

The Evolution of UN Peacekeeping in the Democratic Republic of Congo: From ONUC To MONUSCO

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ABSTRACT

The prevalence of peacekeeping and peacebuilding in the international relations discourse cannot be overstated. Peacekeeping has proven to be an integral part of United Nations machinery, and the related missions embarked upon by the organisation have led to tremendous strides in the promotion of international peace and security. This research focuses on the United Nations peacekeeping mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo. Primarily, this research will analyse the evolution of UN peacekeeping, from ONUC to MONUSCO, and will identify various reasons for this evolution. The challenges faced by both the UN and the Democratic Republic of Congo relating to peacekeeping and peacebuilding will be discussed in order to develop an understanding of the peacekeeping dilemma in modern day Congo DRC.

Through the utilization of primary sources, secondary data and democratic peace theory, this study makes use of comparative analysis that analyses events of conflict, the peacekeeping missions relating to this conflict and the changes in the mandates that guided them. The United Nations involvement in Congo DRC as it relates to peacekeeping is well documented, and the organisation's commitment to the mission of peace is clear. However, for various reasons, the Democratic Republic of Congo continues to struggle to achieve sustainable peace. All in all, this research succeeds in providing an insight to the aforementioned and it highlights conditions that may result in alternate positive outcomes.

Keywords: Peacekeeping, Peacebuilding, Democratic Peace, United Nations, Responsibility to Protect (R2P)

ÖZ

Uluslararası ilişkiler söyleminde barışı koruma ve barış inşasının yaygınlığı göz ardı edilemez. Barışı korumanın Birleşmiş Milletler mekanizmasının ayrılmaz bir parçası olduğu kanıtlanmıştır ve örgütün üstlendiği ilgili görevler, uluslararası barış ve güvenliğin teşvik edilmesinde muazzam adımlara yol açmıştır. Bu araştırma, Demokratik Kongo Cumhuriyeti'ndeki Birleşmiş Milletler barışı koruma misyonuna odaklanmaktadır. Öncelikle, bu araştırma, BM barış gücünün ONU'ndan MONUSCO'ya evrimini analiz edecek ve bu evrimin çeşitli nedenlerini belirleyecektir. Hem BM'nin hem de Demokratik Kongo Cumhuriyeti'nin barışı koruma ve barış inşasına ilişkin karşılaştığı zorluklar, günümüz Kongo Demokratik Cumhuriyeti'ndeki barışı koruma ikilemine ilişkin bir anlayış geliştirmek için tartışılacaktır. Bu çalışma, birincil kaynaklar, ikincil veriler ve demokratik barış teorisinden yararlanarak, çatışma olaylarını, bu çatışmayla ilgili barışı koruma misyonlarını ve onlara rehberlik eden görevlerdeki değişiklikleri analiz eden karşılaştırmalı analizden yararlanmaktadır. Birleşmiş Milletler'in barışı koruma ile ilgili olarak Kongo Demokratik Kongo Cumhuriyeti'ne katılımı iyi belgelenmiştir ve örgütün barış misyonuna bağlılığı açıktır. Ancak çeşitli nedenlerle Demokratik Kongo Cumhuriyeti, sürdürülebilir barışı sağlamak için mücadele etmeye devam ediyor. Sonuç olarak, bu araştırma yukarıda bahsedilenlere bir içgörü sağlamayı başarır ve alternatif olumlu sonuçlarla sonuçlanabilecek koşulları vurgular.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Barışı Koruma, Barışı İnşa Etme, Demokratik Barış, Birleşmiş Milletler, Koruma Sorumluluğu (R2P)

DEDICATION

*To God, my loving Family, those who walked before me, and the People of The
Democratic Republic of Congo.*

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT.....	iii
ÖZ.....	iv
DEDICATION.....	v
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT.....	vi
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS.....	x
1 INTRODUCTION.....	1
1.1 Importance of Study.....	1
1.2 Statement of the Problem.....	3
1.3 Research Questions.....	4
1.4 Methodology.....	5
1.5 Scope and Limitations.....	6
1.6 Outline of the Research.....	7
1.7 Conclusion.....	8
2 LITERATURE REVIEW.....	9
2.1 Peacekeeping Defined.....	9
2.2 Peacekeeping: Principles.....	12
2.3 Function of Peacekeeping.....	14
2.4 Peacekeeping Mandates.....	15
2.4.1 Troop Contribution.....	15
2.4.2 Factors to Consider Before Peacekeeping.....	17
2.5 Need for Peacekeeping: The Responsibility To Protect (R2P).....	18
2.6 Gauging the Effectiveness of Peacekeeping.....	19
2.7 United Nations Peacekeeping and the DRC.....	19

2.8 Conclusion.....	21
3 CONCEPTUAL AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK.....	22
3.1 Liberal Peace Theory/Democratic Peace Theory.....	22
3.2 Defining Peace.....	24
3.3 Critical Theory Approach.....	25
3.4 Conceptual Framework.....	27
3.4.1 Peacekeeping.....	27
3.4.2 The United Nations and Peacekeeping.....	27
3.4.3 The United Nations Charter.....	28
3.4.4 The African Union and Peacekeeping.....	29
3.4.5 The Responsibility To Protect.....	30
3.5 Conclusion.....	31
4 A TIMELINE OF PEACEKEEPING IN THE DRC.....	32
4.1 Colonization of the Democratic Republic of Congo.....	32
4.1.1 The Force Publique (FP).....	33
4.1.2 Military Violence in Colonial DRC.....	34
4.2 United Nations Peacekeeping in the Democratic Republic of Congo.....	35
4.2.1 United Nations Operation In The Congo (ONUC) 1960-1964.....	35
4.2.2 United Nations Organization Mission In the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC) 1999-2010.....	36
4.2.3 United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission In the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) 2010-Present.....	37
4.3 Conclusion.....	40
5 REASONS FOR THE PEACEKEEPING DILEMMA IN MODERN DRC.....	42
5.1 Troubled Peacebuilding: A Consequence of Colonialism and the Cold War....	42

5.1.1 The Cultural Aspect of Colonialism.....	43
5.1.2 The Inception of ONUC.....	44
5.2 African Union and United Nations Relationship.....	46
5.2.1 AU and UN: Operational Differences and Bureaucracy.....	46
5.2.2 AU-UN in the DRC	47
5.3 MONUC to MONUSCO.....	48
5.4 Commitment to Peace: Congolese Government, United Nations, and Political Interests.....	49
5.5 Conclusion.....	51
6 CONCLUSION.....	52
REFERENCES.....	57

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AU	African Union
AUPSC	African Union Peace and Security Council
CNDP	Council for the Defence of the People
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
FP	Force Publique
HRW	Human Rights Watch
ICISS	International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty
LRA	Lord Resistance Army
M23	March 23 Movement
MLC	The Movement for the Liberation of the Congo
MONUC	United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo
OAU	Organization of African Unity
ONUC	United Nations Operation in the Congo
PSCF	Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework
R2P	Responsibility To Protect
RCD	Rally for Congolese Democracy
SADC	Southern African Development Community
UN	United Nations
UNEF	United Nations Emergency Force
UNSC	United Nations Security Council

Chapter 1

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Importance of Study

As with many African countries, the Democratic Republic of Congo experienced heightened conflict and civil war following its decolonization. The Democratic Republic of Congo attained independence from Belgian Rule in the year 1960 after the immense pressure build up that resulted from nationalist movements and campaigns spearheaded by Patrice Lumumba saw the presentation of an Independent Congo through a King Baudouin Speech. However, despite the promise of independence, the events that followed seemed to paint a much darker picture of independence. Since its independence in 1960, regime change and any events surrounding such changes have consisted of violent struggles, the loss of human life and countless human rights violations.

The very year that saw the independence of Congo DRC is the very year that saw the beginning of 5 years of political unrest and violent conflict, a period of time that the modern world now infamously refers to as the Congo Crisis. The nature of the crisis is one that can be looked at from numerous points of view as the realities of the unofficial rule of Joseph-Désiré Mobutu, the outside involvement of the Soviet Union and United States, as well as the unresolved issues of tribalism, ethnic nationalism and federalism all played their respective roles in the loss of over 100 000 people. Succession became the norm as rising conflict between black and white citizens led to

Belgium's decision to send troops to aid stranded Belgians and the United Nations decisions to send peace keeping forces. The United Nations involvement in the crisis was initially a cautious one as the operations of peacekeeping forces was limited to specific parts of the city through the establishment of the ONUC (United Nations Operation In The Congo) in 1960, which aimed at assisting the new government in maintaining order by ensuring the withdrawal of Belgian forces. However, after the death of second United Nations Secretary General, Dag Hammarskjöld in 1961, peace talks regarding a Cease Fire and the upholding of Human Rights became an afterthought and this ultimately led to an aggressive UN intervention that aided in the Leopoldville triumph over secessionist movements in the Katanga and South Kasai regions.

Additionally, the 21st century Democratic Republic of Congo has suffered tremendously. Congo DRC has dominated the global headlines, not for its vast mineral wealth but because it has become synonymous with war, violence, and the perpetuation of human rights violations. The year 1997 saw the ousting of Mobutu by rebel forces and the attainment of leadership by Laurent Kabila, whose presidency was marked by civil war that drew the attention of armed forces of the United Nations as well as those of neighboring countries, a war that lasted through 2003. The year 1998 saw the uprising of a rebellion against the Kabila government, which ultimately led to the seizure of large territories by rebel forces, the calling of a ceasefire and withdrawal of foreign forces by the UN Security Council. Furthermore, the year 1999 saw the UNSC resolution 1279 establish the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) which initially aimed at observing the ceasefire as well as maintaining communications between adherent states. With the expansions of

its mandate through UNSC resolution 1925, MONUC was renamed to United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO), which reflected a new chapter of peacekeeping within the country.

Considering the aforementioned, this paper will focus primarily on exploring the evolution of the outcomes of peacekeeping missions in the Democratic Republic of Congo, the apparent successes and failures of these peacekeeping missions, with a primary focus on the evolution of ONUC to MONUSCO.

1.2 Statement of the Problem

Despite the ONUC being referred to as a completed peacekeeping operation, as well as MONUSCO extending its mandate in the DRC to December 2021, the modern-day Democratic Republic of Congo is still suffering from violent unrest, rebel conflict and human rights violations. The constant turmoil within the country has led to numerous challenges in the development of stable political and economic structures. Democratic processes have often proven to be ineffective and unsustainable, as state building has been challenging for multilateral operations. As evidenced by Felix Tshisekedi's ascension to presidency in 2019, conflict has either preceded or resulted from regime change. The year 2019 might have recorded Tshisekedi's rise to power as well as the release of activists, exiled citizens and detainees, but it is also a year that saw the death of 2000 civilians, the forcible displacement of 1 million people as well as the withdrawal of voting rights of over 1 million Congolese. Currently, Congo DRC now offers free primary education for all, which is commendable as education is a basic human right. However, the country still fails to maintain peace and stability as many regions remain in constant conflict and the country maintains high levels of impunity.

as senior officials that have under international law, committed and perpetrated conflict related human rights abuses have not been brought to task.

ONUC was established in July 1960 to ensure the withdrawal of Belgian forces, to assist the Government in maintaining law and order and to provide technical assistance. The function of ONUC was subsequently modified to include maintaining the territorial integrity and political independence of the Congo, preventing the occurrence of civil war, and securing the removal of all foreign military, paramilitary and advisory personnel not under the United Nations Command, and all mercenaries. This ONUC operation began in 1960 and concluded in 1964, and the success of this operation comes into question when one considers the turmoil that followed its completion. Similar questions may arise concerning the ongoing MONUSCO mission which has gone through various transitions in order to address the seemingly evolving unrest in Congo DRC.

This research intends to evaluate the effectiveness of ONUC and MONUSCO operations in the democratic Republic of Congo, by exploring the evolutions of related peacekeeping in the country.

1.3 Research Questions

To fully understand the evolution of peacekeeping in the democratic republic of Congo, numerous questions will be discussed in order to improve the quality of the work and provide direction.

This study will seek to answer the following primary questions; how has UN peacekeeping in the DRC evolved, why has UN peacekeeping in the DRC had to evolve since its inception, and why is peacekeeping still a challenging issue in modern

DRC. Additionally, the study will also seek to answer the questions regarding whether the aims of UN peacekeeping missions in the DRC have been accomplished, as well as questions concerning what hinderances multilaterals have faced regarding effective peacekeeping in the DRC.

This research will aim to assess the success of ONUC and MONUSCO by critically exploring their respective mandates and determining whether the aims of these mandates were achieved in the Democratic Republic of Congo.

Additionally, this research aims to address the questions concerning what hindrances are faced by multilaterals regarding effective peacekeeping in Congo DRC.

Furthermore, this research will aim to explore possible reasons as to how and why UN Peacekeeping in Congo DRC has evolved, as well as why modern-day Congo DRC is in a Peacekeeping dilemma.

1.4 Methodology

The methodology refers to procedures, directions and rules employed in executing research, and it places emphasis on the formation, collation, dissemination, and presentation of data. Methodology allows for effective measures in establishing transparency and effective critical analysis.

Regarding this particular case, qualitative research will be used through reference to secondary data that consists of existing works relevant literature by organizations, scholars, authors and authorities. Additionally, primary data such as, United Nations Security Council documents, African Union documents as well as peace mission mandates, will be sourced and applied.

Furthermore, regarding the theoretical framework, democratic peace theory, conflict contingency theory and inherency theory will be applied in order to enhance attempts to understand why peacekeeping is needed within Congo DRC and how peace missions strive to achieve effective and sustainable outcomes. The relationship between post-colonialism and the concept of peacekeeping will be explored.

1.5 Scope and Limitations

The aim of this study is to analyze United Nations peacekeeping in the Democratic Republic of Congo since the establishment of ONUC (United Nations Operation in the Congo) in 1960, through to the missions' transition to MONUSCO (United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo) in 2010. This paper will focus only on historical and modern events within and around the Democratic Republic of Congo and how they pertain to UN peacekeeping.

Regarding restrictions experienced by the researcher, the inability to interview both peacekeeping representatives and members of the local population were primary constraints. Additionally, time was another factor that affected the researcher as particular due dates had to be met in a short period of time. Furthermore, the lack of face-to-face meetings coupled with the extremities and realities that resulted from the COVID-19 pandemic created further challenges.

Furthermore, difficulties arose when the researcher sought to acquire certain sources from the internet as many were unavailable to the public and to individuals without subscriptions. Also, in some instances, reports and sources that covered the same topic provided varying and sometimes conflicting information.

1.6 Outline of the Research

This refers to the format that the study will employ by highlighting the content of each chapter and how these chapters are modeled to address the aforementioned research questions.

Chapter one is essentially the introduction of the research as it highlights the importance of the study, the statement of the problem, research questions and the methodology.

Chapter two sees the introduction of a literature review that serves to outline the work, as well as the commentary and opinions from authors and scholars in relation to the research. It will examine the issues surrounding the establishment of peacekeeping missions in Congo DRC, the mandates of these missions as well as the transitions and evolutions of these missions.

Chapter three will house the theoretical framework and will consider the Liberal Peace theory, Conflict Contingency theory and Inherency theory. Additionally, the chapter will seek to provide definitions for peace and peacebuilding, and it will highlight various peacekeeping elements of the United Nations and the African Union.

The fourth chapter aims to create a timeline of UN peace operations in Congo DRC, with an emphasis on the roles of peacekeepers in relation to ONUC and MONUSCO by exploring and examining the rationale behind these missions.

The fifth chapter of this study aims to explore the challenges faced by the UN regarding peacebuilding in Congo DRC. Furthermore, this chapter will explore past

peacekeeping endeavors, events and failures in order to create a logical understanding of the current state of peacekeeping in Congo DRC.

The final chapter will serve as a conclusion to the study, and it will provide a summary of the entire study. Additionally, this chapter will explore the current state of UN peacekeeping in Congo DRC, the likelihood of mandate change or modification, as well as the conditions that would allow for possible exit strategies and an end to the peacekeeping mission in the country.

1.7 Conclusion

The United Nations peacekeeping mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo has been the subject of debate and scrutiny in the international arena. Although dubbed as ambitious by many scholars, authors and international actors, the UN's peace mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo has resulted in some significant outcomes in terms of the promotion of peace and security. However, a disconnect between peacekeeping mandates and the realities of evolving conflict within the region have contributed to the country's modern peacebuilding challenges.

Chapter 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

The concept and practice of peacekeeping has undergone several changes that have garnered high levels of both support and criticism. Both scholars and states are often at odds with each other as well as amongst themselves when attempting to present peacekeeping as a noble humanitarian intervention aimed at preserving life and bringing peace, or as a tool for control and outside influence. Considering the aforementioned, it is important for one to attempt to develop an adequate understanding of the peacekeeping mechanism.

This chapter serves to develop an understanding of the concept of peacekeeping and to highlight points of the concept's evolution. Numerous principles of peacekeeping, such as responsibility to protect (R2P), will be explored and explained, and mandates related and relevant to peacekeeping will also be highlighted. In addition, in order for peacekeeping operations to be initiated, certain requirements have to be met, and these requirements will be explored. Furthermore, advancements in peacekeeping operations will be highlighted, with particular attention given to applicability as well as the limitations of particular principles. Additionally, this chapter will explore differences between peacekeeping and enforcement actions.

2.1 Peacekeeping Defined

Unsurprisingly, peacekeeping is differently understood and “defined” due to the debate that majorly arises from the lack of an official, widely accepted definition. Even

after a thorough analysis of the UN charter, one would be hard pressed to find an official definition of peacekeeping. It is important to note that much of the ambiguity and resulting debate over peacekeeping can be attributed to “The Agenda for Peace”, a book by former United Nations Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, that presents peacekeeping as a mechanism for conflict prevention and peacemaking. Additionally, Boutros-Ghali (1992, p.5) defines peacekeeping as the deployment of UN presence in the field- a presence which may include UN security and military personnel, as well as civilians, with the consent of all parties concerned. Additionally, the United Nations Capstone Doctrine makes mention of the collaboration of civilians, police, and military in securing peace and stability; and defines peacekeeping as a collection of techniques aimed at the preservation of peace in areas of varying fragility where conflict has halted, by assisting in the enactment and implementation of strategy and policy by peacemakers (UN, 2008, p. 18).

In further attempts to understand the varying definitions of peacekeeping, one may do well to consider the contributions of Goulding (1993) and Badmus & Jenkins (2019). Taking into consideration the expenses incurred on member states, Goulding (1993, p. 455) defines peacekeeping as a UN invented tool enforcing UN command and control of impartial field operations consented to and voluntarily embarked on by member states at their collective expense, for the goal of controlling and resolving conflicts with the least amount of force. Additionally, Badmus & Jenkins (2019, pp. 52-53) define peacekeeping as a form of machinery employed by the United Nations for conflict resolution, as well as the buffer zones between warring factions to ensure that ceasefires are adhered to and/or sustained. Also, Badmus & Jenkins (2019) emphasize that peacekeeping sees positive results when other forms of “machinery” such as

negotiation and mediation are applied collectively. As emphasized by Dauda, Ahmad & Keling (2017, p.7), peacekeeping is not a cure, it is palliative.

In addition, despite the lack of an official definition within the UN Charter, Pilbeam (2015, p. 295-296) highlights Chapter VI and Chapter VII as important due to the fact that they reference reactions to the Cold War that can themselves be considered as peacekeeping can be more accurately understood as palliative treatment rather than an absolute cure. Furthermore, difficulties in arriving at universally accepted peacekeeping definitions may arise when one considers the Hammarskjold envisioned ‘Chapter VI and a half’ and how this idea highlights the specificity of peacekeeping in that peacebuilding and peace related operations were often tailored to the particular and/or meticulous requirements of specific individual conflicts (Weiss, Forsythe & Coate, 1994, p. 48). Additionally, stemming from the notion of the existence of peacekeeping between Chapter VI and Chapter VII, Fetherston (1994, pp. 8-12) highlights the Importance of the ‘Uniting For Peace’ resolution and its relevance to peacekeeping, by presenting peacekeeping as external intervention aimed at peaceful dispute resolution, thus highlighting the General Assembly’s authority to act in instances where the security council proved incapable.

On the other hand, when one considers the deployment of UN troops during the Suez Canal Crisis of 1956, one may begin to understand peacekeeping as a collection of techniques that consolidate the self-help nature of global politics by enabling an independent form of external intervention aimed at the discontinuation of conflict (Durch, 1993). Furthermore, Kaya (2015, p. 41) and Diehli (1994, p. 164) agree that a suitable definition for peacekeeping may also entail the provision of external support in the form of military personnel and/or civilians etc., in order to ensure that even after

hostilities have ended, the subsequent peace processes are proceeding effectively. Also, in further attempts to understand peacekeeping, it is important to take into consideration the interchangeable nature and the interchangeable use of the terms “peacekeeping” and “peace operations” and how these terms are not limited to military enforcement as they may refer to various forms of external intervention (Thakur, 2017, p. 42)

It is more than apparent that a universally accepted definition of peacekeeping does not exist. Majority of authors seeking adequate definitions arrive at similar standpoints on the need for the consent of parties in order for peacekeeping to be effective. Additionally, authors agree on the palliative nature of peacekeeping and emphasize on the importance of the creation of buffer zones through the deployment of as well as the establishment of ceasefire agreements in order to allow for effective state building even after conflicts have ended.

2.2 Peacekeeping: Principles

This subsection aims to discuss the various principles of peacekeeping i.e., consent, non-use of force in cases that are not self-defense, and neutrality (impartiality). Additionally, this subsection will consider peacekeeping roles and functions, the mandates that guide peacekeeping operations, conditions for troop contribution as well as some of the different peacekeeping methods.

A large part of the United Nations evolution from the League of Nations was to correct past mistakes by developing mandates and principles that guided the behaviour of peacekeepers and aid in the structuring of peacekeeping operations. Thus considered, it is important to note that peacekeeping operations require credibility before

commencement, as they need to be recognized by the UN, headed by the UN Secretary General, and funded by member states. The aforementioned refers to an encompassing principle of “United Nationsness” raised by Goulding (1993, p. 454). Examples of other principles of peacekeeping are present in the work of Dauda et al. (2017, p.52) who emphasizes the importance of consent, impartiality, and the application of force only as a last resort or as a form of self-defense.

As highlighted by Mateja (2015, pp. 351-360) consent is one of the three principles of the operation of peacekeeping as it serves to express the intentions major parties have regarding peaceful resolutions and how peacekeepers can be aided in finding solutions. Regarding consent, it is important to note that it is not unusual for parties to give consent for operations to go forward, and then later withdraw that consent, as seen in the case of UNEF 1 (1956-1967), specifically Gamel Abdel Nasser’s withdrawal of his support for the occupancy of French, Israeli, and British troops in Egyptian territory (Burns 1968, pp. 1-17). Additionally, Mateja (2015, p. 355) highlights a connection between consent and neutrality (impartiality), as well as the shortcomings of these principles, by referencing numerous missions in the Democratic Republic of Congo that indicated that peacekeepers were mandated to assist one disputing party while foregoing and/or not needing the consent of other parties, and not needing to pick particular sides.

Also, regarding neutrality, Weller (1997, p. 441) expresses that the failures of many international peacekeeping operations has often proven to be as a result of the failure of the United Nations, its members, and other peacekeeping organizations failures to abide by the principle of neutrality, and references peacekeeping operations in Somalia as evidence of the aforementioned. Furthermore, the UN “Capstone Doctrine”

references the principles of peacekeeping and makes an emphasis on the need for fair mindedness amongst parties, in order to lessen neutrality and to encourage responsiveness from parties in situations where being impartial or inactive would jeopardize the effectiveness of peacekeeping operations (UN, pp. 31-35).

Thus considered, it is more than apparent that the principles of peacekeeping are significant. However, it is also apparent that these principles are not always effectively observed, adhered to, and applied. This can be seen in the frailty of principles of impartiality in instances of non-action by parties, and the theoretical nature of principles such as “United Nationsness” in instances of conflict between members. Consent and Neutrality are heavily debated and disputed concepts as the selective application of these principles and the ambiguity that results from this selective application may hinder the effectiveness of peacekeeping operations.

2.3 Function of Peacekeeping

The functions of peacekeepers are vast and diverse and may include development of infrastructure for administrative institutions, the establishment of education centers, the protection of borders as well as demining land (Henderson, p. 232). In addition, peacekeeping missions may also consist of the conduction of surveillance activities, as well as the establishment of administrative programs and services during and after conflicts (Kaya, 2015, pp. 46-47). Furthermore, Fetherston (1994, pp. 31-33) expresses peacekeeping from the specific standpoint of UN peacekeeping and presents peacekeeping functions as military functions, governmental functions, and civil functions. Additionally, peacekeeping duties can fall under four categories: monitoring duties, interpolation duties, peace preservation duties and humanitarian duties. Monitoring duties refer to surveillance aimed at observing party’s adherence

to ceasefires, interpolation duties consist of peacekeepers efforts aimed at preventing escalation, peace preservation entails safeguarding of specific areas and humanitarian duties involve operations and activities aimed at positively impacting populations (Diehl, 1994, pp. 53-60).

2.4 Peacekeeping Mandates

The establishment and enactment of peacekeeping operations occurs through the guidance and the need to serve or meet particular mandates. Goulding (1993, p. 464) highlights that mandates entail precise and realistic guidelines that offer instruction on stipulations to be adhered to, actions to be carried out as well as actions to avoid. Precise and clear mandates may encourage less repudiation of peacekeepers from host populations, but there is significance in the allowance of leeway of interpretation by peacekeepers as this enables adaptation to emerging crises (Weis et al, 1994, pp. 49-53).

Despite clarity and precision being qualities of a mandate, it is important for mandates to be accompanied by follow-up documents that contain further instruction, in order to reduce the likelihood of ambiguous interpretation by commanders and peacekeepers and to increase the chances of a successful operation (Fetherston, 1994, pp. 37-38). Additionally, Durch (1993, pp. 26-311) expresses that the main detriment to peacekeepers is not an obscure mandate, but rather the politics surrounding the agreements within the operation and suggests that mandates are a reflection of politics within the Security Council.

2.4.1 Troop Contribution

United Nations peacekeeping operations are in nature conducted on an ad-hoc basis as the UN does not have a permanent army and relies on the contribution of troops by its

member states, who do receive compensation for their contribution. The standards and conditions that guide and influence troop contribution are highlighted in the Article 43 of the UN Charter. The UN Charter provides guidelines on force recruitment and resource allocation for peace operations. Having no permanent army means the lack of well-organized training programs as well as training facilities. Featherston (1994, pp. 39-40) highlights this as a problem as the success of peace operations is partly dependent on the adequate training of troops, and stresses that more needs to be done in this regard. Additionally, further problems arise when it comes to the allocation of top-tier positions such as force commander, as contributing states contest for troop priority and this may affect the effectiveness and frequency of reports and correspondence between peacekeepers and Force Command (Featherston, 1994, pp. 39-40).

The United Nations Operational Readiness document (2008) serves as an effective tool regarding troop contribution as it stipulates requirements to be met and procedures to be carried out by individuals that intend on being part of a peacekeeping operation. The document stipulates that states are required to gauge the competence of their counterparts. In this regard, competence may represent a state's average age, financial prowess, physical capability, and level of understanding of the rules of engagement. Unsurprisingly, more is required of the Permanent Five of the Security Council in terms of funding, manpower equipment, as members of the Permanent Five are states that often have increased capability and can sacrifice more.

Additionally, in an effort to ensure contribution opportunities are equally given, the United Nations takes into account the geographical locations of the conflict as well as the potentially contributing states. Contributing states are required to provide their own

equipment in terms of armament and communication devices and this sometimes proves to be an issue for poorer countries which leads to the UN's frequent reliance on richer countries (Durch, 1993, pp. 62-67).

2.4.2 Factors to Consider Before Peacekeeping

Concerning the factors to be considered before peacekeeping operations begin, The "Capstone Doctrine" outlines six factors. The first factor takes into consideration the possibility of a circumstance becoming a threat to international peace and security. The second factor considers the availability of a regional or sub-regional body with the willingness and capability to intervene. The third factor considers the existence of ceasefire agreements between disputing parties and the parties' willingness to seek and contribute to conflict resolution. The fourth factor focuses on the formulation of a mandate based on a transparent political agenda, and the fifth factor explores the possibility of actually establishing a mandate for a United Nations operation. Furthermore, the sixth factor is concerned with the establishing the protection of UN workforce through assurance of all parties involved in the conflict (Capstone Doctrine, 2008, pp. 47-48)

Additionally, the motivations for the deployment of peacekeeping can be both announced- known motivations communicated through official government channels and concealed- silent factors that have a bearing on deployment but are not made known publicly (Dauda et al, 2007, p. 53). Thus considered, it is unsurprising that there are numerous challenges that arise concerning the mandates of peacekeeping missions and how parties involved understand or interpret these mandates. Unclear mandates coupled with a lack of funding, lack of payment by member states have made

peacekeeping more viable or applicable when conflict has reached a critical point (Fetherston, 1994, pp. 40-42).

2.5 Need for Peacekeeping: The Responsibility To Protect (R2P)

The year 2001 saw the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) present a report titled “The responsibility to protect” that highlighted three responsibilities that sovereign states have in the international arena; the responsibility to prevent; the responsibility to react; and the responsibility to rebuild (Evans & Sahnoun, 2002, pp. 99-110).

The ICISS report places emphasis on the sovereign state duties to protect citizens, the international community’s duty to provide aid and assist in this protection, as well as to act in instances where states have proven ineffective, while ensuring that military options are only employed as a last resort (Scanlon, Eziakonwa & Myburgh, 2007 as cited in Cilliers, Gumedze & Mbadlanyana, 2009, p. 58). Additionally, the ICISS report highlights four principles; “the just cause threshold”; “the precautionary principles”, “the right of authority” and the “operational principles”. Regarding the aforementioned principles, Hough (2015, p. 303) expresses that their applications harbor around serious human rights violations, specifically genocide, war crimes, ethnic crimes and crimes against humanity and notes that these principles are not absolute in that they do not cover all human rights violations. Furthermore, referring to further limitations of R2P McClean (2008, pp. 131-149) asserts that more often than not, the responsibility to prevent is given more attention than the responsibility to rebuild, and this may be a reflection of a bigger limitation or division within the Security Council.

2.6 Gauging the Effectiveness of Peacekeeping

In an effort to understand the effectiveness of peacekeeping, one may refer to the stipulations of the “Capstone Doctrine” as it highlights four signs that indicate the likelihood of success. The first indicator is the willingness of parties to settle, as this shows the level of commitment to finding solutions, which ultimately enables or hinders the success of peacekeeping. Secondly, the involvement of regional bodies and neighboring states in conflict resolution as their involvement may encourage peace and subsequently ease proceedings between conflicting parties. The third indicator is the unified backing of the members of the Security Council as this sends a strong message of intent to involved parties. Finally, the fourth indicator is the existence of an unambiguous and attainable mission mandate that effectively communicates the capabilities and intentions of organizations involved in the mission (UN 2008, pp. 18-19).

Regarding the role of mandates, Diehl (1993) presents this as a point of debate. Diehl (1993, pp. 33-40) expresses that, peacekeeping successes become difficult to realize as mandates are often ambiguous, and this ultimately makes it difficult to draw comparisons between different peacekeeping missions. Thus considered, Diehl (1993, pp. 33-40) introduces the capability of conflict deterrence or prevention, as well as the resolution of disagreements that caused conflict, and highlights these two factors as effective indicators in assessing the success of peacekeeping operations.

2.7 United Nations Peacekeeping and The Democratic Republic of Congo

Considering the focus of this study, it is relevant to take note of literature relating to the Peacekeeping in the Democratic Republic of Congo. Durch (1993, pp. 8-18)

presented peacekeeping in Congo DRC through ONUC (The United Nations Operation in The Congo) in 1960, as the first multidimensional peacekeeping operation that made use of both military and civilian personnel. ONUC was established to supervise the withdrawal of Belgian troops after DRC Independence. Additionally, Dobbins, Jones & Crane et al (2005) express that ONUC' establishment was influenced by cold war politics that saw the involvement of China, the Soviet Union and the United States. ONUC drew much criticism for its ambitious

UN peacekeeping evolved over time and mission mandates were constantly redefined in order to address ever changing complexities of conflicts in the DRC. Increasing instability and rebel activity in the DRC and surrounding regions led to calls for ceasefires. Fetherston (1994, p. 14) stressed the need for transition and redefinition due to the consequences of an ambiguous mandate and the inadequate preparation of deployed personnel.

Through Resolution 1279 in 1999 the UN established MONUC (the United Nations Organization Mission in The Democratic Republic of Congo), a mission that had the primary mandate to observe adherence the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement of the same year (Lagrange & Vircoulon, 2016, p. 5). Reynart (2011, p.7) highlights that as the UN gradually reduced its military presence in the DRC, insurgency began to increase and ultimately resulted in conflict that devastated the North and South Kivu regions, and further ceasefire agreements would be signed at the Goma Conference of 2008. Resolution 1925 in 2010 would see MONUC transition to MONUSCO (the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo), a mission that was mandated to prioritize stabilization strategies for North and South Kivu. Lagrange & Vircoulon (2016, p. 7) report that meeting the MONUSCO mandate

proved difficult due to reduced operational capacity and the rebel group M23 (March 23 Movement) succeeded in capturing Goma town. Currently, MONUSCO mission is ongoing, and its mandate prioritizes the protection of civilians, security reform and the strengthening of state institutions.

2.8 Conclusion

The purpose of this chapter was to define the concept of peacekeeping, investigate its application and explore its numerous principles and varying complexities. The debatable nature of peacekeeping and the mechanisms that guide and facilitate peacekeeping operations were discussed, and factors that would influence motivations and contributions of states were explored. Furthermore, ambiguities within peacekeeping and their implications on the success of peace related operations were considered. Additionally, by taking note of the United Nations Peacekeeping mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo, the chapter helps create an understanding of how the aforementioned principles may be applied.

Chapter 3

CONCEPTUAL AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

In order to address the research questions raised in the first chapter, Liberal Peace theory as well as Critical Theory will be applied. In addition, The Responsibility to Protect (R2P), which serves as the normative driving force for peacekeeping, will be explored in more depth. Furthermore, this chapter will also consider the contributions from international organizations such as the United Nations and the African Union and how their established frameworks facilitate and support peacekeeping roles and operations.

3.1 Liberal Peace Theory/Democratic Peace Theory

Despite the lack of definitive empirical evidence to support the Liberal peace theory, its universal recognition has seen its prominent application by those seeking to make and maintain peace in instances of modern conflict. A reason for the prominence of the Liberal Peace Theory may be the fact that it promotes the concept of democracy, its benefits and how democratic systems and frameworks may help to prevent, ease or negate conflict between states. Furthermore, in its advocacy for democratic peace, the theory takes into consideration the external and internal limitations. Thus, the Liberal Peace theory is relevant for the purposes of this body of work. Additionally, the Liberal Peace Theory takes into consideration postcolonial elements of peacekeeping, and this is important in understanding peacekeeping effectiveness in former colonies such as the Democratic Republic of Congo.

The origin of the Liberal Peace Theory can be traced back to the writings of Immanuel Kant, who in his “Perpetual Peace”, introduced the idea that states that adopted and practiced similar democratic political structures, would essentially have a very low likelihood of propagating unrest and engaging in interstate disputes. Kant’s assertion was largely due to his understanding that civilians generally showed distaste for conflict, and that in a democratic state, these civilians would be able to hold their governments accountable due to the fact that their approval would be needed before governments could embark on war. Kant further noted that governments would take the approval of civilians with seriousness as through elections, the same civilians may ultimately determine the length of office for ruling governments. Additionally, Kant noted that democratic states would not wage war on other democratic states. (Buchan, 2002, p. 409). In seeking contrast to the aforementioned, one may consider dictatorships and monarchies where those who hold the highest political power would not need the approval of the people and are not under any obligation to report back to civilians.

Buchan (2002, pp. 407-410) highlights the normative superiority of the theory and presents the central argument of the theory as the belief that war would cease if all states were able to become democratic and/or acquire liberal status. Realistically, liberal states may still experience conflicts within themselves as well as with similarly structured states; however, the likelihood of these conflicts turning into large scale war would be significantly low (Buchan, 2002, p. 407).

In addition, Burton (1990, as cited in Fetherston, 1994, p. 97) asserts that it is important to also distinguish between conflicts and disagreements; as disagreements entail situations where disputes are negotiable and a compromise may be reached, while

conflict entails situations that would require more effort and investment in order to attain resolutions due to the fact disputes are based fundamental differences in beliefs, politics, policy etc. Furthermore, violent conflict can be defined as a party's reaction to frustration brought about by another party. The reaction to this frustration may be preemptive or alleviative (Thomas, 1992, p. 265). Additionally, it is important to note that violent conflict can involve both state and non-state actors.

3.2 Defining Peace

Regarding the definition of peace, Kant (1795, as cited in Marcantonio, 2017, p. 79) expresses that peace refers to an ultimate end, a representation of all that is right in the sense of correctness and emphasizes that this can only be effectively achieved through norms and democracy that unite states. Fetherston (1994, p. 93-95) expresses that more frequently, the definition of peace has been in the negative due to the fact that it is often defined as the absence of war and suggests the need for a positive peace definition. Regarding positive peace, Curle (1990) refers to positive peace as the existence of diplomatic ties, political and cultural integration, educational reform, flexible commerce, and the development of mutual trust and understanding that would enable dispute resolution with the least amount of friction.

In further emphasis of the normativity of the liberal peace theory, Owen (1994, p. 93-94) expresses that, states are constrained by international institutions as these institutions and their members abide by principles that promote peacekeeping and peaceful dispute resolution. In addition, the operations of the aforementioned institutions further clarifies the basis of the liberal peace theory as these institutions emphasize the notion that liberal states do not engage in war with each other and are less likely to engage in violent conflict with non-liberal states (Badmus & Jenkins,

2019, pp. 63-64). Furthermore, Placek (2012) expresses that democratic states that declare war are more likely to taste more victory than undemocratic states due to the fact the growing civilian distaste for war will encourage governments to only partake in wars they can win hastily. Additionally, more possible reasons for the reverence of the liberal (democratic) peace theory can be traced back to globalization and economic interdependence, as economically developed countries were less prone to violence than less economically developed democracies (Gat, 2005, p. 78).

3.3 Critical Theory Approach

Unsurprisingly, the liberal peace theory is not without its drawbacks. Pugh (2007, p. 39) expresses that there adding to the lack of concrete evidence to support the accuracy of the theory, critical theorists have argued that peace operations under the guise of liberal democracy are embarked upon with the primary mission of maintaining a particular global order that benefits rich and powerful states while isolating and alienating “unruly” states. A further emphasis on the aforementioned is developed by Gartzke (2007, p. 20, as cited in Kahler & Walter, p. 156) who expresses that rather than the democratic nature of states, capitalism and economic globalization play a larger role in the prevention of war and in the reaction to conflict. Furthermore, issues with the liberal peace theory may arise when one considers the perspective of third world countries, in that they view peacekeeping operations as a means of enforcing the agendas of powerful international actors, and liberal democracy is one such agenda (Badmus & Jenkins, 2019, p. 65).

By applying a critical theory approach to the concept of peacekeeping one can identify elements in early peacekeeping literary works that contributed to the disconnect between modern peacekeeping and modern conflicts. Dugar (2009, pp. 1146) recalls

the contributions of Immanuel Kant and emphasizes his “Definitive Articles” for perpetual peace; “law of world citizenship”, a republican civil constitution in every state, and a law of nations founded on a federation of free states. Issues may arise with Kant’s assertions about perpetual peace when one considers that Kant’s assertions fail to cater for the global south. The prospect and the success of Kant’s definitive articles is largely dependent on the availability of effective governments and civil institutions that can facilitate, promote, and enforce those articles- elements that were and are still lacking in majority of the global south.

Additionally, Norden (2017) asserts that Kantian Philosophy is largely based on racism and misguided Eurocentric ideas about the potential of particular races. Furthermore, Norden (2017) highlighted Kant’s tendency to rank the “white race” above all in the hierarchy of races, as further evidence of the Eurocentric focus of his contributions. Norden’s remarks are of utmost importance in understanding Kant’s ideas about peace because they not only give an insight as to who Kant considered responsible and capable of facilitating and achieving his proposed preconditions for peace, they also give an insight to the scope of Kant’s beliefs about perpetual peace.

It is safe to say that the Liberal Peace theory has been met with both support and critique. It is also safe to assert that both proponents of the theory as well as sceptics have raised valid points regarding their understanding of what the theory represents, aims to achieve, and has achieved. Critical theory allows one to identify the issues of existing and emerging disconnects in the peacekeeping concept and peacekeeping realities. Applying Critical theory to Kant’s contributions to peacekeeping allows for the identification of Eurocentric elements and creates an understanding of how these elements may hinder the effectiveness of peace strategies outside of the global north.

All in all, it is not always an easy task to identify the specific causes of conflict and how best to address them because there are many variables and factors that may be respective of particular conflicts or may be representative of regional, international or global inclinations.

3.4 Conceptual Framework

3.4.1 Peacekeeping

Peacekeeping emerged as a reaction to the Cold War; and it entails joint operations, shared notions, attitudes, and ideas between, international organizations, non-governmental organizations, and the civil societies, aimed at the prevention, alleviation, and cessation of conflict. Goulding (1993, p. 452) presents peacekeeping as a collection of techniques that have been developed, mainly by the UN, for the purpose of armed conflict resolution. Goulding (1993, p. 452) highlights the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) and its unarmed supervisory work in Palestine in 1948, as the first United Nations peacekeeping operation. In the year 1956, the UN would deploy the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) in Egypt to address the Anglo-French Israeli attack. UNEF was the first armed United Nations peacekeeping force (Goulding 1993, p. 452). The success UNEF in addressing the Suez crisis, and the pivotal role played by UNTSO in the Arab-Israeli agreements created a positive international perception of UN peacekeeping, and the Organization would be called on to address multiple crises and threats to international security (Goulding 1993, p. 452).

3.4.2 The United Nations & Peacekeeping

Fetherston (1994, p. 1) expressed that the United Nations was founded after the end of the Second World War due to a considerable amount of lobbying by private entities, most of which were from the United States. The years 1941, 1942 and 1943 were

important periods of the United Nations inception. The year 1941 saw the Signing of the *Atlantic Charter* by Roosevelt and Churchill, and this charter proposed the establishment of wider and permanent systems of general security. In the year 1942, the *Declaration of United Nations* was signed by twenty-six countries that allied against the Axis powers, and it affirmed the principles established in the *Atlantic Charter*. October of 1943 would then see the signing of the *Moscow Declaration* which placed emphasis on the maintenance of international peace and security. The *Moscow Declaration* was signed by leaders and representatives from the United States, the Soviet Union, China, and Britain (Fetherston, 1994, p. 1).

3.4.3 The United Nations Charter

The momentum built by the *Atlantic Charter*, the *Declaration of United Nations*, and the *Moscow Declaration* ultimately led to the *United Nations Conference on International Organization* in 1945, which saw the participation of fifty states in the formal drafting of the Charter of the United Nations (Fetherston, 1994, p. 2). In terms of the main driving forces of the UN Charter, Fetherston (1994, p. 3) highlights the maintenance of international peace and security, and the upholding of the twin principles of sovereignty and non-interference as primary. The Charter establishes rules and principles that aid in the formulation of a legal framework that enables and justifies UN action in the global sphere.

As outlined in the United Nations Charter, the empowerment of the Security Council, in order to promote and preserve global peace and security is a primary goal of the UN. The UN charter grants the Security Council the authority to apply measures that it deems adequate in aiding the council to achieve global peace and security, measures such as the deployment of peacekeeping forces. The legal framework for UN

peacekeeping can be found in the United Nations Charter from Chapter VI through to VIII. Chapter VI of the charter entails peaceful dispute resolution, while Chapter VII enables enforcement aimed at peace protection. Additionally, Chapter VII is invoked by the Security Council before forces are deployed into post-conflict settings where the state is facing challenges in maintaining order and security (Capstone Doctrine, 2008).

3.4.4 The African Union & Peacekeeping

The year 1963 saw the establishment of the Organization of African Unity, which became known as the first post-independence continental institution (AU Handbook, 2020, pp. 15-16). Austin & Nagel (1966, p. 520) express that the Organization of African Unity was created to realize the vision of early pan-Africanists who wished to work on strengthening cooperation between states in a postcolonial world. The year 2002 saw the evolution of the OAU to the African Union (AU) that further established organs and branches geared towards the fulfillment of the Responsibility to Protect mandate.

Regarding the African Union's responsibility to protect, Packer & Rukare (2002, p. 365) highlight the organization's Constitutive Act, and express its stipulations as the enablement of the Union to intervene in the affairs of its member states when there is a clear indication of crimes against humanity. Also, Art 4 (j) enables member states at their discretion, to request for AU intervention. Additionally, apart from the union's obligation to facilitate mediation and embark on peacekeeping missions, Article 4 of the Constitutive Act extends to include intervention where there is a threat to established order in a member state (Packer & Rukare, 2002, p. 372).

It is important to note that the role played by the African Union in attempts at peacekeeping during the Burundi Civil War (1993-2005) led to the formal adoption of the responsibility to protect as a normative principle for guiding AU behaviour (Kabau, 2012, p. 64).

3.4.5 The Responsibility To Protect

The notion of the Responsibility to Protect is relevant to the purpose of this study as it creates an understanding of important mechanisms that encourage the embarkment of peacekeeping missions in volatile regions.

The year 2001 saw the submission report by the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) titled “Responsibility To Protect” that borrowed from former UN special advisor Francis Deng’s assertion that sovereignty entails responsibility. The report placed further emphasis on the notion that, during instances of war crimes, genocide, ethnic cleansing; states have the responsibility to protect citizens, and if they are in one way or another unable to take this responsibility, then the responsibility would fall on the international community, who must act regardless of political implications (Scanlon, Eziakonwa & Myburgh, 2007, p. 7).

The responsibility to protect hinges on three pillars; the responsibility of each state to protect its populations; the responsibility of the international community to assist with state protection and the responsibility of the international community to protect in instances where a state is failing to effectively protect its populations (Simonovic, 2016). The responsibility to protect shows an evolution from the principle of non-intervention, which entailed that due to the respect for sovereignty, states could not interfere with each other's matters even in times of crisis where human lives were threatened.

Unsurprisingly, the responsibility to protect has faced criticism. The ambiguous nature of the R2P has created challenges in the effective outlining of requirements in order to determine when intervention is needed. Additionally, others have argued that R2P has proven to be effective tool for the spread and expansion of western agendas, especially on African states (Scanlon, Eziakonwa & Myburgh, 2007, p. 18). Furthermore, Fetherston (1994, p. 3) expresses that the creators of the UN Charter were misguided in their assumptions that states were relatively stable and would follow certain norms within the international system, and the creators of the Charter failed to account for the possibility of a culture of non-compliance in the Security Council as well as the UN system as a whole.

Regardless of the ambiguity surrounding the Responsibility To Protect, global recognition has meant that R2P has become a normative muscle for guiding peacekeeping behaviour. Organizations such as the United Nations and African Union agree on the need for clarification on some of the elements of R2P and are actively making attempts to evolve the concept by invoking it in the mandates that guide their various operations. This evolution can be seen in the case of the DRC through the progression of peacekeeping from ONUC to MONUSCO.

3.5 Conclusion

The discussed theories and concepts succeed in highlighting the evolution of peacekeeping that the international community has experienced since the aftermath of World War II. The international community has begun to acknowledge that the factors surrounding, encouraging, and enabling conflict are evolving, and so should the measures of peacekeeping used to address them.

Chapter 4

A TIMELINE OF PEACEKEEPING IN THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO

This chapter serves to provide a timeline of peacekeeping in the Democratic Republic of Congo. Additionally, the chapter will explore the colonial history of the DRC, highlighting relevant events before and after independence that ultimately contributed to the need for peacebuilding and peacekeeping. Furthermore, this section will feature a comprehensive look at United Nations peacekeeping missions within the DRC in order to establish a timeline of peacekeeping, with particular attention being paid to the evolution of UN presence within the country.

The Democratic Republic of Congo is a relatively mature democracy, in that the country attained its independence in 1960, which is relatively early in comparison to its African counterparts. However, despite its “early” independence, the country’s record of democracy is relatively poor. In order to accurately discern the reasons for democratic shortcomings, it may be logical to explore the country’s realities before and after its independence.

4.1 Colonization of the Democratic Republic of Congo

The colonization of the Democratic Republic of Congo was initially led by Sir Henry Morton Stanley and took place from the 1870s to the 1920s. Stanley’s exploration of “Zaire” was sponsored by King Leopold II of Belgium, who under the guise of humanitarianism and nominal purpose, established mining and excavation settlements

that resulted in the extraction of large amounts of minerals such as ivory, rubber, etc. (Rosoux, 2014, p. 19). The conference of Berlin in 1885 resulted in Leopold II formal acquisition of the rights to the Congo territory and the same year saw the establishment of the colony known as the Congo Free State. The establishment of the Congo Free State led to numerous infrastructure developments, nearly all of which were aimed at easing the transportation of minerals within the region (Musambachime, 1990, p. 646). Soon after the Congo Free States establishment, Leopold II created three state departments: interior department, foreign affairs department and finances department, which all served to improve the effectiveness of Leopold II sovereign rule. The mid 1880s saw the establishment of three decrees by Leopold II, which aimed at prioritizing the rights of native Congolese and the liberation of slaves. However, not long after the 1889 Anti-Slavery conference in Brussels, Leopold II issued a new decree that aimed to restrict the trading of African harvested products to the state, which greatly limited native Congolese income as the state was now able to set purchase prices.

4.1.1 The Force Publique (FP)

Leopold II decrees that followed the anti-slavery conference led to the establishment of quotas on minerals, and the responsibility for the enforcement of these quotas fell on the *Force Publique*. Established in 1885, the *Force Publique* initially served as a force that campaigned against Arab slave trade, protected Leopold's economic interests, as well as the repression of uprisings that occurred within the state. Musambachime (1990, p. 647) expresses that the in the early stages of its establishment, *Force Publique* consisted of only white Europeans, but that the combination of low wages and declining manpower led to the recruitment of mercenaries, volunteers from eastern and west African countries, as well as unwilling

Congolese natives hailing from villages headed by “complying” chiefs. Musambachime (1990, p. 647) further notes that the recruitment of native Congolese into the *Force Publique*, was criticized by the 1919 Commission for the Protection of Natives as this recruitment would have a negative impact on native society by encouraging infamy, instability and rebellion. This negative impact is more than apparent when one considers the human rights issues that arose from during the *Force Publique*’s reign.

4.1.2 Military Violence In Colonial DRC

The *Force Publique*’s operation during the colonial period was riddled with violence, crimes against humanity and many other human rights violations. The atrocities committed by the Force Publique consisted of the murdering of natives, the raping of women and children, torture, as well as the dismemberment and the beheading of “defiant” children and adults (Hunt, 2008, p. 221). As earlier expressed, the *Force Publique* had a primary responsibility to enforce rubber quotas, which became the most lucrative venture for Leopold II. The rubber venture was so important to Leopold II that failure to meet rubber quotas was punishable by death, and the *Force Publique* was required to provide proof of this punishment by providing the limbs of those killed (Lowes & Montero, 2019). Additionally, Fetter (1988) expressed the *Force Publique*’s operation expanded as the role of colonial central Africa in World War II evolved. This evolution of Force Publique operation ultimately meant the increase in scope and frequency of committed atrocities and human rights violation, and this continued even into the country’s independence.

4.2 United Nations Peacekeeping In The Democratic Republic Of Congo

4.2.1 United Nations Operation In The Congo (ONUC) 1960-1964

The United Nations presence in the Democratic Republic of Congo can be traced back to the year of its independence, 1960, which saw the inception of ONUC. The ONUC mission was in action from 1960-1964 and it consisted of around 90 000 personnel drawn from 34 different nations at the cost of around US\$ 400 000 000. Gross (1963, p. 1) highlights ONUC as one of the most expensive UN operations and asserts that all expenditures of the mission fall within the meaning of Article 17 of the UN Charter. The United Nations Operation in the Congo came at the request of Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba, and UN Secretary General Dag Hammarskjöld, who secured a UN Security Council resolution that requested the presence of United Nations forces in order for the restoration of order and to monitor the withdrawal of Belgian troops from Independent Congo (Dobbins, Jones, Crane, Rathmell, Steele, Teltschik & Timilsina, 2005, p. 7). However, Aksu (2003, p. 5) expresses that ONUC became a very controversial UN mission as the realities and complexities of the situation in independent DRC meant that the United Nations had to constantly redefine its role and the “principles of its enrollment”.

Within the four years of ONUC mission operation, the United Nations presence in the Democratic Republic of Congo underwent many transitions in terms of use of force, recruitment methods etc. Despite the UN’s presence in Congo DRC majorly falling within the legal framework of Chapter VI through VIII of the UN Charter, controversy arose as many were critical about the UN true intentions and they highlighted the selective application of normative action as questionable (Aksu, 2003, p. 5). Fetherston

(1994, p. 14) asserts that redefinition of UN presence during ONUC was inevitable due to the fact that the initial UN personnel that began the peacekeeping mission lacked international support, a clear mandate, and were inadequately prepared for the conflicting pressures from all sides involved in the conflict. The United Nations presence within the DRC would undergo further transitions in later years, leading to the establishment of MONUC (United Nations Organization Mission in The Democratic Republic of Congo) after the conclusion of the Rwandan Genocide.

4.2.2 United Nations Organization Mission in The Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC) 1999-2010

The establishment of MONUC can be said to have resulted from the implications and consequences of three notable events: The Rwandan Genocide (1994), the First Congo War (1996-1997) and the Second Congo War (1998). The end of the Rwandan Genocide led to the displacement of perpetrators and victims as well as the migration of survivors into Eastern DRC. In 1996, conflict began within the region that saw a rebellion by Laurent Désiré Kabila led forces against President Mobutu Sese Seko's regime. With the aid of Rwanda and Uganda, the year 1997 saw the triumph of Kabila's forces, who succeeded in capturing the capital Kinshasa, and ultimately renamed the country as The Democratic Republic of Congo (Eriksen, 2005, p. 1098).

The capturing of Kinshasa and Kabila's ascension to presidency was met by further conflict. In 1998, a rebellion against the Kabila government led to the capture of large areas of the country by rebel forces. Following the abrupt end of the alliance between the DRC, Rwanda and Uganda, the frequency of conflict heightened as hostility between DRC and Rwanda grew and this led to a strategic military battle between Kabila and Rwandan president Paul Kagame (Kisangani, 2003, p. 52). Increasing

conflict drew further attention to the DRC and this ultimately led to the United Nations Security Council calling for a ceasefire and the withdrawal of foreign troops in order to respect the sovereignty of the DRC. Following calls for a ceasefire, an official ceasefire agreement was signed in July of 1999 in Lusaka. The Lusaka Ceasefire agreement was consented to by the DRC, Rwanda, Angola, Zimbabwe and Uganda. Soon after the signing of the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement, the UN Security Council through its Resolution 1279 established the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) which was to serve for the observation of the agreement and to monitor and maintain correspondence with all parties (United Nations, MONUC, 1999). Furthermore, due to emerging challenges at various stages of the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement, the UN Security Council through further resolutions, expanded the mandate of MONUC to include supervision and to assign related tasks. Through MONUC, the United Nations was able to assist in the organization of the DRC's first free and fair elections held July 30th, 2006. After the elections MONUC would maintain its presence in the DRC in order to fulfill UNSC resolution mandates and to assist with the implementation of political structures as well as the quelling of provincial conflicts (United Nations, MONUC, 1999).

4.2.3 United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission In The Democratic Republic Of The Congo (MONUSCO) 2010-Present

Through the operation of MONUC, the United Nations and the DRC were able to realize some success with regards to peacekeeping. However, despite the relative success of MONUC, the DRC had transitioned into a new phase of conflict, particularly in the Eastern regions of the nation. This meant that the United Nations role in the DRC had to evolve in order to accurately address the challenges brought about by this new phase, and as thus, through resolution 1925 in 2010, the United

Nations Organization Stabilization Mission In The Democratic Republic Of The Congo (MONUSCO) was established (United Nations, MONUSCO, 2010). The MONUSCO mandate placed focus on the protection of civilians, humanitarians, human rights defenders as well as the support of the DRC government in efforts aimed at stabilization and peace consolidation. The UN Security Council authorized any means necessary in order to fulfill its mandate. As per Security Council decision, MONUSCO was to comprise of military, civilian and judicial components and at its peak, the mission had 19 000 active personnel (Gowan, 2015, p. 31)

Despite the successes of UN peacekeeping in the DRC, insurrection, sexual violence, human rights violations and exploitation still remained as reoccurring themes. The North Kivu crisis of 2012 reflected the reality of these recurring cycles of violence, and the threat of this crisis to the peace and stability that had been attained in much of the DRC led to further reconfiguration of MONUSCO. In 2013 at Addis Ababa, this reconfiguration came in the form of the *Peace, Security And Cooperation Framework for The Democratic Republic Of Congo and the Region*, which was signed by 11 countries in the region, the UN Security General, chairs of the African Union, SADC representatives as well as the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (Jesensky, 2019, p. 212).

In further attempts to reach the objectives of the framework, all parties agreed to the adoption of Security Council's Resolution 2098 (2013), which, acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, extended the MONUSCO mandate until March 31st, 2014, and resulted in the formation of an "intervention brigade" (Cammaert, 2013, p. 6). As communicated in the 27 February Special Report, the intervention brigade was to comprise artillery battalions, special force battalions as well as a reconnaissance

company, which would all operate under the instruction of the MONUSCO Force Commander with the primary responsibility of reducing the threat of armed groups and establishing better systems for civilian security (Cammaert, 2013, p. 7). Furthermore, the Security Council Resolution 2147 (2014) extended MONUSCO mandate to 31st March 2015 and presented the directive that the Intervention Brigade would operate on an exceptional basis with the hopes of avoiding prejudice and the creation of precedent (Cogan, 2015, p. 330). On the 30th of March 2016, MONUSCO would undergo further adjustment to its mandate through Resolution 2277 which placed emphasis on the humanitarian situation as well as addressing the challenges in the preparation of Presidential elections in November of the same year.

Additional adjustments would be made to the mandate of MONUSCO in the year 2017 through Resolution 2348, as the UN decided to keep MONUSCO operational until 31st March 2018 at a slightly reduced capacity. Resolution 2409 (2018) would then extend both MONUSCO mandate in the DRC as well as the intervention brigade and would highlight the protection of civilians and the implementation of effective electoral processes as strategic priorities. Further adjustments to the mission's mandate were realized through Resolution 2409 (2018), that saw the authorization of troop staffing level that brought variation to the numbers of personnel occupying the numerous departments of the mission. Resolution 2409 (2018) maintained similar strategic priorities regarding civilian protection and the electoral process.

Resolution 2409 (2018) marked an important phase for MONUSCO as it was the first time that the Secretary General was called upon by the Security Council, to develop a “progressive and comprehensive exit strategy”. Through this resolution the Security Council structured that all MONUSCO stakeholders would work collaboratively with

the Government of Congo DRC in order to facilitate a well-organized withdrawal by MONUSCO. Resolution 2463 of March 29th, 2019 brought further extensions to MONUSCO's mandate until December 20th, 2019 while maintaining the priorities of the previous resolution, and these priorities were later renewed through Resolution 2502 (2019). Furthermore, once again with an emphasis on exceptional basis and the avoidance of the creation of precedent, Resolution 2556 (2020) extended MONUSCO's mandate in the DRC until December 20th, 2021. Currently, MONUSCO's mandate prioritizes the protection of civilians, the strengthening of state institutions and political stabilization and security reform.

4.3 Conclusion

Considering the presence of the United Nations in the DRC since its independence, it may be safe to assert that the peace and security of the DRC is not only a top priority to the United Nations, but also an issue of global concern. However, the United Nations prolonged presence in the Democratic Republic of Congo may raise questions concerning the "successes" of these missions. The multiple Security Council resolutions may be indicative of progress in United Nations approach to addressing variations in the DRC's instability, but one may not be entirely wrong in asserting that these resolutions are indicative of the overly ambitious nature of UN peacekeeping in the region.

To expand on the aforementioned, ONUC may be taken into perspective. Goulding (1993, p. 452) explains that even though ONUC succeeded in its objectives, the UN's constant redefinition of the mission was indicative of underfunding, collapsing Congolese institutions, the inclusion of substantial civilian personnel, and the realization that objectives would only be achievable through the use of force.

Goulding's assertions do not only highlight reasons for redefinition and mandate change for ONUC, as his assertions also give an insight to possible reasons for redefinition and mandate change during MONUC and MONUSCO. The next chapter will seek to expand on the aforementioned, by highlighting possible reasons for the current state of the Democratic Republic of Congo.

Chapter 5

REASONS FOR THE PEACEKEEPING DILEMMA IN MODERN DRC

Despite the prolonged presence of UN forces in Congo DRC, and the organization's relative successes in attempts to establish peace in the region, modern DRC continues to suffer from instability, violence, and extreme human rights violations. This chapter serves to explore the possible reasons for modern DRC's human rights dilemma by answering the question as to why peace remains difficult to sustain. Troubled peacebuilding will be presented as a consequence of colonization and the Cold War, and links will be drawn between colonization and the inception of ONUC. Also, issues arising in MONUC and its transition to MONUSCO will be assessed. In addition, the relationship between the African Union and United Nations concerning peacebuilding will be examined. Furthermore, the role of the Congolese government in maintaining and promoting peace will be analyzed.

5.1 Troubled Peacebuilding: A Consequence of Colonialism and The Cold War

In efforts to understand the current peace dilemma in the Democratic Republic of Congo, it may be logical for one to investigate the colonial history of the country, and the consequences that resulted from the colonial period.

5.1.1 The Cultural Aspect of Colonialism

It is not surprising to find that the economic and political impacts of colonialism take priority in most postcolonial studies. However, Pinney (2007, as cited in Bennett & Frow, p. 382) insists that the cultural aspect of colonialism is of utmost importance in understanding its impact on former colonies, due to the fact that at every stage of colonialism, there was a cultural influence that drove the behaviour of the “colonizer”. Furthermore, Pinney (2007, p. 384) channels Bernard Chon in asserting that a large part of the success of colonial endeavors hinged on the successful adoption or integration of “systematization”, which is in turn both a reflection and a byproduct of “culture”. MacDonald (1991, p. 9) presents culture as an integral and inalienable part of what human beings are currently, and what they are likely to become in future. Additionally, despite the availability of simple definitions of the term “culture”, the multifaceted nature of the term has led to numerous debates that harbor around application, history and representation, and these debates have occurred in both the academic world as well as in international politics and economics. (Goldstein, 1957, p. 1078). MacDonald (1991) and Goldstein (1957) remarks are relevant to understanding the consequences of the colonial period on Congo DRC due to the fact that their contributions hint at the importance of culture to a people and how the failure or unwillingness to understand or integrate with said culture may negatively impact indigenous peoples.

Additionally, because culture is integral to the construction of human systems, the destruction of a people's culture, a primary goal of colonization, negates the effectiveness of a people in the construction and the maintenance of human systems. Cultures are an important determinant to how individuals, groups, societies, and

institutions perceive the relationship between conflict and peace (Rider, 2008, p. 74). Furthermore, the western philosophy that contributed to the development of peacekeeping principles failed to cater for the global south, and this failure has made the application of the aforementioned principles in global south a problematic endeavor. Eurocentric or western approaches to African realities negate the possibility for the creation of localized approaches to addressing African instability and the elements that contribute to this instability (Keita, 2020, pp. 19).

5.1.2 The Inception of ONUC (United Nations Operation in The Congo)

Further hindrances to effective peacekeeping in Congo DRC may have also been as a result of a warped or inaccurate recollection of the country's colonial history. Verbeek (2019, p. 48, as cited in Rodriguez & Beckers, 2021) asserts that to most of the outside world, Belgians who were exiled after Congo DRC's independence in 1960, were presented as the primary victims of the Congo's colonial period. Verbeek's assertion is interesting in that it hints at the mindset that would be adopted by the international world and international organizations such as the UN, that would come to be involved in the affairs of newly independent Congo. This becomes more apparent when Aksu (2003, p. 102) expresses that ONUC's initial establishment may have resulted from official requests from Lumumba and Kasavubu who insisted that the request was for the facilitation of peaceful withdrawal of Belgian presence. However, Cold War elements later took priority in how the UN security council deliberated during different phases of the mission (Durch & Blechman, p. 10). Furthermore, Dobbins, Jones & Crane et al (2005) assert that Cold War elements worsened the Congo Crisis (1960-1965) that ensued after the nation's independence as the international parties involved; Soviet Union, China, United States, sought to interfere with DRC affairs not necessarily to establish stability, but primarily to promote their respective ideologies.

Additionally, ONUC was the first mission of its kind and the United Nations efforts to constantly redefine their presence in Congo DRC may not only have been due to the overambitious nature of the mission, those efforts may have also reflected a lack of understanding of the actual threats to a newly independent nation, as well as a lack of understanding regarding the efforts required to establish and promote effective peacebuilding (Aksu, 2003, p. 102). Additionally, Goulding (1993, p. 453) highlighted financial costs and Congolese institutional collapse as the biggest hinderances to the success of ONUC objectives. Furthermore, Fetherston (1994, p. 13) reports that the main hinderances the success of ONUC's operation stemmed from financial controversy, rising tension among the Permanent 5, and a rushed and short-sighted independence process in Congo.

Regarding the impact of colonialism on peacekeeping and human rights, some may argue that other former colonies such as Zambia, that attained their independence around the same time as DRC have fared much better. Concerning this argument, Weinstein (1983, p. 179-180) suggests the Congo DRC's unfortunate outcome, in comparison with other former colonies, was due to a combination of the vastness of the region, ineffective provincial division and a lack of expertise within Belgian leadership regarding effective colonization and peaceful decolonization as Belgium had little experience in handling colonies.

5.2 African Union and United Nations Relationship

Further issues that may have contributed to the current state of Congo DRC may be highlighted when one considers the relationship between the African Union and the United Nations, as well as how both organizations approach the concept and implementation of peacekeeping. Concerning AU and UN cooperation, Carayannis &

Panburn (2016) express that both the AU and UN have made great strides in institutional ability and crisis management. However, Carayannis & Panburn (2016, p. 1) note that both the AU and UN still need to make improvements in institutional engagement, and that the need for improvement is clear when one considers the differences in their approaches to peacekeeping.

5.2.1 AU and UN: Operational Differences & Bureaucracy

At the highest levels of deliberation, evidence has indicated that despite partnerships and annual consultations aimed at improving cooperation between the AU Peace and Security Council (PSC) and the United Nations Security Council (SC), there is a strong element of mistrust between both councils, and this has negatively impacted productivity (Carayannis & Pangburn, 2016, p. 2). Concerning the PSC, troop contributors are ready to withstand greater casualties, and this has allowed for quicker and flexible troop deployment. Additionally, proximity allows the PSC to have a more localized and comprehensive understanding of conflict environments (Carayannis & Pangburn, 2016, p. 2). On the other hand, the UN benefits from a longer history of peacekeeping and a longer time to complete the deployment process which allows for sufficient funding, training as well as a much more structured deployment process. Furthermore, chapter VIII of the UN charter guides the UN behaviour concerning regional arrangements. Despite the AU and UN's respective expertise, collective success has proven difficult to attain due to bureaucracy, the ad-hoc nature of AU engagement, and a lack of shared conflict analysis between the two organizations (Carayannis & Panburn, 2016, p. 2) The aforementioned is further emphasized by Wedgwood (1995, p. 632) who highlights that the lack of transparency in multilateral decision making has resulted in difficulties in cooperation between members of the UN Security Council, the General Assembly, and this has ultimately resulted in

ineffective correspondence with other regional organizations. Also, Nshimbi (2020) notes the importance of the AU Constitutive Act but insists that in its current state it is not adequate in establishing policy and mechanisms for long term regional stability, as its limited ability to intervene in member state conflicts has resulted in the selectivity of its application.

5.2.2 AU-UN in the DRC

Concerning the peace dilemma in the DRC, Carayannis & Pangburn (2016, p. 2) assert that the complexities of DRC's woes were difficult to comprehend by the AU and UN as both organizations failed to recognize that improving the peacekeeping capacity of regional organizations alone, would not lead to successful peace enforcement, and that the underutilization of the AU Liaison Office in Kinshasa, by both AU and MONUSCO is evidence of this. Additionally, disputes among contingent members has contributed to the ineffectiveness of Force Integration Brigade as well as the selective application of the AU Regional Task Force and this has ultimately resulted in peacekeeping operations becoming more political than virtuous (Carayannis & Pangburn, 2016, p. 3) Furthermore, the longevity of peace becomes threatened when parties involved in regional peacekeeping fail to effectively integrate the technical and political aspects of peacebuilding operations. This becomes apparent when one considers Kinshasa's abandonment of the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework (PSCF) after the M23 crisis, despite the PSCF strides in establishing effective oversight and benchmarking mechanisms (Carayannis & Pangburn, 2016, p. 4). Also, a 2008 report by Human Rights Watch (HRW) regarding the "Kiwanga Killings" during the Goma crisis, highlights ineffective prioritization and ineffective logistical and technical application as significant reasons for MONUC's failure to protect the population. (Reynaert, 2011, p.17)

5.3 MONUC to MONUSCO

Despite their differences, in the DRC, the AU and UN have cooperated effectively to establish mandates that have resulted in some levels of peace and security within the region. July of 1999 saw the arrival to a ceasefire agreement in DRC after negotiations between the Organization of African Unity (OAU), the UN, as well as the Southern African Development Community (SADC). A month into the agreement saw the addition of the signatures of The Movement for the Liberation of the Congo (MLC) and the Rally for Congolese Democracy (RCD) two rebel groups whose activity led to calls for a ceasefire (Lagrange & Vircoulon, 2016, p. 5). Following the establishment of the officially titled “Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement”, the UN security council through Resolution 1279, established the United Nations Mission In The Democratic Republic Of Congo (MONUC) which was mandated to monitor the implementation of the ceasefire.

As alluded to earlier, UN presence in Congo DRC has had to be frequently redefined, and the UN mandates have evolved over time to meet particular goals and objectives. Unsurprisingly, the frequent redefinition of UN Presence has contributed to the modern DRC peacekeeping dilemma. This becomes apparent when one considers events surrounding the transitions to MONUC and MONUSCO. As MONUC mandate shifted from ceasefire observation to the support of reform in the security sector, the mission reduced its military presence in the DRC. Lagrange & Vircoulon (2016, p. 7) report that the reduced military presence had a negative impact on the achieved stability as it allowed for a rise in crimes against humanity by armed groups, and the emergence of a new rebellion- National Council for the Defence of the People (CNDP)

led by Laurent Nkunda, whose activity would later devastate the town of Goma in North Kivu.

In the year 2008, a Goma Conference was held that focused on the ending of hostilities and it involved the signing of ceasefire agreements by representatives of the CNDP and representatives of twenty-one other rebel groups operating in North and South Kivu (Reynaert, 2011, p.7). Through Resolution 1925 in 2010, MONUC would transition to MONUSCO (the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo), and the UN would prioritize stabilization strategies for the rising conflict in North and South Kivu regions (Lagrange & Vircoulon, 2016, p. 7). Despite MONUSCO extension of its mandate to include Goma stabilization, reduced peacekeeping capacity made it difficult to supervise the ceasefires and suppress CNDP and M23 (March 23 Movement) insurgency, and the Goma crisis eventually resulted in the capture of the town by M23 (Lagrange & Vircoulon, 2016, p. 8).

5.4 Commitment to Peace: Congolese Government, United Nations & Political Interests

The United Nations presence in the DRC has resulted in many failures by the organization, failures that have ultimately led to the countless reorganization and redirection of peace mechanisms that have proven inadequate in addressing military credibility and establishing strong relationships with the host government. The aforementioned, coupled with the Congolese government's questionable commitment to peace has led to a peacekeeping stalemate in the Democratic Republic of Congo.

A contributing factor to the peacekeeping stalemate in the DRC may be observed when one considers the realities of “non-use of force”. Lagrange & Vircoulon (2006, p. 10) and Carayannis & Pangburn (2016, p. 3) highlight the normative significance of the “none-use of force” policy but insist that in the case of MONUSCO, “none-use of force” and the exceptional application of Chapter VII of the UN Charter hindered the UN ability to protect civilians and to anticipate or react to threats by armed groups. The DRC’s history has shown that the UN’s reluctance to act in particular situations has led to the development of a hostile relationship between the Congolese government and the United Nations. Growing hostility between the DRC and UN, among other things, contributed to the constitutional crisis of 2016 that saw President Kabila’s reluctance to step down or allow for effective national elections (Day, 2016, p. 32).

Despite the UN’s reluctance to act in particular situations in the DRC, the organization has carried out two offensive operations- the pursuit for Lord Resistance Army (LRA) leader Joseph Kony, and the offensive against M23. However, Lagrange & Vircoulon (2006, p. 13) insist that both the aforementioned offensive operations were neither an indication of an effective relationship between UN and DRC nor were they an indication of DRC’s commitment to peacekeeping, as both operations were primarily driven by political interests. The Joseph Kony pursuit was largely due to United States pressure while the offensive against M23 was made possible through the UN’s need to redeem itself after the Goma Crisis, as well the alignment of the government interests of DRC, Tanzania and South Africa who sought to counter Rwanda (Lagrange & Vircoulon, 2006, p. 13). Additionally, further questions arise concerning the DRC commitment to peace when one considers the government’s reaction to the Mutarule Massacre in 2014. The DRC government was aware of the attack on Ethnic

Bafuliro in Mutarule but was reluctant to intervene or commit forces (HRW, 2019). Regarding the DRC government's reaction to the Mutarule Massacre, Lagrange & Vircoulon (2006, p.14) asserts that because the massacre was not a primary threat to the state, its outcome, casualties, and consequences would not be primary concerns of the state.

5.5 Conclusion

To this day, there remains a peacekeeping and a human rights dilemma in the Democratic Republic of Congo and this dilemma is as a result of numerous factors. The United Nations success in maintaining and promoting peace in the region has been negatively impacted by overambition, exceptional policy, political interests, strained relationship between the UN and the AU, as well as a lack of transparency and a lack of effective correspondence between parties involved in peace operations. The Congolese government has contributed majorly to the peace problem in the DRC due to its reluctance to act in reaction or in prevention of crises, as well as through its treatment of ethnic groups and victims. Additionally, the DRC's government's frequent moments of unwillingness to respect the electoral process has greatly encouraged instability.

There is a clear disconnect between the complexities of conflict in the DRC and the mechanisms that governments and multilaterals have designed to address these complexities. Owing to the record of some successful peacekeeping operations, one is inclined to believe that long term peace and stability in the DRC are achievable. However, in order for long term peace and stability to be achieved, effective correspondence, transparency and the successful integration of the technical and the political is vital.

Chapter 6

CONCLUSION

This chapter serves to summarize the study by considering the reality of peacekeeping in the Democratic Republic of Congo. The current state of peacekeeping in the DRC will be examined, and the possible outcomes of this peacekeeping in the near future will be considered. Additionally, the likelihood of mandate change or modification will be considered, and the conditions that would allow for the prospect of ending the UN peacekeeping mission in the DRC will be explored.

The UN Resolution 2556 (2020) renewed MONUSCO's mandate, approved its exit strategy and highlighted civilian protection, stabilization, public institution strengthening, and governance and security reforms as strategic priorities. It is worth mentioning that the evolution of UN missions in the DRC has been characterized by mandate modification which has had both positive and negative impacts on shifting priorities, personnel numbers, actor commitments and project sustainability. The UN's constant need to redefine their involvement in the DRC has been met with scrutiny, since the inception of ONUC, as many stakeholders in the international community have viewed their involvement as political and ambitious. The United Nations had to redefine their involvement in the DRC due to the fact that the nature of conflict in the region had evolved during the course of the peacekeeping mission. Regardless of some truth in the aforementioned, it would be illogical not to acknowledge the successes and strategic impact of the UN mission in the DRC.

Putting MONUC into perspective, we are able to recognize the impact of the UN on the prevention of major violent conflict and the promotion of democratic politics through the mission's inclusion of the private sector and the mission's prioritization of the local economy. Additionally, during periods where the mission mandate prioritized monitoring and reporting, MONUC proved integral to the effectiveness of prosecution in the International Criminal Court, as well as to the growth in the global awareness of human rights violations. Additionally, the UN mission enabled the much-needed regime change through the facilitation of a peaceful electoral process that saw the election of Felix Tshisekedi as DRC President. The aforementioned is commendable especially when one considers the challenges faced by the UN in the region. The size of the DRC, operational costs, the host nations' diminishing cooperation, the involvement of neighboring states in rising instability and disagreement in the UN Security Council, were all constraints that the mission managed to somewhat overcome.

Regarding the current state of UN peacekeeping in the DRC, it is safe to say that peacekeeping is at a stalemate, in the sense that except for the UN, parties involved in the peacekeeping process have shown an unwillingness to participate in peacebuilding if the benefits of their participation cannot be readily realized. Peacekeeping in the DRC has transitioned from a humanitarian venture to a politically motivated endeavor, and the factors surrounding the Mutarule Massacre of 2014 are evidence of this. Establishing peace in all parts of the DRC may be a priority for the United Nations, but the same cannot be said for the Congolese government. The difference in commitment to the peacekeeping mission in the DRC has led to the development of a disconnect that has ultimately led to the misinterpretation of mandates and the frequent

failure of correspondence between parties involved. The relationship between the DRC government and the United Nations remains strained even after Felix Tshisekedi's ascension to power in 2018 due to the fact that the policies of the "old" regime still have influence on state deliberations. The aforementioned has resulted in challenges to achieving sustainable peace as the DRC lacks the structure and systems to promote sustainable peace and many of its current policies hinder the development of these systems.

The current MONUSCO mandate has approved plans for a gradual exit strategy which only seems likely if certain conditions are met or realized. A possible condition that may facilitate this withdrawal from the DRC would be the indication that the DRC would no longer present a threat to international peace and security. The realization of the aforementioned would mean reduced chances of instability, which would provide the necessary incentive for the withdrawal of military personnel. Additionally, withdrawal of the UN from the DRC may prove to be a viable option if the new Congolese government proved capable of promoting peace and stability, and if the state showed better commitment to the establishment of institutions that were structured to ensure that peace can be sustained. Furthermore, effective withdrawal from the DRC would be a possibility if the UN through the Security Council, are able to agree upon transition and exit strategies that would not threaten the host population, the UN personnel as well as the peace systems and programs that are currently in operation.

The latest MONUSCO mandate describes the UN's exit strategy as "gradual", and this is a realistic description. The likelihood of the relevant conditions for withdrawal being met in the near future is very low. Remnants of the "old" Congolese government

continue to threaten the relationship between the new DRC government and the United Nations, and this will continue to be the case if members of the old regime continue to exercise their influence. This influence will prove detrimental to both effective correspondence and effective operation of peace centered programs and institutions. Additionally, the evolution of UN peacekeeping from ONUC to MONUSCO has indicated that the UN Security Council has rarely been able to agree on both operation and execution, and this casts doubt on the likelihood of the formulation of an effective uncontested exit process. Furthermore, the dominance of western philosophy in the international arena continues to influence how UN mechanisms are developed, prioritized and implemented, and this dominance has had an adverse effect on the efficacy and localization of these mechanisms in the global south. Barring institutional reform in the DRC, bureaucratic change in the UN Security Council, and comprehensive philosophical reform in the international arena the state of peacekeeping in DRC of today is unlikely to change in the near future.

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