The Impact of Foreign Defense Aid on the Fight Against Insurgency in Northern Nigeria

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ABSTRACT

Terrorism is one of the major challenges states face globally. The importance of this problem creates strong incentives for policymakers to design efficient counter-insurgency policies. From the global north to the global south, terrorism has become a reality of the modern world. Developing countries are more vulnerable because they lack the technical expertise to handle this imminent threat. As a result, policymakers of most Western democracies employed the idea of providing defense aid to increase their capabilities towards preventing and combating insurgencies. Although fighting insurgency by foreign defense aid continues to find resonance in the policy circles, academics are more skeptical of this policy.

Since 2009, Boko Haram has remained the biggest security threat in Nigeria. The group challenges the sovereignty of the country in the course of promoting Islamic revivalism. The military began to face a new paradigm of conflict (non-conventional warfare). The country lacks the technical expertise and financial capacity to produce the necessary equipment for the military. Subsequently, the government sought aid from friendly countries like the United States and the United Kingdom. However, the lingering insurgency in northern Nigeria has prompted the need for questions to be asked. What has been the outcome of the defense aid? This research work delves into the impact of foreign defense aid on Nigeria's war against insurgency. The question guiding this study is how effective has Nigeria's use of foreign defense aid been in the fight against insurgency?

Keywords: Insurgency, Terrorism, Foreign Defense Aid, Boko Haram.

ÖZ

Terörizm, devletlerin küresel olarak karşılaştığı en büyük zorluklardan biridir. Bu sorunun önemi, politika yapıcılar için etkili isyan karşıtı politikalar tasarlamaları için güçlü teşvikler yaratır. Küresel kuzeyden küresel güneye terörizm, modern dünyanın bir gerçeği haline geldi. Gelişmekte olan ülkeler, bu yakın tehdidi ele alacak teknik uzmanlığa sahip olmadıkları için daha savunmasızdır. Sonuç olarak, çoğu Batı demokrasisinin politika yapıcıları, isyanları önleme ve bunlarla mücadele etme yeteneklerini artırmak için savunma yardımı sağlama fikrini kullandılar. Dış savunma yardımı ile isyanla mücadele politika çevrelerinde yankı bulmaya devam etse de, akademisyenler bu politikaya daha şüpheyle yaklaşıyor.

Boko Haram, 2009'dan beri Nijerya'daki en büyük güvenlik tehdidi olmaya devam ediyor. Grup, İslami uyanışı teşvik etme sürecinde ülkenin egemenliğine meydan okuyor. Ordu, yeni bir çatışma paradigmasıyla (konvansiyonel olmayan savaş) karşı karşıya gelmeye başladı. Ülke, ordu için gerekli teçhizatı üretecek teknik uzmanlığa ve mali kapasiteye sahip değil. Daha sonra hükümet, Amerika Birleşik Devletleri ve Birleşik Krallık gibi dost ülkelerden yardım istedi. Ancak, kuzey Nijerya'da süregelen isyan, soruların sorulması ihtiyacını doğurdu. Savunma yardımının sonucu ne oldu? Bu araştırma çalışması, yabancı savunma yardımının Nijerya'nın isyana karşı savaşı üzerindeki etkisini araştırıyor. Bu çalışmaya rehberlik eden soru, Nijerya'nın dış savunma yardımını kullanmasının isyanla mücadelede ne kadar etkili olduğudur?

Anahtar Kelimeler: İsyan, Terörizm, Dış Savunma Yardımı, Boko Haram.

DEDICATION

To my family and the victims of Terrorism globally

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

x

ACOTA   Africa Contingency Operations Training and Assistance

CJTF   Civilian Joint Task Force

DOD   Department of Defense

DICON   Defense Industrial Corporation of Nigeria

DAC   Development Assistance Committee

EFCC   Economic and Financial Crimes Commission

EIRU   External Intelligence Response Unit

GSCF   Global Security Contingency Fund

IDPs   Internally Displaced Persons

LCBC   Lake Chad Basin Commission

JTF   Joint Task Force

MNJTF   Multinational Joint Task Force

NSA   National Security Advisor

OECD   Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development

TPA   Terrorism Prevention Act

TSCTP   Trans-Sahara Counter Terrorism Partnership

USAID   United States Agency for International Development

Chapter 1

INTRODUCTION

Africa and indeed Nigeria have witnessed different forms of conflict, and violence, resulting in unprecedented levels of political and economic instability over the years. While some Sub-Saharan African countries still face these challenges, others have been able to climb their way out of the quagmire that is associated with such setbacks. The situation in Nigeria is one that continues to persist despite several attempts at appeasing various factions associated with the insecurity in the northern part of the country (Bodunde & Balogun, 2019:526). This has thrown up an interesting challenge for the intelligence community in the state. The effectiveness of intelligence, therefore, had been under examination due to the recurrent failures of the security agents to put an end to the insurgency (Daniel, 2020). This has necessitated the Nigerian government to resort to defense aid from countries like the United States, Britain, and France, as well as international institutions to safeguard its citizens and territorial integrity (Onuoha & Ugwueze, 2014:29-30).

However, there have been different postulations about the impact of foreign defense aid on the fight against terrorism or insurgency as the case may be. Some scholars like, (Easterly 2006, Stotsky 2008, Cohen and Easterly 2009) have opined that defense aid by dominant powers to emerging economies and less developed countries does not necessarily guarantee a positive turn in the tide. Some have even argued that on the contrary, an increase in aid, from foreign countries into war-torn regions aggravates

war and conflict and, by extension, terrorism, by decreasing state ability and democratic institutions (O'Neal, 2013), as well as by promoting "public corruption" and severely impacting economic development and political institutions. The reason put forward for this school of thought is that the political leadership in the recipient country tends to use aid to consolidate their hold on political power (Friedman 1995, Moyo 2009, Strandow & Tanner 2011). In contrast, scholars like (Young & Findley 2011, Mercy Corps 2015) argue, foreign aid (that targets specific sectors like poverty, education, health, conflict prevention) serve as an effective counter-terrorist tool and even more effective than military intervention.

Be that as it may, this study would be concerned with analyzing critically, the impact that foreign defense aid has on Nigeria's war on the insurgency. The period of 2011-2020 would be assessed to figure out the best way to gain positive outcomes from foreign defense aid. Since the wake of the terror acts in the country, a significant number of casualties have been recorded. The Boko Haram insurgency claimed thousands of lives estimated as of 2020 to be approximately 39,385 (Campbell, 2020). They forced about 2.8 million people to leave their homes, leading to the establishment of Internally Displaced Persons (USAID, 2016). Furthermore, agricultural activities in the region were halted for several years thereby creating food insecurity in the whole country, commercial and educational accomplishments were at low ebb for almost a decade in the most affected areas (Sule et al. 2019:8). Above all, Boko Haram's onslaught on Nigeria has set back efforts at the national development of not only Nigeria but also its neighboring countries, i.e., Niger, Chad, and Cameroon (Amao, 2020:363). It is therefore imperative to identify the loopholes concerning the appropriation of defense aid to ensure maximum outcomes.

1.1 Statement of Problem

It was never given much thought that it will come to a point in the history of northern Nigeria when suicide bombing and other terrorist activities will become a front-burner in the national discussion. However, with the activities of Boko Haram, it is obvious that Nigeria is not immune from terrorist attacks. The persistence of the insurgency has become a threat to Nigeria and the international community. Many scholarly works of literature on Boko Haram insurgency in the country highlighted poor governance, unemployment, poverty, widespread corruption, and underdevelopment as the cardinal factors that gave rise to the radical evolution of the group (Amao, 2020, Omenma et al. 2020, Onuoha et al. 2020, Okoye et al. 2020, Onapajo & Ozden 2020, etc.).

The government and security forces have adopted various strategies over the years to end the insurgency. But the group maintained a rise in its attacks which started with the use of bow and arrows, machetes, and the use of a motorcycle. It now employs sophisticated weapons, vehicles, suicide bombing, and Improvised Explosive Device (IED). Its unselective attacks went beyond the government onto defenseless civilians (Alabi, 2013).

This has compelled the government to resort to foreign defense aid. Subsequently, Nigeria has been receiving aid such as monetary, technical assistance, and military hardware from countries and international institutions in the fight against insurgency. However, the lingering insecurity in northern Nigeria has prompted the need for questions to be asked about what has been done with the defense aid packages that have been given to the Nigerian state. This concern, therefore, motivated this study to

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examine the impact of foreign defense aid on Nigeria's counter-insurgency drive, with the following objectives:

i. To examine the specific aspects of defense aid that have been channeled towards ending the war on insurgency in northern Nigeria.

ii. To discuss the effectiveness of Nigeria's use of foreign defense aid in the fight against insurgency.

1.2 Research Questions

This study, therefore, seeks to address the following:

i. What specific aspects of defense aid have been channeled towards ending the insurgency in northern Nigeria?

ii. How effective has Nigeria's use of foreign defense aid been in the fight against insurgency?

1.3 Significance of the Study

The increased impacts of the Boko Haram insurgency on lives and property are a serious threat to Nigeria's security. Therefore, this study was influenced by the need to understand the effectiveness of Nigeria's use of foreign defense in the fight against insurgency. I specifically identified the defense aid received by the government and its relevance in addressing the uprising. The study examined the various approaches employed by the government to tackle the Boko Haram insurgency. It also scrutinized the obstacles behind the effectiveness of Nigeria's use of defense aid in addressing the watershed to enable further understanding of approaches that may help the Nigerian government and security forces to improve their policies for more effective counter-insurgency efforts.

1.4 Hypothesis

This study is guided by the following hypothesis:

H1. The refusal of donor countries to further provide defense aid to Nigeria as a result of human rights violations has disrupted its counter-insurgency efforts.

H2. Disbursement of foreign defense aid engenders corruption among government, and high-ranking military officials, which in turn hindered the effectiveness of defense aid on Nigeria's war against insurgency.

1.5 Methodology

This research is an empirical analysis of how effective has Nigeria's use of foreign defense aid been in the fight against the Boko Haram insurgency. Qualitative methods are used in both data collection and data analysis. it makes use of secondary sources of data. Mostly books, journal articles, newspapers, and statistics from the global terrorism index. Also, reports from Transparency International, Amnesty International, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), Ministry of Defense, and other related documents.

It employs a case study design that focuses on Nigeria. The goal, in this case, is to examine the effectiveness of Nigeria's use of foreign defense aid in the fight against insurgency and highlights the obstacles behind its success in the country. The choice of case study analysis in the methodology of this study was inspired by two reasons. As a qualitative research method, a case study avails the researcher an opportunity to carry out an in-depth analysis of a phenomenon. Secondly, the constraints of time and resources render case study more feasible within the context of an MA thesis time frame than other methods. In the words of Robert Yin (2009:14), "a case study is an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon in depth and within its real-life context especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not evident".

1.6 Scope and Limitation

The study, therefore, covers the period from 2011 to 2020, with particular emphasis on northern Nigeria. Although, poverty, and many other issues, are involved in the recurrent survival of the insurgency in the region. However, it is outside the scope of this inquiry. Hence, the study will be restricted to address the research questions raised above. The main limitation of the study is the absence of a compiled statistics on the amount of foreign defense aid the country received within the time frame of the inquiry. Also, financial constraints and inability to travel, to conduct interviews with the Nigerian military personnel and government officials as well as the lack of access to sensitive data from security agencies. These limitations have therefore made this study rely heavily on the secondary sources of data.

1.7 Road Map

The study will contain six chapters, the first chapter encompasses the introductory part of the study, the research problem, aims and objectives of the study, hypothesis. Scope and limitations as well as the research methodology.

The second chapter reviews relevant literature on the negative impact of foreign military aid in developing countries. Where a gap will be identified to fill in this study.

Chapter three explores the Boko Haram insurgency in northern Nigeria, and it also identifies the defense aid packages the country received in its effort to address the insurgency.

Chapter four examines the strategies employed by the government to address the insurgency. It dwells also on providing empirical evidence to ascertain how the refusal

of donors to further provide defense aid, as a result of human rights violations disrupted Nigeria's counter-insurgency struggles.

Chapter five focuses on how the disbursement of foreign defense aid engenders corruption among government, and high-ranking military officials, which in turn hindered the effectiveness of defense aid in Nigeria's war against insurgency.

Chapter six summarizes the study and concludes base on the findings of the inquiry, with recommendations on what can be done, to put an end to the insurgency.

Chapter 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1 Introduction

This chapter reviews the concepts of terrorism, insurgency, foreign aid and previous studies on the impact of foreign military aid on the fight against terrorism. It centers on the negative effect of military aid on developing countries. It thereafter provides the theoretical foundation upon which this study rests. At the end of the chapter, a summary of the literature review is provided.

2.2 Terrorism

The concept of terrorism is ambiguous to define. Scholars hold different views concerning the conceptualization of terrorism. Therefore, there is no universally accepted definition, and the term remains unclear to understand. Hoffman (2006) maintains that the lack of general agreement on the definition is because hardly anyone agrees to be termed as a terrorist, as many perpetrators of the terrorist act often identify themselves as liberators or freedom fighters. On the other hand, Jackson et al (2011) argues that because terrorism means different things to different people, governments, and political views, conceptualizing the accurate definition of terrorism would be subjective. For example, most countries or people usually define terrorism from the lens of religious motivations, state, and non-state-sponsored terrorism.

Although terrorism as a concept is not clear, it has some key characteristics that several scholars agreed upon to delineate when actions taken by an individual or group

constitute terrorism or not, which includes "the use of violence, harm, and threats; terror, fear, and intimidations, political motivations; the targeting of civilians, non-combatants, and innocents, as well as indiscriminate violence and psychological coercion, etc." (Shanahan, 2016:230-235).

Terrorism, according to the United States Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), "is the unlawful use of force or violence against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population or any segment thereof, in furtherance of social or political goals" (Shanahan, 2016:108). In this sense, political elites or individuals can employ terrorism as means to attain their political objectives.

Brown & Korff (2009) agrees with this assertion, arguing that terrorism is an illegitimate use of violence against individuals or government to cause political change or extension of diplomacy. It can be carried out either by the military or nonmilitary. Thus, terrorism connotes the threatened use of violence or the real use of violence to influence a political change at all costs. This basic approach of terrorism is the application of force and intimidation to instigate fear to bring about the desired feeling of vulnerability and surrender among their target victims.

In similar vein, the United States Department of Defense defines terrorism as the "calculated use of unlawful violence or threat of unlawful violence to inculcate fear; intended to coerce or to intimidate governments or societies to achieve political, religious, or ideological goals" (US Army, 2009:37). This definition is not without criticism as modern terrorism such as Cyber-terrorism does not necessarily requires the use of violence.

Terrorists mostly employed non-conventional methods like guerrilla warfare, murder, suicide bombings, hijackings, kidnappings, and political assassinations to attain their goals. Boko Haram has exhibited all these illegitimate actions in its mode of operations. These immoralities are evident in the activities of the group. Starting from the 2011 bomb attack on the United Nations building in Abuja to the 2014 abduction of 276 Chibok girls to the 2015 suicide bomb attack in the Kwari market in Kano by the group associates, demonstrate clear examples of terrorism. Besides, the political goal of Boko Haram to establish an Islamic Caliphate and abhors the secularized system of the Nigerian state, as well as western education, indicates an ambition for a change of social and political order (Amao, 2020).

2.3 Insurgency

Adedire et al (2016) defines insurgency as an organized movement that aims to overthrow a constituted government through the use of subversion and armed conflict. From the stand point of O'Neill (2005:62) insurgency "is the struggle between non-ruling groups and those that hold power (ruling authorities) in which the non-ruling group consciously uses political resources (like propaganda and protests) and violence to destroy, reformulate, or sustain the basis of legitimacy of one or more aspects of politics." In an important contribution, Steven Metz (2012) conceptualizes insurgency as a form of war used by insurgents in pursuit of political objectives, often to seize state power and become the state (and thus attain a monopoly on sanctioned violence).

As cited in Adedire et al. (2016) The Counter-Insurgency Initiative (2009) has defined insurgency "as the organized use of rebellion and violence to nullify, or challenge political control of a region. Insurgents seek to subvert or displace the government and completely or partially control the resources and population of a given territory". They

do so through the use of force (including guerrilla warfare, terrorism, coercion or intimidation, propaganda, subversion, and political mobilization). Since their resources do not permit an immediate attempt to seize the government's center of power.

Gompert and Gordon discern insurgency "as war by other means composed of organized movements to overthrow existing ruling structures by a combination of force and popular appeal" (Gompert & Gordon 2008: xxix). In this sense, insurgency is an organized, armed political movement whose main objective may be the confiscation of power through revolutionary takeover and substitution of the existing regime. The common denominator for most insurgent groups is their goal of gaining control of people or a particular territory. This objective distinguishes insurgent groups from terrorist organizations. It is important to note that labelling a movement as an insurgency does not convey a normative judgment on the legality of the movement; the term insurgency is simply a description of the nature of the conflict.

Equating insurgency with terrorism has been a major point of contention among academics. Scholars often debate on whether an organization is an insurgency or a terrorist movement. Goswami (2009:69) attempts to differentiates the two concepts by arguing that insurgents have desire to control a given territory and terrorists do not, instead using violence against non- combatants 'for political signaling'. It is more accurate to treat terrorism as a tactic or operational method which can be used in a variety of strategies, including a strategy of insurgency. Pure terrorist movements are nearly always ones which are incapable of implementing a full-scale strategy of insurgency. Insurgents often use terrorism heavily in the initial stages of their strategy, hoping that it will gain attention and draw support which can then be used in a more

general campaign using a strategy of insurgency (Metz, 2012:38). Insurgencies rarely engulf the whole country in armed clashes. Their leaders are always in search of soft spots to attack where they can inflict maximum damage at lowest cost to themselves. This is the strategy deploy by Boko Haram through suicide bombing.

From the foregone analysis, we can deduce that not all insurgency movements are violent but most of the struggles entails the use of terrorist act to draw the attention of government. The same can be said on the Boko Haram movement in northern Nigeria, whose aim is to replace the existing secularized system of the country with a new system that will be governed based on the tenets of Sharia Law (Islamic state). In other words, it aspires for a complete socio-political change in the country. Drawing from the fact that Boko Haram insurgents employed terrorist act in their course, the concept of terrorism and insurgency will be used interchangeably in this study.

2.4 Foreign Aid

There are several definitions of aid in scholarly literature. From the standpoint of Ajayi, "aid is a form of assistance by a government or financial institution to the needy or poor countries, which could be in form of money or any kind" (Ajayi, 2002). Foreign aid is a philanthropic act by one state to another. This encompasses any flow of capital or technical resources to Less Developed Countries (LDCs) (Intelligent Economist, 2019).

Lancaster defined foreign aid as "the voluntary transfer of resources from one sovereign state to another, a Non-Governmental Organization (NGO), or International Organizations, aimed at achieving better human conditions in the aid recipient state" (Lancaster, 2008:9). Foreign aid could be in a form of economic aid, i.e., an investment

in the economy of the needy state, loan, and infrastructural development. It can also be in form of military aid, i.e., provision of military hardware at soft rates, defense pact either bilateral or multilateral (Ukpong, 2017:1).

In a similar vein, Todaro and Smith (2010) sees foreign aid as a transnational transfer of public funds in the form of grants or loans either directly from one government to another (bilateral assistance) or indirectly through a multilateral assistant agency such as the World Bank. In other words, foreign aid is any movement of capital to developing countries that meets two criteria:

i.   Its goals should be non-profit and

ii.   The interest rate, as well as the repayment period for borrowed capital, should be softer than commercial terms.

Tosun & et al (2020) defines foreign aid "as donations, credits, and debts handed out by a country or by an international organization to another country or international organization to promote the economic and social development, enhancements in democracy and human rights, social equality or to provide the general requirements in an emergency, etc."

To Hans Morgenthau, "Foreign aid is one of the essential innovations which the modern time has introduced into the practice of foreign policy". Morgenthau refers to six distinct types of foreign aid, "Humanitarian foreign aid, foreign military aid, subsistence foreign aid, bribery, prestige foreign aid and foreign aid for economic development." He underlined that out of the aforementioned six types of aid only foreign humanitarian aid is offered for non-political motives (Morgenthau, 1962:301). It can be used for political goals if it functions under a political context. Since foreign

aid has often been linked to the interest of donor and recipient countries, like a state's foreign policy, it is not easy to understand.

The Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), defines foreign aid as global financial flow, technical support, and commodities that are; design to foster economic growth and welfare as their primary goal. Provided as either concessional loans or grants (OECD, 2006).

However, foreign defense aid differs from direct external intervention because it delegates the task of fighting to recipient governments and signals an alliance to various audiences. It is distinct from development or economic aid due to being tied to specific purchases of military hardware and training. Therefore, foreign defense aid is defined in this chapter as the supply of weapons and military training by one country to another, (or from powerful countries to weak ones) to build their capabilities to prevent, detect, and respond to security threats.

2.5 Evolution of Foreign Aid

The emergence of modern aid can be traced to the aftermath of World War II. The main purpose of foreign aid in 1948 was for the reconstruction of war-ravaged Europe, as many countries suffered from the effect of the war and need money for recovery. The United States created the Marshall Plan to help Europe, this plan was considered to be the first international aid donation. However, with the success of aid in recovering Europe, it became a widely accepted opinion that investment capital was critical for development, in the absence of national savings as well as the physical and human resources to attract investment, foreign aid was perceived as the only way to

spark higher investment, which would lead to greater economic growth. Thus, many donors shifted their direction to developing countries particularly in Africa, Asia, and Latin America (Moyo, 2009:60-63).

Furthermore, in the 1950s and 1960s, foreign aid witnessed a monumental development, about $950 million had been transferred to Africa, with the main emphasis on the community development movements and productive sectors, like the support for green revolutions and infrastructure. In the 1970s, the World Bank and many donor countries broaden their objectives to encompass poverty eradication and human needs like education and health due to the growing level of poverty in third world countries such as Ghana, Congo, Zambia to mention three, largely caused by the 1970s global economic recession. Towards the end of the 1970s Africa, in particular, was flooded with foreign aid. The continent had received a total of about $36 billion in external support (Moyo, 2009:66-72).

Similarly, in the 1980s international aid focused on macroeconomic reforms and market liberalization, targeting economic development, trade, financial systems, and the promotion of market-based principles to restructure macroeconomic policies in developing countries. This development came as a result of the 1979 oil crunch that led to the global financial crisis. In an attempt to stabilize the situation, many banks that offered loans to the developing countries decided to raise their interest rates, soon the amount of borrowing intensified to the extent that debt was unsustainable. Africa's debt, for example, increased from $2 billion in 1975 to $8 billion in 1982. Due to the increase in global interest rates, the universal recession became almost inevitable (Edwards, 2015:291-295).

Nevertheless, in the 1990s, donors focused on assisting economic and political transition, as well as governance in developing countries, due to the failure of the past decade's aid interventions to improve their economic growth. While Asia and much of Latin American countries were decisively on the growth track, with fewer issues on their economic stability, many African countries were economically relapsed, as a result of poor leadership and weak institutions (Edwards, 2015:293).

More so, in the 2000s onward international aid donors focused on the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and later Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), issues such as climate change, global health (HIV/AIDs, Ebola, Polio, etc.), poverty alleviation, universal education, gender equality, women empowerment, etc. in less developed countries were given much consideration. The event of 9/11, 2001 also influenced the decisions of donor countries, particularly the United States to shift their focus toward security in developing countries, as a result of their vulnerability to terrorist attacks, which in turn, affect global security. Security was later included in the foreign aid program (Kamiljon, 2006:15).

Academics are skeptical concerning the effectiveness of foreign defense aid on the fight against terrorism. While some scholars have opined that foreign aid by dominant powers to emerging economies and less developed countries does not necessarily guarantee a positive turn in the tide. Others stress that an increase in aid from foreign countries into war-torn regions aggravates war and conflict and, by extension, terrorism. Further, it decreases state ability and democratic institutions by promoting public corruption which in turn affects economic development and political institutions. The reason put forward for this school of thought is that the political

leadership in the recipient country tends to use aid to consolidate their hold on political power.

Easterly (2007:330) one of the prominent critics of foreign aid to developing countries subscribes to this view. He opined that the inflow of foreign aid to developing countries subverts government incentives for accountability. The recipient nation considers such to be windfall resources, which generate corruption. Influential people, for example, government authorities exploit these alleged "godsend resources" and divert an enormous part of this cash inflow to themselves to the detriment of the mass population. He observes further that foreign aid promotes dependency in developing countries, which explains the reason why government officials seem to have calculated that the donor countries will continue to support them fight poverty and insecurity in their countries despite their failure to promote good policies that will improve their economic and security condition.

Djankov &et al (2008), Rajan and Subramanian (2008) concur that foreign aid harms the growth of less developed countries. Although aid could reduce corruption in non-industrial countries because it comes along with terms and conditions, the conditions might not be favorable to the aid recipient countries. Aid has contributed to problems such as rent-seeking behavior, corruption, moral hazard, and reduced demand for democratic accountability in the recipient countries. Maren (1997) opinioned that food aid, in particular, may lead to civil conflict, especially when some people decided to use the aid resources to accomplish their desires.

Moyo (2009) asserted that foreign aid has done more damage to Africa than good. Hence, it should be curtailed or stopped. She identified three types of aid, humanitarian

aid that focused on natural disasters, charity-based aid, and systemic aid, a type of aid that is transfer directly to the government (through a bilateral or multilateral form). According to her, out of the three types of aid, systemic aid has done more harm to Africa. She argues further that more than $1 trillion in aid has been transferred to Africa from the wealthy countries, despite the huge amount in aid, Africa's situation has not progressed, it has even relapsed. Therefore, aid has been the cause of a never-ending cycle of political, social, and economic problems in Africa leading to an everlasting state of poverty. She pointed out that foreign aid encourages corruption and conflict, it weakens political institutions and promotes domestic consumption rather than investments. Above all, it promotes dependency, for example, most African régimes believe that donor countries will continue to assist them and that is why they failed to reform their corrupt political, economic, and military system (Moyo, 2009:145).

Wright (2010:70) also maintained that the political processes of aid recipient countries will determine the effectiveness of foreign aid vis-a-vis economic growth, countries that have local authorities with high personalism are more likely to pursue corruption or misdirect foreign aid to politically motivated spending instead of investment that will lead to growth.

In an important contribution, Bapat & Navin (2011) explored transnational terrorism, U.S. military aid, and the incentive to mispresent. They argued that the U.S. military aid to developing countries that face terrorism creates moral hazard problems if countries were given aid to appease their territory only when the terrorist campaigns are ongoing, but will lose this aid once they put an end to the terrorist activities. The recipient will give little consideration to hasten the decline of the terrorist organization.

The authors conclude that the provision of military aid discourages recipient countries from reaching peaceful negotiation with the terrorist organization, but military aid itself may not be effective at actually disarming terrorist organizations, it can only be effective at keeping terrorist organizations out of power.

Gries et al. (2014:86) consider the link between economic and military aid, human rights conditions, and the emergence of transnational terrorism in aid recipients' countries. The author's finding suggests that an increase in aid to repressive regimes will associate donors with the local repression, and donors can be seen as financers of bad governments, which will lead to transitional terrorism. Even if the aid does not directly finance local authoritarian governments.

Dube & Naidu (2015:252) examine the effect of United States military aid on political conflict in Columbia between 1988 to 2005. They argue that military aid is generally seen as a remedy for weak states, as it is supposed to improve the government's ability to secure control of its territory and own legitimate use of violence. The author's result suggests that "International military aid can strengthen armed non-state actors, who rival the government over the use of violence" (p266).

Elayah (2016:96) analyzes the effectiveness of foreign aid in developing countries, the author concludes that poor environments, bad security policies, and corrupt governments have greatly contributed to the poor performance of aid programs in recipient countries. The issue of most donors continues to give aid on self-centered interests, including political, strategic, and commercial ones, also undermines the efficiency of aid. The problem relates to the fact that donors, while always keen to promote these interests, conversely show little consideration by holding the recipient

countries accountable when the aid objectives are not achieved. For example, during the cold war period, the main interest of the United States was to prevent countries from allying themselves to the communist bloc, the US gave little consideration to whether the aid recipient countries have good security policies before delivering aid, which allowed bad governments to utilize the aid differently from the aid intention, without fear of the consequences their action might cause.

Dimant et al. (2017:12) explored the effect of United States foreign military support to 106 countries. The authors discovered that more U.S. military aid is connected to bad political-institutional conditions, which gives rise to grievances and anti-U.S. terrorism in the aid recipient countries. They argue that military aid triggers corruption by governments and human rights violations, causing tension over bad governance which can lead to the expansion of terrorism across boundaries. Donors are mostly perceived as the supporter of the corrupt governments, for example, "The United States is being punished in the form of anti-American terrorism for the actual facilitation of local grievances" (p2).

Morgan (2017:2) asserted that the Chinese provision of arms to authoritarian governments in Africa have been implicated in war crimes, ethnic conflict, interstate wars, and political struggles in countries like the Democratic Republic of Congo, Zimbabwe, Ethiopia, and South Sudan. The author argues that China gives little consideration to how its weapons are used by the aid recipient countries, which explains the reasons why many African dictators that face threats to their political survival turn to China for military support to preserve their holds on power. Morgan concludes that the international community needed to pressure China to stop offering military support to countries where there is a clear violation of human rights.

Karlin (2017:3) observes that the United State new policy of helping to stabilize fragile states by training and equipping foreign armed forces in almost every region in the world has failed in many countries. She highlighted several factors that weaken the effectiveness of U.S. assistance to developing countries. According to her, the unwillingness of officials in the United States to evaluate on higher-order questions of mission, organizational structure, and personnel-issues that deeply affect a military's capacity has hampered the success of the US military aid to fragile states. She argues further that the political system the US operates is slow in carrying out decisions regarding foreign aid. Consequently, it has limited the efficiency of defense aid, minor threats in fragile states might become larger before the aid is issued, pointing at the US aid to Lebanon as example, in 2005, Washington reached a unanimous agreement to support Lebanon's government to regain control of their territory, but it took almost a year for the military aid to be delivered, even the military training program designed by the US for Lebanese forces took almost a year to materialize. It took one and a half years for Lebanon to received military hardware from the United States. This development pushed the Lebanese government to seek new aid from Russia. Besides the aforementioned factors, she stressed that corruption or misuse of aid by the government officials in the recipient countries is also a contributing factor, given the example of the United States donations of nearly half a billion dollars to support the Yemen armed forces in the fight against insurgency between 2007-2011. According to her, Washington failed to realize that the insurgents menace was not only the challenge facing the country, nepotism and favoritism were at a higher level in the military institutions of the country. The then President of the country Ali Abdullah Saleh had filled the military with his relatives and friends who became rich depriving millions of Yemen citizens jobless, causing hunger and a high rate of poverty in the

country. The most worrisome development, according to the author, is that he used the United States financial assistance and military equipment intended for the fight against insurgency to enrich his family and increased his security, leaving the mass population of the country in danger.

Furthermore, Karlin points out that the refusal of aid recipient countries to share (or discuss) some sensitive issues related to their defense strategies with the donor countries also affect the effectiveness of military aid. Authorities in the recipient countries will deliberately fail to share intelligence information with their donors, because they want to pursue a different agenda, as in the case of the South Vietnam government between 1956 and 1960, the country received almost $500 million in military aid to address domestic security threat facing the country. Ngo Dinh Diem, the then president of South Vietnam, restructured the Vietnamese armed forces according to his preferences, organizing them for external conflict with North Vietnam and leaving the military less equipped for the growing internal security problems at home. The security condition became worse throughout 1960 and the Vietnam military was unable to cope with the growing internal insurgency. It became apparent that the country had a misdirected military that was geared toward the wrong type of threat (Karlin, 2017:2).

Sokolsky & Miller (2018) note that in the past four decades the United States has spent over $49 billion in military aid to Middle East countries, but neither the main goal of the aid was accomplished nor promote U.S. interests in the region. Instead, most of the recipient countries are using the weapons in proxy wars, to help oppositions (or rebel groups) like Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates, in Yemen, Libya, and Syrian wars respectively. They further argue that international military aid, if not monitored

by the donor countries, can create leverage and encourage moral hazard, the recipient countries will utilize the aid in a way that will satisfy their desire without fear of the consequences of their actions. The authors conclude that the US military support to the Middle East needs reform, recipient countries should demonstrate their commitment to a set of norms, standards, and rules of good security-sector governance before allocating the US military aid to them.

Deniz & Haıdar (2019:112) examines both the advantage and disadvantages of foreign aid on the development of Afghanistan between 2001-2015. They discovered that foreign aid alone is not sufficient for the growth of post-conflict countries like Afghanistan. Even though Afghanistan had been receiving aid for almost two decades, the economic and security condition of the country has not progressed. Corruption, unemployment, and poverty in the country were at a higher level during the period of their study. They recommended international aid donors to focus on providing resources to improve infrastructure, education, and the transfer of technology.

Helton (2019) argues that the key reason why donor countries offered military aid to developing countries is to improve their military capability and increase military relations with them. According to the author, the United States is one of the major donors in military aid to its allies on this principle but the panacea of military financing has failed, the program has often resulted in conflict between the aid recipient authorities and the US government and, miss the opportunities for improving human rights. The aid recipient countries tend to pursue different agendas or take a different military action that contradicts the US objectives. He cited Egypt as an example, where terrorists are being tortured, incarcerated in the prison, such treatment according to him might lead to more radicalization of youth in the long run. This is the reason why

despite the huge amount of military aid received by the Egyptian government, limited success was recorded in its counter-terrorism drive. He concludes that the United States should end their military aid to countries that fail to comply with its principles (or use military aid to violate human rights).

Darden (2020) examine the United State foreign aid and state violence, using Indonesia, El Salvador, South Sudan, and South Korea as a case study. The author found that the U.S foreign aid has directly, and indirectly, contributed to state repression and violence on the part of the aid recipient countries, and ignored abuses and repressive measures to obtain or maintain wider goals related to U.S. national security. She concludes that military aid has proven to be weak means of increasing the security of developing countries.

While each of the aforementioned inquiries identified several explanations as to why military aid might not work. We can summarize their reasons into three, as to why aid might not be favorable to developing countries.

   i.   Foreign military aid can be used by bad governments to hold their position in power. Hence, aid will lead to poor security policies and delay reform in developing countries, as it can be squandered or diverted to other areas instead of reaching its desired destination (Corruption and Moral Hazard) (Easterly 2007, Djankov et al. 2008, Rajan & Subramanian 2008, Moyo 2009, Wright 2010, Karlin 2017, Morgan 2017, Sokolsky & Miller 2018, Helton 2019).

  ii.   Countries that have weak institutions and lack good security policies might not be able to manage military aid effectively and this will, in turn, hinders its effectiveness (Elayah 2016, Dimant et al 2017).

iii.   Military aid offered to authoritarian regimes (or bad governments) can be used to violate human rights in the recipient countries, which might lead to transnational terrorism (that is anti-donor countries) (Bapat & Navin 2011, Gries et al. 2015, Dimant et al. 2017).

The continual survival of insurgency in northern Nigeria, despite the huge amount of defense aid received by the government to address the issue, is a point of reference to the ongoing debate concerning the negative effect of foreign military aid on the fight against terrorism. To the best of my knowledge little or none of the reviewed literature sought to establish or address the issue. Therefore, it serves as a gap in the existing literature which this study aims to fill by examining the effectiveness of foreign defense aid on Nigeria's counter-insurgency drive. In this light, the next chapter will explore the Boko Haram insurgency, and it will identify the types of defense aid offered to Nigeria to address the watershed.

Chapter 3

BOKO HARAM INSURGENCY AND FOREIGN DEFENSE AID RECIEVED BY NIGERIA

3.1 Introduction

The evolution of the Boko Haram insurgency in northern Nigeria is a process deeply rooted in history. To understand the present activities of the organization, there is a need to explore the historical context. The purpose of this historical background, most especially in scientific research is to provide us with detailed information of the past, continuity, and changes, to enable us have access to various sources of explanations of the subject matter. This chapter journeys memory lane to trace the origins and development of the Boko Haram insurgency. It examines the ideologies, goals, and activities of the organization. It starts with the Maitatsines movement in the 1980s and looks at how it influences the evolution of Boko Haram. More importantly, it looks at the defense aid offered by countries, and institutions to assist Nigeria's struggle towards addressing the insurgency.

3.2 The Maitatsines Movement

Northern Nigeria's ecology is what historians regarded as the Sahel for many decades. The region saw the rise of great empires that embraced trade in the 10th Century. The ancient empires of the Western Sudan, which started with Mali, Kanem, and Kanem-Bornu, flourished and survived because of Islam, whose leaders engaged in trade across the Sahara Desert. The empires rose and declined and the last of the empires

was Kanem-Bornu (Walter, 2013). Since then, several attempts were made to revive Islamic empires in the region. In 1804, a prominent Islamic scholar, known as Usman Dan Fodio, launched a jihad in Sokoto. The jihad symbolized a religious war, that aims to purify Islam. It was fought with renewed preaching and war. By the mid-19 century, Dan Fodio had captured all the states in the region and established his headquarters at Sokoto, an emerging Islamic Empire, which later came to be known as the Sokoto Caliphate. From this Caliphate, his power spread to several directions with the main objective of refining Islam, to areas considered today as the Sahelian West African countries. The Caliphate collapsed with the advent of European colonialism in Africa in the 20th Century (Last, 1977).

Similarly, in the 1980s, the region witnessed a rebirth of an Islamic movement popularly known as the Maitatsine movement, led by Muhamadu Marwa, who had the goal of refining Islam. Maitatsine is a Hausa word meaning 'the one who damns'; it is derived from the regular cursing of Marwa and alluded to his frequent, public condemnation of the secularized Nigerian state. The declaration of himself as a prophet and his resistance to Western secularization marked him out. He rallied supporters through preaching, and between 1975 and 80s, his followers grew to nearly 12,000 (Adesoji, 2011).

The Maitatsines had several conflicts with security forces for harassing people and preventing children from going to school, especially in Kofar Wambai in Yan Awaki quarters in Kano, where Marwa lived. As a result, in October 1980, the police pressed eleven charges against the group for preaching without permission. In November 1980, the Kano State Governor Abubakar Rimi, wrote a letter to the group leader demanding him to leave the illegitimate structures he and his members were occupying. Marwa's

refusal to complied with the command led to the use of force by the government to suppress the group. In December 1980, the government deployed security forces to prevent Maitatsines from illegal preaching in Shahuci, but the group maintained a resistance which led to bloodshed, four officers were killed, their vehicles burned, and their weapons were confiscated by the sect (Aghedo, 2014).

Following the clash between Maitatsines and security agencies, the group began to destabilized cities in Kano, burning churches, mosques, schools, police stations, and markets. The uprising spread to other states in the region, i.e., Kaduna, Maiduguri, Gombe, and Yola, leading to the death of nearly 10,000 people. The conflict continued for days, which led to the deployment of soldiers by the federal government to quash the crisis. It is in this process that Marwa and some of his followers were killed, and several detained in 1980. In 1982, the government in its effort to decongest prisons, granted amnesty to nearly 1,000 Maitatsine convicts. While some of those released repented, others continued with the struggles (Elaigwu, 2005).

The forgone analysis explains the struggles of several organizations in the region to revive the prestigious Islamic empires they had in the past, as well as their stand on modernization and Westernization. Although their goal is not wrong in itself, the manner and approaches employed to pursue the goal was inappropriate, which led to clashes between the group and government. While the government succeeded in suppressing most of the movements, the ruins of their goals continued to thrive, which suddenly gave rise to Boko Haram.

3.3 The Emergence of Boko Haram

Boko Haram translates as "western education is forbidden". It is a terrorist organization that aims to establish Islamic Caliphate in northern Nigeria. The group name was initiated by the residents of Borno state, to describe Jama'atu Ahl Sunnah lid Da'wah Waal Jihad, "People Committed to the Propagation of the Prophet Teachings and Jihad". Eventually, the name was adopted by the media and academics. The people of Borno gave the group this name because of its strong condemnation of Western education, which Boko Haram considered to be corrupting Islam. The precise date of the establishment of the organization remains unclear, but the group often traces its origin to the Muslim Youth Association founded in 1995, by Abubakar Lawal at the University of Maiduguri in Borno. Subsequently, the association was handed over to Muhammad Yusuf, who reorganized the group in 2002. He became both the spiritual and political leader of the organization, he built a mosque and school in Maiduguri, where many migrants from Chad, Niger, and Cameroon are sheltered, and engaged in moral reawakening (Amao, 2020).

In another chain of narration, it was argued that Yusuf's father was the first to start the Boko Haram movement in the 1960s before he was exiled from his home town in Yobe by King Umar Suleiman, because of his radical criticism of Western education. At the outbreak of the Maitatsine crisis, he went to Kano intending to participate in the jihad but was murdered in the conflict (Zenn, 2020). Based on this narration we can hypothetically say that Yusuf continued with the Boko Haram movement to fulfilled his father's dream.

The group under Yusuf gained more followers by providing welfare, food, and shelter to the public. Many members of the organization were refugees, unemployed youths (or graduates), radical Muslims, dropouts, almajiris, etc. Besides, other intellectuals influenced by the group ideologies abandoned their professions, burnt their diplomas, and sold their assets to contribute to the development of the group as they joined. Yusuf, as a leader, was surrounded by several followers ordered in a hierarchical structure based on their allegiance and dedication to him. Although Boko Haram's source of funding remains unclear, a majority of scholars have highlighted, contributions from members, ransom from kidnapping, and recently external support from ISIS, al-Qaeda, etc., as the main source of their finance (Sambo & Sule, 2020). Besides, many researchers have underlined domestic issues like poor governance, illiteracy, conservative religious views, unemployment, poverty, corruption, moral decadence, and underdevelopment as the cardinal factors that led to the growth and development of the group (Amao 2020, Omenma et al. 2020, Onuoha et al. 2020, Okoye et al. 2020, Onapajo & Ozden 2020, etc.).

The group obtained domestic popularity in 2009 after they clashed with security forces while transporting their dead members for burial in Borno state. Some members of the group were clogged and charged for infringing on traffic regulations by the police. Disagreements led to violence between them and the police. As a result, some of their members were murdered. This event triggered a reaction from Boko Haram who claimed an apology from the government. They pledged to take revenge for what happened to their followers if the government failed to apologize. Unfortunately, neither the security forces nor the government apologized. Hence, in July 2009, the group members armed with cutlass, stones, bows, and arrows, etc., attacked police

stations in Maiduguri. In response, the government deployed security forces to crush

the uprisings, it is in this process many of the group members were killed, their mosque

burned, and the group leader, Mohammed Yusuf was captured and killed in custody

under unclear conditions (Jamestown Foundation, 2011).

Since then, the group vowed to take revenge for killing their leader, they began to

execute violence in the region, which led to the loss of lives, and destruction of

properties. Boko Haram's violent activities amplified in 2010, under Abubakar

Shekau, who assumed the leadership of the organization after the death of Yusuf.

Unlike Yusuf, Shekau is a complex, controversial, brutal, and fearless man, who is

partially knowledgeable and partially a hooligan. The group under his coordination

launched an unprecedented level of attacks that included releasing 730 prisoners, many

members of Boko Haram, from a Bauchi prison in 2010 (VOA, September 2010).

Recently, Boko Haram activities have expanded to neighboring countries like Chad,

Niger, and Cameroon.

3.3.1 The Goals and Ideologies of Boko Haram

Boko Haram's ideological belief is rooted in Salafist and Wahhabis philosophy. This

belief advocate for strict adherence to the teachings of the Quran and Hadith. They

believe in the oneness of God (Monotheism). The group opposes the secularization of

the Nigerian state. They believe that a secular state promotes corruption, injustice, and

idolatry (or state worship). For example, pledging allegiance to the Nigerian flag is

considered a form of idolatry by the group and hence punishable by death. They

believe that religion and state should not be separated. Therefore, the main goal of the

group is to establish an Islamic state that will be governed based on the tenets of Sharia

law. Hence it continues to drive for Islamizing Nigeria and discarding the existing

secularized system the country operates under (Hafez, 2011).

The group also rejected western education and considered it forbidden. They believe that the way western education is conveyed contradicts the teachings of Islam, especially that of mixing boys and girls in the same class. It is important to point out here that Islam in itself does not prohibit Muslims from acquiring Western education, which is contrary to Boko Haram's belief. Besides, the majority of the Islamic scholars maintained that Western education is permissible as long as it does not contravene Shariah law. Ironically, the group considered any Muslim that is Western-educated as "Kafir", apostates (or one that betrayed his creed). This explains the reason why members of Boko Haram killed their fellow Muslims, arguing they have betrayed their faith and, therefore, should not be considered Muslims. Unfortunately, the group failed to provide any concrete evidence to justify their claim (Hafez, 2011).

Further, the group classified Muslims into three clusters; the first group includes Muslim governments that failed to apply Islamic law to be the guiding principle of their rule, and for this reason, Boko Haram dismissed them to be members of the community of the faithful. The second group was considered apostates because this group is working for the state, i.e., security agencies, government employees, and anyone who supports the government. The third category includes those the group considered as genuine believers, that is, Muslims who support the Islamic project or desist from aiding the state. Boko Haram endorsed the killing of the first two groups and allows for harming of the third category only as surety damage which would be helpful to them in the future (Hafez, 2012).

The group also maintained that when one commits suicide bombing in their cause, he will be a martyr, and God will reward him/her by forgiving their sins and granting them and their loved one's ticket to heaven. This ideology entrenched in radical

Salafism has greatly influenced Boko Haram members to freely engage in violent activities across the region while hoping for death in the process (Hafez, 2012).

3.3.2 The Activities of Boko Haram

Since 2009, after security forces killed Boko Haram's leader, the group has engaged in violent activities, killing civilians, security forces and destroying properties. Several other places were attacked, like the United Nations headquarters in Abuja. In 2014, the group organized a bold terrorist operation and kidnapped 276 girls from a Government secondary school in Chibok, Borno state. The group leader Abubakar Shekau appeared in a video demanding for the release of his colleagues that was detained by security agencies, in exchange for release of the kidnapped students. This event led to the outcry of the international community against President Jonathan's administration for his failure to protect the children. Consequently, after several negotiations between the government and Boko Haram, 103 girls were freed, and over 112 are missing to date. While some were brainwashed and forced to join the group, others have gotten married and started a family with the group members, and many were used for suicide bombing attacks (Crisis Group, 2018). The group has recently become a more structured terrorist organization with a defined chain of command, organization, intelligence gathering abilities, recruitment drives, access to sponsors, ownership of high-power military hardware, and training of members. These new capabilities earned the group the title of the world's deadliest terror organization in 2015. Between 2010 and 2015, Boko Haram had established strongholds in the region, possessing territories like Maiduguri, Mubi, and Gwoza, etc. (Institute of Economic Peace, 2017).

Similarly, in February 2019, the group launched another attacked and kidnapped 113 girls from a Government secondary school in Dapchi, Yobe State. Though the

government recovered 107 girls after reaching an agreement with Boko Haram, five girls died due to traumatic experience they had in terrorist camp and one of the girls continued to be imprisoned for refusing to deprecate her Christian faith (Crisis Group, 2019). Also, on 28th November 2020, the group attacked and slaughtered at least 110 farmers working in a rice field in Borno state. As a result, Nigeria was ranked 'third most terrorized country' in the world for six consecutive years. From 2009 to 2020, an estimated number of 39,845 people were murdered and more than 2.5 million displaced by Boko Haram activities (Campbell 2020, United Nations Report, 2020).

3.4 Foreign Defense Aid Received by Nigeria

This section discusses the defense aid received by the government and its relevance to its war against insurgency. As we observe from the forgone analysis in the previous section, Boko Haram challenges the sovereignty of the Nigerian state in the course of promoting Islamic revivalism even the military were not exempted, as they began to face a new paradigm of conflict it never had seen before (Asymmetrical or non-conventional warfare). The military needed quickly a new set of weaponry and tactics to contain and eradicate the menace of Boko Haram. Even with the existence of the Nigerian Defense Industrial Cooperation (DICON), they lack the needed funds and technical expertise to produce needed arms and equipment. As such, military and political leaders in Nigeria decided to shift to the option of soliciting foreign defense aid to end the insurgency (Bodunde & Balogun, 2019). However, the major donors of aid to Nigeria are the United States, United Kingdom and inter-governmental organization like the European Union, African Union and the Economic Community of West African States.

3.4.1 The U.S. Defense Aid to Nigeria

The United States and Nigeria maintain good relations, ranging from economic, political, social, and security issues. As the Boko Haram activities intensified, it threatened not only the survival of Nigeria but also the United States' interest in Africa. The US sees Nigeria as an important strategic partner because it is considered to be the largest democracy and population-wise in Africa, and a key contributor to several peacekeeping operations within and across the continent. Besides, the US has a substantial economic interest in the country, with its multinational oil corporations operating on Nigeria's soil. Hence, ensuring peace and stability in the country became a major priority to the United States. The US government adopted a non-confrontational approach to support the government to combat the insurgency. These approaches include.

The training, equipping, and funding of the Nigerian military on security-related matters by the US Department of Defense. The government signed a memorandum of understanding with the United States in May 2012, for joint security cooperation, military exercises, and the exchange of military programs between the countries (Security Assistance Monitor, 2015). However, since the kidnapping of Chibok girls by Boko Haram in 2014, the United State has helped the military by tracing, and gathering intelligence information to secure the release of the girls. As stated by the former US secretary of state John Kerry.

> "The kidnapping of hundreds of children by Boko Haram is an unconscionable crime, and we will do everything possible to support the Nigerian Government to return these young women to their homes and to hold the perpetrators to justice…... I have seen this scourge of terror across the planet, and so have you. They don't offer anything except violence. They don't offer a health care plan; they don't offer schools. They don't tell you how to build a nation; they don't talk about how they will provide jobs. They just tell people, you have to behave the way we tell you to, and they will punish you if you don't". (US Department of State Report, 2014).

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Further, the United State also sent 16 experts in intelligence, counter-terrorism, and medical issues from the Department of Defense, along with two experience army staff in the mission against the Lord's Resistance Army in Uganda, to train a 650-soldiers for combat operations. This was the first time in years that the United States trained Nigerian military units for operations other than peacekeeping missions. Also, Nigeria as a member of the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP), a U.S. Government-funded and implemented effort designed to enhance regional security capacity to counter violent fanaticism, and improve the customs system. The TSCTP provides counter-improvised explosives devices and civil-military operations training to the military as well as border security training to Nigerian law enforcement agencies. Similarly, the State Department's Counterterrorism Finance (CTF) under the US also organized a program that provides training to the Nigerian Customs on how to limit Boko Haram's ability to raise and move weapons, and as well to trace and cut off the sect source of finance. CTF's current focus provides the Customs officers with cross-border financial investigations training to work effectively with counterparts in neighboring countries on critical CTF (Heim & McQuaid, 2015:39).

The US has also provided aid to the Nigerian Police Force, and the Nigerian State Security Service, and Nigerian Civil Defense Service Corps. The U.S. also contributed nearly $71 million to Nigeria through the Global Security Contingency Fund plan (GSCF) to fight against the group. Also, the Africa Contingency Operations Training and Assistance (ACOTA), a program designed by the Department of State to bolster African peace and security has provided non-lethal equipment and training to the armed forces in its quest to defeat Boko Haram. In 2016, before Obama left office, US donated 24 armored vehicles to the Nigerian defense through the Excess Defense Articles program (Heim & McQuaid, 2016:28).

The second strategy employed by the US government to combat the Boko Haram uprising is through targeting an increase in access to education in the region. For example, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) has been carrying out some educational programs for nearly 20,000 vulnerable children in Borno, Yobe, Sokoto, Kano, Adamawa, etc. (Hentz & Solomon, 2017).

Moreover, USAID also focused on conflict mitigation programs in its attempt to address the problem of insurgency in the region through civil societies and governance. It has trained and assisted conflict management and resolution councils in carrying out dialogues. Apart from poverty reduction programs, the organization has focused on accountability and governance. For instance, USAID trained many government officials in financial management and public procurement in Borno, Bauchi, and Sokoto. Also, the US in its effort to limits the group's means of recruitment, invested billions of dollars to build resilience among societies that are at risk of radicalization or joining Boko Haram (Heim & McQuaid, 2015:25).

In 2012, the State Department designates Boko Haram, as a global terrorist organization under Executive Order 13224. The U.S. government placed $7 million rewards on whoever leaked crucial information on the whereabouts of Abubakar Shekau. This clearly explains the US concerns on the systematic security threats in Nigeria, and the fear that the group might grow powerful to defy the intelligence community, and become capable of carrying global attacks. Consequently, Abubakar Shekau was labeled as the third most wanted person in the U.S. Rewards for Justice program in 2014, following after his counterparts, Ayman al-Zawahiri al-Qaeda leader and late Taliban leader Mullah Omar (Hentz & Solomon, 2017:221).

3.4.2 The United Kingdom Defense Aid to Nigeria

The government signed a series of memorandum of understanding as well as a security and defense partnership with the UK, to effectively work together and tackle the common security threats. As stated by the former UK Prime Minister Theresa May.

> "The new Partnership will lay the foundations for us to step up efforts to promote our shared stability, prosperity, and growth, through a series of new initiatives to help Nigeria defeat Boko Haram and Islamic State West Africa…… The agreement will help stop this regional menace from spreading and posing a direct threat to the UK...." (The Prime Minister's office Report, 2018).

According to the Counter Extremism Project Report (2020), the UK has provided training, legal frameworks, counter-terrorism strategies, bomb scene management, anti-terrorist finance training, and military logistics to the Nigerian army to support its war against insurgency. The government also signed a 20-year security agreement with the UK government in 2015, to provide its armed forces with counter-insurgency training. Furthermore, since the abduction of Chibok schoolgirls by Boko Haram in 2014, the UK offered its support to the government by tracking and sharing intelligence information with the armed force to secure the release of the girls. However, following a regional security meeting in Paris, many global leaders agreed to help the country with military logistics and intelligence information to defeat Boko Haram. The meeting resulted in the formation of an External Intelligence Response Unit (EIRU) by Nigeria, Cameroon, England, Chad, United States, Niger, and France to combat the insurgency. According to the UK Foreign Secretary Jeremy Hunt, the UK has trained nearly 30,000 Nigerian forces and offered £300 million to help the country defeat Boko Haram (Adit, 2017).

3.4.3 The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the African Union (AU), and the European Union (EU) Defense Aid to Nigeria

The expansion of the Boko Haram insurgency into Niger, Chad, and Cameroon necessitated a need for a trans-regional response. This development influences the decision of ECOWAS, and AU to support Nigeria's approaches in its war against violent extremism. The AU employed a normative approach in dealing with the problem of insurgency in the country. The organization backed an ECOWAS security framework for Multi-National Joint Task Forces (MNJTF) between Chad, Cameroon, Niger, and Nigeria under the Lake Chad Basin Commission in 2014 to fight Boko Haram. As Boko Haram atrocities became frequent, the AU seeks the international community to assist the country to defeat the group. Besides, the organization has created the African Police Cooperation Mechanism and Advisory Team to combat Boko Haram. "The advisory team is tasked with helping the AU in the observing and implementation of the relevant provisions of the communiqué of the 455th meeting of the Peace and Security Council (PSC)" (AU Peace and Security Council, 2015).

Similarly, Nigeria is considered to be a key strategic country for the EU, due to its oil supply to the European countries. In this light, Nigeria's stability is crucial to the EU. However, in a public declaration following the fourth Nigerian-European Union Ministerial Meetings in May 2013, both sides agreed to cooperate to fight against the Boko Haram insurgency in northern Nigeria. Recently, the EU commission donated an amount of £123 million and £107 million respectively, to offer humanitarian and military assistance in Nigeria (Adit, 2017).

3.5 Conclusion

This chapter has provided historical insight into the insurgency in northern Nigeria, it identified the motives, ideologies, and approaches of several Islamic movements in the region. Though each movement differed from one another, however, the underlying goal remain the same (i.e., the revival of Islamic empires and resistance against Western secularism). Although foreign countries and institutions have offered defense aid to Nigeria, little victory was recorded, i.e., repossessing of Boko Haram strongholds and emancipation of some Chibok and Dapchi girls. The group continued to maintain resilience. One may ask what hindered the full realization of the country's victory against Boko Haram, despite the defense aid packages it received? What strategies the government employed to combat the group? These issues are handled in the next two chapters.

Chapter 4

THE IMPLICATIONS OF DONORS REFUSAL TO PROVIDE DEFENSE AID ON NIGERIA'S WAR AGAINST INSURGENCY

4.1 Introduction

Foreign defense aid is considered crucial in Nigeria's war against insurgency. The country relied on foreign donors like the UK and US to acquire weapons. Subsequently, the countries have stopped providing weapons to the country and focused on humanitarian assistance due to reports of extensive human rights abuses by its security forces (Amnesty International, 2018). Therefore, this chapter argues that such a decision has seriously undermined the country's efforts to address the uprising as a result of; shortage of military equipment, demoralization of the military and an increasingly loose border, etc. It starts by looking at human rights abuses committed by the security forces and later examines the consequences of the absence of defense aid on the country's war against Boko Haram. Hence, it is worth reiterating our first hypothesis the refusal of donor countries to further provide defense aid to Nigeria as a result of human rights violations has disrupted its counter-insurgency efforts.

4.2 Nigeria's War Against Insurgency and Human Rights Violations

Since the 1960s, the sovereignty of Nigeria has been facing several security threats, ranging from civil wars, ethnoreligious clash, Niger Delta militancy, Mai Tasine insurgency, kidnappings, assassinations, bombings, banditry, and the recent Boko Haram insurgency in the north. Nwolise (2004), maintains that security is vital to the survival of states and development and that these are mostly determined by the level of security strategies both domestically and externally. Creating secure lives in a complicated world requires hard work, and inquiries reveal that security building activities are often afflicted with risks. Some of the risks could be transnational, with insecurities associated with terrorism, insurgencies, war, etc. (Oko &Iwu, 2013:285). The government's responsibility, therefore, is to protect the population and institutions and create an environment that is favorable for the pursuit of the aspirations of the citizens. Akpan (2013) underlined that governments must continue to maintain an army to prevent or cope with rebellions, coups, and the possibility of threats from other states or non-state actors like the terrorist organizations against the lives of their citizens, and their territorial integrity.

Kingsley (2019) postulated that effective counter-insurgency needs extraordinary measures and these measures may lead to abridgment of certain human rights. In the process of counter-insurgency operations, it is often normal for states to declare states of emergency law. The emergency powers are mostly considered to be coercive powers, invoked by states, to respond or address a serious security challenge. Counter-insurgency is defined by the United States government as "comprehensive military and civilian efforts taken to simultaneously defeat and contain insurgency and address its root causes" (US State Department, 2009:20).

Ugwueze (2020) highlighted different stratagems for countering insurgencies, such as cooperating with the local population to spot terrorist infiltrators, or through negotiation/dialogue with the insurgents, and the use of security of forces to defeat the insurgency, among many other methods. The Nigerian government in its quest to counter-Boko Haram in the north adopted two strategies, which include military and non-military strategies.

4.2.1 Military Strategy

The consistency and enormity of the terror unleashed by Boko Haram in various parts of the country make it realistic for strategies and solutions to be formulated. The then President of Nigeria Goodluck Ebele Jonathan, in response to the growing attacks by the group in 2011, set up a military Joint Task Force (JTF) in Borno state comprising of the Navy, Army, Air force, the Nigerian Police Force (NPF), and States Security Service (SSS). The rationale behind the formation of the JTF is to allow resources to be pooled, and information sharing between the security agencies to defeat the group. Besides, the government also created several check points/ roadblocks in Kaduna, Borno, Adamawa, Yobe, Bauchi, Abuja, etc., due to the intensification of Boko Haram attacks in those areas. While a state of emergency was declared in Adamawa, Borno, and Yobe states, a curfew was also imposed in Borno state. About 36,000 soldiers were sent to enforce the curfew and state of emergency. The Nigerian government also closed its borders in the north to prevent Boko Haram members from escaping into neighboring countries and to limit the group capacity of accessing weapons into the country (Solomon, 2011:7).

Moreover, in the process of combatting Boko Haram in the region, in 2011, the Nigerian legislature enacted a Terrorism Prevention Act (TPA). The act gives the security agencies enormous power to search places, persons, or vehicles, detain and

arrest any person that happens to be suspect of committing crime or offense, and to lock down the areas of Boko Haram operations, without any warrant. However, these have generated concerns among citizens about the possibility of human rights violations that may occur as a result of power given to security agencies (Kingsley, 2019).

Consequently, the JTF on September 2012, carried out a bold operation and arrested nearly 156 members of Boko Haram. They killed about 35 associates of the group, including prominent leaders in Yobe and Adamawa state. The government also resolved to continue with its counter-insurgency operations in the region. Besides the government forces offensive against the insurgents, there was also youth groups from the cities of Borno and civilian vigilante association, who organized themselves to assist the government in its war against insurgency. These groups provide information to the military of the suspected members of Boko Haram, and sometimes also arrest, kill, and handover the group to the military. The good performance of the group in supporting the government fight against an insurgency led to the formation of Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF). These groups were given identification cards and stationed in several areas to patrol the region (Agwanda & Nyaburi, 2019:489).

The government partners with neighboring countries, i.e., Chad, Niger, and Cameroon to established a Multi-national Joint Task Forces (MJTF) to operate around Nigerian borders, to restrain and limit the operation of the sect. Despite efforts to end the insurgency, the activities of the group continued unabated. This led to a domestic and international outcry against President Johnathan's administration, due to his inability to bring an end to the deadly group (Adeoye et al, 2014).

Several military operations were conducted by the security agencies, ranging from Operation Restore Order on 8 June 2011, which was aimed at securing Maiduguri and limiting the activities of Boko Haram, and Operation Bayona which was tasked with the responsibility, to contain the excesses of Boko Haram in the three most affected states of Borno, Yobe, and Adamawa. There was also Operation Zaman Lafiya Dole that focused specifically on the bombardment of Boko Haram bases in the Sambisa forest, and other territories in the savannah area of Borno State (Ugwueze & Onuoha, 2020).

In 2015, a presidential election was held in Nigeria, Buhari replaced Jonathan as the new president. Unlike Jonathan, Buhari administration's counter-insurgency approach which is predominantly military-centered, identified military problems as the main reason why the previous administration failed in its war against insurgency. The new administration employed two strategies which include the multilateral/diplomatic approach and internal military restructuring. The government also prioritized the strategic importance of the Lake Chad Basin Commission (LCBC) in defeating Boko Haram and to further strengthen its partnership with the members of the LCBC. In 2015, the government organized a meeting of the LCBC and donated almost $100 million for reviving the joint military operations. It was agreed that Nigeria should continue to lead the operations against Boko Haram. Furthermore, the government seeks international cooperation to fight against the group, which lead many countries to provide weapons, funds, and other military logistics (Onapajo, 2017).

The government also relocated the military headquarters from Abuja to the main zone of Boko Haram (Borno state). It has also increased military allowances, and as well increased remunerations and entitlements of the military on the frontline to boost their

morale. Subsequently, the government also sacked the leadership of the military and the National Security Adviser (NSA), due to their inability to defeat Boko Haram, thus replacing them with service chiefs, considered to be more capable of defeating the group (Daniel, 2020).

According to Blanchard (2016), the proactive measures taken by the Buhari administration in tackling the insurgency have boosted the morale of security agencies, which resulted in the partial defeat of the group. The military appears to have taken control over the Boko Haram strongholds in the Sambisa forest, and repossessed all the territories controlled by the group. The organization's methods of purchasing weapons, and food from other countries were also disrupted, and the rate with which the group released videos has reduced. In December 2015, the government declared victory over Boko Haram (International Crisis Group, 2016).

Subsequently, Boko Haram has continued to carry several attacks in the country, i.e., the abduction of Dapchi schoolgirls in 2019, and recently in 2020, the killing of over 110 farmers in Borno State (United Nations Report, 2020). Though the attacks are less frequent than during the period of Jonathan's administration, the group continues to display resilience, which could be a result of endemic corruption rooted in the very fabric of the military (Bappah, 2016).

In summary, the government has adopted the following military strategy to contain the lingering attacks in the northern region;
- Reinforcement of armed forces in the region
- The formation of the Joint Task Force (CJTF)
- The Multinational Joint Task Force (MJTF)

- A state of emergency was declared in Borno, Adamawa, and Yobe.

- A Curfew imposed

- Establishment of the Civilian Joint Task Force

- Military headquarters was relocated to the strongholds of Boko Haram.

- The former military leadership was sacked due to their failure to effectively handle the group, thereby replacing them with competent ones.

- Boosting the military morale, by increasing their allowances, and entitlement on the frontline.

- Partnership with other countries to defeat the group, which resulted in the supply of military hi-tech to the government.

- Check points/roadblocks were set up.

4.2.2 Non-Military Strategy

In addition to the military strategies being employed to quell Boko Haram, efforts were also made to resolve the insurgency through dialogue and political negotiation with key leaders of the group. The government established an amnesty-oriented body, which comprises a committee of 26 members on dialogue and peaceful resolution. The committee includes both previous and current government officials, religious leaders, and human rights groups who were given the task of dialoguing and convincing the insurgents to lay down their weapons. Regrettably, the strategy did not work, to quote the leader of the group (Abubakar Shekau) "We are not criminals that should be pardoned and we will continue to push until Nigeria start to operate Sharia law or become an Islamic state" (Faith et al, 2017:47).

More recently, the government initiated a program of deradicalization, rehabilitation, and reintegration of Boko Haram repentant, to prevent violent extremism in the

country. The government has three deradicalization programs that support the group defectors. First, Correctional Centers programs work with the imprisoned insurgents, and in the course of the program, religious leaders were invited to teach classes on non-violent interpretations of Islam. Vocational training was also offered to the convicts so that when they complete their prison terms, they can re-enter society with minimal risk of reverting to the insurgency. Secondly, the Yellow Ribbon Initiative supported women and children linked to the sect through psychosocial therapy and reintegration programs. The government has also taken measures to address the humanitarian crisis which emerged from the conflict. Lastly, in 2015, Operation Safe Corridor was set up by the military, which works hand in hand with Boko Haram defectors, to address extremist ideologies and provide trauma counseling to nearly 2000 members of the group that have defected via Operation Safe Corridor (Campbell, 2020). The failure of the aforementioned non-military initiatives to tackle the insurgency forced the government to engage in full-scale military offensives against the group which resulted in gross human rights violations.

Regrettably, in countering the Boko Haram insurgency, the security agencies have unleashed brutal retaliation on innocent civilians, and insurgents that were innocent until proven guilty by the constitution. Civilians have suffered from incessant human rights violations, especially when there is a fight between the military and the insurgents. For instance, these violations include the right to life, freedom of movement, and freedom of speech, etc. (Kingsley, 2019).

According to Unumen (2014) in the course of fighting Boko Haram, buildings suspected to be owned or used by the group were destroyed, and in some cases whole communities. Besides, many relatives of the suspected members of the group (wives,

brothers, parents, children, etc.) were detained and tortured for several years for crimes that they do not commit. Unumen argues that the destruction of the buildings and villages owned or used by the suspected members of the sect is mostly preceded by hours of crossfire between the group and the military. As a result, civilians often get caught up in a clash and sometimes murdered (Unumen, 2014:242).

Similarly, a report of Amnesty International noted that between 2009 and 2015, the Nigerian military randomly arrested and detained nearly 20,000, including young children, who are less than 9 years old. There are many cases of extrajudicial killings, ill-treatment, mass murder, physical abuse, rape, and torture recorded by the military, with more than 1000 that took place from 2013 to 2014. Also, in March 2014, in revenge for a Boko Haram attack on the Giwa barracks in Borno state (one of the major detention centers harboring members of the group), the military massacred over 640 men, who were mostly recaptured detainees (Amnesty International Report, 2018).

The Office of the High Commissioner on Human Rights (OHCHR) also reported that an attack by the military has caused many civilian causalities, particularly in Baga, Borno state. In 2013, where innocent civilians were shot and 642 people displaced. After an extensive inquiry into the incidence, cases of torture, enforced disappearance, rape, and execution committed by the military had been recorded. Likewise, detainees are being starved and held without food and water in congested cells of military barracks, resulting in the death of prisoners, which is completely unconstitutional and unlawful. Since the constitution of Nigeria prohibits arbitrary arrest and detention (OHCHR Report, 2014).

The prevailing unstable economic situation of northern Nigeria was also exacerbated by security agencies and counter-insurgency activities been employed by the government, i.e., borders closure, curfews, motorcycle bans, confiscation of trucks, goods, and the suspension of fishing in areas of Gaidam. Subsequently, many people in the region have been deprived of their means of livelihood (UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Report, 2015:11).

Brown (2018) argues that one of the complicating factors in the fight against Boko Haram is because the security agencies have themselves been the sources of instability, radicalization, displacement, and widespread human rights violations. Most of the strategies used by the military before 2015 entails communal punishment of villages suspected of sheltering the sect, or have fallen under the group's rule. In such process of clearing operations, innocent civilians who did not manage to escape to the bush were arbitrarily killed on suspicion of being the group collaborators, while women, children, and old people, were driven off to detention in some cases. Thousands of buildings, supermarkets, vehicles, and private properties in the villages and towns were destroyed by the security agencies (Brown, 2018:21).

The United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC) in 2015 also reported several human rights violations by the Nigerian military in Borno, Yobe, and Adamawa respectively. The report blamed the JTF for their role in the death of 180 civilians in a shootout between the JTF and Boko Haram, and over 2,000 houses were burnt by the military in Baga, Borno state. Similarly, a report by Amnesty International in 2018, blamed the Nigeria Air Force (NAF) for bombarding an IDP camp in Rann, Borno state, killing 167 civilians and children, but excuses were made by the NAF, claiming that the bombing was unintentional, arguing that Rann was not recognized as a

humanitarian camp (Amnesty International Report, 2018). Unfortunately, the security agencies were unable to differentiate unarmed civilians from the group, thus resorted to taking revenge on the whole civilian population. Indeed, knowing that the military will continue to react against the local population, Boko Haram deliberately continues to provoke the military by attacking them. As stated by Shekau, "When we kill the big unbelievers, they will kill the minor unbelievers." The big unbelievers are security agencies, and the minor unbelievers are the civilians (Vanguard 12 August 2018). This approach has greatly affected the civilian perceptions of the military, in this sense, local communities began to confirm that the group, despite its violent extremism, is better than the security agencies. The intensification of human rights violations by the security agencies has crumbled the certainty of many people in the genuineness of the military's mission in the region. It has also created suspicion and a lack of desire by the civilians to share intelligence information with security agencies.

4.3 The Refusal of Donors to Further Provide Defense Aid and its Effect on Nigeria's Counter-Insurgency Drive

The frequency of human rights violations by the military in the process of combatting Boko Haram made some donor countries freeze their defense aid (such as the of sale surveillance aircraft, helicopters, advanced military hardware, military training, and funds, etc.) to the country. The United States, in particular, placed an arms procurement embargo on the country in 2015, maintaining that the Nigerian military has committed gross human rights violations in its war against insurgency, stating that Amnesty International reported that over 8000 innocent civilians were killed in the process of fighting Boko Haram. The US government even went further to block Nigeria's chances of arms and defense procurements from Israel and other countries (Duncan, 2018). Besides, the US officials were cautious to share intelligence with the

Nigerian military, arguing that Boko Haram had penetrated it. To quote Tim Rieser, an aide of Senator Patrick J. Leahy of Vermont;

> "The US human rights law prohibits the State Department and Pentagon from offering military aid to foreign forces with poor human rights records…. We don't have confidence in Nigeria's ability to use the weapons in a way that complies with the laws of war and doesn't end up disproportionately harming civilians, nor in the capability of the US government to monitor their use." (Cooper, 2016).

However, this decision has seriously undermined Nigeria's war against insurgency in several ways which resulted in the shortage of military equipment, demoralization of the military, loose border, and rural-urban migration. Furthermore, it has also exacerbated poverty in the north, breeding a resurgence of insurgency, thereby weakening the state apparatus.

4.3.1 Shortage of Military Equipment

Ugwueze et al (2020) observed that the success of counter insurgency's operation depends on the quality and quantity of a mix of military equipment, strategies, and policies employed in shaping the domestic position on fighting unconventional menace like an insurgency. Such strategies will boost and sustain the morale of the military on the frontline. The authors noted further that the Nigerian military is currently confronted with counter-insurgency challenges, such as porous borders and a weak intelligence base, low level of technological advancement, and inadequate funding, which constitute an obstacle to its fight against Boko Haram. The existing deficits in arms and ammunition in the military armory and the dilapidated state of these weapons are the main rationale behind the inability of the military to defeat the group. Besides, essential military hardware such as T-72 tanks, Tucano attacks helicopters, night goggles, and surveillance aircraft, among others, which was supposed to confer a front-line advantage to the military in difficult terrain was in short

supply. This problem of arms and military equipment deficits was triggered by Nigeria's absolute dependence on imported weapons, which intensified the country's strategic vulnerability to the whims and caprices of major arms industrial countries like the US and its allies, thus limiting the country's quest to acquire hi-tech weapons (Ugwueze et al, 2020:418).

The shortage of weapons impedes the capacity of the military to confront highly armed and ideologically motivated Boko Haram members. Many soldiers operating in the region lamented how they encountered over 100 trucks loaded with more than 900 well equipped Boko Haram insurgents (with weapons such as Anti-Aircrafts, RPGs, and AK47, etc.) in Borno state with less than 300 soldiers who came in with about 48 vans (Ugwueze et al, 2020). This explains the reasons why the security forces flee from the frontline when faced with highly armed members of the group.

A report by Amnesty International in 2016, records that the security agencies that were operating at an outpost in Gashigar, a border village that links Nigeria with Niger in Borno state, fled from their position as a result of the shortage of equipment to defend themselves, at a time when hundreds of well-armed members of the group attacked. Unfortunately, lack of armored carriers, and insufficient bullets, as well as a deficiency in air support from the Nigerian Air Force, were highlighted as the main reason which made it possible for the group to wreak huge causalities on the military (Amnesty International Report, 2016).

4.3.2 Demoralization of the Military

In addition to the inability of the military to confront the group, as a result of inadequate weapons, it has also led to the demoralization of security agencies. Sambo and Sule (2018) noted that the absence of the right quality and quantity of weapons

has predisposed the security forces to mutiny, many soldiers have revoked commands because it exposes them to the risk of been killed easily by the group. Almost 50 soldiers were killed (Including a commander Muhammed Abu Ali) and 89 more were injured in a previous confrontation with the group in 2015. Unfortunately, Nigeria's military courts sentence 56 soldiers to death due to their refusal to fight Boko Haram. They have been accused of lack of loyalty and patriotism, most of them attributed their withdrawal from the battlefield due to the paucity of sophisticated weapons (Onuah, 2015).

4.3.3 Loose Border

Babatola (2015) noted that Nigeria shares borders with Niger, Chad, Cameroon, and Benin. For example, Nigeria's borders with Benin and Chad are 773km and 87km long respectively. In comparison, Nigeria's borders with Niger and Cameroon are 1497km long and 1690km respectively. He observes that the porosity of the country's borders intensified the potential proliferation of illegal weapons and national insecurity. It provides the group with ease in the movement of weapons as well as food from neighboring countries. Besides, records from the Nigeria Immigration Service (NIS) show that there are over 1,400 illegitimate routes that link the country with neighboring countries, and only 84 are patrolled by security agencies. The geographical position of the borders makes parts of it difficult to control, due to the presence of desert, mountains, and forest in the areas. These and many other factors made the country's victory against insurgency difficult to realize. Although Nigeria and its neighbors have collaborated to increase the security of their borders, the absence of surveillance aircraft and other military high-tech that will enable security agencies to secure the porous borders has further weakened Nigeria's borders (The Institute for Security Studies Report, 2015).

Okunde (2017) uncovered that grain merchants in the region employed several mechanisms of hiding arms and ammunitions under their vehicles, or in an empty oil tanker, and sometimes inside bags of grains into the country, mostly go unnoticed at the border's roadblocks. Likewise, the Gwoza hills in the northeast of the Mandara mountains that link northeast Nigeria and the northern part of Cameroon is not secured, many members of the group were able to move weapons through the route without any fear, and regrettably, the Gwoza hills and Sambisa forest have become a shelter of the group. The country's condition of a porous border, which serves as a channel for illegal large-scale transactions of small arms and light weapons, is further exacerbated by the shortage of military technological advancement and training (Okunde, 2017:21).

4.3.4 Rural-Urban Migration

The failure of the security agencies to secure the lives and properties of the populace residing in villages has induced rural-urban migrations in the region. According to Garba et al (2020), the group has devastated the population in rural areas, who are mostly farmers, and more than 2.5 million people have fled their homes to urban areas, where peace and security are relatively stable. This has given rise to significant, dramatic, and spontaneous urban growth, presenting crucial urban management and development challenges. For example, Maiduguri, and Yobe states population has doubled in the past decade. Many people from rural areas have lost properties, assets, business connection networks, and other sources of their livelihood, especially their farmlands and livestock (Thurston, 2018). Most of them live in Internally Displaced Person's (IDPs) camps in Maiduguri, and they relied on food and health services provided by humanitarian organizations to survive, which does not necessarily guarantee the satisfaction of their needs. Meanwhile, many people in the IDP camps become victims of sexual exploitation, rape, and corruption (Thurston, 2018).

Furthermore, displaced people in camps have limited access to employment opportunities, ownership, and rights of movement, as a result of the insecurity in the region. Similarly, an untold number of their children do not have access to formal education. These and other factors have created a vicious cycle of poverty in the region, as a result, many people residing in the IDP camps were left with no option than to join the group (Agwanda & Nyaburi, 2019). As stated by the Governor of Borno State, Professor Umar Zulum;

> "Boko Haram is negotiating with fighters from the IDP camps to recruit them…... If the IDPs living in camps could not get what they are looking for, especially the opportunity to go back to their respective towns and return to the farm, they may be forced to join the group." (Xinhua net report, 12 December 2020).

The aforementioned statement clearly illustrates the need for the security agencies to ensure the return of stable peace in the IDP's respective communities. This will be possible only if the military is well equipped to confront the group. Thus, the refusal of donors to provide weapons that are amenable in the fight against insurgency has obstructed the country's victory. If the group succeeds in recruiting the IDPs, it will be another catastrophe for the country.

4.3.5 An Increase in Poverty

The prevailing unstable economic condition of northern Nigeria was also exacerbated by the inability of security agencies to secure the lives and properties of the people. Consequently, agricultural activities in the region were halted, and commercial activities were at the lowest ebb for almost a decade in the affected areas. Likewise, the counter-insurgency approaches used by the government, i.e., border closures, motorcycle bans, confiscation of truckloads, goods, suspension of fishing, has deprived many of their means of livelihood. For example, several people relied on the northern borders in trading with other countries, the imposition of border closure has

resulted in the proliferation of unemployment, and loss of jobs in the region (Danjibo, 2011).

A survey by the United States Institute of Peace (USIP) in 2014, revealed that unemployment and poverty are the main factors that forced youths to join the group. Unfortunately, the region has become a recruitment hub for terrorist organizations. Citing figures from Nigeria's National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) "the country's unemployment rate in 2006 averaged 14.60 % until 2011 when it reached an all-time high of 23.90 %. NBS figures released in early 2013 revealed that the country's poverty rate jumped from 54.7 percent in 2004 to 60.9 % in 2010. In 2011, 100 million Nigerians lived in absolute poverty and 12.6 million more were moderately poor. The worst hit by these difficulties is young people, especially in northern Nigeria" (USIP special report, 2014:6).

4.3.6 Resurgence of Insurgency

The amplification of unemployment and poverty in the region, together with the failure of the security forces to safeguard the lives and properties of people has resulted in breeding a resurgence of insurgencies, specifically in the northwestern part of the country. A report by the International Crisis Group in 2020, shows that the area has the highest poverty rate. As of 2019, "all the seven states in the zone had poverty levels above the national average of 40.1 %, led by Sokoto 87.7 %, Jigawa 87 %, and Zamfara 74 %" (ICG report, 2020). Starting from 2011, and increasing since 2014, the region has suffered from a surge in crimes and criminality. The availability of guns (Handmade AK47 rifle) made it possible for youth(s) to form gangs and branches into activities like robbery, kidnapping, and banditry. They make income by engaging in kidnapping for ransom and raiding villages across the region. Their main targets at the initial stage were rich individuals and businessmen, recently, it has extended to both

poor and rich people. For example, in Zamfara more than 3,600 people were kidnapped in the state between 2011 and 2019, and at least 8,000 people were killed, most of whom are poor farmers. In some villages of Sokoto, Zamfara, and Katsina states, farmers have to pay taxes to the gangs, to gain access to their fields and avoid abduction. Beyond the kidnapping of people in the rural areas, the gangs often ambush travelers on highways (specifically Kano to Abuja highway), murdering those who resist or whose relatives fail to pay a ransom. There are also cases of rapes, schools, and house destructions, committed by the bandits. In some instances, they send letters to village leaders demanding that residents contribute money and pay them to be spared from attacks (ICG report, 2020). More recently, in December 2020, the bandits attacked a secondary school in Katsina state, and killed a door keeper, kidnapped over 600 students (Vanguard, 11 December 2020).

In addition to the above, the region is also suffering from herdsmen and Fulani crisis, and the infiltration of Jihadist groups, like Ansaru, the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP), and Islamic States of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS), all operating in various segments of the region (Amao, 2020). More recently, in 2020, the Global Terrorism Index, which measures the degree and rate of violence by terrorist groups across several countries, ranked Nigeria as the third after Iraq and Afghanistan. Nigeria, Iraq, and Afghanistan were labeled as being in a condition of war (Global Terrorism Index, 2020).

Moreover, the donor's refusal to further provide defense aid to Nigeria has exposed the weakness of the state apparatus, as it lacks domestic military technology to deal with internal insurgencies. Many terrorist organizations and criminal gangs have engaged in providing jobs to youths in the region, with a monthly salary of $300 and

above, even if their duty is required once a year. Meanwhile, the government cannot provide sufficient jobs to the population, even if it does, the basic salary of government workers is below what Boko Haram and their fellows offered. Interestingly, many officials in the country continue to accuse the US government of aiding and abetting the group in the prosecution of its radical ideology, by refusing to sell advanced military hardware to the country. As stated by the Minister of Information and Culture Lai Muhammed; "When the international community is weighed by unconfirmed arguments to deny Nigeria vital weapons to fight insecurity, they cannot turn round to accuse the country of not fighting terrorism." (Vanguard, August 2020).

4.4 Conclusion

From the forgone analysis, it is apparent that defense aid is essential in Nigeria's fight against terrorism. The unchanged behavior of traditional donors like the US and UK to further provide weapons to the country has compelled the government to secretly shift to another option of getting weapons from China and Russia. For instance, in April 2020 the Chinese government offered modern tanks and artillery to the country (McGregor, 2019). But despite the amount of aid the country received, the insurgency continues to prevail. The kidnapping of 600 students from a secondary school in Katsina state by Boko Haram illustrates a clear example (Vanguard, 11 December 2020). Therefore, this chapter concludes that foreign defense aid has not been effective in Nigeria's struggle to address the insurgency.

Chapter 5

IMPEDIMENTS TO THE APPROPRIATE USE OF FOREIGN DEFENSE AID IN NIGERIA'S COUNTER INSURGENCY EFFORTS

5.1 Introduction

This chapter addresses our second hypothesis that the disbursement of foreign defense aid engenders corruption among government, and high-ranking military officials, which in turn hindered the effectiveness of defense aid in Nigeria's war against insurgency. Donor states continue to provide defense aid to the country with limited ability to hold the government accountable. As a result, military leaders and some authorities in government enrich themselves by embezzling the defense aid.

5.2 Corruption and Nigeria's War Against Insurgency

Corruption is a vague concept to define. It means different things to different people at different times and places. Most people feel that they understand the word, but it easily gets away when we seek to get into detail because there are different types of corruption. In this sense, the chapter employed a comprehensive definition of corruption offered by Transparency International, "as the abuse of entrusted power for private gains" (Transparency International, 2016). In other words, corruption is defined as the private wealth-seeking conduct of an individual or group, who represents the state and the public authority or as the misallocation of public resources by government officials for private ends.

Nigeria, like any country in the world, classifies nearly all defense contracts and budgets and considers any security-related matter confidential for security reasons. However, the secrecy within the country's defense sector has increased the potential of corruption by government officials, due to the absence of transparency and accountability on how the government spends money. For example, the Ministry of Defense (MOD) and the office of the National Security Adviser (NSA) are the most resistant to disclosing vital information on security matters. The public is made not to interfere in a candid review and publicization of the defense sector. As a result, the country was ranked among those states at the highest risk of corruption due to the over-categorization of budget data and feeble oversight of concealed budgets (Transparency International, 2017).

The amplification of Boko Haram activities compelled the government to increase its defense budgetary allocation to purchase military equipment that will be directed towards combatting the group. Especially from 2009-2019, the period has undeniably witnessed an upsurge in military spending in the country. Accessible data show that before 2009, defense budgeting in the country hovered between $1.14 billion in 1999 and $1.7 billion in 2008 (SIPRI 2019). Interestingly, Nigeria's defense spending increased from $1.7 billion in 2008 to $2.496 billion in 2011, $2.199 billion in 2012, $2.114 billion in 2013, and $1. 922 billion in 2014. However, in 2015 it reached $1.875 billion, $1.811 billion in 2016, $1.732 billion in 2017, $2.043 billion in 2018, and $1.876 billion in 2019 (SIPRI 2019).

Furthermore, available data show that between 2011 to 2017, the US and its agencies contributed over $790 million to the country to support its war against the Boko Haram insurgency (USAID, 2019). While other donors like the UK donated £300 million, the

EU contributed £123 million and £107 million, respectively, to support Nigeria's counter-insurgency effort (Adit, 2017). Agreeably, the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), noted that the war against insurgency has increased Nigeria's defense spending to an amazing level in the recent decade, ranking it among the states at war in Africa. The SIPRI, in its 2018 report also measured Nigeria's defense spending as the third highest in Africa competing with the expenditures of states like Algeria, $9.54 billion, South Africa $3.63 billion (Wezeman et al, 2019).

Sadly, despite the huge allocations to the country's defense sector, there is no corresponding result due to the inability of the military to justifiably expend the appropriations in addressing the insurgency. This is not unconnected with the absence of disclosure which effectively makes the defense sector the most prone to ineffective service delivery as well as the creation and financing of fake defense contracts.

Following the 2015 presidential election in Nigeria, Buhari replaced Jonathan as the new president. Unlike Jonathan, Buhari's administration counter-insurgency approach which is predominantly military-centered, identified military problems as the main reason why the previous administration failed in its war against insurgency. The outcry of the military over lack of adequate equipment to confront Boko Haram led to the formation of an Arms Procurement Investigative Committee by Buhari's administration in August 2015. The committee was tasked to investigate the procurement of military equipment to fight insurgency during Jonathan's administration. Unfortunately, after a thorough investigation about how the money allocated to the military sector was spent, it was discovered that an enormous amount budgeted for fighting insurgency has been misappropriated by the top military,

government, and other security agencies officials in collaboration with politicians and contractors supplying military equipment (Ayodeji, 2016).

The committee report revealed mysterious spending of about $2.2 billion by the National Security Adviser (NSA). This amount included grants or defense aid received by the government. The committee further examined how funds were transferred to the office of the NSA and the military. They observed about $2.2 billion was allocated for the procurement of military equipment to tackle insurgency but regretted that despite this enormous amount, little or nothing was spent for the procurement of the hardware for which the fund was disbursed (Ayodeji, 2016).

The committee observation was later supported by the Nigerian Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) in 2017. The EFCC affirmed that the former NSA Ret. Col. Sambo Dasuki has embezzled nearly $2 billion that was meant for arms procurement to security agencies. After a deep investigation into the case, the EFCC found that the money was diverted for the reelection of the interim President (Goodluck Ebele Johnathan) party campaigns in the 2015 election, leaving thousands of soldiers less equipped at confrontational zones (EFCC, 2017).

Further, several media organizations who had access to the corruption report noted that from 2007 to 2015, out of 513 defense contracts evaluated, 53 were not implemented, and these had a total amount of $2.1 billion. While a contract that was worth millions of dollars, intended to purchase 53 armored tanks, that had a three-month deadline was not implemented half-decade after the contract was conferred. Besides, the government also released nearly $520 million in 2014 to purchase 12 combat helicopters and rocket carriers for the training of armed forces deployed in the

north. Unfortunately, the money was embezzled by the Nigerian Airforce. They purchased only two non-airworthy planes for $137 million, well above the cost of $30 million each. These faulty aircraft, when later deployed in the fight against insurgency in the region, crashed and led to the death of several military officers (Daniel, 2020).

In 2015, the Nigeria Airforce was granted a contract of nearly $7.2 million for the procurement of four used alpha jets, but they only procured two and squandered or directed the rest of the money to themselves (Vanguard, January 2016). Further investigation by the EFCC discovered nearly $5 million in the accounts of wives of three Air Force commanders and the officers have admitted that the money proceeds from arms procurement contract awards (Ojo, 2016). It appears as if addressing problems of insurgency in the country became mere government rhetoric and another opening to wealth-hoarding for political and personal gains. In 2016, the former Secretary of State John Kerry, while addressing the world economic forum at Davos, Switzerland, confirmed the endemic corruption in Nigeria's military. To quote him specifically:

> "When Nigeria's President, Buhari took office last spring, he inherited a military that was underpaid, underfed, and unable to protect the Nigerian people from Boko Haram. One reason is that much of the military budget was finding its way into the pockets of the generals. And just this week, we saw reports that more than 50 people in Nigeria, including former government officials, stole more than $9 billion from the treasury. There is nothing, absolutely nothing more demoralizing, more destructive, more disempowering to any citizen than the belief that the system is rigged against them, that people in the position of power are stealing the future of their people" (US mission Nigeria, 2016).

Given the abovementioned, both public opinion and the attitudes of broad parts of society towards the military, which Samuel Huntington perceives as crucial elements in determining military influence, were adversely affected. This severely affected

public support for the security agencies in the epicenters of Boko Haram. The military was increasingly seen by the population as corrupt and undisciplined. Transparency International's (2013) Global Corruption Barometer shown that 45% of its respondents felt that the military is corrupt, and 75% said that corruption had amplified in the country. The vast majority of the population felt that the performance of the military against Boko Haram did not satisfy the huge funds allocated for defense. Unfortunately, despite the corruption allegations in 2018, the United States offered $820 million to support the government war against Boko Haram, while Britain provides £240 million (SIPRI 2019).

However, the diversion of vital funds that could have been spent on fighting terrorism was a significant obstacle. For example, the loss of defense allocations during Johnathan's administration included an alleged disappearance of billions of dollars between 2012-2013 alone. This development has greatly affected military performance against Boko Haram. The SB Morgen report noted that the Nigerian military has suffered from a huge fatality in the process of combating insurgency, and this is not unconnected with the absence of sophisticated equipment to defend themselves against the sect. Nearly 5,656 soldiers have died in the war since 2011, with 2014 documenting the largest number of military casualties of about 2789 soldiers. While in 2015, more than 189 soldiers lost their lives, the numbers rose to 287 in 2016; 472 in 2017; 661 in 2018, and 873 casualties in 2019 (SBM, 2019).

The aforementioned led to several protests by soldiers deployed to fight against Boko Haram, an unnamed security agent was caught on tape complaining about the lack of equipment and maltreatment they face in the line of duty. "Imagine, they are killing us every day", an undisclosed man says in the video, "We are fighting to defend our

country the generals are cheating us" (Financial Times, December 2018). This development clearly explains how high-ranking military officers siphoned funds that were supposed to be used in combating insurgency, leaving Junior officers less equipped, and with no alternative than to flee when attacked. Many wondered about the authenticity of the military leadership. Some soldiers, unhappy with the way the operation was unfolding, revoked commands or mutinied. There were two incidents in May 2014 alone, one of which involved shots fired at a general's car, whom they blamed for the lack of adequate equipment (Bappah, 2016).

Consequently, severe practices by government and military officials such as delay in payment of soldiers deployed to combat Boko Haram, reduction of their feeding allowances, and rationing of equipment have hindered the victory of the military against the group. As a result, some junior officers became informants of the group, they leaked vital information i.e., kinds of weaponry, tactics, and strategies, movement and routes of troops, etc., in exchange for money. In October 2014, for example, some soldiers were arrested, after being discovered to have revealed crucial security information to the group that led to the killing of several soldiers (Omonobi, 2014). There are several instances, where soldiers set up roadblocks and collected money from travelers without checking their vehicles. In such circumstances, Boko Haram members easily smuggled weapons into the region.

Another example is in 2016, when military authorities arrested some Boko Haram supporters, including two senior-officers, two policemen, and 26 civilians, for aiding the sect (This Day, October 2016). Following the killing of Lieutenant Colonel Muhammad Abu Ali on 4 November 2016, a gallant military commander in Borno state, experts have raised concern about sabotage within the military system. Even

before this period, in 2012, the former President of Nigeria, Goodluck Ebele Jonathan revealed that Boko Haram had penetrated his government, maintaining that some of them (or their supporters) are in the legislative, judicial, and executive arms of the government while others are in the military, and other security agencies (BBC News, January 2012).

There are instances where soldiers deployed to fight Boko Haram engaged in the sale of weapons and other sophisticated equipment to the group and criminal gangs. However, military leaders often moderate such news or allegations. In September 2016, the military authorities established that some soldiers are selling military hardware to Boko Haram, signifying the corruption bedeviling the country's counterinsurgency efforts (VOA 2016). Many residents in the northeast accused security agencies engaged in fighting Boko Haram in Borno, of taking over their farming and fishing businesses. Unfortunately, the soldiers engaged in businesses while they are on duty to protect and safeguard the population of the region (Onuoha et al, 2020).

The foregone analysis shows how demoralized the country's military turns out to be, and this is not unconnected with endemic corruption rooted in the military system. Arguably, knowing that ending the insurgency will lead to a shortfall in budgetary allocation to the defense sector, as well as foreign defense aid offered by donors, military authorities became interested in a never-ending war. As a result, many capitalized on the war against Boko Haram to enrich themselves, by diverting funds meant to procure weapons to combat insurgency for personal ends. It is important to stress that troop morale is an essential determinant of military victory, and it is a force multiplier where high morale correlates with a positive effect on performance whereas

low morale adversely affects effectiveness. Absence of sufficient equipment are conditions that were worsened by corruption which discouraged the military to put their lives on the line. Although the recent Buhari administration has put in measures to address the problem of corruption in the defense sector, it is noteworthy that as recent as 2021, very little has changed.

5.3 Conclusion

This chapter has been able to explain how foreign defense aid engendered corruption among government and military officials in Nigeria's counter-insurgency struggles. Although corruption has been in existence in the country, the provision of foreign defense aid by donors has further exacerbated the situation. This is not unconnected with the secrecy of the country's defense spending which constrained the ability of donors to hold the government accountable. Thus, it is worth reiterating that corruption is inimical to progress. Anywhere corruption is found there are drawbacks in the process of administering fair, just, and effective duties and services. The same can be said of Nigeria's security agencies whose internal dynamics are being eaten up by festering cancer, corruption. This has caused the armed forces to experience decline which creates instability in the military and the country's security as a whole. However, findings from this chapter would be helpful as I move to the general conclusion of this study in the next and final chapter.

Chapter 6

SUMMARY CONCLUSION

Academics hold different opinions on the impact of foreign defense aid in the fight against terrorism or insurgency. While some scholars argue that defense aid by dominant powers to emerging economies and less developed countries does not necessarily guarantee a positive turn in the tide because bad governments tend to use the defense aid to hold their position in power. Hence, it will lead to poor security policies and delay reform in developing countries, as it can be squandered or diverted to other areas instead of reaching its desired destination (Corruption and Moral Hazard) (Easterly 2007, Djankov et al. 2008, Rajan & Subramanian 2008, Moyo 2009, Wright 2010, Karlin 2017, Morgan 2017, Sokolsky & Miller 2018, Helton 2019). Other stress that countries that have weak institutions and lack good security policies might not be able to manage defense aid effectively, and this will, in turn, hinders its effectiveness (Elayah 2016, Dimant et al 2017). Some postulated that authoritarian regimes (or bad governments) might use defense aid to violate human rights in their countries, which will possibly lead to transnational terrorism (that is anti-donor countries) (Bapat & Navin 2011, Gries et al. 2015, Dimant et al. 2017).

This study probed into the impact of foreign defense aid in the fight against insurgency in northern Nigeria. The region has been an epicenter of turmoil, instability, and overall chaos for a decade. This development is not unconnected with the historical strive of several groups within the region to revive the prestigious Islamic empires they

had in the past. Although the government was able to suppress the movements, the ruins of their goals continue to thrive, which suddenly gave rise to Boko Haram in 2009. A brief observation from the study shows that Boko Haram is standing on the footprints of the previous Islamic empires of Western Sudan. The group's ideological belief is rooted in Salafist and Wahhabis philosophy. This belief advocate for strict adherence to the teachings of the Quran and Hadith. They believe in the oneness of God (Monotheism). They rejected adulterated Islam, Western education, and the secular constitution of Nigeria. Therefore, the main goal of Boko Haram is to establish an Islamic state that will be governed based on the tenets of Sharia law. The group employed violence act as a means to attain their aspiration, which led to the loss of untold lives and properties. The group had established linkages with international terrorist organizations like al-Qaeda, al- Shabab, and ISIS.

A review of the government efforts to address the insurgency was also done. It shows that the country lacks the technical expertise to produce essential weapons to fight Boko Haram. Hence, it relied heavily on defense aid from friendly countries to execute its war against the group. The United States, United Kingdom, and other international institutions have provided weapons, training, and funding to the Nigerian military. Since the provision of the defense aid, the security forces were able to have remarkable progress against Boko Haram, such as repossessing of Boko Haram strongholds and emancipation of some Chibok and Dapchi girls.

However, reports of extensive human rights abuses by the Nigerian security forces have compelled traditional donors like the US and UK to stop providing weapons and focus on humanitarian assistance in the country. This development has resulted in the shortage of military equipment, which led to the demoralization of the security forces

deployed to combat Boko Haram. The absence of defense aid has further exposed the weakness of the Nigeria state apparatus, as it lacks domestic military technology to deal with internal insurgencies. Currently, the region has become a recruitment hub for many terrorist organizations, like Ansaru, the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP), and Islamic States of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS).

A cursory observation from the study shows that the unchanged behavior of traditional donors like the US and UK to provide weapons to the country has compelled the government to secretly shift to another option of getting weapons from China and Russia. For instance, in April 2020 the Chinese government offered modern tanks and artillery to the country (McGregor, 2019). But despite the amount of aid the country received, the insurgency prevails. The kidnapping of 600 students from a secondary school in Katsina state by Boko Haram illustrates a clear example (Vanguard, 11 December 2020).

An appraisal of the factors that impeded the appropriate use of defense aid in Nigeria's counter-insurgency struggles was also made. It shows that foreign defense aid engendered corruption among government and military officials, as a result of the secrecy of the country's defense spending, which constrained the ability of donors to hold the government accountable. Military leaders and some authorities in government enrich themselves by embezzling the defense aid. The diversion of about $2.2 billion that was meant for combating insurgency by the National Security Adviser (NSA) to support the reelection of the interim President (Goodluck Ebele Johnathan) party campaigns in the 2015 election demonstrate a clear example. It is apparent that corruption enfeebled the ability to respond to the group threats. It also enervated military capacity while it strengthened Boko Haram attacks abilities.

Generally, it can be deduced from this study that there has been a significant lack of progress in Nigeria's counter-insurgency struggles and the effectiveness of defense aid is at low ebb. Therefore, this study concludes that foreign defense aid has not been effective in the country's war against Boko Haram. The insurgency will continue to prevail until domestic structural challenges are efficiently address. Although the current Buhari administration has put in some measures to tackle corruption, some records show that it has been one-sided in its war. If proved to be right, the government must reform its strategy against corruption to effectively deal away with any barrier that would weaken its fight against insurgency. Besides, there is a need for the government to reform its military system. The security forces should undergo training that will be free from the tenets of human rights violations. Entrenching the core principles of accountability and transparency from the high-ranking military officials will go a long way in addressing this menace. Senior management officers will have no choice but to act honestly upon the realization that they are being monitored.

Furthermore, Nigeria's absolute dependence on imported weapons to fight Boko Haram has intensified its strategic vulnerability to the whims and caprices of major arms industrial countries like the US and its allies. Therefore, in the long run, it needs to establish domestic arms manufacturing industries, though it might cost billions of dollars, it is essential for the survival of the country.

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