

The Middle East's Self-Proclaimed Islamic State in Power: Ideology, Politics, and Governance

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ABSTRACT

This thesis highlights how the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood's political ideology evolved from a religious movement to a powerful and violent political party, and how they affected the politics of the Middle East. Whereas many arguments continue to occur about the nature of the events and factors that led to the MB's emergence, as well as attempts to seize power in the Middle East, its prevalence and frequency, and public dissatisfaction with the religious-political movement. I will also prove the direct links between the Islamic political parties represented by ISIS, Hamas, Al-Qaeda, and the Muslim Brotherhood, which is the nucleus of many of these parties, particularly in the MENA region and the world. Since the Muslim Brotherhood emergence in 1928, the Egyptian regime and its army has somehow reflected the way the various Arab regimes deal with the Brotherhood within their own countries, accusing them of committing spying actions for the interest of Western countries through international intelligence services and pursuing foreign agendas, pretending to be an ideological shift toward "moderation." However, my research reveals that the Muslim Brotherhood's and associated political parties' behavior is aimed not only at integrating into political systems within the framework of democratic states but proposing an alternative religious state that excludes all and rejects pluralism, as the Muslim Brotherhood seeks to alter the shape and fabric of the Middle East.

Keywords: Islamic Parties, Muslim Brotherhood, Al-Qaeda, Islamists, Arab Spring

ÖZ

Bu tez, Mısır Müslüman Kardeşleri'nin siyasi ideolojisinin dini bir Selefi gruptan güçlü etkiye sahip siyasi partilere evrimini ve yeni Ortadoğu siyasetini şekillendirmedeki rollerini vurgulamayı amaçlamaktadır. Müslüman Kardeşler'in ortaya çıkmasına neden olan olay ve etkenlerin doğası, Arap Baharı ile doğrudan bağlantısı, askeri darbeler, Arap bölgesinde iktidarı ele geçirme girişimleri, yaygınlığı ve sıklığı ve Selefi siyasi harekete olan halkın hoşnutsuzluğu hakkında pek çok tartışma yaşanmaya devam etmektedir..Ayrıca bu çalışma, IŞİD, Hamas, El Kaide, Hizb Al-Tahrir ve özellikle Arap dünyasında bu partilerin çoğunun çekirdeği olarak görülen Müslüman Kardeşler tarafından temsil edilen İslami siyasi partiler arasında doğrudan bağları olduğu gerçeğini de ortaya koymaktadır. 1928'de Müslüman Kardeşler'in ortaya çıkışından bu yana, Mısır rejimi ve ordusu, çeşitli Arap rejimlerinin kendi ülkelerinde Müslüman Kardeşler'le nasıl başa çıktıklarını yansıtmakta ve onları uluslararası istihbarat servisleri aracılığıyla Batılı ülkelerin çıkarları için casusluk yapmakla, yabancı gündemler peşinde koşmakla ve sözde "ılımlılığa" doğru ideolojik bir değişim davranışlar göstermekle suçlanmışlardır. Ancak bu araştırma, Müslüman Kardeşler'in ve bağlantılı siyasi partilerin davranışlarının yalnızca demokratik devletler çerçevesinde siyasi sistemlere entegre olmayı değil, Müslüman Kardeşler'in amaçladığı gibi bölgenin ve Arap ve İslam dünyasının şeklini ve dokusunu değiştirerek çoğulculuğu reddeden ve herkesi dışlayan bir dini devlet yaratmayı da amaçladığını ortaya koymaktadır .

Anahtar Kelimeler : İslami Partiler, Müslüman Kardeşler, El Kaide, İslamcılar, Arap Bahar

DEDICATION

To my two mothers, who have given me wings to fly by

dedicating their lives to raising me

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ISIS	The Islamic State in Iraq and Syria
MB	Muslim Brotherhood
PJD	The Justice and Development Party in Morocco
POS	Political Opportunity Structure

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Chapter 1

INTRODUCTION

This thesis focuses on one of the most important political phenomena of the twentieth century. Political Islam and the Islamic movements that have emerged in recent years, by addressing the concept of political Islam and identifying the factors for the development and rise of political Islam movements, as well as the position of political Islam movements on democracy, political participation and the impact of the intellectual formation of political islam movements on their political practice.

Regardless of the different concepts and terms used to describe political Islam, the term refers to all Islamic movements and parties that believe in Islam as a religious and political system that desires to participate in political life. Many political, economic, social, cultural, internal, and external factors contributed to the emergence of the Islamic movement, where political Islam has played a significant role in many Arab countries' participation in political life. The Arab Spring in 2011 represents a milestone with significant implications for the Middle East.[1]

The Middle East is undergoing a political transformation, which has resulted in fierce competition among various currents for power and the implementation of their vision. The Islamic currents were the most ascending, led by the MB, the world's oldest and largest Islamic group, which has been designated a terrorist organization by many of the most powerful countries.

The MB aims to bring about a radical change in society and the political system by proposing an Islamic alternative.[2] It seeks to apply religion and Islamic law (Sharia) in various areas of life and establish an Islamic state that does not recognize geographical borders. Moreover, the MB believed that this would only be achieved after dominating power and programs that enact laws. Therefore, the last years that followed the Arab Spring in 2011 witnessed the growth of its political role, its political discourse and programs, the use of violent force, and the methods of destruction within the political framework.

Following the ideological evolution of the MB ,a significant literature has emerged, analyzing the various aspects of this significant transformation since 1920s.This thesis seeks to investigate how the Muslim Brotherhood's political ideology evolved from a religious Salafist organization into political parties with solid and violent weight and power and how they played a critical role in defining Middle Eastern politics. It will examine the direct link between military coups and attempts to seize power in the Middle East, as well as the direct relationships between Islamic political parties in the aftermath.

My analysis proves that violence is an inherent aspect of the organization's attempt to obtain power, and what may alter is the form of this violence used against opponents of their approach by Following the MB from its inception in the 1920s to the present, The MBs seek to rationalize this brutality by connecting it to minor organizations. However, these organizations are instruments in the hands of the MB, and it demonstrates an ideological threat in being a constitution for many terrorist organizations as ISIS and Al-Qaeda. As a result, the MB's actions considered

monopolistic power practices. It deals with other forces with extreme arrogance and a desire for hegemony, disregarding all opportunities for national consensus, and that the MB has no political allies motivated by their interests.[3]

1.1 Research Questions

- How did the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood's political ideology evolve from a religious movement to an Islamic political party with intense and violent weight and power?
- What is the origin and purpose of political Islam movements' intellectual formation? What effect does it have on their political practice?
- What is political Islam' ideological and organizational threats on the state stability?

1.2 Hypothesis

The experience of the MB in Egypt is significant for Islamic movements throughout the Middle East. The Egyptian group's successes and failures provided a variety of opportunities and national and regional constraints for Brotherhood movements in other countries. Regardless of the difficulties they have faced in recent years, Islamic parties will continue to have a significant impact on Middle Eastern political affairs.

- Presenting the alleged Islamic State and the revival of the Islamic Caliphate poses challenges to the democratic state formation since the model provided by Islamic groups does not allow pluralism is founded on the preacher Sayyid Qutab's principles.

- Political Islam movements and the MB, in particular, exploit social, economic, and political conditions to develop and spread in society and serve their political goal, which essentially seeks power in the name of the national Islamic state.
- Political Islam Movements and the MB assess their political engagement strategies based on opportunities and threats analysis, allowing them to broaden their operations as a political, military, and a social movement, paving the way for a potentially stable role in the generation of political Islam.

1.3 Methodology

The qualitative methodology was used to write this thesis, and it was based on a variety of sources, including articles, textbooks, and reports. This thesis answers and explains how the MB evolved in 1920s, how they spread, and the direct link between all Islamic parties in the Middle East, where they share the same ideology and objectives and the obstacles to their evolution, and how they played a critical role.

I will conduct common approaches to analyzing qualitative data, such as qualitative content analysis and thematic analysis, to study the data and find the major themes, patterns, and literature studies to investigate concepts and hypotheses. Because of the nature of the topic, the following methodologies will be used in the research:

- Analytical Approach: Examine themes and patterns to demonstrate the direct link between all Islamic parties in the Middle East that share the same ideology and goals and the crucial role in defining the region's politics.

- The historical approach: Considering Islamic movements as a historical phenomenon and attempting to research the reasons for their emergence and spread while providing reasonable ideological explanations.
- The historical approach: Considering Islamic movements as a historical phenomenon and attempting to research the reasons for their emergence and spread while providing reasonable ideological explanations.
- The inductive method: Collecting data and identifying the main themes and patterns in the sayings of scholars and thinkers, mentioning their evidence and insights statements based on evidence and arguments.
- Process-tracing approach: Following the MB's political ideology and violent behavior in the 1920s to the present.

1.4 The Study Significance

In the context of recent political events in the Middle East, political Islam, as represented by Islamic groups, continues to have intellectual and practical ramifications. It is necessary to make direct contributions to the MB's ideology and practice as an Islamic political organization with strategies, expectations, and aspirations to change the Middle East's political rule structure. I would like to be one of the researchers who focuses on the role of political Islam in the Middle East, where these phenomena attract scholars, authors, and researchers to write about the new political issue. The direct relationship between religion and politics has pushed into Arab-Islamic discourse. The debate over the state and political Islam shaped and

continues to be at the center of religious, ideological, political, and organizational challenges, and it resurfaced, more vital than ever, as a result of the Arab Spring .[4]

Following the Arab Spring, the political situation's rapid mobility created several challenges. In light of the state of instability at the internal and regional levels, conflict tyranny appeared on the political scene, which contributed to the erosion of the state's prestige. Moreover, in the face of this multi-dimensional crisis, all accusations were directed at the MB and Islamic political parties. Furthermore, The MB attempt to bring a dramatic change in society and the political system by providing an Islamic alternative, the only movement that implements religion and Sharia. Moreover, The MB understood that this would not be possible unless they had access to power and the platforms that create laws; as a result, recent years have seen a significant expansion in its political role. Despite Hassan al-Banna and Sayyid Quttob founding the group 90 years ago, they provided academic jurisprudence and practical efforts in intellectual and political matters that are still ongoing and lead the Islamists.[4] Political Islam is widely regarded as one of the century's most dangerous and violent phenomena. In 2019, the Trump administration added the Muslim Brotherhood to the US list of "foreign terrorist groups," allowing sanctions to be imposed on anyone or a group associated with MBs, which have over ten million adherents across the Middle East, which have been subjected to economic and political restrictions due to their designation.[5]

1.5 Theoretical Framework

The failure of the Islamic state's ideological project and the experience and shortcomings of the MB in the Middle East are addressed with different theories. This paper will examine the Muslim Brotherhood's inception and evolution from a social,

religious movement into political parties in Egypt from the 1920s, begins by describing and analyzing factors that contribute to the movement's growth using the concept of the political opportunity structure from social movement theory.

A theory is “an organized and systematic set of interrelated statements (concepts) that specify the natural relationships between two or more variables, to understand a problem or the nature of things “[6]

According to Tadros the MBs first emerged in 1928 as a social movement rather than a political party), evolving and expanding since the 1930s. the political opportunity structure in social movement theory can explain the MB's effective mobilization through linking its Islamic ideology to organizational structure and activities.[6] According to the theoretical review, ideas deeply embedded in social movements than the concept of framing allows. It also helps to explain how Islamic movements emerge in highly repressive environments. Since the MB's inception, it has spread in the Middle East and launched. Many militant Islamist groups, including Hamas and Islamic Jihad.

The social movement literature explaining the mobilization of the Islamist Movement tends to focus primarily on the political context (democratic, semi-democratic, or authoritarian). According to McAdam, this overlooks the presence of religious fundamentalist and racist movements in Western liberal democratic settings. It is not the regime type but rather an openness that determines social movement mobilization as a variable. Whether a regime is authoritarian or democratic determines movement entrepreneurs' strategies rather than a causal factor for movement mobilization. McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly's Political Opportunity Structure focus on the dynamic

relationships between political opportunities, framing processes, and mobilizing structures.

The existing political Islam literature focuses on sociocultural and grievance-based explanations for the movement's mobilization. Grievances, the existence of social isolates, or relative deprivation are "a necessary but not sufficient condition of social protest" according to social movement theory. The MB and the illegal Quran classes they organized were crucial "abeyance structures" in keeping Egypt's Islamist Movement collectively as an Islamist movement. According to McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly, there is a disconnect between studies of social movements in liberal democratic countries and those elsewhere. Social movement mobilization is often confused with social protest activity in the literature.[7]

With a framing approach, the analysis combines opportunity structure in social science, which are the external factors limiting or enabling collective actors (social movements) to explain their social developments.[8]in general, it seeks to explain why social mobilization occurs, the forms in which it appears, and the possible social, cultural, and political consequences to comprehend the Muslim Brotherhood's various aspects in the Arab world. The institutionalized political system's relative openness or closure, the stability or absence of a wide range of elite coalitions that typically drive the political system, the presence or absence of elite allies, state capacity, and proclivity to repression are the main dynamic components of the political opportunity structure.

On the one hand, the framing approach to collective action is based on the frameworks used by the MB discourse to obtain empirical evidence for their various tactics for mobilizing people and societies. The emotional rhetoric, combined with the reconfiguration of collective religious identity, created a wave of "perceived injustice" among the younger generation, who were told stories about the regime's suppression of the Sunni majority, creating incentives for collective action that appeared to allow the Mb to expand its presence and popularity. On the other hand, the group's use of violence is viewed as tactical in response to the opportunity created by the need for armed force to protect civilians from the state's violent repression and indiscriminate killing. According to social movement theory, in the absence of democracy, an oppressive environment, and other alternatives, violent disagreement, rather than an adopted method of protest, is more contextual.[9] As a result to El Fadl analysis, the dictatorial regime's dominance over all political parties in the Middle East, including the MB. Similarly, the MB's military involvement in the events of the Arab Spring was merely a byproduct of the violence fueled by international and regional interventions.

Since the emergence of the political Islam concept, the role of morality and religion in politics has been the focus of controversy and intellectual and political polarization.[10] This controversy still affects the political movement, especially in the Arab world. Mainstream political theories, such as liberalism and socialism, are based on social philosophies and have been influenced by the historical conditions of different civilizations. At the same time, Islam contains intellectual and ideological roots suitable for a political theory separate from contemporary political theories, which prompted Islamic movements to develop an integrated theoretical policy based

on these foundations. However, this paper will first focus the concepts based on a variety of modern political movements, ideological trends, and state-oriented policies concerned with giving Islam a place of reference and a source of organization in political life.

Islamist trends in the Muslim world where Muslims live as minorities range from left-leaning populist protest movements to ultra-conservative movements dedicated to social control. On the other hand, political Islam cannot be equated with the current European ideological spectrum of left and right, Jürgen Habermas wrote about the eclipse of the "secularization thesis" in the Western public domain of Habermas. Others echo these ideas about the Muslim world, such as the view that the conscious nature of Islamic religious obligations, combined with the lack of determination of Islamic law, requires a secular and liberal state for religious reasons. Hashemi argues that liberal democracy requires a secular form of politics but that getting there requires a patient attitude toward internal religious change. Islamists differ in their approach to religious authority and knowledge. According to Anwar Mahajne (2013), non-Arab Muslims can understand Islam's political message; one of the goals of an Islamic state should be to give religious scholars the authority to speak authoritatively on Sharia laws. Political Islam should not be limited to power-seeking social movements or revolutionary regimes based on Islamist militancy as Iran. Many governments, including Egypt, Morocco, Indonesia, and Nigeria, have embraced political Islam principles, most notably the Islamization of domestic legislation. [9]

The main theoretical arguments; the political-ideological transition of the MB is from a socio-religious movement to a political movement, and the shift in the group's

political agenda, particularly rhetoric, is discussed. The analysis situates this shift in discourse within the dynamics of reintroducing the Islamists' project and the Islamic Caliphate, which pose challenges to the state's political and military strategy development, including state cooperation, Regionalism, nationalism, and non-state allies. I briefly outline the MB's history and ideology in Egypt and the Arab world. Then, based on (1) the literature on political Islam, primarily written by regional political scholars and specialists, and (2) the political opportunity structure of arguments in social movement literature, I present and evaluate the two current models that make the most sense for understanding the rapid mobilization. On the other hand, As the MB continues to demonstrate, the role of ideas in social movements and how mobilization is dependent on interactions between ideas and organizations should be expanded to include processes within organizations that allow them to resist the state's repressive efforts. One of its participation tactics, based on the application of opportunities and risks analysis, has broadened the scope of its activities as a political, military, and social movement, paving the way for Islamic movements to achieve a stable position eventually.

1.6 Thesis Outline

The thesis will include five chapters; the first chapter is an introduction that describes the research questions, hypothesis, methodology, significance of the study, and the theoretical framework.

The second chapter discusses the literature review and conceptual framework for Islamic political movements, including the history of Islamic political parties in general, political Islam and the MB Movement, and the development of an "Islamic State." The ideological challenge and organizational threat posed by the intellectual

progress of political Islam organizations on their political action is ideological and organizational.

Chapter three focuses on Social Movement Theory , Islamic mobilization of the Muslim Brotherhood movement and the role of Political Opportunity Structure and focuses on Incentives for organizational development from Religious-Social movements to political parties.

Chapter four focuses on the Aspects of Violence and Extremism in the Behavior of the MB, highlighting the transformative violence of the Mb represented by the special regime and propaganda for violence within the MB, and then focusing on perceptions of organizational affiliation and transformations of violence and finally focusing on interest Opportunism and societal isolation in the behavior of the MB.

Chapter five is the conclusion chapter will put the main findings and recommendations of the thesis together.

Chapter 2

LITERTURE REVIEW

2.1 Introduction

Political Islam is considered one of the most important phenomena that has captured scholars' attention in the political and social disciplines since the 1970s. This concept has given numerous titles, including Islamism, the Islamic Renaissance, and the Islamic Caliphate .What increased the importance of this phenomenon is the international developments witnessed by the international community from the Arab-Israeli conflict to the ideological struggle to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, following the Iranian Revolution, through the events of September 11, 2001, to the Arab Spring revolutions .

The latter has produced many results and developments in the Arab world's political sphere, the most significant of which was the role played by the MB Movement a phase after they came to power, through a series of parliamentary elections that resulted in the victory of all currents of the JDP in Morocco and the Al - Nahda Movement in Tunisia and MB Movement in Egypt with an Islamic orientation.[11]

Regardless of the formal variations between each model and the nature of its political behavior, it was revealed that all of these political Islam movements failed to demonstrate their ability to construct democratic institutions following the opportunities accessible to them. The success or failure of these movements is

determined by the degree to which Arab countries' political and social structures accepted international and contemporary developments in Islamic society.

The concept of political Islam Moreover, the characteristics that distinguish Islamic movements, the debate it sparks over the various names it goes by, and the factors that led to the spread of Islamic movements, as their emergence was due to a variety of factors as a dominant factor and a significant key in the public discourse of many countries in the Middle East. [11] Through a conceptual and theoretical approach to the phenomenon of political Islam through a set of essential points based on defining the concept of political Islam movements and clarifying terminology with defining its distinctive features and highlighting the various factors contributing to its emergence.

The fundamental concept is that numerous reasons and many events contributed to the creation and growth of the Islamic movements represented by the MB into the shape they are today. Islamic movements play a significant role in the Arab political sphere. Two-axis will address in detail; The first provides a conceptual basis for understanding the phenomena of political Islam as the second is concerned with Islamic movements and the causes that contribute to their creation.

2.2 Sayyid Qutb “Milestones”

Sayyid Qutb (1906-1966), an Egyptian scholar, was emphatic in his view of Islam as the definitive answer to humanity's afflictions. Qutb articulates the radical Islamic philosophy that underpins violent organizations such as the MB and Al Qaeda in his most famous work, *Ma'alim fi-l-Tariq*, also known as *Milestones*. [13] As one of Islamism's most important ideologues, his literature has created the beliefs and vision of today's radical Islam, a militant philosophy that substantiates its problematic and

often violent activities most notable for its focus on Islam's triumphalism, essential supremacy, and required dominion. Qutb was the first Islamist to proclaim a cultural war against the US and Western civilization, a stance that continued to emerge in his political works throughout the early 1960s. Qutb had long maintained that the purity of Egypt's culture, heavily influenced by Islam, had been tainted by its residents' ready adoption of Western ideas and behaviors. According to Marandi, Qutb sought an intellectual answer to the issues he saw afflicting his homeland, an ideology that addressed his concern for the country's cultural identity while insulating it from the damaging, modernizing impact of the West.

Through Islam, Qutb developed his Ideology, discovering ideological autonomy in the Islamic vernacular, a discourse unaffected by the Western. Islamism grasped and regulated his inherent proclivity, allowing him to express himself in politically innovative ways."[14] This contradiction of social and spiritual fulfillment became significant in Qutb's later writings, as did his view of Islam as humanity's rescuer. Qutb's personal experience influenced his thoughts and was reflected in his work. Two of these consequences were a two-year journey in the United States and a lengthy prison sentence in Egypt. Many believe Qutb's stay in America inspired and worsened his anti-Western hostility and suspicion, resulting in an essential contribution to Qutb's worldview development.

Qutb was imprisoned for "anti-government action" at a period in which Qutb's political ideas shifted from relatively moderate nationalism to unabashed Islamic radicalism. He continued to write Milestones was a landmark work of this period and a departure from his more modest earlier works.[15] Qutb's outrage inspired an intellectual change

toward compassion for humanity as a whole. Qutb had long believed in the concept of Islamic identity, believing that it "should stop all other articulations of belonging," but this idea became imbued with a sense of urgency. The killings of his friends strengthened Qutb's sense of a lack of humanity in other belief systems; he felt Islam alone supplied that humanity and so was the savior of the entire race. Since his demise, his impact has been seen across today's extreme Islam. Qutb's ideological impact is likened to Hitler's, and he is seen as "as crucial "to Islamism" as Lenin was to Communism." Qutb's writings have had such a broad impact that he has been dubbed the extreme Islamic Karl Marx and "the Arab world's first prominent thinker of the Islamist cause." [13]

The title of Qutb's work refers to the central metaphor of the piece: Milestones is a road map for a small group of people who believe in Islamic ideals and are working to spread them around the world. In addition, his findings are framed as "milestones on the way" to the ultimate goal of global leadership, beginning with the rebirth of true Islam. In his opening words, Qutb warns against this attempt:

“Mankind today is on the verge of a precipice... because humanity is lacking those strong principles which are required not just for its healthy growth but also for its real advancement.” (Chapter 1) [14]

These powerful principles, according to Qutb, exist alone in Islam. After identifying the problem, he presents Islam as the only possible answer and his image of a proud army that would impose its tenets, driven by the need to rescue the world. Qutb's characterization of the enemies is central to Milestones, a strongly presented component of conspiracy that is basic to radical Islam.[15] One of Qutb's key themes is the striking contrast between the new reality of Islam and a debased, wicked

civilization known as jahiliyyah, from which all the world's ills originate. Qutb distinguishes between the two, claiming that "Islam knows only two sorts of societies, Islamic and Jahili." The term "Jahiliya" refers to "preIslamic ignorance" inside the sphere of Islam and is used by Qutb to define Islam's enemy, those cultures that do not adequately adhere to Islamic principles. Qutub took the Islamic tradition's bipolarity of Islam/Jahiliya and repurposed it as full rejectionism in the modern world. His claim that a Muslim only belongs to authentic Islam exists today.

Thus, "in the world there is only one party of God; all else are parties of Satan and rebellion" (Chapter 9).

Qutb wants to bring Islam's "Golden Age," or the first generation of pious Muslims, from Muhammad through the final Caliph Ali, back to life. He insisted on following the Prophet's way to the letter for this purpose. He imagines the world where "nationalism is belief, the country is Dar-al-Islam, the ruler is God, and the constitution is the Quran" (Chapter 9). Nothing escapes the totality of the Islamic order for Qutub, and the individual is seen as a transitory phase towards the Islamic society only in which a wonderful Muslim life is possible, a circular logic that runs through much of his thinking and is most evident in his fluctuation between total revolution and gradual conversion. Qutub develops objectives and goals. Da'awa's objective is to demobilize Jahili society, whereas Sharia's purpose is to build a fair society. Qutub develops objectives and goals. [10] Da'awa's objective is to demobilize Jahili society, whereas Sharia's purpose is to build a fair society.[16] His views on civilization and God as lawgiver and civilized man as law recipient are strikingly similar to present Jewish ideas. His use of Ba'athist jargon demonstrates the time's substantial impact on Arab nationalism. The examination of early Islamic history is more of a discussion of political philosophy in the historicist tradition than history. Qutub's criticisms of

Western modernism tendencies are, ironically, quite contemporary and scarcely original striking common Qutub's ideas is modern comprehensive and through, employing an Islamic symbolic system. According to Qutb, concentrate unique over might subjugation," says Chapter 11, "The Faith Triumphant." Islam To solid human predisposition; however, acclamation to point out defended or on prosperity now a proof. Qutb also argues that Muslims should concentrate on their superiority over non-Muslims. "Conditions change," However, from Qutb's perspective, Muslim civilizations have declined from their earlier ascendancy, and he is quick to underline that Islam does not need to be justified or preferred because of worldly achievement, scientific discoveries, or any other worldly proof. It is superior simply because it is superior.[14]

The importance of the vanguard of Islamic believers in changing a disbelieving society is highlighted by milestones. Instead of persuading those around them with rational arguments or arguments about how Islam led to a better life, Qutb demonstrates how the first Muslims demonstrated through their lives and complete submission to Allah that Islam is the only way to human happiness. Qutb also believes that the vanguard can establish Muslim society through violence. Important in converting to a true Muslim society under the leadership of the vanguard [10]. Qutb opposes any change or organization that is not based on Islam. Imperialism, economic justice, racial justice, and other issues have no bearing on social change. Qutb would say that Qutb would argue that Muslim society is ideal on all social measures. However, the objective is not to reach any social measure but merely to create a pure Muslim society, which will be flawless in all ways imaginable on Earth by definition. No civilization is lawful until it is entirely under the supervision of Muslims and only Muslims daily because

only then are all men free." Non-Muslim cultures deny Islam the ability to organize its adherents according to its method, and as a result, Islam must eradicate all such systems, since they are impediments to universal freedom." [16]

Wherever an Islamic community exists, it has a God-given right to move forward and seize control of governmental authorities in order to build the Divine system on earth, but individual conscience is left to individual conscience.

” he said. Of course, this is not the same as the Western concept of freedom mixed with democracy.” [17]

Qutb's fundamental narratives continue to encompass radical Islamist groups' thinking and theoretical foundation structures, including those responsible for the widespread violence of September 11, 2001, where The massive casualties both of which continue to thrive around the world. [18] However, the repercussions of these extremist organizations' growing membership can be seen in more than just individual terrorist attacks. As these organizations gain political clout, their extreme ideologies manifest in hostile and purposeful ways, albeit less openly violent, toward individuals, as the MB advocates.

2.3 The Phenomena of Political Islam

Social sciences are often characterized by several definitions and terminologies for the concept, unlike other sciences, which is the same for political Islam, which characterize by many purposes. Moreover, among the basic reports provided; The idea of the Islamic Movement refers to those who exercise the political process (thought and systems) based on the Perceptions of the Islamic approach to politics and governance, and therefore these political roles may be recognized by the Arab ruling

regimes as (legal, political roles), and may not be recognized as illegitimate political roles.

The Islamic movements are a group of various organizations that adopt Islam as an ideology. A collection of views and political aims based on Sharia, where Islam is not simply a religion but also a political, social, economic, and cultural system. [19] It works in the field of Islamic political action and within the context of a holistic view of life, attempting to reformulate it following Islamic orientations, and aspires to bring about a comprehensive renaissance for the Islamic peoples through their Islamic conception, and tries to influence all aspects of society to reform and reshape it according to Islamic principles. According to Ayoub, all Islamic groups share a commitment to Islam as a foundation and a point of reference, and these organizations strive to make Islam the final and absolute norm that governs their exterior vision. At the same time, the Islamic Movement means an organized collective popular action that calls for a return. It should be noted that the Arab and Islamic world witnessed the emergence of many of these religious and political movements and currents, such as the case with the Wahhabi movement that appeared at the hands of (Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab) in 1745 in the Arabian Peninsula and the Senussi movement in Libya led by (Muhammad Ali al-Senussi) and the Mahdist movement in Sudan at the hands of (Muhammad Ahmad al-Mahdi) in 1881. After that, the pioneers of the modern Islamic renaissance appeared, Jamal al-Din al-Afghani (1838-1897), Muhammad Abduh (1849-1905), and Muhammad Rashid Rida (1865-1935). They came up with ideas that influenced the emergence of the first contemporary Islamic Movement represented by the MB in 1928 by Hassan al-Banna .[19]

The term "political" Islam is a manifestation of movements and forces that want to impose Islamic Sharia to legitimization using modern political action methodology based on political participation in governance and power. Where it's not a description of Islam as much as it is a description and definition of movements, therefore, this description presents the Islamic methodology movements, especially the MB, following their political discourse.[20] The MB and political Islam's political discourse features are generally represented in violence, ambiguity, and an attempt to monopolize reference and evasion and seek to establish a regime far from democracy and pluralism. Furthermore, many believe that political Islam is the politicization of Islam and its return to its roots, requiring military resistance. El Fadl Adds, this term refers particularly to the MB's, to establish an Islamic state and caliphate, which they believe can only achieve by creating a new Islamic society, and an Islamic government, its vast dissemination, and force of public attraction, particularly among the youth, to replace political regimes with violence.

On the other hand, Returning to the Arab schools of thought that contributed to the formation of the notion of political Islam, however, three philosophical elements emerge; The first is a long-term trend. It takes a restricted view of political Islam, seeing it not as human psychology but as a phenomenon unaffected by social and political contexts, opposing democracy by nature and internal composition, and not subject to evolution and good engagement with the democratic process. On the other hand, the Islamic school has recognized that the Islamic nation's political reality and legacy are distinct from the human context. They are limited to their vision of political Islam with a view of superiority and distinction for them, and their historical perspective is taken on them more. [21] As for the third intellectual school, it was

observed in the unilateral study of the Islamic phenomenon that it fell into scientific and methodological shortcomings. Therefore it recognizes the need for analysis from several perspectives as manifestations of the Islamic literature. However, it exists in the context of social and political reality in which She recognized that the presence of political Islam is an outcome of Islamic history and social and political developments

Thus Islam is amenable to political and democratic development, Political Islam, according to François Borja, is "returning to the terminology of Islam that is initially conducted by the social classes that have not benefited from the positive manifestations of modernization, and which expresses, through institutions - or mostly against them - an alternative political project as it calls for a mixture of religion and politics in local and global affairs." (Shboul, H. (2020, August 14). From this perspective, Islamism, which views Islam and Sharia doctrines as a religious ideology as well as a state, reviews the decline of Islam's civilized role as an inevitable and logical result of their failure to apply the details and details of Islamic Sharia, and the replacement of this Sharia with Western values and principles. The full implementation of Sharia in all aspects of Islamic society, including the political system. Finally, political Islam refers to the politicization of the country within the Islamic state.

The term "Political Islam Movements" is Defined as social movements that regard themselves as movements of sweeping social change based on reliance on the reference of Islam and Islamic Sharia as a source of Ideology, policies, behavior, strategies, and objectives. Reed Argues, However, as a result of differences in understanding the purposes of Islam and the means of its application, these movements

have multiplied, wherein different countries have taken various forms and different names, but all these Islamic movements follow the same Ideology and methodology.

2.3.1 Political Islam and Islamic Movements Terms

The association of Islam with politics has resulted in creating several terms and concepts used as synonyms for political Islam." The Islamic Movement," "Islamic Fundamentalism," "Islamism," "The Islamic Caliphate," and The Muslim Brotherhood Movement.

Fundamentalism: An intellectual, political term referring to an integrated perspective of life in all of its political, social, economic, and cultural components, resulting from an inherent conviction originating from a belief in an idea and a set of thought, which is generally a religious conception of religious belief. The term derives from the title of a series of papers called the Foundations or Fundamentals, published in the US between 1910 and 1920, in which the term fundamentals used to refer to a reaffirmation of basic theological principles through characters; revelation, authority, as well as their defense against liberation theological challenges.[21]

The term "Islamic Fundamentalism" was initially used to characterize what is now known as political Islam in the 1990s; in September 1994, a global conference convened in Washington under the title "The Threat of Fundamental Islam to North Africa." "The meeting was on Sudan and what was described as Iran's aim to export the Islamic revolution to Africa via Sudan.[22] This word was progressively superseded by the term "radical Islamists" in the 1990s, amid internal events in Algeria, and the term settled on political Islam following the events of September 11, 2001.

The term "fundamentals" refers to a variety of terms, which refer to three Islamic sciences: shariah, Hadith, and Fiqh and the science of jurisprudence, as well as the evidence that leads to the determination of legitimacy. Fundamentalism in its modern definition refers to a return to citing religious rules in response to the civic advances that preceded secularism for those incapable of dealing with modernity intellectually. According to what Habermas described and criticized, “this Fundamentalism opposes the modernist notions of alienation and relativism as carrying exclusive rhetoric that rejects the other and does not recognize the attitude of tolerance and speech instead of resorting to force and symbolic violence”[24]. Other readings have attempted to broaden the description of “Fundamentalism” Garaudy, for example, widens the term and adds new dimensions in characterizing and condemning types of Fundamentalism by saying:

“In the West arose the origin of fundamentalism, which is Zionist fundamentalism, and fundamentalism appeared under the mantle of Marxism.”
[24]

Salafi movements: Salafism refers to individuals who adhere to the approach that the nation's ancestors followed in matters of belief and its origins as in the Qur'an and Sunnah. and the term Salafism refers to the Islamic Movement in the 19th century, such as the Movement of Jamal al-Din al-Afghani 1837-1897, Muhammad Abduh 1849 -1905, and Rashid Rida 1860 - 1935.[25]

The Salafi movement's vision and intellectual outputs served as a historical entrance point for mobilizing modern worldwide Islamic movements. Salafism, according to followers of this movement, implies the call to the Qur'an, Sunnah, religion, and Islamic Sharia, as well as the method and route followed by the Companions and

Rightly Guided Caliphs.[26] Among the most fundamental concepts of this Movement is Adherence to Islamic law. The Sunnah is a source of legislation and a reference, making God's monotheism the foundation and reasoning, preserving national unity, and The definitive distinction between polytheism and monotheistic. [26]

Extremist movements: "Extremism" refers to being on the periphery, away from the center. The term dogmatism is from an English word of Catholic origin, and it signifies ideological stagnation and mental isolation, which is the essence of thinking that extreme Islamic groups circle. As represented by ISIS, Al-Qaeda, and Islamic Jihad, Extremist Islam's movements are not a single homogeneous movement. Instead, there are several models of Islamic extremism in various nations, including within the same country at times.[27] Popular movements are internal movements, and political extremism refers to individual and collective appeals for a dramatic change in the country's political, economic, and social systems, which are related to violence and extremism. On the approach of movements for political Islam that is based on certain concepts, such as ignorance and takfir, and uses the method of violence and jihad as these movements call it, as a means for political change, to achieve the goal of establishing an Islamic state and the application of Sharia.

Muslim Brotherhood Movement: The MB has been the most powerful political opposition movement in many Arab and Islamic countries since its founding in 1928 by Al-Banna.. the movement is characterized by its excellent administrative structure and capacity to establish supportive and significant popular bases both internally and externally. Following January 25, 2011, revolution, the group was able to dominate political life in Egypt, beginning with the People's Assembly and the Shura Council

and progressing through the founding committee of the new constitution, due to its organizational strength and advocacy, and service activities, and through the Freedom and Justice Party, which founded on June 6, 2011.[28] Moreover, the President of Egypt was represented by "Mohamed Morsi "after his first legislative election. Since 2011, the activity of the MB in the Arab world has been transforming the political, military, and societal levels in the structure of political opportunities Social paving the way for a possible, stable role for the group.

The political interest in Islamic movements resulted in the same practical characteristics and theoretical ideas that would place them within the "violent Islamic movements." [29] Categorizing or identifying the Islamic movements under one banner is challenging because of the differences in their perception of their intellectual, political, and social project's relationship with the principles of Islam. At the same time, Islam remains a civilization-religious-historical vessel for these movements, which derives these organizations from the Islamic societies and countries, taking the form of a program that differs only in implication where Islamic trends within the political scene multiply with visions and different ideologies, According to Tamara Cofman Wittes, divides Islamic movements into three categories: The first category is armed Islamic movements such as Hezbollah and Hamas, the second category is Takfiri groups, and the third category is Islamists who do not entirely reject violence entirely and participate in the political process in Arab countries .[29]

The study question How far can Islamic parties engage and participate in the political process while endangering political, social, and security stability, as well as the state entity? There is internal debate about how these movements treat minorities, political

engagement, and religious authority's boundaries, as well as their intellectual formation purpose. What impact does it have on their political behavior? On the other hand, the debate over the nature and meaning of moderation is one of the important problems in studying the development of Islamic movements. The study finds that it is not possible in any way to measure the credibility of the discourse of moderation pursued by Islamic movements, nor the extent of their ability to play a constructive role in the political process, before providing a general atmosphere of moderation. Political freedoms allow political competition between Islamists and other political parties and movements. Although the study contains a great deal of skepticism about the pragmatism of Islamists, it considers it necessary to limit their political participation so that there is no room for an increase in the threat and challenges of Islamist movements; As for Wycam, it refuses to use the criterion of moderation in order to measure changes in the behavior and ideas of Islamic movements. Instead, she believes, what is important is that changes are observed in their broader context and not be judged normative. [30] Therefore, instead of looking at the behavior of a group such as the MB in Egypt and its counterparts as an indicator of moderation or not, it is concerned with the ability of these movements to adapt to the political context and their willingness to change their intellectual and ideological vision while engaging in the political field.

2.3.2 Evolving Factors and Conditions for the Emergence and Rise of Political Islam

The Islamic movements resulted from several political, economic, social, and cultural factors and circumstances and various external and internal factors, all of which contributed to the emergence and emergence of political Islam. Without giving

preference to one reason over another, which contributed to the politicization of Islam in Arab society, it may be difficult to determine its beginning.

However, its origins linked to the breakdown of the caliphate system and the degradation of conditions in the Ottoman Empire, while others attribute it to the arrival of Western colonization in Arab nations [19]. The crisis of legitimacy and ineffectiveness, the crisis of social fairness, and the crisis of military losses . Political and military reasons are given precedence in the Islamic group's creation, which focused on the rising rise in demand in Islam as a manifestation of the failure of the Arab National Movement and as a recompense for what the Arabs experienced in 1967. [31] Furthermore, the shaking that accompanied and followed Arab nationalist ideas, systems, and beliefs, the Palestinian issue, the Arab-Israeli conflict, Israel's occupation of Arab lands, and its timing with the Iranian Islamic Revolution and the Second Gulf War. These defeats and events paved the way for the idea that Western policy toward Muslims is unfair and unjust. and the use of double standards.

Most Arab regimes faced a legitimacy crisis in their authority as a result of the adoption of secular policies based on the separation of religion and state, resulting in the establishment of a civil society similar to that of Western societies. Islamists responded to these ideas in two ways: the emergence of fundamentalist Muslims in some countries as a reaction to the dumping of Western trends, as they sought to make Islam a way of life on both the internal and external levels by establishing an Islamic economic, social, and political system and directing international affairs, and the formation of foreign policies based on Islamic principles, and Islam's rejection of

foreign influence, and that Emphasizing the importance of the religious element in the emergence of the Islamic nation." [32]

Most Islamic countries have a low economic level. Since the 1940s, socialist movements have been active in some Islamic countries, aiming to improve people's economic and social conditions. However, the demise of the former Soviet Union created an intellectual vacuum in economic and social change, allowing socioeconomic, political, and cultural disparities to widen within the single state. As a result, theories have emerged claiming that Muslims' deviation from the accurate application of Sharia principles is to blame for backwardness and deterioration in economic and social levels. [33] As a result of the Islamic Movement and their governments' influence on Western policy, the lower class became the popular base for the Islamic movements and found legitimacy in Islam for their right to oppose these regimes.

Among the other reasons the prominent role of the gradual rise of political Islam movements was, It is what governments have done to political Islam and how existing political systems have handled political Islam movements that have resulted in a hostile climate and the rule of exclusion and isolation rather than discussion and constructive engagement. [33] As a result of a desire to preserve power, movements were used as a repressive tool to confront secular democratic movements in order to remain in power without a competitor so that the relationship between some of the Arab region's existing regimes and the Islamic movements later turned into armed conflict in an attempt to reduce, and paralyze, their ability to move.

According to Marie Vannetzel, believes that the reasons for Islamic expansion and the revival of Islamic principles go even further, placing the issue of the Islamic Movement's growth on the foundations of Islamic thought itself, which is the most widespread hypothesis, which sees the issue's origin as inherent in Islamic Arab mentality and sees the position of Islamic currents on resisting alienation and cultural invasion as inherent in Islamic thought itself.[34] As reasons for the emergence of Islamic movements, by listing the following causes, internal factors, and external factors:

- **The internal factors:**

- Westernization was the most dangerous civilized challenge that I rose to confront the Islamic calls and movements. The increase in experimental Westernization processes at all levels had a clear impact on the emergence of Islamic movements. Their aggression against Westernization was not based on their satisfaction with the intellectual reality of Muslims' perceptions of Islam. Instead, in their opinion, these perceptions and behavior were subjective backwardness and a deviation from the Islamic path.[35]

- The political crisis in post-revolution Iraq led to the existence of a vacuum that the Islamic movements tried to exploit by recruiting a considerable number of loyalists and supporters and the absence of an organized opposition movement at the national level. It makes Islamic, ethnic, and social movements take a spontaneous form, lack a broadly popular and mass base, ineffective political discourse, and scattering and lack of unity.[36]

- The absence and weakness of civil society institutions such as parties, associations, and institutions, political Islam groups have filled this void by controlling mosques, religious centers, and charitable societies and providing support to members of these centers, particularly during disasters and calamities. It assisted those affected prior to the arrival of state agencies and institutions, "such as the MB 's position in Egypt following the earthquake of 1993, which provided these groups legitimacy and credibility among large segments of society.[35]

- **The External factors:**

- In times of crisis and failure, mainly military setbacks, people seek safety in religion and return to it. After the defeat of 1967, society, especially the most marginalized and aware groups, took in resorting to the Islamic inventory to make it a new political and intellectual framework, to express its opposition and a tool to crystallize it ideologically so that Islamic ideology becomes permanent use for change in more than one way, Which was the beginning of a stifling crisis in the ideological current that prevailed in the 1960s, represented by the nationalist current that dominated the ideological arena at the time after independence, because the defeat was not only a military defeat while president Abdel Nasser fought this war under the slogan of Arab nationalism, so his defeat was a defeat for the entire Arab nationalism, which could not formulate a sound and clear doctrine or Ideology for Islamic movements to exploit that inability. Ardovini argues that Islamic writings deepened the hatred and rejection of the National Movement, while then-President Sadat fought the 1973 war under another slogan, "Islam." This defeat was inflicted by the occupation of "Egypt, Jordan, and Syria," and, after which some Arab regimes recognized the Hebrew state, resulting in the emergence of Islamic movements rejecting the direction of Arab governments, and then the emergence of Hamas in Palestine along with the Camp David peace

treaty.[36]Egypt's recognition of Israel spawned the emergence of hardline Egyptian Islamic organizations. The Palestinian cause has contributed to the emergence and development of many Islamic organizations that reject their governments' policies with the Palestinian cause prior to the success of the Iranian Islamic revolution to move the Islamic Movement from an opposition to the ruling authority to a position of claiming authority. [37]

- Vannetzel and others attribute the emergence of contemporary Islamic movements in the Arab world to the Ottoman empire's fall in 1924, when the system of the Islamic Caliphate was abolished and secularism was adopted in the administration of the country's affairs,resulting in the loss of an excellent reference for Muslims and opening the door wide for jurisprudence. Personal and collective, which resulted in the emergence of numerous Islamic movements, as well as the abolition of the caliphate system, were strongly opposed by some intellectuals, jurists, and clerics,Some of them hastened to announce the establishment of the MB in Egypt under the leadership of al-Banna, demanding the return of the Caliphate state, before this organization extended to some Arab countries such as Sudan, Jordan and Syria, and the emergence of a group of leaders and thinkers who presented the first Islamic statement to political Islam groups Among the likes of Hassan al-Banna and Sayyid Qutb in Egypt, Hassan al-Turabi in Sudan, Ahmed Yassin in Palestine, Rashid Ghannouchi in Tunisia, and other charismatic leaders, whose efforts and ideas played a prominent role in supporting political Islam groups In addition, these leaders are respected by many Muslims and secularists, for various reasons, some of which are related to their political intellectual production, and some are related to their political stances" as the Iranian Islamic Revolution of 1979, and Iran's attempt to export the revolution to the Islamic world,

and present it later material and military support to many Islamic groups, As one of the most prominent external factors that encouraged and helped in the spread of Islamic movements, because it made these movements and their various directions look to the future with much hope. The Iranian Islamic Revolution, on the one hand, provided the Islamic movements with a practical example of an excellent Islamic revolution; on the other hand, this revolution was seen as a popular revolution that swept away a regime whose rule had lasted for a long time without change and represented the Middle East's most significant military force and an ally of the United States.[38]The revolution arose in response to the secularisation implemented after 1971, as well as the economic problems that Iran was experiencing, as a result of Shah Pahlavi's desire to build a war power that exceeded the capacity of the state budget in order for the Islamic Iranian Revolution to support Islamic movements throughout the Islamic world.

- The emergence of Islamic movements in this manner in the 1990s linked to the United States' participation in the establishment of Islamic movements, as it entered the battle between Arab governments and extremist Islamists at the time. [38] The change of "radical" Islamic movements from internal enemies to foreign enemies in 1998 also resulted in the United States shifting from utter quiet to dealing with them with seeming "radicalism." Radical Armed. This caused the United States to meet the same hatred and loathing that the Arab regimes had on the Arab Muslim peoples. This intervention also caused the creation of many enemies for the United States in the region. The war that was going on between the Arab regimes and the radical Islamists has brought about a shift in Arab popular culture to "Islamization" even within the most open regimes such as "Lebanon, Tunisia, and Morocco," and it has also become

the dominant form of political culture among the elites. As a result, it backed these movements, as seen by the results of parliamentary elections held in various Arab nations, because they position themselves as an alternative capable of opposing the United States and its regional partner Israel.

- The spread of secular philosophy and its manifestations. Secularism was presented as the alternative capable of recruiting the Arab regime by force to confront its lack of the Arab renaissance project and by force to confront the growth of the Islamic political trend. This secularism was adopted as social and economic plans, leaving the media, power parties, and parties proclaimed to be secular.[39] To lay down and promote the epistemological basis of this secularism, Thus, secularism became a source for the fragmentation of society, and at the same time, a source for the generation of religious parties. Thus, secularism worked in our Arab Islamic reality in the opposite direction to what the theory of secularism assumed, and thus secularism was able to provoke the Arab Islamic community to the fullest extent.

- Encouraging local governments to emerge religious parties and organizations to achieve interim or long-term balances. Studies show that most governments in most Islamic countries have encouraged, to varying degrees, the growth of Islamic groups and sometimes violent ones, to combat Marxist, nationalist and liberal tendencies.

The adoption of the newly independent regimes on the one-party system prevented any other political party and did not establish its legitimacy based on the gradual adoption of democratic mechanisms that respect popular sovereignty. Thus, a defect or lack of legitimacy occurred. This crisis of legitimacy leads the ruling elite to use more

mechanisms of oppression to subjugate opponents and opponents of the system, and thus the rule becomes corrupt, which helps the growth of Islamic movements.

- The absence of democratic freedom and the prevalence of corruption, tyranny, and poverty in most Arab countries, as the absence of democracy formed a fertile environment for growth. It spread extremist ideas that herald the torturers in their homelands that by joining the Islamic Movement, they will only lose their suffering and deprivation, but rather that they will be rewarded, if not in This World and the afterlife depend on their stances and they are joining the Islamic Movement. Belief in the principles of the Islamic Movement became jihad; defending them as martyrdom and joining them is a noble and sacred act at times. Küntay contributed to the failure of the Arab and Islamic elites to achieve many promises and political aspirations, which they preached under various names such as national building, Arab unity, equality in rights and living conditions, created the ground for Fertile for the growth of all kinds of opposition, especially Islamic ones, which provided society with an alternative comprehensive theory derived from heritage .

2.4 The MB's Ideological Transformation

The MB's ideology is characterized by an absence of the ability to cognitive, intellectual, and theoretical production, indicating a significant gap in the intellectual and political upbringing of the MBs members, which can be noticed from the content of the MB's intellectual discourse. In contrast, the MB's discourse reveals its frailty and cognitive emptiness.

Following my literature review, I have come to two main conclusions: the importance of Movement replacing ideology. The MB's ideology was not intended to create a

philosophical school distinct from liberalism communism; Others argue that no philosophy or intellectual vision is required because Islam is the Movement's philosophical reference. However, discussing a clearly defined intellectual project is complicated because this reference lacks rooting, theorizing, and intellectual diligence. As a result, MB's philosophical vision is inconsistent.

The Letters of Banna and Qutb is considered the MB's intellectual and primary reference, characterized by generalization and repetition, which may explain its popularity and spread within the MB, particularly in the early stages of the MB's formation. There was no systematic and organizational addition, revision, or modification of such ideas and concepts.[40]

As for the second conclusion; Dominance over politics, the MB's literature focuses on MB and the Islamic caliphate by organizing the MB and mobilizing it with hatred and emotional discourse, which is expected especially in the group's formation and reference values. The MB's intellectual, political content is almost non-existent, and if it is, it is weak. [41] Ideology cannot develop without criticism, review, and debate, lacking within the MB, particularly intellectual and deep theoretical debates. There is no honest and open critical dialogue within MB families and camps, which are more concerned with recitation, indoctrination, imitation, and strengthening MB relations than anything else, as well as the constant confusion between ideas and the personalities of their narrators, which prevents severe criticism of these ideas.

MB's literature's intellectual and theoretical pattern has gone through three stages that represent MB's ideological transformation. The first is the establishment phase, which

runs from founding in 1928 to Hassan al-death Banna's in February 1949. Al -Banna's writings, mainly his letters, as well as some of Al-Huaibei and Saleh Ashmawy's writings, stand out as significant tributaries of the MB's ideology. Most of these writings have a foundational character that focuses on community building, advocacy, and movement methods.

The second stage begins with the death of Al-Banna and continues until the end of the 1970s. It is considered the stage of the Qutb component's dominance over the MB's ideology, and there is hardly anyone who can compete with Qutb in terms of the depth of his intellectual and cognitive production. For example, the writings of Lebanese leader Fathi, which is "Problems of Da'wah and Propaganda,"[41] which is a cornerstone in the MB's evolving. The organizational dimensions, rather than the intellectual or philosophical aspects, dominate most of these writings. There was no intellectual or systematic renewal of these theses even within this organizational production, which resulted in the absence of any initiative renewal over the last two decades.

In general, the MB lacks intellectual diversity and openness to other schools of thought, not only to ideological schools that may contradict the MB ontologically and ideologically but also to those who may share the MB's ideological or ontological roots under the umbrella of Islam. Furthermore, the MB's ideology and method prevent the emergence of intellectual leaders with a sense of or ability to theorize and renew.

2.5 Political Change in Political Islam Movements

The idea of political change is distinguished by its range and comprehensiveness, and the phrase "political change" linguistically refers to transformation or transfer from

one area to another and from one circumstance to another . According to Tadros, It also refers to "the sum of the alterations that political systems in a society go through to redistribute power and influence inside the state itself or across numerous countries." [42] It also entails moving from a non-democratic authoritarian regime to a democratic one." Furthermore, political change is sometimes referred to as (reform), and it is often associated with a constitutional change in leadership or the re-establishment of political power in society. Partially or completely, Combating corruption and weakness in it through various means achieves the desired results.

As for a political change in political Islam, movements does not separate from what came before and after it. It is part of a comprehensive social change movement based on connected intellectual foundations. Political change may be required in terms of the goal, but social change is required as a tool or economic change. A tool for desired political change and reform from the perspective of political Islam movements come first from within; that is, the Muslim individual as a means of change and its axis, believing that societal change (the masses) through spreading the call among them in order to be able to change, with the presence of conscious Islamic leaders legitimizing this change, with the political Islam movements offering a political Islam And yet another scheme with its basic foundation in the social system. Indeed, some believe that the political, social, and economic change that these movements seek is nothing but a tool for a comprehensive Islamic system, and this is what Jaafar Al-Shayeb expressed when he said, "Islam is an integrated legislative system in various dimensions. It contains various factors of societal change, and politics is a natural part of the activity carried out by Islamic movements. The growth of these movements and their ability to change pushed them." [43] until it collides with the political

establishment, Political separation is not possible due to the natural development of society, and the integration of all these dimensions." Some thinkers see that political Islam movements are preoccupied with politics as a gateway for comprehensive change that does not serve the project of those movements, especially if political activity is not built on the depth and social pillars. Cultural and intellectual, and to justify this fear of starting a political change project without a solid social and ideological ground, political action requires a direct clash with internal and external forces to pursue interests. If these movements do not create this suitable intellectual and social ground to stand on them in their change project, they will not be long before they leave the leadership position in light of the clash with other forces [43].

The crisis of the state-religion connection in political transformation among political Islam movements is the outcome of a critical factor: the substantial overlap between the religious and the worldly in the public imagination, particularly among Islamic elites. The national state's political formation as a state in which elements of the sultanate system and other colonial authority were mixed significantly impacted its inability to resolve the dilemma of the political-religious relationship[41]. Islamic movements have crowded the state and since the 1920s in investing the place of religion in societies and ridiculing it for political purposes, which led to the transformation into a political demand and not a religion which have disastrous effects in the Middle East.

On the issue of Egypt, the Islam danger, in particular, was from three sides, the most important of which is the statement that religion possesses a complete system in

politics, with a system of governance and the economy, which was an unbearable mandate. Former President Mohamed Morsi stated:

“We do not believe in a religious state. The term theocracy or clerical rule does not exist for us. We always talk about a civil state in the Al-Azhar document that we all signed.”[43]

This is our concept of the state: a modern state, a democratic state, a state of law, a state that guarantees freedoms. We have learned throughout Islamic history that there is no such thing as a religious state. Islamic Ideology has no peaceful transfer of power, freedom, democracy, and social justice.[44]

In the same context, and amid Tahrir Square, it was noticed that supporters of the MB raised anti-secular slogans, "Islamic Islam," and soon secular voices escalated, expressing the Islamists' monopoly of power and, in turn, emphasized the civility of the state. Moreover, when we return to the Egyptian Code of Slogans, we always notice that the Brotherhood proclaimed the slogan "The people want an Islamic civil state." [44].

The Ennahda built ruling alliances with intellectual opponents of non-Muslims and secularists, and they preferred to be with liberals and leftists, not with ultra-conservative Salafist, at a time when the MB in Egypt strived to show their Salafi alliance, so the MB quickly aligned with the Salafist in haste. Drafting a constitution for the effects of controversy.[44] This distanced them from an essential section of the Egyptians, and things moved in different directions after millions of people took to the streets, including those who initially voted for the MB, demanding the resignation of Mohamed Morsi, and asking the military institution to isolate it.

Hence, we find that the political Islam movement in Egypt represented by the MB has put itself in a dilemma in the process of its political change, as it announced its support for the civil state provided that it has an Islamic reference (without explaining what is civil and what is religious).[45] This is demonstrated by the historical situation in which Islamic philosophy is delayed by many Islamic sayings and their adaption to modern notions and state procedures.

In other words, Orofino explains, this current committed itself to respect Sharia and legality together, so it established party on a religious basis, benefiting from political change. It differs from what the Ennahda and Progressive Movement Parties in Tunisia, the Wasat Party in Egypt, and the JDP in Morocco represented, which was their support for the modern civil state influenced by the experience of the JDP in Turkey, and the pattern of political rationalization on which it is based on its instrumental procedural conception, in that it accepts different approaches to value.[46]

In general, there are broad lines that combine political Islam movements in their change projects, especially in the political field under study, and it may differ in part depending on the environment that represents the strong field of these movements. It seems clear that the more democratic the system is, the more these movements are in harmony with their environment. Its approach was characterized by flexibility, understanding, and working with him based on an agreed policy partnership.

2.6 The Impact of The Intellectual Formation of Political Islam Movements on Their Political Practice

Political Islam movements appear as an ideological system composed of concepts, ideas, and perceptions that formulate its articles and discourses on the one hand and as organizational forms with a specific structure that pleads for movement and action in the social and political fields hand. Because Islam is a complete ideology, there is no division between religion and politics. Islamic movements' approaches are determined by their viewpoint, Explanation, and engagement with the contents of the Qur'an, Sunnah, and Sharia as ideological and intellectual references. Furthermore, based on this duality, Islamism is distinct as a phenomenon capable of polarizing and influencing differentially in the Middle East.

My first contribution within the study framework is a concept that deals with Islamism in terms of it being a current that carries an ideological project and is based on justifying its existence and in giving meaning and legitimacy to its discourses on an intellectual vision that works to link it to the Islamic heritage as a higher model that aspires to restore. This constitutes a challenge to contemporary Arab thought in creating an intellectual project to catch up with civilization. In terms of my second contribution, in the context of this study, there is a concept that considers Islamism in terms of organizations that exploit several social, economic, and political factors that create a fragile situation to be effective on the ground. Their experiences range from peaceful opposition to protest and violence and their governance through various means. These experiences have had repercussions on the political, social, economic, and security levels. It has been apparent through the multiple experiences that these

effects revolve around the challenge that threatens the state's entity and society's stability.

- **Islamism as an ideological challenge:**

- From the beginning of the contemporary Arab renaissance in the late 1980s, with their diverse affiliations and inclinations ranging from reformism, nationalism, liberalism, leftism, and secularism; Commenting on Arabs bridging the historical gap with Europeans and catching up with the civilization dubbed the West, as it is considered "a storehouse of modern civilization and a teacher in the methods of thought and technology" (So, Y. J. (2015) .Many obstacles stood in the way of these hopes, including those related to political complexity as well as those related to culture in terms of mental structure .

This current poses several intellectual and theoretical challenges, particularly at the level of the state, in terms of its nature and the sources of legitimacy on which its political system is based, and at the level of society's organization, in terms of the statuses and roles of its members and the system of relations between them, and at the level of modernizing thinking methods and mental structures.[46] These challenges originate from a fundamental aspect of Islamism, from which it derives its existence. This aspect turns Islam, history, and tradition into a conservative and dictatorial political ideology.

The advocates of Islamism do not find anything wrong with stating explicitly that "Islam" as a creed and a religion is the Ideology that moves Muslims. which means that the ideologization of faith and its use in formulating its theses, building its

discourses framing its practices is a conscious and intentional process that moves within the horizon of betting on achieving political and social goals and gains related to access to power, which, and made religion in a position of "dependence on the world of politics with all its bargains and maneuvers." (So, Y. J. (2015). The tightening of supervision and control over society to reshape it according to the rules of the social project to which they are calling is a past project that separates from the current era and its requirements. Thus, Islam turns from a religious belief to an ideology adopted by a minority and works through it to claim its exclusive representation. This monopolistic approach transforms religion from psychological stability and social solidarity to tension and division.

The advocates of Islamism exploit "the state of the innate religiosity of Arab and Islamic peoples and their inclination to religion in times of crisis." Furthermore, the religious knowledge and perceptions provide reasonable ground for religious, ideological exploitation, such as the tendency to imitate, follow, and glorify the past, the ability to believe anyone who speaks in the name of religion, the tendency to fanaticism and rejection of the other out of a strong mentality of possessing the truth and absolute, as well as the faltering of modernization projects where its oscillation between meeting identification and belonging criteria and intellectual and cognitive demands.

The current intellectual political atmosphere in the Middle East has created an ideal environment for Islamism to flourish because it represents "true Islam" rather than the "incomplete Islam" embraced by those who oppose it. As a result, it is the legitimacy

of the Arab-Islamic cultural and social space's unique thinking system, which is consistent with its conditions and requirements and expresses its aspirations and hopes.

Perhaps it is paradoxical that Islamism converges in this field with opinion orientalist thinkers such as Bernard Lewis. He considers that Islamist movements are the most representative and polarizing movements among Muslims. Their discourse is the most understood and responded to by Muslims, thus being the leading and most substantial current in Islam and representative of Legitimate heritage and principles.[47] Thus, Islamism presented itself as an ideology capable of representing what could be considered the "theoretical superstructure of society" on the one hand and the bearer of the banner of authentic Islamic identity on the other. It is the Ideology from which the knowledge and sciences necessary for society emerge, representing the alternative through the thesis of the Islamic solution, in the face of external enemies represented by the invading Western powers, either with their armies or with their destructive values and ideas.

It is based in this on the concept of Islamization, which is intended to control the minds of youth in the context of the so-called civilized battle with Western values, and according to principles nourished by the Islamists' specific conception of Islam as a moral system, legislation, and culture. For them, Islam represents a method of thinking and a vision of things and a plan of action at the same time, as it is the cornerstone of how to respond to the challenges posed by contemporary life, and it aims to impart what they perceive to be an Islamic tinge to life in its many facets. The challenges of Islamization are numerous to cover all political, social, cultural, economic, and educational life, and converge on a primary goal stemming from stressing the dynamic

and practical nature of the Islamic Movement, which is "community leadership." The Ideology of political Islam focuses on the socio-political action to control reality and bring about change. Given the transformations that Arab Islamic societies are witnessing when the phenomenon of Islamization has grown since the end of the sixties of the twentieth century, which has begun to sweep across various fields, strong trends have emerged in the scientific community for the Islamization of sciences, whether they are natural or human sciences. Islamic psychology, Islamic economics, and other sciences.

MB's Ideology with its vision of the world, society, the state, and the human being, as well as its ideas, concepts, and perceptions, and its frantic quest to gain the legitimacy of representing Muslims and to be the dominant Ideology in their ranks, Islamist Ideology poses a multifaceted challenge politically, socially, intellectually, and cognitively, not just at the level of limiting and delegitimizing it. Instead, it is at the level of bringing about change in intellectual structures and existing knowledge systems that do not create a social and cultural context fit for Islamism and diminish its attraction to a minimum.

- **Islamism is an organizational challenge:**

This element is related to Islamism in terms of movement formations that include active actors and take different organizational forms ranging from civil society organizations from associations, unions, advocacy movements, political parties, and military movements, and gather in their activities between public and covert work. There is no question that the ideological and organizational aspects are at odds.

In addition to polarizing, rallying, and mobilizing supporters and followers, Ideology defines, drives, legitimizes, and justifies changes in behavior.

Islamist groups manifest themselves in various organizational forms based on an essentialist ideological vision of "Islam" that moves and finds groups of society in order to achieve political goals in the first place related to the establishment of what it considers the Islamic state based on Sharia law and social goals in the second degree related to the formation of the Islamic society. An ethical and hierarchical perspective restores jurisprudential judgments, and old sayings contradict contemporary norms. Islamist political groups, whether they are a group, a movement, an organization, or a party, are in a hierarchical structure based on the infallibility of the leader, whether he is called a guide, a sheik, an emir, a leader, or a president, and the complete discipline of his orders, for they are nothing more than a custodian to guard his ideas and the tongues that speak them. They manifest a sanctification aura on him in the framework of establishing the ideal image in which the leader advances to the status of the savior.

Perhaps the most prominent example in this regard; Omar al-Telmisani (1904-1986) said about Al Banna after elevating him to the role of Prophet:

“It is God's blessing on this generation, in whatever form the conditions of the Muslims would have been, had it not been for this great preacher who gave insight to the Muslims, awakened their minds, and stirred their determination to the time is right, as if God had sent him in proportion to the events, in fact, had it not been for God's grace over the Muslims with the appearance of al-Banna in this critical and dangerous period in the history of Muslims, the tragedy would have been grave.” (Soage, A. B. (2009)

This relationship descends within the framework of realizing the concept of allegiance, which Al-Banna made ten pillars of understanding, sincerity, action, jihad, sacrifice, obedience, steadfastness, impartiality, and trust. He defined obedience as being; "Compliance with the command and its immediate enforcement in hardship, ease, stimulus, and reluctance." (Soage, A. B. (2009). It is no secret in this context that the Islamist movements, especially in their infancy stage, were influenced in their organization by fascist movements. It is an organization based on three main pillars: populism, the leader's infallibility, and complete discipline of the rules for what comes out of the summit. Covert action appears to be part of the structure of Islamist organizations, whether they are "jihadist" movements that, under their violent tendency and their involvement in military and combat action, often practice their terrorist activities in secrecy and secrecy.[48]

Alternatively, there were movements that claimed to be moderate, such as the MB, which used to form secret agencies alongside their public apparatus, similar to the MB's particular system, and joining it by swearing allegiance under the banner of jihad and death for God, it was formed with the group's emergence, expressing its aggressive approach; in addition to acts of violence and assassination, it has relied on an intelligence apparatus. The MB has always been interested in gathering information and spying on others, and they are proud to have an intelligence apparatus capable of gathering and analyzing data.[49]

Islamist organizations threaten the stability of society and the integrity of the state, whether they follow the path of da'wah or adhere to political action or turn towards

violence, and whether they are in the opposition or government. This danger is manifested in the following manifestations:

- MB do not seek to represent a specific social group with its demands, aspirations, and interests; instead, they seek to bring about radical changes in the social system in order to rebuild society as a whole, with its various groups and classes, according to their perceptions within the scope of what they call Islamic society, as they seek to impose their vision on the social whole without taking into account the differences and contrasts between social formations and the demands of the people. It has imposed a specific social model on Arab societies, particularly women.
- During the Arab Spring, many facts revealed what could happen if MB succeeded in imposing their societal vision, whether through advocacy or the use of internal tensions that threaten society's division and fracturing. Various Islamist groups in Tunisia, for example, targeted artists, trade unionists, media professionals, and intellectuals with verbal, moral violence between 2011 and 2014, believing that they opposed Islamist ideological trends.
- Vidino attributes that, the most dangerous manifestations of the threat posed by Islamist organizations are linked to the state, and the threat exists on two levels. The first level is that these political organizations' positions are not limited to opposing trends in how the state is run or public policies in their economic, developmental, and social dimensions, nor practices that threaten political systems' stability and spread security chaos infiltrate the political process. Islamist

organizations operate based on a principled position that the nation-state has strayed from Islam's path and is not a conspiracy of forces hostile to the Islamic state. on the other hand, are fundamentally opposed to the foundations upon which they were built, including the social contract, national sovereignty, and legislation. As a result, it is intellectually located in the pre-national state stage and does not recognize this state's entity. The second level manifests itself in these organizations' desperate attempts to seize control of government and power, whether through political action on the part of some or through the tendency of others to seize power through armed violence or coups.[49]

In both cases, the MB's experiences revealed the dangers of the arrival to power, the way the MB managed state affairs in Egypt and Tunisia after the Arab Spring revealed their lack of a strategic vision in dealing with internal and external challenges. The MB's dealings with state agencies as organizational tools harnessed to serve their political and social project, meaning that its management of the state based on an ideological background that lacks any strategic vision for the state that considers the state's interests based on an internal and external circumstances. Its primary concern was imposing its control over these agencies and adapting them to serve its ideological goals, and it did not consider the possibility of conflict between the state's interests and those goals.

2.7 Conclusion

As a conclusion to Islam Theory's conceptual framework for political movements, after discussing the concept of political Islam and Islamic movements, particularly the MB, and the factors that led to their emergence, in sum, despite the lack of a comprehensive and prohibitive definition of the term political Islam, most descriptions

agree that it refers to all groups and organizations that believe that Islam is more than just a religious system. also stated that Islamic movements have a set of characteristics that set them apart from other movements, as well as the integration of many external and internal factors that contribute to the emergence and spread of Islamic movements, as well as the emergence of the role of political Islam represented by the MB in a group of Arab political systems. Especially in the Arab Spring.

In sum, the experiences of Islamists in governance in the Arab region reveal great difficulties in the way they manage the affairs of government and the state politically and economically due to the predominance of the ideological dimension over their project; which poses several intellectual and theoretical challenges, particularly at the state level, in terms of its nature and the sources of legitimacy on which its political system is based, and at the level of society's organization, in terms of the statuses and roles of its members and the system of relations between them, as well as at the level of modernizing thinking methods and mental structures. It has become clear that "Islamization" cannot be a good governance program for managing the affairs of various states and societies in their structures and living social forces. Instead, it poses a threat to the state's integrity and integrity, as well as to society's stability and harmony.

Chapter 3

SOCIAL MOVEMENT THEORY AND ISLAMIC MOBILIZATION OF THE MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD MOVEMENT

3.1 Introduction

Social-religious movements in the Arab world have been rapidly transforming into political parties. The phenomenon of transformations has expanded since the Arab world entered the third wave of democratization, following the uprisings that swept the region following the so-called Arab Spring; the transformations confirmed the absence of an inevitable organizational evolutionary path within any social movement. Some movements become institutionalized and turn into political parties, while others resort to political violence while the different organizational characteristics explain the various organizational options.

Since 1920s, the MB has spread to every Islamic country and enlisted the support of millions of people from all walks of life. Because of the MB, many militant Islamic groups exist today, including Hamas, Islamic Jihad, and Jamaat Islamiyah. Despite its importance, scholars know very little about the Egyptian MB's remarkable rise.

In Arab countries, political parties emerging from Islamic social movements have experienced significant growth. The FJP emerged from the MB Movement to win

legislative and presidential elections in Egypt. However, instantly removed from power in 2013, and membership in the group has criminalized and classified as a terrorist group, whereas, in Morocco, The JDP emerged from the "Unity and Reform" movement to win legislative elections and form the government twice in a row after the events of February 20.[50]

The structure and course of transformations within religious movements are heavily influenced by how the political system deals with religious-social movements. These Arab policies varied in how they dealt with these movements, with some regimes adopting an exclusionary policy, such as Egypt's, and others adopting an inclusionary policy, such as Morocco's. In contrast, others took a middle ground between exclusion and inclusion, based on the perspectives of inclusion of moderation. [51]

The MB's emergence in Egypt since the 1930s is examined in this chapter, which begins by identifying potential explanations for the MB's growth based on the concept of political opportunity structure as defined by social movement theory. Examining the movement's relationship with the new party on the party's ability to organizational development and then political integration to better understand the reasons for the various outcomes of political parties that emerged from social and religious movements.

From a theoretical standpoint, my analysis focuses on two key arguments: the first examines the interaction between the MB's intellectual component and the group's organization and activities on the one hand and the group's organization and activities on the other. Rather than focusing on these three dimensions, it mobilizes

interconnections between ideas, organizations, and environments. Second, the MB discussion suggests that our understanding of the relationship between mobilization and repression should broaden to include internal organizational processes that enable organizations to resist the state's repressive efforts.

Moreover, it also contributes to our understanding of how organizations emerge in repressive environments, demonstrating the fallacy of the assumption that religious movements must become successful political parties not because the ruling political system allows it but because they develop institutional capabilities that set them apart from the social movement that embraces them. Social movement theory must broaden its concept of ideology to account for the MB's rapid mobilization adequately.

3.1.1 Determinants of Transforming Religious, Social Movements into Political Parties

There is no inevitable organizational evolutionary path within any social movement. Some movements become institutionalized and turn into political parties, while others resort to political violence. The different organizational characteristics of the movement explain the different organizational options.

According "Bloomer" identified a typical life cycle for social movements - from social fermentation to institutionalization - there are those who doubt the "inevitability" of this development.[52] Political parties, which emerged from religious, social movements, have gained significant support in Middle East. The MB's FJP won parliamentary and presidential elections in Egypt, but it was ousted in 2013, and membership in the party was criminalized and placed on the terror list. The different outcomes of political parties emerged from social and religious movements by

examining the impact of the movement's relationship with the new party on the party's ability to organizational development and then political integration if the ruling political system allows it to do so, but instead through its acquisition of institutional capabilities that distinguish it from the social movement that embraces it.[52]

3.1.2 From Movement to Party: Organizational Development

The institutionalization of the movement is a process of transformation towards new forms of collective action that entails less mobilization through the institutionalization of its internal structure and the professionalization of the elements of the movement. There are two main sets of incentives for the movement to form a political party:[53]

-Structural Factors:

In countries witnessing the same structural transformation, there are cases of the movement developing into parties and other opposite cases due to the movement's different awareness of structural variables, but the latter remains limited to the list of options available for the movement. However, the latter remains limited to the list of options available to the movement ;Changes in social and economic structures; Some assumed that the state's economic failure led to a social schism between the state elite and the "Islamic bourgeoisie"[54] belonging to urban and young segments that played a role in forming Islamic parties (Wagemakers, J. (2011)).However, this argument ignores that this class did not unite around the Islamic identity, and the Islamists appealed to the poorest segments whom They do not have the material resources to form parties. The MB are not coherent; instead, they vary in mobilization methods. (al-Anani 2016: 124f; Mitchell 1993: 304)

Changes in political structures; Without political freedoms, forming an Islamic political party cannot be an option. The logic is that they will receive incentives to participate, which will lead to behavioral and ideological changes within these movements. Structural factors are essential, as they affect the strategic calculations of the actors. However, the Islamic movements give a different meaning to the available options, and there is no inevitable evolutionary context for the movement towards forming a political party in the same social and political context. [55]

- Internal Factors:

Organizational culture; The relationships and organizational structures in the social movement affect its organizational development, as the party inherits the ideas, limitations, allies, and opponents of the movement, its tactical choices, organizational structures, and leadership patterns.[56]

The nature of the movement's relationship with the state; State repression leads to further radicalization within the political structures of the social movement in the form of internal divisions that produce small, violent radical organizations that break away from the more significant movement (Kirdiş, E. (2019).

The movement's awareness of the benefits and costs of partisan participation; Islamic movements form parties if they expect that they will increase their political influence, but these expectations are not made through a rational analysis to determine the cost/return, but in light of past experiences and limited information and light of their self-arrangement of their priorities, and accordingly positions vary (Zald, M. N. (1996).

The nature of the movement's relationship with the political parties emanates from it; social movements and non-partisan activist groups influence parties. Parties may operate as agents of social movements to express their demands, mainly if they are electorally weak; the more the identification and ideological convergence between the party and the movement, the greater the party's impact. By assuming that the nature of the movement's relationship with the party influences its identity, knowledge of political chances, conduct, and the outcome of its activities, the movement offers it a real impact.[57]

3.1.3 The Identity of the New Parties

Some may classify the new political parties that emerge from social movements with a religious discourse as religious parties. However, this classification by Rucht automatically drops the movement's identity onto the party without considering the effect of the movement's structural action on the party's organizational identity, more accurately to call them Movement Parties. In essence, they are parties in which there is no consensus on a single overarching ideology but instead possess what can be called a "negative consensus" where the party's agenda revolves around a large number of issues that are not limited to one arena. There are no barriers to its membership, which makes the social base. Its activists are more diverse with a hierarchy and central control and a focus on self-assertion. Moreover, they are organizationally hybrid parties, as they participate in collective mobilization outside institutions, and at the same time, compete electorally[58]. while their membership appears more like group membership than membership in parties.

3.1.4 The Institutional Development of the MB Party

The relationship between the nature of the party's interaction and the social movement that emerged from it and the impact of that party's institutional development

manifested in four areas: The impact of the movement's discourse on the party's political discourse first factor in the growth of the MB was its service activities, However, it failed ideologically.[58] It did not possess any intellectual blog before Qutb, except for Al-Banna's simple, general language letters. Qutb found a vast space, especially its literary formulation and relative depth.

The MB ideology was based on the inevitability of a dynamic organization to reach power through political participation or armed action. They emphasized the revolutionary trend and acknowledged the interim political opportunism and that the Caliphate is the final form of the Islamic State, and they declared infidels those who reject the Islamic government (Reed, J. (2002).

This heritage has remained unchanged. The group's draft program from 2007 required Parliament to seek the advice of an elected and independent body of senior religious scholars.[59] The group struggled to determine the nature of the state because the Council of Senior Scholars represents a supervisory body that reflects the idea of a clerical state. Citizenship was also squandered by barring more than 60% of Egyptians from becoming president due to the requirement to be a male Muslim ,[88] With their acquisition of power, the conversation shifted to broad topics that did not directly impact the people, such as the election system, the constitution, the president's powers, and the position of the military institution(Kitschelt, H. P. (1986).

-The influence of the movement on the party's organizational identity; The MB faced a severe dilemma in terms of its organizational identity, which oscillated between support for violence and a commitment to nonviolent resistance. Following the issue

of the MB's militias, the group became embroiled in a political battle with the regime. The scenes of crowded blocs in front of electoral committees, as well as the chanting of religious supplications against the backdrop of a combat show, put on by some of the group's students at Al-Azhar University in 2006, Were a departure from the general framework of political action and an implicit indication that violence is latent. Which confirmed its bias towards the military solution Hamas resorted to in its struggle with Fatah and its defense of the "Hezbollah cell," to confirm that it does not distinguish between opposing the regime and standing against its national security priorities.[60]

Shermukhamedov notes also MB suffered from organizational schisms due to its inability to deal with the different spectrums where the elections of the Guidance Office resulted in the exclusion of the most important figures of the reformist trend and witnessed accusations of directing the vote and interfering in the electoral representation map to make way for the conservatives.

The conservatives' control over the group's capabilities and its ability to coexist with reformist currents inside and outside it have diminished. They attacked the Mufti of the Republic because he called for the separation between the preaching group and the political party and demanded that he "review his faith" in an almost takfiri situation.

The group lost its ability to coexist internally, Moreover, a rural culture prevailed that begged absolute obedience to the organizational official. Sub-pockets of loyalty spread based on non-institutional relationships.[61] Moreover, the urban structure of the community, which expanded to include professionals and faculty members closest to rural training, changed their culture and their vision of public work as a job or position.

- According to Reed ,the Movement's influence on the party's interaction with political institutions a few months after President Morsi's election, the group's failure, and its exaggerations in its quest for control became evident. was evident in several presidential decisions in favor of the group, not the country, such as the decision to restore the People's Assembly, which the Constitutional Court had issued a decision to dissolve, to overthrow the Attorney General, then immunize the Constitution Preparation Committee and the Shura Council from judicial challenges, and ignoring the siege of the Constitutional Court and the Media Production City.[62] Moreover, passing a draft constitution that does not agree with it, appointing trustworthy members of the group to sensitive positions in complete disregard of the criteria of competence or experience

3.2 A Review of Existing Theoretical Approaches in Social Movement Literature

The existing literature on political Islam in the Muslim world focuses on cultural and socioeconomic factors grievance based explanations of the movement's mobilization; as Quintan Wiktorowicz notes, most publications on the Islamist movement do not go beyond descriptive analyses of the ideology, structure, and goals of various Islamic actors or histories of particular movements.[63] From the perspective of social movement theory, however, grievances, the existence of social strains or relative deprivation, are "a necessary but not a sufficient condition of social protest." [64] According to Herbert Kitschelt, Social movement theory suggests the mobilization of citizens suffering from grievances is contingent on the following factors: People should perceive that their situation is amenable for change, and more importantly,

movement entrepreneurs should successfully generate motivations, resources, and political opportunities for collective action.[65]

As Verta Taylor argues, movements confronted with a non-receptive political and social environment do not disappear. They develop "abeyance structures." [66] According to Taylor, movement activists become isolated when a movement loses support. In this situation, movement entrepreneurs establish alternative structures to keep the movement ideas fresh. A "movement in abeyance" becomes a group of activists who find a niche for themselves and provide the movement's continuance by maintaining activist networks, goals, tactics, and collective identity. [67]. Thus, "abeyance structures" maintain the movement and play a crucial role in later rounds of movement mobilization. [68] The MB played an essential role as "abeyance structures" in maintaining the Islamist movement in Egypt in the form of an Islamist collective identity. As "abeyance structures" held and sustained Islamist perspectives and aspirations. Thus, they were the breeding grounds for creating an Islamic elite that seized upon existing Political Opportunity Structures and created new ones. Thus, the Islamic collective identity organized around The MB in the 1930s provided one of the bases for the formation of a political Islamist party. [69]

Since the transition to a multiparty system, MB as "abeyance structures" pursued three primary strategies in their relations with political parties: First, they have in their relations with political parties: First, they have supported by electoral means the leading center-right parties; seconds, have voted for the political Islamist parties; and third, they provided the organizational basis for the formation of a political Islamist party.[70] Tarrow suggests that contemporary social movements have a transnational

character by crossing boundaries and transcending state structures. social movement literature focuses on the impact on movement mobilization of shifts in political opportunity structures, movement organizations, and ideational factors such as culture and social interaction.[71] This explanation provides a more comprehensive framework for analyzing the rise of political Islam Yet, the social movement scholarship has been conceptualized by analyzing cases from Western Europe and the United States. McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly note a gap between studies of social movements in liberal democratic polities.

Bert Klandermans also points out a gap in comparing social movements outside of Western democracies that use similar methods and theoretical concepts.[72] The Muslim world is almost absent from the literature on social movements. A few analyses of the Iranian revolution and the mobilization of MB in Egypt can be found in the literature. By applying the literature to The Middle East with a secular-democratic structure, the research agenda on social movements can be expanded, allowing for a better understanding of MB's mobilization in The Middle East.

Because the social movement literature has been developed by analyzing cases from Western liberal democracies, it exhibits some critical deficiencies in explaining political Islam's mobilization. The social movement literature needs to be developed in specific ways. First, with a few exceptions, the literature equates mobilization of a social movement with social protest activity; that is, moving bystanders the masses to the streets to challenge the authorities through demonstrations, boycotts, or other actions aiming at changing a specific policy.[73]

Hanspeter Kriesi argues, "the crucial element of a social movement is its overt challenge to authorities" [65]

As the series of action campaigns constituted in interaction with the authorities, Similarly, William Gamson regards movement participation; Gamson argues regard movement participation as an action aimed at achieving political goals undertaken when conventional and institutionalized means such as voting are not available. Movement participation,[74] Gamson argues, while rational, is riskier than more conventional types of political action. This approach neglects the possibility that social movements may also utilize conventional means for mobilization. The political party, to carry out mobilization against the state; in this case, to replace the democratic-secular state structure with an Islamist one.

Secondly, the literature usually regards social movements as separate from political parties. In this view, social movements try to realize their goals by influencing political parties.[75] Craig Jenkins and Bert Klandermans focus on the three-way struggle between social movements, political parties, and the state.[76] Political parties, not social movements, are the agents that deal directly with the state. This line of reasoning also excludes revolutionary social movements that mobilize against the state in a political party.[77] McAdam is thus correct when he argues that the role social movements play in reshaping the institutional structure and political alignments of a given polity is an underdeveloped area of research.[78]The MB in Egypt is a clear example that a social movement may utilize conventional means, in the form of a political party, to carry out mobilization against the state; in this case, to replace the democratic-secular state structure with an Islamist one.

Third, most of the literature examines social movements that take place in the context of western liberal democracies (such as feminism, environmentalism, and civil rights) and social movements for democratization in the former communist states.[79] This has resulted in a tendency toward a positive normative bias in the literature. All social movements are assumed to share compatible goals with Western liberal ideas (promoting democracy and liberalism).

Wiktorowicz notes, "Dominated by empirical research on the United States and Western Europe, social movement theory-building has been heavily contextualized by liberal democratic politics and Western societies, thus narrowing the generalizability of findings and conclusions." [80]

There seems to be a tendency in the social movement literature explaining the mobilization of the Islamist movement to focus primarily on the political context (democratic, semi-democratic, or authoritarian). Accordingly, the MB is seen as a reaction against the lack of democracy.

However, this view ignores the specific nature and goals of the MB; While not denying the impact of an authoritarian setting triggering counter-mobilization in such repressive political contexts, one should not forget the presence of religious fundamentalist and racist movements in Western liberal democratic settings. Thus, it is not the regime type but an openness that determines a social movement mobilization as a variable.[81] POS and movement entrepreneurs exploit the POS and create new ones that lead to the mobilization of social movements. Furthermore, as explained above, grievance-based explanations are inadequate in explaining the mobilization of

social movements. Whether a regime is authoritarian or democratic determines movement entrepreneurs' strategies rather than a causal factor for movement mobilization. As Jenkins and Klandermans note,

"Social movements develop in the context defined by the state and the representation system, which afford opportunities for mobilization and set limits on the effectiveness of movement strategies." [81]

Fourth, the social movement scholarship, focusing on one or another of the factors that lead to the emergence, mobilization, and outcome of a movement, misses possible interactions between opportunities, organizational dynamics, and framing processes in analyzing a social movement. The POS proposed by McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly, focuses directly on the dynamic relations among political opportunities, mobilizing structures, and framing processes. Thus, the POS is a viable analytical framework for analyzing social movement mobilization.

3.3 Islamic Mobilization

Understanding the MB mobilization requires focusing on the historical background and ideology, social, and political environment that Egypt experienced before establishing the MB in 1920s. Understanding the essential dimensions of mobilization process in that period is essential and what followed. Political movements and parties are like individuals, the product of their environment and societies. It is affected by, influence, and contribute to formulating its programs, directions, ideology, and decisions.

3.3.1 The MB's Historical Background

In March 1928, Hasan al-Banna, a schoolteacher, formed the MB with six Egyptian laborers in Isma'iliya. Four years after the Ottoman Caliphate fell. The organization has formed to restore the Caliphate and create an Islamic state. Al-Banna understood

that achieving this goal would be difficult and necessitate organizational, financial, and military capabilities, so he established his organization to serve as the core of the desired Islamic state.[82]

Provided that the organization has organizational, financial, and military wings that grow with the group; by establishing a specific organization to serve as the group's army, and putting the organizational structure in place, and serving as an apparatus. After that, the group's administrative, executive, executive, and legislative authorities sought for resources to support its operations, such as finance and administration. Thus, the group became a "small state" with funding capabilities for its educational, cultural, advocacy, and political activities, military capabilities to defend its survival, and organizational capabilities to achieve its goals .

The group grew from a simple advocacy movement to an international organization spread in more than 70 countries globally,[83] where it established special funds for donations and subscriptions and managed a network of companies and international institutions of activity. The charismatic al-Banna spent the first three years of the group's existence primarily on membership-building operations in and around Isma'iliya.[83] By 1932, however, al-Banna had determined that the organization could no longer develop unless its headquarters were moved to Cairo. Al-brother, a Cairo-based Islamic society, was acquired by the organization. Banna's After a year in Cairo, the group began publishing its first weekly newsletter and held its first general member's conference. In the meanwhile, the organization's membership expanded rapidly, By 1932, it had fifteen branch offices, and by 1938, it had 300. While exact

membership numbers are unknown, more than 150,000 people are likely to be represented by the 300 branches.

The MB was active in politics and had paramilitary formations. Egyptian authorities discovered a massive cache of weaponry connected to the organization on the outskirts of Cairo in 1947, and a MB's vehicle packed with explosives recovered a year later. As a result, the organization was officially disbanded in 1948, and many of its members were imprisoned.[84] In response, the organization assassinated Egyptian Prime Minister Mahmoud al-Naqrashi, who was in charge of ordering the MB's dissolution in turn, Al-Banna, was assassinated by Egyptian police two months later. His death marked the end of a significant chapter in the MB's history.

In 1948, the Egyptian government disbanded its organization to begin the phase of mutual assassinations, as it began with a MB member assassinating the Egyptian Prime Minister at the time (Mahmoud Al-Naqrashi).The government responded by assassinating "Morshed Al jama'a" (Al-Banna) in 1949, and when the July Revolution of 1952 led by Egyptian President (Mohamed Naguib) (1952-1954) (the MB participated in it, but President (Gamal Abdel Nasser) quickly disagreed with them and ordered their organization to be canceled in 1954, a failed attempt to assassinate him was triggered. Known as the Manshiyya Incident On October 27, 1954, a member of the MB attempted to assassinate Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser in a public speech. He responded by ordering the re-dissolution of the organization and the arrest of thousands of its members. [85] Following trials, six MB leaders were executed, while hundreds more were imprisoned over the next decade.

3.3.2 The MB's Ideology

The acquisition of power, according to Antonio Gramsci, necessitates the exercise of ideological hegemony, or control over a wide range of mechanisms and tools, including the educational system at various stages, information and knowledge systems, the environment of daily life and mass gatherings, and civil society organizations such as parties, unions, and associations up to the penetration of its intricate institutions, social and cultural.[86]

The strategies and mechanisms of the MB 's work stem from its intellectual conception developed by al-Banna, who considers Islam a comprehensive system that includes all aspects of life and can translate them into practices and behaviors.[87] Looking closely at the history of Islamism, we can say that the Islamists' commitment to anything will continue as long as this guarantees them access to power or preserves their power if they are in power. The rule that has not changed for more than ninety years is that wherever there is power, then Islamism is legitimized. It began with the formalization of the religious-political relationship, progressed to its sanctification and culminated in the absolute politicization of religion, which reduced culture to politics and society in the state and religion to power and government. Islamism reduced religion to power and government, forming a pattern of religiosity separate from religion, making it a mere means of gaining power under the guise of implementing a system.

The MB's ideology, behavior, and goals, is a threat to the nation-state in all cases; They are in the stage of remote work. They are working to attract young and experienced students and exploit the spirit of enthusiasm within them to recruit and train them on the organization's methods of sabotaging and opposing the ruling regime

with its authority that guarantees peace, stability, and security, in addition to the organizational, kinetic, and economic secret work, which affects public safety and the higher interests of the state.

In an environment of freedom, pluralism, democracy, and the election process, the MB also influences the national state. They use democracy and pluralism to gain power, despite their opposition to democracy and acceptance of the political, religious, and sectarian other. As a group that thrives on violence and killing in the name of religion, the MB benefits from the prevalence of wars, chaos, devastation, and total collapse through using religion to mobilize public sentiment, politicize it and turn it into a terrorist weapon. Undercover religion, the MB instilled unconditional devotion in its followers, and the organization grew to revolve around the dominance duality; through their slogans and ideological legacy, Arab political groups with nationalist, religious, and socialist demonstrate the depth of the Arab world's civilizational dilemma and intellectual barrier.[88] In this context, the MB, since its inception, has accounted for the largest share of prevarication and political exploitation of religion, insisting on not accepting criticism and refusing to understand the repeated calls for harmony with the concept of the homeland, abandoning the rituals of allegiance to the leader and stopping promoting the concept of the Caliphate.

The MB's project is intellectually weak and does not have any practical solutions or innovative theories, and the group does not have programs and visions of their own concerning governance and administration or coexistence with the other. Instead, it is just a dream of restoring the Caliphate and the slogan "Islam is the solution," without

clarifying the relationship between Institutional work required for worldly affairs and religiosity.

To sum, contrary to popular belief, nothing changes in Islamism except the desire for power, which is the only constant in its history , thus changing in the style of their religiosity, transgresses religion's profoundly philosophical and moral ends by begging it to achieve or maintain rule, and by making it a source of governance conflict, so that instead of being a factor of approximation, it becomes a source of conflict.

The strategy adopted by Al-Banna in thought and behavior in the process of social and political change reveals the oscillation between political action and the use of force, focusing advocacy work in universities and schools, holding several periodic conferences for the MB and the popular masses, addressing the political and social aspects, directing and contributing to parliamentary life.[89]

By adopting a social structure based on multidimensional strategies: ideological, organizational, and educational, the MB created a parallel society for its members to live, marry, work, and accompany in and through it. This process led to establishing an individual and collective MB identity that gives the MB a “symbolic system of values and standards in their daily lives, enhancing their sense of commitment and belonging to the movement. The structure of the organization links rules to behavior, regulations to values, and members to leadership.[90] These rules played a pivotal role in enabling the MB to maintain its internal unity and avoid disintegration.

3.3.3 The MB's Structure

The MB's has evolved throughout time, although it has remained primarily unchanged since the 1940s. The grassroots movement is organized into a 'family' of about five members who frequently communicate to strengthen each other's convictions; this is the primary level for ideological instruction. A shuba, or division,' comprises a few families. A district,' comprises three to four sectors. Each Egyptian province has a central administrative agency that oversees the province's various districts. The movement's decision-making structure is the majlis al-shura council on a national level. It is made up of ninety members elected from the provinces. The MB's executive body is a guidance bureau comprised sixteen members elected from the shura council. Its leader is al-murshid or Al-Emam, which means 'General Guide.' The shura council elects him after everyone takes the Al-Bay of loyalty:

“I contract with God to adhere firmly to the MB' message, strive on its behalf, live up to the conditions of its membership, have complete confidence in its leadership, and obey absolutely, under all circumstances (fi al-manshat wa-al-makrah).” “I swear by God in that and make my oath of loyalty to Him. Of what I say, God is Witness—quoted in Mitchell 1993: 165.”

Members, however, disagree on what this oath entails and to whom or what loyalty has been pledged. Some argue that the devotion is to the MB's values rather than to a specific leader. "Some members have accused the pledge of being used to silence internal disagreement" [35]

3.3.4 The Egyptian Social Structure and the Deteriorating Economic Conditions of Citizens

The social structure in Egypt, divided between the feudal classes and the poor peasants, formed the fertile environment for heritage advocates to recruit followers, as the rural environment known for its population adherence to traditional social and religious

values formed an ideal society that enabled the pioneers of political Islam thought to spread their ideas in the light of broad social acceptance.

The crisis of social justice and low economic level in the Islamic world, where since the 1940s, some socialist movements under the influence of communist thought have attempted to raise the economic and social level of individuals, but the former Soviet Union's collapse left an intellectual vacuum in the field of economic and social reform, which helped to deepen class, political, and cultural inequality within a state.

As a result, the ideas launched claimed explanation of backwardness and deterioration in the economic and social level is due to the Muslims' distance from the correct application of the texts of Islamic Sharia and the influence of their governments on Western politics. Consequently, the lower class formed the popular base for Islamic movements, which found in Islam a haven from the oppression that the ruling class suffers from and therefore found in Islam the legitimacy of its right against these regimes. This social structure and the state of poverty suffered by most of the farmers, who were wage-earners who could hardly have the livelihood of their day, enabled Al-Banna to mobilize and recruit thousands of the poor .[90]

Al-Banna formed one of their most important symbols after founding the group. It is not surprising that the group's first founders are among the poorest groups in society, because these groups were the most influenced by Islamic heritage thought, while Western ideas and culture more influenced the bourgeoisie class as they were more knowledgeable On Western civilization and coexisting with it because of the richness of life that they excelled.

3.3.5 The fragile political system party

Political parties are the natural expression of the needs of individuals and groups in society to achieve community integration, and they are supposed to play a pivotal role in achieving development and eradicating underdevelopment in various societies. Political parties are the main engine for the wheel of political modernization and development, and political parties are the natural expression of the needs of individuals and groups in society in order to achieve community integration. Prior to the foundation of the MB, however, Egypt's partisan reality was not marked by partisan struggle and the prioritizing of personal interests and the interests of wealthy landlords over the impoverished peasants.[91] It was also marked by corruption and a lack of decision-making independence since the party system was typified by the Wafd Party's domination, which was aided by a large popular base. He won most of the elections he headed over other parties, most marked by deference to the palace and implementing the king's goals and interests.[36]

Similarly, the parties at the period, particularly the Wafd, were notable for their excellent centralization, both horizontally and vertically, in light of the virtually complete absence of the process of election, which restricted to the base of the pyramid in the organizational structure alone. During that period, the Egyptian parties proved their victory for their interests, even if it was at the expense of the poor citizens, as happened when most parties, including the Wafd, the Constitutional Liberals, the Wafdian Bloc, and the National Party, stood against the proposal of a project to limit the ownership of agricultural land, and those parties did not offer practical solutions.

One due to the problems of high prices, monetary inflation, and the administrative and financial corruption that prevailed during that period, as thirty families controlled 25% of the national income in Egypt .The Egyptian parties have failed to achieve the two most prominent roles of political parties, which are the expression of interests and the aggregation of interests, which opened the door wide for the MB to appear as an expression of the aspirations and problems of the citizens, especially the peasants and the poor who suffered from the parties' neglect of their needs and interests.

Political crises, a lack of democratic freedom, and the prevalence of corruption, tyranny, and poverty in most Arab countries created a political vacuum, which Islamic movements attempted to fill by recruiting many loyalists and supporters; where the absence and weakness of civil society institutions such as parties, associations, and institutions allowed political Islam groups to fill this gap by controlling mosques, religious institutions, and other institutions .

3.4 Political Opportunity Structure

Political opportunities are defined as the presence or absence of elite allies, the stability or instability of elite alignments, the state's capacity and proclivity for repression, and the institutionalized political system's relative openness or closure (Tarrow, S. (1996) .

There is a fundamental gap in the literature regarding whether or not a POS exists. The four criteria listed above are as close as the literature gets to defining the presence of a POS, there is a risk that POS will become a tautology. A POS is a set of structural conditions that can mobilize social movement through both movement entrepreneurs

and grievances.[92] Inequalities cannot lead to mobilization unless movement entrepreneurs are present.

Movement entrepreneurs without grievances, on the other hand, are insufficient for movement mobilization. The tautology problem in the concept of POS can be avoided by separating all elements (POS, movement entrepreneurs, organizational resources, and grievances) from one another, resulting in a causal sequence in the analysis of a movement mobilization. [93] Framing processes are defined as movement actors' shared meanings and definitions that lead to collective action. During the emergence phase of a social movement, political opportunities are critical. After that, the movement itself (its organizational structure) comes to occupy the center stage. At each stage of a movement's development, framing processes help shape outcomes.

On the one hand, the state's malfunctioning adopted the POS created by MB, and on the other hand, the exploitation of that opportunity was made possible by the organizational solid networks of Islamist political parties . The first stage of mobilization of the movement occurred as a result of political opportunities. The second phase occurred due to political opportunities and organizational dynamics. Framing processes -shared understandings and strategic mobilization efforts of the movement's activists- were critical in both stages of the movement's mobilization .

The concept POS has been the primary explanatory variable in analyzing a social movement's emergence, mobilization, and outcome. The nature of any social movement, including Islamic movements, where most of the movements are subject to a dynamic, dynamic nature that interacts with the environment in which they arise,

and from here Kepel Gilles believes that "the development of Islamic Society did not take place in a linear approach, as there is a change in the strategy of the movements Islam since the eighties. Due to the many approaches to the phenomenon and diversity of reasons for its development between political and non-political groups, it is impossible to agree on a coherent understanding of social movements. However, the literature agreed on defining social movements according to the criterion of formation and structure .[91]

Tilly defined social movements "A series of interactions between those in power and people who position themselves competently as speakers of a popular base that lacks official representative representation,". Each Marxist definition of the phenomenon of protest movements differed from the liberal definition, as Marxist thought defines it as:

“The mass movement that arises as a result of the class struggle." In contrast, Lenin sees them as "movements with revolutionary action that have a vanguard in the forefront, believing in change.” [92]

As for liberal thought, it is a series of actions and efforts undertaken by several people to achieve a specific goal." Tilly's broad definition of social movements from 1984 broadly encompasses Egypt's current Islamist Movement. As a result, a movement defined as "an organized, persistent, and self-aware challenge to existing authorities." Individuals involved in social movements are, by definition, engaged in the human endeavor of inducing and bringing about social change, which is the link to morality and ethics. "Movements are active in promoting social change because there is some conviction in the necessity of a changing society or the need to defend a society from changes; an ethics is always there," to put it another way." [94]

The theory connects internal factors to the external environment in which movements operate. As a result, the structure of political opportunities expresses the external environment surrounding social movements, and its basic premise is that external factors, along with internal factors specific to the movement, either promote or prevent movement mobilization. The issue is determining what factors caused the MB's political opportunities to change, its popularity to grow, and its emergence as a rival to other political parties. As a result, research into the structure and relationships of political opportunities in Islamic movements provides an empirical framework for the MB's rise.

Social movements are primarily concerned with collective action, which reflects a form or formula of collective action rather than the values that this formula carries. Collective action has based on the premise that groups arise, their characteristics unite, make their decisions succeed, and fail; As a result of specific opportunities, the change in the dimensions of the existing political system plays a decisive role in their presence or absence. Three fundamental factors determine by McAdam to any collective action: First, the available means, which is the set of available practical alternatives, the group chooses its strategy for influence. Second, the values are the ideological premises that govern the group's work. Ideology is the intellectual framework for the movement's program, and strategy ,usually includes reinterpreting history, linking people to the movement, dropping the tendencies of failure, advocating the movement's success, and thirdly, the environmental conditions, which are the conditions surrounding the group, which it cannot modify. It has no choice but to adapt to, either by exploiting the resources it provides or the restrictions it imposes, which is what political analysts describe as the structure of political opportunities.

Moreover, since social movements exist within a particular society, they must be analyzed within the context in which they exist, including the cultural context of the society through which citizens interpret and understand the world in which they live. Therefore, when studying the emergence and success of movements, it is not easy to separate the cultural and structural components. Success in structural mobilization depends mainly on culture and the exploitation of structural reality—successful frameworks based on highlighting injustice in culturally meaningful ways.

Accordingly, the political opportunity theory needs two essential elements: social movement and political opportunity. If the opportunity is a tool for political change, the movements create this opportunity. However, sometimes the political opportunity may not need a movement to create it, as it may exist due to changes in the political system, but the movements may differ in their ability to seize and exploit these opportunities.

Political opportunities are not fixed for all movements but differ from one movement to another. In addition, political opportunities do not have the same importance for social movements, as they differ according to the characteristics of the movements and may differ from time to time, even for the movement itself. However, the political opportunity is not related to the characteristics of the group only. However, instead, They are related Political opportunities do not exist uniformly for all movements; they differ from one to the next. Furthermore, political opportunities do not hold the same weight for social movements as they do for political movements, as they vary according to the characteristics of the movements and can change over time, even for the movement itself. However, a political opportunity is not solely determined by the

group's characteristics. Instead, they are linked to the state and the surrounding environment, elite alliances, the state's bias against certain groups, and the openness or closeness of the political system. External factors (the international context) play a role in creating opportunities ;thus, taking changes in the structure of political opportunities into account is essential. The structure of political opportunities within the internal environment variables is only a starting point for collective action in its early stages, which is soon affected in its later stages by external variables represented in the international context.

As a result of changes in the political process, reflected in the groups that emerge within it, the structure of political opportunities changes over time. These groups may use violent and rebellious methods, strike and peaceful protest, or adopt the characteristics of the organization and its institutional response to changes in available opportunities. The movement or group can be viewed as both influencing and being influenced simultaneously. It either affects and changes the structure of opportunities in its favor or impacts and adjusts the structural change.

According to Samuel Huntington, thriving democracy depends on participation and competition, embodied through effective institutions such as political parties. Thus, it has a significant position in the political system. Democracy serves as a vital link between the people and the government. It also strengthens the ties that bind the various political entities inside the political system's institutions were to play the role of communication and interdependence among persons in authority, whether within or outside the government, on all levels.

In social movement theory, the concept of political opportunity structure offers a possible explanation of how the MB could mobilize. Over the last two decades, the literature has served as the beginning point for a broad spectrum of social movement studies. While views of political Islam constitute the shared wisdom of Middle Eastern specialists concerning Islamic groups, political opportunity is the primary notion in modern sociology for explaining social movements (Kriesi, H. (2017) .The fundamental political opportunity structure argument is concerned with the link between a social movement and its surroundings, mainly its political surroundings. That mobilization can only occur under favorable political conditions and that understanding movement mobilization relies on the link between social movements and political institutions.

The POS model, in theory, can help answer how the MB might mobilize. The core principle,” according to Hanspeter Kriesi applies to a wide range of collective action, emphasizing that all types of social movement activity are in some way dependent on the political arena. Grzegorz Ekiert demonstrates how it can be used to better understand democratizing movements in Eastern Europe in the 1980s, movements that arose in conditions that were similar to those faced by the Egyptian MB since 1932 in some ways;” however, understanding the political and social context in which the group mobilized is critical. Existing arguments on the POS have focused on four central dimensions of the political opportunity structure:” declining state repression, expanding political access, elite divisions, and influential allies .These aspects, are easily overlooked in the case of the MB. State repression was expanding during their most remarkable expansion. They had no access to the political system during this time, except a few months following the Free Officer coup.

In authoritarian regimes, the impact of POS frequently reflected in the level and method of repressive actions. These and other visible repression policies almost always increase the personal costs of dissent. The observation and description of institutional state structures do not explain dissenting social action based on more than personal gain and loss calculations.

3.5 Conclusion

In sum, the POS concept is central to the study of ideological political movements. Islamist movements play a role in influencing the structure of opportunities through their actions, activities, and influence strategies due to the volatile elements of the structure, such as alliances or divisions among elites. At the same time, it can be affected by the structure due to a change in the existing political environment, whether total or partial and concluding that the social movement is a movement of influence and influence, either for influence or change. Structure opportunities in their favor or to be affected and perceive the change in structure and changes accordingly; Like other ideological movements, Hamas has adapted its ideology and political changes to achieve its goals of political participation in the political system.

Opportunities are of two types, opportunities created by the social movement and opportunities that the movement does not have any role in their occurrence, but here its role is limited to seizing them. The first intifada represented an excellent opportunity for the MB, represented by the emergence of Hamas in light of the change in the environmental context. The movement's awareness of the external change that occurred in the political arena prompted it to take advantage of this opportunity to change its reality and prove itself in the political arena, which helped it in the correct reading of the political change and its superior ability to seize and exploit the

opportunity—realized by the Islamic Movement. The transition from a social movement to a political party is often flawed or incomplete. Because the mother social movement's institutional and ideological structures impede the development of the party as an independent political structure, the intellectual and organizational development of this movement - which provides intellectual and organizational independence to the new parties - has a significant impact—influencing the ability of the parties emanating from them to integrate into political life because it affects the pattern of the parties' relations.

The MB's mobilization was possible because its internal structure adapted to prevent state repression efforts, making it easier for individuals to join pragmatically and ideologically. Its activities shared its beliefs in the same way it prevented repression. From the state and to attract more supporters, the group's message structure was established from rich Islamic ideas and symbols linked to Muslim thought, and thus there is potential for recruitment. The MB's style has become more significant than that of any other Islamic group, even as content of its ideology and the connection between organization and beliefs provide a way to think about ideas and ideology systematically without relying on reductive paradigms. From the framework. Considering how a group's organizational, tactical, and ideological advantages can be used to overcome state repression provides insight into broadening the political process paradigm of non-democratic or liberal regimes.

Chapter 4

EXTREMISM IN THE MB'S BEHAVIOR

4.1 Introduction

The writings varied in defining the concept of violence in the thought and behavior of the MB, so it is not possible to understand the issue of violence and the concepts of power, revolution, and jihad in the group, without understanding the intellectual and fundamentalist sources from which it proceeds in exercising its activities on the ground.

The origins and intellectual foundations of the MB's political party of violence and extremism, Al-Banna defined the appeal as one that began with his idea and overpowering internal emotion that he owed it to his Islamic nation; were to revive the Islamic nation and religion. As Al-Banna explains, the MB's belief is based on the Quran and Sunnah, which contain the ideas and beliefs that have proven correct in practice.

4.2 The Origins and Intellectual Foundations of Violence

The MB underwent several transformations at the level of the idea put forward by al-Banna. Towards the organizational level, Al-Banna established the institution of violence and exported it to all political Islam organizations. The MB's transformations reflect its visions, which observers have seen for decades, while Al-Banna consolidated them in several intellectual, organizational, and theorizing

contexts. However, the contexts of time revealed the evolution of these transformations to the square of extremism. During nine decades, From the mere practice of violence to its export to other religious groups and organizations, it became a voice for violence represented by many armed military arms.[94]

Mulford argues these organization went beyond identifying itself as a jihadist group to avoid being penetrated. The idea and its deconstruction, as with all armed groups, devolved into two speeches: a claim, in which the speaker addresses the public and denies any connection to violence from near or far, and a jihadist discourse, in which the speaker expresses convictions and idle ideas that call for fighting under the banner of jihad, and addressed this discourse to the elite who joined and established armed action, whether through the "special regime" in the past or through qualitative committees in the present

The matter was not limited to Egypt; the movement abroad took up arms in several Arab capitals and contributed to the so-called Arab Spring, confirming that the ideas were a firm belief in the context of the use of violence. The MB did not find it difficult to form the armed cells in Egypt, which established against the background of the June 30, 2013 revolution, and it was content with recalling only the ideas that formed the conscience without exception. [95] For more space to work, which is the secret of the organization's cunning, succeeded in concealing many ideas and summoned others not touched by a large segment of people. The most challenging issue was not in the group's practice of violence, but rather in providing incubators of violence through the founding ideas of extremism that are formulated in the books' interiors and placed them on the doors of streets and alleys for passers-by from all groups and organizations

that arose after .Especially those looking for ideological affiliations, as well as providing a haven for ideas and people who practice violence, so become an encouragement to violence and preparing its environment, and has launched two discourses, one public and the other private, that only those who belong to it and believe in its idea can see it so as not to rebel against it or reject it.

The MB went through fundamental transformations that have reflected in the formations of the organization that extended across more than seventy Arab and European capitals. Some attributed them to the ideas put forward by the first founder, Hassan al-Banna, ninety years ago, and others considered them to be an actual translation of the emergence of the private regime at the end of the thirties of the last century through the organization of 1965.[96] Which Qutb stood at his head, ending with the emergence of the two arm movements of Egypt "Hasm" and the Revolution Brigade and other armed militias that emerged from the MB and expressed it very clearly.

During these phases, the group gave birth to armed groups, organizations, and militias such as Takfir wa al-Hijra, the Islamic Group, the Islamic Jihad, Hamas, and al-Qaeda; The MB was an early asset of any of these groups from which it has absorbed, and the beliefs that caused the bloodshed and drove their actions have subsequently exported. The most dangerous transformation of MB was when it headed to inaugurate similar military wings in Egypt after June 30, 2013. The result of this movement was the emergence of armed militias, including "Hasm," "Liwa al-Thawra" as well as some groups close in their ideas to the MB, such as the Army of Egypt Ansar Beit al-Maqdis group .

However, its inception has linked to the older group, which provided conditions that prepared it for that, and its outcome was a state of violence provided by the organization and produced violent groups, which some observers considered the beginning of the actual collapse of the mother group.

The militias produced by the MB come in the context of recalling the past and are consistent with the cognitive and intellectual pattern of ideas put forward by Al-Banna; all the cognitive constants confirm the Brotherhood's relationship to violence in terms of rooting, so the group was the door from which all violent groups emerged, the source of the idea of violence in the modern era.[97]

Many experiences confirm that many groups started advocacy, and the MB turned to violence when it felt that it had reached the stage of "numerical strength" after ten years of inception, and it sought to realize its ideas by armed force, believing that it was on the right and that it had reached the stage of empowerment. With its numerical strength, and when we research the structure of these intellectual organizations, we discover violence in the ideas on which the organization structure, and if violence is not used in its beginnings, wait for the appropriate opportunity to practice it. What confirms the presence of the idea of violence in the ideas of Al-Banna is what he said in the message of the Fifth Conference:

“They know that the first degree of strength is the strength of belief and faith, followed by the strength of unity and connection, and then the strength of the arm and the weapon. All meanings, and that if it uses the force of the arm and the weapon, and it is disjointed, disorderly order, or weak in belief and stagnant faith, it will be destined for annihilation and destruction.” [95]

The fifth is permission to use the force of the forearm and weapons, and the special regime formed against its background. Violence is a behavior that inhabits the human conscience; its justifications may be social, criminal, or religious, and some practice the latter type of violence individually or through groups, entities, and organizations. Often these arise. Organizations are on the margins of society and see that their fundamental role is in correcting its course, changing it, modifying it, or turning against it, as in the case of the MB, which represented a comprehensive and multiple conceptions of the methods of violence.

One of the characteristics of religious organizations is that they cite many religious texts to confirm that their violent behavior is jihad for the sake of God and thus translate their ideas into behavior later. Then they consolidate and legitimize these ideas so that they have an environment that fosters them, where the role played by the MB throughout its inception decades. The MB justifies jihad as an individual obligation on every Muslim that the fall of the Islamic caliphate means the loss of this obligation on Muslims.

4.2.1 Violence and Extremism in the Behavior of the MB

The MB 's connection to violence began from the first moment al-Banna drew the lines in 1928 as a religious movement aimed at adhering to religion and its ethics. In 1932, the group's activity moved to Cairo. The group's political activity did not begin until 1938, and the private regime, After holding the Fifth Conference of the group in 1939. The features of violence developed after that date until it became a phenomenon and marked the formation of armed cells within the organization nearly ten years after its inception.[98]

Al-Banna called for violence in his letters, where he said: "We will address our invitation to the officials of the country, its leaders, ministers, rulers, sheiks, deputies and parties, and we will invite them to our curriculum, and we will place our program in their hands, and we will demand that they walk in this Muslim country, rather the leader of Islamic countries in the path of Islam in the audacity of the He hesitated with her in unambiguous clarity and without equivocation or deliberation, for the time is not enough for deliberations .It is working to support Islam and is going on the road to restoring the rule of Islam, and we will declare it a dispute in which there is no peace or mercy with it until God opens between our people with truth and us and He is the best of conquerors." [99]

Evidence for the MB's relationship with other extremist groups and organizations is the connection of Ayman al-Zawahiri, the leader of al-Qaeda, with the MB before he traveled to Afghanistan and joined al-Qaeda, which confirms the mediation role the group in this context.[99]

The MB was the one who offered the current al-Qaeda leader to travel to Pakistan through one of their associations to help the wounded Afghans during the Soviet war on Afghanistan. Moreover, if the group had not offered Al-Zawahiri to travel, he would not have joined the Al-Qaeda Jihad organization until he became its leader. The organization later became an inspiration to other more extremist organizations such as the so-called Islamic State (ISIS), which explains why the MB was the organization that created the violent atmosphere from which all future groups of violence and extremism arose. The climate created for the rest of the organizations engaged in violence in various ways according to Gelvin.

Zawahiri's relationship with Afghanistan began in 1980, when he stumbled upon a golden opportunity to learn about one of the fields of jihad that could be a tributary and ground for jihad in Egypt, the heart of the Islamic world, where the political battle of Islam is taking place between Muslims and the leaders of the new crusade, America, the Jews, and the Arab rulers who carry out their policies. Where Al-Zawahiri narrates about the beginnings of armed action in Egypt and its justifications, he believes that the armed operations are a true reflection of Qutb's ideas, and he expressed this by saying:

“This is the way that Qutb had a significant role in directing Muslim youth in Egypt in particular and the Arab region in general in the twentieth century. When the Muslim youth looked at the roadblocks, it became evident to them how afraid the Nasserite leadership and its communist partners were of Qutb's demand for monotheism.” [97]

The path of the jihadist movement began with Qutb's ideas, which gained a theoretical and applied dimension of violence. He was an inspiration for the ideas of jihad that MB, whose words were considered candles for their path toward violence where All extremist groups rely on him in rooting violence.

The MB produced armed militias, part of its ideological structure. The group agreed with these militias from an organizational point of view, and sometimes the consensus was from an intellectual point of view, resulting from the organization's ideas. However, this does not prevent differences between these organizations in some ideas and how they are implemented.[100] The group disavowed some of these militias, but it could not deny them.

The first of these militias and combatant groups is the "the Military Technical Group," formed in the mid-seventies of the last century by Saleh Sariya, who communicated with Mrs. Zainab al-Ghazali, one of the group's leaders and mentor, al-Banna. These young people, most of whom belonged to the MB, tried to resist the authority with violence until they became inspiring others towards violence.[100]

The emergence of the Islamic Group in the 1970s coincided with the trial of the "the Military Technical Group," so the slogans raised by the accused left an impact on shaping the awareness of the Islamic Group, which later established a wing and practiced violence.[101] Moreover, the slogans of these young men in prisons and during trials for the application of Sharia combined with what the Islamic group aspired to, which sought to implement Islamic law and establish the Islamic caliphate.

Regarding the Military Technical Group and the connection of these young men to the MB, the leader of Al-Qaeda "Al-Zawahiri" says:

“The Military Technical Group began to form with the arrival of Saleh Serieh, to Egypt, and contact with MB figures such as Mrs. Zainab Al-Ghazali and Hassan Al-Hudaybi began, and he was active in forming groups of young people. He urged them to confront the anti-Islamic ruling regime in Egypt. [101]

Furthermore, one of the founders of the jihadist movement was one of the roots of the ideas born on the background of the issue of The Military Technical group, whose connection with the MB began at its inception. Farag grew up on the young people's ideas who formed the " The Military Technical Group," considered the first Islamic military coup in the modern era.

some of those released from the Military Technical Organization tried to revive the organization twice; The first attempt ended with the arrest of the group in the year 1977, and the second attempt ended with the arrest of the Mujahid youth in the year 1979 as a result of the presence of a detective guide among them, and Muhammad Farag was among those who have not arrested from the second group, and they began the active movement in Cairo and northern Egypt.[102]

Al-Zawahiri used his travels to Afghanistan to build the base of jihad and expressed this by saying:

“Therefore, this invitation to participate in the medical work of the Afghan immigrants came to me according to a measure, and it coincided with a severe desire to identify relevant fields to establish a safe base for the continuation of the jihadi work in Egypt, especially during the era of Anwar Sadat. [102]

He confirms what Al-Zawahiri said, "The travel of one of 's leaders at that time, Kamal Al-Sananir." In addition to his association with MB, he was a crucial player in the jihad effort in Afghanistan since he founded a hospital to treat the Afghan injured. MB: one that is open and may not have anything to do with jihad, and whose members are former armed forces; the arrangement of the MB was strange, as the apparent leader was represented before the people and the regime by the third general guide, Omar al-Telmisani [103] .The Special Regime group, which included Mustafa Mashhour, Ahmed Al-Malt, and Kamal Al-Sananir, held genuine leadership.

4.2.2 The Special Regime. The MB's Transformed Violence

The MB ascribes the primary goal of establishing the special regime to properly prepare the Muslim individual or group member to defend the Islamic homeland or establish an "Islamic state" according to the imagined concept of the MB.

On this basis, the system established prior to July Revolution 1952, when the country was still dominated by the British, may be justified. The organization saw the necessity for its continuation even after the revolution and the formation of state institutions under the republic's foundation following the monarchy's demise, not Egypt, but the critical goal represented by Islam's preservation.

Following the revolution, compulsory conscription legislation has passed, and the National Guard has formed. Therefore, there is no need for military militia presence, which is a direct attack on the state birthed from the womb of the July revolution. The MB desired independent governance even after the revolution and the foundation of the state[49]

Al-Banna is considered the author of the idea of establishing the Special Regime or the Military Group's Militia so that it works in parallel with the group's advocacy role; after Al Banna, the group's guides refused any offers to dissolve the Military Group' after the July Revolution and Gamal Abdel Nasser's assumption of power.

The emergence of the special regime was in 1940, when the founder of the organization, al-Banna, offered Saleh Ashmawy the establishment of a military wing of the group, whose mission, according to the organization's literature, would be to confront the British occupiers of the country .

When AL- Banna, considered establishing the group's administrative and organizational structure, he also considered establishing an armed force attached to the group; this was nearly ten years later than the advocacy structure, as he was confident

of the organization's numerical strength and the presence of followers from all walks of life, professions, and families at the time.[105]Al-Banna succeeded in defining the features of the organization's organizational structure, in which he placed the MB in organizational ranks and established regulations to work within the general organizational structure.

The interaction nature between members and leaders of the organization from inside and the organization's core principles, as represented by the large majority, whether carefully selected through battalions or The organization prevailed, with which the group's families have filled. It also created a general division, which included assembling mobile teams who visited the areas with their parades and developing particular frameworks for the private system.

The touring teams established by al-Banna tended to sports and military performances, and their members trained in violent sports; Although the group dissolved the military wing represented by the Special Regime later, it still adhered to the presence of the mobile divisions, but it was within a narrower framework than it was at the time of Al-Banna.

Before the killing of al-Banna, the security conditions were narrowing and expanding concerning the activities of these teams. Tony argues that They were exploiting the university yards for this training, so the young man came out as a coach and ready without making the organization abroad the trouble of making an effort in this aspect placed in what we might call a reserve until needed in military action .

Therefore, as a result, it is not uncommon for the group to attempt to train and connect with its vast majority base after picking an elite number of them for training and then recommending them for protection. Perhaps it used some of these people in violent protests, such as breaking doors or hitting opponents, when violence was expected. Confronting and attacking security officers, or refusing their meeting with them, is what we might term the organization's seeds of violence sown among its members or the preparation for this violence in its various manifestations.[105]

The MB developed an educational system for its members, particularly the private regime; it focuses on several studies; which divided into reciting the Qur'an, memorizing hadiths, and focusing on martyrdoms that inspire to fight in the cause of God, as well as studying the Prophet's biography, jurisprudence, advocacy, topics related to the nature of military action, and other programs, followed by an evaluation every two months .

To discover the extent The MB benefit from mobilizing programs behind a shared goal and persuade everyone to follow. These questions posed by the members of the special committee-are investigating range from military, legal, and religious experience that they have gained over their training sessions.

Al-Banna translated the group's ideas about violence into reasonable practices on the ground, giving it its current form and leaving its mark on the MB; it has become the most influential source group for violence and extremism in the modern era, as most leaders of extremist organizations have emerged from the organization's mantle with their ideas and behaviors.

The roving teams contributed to drawing the image of the military organization since the first moment of the formation of the roving teams, and they work in violent sports. It is implanted in the souls of those who practiced violence, and it seems that the first founder made it an alternative to military action practiced by those in charge of advocacy work, if members of the private regime practice violence and his training, the rest of the groups must be prepared through some other sports exercises.

Al-Banna drew the community's attention to the organization through the roving teams, and he often participated in their shows and those who were members of the military regime and were organizing military shows. The mobile teams are considered one of the MB's educational tools, which the group used in carrying out its activities, and it remained in its position even after ninety years of its inception.[106] These bands were moving their shows in the streets of Egypt in order to dazzle the people. Then the missionary groups responsible for recruiting do their job, recruiting dozens and hundreds after being fascinated by the roving shows, which represented the organization's preparation point and the starting point for violence, through which the group's members practiced violence.

Among the essential systems of the MB or their means towards spiritual or sports education is the so-called battalion and other means of education such as the family, the journey, and the roving, and all of these means are no less important in translating ideas into behaviors. It expresses the concept of latent or apparent violence in the group. The establishment of the battalions came ten years after the emergence of the advocacy group, as it was a prelude to the emergence of the special regime, which undertook violent training and practiced it through killing and bombing. This is evident

from its name, "battalion," which is a purely military term, and the founder sought to reach twelve thousand members of the battalions.

What is said about the roving could also be said about the battalions: it is still used within the MB organization, so it is still one of the MB's educational means, and members of the organization still attend the battalion and study the concepts of jihad for the sake of God, along with other spiritual worship. Programs change and alter according to a plan drawn up by the community and approved by the Guidance Office. Moreover, the group's leadership has done throughout the ages is that it has copied the organization's means that al-Banna prepared for these particular groups and circulated them to the rest of the organization's members.

The result of this was a paramilitary organization that could easily be transformed into military action or the exit of armed groups from the womb of the group, as happened with Hamas and Liwa al-Thawra. The group is similar and cannot point to an apparent difference, as most of its components received a similar degree of education, training, and upbringing; there are no differences. They worked in missionary work .

They all acquired the same amount of education, and they were all prepared to perform violence, which they did, to varying degrees depending on what they were working in. where operates inside the private system and performs its duties following programs that represent the roving and the battalion for the most part. [107] The spiritual and military education method and the nature of the bond that unites the MB represented in the pillars of the pledge of allegiance guarantee the existence of a solid and cohesive organization capable of confronting a political or military regime.

4.2.3 Perceptions of Organizational Affiliation and Transformations of Violence

Religious organizations constantly provide their member's incorrect impressions of life to keep them within the company for an extended period; also, if a member attempts to leave, he returns to the organization again. So, the member will be like water from which fish cannot escape, and if this occurs, he either returns immediately or decides to abandon life, not just the life of the organization but his own life. Perceptions of organizational affiliation are inseparable from the group's concept of violence and its transformations. The issue of violence is closely related to the group's ability to impose its will on its followers and direct them in the circle of violence or its surroundings.

In this context, the organization always deludes its followers into believing that it has apparent solutions to all issues in its members' minds; It tries to create a parallel society. It creates an alternative society to reality, in which the followers demand to give up the natural and realistic society for a virtual society whose lines are drawn by the group with its laws and legislation. Some people awaken from their condition of organizational anesthesia.

This explains the followers' Some leave the organization to go far to the extremes of ideological extremism, and often the reason is the organization that prompted them to doubt all the skills they have learned and acquired, trying to build his acquaintances again after he realized that there are other sciences and knowledge than the ones the organization insisted on being captive to during the period of his affiliation.

The journey of doubt that some followers experience pushes them to explore and build their knowledge on their own. They often succeed after the organizational affiliation shocked them with the rigidity of their separation from the world around them.

The member is placed under various types of organizational anesthesia that prevents him from waking up so that he remains captive and unable to effectuate the necessary change or review, whatever its degree, and here the organization's influence appears more than anything and is much more complex, mainly when an influence is intellectual.

The group linked the movement of the member to the movement of the organization itself, so there is no movement or a large population, but the organization has a role in it, so it gave the organization sanctity; furthermore, as some have grown in sanctification, the organization becomes a half-god in its followers' eyes; Thus, the member remains captive for the organization.

The organization successfully moves its adherents by remote control and eschatological classification; these are genuine believers, the unbelievers. The miracle is in the person who awakens, not the person who stays obedient to the organization's sanctifying beliefs.

The perceptions that control the MB's understanding of violence are the fundamental link in its violence equivalent. When Al-Banna expanded the definition of violence, he manipulated perceptions. Furthermore, when the group maintained this notion, it was also via perception manipulation since it is the one who controls the concept of

violence and its modifications. Transformations of violence cannot be handled without a previous understanding of organizational affiliation perceptions.

4.3 Opportunistic Interest

Religious groups and currents govern the idea of opportunistic interest, which is the same vision that political groups deal with; there is no difference between them; Opportunism constitutes the governing framework for the relationship that brings the inner group entities together and which binds the group together with other entities, whether they are political, social, or otherwise.

The movement purposefully clashed with various major political entities in its early days, with the Wafd Party serving as one of its symbols as the most considerable powerful opposition at the time. Between conciliation and balanced relations, the group progresses to a coup staged against the party while in power and developed in favor. The most fundamental reason for the MB's turn to violence was opportunism. As long as a group or organization has an interest, it will grasp the opportunity and use violence to change things, regardless of their legitimacy. Furthermore, experience frequently indicates whether or not the group practices this opportunism, and reality validates this usage, and when violence is a means to an objective that may be expressed in opportunism, not the other way around .

By looking closely at the early stage of its inception, the MB represented a pillar for the ruling forces in Egypt, the palace with the delegation, while the British came as a third complement to the intense triangle. The relationship between the three sides was often tense, and the group often benefited from it for political reasons, in addition to the presence of a genetic factor within the organization that pushes it to practice

opportunism to achieve goals that the organization sees as nullifying its project and exerts every available means to achieve them, legitimizing these means under religious slogans and noble goals.

The group did the same thing with the revolutionaries, such as organizing the July 23 revolution and a stage of harmony and unity between the goals of those in charge and society before turning against the revolutionaries and society to achieve what it considers to be noble goals even if the means are not noble .

The history of the group repeats itself. The group that chose to clash with society and its institutions in July 1952 is the same group that clashed with society in June 2013 when the masses came out calling for early presidential elections.

Following the group's idea of confrontation, sensing rightful one and that society is deficient; thus, it requires the guardianship of those who understand the nature and truth of things; from it developed into an uprising into the so-called Arab Spring aimed at settling accounts with an entity that was earlier than many political entities that dominated the scene; it far away using violence to translate this opportunism.

The group may call for democracy, and it may be sincere in its call, and the goal is, of course, to benefit from it and not to export it to the people, but it may not use this democracy within its institutions except in a framework that does not conflict with the wishes of the leaders and what they set bylaws or what they decide. Also, this democracy cannot be the language between the group and others, for it is just a slogan

through which the group practices society, and the truth is that violence is its original language of expressing itself.

They may allow democracy within some organizational structures if it does not clash with the desire and vision of the leadership. Without that, this democracy becomes mere worthless nonsense. Hence, the MB's councils turn into a place for talking only, while the leadership sees something else, and their democracy is not binding, and the leadership that has taken the democratic form cannot be criticized by opening dialogue even if it does not adopt it.

Furthermore, Ahmed Adel Kamal, in his book *The Points Over Letters*, expressed the case of Sheikh Ahmed Al-Sukkari, the representative of the group, and one of the founders of the MB, when he said:

“The group calls democracy within its institutions, but it is fed up with it, using it at times and breaking it at other times.” [100]

The group often confuses fixed religious discourse with changing political goals, calling for respect for democracy and its mechanisms to reach its legitimate goals. At the same time, we find that it rejects democracy in its actions under the pretense of the requirement of listening and obeying the emir or guide while respecting the group's regulations and the leadership's ideology and principles.

4.4 Secrecy and Publicity Violence within the MB

The idea of secrecy and publicity is a cornerstone in the thinking of religious groups, which differ among themselves; The more profound the group goes into secrecy, the closer it is to violence for a reason related to its intellectual and organizational structure.

These groups have preferred violence as an effective tool to achieve their demands, and other organizations are confused between openness and secrecy. Sometimes they turn toward openness to satisfy their rules, or they want to prove that they are peaceful ideas and take moderation as their approach.[108] Sometimes they take secrecy as the basis for some of their movements, which requires them to hide and work from Behind a curtain for fear of revealing it; this disappearance often leads to a state of rot, after the ideas of direct criticism were absent under the justifications of secrecy and the culture of the ordeal that it imposes on the organization with time, all ideas become uneven. With time, the organization's leaders hide more in secrecy so that new ideas appear to the surface.

The MB, considered one of the essential groups cited in this regard, spent half of its life in secrecy and the other half betting on publicity. On the organizational level, while the group takes the public line of action through well-known leaders and carries out its work, it finds another sector that plays an ambiguous and undeclared role.

These executives are typically the organization's window, and they have much power. The organization's goal of engaging in public action is to indicate its intent to the public and its regulations and what it believes necessary in the invitation to continue in steps away from overt indeed accomplished.

Undercover work inevitably pushes its owner to engage in violence or become secretive because of the violence he practices. The prevarication between covert and public work confirms an authentic relationship with violence, as hiding an idea is impossible. At the same time, it is accurate and not afflicted by disease, and its lack of

seeking public presence among people is evidence of its sickness and its transformation into violence.

4.5 Societal Isolation and Violence

The MB lives in societal isolation and considers it necessary to imprison its followers to preserve them from any whim that might lead them east or west away from the basic idea representing the organization's backbone.

The MB's literature includes societal isolation; the group may appear open to society by participating in a wide range of activities but refuses to open up to others or be influenced by; which is incompatible with the idea of taking from or being influenced by; and, most importantly, it tries to preserve its followers' organizational structure by isolating from society and its ideas.[109]

The organization provides an alternative society for its members to isolate them; they live within the community, but they rebel against its laws and legislation, called emotional isolation; the group provides a complete life within it. It may work in the group's institutions for a fee. [110] The group also provides recreational trips for its followers to not merge with the rest of the community members and not be influenced by them.

In the context of achieving an alternative society and emotional isolation, the organization provides a life partner with conditions that guarantee survival when the life partner has the same ideas and belongs to the organization. It provides what the member wants because he does not deviate from it. It provides the circle of friends and

preoccupies individuals with administrative work that makes the individual unable to focus or be preoccupied except with the affairs of the MB.

The societal isolation imposed by the group pushes the follower or member to rely primarily on the idea of violence, at least to defend his community, which he sees in the organization and does not see the community because of the restrictions imposed by the organization that required him to stay inside him away from the real world.

One of the most fundamental aspects of social isolation imposed on its believers is the organization's refusal to allow its members to join any party other than the Freedom and Justice Party, created following the January 25 revolution. It submitted hundreds of people for disciplinary hearings, and others have been subjected to dismissal procedures for failing to comply with this principle.[110] These measures aim to intimidate others who tempted to get out of the group's collar and hegemony in what might differ with the organization political convictions; There are large numbers of MB who did not join the JDP, but at the same time, they did not dare to join parties other than FJP.

4.6 Conclusion

In sum, The MB went through several transformations that took it to the square of violence again after it tried to dispute this idea, especially during the periods in which it reconciled with the successive political regimes; moreover, the fundamental transformation was that it moves in more than one form and form of violence or that it has a superior ability to form according to its violent perception. Furthermore, The Islamic caliphate's doctrine and the universality of Islam without geographical bounds flow into the notion of practicing conduct and inspiration for violent groups, with

justifiable grounds such as creating the Islamic state or the caliphate and jihad for God's sake.

Whoever follows the MB since its founding in the late twenties until the present day sees that violence is an integral part of the organization's strategy to reach power, and what may change is the form of this violence practiced against opponents of their approach. The cover takes in order to justify this violence or to evade it by attaching it to small organizations, but in any case, they are tools in the hands of the organization, and it shows an ideological danger in being a constitution for many terrorist organizations, such as ISIS and Al-Qaeda. Very simply, we can notice the commonalities between the MB and the most violent terrorist organizations, especially in the permissibility of the use of violence and the ease of blaming others and legitimizing their fight. the terrorist group al-Qaeda, whose commanders virtually all passed through the MB, like Ayman al-Zawahiri, the terrorist organization leader, admits in his book "Knights Under the Banner of the Prophet" that Qutb's ideas represent the nucleus of the "contemporary jihadist movement." Al-Zawahiri, who was previously a member of the MB, admits that the organization helped him reach Afghanistan to participate in the fight against Soviet forces in the eighties of the last century through an association run by the organization. The MB took advantage of the presence of the most violent armed organizations to preoccupy and distract government security forces to expand and broaden within the joints of the state and the institutions of society to achieve the goal of achieving power, where the organization later uses it to achieve political interests.

It is impossible to comprehend the MB or its behavior in the context of violence, whether directly in practice, in the past or present, or through the environment it provided, which was akin to an educational incubator for all groups that raised the banner of violent rebellion and practiced violence on a thought and behavior level. The most obvious interpretation of describing the changes to violence is that the organization did not transform but instead remained on its prior path of advocating and supporting violence.

Chapter 5

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5.1 Findings

How did the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood's political ideology evolve from a religious movement to a violent political party, and what impact did it have on Middle Eastern politics? In turn, how do political Islam's organizing and framing strategies reshape their political prospects? What are the ideological and organizational threats to state stability posed by political Islam? I used content analysis, thematic analysis, and literature studies to investigate concepts and hypotheses to answer these questions.

The findings of this dissertation show that violence is an unavoidable part of an organization's attempt to gain power, though the form of violence used against opponents of their strategy may change. Simultaneously, since the twentieth century, the challenge of a direct relationship between religion and politics has forced its way into Arab-Islamic discourse. The MB seeks to impose religion and Sharia law on society and the political system by providing an Islamic alternative.

In the aftermath of political events in the Middle East, the debate over the state and political Islam resurfaced, more vital than ever, in the "Arab Spring," in which the debate over the state and political Islam shaped and continues to be at the center of religious, ideological, political, and organizational struggles. The primary objective of

this study was to figure out what factors and mechanisms led to the emergence and spread of the Muslim Brotherhood and the development of political ideology.

My theoretical model takes cultural, national, and international contexts into account. The analysis employs a framing approach, which combines opportunity structure, the external factors limiting or enabling collective actors' -social movements- to explain their social developments. In general, it seeks to explain why social mobilization occurs, the forms it takes, and the potential social, cultural, and political consequences to comprehend the Muslim Brotherhood's various facets in the Arab world. The main dynamic components of the POS are the institutionalized political system's relative openness or closure, the stability or absence of a wide range of elite coalitions that typically drive the political system, the presence or absence of elite allies, state capacity, and proclivity to repression.

While acknowledging the limitations of the study, Political Islam literature currently available focuses on sociocultural and grievance-based explanations for the movement's mobilization. Grievances, social isolation, or relative deprivation, according to social movement theory, are "a necessary but not sufficient condition of social protest." There is a gap between studies of social movements conducted in liberal democratic countries and those conducted in other countries, according to McAdam and Tilly. In the literature, social movement mobilization is often confused with social protest activity, which is the dissertation's primary flaw in explaining and analyzing political Islam.

Due to the richness the non-objective scholarly work written on the MB; the thesis mainly focuses on the MB in the Middle East. To make broad generalizations about Islamist political ideology organization and its relationship with the POS, especially in the Middle East, each branch of the MB must be studied. More research is needed into the evolution of POS and MB, particularly in new Islamist movements. Comparing organizations like Ennahda in Tunisia, the JDP in Morocco, Hamas in Palestine, and the MB in Jordan would help us better understand Islamist political ideology and its role in shaping Middle East politics.

- The Muslim Brotherhood" or "Islamization," It's a project that mainly refers to implying that its state management is based on an ideological foundation that lacks any rational character that considers the state's interests; the main concern was imposing control over these agencies and adapting them to serve its ideological goals, with no regard for the possibility of a conflict between the state's interests and those goals.
- The purpose of the group and its organizational structure is an educational incubator for all religious organizations and groups that have promoted violence, rebellion, and violence at the level of thought and behavior, whether directly in practice in the past or present, or through the environment, they have created. Most of the leaders of extremist organizations were members or affiliated with them.
- Islamist organizations, whether they follow the path of da'wah, adhere to political action, turn toward violence, and are in the opposition or government,

are formed a threat to the stability of society and the safety of the state which multifaceted political, social, intellectual, and cognitive challenge, not only in terms of limiting and delegitimizing its hegemony but also in terms of bringing about radical changes in the social system to rebuild society as a whole according to its conception within the scope of what it calls the Islamic society. It aims to impose its vision on society without considering the distinctions and contrasts between social formations and the balances required to preserve social stability.

- The most obvious interpretation describing the changes to violence is that the organization did not change and instead continued on its previous advocacy in supporting violence Forming Islamist ideology, which includes a vision of the world, the state, as well as ideas, concepts, and perceptions, and its keen pursuit of the legitimacy of representing Muslims and becoming the dominant ideology.
- The most severe manifestations of the danger of Islamist organizations are those related to the state, and the danger exists on two levels. The first level is that these political organizations' positions are not limited to opposing trends related to the way the state is run or public policies in their economic, developmental, and social dimensions, nor to their practices that threaten the stability of political systems and spread security chaos, rather than opposing the state entity itself, i.e., the modern national state.; The second level manifests itself in the urgent quest of those groups to seize control of the levers of government and power, whether by political activity by some of them or

through the proclivity of others to seize power through armed violence or coups; In both cases, the experiences of Islamist rule in Arab countries revealed the dangers posed by the arrival of an Islamist movement to power.

- The lack of a "strategic vision" in dealing with internal and external challenges, the most indicator of the Brotherhood movement's lack of a strategic vision for the rational administration of the state, is the MB's view of state agencies as organizational instruments harnessed to serve their political and social objectives where; Civil wars erupted due to the issue of imposing Sharia on a multi-religious society and restrictions on freedoms .; Arab counties increased suffers from economic, social, security, and political problems as living conditions deteriorate, poverty, illiteracy, and unemployment.

5.2 Recommendations

- The Muslim Brotherhood must adopt a clear discourse and actual practice toward its vision of the state and abandon political work in order to focus on; renewing religious thought, reviewing the status of institutions specialized in religious affairs, reviewing the presence of religious discourse in the media, and examining methods of violence and terrorism. These elements aim to remove political Islam and religious slogans from the ideological and political spheres, leaving only the preaching and reform side, which they began without political interference.
- Reducing the risks of Islamist organizations requires establishing a political system that adopts the principles of Good Governance, which are the principles of fairness, equality, responsibility, the rule of law, participation, pluralism,

transparency, and sound management. According to this principle, countries that adhere to the rules of good governance are less vulnerable. Because of the dangers of violence and poverty from which Islamist organizations thrive, better able to protect their societies from extremism and fanaticism and more prepared to respond effectively and efficiently to the dangers that may threaten them.

- The Muslim Brotherhood should conduct a comprehensive review of its path from its inception until today and adopt public methods to bring about change and abandon the clandestine or violent change methods and recognize the role and legitimacy of the civil state and that religion and state must be separated.
- confronting the danger and threat posed by Islamist political movements takes many forms, including security, political, social, economic, intellectual, and cultural. While defeating political opponents, the intellectual and cultural confrontation appears to be the most important and dangerous face. If some of its movements and organizations turn to violence, the most certain of matters is the use of ideological Islamism, which it mortgages to the service of an authoritarian violent political project .

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