

**An Analysis of Israel's Settlement Policy in the
Occupied West Bank after the Six-Day War and its
Impact on the Peace-Process
(1967-2002)**

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ABSTRACT

Prior to 1967, the West Bank, known by the Israelis as Judea and Samaria, was under the control of the Jordanian administration. After the 1967 Arab-Israeli War, Arabs for a long time were expecting the return of these territories for the sake of peace with its neighbors. This expectation never took place. On the contrary Israel was in the process of building facts on the ground and ensuring its people that these territories are an essential part of historical Israel. After a twenty years period of patience and hope for the Arab leaders to commit to the Palestinian Question, the oppressed Palestinian civilians in the occupied territories finally decided to take matters into their own hand. This would be known as the first Palestinian Uprising in 1987. The outcome of this turmoil was the Madrid Peace conference followed by the Oslo peace-process which finally collapsed due to both sides having a different understanding of peace. The breakdown of the Oslo Accords led to another uprising, known as the Al-Aqsa Intifada in the year 2000. To end this disastrous clash, Ariel Sharon led a military action known as ‘Operation Defensive Shield’ in 2002, where Israel reoccupied the areas which were offered during the Oslo process to the Palestinians. The purpose of this study is to identify the Israeli government’s main purpose in occupying the West Bank in 1967 and building settlement in these territories which are considered illegal by the international community.

Keywords: Jewish settlements, 1967 Six-Day War, Arab reaction, settlement expansion, creeping annexation

ÖZ

1967 öncesi dönemi, İsraililer tarafından Judea ile Samaria olarak bilinen Batı Şeria, Ürdün hükümetinin kontrolü altındaydı. 1967 Arab-İsrail savaşının ardından Araplar bu bölgenin barış karşılığı eski sahiplerine döneceğini düşündüler. Bu beklenti hiçbir zaman gerçekleşmedi. Tam aksine İsrailin amacı kendi halkına bu bölgenin tarihlerini bir parçası olduğunu garantileyerek aynı zamanda hiç zaman kaybetmeden kalıcı kanıt yaratmaktaydı. Arap liderlerinin Filistin sorununa el atacağı ümidiyle yirmi senelik bir beklemeden sonra Filistin halkı sorunlarını kendileri çözmeye karar aldılar. Böylelikle 1987’de Filistinde ilk ayaklanma başladı. Ayaklanmanın getirdiği sonuçların birincisi Madrid Barış konferansı, ardından da Oslo Barış-süreci oldu. Her iki tarafın farklı barış anlayışı yüzünden barış görüşmeleri başarısızlıkla sonuçlandı. Bu başarısızlık 2000 yılında Al-Aqsa diye bilinen ikinci bir ayaklanmaya neden oldu. Bu kargaşaya son vermek amacı ile Ariel Sharon ‘Operation Defensive Shield’ diye adlandırılan bir operasyon düzenledi. Bu operasyonun sonucunda Oslo döneminde Filistinlilere verilen topraklar tekrar İsrail tarafından işgal edildi. Bu çalışmanın temel amacı, İsrail hükümetinin 1967 savaşı esnasında işgal ettiği Batı Şeria bölgesini hangi amaçla aldığınıö aldıktan sonra bu bölgede kaldırdığı yasa dışı yerleşimleri ne maksatla inşaa ettiği araştırılacaktır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Jewish settlements, 1967 Six-Day War, Arab reaction, settlement expansion, creeping annexation

To My Mother and Husband

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Chapter 1

INTRODUCTION

In the past, the powerful European Empires established colonies in different parts of the world, generally for economic reasons. None of these colonies were ever built on biblical assumptions or as an aim to “return” to a land.¹ However, the Jewish state, later declared the State of Israel in 1948, was built on such messianic pretenses.² The manner in which the Jewish settlements were first built in Palestine, followed by the establishment of a Jewish State in 1948, caused a serious refugee problem and furthermore violated many international laws in respect to land ownership, human-rights, freedom of movement...etc. Moreover, the movement of this Jewish population onto the territory of another’s after the Arab-Israeli War in 1967, also known as the Six-Day War, has created an infinite clash known as the Arab-Israeli conflict. According to Jewish biblical ideologies, the ancient Jews, who called themselves “Bnei Israel” or sons of Israel claimed that this land, Palestine, was promised to them by God.³ Almost all book sources, a majority published by Jewish scholars, dealing with the subject of Jewish settlements built on confiscated Arab land after the 1967 Arab-Israeli war mention the land of Palestine as being the

¹ For particular reasons of why on why colonies where established by European governments, see Marc Ferro, *Colonization: a Global History* (London: Routledge, 1997), 23-50.

² See Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “The Declaration of the Establishment of the State Of Israel, May 14, 1948”, URL: <http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/>

³ Charles D. Smith, *Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict* (New York: Bedford/St.Martins, 2007), 2.

Promised Land for the Jewish people. This act of occupation initiated under the name of a settlement movement was used by the Jewish intellectuals in Europe during the 19th century and later by Israeli politicians of the Jewish State in the 20th century as a divine intervention to unite the Jewish people and convince them to migrate to Palestine, moreover, claim the land for themselves, without any consideration for the indigenous population. This migration of Jews to the Promised Land and the expansion of Jewish settlements on the occupied territories gained after the Six-Day war created a negative impact on Israel's relation with the Arab world in the past and present.⁴

The significance of the 1967 Arab-Israeli War is that the Israeli society was transformed from a democratic self ruling nation to a colonizing power. This war gave the Israeli government the needed pretext for expansion and the eventual goal of permanent annexation of the land through illegal settlement building. Aside from the illegality of the occupying government's settlement policy, Israel also violated international laws: The Hague Regulations and Geneva Convention.

The purpose of this thesis is to shed a light on the Israeli government's settlement policy regarding the West Bank following the Six-Day War. There are many controversial debates among modern scholars, politicians and journalists about Israel's real intentions for these territories, mostly suggesting that the 'land for peace' was never an option to begin with. For what reason did Israel occupy these

⁴ Clive Jones, *Soviet Jewish aliyah, 1989-1992: Impact and Implications for Israel and the Middle East* (London: Frank Cass & Co. LTD., 1996), 8.

territories in 1967 and build illegal settlements that violated international and local laws? Were Israeli leaders planning to annex these territories for security reasons or simply to use these territories in exchange for peace and recognition by its Arab neighbors for its right to exist? This study will acknowledge these questions through analyzing the already existing and contradictory arguments among scholars and additionally documented statements made by Israeli and American politicians such as Dennis Ross, Richard Nixon, Jimmy Carter, Ariel Sharon, Abba Eban, Matityahu Drobbles, Golda Meir, Yigal Allon, and Menachem Begin. It will contribute to future students of social sciences interested in the Arab-Israeli conflict and the tactics that were used by the Israeli governments in reaching its national goals. It is imperative to expose the actual reason for Israel's occupation of the West Bank and why, against all odds, it has continued with its settlement policy. Irrespective to the conflicting views between the Israeli government's ruling parties, Likud and Labor⁵, the settlement policy appears to bring these governments' national objectives under one roof: a settlement expansion plan under the guide of security. According to Dajani, the Labor government that ran the country during the period of 1967 justified the need of these settlements for security reasons.⁶ Bringing light to the issue of illegal settlements will perhaps open new directions to what kind of future Palestinian State can be established. Is a two-state solution still viable after the confiscation of so

⁵ For differing traditions between Likud and Labor, See Sasson Sofer, "Towards Distant Frontiers: The Course of Israeli Diplomacy", in *Israel in the International Arena*, edited by Efraim Karsh (Frank Cass Publishers, 2004), 2-3.

⁶ Souad R. Dajani, *Eyes without country: searching for a Palestinian strategy of liberation*

(Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1994), 11.

much land or will peace negotiations between the Israelis and Palestinian based on a one-state solution be a more rational option for future peace?

The approach in which Israel colonized these territories in 1967; through war, transformed the Israeli image from a victim of the holocaust into an occupying force, defying all international laws and respect to human-rights. Israel became a problematic entity in the region surrounded by agitated Arab neighbors. The occupied territories in the West Bank, known by the Israelis as Judea and Samaria will form the central focus of this study. After analyzing a number of important primary and secondary resources, it will be argued that Israel's real intentions for the occupied territories after 1967 and its participation in peace negotiations was basically gaining time to build facts on the ground with the ultimate goal of *creeping annexation*.

The first chapter of this study presents a brief historical background of the Zionist movement during the Ottoman period and furthermore when the Jewish settlements started to become a problem for the local Arabs during the British Mandate. This part of the study will also mention the significance of the Six-Day War fought in 1967 between the Arab nations and Israel. The international and local laws violated by this occupation will be mentioned in this part of the study to give a better understanding of the depth of the problem.

The second chapter constitutes the core of this study and will chronologically examine two important periods in Israel's history of expansion and annexation. Firstly the period after the Six-Day War; of 1967 till 1977, as a slow and low-keyed

settlement policy that was implemented under the Labor government. Secondly, the period of 1977 till 1987, as an aggressive settlement policy by a dominant Likud government. According to Shafir, “the pioneering activity of Labor, as a movement of settlement and absorption of immigration, was the source from which it drew its legitimacy throughout the whole period of its political dominance until 1977.”⁷ After 1977 when Likud under Menachem Begin took control of the Israeli government, together with the help of Ariel Sharon and Matitiyahu Drobless, the settlement expansion plan took on a new dimension and unstoppable road in comparison to Labor’s. Likud’s aggressive settlement policy, together with its international violations to human rights, would cause great reaction by Israel’s closest ally the United States and by the Palestinian people which would result in an uprising in 1987 bringing us to the end of the second chapter. This chapter demonstrates the controversial dispute between the Israeli politicians within the ruling government on what to do with the territories occupied in the Six-Day War. Other national policies exercised by the Israeli government towards the Palestinians living in the occupied territories such as: deportation, house demolitions, land confiscation and collective punishment worked parallel with Israel’s expansion plan.

The third chapter examines Israel’s ‘changing’ policies and the U.S.’s first real involvement when Georg H. Bush takes office after the Palestinian Uprising. This new administration’s efforts would result in the 1991 Madrid Peace Conference. The Arab-Israeli peace-process would enter a new era when the Bush administration took office in 1989. Despite the continuing settlement expansion all through the peace-process, this era would be the start of peace talks under a new and realistic approach:

⁷ Gershon Shafir, “Changing Nationalism and Israel's "Open Frontier" on the West Bank,” *Theory and Society*, Vol. 13, No. 6 (Nov., 1984), 809. Stable URL: <http://www.jstor.org/stable/657140>. Accessed: 13/05/2011

“confidence-building”.⁸ These peace talks were a result of a more pro-active American administration, evolving policies by Arab leaders in the Middle-East due to the Gulf War and the end of the Soviet influence. According to Eisenberg, the international community witnessed the change in some Arab countries' policies with the melting of Soviet influence during this period. Bush would lay the foundations for the Clinton administration in regards to the peace-process. In addition to this, the U.S, Israeli and Palestinian Liberation Organization evolving policies and strategies, and their impact on the Arab-Israeli peace process will be presented. It can be argued that earlier peace plans and peace treaties signed after each Arab-Israeli war were responsible for Madrid and eventually the Oslo process during the Clinton period. In addition to this, other elements such as political powers in government and personal interests will be mentioned as key factors to the progress as well as stale-mate of the peace-process. Bill Clinton's efforts were also a success only in developing a method in opening bilateral talks resulting in the Oslo Peace Process. This era of peace talks will be evaluated in four stages: 1991 Madrid Peace Conference, Oslo Peace-Process in 1993, Netanyahu administration in 1996 and the decline of the Oslo process, and Clinton's final failed attempts in Camp David II and the 'Clinton Plan'. The arguments discussed in both Chapter two and three will examine Israel's intentions of expanding its borders through creeping annexation. This chapter will also discuss the reasons why Camp David II failed followed by its consequences: the Al-Aqsa Intifada.

The conclusion part of the study will argue whether the goal of Israel was to exchange these territories for peace with its neighbors or to expand its political

⁸ William B. Quandt, *Peace Process: American Diplomacy and the Arab-Israeli Conflict Since 1967* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2001), 295-296.

borders. Furthermore, the negative as well as positive results of the 1987 civilian uprising, Oslo Peace Process and Camp David II will be stated. Finally, the length of the illegal settlements and how they affect the daily lives of the Palestinians living within these territories will be pointed out. All final observations will assist the reader to identify and develop a deeper understanding of the settlement problem and its impact on the peace-process.

1.1 The Context and Background of the Settlement Movement

Historical Palestine was according to Zionist Jews, their birth right and moreover a part of 'Eretz Israel'.⁹ What was seen as an act of occupation by other governments was for them a sacred commitment.¹⁰ Today, leaders of the state of Israel all follow this conviction not necessarily for religious consideration but for the state's national interests: 'security by expansion'. In fact, the first well-known Zionist leaders of the 19th and 20th century that helped built the Jewish State were Marxists and secularists. Theodor Herzl, the father of the first Zionist movement was a secular Jew while some of these secular Jews had Marxist tendencies such as Ze'ev Jabotinsky, Chaim Weizmann and David Ben-Gurion.¹¹ To Theodor Herzl, Palestine symbolized his Jewish identity, customs, freedom and pride. The drive of establishing a state for the Jews was in fact not based on religious beliefs, but on lack of Jewish rights, equality and moreover the level of anti-Semitism towards the Jews in Europe.¹² In my

⁹ For the description of Eretz Israel, see Kermit Zarley, *Palestine Is Coming: The Revival of Ancient Philistia* (Texas: Hannibal Books, 1990), 11-27.

¹⁰ Norman Lamm, *The religious thought of Hasidism: text and commentary* (New Jersey: Ktav Pub. Inc., 1999), 536-537.

¹¹ Jacob Golomb, *Nietzsche and Zion* (New York: Cornell University Press, 2004), 23-24.

¹² Theodor Herzl, *The Jewish State* (Texas: Filiquarian Publishing, LLC, 2006), 63. Also, see Karen Armstrong, *Jerusalem: One City Three Faiths* (New York: Ballantine Books, 1997), 377.

opinion, religion is used as one of the most effective forces in forming a strong argument. The Zionist leaders used religious ideologies for the purpose of reaching a certain goal: building a Jewish State. These religious beliefs were hardly the reason why the Zionist leaders were interested in Palestine. For them, building a state was the basic need of self-preservation and national pride. Rowley and Taylor support this argument by stating that David Ben-Gurion, the first Prime Minister of the state of Israel and his party directly used religion (Mizrahi) as a tool to promote political unity.¹³ One of the Zionist's well-known literary phrases was: "A land without a people for a people without a land".¹⁴ On the contrary, this was never the case in Palestine; it was not a land without any people. Palestinians had lived on this land for centuries and naturally considered it their home.¹⁵ They did not need to make up stories or myths to attach themselves to the land as did the Jews. Their connection to the land was adamant: centuries of existence in the territory. In other words, Palestinians did not build dwellings as an instrument to commit to the land.

It was during the Ottoman period in Palestine that marked the beginning of the modern Zionist movement; when Jews started to migrate to the holy land and establish agricultural settlements in the late 19th century and early 20th century. These Jews were escaping discrimination and persecution in Western and Eastern Europe.¹⁶

¹³ Charles K. Rowley and Jennis Taylor, "The Israel and Palestine land settlement problem, 1948–2005: An analytical history", *Public Choice*, Vol. 128, No. 1/2, Jul., 2006, 85, URL: <http://www.jstor.org/pss/30026634>

¹⁴ Alan M. Dershowitz, *The Case for Israel* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2003), 24.

¹⁵ Karen Armstrong, *Jerusalem: One City Three Faiths* (New York: Ballantine Books, 1997), 377.

¹⁶ Menachem Mautner, *Law and the Culture of Israel* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), 14.

For reasons on why the Jews were discriminated in Europe, especially in Eastern Europe, see Ofira Seliktar, *New Zionism and the foreign policy system of Israel* (Sydney & Kent: Croom Helm Ltd., 1986), 42-43.

According to Marcus, it was the Russian Jews who formed the foundation of this settlement movement, also called the Zionist movement.¹⁷ The father of this movement and the leader of Jewish affairs was Theodor Herzl, an Austro-Hungarian secular Jew. He was a man that became aware of a Jewish problem in the world and the need for the Jews to establish their own sovereign state. The location of this future state was decided as Palestine during the First Zionist Congress convened by Herzl and held in Switzerland in 1897.¹⁸ It can be stated that this date officially marked the beginning of the settlement movement in Palestine. According to Itamar Rabinovich, the aim of this Congress was to “create a home in Palestine for the Jews through colonization.”¹⁹ According to Bowers, Zionism refers to:

“the national movement for the return of the Jewish people to their homeland and the resumption of Jewish sovereignty in the Land of Israel, advocated, from its inception, tangible as well as spiritual aims. Jews of all persuasions, left and right, religious and secular, joined to form the Zionist movement and worked together toward these goals. Disagreements led to rifts, but ultimately, the common goal of a Jewish state in its ancient homeland was attained.”²⁰

The Jews that arrived in Palestine believed that this was the Promised Land and that the rest of the inhabitants were invaders.²¹ The first group of Jewish settlers that arrived from Russia in the 1880s consisted of Zionist socialists. This community needed to evade the prejudice surrounding, and so it came to Palestine. They planned

¹⁷ Amy Dockser Marcus, *Jerusalem 1913: The Origins of the Arab-Israeli Conflict* (New York: Penguin Group, 2007), 11.

¹⁸ Avi Shlaim, *The Iron Wall* (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2001), 2-3. Also, See Dan Cohn-Sherbok, *Judaism: history, belief, and practice* (London & New York: Routledge, 2003), 278.

¹⁹ Itamar Rabinovich, *Israel in the Middle East: Documents and Readings on Society, Politics, and Foreign Relations, Pre-1948 to the Present* (Boston: Brandeis; 2nd ed., 2007), 21.

²⁰ Morris Glen Bowers, *ISRAEL: the 51st State: ...the Unspoken Foreign Policy of the United States of America* (Bloomington: iUniverse, Inc., 2005), xi.

²¹ Dockers Marcus, *Jerusalem 1913*, 9.

to build their own Jewish state by purchasing land from absentee land-lords, both Palestinian and non-Palestinian.²² The second group of settlers arrived in 1902. One of the arrivals was Israel's first Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion, a man who was a passionate Zionist leader and once claimed that Palestine was uninhabited.²³ This attitude may have entrenched the Jewish problem at the time but on the other hand created the 'Palestinian question'. Soon, the first official settlements; the traditional farm known as the 'kibbutz' were established. The idea behind the kibbutz is to spiritually connect the Jewish people to the land by working the land as equals as did their ancestors in the past.²⁴ According to sources, over 60,000 Jews migrated to Palestine from 1880 to 1914²⁵ and by 1917, this number grew to 90,000.²⁶ During this period, Theodor Herzl hoped to create a Jewish homeland for the Jews in Palestine and in return from the paying off the Ottomans debts. The Jewish charter was completely rejected by the Ottoman Sultan.²⁷ But this rejection did neither stop immigration nor the settlement building in Palestine. The Jewish leaders had to find other ways to reach their goals.

With the downfall of the Ottoman Empire, Britain occupied the territories of Iraq, Palestine and future Trans-Jordan. After this change, Zionists had the upper hand in enforcing their decisions because Britain was very much supportive of their

²² Dershowitz, *Israel*, 25.

²³ Armstrong, *Jerusalem*, 369.

²⁴ Shalom Lilker, *Kibbutz Judaism: a new tradition in the making* (New Jersey: Rosemont Publishing, 1982), 134-135.

²⁵ Martín Gilbert, *The Routledge Atlas of the Arab-Israeli Conflict: The Complete History of the Struggle and the Efforts to Resolve it (Routledge Historical Atlases)* (London & New York: Routledge, 2002), 3.

²⁶ Dan Cohn-Sherbok, *Judaism: history, belief, and practice* (London & New York: Routledge, 2003), 280.

²⁷ Cohn-Sherbok, *Judaism*, 278-279.

movement.²⁸ After a previous failed attempt by Herzl in his diplomatic approach with the Turks, Chaim Weizmann, the President of the World Zionist Organization and the future first president of the State of Israel, presented the Jewish charter to the British. This charter was welcomed by the British and as an outcome, resulted in the Balfour Declaration named after the British foreign secretary Arthur James Balfour; where Britain granted the Jews a homeland in Palestine.²⁹ In fact, Britain fully cooperated with Weizmann and the Zionist Jews in their calling, the reason being that this siding would aid the British national interests in the region in securing the Suez Canal.³⁰ According to the Balfour Declaration of 1917:

"His Majesty's Government views with favor the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, and will use their best endeavors to facilitate the achievement of this objective, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine. . . ."³¹

This statement caused tensions between the Palestinians and the Jews. It can be stated that this proclamation officially marked the beginning of a quest for self-determination. On the other hand, with Balfour's full support, Weizmann created a Zionist Commission for Palestine. This commission's duties were assisting the

²⁸ Armstrong, *Jerusalem*, 374.

²⁹ Haim Ben-Asher, *The Zionist Illusion* (Bloomington: iUniverse, Inc., 2010), 125-126.

³⁰ Abraham Malamat and Haim Hillel Ben-Sasson, *A History of the Jewish People* (Tel Aviv: Dvir Publishing House, 1969), 989-990. Also, see Illan Pappé, *A History of Modern Palestine: One Land, Two Peoples* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 65.

For British interests in the region, see Isaiah Friedman, *The question of Palestine: British-Jewish-Arab relations, 1914-1918* (New Jersey: Transaction Publishers, 1992), 1-7.

³¹ Cited in Smith, *Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict*, 77.

British military in all dealings related to the Zionist movement. According to Gavish, the commission's mission included "immigration, land acquisition, settlement and the development of natural resources, furthermore, conducting a land survey for identifying state domain lands, vacant uncultivated lands and abandoned lands"³², in other words, all things required to move a population into an area and maintain for it a sufficient means of life. All these preparations were planned in the expectation of establishing a state.³³ To ease tensions between the Jewish and Arab communities, the British colonial secretary Winston Churchill, came up with a white paper in 1922 to clarify Britain's intentions in hope of satisfying the Arab side.³⁴ However, this paper was rejected by the Palestinian notables of Palestine. It can be argued that diplomatic means failed when it came to dealing with the Palestinians. On the other hand, Armstrong states that the Zionists accepted all proposals made by the British and later by the Americans which was how they were able to reach their goals; the Jewish State. This was an era when the Ottoman Empire was collapsing and the Arab leaders were pursuing nationalism and their own independent states with the backing of the British. This support for nationalism, however, did not include the Palestinians.³⁵ When British Colonel Richard Meinertzhagen was appointed Chief political officer for Palestine and Syria, he personally worked in 1920 with Weizmann in setting up a civilian government in Palestine so that the Land Registry Office could be reopened and land transfers could resume.³⁶ Additionally, with his efforts land transfer prohibitions were removed in order to permit the Zionists to

³² Dov Gavish, *A Survey of Palestine under the British Mandate, 1920-1948* (London & New York: Routledge, 2005), 28-29.

³³ To read more about how the land question was handled and Zionist land purchasing, see Charles D. Smith, *Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict*, 126-133.

³⁴ Armstrong, *Jerusalem*, 376.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, 371-374.

³⁶ Gavish, *Survey of Palestine*, 23.

reach their goal in buying land for building new settlements.³⁷ This would be on a small scale for the time being. It was during this decade that the Zionist Jews were becoming increasingly organized. Besides the agricultural settlements, they were creating an army, trade unions, educational institutions and other organizations necessary to shape the future state of Israel.³⁸

Whatever was stated in the Balfour declaration was officially realized during the British Mandate period in Palestine. The British Mandate, confirmed by the Council of the League of Nations in 1922, came into operation in 1923.³⁹ The British were now officially in charge of the territories of Palestine and Iraq. According to Howard Grief, the conditions and terms of the mandate were drafted by the Zionist Organization.⁴⁰ Therefore, it did not deal with any Arab national rights. This mandate clearly illustrated the British sympathy to the Zionist movement and moreover the British interests in the region. Grief affirms that there was actually only one purpose for the mandate and that was clearly to secure the establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine.⁴¹ According to Article 2, 4 and 6 of the Mandate for Palestine,

The Mandatory shall be responsible for placing the country under such political, administrative and economic conditions as will secure the establishment of the Jewish national home...An appropriate Jewish agency shall be recognized as a public body for the purpose of advising and cooperating with the Administration of Palestine in such economic, social and other matters as may affect the establishment of the Jewish national home and the interests of the Jewish population in Palestine...The Administration of Palestine, while ensuring that the rights and position of other sections of the population are not prejudiced, shall

³⁷ Ibid., 38.

³⁸ Armstrong, *Jerusalem*, 380.

³⁹ Malamat and Ben-Sasson, *Jewish People*, 997.

⁴⁰ For Zionist involvement in the Mandate, see Howard Grief, *The Legal Foundation and Borders of Israel Under International Law* (Jerusalem: Mazo Publishers, 2008), 118-119.

⁴¹ Howard Grief, *The Legal Foundation and Borders of Israel Under International Law* (Jerusalem: Mazo Publishers, 2008), 128.

facilitate Jewish immigration under suitable conditions and shall encourage, in cooperation with the Jewish agency referred to in Article 4, close settlement by Jews on the land, including State lands and waste lands not required for public purposes.⁴²

By the 1930s tensions in Palestine between the Jews and Arabs increased due to increased Jewish immigration. This tense situation during the mandate years due to unchecked Jewish immigration and purchase of land from absentee Arab landowners led to the rise of extremists on both sides.⁴³ Both communities started to arm themselves for a full confrontation. Because of the British support to the Zionist movement, the Arabs, who were controlled by notables, were furious and started to fight against the British administration as well. When the Jewish immigration reached its climax by 1935, it was followed by the 1936 Arab-revolt a year later which lasted until 1938.⁴⁴ This revolt was a result of the Arab nationalist movement that started a decade earlier. It was a reaction caused by the British and the Jewish settlement expansion which was a result of Britain favoring the Zionists.⁴⁵ Eventually, things got out of hand and the British were unable to control both sides. In 1937 the British Peel Committee recommended a partition plan between the Jews and the Arabs, with Jerusalem under permanent control of the mandate (see Map 1). This plan was in theory accepted by the Zionists but completely rejected by the Arabs.⁴⁶ This refusal was then followed by a new White Paper in 1939 which limited

⁴² Cited in Malamat and Ben-Sasson, *op.cit.*,997.

⁴³ Sara E. Karesh, and Mitchell M. Hurvitz, *Encyclopedia of Judaism* (New York: Checkmark Books, 2007), 25.

⁴⁴ Armstrong, *Jerusalem*, 383. Also, see Ted Swedenburg, “The Role of the Palestinian Peasantry in the Great Revolt 1936 – 1939,” in *Islam, Politics, and Social Movements*, ed. Edmund Burke III, Ira Lapidus (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988), 194.

⁴⁵ William B. Quandt, Paul Jabber and Ann Mosely Lesch, *The Politics of Palestinian Nationalism*

(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973), 7.

⁴⁶ For the full report by the Commission, see “The Peel Commission Report (July 1937),” The Jewish Virtual Library, <http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/History/peel1.html>. Also, see Ted Swedenburg, “The Role of the Palestinian Peasantry in the Great Revolt 1936 – 1939,” in *Islam*,

and controlled the Jewish immigration.⁴⁷ It also suggested parity: a one-state solution for both the Arabs and the Jews to govern together on the basis of population relation. According to this proposition, the Palestinians would have the upper hand in the government due to Arab-Jewish population ratio. This situation broke the trust between the British and the Zionists and was followed by terrorist attacks organized by Jewish gangs. These gangs were led by the extremist Zionists. They were against a one-state solution as well as a partition plan. Furthermore, they targeted and killed the British as well as the Arabs. Peculiarly, two of the leaders of these terrorist organizations, Menachem Begin and Yitzhak Shamir later became prime minister of the future State of Israel.⁴⁸

The Holocaust gave the Zionist leaders another device for reaching their goal of creating a Jewish State in such a short time. Moreover, the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem Amin Al-Husayni's relationship with the Nazi's also added to their cause. According to Pappé, during Hitler's bitter days, these leaders insisted that the Jews should migrate only to Palestine. The Zionists completely ignored the White Paper and immigration increased more than ever. The settlement policy was rapidly creating facts on the ground (see Map 3).⁴⁹

By 1947, the terrorist attacks on both sides escalated leaving the British in a helpless state.⁵⁰ That same year in February the UN General Assembly proposed a partition plan. This partition plan would call for 56% of historical Palestine to become a

Politics, and Social Movements, ed. Edmund Burke III, Ira Lapidus (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988), 189-194.

⁴⁷ Armstrong, *Jerusalem*, 384-385. Also, see "White Paper." *Encyclopædia Britannica. Encyclopædia Britannica Online*. Encyclopædia Britannica, 2011. Web. 08 Jul. 2011. <<http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/642470/White-Paper>>.

⁴⁸ Noam Chomsky, *Fateful Triangle: The United States, Israel, and the Palestinians* (London: Pluto Press, 1999), 94-95.

⁴⁹ Ilan Pappé, *A History of Modern Palestine: One Land, Two Peoples* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 118-120.

⁵⁰ Armstrong, *Jerusalem*, 385-386.

Jewish State and the rest would be left for the Arabs (see Map 2). This proposal was accepted by the Zionists but rejected by the Arabs. This rejectionist attitude was in fact the Arabs' last chance for a real state. The Zionists decided to completely free Palestine from the Arabs. Once again, it was the Arab notables that provided a pretext for the Jews. Tension grew even further to the point where the revisionist Jews created plans for ethnic cleansing.⁵¹ Israeli terror encouraged over 300,000 Arabs to flee for their lives to refugee camps in and outside the borders of Palestine. This was the start of the Palestinian refugee problem. The British mandate was terminated on May 15th 1948 because Britain was no longer able to financially maintain their stay. A day before the mandate ended, the Jewish People's Council declared the establishment of the state of Israel.⁵² Immediately after that, war broke out between the new state and its Arab neighbors. During this clash 700,000 more Arabs fled or according to Chomsky, were expelled from Palestine.⁵³ Expulsion would be experienced again by the Arabs later in the 1956 and 1967 Arab-Israeli wars. The 1948 war reached a cease-fire with the mediation of the UN. It was followed by the 1949 Armistice Agreements between Israel and Transjordan, Egypt and Syria.⁵⁴ The West Bank was assigned to the Kingdom of Jordan while the Gaza Strip was placed under Egyptian control (see Map 2). The rest which was half of the designated Palestinian state was assigned to the State of Israel until 1967.⁵⁵

⁵¹ Chomsky, *Faithful Triangle*, 95-96.

⁵² Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs "The Declaration of the Establishment of the State of Israel, May 14, 1948," URL: <http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/>.

⁵³ Chomsky, *Faithful Triangle*, 96.

⁵⁴ Ilan Pappé, *The Making of the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1947-1951* (London & New York: I.B.Tauris & Co.Ltd., 2006), 176.

⁵⁵ Chomsky, *op.cit.*, 96-97.

1.2 New Settlement Policies after 1967 and the Significance of the Six Day War

The 1967 Arab-Israeli War was a military success for the state of Israel at the time where it demonstrated its supremacy. On the other hand, Abba Eban, a senior Israeli politician, affirms that it was also a “moral disaster”. It transformed the Jewish State into an entity which “rules a people larger than one-third of itself”.⁵⁶ According to a report by the Foundation for Middle East Peace, “All Israeli governments, Labor and Likud, pursued settlements after 1967 in order to consolidate Israeli control over the occupied territories and prevent the emergence of a Palestinian state.”⁵⁷

Additionally, Israel assigned strict restrictions on the Palestinian people living in these territories. Carmel Shalev states that directly after this war, the Palestinians living in the West Bank were not allowed entrance to or exit from the territories. In addition to this, the military government exercised collective punishment by cutting telephone lines, water and electricity, placing the community under curfews and demolishing of houses. These actions especially escalated during the Intifada years but according to Shalev’s report, this collective punishment policy was undertaken since the Israeli government gained control over the territories in 1967.⁵⁸ Besides these policies, another type of collective punishment administered by the Israeli government against the Palestinian resistance was house demolishing. According to Ilan Pappé, half of the town of Qalqilya was destroyed after the Israeli Defense Force faced a resistance opposing the occupation. Moshe Dayan ordered the military to

⁵⁶ Abba Solomon Eban, *Heritage: civilization and the Jews* (New York: Summit Books, 1986), 185-186.

⁵⁷ “ISRAELI SETTLEMENTS IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES, A Guide,” A Special Report of the Foundation for Middle East Peace, <http://www.fmep.org/reports/special-reports/a-guide-to-israeli-settlements-in-the-occupied-territories/PDF>

⁵⁸ Carmel Shalev, “Collective Punishment in the West Bank and The Gaza Strip,” *B’Tselem*, November 1990, 30. www.btselem.org/Download/199011_Collective_Punishment_Eng.pdf

take severe action and make an example of this town. This was one of the many ways Israel used to stop Palestinian political activities in the occupied territories.⁵⁹

On June 4, 1967, Levi Eshkol, the third Prime Minister of Israel, formed a Labor dominated National Unity Government, co-opting Moshe Dayan as Minister of Defense and Menachem Begin and Yosef Saphir as ministers without portfolio.⁶⁰ According to Lein and Weizman, “The initial inclination of most of the members of the government was to hold the territory as a bargaining chip for future negotiations.”⁶¹ Joseph Alper states that the government of Israel conceived these territories as “deposits” held until they can be returned in exchange for peace arrangements.⁶² According to Abdul-Ilah Abu-Ayyash, “security was the top priority for the state policy and these settlements would serve as defensive frontiers against the Palestinian resistance.”⁶³ The territories under discussion were perceived as defensive lines in order to secure the existence of the state of Israel and to protect against any neighboring country aiming for its destruction. Abba Eban states that both Eshkol and later Prime Minister Golda Meir were on the side of territorial compromise. Levi Eshkol was willing to give up territory in the West Bank to Jordan in return for peace.⁶⁴ In other words, they were planning to keep a part of the land for

⁵⁹ Pappe, *The History of Modern Palestine*, 197.

⁶⁰ Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs “The Governments of Israel- 13th Government -January 12- 1966-March 17, 1969,” <http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/>.

⁶¹ Yehezkel Lein, Eyal Weizman, “Land Grab: Israel's Settlement Policy in the West Bank,” *B'Tselem*, May 2002, 47, www.btselem.org/Download/200205_Land_Grab_eng.pdf

⁶² Joseph Alper, “Settlement and Borders in the Israeli-Palestinian Relations,” Expanding the Conversation, *Union of American Hebrew Congregations*, Issue 2, 2001, 5-6.

⁶³ Abdul-Ilah Abu-Ayyash, “Israeli Regional Planning Policy in the Occupied Territories,” *Journal of Palestine Studies*, Vol. 5, No. 3/4 (Spring - Summer, 1976), 90.

⁶⁴ Abba Solomon Eban, *Abba Eban: An Autobiography* (London: Random House; 1st edition, 1977),

security reasons and return what is left to Jordan and Egypt as a part of the Allon Plan⁶⁵, which will be mentioned in details in the next chapter.

On the other hand, Gershom Gorenberg states that major housing developments beyond the Green Line were decided upon by the government the same month the war ended.⁶⁶ After the war, new territories were occupied and some were annexed to the State of Israel in order to create a security buffer zone with its neighbors. According to Efraim Ben-Zadok, “The focus of settlement activities was directed toward the new territories occupied in the Six-Day War: Sinai, Gaza, Golan, and the West Bank.”⁶⁷ (see Map 2). In reality, most of these territories, particularly the West Bank and East Jerusalem were never intended to be returned to their rightful inhabitants in any near or distant future. The implementation of Jewish settlements in Judea and Samaria was linked to Israeli’s ideological beliefs. The government’s national planning was focused around three priorities: basic security, defense needs and geopolitics.⁶⁸ According to Pappé, “Judea and Samaria were a vital part of the Jewish State” and moreover, regarded by the nationalist Jews as “the heart of ancient Israel: without the realization of the Zionist dream would remain incomplete”.⁶⁹

During that critical period, the Mapai government was in power and headed by Levi Eshkol. It later became known as the Labor party in 1968. Shortly after the ‘1967 War’ it was this government that renewed the settlement activity in the West Bank and Gaza. Additionally, Labor initiated settlement plans for the newly conquered

⁶⁵ M.E. Yapp, *The Near East since the First World War* (Longman Pub Group; 2 Sub edition, 1996), 421.

⁶⁶ Gershom Gorenberg, *The Accidental Empire: Israel and the Birth of the Settlements, 1967-1977* (New York: Times Books, 2006), 59-61.

⁶⁷ Ben-Zadok, “National Planning”, 333.

⁶⁸ Ben-Zadok, “National Planning”, 340-341.

⁶⁹ Pappé, *The History of Modern Palestine*, 187-188.

Golan and Sinai.⁷⁰ Even though the international community considered these territories as occupied, General Dayan and his followers from Labor stated that they originally belonged to Israel and were finally liberated from the Arabs. The Israelis argued that the political borders coincided with their natural boundaries after the Six Day War.⁷¹ When Dayan was asked in 1968 about Labor's plans in respect to the occupied territories, his reply was "the first step is the traditional one in the realm of action in the State of Israel - settlement."⁷²

According to Nisan, "Israel's settlement policy served to "create political facts" on the ground regarding Israel's future boundaries in any final agreement with the Arabs.... Settlement was a demonstrative method of control that manifested a sense of Israeli permanency. The existence of the army registered the fact of control; but the existence of civilian settlements suggested the integration of new areas with "old pre-'67 Israel."⁷³

1.3 International and Local Law Dimensions

Throughout the period from 1967 to 1987 the Israeli government, ruled first by Labor and later by Likud, was greatly influenced by messianic ideologies, in which "the occupied land was part of biblical Israel and therefore belonged to the Jews".⁷⁴

⁷⁰ Ben-Zadok, op.cit., 340-341.

⁷¹ Abdul-Ilah Abu-Ayyash, "Israeli Regional Planning Policy", 84.

⁷² Moshe Dayan, *New Map - New Relations* (Tel Aviv: Maariv, 1969), 164 (Hebrew). Cited in Gershon Shafir, "Changing Nationalism and Israel's "Open Frontier" on the West Bank," *Theory and Society*, Vol. 13, No. 6 (Nov., 1984), 809. Stable URL: <http://www.jstor.org/stable/657140>.

⁷³ Cited in Ben-Zadok, "National Planning", 336.

⁷⁴ Many nationalist and religious Israelis considered this area the geographic and spiritual heartland of the biblical Promised Land. The names date back to the Jewish Bibles. The book of Joshua first mentions Judea as the area assigned to the tribe of Judah. Samaria was named after the city that was the capital of the Northern Kingdom of Israel. See Sara E. Karesh, and Mitchell M. Hurvitz, *Encyclopedia of Judaism* (New York: Checkmark Books, 2007), 258-259. Moreover, most Israelis claim that it is mentioned in the Book of Genesis that the whole of Palestine has been promised to

Among other government policies, when this powerful ideology entered the Israeli political environment, it strongly dictated the national settlement planning decisions. The outcomes of these decisions voiced by these two governments imposed would have a negative effect on Israel's relationship with its neighboring countries and its strongest ally, the United States. Furthermore, due to the level of discrimination and endless acts of human rights violations, it would create endless acts of oppression and retaliation by the Palestinian civilians in the occupied territories, which will be discussed in the next chapter.

The settlement activity which took place in the occupied territories after the 1967 Six-day War violated international laws such as: The Hague Regulations⁷⁵, the Fourth Geneva Convention⁷⁶, as well as local laws which were the British Mandatory law and Jordanian planning law. According to Khamaisi, the Israeli government took advantage of "the Mandate's structural plans and the Jordanian system in a selective manner" and restructured some parts of these laws for its own national interests.⁷⁷ Laster and Livney state that even today some of the local laws date back from the British mandate. They have either been modified or amended by the Israeli government.⁷⁸ According to Article 43 of the Hague Convention (1907), "the occupying nation may not change laws existent prior to the occupation, unless there is an absolute deterrent to preserving them". According to a briefing paper by Al-

them by God. See James D. Hacker, *Israel: Whose Promised Land?* (Longwood: Xulon Press, 2004), 23-24.

⁷⁵ Regulations Concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Annex to the Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277, 1 Bevans 631 [hereinafter Hague Regulations].

⁷⁶ Geneva Convention (Fourth) Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Fourth Geneva Convention].

⁷⁷ Rassem Khamaisi, "Institutionalized Planning in Palestine," in *The Reconstruction of Palestine: Urban and Rural Development*, ed. A. B. Zahlan, Kegan Paul International (London: Kegan Paul International, 1997), 207-225. Cited in Dr. Ali Abdelhamid, "Urban Development and Planning in the Occupied Palestinian Territories: Impacts on Urban Form," 7, URL: http://blogs.najah.edu/staff/emp_3044/article/Urban-Development-and-Planning-in-the-Occupied-Palestinian-Territories-Impacts-on-Urban-Form/file/001.pdf

⁷⁸ Richard Laster, Dan Livney, *Environmental Law in Israel*, (Maryland: Kluwer Law International, Aspen Publishers, 2011), 133.

Haq organization, these new laws created and existing ones modified by the Israeli authorities were an apparent attempt to further the state's goals of colonization.⁷⁹ The Higher Planning Council assigned by the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) made whatever changes were needed in the laws regarding planning and construction for preventing Palestinians from obtaining building permits or even keeping their lands. Moreover, there was the 'Israeli Planning and Building Law of 1965' that allowed the state to demolish homes deemed "a public nuisance." When Israel illegally annexed East Jerusalem and occupied the West Bank in 1967, this law was exercised within these territories and therefore, thousands of homes and even entire neighborhoods were torn down by the government.⁸⁰ The military council assigned was put in charge of "planning schemes, local plans, building licenses, expanding city boundaries or determining village borders".⁸¹ In addition to this, the government used a Law enacted during the British Mandate (Regulation 119 of the Defense (Emergency) Regulations) for demolishing and sealing houses in the occupied territories. According to Article 53 of the Fourth Geneva Convention:

"Any destruction by the Occupying Power of real or personal property belonging individually or collectively to private persons, or to the State, or to other public authorities, or to social or cooperative organizations, is prohibited, except where such destruction is rendered absolutely necessary by military operations."⁸²

⁷⁹ Al-Haq, "Twenty Years of Israel Occupation of the West Bank and Gaza," *Al - Haq/ Law in Service of Man*, 1987, 2, URL: http://www.alhaq.org/pdfs/Twenty_Years_of_Israel_Occupation_of_the_West_Bank_and_Gaza.pdf

Al-Haq is an independent Palestinian non-governmental human rights organization based in Ramallah, West Bank. Established in 1979 to protect and promote human rights and the rule of law in the Occupied Palestinian Territory (OPT), the organization has special consultative status with the United Nations Economic and Social Council.

⁸⁰ Ma'an News Agency, "Article 212: The Israeli Planning and Building Law of 1965", Published Saturday 13/03/2010, URL: www.maannews.net/eng/ViewDetails.aspx?ID=268387

⁸¹ Yuval Ginbar, "Limitations on Building of Residence on the West Bank," *B'Tselem*, August 1990, 6, URL: www.btselem.org/Download/199008_Limitations_on_Building_Eng.doc

⁸² Ronny Talmor, "Demolition and Sealing of Houses as a punitive measure in the West Bank and Gaza Strip during the Intifada," *B'Tselem*, September 1989, 7-8, URL: www.btselem.org/Download/198909_House_Demolitions_Eng.rtf

This was a part of a well orchestrated settlement policy; preventing the Palestinians from building houses, confiscating their land and constructing Jewish settlements by means of modifying old laws and using them as a means of *creeping annexation*, which is the main theme of this study. Another Law amended by Israel in order to annex land was the Jordanian government's 1953 law, which gives the government the right to expropriate land for public purposes. According to Walter Lehn and Uri Davis, Israel modified this law by replacing a public court into a committee formed of three military officers responsible for issues regarding the expropriated land. In many cases the land-owners were unable to prove ownership and therefore lost their land.⁸³ This settlement policy in the occupied territories after 1967, especially in the West Bank, became "the subject of international politics and diplomatic struggles, including the pressure exerted by United Nations resolutions".⁸⁴ One very clear international humanitarian law that stood in the way of these settlements is the Fourth Geneva Convention which protects the status of publicly owned land confiscated during war.⁸⁵ According to John Quigley, Article 49 of the Geneva Convention clearly argues that it is prohibited to remove a population from its territory; however, Israel did not hesitate to expel the Palestinians from their own

⁸³ Walter Lehn and Uri Davis, *The Jewish National Fund*, (London: Kegan Paul International, 1988), 179-180.

⁸⁴ Efraim Ben-Zadok, "National Planning -- The Critical Neglected Link: One Hundred Years of Jewish Settlement in Israel," *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, Vol. 17, No. 3 (Aug., 1985), 333. For information on UNSCR 242, see Avi Shlaim, *The Iron Wall* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2001), 338.

⁸⁵ For the Convention Relating to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time Of War, see "Part III : Status and treatment of protected persons #Section III : Occupied territories: Article 49", Convention (IV) relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War. Geneva, 12 August 1949, International Humanitarian Law - Treaties & Documents, URL: <http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/WebList?ReadForm&id=380&t=art>

land.⁸⁶ Moreover Nir Shalev states that this article, as well as the International humanitarian law, prohibits an occupying power from transferring its civilian population to the occupied territory.⁸⁷

The illegal annexation of East Jerusalem and occupation of the West Bank brought new challenges to the Israeli government. This territorial policy caused new security issues and changed the demographical balance of the state. But, nonetheless, Israel was planning to hold on to these territories for as long as it could, either as a negotiating card or realizing Eretz Israel.

Chapter 2

LABOR AND LIKUD'S SETTLEMENT POLICIES FROM 1967 TO 1987

⁸⁶ John Quigley, *The case for Palestine: an international law perspective* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2005), 202.

⁸⁷ Nir Shalev, "The Ofra Settlement, An Unauthorized Outpost," *B'Tselem*, December 2008, 5, URL: www.btselem.org/Download/200812_Ofra_eng.pdf

2.1 Labor Administration: The Eshkol-Meir Period (1967-1973)

2.1.1 Eshkol-Meir's Settlement Policy

The idea behind Jewish settlements in the occupied territories was necessary for the Israeli government, not for maintaining security in the area, but as a liable excuse for holding the army in these areas.⁸⁸ As the Arab leaders refused to directly negotiate with Israel for peace, the Israeli government used this position to justify annexation.⁸⁹ This Arab position gave Israel a suitable pretext in this period for pursuing its goals. On the other hand, Shlaim affirms that it was never stated by any Arab leader that the Arab states did not accept indirect negotiations. In fact, President Nasser and King Hussein were in favor of a peace settlement with Israel.⁹⁰ According to Yapp, Egypt and Jordan were ready to accept the 1949 armistice borders as well as coming to an understanding on the Palestinian refugee problem.⁹¹ The 'rejectionist' attitude by the Arab Heads of State at the Khartoum Conference that year was in Israel's best interest.⁹² Israel used its own interpretation of the Conference to pursue its national plans. According to Gorenberg, it had a great effect on the cabinet's decisions of settlement expansion. Israel was now on its own in the Middle East and was free to take any decision without having to answer to anyone, including the United States. While U.S. President Nixon states that "while we are right to support Israel's survival and security, we would be wrong to back the current

⁸⁸ "ISRAELI SETTLEMENTS IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES, A Guide", A Special Report of the Foundation for Middle East Peace, 1, URL: <http://www.fmep.org/reports/special-reports/a-guide-to-israeli-settlements-in-the-occupied-territories/PDF>

⁸⁹ Alper, "Settlement and Borders", 5-6.

⁹⁰ Shlaim, *Wall*, 258-259.

⁹¹ Yapp, *The Near East*, 419.

⁹² Khartoum Conference: Eight Arab heads of state attended an Arab summit conference in Khartoum during August 29 - September 1, 1967. It formulated the Arab consensus that underlay the policies of most Arab states participating in the conflict until the early 1970's. The resolution adopted called for the continued struggle against Israel, the creation of a fund to assist the economics of Egypt and Jordan, the lifting of an Arab oil boycott against the West and a new agreement to end the war in Yemen. By adopting the dictum of no peace with Israel, no recognition of Israel and no negotiations with Israel, the Arab states appeared to have slammed the door on any progress towards peace.

Israeli government's extreme demands".⁹³ In fact, during his administration, Israel received full financial and military support because of its position as a strategic asset in the Middle East.⁹⁴ Moreover, Nixon provided Israel with military assistance during the 1973 Arab-Israeli War. According to Mearsheimer and Walt, "Israel is the only US recipient that does not have to account for how the aid is spent...like building settlements in the West Bank".⁹⁵

After the Khartoum Conference, Israel decided to establish settlement outposts in zones it believed was necessary for 'security reasons'. According to Gorenberg, this would be the first announcement of concrete plans since June 1967.⁹⁶ The first official settlement in the West Bank approved by the Prime Minister Levi Eshkol was Kfar Etzion Bloc.⁹⁷ Even though Israel fully realized the illegality of building settlements in these territories, Levi Eshkol and his cabinet took the decision to permit settlers to move in the Etzion area.⁹⁸ Israel explained these settlements to the US as "military positions in control of occupied territories...for the necessary length of time" in which the US blindly accepted.⁹⁹ Avi Shlaim affirms that the Six-Day War was the beginning of Israel's new policy of; 'annexation'.¹⁰⁰ This was officially the beginning of the Iron Wall. According to Abba Eban, Israel's foreign minister at the time, "Annexation is a total and irreversible failure. It has failed in parliament; it has failed demographically and structurally. It has been proven to be structurally

⁹³ Richard Nixon, *Seize the Moment* (New York: Simon & Schuster; 1st edition, 1992), 219.

⁹⁴ Shlaim, *Wall*, 309-310.

⁹⁵ John J. Mearsheimer, Stephen M. Walt, "The Israeli Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy," *Middle East Policy* XIII (3): 31, URL: <http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/pdf>.

⁹⁶ Gorenberg, *Accidental Empire*, 110-114.

⁹⁷ Idith Zertal, Akiva Eldar, *Lords of the Land: The War Over Israel's Settlements in the Occupied Territories, 1967-2007* (New York: Nation Books; Reprint edition, 2009), 9-12. Also, see Gorenberg, *Accidental Empire*, 102-106.

⁹⁸ Gorenberg, *Accidental Empire*, 108.

⁹⁹ Gorenberg, *Accidental Empire*, 120.

¹⁰⁰ Shlaim, *Wall*, 235-241. Also see Pappé, *A History of Modern Palestine*, 186-193.

impossible.”¹⁰¹ Eban was a strong supporter of giving away parts of the territories occupied in the war in exchange for peace and believed that this expansion plan would compromise the Jewishness of the state. Richard Nixon states that “expanding means absorbing the Arabs living in these territories. This annexation would compromise the security of the state and turn into a national problem”.¹⁰² Nonetheless, Israel took a risk and within the same month of June that year; its new government decided to annex East Jerusalem and the surrounding territories.¹⁰³ This administration also chose to reunify Jerusalem beyond the Green Line for major housing developments for Jews.¹⁰⁴ Furthermore, it decided to annex the Golan Heights for security reasons as well as make plans for building new settlements in these territories.¹⁰⁵ Besides the settlement policy, there was also the issue of the refugees. The Labor government during that period implemented a new law to stop any refugees from returning to their homes. After the war ended, a total of 150 refugees were allowed to return back. After that, the government applied the expulsion policy for demographic reasons.¹⁰⁶ Many times since the 1967 war, the settlement issue in the occupied territories has proven to be an ‘obstacle to peace’. This issue finally resulted in a deadlock in Israel foreign policy in 1973 during the Golda Meir period because of an increase in public and political opposition in Israel.

¹⁰¹ Eban, *Heritage*, 185-186.

¹⁰² Nixon, *Seize the Moment*, 221.

¹⁰³ Shlaim, *Wall*, 251-254. Also, see Paul Hunt, “Justice? The Military Court System in the Israeli-Occupied Territories,” *Al - Haq/ Law in Service of Man*, 1987, 1. URL: <http://www.alhaq.org/pdfs/Justice - The Military Court System in the Israeli-Occupied Territories.pdf>

¹⁰⁴ Gorenberg, *Accidental Empire*, 59-61. Also, see Quigley, *The case for Palestine*, 172.

¹⁰⁵ Quigley, *The case for Palestine*, 125.

¹⁰⁶ Pappé, *The Modern Middle East*, 196-197.

2.1.2 The Allon Plan (see Map 4)

A few weeks after the Six-Day War ended, a new plan was master minded for the newly occupied territories in the West Bank by Yigal Allon. Allon served as Israel's deputy prime minister and Minister of Immigrant Absorption during 1967 till 1969.¹⁰⁷ This plan was known as the Allon Plan and became a part of the state's policy.¹⁰⁸ It was a plan to ensure state security and required the annexation of the Jordan Valley and the Judean Desert to the state of Israel.¹⁰⁹ According to this plan, the area selected in the West Bank was specifically not densely populated with Palestinians.¹¹⁰ For Allon his territorial approach "guaranteed Israel's security and preserved its Jewish nature."¹¹¹

The reason why it is essential to mention this plan is because, although not mentioned by name, it still is used as a basis by Israeli policy for the West Bank and the peace negotiations with the Arab countries.¹¹² The Allon plan, which was proposed but never formally approved by Golda Meir's Labor government in 1969, was a part of the guidelines used by the ruling Labor government at the time to approach the Palestinian problem.¹¹³ Moreover, it shaped to a great extent, Israel's settlement policy in the West Bank and Gaza during the years from 1967 to 1977.

¹⁰⁷ Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Yigal Allon 1918-1980, Foreign Minister of Israel 1974-77," URL:

http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/MFAArchive/1990_1999/1998/7/Yigal+Allon.htm

¹⁰⁸ Shimon Peres, *Battling for Peace* (Weidenfeld & Nicolson; First edition. Edition, 1995), 165.

¹⁰⁹ Lein and Weizman, "Land Grab", 11.

¹¹⁰ Eyal Hareuveni, "By Hook and by Crook: Israeli Settlement policy in the West Bank," *B'Tselem*, July 2010, 13, URL: www.btselem.org/.../201007_By_Hook_and_by_Crook_Eng.pdf

¹¹¹ Cited in Ronald Ranta, "The Wasted Decade Israel's Policies towards the Occupied Territories 1967-1977," Ph.D. thesis, *University College London*, 2009, 193, URL: <http://eprints.ucl.ac.uk/19038/1/19038.pdf>

¹¹² Meir Hare'oveni, "Progress on the Allon Plan," *Journal of Palestine Studies*, Vol. 1, No. 3 (Spring, 1972), 148, Stable URL: <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2535877>

¹¹³ Hemda Agid-Ben Yehuda and Yehudit Auerbach, "Attitudes to an Existence Conflict: Allon and Peres on the Palestinian Issue, 1967-1987," *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 35, No. 3 (Sep., 1991), 520, Stable URL: <http://www.jstor.org/stable/173977>. Also, see Rene Backmann, *A Wall in Palestine* (New York: Picador; 1st edition, 2010), 168.

After Golda Meir was elected leader of Labor and prime minister of Israel, she adopted two principles that shaped Israel's policy after 1967; "no return to the prewar borders and no withdrawal without direct negotiations and peace treaties with the Arab states".¹¹⁴ This did not mean that Israel was against UN Resolution 242. In fact, as soon as Begin and the Herut Party resigned from the coalition government run by Meir in 1970, the Israeli administration publicly declared a cease-fire and accepted the resolution.¹¹⁵ However, this resolution was not effective in stopping the settlement policy. Israel had a different interpretation of the Resolution 242 and later 338. The cease-fire part of the resolution was mutual to all parties. According to Shlaim, the Israeli government had a different interpretation of the UN Resolutions. The West Bank and Gaza were never to be a part of the land for peace plan. Only Sinai and a part of the Golan Heights were to be considered within the framework of any future peace.¹¹⁶ This became later clear to the US when President Carter invited Begin to a meeting in Washington to initiate some kind of settlement between Israel and the Arab neighbors in 1977.

Politically, the Allon plan offered the Palestinians in these territories limited autonomy.¹¹⁷ This meant no citizenship or right to vote. It basically took away all the rights of the Palestinians under occupation and turned them into cheap labor who became completely dependent on the ruling colony.¹¹⁸ According to Makdisi, the Palestinians in this territory were denied any human rights and political identity. Ralph Schoenman states that in the post-1967 territories of occupation, a Palestinian

¹¹⁴ Shlaim, *Wall*, 284.

¹¹⁵ Eban, *Autobiography*, 468.

¹¹⁶ Shlaim, *Wall*, 355-356.

¹¹⁷ Saree Makdisi, *Palestine Inside Out: An Everyday Occupation* (New York: W. W. Norton & Company; Revised edition edition, 2010), 83.

¹¹⁸ Makdisi, *Palestine Inside Out*, 77-78.

could not plant vegetables without an unobtainable permit from the military government. Among other discriminating restrictions, “a Palestinian was forbidden to wear a shirt which has the colors of the Palestinian flag or even own a cassette in your house which has Palestinian national songs”.¹¹⁹ On the other hand, they had the option of working inside Israel which made them completely dependent on its economy that was a part of the Allon plan. This economic shift from self-employment to cheap labor status was made possible when Israel started to control the use of land and water. Thus Palestinians became restricted in working in agriculture on their own land.¹²⁰ Due to these water restrictions Palestinians could not keep hold of their land for long. Once a piece of land was identified by the government as being in a certain status (abandoned); as non-cultivated land for a certain amount of time, it was viewed as ‘state land’. Filing an appeal was very costly and even if the land owner could, his petition was appraised by a military committee.¹²¹ This was one of the methods used by the Israeli government in order to seize land from Palestinians and declare it ‘state land’. As Palestinians faced difficulty in using water for agriculture and found better opportunities in working in the Israeli labor market, all this land was targeted and annexed to the state.¹²²

¹¹⁹ Ralph Schoenman, *The Hidden History of Zionism* (Washington: Veritas Press (CA); 1st edition, 1989), 111.

¹²⁰ For more information on Israel’s economic policy after the 1967 Six-Day War see Sara Roy, “From Hardship to Hunger: The Economic Impact of the Intifada on the Gaza Strip,” *American-Arab Affairs*. No. 34 (Fall 1990):109-132. Also, see Henry Rosenfeld, “The Class Situation of the Arab National Minority in Israel,” *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, Vol. 20, No. 3 (Jul., 1978), 374-407.

¹²¹ Nir Shalev, “Ofra Settlement, An Unauthorized Outpost.” *B’Tselem*, 15-16, December 2008. URL: www.btselem.org/Download/200812_Ofra_eng.pdf.

¹²² Cited in Lein and Weizman, “Land Grab”, 56-57. Also, see Yehezkel Lein, “Builders of Zion – Human Rights Violations of Palestinians from the Occupied Territories Working in Israel and the Settlements (September 1999),” *B’Tselem*, Chapter 1.

A good example illustrating the state’s methods in seizing land belonging to Palestinians by controlling the water and the economy is the village of Taybeh in Ramallah. It is located on the West Bank ridge inside the Occupied Territories of Palestine, about 25 km. After 1967 ever meagre subsistence-farming all but ceased owing to Israeli confiscation of land and water resources. See Webpage: <http://www.taybehmunicipality.org/pages/history.html>

As for the ‘illegal settlement building issue’ whose seeds were planted during the ruling labor government of 1967 till 1977, the principles of Allon Plan were applied. As drafted in Rabin’s personal Service Diary, the plan consists of four main principles:

“(1) setting up the Jordan River as Israel's security border, by constructing in its rift a chain of settlements, 6-10 miles in width; (2) retaining the Jordan Rift under Israeli sovereignty; (3) opposing the colonization of the mountainous region, which constituted the heartland of the West Bank and in which is concentrated the majority of the Arab population; and (4) offering to negotiate for a peace treaty, in return for the non-colonized areas of the West Bank.”¹²³

According to this plan, fifteen agricultural village settlements were established along the Jordan River, twenty in the Golan Heights and five in the Sinai Desert.¹²⁴ In this territory, the mountain peaks and hilltops of the Jordan Valley were the first areas under planning and therefore, were declared and registered by Israel as state land.¹²⁵ Almost fifty percent of the West Bank was seized by the Israeli government on false pretence. While this land was held for the purpose of settlement development and boundary expansion, Israel declared that some of this land was seized for military needs and security. The other reason for this decision was that the land was already abandoned property. Furthermore, Israel gave itself the right to expropriate land from private owners for public use. The private owners were unable to object because of

¹²³ Yitzhak Rabin, *Service Diary* (Tel Aviv: Maariv, 1979), 549 (Hebrew); Matti Golan, Peres (Jerusalem: Schocken, 1982), 179 (Hebrew). 24. Cited in Gershon Shafir, “Changing Nationalism and Israel's "Open Frontier" on the West Bank,” *Theory and Society*, Vol. 13, No. 6 (Nov., 1984), 809. URL: <http://www.jstor.org/stable/657140>.

¹²⁴ Eyal Weizman, *Hollow Land: Israel's Architecture of Occupation* (London & New York: Verso, 2007), 57-58.

¹²⁵ Rafi Segal and Eyal Weizman, “The Mountain,” in *A Civilian Occupation: The Politics of Israeli Architecture* (London & New York: Verso; Revised edition, 2003): 82.

insufficient information and lack of knowledge.¹²⁶ The main objective of these settlements was political: annexing land to the state of Israel. According to Don Will, these settlement belts were aimed to block the Palestinians in Jerusalem from expansion, physically and physiologically.¹²⁷ Moreover, they were aimed by the Labor government to serve as a defensive barrier between Israel and Jordan.¹²⁸ These areas, after extensive planning, were firstly settled in small populations. In accordance with the Allon plan, these settlements should be “camouflaged as military strong points”. In reality, these so-called military posts were ideological small settlements embodied by a civilian population. The first settlements in the Jordan Valley were known as the Kibbutz and Moshav.¹²⁹ They were a type of cooperative settlements which relied on agriculture. In addition to these settlements, several paramilitary outposts were also built for security. As stated by Weizman, the Jordan Valley “was conceived as a hybrid military/civilian defensive zone”.¹³⁰ This was a strategy used to spread around as many settlements as possible in order to grab maximum land possible. In this way, the Israelis could expand the country’s national borders before any permanent peace settlement with the Arabs in the future.¹³¹ Backmann states that these settlements would ensure a Jewish presence and finally lead to the annexation of this region to the state of Israel.¹³² This projection continued in small scale compounds until the political turnabout of 1977 when Likud

¹²⁶ For more information on how the land was seized by the Israeli government, see Lein and Weizman, “Land Grab”, chapter 3.

¹²⁷ Don Will, “Ideology and Strategy of the Settlement Movement,” *Merip Reports*, No. 92 (November-December 1980): 11. URL: library.palestine-studies.org/eweb24/w21.bat?session=0

¹²⁸ Elisha Efrat, *The West Bank and Gaza Strip: A Geography of Occupation and Disengagement* (Routledge, 2006), 36.

¹²⁹ The two innovative types of traditional rural communities were the kibbutz and the moshav. The first type was based on a socialistic communal structure of total economic and social cooperation, while in the latter these were limited. Also see Segal and Weizman, *A Civilian Occupation*, 80.

¹³⁰ Weizman, *Hollow Land*, 58-59.

¹³¹ Makdisi, *Palestine Inside Out*, 120.

¹³² Rene Backmann, *A Wall in Palestine* (New York: Picador; 1st edition, 2010), 155.

replaced Labor.¹³³ The settlement project for the Judea in the Southern West Bank was initiated by the ministerial committee on Hebron in 1970. This new settlement called Kiryat Arba was fully approved by the Labor government and built on confiscated land. It was managed by the Israeli military as the lands were expropriated on the premises intended for military use.¹³⁴ According to Middle East resources, approximately 1500 settlers now reside in the occupied territories.¹³⁵

2.1.3 International Law Dimensions

Overall, it is generally affirmed that both Eshkol and Meir were in favor of the land for peace initiative and against annexation. On the other hand, according to a United Nations General Assembly Resolution 2546 of December 11th 1969 and reports delivered by the Special Committee in 1971, Israel had managed to practice collective and area punishment, the destruction of homes and the deportation of the inhabitants living in the occupied territories. The committee reported that “Ministerial Committee for Settlement of the Territories...showed, beyond doubt, that it is the policy of the Government of Israel to settle the territories occupied as a result of the hostilities of June 1967”, “39 settlements had been established in the occupied territories since the June 1967 hostilities”, “Of these 39 settlements, 20 were permanent civilian settlements and the other 19 were army outposts, 6 of which had subsequently been declared civilian settlements.” Furthermore, the Israeli government reported that these illegal settlements were established for historical rights of the Jewish people.¹³⁶ In light of these reports, it is hard to believe that Labor

¹³³ Segal and Weizman, *A Civilian Occupation*, 80.

¹³⁴ Zertal and Eldar, *Lords of the Land*, 24-27.

¹³⁵ Tzedek v/Shalom, Brit . "Israeli-Arab / Israeli-Palestinian Conflict Timeline, 1967-2007." *Foundation for Middle East Peace*. N.p., Web. 3 May 2011. URL:www.fmep.org/resources/reference/timeline.html

¹³⁶ Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories, “REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE

had a much different policy than the later Likud government run by Menachem Begin. Shlaim states that, Israel was not exploring the prospects of peace but in fact creating ‘facts on the ground’ by exercising policies of *creeping annexation*.¹³⁷ In this short period of time, Israel had violated Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War of 12 August 1949 and the provisions of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. In addition to these, it had breached the Security Council resolutions 2252 (ES-V) of 4 July 1967, 2443 (XXIII) and 2452 (XXIII) of 19 December 1968, 237 of 14 June 1967, 259 (1968) of 27 September 1968, furthermore, Commission on Human Rights resolutions 6 (XXIV) of 27 February 1968 and 6 (XXV) of 4 March 1969.¹³⁸ These allegations, reports and violation of resolutions certainly produce enough facts to illustrate Israel’s attitude towards the Palestinians and also the Arab world.

2.1.4 Arab Reaction – 1973 Arab-Israeli War

As for the reaction towards this Israeli deceptive policy and the government’s reluctance to find a long-term solution for all the occupied territories, including Sinai and the Golan Heights, Syria and Egypt initiated a new war known by the Israelis as the Yom Kippur, an offensive made during the Jewish holiday. Prior to the War, both Egypt and Jordan, two countries at odds with each other during that period, were urging for a settlement with Israel. King Hussein was not prepared to face another Black September or risk Egypt reaching an accord with Israel without Jordan.¹³⁹ He wanted a settlement that would solve his own Palestinian problem. Moreover, he

ISRAELI PRACTICES AFFECTING THE HUMAN RIGHTS OF THE POPULATION OF THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES: III. ANALYSIS OF EVIDENCE, Allegations of annexation and settlement”, United Nations General Assembly Twenty-seventh session, Agenda item 42, URL: <http://domino.un.org/unispal.nsf/eed216406b50bf6485256ce10072f637/a7ef099b001e5b3785256a0d005382f5?OpenDocument>

¹³⁷ Shlaim, *Wall*, 316.

¹³⁸ “United Nations General Assembly Resolution 2546, December 11, 1969”, *Jewish Virtual Library*, URL: <http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/UN/unga2546.html>

¹³⁹ Rabinovich, *Israel in the Middle East*, 251.

wished to improve his image in the Arab world after the Black September events. According to Nevo, his federal plan was not only rejected by Israel, but by the PLO and the Arab states as well.¹⁴⁰ Sadat's peace-initiative in 1971 was turned down by the Israeli government due to security reasons. This initiative suggested a partial withdrawal of the Israeli army from the Sinai for the reopening of the Suez Canal.¹⁴¹ As a result, both King Hussein's federal plan and Anwar Sadat's proposals were rejected by Israel. This stubbornness forced Sadat to turn to war as the only option to regain his territories by forcing Israel to the negotiating table.¹⁴² On the other hand, Israel's policy was to wear out its opponents until all the surrounding parties involved settled the matter under its terms.¹⁴³ When all diplomatic efforts finally failed, Egypt declared war in 1973. According to Shlaim, the Arabs initiated this attack in expectation of unlocking the stalemate and reaching a negotiation with Israel. Additionally they aimed to "provoke and international crisis".¹⁴⁴ But Egypt's main priority during this war was liberating the Sinai, Palestinian rights came second. Among other reasons were improving the economy and advancing diplomatic relations with the United States, Israel's closest ally. By improving ties with the US, Egypt hoped to influence it to apply pressure on Israel for a settlement.¹⁴⁵

¹⁴⁰ Joseph Nevo, *King Hussein and the Evolution of Jordan's Perception of a Political Settlement with Israel, 1967-1988* (Eastbourne: Sussex Academic Press, 2006), 41-42.

¹⁴¹ Nevo, *King Hussein*, 42-43.

¹⁴² Simon Dunstan, *The Yom Kippur War: the Arab-Israeli War of 1973* (New York: Osprey Publishing, 2007), 17.

¹⁴³ Shlaim, *Wall*, 312-316.

¹⁴⁴ Shlaim, *op.cit.*, 318-319.

¹⁴⁵ Avraham Sela, "The 1973 Arab War Coalition: Aims, Coherence and Gain Distribution," in *Revisiting the Yom Kippur War*, edited by P. R. Kumaraswamy, 41-44. Frank Cass Publishers,

2.2 Labor Administration: The Rabin Period (1974-1977) and the Rise of Gush Emunim

2.2.1 Rabin's Settlement Policy

After the Yom Kippur War in October 1973, UNSCR 338 was passed the same month. According to T.G. Fraser, “this resolution sought to end hostilities in the war and resume negotiations based on Resolution 242”.¹⁴⁶ Many political changes in Israel would take place during this period. The 1973 War forced Israel to change its settlement policy. According to Inbar, there was a new emphasis on security. Settlements in the Golan region turned out to be a liability for the state as they were unable to hold defense against Arab attacks. Although settlements were viewed by the state as necessity for national security, they proved otherwise during this war. From this point on, the civilians living in these settlements were to be trained for any type of military intervention.¹⁴⁷ Clearly this change in policy proved that Israel's previous policies had failed. This was also the same year in which the Likud party was formed and run by Menachem Begin.¹⁴⁸ Soon at the Geneva Peace Conference in December, 1973, Israel considered the option of land for peace and supported the UNSCR 338.¹⁴⁹ The new quest for peace in the Middle East was intense and created a dead-lock in Israeli policy. Golda Meir exhausted from political clashes within the government and disputed within the Knesset over which territories to withdraw from, resigned and was succeeded by Yithak Rabin.¹⁵⁰

¹⁴⁶ Cited in Charles D. Smith, *Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict*, 348.

¹⁴⁷ Efraim Inbar, *Israel's national security: issues and challenges since the Yom Kippur War* (New York: Routledge, 2008), 12-13.

¹⁴⁸ Smith, *Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict*, 331-332.

¹⁴⁹ Eban, *Autobiography*, 549-550.

¹⁵⁰ Smith, *Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict*, 332.

During peace talks following the Geneva Conference, the US was pushing Israel to reach an agreement concerning the West Bank and Gaza Strip with King Hussein of Jordan, Yasser Arafat was growing in popularity among the Palestinian people. If Rabin could not reach a deal with King Hussein soon, he might have to negotiate with Arafat in the future, who was viewed as a terrorist. Negotiations with Jordan failed as Israel refused to return any part of the West Bank. It can be asserted that the West Bank territories are a whole different story for the Israeli government when it came to land compromise. According to Shlaim, a disengagement agreement with Jordan was not possible because Rabin's hands were tied and he feared his government might collapse. Finally in October 1974, a unanimous resolution was passed in the Rabat Summit where the PLO was declared "the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people."¹⁵¹ According to Ross, King Hussein was frustrated by the Summits' decision and was ready to hand over the West Bank's responsibility to Arafat. Moreover, "until the late 1980s, the King continued to harbor hopes that at some point he might regain responsibility for the West Bank..."¹⁵² Smith states that this summit was followed a month later with an international recognition of the PLO by the United Nations General Assembly, where the organization was granted observer status in the U.N.¹⁵³ These two important events took Jordan as a negotiator out of the political picture. Since 1964, the PLO has been the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. Its policy on Israel and the Zionist movement was made clear in the Palestinian National Charter.¹⁵⁴ The official Israeli position on the PLO is that it was a terrorist

¹⁵¹ Shlaim, *Wall*, 332-333.

¹⁵² Dennis Ross, *The Missing Peace* (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux; First edition, 2005), 41.

¹⁵³ Smith, *op.cit.*, 333-334.

¹⁵⁴ For Palestinian National Charter, see Charles D. Smith, *Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996), Document 8.2, pp. 345-347. Also, see Leila S. Kadi, *Basic Political Documents of the Armed Palestinian Resistance Movement*, (Palestine Liberation

organization that was committed to the destruction of Israel¹⁵⁵, and therefore refused to talk to any members of this organization. The PLO has been waging terrorist attacks on Israel since the late 1960s which negatively affected Israel's security issues.¹⁵⁶ It was until 1974 when the PLO decided to shift from an armed struggle to a more diplomatic approach, yet refused to renounce terrorism and would continue with acts of liberation.¹⁵⁷ The external threat was later handled by Defense Minister Ariel Sharon when Israel invaded Lebanon to destroy the PLO as an act of self-defense. The plan was not only to stop these attacks by forcing the PLO out of Lebanon, but to force Palestinians in the occupied territories into submission.¹⁵⁸ Concurrent to these developments, Israel's settlement policy in the West Bank continued as planned which was clearly a preparation period for future annexation.

Organization, Research Center, January 1, 1969): pp.137-141. Also, see Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "The Palestinian National Charter: Resolutions of the Palestine National Council, July 1-17, 1968",

<http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Peace+Process/Guide+to+the+Peace+Process/The+Palestinian+National+Charter.htm>

According to the PLO National Charter, articles 15 and 22: "The liberation of Palestine, from an Arab viewpoint, is a national (qawmi) duty and it attempts to repel the Zionist and imperialist aggression against the Arab homeland, and aims at the elimination of Zionism in Palestine...", "Zionism is a political movement organically associated with international imperialism and antagonistic to all action for liberation and to progressive movements in the world. It is racist and fanatic in its nature, aggressive, expansionist, and colonial in its aims, and fascist in its methods. Israel is the instrument of the Zionist movement, and geographical base for world imperialism placed strategically in the midst of the Arab homeland to combat the hopes of the Arab nation for liberation, unity, and progress. Israel is a constant source of threat vis-a-vis peace in the Middle East and the whole world. Since the liberation of Palestine will destroy the Zionist and imperialist presence and will contribute to the establishment of peace in the Middle East, the Palestinian people look for the support of all the progressive and peaceful forces and urge them all, irrespective of their affiliations and beliefs, to offer the Palestinian people all aid and support in their just struggle for the liberation of their homeland."

¹⁵⁵ Shlaim, *Wall*, 330.

¹⁵⁶ Quigley, *The case for Palestine*, 198-199.

¹⁵⁷ Pappe, *The Modern Middle East*, 218.

¹⁵⁸ Shlaim, *op.cit.*, 422. Also, see Quigley, *The case for Palestine*, 199.

2.2.2 The Rise of Gush Emunim

The decision of land exchange for peace by the Labor government not only created great response within the government, but also among the Jewish public.¹⁵⁹ Many citizens decided to take an approach unfavorable to the Labor government: “actual physical settlement in the territory”.¹⁶⁰ As a reaction to the war and Israel’s acceptance of UNSCR 338 a group of people formed the Gush Emunim movement. This movement was founded in 1974 by Israeli settlers who claimed a divine Jewish right to the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. It was a radical descendant of the National Religious Party which played a significant role in settlement expansion.¹⁶¹ Any kind of peace agreement with the neighboring states and sharing a land with the Palestinian inhabitants meant nothing to this group. Their philosophy was based on the Torah in which the land was chosen before the people.¹⁶² Yael Yishai affirms that Allon attacked this movement and claimed that it was “a political movement of false messiahs”. While in 1967 Allon dictated that Gaza would be annexed to Israel, he now was more realistic and supported the idea of ‘land for peace’ deal. Moreover, the only areas Allon was not willing to compromise were the ones essential for the security of Israel.¹⁶³ But this did not change the fact that his plan violated international law. According to Masalha, for Gush Emunim, the West Bank was

¹⁵⁹ For more information on the impact of the October War on the ‘Israeli Planning Policy’, see Abdul-Ilah Abu-Ayyash, “Israeli Regional Planning Policy in the Occupied Territories,” *Journal of Palestine Studies*, Vol. 5, No. 3/4 (Spring - Summer, 1976), 105-106.

¹⁶⁰ Zertal and Eldar, *Lords of the Land*, 31-32.

¹⁶¹ Peter Robert Demant, “Israeli Settlement Policy Today,” *MERIP Reports*, No. 116, Israel's Strategy of Occupation (Jul. - Aug., 1983), 3.

¹⁶² Nur Masalha, *The Bible and Zionism: Invented Traditions, Archaeology and Post-colonialism in Israel-Palestine* (London: Zed Books Ltd., 2007), 195.

¹⁶³ Yael Yishai, *Land or peace: whither Israel?* (California: Hoover Institution Press Publication, 1987), 69-70.

called Judea and Samaria, and moreover was the heart of their nation.¹⁶⁴ This group's objective was a permanent settlement plan in the densely Arab-populated areas, which was in contrast to the Allon Plan.¹⁶⁵ The importance of mentioning this movement is the fact that it had a major influence on the Likud government's decisions on settlements and territories after 1977. In addition to this, this movement contributed to the fall of Rabin's Labor government. With the support of Shimon Peres and military leaders, Gush Emunim succeeded in weakening the Labor party and imposing its ideas on the government for future settlements.¹⁶⁶

The 1973 Arab-Israeli war had a very negative effect on the Golda Meir government as well as on Yitzhak Rabin's. The Israeli public resented the way the government mishandled its military capabilities in the war which resulted in many casualties. Additionally, charges of corruption within the government reached public knowledge. Rabin resigned in 1977 and proposed Shimon Peres as his replacement. Because of the events in the early 1970s, Labor Party lost credibility and Likud won the elections on May 17th, 1977.¹⁶⁷ Despite political changes, Backmann affirms that

¹⁶⁴ Nur Masalha, *Imperial Israel and the Palestinians* (London & Chicago: Pluto Press, 2000), 106-107. For more information on Gush Emunim's philosophy and claims, see Nur Masalha, op.cit., Chapter 3.

¹⁶⁵ The Gush Emunim movement was founded to promote the Jewish settlement of the 1967 occupied territories. It has religious-messianic right-wing core. It was formed by demobilized soldiers and officers who had served together during the 1973 war. It was established in 1974 following the Yom Kippur War under the spiritual leadership of Rabbi Zvi Yehuda Kook. Gush Emunim (translated as "Bloc of the Faithful") was an extra-parliamentary national-religious movement advocating Israeli sovereignty in the Golan Heights, Gaza Strip, Judea and Samaria by a massive civilian presence in these territories. For this purpose, the movement not only promoted settlement, but acted to promote education, social projects, immigrant absorption, and propaganda. Gush Emunim called for coexistence with the Arab population and negated the principle of transfer as advocated by Meir Kahane. Its ideological inspiration was derived from the teachings of Rabbi Zvi Yehuda Kook, according to which the purpose of the Jewish people is to gain physical and spiritual salvation through living in and developing Eretz Yisrael (the Land of Israel); the sanctity of Eretz Yisrael obligates seizing it after it was freed from foreign rulers, and therefore it must be settled even against governmental policy.

¹⁶⁶ Smith, *Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict*, 336.

¹⁶⁷ Peres, *Battling for Peace*, 172-173.

over a ten year period of Labor government, Israel has managed to build thirty-six illegal settlements.¹⁶⁸

One of the most significant illegal settlements built by Gush Emunim in the West Bank was Ofra. After the establishment of the Etzion Bloc in Judea by the Labor government, Samaria was the next target for colonization. This was the first settlement built on the Samarian ridge which was densely populated by Palestinians. The difference between the two settlements is that, Ofra was built under false pretexts against the government's plans.¹⁶⁹ Moreover, it was built outside the boundaries of the Allon plan. The IDF seized the land for defensive reasons and began the construction of an army camp. The Gush movement succeeded in forming a work group which was employed by the army. Normally no one but the army was allowed to stay in these areas at night but the work group managed to move in. This group was granted permission by Minister of Defense Shimon Peres to form a camp as long as it was under the status of a "work camp". Although Peres openly refused to take any responsibility for this illegal settlement, he later pushed for its recognition.¹⁷⁰ The group later exploited the Labor government's good intentions. As soon as Likud was voted as the new ruling government, Begin officially recognized the Settlement. With this recognition, Ofra became protected by the local Israeli law. Soon after, it was registered as a cooperative society where it could make its own rules. Not anyone could move into this settlement and become a member unless he or she shared the same ideologies.¹⁷¹ The settlement of Kaddum was also another example of an army camp turned civilian settlement. Just like Ofra, it was initiated

¹⁶⁸ Backmann, *A Wall in Palestine*, 169.

¹⁶⁹ Zertal and Eldar, *Lords of the Land*, 33.

¹⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, 38-39. Also, see Backmann, *A Wall in Palestine*, 168.

¹⁷¹ Shalev, "Ofra Settlement", 7-9.

under false pretences. The government called these settlement ‘attempted settlement illegal’. But instead of moving them, the Israeli government warned they could only stay until a suitable location outside Samaria could be attained. This never happened. Instead, the settlers were provided running water and electricity.¹⁷²

According to Nir Shalev, the settlement of Ofra breaches a number of international and local laws.¹⁷³ This simple example of how an illegally built settlement can turn into a government protected and serviced area is more than enough to demonstrate the colonization plan since 1967, although for international consumption, at least Labor portrayed itself as willing to make concessions in return for peace treaties. The land Ofra was built on does not fit in the frame of ‘land expropriated for public purposes’. Israel’s official position was that “it is permissible to expropriate privately-owned Palestinian land – after an Israeli settlement has already been built – in order to pave roads for settlers or to establish other public facilities”.¹⁷⁴ The fact remains that this land was and still is registered to Palestinians. Elisha Efrat states that the Labor government was against these illegal posts but on the other hand did not remove them. Apart from Ofra and Kaddum, Gush Emunim had established Shilo and Kefar Qadumim in the West Bank by 1974.¹⁷⁵ These three settlements were the perfect example of how the Palestinian landowners were restricted from exercising their ownership rights; the right to access the land, gain a living from their land and building rights.¹⁷⁶ Besides the illegality of these settlements, it can be

¹⁷² Allan Gerson, *Israel, the West Bank and international law* (London: Franc Cass & Comp. Ltd., 1978), 150-151.

¹⁷³ Shalev, “Ofra Settlement”, 10-13.

¹⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, 22.

¹⁷⁵ Efrat, *The West Bank and Gaza Strip*, 30. Also, see Backmann, *A Wall in Palestine*, 169.

¹⁷⁶ Shalev, *op.cit.*, 29.

argued that the government's policies were careless in respect to its Arab neighbors and the current issue of demographics.¹⁷⁷ These settlements were inhabited by people with deep religious beliefs that the land belonged to their ancestors and therefore was rightfully theirs. Their presence there was more symbolic than a twist of faith and furthermore was to become an integral part of Likud's annexation strategy. Common sense dictates that Labor's approach and insistence on a temporary ownership of the West Bank was in its best interest for reaching a peace agreement with Jordan. Besides peace, there were also the issues of 1.2 million Palestinians residing in these territories which upon annexation would become a part of the Jewish state. This was unacceptable to the Labor party, especially if it intended to maintain the Jewishness of the state.

2.2.3 Palestinian Reaction during the Labor Government (1967-1977)

Even though it is mentioned by many authors that the Palestinians living in the occupied territories during the past decade were submissive, this claim is untrue. The Palestinians had been trying to become mobilized politically and socially since the British Mandate. After the 1967 War, the Palestinian people in the West Bank, especially the well-known families that had an influence in the territories, were patiently waiting for an outside involvement to settle the issue of the occupied

¹⁷⁷ According to current U.S. President Barack Obama "demographic realities are making it harder to maintain Israel as both a Jewish and democratic state and a just and lasting peace can only be achieved through the establishment of two states for two peoples. See Gil Ronen and Fern Sidman, "Obama Addressing AIPAC: ' Hamas, Release Gilad Shalit,'" *Arutz Sheva: Israel National News.com*, par.5, Published: 05/22/11. URL: <http://www.israelnationalnews.com/News/News.aspx/144387>

territories.¹⁷⁸ In addition to this, the military government put restrictions on any political demonstrations and nationalist ideas in order to keep the ‘Jordanian Option’¹⁷⁹ open. If Labor was hoping to reach a deal with King Hussein regarding the occupied territories, then any internal nationalistic activity could jeopardize negotiations. In addition to this, Israel used this option and kept open dialogue with the King in order to push out PLO involvement.¹⁸⁰ All three parties, PLO, Israel and Jordan were wrestling for leadership over the West Bank and were after their own personal interests. Israel’s military policy of administrative detention and deportation was exercised to prevent any internal political movement. The PLO authorized internal bodies to control and dismantle any opponents while Jordan used its economic and political spheres to look after its interests.¹⁸¹

¹⁷⁸ Emile Sahliyeh, *In Search of Leadership: West Bank Politics since 1967* (Washington, DC, Brookings Inst Press, 1988), 6-7.

¹⁷⁹ The Jordanian Option is an Israeli term, describing an Israeli political strategy. See Dan Schueftan, “Jordan’s ‘Israeli Option’,” in *Jordan in the Middle East 1948-1988: the making of a pivotal state*, ed. Joseph Nevo and Ilan Pappé (London: Frank Cass & Co., 1994), 254-255.

¹⁸⁰ Shlaim, *Wall*, 311.

¹⁸¹ Sahliyeh, *In Search of Leadership*, 7-8.

Fatah¹⁸², Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP)¹⁸³ and Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine¹⁸⁴ (DFLP) were the three most influential and militarily active groups after the Six-Day War in the West Bank. These three guerilla groups were involved in external as well as internal attacks and had set up networks in the occupied territories. According to Sayigh, by 1968, the main guerilla groups had established special committees to manage internal covert operations.¹⁸⁵ They first were targeting military targets, but in 1968 they decided to change tactics and target Israeli civilians as well, especially the Jewish settlers. In justification of their actions, Fatah argued that it only distinctly was attacking the Zionist aspiration and aimed to scare Jewish immigrants.¹⁸⁶ Furthermore, this was a counter attack against the IDF targeting Palestinian civilians; it was a reaction to Israel's tactics of driving the Arab population out of their homeland by oppression and force. Lack of organization, poor planning, security problems, exposure and internal rivalries caused these groups to fail in maintaining civil disobedience. Additionally, the IDF

¹⁸² Fatah is a secular movement that declared "armed struggle" as the only path for Palestine's liberation and was committed to political violence. It was established in the late 1950s and early 1960s. The founding members were Yasser Arafat, Abu Iyad, Abu Jihad, Adil Abdel Karim, Mohammed Yusuf Al Najjar, Khalid Al Amira, Abdel Fatah Lahmoud, and Khalid Al Hassan. It had a close association with the Muslim Brotherhood. For more information about the movement and its activities, see Philip Mattar, *Encyclopedia of the Palestinians* (New York: Facts on File, 2005), 158-161.

¹⁸³ PFLP: The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine was a Marxist-Leninist organization founded by Christian Palestinian George Habash in 1952. To read more, see Anthony H. Cordesman and Jennifer Moravitz, *The Israeli-Palestinian war: escalating to nowhere* (New York: Greenwood Publishing Group, 2005), 219-221.

¹⁸⁴ DFLP: A breakaway group of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP) was formed in 1969 by Nayif Hawatmeh and Bilal Hassan and is a Marxist-Leninist organization. See Dilip Hiro, *The Essential Middle East / A Comprehensive Guide* (Carroll & Graf, 2003).

¹⁸⁵ Yezid Sayigh, *Armed Struggle and the Search for State: The Palestine National Movement 1949-1993* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997), 207.

¹⁸⁶ Sayigh, *Armed Struggle and the Search for State*, 212.

and intelligence managed to crush these groups through military clashes, arrests and deportation.

The Eshkol-Meir Period was a time when Israel went to great measures to avoid the formation of any internal political arena. These measures were taken by town arrest and deportation of social leaders.¹⁸⁷ It was also a period of extensive guerilla attacks on Israeli civilians which was a nightmare for the Israeli government.¹⁸⁸ According to Mattar, even though Israel had advanced military superiority in the occupied territories and the region, these guerilla groups posed a serious threat to its national security.¹⁸⁹ According to Milton-Edwards, “after Arafat was kicked out of Jordan by King Hussein after ‘Black September’¹⁹⁰, the PFLP and DFLP continued their armed resistance and encouraged the civilian communities in the West Bank and Gaza Strip to continue their struggle for their homeland”.¹⁹¹ Violent protests against Israel were not in King Hussein’s best interest and were damaging to his plans and interests for the West Bank.¹⁹² Following the famous victory in Karameh, thousands of volunteers were influenced to join the fight of liberating Palestine from the occupiers. These volunteers were mostly residents from refugee camps who were kicked out of their

¹⁸⁷ Sayigh, *op.cit.*, 208-209.

¹⁸⁸ Helena Cobban, *The Palestinian Liberation Organisation: People, Power and Politics* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1984), 42.

¹⁸⁹ One well known example was the Battle of Karameh in March 1968 that was fought between IDF and combined forces of the PLO and the Jordanian Army. This battle actually started a year ago in the West Bank when the IDF chased the guerilla groups out of the area across the Jordan River. According to Cobban, the IDF lost twenty to thirty lives and many more wounded, while the guerilla groups lost around 120 fighters. Cooley affirmed that even though the IDF militarily won by inflicting great casualties, to the guerilla groups, this battle symbolized victory and won them support by the Palestinian community. John K. Cooley, *Green March, Black September: The Story of the Palestinian Arabs* (London: Frank Cass, 1973). Also, see Philip Mattar, *Encyclopedia of the Palestinians* (New York: Facts on File, 2005), 159.

¹⁹⁰ Aburish, *Arafat*, 103-115.

¹⁹¹ Beverley Milton-Edwards, *Islamic Politics in Palestine* (London & New York: Tauris Academic Studies, 1996), 74.

¹⁹² Norman H. Finkelstein, *Ariel Sharon (A & E Biography)* (New York: First Avenue Editions 2001), 59.

lands and had lost their homes to Jewish immigrants.¹⁹³ They were people with nothing to lose and hope of returning to their homes some day. On the other hand, Milton-Edwards affirms that there were Palestinians that prospered from Israel's economic program that were not interested in joining the fight.¹⁹⁴ This temporary prosperity caused some Palestinians to neglect the big picture of how Israel's economic and settlement plans were a part its *creeping annexation* policy.

During Labor's second period and following the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, the Palestinian elite living in the West Bank formed a political program called the Palestinian National Front. This front was formed as a result of the war in 1973 and lasted until 1977. According to Sahliyah, "the aim of this front was the unification of all existing political groups and forces in the occupied territories against Israel".¹⁹⁵ This group of elites was against any Jordanian option and felt it was necessary to form some kind of entity within the territories to deal with daily life problems under the occupation, especially after the previous guerilla type groups had failed to defeat the Zionist occupier. In order to achieve its objectives, the PNF refrained from armed struggle. Instead it took diplomatic steps and passive resistance to reach its goals. In addition to taking care of daily problems, the program was also involved in spreading national aspiration and organizing demonstrations, strikes, boycotts and sit-ins in protest of Israel's settlement policy and economic control. In addition to this, the front organized protest against Israel's illegal actions; house demolishing, deportation, land confiscation and unaccounted arrests. By 1975, PNF managed to organize civil disobedience in protest of the Allon Plan and Shimon Peres' Civil

¹⁹³ Cobban, *The Palestinian Liberation Organisation*, 39-42.

¹⁹⁴ Milton-Edwards, *Islamic Politics in Palestine*, 79.

¹⁹⁵ Sahliyah, *In search of leadership*, 52.

Administration Plan.¹⁹⁶ This Civil Administration Plan was about allowing Palestinians in the West Bank to have control on their civil affairs, but not on security, economy or foreign policy.¹⁹⁷ Jordan was also to play a role in this plan which the PNF was against. It supported a realistic approach to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict; a two-state solution. It repeatedly urged the PLO to refrain from the idea of liberating the whole of Palestine and to accept a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Furthermore, it pushed for a “Pan-Arabism solution to the Palestinian Question”.¹⁹⁸ In return, the PNF would strengthen the political legitimacy of the PLO in the occupied territories. PNF’s objectives and approach were fully supported by the PLO. Out of fear of it becoming a rival in the occupied territories, the PLO turned against the PNF and caused it to collapse. But the real reason for its dismantling in 1977 was the deportation of eight of its leaders and hundreds of arrest of members by the IDF due to security reasons.¹⁹⁹ According to Hasso, most of the organization and committees formed in the 1970s collapsed because of continuous disagreements and competing ideologies which made them an easy target for the Israeli government. Another example of a failed organization was the National Guidance Committee (NGC-II) created in 1979 by Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip as a reaction to Camp David Accords which was declared illegal and crippled by the IDF within a year.²⁰⁰ The political activity in the occupied territories during this period was mostly limited to passive demonstrations organized by elites and isolated violent attacks by guerilla groups. Judging from the settlement

¹⁹⁶ Sahliyah, *In search of leadership*, 54-55.

¹⁹⁷ *Ibid.*, 54-55; 64.

¹⁹⁸ *Ibid.*, 57.

¹⁹⁹ *Ibid.*, 61-62.

²⁰⁰ Frances Susan Hasso, *Resistance, repression, and gender politics in occupied Palestine and Jordan* (New York: Syracuse, 2005), 24.

expansion activity, it seems that anti-Israel movement in the West Bank and Gaza Strip had less than minor effects on Israel's ambitions. It can be argued that unlike the Zionists, the lack of unity among the Palestinian notables in the past cost the Palestinians an Arab state and served the Zionists in reaching their national goals.²⁰¹ This factional unity once again played a role in weakening the Palestinian Question and strengthening the Israeli forces. Each time the Palestinians failed to unite, the Israeli bought more time for settlement expansion.

2.3 Likud Administration: The Begin Period (1977-1981)

2.3.1 Begin's Settlement Policy

After the ideological oriented party of Likud came in power and Menachem Begin won the elections in 1977, the settlement issue became even more proactive than ever. This was a party which was more hawkish in comparison to Labor. Likud supported annexation and made future peace talks literally impossible. It financially supported the settlement policy without hesitation or taking any account of the future.²⁰² According to Ilan Pappé, the expulsion policy that started by Labor in 1967 was made official when Likud came to power in 1977. Besides the settlement plan, decreasing the number of Palestinians in the occupied territories was another important scheme to be implemented parallel to the settlement plan.²⁰³

Although the economic control over the population in the occupied territories continued, there was a shift in political command. In territories where security is not

²⁰¹ Issa Khalaf, *Politics in Palestine: Arab Factionalism and Social Disintegration, 1939-1948* (New York: State University of New York Press, 1991), 90.

²⁰² Eban, *Heritage*, 185-186.

²⁰³ Pappé, *A History of Modern Palestine*, 197.

vital, the Likud government decided to relax its emphasis and let the Arabs govern their own people, in regards to social, medical and economic issues. The so-called autonomy plan was applied by Begin until a solution that would not undermine the security of Israel could be found. In contrast to the minimalist Labor in regard to the settlement plans, Likud has a maximalist approach.²⁰⁴ While they both embraced expansion, Likud's ideology is "Great Israel" which directly meant the West Bank was a part of Israel. The party's view on the settlements was more explicit in declaring the West Bank to be part of Israel.²⁰⁵ According to Likud, Jordan had no claim over the territory and Palestinians had no right to self-determination.²⁰⁶ According to Masalha, Begin's plans were based on biblical ideologies. He was an admirer and follower of Ze'ev Jabotinsky and his mission as a leader of the Israeli people was to achieve Zionist goals with a strong army.²⁰⁷ Ze'ev Jabotinsky was the founder and leader of Revisionist Zionism during the 1910s. He argued that in order for the Jews to survive, they should have their own national home in Palestine by forcefully taking over the land with military power. Revisionist Zionists claimed the entire Mandate of Palestine, not only the western portion, as part of the Jewish state.

The coming to power of the coalition Likud government dominated by the Herut movement resulted in special attention being focused on the issue of Israeli settlements in the occupied areas and security. According to Ilan Pappé, Likud openly supported the Gush Emunim settlement movement and have called for the realization of "Eretz Israel".²⁰⁸ When Menachem Begin was elected prime minister

²⁰⁴ Will, "Ideology and Strategy of the Settlement Movement," 9-10.

²⁰⁵ Quigley, *The case for Palestine*, 176. Also, see Shlaim, *Wall*, 352.

²⁰⁶ Shlaim, *Wall*, 352-353.

²⁰⁷ Masalha, *Imperial Israel and the Palestinians*, 67.

²⁰⁸ Pappé, *A History of Modern Palestine*, 203.

of Israel, he made it known that he was in favor an expansion of the Israeli settlements and opposed territorial compromise.²⁰⁹ According to Newman, the policy of the new administration was to speed up settlement activity in the West Bank.²¹⁰ Its top priority was to annex the West Bank and eliminate PLO. This resulted in accelerated and intensified settlement construction reaching 102 compounds in the new territories in a period under five years.²¹¹ With Begin's unlimited backing, Gush Emunim became a mainstream movement.²¹² As his first gesture, he legalized three unofficial settlements built by Gush Emunim. US President Jimmy Carter stated that "Begin publicly recognized some of the West Bank settlements as permanent..."²¹³ Begin perceived the Arab hostility as an extension of anti-Semitism. This was a major feature of the new prime minister's foreign policy. As for internal affairs, the basic guidelines of his government were "the Jewish people have an unchangeable, eternal, historical right to the Land of Israel..."²¹⁴ He, as Prime Minister, pledged to build rural and urban settlements on this land. According to Shlaim, Begin stated that "Israel will not transfer Judea, Samaria...because of historical rights to these lands...and the need of our national security..."²¹⁵ His ideological belief became physically visible as the focus of settlement building shifted to the West Bank.²¹⁶ In reaction to this policy, later that year, the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution declaring that the settlements "have no legal validity and constitute a serious

²⁰⁹ Quandt, *Peace Process*, 183.

²¹⁰ David Newman, "Gush Emunim and Settlement-Type in the West Bank," *Bulletin (British Society for Middle Eastern Studies)*, Vol. 8, No. 1 (1981), 33-37, Taylor & Francis, Ltd. Stable URL: <http://www.jstor.org/stable/194676>,

²¹¹ Ben-Zadok, "National Planning", 334.

²¹² Efrat, *The West Bank and Gaza Strip*, 31.

²¹³ Jimmy Carter, *We Can Have Peace in the Holy Land: A Plan That Will Work* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2009), 32.

²¹⁴ Shlaim, *Wall*, 353-355.

²¹⁵ Shlaim, *op.cit.*, 356.

²¹⁶ Ben-Zadok, "National Planning", 334.

obstruction" to Middle East peace efforts.²¹⁷ But the UN's Resolution was disregarded by the Likud government.

By the fully pledged support of the Likud government to expansionism, the *Yishuv Kehillati* concept designed by Israeli planner Uzi Gdor was formally recognized. This concept was a non-traditional settlement in comparison to the Kibutz and was formulated by the Gush movement towards the end of 1975. Contrast to working locally in agriculture, the settlers would be allowed to establish their own enterprise by renting land from the government or commute to work in the cities.²¹⁸ This concept was rejected by Labor because it could detach the settler from the area.

One of the biggest supporters to the Gush Emunim movement was former general Ariel Sharon. In 1976, Sharon left Likud and joined the Labor government as a special advisor to Rabin.²¹⁹ On 29th Sep 1977 Ariel Sharon was assigned as Minister of Agriculture and Minister responsible for settlement.²²⁰ According to Ariel Sharon, the settlements were not an obstacle to peace. He stated in one of his interviews in 1977 that these settlement expansion plans enhanced the possibility of peace with the Arabs in the future. Sharon stated in an interview with *Maariv* in 1977 that "It is not our intention to plunder areas from the Arabs, but to create security cordons that will give us and our children and the Jews of the world security and allow us to live. This certainly enhances the prospects of peace; offers new opportunities of coexistence between Jews and Arabs and creates a situation of peace between the two peoples

²¹⁷ For detailed information on the resolution, see United Nations General Assembly, "THIRTY-SECOND SESSION: Official Records," URL: <http://domino.un.org/unispal.nsf/9a798adbf322aff38525617b006d88d7/65a12b78bc3108a8052565fd0056a8be>

²¹⁸ Newman, "Gush Emunim", 35.

²¹⁹ Baruch Kimmerling, *Politicide: Ariel Sharon's war against the Palestinians* (London and New York: Verso Books, 2003), 75.

²²⁰ Zertal and Eldar, *Lords of the Land*, 58-59.

".²²¹ Moreover, Sharon stated that "We shall continue to settle; this is a continuous process that must be achieved. Anyone who thinks that this government is going to withdraw from the West Bank is suffering a delusion."²²² He stressed that Judea and Samaria are not occupied for security but for historical reasons. According to Sharon:

"One night in 1977, 12 core members of Gush Emunim settled in Judea-Samaria, near the military bases, marking the start of the great settlement movement and the beginning of the Jewish repopulation of the territories. I had the immense honor from 1977, in my functions as president of the ministerial committee on population and as defense minister, of establishing 230 settlements in Galilee, the Negev, the Golan Heights, Judea-Samaria, the Jordan valley and the Gaza Strip. In fact, Israel is waiting for new Jewish arrivals. We must encourage aliyah and make it our number one priority."²²³

2.3.2 Drobbless Plan and Sharon Plan (see Map 4)

During this period, two plans were drafted as a two-part settlement policy by two Israeli key figures. These plans represented Israel's settlement expansion scheme. One was prepared in 1977 and published in 1978 by Matitياهو Drobbless (Head of the World Zionist Organization's Settlement Division). This was known as the Drobbless Plan and was very relative to the Gush Emunim movement plans. The objective of this plan was to build settlements on high grounds so as to provide internal and external security for Israel. His opinion was to preserve Judea and Samaria by rapid development of settlement in the region. According to the Drobbless:

The civilian presence of Jewish communities is vital for the security of the state... There must not be the slightest doubt regarding our intention to hold the areas of Judea and Samaria for ever... The best and most effective way to remove any shred of doubt regarding our intention to hold Judea and Samaria forever is a rapid settlement drive in these areas.²²⁴

²²¹ "Jewish Settlements in Occupied Territories," *Journal of Palestine Studies*, Vol.7, No.2, 130. University of California Press, URL: <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2536443>

²²² "Jewish Settlements in Occupied Territories," *Journal of Palestine Studies*, Vol.7, No.2, 131. University of California Press, URL: <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2536443>

²²³ Uri Dan, *Ariel Sharon: An Intimate Portrait* (Oxford: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), 45-46.

²²⁴ Matitياهو Drobbless, *The Settlement in Judea and Samaria – Strategy, Policy and Program* (in Hebrew) (Jerusalem: World Zionist Organization, September 1980), 3. Cited in Lein and Weizman, "Land Grab", 14.

The other one was the Sharon Plan, prepared and presented by Ariel Sharon (Minister of Agriculture). According to Yehezkel Lein, “Sharon recommended the establishment of settlements in areas as means of promoting annexation”.²²⁵ These two plans, together with the Allon Plan, were later used as ingredients/components in the Israeli government’s 1983 “Master Plan”, which was designed to accommodate eighty thousand new citizens within twenty years.²²⁶ Israel’s settlement policy during 1977-1981 was different than the one before and was based on these two principles. It was no longer about placing tiny settlements and outposts on hill tops but about suburban and urban settlements directly connected to Jerusalem and Tel Aviv by high-ways. Annexation was no longer creeping but moving ahead. The government was looking to attract Israelis in search of an affordable but at the same time better quality of life. According to Rema Hammami, the government’s objective was to “empower the settlements as centers of governance and therefore long-term planning and growth...”²²⁷ According to Finkelstein, Prime Minister Begin was very supportive of creating facts on the grounds. The city of Jerusalem was also on Sharon’s agenda. Sharon began putting up settlements around the city which he claimed were necessary for security reasons.²²⁸ This plan of building towns and settlements all around the West Bank, and roads that directly connect them to Israel was clearly the extension of the expansion plan which jeopardizes any future peace talks.

²²⁵ Lein and Weizman, “Land Grab”, 14.

²²⁶ *Ibid.*, 15.

²²⁷ Rema Hammami and Salim Tamari, “Occupation Means For Territorial Ends: Rethinking Forty Years Of Israeli Rule.” in SPECIAL FOCUS COMMEMORATING THE NAKSA, EVOKING THE NAKBA, *The MIT Electronic Journal of Middle East Studies*, (Spring, 2006): 29. URL: http://www.palestinejournal.net/gmh/gmh/MIT_journal_spring-2008.pdf

²²⁸ Finkelstein, *Ariel Sharon*, 57-59.

2.3.3 U.S. Involvement – Camp David I

Since 1967 and until Ronald Reagan was elected president, it was always implied by the US governments that the settlements conflicted with their policy and the Geneva Convention. The U.S. policy in the 1970s was: “Israeli settlements in the West Bank and Gaza were illegal and obstacles to peace.”²²⁹ Carter was committed to Israel withdrawal on all fronts to the 1967 line. According to Shlaim, Carter was the first president to give the Palestinians support for a homeland.²³⁰ The American attitude to legalizing the settlements was completely negative. In an interview during his years as president, Jimmy Carter stated that he made it clear to Israeli Prime Minister Begin, on several occasions in the United Nations and other places that “Washington was against these settlements”; “I let Mr. Begin know very clearly that our Government policy, before I became President and now, is that these settlements are illegal.”²³¹ Carter repeatedly expressed that the “United States’ position on settlements in the occupied territory has been that they are illegal...”²³²

Before his term was over, President Carter took serious measures to resolve the issue of the occupied territories and other problems in the Middle East. He invited both Begin and Sadat to Camp David in 1978. The summit took place between 5th to 17th September. There were two accords signed, the first one dealing with the Palestinian problem and the second dealing with the Sinai. According to the former framework, both parties would honor UNSCR 242 and 338. The first stage was establishing a self-governing authority in the West Bank and Gaza. The second section mentions

²²⁹ Jimmy Carter, *Palestine: Peace not Apartheid* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2006), 39.

²³⁰ Shlaim, *Wall*, 356.

²³¹ President Jimmy Carter, Interview with the President Q&A Session with a Group of Editors and News Directors, the American Presidency Project, July 29, 1977. URL: <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=7898&st=illegal&st1=>.

²³² President Jimmy Carter, News Conference, The American Presidency Project, October 10, 1978. URL: <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=29963&st=illegal&st1=>.

the withdrawal of the Israeli army from the occupied territories except for specific security locations. Finally, in a period not exceeding five years, negotiations between Israel, Egypt, Jordan and the self-governing authority would take place to determine the final status of the West Bank and Gaza.²³³ However, David Newman states that the settlements cause a serious problem in the final status of the West Bank.²³⁴ According to Finkelstein, the negotiations almost fell apart because of the settlement expansion issue. Israel simply stated that these were not new but actually extensions of the existing ones and a part of a natural growth.²³⁵ In addition to the granting of *full* autonomy by the Israeli government to the people living in the occupied territories, the Israeli military and civilian forces would withdrawal from the West Bank and Gaza.²³⁶ Israel had a different interpretation of the accords in respect to autonomy in the West Bank and Gaza. The autonomy talks almost lead to the failure of the entire peace-process when Dayan and Weizman stepped in. They formulated a new approach to save the accords by playing with words in regards to the issue.²³⁷ According to the accords, the Israeli government would provide “full autonomy to the inhabitants”, not the territories, which meant a different thing, whereas President Sadat’s view was self-determination for the Palestinians and a future Palestinian state independent of the Jewish state. Nordquist states that Israel also had a differing understanding of the accords regarding East Jerusalem and the Golan Heights.²³⁸ Against all odds the Accords were signed on the 17th of September. The territories,

²³³ Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Camp David Accords September 17, 1978 - Framework”, URL: <http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/>

²³⁴ Newman, “Gush Emunim”, 33.

²³⁵ Finkelstein, *Ariel Sharon*, 59.

²³⁶ Carter, *We Can Have Peace in the Holy Land*, 39.

²³⁷ For a more detailed discussion on the Autonomy Talks, see Shlomo Gazit, *Trapped fools: thirty years of Israeli policy in the territories* (London: Frank Cass Publishers, 2003), 211-219.

²³⁸ Kjell-Åke Nordquist, “Contradicting Peace Proposals in the Palestine Conflict,” *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 22, No. 2 (Jun., 1985), 162-164, Sage Publications, Ltd. Stable URL: <http://www.jstor.org/stable/42424> Accessed: 13/05/2011

except for Sinai, remain under occupation until today. According to Nixon, President Sadat especially agreed to sign the Accord on the condition that Israel withdraws from Gaza and the West Bank in a transitional period not to exceed five years. The entire process should have concluded in 1984 but nothing has happened.²³⁹ The peace process ended with the Lebanon War in 1982. Furthermore, the settlement expansion activities brought on three more resolutions by the United Nations: UNSCR 446 in 1979, 452 in 1979 and 465 in 1980, all concerning the illegality of the settlements on Arab territories occupied by Israel in 1967.²⁴⁰ The importance of this agreement is the fact that it would become the model for future Palestinian-Israeli negotiations.

The peace agreement signed between Egypt and Israel had its consequences. Joffe states that Sadat's actions caused Egypt to be boycotted by the Arab League for leaving the Palestinian issue unresolved, but in fact, this could have been the only approach to be able to reach any result for normalizing relations between the two countries.²⁴¹ According to Ross, this reaction faded out in the mid-80s and Arabs realized that they needed to consider a diplomatic approach which would produce real results.²⁴² Sadat's drastic approach may be difficult to swallow but in fact direct negotiations proved to be useful for the Israelis. On the other hand, Joffe confirms that the main reason Israel was anxious to sign a deal with Egypt was to eliminate it from the equation of the future events, also known as "Operation Peace for Galilee"

²³⁹ Nixon, *Seize the Moment*, 220.

²⁴⁰ For full text of resolutions, see United Nations Homepage, documents, Security Council Resolutions, URL: <http://www.un.org/documents/scres.htm>

²⁴¹ Lawrence Joffe, *Keating's Guide to the Mid-East Peace Process* (London: Cartermill Publishing, 1996), 56.

²⁴² Ross, *The Missing Peace*, 45.

in 1982.²⁴³

2.4 The New Begin Administration (1981-1985) and the ‘Master Plan’ for the West Bank

2.4.1 Begin’s Enhanced Settlement Policy

Since 1981, the Begin government had been preparing the practical annexation of the West Bank and Gaza by a double strategy of uprooting all expressions of Palestinian national resistance to occupation. When Reagan became the new president of the US, Likud annexed the Golan Heights and increased settlement building in the West Bank and Gaza.²⁴⁴ Moreover, Israel simultaneously moved the maximum number of Jews across the "green line" in order to deprive the autonomy concept of any content. This policy was built on a hawkish trend in Israeli public opinion and had been passively supported by Washington. During these years, Israel continued to face internal and external security threats by the PLO. As previously mentioned by Quigley, the PLO camps located throughout Lebanon were involved with terrorist attacks on Israel and compromising its security issues.²⁴⁵ This external threat was dealt with by Minister of Defense at the time Ariel Sharon in June 1982 in the Lebanon War, also known as “Operation Peace for Galilee”.²⁴⁶ It was Sharon’s plan to destroy the PLO so that Palestinian nationalism would evaporate and the West Bank would be absorbed into the Israeli borders.²⁴⁷ In addition to this, there were the PLO’s internal representatives, known as the “PLO mayors” which were elected in

²⁴³ Joffe, *Keesing's Guide*, 65-66.

²⁴⁴ Carter, *Palestine*, 103-104.

²⁴⁵ Quigley, *The case for Palestine*, 198-199. Also, see Shlaim, *Wall*, 401.

²⁴⁶ For details about the Lebanon War, see Baruch Kimmerling, *Politicide: Ariel Sharon's war against the Palestinians* (London: Verso Books, 2003), 81-92.

²⁴⁷ Shlaim, *Wall*, 396-407.

1976 municipal elections during Labor's second period. According to Sahliyeh, unlike the previous pro-Jordanian mayors, these representatives were given advance approval by the PLO and furthermore, were selected to strengthen the role of the organization in the occupied territories. They advocated Palestinian nationalism and had strong attachments to the PLO. The mayors petitioned for the end of Israeli occupation and for the formation of a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.²⁴⁸ Fully aware of their actions and in aim of preventing this escalation, in 1980 the Begin government arrested and deported these 'pro-PLO' mayors, which according to Hammami was known as the "First Iron Fist" policy.²⁴⁹ According to the UN reports, the Mayors of Hebron and Halhoul and of the Sharia Judge of Hebron were deported by the Israeli government and there were assassination attempts against the Mayors of Nablus, Ramallah and Al Bireh by armed Jewish settlers. These actions were condemned by the International community, and UN Security Council passed two resolutions regarding this matter.²⁵⁰ Moreover, in 1981, when local political bodies established a new institution called the Committee of Guidance, members of this institution were quickly arrested under the orders of Defense Minister Ariel Sharon.²⁵¹ That same year, Ariel Sharon devised a 'Village League Plan' and formed a new agency in the West Bank headed by Menachem Milson.²⁵² This idea was inspired by the 'The Farmers Party' back in 1924. This new

²⁴⁸ Sahliyeh, *In Search of Leadership*, 66-68.

²⁴⁹ Rema Hammami with Salim Tamari, "Occupation Means For Territorial Ends: Rethinking Forty Years Of Israeli Rule," in SPECIAL FOCUS COMMEMORATING THE NAKSA, EVOKING THE NAKBA, *The MIT Electronic Journal of Middle East Studies*, (Spring, 2006): 39, URL: http://www.palestinejournal.net/gmh/gmh/MIT_journal_spring-2008.pdf

²⁵⁰ For full text of resolutions 468 and 471, see United Nations Homepage, documents, Security Council Resolutions, URL: <http://www.un.org/documents/scres.htm>.

²⁵¹ Pappé, *The Modern Middle East*, 218.

²⁵² Esther Rosalind Cohen, *Human rights in the Israeli-occupied territories, 1967-1982*, (Manchester University Press, 1985), 254-258. Also, see Kimmerling, *Politicide*, 76-78.

attempt would be known as the Civil Administration and Palestinian Village Leagues, again formed as a strategy to pacify and control the Palestinian population in the occupied territories.²⁵³ These new agents consisted of pro-Jordanian Palestinians especially chosen to keep the PLO influence from internally spreading.²⁵⁴ The aim of this new alignment backed by Likud was to hit two birds with one stone; undermine any political aspiration in the occupied territories and eliminate PLO influence.²⁵⁵ According to Cohen, this plan would prevent the PLO from having any power in the West Bank. Once this was made possible the local bodies would be encouraged to act on their own self-determination and fully cooperate with the Israeli government. This would be a kind of partnership between the government and the people that involves Palestinian pacification and full Israeli domination. This self-determination would give the Palestinians an illusion of autonomy. This would also be another failed policy for Sharon. It failed because the influence of the PLO thus the Palestinian identity was already wide spread in the occupied territories. The Village league did cooperate at first but soon after, the leaders diverged to politics as local political representatives of the West Bank. Their approach was building peace with Israel and saving what was left of the West Bank before it was completely annexed.²⁵⁶

Until the year of the Intifada, the civilian population in the occupied territories was brutalized by different tactics by the Israeli government. All types of measure were

²⁵³ Raja Khalidi and Sobhi Samour, "Neoliberalism as Liberation: The Statehood Program and the Remaking of the Palestinian National Movement", *Journal of Palestine Studies*, Vol. 40, No. 2 (Winter 2011), p.7, URL: <http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1525/jps.2011.XL.2.6>

²⁵⁴ Rema Hammami and Salim Tamari, 30-31, URL:

http://www.palestinejournal.net/gmh/gmh/MIT_journal_spring-2008.pdf.

²⁵⁵ For more information on the 'Village League', see Salim Tamari, "In League with Zion: Israel's Search for a Native Pillar," *Journal of Palestine Studies*, Vol. 12, No. 4 (Summer, 1983): 42-45, University of California Press. Stable URL: <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2536244>

²⁵⁶ Cohen, *Human rights*, 254-256.

taken by the military government against PLO supporters residing in the occupied territories. According to Cohen, all councils formed to oppose the peace proposals under the basis of autonomy were banned, Mayors organizing demonstrations were dismissed, Universities were closed and lecturers were fired, and newspapers were shut down.²⁵⁷ Houses were demolished, curfews were imposed and any kind of public demonstration was prohibited.²⁵⁸ Smith states that even the settlers were encouraged by the military forces to commit acts of violence against the Palestinians.²⁵⁹ All these physical and mental pressures were inflicted on the Palestinians in order to crush their nationalistic ambitions and national identity. They could either accept the facts on the ground or leave, something which politicians such as Sharon, Begin and Shamir had hoped for.

2.4.2 The Master Plan

During the first half of the 1980s Israel experienced an economic crisis due to high and volatile rates of inflation. According to Ronald E. Ringer, it was the settlement expansion that contributed to this rising inflation. The settlements required security which in return demanded high military spending.²⁶⁰ But this did not stop the Likud administration from over spending (44% of the total budget) for settlement activities. According to Ian Lustick, Israel spent billions of dollars on settlements and infrastructure.²⁶¹ Moreover in 1983, the Ministry of Agriculture and the WZO devised a new project called “The Master Plan” or “The Hundred Thousand Plan”

²⁵⁷ Cohen, *Human rights*, 257-260.

²⁵⁸ Quigley, *The case for Palestine*, 200-201.

²⁵⁹ Smith, *Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict*, 374.

²⁶⁰ Ronald E. Ringer, *Excel HSC modern history: Your Step by Step Guide to HSC Success* (Pascal Press, 2004), 291.

²⁶¹ Ian Lustick, *Unsettled States, Disputed Lands: Britain and Ireland, France and Algeria, Israel and the West Bank-Gaza* (New York: Cornell University Press, 1995), 11.

aimed to house 80000 new Israeli citizens by 1986.²⁶² According to Quigley, this was a plan to annex the West Bank into Israel. Building settlements was a way to achieve the incorporation of land into the national system.²⁶³ That same year, Menachem Begin, announced he is leaving office and retiring from political life due to medical reasons. His post was replaced by Yithak Shamir. He and Begin were both disciples of Ze'ev Jabotinsky that shared the same ideologies. They also shared a history of violence in the 1940s.²⁶⁴ The same Israeli policies continued: no bargaining and compromise, no retreat from any territory. In fact, Shamir's idea of Jewish State included the Golan Heights and Sinai.²⁶⁵ According to Finkelstein, this was the period of Ethiopian and Soviet Jewish emigration which fit perfectly with Sharon's Master Plan. These emigrants were faced with severe housing shortage due to economic recession. They were set up in temporary accommodation while Sharon lost no time in putting up thousands of apartment units around the West Bank as he had already planned since 1977.²⁶⁶

By the time Likud completed its second term, the number of settlers in the West Bank rose from 5000 to 44000. After the elections in 1984 and the formation of the new coalition government between Likud and Labor, this number reached to 53000.²⁶⁷ During this period Labor and Likud agreed to rule in rotation: 1984-1986

²⁶² Lein and Weizman, "Land Grab", 15.

²⁶³ Quigley, *The case for Palestine*, 174-175.

²⁶⁴ Both men were members of the Stern Gang, a terrorist group involved in the killing of British officers in the 1940s. See Harvey W. Kushner, *Encyclopedia of terrorism* (California: Sage Publications, 2003), 348.

²⁶⁵ Shlaim, *Wall*, 420.

²⁶⁶ Finkelstein, *Ariel Sharon*, 74-75.

²⁶⁷ Lustick, *Unsettled States, Disputed Lands*, 11.

by Shimon Peres of Labor and 1986-1988 by Yithak Shamir of Likud.²⁶⁸ The only difference in this period is that the two parties had to compromise and combine the Allon Plan with the Drobless-Sharon Plan, which meant building and promoting settlements in the Jordan Valley as well as the central mountain ridge and on the western slope of the ridge.²⁶⁹ According to Ian Lustick, there was a decrease in the settlement expansion plan during this during Likud's coalition with Labor, particularly between the years of 1986 and 1990 which later exploded in 1991 due to Russian Jew immigration.²⁷⁰

Until the mid-1980s, the Drobless-Sharon/Allon Plan had political and economic control over the entire occupied territories.²⁷¹ According to a paper briefing by Al-Haq, "approximately 150,000 workers cross daily into Israel in search of work". Furthermore, the Israeli government controlled power grids, telecommunication, water, health and social services.²⁷² According to Ex-president Carter, the settlement policy towards the end of the 1987 increased tensions between the Palestinians and the Israeli government. This strategy of political repression and economic

²⁶⁸ Cheryl A. Rubenberg, *The Palestinians in Search of a Just Peace* (London: Lynne Rienner, 2003), 49.

²⁶⁹ Lein and Weizman, "Land Grab", 15.

²⁷⁰ Lustick, *Unsettled States, Disputed Lands*, 11.

²⁷¹ A study of the economic structure of the occupied territories necessitates some understanding of the environment in which the economic activities are taking place. The main feature of this environment is the systematic effort of the occupying authorities to integrate the economy of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip with that of Israel through such measures as monetary and taxation policies, employment, production in agriculture and industry and trade practices. The policies adopted and implemented by Israel have resulted in a high level of economic dependency of the occupied territories on the Israeli economy, including its inflationary trends, thus preventing the generation of conditions which, in the long run, could benefit the indigenous population. For more information on economic control, see United Nations, "Living Conditions of the Palestinian People in the Occupied Territories", *New York: United Nations*, January 1985, 16-29, URL: <http://unispal.un.org/pdfs/85-23923.pdf>

²⁷² Al-Haq, "Twenty Years of Israel Occupation of the West Bank and Gaza", *Al - Haq/ Law in Service of Man*, 1987, 7. URL: <http://www.alhaq.org/pdfs/Twenty Years of Israel Occupation of the West Bank and Gaza.pdf>
Also, see, United Nations, "Living Conditions of the Palestinian People in the Occupied Territories", *New York: United Nations*, January 1985, 16-43, URL: <http://unispal.un.org/pdfs/85-23923.pdf>

exploitation of Gaza and the West Bank finally resulted in the outbreak of the first Intifada in 1987 after 20 years of occupation.²⁷³ What started as a non-violent demonstration as a reaction to Israel's complete control over the economy and violation of Palestinian's human rights in the occupied territories, turned into a very violent conflict between the Yitzhak Rabin and the Palestinian youth.²⁷⁴

2.4.3 Palestinian Reaction during the Likud Administration: The Uprising of 1987

After twenty years of Israeli occupation, the Palestinian civilians, especially the new youth born after 1967, decided to take matters into their own hands and fight for their right to self-determination. According to Ilan Pappé, the Arab countries that did mention the 'Palestinian Question'²⁷⁵ such as Jordan and Egypt, repeatedly failed to produce any solutions for the occupied territories. Even the PLO was unsuccessful in reaching any agreement with Jordan or Israel during the Reagan Administration.²⁷⁶ During those years Israel refused to talk to Arafat and the PLO about peace negotiations because accepting to talk to the PLO would create an atmosphere for discussing a 'Palestinian State'. In regard to forming an independent Palestinian State under Arafat was rejected by the US as well. According to Smith, during the 1980s, Israel's Labor government only accepted to achieve a settlement with Jordan without Arafat's involvement, while Likud completely rejected this concept and continued its plans of annexation.²⁷⁷ Israel's and the United States' attitudes put the

²⁷³ Carter (2006), 105.

²⁷⁴ Makdisi, *Palestine Inside Out*, 78-80.

²⁷⁵ The 'Palestinian Question' generally means the internationalization of Jerusalem and the refugee question. The matter is supported by UN General Assembly Resolution 194 passed in 1948. For full text of the resolution, see "United Nations General Assembly Resolution 194 (III). Palestine – Progress Report of the United Nations Mediator, December 11, 1948", *United Nations*, par.11, URL: <http://unispal.un.org/UNISPAL.NSF/0/C758572B78D1CD0085256BCF0077E51A>

²⁷⁶ Pappé, *A History of Modern Palestine*, 232.

²⁷⁷ Smith, *Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict*, 408-409.

PLO in a very isolated position. Ronald E. Ringer states that King Hussein of Jordan “renounced his claim to the West Bank”, which left Israel to be forced to deal with the PLO.²⁷⁸ This meant that the Israeli government could no longer implement its Allon plan on the occupied territories and, that this plan needed to be reformulated or revised. But even in the future Oslo negotiations, the Allon Plan still had a big influence on the Israeli policy over the 1967 occupied territories. According to Makdisi, “the new package by the Israelis, geographically speaking, looked remarkably like the original” and had “a variation of the same theme”.²⁷⁹

Israel’s twenty years of oppression and Arafat’s inability to fulfill his promise and failed leadership angered the civilians under occupation. According to Bregman, these were the unemployed labors and university graduates, refugees living in poverty and disgrace, and finally the Islamic militants.²⁸⁰ Chomsky states that the Israeli government’s oppressive policies like collective punishment (house demolishing, expulsion and false arrests) and “invisible transfers” were all part of a strategy to force the civilians under occupation to submit to a higher power and accept their destiny.²⁸¹ A report prepared by Al-Haq argues how the Israeli military government managed within the past twenty years to intentionally arrest and detain civilians, demolish and seal their homes, restrict their freedom of movement, close down their educational institutions, and gain full control over their economic and

²⁷⁸ Ronald E. Ringer, *Excel HSC modern history* (Glebe: Pascal Press, 2004), 296.

²⁷⁹ Makdisi, *Palestine Inside Out*, 81, 92.

²⁸⁰ Ahron Bregman, *Israel’s Wars: A history since 1947* (London & New York: Routledge, 2002), 183-186.

²⁸¹ Noam Chomsky, *Fateful Triangle: The United States, Israel, and the Palestinians* (Pluto Press, 1999), 476-477.

social life.²⁸² In addition to this, the militarized settlers in the territories were allowed to own weapons for security reasons. These settlers were free to intimidate and in some cases kill Palestinians. According to the Israeli press, the settlements have large quantities of illegal arms in which the government is very well aware of. Each settlement had a defense unit, which carried out attacks on Palestinian civilians in the area in order to force them to depart from the future Eretz Israel.²⁸³ These acts not only violated the Geneva Convention, but also the provision of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.²⁸⁴ With the alienation by the Reagan Administration of the Palestinian people, the policies taken against them by Prime Minister Peres and the PLO's impotency in bringing its people some solution, a Palestinian uprising broke out.²⁸⁵ There are many explanations to why this uprising suddenly exploded after twenty years of oppression. As previously mentioned, there was a Palestinian reaction for years before the intifada. But this was the first time the Palestinians reaction was not being labeled a terrorist act. This war fought with stones caught the attention of the local and international media, causing a great change in the international perspective of the State of Israel.

Ruth argues that the main contributor for the outbreak of the Uprising was Israel's settlement policy.²⁸⁶ This statement is backed by author Norman H. Finkelstein, who confirms that it was a reaction to the settlements being built on the future Palestinian

²⁸² Al-Haq, "Twenty Years of Israel Occupation of the West Bank and Gaza", *Al - Haq/ Law in Service of Man*, 1987, URL: http://www.alhaq.org/pdfs/Twenty_Years_of_Israel_Occupation_of_the_West_Bank_and_Gaza.pdf

²⁸³ Israeli press, "An Armed Right in Israel," *Journal of Palestine Studies*, Vol. 10, No. 1 (Autumn, 1980), 143-144, University of California Press, URL: <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2536491>

²⁸⁴ Chomsky, *Fateful Triangle*, 473-474.

²⁸⁵ David McDowall, *The Palestinians: The Road to Nationhood* (London: Minority Rights Publication, 1995), 99.

²⁸⁶ Ruth Margolies Beitler, *The Path to Mass Rebellion: An Analysis of Two Intifadas* (London: Lexington Books, 2004), 93.

State.²⁸⁷ According to Smith, the reason was the daily harassments, brutal beating and arrests that caused Intifada in December 1987. The rebellion was triggered by an ugly car crash incident caused by an Israeli driver, killing four Palestinians in the event.²⁸⁸ The day of the Palestinian victims' funeral quickly led to a massive demonstration in Gaza and spread to the West Bank. This ultimately became the official date of the beginning of the Intifada.²⁸⁹

According to Beitler, this uprising brought the issues of the Palestinians under occupation to the negotiating table. Here, the IDF was confronted by civilians with nothing to lose. This uprising was composed of demonstrations, stone throwing at military vehicles, organized protests and strikes which took Israel and the entire world by surprise.²⁹⁰ This was the new generation of youngsters born after the 1967 war brought up in an atmosphere of humiliation, poverty and sense of imprisonment.²⁹¹ It also included the participation of Palestinian women and children. Ilan Pappé affirms that this late uprising was the result of Israel's policies in the occupied territories; creeping annexation.²⁹² Furthermore, Beverley Milton-Edwards confirms that the real reason behind this rebellion was the harsh living conditions and unemployment under the ruling occupation and the objective was to end this occupation and achieve independence.²⁹³ To add more fury to the Palestinian's frustration, on 15 December 1987, Ariel Sharon occupied an apartment

²⁸⁷ Finkelstein, *Ariel Sharon*, 75.

²⁸⁸ Smith, *Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict*, 412.

²⁸⁹ Smith, *op.cit.*, 419.

²⁹⁰ Beitler, *The Path to Mass Rebellion*, 98-99.

²⁹¹ Smith, *op.cit.*, 414.

²⁹² Pappé, *A History of Modern Palestine*, 233.

²⁹³ Beverley Milton-Edwards, *The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict* (London & New York: Routledge, 2009), 145-146.

in the Muslim Quarter in the Old City of Jerusalem.²⁹⁴ The mission of the popular resistance was to force the IDF from the occupied territories and Ariel Sharon out of the Moslem Quarter. Additionally the uprising was aimed stop Israel's policy on collective punishment, land expropriation and settlement expansion.²⁹⁵

According to Milton-Edwards, the 1987 Intifada caused a shift of perception in the West towards the Palestinians. Until that year, they were perceived as terrorists but now they were acknowledged as victims of Israeli violence. The impact of the international media played a big role in this²⁹⁶. It also was the reason why King Hussein of Jordan renounced his claim to the West Bank in 1988.²⁹⁷ According to Yapp, this historical event by Jordan, gave the Palestinians and the PLO the upper hand and the Israelis now had no other choice but to deal directly with Arafat.²⁹⁸ King Hussein stated that he “respected the wish of the PLO for a Palestinian state”.²⁹⁹ By the same year, the Palestinians were asking for their own state in the West Bank, Gaza and East Jerusalem as its capital.³⁰⁰ A further important development was the change of the PLO's approach towards Israel in November 1988, were it recognized the Resolutions 242 and 338 and announced its goal in achieving a Palestinian State within the occupied territories. The declaration of Independence was perceived by the Palestinians as a great progress and was

²⁹⁴ Finkelstein, *Ariel Sharon*, 75.

²⁹⁵ Bregman, *Israel's Wars*, 190.

²⁹⁶ Milton-Edwards, *The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict*, 168. Also, see Shlaim, *Wall*, 454-455.

²⁹⁷ Quandt, *Peace Process*, 286. Also, see UNHCR, “Disengagement Regulations for the Year 1988 [Jordan],” *National Legislative Bodies*, 28 July 1988, available at: <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/43cd04b94.html> [accessed 8 May 2011]

²⁹⁸ Yapp, *The Near East since the First World War*, 300.

²⁹⁹ Cited in John Quigley, “The Legal Status of Jerusalem Under International Law,” *The Turkish Yearbook of International Relations*, Vol.24, 1994, 18, URL: <http://dergiler.ankara.edu.tr/dergiler/44/681/8664.pdf>. Also, see Shlaim, *Wall*, 457-458.

³⁰⁰ Shlaim, *Wall*, 466.

celebrated in the streets with cheers, firecrackers and flag waving.³⁰¹ Butenschon state that it was the Intifada that changed the PLO's policy in forcing it to abandon the idea of liberating the whole of Palestine.³⁰² The U.S. policy since 1975 was against negotiating with the PLO unless it would revise its charter and renounce terrorism.³⁰³ But with PLO's changing attitude, the United States was now ready to open dialogue based on the "land for peace" formula. It was obvious from the beginning of the talks that Israel had a super-power ally and had the higher ground in all negotiations. The uprising was able to break this political balance which Israel administered on the Palestinians. According to Quandt, after a long dialogue between the US and the PLO (Israeli elections in 1988 played a role in these prolonged dialogues), Arafat finally accepted to renounce violence and the Israel's right to exist as a state. His conditions were approved by Reagan and the US-PLO dialogues were opened.³⁰⁴ According to Quigley, this move was rewarded by both the Israelis and the US. Two historical changes in 1988 took place: some members from the Israeli government met in public with the PNC officials and the US opened dialogue with the PLO.³⁰⁵ Armstrong states that the uprising caused Israel's future Prime Minister Rabin to realize that a diplomatic approach should be taken towards the Palestinians.³⁰⁶ During his days as defense minister he believed that "Palestinian national aspirations could no longer be suppressed and there was no military solution to the intifada".³⁰⁷ He was anxious for the intifada to end and "in return would

³⁰¹ Rubenberg, *Just Peace*, 24. Also, see Milton-Edwards (2009), 146. Also, see Quigley, *The case for Palestine*, 212-213.

³⁰² Nils A. Butenschon, "The Oslo Agreement: From the White House to Jabal Abu Ghneim," in *After Oslo: New Realities, Old Problems*, ed. George Giacaman and Dag Jorund Lonning (London and Chicago: Pluto Press, 1998), 30.

³⁰³ Mohamed Rabie, *US-PLO Dialogue: Secret Diplomacy and Conflict Resolution* (Florida: University Press of Florida, 1995), 14.

³⁰⁴ Quandt, *Peace Process*, 277-285.

³⁰⁵ Quigley, *The case for Palestine*, 212-213.

³⁰⁶ Armstrong, *Jerusalem*, 417.

³⁰⁷ Rabie, *US-PLO Dialogue*, 9.

promise full cooperation in seeking a peaceful solution to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict”.³⁰⁸ It can be stated that it was the Intifada that brought the Palestinian question back to the negotiation table. Suleiman states that this rebellion, and later the Gulf War would both influence the American administration to take a more active role in the Arab-Israeli conflict.³⁰⁹ According to Eisenberg, this outbreak in the occupied territories “reshaped political options in the region”.³¹⁰ This change in policy on all sides did not necessarily lead the Israelis to compromise on all topics, especially settlement expansion, but nonetheless, it can be stated that it was a first step to start peace talks. Nevertheless, the future peace-talks were dictated by the Israeli government and the settlements plans would be pushed out of any negotiation.

Chapter 3

CHANGING POLICIES IN THE NEW WORLD

ORDER

³⁰⁸ Ibid., 10.

³⁰⁹ Michael W. Suleiman, “Palestine and the Palestinians in the Mind of America,” in *U.S. Policy on Palestine: From Wilson to Clinton*, ed. Michael W. Suleyman, (Illinois: Assn of Arab-Amer Univ Graduates, 1995), 12.

³¹⁰ Laura Zittrain Eisenberg, and Neil Caplan, *Negotiating Arab-Israeli Peace: Patterns, Problems, Possibilities* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1998), 67.

3.1 The Shamir Administration (1989-1991) and the U.S.

Involvement

3.1.1 The Shultz Initiative and the Road to Madrid

The events that took place during the first two years of the intifada shifted the political balance in the Middle East. The PLO who had for years supported an armed struggle and the Liberation of all Palestine took a step back and accepted Shultz's conditions. George Shultz, US Secretary of State, was not going to take chances, especially after his failed plans to include King Hussein in the peace talks after Jordan's relinquished its ties to the West Bank.³¹¹ During the PNC meeting in Algeria in November 1988, the PLO eased up, renounced terrorism and accepted resolutions 242 and 338. This was also known as the 'Algiers Declaration' or 'Declaration of Independence'.³¹² But the US finally responded to Arafat after a press conference in December where he clearly declared what Shultz and Reagan wanted to hear. The US actions were celebrated but the Palestinians and condemned by Israel.³¹³ The US-PLO dialogue ultimately led to the Madrid Conference in 1991.

Soon after a dialogue opened, he requested of Israel to change its policies and put together a plan for peace talks. According to Carter, 1st March 1989, the newly elected American president George H. Bush warned against settlement activity.³¹⁴

After an intense debate in the Knesset, Prime Minister Shamir and Defense Minister Rabin, although a couple very mistrustful of the PLO and opposed to the peace

³¹¹ Quandt, *Peace Process*, 277.

³¹² To read full text of the 'Declaration of Principles', see Jerusalem Media & Communications Center, "The Palestinian Declaration of Independence, Algiers, Algeria, 15 November 1988," URL: http://www.jmcc.org/documents/Palestinian_Declaration_of_Independence.pdf

³¹³ Aburish, *Arafat*, 211-215. To read full text of the statement by Arafat in the press conference, see Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "419. Statement by Yasser Arafat, 14 December 1988," http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Foreign_Relations/Israels_Foreign_Relations_since_1947/1984-1988/419_Statement_by_Yasser_Arafat-14_December_1988

³¹⁴ Carter, *We Can Have Peace in the Holy Land*, 46-47.

process, formulated a response to America's actions and initiated a peace proposal in April 1989. This proposal consisted of four basic points which were strongly rejected by Sharon:

- Strengthening the peace with Egypt as a regional cornerstone,
- Promoting full peaceful relations with the Arab states,
- Improving refugee conditions through international efforts,
- Elections and interim self-rule for the Palestinian Arabs.³¹⁵

After Israel's positive attempt, US Secretary of State James A. Baker III made a speech in May 1989 during the policy conference of the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) where he made a statement emphasizing his opposition to Eretz Israel. According to Quandt, Baker stated that "US does not support annexation or permanent Israeli control of the West Bank and Gaza nor do we support the creation of an independent Palestinian state."³¹⁶ This was the main Israeli lobby organization which had a great influence on US elections, but the new American administration was not going to back off that easy. James Baker realized that it was a difficult task. After his visit to Palestine in May 1991, Baker stated that:

"Every time I have gone to Israel in connection with the peace process on each of my trips I have been met with the announcement of new settlement activity. This does violate United States policy. It is the first thing that Arabs--Arab governments--the first thing that Palestinians in the territories--whose situation is really quite desperate--the first thing they raise when we talk to them. I don't think there is any greater obstacle to peace than settlement activity that continues not only unabated but at an advanced pace."

³¹⁵ To read full text of Shamir's peace initiative, see U.S. Department of State, "ISRAEL'S PEACE INITIATIVE, May 14, 1989," URL: <http://usembassy-israel.org.il/publish/peace/may89.htm>

³¹⁶ Quandt, *Peace Process*, 296. For full text of J. Baker's speech, see Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "59. Statement to AIPAC by Secretary of State Baker, 22 May 1989," http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Foreign_Relations/Israels_Foreign_Relations_since_1947/1988-1992/59_Statement_to_AIPAC_by_Secretary_of_State_Baker-

Moreover, the negotiations taking place in an international peace conference where US was going to act as a mediator were going to be based on Resolutions 242 and 338 and “must involve territory for peace, security and recognition for Israel and all of the states of the region, and Palestinian political rights.”³¹⁷ This conference was also conveyed to Israel by France, Britain, Russian and Egypt which was rejected by Shamir.³¹⁸ Shamir even went all the way and called off his peace proposal. This move soured relations between the US and Israel. After Labor left the coalition in 1990, Shamir stood by his party’s ideologies by stating that the occupied territories belonged to the government of Israel.³¹⁹

3.1.2 Washington's Changing Policies in the New World Order

Henry Kissinger affirms that Washington was the key to peace and stability in the Middle-East. Its role in the region had began during the Nixon administration in which the United States would realize that the Soviet's are not interested in detente and it was time to eliminate their influence from this region.³²⁰ There are many factors that unblocked the peace negotiations from the American perspective in Washington's involvement. This new approach to peace was a success and with it came the first Arab-Israeli peace negotiations between Egypt and Israel.³²¹ Safran suggests that the competition between the two super-powers and their personal

³¹⁷ Quandt, *Peace Process*, 296.

³¹⁸ Meenekshi Bose, Rosanna Perotti, *From Cold War to New World Order: The Foreign Policy of George H. W. Bush* (Westport: Greenwood Press, 2002), 117.

³¹⁹ Freedman, *A Choice of Enemies*, 265.

³²⁰ Henry Kissinger, *Diplomacy* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994), 733.

³²¹ For more information on the U.S. involvement in the peace-process before the end of the Cold War see see Henry Kissinger, *Diplomacy* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994), 737-740.

interests had a big influence on the problems in the region.³²² Moreover, Gelvin confirms that the United States' full involvement in the Arab-Israeli peace negotiations came about with the end of the Soviet influence in the Middle-East and the beginning of president George H. Bush's New World Order.³²³ It can be argued that many changes in the world had an effect on Washington's new direction in foreign policy. The fall of the Berlin Wall, the reunification of Germany, the Persian Gulf War and the START talks with the USSR were all important developments that made it necessary for the US play a chief role in promoting peace and democracy in the Middle East and the world.

A vital historical event that encouraged the US to get fully involved in the Middle East was the Second Gulf-War in 1991.³²⁴ According to George H. Bush, this war was his country's first test as a single super-power in which it passed with success and pride. Moreover, he knew that a stable Middle East was in his country's best interest and promised his people that he will work hard to reach that goal.³²⁵ According to Ashrawi, the American's main interests in the region was undoubtedly the oil and secondly the security of Israel.³²⁶ But the interest in natural resources was not something new. Kiernan affirms that the U.S. interest in the oil of the Middle-

³²² Safran, "Dimensions of the Middle East Problem," 374.

³²³ James L. Gelvin, *The Israel-Palestine Conflict: One Hundred Years of War* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 229-230.

³²⁴ For details on why Saddam annexed Kuwait and furthermore, why the US decided to intervene, see Lawrence Freedman, *A Choice of Enemies: America Confronts the Middle East* (London: Phonenix, 2008), chapter 11.

³²⁵ George H. W. Bush, "Address before a Joint Session of Congress on the End of the Gulf War (March 6, 1991)," *Miller Centre*, University of Virginia, URL: <http://millercenter.org/scripps/archive/speeches/detail/3430>

³²⁶ Hannan Ashrawi, *This Side of Peace: A Personal Account* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1995), 11.

East dates back to the 1950s.³²⁷ In regards to the oil, the security of Israel was the key to maintaining its good relations with the Arab nations. According to Quandt, under this new administration George H. Bush accommodated new policies for the Middle-East³²⁸ that would pave the way to the Madrid Peace Conference in October 1991, which can be said to be the stepping stone for the breakthrough of the Oslo Accords and the Jordanian-Israeli peace treaty. Judging from Bush's record when he served as Vice President under Reagan, he was a realist and anti-Israeli. When he became president, he took the Arab-Israeli issue to a new level and supported opening dialogue with the PLO.³²⁹ According to Hadar, the U.S. diplomatic influence did not only force Saddam out of the scene, but also played a hand in the ejection of the Likud which rejected dialogues with the PLO and the election of the new Labor government in Israel. Common sense dictates that Bush and Baker needed to play this hand in order to avoid a stalemate caused by Likud's attitude in the Arab-Israeli conflict. Hadar affirms that Bush's stand may very well be one of the reasons he lost the necessary support that was needed to win the next elections in 1992.³³⁰ Unquestionably, George Bush and his new team were eager to get fully involved in ending the dispute between the Arabs and the Israelis. According to Freedman, after the Saddam issue was resolved, Bush declared that "the time has come to put an end to Arab-Israeli conflict".³³¹ In this statement, he meant the security of Israel and the rights of the Palestinians. This decision would later be at the expense of his presidency. When the Bush administration suspended the loan guarantees because of Israel's enhanced settlement expansion, he lost the Jewish vote which partly cost him

³²⁷ V.G. Kiernan, *America: The New Imperialism from White Settlement to World Hegemony* (London: Verso, 2005), 309-313.

³²⁸ Quandt, *Peace Process*, 295-296.

³²⁹ Bose, *From Cold War to New World Order*, 116-117.

³³⁰ Leon T. Hadar, "Pax Americana's Four Pillars of Folly," *Journal Of Palestine Studies*, Spring 1998 (Vol.27, No.3), 51-52.

³³¹ Freedman, *A Choice of Enemies*, 254.

the second elections. The strained US-Israeli relations also damaged Shamir's leadership abilities and therefore he lost the elections in 1992.³³²

According to Johnston, the U.S. foreign policy with respect to the Arab-Israeli problem was based on UN resolutions 242 and 338.³³³ After George H. Bush succeeded in designing the first peace conference, the new Clinton administration continued with the prior policies of establishing peace in the Middle East.³³⁴ Furthermore, this conflict has strengthened the relations between the U.S and the Arab countries when it came to political and military relations. Additionally, it is in America's best national interest to support the peace process because with the end of the Soviet threat, there was now a new threat in the region: the Islamic extremist concern.³³⁵

Kemp suggests that Madrid Peace Conference forged the frame-work for future peace talks between Arabs and Israelis.³³⁶ According to Haydar Abd Al-Shafi, it can be said that "it was at Madrid were it would be possible for the Palestinian issue to be brought before the international community for the first time since....?"³³⁷ It is important to mention this conference because it was clearly this international meeting that helped overcome the impediments to direct Arab-Israeli talks and launched a real

³³² Freedman, *A Choice of Enemies*, 268-271.

³³³ Douglas Johnston, *Foreign Policy into the 21st Century: The U.S. Leadership Challenge*. Center for Strategic & International Studies (Washington, D.C., 1996), 19.

³³⁴ Alan P. Dobson and Steve Marsh. *US Foreign Policy Since 1945 (The Making of the Contemporary World)*, (London: Routledge, 2006), 173.

³³⁵ Johnston, *op.cit.*, 92-93.

³³⁶ Geoffrey Kemp, *Point of No Return: The Deadly Struggle for Middle East Peace*. (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1997), 11.

³³⁷ Haydar Abd Al-Shafi, "The Oslo Agreement. An Interview with Haydar 'Abd Al-Shafi." *Journal of Palestine Studies*". 23. 1 (1993), 14-19, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2537855> (accessed October 25, 2010).

peace process for the first time since Camp David I.³³⁸ Having mentioned the Camp David Accords, Eisenberg states that the Madrid success could not have been realized without its own foundation, the 1978 Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty³³⁹, and furthermore the 1974 and '75 disengagement agreements involving Israel, Egypt and Syria.

3.1.3 Israel's Changing Policies

Israel's present policy of freedom to militarily act against any threat has been exercised since its independence. It used military power in order to ensure its survival in the Middle-East among its hostile Arab neighbors. Its need to expand by building settlements was a way of ensuring its survival. The end of the Cold War and the Second Gulf War were two important factors which led Israel to change its policies in dealing with its neighbors.³⁴⁰ Moreover, the change of Israeli government from right wing to labor in 1992, also the change in Israeli public opinion played a big role in the peace process.³⁴¹ Some would argue that the former statement has no bearing but according to Shlaim, Shamir and Rabin are two men with different agendas.³⁴² Shamir's Likud administration refused to give up the West-Bank for religious sentiments and was strongly against any negotiations with the PLO. He believed that there should be no compromise when it came to dealing with any Arab. He was willing to resist international pressure till his last day in office. Moreover, to Likud direct discussions with the PLO would politically mean accepting to negotiate

³³⁸ Eisenberg and Caplan, *Negotiating Arab-Israeli Peace*, 75.

³³⁹ *Ibid.*, 36.

³⁴⁰ Efraim Inbar, "Contours of Israel's New Strategic Thinking." *Political Science Quarterly*, 111.1 (1996), 42-46, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2151927> . (accessed October 10, 2010).

³⁴¹ Eisenberg and Caplan, *op.cit.*, 81; 205-209.

³⁴² Avi Shlaim, "Prelude to the Accord: Likud, Labor, and the Palestinians." *Journal of Palestine Studies*, 23. 2 (1994), 11, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2538227> (accessed October 10, 2010).

with a terrorist organization in pursuit of the destruction of Israel.³⁴³ Even in the Madrid peace conference, when Likud was in power for one more year, the Israeli government had its strict conditions for attending; deciding who would represent the Palestinian side.³⁴⁴ Khalidi affirms that Prime Minister Shamir dictated the U.S. Administration on all the instructions of who will attend the conference from the Palestinian side to what will the issues discussed.³⁴⁵ Excluding the PLO from the negotiations was an Israeli tactic. Instead, it requested a Palestinian Delegation put together only under the condition that the Israelis would approve the members and those only residents from Gaza and the West Bank would attend. Shamir continued to hold his post and rejected joining any conference that would include the PLO. It accepted the terms in hope that, with the back-bone of the UN resolutions 242 and 338, this conference will bring some kind of a settlement in which Israel failed to adapt.³⁴⁶ Astonishingly the Syrian President Assad accepted to send a delegation to the conference and furthermore the PLO accepted Shamir's terms which left him no other choice but to attend. He turned up not for any new peace proposals, but to announce the construction of new settlements to absorb the new immigrants from Eastern Europe.

According to Wolsfeld, Likud was interested in maintaining security while Rabin was interested in achieving peace.³⁴⁷ Additionally it opposed giving the Palestinians the right to self-determination. Furthermore, Shlaim states that Likud rejected the

³⁴³ Shlaim, *Wall*, 426.

³⁴⁴ Shlaim, "Ariel Sharon's War against the Palestinians," 8.

³⁴⁵ Walid Khalidi, "The Half-Empty Glass of Middle East Peace." *Journal of Palestine Studies* 19. 3 (1990), 25, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2537709> (accessed November 2, 2010).

³⁴⁶ Khalidi, *op.cit.*, 25.

³⁴⁷ Gadi Wolfsfeld, *Media and the Path to Peace Share your own customer images Search inside this book Media and the Path to Peace*. 1st edition ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 47.

“principle of partition”, while the Labor party “...accepts the principle...”.³⁴⁸ Perhaps, without a change in the Israeli government, the events following Madrid would have never been possible or at least, would have taken both sides nowhere. Haydar Abd Al-Shafi confirms that “Israel was the key to peace in the Middle-East” and that Washington was now aware of the fact that resolving this issue was essential for permanent stability in the region.³⁴⁹ According to Rabin himself, his new government aimed to change the previous policies and make a serious effort in resolving the conflict.³⁵⁰ However, according to Shlaim, this did not mean offer the Palestinians a state of their own. All this new government would do is offering the Palestinians a calendar instead of a territory where they could practice self-governing, sovereignty and self-determination.³⁵¹ This point will be discussed in detail in the next part of this paper.

Other components also had to be taken into consideration by the Israeli government such as public opinion and demographics. In principle, the Israeli government had for decades been using external threats to keep its public united. The Israelis now wished for a peaceful and stable environment and they were going to do whatever is necessary to provide it for themselves and their future generation. Shlaim confirms that this is what brought the public to choose Labor over Likud.³⁵² Dajani implies that the fast increase in the Palestinian population is a major threat to Israel and for this reason it has been seeking normalization and peace with its neighboring Arab

³⁴⁸ Shlaim, “Ariel Sharon’s War against the Palestinians,” 7-8.

³⁴⁹ Haydar Abd Al-Shafi, "Reflections on the Peace Process: An Interview with Haydar 'Abd Al-Shafi." *Journal of Palestine Studies*, 22. 1 (1992), 57, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2537687> (accessed October 25, 2010).

³⁵⁰ Yitzhak Rabin, "An explanation of the Gaza-Jericho agreement." *Presidents & Prime Ministers* 3, no. 4 (July 1994): par.1. <http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=f5h&AN=9408012389&site=ehost-live> (accessed October 25, 2010)

³⁵¹ Shlaim, op.cit.,14.

³⁵² Ibid., 10.

countries and the Palestinians for some time.³⁵³ This was also a point Shimon Peres had realized during his years in office as prime minister and later as foreign minister in Likud. As Shlaim stated the demographic balance was not in the Israel's' favor.³⁵⁴ According to Masalha, the 'demographic threat' had been an Israeli concern since 1967. Labor had been against annexation of the West Bank and Gaza due to being densely populated by Palestinians, which could compromise the Jewishness of the State of Israel.³⁵⁵ But for Israel to negotiate with PLO only would become possible when Likud loses the elections and a more realistic compromising party takes over the government in 1992.

3.1.4 PLO's Changing Policies

Since its establishment in 1964, the PLO has been the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. Initially, its policy on Israel and Zionism was made clear in the Palestinian National Charter.³⁵⁶ These policies were somewhat unrealistic and brought many negotiations with the Israelis to a dead-lock. Because of an article in the PLO charter³⁵⁷, Israel refused to negotiate with this organization. It was after the uprising that the PLO changed its angle and by taking some positive steps was able to start dialogue with Washington and later Israel.³⁵⁸ After agreeing to denounce terrorism and recognize the state of Israel, Washington coincided with opening talks with the PLO.

When Saddam defied Washington and Israel, the Palestinians took his side in the

³⁵³ Burhan Dajani, "An Alternative to Oslo?," *Journal of Palestine Studies* 25. 24 (1996), 6-18, URL: <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2538002> (accessed October 10, 2010).

Burhan Dajani is a leading Arab economist and intellectual from Palestine living in Jordan.

³⁵⁴ Shlaim, "Ariel Sharon's War against the Palestinians," 430.

³⁵⁵ Masalha, *Imperial Israel and the Palestinians*, 200-201.

³⁵⁶ See Palestinian National Charter in Charles D. Smith, *Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996), Document 8.2, 345-347.

³⁵⁷ PLO National Charter, Article 15 mentions the elimination of Zionism in Palestine.

³⁵⁸ Rabie, *US-PLO Dialogue*, 161.

war. After his great defeat in the Gulf-War, the PLO lost its financial support from the Gulf States. John claims that after losing the Soviet support, Arafat's siding with Iraq was a blow not only to the PLO, but the Palestinians living in the Gulf as well.³⁵⁹ According to Dajani, this factor encouraged PLO to press for peace negotiations with Israel.³⁶⁰

Until the signing of the Declaration of Principles, the PLO was supported by its people purely because of its sole mission; to liberate Palestine and end the occupation. But after the Intifada in 1987, the PLO had to change its policy and accept a two-state solution, a Palestinian state next to an Israeli one according to 1967 borders.³⁶¹ This change in policy would not necessarily lead the Israelis to compromise on all topics. It would just be a first step to start negotiations.

3.2 U.S. Involvement and the Road to Oslo

3.2.1 Madrid Peace Conference

With Washington's new U.S. alliances formed during the Gulf War, George H. Bush, after two years of coordination³⁶², was able to orchestrate an international conference in 1991 that would act as a stepping stone to future peace negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians, Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon.³⁶³ The Bush Administration would use the Geneva Conference in 1973, a minimalist approach, as a model for the

³⁵⁹ Johnston, *Foreign Policy into the 21st Century*, 95. Also, see Freedman, *A Choice of Enemies*, 266; 312.

³⁶⁰ Dajani, "An Alternative to Oslo?," 6.

³⁶¹ Smith, *Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict*, 420.

³⁶² For more information on the 1989-1991 talks see William B. Quandt, *Peace Process: American Diplomacy and The Arab-Israeli Conflict Since 1967* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press and the University of California Press, 2001), 290-310.

³⁶³ To see full text of the invitation letter to Madrid, see Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Madrid Letter of Invitation, October 30, 1991," <http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Peace+Process/Guide+to+the+Peace+Process/Madrid+Letter+of+Invitation.htm>

Madrid talks. According to Hadar, U.S. would be looking for a peace based on UN Resolutions 242 and 338, a foundation Likud would be declined to accept.³⁶⁴ This achievement would not come without difficulty due to Israel's conditions to join the meeting. Neither Arafat, nor any other member of the PLO could not represent the Palestinians in the conference.³⁶⁵ According to Shlaim, "it was one of the rare international disputes in which one party chose not only its own team...but also that of the other party".³⁶⁶ Israel's relationship with the U.S. soured because of the conference due to Shamir's right-wing government and its ideologies.³⁶⁷ While the PLO aimed to use this meeting as a chance to improve its image in the international community due to Arafat's siding with Saddam during the Gulf War, Shamir's government would attend with no intention of changing its agenda.³⁶⁸ The dispute over the Jewish settlement expansion would continue between Bush and Shamir until Rabin steps in. This peace-process would be on hold during both the Israeli and the American elections³⁶⁹. In regard to the Palestinian issue, this conference would later lead to the Oslo Accords in 1993 under the mediation of U.S. President Bill Clinton.

3.2.2 The Clinton Administration and the Return of Labor

As previously pointed out, the change of Israeli government in 1992 and change of public opinion played a big role in the peace process.³⁷⁰ According to Hadar, it was Washington that influenced the election of the Labor party in Israel.³⁷¹ Quandt confirms that if Bush had not frozen the loans promised to Israel for building new

³⁶⁴ Leon T. Hadar, "Pax Americana's Four Pillars of Folly," *Journal of Palestine Studies* 27. 3 (1998), 51, URL: <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2537834>

³⁶⁵ The Likud Government's position was that it would refuse to negotiate with an active or official member of the PLO. It would only agree to meet with representatives living in the administered areas, providing they do not appear as representatives of the PLO.

³⁶⁶ Shlaim, *Wall*, 8.

³⁶⁷ Quandt, *Peace Process*, 309.

³⁶⁸ Eisenberg and Caplan, *Negotiating Arab-Israeli Peace*, 79-80.

³⁶⁹ Quandt, *op.cit.*, 311-313.

³⁷⁰ Eisenberg and Caplan, *Negotiating Arab-Israeli Peace*, 81 and 205-209.

³⁷¹ Hadar, "Pax Americana's Four Pillars of Folly," 51,

settlements for the new Russian-Jewish immigrants, Shamir would have been reelected and the peace-process would have collapsed.³⁷² After Rabin's victory in February and Clinton's triumph in 1992, both men did not waste any time in proceeding with the peace-process. Rabin came to government with a new approach in which he addressed to the Knesset that year.³⁷³ Clinton had inherited one of the most complex peace negotiations in history. It was now his turn to bring an end to this crisis. The Washington talks that took off since Madrid were still continuing but failing to bring results. Peres states that there were deficiencies in the Washington talks and that no “reference to specific territorial issues” was made and that there was nothing tangible in these discussions.³⁷⁴

The Clinton Administration would face difficulties in the Washington talks from both the Palestinian and the Israeli side in respect to the peace-process. According to Stork, due to the deportation of more than 400 Palestinian to Lebanon and Rabin's refusal to exercise the UN Resolution 799 under U.S. terms, the Palestinian delegation in the Washington talks would boycott all negotiations with Israel.³⁷⁵ Once again, Washington had to act as a broker in order to bring the two parties back to the table, and bring them it did. After some concessions made by Washington to

³⁷² Quandt, *Peace Process*, 318.

³⁷³ See Eisenberg and Caplan, *op.cit.*, 205-209.

³⁷⁴ Shimon Peres, *Battling for Peace: Memoirs* (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1995), 324.

³⁷⁵ Israel took action to remove from the territories 415 Palestinians suspected of being key members of the outlawed Hamas organization. The deported Palestinians were driven to the Israel-Lebanon border, but unlike on previous occasions, the Lebanese government refused to allow them to proceed north into its territory and they remained in makeshift tents on a spot five kilometers north of Israel, at the tip of the security zone in Southern Lebanon. The Security Council met and unanimously called on Israel to return immediately those deported and resolved to send a special envoy of the secretary general to the region; see Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “42. Security Council Resolution 799 (1992), Removal of Hamas Activists, 18 December 1992,” Dec. 18, 1992. http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Foreign_Relations/Israels_Foreign_Relations_since_1947/1992-1994/42_Security_Council_Resolution_799-1992—Removal (accessed 12 Dec. 2010).

both sides, after a suspension of four months the Palestinian delegation agreed to proceed with the negotiations.³⁷⁶ It was essential for the talks to bring results before the next Israeli elections. Both parties tried to find solutions and draft a declaration of principles and by 1993 it they had achieved considerable progress. According to Ross, the Israelis were willing to go with an approach similar to the Camp David model. Washington also embraced such a proposal.³⁷⁷

While the Washington talks were continuing between the West Bank- Gaza team and the Israelis, there was a second team secretly meeting with the full knowledge of Arafat and Rabin. The main players in these talks were Rabin and Arafat and the talks were hosted by the Norwegians. The Clinton administration was unaware of these secret developments. In fact, according to Said, the U.S. was informed some days before it was finalized.³⁷⁸ The Oslo channel was initiated by the mediation of the Norwegians as a form of 'secret talks' between the PLO and the Israeli government just as the Washington talks were ready to fall apart. The reason why Oslo is mentioned in all publications about the Arab-Israeli conflict is because it was the first time in history that PLO and Israelis have accepted to sit around the same table and engage in bilateral talks. Oslo I was in theory intended to be a framework to assist in resolving issues such as: the status of Jerusalem, the Jewish settlement problem, the Palestinian refugee problem and the right to return. Practically, these issues, with Israel's inflexible attitude and plans, could take decades. The Jewishness of the state could not be compromised. Stopping settlement building and allowing the Palestinian refugees the right to return, together with the demographic issue were a

³⁷⁶ Joe Stork, "The Clinton Administration and the Palestinian Question," in *U.S. Policy on Palestine: From Wilson to Clinton*. (Illinois: Assn of Arab-Amer Univ Graduates, 1995), 226-227.

³⁷⁷ Ross, *The Missing Peace*, 102.

³⁷⁸ Edward Said, *Open Secrets: Israeli Nuclear and Foreign Policy* (London: Pluto Press, 1997), p. 62.

formulae for destruction. Prolonging this dilemma was achieved by Israel by keeping these issues apart which is why Oslo was bound to fail from the very beginning.

Talks between the two sides concluded with both parties signing on the Declaration of Principles (DOP), witnessed by the United States of America and the Russian Federation.³⁷⁹ This historical ceremony would come as the aftermath of two protocols. The first Protocol consists of letters of correspondence between Arafat and Rabin, confirming their commitment to the principles. Arafat states that articles in the PLO charter in regards to the illegitimacy of Israel will from that date, no longer be valid. In return Rabin responds in his letter to Arafat by confirming that the Israeli government fully recognizes the PLO.³⁸⁰ Furthermore, the Oslo Accords were supposed to lead gradually to the division of the country between the two nations, to prevent the creation of a bi-national state, while gradually transferring civic powers to the Palestinians and releasing Israel from the burden of the occupation, domination over another nation and responsibility for it. On paper, the DOP represents two agreements. First is the withdrawal of Israeli security forces from Gaza and the West Bank, and second is the basing of the PLO in Palestine.³⁸¹

³⁷⁹ Giacaman, "In the Throes of Oslo," 3-4. Also see, Jewish Virtual Library, "Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements (September 13, 1993)," URL: <http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/Peace/dop.html>

³⁸⁰ Gelvin, *The Israel-Palestine Conflict*, 232-233. Also, see The Associated Press, "Marianne Heiberg, player in Oslo peace accords, 59" *Ha'aretz Newspaper*, <http://www.haaretz.com/print-edition/news/marianne-heiberg-player-in-oslo-peace-accords-59-1.145346> (accessed: 3 Oct. 2010). For first hand details on why the signing was almost canceled, see Hanan Ashrawi, *This Side of Peace: A Personal Account* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1995), chapter 14. Also, see Dan Cohn-Sherbok and Dawoud El-Alami, *The Palestine-Israeli Conflict* (Oxford: One World Publications, 2003), 183-184.

Hanan Ashrawi was the Official Spokesperson of the Palestinian Delegation to the Middle East Peace Process from 1991-93. See, Sarah K. Horsley, "Hanan Ashrawi", *Fem/Bio*, <http://www.fembio.org/english/biography.php> (accessed 12 Dec. 2010).

³⁸¹ Hanan Ashrawi, "Guarded Optimist on the Peace Process. An Interview with Hanan Ashrawi." *Journal of Palestine Studies* 26. 3 (1997), 89, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2538159> (accessed October 11, 2010).

Absurdly, the settlement building activity actually doubled in number after the accords were signed, which was one clear sign of failing for peace to materialize on the Israeli side.³⁸² According to Edward Said, a Palestinian critic and activist, this plan is “mostly unread or unexamined, mostly unclear” and in reality would not provide the Palestinians with limited control of the territories and Israel would continue with its own schedule on settlement building.³⁸³ The second point was the security issue. Said points out that in reality, Oslo was designed to increase security for the Israelis settlers and diminish all the Palestinian's right to democracy and independence in Palestine.³⁸⁴ Mougrabi coincides with this apprehension by questioning whether it was “peace based on territorial compromise or on the absolute security requirements of the Israeli government?”³⁸⁵ Palestinian opposition movements, Hamas and Islamic Jihad, two fundamentalist movements against peace with the Jews, committed terrorist acts that were uncontrollable and according to Ross, Arafat was unable or unwilling to handle the situation.³⁸⁶ These acts of violence together with settlement expansion that directly undermined the peace-process continued all the way after the Clinton administration.³⁸⁷

There is no connection at all between the past events in the occupied territories and the agreements made between Israel and the PLO in Oslo. According to Said, Israel still held control of water, land, settlements, roads, armed forces and security. In

³⁸² Jan de Jong, “The Geography of Politics: Israel's Settlement Drive after Oslo,” in *After Oslo: New Realities, Old Problems*. Editors George Giacaman and Dag Jorund Lonning. (Chicago: Pluto Press, 1998): 77-78.

³⁸³ Edward Said, *Peace and its Discontents: Essays on Palestine in the Middle East Peace Process*. (New York: Vintage, 1996): 3;15.

³⁸⁴ Said, *Peace and its Discontents*, 24.

³⁸⁵ Fouad Moughrabi, "The Oslo Process and the Arab World." in *After Oslo: New Realities, Old Problems*. Editors George Giacaman and Dag Jorund Lonning. (Chicago: Pluto Press, 1998): 45-58.

³⁸⁶ Ross, *The Missing Peace*, 190. For information on the formation of Islamic Jihad and Hamas, see Smith, *Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict*, 417-423.

³⁸⁷ For detailed information on the incidents, see Cordesman and Moravitz, *The Israeli Palestinian War*, 21-28.

addition to this, Said points out that Israel came to the negotiating table fully prepared with detailed maps on which parts were to be assigned to the PNA. On the other hand, Palestinian party did no such thing.³⁸⁸ Wolfsfeld confirms that Israel gained recognition by the PLO, and in return the Palestinian authorities gained new opposition with very different opinions about this so-called peace process with Israel.³⁸⁹ According to Edward Said, the refugee problem has been put on hold once again, together with many other issues until the “final status” talks which would take place within three to five years time.³⁹⁰ The Oslo accords included many concessions from the Palestinians which will be discussed in the following part.

3.2.3 Interim and Other Agreements

During the Rabin government the rate of violence had enormously increased in to the previous and latter ones. According to Cordesman and Moravitz, this rate measured boosted up to more than 3% under Rabin.³⁹¹ Against all odds and despite the increase in violence during Rabin together with the Hebron massacre which led Arafat to stop negotiations for several weeks, the Gaza-Jericho Agreement was signed in Cairo between the Palestinian and Israeli leaders on the 4th of May, 1994.³⁹² This agreement would be a part of the first stage in negotiations between the PLO and Israel. Ross confirms that it would give Arafat the go to move from Tunis to Gaza and Jericho.³⁹³ According to Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Gaza-Jericho interim agreement addresses four main issues: “security arrangements, civil affairs, legal matters, and economic relations”. Secondly, the accord issued the formation of the Palestinian Authority (PA). Finally, it would also initiate the Israeli withdrawal from Gaza and

³⁸⁸ Said, *Peace and its Discontents*, 27.

³⁸⁹ Wolfsfeld, *Media and the Path to Peace*, 54.

³⁹⁰ Said, *op.cit.*, 4-5, 25.

³⁹¹ Anthony H. Cordesman and Jennifer Moravitz, *The Israeli-Palestinian war: escalating to nowhere* (London: Praeger Security International, 2005), 33.

³⁹² Cohn-Sherbok and El-Alami, *The Palestine-Israeli Conflict*, 80.

³⁹³ Ross, *The Missing Peace*, 133.

Jericho in which the PA would be able to exercise self-rule within these territories. Its main objective is after the legislation of the PA, this agreement would help in the preparatory of transfer of powers and responsibilities to the PA.³⁹⁴ According to Watson, the developments after the signing looked promising as Israeli security forces withdrew as promised from most of the territories and the PA took over most of the responsibilities of these areas.³⁹⁵ It can be stated that now for the first time there was a government and a defined territory which could make up a future state. There was great reaction to the signing of this agreement on both sides. In a political dimension, both Likud and the National Religious Party accused Rabin of handing the biblical lands over to the enemy. They viewed it as a tragic day for Israel. The Jewish community in Hebron was also outraged and refused accepting anyone carrying arms except for an Israeli. On the Arab side, the Islamic Jihad and Hamas were also against this accord but once again the leaders had to avoid any obstacles in order to save the peace-process.³⁹⁶ Additional protocols would be signed between the two in 1995 regarding the broadening of the PA's responsibilities and redeploying Israeli security forces from Palestinian territories. The Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, also called the Oslo II accord, was signed in Egypt on September 24, 1995. Oslo II would be more complicated than Oslo I. This extensive and long document identifies the schedule in which the agreed Palestinian territories would be transferred to the PA and the Israeli

³⁹⁴ Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "The Israel-Palestinian Negotiations", [http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/PeaceProcess/Guide to the Peace Process/Israel-Palestinian Negotiations](http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/PeaceProcess/Guide%20to%20the%20Peace%20Process/Israel-Palestinian%20Negotiations) (accessed 18 Dec. 2010)

³⁹⁵ Geoffrey R. Watson, *The Oslo Accords: International Law and the Israeli-Palestinian Peace Agreements* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), 68.

³⁹⁶ "Mideast Accord: The Overview; Israel and P.L.O. Reach Accord to Transfer West Bank Areas", Sep. 25, 1995, *The New York Times*, <http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=990CE2DC113AF936A1575AC0A963958260&pagewanted=2> (accessed 20 Dec. 2010)

security forces would completely withdraw with the exception of some areas.³⁹⁷ Watson states that these interim agreements create “immediate and specific obligations for both parties”.³⁹⁸ On the other hand, there would be no mention for the settlement issue during this period. On the contrary, Israel increased its settlement expansion with no hesitation.

3.2.4 Netanyahu Administration and the Decline of the Oslo Process

After the assassination of Rabin, Peres was chosen as his successor who decided to govern for a full year until the next elections in 1996. He also decided to proceed with the ongoing peace-process; however, not much was accomplished in a year. He and Arafat were in a difficult position because of public fear resulting from the opposition attacks.³⁹⁹ Peres believed what he had believed for a long time; that perusing a peaceful solution is in his people's best and moral interest.⁴⁰⁰ But turning his beliefs to reality was something close to impossible, especially with PLO's new opposition and Syria's involvement.⁴⁰¹

The second elections in Israel during the Clinton Administration took place on 29 May 1996. Benjamin Netanyahu won the elections and became Israel's new Prime Minister with the right wing back in power. Although Netanyahu, in his electoral contest, campaigned as a realist accepting the Oslo accords and aimed to reach a final status, he did nothing of a sort once he won the elections.⁴⁰² Before being elected in

³⁹⁷ For a brief detailing of the schedule, see Palestinian Facts, “What was the “Oslo II” Interim Agreement in 1995?”, http://www.palestinefacts.org/pf_1991to_now_oslo_accords_2.php (accessed 19 Dec. 2010)

³⁹⁸ Watson, *The Oslo Accords*, 72.

³⁹⁹ Kristen E. Schulze, *The Arab-Israeli Conflict* (New York: Longman, 1999), 91.

⁴⁰⁰ Peres, *Battling for Peace*, 299.

⁴⁰¹ Syria has been hosting Hamas and Islamic Jihad and openly backed anti-Arafat factions in the refugee camps in Lebanon. For Israel-Syrian problems, see Lawrence Joffe, *Keesing's Guide to the Mid-East Peace Process* (London: Cartermill Publishing, 1996), 114-115.

⁴⁰² Graham Usher, *Dispatches from Palestine: The Rise and Fall of the Oslo Peace Process* (London:

one of his interviews, Netanyahu stated that he would honor Oslo under two conditions: “one, that Arafat honor it; ... the second was that I would reduce the dangers in Oslo within the agreement -- ... reduce the withdrawals, reduce the price that Israel would have to pay.”⁴⁰³ And reduce withdrawals he did. In fact, according to Barnett, Netanyahu was one of the reasons why Oslo Accords failed.⁴⁰⁴ Savir supports this statement by adding that the freezing of the negotiations on a final-status agreement occurred during the term of Benjamin Netanyahu.⁴⁰⁵ Rubenburg suggests that the change of the main players had a clear influence on the peace process as Netanyahu was strongly against a negotiation with PLO.⁴⁰⁶ His administration was interested in maintaining security while the left was interested in achieving peace.⁴⁰⁷ The Netanyahu administration mark two important agreements with the Palestinians: Hebron Protocol and Wye River Memorandum. Due to these agreements, Netanyahu would be alienated by his party and other conservative allies against Oslo. According to Barnett, he was primarily elected for his political as well as religious ideology of a “Greater Israel”, and the occupied territories in his mind were sacred lands. Now that he accepted the principles of withdrawal from territories, he was abandoning the promise he made to his followers. This acceptance would cause divisions in the Israeli society and politics. This is one major factor in

Pluto Press, 1999), 107-108.

⁴⁰³ Public Broadcasting Service, “Interviews: Benjamin Netanyahu”, *Shattered Dreams of Peace*, available at <http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/oslo/interviews/netanyahu.html#hebron>. (accessed 22 Dec. 2010)

⁴⁰⁴ Michael Barnett, “The Israeli Identity and the Peace Process,” in *Identity and Foreign Policy in the Middle East*, ed. Shibley Telhami and Michael Barnett (New York: Cornell University, 2002), 59.

⁴⁰⁵ Uri Savir ““Bring Back the Oslo Accords,” *Ha'aretz Newspaper*, <http://www.haaretz.com/weekend/week-s-end/bring-back-the-oslo-accords-1.228532>. (accessed 12 Oct. 2010)

⁴⁰⁶ Cheryl A. Rubenburg, “The Bush Administration and the Palestinians: A Reassessment” in *U.S. Policy on Palestine from Wilson to Clinton*. 1st ed., ed. Michael W. Suleiman (Illinois: aaug Press, 1995), 195.

⁴⁰⁷ Wolfsfeld, *Media and the Path to Peace*, 47.

which he would not be reelected in 1999.⁴⁰⁸ It would also mark Arafat's absorbed behavior towards his people in order to increase security so as not to put the peace-process at risk.

After the 1996 elections, Netanyahu started an aggressive policy which would bring the Palestinian people to a hostile mood. His vision of peace was based on security. His policies delayed the Oslo plans and caused explosive events. Although being warned by his security advisers, he endangered the peace-process by issuing the opening of a tunnel under the Muslim shrines of the Al-Aqsa Mosque and the Dome of the Rock, which was a direct violation of international and local laws. This provocative action gave the Palestinians a reason to react in demonstrations and violent acts. Moreover, Netanyahu initiated new building projects that not only angered the Arabs, but the left-wing Jews as well. He even altered the original Oslo maps during the 1996 negotiations. His new map isolated the Palestinians from the Jordanian border and turned it into a ghetto.⁴⁰⁹ This period can be viewed as a virtuous circle, Netanyahu breaking the Oslo plans followed by aggression from the Palestinian side. Sources confirm that during the Netanyahu administration, the peace-process was “constantly threatened, and ultimately undone, by the dynamics of politics and violence.”⁴¹⁰ According to Elazar and Mollov, Netanyahu idea of peace was firstly lowering Palestinian expectations and secondly negotiating only on Israeli terms. As Netanyahu approved new housing developments in East Jerusalem, Hamas

⁴⁰⁸ Barnett, op.cit., 82-86.

⁴⁰⁹ Cohn-Sherbok and El-Alami, *The Palestine-Israeli Conflict*, 85-86.

⁴¹⁰ For a chronology of key events, see Public Broadcasting Service, “Timeline”, Shattered Dreams of Peace, <http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/oslo/etc/cron.html>. (accessed 19 Dec. 2010)

continued strikes.⁴¹¹

On the other side of the iron wall, Arafat and his newly formed authorities was keeping busy devising new rules and regulations on his people. His approach in dealing with the security issue can be said to be justifying his behavior with his goals of building a Palestinian State. Without going into much detail it can be said that his new leadership was completely corrupted. According to Aburish, a whole book on corruption in the PNA can be written. Besides the money frauds, there was the implementation of new regulations such as requirement of police permits for social, cultural and sport event. In addition to this Arafat took full control of the Palestinian press and media in the West Bank and Gaza. Newspapers were shut down and a number of journalists were arrested. Moreover Palestinian academicians and human right activists were assaulted.⁴¹² According to the status report on “Human Rights in the Occupied Territories since the Oslo Accords” of December 1996, both Arafat and Netanyahu played the leading roles in violating human rights and international law but it was only the Palestinians that suffered these extreme and unlawful measures.⁴¹³ It seems like Arafat had forgotten the purpose of the Intifada of 1987 and the Palestinian struggle to nationhood. He was more anxious to stay in power by keeping the peace-process alive. He acted like a tyrant by completely ignoring the main objectives of liberation and a future independent state.

⁴¹¹ James Gannon, *Military Occupations in the Age of Self-determination: The History Neocons Neglected* (West Port: Greenwood Publishing Group, 2008), 117.

⁴¹² Aburish, *Arafat*, 307-313.

⁴¹³ For a detailed report of human rights violations in 1996, see “Human Rights in the Occupied Territories Since the Oslo Accords: Status Report”, Dec. 1996, A Joint Report of The Palestinian Human Rights Monitoring Group and B’Tselem: The Israeli Information Center for Human Rights in the the Occupied Territories, www.btselem.org/Download/199612_Human_Rights_Since_Oslo_Eng.rtf. Also see Palestinian Centre for Human Rights, “An Introduction to Human Rights in the Occupied Palestinian Territories”, Last updated 29 July 2003, URL: www.pchrgaza.org.

With all of Netanyahu's violations to his commitments to Oslo (new settlement plans, tunnel crisis, change in the Oslo map), both sides managed to reach a deal and sign a protocol on January 15, 1997, also known as the 'Hebron Protocol'.⁴¹⁴ Clinton was still fully involved in the peace-process and made sure to put pressure on both sides, especially the Israeli, to prevent a stale-mate. This protocol is the third part of the Interim agreements and specifically involves the city of Hebron, the last city in which Israeli security forces would be redeployed.⁴¹⁵ In regards to both parties' concerns, not only would security be strengthened for settlements but also at various holy sites, especially al-Ibrahim mosque in Hebron which is a sacred site for the Muslims as well as for the Jews.⁴¹⁶ However, neither Israel had released all the prisoners as promised, nor has the PLO finalized the revisions in its charter. This agreement has been disappointing for all the Israeli settlers and many opposing the peace-process, because to them Hebron has religious and biblical significance. Like his predecessor, Netanyahu has agreed to give back land for the promise of peace. He was very much criticized by members of his party for accepting this principle.⁴¹⁷ Andoni states that this would be the first time for Likud to engage with the Palestinians on the basis of the DOP and the Interim agreement. Furthermore, Andoni adds that the Americans not only put pressure on both sides, but acted as partners in the negotiations, which was something the Palestinians have been longing for. If only they knew that this act would make the Israeli-US relationship even stronger. This

⁴¹⁴ For the text of the Hebron Protocol, see Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Protocol Concerning the Redeployment in Hebron January 17, 1997", URL: [http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Peace Process/Guide to the Peace Process/Protocol Concerning the Redeployment in Hebron](http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Peace%20Process/Guide%20to%20the%20Peace%20Process/Protocol%20Concerning%20the%20Redeployment%20in%20Hebron).

⁴¹⁵ For details on the Protocol Concerning the Redeployment of Hebron, see Geoffrey R. Watson, *The Oslo Accords: International Law and the Israeli-Palestinian Peace Agreements* (Oxford University Press: 2000), 369-374. Also see Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Protocol Concerning the Redeployment in Hebron", URL: [http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Peace Process/Guide to the Peace Process/Agreed Minute -Hebron Protocol](http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Peace%20Process/Guide%20to%20the%20Peace%20Process/Agreed%20Minute%20-Hebron%20Protocol).

⁴¹⁶ Quandt, *Peace Process*, 345.

⁴¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 350.

agreement would totally benefit the Israelis and once again deny the Palestinians of their rights to govern.

After Clinton was reelected in January 1997, he declared to the media that he will continue in his active role as a mediator in the peace-making. Unfortunately, Netanyahu's plans for building housing units in East Jerusalem would bring it to a stale-mate in the peace-process and start up a suicide bombers campaign. This situation would continue its course until Secretary Albright steps in on Clinton's request and pays a personal visit to Israel to handle the. According to media sources "During her visit, she not only made strong demands on the Palestinian leadership to crack down on Islamic militants behind the terror attacks but also criticized the Israelis for policies and measures that have antagonized the Palestinians".⁴¹⁸ Sources confirm that, at this point and for the coming year, Clinton and Albright's role in the peace negotiations would be crucial. There were in fact many Israeli's favoring a peaceful solution with the Palestinians.⁴¹⁹ Due to continued suicide-bomber attacks, Netanyahu had increased restrictions on Palestinian movement and frozen the Palestinian funds which in Albright's opinion would not solve any security issues, on the contrary would make the situation more difficult. She criticized both sides for not being able to keep a stable environment and demanded that matters be handled with more enthusiasm.⁴²⁰ Netanyahu was not willing to negotiate any agreement as long as Hamas continued its bombing campaign. Arafat needed to make a bigger

⁴¹⁸ Steven Erlanger, "Albright to Go Ahead With Mideast Trip," Sep. 5, 1997, *The New York Times*, URL: <http://www.nytimes.com/1997/09/05/world/albright-to-go-ahead-with-mideast-trip.html?pagewanted=2>.

⁴¹⁹ "In Support of us Involvement in the Peace Process, A Letter to President Bill Clinton April 4, 1998," Documents, *The Environment*, Vol.5 No.1, 1998, *Palestine-Israel Journal*, URL: <http://www.pij.org/details.php?id=442>.

⁴²⁰ Serge Schmenmann, "Israel Is to Release More Money Owed To the Palestinians", September 15, 1997, *The New York Times*, URL: <http://www.nytimes.com/1997/09/15/world/israel-is-to-release-more-money-owed-to-the-palestinians.html>.

commitment and maintain security for the peace-process to go anywhere. Unluckily, alongside Clinton's "Lewinsky scandal", Albright's efforts would go unacknowledged and the process would be delayed for months.⁴²¹ According to Ross, the Secretary's visit "had been a lost opportunity".⁴²² But this would not be the end of the deal. The coming months would be about Ross' swaying back and forth to meetings with both sides for the agreed points that will be discussed in the Wye Summit: to negotiate on Arafat's security work-plan and the further redeployment of the Israeli forces. For the Palestinians, a fiercely-resisted 13% redeployment of Israeli troops within twelve weeks. As for Israel, a so-far unobtainable Palestinian commitment to security.⁴²³ These two issues needed to be dealt with before Clinton's midterm elections. The deadlock in the peace process solidified in spring 1997 after Netanyahu announced the building of the Jewish settlement of Har Homa in East Jerusalem.

3.2.5 Clinton's last try: Camp David II and the 'Clinton Plan'

Ehud Barak was elected prime minister of Israel in May, 1999. This meant that the Labor party was back and Likud was out for the time being. According to Ross, Barak affirmed to pursue his mentor Rabin's unfulfilled commitments for the peace-process.⁴²⁴ After almost two months of putting together a coalition government, Barak expressed that he was anxious to carry on the peace-process project which he had inherited from his predecessor. He was sincere in his approach and lost no time in contacting Arafat to resume with the peace talks. Barak's policy was to stick to the "Allon Plan as well as the IDF's security interests map". Barak offered to reduce the 13 percent promised to 10. Each time Israel tried to change the format of the

⁴²¹ For detailed information on Albright's and Ross's failed efforts in 1997, see Dennis Ross, *The Missing Peace* (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2004), 354-397.

⁴²² Ross, *Missing Peace*, 356.

⁴²³ Quandt, *Peace Process*, 352.

⁴²⁴ Ross, *Missing Peace*, 494.

agreement, it gained time by delaying redeployment and continuing with its new settlement construction. As his previous predecessor, Barak implied that he would discuss the basic principles of the agreement and leave the details to a later date.⁴²⁵ Furthermore, in a joint press conference Clinton stated that Barak also expressed his interest in including talks with Syria and Lebanon.⁴²⁶ In his speech addressing the Knesset and his new government, Barak defined the importance of establishing peace with these two countries, by the support of his two peace partners, Egypt and Jordan. According to Barak "...comprehensive and stable peace can be established only if it rests, simultaneously, on four pillars: Egypt, Jordan, and Syria and Lebanon,...and of course the Palestinians."⁴²⁷ He claimed that to him they all had equal priorities. Barak's approach would help improve the Israeli-US relations which Netanyahu had managed to devastate. But this time Clinton would announce that he would participate as a facilitator in these agreements. Surprisingly Barak was prepared to compromise on most issues but Jerusalem. It was truly a complicated issue that needed more time and work. The main issue in this summit was the conflicting claims on East Jerusalem and which government would control it. Similar to his predecessors, Barak was against a division of Jerusalem while Arafat wanted sovereignty over the Holy places in the Old City. Washington came up with a proposal of "sharing or joint sovereignty",⁴²⁸ which sounded possible but was

⁴²⁵ William B. Quandt, "Clinton and the Arab-Israeli Conflict: The Limits of Incrementalism", *Journal of Palestine Studies*, 30. 2 (2001), 29, URL: <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2676585>.

⁴²⁶ Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "6 Remarks and joint press conference by President Clinton and Prime Minister Barak at the White House- 15 July 1999," Vol. 18: 1999-2001. URL: http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Foreign_Relations/Israels_Foreign_Relations_since_1947/1999-2001/6_Remarks_and_joint_press_conference_by_President.

⁴²⁷ Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "1. Address in the Knesset by Prime Minister Elect Ehud Barak upon the presentation of his government, 7 July 1999," Vol. 18: 1999-2001. URL: http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Foreign_Relations/Israels_Foreign_Relations_since_1947/1999-2001/1_Address_in_the_Knesset_by_Prime_Minister_Elect_E.

⁴²⁸ Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "1. Address in the Knesset by Prime Minister Elect Ehud Barak upon the presentation of his government, 7 July 1999," Vol. 18: 1999-2001. URL: http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Foreign_Relations/Israels_Foreign_Relations_since_1947/1999-2001/1_Address_in_the_Knesset_by_Prime_Minister_Elect_E.

literally inapplicable. According to Ashrawi, Arafat did not compromise in this deal in hope to make one later. But this situation could go either way. It could very well mean peace in the future or war.⁴²⁹ The 15 day summit ended with a complete failure on both sides. Arafat did not yield on the Jerusalem issue and neither did Barak, both in fear of losing face towards their people.

Robert Malley and Hussein Agha confirm that Camp David's failure can be attributed to no one else but Arafat. On the other hand, Barak and Clinton's approach can be viewed as the real reason to this failure. In fact, it was Barak who insisted on this summit to take place where he would make a final offer which Arafat would reject or be pressured to accept.⁴³⁰ It was clear that Barak aimed to make Arafat look bad in front of the Americans and loose international support as well as the Palestinian's. According to Schulze, the failure of this summit "reflected the conceptual difference in the Israeli and Palestinian approaches on the question of boundaries." Israel's withdrawal relied on the location of the settlements in East Jerusalem while Palestine's relied on the 67 border lines.⁴³¹

The stalemate reached in Camp David II caused a great frustration for the Palestinians living in the occupied territories. Both sides blamed each other for the failure. Israel did not freeze settlement activity while Arafat did not back down on the issue of Jerusalem as well as borders, refugees.⁴³² Negotiations were bound to

⁴²⁹ Michael Hirsh, Daniel Klaidman and Joanna Chen. "Behind the Breakdown." *Newsweek* 136, no. 6 (August 7, 2000): 58. *MasterFILE Premier*, EBSCOhost

⁴³⁰ Robert Malley and Hussein Agha. "The Palestinian-Israeli Camp David Negotiations and Beyond." *Journal of Palestine Studies* 31. 1 (2001), 62, URL: <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2676405>.

⁴³¹ Kirsten E. Schulze, "Camp David and the *Al-Aqsa Intifada*: An Assessment of the State of the Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process, July-December 2000", *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, Taylor & Francis, 1521-0731, 24. 3 (2001), 218.

⁴³² Clayton E. Swisher, *The Truth About Camp David: the untold story about the collapse of the*

fail. And so they did, but Clinton did not yield. It can be argued that Barak enthusiasm in reaching a deal with Arafat would have a positive effect on his position in the next elections. Clinton continued to try before his presidency ended. After Camp David II failed in July and both sides returned home, Clinton formulated a new plan known as the 'Clinton Plan'. Both sides were asked for a final effort in December. According to this plan, 95 percent of the West Bank and Gaza would be returned to the PA and land compensations would be considered. Clinton suggested that Jerusalem would be administered by both sides: Arabs their own neighborhoods including the Muslim and Christian Quarter in the Old City, while the Jewish Quarter and the Temple Mount by the Israelis. Both sides looked satisfied about Jerusalem until the issue of the 'right to return' came up. The refugees would be allowed to return to the new state of Palestine but not their original homes. Barak's side agreed on the proposal but the Palestinian delegation refused to accept unless there would be future negotiations. Finally Clinton's last attempt before his time in office ran out came to a dead-lock in January 2001.⁴³³

It was a time when both communities had reached their final limit of hoping that their superiors would reach an agreement. Barak's coalition government weakened after it couldn't bring back results to its people. Barak finally resigned and new elections were forced in 2001.⁴³⁴ Adding to this tense atmosphere, Ariel Sharon's provocative visit to the Haram in September 2000 not only broke down the final dealing between Barak and Arafat, but provoked a full-scale uprising the same year known as the "Al-Aqsa Intifada".⁴³⁵

⁴³³ Quandt, *Peace Process*, 371-372.

⁴³⁴ Quandt, *op.cit.*, 371.

⁴³⁵ Pappé, *A History of Modern Palestine*, .275.

3.3 Al-Aqsa Intifada and the Sharon Administration

After putting Barak to the test as prime minister, the Israeli public decided in the next election to go for a stronger and more aggressive leader such as Ariel Sharon. With the outbreak of the second Intifada, Barak lost all credibility and was forced to resign from office.⁴³⁶ The Israeli public was disappointed with the results in Camp David summit and why peace was so hard to reach after all the ongoing negotiations since 1993. During the 2001 Israeli elections Sharon campaigned for ‘peace and security’. The newly elected Prime Minister eliminated the essence of Oslo by violating human rights while the new US president George W. Bush looked the other way.⁴³⁷

The end of peace between the two communities can be marked by the start of a horrific period of suicide attacks by Palestinian militants on Israeli civilians as well as the last military strike known as “Operation Defensive Shield” by the IDF in March, 2002. Between the years of 2000 and 2004 nearly 2,800 Palestinians and 920 Israelis lost their lives, mostly the result of suicide bombing and military air strikes.⁴³⁸ Every suicide-bomb attack was followed with a response by Israel: the IDF conducted military raids on towns, cities and refugee camps. This was a large-scale military operation conducted by the IDF under the leadership of Prime Minister Ariel Sharon. Within two weeks, Israel reoccupied the remaining areas in the West Bank assigned to the PA during the Oslo agreements.⁴³⁹

Another development after Camp David failed was the ‘Defensive Barrier’. Uri

⁴³⁶ Isabel Kershner, *Barrier: The Seam of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict* (Oxford: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 57.

⁴³⁷ James Kitfield, "OSLO AND CAMP DAVID ARE DEAD. OR ARE THEY?," *National Journal* 34, no. 14 (April 6, 2002): 1004. *MasterFILE Premier*, EBSCOhost

⁴³⁸ Cordesman and Moravitz, *The Israeli Palestinian War*, 325.

⁴³⁹ Kershner, *Barrier*, 58.

Dayan, the nephew of Moshe Dayan and the architect of this barrier was appointed as head of National Security Council during the beginning of the Al-Aqsa Intifada. This barrier was opposed by Sharon because it would divide the Greater Land of Israel which was against his ideology. But due to growing terrorist attacks by Palestinian militants he was forced to adapt this plan in May 2002. This plan was approved by the cabinet a month later and construction began straight away.⁴⁴⁰ The main reason why the barrier defied international law is because it was not built on the Green Line. This was purposely planned by the Israeli government to avoid a future two-state solution based on the UN partition plan.⁴⁴¹ Moreover, Israeli superiors rejected the fact that it was a permanent border and insisted it was a temporary defensive line to prevent terrorist attacks in Israel and the Jewish settlements in the West Bank.⁴⁴² In other words, it was not a political border but only a means of increasing security.

⁴⁴⁰ Kershner, *Barrier*, 58.

⁴⁴¹ *Ibid.*, 60-63.

⁴⁴² *Ibid.*, 60.

Chapter 4

CONCLUSION

When Israel captured Gaza, the West Bank, Sinai and the Golan Heights during the Six-Day War as an act of retaliation against the Arab forces led by Nasser, their first plan was to hold on to the territories and use them in exchange for a final peace. Later, the Eshkol government changed this decision and decided to keep these territories for security reasons.⁴⁴³ The Arab leaders' attitude in the Khartoum Conference not only contributed to Israel's decision for security needs by means of keeping the territories, but also had a direct affect on the fate of the Palestinian people. It can be argued that the Arab's politically unrealistic approach was a historic mistake. On the other hand, the Israelis claimed that they had no choice but to act as they did. To maintain security for the state these territories were necessary. Within weeks military settlements were constructed in the newly occupied territories. The Israeli government insists that these settlements were and are there to maintain

⁴⁴³ Karen Armstrong, *Holy War: The Crusades and their Impact on Today's World* (New York: Anchor Books, 2001), 278.

security and merely for defense purposes. Karen Armstrong argues that these settlements were a means of conquering new lands.⁴⁴⁴

Israel's ongoing settlement policy since 1967 not only defies International Law but moreover strangled peace-negotiations between the Israeli government and the Palestinians since the Oslo peace-process began in 1993. This stale-mate has led to greater Palestinian suffering given Israel's repressive policy. According to Al-Jazeera, "About 500,000 Jews live on land in the West Bank and East Jerusalem seized by Israel in the aftermath of 1967 Israeli-Arab war."⁴⁴⁵ Israel has constantly argued that these territories were necessary for the security of the state as displayed both in the Allon plan and Sharon plan. Judging from the maps, these settlements created a 'natural security barrier'.⁴⁴⁶ This illustrates Israel's insecurity in the region and the realization of its demographic problems. Both maps also clearly illustrate that the position of these settlements also created a wall between the Palestinians in Jordan and the ones in the West Bank. Moreover, this wall has led to worldwide criticism and the isolation of the Israelis from the international community. The reason behind Israel's annexation of East Jerusalem is also demographic which poses a serious problem to the Jewishness of the state. Therefore settlement expansion was and still is a necessity to create facts on the ground and increase security.⁴⁴⁷ Even though Israel built these settlements as a defense, in reality they are causing more and more security problems for the state. According to

⁴⁴⁴ Armstrong, *Holy War*, 285-286.

⁴⁴⁵ "Developments in the West Bank are an obstacle to peace with the Palestinians," last Modified: 20 Dec 2009, URL:
<http://english.aljazeera.net/news/middleeast/2009/08/2009824145130254273.html>

⁴⁴⁶ Cordesman and Moravitz, *The Israeli Palestinian War*, 64.

⁴⁴⁷ ARIJ "E1 Plan: A Step toward a Dead End, 18,May,2005," The Applied Research Institute Jerusalem, Monitoring Israeli Colonization Activities in the Palestinian Territories, URL:
http://www.poica.org/editor/case_studies/view.php?recordID=570

Yiftachel, they pose a heavy security burden which in turn affects the economy of Israel.⁴⁴⁸ The terrorist attacks during the second intifada prove this point.

The Israeli leaders have emphasized time and time again that they are interested in reaching a peace deal with the Palestinians. On the other hand, their vision of peace was never accepted by the Palestinian side and vice versa. While Rabin, Barak and Sharon all mention a possible future Palestinian State, none of them explained their views in detail.⁴⁴⁹ Israel's settlement policy in the West Bank following the Six-Day War changed the outlook of the world. The Israeli government was no longer envisioned as a democratic one. This war also added new and serious issues to the states' credibility in dealing with its new Palestinian population. This population would change the demographic balance of the Jewish State. After analyzing all arguments and debates the question of why Israel occupied these territories in 1967 remains to be rationally answered. In my opinion, there were political as well as religious reasons for this illegal occupation. The political reasons support the religious aspects and vice versa.

Politically, a state needs a secure border, good relations with its neighbors, a functioning economy and internal security to sustain itself. Israel lacked all three in the past. It has succeeded through many talks and by the support of the US in reaching peace with two of its neighbors: Egypt in 1978 (Camp David I) and later Jordan in 1994 (Israel-Jordan Treaty of Peace).⁴⁵⁰ Syria is yet to be a part of this peaceful triangle although it should be stressed that these peace treaties were reached

⁴⁴⁸ Oren Yiftachel, "Settlements as Reflex Action," in *A Civilian Occupation: The Politics of Israeli Architecture*. ed. Rafi Segal and Eyal Weizman (London: Verso; Revised edition, 2003): 34.

⁴⁴⁹ Cordesman and Moravitz, *The Israeli Palestinian War*, 51-52.

⁴⁵⁰ See Chapters 2 and 3.

after a series of wars. Israel has gone through a difficult economic period especially in the early 1980's; one reason of recession was Israel's conflict with its neighbors.⁴⁵¹ Internal security is still a primary issue. It is important to mention the defensive barrier as a solid and physical proof to Israel's objectives as well as its serious security issues. This barrier has succeeded in increasing security for Israel and the Jewish settlements in the West Bank but also created a permanent separation between the two communities. Although it defies international laws it perhaps will contribute to some kind of a future two-state solution.

Israel's politicians have each time won the support of the religious settler population in the West Bank by claiming that it was a part of biblical Israel. The settlers have positively responded in return by protecting these areas even if it meant killing innocent Palestinian civilians living in the territories. The mentality of these settlers is very different than the politician's but nevertheless contributes to Israel's settlement policy. According to a report by the Human Rights Watch, these settlers have attacked Palestinian civilians as well as humanitarian workers, independent observers and journalists, all under the radar of the IDF.⁴⁵² They believe that the land is their birth right and therefore have the right to protect it by all means necessary. This ideology in return benefited the goals of this delusional nation. As for the building of endless illegal settlements, they were claimed to be a security barrier but actually seem more of a means of creating facts on the ground which will eventually lead to final annexation of the territories. This creeping annexation was supported by the illusive 'land for peace' proposals. Events during the Oslo Peace-

⁴⁵¹ See Chapter 2.

⁴⁵² HRW. "Center of the Storm: A Case Study of Human Rights Abuses in Hebron District April 1, 2001," Human Rights Watch, Web: <http://www.hrw.org/en/reports/2001/04/01/center-storm-case-study-human-rights-abuses-hebron-district>

process and Sharon's final operation prove this fact. According to facts, it can be stated that this was an approach used for reaching the Zionist goals, which is 'Eretz Israel'.

Ariel Sharon, a long time war veteran and the architect of many Arab-Israeli wars and military operation⁴⁵³, lastly being *Operation Defensive Shield*, was never prepared to hand over any part of the West Bank to the Palestinians. He believes that territorial compromise will only create more security issues for the state. It can be argued that Sharon's vision of peace is an internal one, not between two communities as equals but as one single dominant community controlling a weak minority.⁴⁵⁴ According to many sources Sharon opposed the Oslo Accords from the beginning as he believed that Jordan is where the Palestinians should form a state.⁴⁵⁵ His priorities were security first, peace later.⁴⁵⁶ Moreover he was against the division of Jerusalem and repeatedly stated it that it was the capital of Israel and the heart of Jewish religion. Here repeatedly emphasized the religious importance of Jerusalem to the Jewish people, an approach that has been used by many politicians before.⁴⁵⁷

Arafat on the other hand, was the leader of the Palestinians since 1967 until his death in 2005 had been effortlessly trying to win back the West Bank firstly through guerilla tactics and later by diplomatic means. Both tactics finally failed in Camp David II and therefore the Palestinians lost all hope of a future Palestinian state. Arafat was unable to deliver what was expected of his people because of Israel's

⁴⁵³ See Kershner, Barrier, 66-67.

⁴⁵⁴ Dennis J. Deeb II, *The Collapse of Middle East Peace: The Rise & Fall of the Oslo Peace Accords* (iUniverse, 2003), 23.

⁴⁵⁵ Deeb II, *op.cit.*, 23.

⁴⁵⁶ Cordesman and Moravitz, *The Israeli Palestinian War*, 258.

⁴⁵⁷ Deeb II, *op.cit.*, 25-27.

vision of peace. Israel was not ready to compromise on Jerusalem and the refugee problem due to demographic as well as 'religious' reasons. The breakdown in Camp David II led to open warfare in October 2000 where the struggle spread to the whole of Palestine through a series of suicide bombings.⁴⁵⁸ Freedom of movement was once again compromised and house demolition continued by the Israeli authorities, not only in towns but in refugee camps as well, on the basis of security.⁴⁵⁹ The West Bank and Gaza Strip were sealed off as were many Palestinian towns.⁴⁶⁰ All sense of civilized life on both sides was impossible. It can be stated that the result of the Israeli elections in February 2001 marked the end of any hope for peace and the beginning of a horrific war between the Israelis and the Palestinians. Cordesman and Moravitz stated that with the failure of the Taba peace talks and Sharon's election in 2001, the violence escalated including Israeli air strikes and endless suicide bombing of civilian targets by the Palestinian militants (Al Aqsa Martyrs' Brigade, Islamic Jihad, PFLP, PIJ, Fatah and Hamas).⁴⁶¹

According to Kershner, the Israeli authorities sensed an uprising during the Camp David summit and therefore had already made security preparations.⁴⁶² Israel has always considered the United Nations as a bias organization and moreover was under great pressure by the US to freeze settlement expansion plans.⁴⁶³ Moreover, it had never trusted the Arabs and believed that in a time of war, the ones in peace with Israel would naturally choose to support their Muslim brothers. As mentioned in the previous chapter, Operation Defensive Shield, a military operation lead by Sharon

⁴⁵⁸ Pappé, *A History of Modern Palestine*, 265.

⁴⁵⁹ Cordesman and Moravitz, *op.cit.*, 265.

⁴⁶⁰ *Ibid*, 257-258.

⁴⁶¹ For chronology of violent events during 2000-2004, see Cordesman, *The Israeli Palestinian War*, 257-324.

⁴⁶² Kershner, *Barrier*, 90.

⁴⁶³ *Ibid.*, 135.

resulted in Israel's reoccupation of the areas that were assigned to the Palestinian Authorities. Even though more can be said about the period after this operation, the boundaries of this study are limited to this time.

Finally, Israel was forced to put up a concrete wall to protect its settlers from violence. This security barrier was one of the most costly projects in Israel's history.⁴⁶⁴ It can be stated that in fact the settlement expansion policy has not been a positive step for the states' development and prosperity. The defensive barrier is an exclusive and explosive subject in the history of the Arab-Israeli conflict. It has been built as a final response to the Palestinian violence on Israeli settlers. On the other hand, it has physically shaped the boundaries of the state and created an apartheid system which oppresses the Palestinian people in their daily lives in respect to economic as well as freedom of movement. This barrier which is argued by Israel as a temporary fence for security reasons seems more like a permanent solution for annexation. Together with the illegal settlements in the West Bank, this was another well thought out plan that violated international laws and clearly was a means of creating facts on the ground.⁴⁶⁵

Against all these odds, Israel had no reason to stop settlement construction; on the contrary it had more reason to continue expanding for as long as it could. The course it chose since 1967 was a bold and non-reversible one. Even if the separation barrier was a permanent solution, it did not solve Israel's demographic issue. Israel continues its dangerous path in occupying a population larger than itself.

⁴⁶⁴ Kershner, *Barrier*, 64.

⁴⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, 66.

Today, Israel has continued to isolate itself internationally by continuing with the settlement expansion on lands the Palestinians claim for a future state. Its plans for more settlement construction in the West Bank and East Jerusalem have been criticized by the United States as well as the European Union and the United Nations. Even though the US has urged Israel to freeze its settlement plans for the sake of peace talks with the Palestinians to carry on, no such shift has taken place.⁴⁶⁶ Israeli leaders persist on undermining the peace talks and according to the recent news media “continue to ignore strong objections from the Palestinians and the rest of the international community.”⁴⁶⁷ The idea of the need of security through settlement building has not made Israel more secure. On the contrary, the settlements and the defensive wall have led to the suffering of the Palestinian people and created new issues such as international criticism.

⁴⁶⁶ The Washington Times, “Israeli settlement expansion angers U.S.”, Friday, September 4, 2009.

URL: <http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2009/sep/04/israeli-plan-settlement-building-angers-us/>

⁴⁶⁷ RTT News, “Middle East Quartet Flays Israel's Settlement Expansion Plans”, RTT Staff Writer,

8/17/2011, URL:

<http://www.rttnews.com/Content/GeneralNews.aspx?Id=1694376&SM=1&pageNum=2>

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
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APPENDIX

APENDIX A: MAP



MAP 1: Peel Commission Partition Plan, 1937. (Source: Institute for Middle East Understanding, URL: <http://imeu.net/news/article00127.shtml>.)



UN Partition plan

UN General Assembly votes to partition British Mandate Palestine into Jewish and Arab sectors. Soon after the adoption of the resolution on 29 November 1947, fighting breaks out and civil war spreads.

Declares independence

Independence declaration recognised internationally but conflict spreads and five Arab armies invade. By the 1949 armistice, Jordan has captured the West Bank, Egypt has Gaza and Jerusalem is divided.


Six Day War

Israel in preemptive strike against three Arab states, capturing Gaza and Sinai peninsula from Egypt, the West Bank from Jordan, the Golan Heights from Syria and Arab East Jerusalem.

MAP 2: Israel (1947-1967). (Source: Origins & Evolution of the Arab-Zionist Conflict, Israel: A History, The Question of Palestine & Graphic News)



MAP 3: British Mandate (1920-1948) (Source: Map of Historical Israel, URL: http://mapas.owje.com/maps/2886_israel-historical-map.html.)



MAP 4: Allon, Drobless and Sharon Plan. (Source: Eyal Weizman, July 29, 2006. URL: CriticalSpatialPractice.blogspot.com/2006/07/eyal-weizman.html.)