 days, with over 80 per cent of the Force deployed in the buffer zone on a continuous basis. UNFICYP also maintained an increased presence in the mixed village of Pyla during this period.

10. The violent incidents of August and September also had the effect of setting the opposing forces on the island on edge. On a number of occasions, both forces moved forward of their lines into the United Nations buffer zone, and in some cases attempted to restrict UNFICYP operations. This was an almost daily occurrence in areas where the delineation of the ceasefire line is disputed by the Turkish forces. Instances of the firing of weapons have increased, although in most cases these consisted of negligent discharges that can be explained by a lack of discipline and training. In a serious incident on 13 October, however, a Greek Cypriot was shot three times and killed by a Turkish Cypriot soldier after crossing the Turkish forces' ceasefire line. On 29 October, a British military patrol was fired at from a Turkish sentry post when it inadvertently crossed the Turkish forces' ceasefire line. Along the whole buffer zone, but particularly in those areas where the opposing forces are in close proximity to each other, there has been a rise in instances of weapons being pointed or cocked, stone throwing and verbal abuse.

11. In all these cases, UNFICYP intervened with the military authorities on both sides to correct violations and to prevent any escalation.

12. There was also an increase in the number of incidents in which UNFICYP soldiers were threatened at gunpoint by soldiers of either side, and on four occasions UNFICYP personnel came under fire. On 13 September, a Turkish soldier fired several rounds at a United Nations helicopter flying inside the buffer zone west of Astromeritis. On 20 September, a Turkish soldier fired two rounds at a United Nations patrol east of Nicosia. On 26 September, several bursts of automatic fire, totalling some 30 rounds, were fired from the National Guard ceasefire line in the area of a United Nations observation post south-east of Nicosia. (The National Guard denied any involvement in the incident.) Finally, on 16 November near Ayios Ioannis, a Greek Cypriot hunter fired his shotgun directly at UNFICYP soldiers inside the buffer zone. A suspect was apprehended by the Cyprus police and an investigation is under way.

13. As in the past, there were a number of air violations of the status quo, mainly in connection with the annual exercises of the National Guard (4-7 October) and of the Turkish forces (4-7 November). Greek military aircraft took part in the National Guard exercise, which included the dropping of live ordnance, the dropping of parachutists and landings at Paphos airport. Similarly, Turkish military aircraft took part in the Turkish forces' exercise, and landed at Lefkoniko airport. In addition, six F-5 aircraft of a Turkish Air Force aerobatics detachment flew low over a parade in north Nicosia, and briefly over the buffer zone, on 15 November.

14. UNFICYP continued to monitor the status quo in the fenced area of Varosha. There were some cases of looting, which were protested by UNFICYP to the Turkish forces, who were reminded once again that the United Nations holds the Government of Turkey responsible for the maintenance of the status quo in the fenced area of Varosha. In addition, buildings continued to be used to house students.

#### **B. Implementation of paragraphs 4 to 9 of resolution 1062 (1996)**

15. With regard to the level of military forces and armaments on the island, there was no significant change on the Turkish side, which maintained a strength of some 30,000 Turkish and 4,500 Turkish Cypriot troops. On the government side, the National Guard acquired 27 modern T-80UM and 52 AMX-30 main battle tanks, for a total of 123 main battle tanks; the Guard's strength stands at approximately 11,500 troops.

16. As the events reported in the previous section indicate, there was no progress on the question of reciprocal measures to prohibit live ammunition or weapons, other than hand-held weapons, along the ceasefire lines. Nor was there any progress on the question of an extension of the 1989 unmanning agreement. In October, UNFICYP presented to the military authorities on both sides specific proposals for (a) the extension of unmanning to the areas where the military on the two sides remain in close proximity to each other; (b) the prohibition of loaded weapons along the ceasefire lines; and (c) the adoption of a code of conduct, based on the concept of minimum force and proportionate response, to be followed by troops on both sides along the ceasefire lines. The proposed measures are mutually reinforcing and should be treated as a package. They are modest and would not affect the security of the forces or the population on either side. Both sides have agreed to consider the UNFICYP proposals without preconditions and as an integrated whole and discussions are currently under way.

17. The National Guard has continued its military construction programme and, in particular, is currently undertaking construction works in and around the Nicosia Central Prison, close to a sensitive area of the buffer zone. Based on observation from the air, the construction would appear to be intended as a military position. In accordance with established practice, UNFICYP has repeatedly protested the construction and requested access to the site for inspection, but so far access has been denied. For their part, the Turkish Forces have reacted by carrying out construction in the same area. This has also been protested by UNFICYP.

18. There are 39 minefields and booby-trapped areas within the buffer zone, and a further 71 are located on either side within 500 metres of it. UNFICYP has requested their removal by the forces of the two sides, so far with little effect.

### **C. Restoration of normal conditions and humanitarian functions**

19. UNFICYP has continued its efforts to promote and facilitate bicomunal events with a view to increasing communication and cooperation between the two communities. These occasions were organized by the United Nations, embassies of several interested Governments and non-governmental organizations. One notable event was an open house organized by UNFICYP on 24 October 1996, when over 3,000 Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots joined United Nations personnel at the Ledra Palace Hotel in the buffer zone in Nicosia to celebrate United Nations Day.

20. The Turkish Cypriot authorities continued to insist on deciding on the participation of Turkish Cypriots in such events on a case-by-case basis. Authorization was often denied at little or no notice and with no reason provided. Since the latter part of October, a number of Greek Cypriots have been demonstrating at the South Ledra checkpoint in Nicosia with the stated purpose of dissuading foreign tourists from crossing to the northern part of the island. At times, they have also impeded the freedom of movement of United Nations and diplomatic personnel. These demonstrations have contributed to a climate of tension and ill-will between the two sides. UNFICYP has urged the Government to take the necessary measures to ensure that movement through the South Ledra checkpoint is not impeded or deterred. For its part, the Turkish Cypriot side responded by preventing bicomunal events, with very few exceptions.

21. UNFICYP continued to implement its humanitarian mandate in respect of Greek Cypriots and Maronites living in the northern part of the island and Turkish Cypriots living in the southern part. There are now 486 Greek Cypriots living in the Karpas area and 187 Maronites in the Kormakiti region. Of the Turkish Cypriots living in the southern part of the island, 343 are known to UNFICYP. The living conditions of the Greek Cypriots and the Maronites in the northern part of Cyprus have not changed (see S/1996/411, paras. 22-25) and there has been no further progress on the implementation of the recommendations arising out of the humanitarian review undertaken by UNFICYP in 1995 (see S/1995/1020, paras. 20-25, and annexes).

22. Following the incidents that took place in August and September 1996, UNFICYP was contacted by a number of Turkish Cypriots living in the southern part of the island who expressed concern for their safety. As a result, United Nations civilian police increased their visits to Turkish Cypriots. At the beginning of December, UNFICYP opened a liaison office at Limassol to facilitate access to the Force by Turkish Cypriots living in the southern part of the island.

23. The Turkish Cypriots living or working in the southern part of the island and in the buffer zone have been affected adversely by the aftermath of the incidents of recent months. Most, including the Turkish Cypriot residents of

Pyla, have been suspended temporarily from their employment. UNFICYP has urged the Government to take the necessary steps to ensure that these persons can return to their places of work without delay. As a result of UNFICYP intervention, the people affected are receiving unemployment entitlements.

### **III. ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL ACTIVITIES OF THE UNITED NATIONS SYSTEM**

24. UNFICYP continues to act as intermediary between the two communities and to facilitate cooperation in such areas as the repair and equitable distribution of electricity and water resources.

25. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), as well as United Nations specialized agencies, continued their efforts to pursue bicomunal activities, mainly in the sectors of health and environment.

26. The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) continued to administer a bicomunal humanitarian programme, planned and implemented by bicomunal teams of Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots, which includes significant development components. The main areas of cooperation were in sanitation, health, environment, agriculture, veterinary science, rehabilitation of culturally important sites and the Nicosia Master Plan. During the period under review, regular bicomunal meetings in these areas of cooperation were held at the UNHCR offices.

### **IV. COMMITTEE ON MISSING PERSONS**

27. In my last report to the Security Council (S/1996/411, para. 31), I mentioned my letter to the leaders of the two communities of 4 April 1996, asking both sides to agree on four specific points as an indication of their determination that the Committee on Missing Persons should make expeditious progress before initiating the procedure to appoint a new Third Member. Despite the substantial work carried out by both sides, no agreement has been reached on the four points. I am currently considering the merits of continuing United Nations support to the Committee.

### **V. ORGANIZATIONAL MATTERS**

28. As of December 1996, UNFICYP comprised 1,162 troops and 35 civilian police. The military personnel were from Argentina (390), Austria (314), Canada (2), Finland (2), Hungary (39), Ireland (32) and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (383). The police were from Australia (20) and Ireland (15). In addition, it had a civilian complement of 339, of whom 40 were recruited internationally, and 299 locally. The deployment of

the Force is shown on the map attached to the present report.

29. Mr. Han Sung-Joo continues to serve as my Special Representative for Cyprus, Mr. Gustave Feissel as my Deputy Special Representative and Chief of Mission of the United Nations operation in Cyprus, and Brigadier General Ahti T. P. Vartiainen as Force Commander.

### Financial aspects

30. The General Assembly, by its resolution 50/236 of 7 June 1996, appropriated an amount of \$45,079,500 gross for maintaining UNFICYP for the 12-month period from 1 July 1996 to 30 June 1997. This amount includes the pledged voluntary contribution from the Government of Cyprus of one third of the cost of the Force, and the annual amount of \$6.5 million contributed by the Government of Greece.

31. Should the Security Council decide to extend the mandate of UNFICYP for a further period of six months as I recommend in paragraph 38 below, the costs of maintaining the Force would be approximately \$22.5 million. Of that amount, approximately \$12.1 million would be assessed on Member States.

32. As at 30 November 1996, the total outstanding assessed contributions to the UNFICYP Special Account amounted to \$13.6 million, representing some 18.6 per cent of the assessment for the Mission since 16 June 1993. The outstanding assessed contributions for all peacekeeping operations totalled \$1.7 billion.

## VI. OBSERVATIONS

33. The situation in Cyprus deteriorated in the last six months. There was violence along the ceasefire lines, including the unnecessary and disproportionate use of lethal force by the Turkish/Turkish Cypriot side, to an extent not seen since 1974. The atmosphere between the two communities was marked by increasing distrust and hostility.

34. Once again, I must express serious concern about the excessive levels of military forces and armaments in Cyprus and the rate at which they are being expanded, upgraded and modernized. This can only increase tension on the island and in the region.

35. During the demonstrations on 11 and 14 August, UNFICYP did its best to prevent the demonstrators from entering the United Nations buffer zone. An international peacekeeping force is placed in an invidious position, however, when faced with a volatile crowd of civilians. Controlling the civilian population must therefore remain the exclusive responsibility of the local authorities. In Cyprus, the authorities on both sides have proved on many occasions



that they are perfectly capable of fulfilling this task. The police are effective, and the political leaders have both the formal and informal means to provide guidance on important security issues and to ensure that it is heeded.

36. There is an urgent need now for leaders on both sides to make a serious effort to reverse the negative trend of recent months and to lead their communities in a more positive direction. In word and deed, efforts must be made to build trust and goodwill between the two sides.

37. UNFICYP has proposed a number of practical measures that would go a long way towards achieving this aim. Early agreement on the proposed package of measures to reduce tension along the ceasefire lines would be a significant step forward. Implementation of the measures to improve the living conditions of the Greek Cypriots and Maronites living in the northern part of the island should be realized without further delay. The removal of all impediments to the movement of people and increased contacts and communication between the two sides would be another important step towards bringing the two communities closer together, particularly in the prevailing climate; this applies both to official restrictions as well as to unofficial efforts to dissuade people from visiting the other side.

38. In the prevailing circumstances, I believe that the UNFICYP presence on the island remains indispensable if we are to achieve the objectives set out by the Security Council. I therefore recommend that the Council extend the mandate of the Force for a further period of six months until 30 June 1997. In accordance with established practice, I am consulting the parties concerned on the matter and shall report to the Council as soon as these consultations have been completed.

39. I take this opportunity to express my appreciation to the Governments contributing troops and civilian police to UNFICYP for the steadfast support they have given to this United Nations peacekeeping operation. I also wish to thank the Governments that have made voluntary contributions towards the financing of the Force.

40. In conclusion, I wish to express my appreciation to my Special Representative, to my Deputy Special Representative and Chief of Mission, to the Force Commander and to the men and women serving with UNFICYP, who have discharged the important responsibilities entrusted to them by the Security Council with efficiency and dedication.

## Report of the Secretary-General on his Mission of Good Offices in Cyprus

(17 December 1996—S/1996/1055)

### I. INTRODUCTION

1. The present report is submitted pursuant to the Security Council's request in paragraph 14 of its resolution 1062 (1996) of 28 June 1996 that I report on the implementation of that resolution. My report on those aspects of the resolution which relate to the United Nations peacekeeping operation in Cyprus has already been submitted to the Council, on 10 December 1996 (S/1996/1016). The present report concerns my mission of good offices.

2. In the most recent report on my mission of good offices, dated 25 June 1996 (S/1996/467), I informed the Council that the considerable efforts undertaken during the previous 20 months had not succeeded in breaking the impasse in Cyprus. They had included a number of separate meetings between myself and the leaders of the two communities; direct talks between the two leaders hosted in October 1994 by my Deputy Special Representative, Mr. Gustave Feissel; various missions to Cyprus, Greece and Turkey by my then Special Representative, Mr. Joe Clark; and efforts by a number of interested Governments.

3. In resolution 1062 (1996), the Security Council reiterated its concern that there had been no progress towards an overall settlement of the Cyprus problem, reiterated that the status quo was unacceptable, and called upon the parties to demonstrate concretely their commitment to an overall settlement. The Council also called upon the two leaders to work with the Secretary-General and with the many countries supporting his mission of good offices to break the current impasse by establishing common ground on which direct negotiations could be resumed. The Council further recognized that the decision of the European Union concerning the opening of accession negotiations with Cyprus was an important new development that should facilitate an overall settlement.

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### II. A REVIEW OF THE EFFORTS MADE SINCE JUNE 1996

4. In the course of the past six months, intensive efforts have been made to break the impasse and to create conditions for successful direct negotiations between the leaders of the Greek Cypriot and the Turkish Cypriot communities.

5. As envisaged in my last report, my new Special Representative, Mr. Han Sung-Joo, undertook an extensive familiarization mission during the last week in June and the first half of July. In Cyprus he had two extended meetings with each of the two leaders, as well as meetings with political party leaders, businessmen and trade unionists on both sides. He went on to visit Athens and Ankara, as well as the capitals of a number of interested Governments, notably London, Moscow, Paris and Washington, and Dublin and Brussels for meetings with the Presidency of the European Union (EU) and the European Commission respectively. On subsequent occasions, he visited Bonn, London and Paris.

6. He found that the situation in the area remained very much as described in my last report. The positions of the two leaders appeared far apart on a number of issues. The Greek Cypriot leader emphasized that in order to avoid yet another unproductive direct meeting, it was necessary to ensure that sufficient common ground existed between the two sides before direct talks began. He identified five key areas in which common ground had to be established: security, EU membership, territory, sovereignty and political equality. The Turkish Cypriot leader, for his part, reaffirmed his readiness to meet for direct talks within the parameters of an equal partnership and the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee. He opposed any change in the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee, including Turkey's right of unilateral intervention. He was also opposed to Cyprus joining the European Union before Turkey, which, he believed, would negate what he regarded as the foundation of an overall settlement, notably bizonality and the Treaty of Guarantee. It was thus clear that direct talks would not at that time yield positive results.

7. My Special Representative reported to me that his meetings with a broad cross-section of the two communities had revealed a plurality of views and opinions. He underlined the critical importance of support from Greece and Turkey if negotiations were to succeed. He saw the issue of the accession of Cyprus to the European Union as an important new factor. The decision by EU to begin accession negotiations with Cyprus six months after the conclusion of its Intergovernmental Conference had in effect established a time-frame of approximately 18 months for the achievement of an overall settlement. It was therefore important for all concerned to redouble their efforts. He told me that this assessment was shared by his interlocutors in the capitals he had visited.

8. My Special Representative's second visit to the area in mid-September was overshadowed by the incidents on 11 and 14 August and their aftermath, which had raised tensions on the island to a high level (see S/1996/1016, paras. 2-11). His discussions with the leaders of the two communities therefore focused on ways of reducing the tension. To this end, he built upon the efforts of my Deputy Special Representative to encourage the two leaders to issue a joint statement which would make clear that the incidents did not reflect the true sentiments of the people of the two communities; that such

incidents must never occur again; that they underscored the urgent need to resolve differences through negotiation; and that the leaders pledged themselves to redouble their efforts to cooperate with the Secretary-General and work tirelessly to reach an overall settlement. The Turkish Cypriot leader agreed to such a joint statement but the Greek Cypriot leader considered that, given the circumstances surrounding the incidents, a joint statement would not be appropriate. However, he subsequently issued a statement of his own that the incidents must not dissuade the parties from pursuing with increased energy efforts to find an overall settlement under the auspices of the Secretary-General and that they could not be interpreted to mean that the two communities cannot live together in peace and prosperity in their common home, Cyprus. He also called upon both communities to make every effort to defuse the existing tensions.

9. Throughout the period covered by the present report, my Deputy Special Representative continued his regular meetings with the leaders of the two communities in an effort to promote the conditions for direct talks to achieve an overall settlement; to address the serious problems resulting from the August incidents and subsequent ones which also resulted in fatalities; and to lay the basis for the discussions which are currently under way between the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) and the military authorities on both sides on proposals for the reduction of tension along the ceasefire lines (see S/1996/1016). The Deputy Special Representative also remained in close touch with representatives of Governments that have been actively supporting my mission of good offices.

10. The third visit to the area by my Special Representative took place in mid-December. In Cyprus, he held two separate meetings with each of the two leaders. In Athens and Ankara, he met with senior Foreign Ministry officials. The main purpose of this visit was to assess the situation on the eve of my preparation of the present report. He found that the gap in the positions of the two sides had not narrowed and that each leader continued to express serious doubts about the true intentions of the other. This made it difficult to be optimistic about the prospects for direct talks. On the substance, the two leaders reiterated their well-known positions, as described in paragraph 6 above. The Greek Cypriot leader said that, in view of the campaign which would precede the presidential elections scheduled for February 1998, the window of opportunity for negotiations was likely to close by the autumn of 1997. My Special Representative reiterated to both leaders and to his interlocutors in Athens and Ankara the concern of the United Nations and the international community about the existing situation in Cyprus. He emphasized the urgent need for direct negotiations on an overall settlement and for intensified preparations for such negotiations to begin early in 1997, with the active support of Greece and Turkey.

11. In my last report I noted the growing international interest in the Cyprus problem, in particular among the permanent members of the Security Council

and the members of the European Union. This has continued to intensify. During the period under review, senior officials from France, the EU Presidency (Ireland), the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America visited Cyprus, Greece and Turkey, in some cases several times. Their purpose was to help overcome the existing impasse by exploring possible ways of bringing the positions of the two sides closer together and to seek greater support from Greece and Turkey. The missions by the Special Representative of the EU Presidency focused in particular on a possible EU contribution to an overall settlement in the context of the EU's decision to initiate accession negotiations with Cyprus. Such a contribution would include explanation of the benefits which EU membership would bring to all Cypriots and would also address Turkish Cypriot concerns about its implications for an overall settlement of the Cyprus problem, particularly as regards bizonality, the Turkish guarantee and the relationship of Greece and Turkey with Cyprus. All the senior officials who undertook these missions recognized the importance of ensuring that the efforts of interested Governments are coordinated with those of the Secretary-General's mission of good offices. To this end, regular consultations have taken place between the United Nations and representatives of interested Governments in Cyprus, at United Nations Headquarters and elsewhere.

### III. OBSERVATIONS

12. The Cyprus problem has been at an impasse for a considerable time. Since my last report, the situation has deteriorated seriously and has been marked by a level of violence unprecedented since 1974. Frustration that a settlement has proved elusive for so long runs deep within both communities. Unless the political leadership on both sides manifests the necessary determination to negotiate an overall settlement and this process is fully supported by Greece and Turkey, the present unstable situation will persist and even lead to greater dangers.

13. The developments of recent months and the military build-up in Cyprus have underscored what the Security Council has pointed out for so long, that the status quo in Cyprus is most unstable and is not tenable. The events of recent months are a warning. If the current situation is allowed to persist, the consequences will be to the detriment of both communities.

14. The apparent calm that has prevailed for some years has lulled political leaders and the people of both communities into a false sense of stability. Many continue to believe that the situation will remain stable until the underlying dispute is resolved. Beneath the surface, however, the situation in Cyprus is changing, in terms both of the demographic composition of the island and of the relationship of the two communities with each other and to the outside world. Either the two communities will take control of their destiny by reaching an overall settlement on the basis that has already been

agreed, or forces beyond their control will fundamentally change the situation on the island.

15. As has often been pointed out before, the exercise of good offices by successive Secretaries-General has, over the years, generated the substantive elements necessary to reach an overall agreement, as well as the procedures for achieving that objective. I refer especially to the 1977 and 1979 high-level agreements in which the leaders of the two communities agreed on key principles of a solution, including the establishment of a bicomunal and bizonal federation whose independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity would be guaranteed. Other key principles are to be found in Security Council resolutions, in the Set of Ideas and in other ideas explored in recent years. Procedurally, it has become evident that an overall settlement can best be reached through mutual concessions in a comprehensive negotiating session which will continue as long as necessary to reach agreement.

16. As the Security Council recognized in resolution 1062 (1996), the decision of the European Union to open accession negotiations with Cyprus is an important new development that should facilitate an overall settlement. That decision and the timetable that flows from it provide an additional important reason for both sides to redouble their efforts. It is clearly in the vital interests of both communities to reach a solution before accession negotiations begin. It is widely believed that the accession by Cyprus to EU membership in a manner consistent with the agreed basis for an overall settlement would offer both communities the opportunity for enhanced prosperity and security.

17. An urgent effort is accordingly required in 1997 to bring about early direct talks between the two leaders, in the manner described above, to negotiate an overall agreement. Both leaders should clearly and publicly commit themselves to such a process.

18. To facilitate this objective, preparations for direct negotiations are being intensified by the Secretariat. The extensive material which already exists is being reviewed and, as appropriate, updated and expanded, and additional material prepared, so that the United Nations will be in a position to help the leaders of the two communities reach common positions during their negotiations. In addition, more intensive contacts with the leaders of the two communities and with Greece and Turkey are planned for the new year, including longer visits to Cyprus and to the area by my Special Representative. I rely on continued support by interested Governments for these initiatives. I also call upon the Governments of Greece and Turkey, which have a special obligation to Cyprus, to become more active in support of the Secretary-General's mission of good offices.

19. The success of this effort will depend to an important extent on the creation of an atmosphere of confidence and reconciliation between the two communities. Both leaders must give tangible indications that they are seek-

ing an overall settlement on the basis of one country and to ensure that their words and deeds are in harmony with that objective. Such a change in attitude cannot wait for a settlement; it must precede it and should be adopted without delay. The emphasis in their public statements and in their communications with each other must shift away from polemics and mutual accusations and towards their future relationship in a federal Cyprus. Messages of reconciliation and tolerance from both leaders and their communities are long overdue.

20. Both sides should also implement goodwill measures that give tangible indications of their good intentions and help create an atmosphere of confidence. Such measures could include the following: crossing with minimal formality by members of both communities at the Ledra Palace checkpoint (e.g., by only presenting identity cards); facilitating bicomunal contacts; cooperation and joint projects in areas of inter-communal concern such as the environment, water, health, education (including the elimination of biased and negative representations of each other) and the restoration of historic sites; youth and student exchanges; bicomunal sports events; elimination of provocative emblems and slogans; island-wide telephone communications; and bicomunal commercial activities and trade. I call on both leaders to take such measures.

21. Furthermore, it is important that the UNFICYP proposals for further unmanning, the prohibition of loaded weapons and a military code of conduct along the ceasefire lines be agreed to and implemented without delay.

22. The current situation offers the two communities, and the region, both a warning signal and an opportunity. The two leaders have a responsibility to their communities and to Cyprus as a whole to recognize the seriousness of the moment and to seize the opportunity it presents by agreeing to negotiate a comprehensive settlement on the basis of mutual concessions and to facilitate this process by conveying to each other in both words and deeds a message of reconciliation. In conclusion, I call upon both leaders to cooperate with my Special Representative and my Deputy Special Representative and with the Governments that support the Secretary-General's mission of good offices.

# Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Cyprus

(5 June 1997— S/1997/437)

(for the period from 11 December 1996 to 5 June 1997)

## I. INTRODUCTION

1. The present report on the United Nations operation in Cyprus covers developments from 11 December 1996 to 5 June 1997 and brings up to date the record of activities of the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) pursuant to Security Council resolution 186 (1964) of 4 March 1964 and subsequent Council resolutions, most recently resolution 1092 (1996) of 23 December 1996. I shall report to the Council separately on my mission of good offices.

## II. ACTIVITIES OF THE FORCE

### A. Maintenance of the ceasefire and the military status quo

2. During the period under review, the number of serious incidents decreased compared to the previous six months. Nevertheless, the tension along the ceasefire lines remained higher than in the past.

3. Both sides generally respected the ceasefire and the status quo. On a number of occasions, both sides moved forward into the United Nations buffer zone, especially at locations where they dispute the delineation of the ceasefire line. There were frequent discharges of weapons, but only rarely was UNFICYP clearly able to determine the target or the source of the firing. Stone throwing, pointing of weapons and shouting of abuse occurred between the opposing forces, and in some instances at UNFICYP, in those areas of Nicosia where the two sides are in close proximity to each other. Those incidents, although in themselves rather minor, reflect the tension that continued to exist between the two sides along the ceasefire lines.

4. There were a number of shooting incidents. The most serious were two incidents in the area of Louroujina, south-east of Nicosia. On 27 January 1997, the Turkish forces complained that two rifle shots had been fired at a sentry post. On investigation, UNFICYP found a window broken at the post but did not find the bullets and has not been able to verify the origin of the rounds. In the early-morning hours on 6 February 1997, UNFICYP received a complaint that National Guard intruders had attempted to steal a flag;



Turkish Cypriot Security Forces had fired at the intruders, who had withdrawn under covering fire of the National Guard. UNFICYP investigated the scene of the incident at first light and found some blood on the ground. The National Guard reported hearing shots but denied any involvement in the incident. UNFICYP's investigation was not conclusive.

5. Military construction by both sides continued. Of particular note was the continued strengthening of positions by the National Guard in Nicosia near Nicosia International Airport, in the area of the Nicosia Central Prison and along the ceasefire lines east of the city. The Turkish forces continued construction and improvement of positions along the length of the buffer zone. These activities were protested by UNFICYP, but with little effect. In two areas west of Nicosia, the Turkish forces disputed the delineation of the ceasefire line and interfered from time to time with United Nations patrols in the buffer zone.

6. There were again a number of violations of the airspace of Cyprus. In March and April 1997, there were five reports of overflights by Turkish Air Force aircraft, all of which were protested by the Government of Cyprus. In official public statements in May, the Greek Government announced that Greek military aircraft would not enter Cypriot airspace during the planned "Toxotis" exercise, and the Turkish Government announced that the Turkish forces would reciprocate in their exercises scheduled for this year.

7. As previously reported (S/1995/1020, paras. 7 and 10), UNFICYP continued to inspect regularly the underground facilities and park on the Roccas Bastion in Nicosia. There were only minor changes and UNFICYP found no indication that the area is being used for military purposes.

8. UNFICYP continued to monitor the status quo in the fenced area of Varosha. Some buildings continue to be occupied by students. There were again cases of property being removed from buildings; UNFICYP protested these to the Turkish forces. The United Nations holds the Government of Turkey responsible for the maintenance of the status quo in the fenced area of Varosha.

9. On 6 January 1997, the Government of Cyprus announced the purchase of S-300 surface-to-air missile systems. According to official public statements, the missile systems are scheduled to arrive in Cyprus some 16 months after the date of the purchase order, towards the middle of 1998. While the Government emphasized that the missile systems were of a purely defensive nature, the announcement of the purchase drew a strong response from Turkey, including threats to retaliate if the missile systems were deployed. On 10 January, I issued a statement in which, *inter alia*, I recalled that the Security Council, in its resolution 1092 (1996), had expressed grave concern about the excessive levels of military forces and armaments and the rate at which they were being expanded, upgraded and modernized. I also reminded

all sides that the Charter of the United Nations forbids the threat or use of force in situations such as this.

10. Last October, UNFICYP presented to the military authorities on both sides specific proposals for the reduction of tension along the ceasefire lines by: (a) an extension of the 1989 unarming agreement to include all areas where the military are in close proximity to each other; (b) the prohibition of loaded weapons along the ceasefire lines; and (c) the adoption of a code of conduct, based on the concept of use of minimum force and proportionate response. In its resolution 1092 (1996) the Security Council called upon the parties to accept these measures as a package without delay or preconditions.

11. Despite a total of 40 meetings with both sides at the Chief-of-Staff level, progress has not been possible. On some aspects, a convergence of views was achieved between UNFICYP and one or the other side, but no agreement was reached with both sides on the same subject. Although both sides accepted that the above proposals represent an integrated package, they frequently made the submission of their respective comments contingent upon the other side reciprocating. Even though it was repeatedly made clear that each side was dealing separately with UNFICYP as the impartial broker, who would consolidate the comments of both military authorities into an acceptable compromise package for their final agreement, each side continued to insist that they only respond to individual comments of the respective other side. As a result, the process was extremely slow, and only on 26 May did both sides submit detailed comments and suggestions on all elements of UNFICYP's proposals. UNFICYP is continuing its efforts, with a view to eliciting a positive response from both sides to the entire package of proposals, as called for by the Security Council.

12. UNFICYP's movement in the northern part of the island continued to be restricted, notably in the Kormakiti area where United Nations personnel were refused access to certain areas and restricted in carrying out humanitarian tasks.

13. There are 39 minefields and booby-trapped areas inside the buffer zone and a further 71 located within 500 metres of it. UNFICYP has requested both sides to assist in confirming the scale of the problem before presenting detailed proposals for the removal of those minefields located within the buffer zone.

#### **B. Restoration of normal conditions and humanitarian functions**

14. UNFICYP intensified its efforts to promote and facilitate bicomunal events with a view to increasing communication and cooperation between the two communities and building trust and mutual respect. In this regard, UNFICYP is working closely with interested diplomatic missions on the island. The

Ledra Palace Hotel in the buffer zone has been the venue of many bicommunal events held under the auspices of UNFICYP, diplomatic missions or on the initiative of non-governmental and professional organizations from both sides. The Turkish Cypriot authorities continued to insist that the attendance by Turkish Cypriots at such events requires specific authorization in each case. Since late January 1997, such authorization has usually been granted for events in the buffer zone and, though less consistently, for events in the southern part of the island.

15. On 19 April 1997, 437 Turkish Cypriots were able to make a pilgrimage to the Hala Sultan Tekke mosque in Larnaca without any restrictions being imposed by the Government. Unfortunately, a reciprocal pilgrimage to the church of Apostolis Andreas by 600 Greek Cypriots, scheduled for Orthodox Easter on 27 April, was cancelled at the last moment by the Greek Cypriot side because the authorities in the north insisted on the deletion of three individuals from the list of participants.

16. On 19 May, a bicommunal concert by two well-known singers from Greece and Turkey was held under the auspices of the United Nations operation in Cyprus at a soccer field in the buffer zone next to the Ledra Palace checkpoints. Some 3,000 Cypriots from both communities attended the concert, which took place in a completely positive and peaceful atmosphere. Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots mixed readily, singing and dancing together and exchanging flowers and addresses. Police from both sides were particularly effective in providing security for the concert.

17. The concert generated a great deal of debate about bicommunal contacts, which certain Greek Cypriot groups opposed on the grounds that Turkish troops were still on the island. A demonstration on 19 May in Nicosia in protest against the bicommunal concert was organized by the Cyprus Motorcyclist Federation and the Pan-Cyprian Anti-occupation Movement and resulted in violent clashes with the police.

18. Demonstrations by Greek Cypriots continued at the Ledra Palace checkpoint in Nicosia with the purpose of dissuading tourists from crossing to the northern part of the island. These demonstrations discouraged some tourists and at times impeded the movement of United Nations and diplomatic personnel. UNFICYP repeatedly called upon the Government to take the necessary measures to ensure that movement through the checkpoint is not impeded or deterred. In contrast, the restrictions imposed in response by the Turkish Cypriots were lifted in late January (see para. 15 above).

19. UNFICYP continued to carry out humanitarian tasks in respect of Greek Cypriots and Maronites in the northern part of the island and Turkish Cypriots in the southern part. There are now 479 Greek Cypriots in the Karpas area and 187 Maronites in the Kormakiti area. There are some 343 Turkish Cypriots known to UNFICYP in the southern part of the island. The living

conditions of the Greek Cypriots and Maronites residing in the northern part of the island have changed little from those reported previously (see S/1996/411, paras. 22-25 and S/1996/1016, paras. 21-22). Of the recommendations arising from the humanitarian review UNFICYP undertook in 1995 (S/1995/1020, paras. 20-25, and annexes), the Turkish Cypriot authorities have maintained improvements in terms of relaxation of restrictions on the freedom of movement of the Greek Cypriots and Maronites introduced in early 1996. But the other recommendations have not been implemented. UNFICYP continues to seek full implementation of the recommendations. UNFICYP's humanitarian work continued to be impeded by the presence of police officials whenever UNFICYP humanitarian officers were interviewing Greek Cypriots in the Karpas area.

20. The aftermath of the intercommunal violence of last summer continued to have an adverse effect upon the Turkish Cypriots working in the southern part of the island or in the buffer zone in the mixed village of Pyla. Unemployment for these Turkish Cypriots remained very high. The Government is paying unemployment benefits and measures have been taken to extend payments beyond the normal limit. Projects are being explored with the assistance of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) to improve the physical amenities in Pyla and create opportunities for work for otherwise unemployed Turkish Cypriot residents there.

### III. ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL ACTIVITIES OF THE UNITED NATIONS SYSTEM

21. UNFICYP continued to act as the intermediary between the two communities and to facilitate cooperation in such areas as the equitable distribution of water and electricity. The water resources on the island are very limited and UNFICYP strives to ensure effective cooperation between the two communities in order to prevent shortages.

22. UNHCR continued to administer a humanitarian programme funded by a voluntary contribution from a Member State. The main areas of cooperation were in sanitation, health, environment, agriculture, veterinary science, rehabilitation of culturally important sites and the Nicosia Master Plan. Regular bicomunal meetings on these matters were held at the UNHCR offices.

23. After a thorough independent review of the programme, UNHCR has decided to terminate its participation in this activity at the end of 1997. It will retain its office in Cyprus to continue implementation of its mandated responsibilities for the protection of refugees and asylum-seekers.

#### IV. COMMITTEE ON MISSING PERSONS

24. In his last report to the Security Council (S/1996/1016, para. 27), my predecessor mentioned that, despite the substantial work carried out by both sides, no agreement had been reached on the four points contained in his letters to the leaders of the two communities dated 4 April 1996. On 4 December 1996, he addressed a second letter to the two Cypriot leaders, reaffirming the necessity for the two sides to agree on the four specific points as an indication of their determination to make expeditious progress before initiating the procedure to appoint a new third member. In his second letter, Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali requested the two leaders to agree urgently on the implementation of five specific measures related to the above-mentioned four points.

25. After a careful review of the issues of the missing persons in Cyprus, I share entirely the views of my predecessor contained in his two aforementioned letters and emphasize that it is of the utmost importance to preserve the suggested approach. I urge the leaders of the two communities to comply with the five specific measures contained in the former Secretary-General's letter dated 4 December 1996.

#### V. ORGANIZATIONAL MATTERS

26. As of June 1997, UNFICYP comprised 1,173 troops and 35 civilian police. The military personnel were from Argentina (396), Austria (315), Canada (2), Finland (1), Hungary (39), Ireland (32) and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (388). The police were from Australia (20) and Ireland (15). In addition, UNFICYP had a civilian complement of 335, of whom 40 were recruited internationally, and 295 locally. The deployment of the Force is shown on the map attached to the present report.

27. In view of the experience gained during the events of August 1996 and the subsequent prolonged state of alert, I have requested the contributors of infantry units to increase their strength by a total of 63 personnel all ranks, bringing UNFICYP's strength to its authorized level.

28. Mr. Han Sung-Joo requested that his appointment as my Special Representative for Cyprus not be extended beyond its expiration in April 1997. I have appointed Mr. Diego Cordovez as my Special Adviser with effect from 28 April 1997 to prepare and assist me in chairing the next rounds of inter-communal talks. Mr. Gustave Feissel continued as Deputy Special Representative and Chief of Mission of the United Nations operation in Cyprus. Brigadier General Ahti T. P. Vartiainen completed his tour of duty as Force Commander and has been succeeded by Major-General Evergisto A. de Vergara with effect from 28 February 1997.

**Financial aspects**

29. The proposed budget for the maintenance of the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus for the period from 1 July 1997 to 30 June 1998 is currently under consideration by the General Assembly. The cost of maintaining the Force for the 12-month period is estimated at \$50,320,400 gross (A/51/755/Add.1). That amount is inclusive of the pledged voluntary contributions of one third of the cost of the Force from the Government of Cyprus and of the \$6.5 million contributed annually from the Government of Greece. Therefore, should the Security Council decide to extend the mandate of UNFICYP beyond 30 June 1997, the cost of maintaining the Force will be limited to the amount indicated above.

30. As of 13 May 1997, the total outstanding assessed contributions to the UNFICYP special account amounted to \$13,326,013, representing some 15 per cent of the assessment for the mission since 16 June 1993. The outstanding assessed contributions for all peacekeeping operations amounted to \$1.6 billion.

**VI. OBSERVATIONS**

31. During the last six months the situation in Cyprus has been much calmer than in the preceding period. However, there were numerous indications of continuing tension between the two sides.

32. Regrettably, there has been no change in the excessive levels of military forces and armaments in Cyprus and the rate at which they are being expanded, upgraded and modernized. Nor have the military authorities accepted the package of reciprocal measures proposed by UNFICYP to reduce tension along the ceasefire lines. These are simple practical measures that would not affect the status or delineation of the ceasefire lines, nor would they impair the security of either side. Agreement on these proposals would significantly improve the atmosphere and reduce the potential for violations of the ceasefire and the heightening of tension, which inevitably follows. I strongly urge both sides to reconsider their positions and cooperate with UNFICYP to reach an agreement on this package without further delay.

33. UNFICYP intensified its efforts to improve the overall atmosphere through bicomunal activities, which help to overcome misperceptions and anxieties between the two communities. For direct contacts between members of the two communities to take place, the support of UNFICYP or diplomatic missions is still essential. It would be desirable if such contacts could take place without formality and on a regular basis. From time to time, those who promote or participate in bicomunal events encounter pressure and even threats within their own community, making their efforts all the more admirable. I urge the two leaders to send clear messages of tolerance and rec-

conciliation to their publics and to facilitate and encourage direct contacts between the two communities.

34. I believe that UNFICYP's presence on the island remains indispensable in order to maintain the ceasefire between the two sides, which is a prerequisite for achieving the settlement sought by the Security Council. Therefore, I recommend that the Council extend the mandate of the Force for a further period of six months until 31 December 1997. In accordance with established practice, I am consulting the parties concerned on the matter and shall report to the Council as soon as these consultations have been completed.

35. With regard to my mission of good offices, my representatives have in recent months engaged in a process of intensive consultations, with a view to preparing the ground for direct talks between the leaders of the two communities. I shall inform the Security Council separately on the preparations for those talks.

36. I take this opportunity to express my appreciation to the Governments contributing troops and civilian police to UNFICYP for the steadfast support they have given to this peacekeeping operation of the United Nations. I also wish to thank the Governments that have made voluntary contributions towards the financing of the Force.

37. In conclusion, I wish to express my warm appreciation to Mr. Han Sung-Joo, my former Special Representative, for his dedicated work in the last 12 months. I also wish to pay tribute to Mr. Gustave Feissel, the Deputy Special Representative and Chief of Mission, Brigadier General Ahti T. P. Vartiainen, the former Force Commander, to Major-General Evergisto A. de Vergara, his successor, and to the men and women serving with UNFICYP for the efficiency and dedication with which they have discharged the responsibilities entrusted to them by the Security Council.

# Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Cyprus

(8 December 1997—S/1997/962)

(for the period from 6 June to 8 December 1997)

## I. INTRODUCTION

1. The present report on the United Nations operation in Cyprus covers developments since 6 June 1997 and brings up to date the record of the activities of the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) pursuant to Security Council resolution 186 (1964) of 4 March 1964 and subsequent Council resolutions, most recently resolution 1117 (1997) of 27 June 1997, in which the Council decided to extend the mandate of UNFICYP for a further period ending on 31 December 1997. I will report to the Council separately on my mission of good offices.

## II. ACTIVITIES OF THE FORCE

### A. Maintenance of the ceasefire and the military status quo

2. During the period under review, the level of tension along the ceasefire lines remained higher than the norm, but lower than during the same period in 1996. Although both sides generally respected the ceasefire and the military status quo, there were nonetheless frequent incidents and an increased number of restrictions of UNFICYP movement. Moreover, throughout the reporting period, both sides were not forthcoming when UNFICYP protested these violations of the military status quo.

3. Both sides continued to dispute the delineation of their respective ceasefire lines as well as the authority of UNFICYP in a number of areas of the United Nations buffer zone. Moreover, in most instances of protests by UNFICYP to moves forward, the violating side challenged the delineation of the buffer zone in the area concerned. The National Guard violated the agreed arrangements for the civilian-use areas of Athienou and that part of the Nicosia-Larnaca highway that runs through the buffer zone. The Turkish forces violated the agreed military status quo arrangements in two locations in Sector 4, denied access through the Lefka checkpoint for all UNFICYP personnel, and challenged the right of UNFICYP to move freely through some parts of the buffer zone. This resulted in a number of incidents of restriction of movement, including some occasions when physical force was used against UNFICYP foot patrols.



4. During the reporting period, there was a slight rise in the number of serious shooting incidents in or near the buffer zone. On 1 July, the Turkish forces fired at an alleged intruder in the buffer zone over the heads of an UNFICYP patrol investigating a previous incident; on 11 July, unknown persons fired a number of rounds at the Turkish forces position in the area west of Athienou; on 14 July, in the same area, Turkish forces fired shots into the buffer zone in the direction of alleged intruders in the buffer zone; on 25 July, a Turkish forces sentry fired at an alleged intruder in the buffer zone on the outskirts of Nicosia. On 22 September, a National Guard sentry west of Nicosia fired at an alleged intruder in the buffer zone. The most serious incident occurred on 8 October 1997 when Turkish forces fired seven rifle shots towards a Greek Cypriot farmer who, despite UNFICYP warnings, had driven his tractor beyond the farming security line. All these shooting incidents were protested by UNFICYP. However, in several cases, despite evidence, both sides simply denied that any incident had taken place. These incidents underline the need for agreement on UNFICYP proposals to reduce tension along the ceasefire lines as called for in Security Council resolution 1117 (1997) and previous resolutions.

5. Both sides undertook major military construction works extending eastward from Nicosia, including anti-tank ditches and other defensive fortifications. In the Pedieos River area, to the west of the Old City of Nicosia, both sides carried out "tit for tat" construction by building a network of bunkers with connecting trenches. This military construction continued despite strong protests by UNFICYP.

6. On 26 September 1997, the leaders of the two communities met jointly with Mr. Gustave Feissel, my Deputy Special Representative and Chief of Mission in Cyprus, at the latter's residence in the buffer zone, to explore the possibility of agreeing on matters related to security. Mr. Feissel underlined that while a comprehensive settlement of the security issues would be part of an overall agreement, some modest first steps would be most helpful, not least at a time when acrimonious exchanges both on the island and between Greece and Turkey were undermining the overall atmosphere. Mr. Feissel recalled that the leaders of the two communities had on various separate occasions expressed the same position on a number of important matters related to security. These are that an overall settlement must take into account the security concerns of both communities; that they both reject the use of force or the threat of force and that they both commit their respective communities to solving the Cyprus problem by peaceful means only; that Greece and Turkey should undertake a similar commitment; and that they remain committed to demilitarization as an overall objective. In addition, it was suggested that the two leaders should take this opportunity to endorse the UNFICYP package of proposals for unmanning, the prohibition of loaded weapons along the ceasefire lines and the code of conduct. The two leaders agreed that Mr. Feissel would follow the meeting with separate discussions with each of them in the

hope of preparing the ground for an agreed joint statement. Mr. Feissel is pursuing this with the two leaders.

7. Turkish aircraft violated Cypriot air space during the National Guard annual military exercises from 11 to 16 October 1997. On 15 October, Greek military aircraft violated the spirit of the ceasefire by flying within 1,000 metres of the buffer zone. On 16 October, I issued a statement in which, *inter alia*, I recalled the relevant Security Council resolutions, that called upon all concerned to commit themselves to a reduction in defense spending and a reduction in the number of foreign troops on the island and call upon the parties to create a climate for reconciliation and genuine mutual confidence on both sides, and to avoid any actions which might increase tension. However, on 3 November, Turkish forces helicopters violated the buffer zone during the Turkish forces annual military exercise in Cyprus and on 5 November four Turkish Air Force F-4 fighter planes flew straight across the buffer zone at an altitude of 200 metres and entered some 300 metres into the government-controlled area before returning to the northern part of the island. All these incidents were protested by UNFICYP.

8. Both sides continued to upgrade their military and mechanized forces. It is estimated that there are over 30,000 Turkish forces and some 4,500 Turkish Cypriot troops on the island. Their equipment was modernized with the further replacement of M48A5T1 tanks by M48A5T2 tanks. In addition, the Turkish forces introduced 12 large-calibre, self-propelled M-110 artillery pieces on the island.

9. The National Guard's strength is approximately 14,500. The plan announced by the Government of the Republic of Cyprus to purchase the S-300 air defence system (see S/1997/437, para. 9), continued to draw a strong reaction from Turkey and the Turkish Cypriot side. On several occasions, UNFICYP drew the attention of both sides to resolution 1117 (1997), in which the Security Council reiterated grave concern at the continuing levels of military forces and armaments in the Republic of Cyprus and the rate at which they were being expanded, upgraded and modernized. No progress was made towards the implementation of that provision of the resolution.

10. UNFICYP continued its efforts to have the package of proposals for the reduction of tension along the ceasefire lines accepted in accordance with Security Council resolution 1117 (1997) and previous resolutions. In late June 1997, to facilitate an agreement, UNFICYP presented a revised package of unmanning proposals to both sides that took into account the preoccupations that had been expressed by each side. The revised proposals focused upon Nicosia and Dherenia as the areas of close proximity most prone to generate tension. Those proposals, based on detailed on-site reviews with both sides, included a new approach of "lateral unmanning". The lateral unmanning approach would achieve the objective of increasing the distance between positions of the opposing forces by the unmanning of guard posts alternating

diagonally between the two ceasefire lines. The proposal for the prohibition of loaded weapons along the ceasefire lines and the proposed code of conduct were amalgamated since both proposals aim at raising the threshold before firearms are used. Despite a further 21 meetings with the military authorities on both sides, no agreement has yet been reached. UNFICYP informed both sides that I would advise the Security Council of the respective positions adopted by each side up to this time.

11. The latest position of each side is as follows:

(a) The National Guard has taken the position that the reduction of tension along the ceasefire lines would best be achieved by the implementation of the prohibition of loaded weapons and the code of conduct. The National Guard does not wish to unman in areas such as Nicosia where, in their view, the security of Greek Cypriot civilians might be affected;

(b) On 23 October 1997 the Turkish forces declared their willingness to accept the UNFICYP revised package presented to both sides in June 1997, provided that the National Guard did likewise.

UNFICYP will continue its efforts to reach an agreement on the proposed package of proposals.

12. UNFICYP continued to carry out regular inspections of the underground facilities and park at Roccas Bastion in Nicosia. The situation has remained unchanged and there was no indication that the area was being used for military purposes.

13. UNFICYP continued to monitor the status quo in the fenced area of Varosha. There were numerous observed instances of property being removed from buildings by Turkish forces' personnel. UNFICYP protested these violations to the Turkish forces. The United Nations holds the Government of Turkey responsible for the maintenance of the status quo in the fenced area of Varosha.

14. UNFICYP movement in the northern part of the island continued to be restricted. On several occasions, humanitarian patrols were obstructed and vehicles searched. On one occasion the UNFICYP humanitarian officer in Sector 1 was arrested and held for several hours.

15. There are 38 minefields and booby-trapped areas inside the buffer zone and a further 73 located within 500 metres of it. It is estimated that they contain more than 16,000 mines. In accordance with Security Council resolution 1092 (1996) of 23 December 1996, UNFICYP again requested both sides to assist in confirming the scale of the problem before presenting proposals for the removal of the minefields located within the buffer zone. Neither side has

responded to the UNFICYP request. On 21 September 1997, a Greek Cypriot was killed by a mine in a National Guard minefield outside the buffer zone southeast of Nicosia.

16. In July, August and November when the traditional rallies and demonstrations were held in the southern part of the island, the authorities acted in a determined and professional manner. As a result, the events took place with only minor incidents.

17. Greek Cypriot hunters frequently entered the buffer zone illegally during the hunting season. On one occasion, a shotgun was discharged in the direction of UNFICYP personnel; on two other occasions, UNFICYP personnel were assaulted by Greek Cypriot civilians inside the buffer zone. These incidents were protested to the appropriate authorities.

#### **B. Restoration of normal conditions and humanitarian functions**

18. UNFICYP continued its efforts to encourage contact and cooperation between the two communities and to building mutual trust through actively promoting bicomunal events and activities. During the period under review, UNFICYP organized in cooperation with various diplomatic missions a bicomunal fair on 27 September attended by some 3,900 Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots. To celebrate United Nations Day UNFICYP organized an open house, which was attended by over 4,000 persons from both communities. Other activities organized by UNFICYP included a bicomunal darts tournament held in Bellapais in the northern part of Cyprus and a bicomunal go-kart event in the United Nations protected area. A large number of bicomunal meetings were also held in the Ledra Palace Hotel, located in the buffer zone in Nicosia, under the auspices of UNFICYP and diplomatic missions or on the initiative of Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot non-governmental and professional organizations representing a wide spectrum of disciplines and interests. The popularity of these activities continues to demonstrate the desire among the two communities to renew contacts in an unhindered manner. The media coverage of these events also generated a positive public discussion on the desirability and usefulness of bicomunal contacts.

19. Demonstrations by Greek Cypriots continued to be staged at the South Ledra checkpoint, mainly on weekends, with the aim of dissuading tourists from crossing to the north. In many instances, organized groups of school-children in uniform participated in demonstrations. The demonstrations inconvenienced visitors and hindered the movement of UNFICYP and diplomatic personnel.

20. The Government of Cyprus protested that churches and other religious property in the northern part of Cyprus had been allowed to decay and that

some had been vandalized and property had been removed. There is also concern about damage to graveyards. UNFICYP pursued the matter with the Turkish Cypriot authorities.

21. On 28 and 31 July, the leaders of the two communities met jointly with my Deputy Special Representative to discuss a number of humanitarian issues of common concern. On 31 July, the two leaders agreed, as a first step in resolving the problem of the missing persons, to provide each other all information already at their disposal on the location of graves of Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot missing persons. They also each agreed to designate a person who would meet to exchange this information and to prepare the necessary arrangements leading to the return of the remains of these Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot missing persons. On 30 September, the leader of the Greek Cypriot community informed Mr. Feissel that his side had completed its work and was ready to proceed as agreed on 31 July. The Turkish Cypriot side indicated that it would be ready by the end of November. At their 31 July meeting, the two leaders also reached agreement on a number of other humanitarian issues, which have since been implemented (see paras. 22 and 23 below).

22. UNFICYP continued to carry out humanitarian tasks in respect of Greek Cypriots and Maronites in the northern part of the island, and Turkish Cypriots in the southern part. There are now 477 Greek Cypriots in the Karpas area and 177 Maronites residing in the Kormakiti area. There are some 340 Turkish Cypriots in the southern part of the island who have made themselves known to UNFICYP. The living conditions of Greek Cypriots and Maronites residing in the northern part of the island have changed little from those reported previously (see S/1996/411, paras. 22-25, and S/1996/1016, paras. 21 and 22). With regard to the recommendations arising from the humanitarian review UNFICYP undertook in 1995 (S/1995/1020, paras. 20-25 and annexes), the Turkish Cypriot authorities have made some improvements, notably by increasing the number of telephone lines in the Karpas and Kormakiti areas and by allowing UNFICYP humanitarian patrols to meet privately with Greek Cypriots in the Karpas area without the presence of police. Furthermore, the two vacant Greek Cypriot schoolteacher positions have now been filled in Rizokarpaso. Thus far, the Turkish Cypriots living in the south have made little use of the UNFICYP Liaison Office opened in December 1996 in Limassol.

23. The United Nations provides the only telephone line between the northern and southern parts of the island. The existing system has become overburdened and is unable to cope with the increasing demand. Therefore, it was decided to upgrade the current 3 line operator-assisted telephone connections to 20 automated telephone and facsimile connections. This upgrade is expected to increase the annual handling capacity from 107,000 to some 750,000 calls per year, while avoiding the existing logjam. The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) has agreed to cover the

costs of the expanded telephone line.

24. On 8 August 1997, 386 Turkish Cypriots were able to travel by road through the government-controlled area to Kokkina to attend commemoration ceremonies. Some 274 Turkish Cypriots undertook a similar trip on 8 November 1997. On 15 August 1997, 674 Greek Cypriots were able to go on a pilgrimage to the monastery of Apostolos Andreas in the Karpas Peninsula. Another pilgrimage to Apostolos Andreas took place on 30 November 1997 in which some 1,200 Greek Cypriots participated.

### III. ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL ACTIVITIES OF THE UNITED NATIONS SYSTEM

25. UNFICYP continued to act as the intermediary between the two communities to facilitate cooperation in such areas as the equitable distribution of water and electricity. Such cooperation on matters related to water resources on the island has become more important recently owing to poor rainfall, which has led to diminishing water supplies on the island.

26. During the period under review, work commenced on the Pyla Physical Development Plan financed by UNHCR to renovate and upgrade the centre of Pyla village. The first phase of the project, the renovation of the Turkish Cypriot coffee shop and the Greek Orthodox church, was completed in October 1997 using workers from both communities, in particular Turkish Cypriots who became unemployed following the events of August 1996.

27. As mentioned in my previous report (S/1997/437, para. 23), at the end of 1997 UNHCR will conclude its administration of a bicomunal programme funded by a voluntary contribution from a Member State.

28. The main areas of cooperation under this programme during the period under review were in agriculture, water resources, veterinary science, environment, sanitation, laboratory sciences, rehabilitation of culturally important sites and the Nicosia Master Plan. Regular bicomunal meetings on these matters were held at the UNHCR office.

### IV. COMMITTEE ON MISSING PERSONS

29. The overall situation relating to the Committee on Missing Persons has remained as indicated in my previous report (S/1997/437, paras. 24 and 25). At the same time, the 31 July agreement with regard to the exchange of information on the location of graves of missing persons and the return of their remains (see para. 21 above) represents a significant breakthrough, which, if faithfully implemented, should have a positive effect on the remaining work with regard to missing persons.

30. In this connection, I am encouraged to note that on 31 July, the leaders of the two communities agreed to the following text:

“The leaders of the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities consider the problem of the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot missing persons in Cyprus as a purely humanitarian issue the solution of which is long overdue.

“The two leaders agree that no political exploitation should be made by either side of the problem of the missing persons and they pledge to work for its solution in order to terminate the agony and the uncertainty of the families of the missing persons, both Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot.

“The two leaders respect the rights of the families of the missing to be informed of the fate of their loved ones in a convincing and conclusive manner to the best extent possible.

“The two leaders recognize the right of those families whose missing loved ones are proved to be dead to have, to the best extent possible, their remains for proper burial in accordance with their religious traditions and practices.”

31. In their 31 July agreement, the two leaders also requested that I appoint a new third member of the Committee on Missing Persons in order to expedite the conclusion of the Committee's work. As soon as the implementation of the 31 July agreement is effectively launched, I will proceed with the appointment of a new third member of the Committee.

## V. ORGANIZATIONAL MATTERS

32. As of December 1997, UNFICYP comprised 1,230 troops and 35 civilian police. This represents an increase of 57 troops since the last report following the expansion of the Force to its full authorized strength in response to the experiences of 1996. The military personnel are from Argentina (416), Austria (257), Canada (2), Finland (1), Hungary (105), Ireland (30), Slovenia (10), and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (409). Slovenia became a new troop contributor during the period under review. The civilian police are provided by Australia (20) and Ireland (15). In addition, UNFICYP currently has a civilian component of 44 international and 291 locally recruited staff.

33. Mr. Diego Cordovez remained my Special Adviser on Cyprus. Mr. Gustave Feissel continued as my Deputy Special Representative and Chief of Mission of the United Nations operation in Cyprus. Major-General Evergisto A. De Vergara continued as Force Commander.

**Financial aspects**

34. In its resolution 51/235 of 13 June 1997, the General Assembly appropriated an amount of \$48,000,800 gross for maintaining UNFICYP for the 12-month period from 1 July 1997 to 30 June 1998. This amount includes the pledged voluntary contribution from the Government of Cyprus of one third of the cost of the Force, and the annual amount of \$6.5 million contributed by the Government of Greece.

35. Should the Security Council decide to extend the mandate of UNFICYP for a further period of six months as recommended in paragraph 41 below, the costs of maintaining the Force would be approximately \$24 million. Of that amount, approximately \$14.5 million would be assessed on Member States.

36. As at 31 October 1997, the total outstanding assessed contributions to the UNFICYP Special Account amounted to \$15.4 million, which represents some 14.8 per cent of the assessment for the Mission since 16 June 1993. The outstanding assessed contributions for all peacekeeping operations amounted to \$1.6 billion.

**VI. OBSERVATIONS**

37. During the period under review, the situation in Cyprus was calmer than in the preceding six months, but the overall situation continued to be marked by tension. The continued lack of progress towards an overall settlement, coupled with increasingly belligerent rhetoric, contributed to a growing sense of frustration in both communities. I have appealed to both sides, as well as to Greece and Turkey, to refrain from any action that could raise tension and negatively affect efforts to achieve a peaceful settlement. I have also urged that the military authorities on both sides be more responsive to UNFICYP observations and protests concerning their responsibilities along the ceasefire lines.

38. The repeated appeals of the Security Council for a reduction in defence spending and a reduction in the number of foreign military troops have not been heeded by either side. The military forces and armaments in Cyprus continued to be expanded, upgraded and modernized at an increasing rate.

39. It is disappointing that after more than one year of intensive discussions, the package of reciprocal measures proposed by UNFICYP to reduce tension along the ceasefire lines has still not been put in place, despite the Security Council's repeated calls that the two sides should accept it without delay or preconditions. The simple practical measures proposed by UNFICYP, which take into account the concerns of both sides, would significantly improve the atmosphere and reduce the potential for violations of the ceasefire. Now that the UNFICYP proposal has been accepted by one side I hope that the other will follow suit without further delay.



40. There have also been some positive developments. The meetings of the two leaders of the two communities with my Deputy Special Representative at the end of July resulted in progress on the question of missing persons and in some improvements on humanitarian issues. I have also asked my Deputy Special Representative to pursue vigorously the proposal of a joint statement on security, which he discussed with the two leaders during a further meeting at the end of September. Such a joint statement would be an important, positive signal and could significantly improve the atmosphere between the two sides. The participation of thousands of Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots in bicomunal activities sponsored by UNFICYP and others demonstrate that there exists between the two communities a basis of mutual respect and goodwill which can and should be expanded. I have accordingly instructed UNFICYP to give high priority to this part of its work and I call upon the authorities on both sides to facilitate the expansion of such activities in an unhindered manner.

41. The presence of UNFICYP on the island remains indispensable in order to maintain the ceasefire between the two sides, which is a prerequisite for achieving the settlement of the Cyprus question sought by the international community. Therefore, I recommend that the Security Council extend the mandate of the Force for a further period of six months until 30 June 1998. In accordance with established practice, I am consulting the parties concerned on the matter and shall report to the Council as soon as these consultations have been completed.

42. With regard to my mission of good offices, I shall inform the Security Council separately on the direct talks and other developments concerning the effort to establish a sustained process of negotiations.

43. I take this opportunity to express my appreciation to the Governments contributing troops and civilian police to UNFICYP for the steadfast support they have given to this peacekeeping operation of the United Nations. I also wish to thank the Governments that have made voluntary contributions towards the financing of the Force.

44. In conclusion, I wish to express my warm appreciation to my Special Adviser for Cyprus, Mr. Diego Cordovez, and to my Deputy Special Representative and Chief of Mission in Cyprus, Mr. Gustave Feissel. I also wish to pay tribute to Major-General Evergisto A. De Vergara, the Force Commander, and to the men and women serving with UNFICYP for the efficiency and dedication with which they have discharged the responsibilities entrusted to them by the Security Council.

## Report of the Secretary-General on his Mission of Good Offices in Cyprus

(12 December 1997—S/1997/973)

1. The present report is submitted pursuant to the Security Council's request in paragraph 16 of its resolution 1117 (1997) of 27 June 1997. My report on those aspects of the resolution that relate to the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) was submitted to the Council on 8 December (S/1997/962). The present report refers to my good offices mission.

2. In a communication dated 17 April 1997 addressed to the President of the Council (S/1997/320), I stated my determination to pursue intensified efforts to bring about a comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus problem and my hope that it would be possible to convene direct talks between the two community leaders. In the same communication I informed the Council that I had decided to appoint Mr. Diego Cordovez as my Special Adviser on Cyprus with effect from 28 April.

3. In the most recent communication on my good offices mission, dated 20 June 1997 (S/1997/480), I informed the Council that earlier that month I had written to the two leaders inviting them to a session of face-to-face discussions in July. I envisaged that the first session would be followed by another one in August and by a third one, if necessary.

4. The first round of talks was held at Troutbeck, Dutchess County, New York, from 9 to 12 July. In my opening statement at the talks I stated that for 29 years the leaders of the two communities had engaged in discussions about issues that had been identified as the most crucial. These discussions were based on concepts and approaches that successive Secretaries-General had put forward in accordance with Security Council resolutions. I stressed that the search for peace in Cyprus should therefore continue and noted that international backing for a negotiated solution was firmer than ever. The support of the Security Council had been consistently unequivocal and the presence at the talks of special envoys from a large number of countries was proof of the high priority that the international community attached to a viable and comprehensive solution.

5. The Troutbeck round of talks was held in a constructive and friendly atmosphere. The two leaders initiated the consideration of a draft statement intended to launch the process of negotiations that I had suggested, to set out the principles and objectives of the settlement and to establish the modalities for future negotiations. The two leaders affirmed throughout the talks their determination to reach a settlement. They subsequently met in Nicosia with my

Deputy Special Representative, Mr. Gustave Feissel, to consider humanitarian matters. An agreement to achieve progress on the issue of missing persons was concluded on 31 July.

6. The second round of talks was held at Glion-sur-Montreux, Switzerland, from 11 to 15 August. At the opening, the Turkish Cypriot leader informed my Special Adviser that, in the light of the publication by the European Union of a document entitled "Agenda 2000", and pending clarification of some of the statements contained in that document, he would participate in further discussions with the Greek Cypriot leader and with my Special Adviser but would not be able to adopt any formal understandings or agreements. Two further versions of the draft statement were considered but the talks ended inconclusively. In the circumstances, an early third round of talks would have been unproductive.

7. In discussions I had in New York with the leaders of the Greek Cypriot and the Turkish Cypriot communities, on 6 October and 3 November, respectively, I urged both leaders to show their political will to reach a settlement and to make a special effort to see recent developments in a positive light. I also informed them that I had instructed Mr. Cordovez to travel to Nicosia in response to the invitations that the two leaders had extended to him at Glion.

8. My Special Adviser visited Nicosia from 18 to 21 November for consultations with the leaders of the two communities. He also met with the political party leaders of the two communities and was briefed by my Deputy Special Representative and Chief of Mission on the overall situation and by the Force Commander and senior officers of UNFICYP on the operation of the Force. Mr. Cordovez subsequently visited Athens, Ankara and London, the capitals of the three Guarantor Powers, and Brussels. At the request of the special representatives on Cyprus, on 27 November Mr. Cordovez participated in a meeting held in Paris. On 2 December Mr. Cordovez briefed the members of the Security Council on all the discussions held during his trip and explained the new factors and circumstances, which will undoubtedly have a bearing on my good offices mission in the months ahead.

9. The message that I asked Mr. Cordovez to convey to the two community leaders, and to the Governments of Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, was that I remained committed to continue my good offices mission at the earliest appropriate time, bearing in mind that the electoral process is now quite naturally engaging the priority attention of the Greek Cypriot leader and his community. Heads of Government and high-level officials of many interested Member States, who are thoughtfully following my endeavours in this context, have urged me to do so, and I continue to feel that to allow the present status quo, which is precarious, to continue would entail serious danger.

10. During the consultations in Cyprus Mr. Cordovez proposed, and the two community leaders agreed, that he should return to Nicosia in March 1998 in order to discuss the detailed modalities of a continuing process of negotiations and hopefully set it in motion. The Turkish Cypriot leader raised with Mr. Cordovez questions regarding the status of the interlocutors at future talks. My Special Adviser noted that, in accordance with the mandate given to the Secretary-General by the Security Council, the mission of good offices on Cyprus was with the two communities, on an equal footing, and that the Secretary-General and all his representatives had been scrupulous in observing the political equality of the two communities and their leaders.

11. I remain convinced that it is essential to adopt new approaches and to ensure that the two community leaders will enter upon, as soon as possible, a continuing and sustained process of negotiations that will focus on the preparation of the actual legal instruments that will constitute the settlement.

12. I should like to place on record my appreciation to all those Governments that, given their interest in and concern about the Cyprus problem, have appointed special envoys in order to assist, and be kept informed of, my good offices mission. They have provided invaluable assistance and advice to my Special Adviser, who meets regularly with all of them for purposes of consultation and cooperation.

# Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Cyprus

(10 June 1998—S/1998/488)

(for the period from 8 December 1997 to 8 June 1998)

## I. INTRODUCTION

1. The present report on the United Nations operation in Cyprus covers developments from 8 December 1997 to 8 June 1998 and brings up to date the record of the activities of the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) pursuant to Security Council resolution 186 (1964) of 4 March 1964 and subsequent Council resolutions, most recently resolution 1146 (1997) of 23 December 1997, in which the Council decided to extend the mandate of UNFICYP for a further period ending on 30 June 1998. I will report to the Council separately on my mission of good offices.

## II. ACTIVITIES OF THE FORCE

### A. Maintenance of the ceasefire and the military status quo

2. During the period under review, the situation along the ceasefire lines remained calm. Although both sides generally respected the ceasefire and the military status quo, there were frequent minor incidents. Both sides continued to dispute the delineation of their respective ceasefire lines in a number of areas within the United Nations buffer zone, often challenging the authority of UNFICYP. At times, this created friction between UNFICYP and the opposing forces as they moved forward into the buffer zone or overmanned their ceasefire lines in the disputed areas. As in the previous reporting period, both sides ignored UNFICYP protests of the more serious violations of the military status quo by continuing military construction along and in close proximity to the ceasefire lines.

3. There were a number of shooting incidents, which in most cases were heard, but not observed, by UNFICYP. Following investigations, both sides usually denied any knowledge of the incidents. On 13 March and 5 April 1998, each side accused the other of firing. At the request of the side claiming to have received the initial fire, investigations were carried out and rifle rounds recovered. Nevertheless, UNFICYP was unable to obtain sufficient evidence to determine who had fired owing, *inter alia*, to the unwillingness of both sides to give timely access to the sector of the ceasefire line from which

the shots were said to have originated or to answer questions. All shooting incidents were protested by UNFICYP.

4. Both sides continued major military construction works. These include anti-tank ditches and other defensive fortifications east and south-east of Nicosia, and a network of bunkers with connecting trenches to the west of the Old City of Nicosia. Such military construction tends to increase tension along the ceasefire lines. However, despite strong protests by UNFICYP, it continued.

5. There were a number of overflights as follows during the period under review. On 12 January 1998, a Turkish F-4 Phantom fighter aircraft overflew the buffer zone near Pyla. UNFICYP strongly protested this incident to Turkish forces headquarters. On 30 April, UNFICYP observed two Turkish Air Force RF-4 Phantoms conducting a live firing ground attack exercise onto a range area six kilometres north of Avlona. On several occasions, helicopters from both sides overflew parts of the buffer zone. In one incident, a Cyprus police helicopter landed at Athienou, despite denial by UNFICYP of a request for it to enter the buffer zone.

6. Both sides continued to upgrade their military capabilities. It is estimated that there are over 30,000 Turkish forces and some 4,500 Turkish Cypriot troops on the island. The Turkish forces continued to modernize their equipment by replacing M48A5T1 tanks with M48A5T2 tanks.

7. The National Guard's strength is approximately 14,500. During the period under review, the Government of the Republic of Cyprus reconfirmed its plan to deploy S-300 surface-to-air missiles unless there was progress in negotiations towards an overall settlement or towards the demilitarization of the island. This continued to be criticized by Turkey and the Turkish Cypriot authorities. The military airbase in Paphos has been declared operational, although it has not yet come into use. The establishment of this airbase has also been strongly protested by Turkey and the Turkish Cypriot authorities.

8. In spite of the Security Council's call in resolution 1146 (1997) for an early agreement to and rapid implementation of the UNFICYP package of measures to reduce tension along the ceasefire lines, no agreement has been reached on the matter. The military authorities in the north have reconfirmed their earlier acceptance of the UNFICYP package of measures in its entirety. The National Guard has accepted the code of conduct and the prohibition of loaded weapons, but has continued to reject UNFICYP proposals for the unmanning of positions in close proximity to each other on the grounds that it would leave the inhabitants of Nicosia unprotected. The National Guard has made counter-proposals, which, in the view of UNFICYP, would not contribute to the key objective of creating distance between the soldiers deployed on each side of the buffer zone. With regard to the Dherinia area, the National Guard's counter-proposal would entail the unmanning of the entire area

between Dherinia and Varosha and would go well beyond the limited objective of creating distance between the opposing forces. UNFICYP will continue its efforts to gain acceptance by both sides of the UNFICYP package of measures presented in June 1997.

9. UNFICYP continued to carry out regular inspections of the facilities and park at Roccas Bastion in Nicosia. The situation has remained unchanged, and there was no indication that the area was being used for military purposes.

10. UNFICYP continued to monitor maintenance of the status quo in the fenced area of Varosha. There were numerous instances of property being removed from buildings by Turkish personnel, which UNFICYP protested to the Turkish forces.

11. UNFICYP freedom of movement in the northern part of the island continued to be restricted, and the Force remained subject to stricter limitations than those imposed on tourists and foreign diplomats. During the period under review, the National Guard restricted movement by UNFICYP humanitarian personnel at the Potamia checkpoint on several occasions.

12. There are 38 minefields and booby-trapped areas inside the buffer zone and a further 73 located within 500 metres of it. UNFICYP has again requested both sides for precise information before presenting proposals for the removal of the minefields located within the buffer zone. The National Guard has stated its readiness to hand over minefield records provided that the other side does the same. The military authorities in the north indicated that they would be ready to negotiate the minefield issue with UNFICYP immediately following agreement on the UNFICYP package of measures to reduce tension along the ceasefire lines. UNFICYP will continue to seek information about minefields from both sides. The danger inherent in the present situation was highlighted on 12 January 1998, when an excavator being operated by two United Nations personnel working on the Lefka road in the buffer zone detonated an anti-tank mine. Fortunately, both escaped without injuries, but the road has been closed to all UNFICYP traffic for safety reasons.

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13. Greek Cypriot hunters frequently entered the buffer zone during the hunting season. On 14 December 1997, southwest of Lefka, a shotgun was negligently discharged in the direction of a member of UNFICYP civilian police, and on 28 December 1997, in the area of Dhenia, several shots were fired over the heads of an UNFICYP patrol. These incidents were protested to the appropriate authorities.

#### **B. Restoration of normal conditions and humanitarian functions**

14. On 26 December 1997, the Turkish Cypriot authorities announced that they were re-evaluating bi-communal contacts in the context of the situation

that had arisen as a result of the summit meeting of the European Union in Luxembourg, and that, as of 27 December, all bi-communal activities would be suspended. Despite repeated requests, the Turkish Cypriot authorities have continued to prevent Turkish Cypriot participation in bi-communal meetings on the island.

15. The Turkish Cypriot side repeatedly complained that an all-encompassing embargo was continuing against Northern Cyprus, which has been imposed by the Greek Cypriot authorities since 1963. This embargo covers all spheres of life, including international relations, travel, trade, tourism and the economy in general, as well as sports and cultural and social activities. The Turkish Cypriot authorities protested that this leads to the isolation of the Turkish Cypriot community from the rest of the world and creates distrust and a crisis of confidence between the two sides on the island. They claim that while this embargo continues, the superficial attempt to bring together members of the two sides serves no useful purpose, and that the creation of trust and confidence depends on the removal of these measures.

16. A number of Greek Cypriot and Greek civilians were apprehended in the northern part of Cyprus after crossing the buffer zone and were detained by the Turkish Cypriot authorities. In each case, UNFICYP humanitarian and medical personnel visited the detainees and arranged for family visits in the place of their detention. All of them were subsequently released. In some instances, efforts are continuing for the release of their belongings held in the northern part of Cyprus. Four Turkish Cypriots and four Turkish citizens are being held in the custody of the Cypriot police. Two of them, who were arrested on 23 October 1997 south of the National Guard ceasefire line near Louroujina, were eventually charged with livestock and arms smuggling. After frequent adjournments, their trial ended on 11 April. On 25 May, 7 months after their arrest, they were sentenced to one year in prison. UNFICYP maintains that whenever civilians cross the other side's ceasefire line in a non-belligerent manner, they and their belongings should be returned without delay.

17. On 21 December 1997, UNFICYP arranged for 193 Greek Cypriots to visit the Apostolos Andreas Monastery on the Karpas Peninsula. On 31 January 1998, 1,285 Turkish Cypriots visited the Hala Sultan Tekke Mosque in Larnaca, and 1,314 visited it on 9 April 1998. On 7 and 14 March 1998, 94 Turkish Cypriot students were permitted access to the Kokkina enclave by land to mark anniversaries there. The Greek Cypriot pilgrimage to Apostolos Andreas Monastery scheduled for 19 April 1998 was cancelled owing to the imposition of the new charges mentioned in paragraph 21 below.

18. An expanded and automated telephone connection between the northern and southern parts of Cyprus was inaugurated on 4 May at the Ledra Palace Hotel. Since 1974, the United Nations had provided the only telephone connection between the northern and southern part of Cyprus. The existing oper-



ator-assisted telephone connections had, for some time, been insufficient for the growing demand from both sides, which had resulted in delays and inconvenience to users. The upgraded service will significantly increase the handling capacity, thus eliminating the delays that users had frequently experienced.

19. Demonstrations by Greek Cypriots at the South Ledra checkpoint continued, mainly on weekends, with the aim of dissuading tourists from crossing to the north. In some instances, organized groups of schoolchildren in uniform participated in demonstrations.

20. UNFICYP continued to carry out humanitarian tasks in respect of Greek Cypriots and Maronites in the northern part of the island and Turkish Cypriots in the southern part. There are now 460 Greek Cypriots in the Karpas area, two in Kyrenia and 173 Maronites in the Kormakiti area. Some 340 Turkish Cypriots in the southern part of the island have made themselves known to UNFICYP. The living conditions of Greek Cypriots and Maronites residing in the north have gradually improved over the past three years. Since the humanitarian review conducted by UNFICYP in 1995 (see S/1995/1020, paras. 20-25 and annexes), a number of incremental improvements have occurred that have been reported to the Council in previous reports. During the current reporting period, the Turkish Cypriot authorities lifted most age restrictions for Greek Cypriot and Maronite children visiting their families in the north, although the age limit of 16 remains in force for Greek Cypriot boys. Two new telephone lines were installed in Leonarisso recently.

21. However, in mid-February, the Turkish Cypriot side imposed new regulations and fees for entry to and exit from the north. Greek Cypriots and Maronites from the southern part of Cyprus visiting relatives residing in the northern part must pay a fee of 15 pounds sterling per adult per visit. All residents in the northern part, Greek Cypriots, Maronites, nationals of other countries and Turkish Cypriots, travelling to the southern part have to pay a 4 transit charge, or 10 per month for multiple visits. These new charges have significantly reduced the number of Greek Cypriots and Maronites visiting their relatives in the northern part of Cyprus. Effective 17 April 1998, these regulations were adjusted with respect to Maronites, who were granted a reduction of the charges to 4 per visit per adult or 30 per year for multiple visits for the entire family. The charges for Greek Cypriots remain unchanged.

22. Although the standard of living of Greek Cypriots on the Karpas Peninsula does not differ significantly from that of Turkish Cypriots living in the same area, the major restriction remains that Greek Cypriots and Maronites cannot bequeath their property, even to their next of kin, unless their heirs also live in the northern part of the island. Otherwise, immovable property is expropriated by the Turkish Cypriot authorities when the owner dies.

23. In accordance with the agreement reached by the leaders of the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities on 31 July 1997 (see S/1997/962, para. 21), on 23 January 1998, in the presence of my Deputy Special Representative, the two sides met to exchange information concerning the location of graves of Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot missing persons. They also agreed to meet again to discuss the preparation of arrangements leading to the return of the remains of Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot missing persons. In a further meeting on 30 April, however, the Turkish Cypriot representative stated that he was not prepared to discuss the necessary arrangements leading to the exhumation and return of the remains of Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot missing persons until the Greek Cypriot side, as proof of its sincerity, agreed to first look into the fate of the Greek Cypriot victims of the *coup d'état* against Archbishop Makarios in 1974. The Turkish Cypriot side claims that victims of the *coup d'état* are among those persons listed as missing. This position deviates from the 31 July 1997 agreement, which calls on the two sides to work out arrangements for the exhumation and identification of the remains located in the graves on which information was exchanged on 23 January 1998. As a result of the position taken by the Turkish Cypriot side, no progress has been made towards the implementation of the 31 July 1997 agreement. The Greek Cypriot side has since decided to begin exhumation and identification of the remains located in graves in the area under its control.

### III. COMMITTEE ON MISSING PERSONS

24. In accordance with the terms of reference of the Committee on Missing Persons, upon the recommendation of the International Committee of the Red Cross, and following consultations with both sides, I am appointing Mr. Jean-Pierre Ritter as the new third member of the Committee on Missing Persons for an 18-month period. I urge both sides to accord him their full cooperation with a view to discharging the Committee's responsibilities expeditiously.

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### IV. ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL ACTIVITIES OF THE UNITED NATIONS SYSTEM

25. UNFICYP continued to act as the intermediary between the two communities to facilitate cooperation in such areas as the equitable distribution of water and electricity. Owing to poor rainfall and saline contamination, water supplies on the island continue to diminish. Wherever possible, UNFICYP encourages civilian use of the buffer zone for peaceful purposes, such as industrial or agricultural work or maintenance of public utilities and communications.

26. In March 1998, the United Nations Development Programme and the United States Agency for International Development reached an agreement for the United Nations Office for Project Services to take over functions carried out by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees until December 1997. Focusing on reconstruction and development, this programme will continue to give priority to bi-communal activities in public health, environment, sanitation, water, urban renovation, restoration and preservation of cultural heritage, education and natural resources. It will also provide financial and technical support to selected civil society organizations and non-government organizations.

## V. ORGANIZATIONAL MATTERS

27. As of 30 April 1998, UNFICYP comprised 1,226 troops and 34 civilian police. The military personnel are from Argentina (410), Austria (259), Canada (3), Finland (1), Hungary (107), Ireland (29), Slovenia (10), and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (407). On 24 May 1998, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland began deployment of a company of 97 Netherlands personnel integrated within the British contingent of UNFICYP without increasing the overall strength of the unit. The civilian police are provided by Australia (20) and Ireland (14). In addition, UNFICYP currently has a civilian component of 44 international staff and 288 local staff. The number of local staff will be reduced to 221 by 1 July 1998.

28. Mr. Diego Cordovez remained my Special Adviser on Cyprus. Mr. Gustave Feissel continued as my Deputy Special Representative and Chief of Mission of the United Nations operation in Cyprus. He will relinquish his post on 30 June 1998, and the Security Council has agreed to the appointment of Ms. Ann Hercus to succeed him (see S/1998/388 and S/1998/389). Major-General Evergisto A. de Vergara continued as Force Commander.

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## VI. FINANCIAL ASPECTS

29. The proposed budget for the maintenance of UNFICYP for the period from 1 July 1998 to 30 June 1999 is currently under consideration by the General Assembly. The cost of maintaining the Force for the 12-month period is estimated at \$43,000,900 gross (A/52/775/Add.1). That amount is inclusive of the pledged voluntary contributions of one third of the cost of the Force from the Government of Cyprus and of the \$6.5 million contributed annually by the Government of Greece. Therefore, should the Security Council decide to extend the mandate of UNFICYP beyond 30 June 1998, the annual cost of maintaining the Force would be limited to the amount indicated above.

30. As of 30 April 1998, the total outstanding assessed contributions to the UNFICYP Special Account amounted to \$15.6 million, representing some 13.5 per cent of the assessment for the Mission since 16 June 1993. The outstanding assessed contributions for all peacekeeping operations amounted to \$1.5 billion.

## VII. OBSERVATIONS

31. During the last six months, the situation along the ceasefire lines in Cyprus was relatively calm, despite continued tension. This found expression in frequent minor violations. Both sides continued to respect the ceasefire arrangement of 1974. Nevertheless, both sides continued to challenge the delineation of the ceasefire lines in certain areas and UNFICYP authority in the buffer zone.

32. The repeated appeals of the Security Council for a reduction in defence spending and a reduction in the number of foreign military troops have not been heeded by either side. The military forces and armaments in Cyprus continued to be expanded, upgraded and modernized on both sides. There has also been no progress concerning the package of reciprocal measures proposed by UNFICYP to reduce tension along the ceasefire lines, notwithstanding the Security Council's calls for early agreement to and rapid implementation of these measures. UNFICYP will continue its efforts towards that end.

33. It is regrettable that Turkish Cypriots were not allowed to participate in bi-communal activities sponsored by UNFICYP and others. There is evident value in direct contacts between the members of the two communities, especially in times when tensions are relatively high. I urge both sides, and in particular the Turkish Cypriot side, to facilitate arrangements within which bi-communal contacts can take place uninterrupted and without formalities.

34. The presence of UNFICYP on the island remains indispensable to maintain the ceasefire between the two sides, which is a prerequisite for achieving the settlement of the Cyprus question sought by the international community. Therefore, I recommend that the Security Council extend the mandate of the Force for a further period of six months until 31 December 1998. I am consulting the parties concerned on the matter and shall report to the Council as soon as these consultations have been completed.

35. I take this opportunity to express my appreciation to the Governments contributing troops and civilian police to UNFICYP for the steadfast support they have given to this peacekeeping operation of the United Nations. I also wish to thank the Governments that have made voluntary contributions towards the financing of the Force.

36. In conclusion, I wish to express my warm appreciation to my Deputy Special Representative and Chief of Mission in Cyprus, Mr. Gustave Feissel, upon his retirement at the end of June after a long and distinguished career in the service of the United Nations. I also wish to pay tribute to Major-General Evergisto A. de Vergara, the Force Commander, and to the men and women serving with UNFICYP for the efficiency and dedication with which they have discharged the responsibilities entrusted to them by the Security Council.

## Report of the Secretary-General on his Mission of Good Offices in Cyprus

(16 June 1998—S/1998/518)

1. The present report is submitted pursuant to paragraph 17 of Security Council resolution 1146 (1997) of 23 December 1997. The report on those aspects of the resolution that relate to the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) was submitted to the Council on 10 June (S/1998/488). The present report refers to my mission of good offices.

2. In the last report on my mission of good offices, dated 12 December 1997 (S/1997/973), I stated my commitment to continue the process of good offices following the elections in Cyprus in February 1998. Accompanied by Mr. Diego Cordovez, my Special Adviser on Cyprus, I met on 12 March with the permanent members of the Security Council. While expressing strong support for the Secretary-General's mission of good offices, the permanent members called for urgent action by the United Nations with a view to bringing about the earliest possible resumption of face-to-face talks between the parties.

3. The following day, on the eve of his trip to the region, my Special Adviser briefed the Security Council. He reported that both leaders had agreed to receive him, albeit separately, and stated that the main purpose of the visit was to explore the possibility of resuming face-to-face talks between the two leaders. Following the briefing, the President of the Council made an oral statement reiterating the Council's full support for the Secretary-General's mission of good offices and commending the efforts undertaken by Mr. Cordovez to that end. The Council expressed concern about the high levels of tension on the island and in the region and called upon both sides to take the practical steps necessary to move the negotiation process forward in an effective manner.

4. In letters addressed to the leaders of the two Cypriot communities, dated 26 February, I expressed my strong hope that both sides would spare no effort to reach an agreement with my Special Adviser on the necessary arrangements for a continuing and sustained process of direct negotiations. In two additional letters, delivered to the two leaders personally by Mr. Cordovez, I reiterated the importance I attached to revitalizing negotiations between the two Cypriot communities and called upon the leaders to work wholeheartedly with my Special Adviser to overcome the obstacles which for so long have impeded progress towards a principled and sustainable solution acceptable to the people of Cyprus and to the international community.

5. My Special Adviser visited the island a second time from 18 to 22 March. He met twice with Mr. Clerides, on 20 and 21 March, and three times with Mr. Denktash, on 19, 20 and 21 March. Mr. Clerides reiterated his readiness to resume direct talks under my auspices on the basis of the relevant Security Council resolutions. Mr. Denktash elaborated on his view that it was necessary to adopt a new approach based on the "acknowledgment of the existence of two fully functioning democratic States on the island". Mr. Denktash also requested my Special Adviser to convey his views to the Security Council, and expressed the wish that my Special Adviser arrange a meeting for him to convey this position to me directly. Mr. Cordovez undertook to arrange the meeting. On 28 March, I met with Mr. Denktash at Geneva at his request.

6. Following his visit to Cyprus, my Special Adviser was received in Ankara, by the Prime Minister of Turkey, who expressed his full support for my mission of good offices. A similar statement of support had been conveyed to Mr. Cordovez by the Prime Minister of Greece on an earlier occasion. On his return from Athens and Ankara, my Special Adviser briefed the special envoys and representatives at Geneva on 26 March.

7. On 20 April, in a letter addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/1998/410), I reported on my meeting of 28 March with Mr. Denktash and sought any guidance the Council might wish to provide in support of my mission of good offices. On 19 May, in a short reply to my letter, the Council reiterated its strong support for my mission, on the basis of the relevant Security Council resolutions (S/1998/411).

8. In the course of the last six months, as in the past, my Special Adviser and I myself have kept in close touch with the various envoys and representatives involved, particularly those from the United States of America and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and Presidency of the European Union, as well as others with whom my Special Adviser meets regularly for purposes of consultation and cooperation. I should like once again to reiterate my appreciation to all the Governments that have appointed special envoys to assist my good offices mission. They have provided invaluable advice and support to my Special Adviser.

9. It is regrettable that, so far, all these efforts have not proved sufficient to lead to a resumption of the process. I strongly hope that all parties involved will abstain from any action which could further exacerbate tension and I count on their fullest support in the United Nations continuing efforts. In this context, in order to continue to explore possibilities that may lead to a new momentum, my Special Adviser on Cyprus intends to visit the island in the coming weeks.

## Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Cyprus

(8 June 1999—S/1997/657)

(for the period from 9 December 1998 to 9 June 1999)

### I. INTRODUCTION

1. The present report covers developments from 9 December 1998 to 9 June 1999 and brings up to date the record of activities of the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) pursuant to Security Council resolution 186 (1964) of 4 March 1964 and subsequent Security Council resolutions, most recently resolution 1217 (1998) of 22 December 1998. With regard to my mission of good offices, diplomatic efforts are currently under way on which I expect to be able to report before the end of the month.

### II. ACTIVITIES OF THE FORCE

#### A. Maintenance of the ceasefire and the military status quo

2. During the period under review, the situation along the ceasefire lines remained essentially stable. As in the past, there were numerous small incidents, most of which were dealt with at the local level. There was an increasing number of acts of provocation, such as pointing and cocking of weapons, shouting of insults, throwing of objects, obscene gestures and shining of searchlights at the other side's positions, particularly in Nicosia where the lines are in close proximity. This has become a matter of serious concern, since such acts could trigger a serious incident. The incidents also included some overflights over the United Nations buffer zone from each side, as well as military construction on or close to the ceasefire lines, in some cases involving the National Guard, forward of the lines inside the United Nations buffer zone. UNFICYP continued to resist firmly any challenge to the delineation of the ceasefire lines.

3. The routine replacement by the Turkish forces of marker buoys off the shore south of Famagusta led to several days of tension in May, in part because one buoy was placed in the wrong position for a short while. A National Guard vessel crossed the maritime security line and came very close to the buoys. The maritime security line marks the eastern seaward extension of the median of the buffer zone, which vessels from both sides are advised, for their own safety, not to cross. UNFICYP posted new, more visible signs on the shore to warn fishing and tourist boats from the south, which tend to cross the



line in increased numbers during the summer months. Turkish forces supply boats travelling to and from Kokkina regularly cross the line at the western extension of the buffer zone closer to the shore than the minimum distance of 3,000 metres required by UNFICYP.

4. UNFICYP continued to monitor the fenced area of Varosha. Suggestions by the Turkish Cypriot side that they might open Varosha for settlement provoked a strong public reaction on the Greek Cypriot side. UNFICYP did not observe any significant change in the status quo in that area, for which the United Nations holds the Government of Turkey responsible.

**B. Restoration of normal conditions and humanitarian functions**  
**(civil affairs and civilian police)**

5. The suspension of bi-communal contacts imposed by the Turkish Cypriot authorities remained in effect and continued to limit on-island contacts between the two communities. For example, an event organized by UNFICYP at the Ledra Palace Hotel in the buffer zone on 6 March to mark International Women's Day had to go ahead without the presence of Turkish Cypriots. It should be noted that the trade unions on both sides have continued to maintain regular contact. On 28 and 29 May, they held a forum, which was attended by 300 Greek and Turkish Cypriot trade union representatives.

6. UNFICYP continued to facilitate civilian use of the buffer zone for manufacturing and agriculture and for the maintenance of public utilities. This activity includes the establishment of written agreements in order to regularize access to the buffer zone. UNFICYP also continued to act as intermediary between the two sides to facilitate cooperation on such matters as the distribution of water and electricity and the disposal of sewage.

7. During the period under review, seven Turkish citizens and five Turkish Cypriots crossed the buffer zone to the southern part of the island and were detained by the police. Some were released after a few days, while others were charged and later fined in court or sentenced to prison terms. Similarly, three Greek Cypriots and three Greek citizens were detained after crossing northward. UNFICYP visited the prisoners and facilitated their subsequent release, as well as that of their vehicles. Both sides returned impounded items more expeditiously than in the past. In accordance with long-standing procedure, UNFICYP is to be involved without delay whenever the police on either side detain a member of the other community.

8. On 21 January 1999 and 30 March 1999, 1,280 and 1,350 Turkish Cypriots, respectively, made a pilgrimage to the Hala Sultan Tekke Mosque in Larnaca. On 12 April 1999, 1,452 Greek Cypriots undertook a pilgrimage to the Apostolos Andreas Monastery in the Karpas Peninsula. UNFICYP assisted in arranging those events.

9. UNFICYP continued to carry out humanitarian tasks in respect of Greek Cypriots and Maronites residing in the northern part of the island and Turkish Cypriots in the southern part. There are now 452 Greek Cypriots in the Karpas area and one in Kyrenia, as well as 159 Maronites in the Kormakiti area. On 2 October 1998, the Turkish Cypriot authorities informed UNFICYP of the lifting of certain controls affecting Maronites and Greek Cypriots in the northern part of the island (except in restricted military areas). Following initial delays in implementation, Greek Cypriots on the Karpas Peninsula are now allowed to travel in the northern part of the island without first reporting to the local police. First-degree relatives residing in the southern part of the island benefit from more flexible crossing regulations and may stay with their relatives in the north beyond the previously imposed time limit.

10. According to the Turkish Cypriot authorities, the review of legislation that prohibits Greek Cypriots and Maronites residing in the northern part of the island from bequeathing their movable and immovable property to heirs that do not reside there has not yet been completed (see S/1998/1149, para. 16).

11. Some 310 Turkish Cypriots in the southern part of the island have made themselves known to UNFICYP. They had made very little use of the UNFICYP liaison office in Limassol, which was opened in December 1996; the office was therefore closed on 1 March 1999. UNFICYP has increased visits to the areas of residence of those Turkish Cypriots. Meetings between family members residing on different sides of the buffer zone still occur at the UNFICYP exchange point (at the crossing in Nicosia) at the rate of two or three per week.

### **C. Missing persons**

12. Because of continuing disagreement between the two sides, the Committee on Missing Persons was once again unable to proceed to its substantive work, despite the vigorous efforts of its third member. It is to be hoped that the two sides will assess the implications of this situation with due urgency and seriousness, with a view to overcoming the stalemate on this humanitarian issue.

## **III. ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL ACTIVITIES OF THE UNITED NATIONS SYSTEM**

13. The United Nations Development Programme, through the United Nations Office for Project Services, continued to implement its programme aimed at promoting confidence-building by encouraging the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities to work together in the preparation and implementation of projects in areas of mutual concern, notably public health, environ-

ment, sanitation, water, urban renovation, preservation of cultural heritage, natural resources and education.

#### IV. ORGANIZATIONAL MATTERS

14. As of May 1999, UNFICYP comprised 1,223 troops and 34 civilian police. The military personnel are from Argentina (412), Austria (239), Canada (2), Finland (9), Hungary (109), Ireland (20), Slovenia (27), the Netherlands (101) and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (304). The Argentinian contingent includes eight officers from Bolivia (2), Brazil (2) Paraguay (1) and Uruguay (3). The civilian police are provided by Australia (19) and Ireland (15). UNFICYP currently has 41 international civilian staff and 215 local civilian staff.

15. In April 1999, I accepted the resignation of my Special Adviser for Cyprus, Diego Cordovez, who will continue as my Special Adviser on other matters, especially relating to Latin American affairs. His advice has been invaluable and I am grateful for his contribution, particularly in connection with the meetings in Troutbeck and Glion in 1997. Ann Hercus continues as my Deputy Special Representative and Chief of Mission of the United Nations Operation in Cyprus and Major-General Evergisto A. de Vergara continues as Force Commander.

#### V. FINANCIAL ASPECTS

16. The General Assembly, in its resolution 53/231 of 8 June 1999, decided to appropriate an amount of \$45,630,927 gross for the maintenance of UNFICYP for the 12-month period from 1 July 1999 to 30 June 2000. That amount includes the pledged voluntary contributions of one third of the cost of the Force, equivalent to \$14,630,810, from the Government of Cyprus and the annual pledge of \$6.5 million from the Government of Greece.

17. Therefore, should the Security Council decide to extend the mandate of UNFICYP for a further period of six months as recommended in paragraph 21 below, the cost of maintaining the Force would be approximately \$22.8 million. Of that amount, approximately \$12.2 million will be assessed on Member States.

18. As at 31 May 1999, unpaid assessments to the Special Account for UNFICYP from 16 June 1993 to 30 June 1999 amounted to \$17.4 million. Total outstanding assessed contributions for all peacekeeping operations at the same date amounted to \$1,568 million.

## VI. OBSERVATIONS

19. During the past six months, the situation along the ceasefire lines remained stable. UNFICYP continued to use its best efforts to maintain the ceasefire by maintaining the United Nations buffer zone between the ceasefire lines and responding quickly to incidents. These were mostly minor, but the increasing practice by members of the opposing forces of engaging in provocative behaviour along the lines heightens the risk of more serious incidents and thus gives cause for concern.

20. The United Nations acts on the premise that both sides wish to prevent incidents. This is best achieved by enforcing strict discipline along the ceasefire lines and cooperating effectively with UNFICYP on the basis of long-standing principles and practices. The adoption of the UNFICYP package of measures to reduce tension along the ceasefire lines, which has been mentioned in past reports, would further contribute to stabilizing the situation. More direct contact between Greek and Turkish Cypriots on the island would also influence the atmosphere positively.

21. In the existing circumstances, the presence of UNFICYP on the island remains indispensable for the maintenance of the ceasefire between the two sides. I therefore recommend that the Security Council extend the mandate of the Force for a further period of six months, until 31 December 1999. I am consulting the parties concerned on the matter and shall report to the Council as soon as the consultations have been completed.

22. In conclusion, I wish to express appreciation to my Deputy Special Representative and Chief of Mission in Cyprus, Ann Hercus, and to pay tribute to the Force Commander, Major-General Evergisto A. de Vergara, and the men and women serving with UNFICYP for the efficiency and dedication with which they have discharged the responsibilities entrusted to them by the Security Council.

## Report of the Secretary-General on his Mission of Good Offices in Cyprus

(22 June 1999—S/1999/707)

1. The present report is submitted pursuant to the Security Council's request in paragraph 7 of its resolution 1218 (1998) of 22 December 1998. My report on those aspects of the resolution that relate to the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) was submitted to the Council on 8 June (S/1999/657). Meanwhile, I have informed the Council of my intention to appoint Ann Hercus as my Special Representative as of 1 July 1999.

2. As reported in my letter dated 14 December 1998 (S/1998/1166) addressed to the President of the Security Council, on 30 September 1998, following meetings with Glafcos Clerides and Rauf Denktash, I asked my Deputy Special Representative for Cyprus, Ann Hercus, to begin a process of on-island talks with both parties with a view to reducing tension and promoting progress towards a just and lasting settlement. In its resolution 1218 (1998), the Council expressed appreciation for the spirit of cooperation and constructive approach the two sides demonstrated in working with my Deputy Special Representative.

3. In accordance with Security Council resolution 1218 (1998) and in continuation of my initiative of 30 September 1998, my Deputy Special Representative has held numerous meetings with both leaders during the past six months. The substance of these "shuttle talks", as they have come to be known, has remained confidential, and both Mr. Clerides and Mr. Denktash continued to engage in them in a constructive manner.

4. Apart from their confidentiality, the specific agreed methodology of the shuttle talks is that, at this point, neither side is aware of the views expressed to my Deputy Special Representative by the other side. While this format allows me to assess to what extent there is convergence of views on the various aspects, it also has its limitations, as a formal agreement can only be achieved in comprehensive negotiations directly involving both leaders.

5. The discussions involving my Deputy Special Representative have reconfirmed the importance of the issue of political equality. In pursuing the Secretary-General's mission of good offices, my predecessors and I have dealt with the two sides on an equal footing and, together with our representatives, have conducted our work on an equal and even-handed basis. However, the Turkish Cypriot contention is that other aspects of their situation place them at a disadvantage and undermine the commitment to political equality. A major challenge for the negotiations is how to translate this commitment into cle-

ar, practical provisions to be agreed upon by both sides. I hope that both sides will approach any resumption of negotiations in that spirit. I am confident that the international community would support any solution upon which both sides can mutually agree.

6. Cyprus is fortunate that, despite the long-running dispute and continuing tension, there has been no resumption of fighting between the two sides for the past 25 years. However, the absence of a settlement, comfortable as the status quo may appear to some, remains a source of instability and tension. Neither side has anything to gain from waiting any longer. The young generations on both sides deserve to be given the opportunity to live peacefully and in prosperity. It should be understood by all concerned that a lasting settlement can only be reached in negotiations.

7. In the decades during which it has resisted efforts at settlement, the Cyprus problem has become overlain with legalistic abstractions and artificial labels, which are more and more difficult to disentangle and which would appear increasingly removed from the actual needs of both communities. It is now time to focus on the core issues.

8. Over the years, many elements that would make up a solution have been identified. Based on past and current discussions and negotiations with and between the two leaders, the remaining core issues, in my view, put simply, are: (a) security, (b) distribution of powers, (c) property and (d) territory. A compromise on these issues would remove the remaining obstacles towards a peaceful settlement. It is essential, however, that these core issues be addressed without preconditions in a practical, realistic and straightforward manner in comprehensive negotiations.

9. I appreciate the support expressed by the Heads of State of the "G-8" countries, five of whom are members of the Security Council, at their summit held in Cologne, Germany, from 18 to 20 June for holding "a comprehensive negotiation covering all relevant issues". Their statement highlights the continuing interest of the international community in a solution of the Cyprus problem, a solution which would have a positive effect on peace and stability in the entire region. In particular, the members of the G-8 have urged me "in accordance with relevant Security Council resolutions to invite the leaders of the two parties to negotiations in the fall of 1999".

10. In light of the above, and subject to the Security Council's guidance, I am ready to invite both leaders to enter into a process of comprehensive negotiations without preconditions and in a spirit of compromise and cooperation. While each leader faces the responsibility of representing the views and aspirations of his side, they have the joint responsibility for achieving a concrete, mutually acceptable and forward-looking solution. I will ask my Special Representative designate to continue the process of dialogue with the parties to that end.

# Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Cyprus

(29 November 1999—S/1999/1203)

(for the period from 10 June to 29 November 1999)

## I. INTRODUCTION

1. The present report on the United Nations operation in Cyprus covers developments from 10 June to 29 November 1999 and brings up to date the record of activities of the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) pursuant to Security Council resolution 186 (1964) of 4 March 1964 and subsequent Security Council resolutions, most recently resolution 1251 (1999) of 29 June 1999, as well as of my mission of good offices pursuant to Security Council resolution 1250 (1999) of 29 June 1999.

## II. ACTIVITIES OF THE FORCE

### A. Maintenance of the ceasefire and military status quo

2. During the period under review, the situation along the ceasefire lines remained essentially stable, although there were numerous minor but provocative incidents, particularly in the area of Nicosia, where the positions of the opposing forces are in close proximity. These incidents included the pointing and cocking of weapons, laser and searchlight illumination, the shouting of insults and stone-throwing. Military construction along the ceasefire lines continued on both sides, including minefield refurbishment and the construction of anti-tank ditches by the National Guard.

3. There were several violations by the National Guard in the area of Athienou. On 17 October, a military ceremony was held in Athienou in the buffer zone, attended by the Commander of the National Guard and 60 armed soldiers. This was protested by UNFICYP. At the beginning of November, UNFICYP noticed that a house in Athienou had been equipped with additional telephone lines and a very high frequency antenna. Inside the house, a military map and National Guard personnel in uniform could be seen, creating the appearance of a military command post. UNFICYP raised the matter with the National Guard and the activities at the house ceased. UNFICYP also found five machine gun trenches near Athienou, which have now been filled in.

4. The annual National Guard exercise, "Nikiforos", took place from 2 to 7 October 1999. The profile and duration of the exercise was reduced from

previous years. With the exception of large convoys using highways that cross parts of the United Nations buffer zone, the exercise did not affect the military status quo along the ceasefire lines. During the traditional National Guard parade on 1 October, the TOR-M1 low to medium altitude surface-to-air missile system was publicly displayed for the first time. The annual Turkish Forces exercise "TOROS II" took place from 25 to 27 November; it too was on a smaller scale than in previous years.

5. UNFICYP continued to monitor the fenced area of Varosha. Some alterations of the status quo, including the construction and opening of a supermarket, the repositioning of a fence to increase the area used for public access to the beach and minor modifications to existing properties, were observed. The United Nations continues to hold the Government of Turkey is responsible for the maintenance of the status quo in Varosha.

6. Crossings of the eastern maritime security line by Greek Cypriots boats increased significantly during the summer holiday season, despite frequent public warnings by UNFICYP. These crossings are provocative vis-à-vis the Turkish Forces and on occasion caused them to fire warning shots.

7. During the period under review, more hunters penetrated deeper into the buffer zone and were more aggressive towards UNFICYP personnel than in previous years.

8. There were no significant developments concerning the matters addressed in paragraphs 3 to 9 of Security Council resolution 1251 (1999).

#### **B. Restoration of normal conditions and humanitarian functions**

9. On-island contact between the two communities remained very limited owing to the restrictions imposed by Turkish Cypriot authorities. However, an international open house, organized by UNFICYP on United Nations Day, was attended by some 5,000 people, of whom more than 3,000 were Turkish Cypriots. On 12 November, a Turkish and a Greek television station organized and aired a debate attended by Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot politicians, business personalities and journalists at the Ledra Palace Hotel.

10. UNFICYP continued to promote civilian activities in the buffer zone, subject to operational and security requirements. New regulations related to farming at night and the burning of fields were introduced to increase safety. UNFICYP maintained close cooperation with both sides in order to resolve problems concerning water, electricity and sewage. In the mixed village of Pyla, UNFICYP continued to promote stability and the well-being of residents.



11. On 24 June 1999, 234 sick children and their caregivers visited the Apostolos Andreas Monastery on the Karpas Peninsula. Another group of 963 Greek Cypriots undertook the same pilgrimage on 15 August 1999. Two groups of Turkish Cypriots, numbering 137 and 829 persons, visited the memorial site in Kokkina on 26 June and 8 August 1999, respectively. UNFICYP facilitated all of these visits.

12. UNFICYP carried out its mandated humanitarian tasks in support of the 432 Greek Cypriots and 159 Maronites living in the northern part of the island and the 310 Turkish Cypriots in the southern part who have made themselves known to the Force. As in the past, UNFICYP helped to arrange the annual delivery of school books to the Greek Cypriot school in Rizokarpaso. This year the delivery was delayed because the Turkish Cypriot authorities objected to the books on political grounds. On 17 November, 68 out of 120 books were distributed to the school. Another unresolved problem is the Turkish Cypriot practice of preventing the burial of Greek Cypriot residents in the Karpas Peninsula whenever their bodies have been temporarily brought to the southern part of the island for post mortem examinations. UNFICYP continued to press the Turkish Cypriot authorities to allow Greek Cypriots from the Peninsula to be buried there regardless of where and by whom the post mortem examinations were conducted.

### III. MISSING PERSONS

13. During the period under review, the third member of the Committee on Missing Persons continued his consultations on both sides in order to resume the Committee's activities. While these exchanges of views further clarified the respective positions of both sides, they did not resolve their differences. It is to be hoped that the two sides will assess the implications of this situation with due urgency and seriousness, with a view to overcoming the stalemate on this humanitarian issue.

### IV. ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL ACTIVITIES OF THE UNITED NATIONS SYSTEM

14. The United Nations Development Programme, through the United Nations Office for Project Services, continued to implement its programme aimed at confidence-building by encouraging both communities to work together in the preparation and implementation of projects in areas of mutual concern, notably public health, environment, sanitation, water, urban renovation, preservation of cultural heritage, natural resources and education.

## V. MISSION OF GOOD OFFICES OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

15. On 14 November 1999, in response to my invitation, both Mr. Glafcos Clerides and Mr. Rauf Denktash agreed to start proximity talks in New York on 3 December 1999 in order to prepare the ground for meaningful negotiations leading to a comprehensive settlement. I shall keep the Security Council informed of developments.

## VI. ORGANIZATIONAL MATTERS

16. As of November 1999, UNFICYP comprised 1,219 troops and 35 civilian police. The military personnel are from Argentina (411), Austria (237), Canada (2), Finland (9), Hungary (111), Slovenia (29), the Netherlands (100), Ireland (5) and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (315). The Argentinean contingent includes eight soldiers from Bolivia (2), Brazil (2), Paraguay (1) and Uruguay (3). The civilian police are provided by Austria (20) and Ireland (15). UNFICYP currently has 234 civilian staff, of whom 37 were recruited internationally and 197 locally.

17. My Special Representative and Chief of Mission, Dame Ann Hercus, left at the end of September. Mr. James Holger has replaced her as Acting Special Representative and Chief of Mission. I have appointed Mr. Alvaro de Soto as my Special Adviser on Cyprus. He will take up residence on the island in the spring of 2000 as my Special Representative. Major-General Evergisto de Vergara continued as Force Commander, but will relinquish this post on 15 December 1999. I plan to write to the Security Council shortly about his replacement.

## VII. FINANCIAL ASPECTS

18. The General Assembly, by its resolution 53/231 of 8 June 1999, appropriated the amount of \$45,630,927 gross for the maintenance of UNFICYP for the 12-month period from 1 July 1999 to 30 June 2000. This amount includes the pledged voluntary contributions of one-third of the cost of the Force, equivalent to \$14,630,810, from the Government of Cyprus and the annual pledge of \$6.5 million from the Government of Greece.

19. Therefore, should the Security Council decide to extend the mandate of UNFICYP for a further period of six months as recommended in paragraph 22 below, the cost of maintaining the Force would be limited to the amount indicated above. Of that amount, some \$12.25 million will be assessed on Member States.

20. As at 15 November 1999, unpaid assessments to the Special Account for UNFICYP from 16 June 1993 to 31 December 1999 amounted to \$19.1 mil-

lion. Total outstanding assessed contributions for all peacekeeping operations amounted to \$1.7 billion.

### VIII. OBSERVATIONS

21. During the past six months the situation along the ceasefire lines has remained stable. The prevention of incidents remains dependent entirely upon the discipline imposed upon the troops on both sides and upon their consistent cooperation with UNFICYP. This year's United Nations Day celebration was a timely reminder that direct contact between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots can positively influence the atmosphere.

22. Under the existing circumstances, the presence of UNFICYP on the island remains indispensable for the maintenance of the ceasefire between the two sides. Therefore, I recommend that the Security Council extend the mandate of the Force for a further period of 6 months, until 15 June 2000. I am consulting the parties on the matter and shall report to the Council as soon as the consultations have been completed.

23. In conclusion, I wish to express my appreciation to Dame Ann Hercus for her valuable contribution as my Special Representative and Chief of Mission in Cyprus and to Mr. James Holger who is currently the Acting Special Representative and Chief of Mission. I also wish to pay tribute to the Force Commander, Major-General Evergisto de Vergara, and to the men and women serving in UNFICYP for the efficiency and dedication with which they have discharged the responsibilities entrusted to them by the Security Council.

## **Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Cyprus—Addendum**

(15 December 1999—S/1999/1203/Add. 1)

(for the period from 10 June 1999 to 29 November 1999)

### **Addendum**

In paragraph 22 of my report of 29 November 1999 (S/1999/1203), I recommend that the Security Council extend the mandate of the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) for a further period of six months and I indicated that I would report to the Council on my consultations with the parties concerned on the matter. I wish to inform the Council that the Government of Cyprus as well as the Governments of Greece and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland have indicated their concurrence with the proposed extension. The Government of Turkey has indicated that it concurs with and supports the position of the Turkish Cypriot party, namely that UNFICYP can operate on both sides of the island only on the basis of the consent of both parties and that the Turkish Cypriot authorities will accordingly request UNFICYP to work with them to develop modalities of UNFICYP's operations in northern Cyprus.

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#### (a) *Journal Article Citation:*

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#### (b) *Book Article/Chapter Citation:*

Zambouras, Sergios. "Current Greek Attitudes and Policy." Cyprus: The Need for New Perspectives. Ed. Clement H. Dodd. Cambridgeshire, England: The Eothen Press, 1999. pp. 114-127.

#### (c) *Book Citation:*

Reddaway, John. The British Connection with Cyprus since Independence. Oxford: The University Printing House, 1986.

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