Bureaucratic Corruption and Human Development: A Comparative Case-Study of Cameroon and Botswana

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ABSTRACT

The paradox of development in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) countries, characterized by vast natural and human resources juxtaposed with persistent poverty and lack of development, has intrigued scholars and policymakers. While theories like the 'Dutch disease' and 'Dependency Theory' have been used to explain the situation, this study focuses on endogenous factors, particularly the role of bureaucratic corruption in shaping human development outcomes. Using a comparative case-study design, the research examines the impact of bureaucratic corruption on human development in two SSA countries—Cameroon and Botswana—employing an 'institutional quality model.' It examines the correlation between bureaucratic corruption and human development in both countries.

The empirical analysis reveals that bureaucratic corruption disrupts governance institutions' ability to allocate resources effectively for human development. Notably, Cameroon's incomplete projects due to corruption contrast with Botswana's effective management of mineral wealth. This difference highlights the impact of mitigating corruption on development progress.

The study's main findings are twofold: Firstly, bureaucratic corruption is prevalent in both case-study countries, but Cameroon exhibits a higher scale of corruption compared to Botswana. Secondly, Botswana demonstrates superior governance and anti-corruption performance, positioning itself as a regional leader in SSA. Furthermore, the study further establishes that while Cameroon demonstrates a

negative correlation between high corruption and low human development, Botswana exhibits a positive correlation between low corruption and high human development.

This thesis contributes to the corpus of knowledge in development in two ways: Empirically, it enhances the understanding of corruption's role in differences in development between Cameroon and Botswana. By focusing on endogenous factors and using a comparative approach, it unveils the vital connection between governance, corruption, and human development. Theoretically, its usage of an institutional quality model to capture the relationship between bureaucratic corruption and human development is a nouvelle approach to an enquiry largely dominated by econometric models.

Keywords: Bureaucratic corruption; Human development; Institutional quality model; Botswana; Cameroon

ÖZ

Geniş doğal kaynakların ve insan kaynaklarının kalıcı yoksullukla ve kalkınma eksikliğiyle bir arada bulunduğu Sahra Altı Afrika (SSA) ülkelerindeki kalkınma paradoksu, akademisyenlerin ve politikacılarını her daim ilgisini çekmektedir. Bu zamana kadar bu durumu açıklamak için 'Hollanda hastalığı' ve 'Bağımlılık Teorisi' gibi teoriler kullanılmış olsa da bu çalışma içsel faktörlere, özellikle de bürokratik yolsuzluğun insani kalkınmanın getirilerini şekillendirmedeki rolüne odaklanmaktadır. Karşılaştırmalı vaka çalışması modeli kullanılan bu araştırma, iki SSA ülkesinde (Kamerun ve Botsvana) bürokratik yolsuzluğun insani kalkınma üzerindeki etkisini 'kurumsal kalite modeli' uygulayarak incelemektedir. Bu çalışma her iki ülkede de bürokratik yolsuzluk ile insani kalkınma arasındaki ilişkiyi incelemektedir.

Ampirik analiz, bürokratik yolsuzluğun yönetim kurumlarının kaynakları insani kalkınma için etkili bir şekilde kullanma kapasitesini sekteye uğrattığını ortaya koymaktadır. Bilhassa Kamerun'un yolsuzluk nedeniyle tamamlanamamış projeleri, Botsvana'nın maden zenginliğini etkin şekilde yönetebilmesiyle çelişmektedir. Bu fark, yolsuzluğun azaltılmasının kalkınmanın gelişimi üzerindeki etkisini vurgulamaktadır.

Çalışmanın ana bulguları iki yönlüdür: İlk olarak, vaka incelemesi yapılan her iki ülkede de bürokratik yolsuzluk yaygındır; ancak Kamerun'da Botswana'ya kıyasla daha yüksek düzeyde bir yolsuzluk görülmektedir. İkinci olarak, Botsvana kendisini SSA'da bölgesel lider olarak konumlandırarak daha üstün bir yönetişim ve yolsuzlukla

mücadele performansı sergilemektedir. Ayrıca bu çalışma, Kamerun'da yüksek yolsuzluk ile düşük insani kalkınma arasında negatif bir korelasyon görülürken, Botsvana'da ise düşük yolsuzluk ile yüksek insani kalkınma arasında pozitif bir korelasyon olduğunu ortaya koymaktadır.

Bu tez, kalkınmadaki bilgi birikimine iki şekilde katkıda bulunmaktadır: Bu çalışma ampirik olarak, Kamerun ve Botsvana arasındaki kalkınma farklılıklarında yolsuzluğun rolünün daha açık bir şekilde anlaşılmasını sağlamaktadır. İçsel faktörlere odaklanarak ve karşılaştırmalı bir yaklaşım kullanarak, yönetişim, yolsuzluk ve insani kalkınma arasındaki hayati bağlantıyı ortaya koymaktadır. Teorik olarak, bürokratik yolsuzluk ve insani kalkınma arasındaki ilişkiyi tanımlamak için kurumsal kalite modelinin kullanılması, büyük ölçüde ekonometrik modellemelerin hakim olduğu çalışmalara yeni bir bakış açısı getirmektedir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Bürokratik yolsuzluk; İnsani kalkınma; Kurumsal kalite modeli; Botsvana; Kamerun.

DEDICATION

To my family (Mom, Collins, Emmanuel, Irene, Sylvie, Fri and William).

ACKNOWLEDGMENT

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AfDB	African Development Bank
AUCPCC	African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption
BDP	Botswana Democratic Party
CECA	Corruption and Economic Crime Act
CPI	Corruption Perception Index
DCEC	Directorate on Corruption and Economic Crimes Botswana
HDI	Human Development Index
IIAG	Ibrahim Index of African Governance
NACC	National Anti-Corruption Commission Cameroon
NAFI	National Agency for Financial Investigation
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
PAC	Principal Agent Client
SCC	Special Criminal Court
SSA	Sub-Saharan Africa
TI	Transparency International
UN	United Nations
UNCAC	UN Convention Against Corruption
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNODC	United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
UNGA	United Nations General Assembly
WGI	Worldwide Governance Indicator

Chapter 1

INTRODUCTION

Several decades after independence, Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) continues to stagnate on the path of development. From a macro-economic perspective, the Gross Domestic Product per capita based on 'Purchasing Power Parity' GDP (PPP) for the region has remained the lowest compared to other regions in the last two decades (2000 - 2020), with an abysmal growth from $1,971 - $4,356 (Kosenkov, 2019). This pales in comparison to most other regions with similar levels of development potentials like: Middle East and North Africa ($10,172 - $20,007); Emerging and developing Asia ($2,797 - $13,950); and Latin America and the Caribbean ($9,134 - $17,514) (Ibid.). Economic growth in SSA remained below 3 percent from 2016 - 2019 and fell below population growth for four consecutive years (World Bank, 2019).

The situation has been further compounded by the advent of the COVID-19 global pandemic. The SSA Regional Economic Outlook (REO) published by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in April 2021 indicates that economic growth in the region hit rock bottom at -1.9 percent in 2020, and that though a rebound of 3.4 percent growth is expected in 2021, it is weak compared to the 6 percent expected growth of the global economy (IMF, 2021). While some may be quick to point out that this can be considered a case of force majeure considering the fact that pandemics are natural catastrophes, the dilapidated state of SSA economies battered by high public debts made the region relatively more vulnerable in terms of absorbing the shocks of

the pandemic. This point is buttressed by Selassie and Hakobyan (2021) who underscore that SSA states went into the COVID-19 Pandemic with high debt risks and meagre spending capacity. The authors add that in comparison to industrialized economies, which spent 7.2 percent of GDP on pandemic-related fiscal packages, the area spent just an average of 2.6 percent of GDP in 2020 (Ibid).

At the microeconomic level, SSA is also bedevilled by extreme poverty. According to the World Bank, SSA accounts for two-thirds of the global population living in extreme poverty with the number of people living in extreme poverty in the region rising from 284 million in 1990 to 433 million in 2018 (Schoch & Lakner, 2020).

In terms of hunger, more than one in four people living in SSA suffer from malnutrition (Hunger Notes, 2016), while 589 million people in the region live without electricity and 37% of them lack access to clean water (Packtor, 2015).

The aforementioned dismal situation sharply contrasts with the vast natural potentials and human resources the region is endowed with. Most SSA countries seat on huge endowments of natural resources ranging from petroleum, natural gas, gold, timber, aluminium and diamond (Aljazeera, 2018). At the international level, some SSA countries are global leaders in mineral resources. Ghana is the sixth largest producer of gold in the world and first in Africa with an annual production of 138.7 tonnes (Holmes, 2021). Guinea is the second world largest producer of bauxite (the mineral from which aluminium is processed) with an annual production of 82,000 metric tons (Garside, 2021). Nigeria is the leading oil producing country in Africa with a total of 89.9 million metric tons per day (Faria, 2021) and 15th in the world with a total of 1,798 barrels per day (Sönnichsen, 2021). Namibia (fourth) and Niger (sixth) are

among the world top ten producers of uranium with annual production of 5,413 tonnes and 2,991 tonnes respectively (Pistilli, 2021). Izvorski (2018) underscores Gabon is the 10th richest country in the world using natural capital per person as the measure, and that it constitutes alongside three other SSA countries (Equatorial Guinea, Angola, and Democratic Republic of Congo) the four SSA countries that part of the global ranking of 30 resource-rich countries.

In terms of human resources, the Global Human Capital Report 2017 placed Rwanda (71), Ghana (72), Cameroon (73) and Mauritius (74) as shining examples in SSA with a human capital development attaining 60% (Allotey, 2017). This performance puts these countries in front of North Africa, South Asia, Middle East, Caribbean and Latin America averages (Ibid.).

The aforementioned paradox between the level of development in SSA and the abundant endowment of natural and human resources has led many scholars and development researchers to develop theoretical explanations which tend to be mostly exogenous. Perhaps the most popular that has emerged so far is what has been termed the "Dutch disease" or the "Resource curse". Brinčíková (2016: p. 95) defines the Dutch disease as "the negative impact on an economy of anything that increases inflows of foreign currency into the country, such as the discovery of large natural reserves." Given their overwhelming concentration on a single or few commodities (minerals or other natural resources) and failure to diversify their economies, the Dutch disease seems to be a very significant theoretical key to unravel development puzzles in some SSA countries especially those endowed with enormous natural resources. It is inefficient to explain the disparity that exists in levels of development between some resource endowed countries and others.

For instance, Botswana, South Africa, the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of Congo are among the 28 Sub-Saharan countries classified as "resource rich" as a result of non-renewable natural resources constituting more than 25% of their exports (Thorborg and Blomqvist, 2015). However, the Central African Republic and the Democratic Republic of Congo are nowhere near Botswana and South Africa when it comes to human development of GDP per capita. Botswana and South Africa are ranked in the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Human Development Index (HDI) among countries with 'high human development' while Central African Republic and Democratic Republic of Congo are classified among countries with 'Low human development' (Conceição, 2020). Similarly, Botswana and South Africa have a GDP per capita of 8,093USD and 7346USD respectively (Varrella, 2020) while Central African Republic and Democratic Republic of Congo have a GDP per capita of 384USD and 424USD respectively (TRADING ECONOMICS, 2020).

Other scholars and researcher especially with an Afrocentric or anti-capitalist mind-set are more inclined to the "Dependency theory" or "Prebisch–Singer hypothesis" which accounts for the relatively slow pace of development of SSA and other developing countries to unfavourable trade terms in the global economic system. However, the explanatory value of the theory or its usefulness as a paradigm to understand SSA's development paradox has been put to question by a number of factors. First, the authors and leading proponents of the 'dependency theory' like Fernando Henrique Cardoso and Theotonio Dos Santos emphasise that it wasn't conceived as a theory but as a novel perspective or approach (Sánchez, 2003; Sautter, 1985). Even when considered as an approach in understanding development and

'underdevelopment', the 'dependency theory' also suffers from internal contradiction between 'moderate' and 'radical' *dependentistas* (proponents) (Sánchez, 2003).

Second and even more importantly is the fact that there is a paucity of empirical evidence supporting the dependency theory. Craig (1995) carried out an empirical test of the dependency theory among 18 Caribbean Commonwealth states to assess the relationship between political and economic dependence and economic prosperity. His findings reveal a paradox with the dependent state, class, and economies in theses territories experiencing relative prosperity which goes against the grain of the theory. Another notable contradiction of the dependency school of thought is the emerging industrial economies of South East Asia (Shah, 2017). Kleemeier (1978: p. 701) was blunt in her assessment, stating unequivocally that the has an inherent controversy and lacks concrete empirical evidence to disprove the characterization of the theory as mere political dogma that serves the purpose of those who adhere to it.

Kaufman, Chernotsky and Geller (1975: p.330) on their part offer a word of caution: "it seems quite clearly necessary (as Lenin once cautioned) to take "one step backward" in the use of the dependency concept, and to proceed incrementally in its application rather than to elevate it to the status of an overarching 'developmental paradigm'. Its founders did not conceive it as a theory, it is deterministic and fatalist.

Both of the aforementioned theoretical approaches (Dutch disease, and Dependency theory) are essentially exogenous in that they approach the development paradox of SSA from the region's incorporation into, and participation in the world market or global economic system. What if the fundamental impediment to development was from within SSA countries themselves? This researcher is among those who strongly

believe the development paradox in SSA is more related to endogenous than exogenous. In this researcher's prism, corruption is a major endogenous factor.

Generally, Africa is considered among the most corrupt areas in the globe with corruption costing more to the continent than what it receives in development aid. According to a 2002 African Union study, the continent lost about $150 Billion annually from corruption (Blunt, 2002), meanwhile SSA received $22.5 Billion in development assistance in 2008 (OECD, 2009). SSA harboured five of the ten most corrupt countries in the world: Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Libya, and Guinea-Bissau) in Transparency International (TI) corruption perception index for 2016. In 2017, TI ranked SSA public sector as the most corrupt in the world (Club of Mozambique, 2018). Concerning the impact of corruption on development, TI chair José Ugaz underscored that "Corruption creates and increases poverty and exclusion. While corrupt individuals with political power enjoy a lavish life, millions of Africans are deprived of their basic needs like food, health, education, housing, access to clean water and sanitation," (Veselinovic, 2016). Stephanie Hanson of One Acre Foundation adds that corruption contributes to "stunted development and impoverishment of many African states." (Hanson, 2009).

This research study employs an endogenous approach in investigating the development paradox of SSA. Precisely, it examines the impact of bureaucratic corruption on human development in the region using Cameroon and Botswana as case studies.

1.1 Research Question

The research question guiding this thesis is: How does bureaucratic corruption affect the level of human development in Cameroon and Botswana? Subsidiary research questions and the means through which they are going to be answered including standards of measurement would be discussed in the second chapter that focuses on research methodology.

1.2 Key Concepts

This thesis is going to be based on some key concepts that merit a careful elucidation: corruption; institutions, and development.

1.2.1 Corruption

One of the major challenges in the study of corruption resides in its definition. There is a variety of definitions amongst scholars with divergent areas of emphasis. Here are some notable definitions: Joseph S. Nye defines corruption as behavioural deviances in the duties of a public servant which could stem from gains that can be private, financial, or in terms of status.

Nye's contemporary, Stanislav Andreski, provides a similar but shorter definition of corruption as "The practice of using the power of office for making private gain in breach of laws and regulations normally in force" (Andreski, 1968; p.92).

Similarly, Huntington (2002) ascribes corruption to deviant behaviour from public officials that violates agreed norms and serves private interest. Without indicting the individual involved, Werlin (1994) gives a general definition of corruption as "the diversion of public resources to nonpublic purpose".

One of the leading authorities in the field of corruption studies is Susan Rose-Ackerman. She defines corruption as "the misuse of public office for private gains" (Rose-Ackerman, 2008; p. 551). This definition echoes the notion held by one of the early scholars of corruption Joseph Senturia who perceived the phenomenon as "the misuse of public power for private profit (Senturia, 1931; p.448).

To some, the aforementioned definitions may appear as mere semantic differences but the methodological implications are huge. How one defines or specifically identifies corruption largely determines how it can be modelled and measured. Therefore, the importance of having an operational definition for this particular study cannot be over-emphasized. This study would focus specifically on bureaucratic corruption in Sub-Saharan Africa. This choice is based on the argument laid by Jain (2001) that corruption is based on the association of bureaucratic discretionary power with economic rent and deterrence (how probable it is for those involved to be caught and punished).

This study shall adopt as a working definition of bureaucratic corruption, that provided by Blackburn et al (2011: p. 407) who view it as a situation in which "civil servants, or bureaucrats, exploit their powers of discretion, delegated to them by the government, to further their own interests by indulging in illegal, or unauthorised, activities." In terms of manifestation, bureaucratic corruption happens in diverse ways. Mbaku (2016) points out that it can be seen as a mechanism specifically conceived to enable the bureaucrat (in this case the corrupted) to acquire additional income or privileges by helping the entrepreneur (in this case the corrupter) to enhance his business gains. On a broader note, Jain (2001) explains that bureaucratic corruption falls within the category of "petty corruption" and encompasses cases such as: bribes

to bureaucrats for the delivery of services normally due to public service users, or the acceleration of administrative procedure; and use of bribes to alter judicial decisions

The aforementioned definitions and explanations highlight an element of consensus in the perception of bureaucratic corruption—abuse of public office for personal gain.

Among the gamut of practices that constitute bureaucratic corruption, this study shall examine the emerging concept of "quiet corruption" introduced by the World Bank in its 2010 edition of the "African Development Indicators". Quiet corruption has been defined as a situation where "public servants fail to deliver services or inputs that have been paid for by the government" (Arbache et al, 2010; p. vii), which includes malpractices from frontline public service providers such as medical doctors, teachers, inspectors and others, which do not involve the exchange of money (Ibid).

Other manifestations of bureaucratic corruption this study shall investigate include those highlighted by Amundsen in his list of five groups of corruption:

> (1) monetary payment in transitive relationship, (2) the misappropriation of public funds, (3) economic swindle or deceit, (4) extraction of money or other resources from disadvantaged persons through coercion, threats or even violence, (5) the "natural human proclivity to favor friends, family and anybody close and trusted" in the resource distribution process and political process.
> (Jiang, 2017; p12-13).

The analysis of bureaucratic corruption in this study shall draw heavily from the principal-agent-client (PAC) model. This model presents corruption as a transaction that involves three actors: "the Principal (the State and its citizens, always considered the victims), the Agent (the civil servant in charge of administrative tasks), and the Client (the enterprise or the citizen, e.g., as tax payer)." (De Benedetto, 2014: p. 4).

Scheffler (2010) details in practical terms how corruption functions within the framework of the PAC model by explaining that an agent employed by a principal can use the discretional powers accorded to him by the latter to alter decisions and actions based on monetary payments.

Szántó (2012) further highlights this by pointing out that PAC is based on the rational choices of the actors involved. He explains that when the agent (who for instance can be a tax collector), hired by the principal (in this case the head of the taxation bureau) comes in contact with a client (in this instance the taxpayer), that agent will choose to be corrupt if he calculates that the overall benefit from corruption is more than that of honest behaviour. The model also assumes that the client (taxpayer) will attempt to bribe if he calculates there is a net benefit from bribery that exceeds that of abstaining from it (Ibid).

It should be noted that PAC is an evolved form or derivative of the principal agent model of corruption (itself drawn from the agency theory of neo-institutional economics) which on its part limited corruption as the outcome of the interaction between the principals and the agents (Groenendjik, 1997).

The PAC model is very useful in analysing bureaucratic corruption which generally involves the three actors specified in the model.

1.2.2 Institutions

This thesis is based on a hypothesis that corruption erodes the quality of institutions which in turn forestalls development. Since it is difficult to investigate or measure a phenomenon without a clear definition and conceptualization of what it means, it

would be equally important to expound the concept of institutions within the scope of this study.

The concept of institution has been defined in multiple ways by different scholars. March and Olsen view it as "a relatively stable collection of practices and rules defining appropriate behavior for specific groups of actors in specific situations." (as cited by Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998: p. 891). Scott (2014: p. 33) defines institutions as "cognitive, normative, and regulative structures and activities that provide stability and meaning to social behaviour." However, the most succinct and comprehensive definition, in my view, comes from Douglas North who views institutions as "rules of the game in a society or...humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction." (North, 1990: p. 3). According to North, institutions comprise "both informal constraints (sanctions, taboos, customs, traditions, and codes of conduct), and formal rules (constitutions, laws, property rights)." (North, 1991: p. 97).

It is commonplace for 'institutions' to be conflated with 'organisation' as there is a tendency for them to be used interchangeably. However, the United Kingdom's Department for International Development (DFID) provides some clarification by underscoring "If institutions can be defined as the "rules of the game", organisations are how we structure ourselves to play" (DFID as cited by Joshi & Carther, 2015: p. 4). The distinguishing characteristics of institutions include: reproduction by means of routine actions; the capacity to endow daily political, social, and economic interaction with relative predictability and certainty; persistence over time and possibility of incremental and rarely sudden change; the capacity to shape behaviour thereby affecting developmental outcome; and the ability to become internalised and unconsciously inscribed in the interactions of social actors (Ibid.).

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By institution therefore, this study shall pry into formal and informal rules, regulations and code of conduct and how they are affected by the prevalence or practice of corruption. The nexus between institutional quality and corruption was clearly underlined by Mbaku (1998), who views corruption in Africa as the result of the lack of effective institutions and regulation. Mbaku underscored that corruption in the continent is the product of "poor rules and an incentive structure that encourages and rewards opportunism" (Ibid.: p. 7). This thesis shall examine institutional quality, institutional structure, and institutional function within the broad framework of the institutional quality model it has adopted. The aforementioned terms warrant some explanation on their contextual usage in this thesis.

1.2.2.1 Institutional Quality

Bruinshoofd (2016) defines institutional quality as "a broad concept that captures law, individual rights and high-quality government regulation and services". Institutional quality has become a key in analysing the pace of development in Africa in general and Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) in particular. The nexus between the aforementioned variables (institutional quality and development) has been the object of a significant level of intellectual curiosity in recent times with many scholars expressing pertinent perspectives in the SSA and continental context. Most scholars are of the opinion that SSA and Africa's development stagnation is largely the product of weak institutions. In this respect, Wohlgemuth et al (1998: p. 7) unequivocally underscore that: "In a fundamental sense, the crisis in African development can be said to be a crisis of its institutions." Nyamadzawo (2019) links institutional deficiency to lack of human development in SSA, pointing out that it has led to "the lack of political will by governments to address and provide the fundamentals to its people like potable water, housing, economic opportunities, and healthcare". Birdsall (2007), on her part

accounts the slow growth and failure to reduce poverty in several SSA countries to what she termed as 'weak-institutions trap' (WIT)—that is an institutional framework void of adequate autonomy and accountability.

1.2.2.2 Institutional Structure and Institutional Function

The institutional crisis in SSA has a two-fold dimension: structural; and functional. The structural dimension has to do with the existence of appropriate institutions that provides the necessary norms, laws, rules, regulations, and safeguards to ensure good governance, transparency and accountability in the polity; while the functional dimension, as the name indicates, refers to the effective functioning of the institutions of governance. While the former (structural dimension) usually attracts more attention and efforts through institution-building and institutional reforms; the latter is seldom addressed. Parks et al (2017) aptly illustrate this issue by pointing out that while most of the efforts of wealthy countries to promote institution-building and reforms in developing countries have been centred on bilateral and multilateral aid programmes, most of such programmes only offer cosmetic structural changes with little impact on the functioning of institutions in the countries in which they are implemented.

The crux of the institutional crisis in Africa therefore is not just about the existence of appropriate institutions of governance but more importantly their effectiveness. Nowhere, is the institutional challenge more glaring, in the SSA and African context than the justice system. The key element in ensuring the effective functioning of institutions is the effectiveness and efficiency of the rule of law which on its part depends on the effectiveness an integrity of the judiciary. Norms, rules, regulations, customs, and every other element on which institutions are defined become impotent if there is no competent, reliable, integral, and well-functioning judiciary to ensure their enforcement. No number of institutional reforms, capacity-building, and

strengthening can engender strong and healthy institutions when impunity remains the order of the day.

So, does SSA and Africa in general possess the necessary judicial framework to provide accountability, and ensure the smooth functioning of governance institutions? At the continental (African) and regional (SSA) level, there do exists a patchwork of laws in the forms of conventions, treaties, and protocol regulating various fields of law. There also exist continental and regional judiciary entities and a hierarchy which provides elements that depicts a form of international judicial system within the continent with state laws, incorporating and subordinate to regional, and continental courts. Examples of continental judicial bodies include permanent judicial institutions like the African Court for Human and People's Rights (AfCHPR), and the Common Court of Justice and Arbitration (CCJA) of the Organization for the Harmonization of Business Laws in Africa (OHADA); and ad-hoc judicial bodies like the African Extraordinary Chambers (AEC) for the trial of Hissène Habré. Examples of regional judiciary institutions include: the Economic Community of West Africa States (ECOWAS) Community Court of Justice (ECCJ); the Southern African Development Community (SADC) Tribunal; and the East African Court of Justice (EACJ).

1.2.3 Development

According to Sumner and Tribe (2008: p. 10), the notion of development has witnessed a conceptual evolution in terms of perception: from an emancipatory vision based on 'structural transformation' in the 1950s and 1960s; to a perspective (espoused by global development donor organisations) rooted in the quest to achieve the Millennium Development Goals and poverty reduction; and thirdly, to the post-modernist perspective of development as "a 'discourse' (set of ideas) that actually shapes and frames 'reality' and power relations".

It is not surprising therefore to find the concept being defined differently among scholars. Rabie (2016) defines development as an economic concept which involves the implementation of specific economic and technological methods to make use of the resources at hand to stimulate economic growth and raise people's standards of living. Myrdal (1974) on his part perceives development as an upward movement of the social system in its entirety. Slim (1995) defines development simply as a change that brings improvement. From the aforementioned definitions, it is obvious that development is vast and ambiguous. For the purpose of this study, it would be necessary to delineate what aspect of development is involved within the aforementioned corruption-institutional quality-development model.

This study shall focus on human development given that it provides a universally recognized and institutionalized approach to define, measure and achieve development. In its 1990 edition of the Human Development Report (HDR), the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) defined human development as a means of expanding the choices individuals have at their disposal, top amongst which are long and healthy lifespan, education, and good living standard.

This study shall adopt the UNDP's Human Development Index (HDI) as its standard for the measurement of the level of development in the case study countries.

1.3 Output and Relevance

This study aims at generating empirical evidence on the relationship between corruption and development in SSA. Findings derived from this study will be a valuable contribution to literature exploring the development paradox of SSA and those investigating the relationship between corruption and development. Scholars and

researchers will find in it, useful empirical data on the phenomenon of corruption and how it impacts development in Cameroon and Botswana. The outcome of this study will also elucidate the differences and similarities in the manifestation, levels, and implications of corruption in both countries as well as mechanisms put in place for its mitigation and their effectiveness. This would be useful for policymakers, development agencies and experts to better decipher the magnitude of the problem (the impact of corruption on development) and the importance on investing to address it. This study also attempts to provide an alternative explanation in the assessment of the cause of development lethargy within SSA from exogenous causes which are often beyond the control of the SSA countries to endogenous causes which is well within their ability to handle. This study would hopefully ignite more academic curiosity and scholarly debates about the root causes of development stagnancy and poverty in SSA in general and the contribution of corruption to the developmental predicaments of the region in particular.

1.4 Chapter Organization

The first chapter shall focus on an introduction to the study which covers the problematic and objectives of the research as well as its expected output and contribution to knowledge. The second chapter delves into a review of existing literature on the research topic. It shall examine scholarly debates on the paradox of development in SSA (centred on exogenous and endogenous perspectives). It shall also revisit existing literature on the impact of corruption on development with particular emphasis on the debate between the moralist school and the revisionist school and empirical evidence on the impact of corruption on development. The third chapter focuses on research methodology and theoretical framework.

Chapters four and five shall focus on an analysis of the impact of corruption on development in the two case-study countries selected for this thesis—Cameroon and Botswana. It shall look at the causes, manifestation, perception, and consequences of bureaucratic corruption on human development in both countries. Chapter four looks at Cameroon while chapter five examines Botswana.

Chapter six presents a comparative analysis of both case-study countries to highlight the differences and similarities in the prevalence of bureaucratic corruption and its impact on human development in both countries. This chapter also analyse the extent to which these case studies depict the realities of SSA countries.

The seventh and last chapter carries a general conclusion that summarizes the main findings and provide answers to the research question and hypothesis.

Chapter 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1 Introduction

The paradox of low level of development amidst abundant resources in SSA has elicited a great deal of intellectual curiosity and animated discussions and debates amongst scholars and policy-makers. This chapter examines the state-of-the art when it comes to literature on the aforementioned subject. It probes into the two major perspectives scholars have taken concerning the cause of the paradox of development and resources in SSA: exogenous factors, and endogenous factors. This chapter also reviews scholarly debate on the impact of corruption on development. It examines the views of those who see corruption as a necessary evil and those who see it as "an ill wind that blows no good".

2.2 Scholarly Debate on the Paradox of Development and Resources in SSA

There are two major schools of thought when it comes to academic discussions concerning the paradox of development and resources in SSA: the exogenous perspective which traces the cause of the aforementioned paradox in SSA to external constrains or adverse factors emanating from outside which is beyond their control; and the endogenous perspective which underscores the contribution of internal factors to SSA's development paradox. Both perspectives have adherents who have made their views known in academic literature.

2.2.1 Exogenous Perspectives

Proponents of the exogenous perspective use external factors to explain the paradox of development and resources in SSA. Prominent amongst such factors are: SSA's integration into and exploitation within the global capitalist economy (Dependency theory); the Washington Consensus; and the development aid paradigm.

2.2.1.1 Dependency Theory

One of the founders and main proponents of the dependency theory, Brazilian economist Theotonio dos Santos provided a succinct definition of the theory:

> By dependency we mean a situation in which the economy of certain countries is conditioned by the development and expansion of another economy to which the former is subjected. The relation of inter-dependency between two or more economies, and between these and world trade, assumes the form of dependency when some countries (the dominant ones) can expand and can be self-sustaining, while other countries (the dependent ones) can do this only as a reflection of that expansion, which can have either a positive or a negative effect on their immediate development.
> (Dos Santos, 1970; p. 231)

From a dependency perspective therefore, the paradox of development in SSA can be attributed to its economic exploitation through its integration and domination in the global capitalist system where the "metropolis" (typically Western states) develops at the expense of the "satellite" (typical third world states like those of SSA) (Frank, 1966).

It is important to underscore that dependency theory is not monolithic as there exist two broad categories in the dependency school: neo-Marxist who are in favour of a command-centred economy, and liberal reformists who back targeted policy interventions (Schmidt & Tally, 2018). However, the distinguishing characteristic of the theory (irrespective of the categories) is the fact that insist on the structure of the

international system rather than the internal characteristics of countries as the key variable in understanding their level of development (Smith, 1979). In this context, 'underdevelopment' (a jargon used by proponent of the theory to refer to lack of development) represents a direct consequence of capital intervention. Prominent dependency scholars like Raúl Prebisch and Andre Gunder Frank argue that development and underdevelopment are two sides of the same coin given that the exact same processes that engender high incomes in the West tends to keep the rest of the world in a state of dependence when it comes to wealth extraction (Schmidt & Tally, 2018; Sánchez, 2003).

From the African perspective, another prominent member of the dependency school Walter Rodney accounts Africa's development stagnation to Western capitalist interventions on the continent--slave trade and colonialism (Rodney, 1973). The title of Rodney's masterpiece on the aforementioned subject published in 1973 speaks for itself--How Europe Underdeveloped Africa.

From the perspective of dependency theorists therefore, the SSA development paradox is essentially the outcome of their exploitation by the West through successive capitalist interventions from slavery, through colonialism to what has now been termed 'neo-colonialism'. Concerning the latter (neo-colonialism), Berman (1974: p. 4) notes that:

> Economically and politically weak, African states are and will continue to be peripheral areas in relation to centres of economic and political power in wealthy nations. Independence for these former colonies has meant trading the direct political control of colonialism for the indirect economic, political and cultural controls of neo-colonialism. They continue in imperialistic relations of dependence to the former ruling powers, Britain and France, and, more diffusely, to Western Europe (through the European Economic Community) and to the United States.

The Dependency theory has come under criticism from some scholars who have identified certain lapses in its assumptions. Sánchez (2003) points out the lack of consensus on the definition of 'dependency' amongst dependency scholars giving rise to multiple interpretations that makes the theory ambiguous. Schmidt and Tally (2018) adds that policymakers have challenged the unequal terms of trade hypothesis which they argue is based on theoretical assumption which are not backed by empirical evidence; and that some theorists later on took aim at the some of the key tenets of dependency which proved impotent in explaining the transition from the status of a peripheral to a core state.

Rudolf von Albertini on his part, criticized both the conceptual framework and the idealization of precolonial societies embedded in dependency theory. He underscores:

> The Theory of Dependency makes use of a concept of underdevelopment which does not correspond to every day language. By underdevelopment the "normal user" understands an extremely low standard of living, that is, a minimal per capita income, low productivity, a low level of technical sophistication, little or no industry, a high illiteracy rate, insufficient formal and technical education, modest medical services, and a low life expectancy. In this general sense, Nepal, Afghanistan, Yemen, Ethiopia, Niger and Chad qualify as especially underdeveloped, more underdeveloped than India, Ceylon, Egypt, Ghana and Senegal. Incorporation into the world economic system - thereby capitalism - can hardly be held as being responsible for the underdevelopment of the countries initially mentioned...
>
> Nationalist and Marxist historians and economists who use the Theory of Dependency and make colonialism responsible for underdevelopment, always tend to idealize the precolonial societies. The administrative efficiency of precolonial states in Africa and Asia is over-estimated in this way and is compared with the absolutist states in Europe in the 17th and 18th centuries, in order to emphasize the possibility of a transition to bourgeois capitalism; analogous to the European situation this transition did not, however, take place as a result of the European penetration and occupation.
> (von Albertini, 1980; p.45; 46)

Smith (1979) also shares von Albertini's line of thought. He argues that "dependency theory in general substantially overestimates the power of the international system-or imperialism-in southern affairs today".

In a nutshell, while dependency theory provides an alternative theoretical lens to view the development process especially in third world nations, there are few empirical evidences to corroborate or validate its key assumptions. While acknowledging the overall negative impact of slavery and colonialism on Africa's development, it is difficult to still hold on to these factors as they explanation of development stagnation in SSA more than half a century after independence. The economic determinism embedded in dependency theory not only robes SSA countries of the power of agency but imposes on them a fatalism to under which escape is impossible.

2.2.1.2 Washington Consensus

Another school of thought attribute SSA development predicaments to what has been termed the 'Washington Consensus'. Before analysing the arguments of adherents of this perspective, it is important to elucidate the meaning of the aforementioned term. The term 'Washington Consensus' was coined by British economist John Harold Williamson in 1981 to encompass a list of ten policies the author believes everyone in Washington (experts of Washington-based international institutions like the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and the United States Treasury) would concur were necessary to tackle the debt crisis and macroeconomic predicaments that bedevilled Latin America from the early to the mid-1980s (Irwin & Ward, 2021). The ten reforms included: Fiscal Discipline; Tax Reform; Reordering Public Expenditure Priorities; Liberalizing Interest Rates; Deregulation; Trade Liberalization; Privatization; Property Rights; Liberalization of Inward Foreign Direct Investment; and Competitive Exchange Rate (Williamson, 2004). According to Rodrik (2006), the

Washington Consensus inspired a SSA and Latin America which brought fundamental transformation in their policy landscape.

The main instrument through which the Washington Consensus was implemented in SSA is the Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAP). The SAP jointly pursued by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) for almost two decades (1980 - 1999) in response to the economic crisis that rocked African countries in the 1970s. While the IMF focused on restructuring the macroeconomic policy and development agenda of SSA countries that subscribed to the programme, the World Bank provided structural adjustment loans. According to Heidhues and Obare (2011: p.58), SAPs implemented in SSA had the following characteristics:

> They emphasised anti-inflationary macroeconomic stabilisation policies and pushed for private sector and free market development, controlling budget deficits, privatising public sector companies and services, dissolving parastatals, eliminating subsidies and cutting public support for social services. A typical SAP called for devaluation and trade liberalisation to improve the country's balance of payments and control its foreign indebtedness; debt rescheduling and stricter debt management were regularly part of the prescribed policy set.

SAPs have come under sharp criticism from several scholars as having had an adverse effect on African economies. Lopes (2012) points out that there is a general perception that SAP and is macroeconomic stabilization reforms have engendered disastrous effects on the level of poverty and social policies in several countries which include a rise in unemployment, poverty, and unequal distribution of income. The most damning assessment of the Washington Consensus comes from its one of its most vocal critic Turkish Economist Dani Rodrik who said the following concerning its failure:

> The one thing that is generally agreed on about the consequences of these reforms is that things have not quite worked out the way they were intended. Even their most ardent supporters now concede that growth has been below expectations in Latin America (and the "transition crisis"

deeper and more sustained than expected in former socialist economies). Not only were success stories in Sub-Saharan Africa few and far in between, but the market-oriented reforms of the 1990s proved ill-suited to deal with the growing public health emergency in which the continent became embroiled.
(Rodrik, 2006; p. 974)

From a more nuanced perspective, Manuel (2003) argues that while the Washington Consensus "provided a good mixture of reforms to both stabilize the economy and encourage private sector activity, it did very little to help resolve structural and institutional constraints on growth". The most glaring positive assessment of the impact of the Washington Consensus on the economies of SSA comes from a recent article published by Archibong, Coulibaly and Okonjo-Iweala which doccuments significant advances in the economic output of countries who adopted Washington Consensus reforms in the past two decades (2000 - 2020). From their analysis of empirical data on the three key reforms that underlies the Washington Consensus, the aforementioned scholars came to the following conclusion on its overall impact on SSA economies:

> ...the reforms in a number of cases did lead to an improved macroeconomic environment with lower inflation, combined with debt reductions. These changes did help to attract more private investment in key sectors like retail, wholesale, telecommunications and manufacturing that accounted for a significant share of the growth increases in the 2000 to 2019 period. In addition, the countries of sub-Saharan Africa saw a wave of democratization in the 1990s, with the number of countries that held multi-party elections increasing from just 2 (Botswana and Mauritius) before 1989 to 44 of 48 or 92 percent of Sub-Saharan Africa by mid 2003 (Lynch and Crawford, 2011); this had the effect of encouraging investment in infrastructure and in pro-poor polices. While the total investment as a share of GDP in sub-Saharan Africa fell sharply in the early 1980s as shown in Figure 3, investment stabilized and then rose. Over time, countries that were more responsive to their citizens, as well as international financial institutions, learned from past experiences and improved design and implementation of reforms.
> (Archibong et al, 2021)

From a comprehensive perspective, while the weaknesses of the Washington Consensus as an instrument of growth and development in SSA has been glaring it would historically inaccurate to attribute the paradox of development in SSA to the aforementioned reform package given the fact that it came as a prescription following the crises induced on SSA by the failures of the Import-Substitution Industrialisation (ISI) model and other reform policies it pursued (Heidhues and Obare, 2011) like the "Lagos Plan of Action for the economic development of Africa" adopted by the Organisation of African Unity in 1980 (D'Sa, 1983) and the Regional Food Plan for Africa conceived by the Food and Agricultural Organisation (FAO) and the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) in the late 1970s (UNECA, 1982). The Washington Consensus came as a treatment to a patient ailing from their own induced wounds of economic policy failures. While, Washington Consensus reforms like the SAPs and its successors like the Highly Indebted Poor Countries Initiative (HIPC) had some adverse effects, there are not the fundamental reason for the development paradox in SSA.

2.1.2.3 The Development Aid Paradigm

Another possible explanation for the development paradox in SSA comes from scholars who question the effectiveness of development assistance to the region. Prominent amongst them is Zambian Economist Dambisa Moyo whose masterpiece Dead Aid underscores the correlation between international development assistance and development stagnation in Africa in general. She explains that poverty rose from 11% to an alarming 66% from 1970 - 1998 which is the period when foreign aid to Africa was at its climax (Moyo, 2009). Moyo argues that international aid to Africa is easy cash that is vulnerable to corruption (illustrated by the fortunes accumulated by African dictators like Mubutu of former Zaire through embezzlement of state funds),

distorts the local economy by establishing a culture of dependency (Moyo & Myers, 2009). Moyo illustrate her case by pointing to the fact that 25% of World Bank Aid is mismanaged with a clear example being that of Uganda in the 1990s where it was estimated that just 20% of government allocation to education actually got to local primary schools to which it was destined (Thompson, 2016).

In a nutshell, Moyo argues that international aid entraps recipient countries in poverty and keeps social capital weak by "thwarting accountability mechanisms, encouraging rent-seeking behavior, siphoning away talent, and removing pressures reform inefficient policies and institutions," (Moyo as cited by Wales, 2009).

Moyo's views which have come under sharp criticism and instigated a hair-splitting debate amongst policymakers, scholars, and practitioners on the importance and necessity of international development assistance. Her book Dead Aid provoked a backlash from campaigners of foreign assistance notably Bono and his aid advocacy group ONE.

Responding the claims in Moyo's book, ONE's senior Africa manager Edith Jibunoh pointed out that foreign aid can play a useful role in some countries when managed properly and associated to with a clear exit plan (Jibunoh, 2009); and that Moyo's argument for the termination of all aid in five years puts out of touch with the realities of suffering families in Africa. As evidence of the importance of how the aforementioned combination (development aid and its effective management) has helped Africa, Jibunoh points out that:

> …more than two million people in Africa on life-saving antiretroviral Aids drugs; 34 million more African children going to school for the first time; malaria deaths halved in Rwanda and Ethiopia. All this has happened

within the past decade thanks to a combination of increasingly effective aid and improved African leadership.
(Ibid.).

To Moyo's defence, Easterly and Freschi (2009) points out that ONE's criticism of Moyo is based on a misrepresentation of her ideas. They underscore that "ONE characterizes Moyo's plan as a call to 'shut off all aid in 5 years,' when Moyo is very clear about excluding humanitarian aid and NGO/ charitable aid from her discussion."

One of the most vociferous criticisms of Moyo's argument against international aid to Africa came from the co-founder of Microsoft and philanthropist billionaire Bill Gates who took aim at Moyo's claim about the role of international aid in promoting dependency. On this regard, Gates stated:

Having children not die is not creating a dependency, having children not be so sick they can't go to school, not having enough nutrition so their brains don't develop. That is not a dependency. That's an evil thing and books like that – they're promoting evil ... I think that the book actually did damage generosity of rich world countries … People have excused various cutbacks because of it.
(Provost, 2013)

The content of Gate's critique appears to re-echo the misrepresentation of Moyo's claims put forward by ONE as it hinges on humanitarian rather than international development aid which is the subject of Moyo's book.

Be it as it may, Moyo's critique of international development aid as pertinent as its is doesn't in itself explain the development paradox in SSA which predates the aforementioned phenomenon. SSA was already in severe economic crisis in the 1970s and early 1980s (Fole, 2003; Greene & Khan, 1990; Lancaster, 1983) before approaching the Bretton Woods institutions and other international donors.

2.2 Endogenous Perspectives on the Paradox of Underdevelopment in SSA

Whilst a lot of scholars have accounted the paradox of underdevelopment in SSA to exogenous factors especially its interaction with the global economy, there is a growing number of scholars who have offered an alternative perspective by looking at endogenous factors. Authors of this school of thought focus their attention on internal factors within SSA that can explain the absence of development amidst abundant natural and human resources. There are three main arguments postulated within this school: policy failures (Import-substitution industrialization); and bad institutions; and corruption.

2.2.1 Policy Failures (Import-substitution Industrialization)

In terms of policy failures, the 'original sin' that engendered the development paradox in SSA can be traced to the unsuccessful implementation of the import-substitution industrialization (ISI) policy adopted by most SSA countries at independence. Theoretically, ISI refers to an economic approach embraced by developing countries or states considered as emerging markets which seeks to reduce their reliance on developed countries (Segal, 2021). In practical terms, ISI is "based on the protection of local infant industries through protective tariffs, import quotas, exchange rate controls, special preferential licensing for capital goods imports, subsidized loans to local infant industries, etc. "(Ogujiuba et al. 2011: p. 8).

ISI was supposed to be the development catalyst and panacea to decades of economic exploitation, poverty, and stagnation engineered by slavery and colonialism. At the dawn of independence, most Sub-Saharan African states made a transition from an export-oriented economy that was dependent on commodity exportation to an

industrialized economy through ISI. As the name indicates, ISI sought to promote industrialization through the substitution of the imported manufactured goods with locally made ones through the establishment of local industries to produce them (Ogujiuba et al, 2011). The ultimate goal was to use ISI as a means to reverse the adverse effect of the falling terms of trade and balance of payment disequilibrium (Mendes et al, 2014). The early adopters of ISI in SSA were: Tanzania, Nigeria, and Zambia who began a large-scale implementation of the policy in the early 1960s. They were followed by Madagascar and Ghana before others join the queue right up to the 1980s (Mendes et al, 2012).

By and large, ISI turn out to be a failure in SSA. Statistical indicators show industrial development in countries of SSA was lower than that of other developing countries more than a decade after the implementation of ISI. For instance, of the 6.9% of value addition to global manufacturing by developing countries in 1960, SSA accounted for just 0.7% and a trivial 0.8% of the 8.8% value addition to global manufacturing by developing countries in 1975; in terms of global industrial export, SSA's share in the export of manufactured products fell from 1.12% in 1970/71 - 0.60% in 1975/76 (Ibid.).

The major reason for the failure of ISI was the wrong approach taken and lapses in its implementations by SSA states. The implementation of ISI failed to produce the expected results partly due to excessive intervention of the state into the economy and mismanagement (UNCTAD, 2008).

Mytelka (1989) underscore that there was an overall misconception in the implementation of ISI in SSA as import reproduction was mistaken for import

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substitution which was a more rigorous process that focus on purpose and context of production.

Ogujiuba et al (2011: p. 12) corroborate Mytelka's explanation of the failure of ISI in SSA by adding:

> Firms in sub-Saharan Africa failed to use ISI as a learning process to acquire the requisite technological capability for export production. ISI, apparently, had encouraged accumulation of production capacities but paid little attention to accumulation of technological capability. By the end of the 1970s, ISI in sub-Saharan Africa had entered a cul-de-sac - a phase of decline.

Another factor that accounts for the failure of ISI policies in SSA and Africa in general is corruption and mismanagement. Jackson and Jabbie (2020) argue that corruption was a determinant factor that made the pace of the implementation of ISI slower in Africa than in Latin America and Asia.

Mendes et al (2014) also argued that one of the reasons for the failure of ISI in SSA is because of governmental corruption which led to structural deficiencies in the industrial plants (wrongly located, and badly designed, and oversized). A typical example of such corruption is the case of Tanzania and Zambia where the politicization of decision-making in public enterprises during the ISI process led the appointment of incompetent managers and directors to parastatals (Makoba, 1993).

It is obvious from the aforementioned explanations that the cause of the failure of the ISI as a development policy in SSA can be attributed to the failure of its leadership to effectively implement the policy due to a misguided approach and corrupt governance. The failure of the ISI can be categorized as the 'original sin' in the development

paralysis that ensued given the fact that it formed the basis of the subsequent resort to and dependence on foreign aid from the Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) era till date.

2.2.2 Bad Institutions

The main proponents of the institutional argument are Acemoglu and Robinson who attribute development differences to disparity in institutions of governance amongst states. In their masterpiece entitled *Why Nations Fail: The Origins of Power, Prosperity, and Poverty*, the authors postulate an institutional paradigm that distinguishes two types of political institutions: inclusive and extractive. Inclusive institutions, they explain, are those that combine broad-based political participation (pluralism), rule of law, checks and balances in the political front; and "secure private property, an unbiased system of law, and a provision of public services that provides a level playing field in which people can exchange and contract" in the economic front (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012; p. 144). Extractive institutions on their part are a combination of absolutism (concentration of powers in the hands of a few, absence of checks and balances and the rule of law) in the political domain; and an economic system design to discourage economic participation within the masses and extract resources for the benefits of the political elite in the economic domain.

The thrust of their arguments is that extractive institutions create an enabling environment for stagnation in development and poverty meanwhile inclusive institutions are a catalyst to economic development. An empirical example provided by the authors to illustrate this argument is that of the Congo where a group of powerful political elites known as 'Les Grosses Legumes' (The Big Vegetable in English) under the leadership of Mobutu amassed a fabulous amount of wealth at the expense of the masses by running extractive political and economic institutions. In the opinion of the

authors therefore, institutional quality is therefore a crucial determinant when it comes to economic development and growth.

The contrast between extractive and inclusive institutions was also highlighted in a speech by former US President Barack Obama during his first visit to Africa in Accra Ghana. Obama underscored the following concerning the aforementioned distinction:

> As I said in Cairo, each nation gives life to democracy in its own way, and in line with its own traditions. But history offers a clear verdict: Governments that respect the will of their own people, that govern by consent and not coercion, are more prosperous, they are more stable, and more successful than governments that do not.
>
> This is about more than just holding elections. It's also about what happens between elections. Repression can take many forms, and too many nations, even those that have elections, are plagued by problems that condemn their people to poverty. No country is going to create wealth if its leaders exploit the economy to enrich themselves or if police -- if police can be bought off by drug traffickers. No business wants to invest in a place where the government skims 20 percent off the top or the head of the Port Authority is corrupt. No person wants to live in a society where the rule of law gives way to the rule of brutality and bribery. That is not democracy, that is tyranny, even if occasionally you sprinkle an election in there. And now is the time for that style of governance to end.
>
> In the 21st century, capable, reliable, and transparent institutions are the key to success -- strong parliaments; honest police forces; independent judges; an independent press; a vibrant private sector; a civil society.
> (Obama, 2009)

Acemoglu and Robinson can be considered as the main proponents of what can be described as the institutional paradigm of development. This notion (institutional paradigm) identifies institutions as the key to development (both economic and human) in all countries. It also emphasises the relationship between the quality of institutions of governance and the level of development a country can attain pointing

out a positive correlation between inclusive institution and increase development and negative correlation between extractive institution and increase development.

While Acemoglu and Robinson can be rightfully credited as the main proponent of the institutional paradigm of development, Putnam can be seen as its precursor. Putnam, Leonardi, and Nonetti's 1993 masterpiece entitled: *Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy* was one of the first attempt to analyse development outcomes as a product of institutional performance. Based on an empirical study of the performance of newly instituted regional governments in northern and southern Italy in the early 1970s, Putnam and his collaborators developed the notion of 'social capital' which they identified as the key determinant to institutional performance in a democracy (Putnam et al, 1993). From a comparative evaluation of policy pronouncements, processes, and implementation of all the regions (based on a composite performance index comprising 12 indicators measuring success and failure of institutions) the authors established a strong correlation between the performance of institutions and the level of economic and social development.

Their main conclusion of their research was that regional governments in northern Italy performed better than their counterparts in the South in terms of social and economic development because of more effective and stable institutions which in themselves were the result of social capital (the high level of civic engagement of their inhabitants).

Acemoglu and Robinson's institutional paradigm has been corroborated by others studies that have established a relationship between institutional quality and development in SSA. Wandeda et al (2021) in a study on the impact of institutional

quality on economic growth in SSA countries from 2006-2018 using the two-step system Generalized Method of Moment (GMM) estimator, found out a significant and positive improvement of output is derived from an improvement of institutional quality. The study also recommends the strengthening of institutional entities prosecuting economic crimes as well as those that broaden democratic space, enhances civil liberty, and citizen participation in the country's development agenda (Ibid).

Similarly, another study by Adegboye et al (2020) on the role of institutional quality in determining the flow of foreign direct investment (FDI) confirms the validity of the institutional quality paradigm. Analysing data pooled for 30 selected countries in SSA for an 18-year period (2000 - 2018), the study reveals institutional quality affects the inflow of FDI into SSA which (FDI) is a crucial factor to the economic development of the region (Ibid).

The institutional quality paradigm in SSA is also supported by another empirical study on 42 SSA countries that focuses on the nexus between trade liberalization, institutional quality, and income for a 34-year period (1980 - 2013). The study found institutional quality is a key determinant for economic development within the context of free trade in these countries (Doan, 2019).

Last but not the least amongst corroborating evidences is a study on the whether or not institutions have an impact on economic performance in SSA and if it be the case, what type of institutions matters most. The results of the study reveal institutions have an impact on economic performance in SSA and that the most important of such is regulatory quality (Kilishi, 2013).

Institutional quality is therefore a crucial determinant when analysing the development paradox in SSA. One of the fundamental factors that determines institutional quality is corruption. The link between corruption and institutional quality has become the object of much intellectual curiosity with studies and academic publications highlighting the issue. Habivov et al (2017) probed into the nexus between corruption and institutional trust in post-Soviet states and Mongolia. Their study reveals, "increases in corruption erode trust at all levels of the societal institutions including political parties, government and financial institutions, international investors, non-profit organizations, and trade unions" (Ibid., p. 172).

The aforementioned findings can be corroborated by a study commissioned by the United Kingdom Department for International Development (DFID) on the conditions facilitating corruption, its cost and the most effective mechanism to fight it. The report highlights the existence of "a large and statistically significant negative correlation between corruption and levels of confidence in public institutions." (Menocal & Taxel, 2015; p. 50)

Assessing the impact of on corruption and growth and inequality, Transparency International underscores that a wide consensus exists on argument that corruption experience and perceptions destroys the trust citizens have on the legitimacy of the institutions of the state, the political process, and public institutions; and in the long run the democratic process and the rule of law (Chêne, 2014).

A global study on the impact of corruption on confidence in public institution based on global household survey data collected from Gallup World Poll indicates there is

"a quantitatively large and statistically significant negative effect of corruption on confidence in public institutions" (Clausen et al, 2011; p. 243).

2.3 Scholarly Debate on the Impact of Corruption on Development

While there seems to be a consensus that corruption has an impact on society, the nature of that impact has been a subject of hair-splitting debate among scholars. On the one hand are 'Functionalists' (also called 'Revisionists'), who see some virtue in corruption like: speeding up red tapes; granting political access to the excluded; and on the other hand, are the 'Post-Functionalists' or 'Moralists' who view corruption as a harmful phenomenon to governments and society, an impediment to development, and a factor that erodes institutional legitimacy (Johnston, 1986). Scholars of both schools have put forward strong arguments to buttress their claims which are worthwhile revisiting.

2.3.1 Functionalist/Revisionist School

The functionalist/revisionist school emerged in the 1960s and had as prominent adherents Samuel Huntington, Joseph Nye, Nathaniel Leff, and David Bayley (Noor, 2009). Generally, functionalist perceived corruption as a by-product of modernization and development and tried to detach it from any ethical or moral ethos (Munyai, 2020). According to functionalists, corruption has a developmental function as it plays a role in developing countries "which is sufficiently important that if it was not played by this device must be played by another or the consequences might severely undermine the pace, but more importantly the character of the development effort." (Alam, 1989: p.441).

Huntington saw corruption as a means to "grease the wheels" of development by fast-tracking the burden of regulatory requirements, and enhancing the distribution of

resources and engendering economic growth (Dupuy, n.d.). Nye underscores, the functionalist perspective of corruption re-echoes Bernard Mandevill's axiom—"Private vices, by the dextrous Management of a skillfull[sic] politician, may be turned into Publick[sic] Benefits." (Werner, 1983: p. 146). Functionalist make four main arguments about the functionality of corruption:

2.3.1.1 Corruption Prevents Revolutions

This contention emerged in the context of the Cold War where the capitalist West struggled to contain the spread of communism of which revolutions was a glaring indicator. Within this framework, functionalist scholars argue that corruption could serve as a mechanism to pre-empt the emergence of revolutions. According to Huntington (1969), corruption can be used to stem the tide of a revolution by serving as an appeasement mechanism for disgruntle segments of the society thereby reducing the potentials of a class struggle which can lead to a system upheaval. He makes the case by presenting corruption as an alternative to reform which when combine with corruption can both form an alternative to revolution. To illustrate this tandem, he presents the case of Brazil where corruption served as a tool to mitigate pressure from groups and classes for policy or structural changes. He adds that government loans were provided to leaders of trade association in Brazil to lure them to surrender the larger claims of their associations (Ibid).

This perspective is shared by Dwivedi (1967) who also argues that bureaucratic corruption particularly 'universalistic bribery' plays a functional role in preventing the outbreak of revolutions.

In the minds of functionalists therefore, corruption has a useful role in preventing revolutions which within the context of the Cold War was a far bigger concern.

2.3.1.2 Corruption Facilitates Modernization

Huntington (1969) argues that corruption is both a by-product and a catalyst to the process of modernization. He emphasizes that corruption enhances modernization in two ways: it stabilizing the political system by increasing informal political participation; and facilitates social mobility by providing an opportunity for newcomers to acquire private wealth which will otherwise not be possible in a developmental state with a small and restrictive private sector (Osrecki, 2016).

Functionalists generally view corruption as part of the initial phase of modernization across societies. They argue it was experienced by modernized Western societies in their early stages of modernization such as 18th - early 19th Century Britain and late 19th and early 20th Century America; and represents a 'functional dysfunction' for developing countries at the start of their process of modernization (Kajsiu, 2016).

2.3.1.3 Corruption Greases the Wheel of Economy

One of the most prominent arguments of the functionalist school on corruption is the "grease the wheels" hypothesis postulated by Nathaniel Leff and Samuel Huntington. This hypothesis claims corruption can be useful in enhancing investment in the context of an inefficient bureaucracy marked by dysfunctional institutions (Méon & Sekkat, 2005). On the issue of corruption as a catalyst to economic development, Neff (1964) makes four arguments with regards to bureaucratic corruption: it increases investment by availing to investors the capacity to reduce uncertainty in the economic and political environment of their host countries; it facilitates economic innovation by granting economic innovators quick bureaucratic access to start their innovations; it serves as hedge or 'insurance' against bad policy which can work against the investor; and encourages competition and efficiency given the fact that investors who have to pay

the highest bribe to win licenses or favours must compensate their revenue by relying largely on production efficiency.

2.3.1.4 The Principle of Geographical Morality in Corruption

Generally, the concept of development carries a moral ethos and corruption is unethical or immoral by definition. Development generally takes place within the context of norms, rules, regulations, and ethics sanctioned by institutions at national and international levels. Corruption is generally seen as a violation of norms. However, moral relativism (the view that morality is not absolute but relative and dependent on context) places an interrogation on the aforementioned assumptions about corruption and development. In other words, moral relativism opens the door to the possibility of 'good corruption' that enhances rather than inhibits development.

Functionalist are moral relativists when it comes to corruption as they seek to move beyond ethical determinism to the context, motives, and ends of the practice of corruption. The functionalist perspective therefore seeks to introduce a paradigm shift on the moral ethos of corruption and development by exploring a contextual ethical prism of both phenomena. Lee (2002), for instance, cites Zinoviev's moral justification of corrupt practices in the Soviet Union on the basis of situational ethics. Zinoviev underscores that 'under the table' and nepotistic transactions became normalized in the Soviet Union as an acceptable and ultimately viable practice because of the peculiarity of the social circumstances prevailing in the Soviet Union like dictatorship, party privileges and shortages (Ibid.).

The most glaring demonstration of moral relativism within the context of the functionalist approach to corruption emanates from the principle of 'geographical morality' evoked by the defence in the impeachment trial and eventual acquittal of the

former British Governor-General of Bengal Warren Hastings in the House of Commons (1787-1795). In response to accusations of corruption and bribery in the discharge of his functions Hastings did not refuse having received payments but argued that his decision to execute arbitrary power (within which can be attributed all the vices he was accused of) is based on the fact that despotism was entrenched in the "constitution of Asia" and was the only form of government Asians were acquainted to (Ala'i, 2000). His defence team added that Hastings was not the author but inherited a corrupt system which obliged him to behave in a manner that was against his own personal ethics and that at such it would not be fair for his actions in India to be judge using the moral yardstick applicable to British public officials (Ibid.).

The principle of geographical morality is also highlighted by Bayley (1966) in his discourse on the effect of corruption on a developing country. Bayley illustrated the principle of geographical morality in corruption in the following explanation:

> Corrupt behavior is behavior condemned and censured. "Corruption" is a pejorative term. However, applying the label to behavior on the part of public officials in many non-Western countries immediately poses a dilemma of intriguing dimensions. The man who in many non-Western countries is corrupt in Webster's sense [Webster dictionary definition] is not condemned at all by his own society. Indeed, he may be conforming to a pattern of behavior his peers, family, and friends strongly support and applaud. For example, in both Africa and India the man who uses his official position to obtain jobs for his relatives is not considered immoral: in traditional terms, he is only doing what every loyal member of an extended family is expected to do. He would be censured if he did not act in this way.
> (Ibid., p. 721).

In other words, what would be condemned in Western societies as an act of corruption would be reckoned as a virtuous act in the context of other geographical locations. From Bayley's explanations, one can deduce that nepotistic actions to help secure jobs for family members can now perceived be as acts of kindness that helps enhance social

cohesion rather than acts of corruption. While the claims of the functional schools have come under much criticism it nevertheless has the merit of attracting much academic curiosity and intellectual debate on something many had considered a given—the moral bankruptcy of corruption. Leading the charge against the claims of the functionalists are the post-functionalist or moralist school.

2.3.2 Post-Functionalist/Moralist School

The post-functionalist or moralist school (given their focus on the moral aspect of corruption) developed in the 1970s in response to the functionalist school. Contrary to functionalist perspective that corruption eventually goes through self-destruction when the national maturation process is completed; post-functionalists believe corruption is self-perpetuating and is natured by a range of causes (Werner, 1983). Post-functionalists dispute functionalists' claims which they argue are void of empirical foundation and based on the inability of the latter to perceive the systemic nature of the phenomenon, as well as their unwillingness to approach its impact from a dynamic prism (Alam, 1989). Here are some of the main arguments of post-functionalists against the claims of functionalists on the benefits of corruption to development:

2.3.2.1 Corruption "Sand the Wheels" of Development

In response to the "grease the wheels" hypothesis put forward by the functionalist on the benefits of corruption on economic development and growth, post-functionalists have advanced the "sand the wheels" theory which argues that corruption has a net negative impact on both in all its variations (Mayo, 2016). Post-functionalist scholars have provided empirical evidences to support the "sand the wheels" theory. Based on data indices from about 70 countries on corruption, judicial system efficiency, and red tape from 1980 - 1983, Mauro (1995) carried out a study on the impact of corruption

on economic growth. His studies reveal corruption reduces private investment and economic growth by implication (Ibid.).

The aforementioned results are corroborated by a similar study by Méon and Sekkat (2005) on the impact of corruption on growth and investment using a sample of 63 - 70 countries over the period 1970 - 1998. The result show corruption has a negative impact on both growth and investment and that growth tends to worsen with the deterioration of the quality of governance (Ibid.).

2.3.2.2 Corruption Undermines Allocative Efficiency

Concerning the claim by functionalists that corruption enhances allocative efficiency by creating a situation where the most efficient producers become the highest bidders, Alam (1989) points out a number of factors that shows corruption rather undermines allocative efficiency. First, faced with the risk of detection that may arise from complaints of unsuccessful bidders (that is the failed bribers), bureaucrats may restrict access to the auction to those they can trust who may not necessarily be aspirants with productive efficiency. Also attempts by successive set of bureaucrats to extract bribes from investors may lead to a reduction in quality of supply given that suppliers need to offset the cost of bribes and maximise their revenue.

2.3.2.3 Corruption Engenders Revolutions

In contrast to the functionalists' claim of corruption as a deterrent to revolutions, non-functionalists argue the exact opposite—corruption fuels revolution. Empirical realities lend credence to latter and discredits the former. The functionalists claim that corruption prevents revolutions has been largely discredited and its anti-thesis upheld by factors that engendered recent revolutions like the 'Arab Spring' and the 'Colour Revolutions'. Rampant corruption in the government has been identified as one of the main triggers of a series of revolutions dubbed the 'Arab Spring' that toppled regimes

in Tunisia, Egypts, Libya, and Yemen (Transparency International, 2019; McKenzie, 2016; Rijkers et al, 2015; Mnawar, 2015 Partridge, 2011). Corruption is also said to have played a huge role in the outbreak of the 'Colour Revolutions' in Georgia and Ukraine in 2003 and 2004 respectively (Spirova, 2008).

2.3.2.4 Corruption is Self-sustaining

Contrary to the functionalist argument that corruption is a by-product of modernization and will naturally vanish at the end of the process, post-functionalists believe corruption is self-sustaining. Leading the charge on this contention is Werner (1983) who argues that corruption creates a vicious circle of self-perpetuation. Post-functionalists therefore base their views on the strong conviction that corruption is an ill wind that blows no good.

2.4 Conclusion

This Chapter has explored the state-of-the art in terms of academic discussions on endogenous perspectives on the explanations about the development paradox in SSA. It took a look at the debate between the functionalist/revisionist and the post-functionalist/moralist schools of thought on how corruption affects development. This thesis subscribes to the post-functionalists' perspective about corruption. To better understand the relationship between bureaucratic corruption and human development, it is imperative to establish a methodological foundation upon which such analysis would be based. The next chapter shall focus on the research methodology employed in this thesis.

Chapter 3

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

3.1 Introduction

Corruption and Development are complex phenomena with multiple tentacles and subjective interpretations. It goes therefore without saying that any meaningful research study into the aforementioned phenomena necessitates a well-defined method of inquiry. This chapter focuses on the research methodology. It states and explains the research question and subsidiary questions; the hypothesis and model guiding the study and how they would be measured; the research design; the method of gathering and analysing data.

3.2 Research Question

This thesis investigates the relationship between bureaucratic corruption and human development in Sub-Saharan Africa. The research question guiding this thesis is: How does bureaucratic corruption affect the level of human development in Cameroon and Botswana?

Allied to this main question are subsidiary questions which would help to further illustrate the relationship between the key variables (bureaucratic corruption and human development):

1. What are the causes of bureaucratic corruption?

2. How does bureaucratic corruption occur in the public sector?

3. What is the level of bureaucratic corruption in Cameroon compared to Botswana?

4. What is the difference in the relationship between bureaucratic corruption and human development in Cameroon and Botswana?

3.3 Hypothesis / Model

This thesis uses a hypothesis and a model to predict the relationship between the two key variables involved (bureaucratic corruption and human development):

3.3.1 Hypothesis

This study is predicated on the main hypothesis that there is a correlation between the rate of bureaucratic corruption and the level of human development in both Cameroon and Botswana.

There are also two sub-hypotheses in this research work that relates to the case-study:

i.   There is a negative correlation between high rates of bureaucratic corruption and human development. This implies a high rate of bureaucratic corruption corresponds to a low level of human development.

ii.   There is a positive correlation between high anti-corruption (indicating low level of bureaucratic corruption) and high performance in human development. This implies a low rate of bureaucratic corruption corresponds to a high level of human development.

This study investigates correlation between bureaucratic corruption and human development in Sub-Saharan Africa. Correlation in social science is a statistical technique used to test the relationship or association which exist between variables (Samuel & Okey, 2015). The choice of correlation is informed by a number of considerations. First, given the fact that the current study deals with social phenomena

(corruption, and human development) that can't not be manipulated in a controlled setting correlational research is more appropriate than experimental research.

Secondly, though correlation doesn't imply or necessarily proves causation, it can provide early indications and supplementary support to theories that assumes causal relationships (Bhandari, 2021).

Statistical test would be carried out with data on bureaucratic corruption and human development in Cameroon and Botswana for a specific time-series from 2010-2020 using IBM SPSS Statistics software to establish the type of correlation and the significance of the correlation. The data shall be obtained from composite indicators on country's performance on the variables under study (bureaucratic corruption and human development) from internationally recognized studies like Transparency International's Corruption Perception Index (CPI); the World Bank's World-Wide Governance Indicators, Mo Ibrahim Foundation's Ibrahim Index of African Governance (IIAG); World Bank's Annual "Doing Business" rankings for the analysis of bureaucratic corruption. Data for the analysis of human development would be based on the following sources: The United Nations Development Program (UNDP)'s Human Development Index (HDI); the World Bank's poverty and equity database; and the African Development Bank (AfDB)'s Socio Economic Database.

A correlation analysis of the data obtained from the aforementioned sources shall be done using the IBM SPSS Statistics software to get results for the type of correlations and their significance.

Results obtained from the correlation analysis shall be triangulated with secondary materials (mostly books, and peer reviewed articles), and information from field interviews.

3.3.2 Model

This work is based on what I have termed the 'institutional quality model' which supposes that bureaucratic corruption erodes the quality of state institutions which in turn undermine its ability to deliver on human development (See Figure 1).

Figure 1: Institutional quality model of corruption

This model is drawn from the post-Washington consensus "institutional quality" paradigm propounded by World Bank economists like Joseph Stiglitz and Dani Rodrik who accounted the failure of the maiden generation of reforms under the Washington consensus to lack of a conducive institutional environment. Both of them contended that the institutional environment is more important than policies in promoting growth (Stiglitz, 1999; Rodrik, 2006). As Rodrik and Subramanian (2003; p.31) succinctly underscore: "What matters are the rules of the game in a society, as defined by

prevailing explicit and implicit behavioral norms and the ability to create appropriate incentives for desirable economic behavior".

Similarly, Acemoglu and Robinson (2012) in their widely acclaimed masterpiece *Why Nations Fail: The Origins of Power, Prosperity, and Poverty,* investigated the reason why some nations become rich and others become poor. Based on research on historical evolution of different civilizations and nations, and contemporary realities, the authors debunked three hypothetical explanations of the disparity between rich and poor nations: geographical determinism, cultural differences, and lack of knowledge on growth enhancing policies. They posit that the most compelling theoretical framework that can be used to unravel the prosperity puzzle between nations is institutional differences based on a variation between extractive and inclusive institutions.

In contrast, inclusive political and economic institutions (essentially symbiosis of a democratic state and a free market economy) provide the necessary framework for growth and prosperity like: private property rights and enforcement of contract law which provide incentive for investment and innovation; education and infrastructure which enhances investment and growth; democratic principle which endows the control of the state to its citizens rather than a small elite; and state monopoly on violence. The authors contrast Congo under Mobutu as a typical example of an extractive institution govern in the interest of the ruling elites (dubbed 'les Grosses Legumes' or 'the Big Vegetable' in English) who became famously rich at the expense of the impoverished citizens; and contemporary Botswana which developed inclusive political and economic institutions after independence (democracy, prioritization of

public interest over private greed, modest state centralization and the tenure of regular elections) that engendered prosperity for its people (Ibid.).

It is important to emphasise at this point that the aforementioned model draws empirical robustness from a number of studies and compelling scholarly arguments by researchers. Rodrik, Subramanian, and Trebbi (2014) examine the impact of three variables (institutions, geography, and trade) in the determination of income levels across the globe (an important development indicator). Their study reveals that the quality of institutions supersedes all the other variables in terms of contribution towards levels of income. Similarly, Mauro (1995) in a study on subjective corruption indicators found a negative impact of corruption on both investment and economic growth. In their study on the relationship between institutional quality and economic growth, Butkiewicz and Yanikkaya (2006) found that countries with democratic institutions and the rule of law experience growth. Keikha et al (2012), investigated the impact of fluctuations in oil prices on the economic growth of oil-reliant states in relation to institutional quality. Their study revealed that the impact of oil price fluctuations is a function of institutional quality index: states having strong institution are able to mitigate the impact of such fluctuations.

Still in the context of natural resources and institutional quality, Khan et al (2019) probed into the role institutional quality plays in the nexus between resource rent and finance in the United States. Their findings identify institutional quality as a key prerequisite to the US's financial development. On her part, Kandil (2009) examined the impact of the determinants of institutional quality (political stability, rule of law, government effectiveness, control of corruption, voice and accountability, and regulatory quality) on economic growth in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA)

region. Her findings revealed that institutional quality contributed to an increase in the real GDP growth of MENA countries.

3.4 Methodology

In terms of methodology, this study shall use a comparative case study. Generally, a case study refers to "an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon (the case) in-depth and within its real-world context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and context may not be clearly evident."(Yin, 2014: p. 16). Goodrick (2014: p. 1) defines comparative case studies as a methodological approach which involves "the analysis and synthesis of the similarities, differences and patterns across two or more cases that share a common focus or goal in a way that produces knowledge that is easier to generalize about causal questions – how and why particular programmes or policies work or fail to work." This study uses the institutional model to investigate the relationship between corruption and development by comparing the case of two SSA countries: Cameroon and Botswana.

The choice of this particular research method can be accounted for by a number of factors. First, it permits an in-depth analysis on the phenomenon under investigation (the relationship between corruption and development) and it also provides a contextual environment for control factors to enhance the accuracy and reliability of the results. In addition, comparative case studies are very helpful in a study that involves generalizations like the one in question. By investigating similarities and differences in the outcome of a particular phenomenon under controlled environment or circumstances, some generalizations can be made on their broader impact. A comparative approach will therefore be very helpful in trying to understand the

relationship between the independent variable (corruption) and the dependent variable (development) from the selected case studies.

The study shall focus on Cameroon and Botswana. The selection of both countries is informed by the fact that while both are located in SSA, gained their independence within the same period (the early 1960s), and endowed with rich mineral resources, they offer contrasting outlook when it comes to corruption perception and standard of development. Cameroon is ranked 153rd out of 180 countries in the most recent (2019) Transparency International (TI) Corruption Perception Index (CPI) with a score of 25 on 100, which places Cameroon in the highly corrupt category (Transparency International, 2021). In terms of human development, Cameroon is ranked 153rd out of 189 in UNDP's recent HDI (2019) with an HDI value of 0.563 and falls under the category of 'Medium human development' (Conceição, 2020).

By contrast, Botswana is ranked 34th out of 180 countries on TI's CPI with a score of 61 on 100 (Transparency International, 2021b). In the area of human development, Botswana ranked 100th out of 189 countries in UNDP's 2019 HDI with an HDI value of 0.735 and was classified in the 'High human development' category (Conceição, 2020).

These two countries provide sufficient contrast in their corruption and development outlook needed for an effective comparative case study of the relationship between corruption and development.

This study shall employ mixed methods (quantitative and qualitative) in the collection of data principally through the administration of structured questionnaires and the

conduct of interviews with resource persons. It shall make use of primary and secondary data sources ranging from surveys, polls, archival materials and various publications. One of the challenges of studying corruption is its measurement.

Given the fact that much of its manifestations take place in the shadows and at outside the margins of what is legal, it is quite an uphill task to assemble adequate and accurate data for an effective analysis. Most of those involved in its perpetuation will naturally be reluctant to provide information if being approached to take part in surveys or interviews. Even when sufficient data is assembled there is the issue of finding the right tool to measure the prevalence and impact of the phenomenon on development. These challenges can be mitigated in the case of this research by the fact that both countries selected for the comparative case-study (Cameroon and Botswana) have national agencies established to control the spread of corruption and international anti-corruption entities.

Cameroon's national anti-corruption agency is the National Anti-Corruption Commission (NACC) which operates as a public independent body under the supervision of the head of state charged with the duty of monitoring and supervising the country's anti-corruption programme. Members of the NACC are appointed by the president of the republic. It has units in almost every government department which monitor corruption in the public service. Cameroon also hosts a branch of Transparency International (TI). These two entities will be very useful in my bid to gather primary and secondary data on the state of bureaucratic corruption in Cameroon.

Botswana also has a national anti-corruption agency dubbed Directorate on Corruption and Economic Crime (DCEC) whose is entrusted with the task of investigating corruption allegations and economic crimes, the prevention of corruption, and public sensitization on the effects of corruption. The DCEC has the status of a full government ministry. Botswana also hosts the Commonwealth Africa Anti-Corruption Centre (CAACC) which serves as a capacity building organization for the 18 Anti-Corruption Agencies in Commonwealth Africa that constitute its members. These two institutions will be very helpful in my effort to gather primary and secondary data on bureaucratic corruption in Botswana.

In terms of instruments or tools of measurement, this study shall rely extensively on composite indices notably Transparency International's Corruption Perception Index (CPI), the World Bank's World-Wide Governance Indicators for its measurement of corruption, and the World Bank's annual "Doing Business" rankings. Expert assessment will also be employed where and when necessary. Concerning development measures, it shall rely mostly on the United Nations Development Program (UNDP)'s Human Development Index (HDI) which has become a widely accepted term of reference in global development. Another indicator that will be used in measuring development in this research is rate of poverty, using the World Bank's standard of living below $1.90 a day).

3.5 Theoretical Framework

Any concrete research study on corruption requires a rigorous and unequivocal theoretical framework given the complexity of the phenomenon. It is therefore imperative to elucidate the theory that would be employed as well as the key concepts involved in this research: corruption, development, and institutions.

3.5.1 Theories on Corruption

Corruption is a multi-pronged phenomenon which diversity makes it difficult for it to be comprehended from a single theoretical lens. Various theories have therefore been conceived that offer succinct explanatory framework to different aspects of corruption. Broadly speaking there are two fundamental theoretical approaches to the study of corruption: functionalist and rational choice.

The functionalist approach towards corruption is predicated on the assumption that corruption has a bottom-line beneficial effect on the economy; as one of its main proponent Samuel Huntington puts it, corruption can be seen as a means to "grease the wheels" for things to be accomplished especially for companies and investors (Dupuy, n.d.). Huntington underscores the functionalist logic by stating bluntly that: "Corruption may be one way of surmounting traditional laws or bureaucratic regulations which hamper economic expansion" (Huntington as cited by Castro et al, 2020; p. 940).

The theoretical offspring of the functionalist approach is the modernization theory which emerged in the 1950s and 1960s as a revisionist perspective to the moralistic condemnation of corruption. The modernization theory argues that corruption is a natural phenomenon that occurs at the early stages of a country's progression into modernization and development; as such it can act as a catalyst to both (modernization and development) "at least occasionally and at times systematically (Mungiu-Pippidi & Hartman, 2019; p. 8).

As the name indicates, the rational choice approach on the other hand is rooted in the rational choice model of human behaviour which is based cost and benefit calculations

of rational and self-interested individuals. There are four theories that can be classified under the rational choice approach: institutional theory; game theory; principal-agent, theory, and collective action theory.

Generally, the institutional theory, also referred to as 'institutionalism', has been defined as an examination of "the processes by which structures, including schemas, rules, norms, and routines, become established as authoritative guidelines for social behavior." (Scott, 2005: p.461). As a model that explains corruption, institutionalism "uses country and government institutional characteristics, such as pre-existing rule of law, well-defined anti-corruption norms, and independent anti-corruption institutions with enforcement powers, to explain corruption in the public sector." (UNODC, 2019).

The Game theory is a rational model borrowed from economics that attempts to explain the reason or motivation behind corrupt decisions taken by public officials. It is based on the 'Prisoner Dilemma' in which actors involved in corruption calculate the cost and benefits of indulging or refraining from corruption in a competitive environment (Jarynowski, 2019; Dixit, 2017).

The principal-agent theory is an approach based on agency or delegation of authority. The principal in this case is the entity who has the authority and the agent represents the entity to whom that authority is delegated (Lupia, 2015). For instance, the legislature delegates authority to an agency like the taxation office to collect taxes. The legislature here is acting as the principal and the agency (taxation office) is acting as the agent. The theory highlights the principal-agent problem which is based on two assumptions: that there is a divergence of interest between the principal and the agent, and an asymmetry of information to the advantage of the agent which prevents the

principal form being able to properly monitor the agent and avails the agent the discretion to pursue self-interest (Marquette & Peiffer, 2015). Corruption from this prism is seen as an agency problem which occurs when the agent engages in corrupt practices to further their self-interest at the cost of that of the principal.

The collective action theory as the name indicates, perceives corruption as a collective problem which emanates from the collapse of social norms. The theory underscores the influence of group dynamics including trust in the behaviour of others on individual decisions and choices when it comes to corruption. It draws from Mancur Olson's logic of collective action which underlines the propensity of individuals to priorities their self-interest over collective interest except under coercion to act in the common interest (Zapata, 2018). The theory highlights the collective dilemma individuals find themselves on whether or not to keep their integrity in a corrupt system. From a rational perspective, the collective action approach points out individual would opt for corruption in such circumstances based on the logic bluntly stated by Marquette and Peiffer: "it doesn't make sense to be the only honest person in a corrupt system" (as cited in UNODC, 2019).

Rather than being mutually exclusive, the aforementioned theories combine together to provide a comprehensive understanding of corruption. However, studies of various types, aspects or dimensions of corruption may require specific theories or models.

3.5.2 Principal-Agent-Client Model

Given the fact that this research focuses specifically on bureaucratic corruption, the principal-agent theory would be most beneficial for my analysis. This choice is based on the fact that the theory identifies the principal actors involved in the practice of bureaucratic corruption: the principal (the entity or person that delegates authority for

a task to be performed) and the agent (the public agency or bureaucrat who performs the task). As already discussed, there are three main principles involved in this theory: delegation of authority, divergence of interest and information asymmetry between the principal and the agent (See Figure 2).

Figure 2: An illustration of the principal-agent theory

The principal-agent theory has been enhanced by the principal-agent-client (PAC) model which introduces another actor in the chain—the client who is user of the services offered by the agent (See Figure 3). The PAC model postulates that "corruption occurs when there is a lack of (or near lack of) accountability when an agent (A) to whom the principal (P) has entrusted to carry out the services to a client (C), has an element of discretion in administering the services." (Carr, 2020; p.514).

Within the context of a bureaucracy, the principal can be the legislative or executive arm of government which appoints and delegates authority to public agencies and bureaucrats (Agents) to provide certain services to citizens (Clients) like education,

health care, public infrastructures, social welfare etc. Carr (2009; 2020) underscores that the PAC model has inspired most of the current measures to fight against corruption like civil service and legal reforms, privatizations of the public sector as well as the promotion of public sector integrity inscribed in the United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC).

Figure 3: The Principal-Agent-Client model

This model is very apt as a framework for the analysis of bureaucratic corruption because it very comprehensive in its scope. Not only does it identify all the actors in the corruption chain, it exposes the nature and extent of their involvement. This model would therefore provide an effective approach to analyse the occurrence of bureaucratic corruption in the selected case-study countries in this research.

Chapter 4

BUREAUCRATIC CORRUPTION AND HUMAN DEVELOPMENT IN CAMEROON

4.1 Introduction

After going exploring the state-of-the art in academic literature on endogenous approaches to SSA's development paradox in general and the relationship between corruption and development in particular in the previous chapter, the attention would now be focused on the two case studies. This chapter is going to present an empirical analysis of the relationship between bureaucratic corruption and human development in Cameroon while the next chapter would carry out the same analysis on Botswana. The chapter begins with perspectives and empirical examples on the manifestation of bureaucratic corruption in some key sectors of Cameroon's bureaucracy. It also presents a ten-year statistical analysis of Cameroon's performance on corruption from the lenses of four renown international composite indicators on corruption and governance. This chapter also probes into through the correlation between the corruption and human development from three international composite indicators on human development as well as factual cases and expert opinion drawn from elite interviews.

4.2 Principal Agent Client (PAC) Model and Bureaucratic Corruption in Cameroonian

Bureaucratic corruption in Cameroon is consistent with the PAC model given that occurs through the interaction of the three main actors identified in the model: the principal (the entity that delegates authority, and in this case the executive or legislative arm of government); the agent (government agency and bureaucrats to whom the aforementioned authority has been delegated), and the client (in this case citizens who use the services of the agent). In this context, the manifestation of bureaucratic corruption can easily be captured by examining the interaction between government agencies and agents and users of the services they provide.

4.2.1 Manifestation of Corruption in The Public Sector

Corruption is endemic and has permeated all most all sectors of public life in Cameroon (Bechem, 2018; Fombad, 2000). This section examines the manifestation of bureaucratic corruption in the following key sectors of public life in Cameroon: public service; public procurements; tax administration; custom administration; land administration; and natural resources management.

4.2.1.1 Public Service

Corruption is a rife with corruption. The 2020 Country Risk Report on corruption in Cameroon by GAN integrity identifies Cameroon's public service as an area with high risk of corruption with bribery, embezzlement, and the abuse of public office reckoned as the order of the day (GAN Integrity, 2020). A World Bank Enterprise Survey of 361 firms operating in Cameroon revealed 45.6% of firms are expected to offer "gifts" to public officials "to get things done"; 48.9% are expected to do same to obtain a construction permit; and 47.6% to obtain an operating license (World Bank, 2016). Application for public utilities is also characterized by bribery and inappropriate

payments (GAN Integrity, 2020). According to a survey entitled "Governance, Peace and Security Statistics in Cameroon", conducted by Cameroon's National Institute of Statistics with 5,044 respondents (a representative sample size of Cameroon's population), 83% civil servants, and 85% of government ministers were perceived as corrupt (GPS-SHASA, 2014).

The health and the education sectors are particularly more vulnerable to bureaucratic corruption in Cameroon given that most Cameroonians depend on public health facilities and public schools for their health and educational needs. In the health sector, public hospitals are prone to corruption. A survey on corruption and users of public hospitals in Cameroon's economic capital (Douala) that sampled the eight main public hospitals in the town, revealed the prevalence of corruption in the reception service (82.02%), pharmacy service (70.18%); hospitalization service (58.48%); the issuance of medical certificates (56.16%) (Bayemi, 2018).

Another manifestation of corruption that is prominent in the health sector in Cameroon is fraud. In 2011, the GAVI Alliance which funds immunization across the globe uncovered the misappropriation of 3.7 million USD out of its 5.1 million USD Cameroon's Health System Strengthening grant partly as a result of fraud (Vian, 2013). An investigation carried out through GAVI's Transparency and Accountability Policy (TAP) revealed two types of fraud: procurement malpractices, and mismanagement of funds allocated to activities.

Closely related to fraud is embezzlement which is also rampant in the health sector in Cameroon. In 2012, Cameroon's former Minister of Public Health Urbain Olangena

Awono was found guilty of embezzlement and sentenced to 20 years in prison for fake contracts of mosquito net delivery to hospitals (BTI, 2022).

Another type of corruption that is often ignored is what the World Bank calls 'quiet corruption'. This new jargon, which surfaced for the first time the 2010 edition of the World Bank's Africa Development Indicators, has been used to describe a situation where "public servants fail to deliver services or inputs that have been paid for by the government. The most prominent examples are absentee teachers in public schools and absentee doctors in primary clinics." (World Bank, 2010: p. vii).

In Cameroon's health sector, quiet corruption is characterized by the decision of government trained medical doctors to ditch service posting and migrate abroad in search of greener pastures. According to the Vice President of Cameroon Medical Council Prof. Tetanye Ekoe, around 25% - 30% of medical doctors trained in Cameroon (by the government) are plying their trade abroad (Atanga, 2006). Others who choose to remain have been engaged predatory 'coping mechanism' such as: diversion of patient to attend private consultations, under-the-counter payments, and the sale of medications which are supposed to be freely distributed (Amani, 2010). Though some try to justify these behaviours to difficult working conditions and low salaries (Kindzeka, 2018; Amani, 2010; Abena Obama et al, 2003), there still constitute glaring manifestations of quiet corruption.

Bureaucratic corruption in the educational sector in Cameroon is most in the form of quiet corruption. The practice of quiet corruption in Cameroon's educational sector mostly takes two forms: absenteeism and abandonment of duty post. In July 2021, Cameroon's Minister of Secondary Education, Prof. Nalova Lyonga issued a summon

to 600 secondary school teachers who were identified as having abandoned their duty post and were at that time residing in Europe, the Americas, Africa, and other regions of the world (Foguem, 2021).

A flagrant case of quiet corruption in Cameroon's educational system was that reported by the National Anti-Corruption Commission (NACC) of that it titled "Desertion and Unlawful Collection of Salaries by Some Teachers of The Government High School, Elig-Essono" (NACC, 2021). In its "Cameroon's 2020 Anti-Corruption Status Report", the NACC revealed a quiet corruption scheme at the Government High School, Elig-Essono in Yaounde where ten teachers of the said school were found to have committed the following anomalies: abandonment of their duty post for four years (2016 - 2019); and undue salary collection by the said teachers to the tune of 106,742,751 FCFA during the period of their absence (Ibid.).

In 2012, an average absenteeism rate of 20% was noticed among the 37,200 primary school teachers recruited by the government (Cameroon Post, 2012). A TI Cameroon survey of 48 public primary schools in three regions of Cameroon (South, Littoral, and Center) revealed a 40% rate of absenteeism of teachers noticed by households in the schools their children attend (Abassa et al, 2011).

The judiciary in Cameroon is also not left out when by bureaucratic corruption. A TI Global Corruption Barometer (GCB) survey for Cameroon in 2019 revealed over half of Cameroonians (54%) believed most or all judges and magistrates in Cameroon are corrupt (Transparency International, 2019). Examples of corruption in Cameroon's judiciary include rampant cases of bribes in exchange of favourable judgements; and

bribes taken by judicial officials in exchange of prison release, reduced prison sentences, or cessation of charges (GAN Integrity, 2020).

4.2.1.2 Public Procurements

Public procurements in Cameroon are plagued by rampant corruption especially bribery and fraud from state agents who are in charge of public contracts. A 2016 World Bank survey of owners and heads of 361 companies in Cameroon revealed more than half of companies operating in Cameroon are expected to give bribes (of up to 2.8% of the contract value) to obtain government contracts (World Bank, 2016). Though a system of competitive bidding has been put in place for the award of contracts, it is frequently breached through corruption (GAN Integrity, 2020). A good example is the manipulation of the bidding process by bureaucrats at the South West Regional Delegation of Cameroon's Ministry of Public Contracts to give preference to contractors who have bought their favour (Asek, 2014).

In a survey on the practice of corruption in the public procurement process in the South West Region, 29% of contractors sampled revealed government agents in charge of contracts provided inside information to their favoured contractors; 25% pointed out public contract agents tailored bids to suit their favoured contractors, and 22% disclosed public contract agents granted contracts to companies the owned or had shares in (Ibid.).

The consequences of such behaviour are oftentimes the abandonment of public projects by contractors which in itself is a form of corrupt practice. More than 60 projects awarded by the Cameroonian government to contractors in the South West Region were abandoned from 2013 to 2016 (Nsom, 2016). In 2017, Cameroon's Minister of Public Contracts Abba Sadou revealed that 334 companies had "abandoned

the execution of at least one contract during the fiscal periods 2014, 2015 and 2016" (Business in Cameroon, 2017).

4.2.1.3 Tax Administration

Bureaucratic corruption is also rife in Cameroon's tax administration. According to a TI GCB 2015 survey, more than half of Cameroonian citizens identify most or all tax agents as corrupt (Transparency International, 2015). The World Economic Forum's Global Competitiveness Report (GCR) for 2015 - 2016 reported recurrent bribes and irregular payment to tax agents in Cameroon (World Economic Forum, 2015). The 2016 World Bank Enterprise survey revealed one of every five companies in Cameroon are expected to give bribes when meeting with tax agents (World Bank, 2016).

Another major form of corruption in the taxation sector of Cameroon is tax evasion. Mukah and Fossung (2019) carried out a questionnaire-based survey of taxpayers in three of Cameroon's regional capital cities (Douala, Bamenda, and Bafoussam) which respondents noted the presence of the following tax evasion schemes amongst taxpayers: fake sales records and invoices; concealment of profit by undervaluing income and inflation of expenses; bribes to tax agents; false deductions; and submission of fictitious returns.

4.2.1.4 Custom Administration

Cameroon's custom has been identified as one of the most corrupt public sectors in the country (GAN Integrity, 2020). It was ranked as the most corrupt government agency in a 2018 report published by Cameroon's national Anti-Corruption Commission (NACC) (Ebo'o, 2019). The report that covered the period 2010 - 2015 revealed the following corrupt activities among custom agents: numerous bank accounts credited with hundreds of millions which could not be justified by their salaries as civil

servants; a loss of more than 1.2 billion FCFA by the state treasury as a result of illegal exonerations given to importers; fraudulent payment of legal fees to the tune of over 7.9 billion FCFA at the South West regional treasury department in Buea for the period from January 2011 - June 2016; and a similar fraudulent payment of close to 1.7 billion FCFA was also noticed at the East regional treasury department in Bertoua for the period running from January 2014 - July 2016 (Ndoumbe, 2018).

4.2.1.5 Land Administration

Land administration in Cameroon is highly characterized by bureaucratic corruption. The property acquisition and land title establishment processes are plagued by rampant corruption (BTI, 2016). Almost half of companies operating in the country are expected to offer a bribe to obtain a construction permit (World Bank, 2016). It has also been reported that bribes are offered to land administration agents for the conduct of a wide range of procedures (GAN Integrity, 2020).

Commenting on corruption in Cameroon's land administration, Puépi (2010) notes that the process of obtaining a land certificate in Cameroon is bedevilled by corruption which ranges from land grab from politicians, businessmen and civil servants and illegal transactions carried out by traditional rulers on national land.

4.2.1.6 The Police

The police core in Cameroon is notoriously corrupt. In 2005, the Cameroon police force was identified in a TI global survey as the most corrupt institution in the world (Mbunwe, 2005). Cameroonians rated the Cameroon Police was rated as the most corrupt government institution in Cameroon in TI's GCB surveys from 2015 - 2019 moving from 55% - 63% corruption between those years (Transparency International, 2022). This corroborates a 2011/2013 Afrobarometer survey which also placed the police corps as the most corrupt institution with a corruption rate of 42% (Wambua,

2015). A recent Afrobarometer survey (2019/2021) on corruption in the police sector revealed of 69% of respondent had interactions with police agents and half of them (35%) ended up paying bribes to those agents (Logan, 2022).

In a study on the perception of institutional corruption in the Cameroonian police force, Babila (n.d.; p. 37-38) reveals a systemic pattern of corruption among police agents in which promotion of junior police officers is dependent on their participation of a bribery scheme under which subordinates pay an amount of money informally to their superiors which has been gotten through the practice of extortion and bribes.

4.3 Statistical Indicators and Surveys on Bureaucratic Corruption in Cameroon

In addition to empirical evidences mentioned above, the manifestation of bureaucratic corruption in Cameroon can also be traced from composite indices that measures the phenomenon. The following prominent global and continental composite indices have been used to gauge the performance of Cameroon in bureaucratic corruption at the global and continental levels: Transparency International Corruption Perception Index; World Bank Worldwide Governance Indicator on Corruption control; and the Mo Ibrahim Foundation's Ibrahim Index of African Governance (IIAG).

4.3.1 Transparency International's Corruption Perception Index

One of the most renown global indices that measures corruption is the Corruption Perception Index (CPI) of Transparency International (TI). TI's CPI is a worldwide composite index that compares and ranks countries around the globe according to the level of perceived corruption in the public sector (Rohwer, 2009). Given its exclusive focus on bureaucratic corruption, CPI is ideal to the context of this study which focused on the impact of bureaucratic corruption on human development. Though

there has been some improvement over the years, Cameroon's performance in the CPI for the past two decades (2000 - 2020) has remained dismal. The country had an average (mean) score of 22 on 100 from 2000 - 2020, which places it within the ranks of the highly corrupted countries (See Figure 4).

Figure 4: Cameroon's CPI score from 2000 – 2020

4.3.2 The World Bank's Worldwide Governance Indicator

Another major global composite index from which Cameroon's level of bureaucratic corruption can be measured is the World Bank's World Bank's Worldwide Governance Indicator (WGI). The WGI is a more comprehensive measurement tool than the CPI in that it covers six dimensions of governance: Voice and Accountability; Government Effectiveness; Rule of Law; Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism; Control of Corruption; and Regulatory Quality (Kaufmann et al, 2011). Of interest to this study is the Control of Corruption dimension which focuses principally on bureaucratic corruption (Ibid). The Control of Corruption dimension of the WGI measures the extent to which public agents exercise their power for private gain (World Bank, 2022). Cameroon performed poorly on in both the Control of Corruption Estimate with an average score of -1.12 on 2.5 from 2000 - 2020, and the Control of

Corruption Percentile Rank with and an average ranking of 12.02 on 100 (See Figure 5).

Figure 5: Cameroon's performance in WGI control of corruption estimate and control of corruption percentile ranking

4.3.3 Mo Ibrahim Foundation's Ibrahim Index of African Governance (IIAG)

The Ibrahim Index of African Governance (IIAG) of the Mo Ibrahim Foundation is one of the most recent and comprehensive composite indices on governance focused entirely on the African continent. The IIAG monitors governance performance of all the 54 countries in Africa under four key components: Security and Rule of Law; Participation, Rights and Inclusion; Foundations for Economic Opportunity; and Human Development (IIAG, 2022; Mugabi, 2020). This study concerns itself with the 'Anti-Corruption' sub-category which falls under the Security and Rule of Law category of the IIAG. It is worth mentioning that the Anti-Corruption sub-category of the IIAG includes absence of corruption in state institutions, the public sector, and

public procurement within scores within the range of 0 for worst and 100 for best performances (IIAG, 2022b). Here too, Cameroon's average performance for the last decade (2010 - 2019) has been dismal with an average score of about 32 on 100 (See Figure 6).

Figure 6: IIAG statistics on Cameroon anti-corruption performance for 2010 – 2019

4.4 Causes of Bureaucratic Corruption in Cameroon

Bureaucratic corruption has a wide range of cause some of which has to do with the attitudes of the actors in the PAC model and others are more systemic and embedded in the society itself. Among attitudinal causes we have greed, and situational ethics. Systemic causes include: neopatrimonialism, nepotism, tribalism, discretional powers, lack of accountability, lack of transparency, and impunity.

4.4.1 Attitudinal Causes

Bureaucratic corruption in Cameroon is partly due to the personal attitude of public officials (government agents) prominent amongst which are greed and situational

ethics. The most predominant attitudinal cause of bureaucratic corruption in Cameroon is greed. In a study carried out on public perception on the fight against corruption in Cameroon, respondents and interviewees identified greed as one of the causes of corruption in the country (Bechem, 2018).

One of the clear manifestations of greed is the practice of embezzlement of state funds by public officials in Cameroon. Prominent examples of greed and embezzlement are those of the former general manager of Cameroon's Special Council Support Fund for Mutual Assistance Emmanuel Gerard Ondo Ndong, and the country's former economy and finance minister Polycarpe Abah Abah. The former (Ondo Ndong) was found guilty of embezzling 13 billion FCFA part of which prosecutors said was used for the purchase of 12 houses, seven luxury homes, building plots and a hotel in Cameroon's capital Yaounde (Musa, 2007). Abah Abah on his part was found guilty of embezzling 6 billion FCFA part of which was used for the purchase of string of cars and homes (Reuters, 2015).

Situational ethics is also a huge cause of bureaucratic corruption as bureaucrats generally justify their corrupt tendencies to what they consider as low salaries. Some scholars (Tanga & Dzemua, 2009) and officials (Cantens, 2012) identify low salaries as the cause of high level of corruption in the Cameroonian bureaucracy. However, this conventional wisdom has been rebutted by empirical data from field research which suggest either the opposite (salary increase leading to increase corruption) (Foltz & Opoku-Agyemang, 2015) or a negative relationship between corruption and wages (Rijckeghem & Weder, 1997). Low salaries appear therefore as a situational justification of corrupt behaviour by bureaucrats in Cameroon.

4.4.2 Systemic Causes

Bureaucratic corruption in Cameroon is mostly caused and maintained by systemic factors prominent amongst which are the following: neopatrimonialism; and discretional power. One of the major causes of corruption in Cameroon is neopatrimonialism (Funwie, 2021). The concept (neopatrimonialism) was developed by Jean-François Médard in 1977 to describe the state of Cameroon in 1977 which in his description was both 'soft' (deeply corrupt, incompetent, and ineffective) and 'hard' (power endowed to the president by the constitution and his grip over the bureaucracy and society) (Hansen, 2003). Neopatrimonialism generally refers to "a system whereby rulers use state resources for personal benefit and to secure the loyalty of clients in the general population" (Bach & Gazibo, 2011).

Within the context of Cameroon and Africa in general, neopatrimonialism is characterized by a patron-client relationship between senior bureaucrats including the head of the executive and citizens of the state (Amundsen, 1999) in which there is an absence of a distinction between the office and the office holder. As Bach (2011) puts it "In the absence of a legitimizing ideology, the ruler owes his ability to remain in power to his capacity for transforming his monopolistic control over the state into a source of opportunities for family, friends and clients." The most predominant channels through which neopatrimonialism is manifested is through nepotism and tribalism which is highly prevalent in the Cameroonian bureaucracy (Bainkong, 2019; Fochingong & Gemandze, 2009; Agbortoko, 2008).

Another important cause of corruption is the discretional authority endowed to certain bureaucrats by the reason of the office they hold. To this end, Gbetnkom underscores those corrupt practices in Cameroon bureaucracy "stems from the fact that in

Cameroon, the discretionary power of many civil servants is quite extended."
(Gbetnkom, 2012: p. 3). Similarly, Ebai (2011) also notes that the police force in
Cameroon wields enormous power including discretional powers in decisions on
issues related to pre-trial detention, the conduct of searches, and arrest. Such
discretional power is vulnerable to abuse prominent of which is corruption in the police
corps which is rampant as discussed above.

4.5 Efforts to Combat Bureaucratic Corruption

Since being identified twice consecutively (1998 and 1999) as the most corruption
country in the world in TI's Corruption Perception Index (CPI) (Transparency
International, 1998; Transparency International, 1999), Cameroon has taken
significant steps to fight against bureaucratic corruption in the country. Here are some
of the major steps taken by the Cameroonian government to combat bureaucratic
corruption in the country

4.5.1 Criminalization of Specific Acts of Bureaucratic Corruption in Penal Code

The revision of the Cameroon penal code in 2016 gave special focus to the problem of
bureaucratic corruption by providing a more detailed and comprehensive
criminalization of specific acts of corruption involving civil servants. The 2016 revised
penal code of Cameroon contains an entire chapter (Chapter III) entitled "OFFENCES
COMMITTED BY PUBLIC SERVANTS" which carries 20 sections that details
various forms of bureaucratic corruption and their punishments (Cameroon.cc, 2021).

4.5.2 International Treatise and Conventions

Cameroon has ratified the two most important international legal instruments in the
fight against corruption. At the global level, Cameroon is a party to the United Nations
Convention against Corruption (UNCAC) which it signed on 10 December 2003 and
ratified on 6 February 2006 (Transparency International, 2022; United Nation, 2003).

UNCAC was adopted by the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) Resolution 58/4 of 31 October 2003 and entered into force on 14 December 2005 (UNODC, 2003). UNCAC is the largest (in terms of state parties), and most comprehensive (in scope and monitoring mechanism) international legal instrument in the fight against corruption.

Cameroon is also party to the African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption (AUCPCC) which it signed on 30 June 2008 and ratified on 29 June 2020 (African Union, 2021). The AUCPCC was adopted by AU member states during the Second Ordinary Session of the AU Assembly that took place in the Mozambique capital Maputo on 11 July 2003, and came into force on 5 August 2006 (AUABC, 2022).

4.5.3 Creation of Anti-Corruption Institutions

Another major development in Cameroon's fight against bureaucratic corruption is the establishment of anti-corruption institutions to implement the country's strategies and meet its goals. The major institutions established by Cameroon to combat bureaucratic corruption are: the National Anti-Corruption Commission; the Audit Bench of the Supreme Court; the National Agency for Financial Investigation, and the Special Criminal Court. The National Anti-Corruption Commission (NACC) was established by a Presidential decree on 11 March 2006 and charged with the mission of monitoring and evaluating the effectiveness of the implementation of Cameroon government's national anti-corruption programme (Cameroon Tribune, 2018). Since its creation, NACC has registered major strides like the recovery of several billions of embezzled funds from culprits, and the prosecution and incarceration of high-ranking bureaucrats for corruption (Tangumonkem, 2018).

Thought the Audit Bench of the Supreme Court of Cameroon was officially created through the enactment of Law No. 96/06 of 18 January 1996, it only went operational in 2003 with the passage of Law No. 2003/005 of 21 April 2003 which put in place the organization, functioning, and jurisdiction of the institution (Wacka, 2008). This institution recently came to the lime light with the publication of a report on the embezzlement of funds from the Special National Solidarity Fund for the fight against COVID-19 in Cameroon. The audit report published by the Audit Bench of the Supreme Court of Cameroon "made 30 recommendations, decided to open 14 proceedings into mismanagement and transmitted 12 cases – likely to be classified as criminal- to the Ministry of Justice (Songne, 2022).

The National Agency for Financial Investigation (NAFI) began operations in January 2006 as a body charged with the investigation of money laundering and the finance of terrorism in Cameroon (Cameroon Tribune, 2018). A report published by NAFI in 2018 revealed that the misappropriation of public funds in Cameroon produced illicit cash flows totalling up to 489.6 billion FCFA from 2016 - 2018 (Andzogo, 2021).

In terms of accountability, the most effective and productive effort made by the Cameroonian government has been the establishment of a special court to litigate cases of 'Grand corruption'. In this light, the Special Criminal Court (SCC) was established in December 2011 to judge and render decisions on cases of misappropriation of state property and similar offences in which the cost of the loss is not less than 50,000,000FCFA (Agbor, 2021).

As of 2020, the SCC adjudicated 225 cases brought before it and delivered to the public treasury over 9 billion FCFA as being the restitution of the 'corpus delicti' of the cases it rendered verdict on (Cameroon Tribune, 2020).

4.6 The impact of bureaucratic corruption on Human development in Cameroon

The institutional capacity of a country to deliver on its human development goals for its citizens depends very much on the efficiency of the bureaucracy given that the fundamental goal of government is to provide public goods (Anomaly, 2015) which goes to enhance the welfare and well-being of the govern. The key player in effective and efficient governance are bureaucrats who, within the framework of the PAC model, are the agents delegated the authority by government (the principal) to provide public goods to the citizens (the client).

Therefore, a failure in governance by bureaucrats will naturally impede the ability of government to provide public goods like education, health services, welfare benefits, and other social amenities which together form the crux of human development. Good governance therefore should reflect in the improvement of the standard of living of the citizenry. Bureaucratic corruption can therefore hamper the capacity of governmental institutions to deliver on human development. The previous section established the existence of a significant level of corruption in Cameroon's bureaucracy. This section would examine the impact of this phenomenon on human development. This shall be done in two dimensions: a correlation analysis using statistics from composite indices on bureaucratic corruption and human development; and empirical evidences in Cameroon.

4.6.1 Correlational Analysis of TI's CPI and UNDP's HDI for Cameroon

A bivariate Pearson correlation coefficient test then conducted using IBM SPSS Statistic software to determine the relationship between Transparency International (TI)'s Corruption Perception Index (CPI) and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)'s Human Development Index (HDI) for Cameroon in the last two decades (2000 - 2019). The results indicate a strong positive correlation between low CPI score (indicating high level of bureaucratic corruption) and low HDI score (indicating low level of human development) for Cameroon with a correlation coefficient of 0.84 (See Table 1). This means poor performance in corruption is associated to poor performance in Human development.

Table 1: Results of Pearson Correlation Coefficient test of CPI and HDI for Cameroon

Correlations

		CPI	HDI
CPI	Pearson Correlation	1	.845**
	Sig. (2-tailed)		.000
	N	20	20
HDI	Pearson Correlation	.845**	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	
	N	20	20

**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

4.6.2 Correlational Analysis of TI's CPI And World Bank Poverty Line Statistics for Cameroon

A correlational analysis was also done on the impact of bureaucratic corruption on the rate of poverty in the country which is one of the major indicators of human development (Madan, 2012). The CPI is used as a performance indicator for bureaucratic corruption. Meanwhile, the World Bank's poverty per headcount ratio which measures the percentage of people living below 5.5USD per day going by the

2011 purchasing power parities (PPP) of World Bank's International Comparison Program (ICP). Fosu (2007: p. 734) underscore the importance of the aforementioned indicator of poverty by stating that:

> The most recognized indicator of (income) poverty is the headcount ratio, which simply measures the proportion of the population considered to earn an income less than the standard required for basic needs (the other poverty measures are those for the depth and severity of poverty).

Given that the World Bank ICP 2011 PPP poverty per headcount (PPHC) statistics on Cameroon are only available for a cluster of seven-year periods from 1996 - 2014, and that TI's CPI begins from 1999, I based my correlational analysis from the PPP PPHC statistics from 2001 to 2014 and Cameroon's CPI performance for the same period. Cameroon's poverty rates based on the 2011 PPP for 2014, 2007, and 2001 were: 71%; 81%; and 81% respectively (World Bank, 2022). Cameroon CPI score (on 100) for 2014, 2007, and 2001 were: 27; 24; and 20 respectively (TRADING ECONOMICS, 2022).

A bivariate Pearson correlation coefficient test was conducted to examine the relationship between the aforementioned variables (CPI and World Bank poverty per headcount) using IBM SPSS Statistic software for the years: 2001, 2007, and 2014. The results indicate a strong negative correlation between Cameroon's CPI score and its poverty per headcount ratio (See Table 2). This means high level of corruption (evidenced in low CPI score) negatively affects level of poverty in the country.

Table 2: Results of the Pearson Correlation Coefficient test of CPI and PPP PPHC for Cameroon

Correlations			CPI	PPHC
CPI	Pearson Correlation		1	-.822
	Sig. (2-tailed)			.386
	N		3	3
PPHC	Pearson Correlation		-.822	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)		.386	
	N		3	3

4.6.3 Correlational Analysis of IIAG 'Anti-corruption' and IIAG Human Development Performance of Cameroon

At the continental level, the relationship between bureaucratic corruption and human development in Cameroon can also be analysed by comparing the country's performance in the 'Anti-corruption', and 'Social Protection' components of the Ibrahim Index of African Governance (IIAG) produced by the Mo Ibrahim Foundation. The Anti-corruption component is a sub-category under the 'SECURITY AND RULE OF LAW' category covers five sub-indicators: Anti-Corruption Mechanisms; Absence of Corruption in State Institutions; Absence of Corruption in the Public Sector; Public Procurement Procedures; Absence of Corruption in the Private Sector (IIAG, 2022).

The Social Protection component is a sub-category under the 'HUMAN DEVELOPMENT' category and covers the following sub-indicators: Social Safety Nets; Poverty Reduction Policies; Socioeconomic Inequality Mitigation; Access to Housing; Absence of Undernourishment (Ibid). Cameroon's Anti-corruption score for the last decade (2010 - 2019) has remained below 38% (See Figure 7). Meanwhile, its

performance in the 'Social protection' sub-category for aforementioned period has been generally average (See Figure 8).

Figure 7: Cameroon anti-corruption scores from 2010 – 2019 in the IIAG

Figure 8: Cameroon social protection score from 2010 – 2019 in the IIAG

The relationship between Cameroon's IIAG Anti-corruption and IIAG Social protection scores from 2010 - 2019 was analysed using Pearson bivariate correlation coefficient test on IBM SPSS Statistics. The results show a moderate negative correlation between IIAG Anticorruption, and IIAG Social protection performances (See Table 3). This means poor anti-corruption performance negatively affects social protection.

Table 3: Results of the Pearson Correlation Coefficient test of IIAG Anti-corruption and IIAG Social protection scores for Cameroon

Correlations

		IIAG_AC	IIAG_PPHC
IIAG_AC	Pearson Correlation	1	-.460
	Sig. (2-tailed)		.181
	N	10	10
IIAG_PPHC	Pearson Correlation	-.460	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.181	
	N	10	10

4.7 Empirical evidences of how bureaucratic corruption affects human development in Cameroon

In addition to the correlational analysis using data from well-known and trusted composite indices, the relationship between bureaucratic corruption and human development in Cameroon can also been seen from empirical evidence on how the former impacts the latter. Here are some instances that demonstrate how bureaucratic corruption takes a toll on human development in Cameroon:

4.7.1 The Poor Execution of Public Investment Projects

The bulk of Cameroonian government's efforts to deliver on its human development obligations towards its citizens rest in the public investment projects which covers its

investments in key sectors of human development like health, education, and public infrastructures. In Cameroon, such projects are lodged in the public investment budget (PIB) which has witnessed a low rate of execution over the years as a result of bureaucratic corruption especially in the execution of public contracts. The World Bank underscore the aforementioned link when it gave the following unequivocal assessment of Cameroon's management of its public invest projects:

> A candid look into how public investment funds are managed in Cameroon reveals that a great number of public investment projects are approved and implemented "on paper," and considered done despite being poorly executed or incomplete. What's more, local populations who are supposed to benefit from these projects don't know that they exist.
> (World Bank, 2011).

The African Development Bank (AfDB) confirms this trend. It an appraisal report of the "Public Expenditure Efficiency Improvement Support Project (PAEDEP)" it embarked on with the Government of Cameroon from 2017 - 2020, the AfDB affirms that the annual rates of implementation of the PIB in Cameroon remains low as the country failed to make use of resources put at its disposal by the bank through a partial credit guarantee it received in 2015 (AfDB, 2016).

The negative impact of corruption in the execution of public investment projects and human development in Cameroon was also confirmed by Cameroon's main anti-corruption body the NACC. According to NACC officials, corruption in Cameroon's public investment domain has halted socio-economic development and can be identified as the cause of the country's poverty (Nsom, 2010).

Practical examples of the impact of corruption in the implementation of public investment projects include cases of abandoned or poorly executed contracts in some

regions of Cameroon. In the West region for instance, Yemmafouo and Lebga (2018: p. 17) revealed in a study of public contract governance in the Menoua division that corrupt practises exist at almost all stages of project execution, and has resulted in "non-executed but paid contracts or poorly executed contracts".

Another pertinent case is that of public investment projects in the Adamawa region. According to the Adamawa Regional Delegate of Economy, Planning and Regional Development, Ahmadou Bello, a total of 38 projects under the PIB for 20108 - 2021 were abandoned by contractors (Mbodiam, 2021). The reason disclosed for the abandonment was mostly (for 81.5 % of abandoned projects) bankruptcy of the contractors (Ibid.) which is a clear indication of foul play in the contract award procedures which should normally only attribute projects to viable contractors. Such failures have a direct impact on the infrastructural development of the Adamawa which is numbered amongst the bottom three in the list of the poorest regions of Cameroon (Fambon et al, 2016).

A 2012 report published by NACC within the framework of the National Coalition for the fight against Corruption, detailed a catalogue of abandoned public investment projects in four regions in Cameroon (Nsom & Tabi, 2012). These abandoned projects include: a health centre in Mvamedjap Fong in the locality of Ngoulemakong in the South Region; a hospital in Songsimut-Log Bond-Biboumh Ngonga in the Littoral Region; school buildings at Government Primary School Eyene, Sa'a, Government Primary School Nkolangong, and Government Technical High School Akono in the Center Region; and other projects financed by the PIB, the Debt Relief and Development Contract (CD2) Funds in Cameroon's North Region (Ibid.).

Last but not the least among the examples of public investment projects forestalled by corruption is that of the Cameroon government's efforts to mitigate the effects of climate change. The Secretary General of Cameroon's Ministry of Environment, Nature Protection, and Sustainable Development Patrick Kum Bong Akwa told staff of his ministerial department that:

> One of the big challenges our ministry is facing now is the fight against climate change. Unfortunately, many investment projects of our ministry towards this direction are frustrated by corrupt practices that have become pervasive in the country.... We are surprised that construction works to repair the dyke system in the north of Cameroon against persistent annual floods since 2012 is still to complete, despite billions of francs CFA allocated by the government and donor institutions in 2012 and 2013. This is (a) clear indication that funds allocated for these projects are being misdirected to private pockets, or other uses that have no bearing with the targeted project.
> (Ngalame, 2014).

Other public investment projects of the Ministry of Environment, Nature Protection, and Sustainable Development abandoned or poorly executed because of corruption include: a canal construction for flood prevention in the city of Douala which is vulnerable to floods; and the renovation of damaged equipment in meteorological centres to enhance the monitoring of weather (Ibid).

4.7.2 Lack of Access to Healthcare

Another area where the impact of bureaucratic corruption on human development in Cameroon can be seen is the health sector. The prevalence of bureaucratic corruption has had an adverse effect Cameroon's healthcare system especially in the area of access to health care and quality of health care provided to citizens. The World Justice Project had the following to say concerning the nexus between corruption and healthcare access in Cameroon: "Pervasive corruption in Cameroon's public health system has forced citizens to pay bribes for health services that should be free under the law and

has ultimately left millions of at-risk adults and children without access to basic health services" (World Justice Project, 2019).

This has been corroborated by the Country Director of the Global Citizen's Initiative, Cameroon, Mr. Tarh Frambo, who in an interview at the World Justice Forum IV underscored that corruption had affected patients' access to basic health facilities in Cameroon given that some of them are asked to pay bribes to access treatments such as HIV/AIDS, Malaria, and Tuberculosis that have been made available for free by the Cameroonian government (Friedman, 2013).

Following a survey of 407 users of nine public hospitals (Laquintinie, General, New-Bell, Bonamoussadi, Nylon, Bonassama, Logbaba, Palmiers, and Diedo hospitals) in Cameroon's economic capital city, Douala, Bayemi (2018) ascertained the pervasive prevalence of corruption in public hospitals with the reception service (82.02%), the pharmacy (70.18), and hospitalization (58.48%) among the most corrupt services. He further notes that these corrupt practices impede the access to healthcare services for users from all walks of life in the city of Douala (Ibid).

Furthermore, a report on governance indicators in Cameroon's health sector by a visiting World Bank delegation identified informal payments in public health facilities in the country as the most prevalent type of corruption acknowledged by the general public (Vinard & Djateng, 2007). The report goes further notes the following concerning the impact of corruption in the public health sector access to healthcare:

> It has a particularly adverse impact on access to health care owing to its arbitrary and repetitive nature, because it often affects the most vulnerable (they are less able to complain), discourages patients from seeking care (or delays it), and orients it in an inefficient manner.
> (Ibid.)

Yamb and Bayemi (2016), also confirm the nefarious effect bureaucratic corruption has Cameroon's public health sector by pointing out the efforts made by the Cameroonian government and its partners to enhance access to health care services is undermined by corruption. The cite situation of quiet corruption in Cameroon public hospitals where medical doctors abscond their duties in public hospitals and divert patients to their private health centres for treatment (Ibid.).

4.8 Stakeholders' Perception on Bureaucratic Corruption and Human Development in Cameroon

In a bid to better understand the relationship between bureaucratic corruption and human development in Cameroon, interviews were carried out with some stakeholders in the governance process of the country. I spoke with two officials from leading anti-corruption non-governmental organizations in Cameroon to gathered their views about the aforementioned issue. Here are the responses on the relationship between the two phenomena in Cameroon's governance landscape.

According to the country representative of International Governance Institute (IGI), Cameroon, Stephen Nkem Asek, a high degree of bureaucratic corruption does exist in Cameroon and touches all levels of government (Fon & Asek, 2021). Asek asserts that responsibility for the high prevalence of bureaucratic corruption in Cameroon is shared between all the three arms of government given that their role they played as principals in the operationalization of the phenomenon in the country is interlinked. In this regard, he underscores that the failure of the legislative to effectively exercise its oversight responsibility over the executive, and to moralize the legal process, as well as the failure of the judiciary to bring to book perpetuators of bureaucratic corruption has created an enabling environment where the executive (which is in charge of the

country's bureaucracy) can abuse its power and engage in various forms of corruption most often with impunity (Ibid).

Concerning the nexus between bureaucratic corruption and human development, Asek believes the former has a negative effect on the latter in the Cameroonian context. As evidence, he points out that bureaucratic corruption hinders equitable access to health care with the poor severely affected given that they can't afford the additional cost to health services imposed by corruption in the public health sector.

Another example of the adverse effect of bureaucratic corruption on human development cited by Asek is its impediment to access to education. Here, he brought to light the case of a public school in the town of Limbe in the South West region of Cameroon which they came across when monitoring the effective implementation of the country's public investment budget. Here, Asek notes that the contractor abandoned the construction of the school building because he could not bear the losses incurred from excessive bribes, he engaged in to get the contract (Ibid.). The direct impact of this debacle was non-availability of education this aborted public school was to provide to inhabitants of that community.

The views of Asek are largely shared by my second interviewee, Francis Simeu, who occupies the function of project advisor at the Cameroon chapter of Transparency International. Concerning the prevalence and causes of bureaucratic corruption in Cameroon, Simeu believes bureaucratic corruption exist in Cameroon and is fuelled mostly by impunity, lack of the implementation of existing legal framework to contain its spread and the ignorance of such legal framework by citizens (Fon & Simeu, 2021).

He is also of the view that the country lacks a culture of accountability and that transparency is still at its budding stage.

With regards to the relationship between bureaucratic corruption and human development in Cameroon, Simeu had the following to say: "Bureaucratic corruption affects human development in Cameroon, people feel abused or fooled, infrastructures do not reflect their official cost, citizens don't trust leaders, and access to basic social services (health, education, electricity, water, etc.) is not equitable". (Ibid). He adds that as a result of embezzlement of public funds by government officials, and civil servants, the quality of infrastructure delivered through public contracts are poor, and do not reflect their official cost (Ibid).

4.9 Conclusion

In conclusion, this chapter revealed the high prevalence of bureaucratic corruption in Cameroon and its impact on human development. It explored the various sectors in which the phenomenon occurs and efforts put in place by the Cameroonian government to mitigate its occurrence. The impact of bureaucratic corruption on human development was measured both statistically and empirically. Statistically, it was measured through correlational analysis using composite indices from the World Bank, the UNDP, TI, and Mo Ibrahim Foundation's IIAG. Empirically, I looked at evidences on the relationship between the two phenomena in the country's governance, as well testimonies from my interview with civil society actors engaged in the fight against corruption in Cameroon. The next chapter would focus on bureaucratic corruption and human development in Botswana.

Chapter 5

BUREAUCRATIC CORRUPTION AND HUMAN DEVELOPMENT IN BOTSWANA

5.1 Introduction

The previous chapter examined the relationship between bureaucratic corruption and human development in Cameroon, which is one of the selected case-study countries. It explored the manifestation of bureaucratic corruption in key sectors of the Cameroon bureaucracy before moving on to analyse the correlation between bureaucratic corruption and human development from a statistical and empirical perspective. The overall results showed a positive correlation between bureaucratic corruption and human development in Cameroon which is a country plagued by a high level of bureaucratic corruption. This chapter shall focus on the case of Botswana which is a country that is largely reckoned as model in Africa when it comes to good governance and the fight against corruption. In spite of its impressive reputation and exemplary performances in various international corruption measurement indices (especially TI's CPI and the World Bank's WGI), corruption still exist in Botswana and is regarded as an important challenge towards which much resources and efforts have been mobilized to address. This Chapter begins by exploring the manifestation of bureaucratic corruption in key sectors of Botswana's bureaucracy. It also examines the correlation between bureaucratic corruption and human development in Botswana from both quantitative (statistical) and qualitative (empirical evidences) perspectives.

5.2 Principal Agent Client (PAC) Model and Bureaucratic Corruption in Botswana

Though it is neither systemic nor endemic as the case might be with other SSA countries, corruption does rear its ugly head in different sectors from time to time in Botswana. Botswana anti-corruption expert David Sebudubudu affirms this reality by stating that, "In spite of its democratic success, Botswana has its share of corruption, although it not yet a way of life."(Sebudubudu, 2003: p. 126). He went further to acknowledge that most of the manifestation of corruption in the Batswana society is bureaucratic in nature (Ibid).

The aforementioned depiction of the nature of corruption in Botswana falls squarely with the PAC model of corruption which is predominantly seen as the mode through which bureaucratic corruption occurs. Corrupt activities like those outlined Sebudubudu usually necessitate the participation of the three main actors in the PAC chain: the principal who delegates power to the agent (usually the executive or legislative arm of government); the agent (in this case a government agency and bureaucrats) who act on behalf of the state; and the client who in this sense are users of public services.

5.2.1 Manifestation of Corruption in The Public Sector

As already mentioned, Botswana does not have a systemic problem of corruption in its public sector. However, there are still areas where bureaucratic corruption is practiced. This section would examine the manifestation of bureaucratic corruption in six key areas of the Batswana public sector: public service; public procurements; tax administration; custom administration; land administration; and the police.

5.2.1.1 Public Service

Corruption in Botswana's public service is relatively low as evidences in a number of reports and statistics. According to Transparency International, the practice of bribery to obtain public service is less prevalent in Botswana than other African states (Transparency International, 2015). Investigations carried out by the Batswana Directorate on Corruption and Economic Crimes (DCEC) between 1995-2005 reveals civil servants were amongst the majority of employees involved in corruption and that average amount involved in most corruption cases was 600 pula (150USD) (Transparency International, 2014).

In an Afrobarometer Survey on Batswana's perception of corruption in Botswana carried out in 2019, a majority of Batswana had an averagely positive perception of the country's civil servants when it comes to involvement in corruption (Isbell & Seabo, 2020). 49% of those surveyed said some civil servants were corrupt and 7% said none of them were corrupt. The general outlook of Botswana's public service is however positive when it comes to governance (Ibid). The Mo Ibrahim Foundation's Ibrahim Index of African Governance (IIAG) composite index on transparency, accountability and corruption in the Botswana public service gives it a very high scores with some indices registering a score of 100 out of 100 (See Figure 9).

	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015
Overall	73.9	75.1	75.3	73.7	74.2	75.8	76.2	74.6	70.4	72.1
Public sector accountability and transparency	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Accountability of public officials	83.3	83.3	83.3	83.3	83.3	83.3	79.8	76.2	76.2	76.2
Corruption in government and public officials	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Corruption and bureaucracy	71.4	85.7	85.7	71.4	85.7	85.7	85.7	85.7	76.2	76.2

Figure 9: Botswana's performance in Transparency, Accountability, Corruption on the IIAG

5.2.1.2 Public Procurements

The public procurement sector is the most corrupt of Botswana public sectors. It is highly permeated by nepotism and patronage as government ministers often tender with companies owned by family members without disclosing conflict of interest (Badham-Jones, 2014). Nepotism and cronyism have become so entrenched in public procurement that government tenders have often been used an instrument of distributing favours to political cronies. Sebudubudu (2014) highlighted the aforementioned phenomenon in unequivocal terms by stating that there is a close association between leading business men and the ruling party under which government tenders for the supply of goods and services are given to people with affiliations with the ruling party.

The most glaring case of nepotism in the public procurement sector in Botswana is the 2015 Khama family scandal in which the twin brothers of then President Ian Khama

(Anthony and Tshekedi Khama) where accused of being favoured with military contracts from the Botswana Defence Force (BDF) (Powell, 2018). The scandal erupted in July 2015 when then Botswana Defence Minister Shaw Kgathi was questioned in parliament and had to admit that Seleka Springs (the company owned by President Ian Khama's twin brothers) was involved in military contracts worth about 225 million Pulas awarded by BDF (Motlogelwa, 2015). According to confidential documents intercepted by the Sunday Standard (A Botswana Newspaper), it was revealed that Ian Khama (at the time Vice President) may have leaked confidential data about tender pricing to Seleka Springs to enable the win a multi-million contract to supply combat vehicles to the BDF (Sunday Standards, 2014).

5.2.1.3 Tax Administration

The level of corruption in Botswana's taxation sector can be categorized as fair. According to the 2015-2016 Global Competitiveness Report (GCR) of the World Economic Forum companies operating in Botswana reported that bribes related to yearly tax payment are scares (GAN Integrity, 2022). Statistics from the USAID's International Data & Economic analysis (IDEA) on domestic revenue mobilization reveals that the percentage of companies expected to give gifts during meetings with tax officials is 8.4 which is about half below the SSA regional average of 16.1 (USAID, 2010).

Similarly, USAID IDEA data also reveal that 17.6% of companies operating in Botswana see the tax administration as a major constrain to their business which is below far below the regional average of 28.5% (Ibid). Botswana's taxation sector has also made some strides in terms of aligning to international benchmarks of good governance. Botswana is party to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)'s Tax Information Exchange Agreements (TIEAs), which

stands out as one of the most comprehensive global standards on taxation (Botlhale, 2019). A phase two review report of OECD's Global Forum on Transparency and Exchange of Information for Tax Purposes in 2015 indicated that Botswana's tax administration was mostly in sync with international standards (Ibid).

However, all is far from being perfect, as there has been reports on tax evasion and corruption concerning tax payments. Botswana's Member of Parliament (MP) from the Gaborone North constituency Haskins Nkaigwa stated in parliament in 2015 that a report from a US based organization indicates Botswana was losing around 10 billion Pola each year from tax evasion and corruption (Sejabosigo, 2015)

5.2.1.4 Custom Administration

Botswana's custom administration has a low-level corruption. The 2015 Global Enabling Trade Report of the World Economic Forum indicated that bribes and irregular payments are rare when it comes to importing to and exporting from Botswana (GAN Integrity, 2022). Botswana was an outlier amongst its SSA peers in the 'Trade across Border' category of the World Banks's 2020 Doing Business Report. It registered a score of 86.7/100 in the aforementioned category with a global rank of 55 out 190 countries which are far higher than its regional peers like; Kenya with a score of 67.4/100 and a rank of 117/199, Namibia with a score of 61.5/100 and a rank of 138/199, South Africa with a score of 59.6/100 and a rank of 145/199, and Zambia with a score of 56.9/100 and a rank of 145/199 (World Bank, 2020).

Nevertheless, all is not a bed of roses with the Botswana custom administration when it comes to corruption. In an assessment report on selected trade facilitation measures among five Southern Africa states published by USAID in 2017, stakeholders interviewed identified corruption at Botswana's custom border posts and other hotspots

in the country's transport corridor as one of the key challenges to trade facilitation (Makokera et al, 2017). 17 police agents at Botswana's Kopfontein custom border post were apprehended for collecting bribes from border crossers (allegedly involved in a cigarette smugglers syndicate) coming from South Africa (GAN integrity, 2022). The apprehended police agents were suspended and tried for corruption and fraud charges (Ibid).

5.2.1.5 Land Administration

Like the custom administration, Botswana's land administration is also an example of good governance in land management. After independence, land administration in Botswana was structured into three land tenure systems: Tribal land; State land (which replaced 'Crown land'); and Freehold land tenure (Kampamba et al, 2018). Tribal land is administered by the Ministry of Land Management, Water and Sanitation Services through autonomous 'Land Boards' established and regulated by the Tribal Land Act of 1968; while state, and freehold land are directly administered by the Department of Lands of the aforementioned Ministry (Ibid.; Lina Bornegrim, 2010). From 2009 to 2013, the country's land administration went through a reform process with the implementation of the Improvement of Land Administration Procedures, Capacity and Systems (LAPCAS) which is a partnership between Botswana's Ministry of Lands and Housing (MLH) and the Swedish Mapping, Cadastre and Land Registration Authority (Lantmäteriet).

The aforementioned reform greatly enhanced land governance in Botswana by introducing improvements such: a unique parcel numbering system for the entire country; the computerisation of the country's deeds registry and the putting in place of a land hub to serve as a one-stop-shop for all issues related to land in the country (Malatsi and Finnstrom, 2011). All these have helped to diminish the risk of

corruption. The 2022 Index of Economic Freedom published by the Heritage Foundation states that "Property rights are enforced" in Botswana (Heritage Foundation, 2022). Botswana also has a good score (65.8/100) and ranking (82/190) in the ease of land property registration in Doing Business 2020 (World Bank, 2020).

Notwithstanding, the land acquisition process has been criticised as being tainted by nepotism as acknowledged by de Satgé (2021).

5.2.1.6 The Police

Corruption in Botswana's police force can be categorized as moderate given that its occurrence is not pervasive and largely under control. A 2014 Report on Human Rights Practices by the US Department of State acknowledges that issues of corruption exist among lower rank police officers like the extortion of bribe from traffic violators and irregular immigrants but that the police core has mechanisms to address such issues (US Department of State, 2014).

The report also reveals that corruption investigations were initiated against four police officers in 2012, and that a total of 31 police officers were sacked for non-adherence to the code of conduct of the police force (Ibid). An Afrobarometer survey carried out with Batswana on the quality of democracy and governance in their country, 61% of respondents expressed their trust for the police (Afrobarometer, 2014). According to the World Economic Forum's GCR, Botswana ranked 62 on 140 countries globally in the areas of reliability of police services with an above average score of 4.3/7 (World Economic Forum, 2016).

5.3 Statistical Indicators and Surveys on Bureaucratic Corruption in Botswana

The manifestation of bureaucratic corruption in Botswana can also be examined by looking at the country's performance in global and regional composite indices used to measure corruption. In this regard, this section shall focus on three internationally renowned corruption measurement indices: TI's CPI, and the World Bank's WGI at the global level; and the Mo Ibrahim Foundation's IIAG at the continental level.

5.3.1 Transparency International's Corruption Perception Index

Botswana has been sui generis when it comes to the perceived level of corruption in SSA measured by Transparency International (TI). In 2021, TI ranked Botswana 45 out of 180 countries in its CPI with a score of 55/100 in terms of perceived level of public sector corruption (Transparency International, 2022). In comparison to other SSA countries Botswana third among the top scorers (below Seychelles which emerged first, and Cabo Verde which emerged second) and its score (55), though lower than previous years (61 in 2017, 2018, 2019, and 60 in 2020), was far above the SSA regional average of 33 (Transparency International, 2022b).

Botswana's good performance at TI's CPI has been very consistent as the country has registered an average score of 60/100 for the past two and a half decades (See Figure 10). These results are eloquent proves of that Botswana's public sector is being held in high esteem when it comes to freedom from bureaucratic corruption.

Figure 10: Botswana's TI CPI score from 1998 – 2020

5.3.2 The World Bank's Worldwide Governance Indicator

Botswana's performance in the Corruption Control Indicator of the World Bank's WGI (which measures bureaucratic corruption) is equally impressive. Botswana's average percentile rank for Control of Corruption is 78.6 while its score in the Control of Corruption Estimate sub-indicator for the past two decades (2000-2020) is 0.88/2.5 (See Figure 11).

Figure 11: Botswana's performance in WGI control of corruption estimate and control of corruption percentile ranking

5.3.3 Mo Ibrahim Foundation's Ibrahim Index of African Governance (IIAG)

Botswana has also had a very good performance in the lone anti-corruption composite index that measures public sector corruption in the continent--the Ibrahim Index of African Governance (IIAG). Botswana's average score in the 'Anti-corruption' sub-category of the 'Security and Rule of Law' category from 2010-2019 stands at 72.9/100 which is far above the African average for the same period which stands at 38/100 (See Figure 12).

Figure 12: IIAG statistics on Botswana anti-corruption performance for 2010 – 2019

5.4 Forms of Bureaucratic Corruption in Botswana

The forms of bureaucratic corruption practiced in Botswana are wide-ranging. According to Sebudubudu (2014: p. 126), the forms of bureaucratic corruption in Botswana includes:

> ...fraud, bribes, sleaze, inflating government tenders, cost overruns, ghosting, fronting, inflating allowances, misleading tender boards, forging documents, obtaining money by false pretences, illegal sale of passports, embezzlement of trust funds, misappropriation of money, money laundering, unnecessary travel and travel claims, and general unethical behaviour.

Added to the aforementioned list is conflict of interest, nepotism and patronage which have become rampant in Botswana Democratic Party (BDP)-led government in recent times (Badham-Jones, 2014).

5.5 Causes of Bureaucratic Corruption in Botswana

The factors that account for the practice of bureaucratic corruption in Botswana are both attitudinal and to a limited extent systemic. Attitudinal causes essentially revolve around greed. Systemic causes include neopatrimonialism, nepotism and lack of accountability. In spite of Botswana's consistent impressive record in good governance and the fight against corruption over the years, the aforementioned factors still rear their ugly heads in the Batswana society and even more so in recent years.

5.5.1 Attitudinal Causes

The most prominent attitudinal cause of corruption in Botswana is the greed of bureaucrats especially senior government officials who are usually not satisfied with their position as civil servants and seek to make more profit by venturing cumulatively into the private sector. Some the biggest corruption scandals Botswana has experience over the years have been those involving conflict of interest in which senior bureaucrats awarded contracts to private sector entities to which they either owned or had shares. According to Phetlhe (2021), the aforementioned practice was formalized during the tenure of Ian Khama as President of Botswana (2008-2018).

Badham-Jones (2014) corroborates the aforementioned indictment by pointing out that a blurred line separates public and private interest in Botswana as members of the BDP-led government usually cumulate as directors and owners of businesses and agricultural enterprises.

5.5.2 Systemic Causes

The main systemic causes of bureaucratic corruption in Botswana are neopatrimonialism, nepotism, and lack of accountability. Over the years, the aforementioned vices have started eating into the fabric of Botswana's civil service,

and though not yet rampant, can still be seen as a threat to good governance in the country. Neopatrimonialism in Botswana is peculiar relative to the African context. The system of concentration of political power, distribution of favours, and used of state resources to entrench political power is not done from a personal or ethnocentric prism as obtain in most African countries. In Botswana, neopatrimonial networks serves to entrench the ruling BDP in power. As Gordon (2019) explain (when comparing the patronage that exist in Kenya with that in Botswana):

> the decision to vest natural resource rights in the federal government avoided the privatization of diamond exports, which could have led to ethnic patronage networks extending from an individual. Instead, the federal government utilized the mineral wealth to invest in heavy urban and rural spending programs to legitimate BDP rule. However, rather than allow the BDP party apparatus access to the wealth generated by the diamonds, the central government keeps tight control over the distribution of government resources. Furthermore, the government allocates resources evenly throughout regions, regardless of whether the region supported the BDP in prior elections. The government regulates the distribution of these resources down to the local level, requiring federal employees, rather than elected local officials, to distribute resources. This situation can be considered somewhat of a government-managed patronage network, as citizens are increasingly dependent on the government for drought relief, access to education, and employment. Continuation of these services, then, is dependent on the BDP's return to power, not on which ethnic group gains exclusive access to the executive branch.

The aforementioned perspective is shared by von Soest (2009) who points out that the level of neopatrimonialism in Botswana is relatively low and restricted to certain cases of patronage and elite clientelism.

Nepotism however is increasingly becoming rampant within the country's bureaucracy. An investigation carried out by South African investigative and comment news organization Mail & Guardian revealed that nepotism was pervasive in Ian Khama's government as the former Botswana President sort to fill his cabinet with relatives and friends (Ditlhase, 2012).

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Several other authors have attested that nepotism is one of the biggest factors that promotes corruption in Botswana (Gabathuse, 2021; Ruele, 2020; Kuhlmann, 2020; Gbadamosi, 2006).

Last but not the least amongst the cause factors of systemic corruption in Botswana's bureaucracy is lack of accountability. A report produced by civil society organizations in Botswana in partnership with the South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA) identified the absence of accountability, evidenced by impunity amongst public officials who failed in their oversight responsibilities, as an incentive for corrupt practices (BOCONGO/SAIIA, 2021).

5.6 Efforts to Combat Bureaucratic Corruption

The fight against bureaucratic corruption in Botswana took centre stage in the 1990s after a series of high-profile corruption scandals involving government officials from the higher echelons of the BDP the enraged public opinion (CPI, 2018). The scandals included: the unlawful attribution of contract for the supply of primary school teaching materials to the International Project Managers (IPM) in 1990; illegal land transactions involving then Vice-President and Minister of Local Government P.S. Mmusi, and Agriculture Minister D.K. Kwelagobe in 1992; and a case of unbridled mismanagement and dishonesty among top government officials that costed millions of Pula to the Botswana Housing Corporation (BHC) in 1992 (Good, 1994). All of these led to the establishment of the Directorate on Corruption and Economic Crime (DCEC) in Botswana in 1994 with the mission of fighting against corruption through prevention, education and investigation (Kuris, 2013).

The DCEC was part of a broader effort by successive governments in Botswana towards combatting corruption in general and bureaucratic corruption in particular. The aforementioned endeavour can be examined in three areas: criminalization of specific acts of bureaucratic corruption, establishment of an anti-corruption institution, and the pursuit of anti-corruption policies.

Before delving into the aforementioned analysis, it is imperative to point out the fight against corruption in particular and the pursuit of good governance in general in Botswana is not entirely a post-colonial novelty. It is partly engrained in the country's traditional system of governance that promoted participatory democracy, and tolerance.

5.6.1 Criminalization of Specific Acts of Bureaucratic Corruption in Penal Code

One of the first steps taken in the revamping the fight against corruption after the backlash that ensued from the 1990s corruption scandals was the enactment and promulgation of the Corruption and Economic Crime Act (CECA) in 1994. Apart from establishing the DCEC and specifying its structure, function, and jurisdiction, the Corruption and Economic Crime Act (Part IV: Section 23) establish a new definition for the concept of 'valuable consideration' which encompasses the following:

> (a) any gift, benefit, loan, fee, reward, or commission consisting of money or of any valuable security or of other property or interest in property of any description;
> (b) any office, employment or contract;
> (c) any payment, release, discharge or liquidation of any loan, obligation or other liability, whether in whole or in part;
> (d) any other service, or favour including protection from any penalty or disability incurred or apprehended or from any action or proceedings of a disciplinary, civil or criminal nature, whether or not already instituted;
> (e) the exercise or forbearance from the exercise of any right or any power or duty; and
> (f) any offer, undertaking or promise whether conditional or unconditional, of any valuable consideration within the meaning of the provisions of any of the preceding paragraphs.
> (Quanash, 1994, p. 194)

CECA was amended by parliament in 2013. The amended version of the Act contains an updated and more precise definition of what constitute corruption in relation to offer or acceptance of valuable consideration. Section 25A of the amended Act states that:

> 25A. (1) A person is guilty of corruption if he or she directly or indirectly promises, offers or gives to a public body or any other person, a valuable consideration, in order that the public body or the person abuses his or her real or supposed influence with a view to obtaining from that person an undue advantage for himself or herself or for any other person's own benefit.
>
> (2) A public officer or any other person shall be guilty of an offence if he or she directly or indirectly solicits or accepts, a valuable consideration for himself or herself or for another person, in order that the public officer or the person abuses his or her real or supposed influence with a view to obtaining from a public body a valuable consideration."
> (Blackhall Publishing, 2021: p.47)

A more comprehensive criminalization of corruption is found in Division II of the Botswana Penal code which essentially covers crimes related to bureaucratic corruption. This part of the penal code comprises a total of 36 offenses criminalized as acts of corruption under the following four sections: Corruption and the Abuse of Office; Offences relating to the Administration of justice; Rescues, Escapes and Obstructing Officers of Court of Law; Miscellaneous. Offences Against Public Authority (Blackhall Publishing, 2021b).

Other more targeted legislations have also been passed to strengthen the legal and institutional framework and render it more effective in the fight against corruption. They include: the Proceeds and Instruments of Crime Act enacted in 2014 and focused on depriving individuals convicted of corruption crimes from the proceeds of such crimes; the Whistleblowing Act of 2016 which seeks to protect whistle-blowers and encourage them to give identified reports without fear of victimization; the Declaration of Assets and Liabilities Act of 2019 which places an obligation on an identified list

of personalities (including the President and Vice-President) to declare their assets, income, liabilities and interests so it can be monitored to detect and prevent corruption, benefits from the proceeds of crime and money laundering (Government of Botswana, 2020).

5.6.2 International Treaties and Conventions

Botswana is a party to two international conventions against corruption. At the global level, Botswana is a state party to the United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC) through its accession on 27 June 2011 (UNODC, 2021). UNCAC is the sole legally binding global instrument for the fight against corruption. It encompasses five main domains: criminalization and law enforcement; preventive measures, asset recovery, information exchange and technical assistance, and international cooperation (World Bank, n.d.). UNCAC covers several manifestations of corruption like abuse of function, bribery, and influence peddling (Ibid).

At the continental level, Botswana is a state party to the African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption (AUCPCC) which seeks to promote the prevention, detection, punishment, and eradication of corruption in the public and private sectors in Africa (African Union, 2003). It acceded to the AUCPCC on 14 May 2014 and ratified it on 19 August 2014 (African Union, 2021).

5.6.3 Creation of Anti-Corruption Institutions

The major strategy developed by Botswana to combat corruption has been the establishment of the DCEC which saw the light of day on 5 September 1994 (Quah, 2017). The task assigned to the DCEC comprise: the investigation of alleged acts of corruption and economic crime; corruption prevention; and the sensitization of the public on the consequences of corruption (Government of Botswana, 2022).

To accomplish the aforementioned task, the CECA endowed the DCEC with certain prerogatives such as: the authority to conduct investigations and inquiries on allege corruption crimes including the ability to demand records of private citizens, public and private agencies; the power (to its director) to arrest (without a warrant) any individual the DCEC Director has committed or is about to commit a crime; and to perform search without a warrant in a premises or place the DCEC Director believes can lead to a conviction (Bamidele, 1999). While such provisions have been vehemently criticized as a clear example of the violation of civil rights including the right of the accuse "to remain silent and not to incriminate himself"(Quansah, 1994: p. 194), the DCEC has used the aforementioned powers to effectively play its investigative role.

The DCEC made some strides over the years in terms of the investigation and adjudication of corruption cases. From its inception in 1994 to 2003, a total of 13,457 reports on alleged cases of corruption had been received, out of which 3639 were investigated and 9754 either referred to other appropriate bodies or retained for the purpose of intelligence (Gbadamosi, 2006). In 2012 alone, the total number of corruption cases actively investigated stood at 1479 meanwhile the conviction rate for the cases brought before the courts stood at 71% (Porogo and Dewah, 2017). Most recently in 2022, the DCEC received 75 allegation reports on COVID-19 graft (misappropriation of public funds for private benefit) out of which 22 were being investigated and one transferred to the Directorate of Public Prosecution (DPP) (Selatlhwa, 2022).

This high number of reports of alleged cases of corruption received by the DCEC is an eloquent testimony of a successful anti-corruption sensitization campaign that has

brought the issue of corruption front and centre among various organizations and Batswana from all walks of life (Bamidele, 1999).

5.7 The Impact of Bureaucratic Corruption on Human Development in Botswana

As previously established (in the last chapter), the conduct of bureaucrats is crucial to good governance, which in tend has the capacity to enhance the capacity of governments to meet the human development needs of their citizens. In this respect, there is a logical correlation between efficient and effective bureaucracy and successful human development and vice-versa. After exploring the performance of the Botswana's bureaucracy in terms of corruption, the ensuing analyses would be focused on the impact of Botswana's performance in bureaucratic corruption on the country's achievement of human development. This shall be done through a correlational analysis between Botswana's performance in bureaucratic corruption in the three composite indexes so far explored on (TI's CPI, the World Bank's WGI, and IIAG's Anti-Corruption sub-category) and its performance in human development based on two human development composite indices: UNDP's HDI, and the World Bank's Poverty line statistics.

5.7.1 Correlational Analysis of TI's CPI and UNDP's HDI for Botswana

A correlation analysis was using IBM SPSS Statistics software to test the relationship between bureaucratic corruption and human development in Botswana. Data on the country's performance in the fight against corruption was obtained from its TI's CPI score over a twenty-year period: 2000 - 2019. Similarly, data on Botswana's level of human development was obtained from the country's score on UNDP's HDI over the same time series (2000 - 2019). A bivariate Pearson correlation coefficient test then conducted using IBM SPSS Statistic to determine the relationship between both

variables (CPI and HDI) over the identified time series. The results indicate a positive correlation between high CPI score (indicating low level of corruption) and high HDI score (indicating high level of human development) for Botswana with a correlation coefficient of 0.38 (See Table 4).

Table 4: Results of Pearson Correlation Coefficient test of TI CPI and HDI for Botswana

Correlations

		CPI	HDI
CPI	Pearson Correlation	1	.383
	Sig. (2-tailed)		.096
	N	20	20
HDI	Pearson Correlation	.383	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.096	
	N	20	20

5.7.2 Correlational Analysis of TI's CPI and the World Bank Poverty Headcount Ratio for Botswana

A correlational analysis was also carried out to assess the impact of bureaucratic corruption on the rate of poverty in Botswana. The CPI serves as a performance indicator for bureaucratic corruption, while the World Bank's poverty headcount (PHC) ratio measured by the percentage of people living below $2.15 per day based on the 2017 purchasing power parity (PPP) was used as an indicator for the measurement of poverty.

A bivariate Pearson correlation coefficient test was conducted to examine the relationship between Botswana's TI CPI performance and its most recent World Bank PHC statistics (2007 - 2014). Before delving into the results, it is important to underscore that Botswana's TI CPI performance moved from 56% in 2007 to 63% in

2014. Meanwhile, its PHC ratio dropped from 17.70% in 2007 to 15.40% in 2014. The results of the Pearson correlation test show a perfect negative correlation which demonstrates that an increase in anti-corruption performance (as indicated by Botswana's improvement from 2007 - 2014) leads to a decrease in the prevalence of poverty (as indicated in the drop in Botswana's World Bank PHC from 2007 - 2014) (See Table 5).

Table 5: Results of Pearson Correlation Coefficient test of TI CPI and World Bank PHC for Botswana

Correlations		TI_CPI_BW	WB_PPH_BW
TI_CPI_BW	Pearson Correlation	1	-1.000**
	Sig. (2-tailed)		.
	N	2	2
WB_PPH_BW	Pearson Correlation	-1.000**	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.	
	N	2	2

**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

5.7.3 Correlational Analysis of IIAG 'Accountability and Transparency' and IIAG 'Human Development' performance for Botswana

The impact of institutional quality on human development was analyzed using Botswana's performance in IIAG's Accountability and Transparency on the one hand and its performance in IIAG's Human Development category on the other. A Pearson bivariate correlational analysis was carried out to examine the relationship between Botswana's performances in the aforementioned indicators (the IIAG 'Accountability and Transparency' and the IIAG 'Human Development'). Before looking at the results, it is important to point out that there has been a consistent improvement in Botswana's IIAG 'Accountability and Transparency' score in the past three years, which moved

from 60.70% in 2017 to 65.90% in 2019. This has had a positive impact on its human development performance as seen in the results of the Pearson bivariate test which shows a very strong positive correlation between Botswana's IIAG 'Accountability and Transparency' performance and its performance in Human Development (See Table 6).

Table 6: Results of Pearson Correlation Coefficient test of IIAG 'Accountability and Transparency' and IIAG 'Human Development' performance for Botswana

Correlations

		IIAG_AT_BW	IIAG_HD_BW
IIAG_AT_BW	Pearson Correlation	1	.996
	Sig. (2-tailed)		.056
	N	3	3
IIAG_HD_BW	Pearson Correlation	.996	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.056	
	N	3	3

5.8 Empirical Evidences of how Bureaucratic Corruption Affects Human Development in Botswana

The impact of bureaucratic corruption on human development in Botswana can also be verified from empirical cases that demonstrate the correlation between the two phenomena. On this issue, there are two notable trends that would be highlighted in this section. On the positive side, Botswana's progress in bringing bureaucratic corruption under control (as attested by its good performances in both TI's CPI and the World Bank's WGI Control of Corruption Indicator over the years), has yielded much dividends in meeting the human development needs of its population. On the negative side, there has also been some occasional relapse in Botswana's bureaucratic

corruption performances in recent years which has had a negative impact on its pursuit of human development.

5.8.1 Control of Bureaucratic Corruption and Strides made on Human Development

Unlike most of its contemporaries in SSA and Africa in general, Botswana is one of the few African countries that has escaped the 'Dutch Disease' (Resource curse) wherein the abundance of natural resources has paradoxically led to less economic growth and development (Rohrig, 2019). From 1965-1998, Botswana emerged as the world highest achiever in PPP-adjusted income per capita growth (a key indicator of human development) with an average GDP per capita growth rate of 7.7. Botswana attained the status of an 'upper middle-income' country in mid 2000s with a GDP per capital (in purchasing-power adjusted terms) of above $12,000 (Kuris, 2013).

Botswana has also achieved significant strides in education (another key human development indicator) with an increase in adult literacy rate from 34% in 1981 to 81% in 2006 (Martin, 2008). Primary school enrolment moved from 66,100 at independence (1966) to 327,600 in 2000, and enrolments in recent decades has consistently been marked by gender balance with a female enrolment rate of more than 50% (Leith, 2005). The IMF reckons Botswana as "one of the few countries in sub-Saharan Africa that has truly benefited from its mineral wealth." (IMF, 2018). Weldon and Shor (2014) see Botswana as a global source of inspiration for having demonstrated "a clear understanding of how to harness the country's natural resources—diamonds, primarily—for the good of its people". How did Botswana become *sui generis* amongst its African contemporaries plagued with the 'Dutch disease'? Many scholars attribute this to good governance which has enabled the

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country to translate revenues accrued from trade in its mineral resources to economic and human development.

While Kuris (2013) attribute Botswana's aforementioned stellar economic and human development performance in the first three decades of independence to the discovery of diamonds (soon after independence), Acemoglu et al (2002) associate it to good governance. They directly linked Botswana's economic and human development progress, attested by its unparalleled GDP per capita growth, to a "meritocratic, relatively noncorrupt and efficient bureaucracy" it developed and sustained after independence (Ibid., p, 83). Their perception is shared by Sebudubudu (2005) who links Botswana's success as a developmental state to the fact that corruption has remained relatively under control in spite of clientelism and pressure for the distribution of public resources.

Other scholars and development agencies have also provided empirical linkages between Botswana's good governance and human development. Kaboyakgosi and Marata (2012) points out that accountability in Botswana can be seen in the implementation of the democratic principle of separation of powers between the executive, legislative and judiciary, and the practice of decentralization which helps to entrench democracy at the local level. Good governance not only provides a safeguard that prevents revenues from mineral wealth from becoming the preserve of kleptocratic elites but makes it possible for resources to be invested to enhance the social welfare of citizens. In this regard, Kaboyakgosi and Marata (2012) go further to points out that Botswana has made a practice of investing revenues from diamond trade into social protection for the underprivileged especially in key areas such as education, health, and the provision of water.

Development agencies have also corroborated this positive impact of the control of bureaucratic corruption in and good governance in general has on human development in Botswana. In an interview with IMF COUNTRY FOCUS, the head of the IMF team in Botswana Enrique Gelbard underscored that there are three major ingredients in Botswana's recipe of success in moving from a seriously impoverished country at independence to high-middle-income state:

> First, transparent and prudent management of diamond revenues (evidenced by the country's consistently making it to the top 50 states in the globe in terms of governance), leading to huge savings that can be used for investments.
>
> Second, the allocation of a good portion of government expenditure to education, health, social assistance, and public infrastructure investment.
>
> Third, the establishment of a tradition of democratic values which has helped to preserve political and social stability in the country.
> (IMF, 2018)

In a chapter devoted to Botswana in the World Bank's publication entitled Yes Africa Can: Success Stories from a Dynamic Continent, Michael Lewin explained that one of the reasons for Botswana's extraordinary development performance was good governance spearheaded by the country's leadership at independence which according to him "has designed and fostered the conditions of governance that have ensured stability and social and economic progress" (Lewin, 2011; p. 82).

A study on Botswana's mineral revenues published by the African Natural Resources Center of the African Development Bank (AfDB) underscores that the main reason Botswana has been able to avoid the resource curse is because of sound economic management of mineral revenue (AfDB, 2016). Unlike some of its African contemporaries, where mineral revenue usually gets looted, embezzled or help the elites to entrench a patrimonial system, Botswana's has pursued efficient and effective

fiscal and macro-economic policies that has enabled it to employ its mineral revenue towards diversification of its economy and enhancement of human development.

This has been done through the following measures: a public spending policy based on six-year National Development Plans (NDPs) which guides government expenditure towards priorities for a plan period and avenues for monitoring and evaluation (mid-term review); maintaining a Sustainable Budget Index (SBI) by following the Hartwick-Solo Rule (for mineral dependent economies) which requires that the value of investment to be commensurate to the value of rents on extracted mineral resources to achieve constant consumption; a macroeconomic policy based on the maintenance of internal and external balance which has helped the government to maintain budget surpluses; and investment in human capital especially education, and health that has moved the country from one of the poorest in the globe to a middle income country (Ibid.). Noteworthy here is the fact transparency, accountability, and efficiency in the management of mineral resources can help enhance human development.

5.8.2 Increase in Bureaucratic Corruption and Decline in Human Development

In spite of the numerous achievements, all has not been a bed of roses when it comes to Botswana's record in bureaucratic corruption and pursuit of human development. There have been some lapses in the country's performance in bureaucratic corruption in recent years which has definitely had an impact on its progress on human development. Despite Botswana's remarkable economic growth over the years, its performance at the level of income distribution is deplorable. According to the UNDP, Botswana has the 9th highest Gini coefficient globally making it one of the most unequal countries in the world (UNDP, 2021).

This poor performance in income distribution can be linked to neopatrimonialism in the country's bureaucracy which creates a framework for top bureaucrats to draw the lion's share of the country's revenue, and the ruling BDP to entrench itself in power. In this regard, Badham-Jones (2014) points out that over dependence on diamond revenue has created a high level of dependence on the state for wealth redistribution wealth among Batswana. Wealth redistribution is carried out through tenders for the creation of state infrastructure. The award of tenders by the government is highly characterized by nepotism, and conflict of interest which is used to enhance neopatrimonialism to the benefits of a few government and party loyalists.

Mogalakwe and Nyamnjoh (2017) corroborate the link between bureaucratic corruption and income inequality by pointing to the growth of elite corruption in the administration of Ian Khama (Botswana's fourth president) through an alliance between BDP elites, and army generals. As president, Khama not only awarded lucrative defence contracts to his brothers but use his influence to reward loyalists and close friends with positions in governments as an investigation by M&G revealed (Ditlhase, 2012). Makgala and Botlhomilwe (2017) believe that the fact that the state is the main employer in Botswana has created a situation where political participation is perceived as the main route for the achievement of wealth and social status. Therefore, a patrimonial system like that operated by Khama can exacerbate income inequality.

5.8.3 Stakeholders' Perception on Bureaucratic Corruption and Human Development in Botswana

The above empirical evidences from secondary sources were supplemented by interviews with stakeholders on the field. I interviewed two key civil society actors in the fight against corruption in Botswana to get their perception on the realities on the

ground when it comes to the prevalence of corruption and its impact on human development in the country. Here are their perceptions on the aforementioned phenomena and its correlation.

The first interviewee was Sonia Gaobolae, who serves as Communications, Research and Advocacy Manager for one of the leading national anti-corruption non-governmental organizations dubbed Botswana Centre for Public Integrity (BCPI). Concerning the prevalence of corruption, Gaobolae acknowledge that bureaucratic corruption does exist in Botswana but emphasis that is mostly entrenched among senior state bureaucrats than those in the lower echelon (Fon & Gaobolae, 2023). She accounts this peculiarity to the fact that "higher public officers feel less likely to be effectively taken to task for not being accountable and acting with integrity while lower ranked public officers know that facing repercussions (socially, legally) is more likely for them." (Ibid.).

Concerning the causes of bureaucratic corruption, Gaobolae accounts the prevalence of corruption among state bureaucrats to a culture of impunity and neopatrimonialism evidenced in what she terms as a "protective network" that shields those in positions of power in government services from being held accountable (Ibid.).

Concerning the impact of bureaucratic corruption on human development, Gaobolae believes there is "an inverse relationship" between both phenomena pointing out that "A gain via corruption is a loss for human development because that money could have gone to improving any of the multiple indicators of human development." (Ibid.). In the precise case of Botswana, she is of the opinion that bureaucratic corruption

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undermines human development, equitable distribution of wealth, and increases poverty in her country. Concerning the aforementioned issues, she underscored that:

To use public money and office for personal gain (corruption) is to take it from the provision of quality social services. If you look at any of the biggest corruption scandals in Botswana, the sectors they affect have issues of (lack of) quality service delivery to Batswana...The enrichment of public officers using public funds and office, is taking away from money that would make life better for some of society's downtrodden, effectively rendering them unable to pull themselves out of their dire situations. In that manner, they gap between the rich and the poor is maintained and even grown, via instances of grand corruption...Poor people remain poor and sometimes even get poorer, since money that could empower them (even by merely giving them access to better health, education etc) is used for the enrichment of those in government

(Ibid).

My second interviewee was Dr. Eriyoti Chikodza, a senior lecturer at the University of Botswana. Dr. Chikodza had a different assessment from Gaobolae when it comes to the prevalence of bureaucratic corruption in Botswana. He was more positive in his personal evaluation on the level of bureaucratic corruption in Botswana. He said, he is yet to come across the phenomenon in real life as an individual and grades the level of transparency, accountability, and integrity in the country as 48 on a scale of 1-50 (with 1 being lowest/worst and 50 being highest/excellent) (Fon & Chikodza, 2023).

Concerning the relationship between bureaucratic corruption and human development, Dr. Chikodza is very much on the same page with Gaobolae. He stated that:

"Bureaucratic corruption and human development are negatively correlated. Bureaucratic corruption is counter-productive and therefore reverses efforts by government to positively transform the lives of citizens.". He believes that the provision of social amenities, and the equitable distribution of wealth in Botswana can be adversely affected by bureaucratic corruption (Ibid).

What one can draw from both interviews is that Botswana has made some progress in its fight against bureaucratic corruption (as attested by the responses of Dr. Chikodza) but that doesn't mean it has eliminated the phenomenon, which, according to Gaobolae, still exist in the country's public service. Both interviews strongly agree that bureaucratic corruption has an adverse impact on human development in Botswana.

5.9 Conclusion

This Chapter examined the manifestation of bureaucratic corruption in Botswana and its impact on human development. It probed into the causes and mechanisms put in places to fight against the bureaucratic corruption. The analysis reveals that bureaucratic corruption does exist in Botswana but it is largely under control. The establishment of the DCEC was a milestone in efforts put in place by the country to combat bureaucratic corruption. The impact of bureaucratic corruption on human development was analysed at two levels: a statistical analysis based on global and continental composite indices using SPSS Pearson Correlation Coefficient test; and an empirical analysis based on the realities on the ground. The results of both show that Botswana there is generally a positive mutually enhancing relationship between the containment of bureaucratic corruption and progress in human development in Botswana. The next chapter would focus on a comparative analysis between the impact

of bureaucratic corruption in the two case-study countries in this thesis (Cameroon and Botswana).

Chapter 6

A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS BETWEEN BUREAUCRATIC CORRUPTION AND HUMAN DEVELOPMENT IN CAMEROON AND BOTSWANA

6.1 Introduction

The previous two chapters have separately analysed the relationship between bureaucratic corruption and human development in the two SSA countries that serve as case-study in this thesis—Cameroon and Botswana. Given that this work is based on a comparative case-study approach, it is imperative to compare and contrast the experiences of both countries with regards to bureaucratic corruption and human development. This chapter presents a comparison between the manifestation of bureaucratic corruption and its impact on human development in both countries. It shall explore differences and similarities on the nature and level of corruption in both countries, statistical indicators on the prevalence of bureaucratic corruption, efforts to combat bureaucratic corruption, and the impact of bureaucratic corruption on human development in both countries. This chapter shall also situate the comparative statistics the regional context (the entire SSA Region) where possible in order to present a comprehensive assessment of differences and similarities that may exist between the experiences of both case-study countries and their SSA contemporaries.

6.2 The Manifestation of Bureaucratic Corruption in Cameroon and Botswana Compared

There are certain similarities and differences in the way bureaucratic corruption is practiced in Cameroon and Botswana. Drawn from the analysis carried out in the two previous chapters (four and five) of this thesis, Table 7 below illustrates the differences and similarities in the practice of bureaucratic corruption in Cameroon and Botswana in four domains: public service; public procurement; tax administration; custom administration; land administration; and the police.

Table 7: Similarities and Differences in the manifestation of bureaucratic corruption in Cameroon and Botswana

	Sector	Similarities	Differences
1.	Public service	--	High prevalence of bureaucratic corruption and high risk of its occurrence for Cameroon. Relatively low prevalence of bureaucratic corruption and positive governance outlook in the public service for Botswana.
2.	Public procurement	This sector is highly corrupt in both countries.	Bureaucratic corruption public procurement in Cameroon mostly takes the form of bribery and fraud meanwhile it is mostly manifested in nepotism and patronage in Botswana.
3.	Tax administration	--	High in Cameroon with most or all tax agents seen

			as corrupt. Low and scares in Botswana.
4.	Custom administration	--	Very high in Cameroon with the custom sector frequently identified as one of the most corrupt sectors. Low in Botswana with bribes and irregular payment in import/export categorized as very rare.
5.	Land administration	--	Land administration in Cameroon is highly corrupt especially property acquisition and land title establishment. Botswana's land administration sector has a low level of corruption thanks to a well-structured system and governance reforms.
6.	Police		The police force in Cameroon is seen as highly corrupt, and ranked the most corrupt institution in the world in 2005 by TI. Corruption in the police force in Botswana is seen as moderate. Corruption in the police force in Cameroon usually takes a top-bottom approach meanwhile it is mostly found among lower

			rank police officers in Botswana

Compiled by author

What can be deduced from the above comparative tabulation is that while bureaucratic corruption does exist in both countries but the proportion and measure differ with the Cameroonian bureaucratic institutions experiencing a severe manifestation of the phenomenon.

6.3 Statistical Comparison on Bureaucratic Corruption in Cameroon and Botswana

In terms of statistics, Cameroon and Botswana have significant differences in the level of bureaucratic corruption identified by the major international composite indices measuring corruption and governance at the global and African level. This section takes a comparative look at the performances of both countries in global and regional anti-corruption and governance indices as well as a broader comparison with other SSA countries to give a full regional context to the statistical comparisons.

6.3.1 Transparency International's CPI for Cameroon and Botswana

When it comes to the prevalence of corruption in the bureaucracy, Cameroon has a significantly poor low performance as compared to Botswana. When compared using 'Compare Means' on SPSS Statistics, Cameroon's average score at TI's CPI for the past two decades (2000 - 2020) stands at a dismal 23.47% which is a far lower than Botswana's 60.04% average score over the same period (See Table 8)

Table 8: Comparison of Cameroon and Botswana's average score on TI's CPI from 2000-2020

Case Processing Summary

	Cases					
	Included		Excluded		Total	
	N	Percent	N	Percent	N	Percent
TI_CPI_Cameroon	21	100.0%	0	0.0%	21	100.0%
TI_CPI_Botswana	21	100.0%	0	0.0%	21	100.0%

Report

	TI_CPI_Cameroon	TI_CPI_Botswana
Mean	23.4762	60.0476
N	21	21
Std. Deviation	2.46209	2.87187

6.3.1.1 Cameroon and Botswana's Performance on Transparency International's CPI for SSA

A time series data for SSA compiled from TI CPI from 2012-2020 reveals that Botswana is second (after Seychelles) out of the 49 SSA countries in terms of aggregate CPI score (See Figure 13). Meanwhile, Cameroon occupies the 34th position in ranking in terms of aggregate CPI score (See Figure 13).

Figure 13: Botswana and Cameroon TI CPI performance among other SSA countries

6.3.2 World Bank's WGI for Cameroon and Botswana

Botswana also vastly outperforms Cameroon in the Control of Corruption category of the World Bank's WGI. Statistics on the percentile ranking for both countries in the aforementioned category for the past two decades (2000 - 2019) reveals an overwhelming disparity between both countries with scoring an average performance of 79.6% as against Cameroon's dismal 12% (See Figure 14).

Figure 14: Cameroon and Botswana's performance in the World Bank WGI percentile ranking from 2000 - 2019

6.3.2.1 Cameroon and Botswana's Performance in World Bank's WGI for SSA

At the SSA regional level, Botswana is among the top performers alongside Comoros, Mauritius, Rwanda, Seychelles, and South Africa meanwhile Cameroon is among the underachievers alongside Central African Republic, Republic of Congo, Nigeria, Sudan, and Chad (See Figure 15).

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
Figure 15: Cameroon and Botswana World Bank WGI control of corruption percentile ranking performance among other countries in the SSA

6.3.3 Mo Ibrahim Foundation's IIAG Anti-Corruption Sub-category for Cameroon and Botswana

Botswana also highly outperforms Cameroon when it comes to country performance (with a score from 0 - 100) in Anti-Corruption sub-category of the Mo Ibrahim Foundation IIAG for the past decade (See Figure 16). This demonstrates Botswana has made greater progress than Cameroon in its fight against corruption.

Figure 16: Cameroon and Botswana's performance in the IIAG anti-corruption sub-category from 2010 - 2019

6.3.3.1 Cameroon and Botswana's Performance in IIAG Anti-Corruption Sub-Category Relative to other SSA Countries

At the SSA regional level, Botswana is also among the top achievers in the fight against corruption alongside Mauritius, Rwanda, Seychelles and South Africa (See Figure 5). Meanwhile, Cameroon is among the underachievers alongside Chad, Democratic Republic of Congo, Equatorial Guinea, and Sudan (See Figure 17).

Figure 17: Cameroon and Botswana's performance in the IIAG Anti-Corruption among other SSA countries

6.4 Differences and Similarities in the Causes of Bureaucratic Corruption in Cameroon and Botswana

There are several similarities and few differences in the causes of bureaucratic

corruption in Cameroon and Botswana (See Table 9).

Table 9: Similarities and differences in the causes of bureaucratic corruption in Cameroon and Botswana

	Similarities	**Differences**
1.	At the general level, the causes of bureaucratic corruption in both countries can be broadly categorized under attitudinal and system	

2.	Greed is a common attitudinal cause of bureaucratic corruption for both countries	One attitudinal cause unique to Cameroon is situational ethics.
3.	The common systemic cause of bureaucratic corruption in both countries is neopatrimonialism	The systemic cause of bureaucratic corruption unique to Cameroon is discretional power, and that for Botswana is nepotism.

Compiled by author

The above comparative tabulation reveals that there more similarities than differences in the causes of bureaucratic corruption in both case-study countries. This can be identified as a control factor in the comparative cases given that it illustrates that both countries are confronted with similar causes that should logically imply similar effect. However, as shall be seen in the subsequent comparison, the efforts and effectiveness of steps taken to fight against bureaucratic corruption has led to different institutional outcomes between the two countries.

6.5 Differences and Similarities in Efforts to Combat Bureaucratic Corruption in Cameroon and Botswana

Both Cameroon and Botswana have engaged in similar efforts to combat bureaucratic corruption in their respective countries. The efforts have been focused on the criminalization of specific acts of bureaucratic corruption in their penal code, the ratification of international legal instruments for the fight against corruption, and the establishment of anti-corruption entities.

However, there has been some differences in the implementation the most important of which is the fact that Botswana's anti-corruption agency (DCEC) was endowed with a more robust authority to investigate allegations of corruptions (powers of arrest, search and seizure) which the main anti-corruption entity in Cameroon (NACC) seriously lacks. This undermines the ability of NACC to carry out effective investigations. See table 11 for a comprehensive account of the similarities and differences in the efforts of both countries to fight against corruption.

Table 10: Similarities and Differences in efforts to combat bureaucratic corruption in Cameroon and Botswana

	Similarities	**Differences**
1.	Criminalization of specific acts of bureaucratic corruption in the penal code and laws of the country	
2.	Ratification of international legal instruments for the fight against corruption notably the UNCAC at the global level and the UAABC at the continental level.	
3.	The establishment of anti-corruption entities	Cameroon has multiple anti-corruption agencies involved in the fight against corruption (NACC, Audit Bench of the Supreme Court; NAFI, and

| | | the Special Criminal Court), meanwhile Botswana has a single anti-corruption agency (DCEC). The advantage of having a single anti-corruption agency is that it prevents duplication of functions, interagency interference, and inefficient monitoring and evaluation common in a multipronged approach. |
| | | The NACC which is supposed to be the main anti-corruption agency is highly limited compared with Botswana's DCEC. The NACC can conduct investigations and make recommendations but those not have prerogatives that can enhance the effectiveness of its investigation like power of arrest, power of search and seizure. In contrast. The DCEC has wide range powers to carry out investigations of allege acts of corruption. Section 10 of the "Corruption and Economic Crime Act" enacted by Botswana grants the Director of the DCEC the power (to him and his subordinate officers by delegation) to arrest without warrant any person the Director reasonably suspects to have committed an offence under the aforementioned law. Section 11 of the same Act, grants officers delegated by the |

		Director the power to search and seize any evidence of crime from persons arrested.

Compiled by author

The above comparative tabulation shows that there are significant differences in the efforts put in place by both countries in the fight against bureaucratic corruption and their effectiveness. While both countries have put in place regulations, strategies, and control bodies to mitigate the phenomenon, Botswana have done much better in terms of method and outcomes. Botswana's single anti-corruption body (the DCEC) has proven to be more effective and efficient than the host of anti-corruption entities in Cameroon.

6.6 Comparative Statistical Analysis of the Impact of Bureaucratic Corruption on Human Development in Cameroon and Botswana

In the two previous chapters, the impact of bureaucratic corruption on human development was analysed from two perspectives in the two case-study countries. First, a Pearson Correlation Test was used to test the relationship between the two variables (bureaucratic corruption and human development) in the two case-study countries using different composite index that measures the two variables. Second, an empirical analysis was done on the impact of bureaucratic corruption on human development based on the realities on the ground in both countries. This section compares the performance of both countries in both dimensions: correlational analysis of their performances in composite indices, and empirical analysis on the realities in the respective countries.

The results of the correlational analysis carried out to determine the relationship between bureaucratic corruption and human development for Cameroon and Botswana using various composite measurement of the two phenomena will be compared in this section. This would help show patterns or differences or similarities in the correlational relationship between both variables in both countries.

6.6.1. Correlational Analysis of TI's CPI and UNDP's HDI for Cameroon and Botswana

Analysis was done to test the correlation between corruption and human development in both of the case-study countries (Cameroon and Botswana) using IBM SPSS Statistics. Data on the performance of both countries in the fight against corruption was obtained from their scores on Transparency International (TI) Corruption Perception Index (CPI) over a two-year period: 2000 - 2019. Similarly, on the state of human development of both countries was obtained from their scores on United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)'s Human Development Index (HDI) over the same time series (2000 - 2019). A bivariate Pearson correlation coefficient test then conducted using IBM SPSS Statistic software to determine the relationship between both variables (CPI and HDI) for both countries over the identified time series.

The results indicate a strong positive correlation between low CPI score (indicating high level of bureaucratic corruption) and low HDI score (indicating low level of human development) for Cameroon with a correlation coefficient of 0.84 (See Table 12). Conversely, a positive correlation was observed between high CPI score (indicating low level of corruption) and high HDI score (indicating high level of human development) for Botswana with a correlation coefficient of 0.38 (See Table 13).

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The aforementioned results clearly demonstrate from a statistical perspective, that a relationship actually exist between bureaucratic corruption and human development in the two case-study countries included in this thesis.

Table 11: Results of Pearson Correlation Coefficient test of TI CPI and UNDP HDI for Cameroon

Correlations		CPI	HDI
CPI	Pearson Correlation	1	.845[**]
	Sig. (2-tailed)		.000
	N	20	20
HDI	Pearson Correlation	.845[**]	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	
	N	20	20

**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

Table 12: Results of Pearson Correlation Coefficient test of TI CPI and UNDP HDI for Botswana

Correlations		CPI	HDI
CPI	Pearson Correlation	1	.383
	Sig. (2-tailed)		.096
	N	20	20
HDI	Pearson Correlation	.383	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.096	
	N	20	20

6.6.2 Correlational Analysis of the TI's CPI and the World Bank Poverty Headcount Ratio (PHC) for Cameroon and Botswana

A correlational analysis was also carried out to examine the relationship between bureaucratic corruption and poverty (a major indicator of human development) using TI CPI and the World Bank Poverty headcount (PHC) ratio respectively as measures of corruption and poverty. As indicated in chapters four and five, the most recent

statistics (2007 - 2014) show both countries have had an improvement in their TI CPI scores and a correspondent improvement in their World Bank PHC ratio. The results of the bivariate Pearson correlation show a perfect negative correlation for both countries. This means that an increase in anti-corruption performance leads to a decrease in the prevalence of poverty for both countries (See Table 14 and 15).

Table 13: Results of Pearson Correlation Coefficient test of TI CPI and World Bank PHC for Cameroon

Correlations			
		TI_CPI_CM	WB_PPH_CM
TI_CPI_CM	Pearson Correlation	1	-1.000**
	Sig. (2-tailed)		.
	N	2	2
WB_PPH_CM	Pearson Correlation	-1.000**	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.	
	N	2	2

**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

Table 14: Results of Pearson Correlation Coefficient test of TI CPI and World Bank PHC for Botswana

Correlations			
		TI_CPI_BW	WB_PPH_BW
TI_CPI_BW	Pearson Correlation	1	-1.000**
	Sig. (2-tailed)		.
	N	2	2
WB_PPH_BW	Pearson Correlation	-1.000**	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.	
	N	2	2

**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

6.6.3 Correlational Analysis of IIAG Accountability and Transparency and IIAG Human Development Performances for Cameroon and Botswana

Within the framework of the institutional paradigm put forward in this thesis presupposes a relationship between institutional quality and human development, a correlational analysis was also carried out to examine the impact of institutional quality on human development in both case study countries using indicators derived from the Ibrahim Index of African Governance (IIAG): 'Accountability and Transparency' on the one hand and the 'Human Development'.

A Pearson bivariate correlational analysis was carried out to analyse the relationship between the performances of both countries in the IIAG Accountability and Transparency, and Human Development categories. The results show a positive correlation for both countries indicating an improvement in IIAG Accountability and Transparency has a correspondent improvement in IIAG Human Development (See Tables 16 and 17).

Table 15: Results of Pearson Correlation Coefficient test of IIAG Accountability and Transparency and IIAG Human Development Performances for Cameroon

Correlations

		IIAG_AT	IIAG_HD
IIAG_AT	Pearson Correlation	1	.217
	Sig. (2-tailed)		.861
	N	3	3
IIAG_HD	Pearson Correlation	.217	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.861	
	N	3	3

Table 16: Results of Pearson Correlation Coefficient test of IIAG Accountability and Transparency and IIAG Human Development Performances for Botswana

Correlations

		IIAG_AT_BW	IIAG_HD_BW
IIAG_AT_BW	Pearson Correlation	1	.996
	Sig. (2-tailed)		.056
	N	3	3
IIAG_HD_BW	Pearson Correlation	.996	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.056	
	N	3	3

6.7 Conclusion

This chapter undertook a comparative analysis of the impact of bureaucratic corruption on human development in Cameroon and Botswana. It looked at the similarities and differences in the manifestation, causes, and efforts undertaken to address corruption in Cameroon and Botswana. It also made a statistical comparison of the prevalence of bureaucratic corruption between both countries using various composite indices at the global and regional level. The statistical comparison was also extended to the context of the SSA region to situate performance patterns between the case-study countries (Cameroon and Botswana) and their SSA peers. A comparison was also made on the results of the Pearson correlational analysis of the performances of both countries done in the two previous chapters.

There are two important takeaways from the analysis in this chapter. The first is the differences in the performances of both countries with Cameroon lagging behind in its performances in bureaucratic corruption and human development and Botswana excelling in both. The second is the fact that the statistical analysis carried out using Pearson correlation coefficient test on SPSS reveal that there is a significant correlation between the two variables being tested in both case-study countries. The

next chapter would present a general conclusion to this thesis. It would identify the

main conclusions that can be drawn from the comparative studies and the research

aims.

Chapter 7

GENERAL CONCLUSION

The paradox of development and resources in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) has been a recurrent theme in academic debates and a subject of contemplation among development and governance experts. Various theories and explanations have been put forward to unravel the puzzle of a region that has remained in the doldrums of development and poverty while sitting on an enormous repository of natural and human resources. Some have evoked the 'Dutch disease' or resource curse syndrome as a theoretical framework to understand SSA's development paradox; others have employed the 'Dependency Theory' as the paradigm to disentangle this web. Much of the explanations so far has been based on exogenous factors as pointed out in the first chapter of this study. Little attention has been given to endogenous factors that explains SSA's development paradox. This study attempts to fill that gap by looking into endogenous factors. It draws a nexus between governance and development by focusing on the impact of bureaucratic corruption on human development.

In terms of methodology, this study was done using on a non-experimental comparative case-study design which examined the impact of corruption on development in SSA by taking a comparative analysis of the relationship between bureaucratic corruption and human development in two SSA countries with contrasting outlook in the variables under consideration: Cameroon and Botswana. It employed an 'institutional quality model' which supposes that bureaucratic corruption

erodes the quality of state institutions which in turn undermines its ability to deliver on human development.

The manifestation of bureaucratic corruption, efforts made to combat it, and the relationship it has with human development both from a statistical and empirical perspective for both case-study countries (Cameroon and Botswana) was analysed in chapters four and five of this thesis. The sixth chapter made a comparative examination of the phenomenon of bureaucratic corruption and its impact on human development in both countries. Differences and similarities in the modus-operandi of corruption in various sectors of the bureaucracy and efforts made by the governments of both countries to remedy the predicament were highlighted using cross tabulations.

A comparative analysis of the performances of both countries and the SSA regional context of bureaucratic corruption and human development was carried out using global and regional composite indices like TI's CPI, the World Bank's WGI, the Ibrahim Foundation's IIAG and UNDP's HDI. The results of the correlational analysis of the relationship between bureaucratic corruption and human development for both countries were also compared to see differences and similarities.

The key findings from the analysis carried out in the various chapters of this thesis can by summarized as follows:

First, bureaucratic corruption exists in both of the case-study countries but differs in terms of scale with Cameroon showing a higher level of prevalence of the phenomenon than Botswana according to statistical data from global and regional composite measurement indices and empirical evidences on the field.

Second, Botswana has a better record in its good governance and anti-corruption performances than Cameroon and is among the best performers at the SSA regional level when compared with other countries in the region.

Third, the analysis carried out in this study reveals there exist a relationship between bureaucratic corruption and human development for both case study countries both in terms of statistics and the facts on the ground. This relationship can be seen in the correlational analysis carried out based on the performances of both case-study countries in key composite indices on both variables (bureaucratic corruption and human development) using Pearson bivariate correlation coefficient test on IBM SPSS Statistics. All the various tests performed (using: TI CPI and UNDP HDI; TI CPI and World Bank PHC; and IIAG Accountability and Transparency and IIAG Human Development performance indicators) reveal a positive linear correlation between the bureaucratic corruption and human development.

On the one hand, a lower performance in bureaucratic corruption correlates with a lower performance in human development as the case with Cameroon's TI CPI and UNDP HDI Pearson bivariate test result; and on the other hand, a higher performance anti-corruption or good governance correlates with a higher performance in human development as the case with the case with the Pearson bivariate test results of both countries in their TI CPI and World Bank PHC as well as their IIAG Accountability and Transparency and IIAG Human Development performances.

So how do the above findings relate to the research question, model and hypothesis put forward at the beginning of this thesis? The above findings provide a clear basis

for an informed determination concerning the interrogations and assumptions presented at the start of this research.

Let me start with the research question. The principal research questions this thesis sought to answer is the following: How does bureaucratic corruption affect the level of human development in Cameroon and Botswana? As seen above, the findings show that bureaucratic corruption has an impact on human development. The correlational analysis reveals a positive linear relationship between both variables. The empirical analyse demonstrates there is palpable impact between the two with a good performance in anti-corruption producing an enhancing effect on human development and a poor performance acting as an impediment to human development.

Concerning the subsidiary research questions, the findings in this thesis also helps to clarify the various interrogations that were presented. The first question had to do with the causes of bureaucratic corruption. Here, a similar pattern can be seen in the causes of bureaucratic corruption in both case-study countries. The causes can be broadly categories as attitudinal (the habits of bureaucrats) and systemic for both countries. The common attitudinal cause for both countries is greed and the common systemic cause for both countries is neopatrimonialism.

The second question was focused on how bureaucratic corruption occur in both countries. Here, the manifestation of bureaucratic corruption was examined in six different sectors for both countries: public service; public procurement; tax administration; custom administration; land administration; and the Police. It was realized that the type and extent of the phenomenon differed from one sector to the other.

The third question had to do with a comparison of the level of bureaucratic corruption between Cameroon and Botswana. Here, the findings made is very clear that while the phenomenon existed in both countries, the level of bureaucratic corruption in Cameroon was by far higher than the level in Botswana.

The fourth question was focused on the difference in the relationship between bureaucratic corruption and human development in Cameroon and Botswana. Here, the findings revealed some diversity especially in terms of correlational analysis. As mentioned above, the Pearson bivariate correlational test revealed a disparity at the level of the analysis of TI CPI and UNDP HDI with Cameroon having a negative/negative and Botswana a positive/positive correlation. However, both countries had a positive/positive correlation on both the TI CPI and World Bank PHC and the IIAG Accountability and Transparency and IIAG Human Development Pearson bivariate tests. What this indicate is that an improvement in performance in anti-corruption has an enhancing relationship with human development performance while a low performance in former will have a diminishing relationship with the latter.

The model adopted as a theoretical framework for the analysis in this thesis was the 'institutional quality model' which supposes that bureaucratic corruption erodes the quality of state institutions which in turn undermines its ability to deliver on human development. The findings in this thesis clearly demonstrates that a relationship exist between the two variables in the institutional model: bureaucratic corruption and human development with evidence from the empirical and correlational and analysis showing a linear relationship.

There are some conclusions that can be drawn concerning the institutional model both from the empirical analysis on of the situation of both case-study countries and the correlational analysis of data from composite indices measuring bureaucratic corruption and human development in both countries.

From the empirical analysis of the bureaucratic corruption and human development in both countries, the following deductions can be made in relation to the institutional model put forward in this paper. The ability of the bureaucratic institutions to deliver on the human development responsibilities of the state largely depends on whether resources allocated to promote human development (like the provision of healthcare, public education, and other welfare amenities, law and order, the constructions of roads, bridges, and other public infrastructures) are actually used for the purposes for which they are allocated.

It also means the rule of law is maintained through a judiciary that fairly administers the laws of the land. In general, the institutions of governance have to function properly to ensure that government is able to provide public goods that meet the human development needs of its citizens. Bureaucratic corruption from the top (senior public officials) to bottom (lower-level state agents and officials), be it in the form of embezzlement, fraud, bribery, nepotism, clientelism etc, upends institutional governance and prevents the effective accomplishment or delivery of projects and initiatives taken by the state to meet its human development obligations. For the case of Cameroon, there were instances of numerous human development projects that could not be completed because of bureaucratic corruption.

Clear examples included: abandoned hospitals and health centre constructions; abandoned primary and secondary school buildings projects; poorly executed public investment projects; abandoned flood mitigation projects; amongst others, all as a result of corruption in public procurement process. There is no doubt on how much the health, educational and environmental welfare of the citizens in the communities who were supposed to benefit from this project would have improved had these projects been effectively accomplished.

By contrast, Botswana's ability to move from one of the poorest countries in Africa to an 'upper middle-income' country in the mid-2000s has been largely attributed to its ability to properly manage its mineral wealth, which in turn reflect an institutional governance that greatly succeeded to mitigate bureaucratic corruption. Acemoglu et al (2002) attribute Botswana's unparallel human development progress and economic performance to what they termed "meritocratic, relatively noncorrupt and efficient bureaucracy". Botswana anti-corruption and governance expert, David Sebudududu also attest that his countries developmental success can be explained by its ability to mitigate corruption (Sebudubudu, 2005).

However, it is important to mention that bureaucratic corruption in Botswana has been on the rise in recent years (though relatively still good enough to keep the country on a positive angle vis a vis other SSA countries). This recent decline in anti-corruption may be one of the explanations for its income distribution disparity which constitute one of the biggest development challenges of the country.

Comparatively, Botswana can be said to be doing far better than Cameroon in terms of how the enhancement of governance institution through the mitigation of

bureaucratic corruption enhances government's ability to deliver on human development but such appreciation must be nuanced by the fact that Botswana has also been witnessing a level of decline in recent times. Therefore, while it is true that much work needs to be done to mitigate bureaucratic corruption and its impact on human development in Cameroon, Botswana must remain vigilant and not lie on its laurels which may occasion a roll back of the achievements it has made on the interplay of both variables (bureaucratic corruption mitigation and human development enhancement) in recent years.

Though a causational study would be needed to derive a definite judgement on the matter, it can nevertheless be seen from the results of the correlational analysis and the empirical facts uncovered in this thesis that there exist grounds to talk about a mutually enhancing effect between anti-corruption and human development. The correlational analysis in particular provides a relationship that works in two linear directions: an improvement in a country's performance in anti-corruption correlates with an improvement in its human development and the regression in anti-corruption performance correlates with a regression in human development.

The following determinations can be made concerning the two hypothesis that were stated at the beginning of this thesis:

The first hypothesis states that:

    i.   There is a negative correlation between high rates of bureaucratic corruption and human development. This implies a high rate of bureaucratic corruption corresponds to a low level of human development.

Concerning the first hypothesis, the results of the correlational analysis and the empirical findings lean towards the alternative hypothesis (H1) rather than the null hypothesis (H0). The Pearson bivariate correlation test of Cameroon's TI CPI and UNDP HDI performances proves clearly that high rates of bureaucratic corruption have a negative correlation with human development. The results of the Pearson bivariate correlations performed on Cameroon's performance on the two variables (TI CPI and UNDP HDI) on SPSS Statistics revealed a strong positive correlation between correlation between low CPI score (indicating high level of bureaucratic corruption) and low HDI score (indicating low level of human development) for Cameroon with a correlation coefficient of 0.84. The aforementioned correlation results were corroborated with empirical evidence with factual analysis on the realities in the country showing a negative impact of cases of bureaucratic corruption on human development.

The second hypothesis states that:

ii.   There is a positive correlation between high anti-corruption (indicating low level of bureaucratic corruption) and high performance in human development. This implies a low rate of bureaucratic corruption corresponds to a high level of human development.

Here too, the results of the correlational analysis lean towards the alternative hypothesis (H1) rather than the null hypothesis (H0). The results of both case study countries in the Pearson bivariate correlational test carried out on their performance in the TI CPI and World Bank PHC; and the IIAG Accountability and Transparency and IIAG Human Development demonstrates an increase in anti-corruption performance is positively linked to an increase in human development performance.

The analysis in this thesis can better be viewed as a modest contribution to the corpus of literature on academic discourse about the impact of corruption on development in general and bureaucratic corruption on human development in particular. It is in no way an attempt to bring a conclusion but rather an endeavour to stimulate more discussions, research, and critical analysis on the nexus between the aforementioned variable especially in the context of regions that are struggling in their march towards sustainable development like SSA.

This study can also be viewed as an attempt to provide an endogenous explanation to the development paradox SSA has been embroiled in since independence. While most of the explanations of the paradox of development regression amidst much natural and human resources hovers around exogenous factors like dependency, and the weight of Africa's dual heritage of slave trade and colonialism, this thesis focuses on endogenous factors paramount amongst which is governance as an alternative explanation. The role of good governance and solid institutions as a catalyst for economic growth, sustainable development, and the eradication of poverty cannot be overemphasized.

The theoretical contributions of this thesis to the corpus of knowledge on governance and development resides in the fact that it pursues relatively unexplored angle in explaining the development differences between Cameroon and Botswana. It uses an institutional model to capture the relationship between bureaucratic corruption and human development in both countries. Specifically, it uses the Principal-Agent-Client (PAC) model as a theoretical framework to demonstrate how bureaucratic corruption occurs. It combines correlational analysis (with data from internationally recognized composite indices) using IBM SPSS Statistics, with empirical facts on the ground to

compare and contrast the impact of bureaucratic corruption on human development in Cameroon and Botswana.

In an address to Ghana's parliament on 11 July 2009, as part of his first visit to Africa after his inauguration as the first African-American president of the United States, Barack Obama underscored unequivocally that: "Africa doesn't need strongmen, it needs strong institutions." Nowhere is the pertinence of this statement more poignant than SSA which is that part of the African continent with the highest level of extreme poverty and lack of development. To change the fortunes of the region, there is a great need to focus on strong institutions; institutions that are transparent, accountable, efficient, and effective; institutions that can bring the predicament of corruption under control and mitigate its impact on development. The gap between development and natural resources in SSA can be bridged by governance. Good governance can become a panacea that would unleash the development potentials of SSA. Beyond the bleak picture painted by dismal statistics and anecdotal evidences lies a truth that tells the reality of the region: Sub-Saharan African is not poor; it is poorly governed.

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APPENDICES

STRUCTURED INTERVIEW QUESTIONS CAMEROON

My name is NGUH NWEI ASANGA FON. I am a PhD candidate in International Relations at the Department of Political Science and International Relations, Faculty of Business and Economics, Eastern Mediterranean University, Famagusta, North Cyprus.

This interview is part of an Eastern Mediterranean University (EMU), Department of Political Science and International Relations, Faculty of Business and Economics dissertation research on the topic: "SELF-INFLICTED WOUNDS: CORRUPTION AND DEVELOPMENT IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA". The purpose of the project is to assess the impact of bureaucratic corruption on human development using two Sub-Saharan African Countries (Cameroon and Botswana) as a comparative case-study. This interview focuses on the case of Cameroon. It is aimed at soliciting the opinion and observations of experts and competent authorities on the prevalence of bureaucratic corruption and its impact on human development in Cameroon.

This interview and the data (response) collected shall be used strictly for academic purposes. The confidentiality of all participants is guaranteed. Feel free to give your honest and sincere opinions to the questions posed. Also, you are free to stop participating in this project anytime you don't want to continue. Thank you very much for your participation.

Names:

Institution/Organization:

Position in the institution/organization:

QUESTIONS

Part One: Bureaucratic Corruption

1. In your opinion, does bureaucratic corruption exist in Cameroon?

2. If it does, do you believe it is a serious issue? If yes, why and if no why not?

3. What is your personal assessment of the level of transparency, accountability, and integrity of public office holders in Cameroon?

4. In your opinion, what are the three most corrupt bureaucratic institutions in Cameroon?

5. Give three principal reasons for the prevalence of rampant corruption in the institutions you mentioned?

6. In your opinion, what are some of the reasons that push government employees to engage in corruption?

7. In your opinion, what are some of the reasons that push users of public services to be involved in corruption?

8. What are some of the major cases of bureaucratic corruption you or your organization have come across in the past 20 years?

9. What are some of the major cases of the embezzlement of public funds you or your organization have come across in the past 20 years?

Part Two: Bureaucratic corruption and Human Development

10. What in your opinion is the relationship between bureaucratic corruption and human development?

11. Does the practice of bureaucratic corruption affect human development in Cameroon? If yes, how?

12. Does the embezzlement of public funds by government officials, civil servants and other public officials affect human development in Cameroon? If yes, how?

13. Are the specific cases you or your organization have come across where bureaucratic corruption or embezzlement has had impact on human development at the local or national levels in Cameroon?

14. Can the provision of social amenities in Cameroon (especially basic amenities like good health care system and educational institutions) be affected by the prevalence of bureaucratic corruption? If so, how?

15. Can the equitable distribution of wealth in Cameroon be affected by bureaucratic corruption? If so, how?

16. Does the prevalence of bureaucratic corruption affect the rate of poverty in Cameroon? If so, how?

17. What impact do you think the mitigation or elimination of bureaucratic corruption will have on the overall welfare and wellbeing of the citizens of Cameroon?

18. Do you agree with the United Nations Development Programme's rating of Cameroon's performance in human development in their recent (2020) Human Development Index report?

19. What do you think can be done to reduce bureaucratic corruption and prevent its impact (where such exist) on human development in Cameroon?

Thank you very much for your participation in this interview.

Appendix B: Structured Interview Questions Botswana

STRUCTURED INTERVIEW QUESTIONS BOTSWANA

My name is NGUH NWEI ASANGA FON. I am a PhD candidate in International Relations at the Department of Political Science and International Relations, Faculty of Business and Economics, Eastern Mediterranean University, Famagusta, North Cyprus.

This interview is part of an Eastern Mediterranean University (EMU), Department of Political Science and International Relations, Faculty of Business and Economics dissertation research on the topic: "SELF-INFLICTED WOUNDS: CORRUPTION AND DEVELOPMENT IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA". The purpose of the project is to assess the impact of bureaucratic corruption on human development using two Sub-Saharan African Countries (Cameroon and Botswana) as a comparative case-study. This interview focuses on the case of Botswana. It is aimed at soliciting the opinion and observations of relevant government and civil society authorities in the fight against corruption, anti-corruption and governance experts, scholars, and researchers concerning the prevalence of bureaucratic corruption and its impact on human development in Botswana.

This interview and the data (response) collected shall be used solely for academic purposes. The confidentiality of all participants is guaranteed. Feel free to give your honest and sincere opinions to the questions posed. You can request anonymity if you are not in a position to disclose your identity. Also, you are free to stop participating in this project anytime you don't want to continue. Thank you very much for your participation.

Names:

Institution/Organization:

Position in the institution/organization:

QUESTIONS

Part One: The Prevalence of Bureaucratic Corruption in Botswana

1. In your opinion, does bureaucratic corruption exist in Botswana?

2. What is your personal assessment of the level of transparency, accountability, and integrity of public office holders in Botswana?

3. In your opinion, what are some of the reasons that push government officials and employees to engage in corruption in Botswana?

4. In your opinion, what are some of the reasons that push users of public services to be involved in corruption in Botswana?

Part Two: Bureaucratic corruption and Human Development

5. What, in your opinion, is the relationship between bureaucratic corruption and human development?

6. Can the provision of social amenities in Botswana (especially basic amenities like good health care system and educational institutions) be affected by the prevalence of bureaucratic corruption? If so, how?

7. Can the equitable distribution of wealth in Botswana be affected by bureaucratic corruption? If so, how?

8. Does the prevalence of bureaucratic corruption affect the rate of poverty in Botswana? If so, how?

9. What impact do you think the mitigation or elimination of bureaucratic corruption will have on the overall welfare and wellbeing of the citizens of Botswana?

   Thank you very much for your participation in this interview.