

Ethnonational Conflict: A Study of the Anglophone Crisis in Cameroon

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ABSTRACT

When the Cold War ended in the late 1980s, a multiplicity of intrastate conflicts occurred, which exposed many countries to conflicts that had their roots in a range of concerns, including power sharing, ethnicity, resource control, and distribution. The majority of these conflicts are located in Africa.

In the Anglophone regions of Cameroon, protests around sectoral demands have turned into a political crisis since October 2016. The Anglophone Problem has returned as a result of this crisis, which has also revealed the shortcomings of Cameroon's centralized, elite-coopted governance system. Using a few conflict theories, this thesis seeks to analyze the ongoing Anglophone struggle. I use theories like PSC, physico-cultural conflict theory, and structural conflict theory to support my contention that the Anglophone dispute is a long-running social and ethnic struggle rather than an isolated incident. In that the bulk of the characteristics accurately reflect the emergence and progression of this specific situation, Azar's framework of "Protracted Social Conflict" serves as a valid explanation of the conflict in Cameroon.

My analysis results demonstrate that Azar's Protracted Social Conflict framework is an appropriate way to describe the conflict in Anglophone protracted social conflict since majority of the criteria accurately define the conflict and its development. Azar's framework of "Protracted Social Conflict" is a legitimate description of the conflict in that the majority of factors are appropriately mirrored in the emergence and evolution of this particular. Structural institutional discrimination, and a crisis in group identification are the primary causes of the conflict. I argue that the Anglophone

conflict is a result of the difference in colonial leadership of the past of both Anglophone and Francophone Cameroon and the weak negotiations of the reunification terms. International and regional actors this includes state and non-states actors find it hard to intervene in the conflict because of their relation with the Cameroon. Though there has been no fruitful mediation process in the Cameroon conflict, I argue that factors like economic interest is the reason why external actors have not intervened yet.

Keywords: Ethnic Conflict, Protracted Social Conflict, Anglophone Conflict, Cameroon.

ÖZ

1980'lerin sonlarında Soğuk Savaş sona erdiğinde, birçok ülkeyi güç paylaşımı, etnik köken, kaynak kontrolü ve dağıtım dahil olmak üzere bir dizi endişeye dayanan çatışmalara maruz bırakan çok sayıda devlet içi çatışma meydana gelmiştir. Bu çatışmaların çoğu Afrika'da bulunmaktadır.

Kamerun'un Anglofon bölgelerinde Ekim 2016'dan bu yana sektörel taleplere yönelik protestolar siyasi bir krize dönüşmüştür. Bu kriz sonucunda Anglofon Sorunu geri dönmüş ve Kamerun'un merkezi, elitlerin oluşturduğu yönetim sisteminin eksikliklerini de ortaya çıkarmıştır. Bu tez, farklı çatışma teorilerini kullanarak, süregiden Anglofon mücadelesini analiz etmeyi amaçlamaktadır. Anglofon anlaşmazlığının münferit bir olaydan ziyade uzun süredir devam eden sosyal ve etnik bir mücadele olduğu yönündeki iddiamı desteklemek için PSC, fizik-kültürel çatışma teorisi ve yapısal çatışma teorisi gibi teorileri kullanılmıştır. Azar'ın "Uzun Süreli Sosyal Çatışma" çerçevesi, özelliklerin büyük kısmının bu özel durumun ortaya çıkışını ve ilerlemesini doğru bir şekilde yansıtması nedeniyle Kamerun'daki çatışmanın geçerli bir açıklaması olarak hizmet etmektedir.

Analiz sonuçlarım, Azar'ın Uzun Süreli Sosyal Çatışma çerçevesinin Anglofon uzun süreli sosyal çatışmadaki çatışmayı tanımlamanın uygun bir yolu olduğunu göstermektedir. Bunun nedeni, kriterlerin çoğu, çatışmayı ve gelişimini doğru bir şekilde tanımlıyor. Azar'ın "Uzun Süreli Sosyal Çatışma" çerçevesi, faktörlerin çoğunun bu özel durumun ortaya çıkışında ve evriminde uygun şekilde yansıtıldığı çatışmanın meşru bir tanımıdır. Yapısal kurumsal ayrımcılık ve grup kimliğindeki bir

kriz, çatışmanın başlıca nedenleridir. Tez, Anglofon çatışmasının, hem Anglofon hem de Frankofon Kamerun'un geçmişteki sömürge liderliğindeki farklılığın ve yeniden birleşme koşullarının zayıf müzakerelerinin bir sonucu olduğunu savunmaktadır. Buna devlet ve devlet dışı aktörler de dahil olmak üzere uluslararası ve bölgesel aktörler, Kamerun ile olan ilişkileri nedeniyle çatışmaya müdahale etmekte zorlanmaktadır. , Bu çalışma, Kamerun ihtilafında verimli bir arabuluculuk süreci olmamasına rağmen, dış aktörlerin henüz müdahale etmemesinin nedeninin ekonomik çıkar gibi faktörlerin olduğunu da savunmaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Etnik Çatışma, Uzun Süreli, Sosyal Çatışma, Anglofon Çatışması, Kamerun.

DEDICATION

To Oluwanisola

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AACI	All Anglophone Conference
AACII	All Anglophone Conference II
AGC	Ambazonia Governing Council
AU	African Union
CACSC	Cameroon Anglophone Civil Society Consortium
CNU	Cameroon National Union
CPDM	Cameroon Peoples Democratic Movement
OGTR	Operation Ghost Town Resistance
PSC	Protracted Social Conflict
RDPC	Rassemblement Democratique du Peuple Camerounais
ROA	Republic of Ambazonia
SCACUF	Southern Cameroons Ambazonia Consortium United Front
SOCADEF	Southern Cameroons Defence Force
SCNC	Southern Cameroon National Council
SCAPO	Southern Cameroon People Organisation
SCSAF	Southern Cameroon South Africa Forum
SCINGA	Southern Cameroonian in Nigeria
SDF	Social Democratic Front
UN	United Nations

Chapter 1

INTRODUCTION

Numerous African nations and regions—including Burundi, Cameroon, Chad, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Côte d'Ivoire, Ethiopia, Liberia, Libya, Nigeria, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, etc.—have experienced internal or external warfare since the conclusion of the Cold War. Ethnic animosities and the marginalization of the minority by the dominant majority group are the real causes of the majority of these wars. “Even so, some would claim that colonialization is to blame for these problems”, (Blanton et al., 2001). In the latter decade of the twentieth century, the kind of unfathomable violence and slaughter saw in Burundi and Rwanda returned. Although the political exploitation of ethnic differences in Africa has colonial roots, the marginalization of the poor has increased, creating a favourable environment for those who support ethnic conflict as a way to maintain their hold on power (IFEOMA, 2011).

Cameroon, like many other former African colonies, is currently dealing with a major ethnic minority population problem. The turbulent colonial past of Cameroon, which gave rise to the nation's dual linguistic inheritance, is the root of the Anglophone crisis (French and English official languages). The conflict began at the end of 2016, but there had been years of tension prior to it due to the francophone government's years-long marginalization of the Anglophone population. According to a United Nations report published in April 2021; “The United Nations believes that three million of

Cameroon's four million people have been affected. The Northwest and Southwest of have been affected ". At least 4,000 civilians have been slain in the Anglophone regions, outnumbering those killed in the country's Far North region, where Boko Haram has waged an armed operation since 2014¹. In spite of the fact that this battle has claimed numerous lives and forced hundreds of people to flee their homes, no real action has been taken to end it, and no other nation or organization has offered any real assistance. As of August 2021, 712,000 people were internally displaced throughout the Francophone Littoral, West, and Centre areas as well as the Anglophone regions, where the crisis had persisted unabatedly for five years, and at least 2.2 million people needed humanitarian aid². The country is now considerably more vulnerable to terrorist groups because of the Anglophone struggle and separatist movement. Between January and April of 2021 alone, the Islamist armed group Boko Haram intensified its attacks in the Far North region, resulting in at least 80 civilian deaths and more than 340,000 internal displacement cases as of August 2021, (Craig, 2021). Government forces have also committed illegal executions and arbitrary arrests as a response to the armed conflict, as well as other violations of international humanitarian and human rights law³. These numbers do not include the externally displaced population seeking refuge in neighbouring states .

Despite numerous violations of human rights and the conflict being one of the deadliest in Africa. Regional and international players have not given Cameroon the attention it

¹ Craig Jess, (2021), Violence in Cameroon's Anglophone crisis takes high civilian toll. <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/4/1/violence-in-cameroon-anglophone-crisis-takes-high-civilian-toll>

² Human right watch, Cameroon event of 2021. <https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2022/country-chapters/cameroon>

³ Human right watch, Cameroon event of 2021. <https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2022/country-chapters/cameroon>

merits. A deadly ethnic insurgency evolved from rallies against marginalization and bad administration. The goal of this thesis is to analyse ethnonational conflict using the case of Cameroon as a case study, with the help of various conflict theories.

1.1 Statement of Problem

In spite of the fact that regional stability in central and Western Africa has become a serious issue, Cameroon has been able to preserve a "tensioned peace climate" there. The Anglophone Problem must be understood in order to address the Cameroon issue swiftly and completely. However, the current regime appears to lack this understanding, either owing to misinterpretation, oversight, or a lack of political commitment to confront the problem. However, due to internal insecurities and terrorist groups like Boko Haram's attacks on the country from the North and its external neighbours' fragility, Cameroon faces an imminent threat of civil war if the Anglophone Crisis is not managed in general. As a result of a country being ripped apart by conflict, there is a power vacuum, secessionist movement and a Centre for terrorist activity this might cause a spill over in the region. Despite all this violent currently going on in Cameroon there as still not been any external help or measures of conflict management or least of all peace keeping.

Therefore, the importance of this study cannot be overstated because it has the potential to offer a vivid insight and knowledge of the Anglophone crisis in order to prevent more irreparable harm to the nation and the region at large.

1.2 Aims and Objective

This research uses the Anglophone crisis in Cameroon to critically examine ethnonational conflict. How does one of the countries with Large positive peace

deficits in 2008 deteriorate⁴, become one of the most violent regions has been a persistent mystery for the international community since the Anglophone crisis began in 2016. The purpose of this thesis is to raise awareness about one of the most dangerous ethnic conflict in the region .This thesis examines the conflict in Cameroon in terms of the various parties' roles and the lack of conflict-resolution techniques. The case of Cameroon was also carefully chosen to highlight some of the key reasons why conflict resolution has failed up to the point that this thesis has been published.

1.3 Research Question

The topic of ethnonational conflict is examined in the thesis. Its main goal is to address the root and consequences of specific ethnonational disputes in this case Cameroon. How did structural violence lead to the escalation of the Anglophone conflict? How effectively do the components of the protracted social conflict in Cameroon since the 1990s after becoming a unitary state correlate to Edward Azar's genesis variable of the theory?

In order to address this research issue, I plan to look at the root of the Anglophone conflict that arose immediately after Cameroonian unification in 1961 using theories like the Galtung conflict triangle, structural conflict theory, psych-cultural theory, and the origin of marginalisation of the Anglophone Cameroon which can be traced back to the colonial era. Explain the failures of failures of the Fomban negotiation which led to a weak federal system. Analysing the Anglophone crisis and its ramifications with the use of conflict theories I mentioned above.

⁴ Positive peace report, 2020, Analyzing the factors that sustain peace. <https://www.visionofhumanity.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/04/PPR-2020web.pdf>

1.4 Hypothesis

The conflict in Cameroon is a result of lack good governance, corruption and years of marginalization of the Anglophone population. Though most literature say that the Anglophone Conflict in Cameroon started at the end of 2016, I argue that the conflict actually started in the 1900s with AACI and only escalated into total violent conflict at the end of 2016. With this analysis I conclude that for the most part Cameroon is Protracted social conflict case and if peace keeping measures are not taking anytime soon the conflict might escalate more into genocide or ethnic cleansing like the case of Rwanda.

1.5 Methodology

This section goes into details about the several phases of creating the current thesis methodology, it contains a thorough explanation of the philosophical underpinning of the research methodology used. The section discusses the methodology for gathering data, including the choice of research tools. The description of the analysis techniques used to analyse the data collected brings the section to an end.

1.5.1 Research Approach

For the purpose of this study, I shall use a qualitative methodology. A naturalistic interpretive approach to the issue is used in the multimethod of qualitative research. Interpretivist, constructivism, and intuitivism are the three foundations on which qualitative research is primarily built. Its goal is to investigate how people understand and perceive the world and construct reality (Sumner, 2006). In other words, qualitative researchers look at things as they are in their natural environments while trying to understand or interpret phenomena in terms of the meanings that different people assign to various occurrences. The usefulness of the qualitative research methodology has been established by academics. It is regarded as significant because,

as compared to other approaches, it is "more open" and therefore more in-depth (Flick et al. 1979). In essence, qualitative research is an investigation into a social or human issue using certain methodological traditions of inquiry. The researcher performs the study in a natural context, analyses language, recounts the informants' specific opinions, and constructs a sophisticated, holistic picture. The two main approaches used in the qualitative methodology are symbolic interactionism and phenomenology, which entail the gathering of information through interviews and the interpretation of that information using theoretical coding (Flick et al. 1979).

The research for this thesis will be centred on qualitative techniques for constructing theoretical phenomena, explaining, and analysing the processes underlying ethnonational conflict in Africa. The information from documents written by pertinent academics, analysts, and writers as well as other helpful secondary materials with significant subject-related insights will be used primarily in the qualitative approaches.

1.5.2 Research Design

Planning and defining the data that will be gathered, processed, and reported on as thoroughly as possible are all components of the research process. In a nutshell, it is the imaginative framework for conducting research and includes a plan for gathering, measuring, and analysing data (Kothari, 2004). Similar to that, a researcher's plan for investigating an empirical question is called their research design. The design will outline the hypotheses a researcher will test, the suitable unit of analysis for testing, as well as all other pertinent details targeted at producing well-supported results (Johnson and Reynolds, 2005). The goal of a research design is to ensure that the information gathered will enable the researcher to provide an explicit response to his research topic. When planning a research project, it is important to consider the following: What kind of facts are required to address this question or to test this theory? Consequently,

research design is a logical framework for an investigation (De Vaus, 2005). Research design has certain components. To begin with and the foremost imperative component is the set of questions and theories to be answered and tried. This portion addresses what is to be done, legitimization of why it is to be done, and arranged way of how it will be done. The moment component bargains with how inquire about questions will be in congruity with information sources and investigate strategy. The ultimate and third component demonstrates how information is to be prepared and analysed (Davies, 2006).

The selection of a study design depends on a few important aspects. The primary and most crucial aspect is the study investigation's goal, whether it is exploratory, descriptive, or explanatory. A solid research design should be able to strike a balance between what can really be done and what would be ideal to investigate a certain hypothesis. All research designs, whether experimental or non-experimental, can be viewed as an effort by researchers to test hypotheses and determine whether a relationship between two or more variables exists. A researcher can regulate how much of an experimental variable—an independent variable—they are exposed to through an experimental research design. Simple post-test designs, time series designs, multi group designs, and outdoor experiments are a few examples of experimental study designs (Johnson and Reynolds, 2005).

1.5.3 Case Study and Justifications of Case Study

The purpose of this component of the study is to evaluate the case study's applicability and the rationale behind that assessment.

A case study research design thoroughly explores one or more phenomena situations using a variety of data and methodologies. Moses Knutson, Lipson, Bennett, and

George are just a few of the authors who have put forth various definitions of what a case is. However, they all agree that case study designs focus on historical or modern events, phenomena, or actors. Personal interviews, content analysis, and observation are a few examples. Similar to that, it is a comprehensive examination of a single unit with the goal of comprehending a sizable group of comparable units. When inferences are more descriptive than causal, case study design is crucial. A case might be a person, a team, an occasion, an institution, a state, etc. This design is criticized since, in the majority of circumstances, specific cases do not reflect broader conditions (Keddie, 2006). Even if it is frequently seen in the discipline as methodically underdeveloped, the usage of case study design has dramatically risen in the field of international relations in recent years (Maoz 2002). However, its continued usage in the area is based on the observation that it offers an in-depth analysis of current and hazy phenomena without necessarily destroying the comprehensive and significant aspects of actual events (Yin 2009).

In order to provide a more comprehensive understanding of certain events, phenomena, and players, its compound application has been extended to the area of comparative design and combined with other designs. In addition to helping to illustrate the early warning signals of ethnic conflict that are not just unique to the Anglophone dispute but also to other ethnic wars around the world, case study design is very pertinent to this subject due of its contemporary nature. The case of the Anglophone conflict will be used to explain the interaction in Galtung triangle by looking at the interaction between attitude and behaviour of actors and how the presence of the two results to contradictions. I will also be using other theory, structural and psych cultural .The decree of hostility of the primary actors towards each other.

1.6 Data Sources and Data Collect

This thesis relies heavily on secondary data gathered from existing data sources, including scholarly books, articles, reports, and journals that are all freely accessible to the public.

1.6.1 Content Analysis

Content analysis will be used in this thesis for data analysis and presentation. Content analysis "may be considered as a technique for acquiring and analysing documents that involve words, pictures, symbols, and text," according to Neuman's explanation (Neuman, 2007). This literature contains textual, visual, and spoken elements that can be utilized as communication tools. Since the Cameroon conflict is still going on, content analysis is most appropriate for this research because it is mostly used to analyse secondary material rather than primary data, as well as official papers, newspaper, statements by decision makers, etc. Content analysis is therefore more equipped to evaluate the impact and difficulties of promoting peace in the Cameroon Anglophone conflict.

1.7 Conceptual Framework

After determining my research problem and research question, it is appropriate to explain a theoretical framework that will act as a direction and guide for the research as well as a basis for justification. An explanation of a theory is that it is "a set of related constructions, definitions, and propositions that give a systematic perspective of phenomena by specifying relations among variables with the purposes of explaining the forecasting events" (Kerlinger, 1973 in Nnabugwe, 2010). The theoretical framework is frequently a significant aspect of numerous investigations. The analysis, descriptions, and interpretation of the findings are supported by it. In recognition of this, this thesis will employ a couple of theories .Starting with protracted conflict, they

are conflicts that are odd, character-rich creatures. They are not specifically defined by law. The political scientist Edward Azar is credited with coining the phrase and framing it in terms of conflicts between social identities. These conflicts might be episodic, cyclical, "frozen," or long-lasting insurgencies. They may be ongoing conflicts or low-intensity hostilities that veer between resolutions and relapse. Gradual destruction is what distinguishes them. In the case of the Anglophone conflict it is episodic in nature, where by the first episode was a few years after reunification which did not have any physical violence a concept Galtung called negative peace. A negative peace is one that lacks equity. It is a phony sense of "peace" that frequently sacrifices justice. It may not be possible to perceive open fighting in a scenario of bad peace, yet tension still exists because the issue was never resolved.

What causes peace, asks Galtung (1996) He offers a typology as a response. What results from peace? The typology has six categories: nature, individual, society, and world, culture, and time. This results in five types of violence: nature, actor-based or direct violence, structural or indirect violence, cultural and time-based violence. Therefore, negative peace is the absence of all forms of violence. Natural peace, direct positive peace, structural positive peace, and positive peace in culture are all examples of positive peace. Galtung deduces from these that positive peace is the best defence against violence and that both violence and peace grow upon one another. I will also be analysing my case study with the Galtung conflict triangle, Structural and Psychological theory.

1.8 Limitation of Research

This study primarily focuses on the ongoing Anglophone conflict in Cameroon but also other ethnonational conflicts in Africa. But there are a number of difficulties with this study.

The first flaw in this study is its excessive reliance on secondary sources and data; this was mostly caused by timing issues and the impossibility of undertaking fieldwork to gather primary data. To combat this, information from a few reputable and authoritative sources was used, and it was then cross-checked with additional sources to ensure its validity.

Second, because the crisis is continuing and the government is restricting information release, using an on-site study poses a serious security concern. Since only academics in the diaspora write about the conflict, the literature is also extremely scarce due to the great risk of arrest.

Finally, because of time constraints, this research will only focus on the major subject matter, even if a more thorough investigation will be crucial in the future.

1.8.1 Scope of the Study

The purpose of defining the research's scope is to identify and focus on the major topics that will be examined throughout the investigation process in order to confine the investigation to a single premise. Geographically this research is limited to Cameroon, The study was carried out, with particular focus on the periods of colonial era during the British and French rule over Cameroon from 1961 till 2021 which is 60 years after reunification.

1.9 Organization of the Thesis

This section outlines the structure of the research and the topics covered in each chapter. The following five chapters will comprise the thesis. After this introduction chapter, which gives a brief outline of the study's nature, objective, methodology, hypothesis and research questions, there follows a chapter that examines the literature that has already been written about conflict, ethnic conflict and the conflict in Anglophone Conflict in Cameroon. The second chapter conceptualise conflict, ethnic conflict, and protracted conflict .Chapter two also gives an overview of existing literature on Cameroon conflict.

Chapter three explains the three theoretical frame work; protracted social conflict, structural conflict theory and the conflict triangle and how they can be used as the basis of analysing ethnic conflict in general. The fourth chapter explores the conflict form the root of the conflict which date back to the end of the First World War. Proofing the length of protractedness of the Anglophone conflict using Azar literature. Using the component such as psychological motivation: emotion, perception, group identity .The chapter also give a detailed analysis of the conflict using the conflict triangle to look at the reaction of actors toward one and other. Finally chapter five consist of the summary and conclusion of the thesis.

Chapter 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

In general, the term "conflict" refers to a scenario in which two or more people pursue objectives that are contradictory but, from each of their own views, wholly legitimate. One type of this type of conflict is an ethnic conflict, which is one in which the main point of contention is an ethnic difference and in which at least one conflicting party's goals are articulated solely in ethnic terms. Therefore, ethnic conflicts are a type of group conflict where at least one party understands the dispute, its causes, and potential solutions along an actual or perceived discriminatory ethnic divide. In his book *Ethnic conflict – A global perspective* Stefan Wolff stated;

Whatever the concrete issues over which conflict erupts, at least one of the conflict parties will explain its dissatisfaction in ethnic terms—that is, one party to the conflict will claim that its distinct ethnic identity is the reason why its members cannot realize their interests, why they do not have the same rights, or why their claims are not satisfied. Thus, ethnic conflicts are a form of group conflict in which at least one of the parties involved interprets the conflict, its causes, and potential remedies along an actually existing or perceived discriminating ethnic divide, (Wolff, 2007, p.2).

Discrimination of the Anglophone education and civic system triggered the Cameroon Anglophone Civil society Consortium (CACSC), an organization consisting of lawyers and teachers trade unions from the Anglophone region of Cameroon. Ethno-national conflict is defined broadly, and both peaceful and violent conflict may be included. In general, while discussing ethno-national conflict, the secondary sources which were used in this thesis refer to the collapse of the ordinary political process into violence due to their propensity to concentrate on the latter. When considering the

peaceful form of ethno-national conflict, where a conflict of nationalisms takes over politics, Cameroon is a good example. In the case of Cameroon it is obvious that their linguistic and minority population was what cause them to be marginalized for years.

The current conflict in Cameroon can be characterized as an ethnonational conflict for several reasons. This is an important concept in dealing with ethnic conflict. It permeates the very fabric of society and often a severe hindrance to conflict resolution (Reader, 2009). Conversi (2002 & 2004) posits that once the prevailing opinion of the ethnic group perceives it to be distinct politically as well as culturally, then it becomes an ethno-national group. This is true with the case of the conflict in the two English speaking regions of Cameroon, where the 'Anglophones' also known as 'Southern Cameroonians' who are regarded as an ethnic group with minority population where armed groups known as 'Ambazonia Defence Forces' feel their culture is being alienated and are politically motivated, thus seeking autonomy as was the case of the erstwhile southern Cameroon before reunification with La Republic du Cameroun in 1961. Identity conflict is basically about ethno-national behaviour. It manifests in the pursuit of perceived human needs and values by a group in light of confrontation with the other competing ethnic groups within the confines of a single state (Reader, 2009). One can sense that depth of emotion and sheer intensity of the identity-driven conflict by atrocities that are carried out by the violence extremes of competing ethno-religious groups. Whether in ethnicity or religious, or ethno-religious context, emotional intelligence is always a missing link (Reader, 2009). Another concept is known as ethnic victimization. Montville defines the concept of ethnic victimization as the state of mind when the security of their group is shattered by violence and aggression; it is fuelled by the developed ethnic militia and private security outfit. Ethnic conflicts are hard to resolve because they are not about 'who gets what' but about 'I do not like

you' (Goldstein & Pevehouse). To cast the conflict in terms of a bargaining situation, each side places value on the other's loss of value (making a zero-sum game). To lose money, the support of allies, or even life to deprive the enemy of value as well (Goldstein & Pevehouse, 2006). Horowitz (1985) vividly describes the consequences of such conflicts. When ethnic violence occurs, unranked groups usually aim not at social transformation, but at something approaching sovereign autonomy; the exclusion of parallel ethnic groups from a share of power. Ethnic minorities, on the other hand, experience marginalization, exclusion, and neglect. Conflict lines are defined, and violent activities, as in the case of Cameroon, are not uncommon.

To enable us to comprehend the complex definitions and various arguments made by researchers, analysts, and occasionally "peace activists," it is necessary to examine more closely at the debate around the notion and theories of conflict, and ethnic conflict. Conflicts seem to rage on for decades, and even more, at occasions, in some countries around the world. But each of these conflicts may be interpreted from a different theoretical standpoint, and they all seem to have different causes. However, there are other varieties of conflict, and each of them conflicts can be described from a unique theoretical standpoint and tend to have a variety of reasons. The majority of definitions of conflict include a component of struggle, strife, or collision, which separates conflict from competition. Some people even go so far as to say that conflict involves the pursuit of incentives that are mutually exclusive or the adoption of antagonistic strategies to achieve a goal. Even though these terms are appropriately used to characterize a lot of ethnic conflict, mutually exclusive aims or means must nonetheless be inherent to every conflict. Wolff, for example, defines conflict as "a scenario in which two or more players pursue inconsistent, yet perfectly just, aims from their own perspectives. One type of this type of conflict is an ethnic conflict,

Wallenstein contends that “conflicts are solvable”⁵. He believed that conflicts would end eventually, no matter how they turned out, and that doing so would lead to a peaceful resolution—one method to resolve problems. The definition, explanation, and discussion of conflict, and ethnic conflict, in this chapter will serve as the foundation for our subsequent studies in the next chapters.

2.1 Defining Conflict

Conflict does not have a widely agreed definition. This is due to the vast number of them made available by academics who are impacted by their personal environments and experiences. Conflict refers to a scenario in which there are two or more opposing factions with divergent viewpoints regarding a particular circumstance. Conflict between two friends, between a customer and salesperson, between various internal groups in a state, or between two or more states are a few examples of this. But not every one of these circumstances can be described or explained in the same way. Every dispute has unique traits of its own. However, they are all connected by the fact that they are all disputes between people of the same sort, and the actions reflect the characteristic that binds one dispute to another. These disputes all include various parties clashing over disparate interests. It is significant to note for the purposes of this thesis that our interest is with conflicts involving groups (ethnic) of people and societies within a state. We will therefore place more emphasis on the common elements that account for actions and reactions, such as the causes of these disputes and their distinctive characteristics.

Wallenstein defines conflict as “a social situation in which a minimum of two actors (parties) strive to acquire at the same moment in time an available set of scarce

⁵ Peter Wallenstein (2002), p13

resources”, (Wallensteen, 2002, p.16). His definition combined three component; Actors meaning in a conflict there as to be two or more sides, incompatibility there as to an issue that make the parties (actor) disagree on having various position, and lastly action, this is basically the steps actors take, whether violent or non-violent to demonstrate the position on the issue. Even if there are no actions there could still be a conflict .The internal system conflict is present. You can get similar descriptions of the interstate system as well. It is asserted that conflicts between sovereign states are unavoidable.

In order to be protected, states always get ready to defend themselves from potential assault. Conflict is defined by Wallenstein as a situation when scarce resources are present. One can wonder, though, if all disputes are centred on resources. There are also some disputes based on ideologies, cultural differences, ethnicity, religious differences, class divisions, etc. conflicts over resources almost always entail the existence of physical products like money or oil, these cannot be entirely unrelated to resources. Materials and resources do not, however, completely equate. A group of individuals may be excluded from public services based on their ethnicity, religion, or area. This idea is somewhat limited, though, as not all conflicts are about access to resources or how scarce or plentiful they are. Conflicts may also be centred on non-resource-related problems like identity, yet even these conflicts frequently have resource considerations at their core (Northrup, 1989). Nevertheless, resource-based conflicts and identity-based conflicts have fundamentally distinct dynamics and causes, with the latter being famously harder to resolve. In conclusion, while resource considerations may be present in all identity-based conflicts, not all resource-based conflicts have identity-based components (Rothman, 1997, p. 11). Despite the numerous conflicts including or resulting from cultural concerns, religious

disagreements, ideological issues, and many other things, for the sake of this thesis, our focus is on conflicts involving social groupings of people within a state.

Wolff describes “conflict as a situation in which two or more actors pursue incompatible, yet from their individual perspectives entirely just, goals”, (Wolff, 2007, p.2). His definition talks about the aim of the conflict to actors that is what do they stand a chance to win. The goal in this case might not be physical resources like oil or money but change in political and economic goal. Kurt Lewin defined conflict as "a situation of "tension," which was brought on by a variety of circumstances, such as the extent to which a party to the contract were in a "state of hunger or contentment”⁶. This description does not make it clear how needs can be identified, but it does make us aware of the tension and unhappiness around needs. Horowitz favoured the definition of Lewis Coser that states that; “conflict is a struggle in which the aims to gain objectives and simultaneously to neutralize or injure or eliminate rivals”, (Horowitz, 1985, p.95). As opposed to closed definition fiat, this leaves the nature and compatibility of objectives and procedures open for examination. We can better comprehend what conflict is and its significance thanks to the several definitions of the term that have been offered above. Depending on the course of action chosen by the actors, conflict might be violent or not. But if I had to define conflict in my own words, I'd say that it occurs "whenever irreconcilable activities, preferences, or objectives between multiple actors emerge; these groups impeding, disorientating, or trying to interfere with the other's irreconcilable actions, and in some way making each other less efficient and in most cases not been capable of achieving their interest." This

⁶ Stewart Mills (2006), p2

definition of conflict gives a general idea of what conflict actually is, what it entails, and the related elements.

Most frequently, the terms "conflict," "crisis," and "war" are used synonymously; this may be due to the deep conceptual and factual relationships between them. They are all characterized by conflict, tension, and enmity amongst rivals. Conflict and crises frequently involve violence, which is a necessary component of war but is not always present (Brecher, 1996). Crisis: What is it? First, there must be a shift in the nature and degree of disruptive interactions between two or more actors, along with a higher likelihood of conflicts, which, in turn, destabilizes their interactions and puts the system's structure in jeopardy. While conflict refers to the interaction of friction and disagreement brought on by diametrically opposed, unbridgeable interests, crisis refers to the point at which a conflict reaches its peak and is frequently accompanied by armed conflict. A crisis is sometimes viewed as an abrupt, unforeseen event that causes a dangerous escalation⁷. Crises can arise within or outside of protracted battles or long-standing rivalries. Examples include the Ethiopia/Somalia crises of 1960, 1964, and 1977–1978 over the disputed Ogaden territory and the Iceland/UK "cod wars" of 1973 and 1975–1976 over fishing rights (Brecher, 1996). The present Anglophone conflict is mostly called or considered the Anglophone crisis is because of the sudden escalation of violence of the conflict in 2017.

2.2 Ethnic Conflict

Samuel Huntington famously argued that cultural differences across civilizations will be the main causes of war in the modern world in a classic article titled "The Clash of Civilizations?" (Huntington 1993, p. 22). While Huntington's anticipated civilizational

⁷ Pfaltzgraff, Robert L. 2008. Crisis Management: Looking Back and Looking Ahead. Paper presented at The Crisis Management Conference: Athens 2008. Hellenic Ministry of National Defense, July.

clashes have not yet materialized, many critics have noted that there has recently been a substantial rise in the number of conflicts defined by clashes between groups defined by some particular social/group identity, be it culture, nationality, religion, ideology, race, language or ethnicity (Eidelson & Eidelson, 2003; Paulson & Rappleye, 2007). Most modern conflicts take place within national borders and do not take place on typical, clearly defined battlefields. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union ethnic conflict has increased; in fact, although interstate conflict (conflict between nations) has decreased recently, intrastate conflict (conflict within a single state) has increased. The conflicts in South Africa, Sudan, Angola, Rwanda, Burundi, and currently Cameroon.

Ethnic groups have been involved in all of these conflicts with grievances regarding their position as an ethnic group. "Majority may be tempted to seek control and the minority seeking protection through autonomy, secession, or external intervention", (Joseph 1997, p. 6). According to Horowitz (1985), the term "ethnicity" refers to a sense of group identification that may be based on shared ancestry, language, history, culture, race, or religion (or some combination of these). "Ethnic conflicts are one particular form of such conflict: that in which the goals of at least one conflict party are defined in (exclusively) ethnic terms, and in which the primary fault line of confrontation is one of ethnic distinctions", (Stefan Wolff, 2007, p.2) .Basically to Wolff conflict is a way actors get to their final objective. Regardless of the specific issues that cause conflict to arise, at least one of the parties will use their ethnic identity to justify their dissatisfaction. In other words, one party will argue that because of their unique ethnic identity, they are unable to realize their interests, enjoy equal rights, or have their claims rejected. Ethnic conflicts are thus a type of group conflict where at least one party views the dispute, its origins, and its possible solutions along an actual

or perceived discriminatory ethnic divide. In other words, the phrase "ethnic conflict" itself is a misnomer because at least one of its players is structured around an ethnic identity, not the conflict itself, making an ethnic conflict involve at least one such party (Cordell & Wolff, 2016). Ethnic groups that normally cohabit peacefully do not become violent on their own. But in these situations ethnicity is not the fundamental, unchanging root of violent conflict. Ethnicity easily embraces groups differentiated by colour, language and religion; it over tribes, "race" nationalities and castes⁸. Both leaders and citizens may be strongly motivated by a desire for power or economic gain when deciding to engage in violent confrontation rather than peaceful negotiation. Therefore, merely examining the level of violence is insufficient to fully comprehend the unique dynamics of various ethnic conflicts. Instead, it is important to thoroughly examine the various players and elements involved in each conflict and how their interactions affect whether violence escalates or constructive conflict resolution occurs.

One of the most frequently observed objective characteristics that apply to numerous ethnic conflict? The following are the most frequently observed objective characteristics that apply to the numerous ethnic conflicts mentioned in this thesis: Language, territory, social organization. Ethnic conflicts frequently involve a dispute for language rights and language policies (Stavenhagen, 1996). To be honest the diversity of language is not the actual cause of this conflict but the language as a means of discrimination is a trigger of ethnic conflict. Language has the capacity to exclude people. By using the educational system to teach the Imperial language to a (usually very tiny) minority, Keith Watson demonstrates how colonial governments, wherever

⁸ Horowitz, Donald L.(1985),p53

they were, imposed their own language for administrative and modern sector occupations (Watson, 2007). Ethnic conflict varies widely in terms of its character, making measuring challenging. That difference in essential identity that shows up as the "us-them" syndrome is what is ultimately at stake in such a confrontation. "Us" meaning in groups that a person belonged to and "them" out groups that you don't belong to. Furthermore, adherence to overt cultural norms is rarely the deciding factor in determining whether a person is one of us or one of them. Horowitz (1985, p.3-6) mentions a variety of violent ethnic conflicts that exist in different parts of the world, but he also emphasizes that there are several less spectacular ethnic conflicts that exist. In several country, political parties and labour unions are structured along ethnic lines, there are campaigns to expropriate ethnically distinct traders and evict long-term foreign-origin residents, and ethnic divisions in the armed services are common. Many nations have underground racial resistance activities as well as ethnic separatist ethnic movements.

For a number of reasons, the ongoing violence in Cameroon qualifies as an ethnonational conflict. First, according to Conversi (2002 and 2004), an ethnic group becomes an ethno-national group when the general perception is that it is different both politically and culturally. This is true in the case of the conflict in the English-speaking regions of Cameroon, where the "Anglophones," also known as "Southern Cameroonians," are regarded as an ethnic group with a minority population and where armed groups known as "Ambazonia Defence Forces" feel their community is being alienated and are motivated by politics, thus seeking independence as was the case of the former southern Cameroon before it was reunited with La Republic du Cameroun. The core of identity conflict is ethno-national behaviour. It shows up in a group's pursuit of what it believes to be necessities of life and values in the face of conflict

with other contending ethnic groups within the boundaries of a single state (Reader, 2009, p.31). By the atrocities committed by the violent extremities of rival ethno-religious groups, one may sense the severity and depth of the identity-driven conflict. When it comes to the significance of ideas like identity and the Us-Them dichotomy, there is typically agreement of opinion. It frequently results in the idea of a zero-sum game where the winner takes it all. Emotional intelligence is always a missing piece, whether in the context of race, religion, or ethno-religious beliefs, (Reader, 2009, p. 32). Ethnic conflict are mostly about identity. According to Brass, conflicts based on identities do not result from cultural identity differences but rather from the use of identities for political or economic advantage (Brass 1991, cited in Ozkirmli 2010, p. 89; Varshney 2007, p. 282). As a result, conflicts that appear to be based on identity only happen when there is disagreement between indigenous and external elites or among the indigenous elites themselves (Brass 1996, p. 89).

Identities are essentially tools utilized as a means to some economic or political objective by societal elite. In the case of Cameroon, the conflict is between minority Anglophone and corrupt political elites this is known as ethnic victimization. Ethnic disputes frequently escalate as a result of political leaders that are just interested in themselves, like president Biya. Groups turn violent and malevolent under political, economic, ecological, or military stress. According to Joseph V. Montville, ethnic victimization is the mental state that results when a group's sense of security is undermined by violence and aggression, as well as marginalization, exclusion, neglect, and violations of human and civil rights (Reader, 2009, p. 32). These communities (as in the two English-speaking districts of Cameroon) feel that their survival is in jeopardy and is in their own "hands" depending on the conditions and pattern of regime reactions. They eventually adopt a "Siege mind-set" and declare that they would not

"surrender." The formed ethnic militia and private security firm are its sources of fuel. Finally, because a hierarchy of social identities that people view shapes an individual's setting, in this case Cameroon. According to William G. Cunningham, ethnic identities are powerful because they are made up of extended kingship groups, which are crucial for the formation of in-groups and out-groups (Cunningham, 1998). When addressing interethnic conflict, this idea is crucial. Conflict, according to Walker Connor, is the difference in fundamental identity that shows up as the "us- them" mentality (Connor, 1994). People frequently fall victim to the "us-them" mind-set in the two English-speaking regions of Cameroon. Us being English speakers, and them being French speakers. Ethnicity has a role in a variety of issues in multilingual societies like Cameroon, including the control of governmental power, development plans, educational challenges, legislation, resource control conflicts, religious intolerance, land disputes, and indigene-settler syndrome (migration and incomplete conquest). All of these problems are connected to the larger ethno-national conflict along lines of diversity. It makes conflict so protracted and difficult. It penetrates society as a whole and frequently poses a serious obstacle to peaceful conflict resolution.

2.3 Conceptualizing Protracted Social Conflict

Complex, serious, and enduring conflict is one type that is known as protracted conflict. The concept, which was created by Edward Azar, is also sometimes referred to as intractable conflict. "Protracted conflicts are hostile interactions which extend over long periods of time with sporadic outbreaks of open warfare fluctuating in frequency and intensity" (Azar et al., 1978). Violence, either chronic or sporadic, characterizes the majority of protracted conflicts, but not all of them; the current Cyprus issue between the Greek Cypriot and the Turkish Cypriot, which dates back to the 1970s, is a good example. The parameters of a country's identity and social

cohesion are established via these battles, which span whole civilizations. The stakes are very high as a result. While there may be times when overt violence stops, they persist over time and don't have a distinct beginning or conclusion. These conflicts won't always cease by formal agreement; instead, they will gradually "end" by settling down, evolving, or dissipating. In other words, prolonged conflicts are processes rather than singular events or even clusters of events occurring at a certain moment. Social-ethnic conflicts usually last for a very long period and have a lot of room for expansion in terms of both the primary actors and secondary actors involved in the conflict as well as the objectives, aims, and types of grievances that continue the conflict environment. Anatol Rapoport has highlighted some key characteristics of protracted social conflict. Makes a distinction between conflicts involving members of the same social system and conflicts involving two social systems that are sufficiently self-contained (external conflict) in his book *Conflict in Man-Made Environment* (1974). (Endogenous conflict) Within this distinction, he suggests that affect, especially hatred, plays a far more significant role in exogenous conflicts than it does in endogenous conflicts, where "obedience, not hatred, is the main channel by which the abstract power of government is transmitted to the human agents of violence under its control"⁹. In persistent social conflicts, interstate and ethnic conflicts typically overlap.

Consistently, they make it less likely to resolve disputes through negotiation and prevent improvement in the fundamental difficulties. They frequently help each other project false impressions or amplify them. They also have a propensity to increase the likelihood of misinterpretation of interactions between the parties and their allies, both directly and indirectly. They intensify the concerns of the parties to the conflict and

⁹ Anatol Rapoport, (1974), *Conflict in Man-Made Environment*, p.184-185

support strategies for keeping it tense. It is useless to seek any ultimate conclusion when there is a lengthy fight because the conflict becomes a forum for redefining issues rather than a way of deciding them. Instead of being the result of conflict, the conflict process becomes the cause of policy.

2.4 Conflict in Cameroon

Cameroon is roughly half the size of its neighbouring state of Nigeria, with a total area of 475,000 km². It extends from the Atlantic, via the Bight of Biafra, inland toward north central Africa, and all the way to Lake Chad, where it occupies a small portion of the lake's shore. The Southwest and the Northwest are two of the 10 regions that make up the Anglophone area. Of the 475,442 sq km of total land area, it covers 16,364 sq km and is home to nearly 5 million of Cameroon's 24 million people¹⁰. Since the African nations that make up Cameroon achieved their independence from European colonizers, the Anglophone struggle there has been steadily developing. The forced state formation and forced cohabitation of ethnically and geographically disparate people during independence were the first causes of the conflict (Deng, 1997). This predicament is not specific to Cameroon. The Nigerian Civil War (1967–1970) and the Tutsi–Hutu struggle during the Rwandan genocide (1994) are two further instances of conflict that followed such partnerships. African governments are currently coping with the long-lasting detrimental effects of forced state formation. The conflict in Cameroon has been described in various ways since tension started rising right after independence. At least within the confines of Cameroonian academia, politics, and social contacts, the Cameroon conflict is not a gossip topic. For a significant portion of the post-independent era, it has sparked discussions among the academic, social,

¹⁰ International Crisis Group, (2017), “Cameroon’s Anglophone Crisis at the Crossroads”.<https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/central-africa/cameroon/250-camerouns-anglophone-crisis-crossroads>

and political specialties (Ngam & Budi, 2020). The Cameroon conflict has been described with various names like the Anglophone crisis/conflict, the most common one is the Anglophone problem which was first used few years after reunification. Fanzo asserts that the Anglophones' linguistic, political, social, and economic marginalization and relegation to a second-class status in Cameroon are to blame (Fanzo, 2017, p. 385). Other scholars called it emergence of the Anglophone conflict, "Anglophone consciousness: the perception of being "alienated," "exploited," and "assimilated" by the state with a predominance of Francophones and even by the entire population of Francophones" (Konings and Nyamnjoh, 1997, p.207). The Anglophone "Problem" is, according to a Briefing Paper of the United Kingdom House of Commons (2019), the uprising of Anglophones against the 1961 decision to deny them the right to self-determination and their marginalization inside the borders of the current State of Cameroon (Lunn and Brooke-Holland, 2019, p. 5)¹¹. For other scholars Ngam & Budi, The Anglophone "Question" will be perceived as the Anglophone "Problem" that it has been called. This is due to the ambiguity of the term "Anglophone Problem," which could be construed to mean either that there is a problem among Anglophones in Cameroon or that Anglophones are a problem for Cameroon. Thus, The Anglophone Question is a problem of identity. The majority influence of the French language, culture, and administrative systems over the English language, culture, and systems of administration is evidence of the Anglophones' perception that the way the nation has been run in the post-independence era threatens their Anglo-Saxon identity (Ngam & Budi, 2020).

¹¹ Lunn, J. and Brooke-Holland, L. (2019), The Anglophone Crisis: April 2019 Update, Briefing Paper N.º 8331. House of Commons Library, April 17.

The Anglophone conflict runs deeper than just language, it is a conflict caused by years of political and economic marginalization, human right deprivation and internal colonization. Internal colonialism is the term used to describe the structural, economic, political, and cultural disparities that exist between regions within a given state. It is characterized by the unequal distribution of economic resources and greater exploitation of the state's peripheries, which is typically caused by the unrestrained operation of market forces or economic policies that have unintended consequences for the targeted regions (Hechter 1975). According to scholars the internal colonialism started with the abolition of the federal system that was agreed on during the negotiations of reunification. The two Cameroons' reunification was negotiated on the basis of federalism, as was mentioned in the section above. In truth, the Southern Cameroonian's overwhelming support for reunion stemmed from guarantees that their identity would be protected in the union through a federation. President Ahidjo gave Southern Cameroonians the assurance that "our objective is [re]unification, not annexation" as early as July 1960 while visiting Buea and Tiko. The moment has come for Africans to come together as one and build a united Cameroon (Ndi, 2013, p. 129). According Ezemenaka & Ekumaoko who analysed the conflict with they argued that social conflict theory, social order is characterized by power and dominance rather than agreement, compliance, and compromise. It asserts that individuals in positions of money and influence will use every means at their disposal to retain their dominance and repress everyone else. Their study found that discrimination against the Anglophone population is the source of the conflict between the Francophone and Anglophone parts of Cameroon. This result lends support to the social conflict theory's hypotheses regarding the purposes of intergroup interactions. As a result, tensions between the Anglophones and Francophones in Cameroon have gotten worse over

time, leading to increasingly hostile clashes between respective regions (Ezemenaka & Ekumaoko, 2022). Though the conflict started as protest of teacher and lawyers on the issues of protecting the common law and promoting the Anglophone culture in schools. Their study found out that if, all of the Francophone participants in this study's interviews said they would support the choice to teach English in Francophone schools if it meant more harmony and less marginalization. Also mentioned was the openness of Francophone Cameroonians to study English (Ezemenaka & Ekumaoko, 2022). This study proved that random Francophone citizens do not hate their Anglophone counterparts rather its structural system that dislike them.

Since the escalation of the Anglophone conflict, the conflict has become more violent and there has been no concrete talk on conflict management or peacekeeping. The prolonged nature of the struggle has left both sides in a state of shock, and either side's chances of winning the war militarily seem remote. The only diplomatic approach that has been used to try to resolve the problem is track one: pressuring or persuading the government to talk to the separatists. Fon & Achiri believed that this impasse, which is affecting both sides, makes the situation prime for dual-track diplomatic intervention. Due to the failure of earlier projects that mostly used track one diplomacy, a dual track strategy is a more sensible and efficient choice. The benefits of a dual track strategy stem from its capacity to engage both parties concurrently and gradually in the direction of a cease-fire and a binding agreement. Track two is best suited to reach out to non-state parties in a conflict given its informal, unofficial nature, which promotes greater flexibility and inclusivity. Track one is intended for governments and state representatives. To comprehend grievances and demands that could be feasible for both sides during discussions, track two diplomacy can be employed prior to negotiations (Fon & Achiri, 2021). The leaders of all the major

international and regional organizations that Cameroon is a part of have visited the nation and met with the administration since the crisis started. However, none of them had gone to the troubled areas or interacted with the separatists (either those on the ground or their allies and representatives in the Diaspora). This limited track one pursuit hasn't yet been able to convince both parties to sit down and negotiate. Dual diplomacy is great but if the primary actors are not willing to work together there is no hope for Cameroon. Due to the failure of earlier projects that mostly used track one diplomacy, a dual track strategy is a more sensible and efficient choice. The benefits of a dual track strategy stem from its capacity to engage both parties concurrently and gradually in the direction of a cease-fire and a binding agreement. Track two is best suited to reach out to non-state parties in a conflict given its informal, unofficial nature, which promotes greater flexibility and inclusivity. Track one is intended for governments and state representatives. To comprehend grievances and demands that could be feasible for both sides during discussions, track two diplomacy can be employed prior to negotiations (Fon & Achiri, 2021).

Fischer's two-pronged approach of informal problem-solving gatherings that aim to bring together powerful political figures to support "the process and outcomes of official negotiations" is highly commended (Fisher, 2006). The goal of this pre-negotiation method is to create a climate that is conducive to negotiation through improved attitudes, improved communication, better conflict analysis, the construction of frameworks, and the creation of choices for resolution (Fon & Achiri, 2021). Hottinger emphasizes the significance of adding track two in the context of a war in which an armed organization is one of the belligerents: Armed groups, like the majority of organizations, do not develop spontaneously and are stable during their entire existence (Hottinger, 2005). Understanding armed groups can take many years

because they are extremely unstable organizations. Actors from Track two can aid in constructing this gradual comprehension. In order to understand an armed group's intentions, justifications, strategies, and evolution and be in a position to help prevent the situation from getting worse or, on occasion, to help set the venue and agenda during pre-negotiations, one of the essential tasks of any mediator interested in an armed group is to observe and measure the phases within an armed group's life.

Chapter 3

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

The primary theoretical ideas that I used to create my thesis contention comes from the theory of conflict as well as its sub theories, like structural, psycho-cultural theories and the Galtung conflict triangle. The theory of ethnic conflict is also used. Past scholars in the conflict and international relations discipline have written extensively about the sources of conflict, but typically, in accordance with their respective fields of study, they have only focused on and highlighted one particular source as the true explanation of the cause of conflict like that of my case study, occasionally I use other significant theories to buttress my hypothesis. “Some theorists, like Edward Azar, have called attention to the fact that, because so many conflicts in the developing world are protracted and ethnic in nature rather than purely strategic in nature, attention is now being drawn to the fact that, in order to manage and hopefully resolve these kinds of conflicts, a comprehensive approach that identifies and tackles their multiple causal factors is necessary”¹².

3.1 Theory of Protracted Conflict

A protracted conflict is one that lasts longer than five years and is characterized by a high frequency of violent incidents and fatalities (Bang & Balgah, 2022). Protracted social conflict is characterized by a conflictual dyadic relationship between non-state actors and another entity that involves intermittent violent interactions for long enough

¹² Utterwulge, 1999. OJPCR: The Online Journal of Peace and Conflict Resolution. https://www.trinstitute.org/ojpcr/p2_3utter.htm

to become deeply ingrained in the social fabric of the conflict groups. While the points of contention may change over time, they remain of such importance to the actors that they are still regarded as non-negotiable (Beaudoin, 2013). In Azar's protracted social conflict theory, a combination of both inter-state and ethnic conflicts have the following characteristics:

They do not permit change in the fundamental grievances, and continually reduce the chances for dealing with conflict settlement issues. They tend to generate, reinforce, or intensify mutual images of deception. They tend to increase the likelihood of confusion in the direct and indirect communications between the parties and their allies. They increase the anxieties of the parties to the conflict, and they foster tension and conflict-maintenance strategies. In the protracted conflict situation, the conflict becomes an arena for redefining issues rather than a means for adjudicating them; it is therefore futile to look for any ultimate resolution. The conflict process becomes the source rather than the outcome of policy (Azar et al., 1978).

Protracted social conflict is how Azar described a persistent and seemingly unsolvable disagreement, whether it be a conflict such as in Lebanon or Soviet-USA relations (Azar, 1985). Similar to this definition, according to Stephen Ryan, long-running disputes are "frequently clashes among ethnic groups that have been going for a number of years, and which may appear to be impossible to resolve to the folks swept up in them", (Ryan 1990). Protracted social conflict have preconditions that are important in determining their origin and illuminating their protracted nature. "These conflicts frequently arise in communities made up of different ethnic groups. They appear in circumstances of severe political and economic underdevelopment around demands for collective identity. Chronic social conflict arises from the interconnected nexus of underdevelopment, structural deprivation (political, economic, and psychological), and communal or identity cleavages" (Azar & Moon, 1986, p.305). Furthermore, it is considered that in these types of countries, "structural victimization"—i.e., social, political, and economic inequities as well as psychological

oppression—typically manifests itself as racial prejudice. In actuality, "structural victimization" is thought to favour some groups or disproportionately harm others.

According to Azar, structural victimization "bursts into hostile and violent actions at this confluence of actual bodily and psychological deprivation" (Azar, 1983, p.90). Typical preconditions that play significant roles in influencing their formation and explaining their extended character are present in protracted social disputes. These disputes have a propensity to occur in communities with multi-communal makeup. In his book, *The Management of Protracted Social Conflict: Theory and Cases* Azar, argued that, numerous important criteria, including the three essential phases of Genesis, Process Dynamics, and Outcomes Analysis, are used to identify protracted social disputes.

3.1.1 Genesis

Genesis, which means "from the beginning," alludes to a series of circumstances that cause peaceful settings to become tense ones. For this approach, Azar cites four crucial variables. The first he called communal content, According to Azar, societies with a "multi-communal" composition are the most important of all the conditions that contribute to the development of PSC. Azar contends that attempts to resolve this by imposing integration or cooperation slow down the process of developing a nation. Multi-communal societies frequently saw the dominance of one group over the other, whether as a result of historical rivalries or the divide-and-rule tactics of former colonial powers, according to Azar, who claims that these societies are "...characterized by disarticulation between the state and society as a whole." A single communal group or a coalition of several communal groups that are typically in control of the state typically do not care about the demands of other groups in the society (Azar, 1990). What features of identification a particular actor, actors, or group of

actors are looking for from identity distinction is not evident when the components are characterized as distinctive identity and societal acknowledgment of identity. In actuality, both the individual and the collective can benefit from these conceptualizations (Goertz, 2005, p.63). “The most useful unit of analysis in protracted social conflict situations is the identity group racial, religious, ethnic, and cultural and others. It is more powerful as a unit of analysis than the nation-state, the reason is that ‘power’ finally rests with the identity group”, (Azar, 1985, p.31). The second he identified as human need, Physical survival and well-being for individuals and communities are the most obvious ontological needs. Survival—whether of an individual or a community—depends on meeting basic requirements. These fundamental wants are rarely satisfied fairly or equally in a world of physical scarcity. While one set of people could experience abundant fulfilment of those requirements, others do not. The majority of the time, grievances brought on by need deprivation are expressed jointly. The authorities fails to address these complaints, which creates the conditions for a protracted social conflict (Azar, 1990). For instance John Burton argues that conflicts arise from human needs that can either be ontological, values and/or interests oriented. For him the first needs (ontological) are not negotiable. Values, however, display a minimum aspect of being resolved and interests are those needs that can be negotiated¹³. According to Azar, developmental requirements do not necessarily have to be viewed as largely physical, nor do such unmet material demands necessarily result in conflict. The importance of minority groups' access to the political system, the economy, and organizations that recognize communal existence lies elsewhere. As a result, we now have a far broader understanding of human desires that, if unsatisfied, may turn into causal factors that violence will strive to correct (Azar,

¹³ Burton (1986), p.333

1990). The third variable in Azar's model focuses on the state's function in ensuring that all communal groups under its control can meet their most basic needs. According to Azar, in nations where social conflict has lasted for a long time, one identity group typically holds the majority of political power and uses its resources to maintain control over the other. PSC-affected nations will frequently witness attempts by the majority group to thwart the participation of minority groups in order to maintain their position of power. "Such crises worsen previously existing competitive or conflictive circumstances, reduce the state's capacity to provide fundamental requirements, and precipitate subsequent developmental crises," writes Azar in his conclusion (Azar et al., 1978). This means that the regime type, whether democratic or authoritarian and how legitimate the political culture of the state is affect the need of the citizens and triggers the Protracted social conflict. The fourth component identified by Azar is that the degree to which internal policy is influenced by international ties is also a factor in communal groups' inability to attain fundamental human necessities, security, or recognition. Azar contends that the degree to which internal policy is influenced by international linkages, rather than just governance at the state level, is what causes communal groups to lack access to basic human requirements. States that are economically dependent on the larger international economic system consequently experience a reduction in their autonomy as a result of the external forces that partially shape their economic development strategies (Azar, 1990).

3.1.2 Process Dynamics

Process dynamics, which are variables that, given the prior preconditions described, are in charge of activating overt conflict, constitute the second element of PSC. Azar identifies three crucial deciding factors:

Community Actions and Strategies : This is a reference to the possibility of different "triggers" can awaken previously dormant conflict, which then spreads into a larger and perhaps more violent conflict. The process is summed up by Azar as follows:

“At first, the trigger may or may not be a trivial event. Collective acknowledgment of individual grievances (or irreconcilable goals) naturally leads to collective protest, which is usually met with some degree of repression or oppression .As tensions escalate, victimized community groups are exposed not only to the event itself, but to various issues (such as selective poverty and political inequality) that affect the safety, access, and security needs of communities. Begins to draw members' attention to spreading the event across multiple themes increases the momentum of resource organization and mobilization. As levels of community organization and mobilization increase, community groups seek to develop a wider variety of strategies and tactics, including civil disobedience, guerrilla warfare, or separatist movements. The extent to which this escalates is influenced, in part, by the ability of community groups to organize effectively and develop strong leadership, and their propensity to gather support across national borders, which can lead to conflicts of a regional nature. It may be connected”, (Azar, 1990).

Second, Azar points out that regimes typically respond to communal complaints through coercive repression or instrumental co-option in order to avoid showing evidence of weakness or loss, especially in countries with poor governance institutions. ‘A violent or severe response is frequently the cornerstone of the governmental policy in dealing with intercommunal opposition. Such a rigid approach calls for similarly violent responses from suppressed groups. Co-optation could help to ease tensions among communities, but it is typically seen as a method used to divide and distract the opposition. Failure of the co-option technique justifies more coercive and repressive measures, which fuels escalating violent conflicts(Azar et al., 1978).Finally, Azar's process factors are related to how long-lasting conflicts affect how people perceive one another and how this, in turn, might affect how aggressive groups act.

The experiences, anxieties, and belief systems of each community group influence the perceptions and motivations driving the behaviour of state and communal actors. The worst intentions are frequently imputed to the opposing side in circumstances when interactions are constrained or forbidden. There is little chance for deception, and the result is reciprocal negative perceptions that strengthen ongoing communal animosity and social conflict. These wars are frequently long- lasting in nature; they are seen by the opposing parties as struggles over the survival of the group, the nation, or the state; and they are repeatedly characterized by violence against civilians (Kelman, 2000, p. 273).

3.1.3 Outcomes Analysis

After describing the factors and preconditions that "activate" protracted social conflicts, Azar concludes his model by introducing the outcomes that "...generate (and are further reinforced by) the following conditions: declining physical security, institutional deformity, psychological ossification, and rising dependency, that are in turn responsible for the protractedness of PSCs. The long-term effects of social conflict degrade political institutions and delay their ability to function effectively", (Azar, 1990, p.15-17). It intensifies and expands pessimism across society, demoralizes leaders, and paralyzes the pursuit of peaceful solutions. We have seen that communities experiencing lengthy social conflict find it challenging to start looking for solutions to their issues and complaints. As the extended social strife permeates the nation's culture, it creates a sense of paralysis that affects the population's collective psyche. All social strata are affected by a climate of pessimism, and a siege mentality emerges that prevents productive bargaining for any social change.

Although intriguing and helpful, this quick overview of the theoretical concept as offered by Azar is still a little unclear. Therefore, theoretical clarification is necessary

in order to build my argument, which was originally founded on the prior general notion, and to give the reader a clear conceptual roadmap for my examination of the Cameroon situation. A thorough exposition of my other major infra-theories, including structural conflict theory, psycho-cultural, and the conflict triangle, which are all direct outgrowths of protracted social conflict theory, will be made in an effort to establish an argument.

3.2 Structural Conflict Theory

Conflict theories that analyse and identify structural and psycho-cultural origins of conflict are significantly different from one another. The opposing interests of groups are highlighted by structural theory as the main causes of conflict. The social, economic, and political structure of society as well as the type and strength of links that exist within and across communities are thus identified as the main drivers of conflict. Marc Ross states in specific terms that the likelihood of conflict between groups will be increased in a society where there is economic and political discrimination as well as frayed familial bonds. According to the social structural conflict theory, the kind and strength of links between and within communities, as well as in society's social, economic, and political organization, are the main causes of conflict (Ross, 1993). Some objectivist conflict scholars have a tendency to have a slightly more reductionist understanding of what causes serious prolonged conflicts to begin and continue. For example, according to Neo-Marxist structuralists, "structural victimization," as described by Azar, mostly takes the form of economic deprivation of individuals or groups, which leads to chronic poverty and overt conflict in the end. Any subjective approach has also come under fire from some structuralists, who claim that it "has led to a concentrate on unreal components in instances of social conflict as defined by the participants", (Mitchell, 1991, p.218).

When seen as a whole, the structural approach offers a wider range of underlying variables that may lead to an outbreak of internal conflict. Political and institutional factors (state structure, discriminatory political institutions, inter-group politics, elite politics, etc.), security factors (intra-state security issues, security conundrum, regional military environment, refugee problems, etc.), and ethnic factors (geography, demography, physical geography, etc.) are also significant. Economic and social factors are obviously determinants. The justification up to this point has been that it is undeniable that people, and in my example, ethnic groupings, engage in aggressive encounters over legitimate objectives. The onset of internal conflict is affected by issues with overcrowding, resource shortages, overall economic underdevelopment, and unintegrated social and political institutions, among other things. However, I would like to further my case by assuming that in severe conflicts, such as those involving ethnic groups, material interests are insufficient to account for their intensity, ferocity, and protracted character. I would contend that conflicts involving actual interests occur under specific psychological conditions and within specific psycho-cultural contexts, both of which have a significant impact on the conflict's intensity and duration as well as its final result. "Although the identification of structural factors in severe conflict is rarely wrong, explanations for conflict based on these considerations alone are often incomplete and therefore misleading"(Ross, 1993,p.24).Ross add that "people do fight about real interests, but the way this is done, the intensity of feelings, and the lengths to which disputants go to defend or acquire what they believe is their due are evidence that pursuit of interests has an important psychological component which is not well understood", (Ross, 1993,p.194).

The structural conflict theory has its drawbacks in this regard. While structural characteristics may play a significant role in identifying the targets of hostile action,

psycho-cultural traits are more useful in understanding the severity (such as ethnic cleansing or genocide, as in Rwanda and Burundi) and duration such as protractedness of conflict. In many cases, structural factors serve as the catalysts, or as Brown put it, the "proximate causes," that turn latent conflict into manifest or overt conflict. Specific characteristics that can operate as triggers include things like political transition, a looming military danger, or escalating economic issues. However, significant ethnic conflict scenarios frequently take place in a predisposed psycho-cultural setting, which I will now analyse later. Let's review the key concepts that have been produced before delving more into the psycho-cultural conflict theory. The reasons of persistent ethnic conflict are different according to structural and psycho-cultural conflict theories. I claimed that a key component in the justification of conflict is the role of competition for genuine interests. It is the rejection of human wants, as Azar put it, "that finally emerges as the basis of conflict"¹⁴. These human needs are typically described in the literature as need for physical security, nutrition, shelter, successful participation in the market, and decision-making institutions. However, I also argued that structural factors do not adequately account for the intensity alone and, in some cases, the protracted nature of severe ethnic conflict, characteristics that contribute to their apparent intractability and, ultimately, have a significant impact on how such conflict is managed and resolved.

3.3 Psycho-cultural Conflict Theory

The psycho cultural conflict theory highlights the importance of deeply ingrained "us-them" oppositions that are culturally shared, the conceptualization of foes and allies, and ingrained attitudes toward how people should act that date back to infancy (Ross, 1993, p.18). In order to understand what contributes to these psycho-cultural

¹⁴ Azar quoted in M. Rabie, *Conflict Resolution and Ethnicity* (London: Praeger, 1994), p.27.

dispositions' shared and socially constructed nature, I propose addressing the psychological processes through which they are acquired. Protracted social disputes are typically of an ethnic nature, as was demonstrated at the beginning of this chapter. However, this does not indicate that ethnicity alone causes conflict. This, it was supposed, is a result of the frequent occurrence of protracted social disputes in societies that are multi communal in makeup and that discriminate against a particular ethnic community. It has been assumed that PSC arise when groups of people are treated unfairly or denied the basic necessities of life because of their shared identity. The acceptance and safeguarding of identity is one of these needs, along with the need for self - protection, nourishment, political and economic engagement, etc. Given that identity plays a crucial role in the development of psychological processes that will ultimately lead to the psycho-cultural dispositions that lead ethnic groups to engage in violent interactions, special attention needs to be paid to identity in order to comprehend the significance of its role in the escalation, duration, and intensity of conflict. Protracted conflicts are "identity-driven," the outcome of an underlying "fear of extinction" (Horowitz), which arises from the experience of being a weak ethnic group with painful memories of persecutors and massacres. All of these concerns, however, seem to have the same underlying component: the fear of the threat of losing one's identity. Horowitz talks about the "fear of extinction," Volkan about the "fear of dying off," and Rothschild about the "fear of the future" .This means minority populations like the Anglophone may fear that since their culture is being accommodated or integrated in areas like politics, education legislation of Cameroon that someday there might not be acknowledge as citizens of the state anymore. This threat, whether actual or perceived, results from a history of victimization, oppression, humiliation, and inferiority, as well as other forms of discrimination. A component of

what Rothschild refers to as the "pathological feature of ethnicity" is this total loss of self-respect and dignity (Rothschil & Groth, 1995). A theory of the psychology of victimhood has been established by political psychologist Jeanne Knutson. She deduced from it that a sense of safety and security is a necessary component of human desires for identity as well as for affection, self-esteem, and respect from others¹⁵. Therefore, people and groups will act strangely and possibly violently in attempt to protect their identity. This sense of helplessness and threat of losing one's identity is rooted in recollections of psychological scars and hurts as well as true but mythologized truths. This means that history is important. "Actors form beliefs subjectively, largely on the basis of past interactions" (Lake & Rothchild, 1996, p.51).

This "history," upon which a group's ideas and actions are based, is either mythologized or actual. The origins of various groups, the nature of their relationships, and their position in the social structure are frequently, but not always, referenced in myths or mythico-histories. These narratives sometimes show one group as heroic and superior while demeaning the other, and they are frequently altered and inflated through time. It is also possible to build irrational myths from a more recent history, the colonial past. The facts in such cases are true, but they will also be mythologized, perverted, and reinvented in a way that best serves the objectives of such groups. Although Mohammed Rabie's claim that "The primary causes of all types of contemporary ethnic conflicts are rooted in the colonial era"¹⁶, should only be partially followed, it can be assumed that colonialism has played a significant role in

¹⁵ Utterwulghé Steve, (1999), Rwanda's Protracted Social Conflict: Considering the Subjective Perspective in Conflict Resolution Strategies
https://ciaotest.cc.columbia.edu/olj/ojpcr/ojpcr_2_3/ojpcr_2_3b.html

¹⁶ Rabie, Conflict Resolution and Ethnicity (London: Praeger, 1994), p. 162

the development of ethnic group psychology and subsequent hostile behaviour. In some cases, it can be argued that racial tensions and hostilities predate colonial rule and that other modern post-colonial objective factors, such as the way a country is linked to the global economy, its level of dependency or autonomy, and the nature of its political and military environment, also play a role in ethnic issues or violence. However, I also think that colonial powers, in their pursuit of political dominance, economic exploitation, and cultural hegemony, exacerbated and polarized existing group differences, giving rise to new mythico-histories, strong ideologies, and genuine victimization, particularly in my case study of Cameroon. Horowitz has demonstrated a connection between colonial assessments of assumed group character, the distribution of group worth, and the propensity of a group to start interethnic conflict or use the political system to effect change (Horowitz, 1985). Evaluation of ethnic groups by foreign control based on alleged "racial superiority" and distinctions in levels of "civilization" contributes to a certain amount of humiliation and a sense of helplessness among "backward" people. Since thoughts of "backwardness," "inadequacy," and "helplessness" are profoundly uncomfortable as a collective, they will either cause the group to retaliate violently or use the democratic system to change the circumstance. Therefore, it is just as important to comprehend how each group is related to the colonial powers as it is to understand how they are related to one another in order to fully understand the impact that group juxtapositions have on ethnic conflict (Horowitz, 1985, p.167).

In summary, the term "past" frequently alludes to a history of injustice, discrimination, persecution, and, in the most extreme cases, slaughter, whether it be pre-colonial or colonial, mythologize or be founded on actual experiences. This is perceived as a challenge to one's individual or collective identity, and as a result, the group will be

significantly impacted by fears of extinction and the future. What I want to show is that the psychological escalation process that will develop and have a significant impact on the length and intensity of ethnic conflict as well as its result begins with the "pathological dimension of ethnicity," which is born out of fear and threat regarding ethnic identity. Rothchild and Growth states, "Pathology may be defined as a pervasive sense of anxiety, hostility, and estrangement project onto other surrounding ethnic groups, as opposed to a more neutral sense of one's own identity and distinctiveness", (Rothschild & Groth, p.69).

In terms of many psychological processes that have a tendency to make conflict increasingly severe and unresolvable, Terrel Northrup has defined the role of identity in conflict escalation. Threat, distortion, rigidification, and collusion are the several phases of the escalation (Northrup, 1989). The escalation model developed by Northrup is applicable to a variety of disputes, from interpersonal to interpersonal and social conflicts. I will use this approach to analyse interethnic conflict. Threat is the initial phase. As previously established, threats to group and individual identity could be actual or hypothetical. Both parties' members consider that the other's very existence is a threat to their own. Distortion is the second stage. Northrup defines distortion as an aggressive psychological reaction to threat. The aggressive reaction need not be violent. In that it will be defensive in nature, the reaction to the perceived threat will be misinterpreted. Due to their protective posture, individuals and groups will act more aggressively when interacting with other groups. Third in the escalation of psychological processes is rigidification. The third psychological process in the escalation is rigidification. Rigidification entails putting up more effort to define one's own bounds. Self and other split into opposing categories. In order to maintain the group's identity, this rigidification process upholds a system of exclusion, which

solidifies conflict as a whole. At best, it fosters a perception of others that is marked by distrust, antagonism, and mistrust; at worst, it establishes a dehumanization process that makes violence against another group more bearable. Collusion is the final phase. In some ways, the parties cooperate to keep the conflictual relationship going by incorporating conflict or aspects of conflict into their identities. Conflict institutionalizes at this point. This escalation model makes it very evident that ethnic identification, in particular, plays a critical role in the hardening of ties between groups, leaving them with deeply unfavourable opinions of the "other" and its intentions. The final phase might be the annihilation of the "other".

In conclusion, it is through this psychological process that psychological dispositions are developed and ingrained in group consciousness. This process has its roots in a history of discrimination as well as a feeling of threat and fear towards ethnic identity. It is significant to note that psychological processes can cause conflict to escalate over a very lengthy period of time. Due to this, conflict is still there but is latent, meaning that both parties are aware that their goals conflict but take no action to resolve it. 'Proximate' variables must function as triggers for conflict to become overt or, in conflict lingo, manifest. The "catalytic variables that turn potentially violent circumstances into lethal conflicts" are the proximate causes of conflict. Politics, economics, or social issues are frequently among these proximate reasons. Growing economic issues, combined with another circumstance, such as a political movement toward democracy, which poses an intolerable challenge to certain top members of the dominant group, the outcome could be a leader-led mobilization of the group for action. In other words, ethnic activists and political entrepreneurs divide societies by exploiting the psychological tendencies of their own group, enhancing myths and


emotions (which is simple to do when a group is particularly receptive to myths), and escalating ethnic resentment directed at the other group, which serves as the scapegoat.

Last but not least, ethnic conflict does not develop in a straight manner. It moves with the times. Over a lengthy period of time, ethnic conflict can escalate, explode, de-escalate, and re-escalate. Furthermore, because psychological dispositions, interpretations, and subjective factors are the root causes of conflict, it is possible for a protracted dispute of this nature to become even more entrenched, and the parties will further develop into mutually exclusive categories. Dehumanizing beliefs will proliferate and become more entrenched, which is quite dangerous because it frequently comes before mass murder.

3.4 The Conflict Triangle

Johan Galtung created the ABC triangle. There are three sides to this: the first sides are players' attitudes (A): racism, discriminatory, sexism, victimhood. The second side are actor's behaviour (B): violence, genocide, insurgency attacks. The final side he labelled conflict (C): dispute over territory. The actors concerned characterize the contradiction (conflict) in terms of the opposing values or objectives that exist between them. The three factors are interconnected, and any one of them could serve as the catalyst for the escalation of a conflict (Galtung, 1969).

A major source of conflict is perceived or actual "incompatibility of goals" between the people involved. In symmetrical disputes, the parties, their interests, and any conflicts between those interests establish the contradiction. In asymmetrical disputes, the parties, their relationship, and the conflict that arises within it all determine the contradiction (Ramsbotham, Woodhouse, and Miall, 2011, p. 9–11).



It is important to emphasize the distinctions between symmetric and asymmetric conflicts before moving on to Galtung's model analysis. We speak of a symmetrical conflict when A and B are in a similar or equal position and are at odds with one another because their interests are at odds. Asymmetric conflict occurs when one party in the interaction between A and B plainly has a better position than the other (i.e., when there is an obvious state of inequality between the two sides). For instance, the Anglophone dispute is characterized as asymmetrical since it involves elite policymakers and marginalised Anglophone. This kind of confrontation, in Ramsbotham's opinion, arises between the majority and the minority, between the government and a rebel group, between an employer and his employees, or between a master and his servants¹⁷. Strong asymmetry is a feature of an increasing number of conflicts today. Asymmetry comes in three types: power, strategic, and structural. The line dividing these three different kinds of asymmetry is frequently hazy, and in a conflict, more than one kind of asymmetry could be present, each with a different level

¹⁷ "Transforming Civil Conflicts", (2000), The Network University (the University of Amsterdam), chapter "Power: Symmetric and asymmetric conflicts", available at: http://www.netuni.nl/courses/conflict1/week1/1.9_week.html accessed on 15th June 2022.

of intensity. Giorgio Gallo and Arturo Marzano contend that a conflict can only be understood and explained conceptually by using the obvious distinction (Gallo et al., 2009, p.33). When there is an imbalance of power and the weaker player starts the dispute, there is power asymmetry. When A and B use asymmetric tactics and methods to resolve the dispute, there is strategic asymmetry. Guerrilla warfare and terrorism are two examples of this kind of asymmetry. When A and B are unequal in terms of status, structural asymmetry exists; in this situation, the nature of the two parties' connection is what is at the heart of the dispute. A shift in the relationships between the enemies is what started the fight. One wants to change, while the other will stop at nothing to prevent the change. The majority of the time, one is a state or governmental organization, and the other is a political movement, non-state group, or liberation organization. The conflict between Israel and Palestine is an illustration of structural asymmetry (Andrew, 1975, p. 177).

According to Galtung, a conflict is defined as attitude + behaviour + contradiction, when Galtung structural violence re contradiction (C) is the source of the conflict and attitude + behaviour + contradiction are subsequent meta-conflicts (C). A conflict sequence that begins objectively with an attitude of inner life and is manifested externally by violent or nonviolent verbal and/or physical behaviour is feasible in the case of CAB. With the aid of this definition, we can discuss the CAB as a guiding conflict theory, a dynamic stage of the conflict, or a method of problem-solving (Galtung, 2007, p.22). The perceptions and lack thereof that the parties have of one another and themselves are referred to as attitudes. Positive or negative, it can be very negative, particularly in violent disputes where the parties may form demeaning preconceptions about one another. According to Ramsbotham, Woodhouse, and Miall (2011), attitude is made up of emotive and affective components (I like or I don't like

X), cognitive components (favourable or unfavourable knowledge about X), and conative/ behavioural components (desire, will). "Any human activity in which desire plays a role and, by extension, any conduct in which planning is necessary and the engagement of knowledge and resources in order to achieve it," says J. Sutter, is what is meant by "any act of will." (Sutter, 2006, p.1300). Behaviour involves either conciliation or animosity, or compulsion threats, coercion, or destructive attacks are all behaviours that occur in violent confrontation.

The main actors of the Cameroon Anglophone crisis are the president Biya Administration (the Government), and the minority southern Cameroon (the Anglophone). The Anglophone conflict is an asymmetrical conflict with structural asymmetry, according to Galtung's conflict triangle. Due to the disparity in strength between the two parties at odds, the Anglophone conflict is an asymmetrical one. In this particular example, the Anglophone teachers and attorneys are the weak players (B), whose behaviour was to start with a peaceful demonstration, whereas the Biya administration is the strong player (A), as they are the government and have access to more resources. Despite this imbalance in power, guerrilla warfare plans and tactics give the weaker party an advantage on the field of combat (strategic and power asymmetry). The current crisis has strengthened support for secessionism and boosted federalism among the Anglophone community, which was most likely already high. This updated setup demonstrates how serious the Anglophone issue is. Without the support of a sizable segment of the populace, the activities of the ghost town and the closing of the schools could not have persisted for nine months (Crisis Group, 2019). As was already evident, the Anglophone (player B) is attempting to alter the dynamics of his connection with (player A) Biya administration. (Asymmetry in structure).

Player A is only left with one choice, which is to reply with a theatrical rejection. It loses the popular support it need because it consistently violates human rights.

Many Anglophones believe that the Francophone area of the country had a policy to marginalize Southern Cameroons, and they still do not fully understand the catastrophic effects that the 1980s economic crisis also had on some Francophone regions. The Anglophones grabbed the chance to voice their complaints when the multiparty system was reinstated in the 1990s (Crisis group, 2019). The Attitude (A) was discrimination towards the Anglophone this expressed itself through the form of excluding the Anglophone culture in education and the judiciary system .The Behaviour (B), of the Anglophone towards marginalisation was to express themselves with a peaceful protest which was met with violence insurgency when the Biya administration ordered military to disrupt the peaceful protest . The security forces of Cameroon have used disproportionate force to disperse crowds in Bamenda and Buea during the past month, arresting peaceful demonstrators arbitrarily and injuring numerous people while killing at least one civilian. More than 100 individuals were taken into custody in Bamenda on November¹⁸.

3.4.1 Structural Violence

Another unique characteristics of the structural asymmetry conflict in Cameroon is Galtung concept of structural violence. Johan Galtung initially discussed structural violence in 1969, distinguishing it from direct personal violence. According to Galtung (1969, p.175), "structural violence is defined above all by inequality, particularly when it comes to the distribution of power in a social organization". Structural violence is also referred to as indirect violence and, in some cases, institutionalized violence. It

¹⁸ <https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/press-release/2016/12/cameroon-excessive-force-that-led-to-deaths-of-protesters-must-be-urgently-investigated/>

refers to preventable harm or destruction to people and, by extension, things where there is no actor perpetrating the violence or where it is impractical to look for the actor; such violence arises from unequal distribution of power and resources or is said to be built into the system of the state. These systems include: laws and the institutions established to enforce them, economic systems such as the market, social interdependence, educational institutions and their operations, and, in many cases, military institutions. According to the Galtung Institute, structural violence is defined as physical, emotional, verbal, institutional, or spiritual activity. Galtung emphasizes that structural violence is a source of preventable death and disability that affects people in many social structures and is directly linked to social injustice. As a violence triangle, there is a relationship between direct, structural, and cultural violence (Galtung, 1990). When everything that a society requires to survive, such as access to healthcare and medication, education, and adequate food and water, are concentrated amongst just the top classes or those in power, structural violence occurs (Høivik, 1977, p.60). As a result, this type of structural violence leads to economic underdevelopment and poverty in wide segments of society. These arrangements can subsequently lead to conflict since certain sectors of society believe they are worse off or require more and thus blame other groups within society (Galtung, 1990, p.292). According to Fearon and Laitin (2003, p.79), "greater income inequality should be associated with higher risks of civil war onset," and while many have gotten rich from the oil and other commodity booms in Sub-Saharan Africa, United Nations development report figures show that the per capita income ratio in Sub-Saharan Africa fell from ninth to eighteenth in 1960 (UNDP, 2001, p. 16). Economic concerns have cemented poverty in the region, increasing the likelihood of conflict as inequality rises and afro-pessimism takes hold (Clegg, 2010).

Cultural violence, according to Galtung (Galtung Violence Triangle, 1969), causes and legitimizes direct or personal and structural violence, while simultaneously instilling in us the belief that structural violence is normal. Direct violence stems from cultural and structural violence, which feeds and reinforces it. In the case of Cameroon, at the surface level the institutional discrimination of Anglophone teacher and lawyers lead to the direct violence currently happen in Cameroon, but there more to the Anglophone conflict that meets the eyes .At the beginning of this this I asked that, How does one of the countries with Large positive peace deficits in 2008 deteriorate and I went on by answering that Cameroon was not peaceful but in negative peace .Which meant ,tension existed but there were absence of war. Cameroon saw one of the worst cholera outbreaks in its history between 2009 and 2011. Despite the fact that this disease is caused by bad public health systems, a lack of clean water, and unsafe hygiene practices, little was done to prevent it from recurring. In fact, another outbreak emerged this year, leaving about 100 people dead and 1400 afflicted. This is a disease that could have been avoided or better still treated if there was great access to good health care. Cholera is simply one of several avoidable diseases afflicting Cameroonians (measles, Typhoid fever, mumps, and so on). Nonetheless, Cameroon prides itself on being a peaceful nation in the eyes of the world.

When civilians carry out peaceful protests, the military forces of Biya's dictatorship severely repress them. The large strike over the president's proposed constitutional revision to allow him to continue in office, as well as the growing cost of fuel and other essential necessities, resulted in one of Cameroon's deadliest military crackdowns in its history in 2008. The president's harsh armed troops stormed the peaceful pro-democracy activists, resulting in widespread arrests, detentions, and torture. Apart

from right to good healthcare, political and economic right Cameroon citizens other various disruption of their human right. President Biya ordered the closure of dozens of churches in Cameroon in 2013 because the churches, according to him, participated in "unhealthy" and "indecent" behaviours that did not fit to the fundamental purpose of spiritual growth of its people. Denying people these fundamental rights leads to the notion that institutional violence exists. Cameroon is clearly experiencing a terrible peace, as it has for a long time. It is time to embrace peaceful coexistence. And for this to happen, people must be allowed to live in a safe atmosphere free of fear and violence, both in law and in practice. The police, for example, should not brutalize the individuals they are supposed to protect. Everyone should be treated equally before the law, by independent and impartial justice systems, and by effective laws that defend the rights of the people. This is what triggered the Anglophone citizens to fight against the corrupt Biya's administration.

Chapter 4

ANALYSIS OF THE ANGLOPHONE CONFLICT

4.1 Introduction

Among the most important conflicts in Africa is the one between the Anglophone minority community in Cameroon and the authoritarian francophone regime led by President Biya, who is the second and longest serving president of Cameroon. It has taken thousands of lives, driven hundreds of thousands from their homes, creating refugees and asylum seekers, and has both directly and indirectly impacted the lives of millions more people. The truth is that tensions have existed since the colonial era, and that no one, not even Cameroon, could have imagined a catastrophe before 2016. Cameroon was previously known as Africa's most stable country. With some Anglophones demanding for an independent No-So, renamed "Ambazonia," the problem has devolved into a separatist movement (Ekah, 2019). And a government that continues to deploy military force to terrorize the population while denying that there is a problem. The Cameroon Anglophone Civil Society Consortium (CACSC), a group made up of the lawyer and teacher trade unions from the Anglophone regions of Cameroon, staged a protest in response to the conflict in those areas. The demonstration, which was intended to be a sit-down strike in peace, has escalated and is now an unresolvable conflict that, if left unattended, runs the risk of destabilizing the entire Central African sub-region. The origins of the war, however, may be found in Cameroon's historical evolution, going all the way back to the colonial era on the one hand and the reunification of the southern and northern Cameroon during

independence on the other. The Cameroon conflict has revealed many universal facts and ideas that can be observed and researched. One must examine the historical occupants of this nation, notably their pre-colonial and colonial past, in order to trace and comprehend the causes of the Anglophone conflict.

The Anglophone conflict was not triggered overnight but it was a series of constant marginalization of the population of Anglophone Cameroon, it was a result of the Anglophone consciousness. Konings and Nyamnhoh defined Anglophone consciousness as the; “the feeling of being ‘marginalised’, ‘exploited’, and ‘assimilated’ by the francophone-dominated state, and even by the francophone population as a whole”(Koning & Nyamnjoh, 1997). In the Anglophone districts of the South West and North West, the Anglophone problem has given birth to the worst crisis, which is escalating into a civil war. Some members of the English-speaking elite did not begin to publicly criticize the alleged inferior status of the Anglophones and make claims for self-determination until the political liberalization movement in the early 1990s. To protect the unitary state, the government has developed a number of tactics, some of which aim to minimize or deny the presence of an "Anglophone problem." This chapter will show how boundaries set under colonial times and choices made at the time of decolonization have had long-lasting effects on many regions of the world, particularly in Africa. South Africa, Rwanda, Cameroon and Nigeria are a few instances. Nevertheless, the Anglophone crisis, or the Anglophone problem as it is frequently known in Cameroon, is one of the most prominent contemporary examples of a conflict that results from the legacies of colonialism. This chapter will therefore primarily focus on the Cameroon Anglophone struggle by describing the nature of colonial Cameroon, the root of the conflict, what triggered the Violence, its dynamics, and how it progressed into one of the most violent conflicts. The chapter's other

sections will give a general outline of the role that the international community as played so far in relation to the conflict.

4.2 Background of the Conflict

The majority of African nations speak either English or French due to their colonial background. However, Cameroon has a peculiar case that is a legacy of its colonial past. The Republic of Cameroon, sometimes known as Cameroon, is a nation in west-central Africa. Its official name is Cameroon (French: Cameroun). The Central African Republic, Gabon, and the Republic of the Congo are its southern neighbours, and Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, and Nigeria are its western and northern neighbours. The Bight of Biafra, a portion of the Atlantic Ocean and the Gulf of Guinea, is where its coastline is located. It has been positioned in both West Africa and Central Africa due to its strategic location at the meeting point of the two continents. Its population of 26 million people speaks 250 native languages. Cameroon's history has been marked by intervals of apparent calm and stability followed by intervals of frequently violent conflict. Prior to gaining complete independence in 1960, for 77 years, Cameroon was controlled by three European powers before becoming fully independent in 1960 (for French Cameroon) and 1961 (for English Cameroon by joining the French part).

4.3 Colonial Era

The growth of modern African republics was profoundly, persistently, and widely impacted by European colonialism. Ethnic warfare is one of the colonial era's most lasting effects. The seeds for the ethnic war in post-colonial Africa were sowed when the European powers set official territorial boundaries across the continent in 1885. Little thought was given to how indigenous ethno cultural groups were actually distributed when those limits were set (Blanton et al., 2001). In 1884, Germany annexed Cameroon during the so-called "Scramble for Africa," the period of

imperialism that saw European countries dominate most of the continent¹⁹. Within each colony's newly established geographical boundaries, there were various ethnic groups represented, and many ethnic nationalities were split among two or more colonial administrations. As the frontiers of newly independent nation-states, these lines acquired international (but not necessarily domestic) legitimacy. Each colonial system was unique from the others but French and British had greater influence over more parts of Africa than Belgium, Portugal or other European countries did. Economic imperatives drove both French and British colonial strategy in Africa. These requirements required colonial government to be as close to self-sufficient as possible, (Young, 1994, p.97).

When Germany lost the First World War, it was later split into two factions. The British controlled 20% of the country, which they combined with Nigeria, and the French controlled 80% of it because they were the League of Nations' designated rulers in those regions. The division of Cameroon under French and British rule, known as the Milner-Simon 1919, coincided with the change in power (Elango 1985). The colonial administration systems of the British and the French were based on opposing ideologies and methods of control. According to Young, “the British colonial state differed from other states because it had a less centralized historical personality, was less thoroughly infused with an earlier absolutist history, and used a less prefectural type of regional administration. . . .,” (Young 1994,p.99), The tremendous Cartesian and Jacobin tendencies in France, on the other hand, gave rise to a potent legacy of a fully-fledged absolutist heritage, modernized in the Bonapartist rationalization of the state, that inspired the interior spirit of republican institutions(Blanton et al., 2001).

¹⁹ Longley, Robert. (2021, December 6). A Brief History of Cameroon. Retrieved from <https://www.thoughtco.com/brief-history-of-cameroon-43616>

The systems of ethnic stratification and conflict that developed in each system after independence differed as a result of these disparities in French and British colonial administration strategies. With the goal of incorporating its colonial inhabitants into a "Greater France" through cultural assimilation and administrative centralization, the French approach to colonialism was based on this concept (Clapham, 1985). In fact, French colonial subjects obtained French citizenship in 1946, (Delavignette, 1970, p. 259). The quest for a centralized state that merged people from many areas and ethnic groups into a unified social structure and was governed by an administrative state based on and subordinate to the French state was evident in all facets of French colonial authority. The adoption of French as the official language and the language of trade were important assimilation tools (Clapham, 1985, p. 21). The metropole was much less dominant under the British system of colonial government than it was under the French one. The colony's daily operations were far less strongly reliant on the UK than on the local aristocracy (Emerson, 1964). The British administration wanted to leave local elites in place rather than colonize their African possessions with a sizable number of British nationals and force them into acting as agents of British control, (Wilson, 1994: 19). By doing so, the British colonial state created a network of native middlemen "who combined the useful authority derived from some customary title to office with the literate skills and exposure to basic administrative training that would make them serviceable auxiliaries of the would-be Weberian state" (Young, 1994: 150). This tactic was particularly effective in northern Nigeria and Uganda, where the British discovered robust social control institutions already in existence and eager collaborators among those in charge of those organizations (Young, 1988, p.42-43). As a result, unlike the French, who destroyed native social institutions, the British upheld conventional social organization design.

The root of the Anglophone issue is this division. Separate nationalist movements and aspirations were developed in the two areas as a result of the Anglo-French division of Cameroon in 1916. For administrative reasons, when the British acquired control of their own region of Kamerun, they integrated it with Nigeria. The adoption of Nigerian laws and administrative procedures was the first stage towards integrating the British Southern Cameroons into Nigeria. The southern part was referred to as the Cameroons Province, while the northern half was referred to as the British Northern Cameroons. The Cameroon Province is typically referred to as the Southern Cameroons to differentiate it from the Northern Cameroons. The environment required for the development and articulation of Cameroonian particularism in Nigeria was established by British colonial administration and beliefs. First, when viewed from the perspective of promoting the development of a democratic society, the British were seen to be quite liberal. Second, as shown by the overwhelming presence of Nigerians in all aspects of Southern Cameroons society, the region was governed more as a colony of Nigeria than of Britain (Awasom, 1998). The Anglophone Cameroon at this moment was marginalized by Nigeria in addition to their colonial masters. They became disgruntled with the union with Nigeria as a result. For the French portion of Cameroon because of its size it was ruled by the French independently and not added under any countries jurisdiction.

This format went on until the decolonization era in the 1960s. French Cameroon was given independence after decolonization, whereas British Cameroon was asked in an UN-sponsored referendum whether it wanted to join Nigeria or French Cameroon. Following the results of this referendum, British Cameroon further separated, with the northern section joining Nigeria and the southern part joining French Cameroon (Percival 2008) (Hoekman, 2008). As stated by Fon and Achiri; “This referendum is

often criticized by Anglophone activists who decry the lack of a real choice. Leaders of the British Southern Cameroons preferred an independent territory, but opposition from Pan-African movements as well as the British government forced the UN to offer British Southern Cameroons only two choices to gain independence by either joining the Federal Republic of Nigeria or the Republic of Cameroon”(Fon & Achiri, 2021,p.81). In order to "take their chances" in a loose federation with the French-speaking Cameroons, the peoples of British Southern Cameroons, under the leadership of John Ngu Foncha, made this decision. The primary concern in French Cameroun was the nature and scope of the connection with France following independence. The Union des Populations du Cameroun (UPC), Cameroon’s first authentic nationalist party, and its leaders Felix Moumié and Um Nyobe called for a complete rupture from France and the establishment of a socialist economy.

4.4 Protracted Social Conflict Analysis and Anglophone Crisis

Le Vine (1961) allegorically referred to the British Cameroons as the "bride" and hinted that the Republic of Cameroon was the "bride-groom" during the reunification debate in the early 1960s. The Republic of Cameroon had 10 times the land, four times the population, and "immeasurably bigger resources and a significantly better level of social and economic development" than the British Southern Cameroons, making this concept of weaker and stronger partners fitting (Le Vine 1976,p. 273).

4.4.1 Genesis

Beginning with "the pattern of causal connection among... circumstances that give rise to a certain protracted social conflict,"(Azar 1990, p.7) Azar describes his PSC model. Azar cites four factors in this phase, which he refers to as "Genesis," that act as prerequisites for "the transition of non-conflictual situations into conflictual ones." (Azar 1990, p.7).The root of the Anglophone problem goes back to the division of

Kamerun the German colony in two unequal size while the current Anglophone conflict as its root right after the reunification of the present Republic of Cameroon . It soon became clear that the differences in culture, society, and politics between the two linguistic groups were deeper and more difficult to overcome than the nationalists' original goals of creating a united and independent Cameroon.

The genesis of the conflict was not only actually the colonial division of Cameroon but architecture of the political institution designed during the unification. In the 1960s when most colonies like Nigeria and the French Cameroon gain independent, some of the southern Cameroon citizens (Anglophones) felt like Nigerians where dominating their social economic life and marginalizing them they opted for independence while other southern Cameroonians where satisfied with their position in Nigeria . Due to this schism among Anglophone nationalists, the United Nations called a plebiscite in British Southern Cameroons in February 1961. The electorates were given the option of declaring independence with Nigeria or reuniting with French Cameroons. A total of 332,665 votes were cast, with 233,571 in favour of reunion with French Cameroon and 97,741 in favour of union with Nigeria, (Ebune, 1992, p.230). The majority, led by J N Foncha, therefore chose reunification with French Cameroon, or the Republic of Cameroon, as the territory was named at independence in 1960. The reunified Cameroon was a federation known as the Federal Republic of Cameroon. The federal system failed due to a number of factors, including discrepancies in the component elements and a lack of rigorous planning.

Communal Content: A society with a "multi-communal" character that contributed to the creation of PSC (Azar 1990). In a given society, the existence of two or more groups does not inevitably result in conflict. The rise of politically active communities

within such a society is typically related with the necessity for the eventual development of a PSC scenario within a multi-communal society. Cameroon like most African countries is a multi-communal state made up of 200 ethnic group but Cameroon identify first as a bi- lingual state which consists of the Anglophone and Francophone Cameroonians .For Cameroon the two official linguistic group are the politically active communities .Since the partition of Cameroon was unequal this gave Francophone Cameroon the upper hand because they had majority of population in the after the unification. Though Azar did not make any point about a case like Cameroon but I contend that a distinct difference between other conflicts that has been analysed before like the Cyprus conflict is that before the unification Francophone Cameroon was already an independent sovereign state. The country attained independence on January 1st, 1960. Ahmadou Ahidjo was chosen as the first president of the Republic of Cameroon in elections that took place shortly after the country's independence. In addition to pledging to create a capitalist economy, Ahidjo and his party, the Cameroon Union (Union Camerounaise), also promised to retain close connections to France²⁰. A constitution was approved in a referendum on February 21, 1960²¹.

The Federal Constitution adopted in 1961 by the fathers of reunification maintained the two language groups' distinctions while firmly enshrining the colonial cultural legacies of each community in terms of politics, the judiciary, education, and other spheres of public life. The connection quickly worsened, as it so frequently does in situations like this. While some Anglophones held important positions, such as John Foncha, the Southern Cameroons' pro-unification premier who later served as the

²⁰ <https://www.britannica.com/place/Cameroon/Moving-toward-independence>

²¹ British/French Cameroon (1948-1961). <https://uca.edu/politicalscience/dadm-project/sub-saharan-africa-region/britishfrench-cameroon-1948-1961/>

nation's prime minister and vice president, most soon felt outnumbered by the French-speaking majority, which had established a highly centralized federation under the autocratic first president of the nation, Ahmadou Ahidjo. Ahmadu Ahidjo and John Ngu Foncha dominated Cameroonian politics during the first Cameroon Republic (1961–1982) and were widely regarded as the architects of the country's reunification. Nzo Ekanghaki (1972–1974) and William Eteki Mboumoua were named as the Organization of African Unity's (OAU) first and second Secretary Generals, respectively, in recognition of Cameroon's unusual Pan-African stance (1974-1978). Reunification was therefore seen as the pinnacle of African nationalist struggles and the ultimate accomplishment (Awasom, 2000).

According to Konings and Nyamnjoh ; “Ahidjo looked upon federalism as an unavoidable stage in the establishment of a strong unitary state, and employed various tactics to achieve this objective” (Koning & Nyamnjoh, 1997) Ahidjo played Anglophone political factions off against one another after being elected president of the Federal Republic of Cameroon in October 1961, eventually convincing them to join the Union nationale camerounaise (UNC), the single party established in September 1966, and was able to punish any Anglophone leader who continued to support federalism. He used the state's financial might to reward supporters while using the police and the security system to punish detractors. Slowly and brutally, the civil war with the Union des Populations du Cameroun (UPC) came to an end, but the state of emergency that had been imposed during the conflict lasted for years after it was over. He dissolved the federation in 1972 and replaced it with a highly centralized government in an effort to consolidate control. He also banned all political parties other than the Cameroon National Union (CNU) and repeatedly changed the constitution to centralize power in the hands of the president. Politics in the Second Cameroon

Republic, especially under President Paul Biya in the 1990s, seem to indicate that reunification was an unwelcome and sad development. Reunification began to be portrayed as a sinister act, a disease, a burden on people's shoulders, and a far from heroic deed. Some said that Anglophone Cameroonians were the ones who had come up with the reunification notion amid constant Anglophone agitation for a return to federalism or a separation from the union (Awasom, 2000, p.92). This started the marginalization and discrimination against the Anglophone Cameroon. In the early years following independence, polarization along communal lines was exacerbated by the overwhelming presence of Francophone Cameroon in state institutions and the perception by Anglophone Cameroon that the Francophone elites were using the state apparatus to further their own ends at their expense. Ahidjo renewed his mandate as the supreme magistracy, The Federal Republic of Cameroon was abolished and the United Republic of Cameroon was established on May 20, 1972, after Ahidjo asked for another referendum (Ngoh 1979, p. 100). When Ahidjo resigned in 1982, his prime minister, whom he had been preparing for the position, took over in accordance with the constitution. He is the second and current president of the nation. As well as steadily eroding the region's autonomy, he changed the country back to the original Republic of Cameroon, as it was before the reunification. In spite of harsh criticism from Anglophone campaigners who noted that the new name was the same as the French-speaking region of Cameroon had upon its independence, President Paul Biya changed the name once more to the Republic of Cameroon in 1984.

Human need: The second element in Azar's conflict genesis allows us to consider how much access identity groups have to developmental human needs. Although a PSC's development depends on the satisfying of security, development, and identity needs (Ramsbotham et al, 2016), their absence alone does not cause communities to enter a

state of persistent social strife. The deciding factor appears to be "...by the level of acceptability of each community" as well as "...by the access that each community has to political and financial power" (Azar, 1990, p.9) .The possibility of a PSC emerging is raised when political elites or the majority community fail to address the concerns and grievances of a particular group when that community does not actually have access to, or believes it does not have access to, political and financial power. "Most states which experience protracted social conflict tend to be characterized by incompetent, parochial, fragile, and authoritarian governments that fail to satisfy basic human needs" (Azar, 1990,p,10). The basic human need which include food, shelter and security can only be met when there is access to economic development .An important feature of this prejudice is the Anglophone region's relative underdevelopment, which explains why it has not reaped the benefits of its abundant resources, particularly oil discovered off the coast of Western Cameroon in 1973. (Konings 1993). He goes on to say that the oil public firm SONARA is primarily employed by Francophones, despite the fact that the oil is extracted, produced, and transformed in Anglophone Cameroon. In the Francophone area, oil-derived revenues and taxes are also remitted directly to the state in Yaoundé (Cameroon Capital) (Konings 1993). This, in particular, raised awareness among the Anglophone community, who now believe they have been recolonized and marginalized, and are consequently treated as second-class citizens in their own country. In addition to the foregoing, Anglophone Cameroonians suffered the impacts of the country's removal from the Common Wealth when they lost Common Wealth privileges for particular export products from their region. Banana producers who had been permitted to ship their products to the United Kingdom suffered significantly (Konings1993). According to Konings (1993), the opening of road and rail links, as well as the removal

of customs barriers between East and West, has resulted in the rapid decline of West Cameroon's two main ports, Victoria and Tiko, and the expansion of Douala port in the Francophone East. The Cameroon Development Corporation (C.D.C.) is the country's largest and one of its oldest agro-industrial companies, located in the Southwest. It is the second largest employer after the government and specializes in a wide range of crops. Rubber, palm oil, tea, and bananas are four of its crops. It is vital to regional development and is largely responsible for the socioeconomic growth that has occurred in Anglophone Cameroon. It has produced jobs, provided water, built schools and hospitals, and built roads. As such, it has been dubbed Anglophone Cameroon's economic lifeline (Konings, 1996).

Apart from economic discrimination the Anglophone also suffered from other discrimination like education and political representation. The nation-state project following reunification, which has continued to this day, has played a significant role in the development of the Anglophone problem. The determination of the Francophone political elite to dominate the Anglophone minority and obliterate the cultural and institutional foundations of Anglophone identity, according to the Anglophone population, has spurred nation building (Kofele-Kale 1986; Takougang & Krieger 1998). Anglophones have been demoted to lower-level roles in national decision-making, and they are underrepresented in ministerial, senior, and middle-ranking positions in government, the military, and parastatals (Kofele-Kale 1986; Takougang & Krieger 1998). Since reunification, significant posts in the country have always been held for Francophones; ministries in charge of Territorial Administration, the Armed Forces, Education, Finance, Foreign Affairs, Commercial and Industrial Development, and so on have never been led by Anglophones. Anglophones are rarely appointed as Cameroon's ambassador to London, Washington, New York, Lagos, or Paris in the

Foreign Service. This discrimination does not only end at the federal post but Anglophone are also disrupted from political participation. When the Anglophones attend their party meetings, they are occasionally assaulted. During a rally to promote the country's first opposition party, the Social Democratic Front (S.D.F), its members were assaulted, resulting in the deaths of six young Anglophones (Konings and Nyamnjoh 199, p. 214). The members of the Southern Cameroons National Council (SCNC), Cameroon's largest Anglophone movement, were held when they attempted to attend a news conference chaired by the group's vice chairman, Nfor Ngala Nfor. They were arrested under the guise that they were not authorized to hold meetings. Arrests of this nature have been prevalent in recent years, and the situation has not improved. Although the Republic of Cameroon is nominally bilingual, it is impossible to have a solid career in state administration without knowing French because all administrative work is done in French (Mbembe, 2001). Anglophone identity and consciousness are heightened by almost daily confrontations with Francophone government officials stationed in Anglophone Cameroon, who frequently do not speak English and act as masters of the region, relegating the Anglophone population to the status of subjects rather than citizens (Mbembe, 2001).

According to Bouddih Adams (2006), Anglophones face systematic discrimination in admission to professional schools and other institutions of higher learning, particularly the National School of Administration and Magistracy (ENAM), where the Anglophone sections have been abolished, and the Higher Teachers' Training College (ENS). There is little to no continuity between the education provided to Anglophone children in primary and secondary school and the French-oriented teaching provided in national institutions of higher learning. Thus, Anglophone teenagers are obliged to fly abroad at significant financial risk to themselves and their families in quest of high-

quality further education that is congruent with their basic education. In 1983, the Minister of National Education issued an order revising the Anglophone General Certificate of Education (GCE) examination to be more similar to the Baccalaureate, a French examination in Cameroon (Konings and Nyamnjoh 2003:117). According to them, the Anglophone students claimed that the problem of exclusion of Anglophone students from professional and technical institutes could only be remedied by the establishment of institutes based on the English system (Konings and Nyamnjoh 2003, p.117). Education and politics were not the only thing dominated by the Franco phone other sector like media were also a reflection of Franco phone culture while omitting the Anglophone culture.

According to Konings and Nyamnjoh (2003), English-language television films and programs are transmitted in Cameroon only after they have been dubbed into French, and only in their French version. As a result, Anglophones have decided that, based on the content and language of the program, Cameroon Radio and Television (CRTV) is only for Francophones (Konings and Nyamnjoh 2003, p.128). All of these considerations, as well as many others, prompted Anglophone lawyers and teachers to launch a nonviolent protest. They believe that the East dominates the Western Region and that they are underrepresented in government posts. They see themselves as victims of the majority and believe they face discrimination in many aspects of life, particularly socially, economically, and politically. They believe that the government has not preserved their rights as citizens, but rather has made them second-class citizens.

Government and the State's Role: Azar's third variable focuses on the responsibility of the state in guaranteeing that all community groups under its authority can achieve

their basic human requirements. The case of Cameroon fits in this statement with the authoritarian corrupt administration that has been leading the country for over fifty years. Situations under this variable could potentially result in crises of legitimacy for a particular government's controlling power and authority since the community (or communities) that feel denied their basic requirements won't recognize the regime as speaking for them. As a result of the state's inability to carry out basic functions of governance, which include formulating and implementing policies, it will be unable to meet the needs of its many constituents. Therefore, the capacity of the state to implement policies, which is related to its effectiveness and capacity to govern, is also crucial. These variables describe the endogenous factors influencing a conflict's development towards a PSC typology and serve as the link between governance, the role of the state, and human needs discussed previously (Azar, 1990). Kholi (2004) addresses the role of the state in promoting various rates of economic development, particularly rapid industrialization. This is due to the fact that the state decides and implements how a country's resources and labor force should be positioned for its industries. As a result of the growing success of this firm in West Cameroon, the government was supposed to invest additional resources in order for it to expand further and improve the development of the area, but the opposite occurred. The government's announcement in 1994 of the privatization of this important agro-industrial enterprise shocked the Anglophone population and sparked vehement protests among Anglophone Cameroonians, who saw it as a major form of marginalization, given that the enterprise had been doing quite well despite economic crises and was offering them so much (Konings 1996:206-212). To oppose the government's decision, all existing parties, organizations, and pressure groups banded together. Thus, strong protest marches organized by Anglophone movements

protesting C.D.C privatization forced the Biya regime to rescind its decision on C.D.C privatization (Konings 1996:206-212). The privatization protest movement is one of the recent developments in Anglophone Cameroon that have made the Biya regime painfully aware of the Anglophones' growing unity and determination in their struggle for redress of their region's marginalization and subordination within the francophone-dominated state (Konings 1996:215-216).

When examining the Cameroon Conflict example, it becomes clear that the Anglophone Cameroonian initially felt the first instances of physical threat. After President Biya change the name of the country to Republic of Cameroon, which was what the independent sovereign state was called before reunification he completely ignored the identity of the Anglophone Cameroon and their historic journey, Anglophone leaders and activists continued to criticize the central government's ongoing economic, political, and cultural marginalization of the Anglophone population (Fon & Achiri, 2021). With the rise of Anglophone political leaders like Ni John Fru Ndi and the Social Democratic Front (SDF), the formation of the All Anglophone Conferences (AAC), and the emergence of the Southern Cameroons National Council, complaints of marginalization by the Anglophone community that date back to the 1970s and 1980s persisted through the 1990s.

In 1993, a number of organizations from Cameroon's English-speaking regions joined together for the first ever all-Anglophone conference (ACC I). There they issued a declaration calling for the restoration of the 1961 federal constitution. At the same time, Anglophone began to campaign internationally for their cause. Former Prime Minister Foncha, who had helped bring the Southern Cameroons together, now argued for the restoration of the region's autonomy, but to no avail. The conference reiterated

its demands the next year, but this time it made it clear that they would move forward with the declaration of independence if they weren't met. The Second All Anglophone Conference (AAC II), which met in Bamenda from April 29 to May 1, 1994, adopted the Bamenda Proclamation, which stated that; "Should the government either persist in its refusal to engage in meaningful Constitutional Talks or fail to engage in such talks within a reasonable time, the Anglophone Council shall so inform the Anglophone People by all suitable means. It shall, thereupon, proclaim the revival of the Independence and Sovereignty of the Anglophone territory of the Southern Cameroons and take all measures necessary to secure, defend and preserve the Independence, Sovereignty and Integrity of the said Territory" (All Anglophone Conference 1994). The Biya administration altered the constitution once more, thus removing the final remnants of decentralization, and launched a push on what is considered separatist rather than addressing the issues. As a result, numerous people were arrested, and there was occasionally violence. However, it appeared that political turbulence had mostly subsided by the year 2000, even though pro-independence political activity persisted for the most of the decade. Since 1990, violent, quick retaliation to protesters has frequently occurred in the Anglophone regions which made the Anglophone protestors retreat. Similar events occurred during the protests of 2016–2017, which marked the start of the current escalation in violence because this time the Anglophone decide to fight back. Soldiers shot and murdered unarmed demonstrators. Detainees experience abuse as well. The "coloniality" of their union with the French Cameroon state is one of the main grievances of Anglophone separatist's .For decades the Anglophone population have complained of neglect by the French speaker including the administration of President Biya who has been president since 1982 which does not favour the federated system they two parts agreed

on during the reunification agreements. The problem is not just about language or identity the main problem for the Anglophones is the economic gap, there has been less development in the Anglophone parts compare to the Francophone Parts.

On December 13, 2017, François Louncény Fall, the Secretary General's Special Representative for Central Africa and the head of UNOCA, urged the international community to pay attention to the growing situation in Cameroon known as "the Anglophone problem." He criticized the situation is actually violent turn and called for an all-inclusive, comprehensive conversation to resolve the conflict. Although the issue has a long history, as was demonstrated, the most recent expression can be dated to November 2016, when English-speaking lawyers and educators started demonstrating against the government's marginalization of the Common Law and the Anglophone educational institutions (Fon & Achiri, 2021). The latest stage of the conflict started in late 2016, when protests broke out against the rise in French speakers working in the area's schools and courts. "Teachers from the English part later joined the striking lawyers on November 21, 2016; thereby, paralyzing the Anglophone sub system of education in the two English speaking regions of Cameroon from basic to higher education. This day was marked by heavy confrontations between protesters and security officers especially in the streets of the North West Regional capital, Bamenda"(Ngange & Mokondo, 2019). The administration retaliated by launching a crackdown. Agbor Nkongho claimed that despite Cameroon Anglophone Civil Society Consortium (CACSC) leading the initial wave of nonviolent demonstrations in 2016 against the federal government's marginalization of Cameroon's Anglophone regions, violence was never in the group's agenda. "Nobody had a crystal ball that could see

the future," he said. "By and large we didn't foresee violence"²². As armed groups retaliated, this quickly turned violent, marking the beginning of the horrific Anglophone Cameroon crisis.

The Cameroon conflict is not just an identity crisis but a result of years of political, economic and governmental marginalization of the Anglophone people of Cameroon. Eko Lyombe (2003) considers the Anglophone issue to be a confluence of political, economic, and social complaints made by the English-speaking minorities in the largely French-speaking republic of Cameroon. The terms discrimination, marginalization, and second-class citizenship are used to describe these complaints. Because the conflict's core roots have not yet been addressed or resolved, it has escalated, which has caused the economy's social and economic operations to become unstable (Eko, 2003). This made them feel like they were being colonized and oppressed internally by French Cameroon. More specifically, Abiem a Tchoyi listed the following as some of the factors contributing to the Anglophone problem in Cameroon: migration of decision-making to Yaoundé, far from the difficulties of the Anglophone people. Failure to uphold obligations to fairly consider the institutional, legal, and administrative traditions and customs left behind from the past administering powers. Keeping the solemn commitments made throughout the referendum campaigns (referring to 1961 plebiscite and 1972 referendum). The Republic of Cameroon has replaced the United Republic of Cameroon as the name of the state, and despite the fact that the Constitution designates French and English as two official languages with equal status, bilingualism in the public sector is not respected²³. other

²² <https://www.dw.com/en/cameroon-anglophone-conflict-five-years-on/a-59363797>

²³ Abiem a Tchoyi, "Anglophone Marginalisation: Cold Hard Facts," The Rambler, edition No. 0037, 18 January 2017.

reasons include, Anglophone The unitary state that Cameroon is currently in displeases its citizens, who would prefer to see it revert to its former federation-like status. Limited political representation, economic discrimination in hiring, training, and education are examples of other forms of marginalization. The integration that the Anglophone Cameroon dreaded most came through education.

Exogenous elements that may determine whether a conflict grows into a PSC are taken into consideration when Azar constructs this prerequisite. 'International linkages' is intended to draw attention to external factors affecting a potential PSC and can be divided into two types: economic dependency and political and military client relationships. It functions similarly to the previous variable, 'governance and the state's role,' which is used to pinpoint domestic factors (Azar, 1990). The independence of the state and its capacity to meet the various demands of some of its constituent populations are both impacted by these two factors. The international linkage only support the Franco phone, because the state has labelled the Anglophone separatist groups as terrorist. It is important to consider the positions taken by the United States, Russia, and China, which appear pro-active, practical, and focused on the Anglophone crisis. France, which has historically been present on Cameroonian territory due to its colonial past and contributes to the upkeep of security and fight against terrorism that gangrene certain regions, is also involved in these efforts. The commitment of the United States, Russia, and China to the Anglophone crisis is a good illustration of the fundamental axis linking space and power, the power expressed in the space policies adopted by these states, if realistic arguments that are almost unanimous on the fact that states are constantly in a frantic race of their vital interests are to be believed (Cottin Gelin Kouma, 2020). Other African country are also against Anglophone separatist group ,for example Nigeria fears that if the separatist group in Cameroon

should win this conflict it will cause a spill over .For Nigeria this means ,the Biafra separatist group within its territory will gain more confidence (Ekah, 2019).Except for the united states which have issued sanctions regarding the human right law abuse in the Anglophone region other state have been tight lipped.

4.4.2 Process Dynamics

Azar contends that the presence of the four precondition factors mentioned earlier (individually or collectively) does not necessarily turn a conflict scenario into a PSC (Azar, 1990, p.12). The development of a conflict from its latent stages—expressed by the preconditions in the "Genesis" section—to a more overt phase necessitates a set of "activation" variables whose "interactive effects" are "key determinants" in its development as a PSC, a cluster Azar refers to as "Process Dynamics" (Azar, 1990).In the 1990s the trigger was president Biya actions for example change the of the name of the country back to the Republic of Cameroon ,changing the flag which tells the story of the two sides merging together and making it represent just the Francophone .The 2016 trigger was deploying French magistrates and teacher to the Anglophone region .

This initial "activation" cluster emphasizes the actions and results that "... the organization and mobilization of communal groups, the emergence of effective leadership, the strategies and tactics of this leadership, and the scope and nature of external ties" (Azar, 1990, p. 14) can have on "triggering" a previously latent conflict into a protracted social one. For the case of Cameroon, the conflict is not between to communities rather it is between the Anglophone community which make up 20 percent of the whole Cameroon population and the political elites namely the authoritarian leader. The longstanding opposition to the supposed integration of the native English-speaking population has continued in the form of the current

Anglophone issue. The unwarranted harassment of Anglophone attorneys participating in nonviolent protest marches to air their frustrations about the perceived marginalization of the Anglophone Common Law practice in the nation started it all off in September 2016. They went on strike in October 2016, and the Anglophone Teachers Trade Union followed suit in November, both in protest of the distortions affecting the educational system in the Anglophone regions. The military on the University of Buea and National Polytechnic Bambli in November 2016, which culminated in the imprisonment and torture of students, greatly exacerbated the current issue. Similar incidents include the detention, abuse, and murder of some youths participating in nonviolent protest in Bamenda and Kumba by security forces²⁴ . According to Okereke, Tchoyi stated that the Cameroon Anglophone Civil Society Consortium (CACSC), founded by activist lawyer Felix Agbor Balla in December 2016, promoted the preliminary demands of the Anglophone community, this included: Yaounde's annexationist attitude and marginalization must end. a return to the 1961-entered union's founding principle of a two-state federation for the administration of public affairs in Cameroon. Preservation of the highly regarded legal and educational systems of Anglophone Cameroon. Release without conditions of the more than 100 genuine Cameroonians who have been detained in connection with the protests that have taken place in the Southwest and Northwest regions since September 2016 and immediate restoration of internet access throughout the Anglophone areas (Okereke, 2018).

²⁴ International Crisis Group (2017) "Cameroon's Anglophone Crisis at the Crossroads," Report No 250, Africa, 2 August 2017, <https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/centralafrica/cameroon/250-cameroons-anglophone-crisiscrossroads> (accessed 25 April 2022).

President Biya characterized the demonstrators as a group of socially engineered and exploited extremist rioters whose operations have resulted in the loss of lives, destruction of residential as well as commercial, paralyzing of economic activities, and the defacement of sacred national symbols" after attempts to address the demands of the Anglophone population had failed. According to Fon and Achiri "The government's initial response of arresting protest leaders and shutting down the internet in western regions further intensified the resolve of many Anglophones, as well as radicalized some who saw this as further evidence of marginalization"(Fon & Achiri, 2021). Rebellion was a response to President Biya's determination to destroy the resistance. Agbor Balla announced Operation Ghost Town Resistance (OGTR) on January 9, 2017, which is primarily distinguished by rigorous adherence to a sit-at-home ceremonial day designated by the CACSC leadership. Residents of the two Anglophone regions of Cameroon avoided the offices and commercial spaces at this time, which halted all political and economic activity. In response to OGTR, the Biya government banned the CACSC and imprisoned its officials, including Agbor Balla, Mancho Bibixy (the organizer of the Bamenda coffin demonstration), Fontem Aforteka'a Neba (a lecturer at the University of Buea), and Paul Ayah Abine (a justice of the Supreme Court) (Caxton, 2017) ²⁵. While the other leaders were able to escape from Cameroon, After the CACSC leaders were apprehended and imprisoned, the Anglophone diaspora assumed control of the movement. The initial demand for the reinstatement of two-state federalism was replaced by the desire for a separate State of Ambazonia by the Anglophone diaspora. Several groups fighting for the same cause emerged, among them are the Southern Cameroon Peoples Organisation (SCAPO),

²⁵ Caxton, A. S. (2017). The Anglophone Dilemma in Cameroon: The Need for Comprehensive Dialogue and Reform. *Conflict Trends* 2 <https://www.accord.org.za/conflict-trends/anglophone-dilemma-cameroon/>

Southern Cameroons South Africa Forum (SCSAF), Movement for the Restoration of Independence in Southern Cameroon (MoRISC) and Southern Cameroonians in Nigeria (SCINGA). Others are the Southern Cameroon National Council (SCNC), Republic of Ambazonia (RoA), Ambazonia Governing Council (AGC) and the Southern Cameroon Youth League (SCYL). The Southern Cameroons Ambazonia Consortium United Front (SCACUF) under the leadership of Sisiku Julius Ayuktebe emerged as the umbrella organisation for all these groups. The SCACUF established the Southern Cameroon Broadcasting Corporation (SCBC) to sustain Anglophone aspirations through its propaganda (Okereke, 2018). Even though the government did take some action in response to the lawyers' and teachers' concerns, it was too little, too late. Following the incidents on September 22 and October 1, which resulted in the deaths of roughly thirty demonstrators, there was a further escalation²⁶. President Paul Biya ordered the release of numerous prisoners in August 2017 but chose to forgo dialogue, sparking a massive demonstration in September 2017 that is thought to have involved 500,000 people. In celebration of this proclamation, 900,000 unarmed protestors were present, but government forces opened fire on thousands of them using automatic weapons and helicopters. This was the beginning of military assaults on villages, orders to leave settlements, and a large migration of residents into Nigeria, leading to the creation of today's 50,000 refugees and 200,000 internally displaced people (Nkongho, 2018). Human rights organizations have documented several human rights breaches by government security forces alone in 2018–2020²⁷. There have been attempts at a truce and dialogue as a result of international pressure. President Biya

²⁶ International Federation for Human Rights. 2017. "Cameroon: Death toll rises in Anglophone regions after severe repression" <https://www.refworld.org/docid/59e4c4994.html> [accessed 28 July 2022].

²⁷ Human Rights Watch. 2020. "World Report 2020. Cameroon Events of 2019." <https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2020/country-chapters/cameroon>

requested a national dialogue for September 2019. The acceptance of a "special status" for the two Anglophone regions and the release of 300 political prisoners were the results of this round of national debates. Following the September 2019. The acceptance of a "special status" for the two Anglophone regions and the release of 300 political prisoners were the results of this round of national debates.

Following the COVID-19 outbreak in March 2020, the Southern Cameroons Defense Forces (SOCADEF) called for a truce. Subsequent negotiations between the government and the separatist faction headed by Sisiuku Tabe took place in June 2020. Both sides have not put an end to the bloodshed despite these negotiations. 285 civilians have been slain since January 2020 by armed rebels and government security forces.

4.4.3 Outcome Analysis

Azar introduces the outcomes that produce (and are further reinforced by) the following conditions: near the conclusion of his model. Physical security deterioration, institutional malformation, psychological ossification, rising dependence, and which in turn contribute to the length of PSCs, are to blame. Due to the a fact that the Cameroon conflict is still in the heat of the conflict except for the a few outcome analysis there the conflict through the course of its protractedness keeps producing consequences daily . Despite the war becoming drawn out and expensive, no side has been able to win or even see the possibility of winning. There are increasing costs to the government as well as a toll on the administration from having to constantly respond to external pressure. Although the government has long since stopped disclosing the number of deaths among its soldiers, the most recent reports were worrisome.

According to Azar, this variable is the "most visible" result of any lengthy conflict situation, which also includes economic decline in addition to physical deaths. The simultaneous degradation of the physical and economic conditions deprives (for all populations concerned) of the resources needed to meet their "basic requirements" and contributes to the continuation of the conflict. The Cameroon conflict has led to country to a lot of the deterioration, the common one being the loss of lives and the displacement of people. By June 2018, there has been an increase in both the number of soldiers kidnapped and the number of soldiers and police slain, surpassing 100 (Kindezek, 2018). Increased injuries have been reported among government forces. The military and police hospitals in Yaoundé and Douala reported receiving 32 and 14 wounded patients, respectively, in June 2019²⁸. According to a 2019 analysis by the International Crisis Group (ICG), which has been tracking the conflict since its commencement, 235 government troops (soldiers and police) have perished overall²⁹. The administration was also alarmed to learn that secessionist rebels had started employing more advanced weapons, according to a wounded government soldier. The prolonged issue also caused Cameroon's suspension from the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) at the start of 2020, which was a huge blow for the government's foreign strategy. President Trump claimed "repeated grave abuses of internationally recognized human rights" in a letter to the US Congress that was related to extrajudicial killings of its nationals by armed forces engaged in a fight with Anglophone secessionists. Additionally, the Trump Administration stopped providing approximately US\$17 million in security aid to Cameroon (Ekonde &

²⁸ Kindzeka, M. 2019. "Cameroon War Victims: Casualty Figures High Because Fighters Are Well Armed." <https://www.voanews.com/africa/cameroon-war-victims-casualty-figures-high-because-fighters-are-well-armed>

²⁹ International Crisis Group. 2019. "Eight Priorities for the African Union in 2019." <https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/eight-priorities-african-union-2019>

Adebayo,2019).The weakness of the Anglophone as also encouraged terrorist groups like Boko Haram to increase the illegal activities like kidnaping etc. The economy is suffering greatly as a result of the fighting. Some extremely unsettling numbers are revealed in a report on the implications and impact on commercial firms operating in the North and South West areas that was issued in 2019 by the Cameroon Employers' Association (better known by its French abbreviation GICAM). According to the research, the conflict has caused overall economic losses of about 269 billion XAF, which also means that the state has lost close to 6 billion XAF in tax revenue (GICAM, 2018).

4.5 Origin and Failure of the Federal System in Cameroon

Federal systems have been tried in many regions of Africa for various reasons and have lasted for comparatively short periods of time, followed by fractures into sovereign parts or movements toward unitary systems (Bach 1989, 218-45; Rothchild 1966, 275-93). They failed for a variety of reasons, including discrepancies in the component parts; Nigeria and Sudan are examples of such cases. The confederal union between Gambia and Senegal is an example of a failed federal system since the arrangements were not adequately worked out. In the instance of Cameroon, the agreement was not thoroughly worked out, and the union was expedited due to the United Nations' involvement. According to Awasom (2002), the first scholars to write on the federal system devised in 1961 for Anglophone and Francophone Cameroon were unified in their criticism of its poor quality. Because Cameroon's federalism was mostly notional, with a preponderance of francophone constitutional elements, the natural criticism was that Anglophones had struck a terrible bargain with Francophones, (Awasom, 2002, p.426-427). Other academics, like as starks, believe that the Anglophone Cameroon elites that negotiated federalism with their

Francophone counterparts "were poorly advised, had little experience or knowledge, and were befuddled" (Stark, 1976, p.429). My argument disagrees with a few of the aforementioned points, yes the Anglophone elites got a bad deal this was because the Anglophones were so eager for their departure from Nigeria that they overlooked so many components. Third parties such as the United Nations and the United Kingdom were preoccupied with other matters such as decolonization and the Cyprus conflict that they rushed both sides into a federation. The challenges surrounding the creation of Cameroon's foundation Union constitution had nothing to do with educational level of the elite leaders of both sides; there were other intervening variables that hindered the constitutional deliberations. The challenges surrounding the creation of Cameroon's foundation Union constitution had little to do with the intellectual attainment of the elites on both sides; there were other intervening variables that hindered the constitutional deliberations. Unlike the French side where France saw the establishment of political institution, the British on the other hand did not establish a political institution for the Anglophone Cameroon because they hoped they will remain under the leadership of Nigeria. The failure of the United Nation was that they created an avenue for the sides to negotiate the unification but they did not help with the establishment of the political institution the way they did with the case of Cyprus. From February 1958 to February 1961, Ahidjo, the prime minister of French Cameroon, Foncha, the premier of British Southern Cameroon, and the United Nations decided the political destiny of the reunified Cameroon.

According to a research of the 1961 Fomuban Talks, the definition of the problem and the objective of the Fomuban Talks differed for the various parties. The Fomuban Talks were designed to welcome back British Southern Cameroons for the Republic du Cameroun. The purpose of the Fomuban Talks for the British Southern Cameroons

was to draft a constitution for a Federal United Republic of Cameroon (Tatah-Mentan, 2014). This difference in defining the problem accounted for the disagreements at the Talks and sowed the seeds of mistrust that has clouded the joining of the two Cameroons and caused political problems culminating in the Proclamation of the Restoration of the Independence and Sovereignty of British Southern Cameroons in December 1999, (Ebong, 1999). The Secretary of State for Colonies convened the London Conference on October 10-13, 1960, at the request of Premier John Ngu Foncha, and one of the conclusions was that if British Southern Cameroons voted in favour of joining République du Cameroun, the territory "would unite in a Federal United Cameroon Republic". It was also agreed that arrangements would be worked out following the plebiscite by a conference comprised of equal-status representative delegations from the République du Cameroun and the Southern Cameroons. This conference would also be affiliated with the United Nations and the United Kingdom (UN Doc. T/1556, p. 40). Furthermore, the United Nations Resolution A/C.4/L685 of 18 April 1961, aimed at ending British Trusteeship over the British Southern Cameroons, invited the administering authority (Great Britain), the governments of the Southern Cameroons, and the Republic of Cameroon, to initiate urgent discussions with a view to finalizing, before 1st October 1961, the arrangements by which the parties' agreed and decided policies for a union of the Southern Cameroons with the Republic of the resolution established a commission of three constitutional and administrative professionals to guide the talks and develop the constitution. Instead of the three sides starting the talks, Ahmadou Ahidjo called the Founban Conference on July 17-21, 1961. (Tatah-Mentan, 2014). Tatah-Mentan saw this as Ahmadou Ahidjo's own skewed interpretation of the UN Resolution, to which Britain, the government of Southern Cameroons, and the three-man expert commission responded by boycotting

the conference. Because the Southern Cameroons had not yet achieved independence, the British Commissioner of the Cameroons, J. O. Field, presided over the government rather than the so-called Prime Minister, J. N. Foncha. (p. 151). The Resolution also designated the United Kingdom to represent the United Nations' interests in all deliberations. As a result, the United Kingdom's boycott implied a boycott of the United Nations (Tatah-Mentan, 2014). This meant that three of the four parties specified in the resolution did not participate in the preparations for the Foumban Conference, and thus boycotted it. The Republic of Cameroon was alone, accompanied by a minor and insignificant Foncha delegation from the British Southern Cameroons. According to Tatah-Mentan (2014), because the British Southern Cameroons was a UN territory under UK Trusteeship at all material times, a conference on the future of the British Southern Cameroons that was boycotted by the United Nations, the United Kingdom, and even the government of the Southern Cameroons itself lacked the legal capacity to deal with the subject of the resolution. Furthermore, any conference that was directed by the United Nations but later boycotted by the same United Nations should never have taken place. This shows that the basis of the negotiations were very weak.

The Federal Republic of Cameroon was essentially a centralized two-state federation (West and East Cameroon) led by an executive President who was aided by a Vice President. The president and his vice president were chosen by universal suffrage for a five-year term renewal. The President and his Vice President could not possibly be from the same state. The President wielded excessive power, appointing and dismissing all federal and state officials, including the Prime Ministers of West and East Cameroon. In reality, his powers were not limited, and the Vice President was not assigned any specific activities; rather, the constitution stated that the Vice President's

responsibility was to assist the President, who might delegate obligations to him by decree. Yaounde was to be the federal capital and the headquarters of East Cameroon, while Buea would be the capital of West Cameroon. A Federal House of Assembly, an East Cameroon House of Assembly, a West Cameroon House of Assembly, and a West Cameroon House of Chiefs comprised the legislature. The constitution required that a law passed by the Federal House of Assembly be approved by a majority of the deputies in each of the federated states assemblies. This measure was designed to thwart any effort to amend the Federal Constitution to the detriment of any of the states. Despite the fact that the Fouban compromise appeared to satisfy both Ahidjo and Foncha, the leaders of the two delegations, the federation's grave was also dug at Fouban. Ahidjo had limited understanding of how the federal government worked. He accepted it mainly to appease Foncha and his team, who had come to Fouban convinced that the ultimate form of union was a loose federation or confederation led by a ceremonial President and executive Prime Ministers in charge of the federated republics. According to Lon, "Ahidjo, like his French advisers at Fouban, believed in centralized authority and was keen to create a unitary state as soon as feasible. As a result, he meticulously added a phrase to the French and original version of the constitution indicating that the federation was an experiment and a temporary measure. Articles five and six, which gave the central government broad powers, were also laying the groundwork for a unilateral renunciation of the Fouban agreement", (Lon, 2017).

In their book "Negotiating an Anglophone Identity" (2003:44-48), Konings and Nyamnjoh discuss some of the words that were not recognized and are considered as the beginning of Anglophone marginalization. Cameroon was formed as a Federation, with East and West Cameroon as component nations. The legislature of East

Cameroon was unicameral, while the House of Chiefs was added in West Cameroon. This article was amended in May 1972, when Ahidjo wrote a new constitution in which he eliminated the Federal system and replaced it with a highly centralised unitary state with broad political power vested in the presidency. The former legislative structure was replaced by a unicameral National Assembly with 120 seats. During the negotiations at the Fouban conference, the bargaining strength of the Francophone delegation reflected the fact that the Anglophone region's population was small, comprising about one-quarter of the total population; thus, by joining the Republic of Cameroon, President Ahmadou Ahidjo was able to dictate the terms of Federation by capitalizing on his territory's senior status. The former Federal Republic's official languages were to be French and English, but to the chagrin of Anglophones, the final version of the unitary state's constitution appeared to deny equal status to both languages, stipulating in article 59 that the revised constitution be published in both French and English, with the French text being authentic. Ahidjo rejected the Southern Cameroonian delegation's proposal for equal citizenship, but he eventually agreed to include a clause in the constitution affirming the Federal Government's adherence to the fundamental freedoms outlined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Charter of the United Nations (UN article 1).

In contrast to the Anglophone plan, the Constitution established a presidential regime at the unitary level; instead, Ahidjo stated in the new constitution that the president of the Republic was to be an active and powerful chief rather than a figure head. He was to be the head of state and the armed forces, with no accountability to the legislature for his acts. He picked ministers, governors, judges, and high-level government workers whose survival was totally depended on his favour. Ahidjo encouraged Southern Cameroonians to support his party, the Union Nationale Camerounaise

(UNC), which was created in September 1966, and was able to punish any Anglophone politician who remained devoted to Federalism. On May 6, 1972, he announced in the National Assembly that he intended to transform the Federal Republic into a unitary state on May 20, 1972, thereby repealing clause 1 article 47 of the Fouban Constitution, which stated that any action that jeopardizes the unity and integrity of the Federation is inadmissible. Even if the constitution were to be amended, it should not be done through a referendum because clause 3 of Article 47 states that "proposals for revision shall be adopted by simple majority vote of the members of the federal assembly, provided such majority includes a majority of representatives from each of the federated states" (Konings & Nyamnjoh, 2003,p.46). The Anglophones began to resent their regional loss of autonomy and their inferior status in the unitary state, claiming that marginalization continued after the Fouban constitutional convention and continues to this day.

4.6 Anglophone Conflict and Efforts towards Conflict Resolution

The Anglophone actors are divided into two. The first are the separatist, this group want solely in favor of separation of the southern Cameroon (Anglophone) from Cameroon this they are infamous of an independent state. According to the movement's website, there are around 2 million Ambazonians living in the diaspora. While separatists appear to support the formation of a Republic of Ambazonia, their views are split by many factions (Eyango & Roger, 2018). The second group, they are more interested I the autonomous and federalist arrangements, like Cameroon had right after the reunification in the 60s.The third groups interest, is more federalist and pro decentralization activist. The federalist current, however, has lost ground to the separatists since the arrest of its leaders in January 2017, and has been unable to overcome its differences. Since the end of 2017, a number of federalists have joined

the separatists. There are hardliners among the federalists, as well as others who are willing to accept decentralization (Crisis Group, 2019). To be honest the Anglophone activists are actually not united in interest which has been a detriment to the conflict resolution. The other primary actor is the Cameroon government which is been led by president Biya, because Biya's administration an authoritative one he has used violence as response.

The Southern Cameroon Ambazonia Consortium United Front (SCACUF) has used a wide range of strategies to pursue its political objectives, from passive resistance through the OGTR and large-scale protests to industrial actions by Anglophone attorneys and teachers that have persisted since October and November 2016 respectively. The Anglophone nationalism in Cameroon progressively became violent starting in September 2017. On September 22, 2017, large-scale demonstrations were held in cities and villages throughout the Northwest and Southwest regions, with demonstrators calling for Cameroon's dissolution. The demonstrations were also a part of the SCACUF-planned events that took place before to Sisiku Julius Ayuktebe's declaration of the Federal Republic of Ambazonia's independence on October 1st, 2017. The incident was marked by the lowering of the Cameroon national flag from a number of offices and structures in the northwest and southwest and the raising of the Ambazonia flag. The Southern Cameroon Ambazonia Education Board (SCAEB) was also created at this conclave with the responsibility of, among other things, creating a new school curriculum that is in line with the Anglo-Saxon educational system. In order to safeguard the lives and property of unarmed Southern Cameroonians, it also created a governing body made up of the Executive, Legislative, and Judicial branches of government, as well as the Southern Cameroon Self-Defence Committee. The proclamation of Ambazonia's independence on October 1, 2017, was made possible

by adherence to this mandate, and this development substantially altered the way of the Anglophone question in Cameroon's national politics. Thousands of Anglophones fled to Nigeria as refugees as a result of continued military and security operations to neutralize the Ambazonia threat. The Anglophone issue in Cameroon intensified in the fourth quarter of 2017, making it one of the biggest challenges to the Biya administration's national security. Following the Fourth Conclave of the SCACUF held in Zaria (Nigeria) between October 27 and October 31, 2017, the Ambazonia Interim Government (AIG) was appointed in lieu of the SCACUF Governing Council as a result of the crisis's intensification in October. Since October 2017, members of the opposition Social Democratic Front (SDF) have disrupted parliamentary sessions at the Cameroon Parliament in Yaoundé because the chamber, which is presided over by the Cameroon Peoples Democratic Movement (CPDM), will not tackle the Anglophone problem.

“The Biya administration’s response to the Anglophone crisis has been through the use of soft and hard measures”. For instance, the National Commission on the Promotion of Bilingualism and Multiculturalism was established by the government in January 2017 (Okereke, 2018). To meet the needs of Anglophone teachers, the Biya government started recruiting 1,000 Special Bilingual Teachers in March 2017 who were proficient in technical and scientific disciplines. However, in general, the influence of the state apparatus has shaped the official reactions to the Anglophone dilemma. Security forces, including soldiers, gendarmes, and the Rapid Intervention Battalion (BIR), have killed civilians, set communities on fire, and imprisoned and tortured suspected separatists as a result of the government's heavy-handed tactics. Separatists, on the other hand, murder both civilians and members of the security forces while robbing schools in an effort to impose lockdowns. In an effort to gain

assistance from other nations in resolving the Anglophone issue, the Biya administration has also sought diplomatic backing from neighbouring Nigeria and other countries while also hosting high-level UN and Commonwealth diplomats. In the months leading up to Ambazonia's declaration of independence in October 2017, the government had jailed and incarcerated more than 100 Anglophone activists it had deemed extremists. It is significant to remember that the individuals who were freed were among the top activists who led the Anglophone crisis in 2016. The leadership void was brought by their arrest and confinement, which the Anglophone diaspora filled. International Crisis Group and Amnesty International reports claimed that captives were routinely subjected to torture and other forms of dehumanization, and the SCACUF and other outspoken Anglophone voices have accused the Yaounde regime of committing genocide. Following Ambazonian independence, the Biya administration's stance to the Anglophone conflict underwent a significant transformation. At the end of 2017, Biya said in a statement, "It is now clear that Cameroon was at war and under attack by terrorists masking themselves as secessionists." He then made the announcement that all necessary security measures will be taken to re-establish calm and order³⁰. The rulers of Cameroon keep using force and violence to communicate with the citizen and have refused to any form of dialogue, it is basically their way of saying they are superior to their citizens. Though minority of the governing class do not agree with President Biya's choice of action they have not been publicly vocal about it because of their safety. President Biya has also extended a fake hand of dialogue to the Anglophone people to impress the international actors. "President Paul Biya has proposed a national dialogue aimed at resolving the Cameroonian government's conflict with Anglophone separatists. But

³⁰ Paul Biya, Pronouncements at Nsimalen-Yaounde Airport on 30 November 2017 following his return from the AU-EU Summit at Abidjan, Cote d'Ivoire (as translated).

the mooted dialogue will include neither separatists nor, it appears, other important English-speaking constituencies. Biya should allow greater Anglophone participation and neutral facilitation for the dialogue” (Crisis Group, 2019).

One of the biggest international actor who I perceive could play a bigger role if it was not personal struggling with its bad governance and corruption is Nigeria .Firstly, Nigeria shares a border with Cameroon and in the last decade have been affected just like Cameroon on the matter of popularly known terrorist group Boko Haram. “The Nigerian government tends to support Biya’s position, however, partly because it fears that the conflict in the Anglophone regions will encourage its own separatist movements in Biafra. The Nigerian president, Muhammadu Buhari, also fears annoying Paul Biya, an important ally in the struggle against Boko Haram”(Crisis Group, 2019).Secondly, the colonial ties they had in the past ,from the time of the colonial era Nigerians have been able to migrate to Cameroon to sell their product and look for greener pasture but now due to the conflict and insecurity some Nigerians have lost their lives and way of living .Thirdly, Nigeria has also been able to create asylum for people who have been displaced because of the war . Moreover, victims of the conflict are also fleeing to Nigeria. “According to the UNHCR, the numbers of Cameroonians seeking asylum in Nigeria has doubled since mid-January. About 20,000 refugees have been registered in some states such as Cross River, Taraba, Benue, Akwa-Ibom”(Eyango & Roger, 2018). The Nigerian Government as shown that it is very much in alliance with President Biya’s administration. They have gone as far as to arrest separatist leaders like Julius Sisiku Ayuk Tabe and hand them over to the Cameroon Government . I'm concerned that the instability in Anglophone regions, as well as the expansion of criminal armed organizations over the border, would exacerbate instability in Southeast Nigeria. Nigeria's impact on the conflict's

future developments is unquestionably vital to contemplate. If Nigeria and Cameroon are now working to combat Boko Haram's danger in the far north, they must step up their collaboration for the stability of the Anglophone border and conflict resolution.

International actors do not share a single perspective on the Anglophone dilemma, and they are not all equally active. However, as a collective, they are taking a firmer stance against the violence, advocating for dialogue, and several have offered their individual mediation or technical help. When it comes to placing pressure on the Cameroon government and separatist advocates, the US has been ruthless. The State Department first published a statement in December 2016, a few months after the first peaceful protest, criticizing human rights violations and urging the government to give Anglophone participation claims more consideration. “Members of Congress have played an important role in putting pressure on the Departments of State and Defence to reduce U.S. military aid to Cameroonian security forces. Some senators like Richard Durbin, Ben Cardin, Amy Klobuchar, Elizabeth Warren, and Kamala Harris are intent on an assessment of whether the U.S. government should impose additional conditions on security assistance, and on asking it to put in place sanctions on individuals found to have committed gross violations of human rights”(Crisis Group, 2019). Cameroon's favourable trade benefits were terminated by the Trump administration reason being violent attacks, torture, and other human rights breaches by Cameroonian security forces. More recently, “The United States stepped up pressure for a peaceful resolution to Cameroon's conflict between state forces and English-speaking rebels on Monday, imposing visa restrictions on individuals believed to be undermining efforts to end the crisis”(Reuters,2021).

France's stances have been so on clear when it comes to this crisis. It kept a quiet profile at first, possibly even supporting the government's strategy because of its economic profit it was getting from Cameroon's agricultural sector. Faced with the crisis's worsening, it urged for a political settlement and backed the idea of a dialogue between the primary actors of the crisis, as did other Western nations. In opinion when it comes the Anglophone crisis France as failed to make an impact as an actor because of the fear of losing their relation with the Cameroon government and the citizen of southern Cameroon actually do not trust France because they feel they are being exploited by France since before independence and whenever they find their self in situations like that of this crisis France is suddenly quiet.

Switzerland has not taken a public stance on the crisis since it began, but it appears that it is pushing for regionalism in private. Since late 2018, a Swiss non-governmental organization called Centre for Humanitarian Talks has strengthened its contact with Anglophone federalist leaders and separatist organizations in order to advance toward dialogue with the Cameroonian government. The Switzerland's president took it a step further and went down to Cameroon to offer President Biya and the separatist actors mediation services. But the Anglophone actors will be indifferent about this because they see Switzerland in alliance with corrupt leaders of Africa an illustration are the offshore account where African corrupt leader store their money.

The United Nations is at the frontline on a multilateral basis. The United Nations Regional Office for Central Africa has released remarks, and UN Secretary-General has called Paul Biya back in 2018. Both sides have been asked by the UN to ensure humanitarian access to conflict-affected areas, halt violence, and agree to dialogue. In Cameroon, the African Union have limited political influence. Factor like state

sovereignty have stopped the United Nations from enforcing any invasion. The African Union have little to no direct contact with President Biya and attempt to avoid insulting him because of his country's enormous economic importance. The African Union has chosen a more subdued approach to the Anglophone crisis, despite the fact that many African and Western policymakers would prefer to see it play a bigger role. According to the realist view state only involve themselves in conflict that serves their best interest, except for the United States that issued some sanction on the Cameroon government under Trump's regime other state like France who benefit from Cameroon's export has not said much about the conflict.

4.7 Conclusion

The Anglophone crisis in Cameroon has been a concern for the entire central African region, not simply Cameroon. A teacher's nonviolent protest was the catalyst for the dispute, which developed into a separatist movement. The conflict's colonial origins are discussed in this chapter, as well as the impact the division and rule movement had on Cameroon after it gained independence. The dynamics of the struggle and its current state in 2020 during the pandemic served as the chapter's conclusion.

In this chapter, gave a detailed analysis of the Anglophone protracted social conflict. Using Azar's argument and occurrence to prove that the Anglophone conflict's protractedness. I identify the genesis and the other component protracted social conflict by linking the 2016 escalation to the failure of the reunification negotiations and weakness of the federal system in Cameroon.

The Cameroon conflict can't move past its stagnant phase for various reason, first the Cameroon government have refuse to acknowledge the fact the there is a conflict going

on its territory. Up to this point, track one diplomacy—which involves applying pressure to the government to participate in talks in search of a lasting solution that addresses the underlying causes—has dominated efforts to end the conflict. There has been an evident reluctance on the part of the African Union (AU) to get involved in the conflict. Nkosazana Dlamini Zuma, chair of the AU Commission, released a statement at the beginning of the crisis in January 2017 urging caution and urging the continuation of government-initiated discussion to find a resolution to what were at the time a series of modest protests³¹. In July 2019, Moussa Mahamat Faki, her successor, visited Cameroon and advocated for an inclusive debate "based on national leadership and ownership" with participation from all stakeholders³². The regional body known as the African Union is so helpless that it is totally dependent on the UN's leadership and action on the African continent. The omission of this problem from the Peace and Security Council's (PSC) agenda and the perception that it is a "internal matter" are both indications that the AU has been "surprisingly restrained" about it, according to the ICG³³. The conflict is attributed by Netsanet Belay, director of Amnesty International Africa, to "the persistent inability of the AU to marshal the determination, political will, and courage to hold member states to account for clear violations of AU principles, values, and standards, particularly on human rights"(Durmaz,2019).The relation of the Cameroon government with nation state in Africa as made it highly on likely for them to intervene in the President Biya's domestic

³¹ African Union. 2017. "AU expresses concern on the situation in Cameroon." <https://au.int/en/pressreleases/20170118-0>

³² African union. 2019. "Readout of the visit of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission to Cameroon." <https://au.int/en/pressreleases/20180716/readout-visit-chairperson-african-union-commission-cameroon>

³³ International Crisis Group. 2019. "Eight Priorities for the African Union in 2019." <https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/eight-priorities-african-union-2019>

policies .This as made them turn a blind eye to the violent insurgence he authorised toward the Anglophone region.

The African Union and the Economic Community of the Central African States are urged to push for the organization of such talks, and the EU is urged to be prepared to support this process. In contrast, the European Parliament adopted a resolution in April 2019 calling specifically for the Government to organize an inclusive political dialogue aimed at finding a peaceful and long-lasting solution to the crisis in the Anglophone regions³⁴. The above parties have so far been unable to seriously engage the parties in the ongoing crisis or find a resolution. On the other hand, the separatist forces' chances of success are hampered by a lack of coordination and internal strife.

³⁴ European Parliament. 2019. “Joint Motion for A Resolution on Cameroon.” http://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/RC-8-2019-0245_EN.html

Chapter 5

CONCLUSION

Conflict is a broad word with various definition, provided by different scholars. I defines conflict as, whenever irreconcilable activities, preferences, or objectives between multiple actors emerge; these groups impeding, disorientating, or trying to interfere with the other's irreconcilable actions, and in some way making each other less efficient and in most cases not been capable of achieving their interest. This definition of conflict gives a general idea of what conflict actually is, what it entails, and the related elements. There are various types of conflict, but for the purpose of this thesis, I write about ethnic conflict. Which is a conflict where by at least of the actor's claims their grievances are caused because of their ethnic background. At the end of the cold war we see a decrease in interstate conflict and a rise in intrastate conflict .This conflict are triggered by inequality in power sharing, ethnicity, resource control, and distribution between certain groups in a community.

The Anglophone crisis in Cameroon is an example of this type of conflict. The conflict which is a mixture of power sharing struggles between the Francophone majority and the Anglophone, the lack of equal distribution of resources which has coursed the Anglophone area of the country to be less developed than the Francophone area. The first trigger of the Conflict was the division of Cameroon into two parts, 80 percent of Cameroun being controlled by France while the other 20 percent was united with Nigeria under the British administration. When the decolonisation trend came the

France established a political institution for the francophone Cameroon citizens while the British left the Anglophone under the jurisdiction of Nigeria. Under the rule of Nigeria, the Anglophones felt marginalised and decided that they would want to be an independent state but the United Nations and Britain argued that they (British Southern Cameroon) were so small and will not be able to sustain their selves economically as an independent state. The United Nation offered a second solution which was to unify the already independent La Republique du Cameroun with the British southern Cameroon this was where the origin of the marginalization started .The unification idea was not what the problem but the nonchalant which the third parties involved handled it. The main argument of my thesis is that 2016 was not the beginning of the Anglophone conflict but rather it is bear somewhat identification of Azar's protracted social conflict. Using Galtung triangle I analysed how the violent attitude of the Cameroon government escalated the conflict and how the conflict will be leading to a civil war.

The foregoing research suggests that, taken as a whole, Azar's framework of "Protracted Social Conflict" is a legitimate description of the conflict in Cameroon in that the majority of factors are appropriately mirrored in the emergence and evolution of this particular example. Protracted social disputes are defined by a variety of essential characteristics that include three main phases: genesis, process dynamics, and outcomes Analysis. Genesis which means the beginning factor, means factors that are responsible for the transformation of non-conflictual situations into conflictual ones. Azar argued that there are four factor that are responsible for this shift, the first he called communal Content. He argued that this is the most significant of all of them, because PSC tend to develop in multi communal society which for a few reasons. Whether formed as a result of divide-and-rule policies of former colonial powers or

whether through historical rivalries often resulted in the dominance of one group over the other. Cameroon is a victim of both, after being divided after the First World War. The unification was what present the opportunity for the majority Francophone to dominate the minority Anglophones. The second characteristics of the genesis is human need, Azar argued that if group of people who share identity (ethnic) cannot access developmental human need tension is bound to spark between actors. For Cameroon the economic development of the Francophone surpassed that of the Anglophone. Factors like lack of equal share federal resources, linguistic discrimination in all sector, lack of job opportunity, education deprivation, change of Anglophone common law court to Francophone, lack of the Anglophone citizen representation in the political system etc. were what made the Anglophone unsatisfied. This was the reason for the AACI and other consecutive protest the government tried to silence until in 2016 when the Anglophone decided to retaliate. The third characteristics turns its attention to the role of the state and its role in ensuring that all communal groups under its jurisdiction are able to meet their basic human needs. The Biya administration like I mentioned above failed in most ways to meet the basic need this is due to the authoritative and corrupt manner of the administration. . Azar notes that in those countries that are experiencing protracted social conflict, political power tends to be dominated by one identity group that uses its resources to maintain power over the other. In turn, to ensure that the group in power remains so, PSC-affected countries will often see attempts by the dominant group to resist participation of minority groups. The last characteristic of the genesis factor is international linkage. Azar points to the role of how it not simply governance at the state level that leads to communal groups being unable to access basic human needs, security or recognition but the extent to which internal policy is dictated by international linkages. Azar

categorises two distinct forms in which these international linkages can take; economic dependency and client relationships. This particular characteristic has nothing to do with the Cameroon conflict because she is not only an independent state but Cameroon is of the most self-sufficient states in Africa. According to the World Bank, The Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in Cameroon was worth 45.20 billion US dollars in 2021, according to official data from the World Bank. The GDP value of Cameroon represents 0.03 percent of the world economy³⁵. In 2015 a year before the conflict started the GDP in Cameroon was worth 30.93 billion US dollars³⁶. This shows that there was an increase even with the current crisis in Cameroon, even with the internal hostility going on.

The second component of PSC is that of process dynamics, variables which, given the preconditions mentioned previously, are responsible for the activation of overt conflict. Azar recognises three key determining factors. The first factor he calls the communal actions and strategies, 'At first, a trigger may or may not be a small incident e.g., an insult to an individual with strong communal ties. However, the insignificant occurrence tends to become a watershed moment in which individual persecution is socially acknowledged. Individual grievances or incompatible goals that are recognized collectively inevitably lead to collective protest. Collective protest is generally greeted with repression or suppression (Azar, 1990). The present escalation began in Bamenda on October, 2016, when lawyers from the Northwest and Southwest went on strike. Their claims, which had previously been ignored by the justice ministry, were related to the legal system's failure to apply Common Law in the two

³⁵Trade economics. <https://tradingeconomics.com/cameroon/gdp>

³⁶ <https://www.worldometers.info/gdp/cameroon-gdp/>

regions. The lawyers urged that the Code of the Organisation for the Harmonisation of Business Law in Africa (OHADA) and other legal texts be translated into English. They criticized the "Francophonisation" of Common Law jurisdictions, such as the appointment of Francophone magistrates to the Anglophone zone who did not speak English or Common Law, as well as the employment of notaries to conduct work done by lawyers under the Common Law system (International Crisis Group, 2017). This peace protest became violent in a number of days with the response the state. The Anglophone population persistence in making their voices by continuing the protest and taking other strategies this includes a two-day Operation Ghost Town in the Northwest and the Southwest in 2017 ,closing down of schools etc. The second characteristics of processing dynamics State Actions and Strategies, Azar notes that in the majority of cases, the response by states to communal grievances, particularly those which have weak governance structures is usually one of coercive repression or instrumental co-option to avoid outward signs of weakness or defeat. This was the case of Cameroon, tried to repress the voices of the Anglophone actors by sending militant which I mention were mostly Francophone to disrupt the protest. When the Anglophone citizen tried to create awareness about the issue on social media to international actors the government switch off the internet. This disrupted lively woods more, universities and business who use the internet in the Anglophone region not able to function well .The government attempted to maintain the status quo in the face of the Anglophone issue. However, seeing that repression had limits, the government opened talks with the striking unions. But this didn't last long because police brutality started again a few months later. Negotiations were difficult because of the deep distrust between the government and representatives of the Anglophone community. The ad hoc committee did not inspire much confidence, because most of its members

were Francophones. The police brutality continue and birthed the Ambazonia separatist movement. The last characteristics of process dynamic built in mechanisms of conflict, Although the previous two 'activation' variables exhibit self-sustaining dynamics, Azar also identifies "... the perceptions and cognitive processes generated through experience of conflictual interactions", (Azar, 1990, p. 15) as promoting confrontational communal and state actions and strategies. Thus, the misperceptions, stereotyping, polarisation and 'tunnel-vision' exhibited by communities in conflict towards one another is both responsible for, but also a product of, the aforementioned two variables. For Cameroon the Anglophone and Francophone citizens do not stereotype one another neither do they have hostile sentiment towards one another. The dissatisfaction of the policy making of Biya's administration is the only built in mechanism and of the Francophone government part the saw the Anglophone actors as terrorist.

The last factor of PSC according to Azar, Outcomes Analysis. Azar defines Protracted Social Conflicts as ones that produce negative-sum outcomes with no obvious end-point or winner, let alone a solution that comes close to addressing unfulfilled requirements. Azar points us to four possible consequences of PSC: deterioration of physical security, institutional deformity, psychological ossification, and increased dependency & cliency. For Cameroon the conflict is still on going, which means we don't know the definite yet but so far the conflict as produced a number of losses for Cameroon. Apart from the loss of lives, insecurity and displaced people there have been other outcomes. The current crisis has likely enhanced support for federalism among Anglophones, which was already high, and reinforced support for secessionism. This new setup demonstrates the breadth of the Anglophone issue. Without the support of a huge part of the community, Ghost Town operations and

school closures could not have continued for nine months. It has triggered a separatist movement named the Ambazonia who want independence from Cameroon. Federalism appears to be a maximalist negotiation strategy for certain Anglophone campaigners. They raise the bar in order to achieve at least effective decentralization, with actual autonomy for the country's 10 regions, beginning with changes to and full implementation of current decentralization laws. The crisis has exposed a schism between the concerns of the Anglophone populace and the Anglophone elite, which has long attempted to arbitrate between them and Yaoundé, and at times even favored a more repressive attitude. Economic marginalization has been a major source of frustration among Anglophones. Despite the fact that the two Anglophone regions are not suffering as much as certain Francophone regions from the prolonged economic crisis, Anglophones believe their potential is not being realized or is being intentionally wasted and that they are being abandoned. No significant economic analysis on the economic impact of the conflict has been released, but there is no doubt that the isolation for several years of these two regions, which represent around 20% of Cameroon's GDP, has had an influence on them as well as the national economy. The issue has exposed Cameroon's schisms between Francophones and Anglophones. Francophones are generally unaware of the causes of the Anglophone crisis and regard Anglophones who advocate for federalism or independence with curiosity and distrust, even mocking them. Anglophones criticize Francophones for their lack of unity. While many Francophones claim to support Anglophone demands, the latter believe that this support is merely in words and that Francophones do not fully comprehend the difficulties that come with being a minority. Out of the four characteristics that Azar's points out in outcome analysis Cameroon only identify with deterioration of physical

security. Though the institution have suffered due to the conflict, they have not collapse has azar explains.

Although they do not expressly fail in their application, the variables "international linkage" (genesis), "psychological ossification" and "growing reliance and cliency" (under Outcome Analysis) have been found to not adhere (to varied degrees) to the "ideal" criteria of PSC analysis. The flaws of the PSC framework as they pertain to the Anglophone are indicative of a larger fault with the paradigm. It should be noted that Azar created the 'Prolonged Social Conflict' analysis expressly to emphasize aspects of the conflict in Lebanon and to promote a certain form of conflict resolution (Track II problem-solving workshops). Although the model emphasizes that "... the source of such conflicts lay predominantly within and across rather than exclusively between states ..." (Ramsbotham, 2005, p.114). Its over-reliance on identity overlooks elements and processes that influence its development and manifestation. Economic and territorial grievances, for example, are also causes of conflict, but they tend to be articulated in terms of identity preservation in order to broaden their appeal. Thus, in any particular disagreement, there is likely to be an interaction of underlying (possibly non-identity related) factors that fuel the debate, which PSC in its original form overlooks. The Anglophone conflict is an example of conflict like this, the economic grievances and competitiveness overrides the identity of the situation. The Anglophones actor are more interest in meeting their human need and fighting for equal opportunities like that of the ones given to their Francophone counterpart.

At the bringing of my thesis I asked the question, how does one of the countries with large positive peace deficits in 2008 deteriorate? In chapter three and four, I write about structural violence .Which show that Cameroon was never really peaceful,

except to the ordinary eye instead it a great example of Galtung structural violence. Peace is also achieved when citizens can participate in political decision-making processes that affect their lives, and when the government is held accountable to them. Everyone must have access to fundamental essentials (human needs) such as food, shelter, education, clean water, jobs, functioning healthcare systems, and healthy living environments in order for peace to prevail. Furthermore, everyone should have equal access to opportunities regardless of gender, political party, ethnicity, or other factors. It would also be foolish and narrow-minded to blame the Anglophone conflict just on structural violence. The conflict have surely stemmed from the legacy of colonialism and the social construction of ethnicity and identity, which I addressed in chapter four of this thesis.

So far the Cameroon conflict has not had much influence from external third party, this I think is because of the geographical location of Cameroon .Cameroon is located in Africa, which one of the undeveloped continent. If we look at the role of international actors in conflict resolution in different African conflict over the years, we will notice that help really never comes in the right way or it comes when it is too late. For example the case of Rwanda, effective help after the genocide. This is because international organization and external actors go through the state authority before they intervene, which is not their fault but the respect that is given to state sovereignty. The United States' mission is to keep the globe at peace and to foster goodwill among nations. The UN also attempts to bring states together on a common platform to address social issues and combat general problems such as poverty, as well as to assist developing countries in achieving a better educational system, reducing hunger, and eradicating diseases, and promoting human rights respect. Since the cold war there has been a decline in conflict among states and an increase in internal conflict ,though the

purpose of the United Nations is to maintain peace the United Nations suffer from limitations. The idea of sovereign equality for its members is expressly stated in the United Nations' founding Charter (26 June 1945). Critics of regime change see the idea that a state has the right to conduct its own domestic affairs without external interference as the foundation of a peaceful world order. Any violation of this principle through military intervention risks eroding international peace and security and leading to endemic conflict, as demonstrated by the aftermath of Saddam Hussein's fall in 2003 by the US and British invasion of Iraq. External actors who have tried to take conflict resolution measures towards the Anglophone conflict have only sat down with Biya's administration which is a huge percentage of the problem.

In conclusion ethnic conflicts can be result of a number of factors: structural violence, discrimination of all kind, marginalization, lack of respect for human right, colonial heritage, bad governance etc. The essence of my research, is to deeply analyze the conflict causes of the Anglophone conflict and create awareness because in order for a solution to be reached or a third party intervention the dynamics of the conflicts needs to be understood. The Anglophone conflict truly requires a solution fast because the conflict might escalate for the worst.

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