

The Challenges of Federalism in Africa: A Case Study of Nigeria

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ABSTRACT

Federalism is a political system where governmental functions are divided between a central authority and constituent regions within a nation. The first roles of federalism are grounded in the principles of federalism, which advocate for the implementation of a three-tiered system of government in order to enhance individual liberty, equality, freedom, and democratic self-governance.

The objective of this research is to examine the challenges of federalism in Africa through a case study of Nigeria. The study adopted the secondary method of data collection via books, journals, articles, and newspapers in order to analyse the challenges of federalism in Africa with a case study of Nigeria. While ethnic federalism and fiscal federalism were adopted as the theoretical framework.

The argument of this thesis is that African federal states desire a democratic structure that protects individual liberty, property and independence, as shown by their constitutional history but they do not see federalism as a preeminent form of governance for attaining these objectives. The implementation of federalism in Africa particularly Nigeria, has faced with issues such as racial diversity, political instability, economic imbalance, resource allocation, and institutional capability have plagued African federalism. The study emphasises the need to solve these difficulties to build successful federal institutions that promote integration, ethnic, religious ties, democracy, and growth in Nigeria and Africa

The study revealed that Nigeria's founding fathers chose federalism as the best way to protect the basic interests of the federating units due to the country's complex political system. The federal governmental system in Africa including Nigeria has many challenges, such as racial and regional divides, power disparities, inadequate leadership, disputes on resource management, and capability limitations. Based on the findings, the following recommendations were made: Supporting local governments, improving governing bodies, combating corruption, advocating for power-sharing and decentralisation, promoting dialogue and conflict resolution, and amending the constitution to address power imbalances and protect minority rights.

Keywords: Africa, Nigeria, Federalism, Fiscal Federalism, Decentralization

ÖZ

Federalizm, hükümet fonksiyonlarının bir merkezi otorite ve bir ulusun içinde yer alan bölgeler arasında paylaştığı bir siyasi sistemdir.. Federalizm bireysel özgürlüğü, eşitliği, demokratik ve öz yönetimi geliştirmek için üç kademeli bir hükümet sisteminin uygulanmasını savunan ilkelerine dayanır.

Bu araştırmanın amacı, Nijerya'nın bir vaka çalışması aracılığıyla Afrika'daki federalizmin zorluklarını incelemektir. Çalışmada, Afrika'daki federalizmin zorluklarını analiz etmek için kitaplar, dergiler, makaleler ve gazeteler aracılığıyla veri toplama ikincil yöntemi kullanıldı. Etnik federalizm ve vergi federalizmi teorik çerçeve olarak tercih edildi. Afrika'daki federalizmin temel hedefleri arasında ekonomik büyümenin ilerlemesi, siyasi istikrarın kurulması, etnik çeşitliliğin yönetilmesi ve birlik ve demokrasi teşvik edilmesi yer alıyor.

Çalışma, Nijerya'nın kurucularının ülkenin karmaşık siyasi sisteminden dolayı federatif birimlerin temel çıkarlarını korumanın en iyi yolu olarak federalizmi seçtiğini ortaya koymaktadır. Afrika'daki federal hükümet sistemi, ırk ve bölgesel bölünmeler, güç farklılıkları, yetersiz liderlik, kaynak yönetimi ve kapasite sınırlamaları gibi birçok zorlukla karşı karşıya kalmaktadır. Yerel hükümetleri destekleme, idari organları iyileştirme, yolsuzlukla mücadele etme, güç paylaşımı, diyalog ve çatışmaların çözülmesini teşvik etme ve güç dengesizliklerini giderme ve azınlık haklarını korumak için anayasayı değiştirme konuları Afrika'daki federalizmin zorluklarını gidermek için gereklidir. Ancak, vergi toplama, bütçe dağılımı ve yerli yerleşimcilerin

anlaşmazlıkları gibi Nijerya'nın zorluklarını karşılamak için tam bir anayasa değişikliği gereklidir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Afrika, Nijerya, Federalizm, Mali Federalizm, Merkezleşme

DEDICATION

It is with a feeling of immense accomplishment that I dedicate this thesis

To my parents and siblings (Aisha, Maryam, Rabi'u, Mubarak, Hadiza, Samira, and
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Chapter 1

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Introduction

Federalism is a political system where governmental functions are divided between a central authority and constituent regions within a nation. This process entails the amalgamation of the central government with Subnational governments. This creates a unified political system where authority is distributed between central and regional entities. The first roles of federalism are grounded in the principles of federalism, which advocate for the implementation of a three-tiered system of government to enhance individual liberty, equality, freedom, and democratic self-governance (Elazar, 1987). Furthermore, the concept of federalism is established to facilitate growth, mitigate external risks, and capitalize on opportunities (Riker, 1964). The third objective is to address disputes that arise as a result of the mismatch between a territorial-based sense of political identity and the geographic structure of the political body. The aforementioned thesis posits that federal systems effectively address diversity by implementing procedures that promote accommodation (Kymlicka, 1998; Stepan, 1999). Federalism is often seen as an appropriate approach for facilitating the transition to democracy and promoting peace-building. This role is supported by examples such as Bosnia and Herzegovina Keil (2016), Shakir (2019), Nepal, Myanmar, Breen 2018).

The rise and spread of federalist principles Africa were attributed to its unique cultural, linguistic, and ethnic background. The main objectives of African federalism include the development of economic expansion, the construction of political steadiness, the administration of ethnic variety, and the fostering of unity and democracy. According to Dickovick (2014), federalism in Africa saw a significant increase in the 1990s when African governments, which were politically and economically split, adopted efforts to promote liberalization inside their own states. In Africa, federalism is often seen as a means of preserving cohesion among fragmented communities, in light of the past shortcomings of authoritarian governance, centralized state management, and excessive economic concentration (Dickovick, 2014:553).

African states exhibit either diminished enthusiasm or a prevailing aversion towards the concept of federalism. The term federalism is often seen as unfavourable in the vocabulary of African political discourse (Rotimi, 2019). African federal states have a desire to establish a democratic system that safeguards individual liberty, independence, and wealth, as shown by their constitutional history. However, they do not see federalism as a preeminent form of governance for attaining these objectives (Rotimi, 2019). Among the 54 states, only a limited number of them have embraced the concept of federalism. According to Adem (2013), Nigeria, Ethiopia, and South Africa are recognised as established African federal nations, although the Union of Comoros, Sudan, South Sudan, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and Somalia might be classified as federalist states.

Nigeria, often regarded as Africa's most prominent federal system (Keller, 2002), has encountered several paradoxes and conflicts similar to those experienced by other African nations, which have resulted in a multitude of failed federal experiments. The

establishment of federal unions in Africa has mostly been characterised by a colonial nature, marked by a lack of domestic legitimacy and involvement. The scarcity of resources and constituencies is further intensified by inherent institutional design flaws, such as a limited number of constituent units and imbalanced asymmetries among these units. The process of post-colonial modernization and transition necessitates the consolidation of political and economic power, resulting in a diminished capability of the central state and perceived risks to the geopolitical security of the state. The presence of unfavourable regional and international circumstances also plays a role in fostering the opposition towards the federal concept of subnational autonomy among authoritarian regimes in Africa (Rothchild 1966; Kymlicka, 2006; Thomas-Woolley & Keller, 1994). The Nigerian people have shown remarkable unity in their support for federalism, and the country has also made remarkable efforts to tailor the federal model to its unique ethnopolitical characteristics (Downs, 2011).

The concept of federalism in Nigeria pertains to the delegation of self-governing authority by the country of Nigeria in West Africa to its constituent states, which possess shared sovereignty with the central Federal Government. The origins of federalism in Nigeria may be attributed to the amalgamation of the Northern and Southern protectorates in 1914, under the administration of Sir Frederick Lord Lugard. According to Suberu (2015), Nigeria stands out as the only nation with a lengthy and uninterrupted lineage of federal constitutions. The first quasi-federal constitutional arrangements were established during the period of colonial administration in 1946. The Richards Constitution, also known as the 1946 Constitution, placed significant emphasis on self-governance through the establishment of three regions and their

respective regional legislative assemblies. In contrast, the 1951 constitutions further enhanced mechanisms for shared governance by introducing a Council of Ministers composed of representatives from each region (Nze 2002). The evolution of the states within the Federal Republic of Nigeria may be attributed to a combination of complicated socioeconomic factors and the lasting impact of the colonial period. In contemporary Nigeria, the territorial organisation of Nigeria encompasses a total of 36 states and one federal capital territory.

The politicisation of federalism in Nigeria has arisen as a consequence of demands for the implementation of "true federalism" as a strategy to attain justice and foster economic development. Consequently, it is a prevalent practice to use federalism as a means to promote the objectives of certain demographic groups or communities. A common association made by individuals from Northern regions, particularly those who identify as Northern Muslims, is the connection between their identity in the implementation of comprehensive Sharia law governing regional control of resources. Nevertheless, the southern region might argue that the distribution of resources ought to be guided by the genuine need for them and to control the oil resources in the region. Lastly, those from Western Nigeria, namely the Yoruba ethnic group, hold the belief that the allocation of resources should be based on needs and population (Jinadu, 2004). According to Jinadu (2004), the emergence of federalism may occur via several means; nonetheless, it is argued that there is no inherent or definitive manifestation of federalism. Nevertheless, it should be noted that the federalist system in the United States is not exempt from imperfections. The federal form poses challenges in effectively addressing the marginalisation perpetuated by the unequal structure of the

federation. Because of this, the researcher is set to assess the challenges of federalism in Africa with a case study of Nigeria.

1.2 Research Statement of Problem

The presence of federal political structures in African nations, including Nigeria, has posed a considerable challenge to several aspects of national progress, including economic growth, ethnic and religious relations, democratic procedures, and the overall cohesion of the country. The question of federalism and resource management in Nigeria has resulted in persistent tension between the federal government and states that produce oil, leading to a sense of marginalisation and underdevelopment among the latter. The absence of sufficient control has impeded the allocation of resources towards the development of infrastructure, education, and healthcare. The federal system engenders an imbalanced allocation of resources and authority, resulting in decision-making processes that fail to sufficiently cater to the unique requirements of different states. This phenomenon leads to an imbalanced development trajectory, characterised by the prosperous advancement of some areas juxtaposed with the persistent poverty and underdevelopment of others. The limited autonomy granted to governments in managing their internal affairs and resources has also impeded the implementation of successful development plans. The contestation between ethnic and regional factions for authority over resources has engendered ethnic animosities, undermined societal cohesion, and sometimes erupted into acts of violence. The persistent contestation over resource management has undermined trust and collaboration across diverse areas, posing challenges to the realisation of a cohesive national development goal.

1.3 Research Questions

The research intended to answer

- i. What are the challenges of Federalism in Africa?
- ii. How have the challenges of Federalism in Nigeria affected its citizens and development?
- iii. How have the conflicts of diversity and challenges arising from resource control issues affected Nigeria's federal system?
- iv. What are the policy recommendations and strategies that can improve resource allocation, devolve more power to states, and foster unity among diverse ethnic and regional groups to enhance national development in Nigeria

1.4 Objective of the Study

This research examines the challenges of federalism in Africa with a case study of Nigeria

- i. To examine the challenges of Federalism in Africa
- ii. To identify the extent those challenges of Federalism in Nigeria have affected its citizens and development
- iii. To analyze the conflicts of diversity and challenges arising from resource control issues within Nigeria's federal system.
- iv. To propose policy recommendations and strategies aimed at improving resource allocation, devolving more power to states, and fostering unity among diverse ethnic and regional groups to enhance national development in Nigeria.

1.5 Justification of the Study

The problems of federalism in Africa may be better understood by examining the broader phenomena in which federalism and ethnic diversity are both seen and by recognising their use as political instruments. The present study seeks to enhance

comprehension of the underlying reasons and origins of the challenges of federalism in Nigeria. Specifically, it seeks to investigate the impact of resource control difficulties and ethnic rivalry on the challenges faced by the federal system in Nigeria. Furthermore, this research endeavours to provide effective solutions to address these challenges. This research aims to provide valuable insights for policymakers and organisations tasked with addressing the issues of federalism in Nigeria. It also emphasises the need to explore alternative mechanisms to effectively manage complex societal disputes in this context.

1.6 Methodology of the Study

The study used a qualitative methodology to collect data to accomplish its objectives. The qualitative approach to data gathering heavily depends on secondary sources of information. It entails using data that have already been acquired for a different study to investigate a subject unrelated to the original project. This area of study can provide other research questions or present a different perspective on the original request. Secondary sources are observations, journals, books, reports, newspapers, published documents, focus groups, artifacts, case studies, recordings, and libraries.

This qualitative research employed a case study methodology. Case study research is a valuable qualitative research methodology that involves conducting a comprehensive examination and evaluation of a singular instance, such as an organisation, programme, or event, to understand its unique characteristics and complexities in challenges of federalism in Africa with the case study of Nigeria. According to Yin (2003), case study research is an empirical inquiry that investigates a current phenomenon in its natural environment, including the phenomenon's limits. Scholars such as Eisenhardt (1989) have identified case study research as a viable approach to

investigate intricate and broad subjects in which context is of the utmost importance. Case study research methods include single, multiple, descriptive, exploratory, and explanatory approaches, (Baxter& Ack 2019; Yin, 1984).

Despite the abundance of methods, this research concentrated on the challenges of federalism in Africa with a case study of Nigeria. To identify commonalities and trends, a case study approach was employed. The findings were strengthened and a clearer picture of the phenomena was gained through the convergence of the data sets. The credibility of qualitative studies is reportedly enhanced by the use of multiple data sources (Eisenhardt, 1989).

Also, the ex post facto research approach is suitable for this study since it focuses on events that have already taken place, namely the challenges of federalism in Africa with the case study of Nigeria, and aims to provide a full explanation of these occurrences. In an ex post facto research design, the researcher refrains from intervening to modify independent variables since the event being studied has already taken place. This study used the ex post facto research approach, in which pre-existing data and events were exploited to explain the literature review, theoretical framework, Federalism in Africa and challenges of Federalism in Nigeria.

1.7 Scope and Limitation of the Study

The study covers the challenges of federalism in Africa. It focuses primarily on Nigeria. The study looked at the effect of adoption of federalism as a system of governance in Nigeria, the conflicts of diversity and challenges arising from resource control issues within Nigeria's federal system, and the decentralization in Nigeria. Also, the thesis proffered policy recommendations and strategies that aimed at

improving resource allocation, devolving more power to states, and fostering unity among diverse ethnic and regional groups to enhance national development in Nigeria.

The biggest limitation of the study has been finding materials with the researcher having to depend extensively on online sources such as newspaper articles, journals, and other publications. Also, the short time framework for the study.

1.8 The Structure of the Thesis

The research has five chapters. Chapter one (1) contains the introduction of the study; research question, objectives, justification of the study, and methodology of the study. Chapter two (2) consists of a literature review and theoretical framework. Chapter three (3) contains an Overview of Federalism in Africa. Chapter four (4) deals with the Challenges of Federalism in Nigeria. Chapter five (5) include a summary, conclusion, recommendations, and references.

Chapter 2

LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

2.1 Introduction

The federal formula, which African governments embraced upon gaining independence, is often regarded as a strategy for ensuring national existence. Functional federalism is a kind of federalism that emphasizes the distribution of authority and the division of responsibilities between the Federal government and the individual states, as well as among the states themselves. This thesis examines the challenges of federalism in Africa with a case study of Nigeria. It seeks to offer a thorough examination of the review of related literature and theoretical underpinnings, conceptual issues, and practical ramifications of federalism. The focus of this chapter is the presentation of the review of related literature on Federalism. For this study, the review of the related literature was examined under the following sub-headings: The concept of federalism, theoretical and conceptual issues, devolution of powers, decentralization, decentralization in Nigeria, empirical review on federalism in Africa and theoretical framework.

2.2 The Concept Federalism

Many definitions have been offered for "federalism," but none have been widely accepted. As Jinadu (1980) noted, Daniel (1992) claims this strategy has worked in many political circumstances. Ricker (1984) comprehensive discussion of federalism

focused on the difficulty of "federalism"s definition due to the institutions' dramatic transformation. The name "federalism" comes from the Latin word "Foedus," meaning league or compact. Many English terms come from "Federdus," including "federal," "federate," and "the word federation." Modern American politics, law, and English are rooted in these ideas. In constitutional law, "federal" refers to a multi-nation treaty to create a united UN.

Power separation may create a centralized government that is independent and coordinated with regional administrations, (Wheare, 1953). According to Wheare (1953), the federal system is distinguished by the explicit division of powers among government branches, a written constitution, and the two branches' equal rather than subordinate authority over their respective responsibilities. For Wheare (1953), people in constitutional units want federalism because they want central authority but also local power. A constitutional language that maintains the independence of local and state administrations from the federal government creates federalism (Wheare, 1953).

Livingston (1956) took a broad view of legal interpretation in his major book. He found that the documented constitution did not always accurately reflect a political system's federal basis. Federalism emerges from social, cultural, and political convergence. According to Livingston (1956), economic, social, political, and cultural factors affect federalism's manifestations, not just its legal form. Our governmental framework protects our federalist social order (Livingston, 1856).

Livingston (1956) contrasts Wheare's (1953) legal model with the dynamic interaction between socio-cultural structures and the constitutional framework. His claim that centrifugal and centripetal forces do not shape the Constitution is convincing.

Livingston (1956) distinguished between a federal constitution as the governing mechanism and its need in a federal society. According to the concept, a federal society has several ethnic groups with distinct histories, cultures, and languages. However, each ethnic group is limited to a geographically distinct territory. Federalism may undermine diversity by encouraging unity. Federalism requires a communal political legacy (Livingston, 1956). He stated "Of all the constituent factors that constitute the foundation upon which federations are established, the likeness of social and political traditions is arguably the most pivotal." Once formed, Federalism's political structures may change society by channeling social forces (Livingston, 1956). In essence, the Constitution impacts and is impacted by social diversity.

The above research successfully identifies the characteristics that affect a federal system, however, it does not specify which factors are necessary for federation. A similar view may be taken of Livingston's (1956) federal system, which encompasses any society framework with a separation of powers. Using this strategy to compare Britain's decentralized governance to the US's federal framework is unsuccessful.

The viewpoint expressed is consistent with Friedrich (1963) and Wheare (1953). According to their perspective, federalism serves as a political mechanism that facilitates the organization of diversity and unity across many aspects of society, such as institutions, ideologies, political occurrences, and individuals. According to their perspective, federalism may be defined as a collaborative arrangement among independent entities including individuals who possess a common objective. Conversely, association pertains to the connections formed among individuals. The individual highlighted the potential of federalism to foster social cohesion and strengthen interpersonal connections without compromising their integrity. Friedrich's

(1963) convergence refers to the phenomenon whereby many politically distinct groups collaborate to tackle shared challenges, develop mutual policies, and make collective decisions. On the other hand, federalization pertains to the process through which a formerly independent political entity becomes subject to governance and supervision by a federal authority.

Federalism, as defined by Sagay (2003) and Wheare (1953), is a political system in which a multinational nation is governed by multiple regionalized governments and a central federal authority. Each unit, including the central authority, governs people and assets within its geographical jurisdiction autonomously and according to its aims. Each government in a federation has its jurisdiction and may operate freely. Each government has the right to manage its affairs. According to Wheare's (1953) scholarly work, the federal system, which he devised, posits that the central government does not possess a position of superiority over the other tiers of government. A horizontal linkage exists among all governmental entities.

Ranny (1993) defines federalism as a system in which a central government and many subnational governments share power and each holds supreme authority in its sphere of influence. His remark attributes federalism to pragmatic political reasons. However, it is now widely recognized as a symbol of American administration brilliance. Many nations employ this approach to unite people from different cultures and with different interests. Australia, Canada, Germany, and Switzerland are leading the way, with Brazil, India, and Mexico following. Federal character systems' contractual, non-concentration of power is important, according to Osaghie (1990). He claims that the constituent nations and cities of a federal state have agreed to establish a durable balance of power through the Constitution.

Although ethnic and cultural variety can split communities, Tamuno (1989) defines federalism as a governance system where political organization constituents agree to assign duties and authorities. Peace through accords is not necessarily bad for favoured sides. In communities with occasional agreement and occasional disagreement regarding cooperative governance goals and techniques, friction and arguments can be resolved. According to Jega (1999), Federalism assigns vital power to both a central government and smaller regional authorities. Though basic, this idea is useful. In "federalism" for Eligwu, (1996), legally created political agencies share economic and policy authority.

The existing body of literature on federalism allows for many key observations. First, numerous writers utilize different terminology and ideas, indicating that federalism research lacks a universally acceptable definition or concept. Examining the different scholarly opinions on the concept of Federalism shows that there is no fundamental disagreement. Each technique limits its view of the subject, and none adequately captures the federal notion in isolation. In this case, Wheare (1953) provides a legal basis for federal constitutions. Livingston (1956) also examines the socioeconomic diversity that constitutional divisions of powers represent. Friedrich (1963) also examines how societal centripetal and centrifugal forces affect the constitution.

2.3 Theoretical and Conceptual Issues

Constitutional federalism is distinguished by the division of powers between a strong central government with nationwide jurisdiction and self-governing subnational regions. This supports Elazar's (1987), federalist ideas of self-government and collaboration. Watts (2005), shows that federal states including the US, Argentina, Australia, and Brazil have uneven Senate representation. Austria, Germany, India,

Malaysia, and Switzerland adopt asymmetric methods (Watts, 2005). Federations' upper houses have different legislative powers. However, federal lower chambers actively legislate alternate years (Watts, 2008). Members' expertise may determine the lower chamber's effectiveness. The distribution of legislative functions to component units (CUs) may favor one state or province over another in a federation. Ecological, linguistic, and religious barriers combined with geographical power asymmetries may raise union insecurity, according to Duchacek (1987). Defining federalism's objectives will create a comprehensive structure that explains federalism in Africa, and the goals may be used to evaluate the system's effectiveness. There are three main theoretical frameworks for understanding federalism's goals. The Federalist scholars argue that state-to-state federalism increases representative democracy, individual liberty, and social equality (Elazar, 1987). Growth, risk, and opportunity affect federalism (Riker, 1964). The third goal is to reduce disputes that arise when a nation's infrastructure doesn't fit its people's political views. Kymlicka (1998), and Stepan (1999), argue that federal systems efficiently manage diversity through adaptive policies and practices. To facilitate peaceful and democratic transitions, federalism has been employed in Sri Lanka, Nepal, Myanmar, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Iraq (Shakir, 2019).

Federalism comes from numerous political traditions and contexts. Stepan (1999), suggested a three-stage theoretical framework for federations: "coming together," "holding together," and "putting together." The US is an example of a federation formed when separate organizations cooperate because of a shared fear of threat, economic need, or both (Riker, 1964).

Federative states, like Belgium and India, are formed by reorganizing unitary governments to give component units (CUs) greater power or protect minority rights. Several sovereign states were forced to join to become the erstwhile Soviet Union. Coercion may be incorporated into the other two models (Taylor, 2007). Federated nations' constitutional units (CUs) have diverse autonomy and authority depending on their foundation architecture (Elazar, 1987). Dardanelli et al. (2019) and Watts (2008) found that union-created subnational entities inside federations had more regional autonomy than those formed via union separation. Component units (CUs) are a prime example of federalism. Given that the individual components must have had distinct limits before their amalgamation and that territorial self-governance does not require a federal system, this issue seems straightforward in confederations or homogenous federations. Federations struggle to design identity-based component units (CUs). According to McGarry (2005), federations can be single- or multi-national. The former promotes national growth, whereas the latter embraces variety from numerous sources. Due to the clear division of component entities, cultural differences in mono-national federations like the US, Germany, Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, and Venezuela are typically hidden. Multinational federations like Switzerland, Canada, India, Russia, and Belgium encourage local communities to form independent organizations. A federation with multiple ethnic groups might form component units (CUs) in two ways. Since ethnically-oriented institutions allow different cohorts to form autonomous governments, they may be a solution (Anderson, 2014). This initial technique has been questioned due to its failure in ethno-federal republics such as Yugoslavia, the Soviet Union, and Czechoslovakia (Roeder, 2009).

Critics argue that racial or ethnic constituent units (CU) promote new identities and empower ethnic leaders, which increases the likelihood of secession (Cornell, 2002 & Kymlicka, 1998). Anderson (2014) disagrees that the collapse of pseudo-socialist non-democratic federations warrants sweeping generalizations. Additionally, spatial federalism may not meet the demands of territorially-based groups that value their identity. Since violent separatist movements have failed in federal democracies, Bermeo (2002), states that the character of the governing system determines whether federalism can settle conflicts. In cases where one party has control, Wheare (1946) claims that federalism cannot confront dictatorships because fair elections are impossible. According to Dardanelli (2010), democracy must survive for federalism to survive. In his central party theory, Riker (1964) proposes a centralized federation where central government and constituent unit (CU) political philosophies converge. Authoritarian federalism in Mexico in the mid-1990s (Barracca, 2007) and Malaysia and other communist federations and nations with a strong communist party in power, demonstrate the importance of regime type in implementing federalism. The federal order's ability to govern ethnic variety by place can succeed or fail (Elazar, 1987;; Neudorfer et al., 2020). Burgess (2011) suggests assessing federalism's efficacy based on its endurance and capacity to fulfill its goals.

Analyzing the federal system's durability is simple. Many things make a situation complicated. First, success factors may differ by state or location. A wide range of elements affect the success of any action. Finally, vital information may not always be readily available. Africa promotes federalism to resolve conflicts and build stability while respecting state sovereignty. These criteria should be considered while assessing system efficacy.

2.4 Democracy and Federalism

Political science has long considered the possibility that federalism and other democracy systems may coexist with the division of powers, which promotes people centered government. These principles support the assumption that federalism is democratic, (Gerring, Thacker, & Moreno, 2005). Federalism is said to improve democracy by extending the number of institutions, boosting participation and choice.

According to the economic theory of federalism, democracy and federalism increase institutional competition, giving individuals greater opportunities to move (Oates, 1972). Federalism promotes diversity and minority groups, which are democratic traits (Levy, 2007). According to Watts (2008), the factors above demonstrate federalism's compatibility with democracy. Lijphart's consensus model (1999) shows how federalism complementary to democracy. Analytically, democracy is measured by central power-sharing and consensual democracy.

According to the analytical perspective, the relations between democracy and federalism may be either complementary or antagonistic. Federal systems moving to democracy (Benz & Kropp, 2014). The vertical and horizontal allocation of power across government levels is linked in a democratic federation. The horizontal separation of powers is essential to democracy. Thus, knowing democratic federations is crucial to separating these two governance dimensions. Federalism and democracy have distinctive collective action systems.

Institutional structures, processes, and behaviour determine how democracy and federalism operate together to solve these problems. The constitution's provisions on the division of powers in vertical and horizontal dimensions will decide whether

federalism or any other geographical organisation promotes democracy. Institutions and people must carefully navigate and preserve equilibrium to regulate complicated circumstances, which is equally important. The allocation of power in a government differs between federalism and democracy. Both separations of powers have important elements. Organisational, structural, and normative principles are affected. Constituent representation, division of powers, shared rule and (collective) self-determination, constituent equality, self-determination and self-governance, and others are available. One may argue that democracy and federalism follow these principles. Conflicting principles need compromise or sacrifice to accomplish any one of them.

Democracy and federalism depend on the principles of cooperation and competition, which are interwoven with numerous philosophies. Different methods may foster these ideas. Federalism and democracy have many similarities, indicating their interdependence (Hueglin, 2013). These principles apply to both, although in different ways. Federalism and democracy are oversimplified versions of the same idea: geographical division and people. The phrase "democratic regime" often refers to a horizontal division of powers under a single administration (Coppedge, Álvarez & Maldonado, 2008). The federal regime component, according to Elazar (1987), vertically distributes powers. All other ordering principles are connected to equality, yet this essential notion sparks the most controversy. Shared rule results from mutual respect across levels and branches of government, whereas federalism promotes self-governance by the parts. These are essential to democracy and federalism, yet they work differently. Democracy requires personal freedom and community decision making. Regarding representation, the basic principles of equality in the two systems are incompatible: democracy needs equal representation for all individuals, whereas

federalism requires equal representation for component units. The existence of federations made up of countries with different population proportions may result in contradictions in democratic equal representation, such as the one person, one vote concept.

Federalism and democracy don't clash. Each regime's structural components and functional logics separation of powers, shared rule, and checks and balances are distinct in theory and practice. The amount of autonomy and competition, the policy areas and historical periods they concentrate on, and whether to have shared or separate rule may all impact a government's decision to prioritise cooperation and consensus? By splitting powers into intragovernmental and intergovernmental dimensions, the two regime dimensions may be distinguished. The distinction transcends compatibility, incongruity, mutual tensions, and connectivity.

The interaction between democracy and federalism may lead to contradictory institutional logics. Sharman (1990) claims that this occurs when democratic principles of the game, as exhibited in competitive party politics in a parliamentary system, collide with federal intergovernmental decision-making. Corporatist interest mediation works better in bicameral systems since responsibility is limited to one chamber of parliament. Strong bicameralism, which is typical in federal systems, may be hampered by this. Comparative federalism research shows that a federal system may empower or limit the people's role throughout democratic activities. Federalism's propensity to engage in politics while altering and reforming the constitution is the most notable example of the intricate interaction of federal dynamics (Colino, 2013). Because of their different political logics, the two institutional dimensions of federalism and democracy sometimes clash. Both regime dimensions reveal shared

principles of individual and group self - determination, self - rule, and geographical bounds.

Both democracy and federalism are limited by their geographical constituents' legitimacy, accountability, and democratic representation (Mayntz, 2002). Democratic federalism has both vertical (intergovernmental) and horizontal (intragovernmental) dimensions. These patterns consider the various forms of federalism and democracy discussed above. Consensual democracy has the aforementioned traits, but competitive democracy is built on the division of powers and power sharing between institutions. The distinction between competitive and negotiated intergovernmental policy making is crucial within the federal structure. Horizontal relations among component organisations and power sharing or division affect intergovernmental negotiations.

2.5 Devolution of Powers

The separation of powers between component states and common institutions is an essential need, serving as a core principle of federalism. According to Iyoha (1999, p. 93), devolution refers to the legal transfer of power to officially established local authorities to execute specified or residual responsibilities. In the context of a federal system, the devolution of power refers to the transfer of authority from the central or federal government to the respective state and local governments. The establishment of spatial boundaries of authority has the potential to facilitate effective socio-economic advancement, along with promoting power distribution and democratic participation. The concept involves the transfer of authority and allocation of resources to regional governing bodies, perhaps characterized by a greater adherence to democratic principles. In the context of policy creation and administration, it is desired that they possess a certain level of autonomy from the central government. Iyoha

(1999), delegation may be understood as the transfer of specified powers by a political authority to another authority, either fully or partly, as originally described by Rondinelli. This process involves endowing the delegated authority with the responsibility for executing the transferred functions. Bicameral legislatures have been adopted in several countries, including France, Spain, Italy, and South Africa, as a means of distributing power. South Africa's legislative branch consists of a national parliament and a national council of provinces, both characterized by a high degree of decentralization, whereby each body is composed of 10 delegates. The process of decentralization is often seen as being more complex in nature when compared to deconcentration.

Nigeria delegates jurisdiction to its subordinate entities, namely the state and local governments, upon their establishment. From 1985 until 1993, the military rule implemented a transfer of power and allocation of resources to state and local governments, accompanied by the provision of direct financing. The perception of devolution as a mere transfer of administrative tasks without adequate resources has resulted in limited improvements to democracy in the majority of developing nations. When there is a lack of enough resources, administrative proficiency, and mechanisms for ensuring accountability, the act of delegating decision-making power to local authorities may be rendered insignificant. According to Manor (1999), for decentralized systems to achieve effectiveness, they must exhibit the following qualities: Sufficient institutional power to exert substantial influence on important development efforts and the political system; Sufficient financial resources to properly carry out crucial duties; Adequate administrative competence to efficiently execute those tasks; and The establishment of robust accountability mechanisms is necessary

to guarantee that administrators and elected lawmakers are held responsible to their respective populations. Through the exercise of its authority, the central government maintains a heightened level of control and oversight over the processes of development and administrative operations, with the ultimate aim of promoting the welfare of the citizens within a particular country. Peck (1996) asserts that despite the devolution of power and resources from the federal government to lower levels of government, the federal government still can choose the direction of this transition. The process of reconfiguring regulatory structures and state authority at the sub-national level takes place within the framework of institutional, discursive, and political boundaries set by the national governments.

2.6 Decentralization

Bardhan (2002) argues that decentralisation is commonly acknowledged as a means by which the central government may allocate its responsibilities. The primary objective of this method is to create a framework of checks and balances inside the government by increasing the number of governmental institutions, hence reducing the concentration of power held by the central government. As a result, the government experiences a significant increase in its level of commitment, responsiveness, and efficiency. The implementation of decentralisation is anticipated to enhance the level of local cultural and political autonomy for separatist movements and ethnic conflicts. The argument posits that decentralisation has enhanced the effectiveness and efficiency of government at all levels by facilitating the collaboration between local governments and national as well as international institutions, hence enabling them to bring about substantial changes.

Research by Manor (1999) states that decentralisation is the process by which power is moved from the federal government to lesser governmental levels such the state,

regional, local, provincial, or municipal levels. This transfer of duties encompasses several domains, including administration, politics, and economics. In essence, if any of the aforementioned tasks are delegated to the component units of government, it is expected that these units would operate autonomously from the central government within a specified framework and within specified functional areas. Following Manor's (1999), provided definition, the SDC Decentralisation Team (2001) offers its interpretation of decentralisation as the process of transferring responsibilities and competencies from the central government to subunits or subordinate authorities, thereby enabling the effective fulfillment of public service obligations. The team employs decentralisation in many situations and scenarios. The primary aim of political decentralisation is to foster civic involvement in the political decision-making process. By actively engaging in the formulation of policies, citizens can effectively hold their elected representatives accountable and ensure that consequential political choices align with their interests. Administrative decentralisation pertains to the distribution of responsibility for executing public obligations among public authorities at different tiers of government. According to Ruland (1993), decentralisation refers to the transfer of ultimate authority over performance and decision-making to subsystems that possess varying degrees of autonomy. According to the user's perspective, it is necessary for every component to which power is assigned to possess a certain degree of self-sufficiency, either in its entirety or in part.

In a similar vein, Crook and Manors (1998), provide a definition of decentralisation as the transfer of authority from the central government to lower levels within the political-administrative and geographical frameworks. According to their assessment,

the conveyed authority has the potential to materialise in either a political or administrative context.

In 2001, the World Bank Group defined administrative decentralisation as the process by which different levels of government in a country take turns providing public services and receiving funding for doing so. Transferring crucial governmental activities and financial control from the federal government and its agencies to regional or local governments is referred to as "administrative decentralisation." World Bank political decentralisation has been shown to enhance the level of involvement of both representatives and constituents in the process of government decision-making. The concept of political decentralisation is based on the belief that decision-making processes that include a higher level of public engagement are more effective in addressing the different viewpoints and interests of society compared to those that are purely established by political authorities. The people have the opportunity to have a deeper understanding of their representatives due to the implementation of political decentralisation, which involves the election of representatives from local electoral regions. The implementation of political decentralisation requires the development of a diverse range of political parties and the modification of constitutional provisions. Consequently, the strengthening of legislative bodies, the emergence of new political subdivisions, and invigoration of citizen advocacy organisations will occur.

The United Nations Development Programme provides a more comprehensive definition of decentralisation or the process of decentralising government. Decentralisation, as defined by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), refers to the process of restructuring or reorganising authority within a

governance system. This restructuring aims to establish a framework of shared responsibility among central, regional, and local institutions, in line with the principle of subsidiarity. The objective of decentralisation is to strengthen the overall governance system while empowering sub-national levels by granting them greater power and capacity. In addition to expanding citizens' access to possibilities for engagement in economic, social, and political decision-making, decentralisation has the potential to strengthen the government's responsiveness, accountability, and transparency (UNDP, 1997:4).

Decentralisation, as defined by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), refers to the systematic restructuring of a country's governmental institutions, aimed at improving governance effectiveness and stimulating economic advancement. Decentralisation, as conceptualised by Islam (1997) and Rondinelli (1981), is the delegation of distinct tasks from the central government to regional, local, and semi-autonomous governing bodies. The assigned duties may include the tasks of strategizing, distributing, and securing financial resources, as well as effectively managing these resources to facilitate growth. Decentralisation involves the allocation of duties among many persons or institutions. Funds are distributed to various entities by the central government and its agencies, (Herath, 2009:28). These entities include state and local governments, non-governmental private and voluntary organisations, area-wide, regional, and functional authorities, and semi-autonomous public authorities and corporations. This allocation of funds is based on the research conducted by Rondinelli in 1981.

The pursuit of decentralisation is motivated by a range of factors, as outlined by Okojie (2009). These factors include the need to enhance the effectiveness of public

services, the aspiration to promote heightened engagement at the grassroots level, and the aim to address the demands of regional and provincial authorities for more self-governance. The author posits that decentralisation has been a contributing factor in the democratisation processes seen in Latin America and Africa, drawing a parallel with the replacement of military dictatorships by democratic systems. The research conducted by Hassan and Iwuamadi (2018) titled "Decentralisation, Governance, and Corruption at the Local Level: Evidence from Nigeria" explores the theoretical implications of decentralisation in the context of corruption. Some scholars argue that the implementation of decentralisation policies may lead to a decrease in corruption and promote government that is more responsible and transparent. However, there are opposing viewpoints that suggest that the granting of enhanced autonomy and the promotion of participatory democracy can have these effects.

2.7 Decentralisation Accommodate or Exacerbate Ethnic Divisions

Decentralisation as a tool, accommodation of ethnic divisions, policymakers and researchers have also identified decentralisation as a instrument for ethnic divisions accommodation in a broader political system where diverse ethnic groups want greater autonomy and powers inside and beyond the physical boundaries of the communities in which they inhabit. In over 90% of sovereign states, significant minorities form one or more ethnic groups. Most developing nations contain minority groups that resist government policies, protect their rights, and campaign for economic possibilities, political power, and security (Esman, 1997:527). The majority often leads ethnic groupings in competition. The decentralization initiatives of some of these countries have not taken into account the needs and rights of minority populations. It is usual for ethnically diverse societies to have conflicts due to authority being decentralized from the center to the periphery or regions and local level entities. This imbalance creates a

hostile environment for ethnic minorities. Decentralization is recognized and supported by lawmakers, administrators, international players, and conflict mediators as a technique to address the rights, interests, and needs of ethnically diverse groups that are mostly concentrated in a certain geographic region. The purpose is to prevent or reduce the intensity of possible confrontations that may arise between these groups. The process of decentralization may accomplish a multitude of purposes.

Experts agree that incorporating ethno-regional [minority] groups' legitimate rights, interests, and needs into political and administrative structures was one of the many objectives of decentralisation. Minimizing ethnic tensions was another objective. In governments that have just emerged from war or a violent conflict, decentralization reforms and initiatives may help bring about less ethnic strife. Delegating responsibility and power to locally formed political and administrative institutions and sharing powers allows all ethnic groups and localities to operate independently and resolve conflicts via their own procedures or with little interference from the federal government. Since the start of decentralisation movements, it has been believed that decentralised authorities may address the needs of several distinct and independent cultural, linguistic, political, and linguistic communities. According to Gjoni et al. (2010), giving groups, especially minorities, high autonomy and self-rule may lead to national cohesiveness and a conflict resolution. In ethnically diverse societies, decentralisation helps settle differences via political and administrative channels. For ethnic minorities to gain official power in the national system, cooperation with the central government is more appealing. Minority groups may be confident that their top concerns will be taken into consideration in government and administration due to the enhanced local power over problems that affect the majority of people's everyday lives.

Decentralisation is viewed as a flexible institutional mechanism that may accommodate the diverse needs and goals of a state or local authority's population.

One could argue that decentralization could potentially contribute to the stability of governments through the amplification of ethnic minority influence and participation in public spheres. By implementing government administrative levels, decentralised systems, according to Siegle and O'Mahony (2009), reduce competition and anxiety brought on by a winner-take-all incentive structure. Similar to how the centralization of power within the minority group would increase with the delegation of political authority to lower levels of government. Active participation in politics and government may help preserve their local ethnic identity. Secession and independence aspirations will be avoided, (Schrottshimmer, 2006).

Decentralization mitigates ethnic sectarianism and tensions by increasing participation, making government more accessible, and empowering ethnic groups to control their social, economic, and political affairs. In order to address the challenges faced by ethnic groups and areas with a significant religious population concentration, local legislation may be enacted under this authority. Language preservation, environmental policy, economic development, and safety are among the issues at hand. Decentralisation allows groups to advocate for their own interests, reducing intergroup conflict over perceived injustices and the incentive for regions to pursue independence (Brancati, 2006:655-656). The federal government may establish a system of devolution of power and jurisdiction to subnational administrative and local government bodies in order to facilitate local autonomy. According to Cheema and Rondinelli (2007), this will enable wider political participation and provide local communities the capacity to achieve their objectives.

Siegle and O'Mahony (2009) found that ethnically diverse communities with decentralisation allowed indigenous practices and religious beliefs to be practiced without persecution, reducing intergroup conflict. Thus, decentralisation may help the country by encouraging minority groups to stay loyal and giving majorities a more popular governing structure (Lake & Rothchild, 2005). Azar (1986) suggests decentralised structures for permanent conflict settlement. In countries with concentrated ethno-religious groups, decentralisation reduce intergroup conflict for power, resources, and control. Since the conclusion of the Cold War, decentralisation has been viewed as a measure to prevent the reestablishment of governmental monopoly on power by one or more ethnic groups. Decentralisation makes sense for more strong groups in post-conflict domestic politics because it shows less powerful groups that they are prepared to compromise and accommodate. Linder (2009) argues that local administrations may better supply public goods to their people than central authorities, supporting decentralisation in post-conflict state reconstruction. According to Litvack et al. (1998), decentralisation accommodate regional autonomy demands, which may increase diverse countries' legitimacy and lifespan.

2.8 Decentralization in Nigeria

Decentralisation, a political structure that gives lower levels of government more administrative power to provide services, may help things move forward (Khan, 2002). Is implemented to confer effective governance over local regions to subnational entities.

In Nigeria's federalism system, the lack of sufficient financial resources poses a significant challenge to the promotion of growth in a decentralized area. There is an expectation that the necessary money to facilitate a thorough decentralization of

governmental tasks to lower levels would be accessible. Insufficient allocation of resources to lower levels of government power results in the unavoidable outcomes of bad service provision and stagnating development. The distribution of revenue among the federal, state, and local governments is 52.7%, 26.7%, and 20.6%, respectively. If an individual were to initiate advancement within their community, it might be argued that the allocation of tax revenue to the local government has been woefully insufficient. Moreover, a substantial portion of the monthly financial resources allocated to the state and regional governments in Nigeria is derived from the federation account, posing a considerable obstacle to economic expansion (Adegami, 2013).

Nigeria's political structure comprises the federal, state, and local levels of government. To fulfill their collective responsibilities, these three levels of government not only divided tasks and obligations but also used the same financial resources allocated for budgetary purposes. The federal government, in contrast to state and local governments, gains significant benefits from the revenue-sharing system. The capacity of subnational governments to produce sufficient tax revenue to supplement federation account funds poses a challenge to this undertaking, (Adegami and Osungboye, 2019). The responsibility of financing increased levels of government ultimately rests with state and local governments, but the authority to impose more taxes is with the federal government. As to the Federal Republic of Nigeria Constitution (1999) (as amended), the federal government of Nigeria has authority over 68 distinct legislative matters, which are included in Schedule II (Part I). Government has jurisdiction over many areas such as police services, military operations, customs and excise taxes, foreign affairs and currency management, mineral extraction, and power production.

The Concurrent Legislative List is a compilation of 30 subjects that are recognized by the Constitution as being jointly governed by both the federal and state governments. The themes mentioned are included in Schedule II, Part II of the Constitution. The concurrent list encompasses domains such as transportation, water infrastructure, schools, and healthcare. The residual powers of the local government are outlined in Schedule IV of the Constitution. Perpetual legal duties include the tasks of establishing and maintaining community facilities, cemeteries, housing for the impoverished or crippled, providing public products and services, key educational and healthcare institutions, as well as markets.

Both the exclusive legislative list (which includes 68 topics) and the concurrent legislative list (which includes 30 subjects) are susceptible to taxation by the federal government, according to the aforementioned research. As stated in the 1999 constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, however, the federal government shall have final power in the case of a dispute between the federal and state governments on the implementation of laws from the concurrent list. The federal and state governments have far more authority than the local governments. The federal government has more power to regulate components that may generate large money, whereas state and municipal governments have little control over these parts. It is normal for various levels of government to ask the federal government for financial help due to budget constraints. Because it is entirely under the purview of the federal government and includes all national finances, the monthly transfer of cash from the federation account to state and municipal governments is marked by an unfair distribution.

Another notable hindrance to progress via governance decentralization is the absence of political will at the national level to adequately delegate power to subordinate tiers

of government. Martinez-Vazquez and Vaillancourt (2011) argue that the implementation of real decentralization requires varying levels of democratization and political openness. Consequently, elites have acknowledged that authentic decentralization has the potential to enhance the political opposition's influence and pose challenges to their governance practices. There is a suggestion that the concerns of political elites over the possible formation of local democracy and leaders rooted in grassroots movements, as a consequence of decentralization, played a role in the decline of a decentralized government.

Consequently, it is not unexpected that local governments often find themselves burdened with a plethora of obligations for which they may lack the necessary preparation or capability. According to Bossert (2000), certain functions and responsibilities that are deemed suitable for centralization or direct oversight by the central government are transferred to the local government, while the central government maintains control over governance activities that may be more effectively managed at the local level. The decentralized government faces obstacles in successfully carrying out its tasks and promoting proper development owing to the central government's unwillingness to offer local authorities enough authority and limit their autonomy. According to the scholarly work of Roeder and Rothchild (2005), the concept of decentralization entails granting local authorities an increased level of power. In essence, decentralization enables local leaders to amass riches, which they may then use to mobilise and influence the population in decentralized regions, prompting them to seek more political power from the central government. Occasionally, the growing prominence of subnational leaders who contest the authority of the central government to attain greater political and economic autonomy has

resulted in heightened tensions, posing a potential threat to the national political elites and the entire nation (Roeder and Rothchild, 2005; as cited in Faguet, Fox, and Poeschl, 2014).

Following the conclusion of the civil war in 1967, the Gowon administration implemented a significant political reform by dividing Nigeria into twelve regions. This marked the start of a decentralization process within the country's political framework. Furthermore, the distribution of tax revenue may exhibit a greater inclination towards the federal government after this measure. Before this specific time frame, each area maintained possession of 50% of the generated income within its geographical confines, while the other half was allocated to the Federation Account. However, starting in 1970, there was a progressive decline in the percentage of revenue kept by the regions. Ultimately, the percentage saw a drop, reaching 45% by 1975, and then further decreasing to 20%. A requirement was established whereby all forthcoming revenue generated by federation members would be sent to a central Federation account, and thereafter allocated elements including population size, economic status, and geographic location. However, the notion of derivation, which refers to the practice of a producing community retaining a fixed portion of the earnings obtained from the extraction and exploitation of crude oil in a particular region, has later lost significance. Moreover, it is worth noting that in 1982, the derivation concept was entirely discarded, and instead, a new approach known as the "development account" was introduced, which gave 1.5 percent of the overall government revenue to oil-producing countries (Ushie, 2012).

The impact of the new decentralized revenue allocation system and resource control on the growth of decentralized areas, namely local government areas located in

Nigeria's oil-producing regions, has been a recurring phenomenon. There persists an ongoing conflict between oil corporations and local people about the issue of underdevelopment in areas that serve as crude oil production sites. According to Adegami (2013), there have been instances where prolonged hostility and bitterness have escalated into large-scale conflicts, leading to significant loss of life and the complete annihilation of any modest progress made in regions involved in oil production before the outbreak of hostilities.

Despite the Babangida government's decision to increase the derivation allocation from 1.5% to 3% in 1991, the oil-producing areas persisted in facing crises, insurgencies, and brutal warfare. In 1995, the Constitutional Conference proposed that 13 percent of the revenue generated from derivation should be allocated to the areas involved in oil production. The basis for this suggestion stems from the perceived economic danger to the nation, persistent instability inside oil-producing communities, and the observable decline in security within these areas. This action was undertaken in an attempt to alleviate the consequences resulting from the federal government's blatant neglect, deterioration, and pollution of the villages involved in oil production, despite the significant contributions of these areas to the nation's overall revenue. The 13% derivation provision of Nigeria's 1999 Constitution was passed and maintained during the country's transition to the Fourth Republic in May 1999. The distribution of the remaining 87% of national revenue in the Federation Account is as follows: 26.7% is apportioned to the states, 52.7% is allotted to the federal government, and 20.6% is assigned to local governments. The constraints imposed by the Constitution, which grants the federal government authority over significant national resources, restrict the capacity of local governments to actively contribute to development. Consequently,

local governments face limitations in fulfilling their constitutional responsibilities, particularly in terms of providing essential social amenities.

Scholars have expressed varying perspectives on the potential correlation between decentralization and the mitigation of corruption. In contrast to the perspective held by some scholars who support the idea of reducing corruption via decentralization, an opposing argument posits that decentralized political systems are more prone to corruption compared to centralized governments. According to Banfield (1979), decentralized political systems are often associated with higher levels of corruption compared to centralized systems. The author also asserts that a person with corrupt tendencies might readily commit heinous acts inside governmental institutions due to limited opportunities for influence and a lack of centralized mechanisms to ensure integrity within the system. Similarly, Prud'homme (1995) argues that corruption has the potential to permeate municipal governments via several channels. This phenomenon occurs due to the fact that authorities at this level have a greater degree of autonomy compared to decision-makers within the central government. According to Carbonera (2000), there is a higher likelihood of local government personnel participating in corrupt activities, such as the solicitation and acceptance of bribes, while carrying out their official duties.

The recognition of local government as a development tool stems from its proximity to the people, enabling it to effectively address the issues of the local population. The laudable goal of establishing a decentralized local government system in Nigeria has, nonetheless, encountered challenges. The problem at hand is somewhat influenced by the presence of corruption within local government. The local government areas in Nigeria have faced allegations of progressing at a very low pace of development as a

result of pervasive corruption occurring at the grassroots level. Concerns about corruption and the amount of development at the local government level were voiced by Farida Waziri, the former chief of the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC).

The magnitude of government resource misallocation at the local council level has reached significant proportions. Over the course of the previous eight years, local governments across the country have been allocated a substantial amount of cash, totaling more than N3.313 trillion. However, the council has not provided a comprehensive account or justification for its lack of effectiveness in utilizing these resources. Unfortunately, the local government officials have not been absolved of responsibility in this particular circumstance. According to Adeyemi (2012:191), the local governments that were prevalent in the past are no longer in existence. Consequently, the local government, which was anticipated to facilitate advancement, has experienced a state of stagnation and consistently faced obstacles in its developmental efforts, while the general population has reaped the benefits of the resources originally designated for various types of growth at the local government level.

The decentralization efforts in Nigeria, aimed at promoting development, have paradoxically resulted in sporadic outbreaks of violence that have impeded any little progress. The establishment or implementation of decentralized units within state and local governments has at times incited violence, leading to a significant destruction of individuals' livelihoods, assets, and developmental endeavours. Disruptions occurred in many parts of Nigeria at different periods due to disputes around the placement of administrative offices for local governments. Leaving the Ijaw town of Ogbe-Ijoh as

the site of the Warri-South regional administration, to Itsekiri, an Ogidigba community, gave rise to significant conflict, notably among the Itsekiri and Ijaw ethnic communities. The transfer of the Ife East local government offices to the Oke-Ogbo area of Ile-Ife gave rise to similar difficulties between the Ife and the Modakeke communities (Adegbami, 2020).

The violent fight not only resulted in loss of life but also inflicted significant damage upon both private and public infrastructure. Numerous people experience the subsequent loss of their work and other means of financial support, while others become unable to actively participate in the economy owing to enduring physical disabilities. The presence of fever. According to the study conducted by Erk, (2014), the effectiveness of decentralization in mitigating violence relies on the willingness of decentralized governments to accommodate the interests and concerns of "national minorities." Local governments that engage in the suppression or disregard of local minority groups, resembling what might be described as "small-scale tyrannies," can intensify tensions and undermine not just specific governing bodies but also the fundamental principles of democracy. Hence, the process of decentralization must be followed by the implementation of robust local accountability mechanisms. These mechanisms should enable citizens to effectively monitor the behaviour of elected representatives and ensure that the actions of local authorities match the desires of the local community. In addition, the central government must implement comprehensive safeguards for the preservation of minority rights throughout the whole country. This would allow groups and people from any geographical location to seek redress and support (Faguet et al., 2014:9).

The lack of successful integration of diverse communities is a substantial obstacle to growth in decentralized regions. The persistence of violence in the context of decentralization may be attributed to the inadequate integration of heterogeneous groups, including both majority and minority populations, by leaders in devolved areas. Tsebelis (1990) and Lijphart (1996), as referenced by Faguet et al. (2014), According to Erk, (2014), there is a consensus that decentralization can effectively accommodate a wide range of groups. One potential factor that might contribute to the establishment of peace in a decentralized area is the consolidation of diverse groups under a shared aim, hence fostering their engagement in collaborative decision-making processes. Promoting the active engagement of focused collectives in many aspects of governance is of utmost importance. The empowerment of certain groups is of utmost importance, particularly in facilitating their ability to independently address and resolve issues. By implementing this course of action, there is potential for substantial advancement in cultivating the requisite state of calmness for development planning, nurturing a collective identity among the citizenry, and motivating people to actively contribute to the betterment of their immediate community.

Bolleyer and Thorlakson (2012) argue that the presence of interdependence imposes limitations on policy responses. This is what limits the 36 states to operate freely and treat issues on their own in Nigeria because of their independent in the center. However, they contend that when decentralization is coupled with autonomy, it creates a very conducive setting for policy formulation and implementation. Concisely, it can be said that federal systems exhibit significant variation in terms of the extent of interdependence and decentralization.

2.9 Empirical Review on Federalism in Africa

The study of Yimenu (2023) on "Federalism and State Restructuring in Africa: A Comprehensive Analysis of Challenges, Justifications, and Origins" examines the intricacies of federalism and state reform in Africa. This article evaluates South Sudan, Ethiopia, Nigeria, and Somalia's federalism systems. Afrobarometer and Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) data are used to evaluate regional differences in federalism results. State geographical integrity is protected under federalism, but its power to mediate disagreements is limited. According to his study, Federalism reduced violence only in South Africa, while it wasn't because multinational countries lacked the necessary elements to successfully adopt federal systems; Nigeria and Ethiopia were examples of this. South Africa and Nigeria were able to accept diversity because of the federal government. Achieving this goal required empowering many individuals politically and decreasing exclusion based on identity. Despite promoting linguistic and cultural diversity in Ethiopia, the plan failed to remove discrimination or ensure equal political participation for all ethnicities. The Ineffectiveness of federalism in reducing violence in Africa supports incumbents' support for federalism, decentralization, and democracy. The researcher casts doubt on federalism's ability to handle intergroup concerns. Despite poor results and ongoing issues, the federal system is the only way to achieve peace and harmony in diversity. Federalism will remain theoretical until the existing ruling elites understand democracy's value, control their predisposition toward centralization, and commit to its actual execution.

The study by Abam and Abam (2022), Comparing Nigeria's Federalism, Democracy, and Economic Development to Other African Nations. African republics' federal formula for independence is frequently considered vital to their existence as

independent entities. Instead of competition, functional federalism emphasizes collaboration between the central government and its member states. Even when numerous state governments coexist, no state government should be subordinate to another for federalism to work. Under authoritarian rule, true federalism may be impossible. After independence, Nigeria adopted a federal system, which is said to have strengthened its society. The 1966 military coup may change this. Unless a determined effort is made to emphasize essential political stability objectives, such as protecting the rule of law and implementing fiscal federalism, the federal system's problems will exceed its benefits.

According to the study of Gebeye's (2020) on "Federal Theory and African Federalism." This article uses classic federal theory to examine convergence and divergence in African federalism's origins, paths, and effects. Federalism's origins, evolution, distinguishing traits, successes, and limits are examined in the classic federal theory. His article uses case studies from Nigeria, Ethiopia, and South Africa to show that African federalism has syncretic institutional frameworks and normative articulations despite sharing form, structure, and discursive practice with classical federalism. Thus, African federalism requires adjusting its goals, principles, and methods. His article describes how the operational structure and assessment criteria for African federalism were developed simultaneously. Federalism in Africa works because of its "unconstitutional constitutionalism" base, despite its departure from classic federal philosophy. The ethical and institutional basis of federalism in Africa should promote constitutionalism, human rights, and democracy, according to federal theory. This method is essential for continental constitutional democracy.

Kendhammer's (2014) complete literary works on Nigeria's federal character and the difficulties of institutional design: Citizenship, Federalism, and Power Sharing. His article addresses Nigeria's institutional issues in citizenship, federalism, and power allocation. Despite sub-Saharan Africa's ethnic variety, 'pluri-national' federalism has been neglected. Why? This strategy has recently been proposed as a way to promote democracy and conflict settlement in deeply divided nations. A comprehensive analysis of Nigeria, Africa's most populous nation and the federal system with the longest history, demonstrates how institutions of late-colonial indirect authority influenced citizenship and participation in politics. Nigeria's conventional interpretation of ethnic citizenship hinders the Federal Character Commission (FCC), the main power-sharing institution, from negotiating and resolving ethnic conflicts. The Federal Character Commission (FCC) manages public employment quotas. These programs' 'indigeneity' approach promotes ethnicity above federal citizenship, making them discriminatory. This despite the Federal Character Commission (FCC's) formal association with 36 Nigerian states and the FCT, Abuja.

Goldpin, et al., (2017) looked at the Problems of Nigerian Federalism. In this study, they analyze the causes, consequences, and solutions of Nigeria's federalism problems. In this work, the philosophical underpinnings of the federalist alternative in Nigeria are explored. This objective was met via the use of secondary resources such online databases of academic articles, newspapers, and textbooks. The difficulties of federalism in Nigeria are explained by philosophical deduction, content analysis, and an evaluation of the country's contextual situation. But most of the academic work on federalism, especially concerning fiscal federalism, has concentrated on the distribution of power among different levels of government. The disadvantages and

contextual difficulties of federalism, on the other hand, have received comparatively little attention in the scholarly literature. Research on federalism is dominated by content analysis at the expense of a focus on philosophical underpinnings. As a result, the difficulties outlined above are what this research focuses on. The report identifies the following as challenges to Nigerian federalism: military participation, corruption, civil war, colonial impact, and elite manipulation. The research advises developing a robust anti-corruption entity to reduce corruption. A population- and origin-aware, all-encompassing fiscal policy is also advocated for. It proposes a national conference be held with deliberation and objectivity, and it urges states and regions to make use of their own resources to advance the economy.

Suberu, (2009) on "Federalism in Africa: The Nigerian Experience in Comparative Perspective," examines federalism in Africa through the lens of the Nigerian experience. Despite its reputation as a failing state, oil-rich Nigeria has handled governmental collapse and domestic instability well. This is particularly notable compared to other huge multiethnic republics in Africa like the Democratic Republic of Congo and Sudan, who have encountered identical issues. The 1967–1970 civil war in Nigeria led to a revision of the country's federal structure, which may account for the country's increased stability. Before this fight, Nigeria was split into three areas, each with a different culture and history of instability. After the war, the nation unified into a federation of 36 units, which included people of many different ethnicities. Nigeria's federal structure has helped to reduce the effects of strong ethnic identities, promote regional integration, keep groups in check, and forestall centrifugal tendencies that may jeopardize the country's cohesion and long-term viability. Pervasive political corruption has distorted Nigeria's intergovernmental

decentralization. Corruption has hampered national unity, contributed to regional strife, and stifled economic development. For these reasons, the Nigerian example is less useful for resolving conflicts and managing diversity in governance in other African nations and developing regions.

Orokpo and Williams (2014), *Fiscal Federalism in Nigeria: Issues and Challenges*. The article defines fiscal federalism as a constitutional division of financial authority and obligations among government levels. Since the 1970s, Nigeria's federal government has held a strong grip over state and local governments. This is because most financial and legislative authority for economic growth has been purposely consolidated at the federal level. The report believes that Nigeria needs a high degree of fiscal decentralization due to the unjust income sharing formula and the need to address fiscal federalism issues. It emphasizes the political imperatives of a constitutional budgetary adjustment and adequate remuneration for those who generate the 'commonwealth' in addition to recommending a fundamental fiscal system review. Since his inclusion, Nigeria's fiscal system has been plagued by misaligned expenditure, unequal resource distribution, and excessive fiscal centralization. Fiscal federalism has been a concern for a long time, partly due to resource disparities across government levels and partly due to intergroup disputes over central revenue. It would be very detrimental to national unity to disregard the demand for resource management among the wealthy nations and ethnic minorities in the South-South geopolitical Zone.

2.10 Theoretical Framework

2.10.1 Ethnic Federalism

Ethnicity delineates the federated regional or state units within a multi-national, ethnic, or multi-ethnic federal system (Liam, 2016). According to this perspective, ethnic

federal systems have arisen as a viable option to address interethnic disputes and the desire for ethnic autonomy. As a result of challenges associated with establishing and maintaining an ethnic federation, certain states or parts of states have experienced disintegration, a return to authoritarian governance, or the implementation of ethnocracy. This has led to practices such as segregation, population transfer, internal displacement, ethnic cleansing, attacks, and pogroms based on ethnicity.

Ethnic federations provide ethnic groups with a certain degree of self-governance by creating federated organizations that precisely align with ethnic divisions (Yonatan, 2012). Unlike a total division, the federation is still seen as a cohesive nation. It may be worth considering the adoption of such a system in countries where ethnic minorities are densely populated in certain areas (Liam, 2013).

Ethnic federalism aims to mitigate conflicts among various groups within a state by providing each group with the authority to govern themselves locally and ensuring their representation at the central level (Lovise and Magnus, 2008). Therefore, areas experiencing impending or existing severe conflicts may find an ethnic federal system attractive. According to Liam (2013), this objective is classified as "defensive" since it acknowledges the continued presence of several ethnic groups inside the country.

Federalism grants a certain degree of self-governance to communities with ethnic diversity, safeguarded by a constitution that outlines the interaction between the authorities of the federal government and those of the federated organizations. To address concerns of oppression or discrimination by the state government, the units are designed in a way that guarantees each ethnic group a local majority in one or more

areas. This arrangement also encourages the development of cultural identities within the respective home nations of each group.

As stated by Lovise and Magnus (2008), the federal constitution ensures that all regional ethnic groups have representation in the central government. This would enable the smooth and amicable settlement of conflicts among diverse populations. The system's success relies on the leaders' readiness from various ethnic groups to cooperate at the state level in order to maintain a secure government (Liam, 2013).

The federal government of Nigeria has unique challenges as a result of its ethnically diverse population. The concept of ethnic federalism is supported by the case of Nigeria, where conflicts between ethnic groups hinder the functioning of the government. This example strengthens the idea that allowing several ethnic groups to coexist under a federal system might worsen tensions. The future requirements and stresses on the nation's systems will jeopardize the Nigerian federation's capacity to sustain its cohesion. Reconsideration, in this context, pertains to the need for restructuring Nigeria's institutional and constitutional framework to enable federalism. This is necessary due to the socioeconomic and political dynamics resulting from power struggles between elites within and among ethnic groups, both at the national and unit levels, as well as their competition for control over state resources.

From this standpoint, the crux of the matter lies in the fact that the stability of Nigerian federalism is based on the notion of "unity in diversity," prompting the question, "What is the price of maintaining unity in diversity?" This research reflects pivotal occasions in the core political problems of other federations. The primary issue of the centrifugal force of ethnic political mobilization in Nigeria, where federalism is a strategic tool to

manage ethnic diversity, is brought up by the rational evaluation of costs by covenantal parties. The historical hostilities in Nigeria cannot be attributed to the federal government's dominance, the country's dual or split authority, or the possibility of secession within a federation. Essentially, it pertains to the exclusion of marginalized groups from positions of power and influence in the national or unit-level government, as well as the attitudes of superiority maintained by some ethnic or subethnic groups towards others.

Ethnic diversity has the effect of fostering self-reflection on individual prejudices and preconceived ideas, hence facilitating cooperation. The possibility of collaboration for the betterment of others would be rendered unattainable if every person were exclusively fixated on preserving their own cultural identity and fundamental principles. In order to foster cooperation and collaboration, it is crucial for people to actively assess their own prejudices and preconceived ideas. Consequently, the presence of ethnic diversity becomes very important. Personal viewpoints on one's place in society and self-awareness are essential elements of ethnic variety. Embracing diversity has many beneficial outcomes, such as developing tolerance, cultivating connections, deepening understanding of value systems, and countering cultural imperialism (Al-Jenaibi, 2011). One may exhibit tolerance for ethnic diversity by embracing another person regardless of their distinctive attributes.

2.10.2 Theory of Fiscal Federalism

Kenneth Arrow, Richard Musgrave, and Paul Samuelson were the architects of the foundational concepts of Fiscal Federalism. Several influential books, such as Samuelson's (1954, 1955) theory on public goods, Arrow's (1970) analysis of the public and private sectors, and Musgrave's (1959) book on public finance, shaped the

overall understanding of the state's economic role among the general public. The subsequent theory was denoted as the "Decentralisation Theorem" (Ozo-Eson, 2005).

The theory identifies the three separate roles that make up the government sector. These initiatives include actions to reduce income inequality, provide stability in the overall economy, and address different aspects of market inefficiencies. Ozo-Eson (2005) argues that the state or local governments are responsible for correcting market failure and maintaining macroeconomic stability, while the central government is tasked with resolving income inequality. One may argue that the main goal of each level of government is to provide the highest possible social well-being for the population living under its authority. When evaluating public goods that are consumed locally rather than nationally, this intricate undertaking becomes very significant. Under such conditions, local outputs, which are specifically tailored to meet the local requirements by local authorities, undeniably provide higher social welfare compared to centralised provision. The notion described here is the fundamental basis of the initial generation theory of fiscal decentralisation, which was codified by Oates (1972) as the "Decentralisation Theorem" (Oates, 2006a; Bird, 2009). According to this theory, many levels of government work best when it comes to producing public goods that fall within the geographical boundaries of their jurisdictions (Oates, 2006). This sort of circumstance has been described using terms like "perfect mapping" or "fiscal equivalence" (Ma, 1995; Olson, 1996).

Nevertheless, it was recognised that no government entity could fully map out all public goods because of the wide range of regional commodities and their consumption patterns. Consequently, it is acknowledged that local public goods may have impacts that extend beyond the borders of a country. For instance, a road might have

advantages that stretch beyond the limits of one municipality because of the public goods features it provides. This might lead to a situation where the local government is unable to sufficiently finance the service. The theory discusses the well-established Pigouvian subsidy system, which states that for local governments to get full benefits, the central government must provide matching funding. As said before, lower levels of government have a more significant impact on optimising social welfare via providing public goods. The central government is seen to be more suitable for the other two functions of income distribution and stability.

Fair income distribution, macroeconomic stability, and the provision of public goods at the national level are the basic responsibilities of the central government, which stem from the fiscal federalist principle. There should be an emphasis on delivering local public goods by lower levels of government where there are jurisdictional spillovers associated with them, with explicit funding coming from the federal government.

The selection of a suitable tax system follows the assignment of responsibilities within the conceptual framework. Ensuring that distortions resulting from the decentralised taxing of mobile tax bases are avoided is a crucial factor to address when trying to solve this tax assignment challenge. Gordon (1983) highlights that a significant decentralisation of taxes on mobility factors, which do not provide benefits, might lead to distortions in the location of economic activity.

After assigning specific roles, the government level or stratum was then assigned taxes that were more matched with their respective responsibilities. Progressive income tax is particularly well-suited to the central government's goals of macroeconomic stability and income redistribution. However, it was concluded that property taxes and user fees

should be used to fund local administrations. Research conducted by Olson (1982) has shown that taxes on benefits, whether levied on businesses or people, aid decentralised governments in efficiently regulating mobile economic entities.

The ultimate component of the fundamental theory is fiscal equalisation. The federal government allocates these cash to decentralised administrations as lump-sum payments. Primarily, there are two rationales for equalisation. Equalisation is seen as a solution to address uneven migration trends, taking into account its effectiveness. The second purpose is to provide assistance to areas or administrations that are economically disadvantaged. Several federations stress the attainment of equalisation. The equalisation process of Canada's intergovernmental fiscal arrangements is complex, (Boadway & Hobson, 2009; Weingast.1995).

Significantly, contemporary research highlights the significance of financing budgets using resources from the local area. Weinga Udoma, (1997) and McKinnon (1997) are among many scholars that warn against decentralised governments depending substantially on intergovernmental transfers as a primary source of finance for their budgets. In order to maintain macroeconomic stability, it is crucial for the Nigerian government to gain knowledge from these mistakes.

True federalism requires that the financial authorities at each level of government be responsible for their duties and powers as outlined in the Constitution, since fiscal federalism is based on past constitutional arrangements.

Although Nigeria is officially designated as a federation according to the Constitution, it has effectively been controlled as a unitary state in practice owing to the successive

military coups. The hindered implementation of fiscal federalism may be partly attributed to the installation of a centralised unitary system inside a federal structure under military rule, as well as inadequate fiscal management and economic performance.

Before granting independence to Nigeria, the British government organised a series of constitutional conferences that laid out the essential foundations of the country's federal structure. The Constitution clearly outlines the specific responsibilities allocated to each level of government. The constitutional provisions were significant because they clearly defined the statutory financial obligations assigned to each level of government and ensured that they would be supported in a fair and sufficient manner to fulfil those tasks. The legislative aspects of state and municipal governments were reduced due to impromptu financial actions. These measures included the stabilisation fund, the Petroleum (Special) Trust Fund (PTF), the allotment of crude petroleum for special government programmes, and the prepayment of foreign debt obligations. The nation's shift to a unitary state under military rule had a negative impact on fiscal federalism, since it rendered the federal system inefficient.

Authoritarian regimes evaded difficulties related to effectively distributing finances to guarantee the delivery of public goods and services, as well as fulfilling the legal obligations at each government level. The Aboyade Presidential Commission on Revenue Allocation (1977) noted a significant departure from the ideals of fiscal federalism and subsequently made the following declaration: Given the clear financial and political dominance of the central government over the states, the central Military Government has assumed several responsibilities that would typically need constitutional discussion and consensus. The evolution of this system is demonstrated

through executive actions undertaken in various areas such as universal primary education, agriculture, higher education, roads, and the establishment of ministries for water resources, housing, urban development, environment, youth, social development, and sports.

According to the final report of the Aboyade Commission, the acts described above have reduced the likelihood of Nigeria achieving genuine fiscal federalism. This persistent phenomenon, which began in the 1970s and has continued throughout the 2000s, has led to disproportionately huge government budgets and deficits spanning many fiscal years. As the federal government took on financial tasks that were first assigned to subordinate levels of government, the fiscal deficits became more unsustainable. The primary method used to address the deficit gaps was via the provision of credit by the Central Bank, leading to increased inflation and a slow pace of economic development (Okunroumu 1999).

The arbitrary and persistent establishment of new states is another factor of military governance that has impeded the implementation of genuine federalism. Consequently, the federal budget expanded excessively, and several recently established states struggled to fulfil their fundamental requirements, much alone make progress in their economies.

An further concern arises from the fact that a substantial proportion of the cash extracted from the Federation Account, which is a shared pool of resources, fall under the purview of the federal government. The federal government has always had ample financial resources. Nevertheless, the federal government's absolute contribution has

been rather stable throughout the years, fluctuating between 60% and 65% (Sarah et al., 2003).

Immediately, many fundamental issues were raised about fiscal federalism. Furthermore, issues have arisen as a result of the distribution of tasks among the constituent divisions of Nigeria. At first, there was a worry about giving enough financial power to the various levels of government so that they could effectively generate money, fulfil their constitutional duties, and maintain their financial independence. The notion of fiscal autonomy at the state and municipal levels may seem contradictory to the centralization of tax administration. However, the difficult decision may include finding a balance between generating more money and having less fiscal power, or having limited authority and generating more revenue. The application of the value-added tax (VAT), which the federal government uses instead of state sales taxes, is a specific area of disagreement.

Moreover, there were questions raised about the fair distribution of the centralised monies across all levels of government. Despite the careful efforts of many fiscal commissions, a widely accepted framework for income sharing has not yet materialised as a workable solution to this problem. The issue of revenue distribution between local and state governments was often worsened, rather than addressed, because of a lack of sufficient data that prevented impartial study.

Furthermore, fiscal federalism has always faced challenges related to factors outside jurisdictional boundaries, such as inequalities in levels of development, availability of resources, population, and geographical area. Consequently, state and local governments are unable to independently produce sufficient revenues to meet their

objectives. Due to the significant gap between the wealthiest and poorest nations, the guiding principles often favoured the destitute governments, often causing the richer ones to suffer the consequences.

In addition, although the military administration originally aimed to create a fairer federation by introducing several levels of government, the excessive growth of these government layers has merely increased the complexity of fiscal relations between different levels of government. Despite the main goal of reducing regional and ethnic politics in the new federal system, the military administration saw the creation of states as a chance to use its military might to establish the dominance of central monetary authority over the states.

The 1999 Constitution established the present allocation of responsibilities among the three bodies of government based on the legislative capacity of each body. The list of responsibilities can be categorised into three: the exclusive list, which only the federal government has the authority to act upon; the concurrent list, which includes responsibilities that are shared by both the federal and state governments; and the residual list, which is specifically reserved for state governments. The federal government is responsible for functions that have nationwide benefits, such as defence, foreign trade, immigration, and currency, among others (Akpan, page 169). Concurrent lists consist of tasks that have the potential to extend beyond state borders and include the control of vital commercial sectors (such as utilities and railroads) via parastatals. Marketplaces, primary schools, and cemeteries, in contrast, serve as examples of local government functions that specifically cater to a particular geographic region.

The federal government's financial situation has been enhanced compared to that of the states and local governments by assigning the most productive income-elastic taxes to the federal government. This trend has persisted throughout several revenue distribution formulae, continually granting a financial advantage to the federal government as compared to lower levels of government. Lower governments are becoming more financially burdened as they rely more on monies collected by the federal government, both via legal requirements and voluntary contributions.

The nation's fiscal federalism has been seriously damaged by an overwhelming dependence on oil money, which also poses substantial challenges. The outcome is the manifestation of the "leech syndrome," which has gradually weakened the fiscal autonomy of the states and resulted in the federal government being fiscally reliant on them. Subnational administrations now depend fully on the federal government due to the formation of a master-servant relationship. Arowolo (2011) contends that the enduring conflict and contention around revenue distribution in Nigeria would exist as a recurrent and persistent issue under fiscal federalism. For states and local governments that rely on the federal government, this might be compared to the precarious equilibrium between economic viability and progress.

The challenges and features of fiscal federalism in Nigeria have been summarised to demonstrate its practical differences. Anarchy will ensue if all three arms of a federal government independently assume the role of the public sector in a market economy without coordination. Therefore, it is essential to understand and implement the policy concerns related to fiscal federalism to ensure long-term economic and national development.

Several political regions have primarily challenged the norms for horizontal distribution, thereby perpetuating their discriminating character. Population has become the central topic due to allegations made by several states that population estimates were manipulated in their favour.

The gradual decrease in the allocation of weights on derivation based on the income sharing concept is causing more disagreement. The focus on derivation was intended to encourage fiscal discipline among subnational administrations and ensure that units maximised their tax revenues. Smaller nations are at a disadvantage when it comes to geography and landmass. A growing body of progressive ideology argues that the distribution of taxes should not be based only on land area. There are presently various concerns with fiscal federalism in Nigeria.

Chapter 3

OVERVIEW OF FEDERALISM IN AFRICA

3.1 Introductions

The need for a federal political structure is being recognized by a growing number of countries throughout the globe. The allocation of powers between the federal government and other levels of administration, such as state, regional, or municipal, is a crucial element. The proliferation of federalist ideologies and organizations in Africa may be traced to its distinctive cultural, linguistic, and ethnic history. The primary goals of African federalism include the advancement of economic growth, the establishment of political stability, the management of ethnic diversity, and the promotion of cohesiveness and democracy. In reality, as emphasized by Dickovick (2014), federalism in Africa saw a surge in the 1990s when politically and economically divided African governments implemented liberalization measures inside their respective states. In Africa, federalism is often seen as a way to maintain unity among divided populations, given the historical failures of authoritarian control, centralized state administration, and excessive economic centralization (Dickovick, 2014:553). The chapter examine the overview of federalism in Africa. The thesis addresses important issues such as racial diversity, political volatility, economic disparity, and institutional capacity. The findings underscore the need of addressing these challenges to construct effective federal institutions capable of promoting cohesion, democracy, and progress throughout Africa.

3.2 Africa Continent

Africa is the second largest and most densely inhabited continent on Earth, surpassed in size and population only by Asia. According to Sayre (1999), the region in question, when taking into account the surrounding islands, encompasses about 20% of the terrestrial land area and 6% of the overall surface area of the planet Earth. The projected population for the year 2021 is around 1.4 billion individuals, constituting approximately 18% of the total world population.

According to Swanson (2015), the median age in Africa in 2012 was reported to be 19.7, whereas the worldwide median age was recorded as 30.4 (Abdoulie, 2012). This data indicates that Africa has the most youthful population among all continents. Africa exhibits a wide range of resources, nevertheless, it is characterised by the lowest per capita income among other continents and ranks as the second-poorest continent in terms of total wealth, with Oceania being the only exception. Many reasons have been proposed by academics as possible influences on the situation, including climate, geography, tribalism, colonialism, neocolonialism, a lack of democratic processes, and corruption. Africa is a vital economic market in the global perspective due to its youthful population and rapid economic expansion, even if the continent has comparatively low wealth concentration (Collier, Gunning, Jan, 1999).

The continent is bordered by the Atlantic Ocean to its western side, the Indian Ocean to its southeastern side, and the Mediterranean Sea to its northern side. The continent consists of Madagascar and other archipelagos. Africa consists of a total of 54 internationally recognised sovereign states, along with 8 cities and islands that are politically affiliated with countries outside of the continent. Additionally, there are 2

de facto autonomous entities that possess little or no formal recognition. The islands of Malta and Sicily are excluded from this enumeration since they are geographically situated on the African continent. Algeria is recognised as the largest country in Africa, although Nigeria has the distinction of being the most populous nation in the continent. The establishment of the African Union, with its headquarters situated in Addis Ababa, was undertaken with the aim of fostering collaboration among nations within the African continent.

Africa is situated precisely on the intersection of the prime meridian and the equator. The continent under consideration is the only landmass encompassing both the northern and southern hemispheres within the temperate zone. North America is home to most of the continent's states and territories, but South America is also home to a sizeable chunk of the continent and a few of its countries. The bulk of the African continent is located inside the tropical region, with the exception of some areas in the north such as Western Sahara, Algeria, Libya, and Egypt. Additionally, the northernmost point of Mauritania and the whole territories of Morocco, Ceuta, Melilla, and Tunisia are all outside the tropical zone. Situated in the southern temperate zone, below the equator, are many nations including Mozambique and Madagascar. Additionally, the southernmost regions of Namibia and Botswana, together with substantial parts of South Africa, Lesotho, and Eswatini, may be found in this geographical area.

Africa has remarkable levels of biodiversity, making it the continent with the highest abundance of megafauna species. This may be attributed to the fact that Africa experienced the least amount of damage during the extinction event that affected the Pleistocene megafauna. Nevertheless, the African continent is confronted with a range

of environmental challenges that have a substantial influence, such as desertification, deforestation, water scarcity, and pollution. The potential consequences of climate change in Africa are expected to further intensify the already environmental difficulties. According to Schneider et al. (2007), the UN Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change has designated Africa as the continent that exhibits the highest vulnerability to climate change.

The continent of Africa has a diverse and intricate historical narrative that has mostly been neglected by scholars in other regions. The consensus among scholars is that humans and other members of the Hominidae family, also known as the great apes, are believed to have originated in Africa, particularly in Eastern Africa. *Sahelanthropus tchadensis*, *Australopithecus africanus*, *A. afarensis*, *Homo erectus*, *H. habilis*, and *H. ergaster* have been assigned an approximate age of 7 million years ago based on dating methods. The oldest known remains of *Homo sapiens*, or modern humans, have been unearthed in Ethiopia, South Africa, and Morocco, with estimated ages of around 233,000, 259,000, and 300,000 years ago, respectively. It is widely acknowledged among anthropologists that Africa, due to its extensive history of human occupancy, has the highest degree of genetic diversity among other continents.

The emergence of Ancient Egypt and Carthage, two early human civilizations, took place within the geographical region of North Africa. Africa harbours a diverse array of various ethnic groups and cultural traditions, which may be attributed to the continent's extensive and intricate history of trade, population movements, and societal development. Throughout the last four centuries, the influence of Europe on the Americas has shown a consistent and progressive growth. The rise of the Americas throughout the 16th century was significantly influenced by the Trans-Atlantic slave

trade, resulting in the substantial influx of African individuals to the region. During the period spanning from the late 19th century to the early 20th century, European nations embarked on a process of colonisation throughout the African continent, resulting in the establishment of European control over the majority of African territories. This colonisation effort was so extensive that only Ethiopia and Liberia remained as independent political entities during this time. The decolonization movement in Africa after World War II led to the emergence of the bulk of contemporary states on the continent.

3.3 Federalism in Africa

Following the period of decolonization in the 1960s and 1970s, a number of federal directives were implemented in various African nations. The unpopularity of federalism in Africa may be attributed to the enduring influence of an authoritarian historical context, including both colonial and postcolonial periods. Colonial powers used tactics such as the "divide and rule" approach, the establishment of artificial boundaries, and the implementation of ethnic and racial profiling and categorization methods. These techniques were utilised to reinforce pre-existing divisions and create new ones, thereby impeding the progress of federalism (Osaghae 2004, 166). The exacerbation of internal conflicts, particularly in multiethnic states, may be attributed to the absence of democratic and inclusive mechanisms. The governing elites saw federalism as a possible driver for achieving independence. Considering the historical track record of failed federal systems in Africa, it would have been a judicious decision for African states to refrain from adopting federalism.

African state creation is significantly influenced by colonisation. The dilemma of whether the formal state structure is unitary or federal has made it difficult to create

and maintain state institutions with mass support, legitimacy, and appropriate policy aims. Federalism was first touted as a way to build stable political institutions in post-colonial states, but actual data from real-world deployments is gloomy. In the 1950s and 1960s, most federalization efforts failed, save for Nigeria. Uganda is one example of states trying to create (quasi-)federal institutions. As Burgess (2012:9) notes, Ethiopia-Eritrea ties are another example. Federal states include Nigeria (1963/1999), Ethiopia (1995), and South Africa (1993).

Constitutional changes in the 1990s shaped all three federations. According to Suberu (2015), Nigeria is the only country with uninterrupted federal constitutions. In 1946, the nation established its first quasi-federal constitutional structures under colonial authority. The 1951 constitutions established a Council of Ministers with regional representation to improve shared-rule (Nze, 2002). The Richards Constitution divided the nation into three zones with regional legislative assemblies to promote self-rule. Ethiopia and South Africa have different federal constitutionalism histories. There are remarkable commonalities between the three federations. All of these examples demonstrate decentralised federalization (Dickovick, 2014). African occurrences have emerged suddenly, unlike dis-aggregative federalization in Europe, which involves progressive institutional improvements. The federal model was adopted in all three nations after major historical events. The South African (quasi-)federal constitution ended apartheid. Ethiopia enacted a federal constitution after the 1991 fall of the communist military administration after three years of negotiations. The democratic transition from the Third to the Fourth Nigerian Republic in 1999 is also when the current Nigerian constitution first emerged. The aforementioned scenarios demonstrate dis-aggregative federalization, where authority is transferred from the

central government to lower-level bodies, but all three federations have maintained highly centralised political regimes. This contradiction distinguishes African federations from European ones, which have consistently devolved authority to local governments. Although federalism is frequently considered as a constitutional solution to manage multiple ethnic populations, central authorities nevertheless retain a lot of influence.

Tyler Dickovick (2014) highlights three major contributions. Ethiopia and South Africa have prominent political parties, the EPRDF and ANC. These parties operate across government levels with great integration. After losing the 2015 general election, Nigeria's People's Democratic Party (PDP) lost its political dominance. However, it has influenced policymaking at various levels of government. There is typically a highly concentrated, weak global bureaucracy. Political parties frequently dominate this bureaucracy, which controls public expenditures. The high level of fiscal centralization makes subnational entities dependent on the federal government. Essentially, powerful people were able to influence the political scene of the federation early on. The historical processes of federalization throughout important moments and the persistent effects of previous authoritarian regimes are to blame for this. This initial success may be difficult to overcome later. The central authority's dominance hinders the practical implementation of all three federations' self-governance and shared-governance systems, which theoretically give component states some autonomy. All three federations may also lack the ideational base of federalism. Despite a stable political climate and a strong economy, the South African constitution does not incorporate federalism. In each case, a federal system was chosen for practical reasons because it could resolve complex ethno-cultural and ethno-linguistic issues.

Constitution-building did not include a true affirmation of federalism (Burgess 2012). African federations seem to lack the principles of true federalism, as defined by the Latin word "foedus," which means trust and confidence.

Nevertheless, Nigeria complied with a federal directive formulated by British authorities. The preservation of the state's territorial boundaries was significantly dependent on its federalist structure (Suberu 2009, 68). In the past, Nigeria's geographical area was partitioned among three southwest is home to the Yoruba, the Hausa-Fulani inhabit the northwest, and the Igbo (Ibo) are in the southeast (Falola 2001, 5). Following the year 1990, there was a notable increase in the prevalence of territorial reconfiguration in Africa, mostly due to the growing acceptance of federalism among various states.

An illustrative instance may be seen in Ethiopia, where a protracted civil war spanning from 1974 to 1991 prompted the restructuring of its long-standing centralised state. Ethiopian federalism came into being as a result of the violent state-building process that occurred throughout the imperial and Derg periods, as well as the repression of variety and the rise of identity-based organisations who wanted independence. In 1991, when the communist Derg dictatorship fell, the Ethiopian Students Movement played a key role. The idea of national self-determination, which Stalin put forward, had an influence on this movement (Rock 1996, 93). The post-1991 Ethiopian constitution, which followed a model similar to the Soviet Union's federal system, acknowledged the freedom to secede and the autonomy and self-determination of its component regions, ethnic groups, and people. In 1993, when apartheid ended, South Africa adopted an interim constitution that incorporated federalism. This ruling set the stage for protracted negotiations that, in 1996, resulted in a new constitution. Locational

devolution of authority was made easier by the new constitution (Simeon 1998, 42–43). Following significant developments in federalism in Ethiopia and South Africa, Nigeria, which has the distinction of being the longest-standing African federation, had a resurgence of interest in this political framework subsequent to the demise of military rule in 1999 (Suberu 2013, 416).

Since the year 2000, there has been a growing focus on federalism and state-level reform in Somalia and South Sudan, two African nations that have experienced post-conflict situations. The inception of the first endeavour to consolidate Somalia into a unified state was initiated by the anti-colonial movement in the 1960s. The notion of "greater Somalia," which aimed to unify the five regions inhabited by Somali ethnic communities upon their independence, was advocated (Dahir & Sheikh Ali, 2021, p. 3). The Somali peace conference, under significant global pressure, implemented federalism as a means of reconstructing the nation after a prolonged period of civil conflict (Kefale, 2019). In 2012, a novel interim federal agreement and subsequent elections were implemented, so establishing a robust foundation for the practise of federalism. Between the years 2012 and 2016, four Financial Management Systems (FMSs) were built, as documented by Dahir and Sheikh Ali in 2021 (pp. 3-5). The foundation of South Sudan's federalism is rooted in the Sudan constitution of 1994, which led to the establishment of 26 new states. Out of them, 10 states were designated to become part of South Sudan (Fessha and Dessalegn 2022, 873). The first session of South Sudan's initial parliamentary body took place in 2005 after a negotiated agreement with Sudan, as reported by Sudan Tribune in 2009. This agreement facilitated the establishment of a federal government system in South Sudan. The

provisional constitution was accepted by the country, which implemented a division of legislative power between two chambers and three branches in an arbitrary manner.

Iraq, India, Malaysia, and Sri Lanka are examples of Asian federations (Breen, Bhattacharyya, and Shakir, 2019), the primary rationale for the adoption of federalism in Africa is to facilitate the inclusion of diverse groups and effectively handle conflicts. The inclusion of local self-government also serves to mitigate separatist tendencies. Several notable instances of separatist movements, during the 1960s, Nigeria saw the emergence of the Biafra independence movement (Suberu 2009, 72), similarly, in the late 1980s and early 1990s, Ethiopia experienced the rise of the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) and Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF) (Rock 1996, 93), were unsuccessful in achieving their objectives due to the presence of federalism. The emergence of federalism in South Africa may be attributed to the need of addressing the many groups' desires for self-governance (Simeon, 1998; Simeon & Murray, 2001). The process of peacebuilding and rebuilding state capabilities in South Sudan and Somalia is significantly dependent on the implementation of federalism and state reform. African federalism places a greater emphasis on the mitigation of violent conflict via the preservation and promotion of cultural variety, as opposed to the conventional objectives of security and economic advancement. The implementation of federalism in African states would provide conventional advantages.

3.4 Reasons for Adopting Federal System in Africa

There has been scholarly discussion surrounding the implementation of federal forms of government in African nations. African nations adopted federalism, despite the fact that the continent is varied and has a variety of historical, political, and social circumstances. Here are some viewpoints:

Colonial Legacies: According to many academics, the colonial period is where African nations first adopted federalism. European colonial forces often partitioned African domains into various regions or provinces, laying the framework for subsequent federal structures. The federations were considered a means of controlling the various ethnic, linguistic, and cultural groups that existed inside the borders (Young, 1994).

Diversity of Ethnic Groups and Regional Identities: Many diverse peoples and cultures have emerged throughout Africa ethnic groups and regional identities. According to experts, some African nations have embraced federalism as a method to accommodate and manage these various communities. Power-sharing, decentralization, and the acknowledgement of regional autonomy are permitted by federal systems, and these features can help reduce ethnic or regional tensions (Hyden, 1983).

Room for Conflict Resolution: Federalism has occasionally been viewed as a method for handling or resolving internal disagreements. Federal systems can reduce political, ethnic, or religious tensions by providing various areas or ethnic groups a certain amount of self-rule. It is stated that federalism offers a structure for dividing authority and assets, which can support stability and harmonious cohabitation (Posner, 2005).

Development and governance: According to some academics, federalism can improve governance and development outcomes in African nations. They contend that decentralization of power may increase participation and representation, encourage accountability, and move decision-making closer to the local level. Federal systems can support local development initiatives and improved resource distribution by giving regions or states more autonomy (Horowitz, 1985).

Post-Conflict Reconstruction: Federalism has been suggested as a way to alleviate power disparities and advance inclusivity in nations recovering from internal conflicts. According to academics, federal systems can promote reconciliation, reestablish confidence between various communities, and assist incorporate historically disadvantaged people into the democratic process (Kymlicka, 1995).

3.5 Federalization Patterns in Africa

In his research of African federations, Stepan (1999), found that Nigeria fits both the "putting together" and "coming together" paradigms in his research on African federations. The British colonial rulers' attempt to merge the three areas that eventually form Nigeria illustrates amalgamation. All three Nigerian regions worked together to build the federation when colonial rule ended. Political entities are sometimes called models of "collective convergence." The idea of "holding together" is similar to ethnic communities' claims of self-governance spawning new states. Ethiopia, Nigeria, and South Africa exhibit the coming-together paradigm, especially when Riker's (1964) federal bargaining is relaxed. After compromise and political talks, the emergent CU leaders and the governing elites of the potential federations founded three functioning federations. Ethno-regional groups representing diverse ethnonationalities negotiated territorial and homeland claims to form the Ethiopian Federation. The proceedings were heavily influenced by the TPLF (Vaughan, 1994). South Africa's quasi-federal constitution was established through multiparty discussions in 1996, similar to Nigeria's (Simeon 1998). Ethiopia and Nigeria needed consensus-based elites to establish federalism.

However, regional elites may have had more impact in Nigeria. Nigeria's state establishment process resembles unitary states' decentralization approach rather than

Ethiopia's referendum. Somalia's intended federalization lacks precedence. Federalism was not established by combining states or devolving authority to a central administration. Its focus on synchronized internal and external measures, including military involvement and the use of force, to restore order after the state's devastation sets it apart from traditional federalism. The Somalia federation was formed without national or subnational institutions and organizations, therefore "building together". Thus, it resembles "putting together" This type of federalism is difficult to federalize because it lacks a strong central authority and a well-functioning coordinating entity.

However, federalization is a complicated process that involves many local and international parties, including the projected central government and the CU. Ethiopia, Kenya, the EU, the UN, and IGAD in Eastern Africa are major stakeholders in Somalia's reorganization. South Sudan has been inspired by Somalia's proposed federalization. The 1994 constitution needed 10 regional governments nationwide, (Idris, 2017). Northern and Southern Sudan negotiated the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) (2005–2011) to form a federal administration. Stepan's (1999), analysis of Iraq and Bosnia and Herzegovina reveals a "holding together" paradigm in South Sudan's federalization. Some centers or prospective centers are vital to building new African federations. African federalism does not include previous sovereign territories to maintain peace and manage national and regional issues. Spain, India, and Belgium have switched from unitary republics to federalism to handle their complex administrative systems (Stepan, 1999).

Many causes led Brazil to choose a federal system over a confederation of sovereign states. These include the country's size, the requirement for centralized management, and regional demands (Rosenn 2005). Because pre-federalistic entities lacked a state

structure, "coming together" to form a federation was unlikely. Remember that the two models' traits are not mutually exclusive. Hawaii's incorporation in 1898 (US Department of State, 2009) illustrates the "putting together" paradigm, whereas "coming together" federations are similar. Political parties and important people negotiate power distribution between the executive and legislative branches to ensure federation cohesiveness. Establishing a federation requires talks or co-optation between central elites and component entities. The honesty, technique, and influence of the parties involved may vary, but discussion is important to every government decision.

3.6 Federal Experiments in Africa

A federation is a political body made up of territorial sub-units that have constitutionally guaranteed autonomy in some policy fields and participate in political decision-making. A federation provides sub-unit autonomy, unlike a centralised unitary state, which grants and revokes subnational competences through national law. A federation differs from a confederation because its levels of governance directly affect its inhabitants. In contrast, a confederation includes the central government indirectly dealing with the populace through member governments.

Cameroon, Zaire, Uganda, Sudan, Ethiopia, Tanzania, South Africa, and Nigeria are among the ten federations or quasi-federations that have emerged in Africa since its independence. Many attempts at transnational or supra-state federal-type organizations, including those in Mali and Senegal, Senegambian, and East African federations, failed. Eight federations existed. Four collapsed within ten years of founding, while two survived near-collapse. The other four federations have survived political turbulence, fragility, and uncertainty.

In 1972, President Ahmadu Ahidjou abruptly abolished the federation in pro-federal British West Cameroon without local protest, according to sources. The Cameroonian federation (1962–1972) emerged as a collaboration between the Anglophone and Francophone countries to decolonize and combine two trust territories in Africa. President Mobutu, an autocratic African monarch, demolished the Congolese (Zaire) federation from 1960 to 1965. A number of ethnoregional conflicts in the Congo, including the separatist rebellion in Katanga in 1962, were attributed to the federation. Civil war broke out again in 1994 as a result of Mobutu's policies, which exposed the lack of consistency and stability within the Congolese government. Despite a 2006 federal constitution, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (formerly Zaire) continues to face violence, mainly in eastern North Kivu Province. Several problems have hampered the success of federalism in the former Belgian Congo. Among these, we find the new Constitution's overemphasis on centralization, the Great Lakes region's ethnic tensions, the failed 2006–2007 democratic transition that failed to disarm and build peace, and the historical reality that the former Belgian Congo has never fully functioned.

Uganda's federal structure was inspired by Buganda Kingdom autonomist ideas. After four years, African leader Milton Obote violently ended the temporary federal union between the Kingdom and Uganda (1962-1966). In 1963, the Kenyan African National Union (KANU) assimilated the opposition party Kenyan African Democratic Union (KADU), making the federalist 'Majimbo' Constitution of 1963 obsolete.

The first federal endeavor in Sudan, spanning from 1972 to 1983, sought to resolve the long-lasting and violent civil strife between the Muslim and Arab majority and the non-Muslim and African minority in the nation. The collapse of the federal endeavor

to grant regional autonomy to the South of Sudan was finally caused by Islamic law and the 1983 military struggle. However, it is important to note that the Sudanese government had been gradually weakening this initiative. The experiment was unsuccessful owing to many variables. These factors encompass the experiment's dependence on Sudanese President Jafaar Nimeiri's political determination and cooperation, the ethnic conflicts in the southern region of Sudan, the rise of Islamist parties with majority support, the discovery of oil in the southern part of the country in 1978, and the complex geopolitical dynamics of the Horn of Africa, which involve Sudan and Ethiopia interfering in the internal conflicts of neighboring Ethiopia. The previous events have prompted the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) between Sudan and its surrounding nations to place a strong emphasis on federalism. However, two damaging civil wars (1967-1972 and 1983-2004) and a major crisis in Darfur since 2003 have seriously weakened Sudanese unity. The concept of federation is today seen more as a short-term compromise that might lead to secession than as a long-term solution to the country's problems.

Ethiopia has had two federalisms, each spanning three decades. Eritrea, a former Italian colony, has showed little interest in integrating with Ethiopia due to the tenfold size and demographic gap. The Ethiopian-Eritrean federation (1952–1962) was weak. Eritrean discontent increased after Eritrea's federal status was revoked in 1962, Emperor Haile Selassie tried to turn Ethiopia into a unitary state under Amharic rule, and a Marxist-leaning military administration was established in 1974. The 1995 Constitution's ethnic-based federalization of Ethiopia and Eritrea's independence were immediate responses to the military regime's repression.

The ethnic federation of Ethiopia is made up of nine regional republics, each of which represents a different tribe or ethnolinguistic group. To keep itself coherent, the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) coalition of moderate ethnic parties and affiliated regional satellite organisations imposes a tightly integrated bureaucratic party structure on the large federal administrative system. Ethiopia operates like a centralised, unitary state since authority is concentrated in the capital, (Keller, 2002).

Tanzania, one of Africa's stable polities, may be a quasi-federacy due to the minority population on Zanzibar and Pemba's federal status. The Comoros are a federation of three islands, with Grande Comoros being the largest and most populous. This federation is unstable due to its unorthodox structure (Mohadji, 2005).

The government implemented a federal-like system that recognised national, provincial, and municipal levels of governance to address the resistance of Afrikaner and Inkatha-Zulu communities during South Africa's transition from apartheid to a constitutional democracy. South Africa's multi-sphere polity has promoted national unity and excellent administration. However, national mistrust about decentralisation and federalism because to their relationship with apartheid has hindered the establishment of a truly decentralised federation. The ruling African National Congress (ANC) has also resisted decentralisation by promoting political centralization. Provincial governments' inadequate political, administrative, and budgetary skills have significantly exacerbated this issue.

Keller (2002) claims Nigeria is Africa's most prominent federal system. However, various contradictions and disputes have made the continent a "virtual graveyard of

federal experiments." Imposition of federal unions by external forces, particularly colonial powers, without sufficient support from inside the country, either in terms of legitimacy or engagement, and without the means or supporters to shield regional autonomy from federal meddling; institutional design flaws in federalism that exacerbate conflicts, such as a limited number of constituent units and unsustainable asymmetries between them; and demands for political and economic centralization that are now present in Africa in response to several challenges.

According to Rothchild (1966), Kymlicka (2006), and Thomas-Woolley & Keller (1994) African political and personal leaders are known for their authoritarianism. Nigeria's civilian political consensus favours federalism over unitary or separatist methods, distinguishing it from other African states. Nigeria is also known for its comprehensive, imaginative, and ingenious efforts to adapt the federal model to its ethnopolitical conditions.

3.7 Challenges of Federalism in Africa

Empirical data from Africa reveal conflicting outcomes, despite the fact that federalism is expected to reduce conflict. According to V-Dem statistics, political violence in Nigeria has been on the rise over the last several decades, calling into question whether or not federalism effectively decreases conflict. Post-federalism Ethiopia has seen a slight decrease in political violence, however this trend reversed in 2020 with the outbreak of the Tigray conflict. As a result of federalism, political violence in South Africa has decreased significantly, making the country an example of success (Yimenu, 2023:18).

Prior to Africa's independence, there was no genuine federalist programme that could provide for its own needs. Since most African states have international relations, federalism should be supported. However, federalism is especially unpopular in Africa because of the continent's history of authoritarianism, both colonial and postcolonial. An emphasis on ethnic and racial profiling and categorization that served to further solidify divides, as well as other forms of divide and rule, the creation of divides where none previously existed all served to impede the development of federalism under colonial powers (Osaghae 2004, 166).thus, there are several challenges facing federalism in Africa. In their own survey and studies of federalism in Somalia, Abdinor and Ali argued thus;

" The conflict among Arab states in the Gulf is having an impact on Somalia, which might potentially have consequences for the nation's federal program. The relationship between Somalia and the anti-Qatar faction, namely the UAE, improved significantly after Somalia maintained a neutral stance during the Qatar-GCC war in 2017. Consequently, Abu Dhabi ended its association with the Somali military training program, shut down its operations in Mogadishu, and moved closer to the FMS. An instance of the UAE's collaboration with Somaliland is the allocation of \$442 million for the expansion of a port and the establishment of a new military base. The UAE's acquisition of a concession to build and oversee a port in Puntland is another example (Abdinor and Ali, 2021:14)."

Similarly Dickovick presented Nigerian thought-provoking federalism as follows;

" Various geographical patterns can be discerned in the occurrence of violence in Nigeria. Intersectarian tensions between a predominantly Muslim north and a predominantly Christian south, together with internal splits within the south, are factors that contribute to the tension between the two regions. These divisions are rooted in ethnic disparities. The Hausa-Fulani language is the largest linguistic group in the country, while the Yoruba speakers are the majority in the south-west region and the Igbo (Ibo) speakers dominate the south-east region. The secessionist efforts of the Igbo people from the southern and eastern regions were ultimately foiled during the Biafra War 1967–1970, (Dickovick, 2014:555-556). "

Also, both Ethiopia and South Africa are faced with trouble and ever-challenging federal structure as argued thus;

" In the 1990s, Ethiopian federal authorities acknowledged the ethnic and regional diversity present among the Amharic, Oromo, Tigray, and Somali groups. It is important to highlight that these groups make up the largest portion of the population in various parts of the country. The Ethiopian government is theoretically based on a "ethno-federal" constitutional framework. While the connection between regionalism and ethno-racial politics in South Africa is complex, identity had a significant role in shaping the federal system that emerged after apartheid. The main catalyst for this was the white minority's insistence on constitutional safeguards for regional political self-governance. However, in the 1990s, Zulu nationalists, led by Xhosa of the African National Congress, also initiated efforts to achieve independence, (Dickovick, 2014:556). "

Therefore, identity-based demarcation exists to some extent in all three countries. The desire for stability is intimately tied to the creation of political groups based on ethnic (or racial) identities. Additionally, this highlights the contrasting approaches between the colonial establishment of national borders and the contemporary approach of nation-building via federalism, which incorporates considerations of ethnic identity. In contrast to the African national borders, which have gained notoriety for their tendency to divide or intersect ethnic groups, the subnational borders within modern federations are often delineated with transparency, taking into consideration ethnic affiliations. This can be observed in various instances, such as the tripartite division of Nigeria during the period of British governance and the subsequent establishment of regional republics in Ethiopia, each catering to specific ethnicities, particularly in the 1990s. The provinces of South Africa are geographically aligned with significant divisions, such as those based on the predominant ethnic groups of Zulu and Xhosa, as well as reflecting the diverse racial composition of the country (Dickovick, 2014).

The explicit specification of the process of establishing provincial identities was lacking. During the inception of each of the three federal regimes, many factors contributed to the inclination towards political centralization. These factors included the consolidation of state power via military and the rise of a prevailing political party. The emergence of federalism may be traced back to the occurrence of civil wars, while the establishment of prominent political parties marked the shift from military rule to civilian governance. According to Dickovick (2014), Nigeria saw the occurrence of this event throughout the 1990s, when the military took steps to reinstate a federal framework for the purpose of overseeing a transition towards democracy and resolving various tensions, including historical regional conflicts and the escalating religious discord between the northern and southern regions.

The focuses on the difficulties with revenue distribution as it relates to the fiscal components of Nigerian federalism. The report emphasizes the effect of oil resources on the federal system and the requirement for an equitable and open revenue distribution. It examines the intricacies of resource management, formulas for income distribution, and the function of subnational governments in promoting economic growth (Ite, 2014). As said by Achebe thus;

" The trouble with Nigeria is simply and squarely a failure of leadership. There is nothing basically wrong with the Nigerian character. There is nothing wrong with the Nigerian land, climate, water, air or anything else. The Nigerian problem is the unwillingness or inability of its leaders to rise to the responsibility, to the challenge of personal examples which are hallmarks of true leadership (1983:2-3)."

Federalism as it currently exists in Africa both confirms and defies Riker's idea. Constitutions were used to construct federations in nations where subnational groups had little military or historical resources. The absence of the 'expanding condition' and

the 'military condition' as originally conceptualised by Riker (1964: 12-13) was observed. The assertion made by Stepan (1999) on the prevalence of the 'keeping together' principle over the 'getting together' rationale in the formation of several contemporary federations finds credence in the following instances. Nevertheless, when certain assumptions are relaxed, the Rikerian model gains greater credibility in several aspects (Riker, 1964).

It is widely acknowledged that the existence of a security dilemma in these nations that have experienced conflict can be attributed to the implementation of federalism. This political arrangement was undoubtedly the result of a compromise between actors with national-level interests and those with power bases at subnational levels. The occurrence of such negotiations may transpire regardless of the institutional authority held by subnational groupings, necessitating an adjustment to Riker's thesis to account for this. The establishment of federalism in Africa commonly arose from negotiations between central government officials aspiring to govern at the national level and other central government officials aspiring to govern at the subnational level (Dickovick, 2014). These negotiations did not typically involve the present central politicians and subnational politicians.

In the context of Africa's federal cases, it is noteworthy that the opposition has shown fragmentation both at the regional/state and national levels. According to Brancati (2009), in contexts where ethnic and regional identities have significant importance, it may be anticipated that the emergence of regional parties would occur. On this note Dickovick argued that;

"Africa's centralized federations seem to have cut off significant ethno-regional challenges to the dominance of the national governing party and undermined opposition. This has closed off

virtually the last avenue available to actors clamouring for subnational autonomy. The mechanisms through which central governments have done so are the subject of the next section (Dickovick, 2014:558-559)."

3.8 Remedy to the Challenges of Federalism in Africa

There are two distinct techniques in organising the constituent units within an ethnically diverse federation. One category is comprised of ethnic-based entities, which facilitate the establishment of institutions for self-governance by geographically defined communities (Anderson, 2014). The second category of component units comprises those that are geographically-based. The number of critics of the first strategy increased with the dissolution of former ethno-federal republics such as the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia (Roeder, 2009). Critics argue that the establishment of constituent units based on ethnic identities has the potential to foster secessionist tendencies by empowering ethnic leaders and fostering the development of distinct identities (Cornell, 2002, p. 252; Kymlicka, 1998, pp. 138-139).

In contrast, Anderson (2014) raises scepticism over the legitimacy of extrapolating overarching implications from the downfall of socialist nondemocratic federations. The implementation of federalism in Ethiopia and Nigeria was hindered by the specific contextual factors, resulting in its inability to thrive. The Nigerian system of federalism has included elements of military governance, while in Ethiopia, federalism has been intertwined with the Leninist concept of national self-determination inside a one-party electoral dictatorship.

The connection between South African federalism and liberalism is often made, notwithstanding the centralization tendencies shown by the African National Congress

(ANC). The consolidation of power was facilitated by the political domination of centralised military elites, the presence of a centralised party system, and the militarization of government. The ruling elites opted for federalism as a strategy to address the volatile ethnic, regional, and religious disparities within their communities, while also preserving the cohesion of their states among divisive forces. Nevertheless, there exists a diverse array of perspectives across states regarding the matter of autonomy for subnational organisations (Yimenu, 2022).

3.9 Conclusion

In summary, the federal governmental system in Africa has many challenges, such as racial and regional divides, power disparities, inadequate leadership, disputes on resource management, and capability limitations. These problems have the potential to impede equitable growth, intensify political conflict, and impede the effective functioning of federal institutions. Tackling these challenges may be achieved by examining a range of different options. Several measures include assisting subnational governments in enhancing their capabilities, strengthening governance institutions, enacting anti-corruption policies, promoting power-sharing and decentralization, encouraging dialogue and conflict resolution methods, and making constitutional amendments to address power disparities and safeguard minority rights. When devising these solutions, it is crucial to take into account the historical, political, and social realities of each African country. African states may strive for a more inclusive form of government, fair allocation of resources, and sustained success within their federal systems by addressing these concerns and implementing appropriate solutions.

Chapter 4

CHALLENGES OF FEDERALISM IN NIGERIA

4.1 Introduction

Over the course of Nigeria 63-year existence, including 30 years of military administration, the Nigerian federation has seen significant restructuring and inventive political strategies. These attempts have been made to address the three fundamental issues faced by postcolonial societies: achieving national cohesion, ensuring democratic stability, and promoting socioeconomic progress. Nevertheless, several authorities affirm that Nigeria's federalism has shown a lamentable track record of efficiently tackling all three of these difficulties. The Nigerian federation has been characterized by an international community of experts as economically dysfunctional, politically unstable, violently divided, and ultimately destined for failure (International Crisis Group, 2006; Ottaway et al., 2004; Herbst, 2005). The negative evaluations stem from the Nigerian government's reliance on the distribution of centrally collected oil revenues among different levels of government, where a substantial portion of these funds is subsequently misused by ethno-political leaders at the federal, state, and local levels (The World Factbook, 2023). Hence, this chapter is to examine the challenges of federalism in Nigeria.

4.2 Federalism in Nigeria

Nigeria implemented constitutional federalism in 1954, and by 1960 it had reached maturity. At its inception, Nigerian federalism diverged from the American model of federations, in which several independent entities join forces under a single head of

state. The objective was to form a confederation that would become a federation. The federation would gain power when each powerful smaller organization surrendered part of it. The federation of Nigeria evolved from a unified state into provincial and eventually regional entities. But many large areas have willingly ceded part of their power to the resulting state institutions (Esho, 1996).

According to Diamond (1988), the founding union's regulations were established by the original thirteen American colonies. However, the British imposed federalism on Nigeria without considering the necessity for regional protection of minority communities. Due to long-term stability concerns, the southern region urged against a federal system where one area had a majority population (Diamond, 1988). Mackintosh (1962) argues that, according to popular belief, the Nigerian federation was not founded by the consolidation of existing states but rather by the secession of a previously unified country. Despite having been approved by a unanimous majority at the 1950 First National Conference, federalism was imposed by colonial authority. Federalism's adoption as the only workable political system for multiethnic nations like Nigeria's has sparked this debate. Numerous intellectual discourses have explored the Nigerian federation's nature, organization, and administration. The Constitutions of 1960 and 1963 are widely recognized as the foundation of Nigeria's genuine federalism. Many territories now have their own constitutions as a result of the ensuing constitutional framework. The northern, western, and eastern areas all operated under their own sets of laws. In the years after its inception in 1963, the Midwest drafted its own constitution.

The setup promoted friendly competition between areas. Thorough debates and an agreement were established on such crucial topics as religion's restricted role in

national governance and intergovernmental relations, in addition to resolving concerns about the status of minority groups in relation to larger society factions. The formed federation's independence constitution placed an emphasis on resource management and fairness. It's possible that under a derivation formula, each area may retain half of the benefits accruing from its land. This meant that the Western Region could implement free public education without seeking permission from the federal government. There was a lot of leeway for each area to come up with and execute its own development strategy without feeling threatened by the achievements of other regions. This is very definition of federalism. One's citizenship status was common knowledge. Federalism, according to Ewa (1976), does not necessitate that developed countries decline into poverty. This implies that no part of the Federation may be noticeably worse off than the others. According to Sagay (2001), each government has its own set of responsibilities and should not interfere with the other while exercising those responsibilities within the scope of the constitution. Federal institutions in Nigeria need to be revised to accommodate emerging problems and promising new prospects.

4.3 Issues and Challenges of Federalism in Nigeria

Since the inception of federalism in Nigeria, there have been structural and operational challenges. This behaviour is linked to "the error of 1914." Despite several attempts, Nigeria's federal system has faced challenges due to the country's varied population's lack of compromise, tolerance, and respect. However, Nigeria's federal system has several challenges, as described in the following sections.

The nation's primary legislative document, the Constitution, governs each federating partner's operations. Given the inherent variety in most federations, the

aforementioned constitution is expected to be rigorously designed to limit any changes unless accepted by a majority of partners. The traditional Nigerian constitution, noted for its thoroughness and stringent nature, has faced mounting challenges. One concern is the lack of public consultation during constitution-making.

The difference between constitution provisions and federating institution aims is one explanation for the misalignment. The constitution's Sharia Court of Appeal, with its primary jurisdiction restricted to civil matters involving Islamic personal law (section 262), has been criticized by the primarily Muslim northern states. These states say this provision violates their requirements and preferences.

The creation of new local government districts, the integration of indigenous and migrant ideology, the income sharing system, and the adoption of shariah principles are complicated. The second major hurdle to the Nigerian federal experiment is income allocation and mobilization. In particular, the federating units' inadequate domestic revenue production makes them too dependent on the central government. According to data, states' overreliance on the federal government has weakened local governments, making them unable to fund infrastructure development or satisfy wage responsibilities. The situation in Nigeria has not altered, according to Ogundiya and Abdullahi (2012). Despite bailout monies from the Central Bank of Nigeria, numerous Nigerian governments have not paid workers for more than six months. Federal jurisdiction has increased, reducing state autonomy and causing excessive dependence on the federal government.

Misuse and misinterpretation of fundamental ideas and concepts for federation operation have also occurred. Compromise, tolerance, fair authority, and responsible

leadership demonstrate these ideals. These ideas are crucial because they may strengthen government by resolving conflicts and meeting the requirements of numerous stakeholders. Nigeria's federal system hinders the maintenance of these principles. According to Ogundiya and Abdullahi (2012), the failure to follow these principles in strategic appointment and admission to higher education institutions in Nigeria, along with the classification of minority groups as settlers or non-indigenous within a state, has led to many unresolved challenges. The above elements may explain current conflicts in Jos, Wukari, Osun's Ife and Modakeke battles, Benue's Agatu, Southern Kaduna, Nassarawa, and other states.

Corruption and poor governance affect the federal system and the entire political apparatus. The federal system of Nigeria has been significantly impacted by corruption through two primary pathways. The efficacy of governmental agencies charged with supporting economic growth has initially been weakened. The institutions in question have been unable to fulfill their constitutional mandate to provide services due to poor procurement regulation compliance, due process compliance, and service supply transparency. According to Ogundiya and Abdullahi (2012), state institutions declined to a point where they could no longer support a federal system. Current legal proceedings against the former National Security Agency (NSA), commonly known as "Armstronggate" or "Dasukigate," buttress the argument. The second viewpoint examines "the inherent qualities and characteristics of governmental leadership at various tiers of the state." Leaders intentionally or unintentionally misunderstand federal and state power hierarchies (Ogundiya & Abdullahi, 2012).

Statism is a political philosophy that supports a large, centralized state and believes the government should have substantial power. Non-indigenous people experience

governmental economic, social, and political prejudice. Native Americans are prioritized above non-Natives in governmental posts, employment, student placement, land allocation, and education. Thus, foreigners are considered aliens in their own nation. First, many Nigerian minority groups fear subjugation by the larger ethnic groupings. The expo has caused nationwide conflicts and discontent. Eliminating poverty, unemployment, and illiteracy is crucial. Local or state governments cannot solve the problem.

Power sharing is a political concept that relates to the distribution and allocation of authority, influence, and decision-making. A vital aspect the issue at hand is how the central government distributes governmental tasks and powers to its member bodies. Giving some entities too much power would undermine the central government, while giving the central government too much power would harm the state government. In Nigeria, the federal government possesses financial power and implements most governmental functions.

Despite efforts to remove the structural unfairness caused by colonialism, there is still a boundary dispute between component divisions, similar to the conflict between Kogi and Anambra. Lack of competent and true leadership: In the federal system of Nigeria, politicians' lack of true commitment to development is a major worry. Costs rise when federalism is implemented. Duplicate ministries, agencies, and government departments at the federal and state levels, such as a federal environment minister, add to the financial burden of maintaining the federal system. Additionally, every state has a Department of Environment (DOE) led by a Commissioner.

4.4 Nigerian Constitution and the Challenges to the Practice of Federalism

As stated in section (2) of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, the country is structured as a federation with 36 states and a Federal Capital Territory. The idea of a distinct separation of powers between the federal and state levels of government is fundamental to Nigeria's federal system of administration. The separation of powers, collaboration, and streamlined administrations principles are sought after by the federal and state governments via the consolidation of authority. Thus, it seems that promoting unity among the regions of Nigeria while simultaneously granting them political independence is the primary goal of federalism in the nation (Amah, 2016). As a result of the limited financial resources of most of these countries, this goal has not yet been accomplished. The division of the federation into separate states has resulted in an undue dependence on the central authority, which goes against the core principle of federalism. While the establishment of states in Nigeria once had the potential to bring autonomy to minority ethnic groups, it is the dominant ethnic groups who have eventually reaped far more benefits from this process. Consequently, there has been a persistent demand for the establishment of separate states for various ethnic groups. The establishment of states has not benefitted the Nigerian federation; instead, it has worsened the issue due to the fact that these states lack the resources to sustain themselves. Here, we will discuss the difficulties posed by her federal Constitution and practices.

4.4.1 Nigerian Federal Constitution and the Amendment Process

Federal constitutions often have a strict and demanding character. It may also be seen as having a precise protocol that must be followed in order to modify it. The rationale behind this is to safeguard against any potential misuse of a constitutional provision

by any branch of government. According to Igwenyi (2006), only the existing procedure, known as "entrenched clauses," may be altered or adjusted in the constitution.

Section 9 of the Nigerian Constitution outlines a specific mechanism for making changes to the document. Therefore, to modify any article of the Nigerian Constitution, a two-thirds majority vote is required in both the House of Representatives and the Senate (National Assembly). The National Assembly consists of a total of 469 members, with 109 serving as senators and 360 as representatives in the House of Representatives. The amendment must be endorsed by a minimum of twenty-four (24) out of the thirty-six (36) states that are currently receiving federal funding, as specified in sections 49 and 48. A stricter condition of a four-fifths majority of the State Houses of Assembly worldwide is necessary when modifying Section 9, Section 8 (which pertains to the establishment of states), or Chapter 4 (which deals with basic human rights).

The Nigerian constitutional amendment process is widely recognized as being very challenging due to a range of variables. In Nigeria, a supermajority vote is necessary for any modifications to be made. In certain situations, an external organization or agency must also validate these changes, such as when the Houses of Assembly of the Federation States pass a resolution. Additionally, when the Parliament initiates a change, like adjusting boundaries or establishing new local government councils, the amendment must be endorsed through a referendum after the change is initiated.

The implementation of rigorous amendment processes may effectively protect the rights of minority groups and prevent arbitrary decisions. However, it can also lead to

the suppression of opposing views and the concentration of power in a diverse federal society. The amendment procedure, which requires consent from the states or councils that will be impacted, such as in the establishment of new local governments, would surely reject the legitimate group's appeal for more states or local government councils. This is shown by the fact that in Nigeria, every democratic effort to establish more states or local government councils has faced significant resistance. Recently, certain state legislatures made efforts to establish new councils in accordance with the constitution's rules on creating local government councils. However, these attempts were blocked when the federal government invoked the constitutionally required special procedure for amending the constitution. Additional referendums should be included as a vital part of the constitutional change process. The lack of a referendum process in the proposed amendment is the reason why Nigerian voters are unable to directly vote to modify the constitution. Referendums are essential to modern administration and established democracies since they allow people to directly vote on political and national matters by expressing their support or opposition to certain themes. This kind of direct democracy empowers individuals to participate in decision-making processes.

4.4.2 Division of Powers under the Nigerian Federal Constitution

Federalism is characterized by the allocation of power to several branches and constituent bodies as specified by the Constitution, setting it apart from other types of governance. Establishing a clear chain of command throughout the several tiers of government is essential for preventing any one level from infringing on the authority of any other and for reducing the likelihood of conflict (Elazar, 2016). Following extensive deliberation, several scholars reached the consensus that the federal government should maintain the majority of powers and duties. Conversely, others

contended that each state should possess an equal voice in the formulation of federal policies (Adediran, 1995).

The Constitution employs a division of powers and responsibilities to safeguard against the abuse of governmental authority. Elaigwu, Longams, and Galadima (2008) posit that the rationale behind the division of powers in a federal state is for the central government to address matters of national significance, while the governments of the constituent states should focus on matters of a more regional nature. The goal of the constitution is to provide a degree of autonomy among the many components of the federation, while also acknowledging the need for collaborative cooperation.

According to Amah (2017), the 1999 Constitution established two separate types of legislative power: concurrent and exclusive. Amah (2017) provides a detailed overview of the Exclusive Legislative List, which includes 68 different themes. The areas of responsibility included by this list are not limited to, but encompass: defense, diplomatic relations, foreign affairs, wireless broadcasting, aviation, customs and excise, currencies, copyrights, defense, prisons, railroads, taxes, trade and commerce, weight and measures, and communication. By comparison, the Concurrent Legislative List has 12 articles as stipulated in the 1999 Constitution, with amendments. The exclusive authority to enact legislation on matters included in the Exclusive Legislative List rests only with the federal government. States are only permitted to enact laws on these subjects if there is explicit authorization from a federal law. However, it is important to acknowledge that the Exclusive Legislative List contains an excessive number of items, many of which should rightfully fall within the jurisdiction of the federating units. Land parcels are an exemplification of this concept. The enactment of the Use Act of 1978 resulted in the transfer of land ownership to the

states, but, it did not exclude the region from the exclusive legislative list. Other notable elements include: natural gas, oil reserves, geological studies for oil production, fishing industry, labour force, minimum wage, and narcotics and toxins. Given that matters of regional significance include commerce, business name registration, law enforcement, postal services, telegraph and telephone operations, incarceration facilities, taxation, marriage ceremonies, education, and other related areas, it would be most expedient for the states to assume responsibility for these affairs.

The concurrent list of issues may be the subject of legislation by either the Federal Government or one of the State Governments. When two laws, one passed by the state and the other by the National Assembly, are in conflict with one another, the federal legislation will take precedence and the state law will be void to the extent that the dispute is severe. The existence of overriding power allows the federal government to retain influence over state governments via the Concurrent Legislative List. The states' reliance on the federal government has grown as a result of their limited access to the productive parts of the federation's resources.

The Fourth Schedule of the 1999 Constitution lays out the responsibilities of the Nigerian local government councils, the third tier of federal administration. On the other hand, it did not provide the LGCs any kind of direct or indirect legislative authority (Amah, 2011). Given that the councils are considered an extension of state governments, the state house of assembly has the authority to pass legislation that regulates them. The state governments are charged with the responsibility of creating and supporting local government councils, as mandated by the constitution. This allocation of authority imposes a constraint on the sovereignty of these entities.

4.5 The Challenges of Federal Character Principle in Nigeria

Nigeria's Federal Character Principal implementation problems and prospects. The 1999 Constitution (amended) incorporates the federal characteristics principle, which was first established in Section 14 (3) and (4) of the 1979 Constitution as a fundamental principle governing state policy. To tackle these difficulties and ensure fair allocation of benefits and claims among different groups and interests in Nigeria, it became clear that this principle must be put into action. As this matter is not subject to legal judgment, governments and their institutions are required to abstain from certain actions. However, this does provide people certain principles for how they should conduct their lives.

The 1995 Draft Constitution included additional provisions for a Federal Character Commission to achieve the objectives of promoting the effective implementation of the Federal Character Principle, fostering a sense of national pride and optimism among all Nigerians, and strengthening national unity and stability. The Commission mentioned in the text is established under the 1999 Constitution, particularly under Part I, Section 153(1) (c), as modified. The Commission is granted the power to prosecute government officials who do not comply with the formula and to oversee, promote, and ensure that all levels of government adhere to the principles of proportional sharing of posts. Additionally, it has the ability to establish an equitable formula for the distribution of all positions. The Federal Character Commission's inability to properly apply the provisions of the Federal Character Principle is evident, mostly owing to the inequities and marginalization present in the nation's political, cultural, and socioeconomic domains. In addition, the bourgeoisie has twisted and diverted the principles of federal character to promote its own interests. The

bourgeoisie gains power and dominates the state machinery by exploiting the federal character principle, so solidifying its position of dominance. Gboyega (1989) accurately argued that the technique in question is elitist and would not provide any advantages to the oppressed folks it is intended to help.

Since achieving independence, this problem has endured, leading to conflicts between different communities and a lack of trust amongst them. This situation poses a danger to the political stability of the nation.

Therefore, it is inevitable that there would be socioeconomic disputes between the privileged elite and the ordinary population. To effectively address Nigeria's integration challenges, it is imperative to use the federal character principle in a way that ensures the population's access to basic requirements of life. According to Saro-Wiwa (1985), using the formula will create a fairer federation, fostering stronger loyalty among its members by ensuring genuine representation. Neglecting to do so will make the formula useless. While stressing the need for ethnic balance, this principle consistently prioritizes ethnic identity above national sovereignty. Consequently, it strengthens the conventional ethnic divides and limited viewpoints of the Nigerian population (Agbodike, 1998). Thus, the issue that the federal character principle was intended to address has deteriorated (Yusufu, 1977).

The principle's limited applicability to interethnic national suspicion shows its inadequacy to handle this issue. Addressing structural inequalities and ethnic dominance in government and public institutions to promote national cohesion has failed. In Nigeria, the Hausa/Fulani people and other northern ethnic groups formed the Arewa Consultative Forum. Boko Haram, on the other hand, wants to build a

caliphate in the northeast. The Movement for the Actualization of the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB), an Igbo group characterised as "radical," has also started broadcasting on "Radio Biafra," fitting with the notion of "actualization" mentioned in their organizational identity.

The individual recognizes that federal character is laudable in theory but difficult to achieve. They say ethnic inclusion in Nigeria's national representative institutions is necessary for national integration. They oppose affirmative action in this regard. However, they oppose "more harmful than the problem" solutions (Osifeso, 2011). Ojo (2009), states that the Federal character was created to help the poor. However, its execution in Nigeria has primarily benefited the ruling elite, marginalizing the underprivileged. As a result, the system's fundamental supervision and accountability procedures were ineffective, resulting in rapid quality decline, public service deficiencies, and public morale decline (Suberu, 2001, Osifeso, 2011).

According to Osifeso (2011), the principle "leads to federal instability rather than integration," which was its initial goal. Therefore, this technique has largely boosted knowledge and identification with particular ethnic and sectarian groups. Osifeso (2011), further claims that the principle's assumption that no entity would treat groups unequally is flawed. This effort seeks "distributive justice," or parity or fairness among nations. Lack of implementation capability makes this unfair, (Ojo, 2009). The amount of qualified job seekers and state populations vary greatly. Ojo says in Osifeso's (2011), research that treating people equally regardless of their differences is the summit of equality.

Dominophobia is an unreasonable dread or anxiety of dominating circumstances or people. The federal character principle's failure to combat ethnic dominance and promote government equality may be due to the battle for centralized political and administrative power. The present system implementation does not adequately address the system's initial goal. Critics say the federal character principle emphasizes Nigerian differences rather than our similarities. Ethnicity, religion, and language have been among the many divisions in history. Nigerians, including leaders and the general population, want transformative change and a break from the conditions that have slowed the nation's progress, but many experts and analysts are wary of federal character principles. Former Vice President Yemi Osinbajo, a distinguished academic and the second-highest executive officer in the Federal Republic of Nigeria 2015-2023, supports the idea that candidates for public jobs should be chosen based on merit rather than the principle of Federal Character (Osinbajo, 2015). Fans believe the Nigerian national football team's leadership or coach would choose the best players, ensuring victory. They just expect the instructor to develop a proficient team. The vice president said, "I do not consider my health as something that I assume will always be present." I emphasize selecting the most qualified Nigerian doctor, regardless of nationality, since Nigerians must prioritize skill over federal character to show genuine care for the government (Osinbajo, 2015).

On August 30, 2015, incumbent Nigerian senator Ben Murray Bruce shared similar thoughts on the forced national development caused by the quota system and federal character. Senator Bruce (2015), believes Nigeria must progress despite its many languages and ethnicities. To attain this purpose, racial differences must be set aside and individual talent accepted. Refineries and power plants cannot benefit from the

federal character principle. Merit alone guarantees this result. Over \$60 million in debt and 30 planes accumulated when Nigeria Airways faced insolvency in 2000 owing to federal regulations. The federal character and quota system has been found to leave beneficiaries feeling entitled and anger others. Merit-based living is better, (Eniola, 2015).

Federalism allows organizations and people to form mutually agreed-upon relationships without erasing cultural characteristics like ethnicity, religion, and language, according to social scientists. Nigeria, with its cultural diversity, may benefit from a federal administration. Mar and Leraud in Osifeso's (2011) study perceive federalism and ethnicity as a solidarity dyad. A federal constitution should strike a balance between subnational entities and national unity, (Duchacek, 1973). Nigeria's heterogeneous ethnic mix suggests that real federalism may solve conflict, integration, and friction. Comparing meritocratic and outcome-driven strategies shows that the federal character principle weakens efforts. Federalism is typically considered a successful political and constitutional arrangement for handling ethnic and cultural diversity in governance.

Both the Nigerian federal system and the federal character principle have failed to promote federalism's aims and goals in Nigeria's varied society. These institutions aggressively promote true power and have incited fatal contests between constituent groups and the central authority. Thus, violent conflicts, ethnic tensions, intergroup hostility, and uncontrolled tribal fights for political power and economic resources have increased (Osifeso, 2011).

This undermines the apparent harmony between the two political concepts, which seek to consolidate, cohere, and include the country.

4.6 Conflicts of diversity and Challenges Arising from Resource Control Issues

Nigeria is struggling with the issue of revenue allocation. Successive Nigerian administrations have established laws and decrees and created revenue allocation institutions to standardize revenue distribution. Concerning the allocation of revenue, the commissions have made the following conclusions and rulings:

- ❖ In 1946, the Phillipson Commission suggested revenue allocation based on derivation and fair development. According to the panel, each government entity would receive a central fund contribution commensurate with its participation.
- ❖ In 1951, the Hicks Phillipson Commission established criteria for meeting critical requirements, advancing national interests, and producing revenue independently or with budgetary autonomy.
- ❖ The 1957 Raisman Commission established key standards, substantial advancement, and restricted responsibilities. Assign 40% to the north, 31% to the east, 24% to the west, and 5% to the south for Cameroon divisions.
- ❖ In 1964, the Binn Commission rejected need and derivation grounds for regional financial comparability. Northern receives 42%, Eastern 30%, Western 20%, and Midwestern 8% on the allocation.
- ❖ The national level must meet minimal standards to distribute States' Joint Account monies fairly. This 1969 Dina Committee recommendation is required.
- ❖ The Aboyade Technical Committee was founded in 1977. The minimum national integration, absorptive capability, fiscal efficiency, and independent revenue effort standards are: 22% integration, 20% absorptive capacity, 15% fiscal efficiency,

18% autonomous revenue effort. Access to development possibilities is 25% egalitarian. Below is the allocation breakdown: 57% will go to the federal government, 30% to states, 10% to municipalities, and 3% to a fund.

- ❖ The Okigbo Presidential Commission was founded in 1980. Social development, internal revenue effort, principles, population, equality, and social development (15%) make up the rest. Funds are distributed as follows: 30% for the state, 10% for local governments, 53% for the federal government, and 7% for special funds.
- ❖ According to the 1988 Danjuma Commission, 50% goes to the federal government, 30% to the state, 15% to the municipal, and 5% to a special fund.
- ❖ Other income distribution laws and directives include the Allocation of Revenue (Federation Account) Act of 1981 and Decrees 15 of 1967, 13 of 1970, 9 of 1971, 6 of 1975, and 7 of 1975.

The revenue allocation model assigns over 50% of government revenue to state and municipal governments, almost equivalent to federal spending. The Federation Account gives the federal government 52.68% of profits, while 4.8% is used for "special projects" include developing Abuja, discovering natural resources, and managing ecological issues. With a total value of 47.32%, the revenues are allocated as follows: 26.72% go to local governments and 20.60% to states (Babalola, 2008; The Punch, February 2012:7; Tribune, January 27, 2013). The constitution also mandates 13% of revenue to go to oil-producing states as a derivation fund. The continual discussion between regions concerning resource sharing has led to several commissions, legislation, and decrees to manage revenue allocation.

Suberu said that derivation-based oil income declined from 50% of mining rents and royalties in 1969 to 2% of the Federation Account in 1981 and 1% of mineral profits

from 1989 to 1999. The Niger Deltans views this compromise as inadequate, and their demands for a higher share of oil revenues or direct control over oil resources have increased young militancy and crime (Suberu, 2001). The regional instability has been worsened by crude oil supply disruptions.

Politicalization of the federal government's revenue distribution system and concentration of oil ownership and control hurt minority oil-producing states. So, demonstrations in these nations were visible to the globe. Decree 51 of 1969 gave the federal government exclusive power over Nigeria's petroleum resources, violating fiscal federalism. Oil minority state were excluded from direct oil revenues by Offshore Oil Revenue Decree No. 9, increasing their dependency on dominant groups for oil wealth. This was because the federal government had full control over offshore oil well income in coastal seas around these localities. Isolating the oil-producing minority from their wealth deepened Nigeria's strife. Extreme political and financial centralization was used by the government to obtain power and exploit minority groups' significant resources (The Vanguard, October 20, 2011:35 Tribune, January 27, 2013). The dispute has hurt Nigeria's federalist option (Jinadu, 2004).

The protests have grown increasingly violent and now demand absolute secession and the opportunity to choose one's own future. These improvements have slowed nation-building economically and politically. Violent disputes threaten federalism, individual liberty, public safety, and property. The federalist option, democracy, security, and nation building are threatened by ethnic militias, Boko Haram, and other unnamed groups' increasing violence and brutality under the current political system.

Decentralised regions, such as Nigeria's energy-producing local governments, have suffered from the revenue allocation system and resource control. Indigenous people and energy companies are at odds due to the underdeveloped oil-producing regions. According to Adegami (2013), oil-producing regions have seen recurring violent conflict. Hostility and conflicts have ruined all growth in certain regions.

4.7 Remedy to the Challenges of Federalism in Nigeria

In nations that have implemented federal systems, the balance of power between the federal and state levels of government varies greatly. The constitutions of some countries, like India, Mexico, Brazil, and Germany, provide the federal government significant power over state and local governments. The constitutions of other countries, on the other hand, provide state and local governments a lot of power, particularly when it comes to taxes (Shah 2007). Some countries, like Brazil and Belgium, have a system of cooperative federalism, which means that each level of government has equal and independent responsibilities. However, within the framework of the United States, a functional balance is maintained between the federal, state, and local administrations, which adds to the stability of both the states and the nation as a whole.

Despite the numerous criticisms surrounding the Nigerian federal system, it is frequently cited as a model for employing power-sharing mechanisms and practices to foster inter-ethnic inclusivity and mitigate sectional imbalance and bias in decision-making processes across other African nations (Suberu, 1996). Addressing the challenges afflicting Nigeria's federal system requires a comprehensive approach, since there is no one solution that will effectively resolve these issues. Suberu (1996)

identified the aforementioned challenges. However, I have supplemented the discourse with a set of constructive strategies and initiatives aimed at resolving these issues.

Firstly, it is necessary to conduct a comprehensive examination of the constitution in order to address the many challenges faced by the nation, particularly those pertaining to the "national Question." These challenges include issues such as the effective collection of taxes and allocation of finances, disturbance in the Niger Delta region, and conflicts arising from the coexistence of indigenous populations and foreign settlers, among others.

Constitutionalism, secondly, is a process that places significant emphasis on the adherence to the rule of law, the recognition of principles such as justice, fairness, and good conscience, as well as the legitimacy of authority. To put it differently, the practical implementation of the Constitution.

Thirdly, accountability should be prioritized while determining the allocation of funds. Given the historical presence of disputes about resource distribution, it is essential to provide individuals the opportunity to participate in decision-making processes concerning the allocation of their tax contributions.

Fourthly, it is imperative to prioritize and endeavor towards the promotion of unifying principles above divisive ones, given that the issue of power sharing has consistently hindered the progress of Nigerian federalism. This outcome may be achieved through collaboration between those in positions of influence and individuals of high intellectual capacity.

Ultimately, it is crucial to prioritize the establishment of a national political leadership that is driven by the collective welfare of the populace rather than personal gain.

4.8 Conclusion

A federal system of government does not adequately fulfil the human need for justice and fairness. While federalism provides the framework for the allocation of a nation's resources and power, it is not a panacea for resolving all political issues. Nevertheless, it might provide a foundation for addressing some of those issues. The adoption of federalism as the preferred system of governance for Nigeria was a deliberate choice. The founding fathers of Nigeria considered this to be the most efficient strategy for safeguarding the basic interests of the federating units, taking into account the complex character of the country's political system. The authority of the federating divisions was expressly acknowledged in the federal constitution, especially in the 1963 Republican Constitution. For example, every unit came up with its own constitution so that it could rule itself to some extent.

Chapter 5

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5.1 Conclusion

This study examines the challenges associated with federalism in Africa, with a specific emphasis on Nigeria as a case study. The federal governmental system in Africa encounters several challenges, such as racial and regional divisions, power imbalances, insufficient leadership, disagreements over resource management, and limits in capabilities. These problems may impede fair and balanced economic expansion, exacerbate political strife, and impede the efficient operation of federal establishments. The study highlights that federalism does not adequately satisfy the human need for justice and equity. Although it offers a structure for distributing a nation's resources and power, it is not a panacea for all political problems.

Africa's distinct cultural, linguistic, and ethnic background explain the proliferation of federalist ideologies. The fundamental tenets of African federalism are the enforcement of democratic principles, the facilitation of economic development, and the resolution of ethnic conflicts. There are several challenges facing Africa's federal governmental structure, including racial and regional splits, power imbalances, ineffective leadership, disagreements over resource management, and resource constraints. The efficient operation of federal institutions, more political strife, and less equitable development are all possible outcomes of these issues. There are a variety of approaches that might be taken to tackle these challenges. Helping subnational

governments become more capable, bolstering governance institutions, passing anti-corruption laws, advocating for decentralization and power-sharing, promoting dialogue and methods for resolving conflicts, as well as revising the constitution to guarantee minority rights and rectify power disparities, are all commendable initiatives. Each African country's unique political, social, and historical context must be considered in order to arrive at workable answers. By tackling these issues and finding suitable answers, African nations may work towards a more inclusive government, equitable distribution of resources, and long-term success within their federal systems.

However, the intentional decision to implement federalism in Nigeria was based on the founding fathers' belief that it was the most efficient technique for protecting the fundamental interests of the federating states. The federal constitution, namely the Republican Constitution of 1963, explicitly acknowledged the authority of the federating divisions. A federal system of government is most suitable for a diverse and diversified country like Nigeria. The present situation and conflicts inside the federation have been significantly and directly influenced by colonialism and the enduring effects of Nigeria's several military governments after gaining independence. Although federalism has effectively brought together many ethnicities within the Nigerian political system, its execution has been somewhat ineffective in ensuring their peaceful coexistence.

Political reorganization is important in a federal democracy such as Nigeria in order to accomplish certain predefined goals. Initially, restructuring should prioritize efforts towards equitable governance systems and shared sense of belonging, helping them to define their appropriate direction and role.

However, the 1999 Constitution requires prompt modification in order to consolidate and distribute the federation's resources under the authority of the federal government, among other matters. As previously said, a key characteristic of every federal republic is the distribution of supreme powers and resources between the central governing body and the many component units. Stakeholders involved in the management of national affairs in the federation should prioritize expressing their viewpoints throughout the revision process, taking advantage of their collective knowledge and experience since the implementation of the Lyttleton Constitution in 1954, which laid the foundation for the federal system.

Our society urgently need a comprehensive and genuine restructuring and overhaul to promote cohesion over variation and prevent any one ethnic group from exerting disproportionate influence. When creating a constitution that incorporates the principles of collaboration and comity, it is essential to take into account not only the governmental necessities but also the unique characteristics, historical background, and local conditions of the nation. In the case of Nigeria, a multi-ethnic state with complex social and economic issues, real federalism stands as the only feasible option.

5.2 Recommendations

These recommendations are derived from the finding.

Based on the finding the following recommendations are made:

- i. In order to tackle the challenges associated with federalism in Africa, several alternatives are suggested, such as providing support to local governments, enhancing the effectiveness of governing bodies, implementing measures to combat corruption, advocating for power-sharing and decentralization, promoting dialogue and conflict resolution techniques, and amending the

constitution to address power imbalances and protect the rights of minority groups.

- ii. Addressing Nigeria's challenges including tax collection, budgetary allocation, and native-immigrant conflicts requires a thorough constitutional analysis. Legal governance, impartiality, equity, and proper government usage are central to constitutionalism. Fund allocation must emphasize accountability and ensure public participation in decision-making. In Nigerian federalism, inclusive ideals must be promoted above contentious ones. This may be done by encouraging influential and intelligent people to work together.
- iii. In accordance with the restructured federal system, it is necessary for democratically elected representatives of Nigerians to formulate a fresh constitution. This would enable key players to engage in negotiations about new structural principles, including the recognition of Nigeria's need for a new constitution. To ensure that Nigerians have enough opportunity to examine the proposed constitution, it is crucial to widely distribute its principles and content.
- iv. In addition, political restructuring seeks to foster a feeling of national cohesion or, at the very least, enhance it by creating an institutional framework that enables a fairer and more balanced allocation of political authority among multinational entities present in a federal nation.

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