**Peace Journalism and News Coverage**

**on Cyprus Conflict**

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# ABSTRACT

Peace journalism is a new concept in the academic field and the media sector. It is important to stress that peace journalism is a new kind of reporting, and it involves news selecting and news framing for the journalism profession. This dissertation, which conducted on the Cyprus Conflict present for more than five decades, makes a contribution to the peace journalism conception of Johan Galtung. The findings of this dissertation, which analyses the coverage of the Cyprus Conflict on the press from the perspective of peace journalism, can also be applied to the other conflict zones of the world. In this study, the notion of peace journalism is explained by means of various examples taken from the Cypriot media. This study looks at the news stories reported by the Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot newspapers on the matters relating to one another, from the perspective of peace journalism. The Cypriot media do allocate sizeable coverage for the stories related to the Cyprus Conflict. However it is observed that journalists do not necessarily stick to the principles of peace journalism as they prepare the reporting of the newsworthy stories on the conflict. The media in which peace journalism is not employed turns into a media instigating violence, hatred, and storm. Among the roles of journalists in battle areas include the crucial significance of approaching incidents from peace journalism perspectives. In light of the renewed negotiations in Cyprus for reunification, the Cypriot media should engage in responsible reporting.

**Keywords:** Cyprus Conflict, News media, Peace journalism, News coverage, Framing.

# ÖZ

Barış gazeteciliği akademik alan ve medya sektörü için yeni bir kavramdır. Barış gazeteciliğinin gazetecilik mesleği için yeni bir tür habercilik, haber seçimi ve haber çerçevesi olduğu önemle vurgulanmalıdır. Bu çalışma, 50 yıldan fazla devam eden Kıbrıs Sorunu’nu konu alıyor ve Johan Galtung’un barış gazeteciliği kavramına katkı sağlıyor. Çalışmanın bulguları ki barış gazeteciliği perspektifinden medyanın Kıbrıs Sorunu’nu yansıtmasını analiz ediyor, dünyadaki diğer çatışma bölgelerine de uygulanabilir. Çalışmada barış gazeteciliği anlayışı Kıbrıs medyasından alınan çeşitli örneklerle açıklanıyor.

Bu çalışma Kıbrıs Türk ve Kıbrıs Rum gazetelerinin birbirleriyle ilgili konulardaki haberlerini barış gazeteciliği perspektifinden inceliyor. Kıbrıs’taki her iki medya da Kıbrıs Sorunu’yla ilgili haberlere önemli ölçüde yer veriyor. Buna rağmen, gazetecilerin haber değeri olan olayları haberleştirirken barış gazeteciliği prensiplerini yerine getirmedikleri gözlemleniyor. Barış gazeteciliğinin kullanılmadığı bir medya; şiddet, kin ve nefretin körüklendiği bir medya ortamı olarak karşımıza çıkıyor. Gazetecilerin çatışma bölgelerinde oynayabileceği roller arasında, olaylara barış gazeteciliği perspektifiyle yaklaşması önemlidir. Kıbrıs’ın birleştirilmesi için yeniden başlayan görüşmelerde, Kıbrıs medyası sorumlu habercililik yapmalıdır.

**Anahtar Kelimeler:** Kıbrıs Sorunu, Haber medyası, Barış gazeteciliği, Haber kapsamı (coverage), Haber çerçevesi.

# 

To My Wife, My Daughter and My Family

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**Chapter 1**

# 1 INTRODUCTION

## 1.1 Problem

Print media play an essential role in democratic societies; all societies feel the need for media which rest on principles of pluralism so that they can discuss current problems and find appropriate solutions. For several decades, Cyprus has experienced various levels of ethnic conflict between its Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot populations, and as an integral part of these respective societies, the press have also been involved, either directly or indirectly, in this conflict. This study focuses on mediatic aspects of the problem internationally known as the “Cyprus Conflict.” Its main focus is the forms or frameworks within which this issue is presented in the print media in Cyprus.

## 1.2 Purpose of the study

The basic aim of this study is to explore the Turkish and Greek Cypriot media constructions of a perceived/imagined “other” and determine how each frames the “other,” in order to formulate a *peace journalism* approach for journalists in Cyprus.

## 1.3 Importance of the study

This study makes a significant contribution to the literature: it takes a comparative approach to analyzing the news coverage in Cyprus, considering both Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot print media.

## 1.4 Research Methodology

This study employs quantitative research and framing analysis. Quantitative content analysis is used to determine what kinds of news topics are prioritized, what sources are used by journalists, and how events and stories are presented in the press. This “is a useful method to analyze the manifest content [which] … is also claimed to be ‘objective and systematic’” (Singletary, 1993, p. 281); as Sherry Devereaux Ferguson (2000) notes, “…content analysis assumes that messages have an effect [and… also] …that an issue’s place in the media agenda and how the media covers a story can influence audience perceptions of the issue, the organization, and its chief executives” (p. 86).

However, quantitative content analysis on its own does not provide an understanding of the deeper significance of news and opinion articles in the context in which they are read; for this purpose, frame analysis is used: “To frame is to select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation for the item described” (Entman, 1993, p. 52).

Journalists usually create conceptual frameworks in news articles and columns in order to draw attention to issues which they feel are important. In the print media of each of the two communities in Cyprus, it is typical for a perceived/imagined “other” to be constructed, either intentionally or unintentionally, when the subject is the other community. Public perceptions are thus shaped by the media in Cyprus in sigificant ways depending on whether the framework used by journalists is one of conflict or of peace.

This study utilizes both quantitative research and framing analysis to examine how Greek and Turkish Cypriot newspapers cover events in the Cyprus conflict related respectively to the north and south of Cyprus, and what frames “they” tend to use. A ‘Content Analysis Coding Schema’ has been developed to address the following issues: How do Turkish and Greek Cypriot journalists select headlines (positive, natural, or negative)? Who writes the stories [sources[[1]](#footnote-2) of the stories]? What are the most quoted sources in the stories? What is the typical length of the stories? What word choices are made by the journalist or the newspaper? And are the dominant frames peace-oriented or conflict-oriented?

## 1.5 Sampling of the Study

Five Turkish Cypriot and five Greek Cypriot newspapers’ news and opinion articles are the subjects or main independent variables of this study. The Greek Cypriot newspapers are Alithia, Haravghi, Phileleftheros, Simerini and Politis; the Turkish Cypriot papers are Kıbrıs, Afrika, Yenidüzen, Halkın Sesi and Volkan. The samples for news stories study were publications in May 2006 and October 2006 for opinion articles.

## 1.6 Research Question and Hypotheses

This study will seek to answer the research question: “To what extent are the print media of each of the two communities in Cyprus negatively oriented towards their constructed other in coverage of the Cyprus Conflict?”

One major and three minor hypotheses are tested. The major hypothesis is: “The coverage and framing of news by Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot journalists are negatively oriented towards their respective “Other.” The basic rationale for this hypothesis is that, in the current practice of journalism in Cyprus, and in the context of the ongoing ethnic conflict, bad news about the other is seen as good news as it serves certain political agendas; traditional Western-oriented news values are also conflict-oriented.

Minor hypotheses:

1. Turkish and Greek Cypriot journalists’ framing of news about the “other” side is more conflict-oriented than peace-oriented.

2. The Cyprus media more likely choose stories such as crime, rape, and drug use which can be considered as negative rather than positive stories from the other side when they are not covering Cyprus Conflict.

3. The values and practices of journalism in Cyprus are not contributing to reconciliation and peace between the Turkish and Greek Cypriot communities.

**Chapter 2**

# LITERATURE REVIEW

## 2.1 Historical Overview of the Cyprus Conflict

The recent period of inter-communal conflicts in Cyprus began in the 1950s, when the Greek Cypriot community began its struggle with the British colonial administration for independence. In the nineteenth century, the declared aim of the Greek Cypriots had been “ENOSIS,” or “union,” a Greek term used to refer to the national aspiration and strategy of the Greeks and Greek Cypriots to unite Cyprus with mainland Greece; this strategy is known as the “Megali Idea”[[2]](#footnote-3) or “Great Idea.” According to Niyazi Kızılyürek (2005), “[w]hen the Turkish Cypriots understood that the real aim was not to fight against colonialism for independence, but ‘ENOSIS’, unification of Cyprus with mainland Greece; they were persuaded by the UK to create the thesis of partition” (p. 36). The thesis of partition or “TAKSİM” in Turkish was a response to the perceived threat of annexation of Cyprus as a whole by Greece, and proposed the physical separation of the two communities on the island.

Raising issues such as who started the conflict, or who is right and who is not, is not productive in the context of this study, as from the perspective of peace journalism the question of who threw the first stone leads to conflict rather than solution: If one declares the party who threw the first stone is “guilty” and the counterpart has been “victimized,” then any future faults of the victim will be legitimized. Thus in the Cyprus conflict, repeating the historical argument that the first stone was thrown by the Greek Cypriots trying to achieve ENOSIS and that following this the British provoked the Turkish Cypriots to argue for TAKSIM, does not serve any useful purpose; both theses contributed to the expansion of the conflict between the two communities. According to Papadakis (2005), the termination of their convergence came about with the foundation of the Greek Cypriot EOKA[[3]](#footnote-4) organization in 1955, and two years later, in reaction, the establishment of the Turkish Cypriot resistance movement, TMT[[4]](#footnote-5):

The era of rapprochement ended with the beginning of the EOKA (National Organization of Cypriot Fighters) struggle in 1955 for union with Greece: ENOSIS. Turkish Cypriots opposed this, asking for partition – TAKSIM – of Cyprus, and set up their own fighters’ organization called TMT (Turkish Resistance Organization) (p. 39).

During 1959-1963 there was heated conflict between EOKA and the TMT. According to Sözen (1999), “… [it] culminated in 1974 with the interventions of Greece and later Turkey that led to the island’s current de facto division as the Greek Cypriot SOUTH and the Turkish Cypriot NORTH” (p. 1).

Historically, the Cyprus conflict dates back to long before the 1950s. In 1878, Britain leased the island from the weakening Ottoman Empire in order to protect its interests in the eastern Mediterranean. Initially, the Greek Cypriots were happy about the leasing of the island to Britain; many saw this as freedom from Ottoman sovereignty and believed it would facilitate ENOSIS, or the annexation of the island to Greece (the Megali Idea). However, this did not happen when the island came under British control:

The British rule from 1878 to 1959 has harboured some deep-rooted causes that eventually led to the Cyprus Conflict. Great Britain wanted to keep Cyprus as its colony at any cost and was merciless enough to enforce its “divide and rule” policy, which created hostilities among the two communities (Kızılyürek, 2001, p. 32).

The British were not positive about the Greek Cypriot’s demand for ENOSIS and accordingly took some measures against such a possibility occurring. Winning the support of Turkish Cypriots was one measure, and the British convinced them that they would lose their rights as Muslim Turks if British colonial rule in the island ceased to exist. Thus Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots began a conflict that would last for many decades. To realize their aspiration for ENOSIS, the Greek Cypriots formed the EOKA organisation in 1955 under the leadership of Archbishop Makarios, and on 1 April 1955, EOKA staged its first armed attack against British rule. “The British Administration took a set of measures against the acts of EOKA... The British Rule put into place its most powerful weapon: the ‘DIVIDE and RULE’ policy. It employed Turkish Cypriot police officers to counter EOKA activists and tried to create a divide between the two communities” (Kızılyürek, 2001, p. 51).

The EOKA attacks originally targeted the British administration in Cyprus; later on, following the intervention of Turkish Cypriots in the capacity of Auxiliary Police officers, these turned into violent ethnic clashes. The Turkish Cypriot community staged counter-offensives in revenge for the deaths of Turkish Cypriot police officers killed in the attacks, thus serving the interests of the British Administration. In 1958, when the clashes between the two communities reached a critical point, Turkish Cypriots formed the TMT resistance organization.[[5]](#footnote-6) The “TMT remained an underground organization from 1 August 1958 till 21 December 1963, during which it got organized, trained its members, possessed arms and prepared itself for any potential attack of Greek Cypriots” (Tansu, 2001, p. 15). As the situation developed in the direction desired by the British administration; and as Greek Cypriots started to perceive Turkish Cypriots – in addition to the British – as an obstacle to their aspiration for ENOSIS, Britain planned its next move.

As a result of the British policy of “divide and rule,” the idea of TAKSİM (partition) was put forward as a response to ENOSIS. The British worked hard to force the Turkish Cypriots to adopt the idea of a divide, a partitioning, against the island’s union with Greece. In this way, the protests and attacks started primarily for the independence of the island and against the colonial administration of the English could be diverted as the Cypriots fought among themselves over the future of the island. The status of the two military bases (Dekhelia and Akrotiri) obtained by Britain through the Treaty of 1960 were questioned by neither Turkish Cypriots nor Greek Cypriots, as the probem of independence became transformed into an ethnic conflict between the two communities that continued to escalate. The insistence of the British on TAKSIM was based on their envisioned benefits from an unsolvable problem. According to Bailie and Azgin (2008), at the end of the 19th century “…the issue was between Greek Cypriots arguing for union of Cyprus with Greece and Turkish Cypriots claiming that Cyprus legally belonged to the Ottoman state and that, should Britain decide to vacate the island, it should be handed back to its legal owners” (pp. 86-87).

The demand to “return the Island to its legitimate owner” that was promoted by the Turkish Cypriots arose from their seeing the new Republic of Turkey as the successor of the Ottoman Empire. The Turkish Cypriots claimed the island had to be given back; however, the Menderes government which was in power in Turkey at that time adopted the position that “Turkey doesn’t have a problem called Cyprus”. Mehmet Fuad Köprülü was the Foreign Minister in the second and third Menderes’ government. He had strong effect on this stand of the Turkish Government. Mehmet Fuad Köprülü did not take part of the fourth Menderes’ government this policy changed. This stand came to an end in 1959, when Turkey participated in the Zurich and London Conferences organized at the invitation of England, and with the signing of the guarantorship treaties on Cyprus.

The future of the Turkish and Greek Cypriots was decided by the British, Turkish and Greek governments in February 1959, when the Turkish and Greek prime ministers signed the Zurich Agreement: “In 1959, Britain, Greece and Turkey developed the Zurich – London Accords and later in 1960, with Cypriot representatives, concluded the Treaties of Alliance, Establishment and Guarantees, which formed the basis for the constitution of the Republic of Cyprus” (Swan, 1998, p. 32). The two communities in Cyprus were brought in subsequently: “Later between the Turkish, Greek and British governments the London Agreement was prepared in London and the Turkish (Cypriot) and Greek (Cypriot) delegations were invited to London only to sign this agreement as representatives of the Cypriot communities” (Kizilyurek, 2001, p. 60).

The Republic of Cyprus was declared to the world on 16th August 1960. As indicated by İsmail Bozkurt (2001),

The Republic of Cyprus was a functional/federative republic with additional confederative qualifications... The ratios for parliament, government, police and gendarmery forces were calculated as 70 percent Greek Cypriots and 30 percent Turkish Cypriots and the ratios for the army were 60 percent Greek Cypriots and 40 percent Turkish Cypriots. A total veto right for foreign affairs, defense and security issues was given to the Vice President who was a Turk (p. 14).

The independent Republic of Cyprus was short-lived. On 30 November 1963, the President of the Republic, Archbishop Makarios, prepared 13 proposals for amendment of the Cyprus Constitution. These constitutional alterations were not approved by Turkish Cypriots, and the tension between the parties began to grow.

By 21 December, 1963, EOKA fighters began a campaign of violence against the Turkish Cypriots, and as Dodd (2001) notes, “From the end of 1963 until 1974 armed conflict continued. After the Greek Junta’s coup in Cyprus, Britain refused Bülent Ecevit’s request for joint action in Cyprus to restore the state of affairs as prescribed in the Treaty of Guarantees. Britain declined to become involved militarily, because she was not prepared to be involved in hostilities against Greece or Greek Cyprus” (cited in Gökçekuş, 2001, p. 336).

On 20 July, 1974 Turkey launched a military operation in Cyprus. The war of 1974 resulted in many people dying, children being orphaned, people leaving the island, and a large proportion of the population being displaced.

Afterwards, the “Treaty of Population Exchange” was signed in Vienna under the auspices of the United Nations in 1975. The treaty, which anticipated a bilateral exchange of populations, was signed by Glafcos Clerides for the Greek Cypriots and Rauf Raif Denktaş for the Turkish Cypriots. With this treaty, Turkish Cypriots who lived in the south of Cyprus migrated to the northern part of Cyprus and Greek Cypriots to the southern part; the small number who did not want to move continued their lives in their villages. As a result, a de facto situation was created where the south part of the island came to be inhabited by the majority of Greek Cypriots and the north by the majority of Turkish Cypriots. With this population exchange, the partition of the island was realized.

Eight years later, on November 15, 1983, the Turkish Cypriots declared their own state, the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC), and “[w]hen independence was declared, Britain introduced UN Security Council Resolution 542 which deplored the ‘purported secession’ of part of the Republic of Cyprus and called upon all states not to recognize any Cypriot state other than the Republic of Cyprus” (cited in Gökçekuş, 2001, p. 337).

Although it appears that the Cyprus conflict reached its decisive point with this UN Security Council resolution, there are still many problems to be solved between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots, and this is why the negotiations for a solution between the parties are still continuing. The divided interests, which were forcibly created between the two communities, have only resulted in deaths, casualties, missing people, orphans, poverty, misery and migration; and there are individuals who have profited unfairly from the division, especially in the northern part of Cyprus, as a result of unfair distribution of property.

### 2.1.1 Different Histories: How Turkish and Greek Cypriots See the Past

According to Michel Foucault, “history is a form of knowledge and a form of power at the same time; put differently, it is a means of controlling and domesticating the past in the form of knowing it” (cited in Poster, 1984, p. 75). Historians try to recreate the past; and so it is natural that the Cypriot communities have different interpretations of history, especially regarding the Cyprus Conflict. Yiannis Papadakis (2008) notes that “…in many societies, especially those divided through ethnonational conflicts, history is often used to propagate a narrative focusing on the suffering of the nation and to legitimate its political goals. The suffering of others is silenced, their historical existence is questioned, and sociocultural interactions are ignored” (p. 1). This ideological legitimization of “the facts” is a major problem in Cyprus, where the parties to the conflict have spent decades attempting to legitimize their own behavior towards the ‘other’ or present themselves as innocent.

Turkish Cypriots claim that the Cyprus conflict began in the latter half of December, 1963 when EOKA members attacked Turkish Cypriots. This incident is referred to as “bloody Christmas” by Turkish Cypriots, and from this time onwards they were not allowed to participate either in the parliament or in any of the civil services of Cyprus. However, Greek Cypriots claim that the conflict started in 1974, when Turkey intervened militarily in Cyprus and subsequently occupied the north part of the island. In the history textbooks written by Dr. Vehbi Zeki Serter[[6]](#footnote-7) and the ones used in lower secondary schools in North Cyprus, “[t]he events of 1974 are described … as the ‘Happy Peace Operation’ when the ‘Heroic Turkish Army’ came to safeguard the ‘Turks of Cyprus’ and remained ever since” (Papadakis, 2008, p. 14). The Greek Cypriot history textbooks have a different narrative, which describes 1974 as a tragic end caused by the “Barbaric Turkish Invasion” (Papadakis, 2008, p. 15).

This example illustrates the radical difference in perspectives between the two Cypriot communities; there are also differences in the way history is interpreted within each community. According to Papadakis (2008), “[h]istory is constructed through Manichean, black and white, good and evil, homogeneous categories” (p. 15). This is why there is no open space for different understandings or meanings, and each history textbook constructs a narrative of events from the perspective of a single voice which attempts to legitimize the perceived realities of the community it serves.

There are numerous other examples; for instance “[in the Greek Cypriot textbook] the period of interethnic violence in the 1960s is described only briefly from an exclusively Greek Cypriot viewpoint. Turkish Cypriots are described as ‘mutineer Turks’ staging provocations, and are held responsible for the conflict” (Papadakis, 2008, p. 9). In contrast, the history textbook which was used during 1971-2004 in the Turkish Cypriot community describes this period as the “continuous barbaric onslaught of ‘Rums’ [i.e. Greek Cypriots] against the ‘Turks’ in Cyprus, all part of a plan…designed to eradicate the ‘Turks,’ this being a period when the ‘Rums’ displayed such savagery and barbarism that the world has seldom seen” (Papadakis, 2008, p. 14). It is through this kind of emotional rhetoric that both Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots attempt to construct their respective realities, and support and legitimize their theses as right and just, for themselves and for future generations.

Another important difference in perpectives emerges in the question of missing persons from both communities. Greek Cypriots claim that many of their missing disappeared because of Turkey’s operation during the 1974 war; for the Turkish Cypriots, however, many of the missing disappeared during the intercommunal fighting of 1963-1974. Thus when the two sides discuss their missing persons, they are talking about different times and situations.

Similar differences in perspective appear in the print media in Cyprus. There is a general tendency in the Greek Cypriot press to depict Turkey’s actions as the basic reason for the division of the island; from this angle the Cyprus conflict began with Turkey’s military intervention in 1974, and Turkey is still occupying the northern part of the island. The Turkish and Turkish Cypriot versions of the conflict show a wide range of different opinions. Some claim that the ethnic clashes ended because of the intervention in 1974 and that Turkey, as a guarantor brought peace to Cyprus. Others argue that there is a ceasefire situation in Cyprus, and they emphasize the need for a new political treaty. There is one argument that Turkish Cypriots should be able to return to the framework of the Republic of Cyprus founded on the 1960 treaty; and another, that the treaty is no longer valid.

As Niyazi Kizilyurek (2007) argues, “…history is not the past itself, but the ‘meaning’ that we produce from the past. Thus, it is important to take into account the time and context of an event. In other words, one must consider the events in the right context and evaluate them in ‘historical time’” (p. 7). Facts are existing realities, but the interpretation of facts involves the construction of meaning, and alternative constructions need to be found beyond nationalistic discourses based on “self-other” and “win-lose” perspectives.

The disputes between Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot perspectives on history are similarly based on different interpretations of even basic concepts such as “Conflict”, “Peace” and “Reunification”. The individuals of each community create different versions of what these concepts mean to them, and expect the others to understand them in the same way; as a result, there is no common ground for understanding, and the level of the conflict increases:

*Conflict:* Anyone browsing through newspapers in Cyprus will see that conflict is the good news, as it means “the Cyprus Conflict for the Cypriot press.” The Cypriot press tends to focus on Cyprus-conflict related news stories, and columnists write articles on it. The definition of the conflict in the Cypriot press is thus an important factor in the Cyprus conflict itself, as through the media each side considers itself the victim and blames the other side.

Because of the nationalist character of the press in Cyprus, journalists are always on the side of what they understand as their state or nation, and evaluate the Cyprus conflict for its benefit. Thus the members of each community try to be on the “right side” against the “Other” side.

*Peace:* The understanding/definition of “peace” varies from person to person in Cyprus, and there is no consensus on the definition of peace between the communities. There are similar examples elsewhere in the world; for example, what Israelis and Palestinians understand about peace. One can say that “every peace is different”; the definition of peace may not be the same for different people even if they are neighbors, as in the case of the communities in Cyprus. Some believe that there is peace on the island, whereas others do not; some believe that there is a cease-fire; others believe that there will be peace only if all of Cyprus enters the European Union. The reality of the island is that there is legally a cease-fire situation and Cypriots are suffering from a lack of political settlement; however, because of differences of interpretation, it is difficult to separate Turkish and Greek Cypriots’ definitions of peace. Each newspaper has a different definition: for instance, in the press in the north, the leftist Yenidüzen newspaper has a totally different understanding of peace from that of the nationalist newspaper Volkan. Yenidüzen understands peace as unification of the island and settlement, but Volkan understands it as “there has been peace in Cyprus since 1974.” Press in the south, the definition of peace is also different to newspaper to newspaper. Some newspapers are understood as a unitary state solution from the definition of peace, and some of them see “federation” would bring to peace and some newspapers support the withdrawal of Turkey from the island is “peace”. We can increase these definition of peace for both sides press and communities.

*Unification:* Unification is not a new concept for Cypriots. When bi-communal fighting started between the Turkish and Greek Cypriots in 1963, Turkish Cypriots were not able to go to the parliament, the government and all civil services; and they had no choice but to have their own separate legislature and government. Today, the leaders of the two communities are still working on “unification,” a concept which has many different definitions from country to country, and which is understood differently by the Turkish and Greek Cypriot communities, and even within these communities. While for some in the Turkish Cypriot community it describes a return to the 1960 Republic of Cyprus, for others it is a new-born federal republic with two partners, or a republic composed of the two separate states. There are also different opinions in the Greek Cypriot community, where for some, unification means a unitary state, but for others, it means the withdrawal of Turkey from the island.

## 2.2 The Historical Overview of the Cyprus Press

The general and common peculiarity of the press in Cyprus is that it is a “press for struggle”. The first newspapers of Cyprus press began their publication life on a nationalistic axis, and even today there does not seem to have been much progress beyond this line. Besides the occasionally different standpoints of some newspapers, the general trend in the print media is to publish around topics based on struggle and dispute. The press community in Cyprus is also struggling with its own identity; there are many different voices in the Cyprus press, and they are constantly in conflict with each other to try to gain legitimacy for their opinions. This should be seen not only from the perspective of ethnic conflict, but also as part of a democratic process for solving problems within the communities.

Ünlü (1981), explaining why the press of Cyprus is “a press for struggle” (p. 14), suggests that its main characteristic is that differences of opinion between the two communities are expressed through the print media in a “tough and hurtful” manner, so that they expand into an ethnic problem. This tradition and habit of the Cypriot press continues to this day; and as Bailie and Azgin (2008) emphasize:

Journalistic tendencies toward conflict reporting in Cyprus are deeply rooted in history. Conflict-centered journalism transcends the bi-communal disturbances of the 1950s and 1960s. During that time period, inter-communal fighting only exacerbated an already long standing journalistic tradition and helped to align both Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot newspapers and journalists with “national struggles. (p. 58)

Andreas Cl. Sophocleous (2006) notes that the first Greek Cypriot newspapers were published as platforms for voicing demands and outlining a vision: “It was not fortuitous that from the start of their publication the first Cypriot Greek-language newspapers persistently and vigorously promoted the demand of the Greeks of Cyprus that the island should be ceded to Greece, thus achieving the vision of their national restoration with their incorporation into the metropolitan national body” (p. 113). This assessment once again demonstrates how the print media of Cyprus are embedded in the logic of ethnic conflict on the island.

### 2.2.1 The Structure of the Cyprus Press

The structure of the press in Cyprus is based on patronage and political party journalism. There are daily newspapers reflecting the political viewpoints of almost all the political parties; and on an island where the “Cyprus problem” is at the top of the agenda, the statements of those in power and authority take priority.

The fact that political parties are so involved in the publication of newspapers needs to be questioned, as they use the media to propagate their political views and manipulate them as tools of propaganda. If one takes into account the organizational structure of today’s press in Cyprus, it is clear that newspaper publication is problematic from the start: since the nature of the press stems from its historical mission as a “press for struggle” in the context of the Cyprus conflict, its organizational structure has been affected accordingly. Özen Çatal’s (2006) study on the Turkish Cypriot press argues that the problem is “more than the direct interventions of the proprietors of establishments[;] it is the employees’ and their managers’ protection of the proprietors’ interests within the framework of self-control” (p. 9). In other words, the press applies “self-censorship” in order to protect the interests of its employers, and it is on this basis that the news is created and established.

The Cyprus press can also be affected by patronage for economic reasons: news items are typically assessed from the point of view of the proprietor’s economic interests before they are published. As Eda Hançer (2006) pointed out in her study of the structure of proprietorship in the Turkish Cypriot press and its effects on the news, “… [in Cyprus] the proprietor of the newspaper, in order to protect his/her economic interests, tries to establish control over the content of the news and applies pressure on journalists not to publish those that are contrary to his/her interests” (p. 7).

Patronage and political party journalism in these senses play a critical role in shaping the structures of today’s Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot newspapers, which are the focus of this study. Among the Greek Cypriot newspapers, Alithia has close ties with DISI, the main opposition party, and is a liberal newspaper which opposes government policies. Haravghi, on the other hand, is owned by AKEL, the communist party which is currently in power and which opposed the Annan Plan in the referendum campaign for a solution in Cyprus. Phileleftheros is the commercial newspaper with the highest circulation in the South. Politis has the second highest circulation, supporting peace initiatives and featuring columns by Turkish Cypriot contributors. Simerini can be described as an ultra-nationalist newspaper.

As for the Turkish Cypriot newspapers, the following general remarks can be made: Kıbrıs has the highest circulation in the North. It is highly influential and can be described as a right-wing newspaper. Afrika is an opposition paper which takes an active stance on the Cyprus conflict. Yenidüzen is owned by the Republican Turkish Party, and it supports and promotes peace initiatives. The ultra-nationalist paper Volkan supports division of the island and promotes a two-state solution. Halkın Sesi, is the oldest Turkish-language newspaper on the island; it is privately owned and can be described as right-of-center.

### 2.2.2 The Referendum and the Press

The referendum held in April 2004 was a turning point for solving the island’s problems which had been pending for years. The United Nations Secretary-General at the time, Kofi Annan, submitted a comprehensive plan to the parties for the first time; and after various amendments to the plan, the fifth version of it was submitted to both sides for approval. While 75.83 % of Greek Cypriots voted against the plan, 64.91 % of Turkish Cypriots voted in favor.

It can be said that the holding of a referendum in the public sphere[[7]](#footnote-8) for the Cyprus problem, which had not been solved for many years, was a revolutionary development in Cyprus politics. As a result of the referendum, the role of the press in shaping public opinion[[8]](#footnote-9) gained considerable importance.

From the first day when the Annan plan was submitted to the sides on November 11, 2002, the press of Cyprus put the referendum at the top of their agenda and made it possible for the plan to be discussed and talked about publicly. Yet although the issues of the Annan plan were at the top of the public agenda, thanks to the press and the politicians they were thrown around superficially. The plan was not discussed in depth, but only around the axis of two poles: people were being made to choose between voting “yes” or voting “no.” The “yes camp” tried to demonstrate the positive aspects of the plan and the “no camp” only the negative aspects.

As the Annan plan was being voted on in the referendum, the press played an important role in shaping public perception, and those in power on both sides of the island maximized the use of the media. The governments of the Greek Cypriot leader, Tassos Papadopoulos and the Turkish Cypriot leader, Mehmet Ali Talat, made effective use of the media to influence public opinion. And instead of giving correct, analytical and critical information to the citizens on the Annan plan, the media of both sides chose to promote the views of their own governments.

### 2.2.3 The Press is Writing History

Beginning in the year 2000, and especially during the referendum of 2004, journalists in Cyprus wrote the history of the country. The Turkish Cypriot CTP government of that period and the government in Ankara[[9]](#footnote-10) adopted the stance of saying “yes to the Annan Plan”as their official policy, and the Turkish Cypriot press supported this policy. In the same way, the Greek Cypriot press continued to propagate the official thesis of the Papadopoulos government, saying “no” to the Annan plan.

While the press in the south of Cyprus was supporting the “no” vote by creating fear among people through censorship, distortion, disinformation, and manipulation, the press in the north of Cyprus used the same method to promote a “yes’ vote: it created scenarios of fear around what could happen to Turkish Cypriots if the plan was not supported, and presented only its positive aspects. The media was not, of course, solely responsible; the government directed the press by providing them manipulated information.

In a public sphere where the press was not providing the correct information, no opportunity was provided for arguing the pros and cons of the plan. The press, as if in cooperation with their governments, executed the “yes’ campaign in the north and the “no” campaign in the south leaving no space for criticism of these views. In the absence of a healthy environment for criticism, opposite and alternative views were excluded and alienated, and people with different viewpoints were polarized, and socially and politically stigmatized. Stigmatization took the form of accusations of treason, and the use of various negative adjectives, such as, *“status quoist”, “Grecophile”, “Turkophile”, “a sellout”, “collaborator”* etc.

Since the 1950s, when the Cyprus problem first took the form of an ethnic problem with the start of inter-communal fighting, the Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot press have played an important role in establishing unity and solidarity among their respective readerships as parties to the conflict, facilitating the kindling of nationalistic feelings. Cypriot journalism, rooted in the politics of nationalism, played this role during the period of the referendum, and continues to do so today.

### 2.2.4 Print Media of Cyprus

There are currently 18 Turkish and English language newspapers published in North Cyprus[[10]](#footnote-11):

*• AFRİKA* (Turkish, daily) is an opposition paper in the North, and takes an active stance on the Cyprus Conflict.

*• BİRLEŞİK KIBRIS* (Turkish, bi-weekly) is owned by the United Cyprus Party, and supports unification of the island.

*• CYPRUS OBSERVER* (English, weekly) is privately owned and supports unification of the island. It does not belong to any political party.

*• CYPRUS TODAY* (English, weekly) is a commercial newspaper which is privately owned. It does not belong to any political party.

*• ÇİVİ* (Turkish, weekly) is a rightist newspaper which supports a two state solution. It does not belong to any political party.

*• DEMOKRAT BAKIŞ* (Turkish, daily) is owned by the Democrat Party, and supports a two-state solution on the island.

*• GÜNEŞ* (Turkish, daily) is owned by the National Unity Party which is currently in power, and it supports a two-state solution.

*• HABERDAR* (Turkish, daily) is a “new” newspaper in the North. It published its first issue on 22 December, 2009.

*• HALKIN SESİ* (Turkish, daily) is the oldest Turkish language newspaper on the island. It is privately owned and can be described as right-of-center.

*• HAVADİS* (Turkish, daily) is privately owned, and supports unification of the island. It does not belong to any political party.

*• KIBRIS* (Turkish, daily) has the highest circulation in the North. It is a commercial newspaper and is highly influential. It does not belong to any political party.

*• KIBRIS SÖZCÜ* (Turkish, daily) is owned by the Freedom and Reform Party, currently in the opposition, and it supports a two-state solution.

*• KIBRISLI* (Turkish, daily) is a privately owned newspaper and does not belong to any political party.

*• ORTAM* (Turkish, daily) is owned by the Peace and Democracy Party, currently in the opposition, and it supports unification of the island.

*• VATAN* (Turkish, daily) is a privately owned nationalist newspaper which supports a two-state solution. It does not belong to any political party.

*• YENİ ÇAĞ* (Turkish, weekly) is owned by the New Cyprus Party, currently in the opposition, and it supports unification of the island.

*•YENİDÜZEN* (Turkish, daily) is owned by the Republican Turkish Party, currently in the opposition, and it supports unification of the island.

*•YENİ VOLKAN* (Turkish, daily) is a nationalist paper, which supports division of the island and promotes a two-state solution.

At present there are 10 Greek and English language newspapers published in the south of Cyprus[[11]](#footnote-12). The relatively smaller number of newspapers in the south, as compared with the Turkish Cypriot press, is due to the fact that in the north, almost all the political parties have their own newspapers. Together with other commercial newspapers, this adds up to double the number of newspapers published in the south. The Greek Cypriot newspapers are as follows:

*• ALITHIA* (Greek, daily) has close ties with DISI, the main opposition party. It opposes governmental policies and supports unification initiatives. Alithia can be described as a liberal newspaper.

*• CYPRUS MAIL* (English, daily) is a moderate newspaper. It does not belong to any political party.

*• CYPRUS WEEKLY* (English, weekly) is a nationalist paper, owned by Nicos Chr Pattichis, which supports ideas of the Orthodox Church in Cyprus. The Orthodox Church believes that the island of Cyprus has belonged to the Greeks throughout history.

*• HARAVGHI* (Greek, daily) is owned by AKEL, the communist party currently in government which has opposed the Annan Plan referendum campaign. It supports AKEL’s policy, which is a bi-communal and bi-zonal solution.

*• KATHIMERINI THARROS* (Greek, weekly) is published weekly in South Cyprus. It is a right-wing nationalist newspaper. Kathimerini was originally published in Greece, and “KATHIMERINI THARROS” is another version of this newspaper. The first 6-7 pages of the newspaper cover issues related with the south of Cyprus, and the rest of the pages cover news from Greece.

*• MACHI* (Greek, daily) can be described as an ultra-nationalist newspaper. Since Greek Cypriots constitute a majority of the population in Cyprus, Machi supports a “unitary state” solution under the domination of Greek Cypriots.

*• PHILELEFTHEROS* (Greek, daily) is the commercial newspaper with the highest circulation in the South. It is owned by Nicos Chr Pattichis, and supports and promotes the ideas of the Orthodox Church in Cyprus. During the Annan Plan period (2003-2004) it promoted the views of the Greek Orthodox Church and the President of Republic of Cyprus, Tassos Papadopulos.

*• POLITIS* (Greek, daily) has the second highest circulation, supporting peace initiatives with contributions from Turkish Cypriot columnists. It is published by Arktinos Ltd.

*• SIMERINI* (Greek, daily) can be described as an ultra right-wing newspaper. It is published by Dias Ltd. Simerini has a close relationship with DIKO (the democratic party) and EDEK (the social democratic party). It supports a “unitary state” as a solution for the Cyprus conflict.

As can be seen from this overview of the existing newspapers in circulation, political parties play a pivotal role in what stance a newspaper will adopt on an issue, and even on which issues it will cover.

## 2.3 The Role of the Media in Public Opinion Formation

There is no question that the media form, shape and direct public opinion. Its role in forming public opinion may be more effective in target groups in the communities and less effective in others. Factors like age, sex, language, religion, intelligence and education have to be taken into acount when the target group is receiving messages sent by the media, and how the meanings of these messages are understood. Because peace journalism assumes that journalists can have powerful effects on their target readerships with their news, theories which emphasize the effectiveness of the media in the formation of public opinion must be examined. In this context, the concepts of public opinion, agenda setting, framing, gatekeeping and spiral of silence and their links with peace journalism are critical.

### 2.3.1 Public Opinion

In the academic context, the concept of public opinion has been a research issue since the 19th century. In the beginning, the concept was examined by political scientists and sociologists, and later it attracted interest in the field of media studies. Walter Lippman (1922) defines the concept of public opinion as follows:

Those features of the world outside which have to do with the behavior of other human beings, in so far as that behavior crosses ours, is dependent upon us, or is interesting to us, we call roughly public affairs. The pictures inside the heads of these human beings, the pictures of themselves, of others, of their needs, purposes, and relationship, are their public opinions. Those pictures which are acted upon by groups of people, or by individuals acting in the name of groups, are Public Opinion with capital letters (p. 23).

Lippman (1922) emphasizes that people adopt opinions with the help of second-hand experiences. In the present day, these second-hand experiences may be factors such as opinion leaders, the mass media, family, profession, groups of friends and school. Therefore, in speaking about “public opinion”, different meanings of the expression may emerge in people’s minds under the influence of second-hand experiences. For Arsev Bektaş (2000), “According to its definition, public opinion reflects the opinions of the majority (p. 9)”. According to Bektaş, the ideas/opinions accepted by the majority can be described as public opinion. However, even if the opinions accepted by the individuals who form this majority have different meanings for them, they are not revealed because they are not discussed. For example, individuals in a political party which forms public opinion may have different understandings of the concepts of “peace” and “solution,” but if these concepts are not controlled and filled with specific meanings, the public will not know what to believe or why.

It could be said that public opinion is formed only through access to certain information. The basic role of the media is informing the public, in other words, shaping public opinion; however, the media try to create political culture and thus become the tools of political parties. When political leaders and parties are aware of the role of the media in public opinion formation, they start to use the media to make their own views public opinion. Thus, print, visual and aural media become transmitters of the voices of the political parties rather than impartial transmitters of the truth.

### 2.3.2 Agenda-Setting Theory

When the first agenda-setting research was conducted, the researchers were trying to answer this research question: How does “[n]ews coverage influence our personal perceptions of what are the most important issues of the day?” (McCombs and Bell, 1996, p. 105)

As McCombs and Yüksel (2004) argue: “Agenda-setting theory basically explains how and why the public learn how much importance to attach to a topic from the emphasis placed on it in news coverage. In the words of the theory, the mass media of communication set the agenda for public attention and lay the groundwork for public opinion” (pp. 328-329). In short, this is “the idea that media don’t tell people what to think, but what to think about” (Baran and Davis, 2003, p. 311). As this is an effect of the media or journalists on people, the question is: who sets the agenda of the media? Shoemaker and Reese (1996) cite five major categories: “(1) Influence from individual media workers, (2) influences of media routines, (3) organizational influences on content, (4) influences on content from outside media organizations, and (5) ideology” (cited in McCombs and Yüksel, 2004, p. 383).

For instance, politics sets the agenda of the media in the Cypriot press. Bailie and Azgin’s (2008) bi-communal research project found that: “...news stories in the Cypriot media generally “follow” political agendas rather than develop independently. They do this mainly through an over-reliance on highly selected quotations that come directly from elite and socially privileged sources. Furthermore, newspapers suggest their own agendas through the ‘selection’ of quotations and their choices in how to present official sources” (p. 84). According to McCombs (2005) “…they [key government officials and institutions] can have considerable influence on what is covered and how it is covered” (pp. 164-165), although McCombs believes that editorials affected by these sources are limited.

Harcup notes that “The term agenda setting was coined by Maxwell McCombs and Donald Shaw in their study of media coverage and voter attitudes in 1968 US presidential election campaign” (Harcup, 2004, p. 63). These researchers found that the media have a powerful effect on voters’s opinions; and journalists can use this powerful effect for influencing public opinion to build peace and prevent conflict. McQuail (1994) explains the agenda-setting hypothesis as follows: “Mass media news and information reflect the content and order of priority of issues. This representation of issues in the mass media exerts an independent effect on issue content and on relative salience in public opinion” (p. 357). Agenda-setting theory suggests that news coverage influences the perceptions of people.

Everett M. Rogers (2004) argues that “framing,” the second step of agenda-setting, is an important concept for understanding the agenda-setting process in the media: “Framing began to be studied as an important influence in the agenda setting process a decade or so after the Chapel Hill Study, in a series of ingenious experiments by Shanto Iyengar (1991), a political scientist and communication scholar” (p. 11).

### 2.3.3 Framing Theory (News Framing)

Maxwell McCombs (2004) summarizes the case for agenda setting and framing connections as follows: “Applied to the media agenda, a frame is ‘the central organizing idea for news content that supplies a context and suggests what the issue is through the use of selection, emphasis, exclusion and elaboration” (p. 87).

Gitlin (1980) first introduced the concept of framing. McCombs and Bell’s (1996) undestanding of framing is based on the fact that “news coverage of any social movement can use a variety of framing strategies. The news can describe the scope of the social problem, critique alternative proposals for coping with the problem, or detail the tactical moves of activists and officials” (p. 106).

News media framing is very important, especially in conflict situations, because the media is “telling us what to think about a story before we have had a chance to think about it for ourselves” (Parenti, 1993, p. 201). Framing, for Michael Parenti (1993), is “…achieved in the way the news is packaged, the amount of exposure, the placement (front page or back, lead story or last), the tone of presentation (sympathetic or slighting), the accompanying headlines and visual effects, and the labeling and vocabulary” (p. 201).

Media frames are defined by Gitlin (1980) as follows:

Media frames are persistent patterns of cognition, interpretation, and presentation, of selection, emphasis, and exclusion, by which symbol-handlers routinely organize discourse, whether verbal or visual. Frames enable journalists to process large amounts of information, to assign it to cognitive categories, and to package it for efficient relay to their audiences (cited in Wolfsfeld, 1997, p. 33).

In the 1980s framing effect studies began to emerge as an important area of study in communication research. Framing research is important in many ways, and it has developed new areas of expansion for the field of communication. The new expansions are related to (i) how the media frame certain issues, and (ii) how these media frames affect human perception.

The concept of frame analysis was first used by Goffman (1974); later, in 1978, Tuchman applied Goffman’s frame analysis to news reporting, arguing that news reporting frames organize everyday reality. Fifteen years later, Entman developed Goffman’s frame analysis, putting it in a conceptual frame and explaining how frames work in the media.

At this point, it is necessary to refer to Goffman’s (1986) definition of frame analysis: “a frame is best understood as the way information is presented and organized in the media and interpreted by the individual.” Goffman’s definition mentions organized information; Gitlin (1980) has a similar definition, and comments: “the advantage of the frames is giving the static presentation of information the additional dimension of persistent patterns of ‘cognition, interaction and presentation’” (cited in Sieff, 2003).

Entman (1993), in his article entitled *“Framing: Toward Clarification of a Fractured Paradigm,”* defines framing and emphasizes the power of communicating text:

Whatever its specific use, the concept of framing consistently offers a way to describe the power of a communication text. Analysis of frames illuminates the precise way in which influence over a human consciousness is exerted by the transfer (or communication) of information from one location-such as a speech, utterance, news report, or novel-to that consciousness (Entman, 1993, pp. 51-52).

As Entman’s (1993) definition of framing makes clear, the media, when delivering events to the public, have an effect on people’s consciousness. Other researchers define framing in various ways. For example, Gamson et al. (1992) suggest that “[f]rames economize our information-processing burden by highlighting certain informational elements, and hiding others” (cited in Sieff, 2003, p. 263); in other words, the media organize elements of information in order to provide cognition to the target audience.

Minsky (1975) defined the organization of framing in a simple way, seeing the “frame as a template or data structure that organizes various pieces of information. Thus, frames are discursive or mental structures that are closely related to the ideas of scripts and schemata as well as other standard constructs from the literature on social cognition” (Simon & Xenos, 2000, p. 366). A few years later, Gamson and Modigliani (1987) constructed a similar definition: “Frames are the “central organizing idea or storyline that provides meaning” (p. 143) or “a central organizing idea for making sense of relevant events and suggesting what is at issue” (p. 57) (cited in Simon & Xenos, 2000, p. 367). The emphasis here is on how ideas are organized by media workers in order to affect people’s consciousness on certain issues.

It can be said that the media organize ideas, and during this organization process, define and frame issues in a certain way. For instance Nelson, Clawson, and Oxley (1997) define framing as, “the process by which a source defines the essential problem underlying a particular social or political issue and outlines a set of considerations purportedly relevant to that issue” (p. 222) (cited in Simon & Xenos, 2000, p. 367).

A similar definition comes from Snow and Benford (1992), who define framing as “an interpretive schemata that signifies and condenses the 'world out there' by selectively punctuating and encoding objects, situations, events, experiences, and sequences of action in one's present or past environment” (cited in Moshe, 2004, p. 500). If one looks at how psychologists examine framing effects, one sees that, “they generally refer to the relationship between context and information since it determines meaning” (cited in Simon & Xenos, 2000, p. 366).

Iyengar’s (1991) definition is also a valuable one. He stated that, “At the most general level, the concept of framing refers to subtle alterations in the statement or presentation of judgment and choice problems, and the term ‘framing effects’ refers to changes in decision outcomes resulting from these alterations” (p. 11).

Before discussing the effects of framing, it is necessary to focus on how the media frames issues; and there is a lot of discussion in the literature on this subject. The most knowledgeable definition comes from Robert Entman (1993). In his understanding,

Framing essentially involves *selection* and *salience*[[12]](#footnote-13). To frame is to *select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation* for the items described. Typically frames diagnose, evaluate, and prescribe, a point explored most thoroughly by Gamson (1992) (Entman, 1993, p. 52).

Entman (1993) gives a detailed description of how framing works: “Frames, then, *define problems*-determine what a causal agent is doing with what costs and benefits, usually measured in terms of common cultural values; *diagnose causes* - identify the forces creating the problem; *make moral judgments* - evaluate causal agents and their effects; and *suggest remedies* - offer and justify treatments for the problems and predict their likely effects” (p. 52). According to Entman (1993), there is a selection and highlighting process. By using these selected and highlighted essentials, a certain frame is created in order to define, evaluate and draw conclusions from the elements.

Another important definition about how framing works comes from Shanto Iyengar (1991). In his book entitled *“Is Anyone Rresponsible?”* Iyengar divides framing into two categories: “episodic” and “thematic”. According to Iyengar, “the episodic news frame takes the form of a case study or event-oriented report and depicts public issues in terms of concrete instances. The thematic frame, by contrast, places public issues in some more general or abstract context and takes the form of a ‘takeout’, or ‘backgrounder’, report directly at general outcomes or conditions” (p. 14).

It could be said that framing exists everywhere in our lives, and that our perception of life depends on how we frame issues, consciously and unconsciously. The same is true of media workers; and Iyengar (1991), Entman (1993) and other researchers’ framing definitions are thus important for understanding how the media frame issues.

Valkenburg, Semetko, and de Vreese (1999) categorize four common news frames which the media use in order to affect people’s interest in news articles. These are:

Conflict, human interest, responsibility and economic consequences. The conflict frame presents a ‘conflict between individuals, groups, or institutions’. The human interest frame presents ‘an individual’s story or an emotional angle to the presentation of an event, issue, or problem’. The responsibility frame presents an individual’s or group’s ‘responsibility for causing or solving a problem’. Finally, the economic consequences frame presents ‘the economic consequences [a news item] will have on an individual, group, institution, region, or country (p. 551-552) (cited in Stewart, 2005, p. 149).

Pan and Kosicki (1993), in their article entitled *“Framing Analysis: An Approach to News Discourse,”* made a major contribution to the framing literature, classifying framing in four categories: (i) syntactical structure, (ii) script structure, (iii) thematic structure and (iv) rhetorical structure. They defined syntactical structures as follows: “At the most mundane level, syntactical structures refer to the stable patterns of the arrangement of words or phrases into sentences… For example, a headline is the most salient cue to activate certain semantically related concepts in readers' minds; it is thus the most powerful framing device of the syntactical structure. A lead is the next most important device to use. A good lead will give a story a newsworthy angle, suggesting a particular perspective to view the event reported” (p. 59-60).

Pan and Kosicki’s (1993) definition indicates that the headline is the most important element of the news, since readers can glance at a newspaper very quickly. This is why media pay attention to (in Pan and Kosicki’s terms), the “syntactical structure” of the news.

The second element in Pan and Kosicki’s (1993) definition is the script structure: “A script refers to an established and stable sequence of activities and components of an event that have been internalized as a structured mental representation of the event” (Pan and Kosicki, 1993, p. 60). The press tries to write news in the form of a script structure, using drama, emotions, action and other elements in order to increase (in Entman’s [1991] terms) the “salience” of the news.

The third element identified by Pan and Kosicki (1993) is thematic structure: “Even the action-oriented stories very often contain certain hypothesis testing elements: A theme is presented or implied, and evidence in the forms of journalists' observations of actions or quotations of a source is presented to support the hypothesis” (p. 60). The media thus use themes in order to increase human interest in news articles, and to support theese themes they use sources, especially official ones.

Pan and Kosicki’s (1993) fourth category of framing news is rhetorical structure: “The rhetorical structures of news discourse describe the stylistic choices made by journalists in relation to their intended targeted effects. Gamson's five framing devices (Gamson & Modigliani, 1989)—metaphors, exemplars, catchphrases, depictions, and visual images—belong to this category” (cited in Pan and Kosicki, 1993, p. 61). This seems to describe an art of rhetoric: if a journalist has the ability to use rhetorical devices, he or she may have a greater effect on people. As Gamson and Modigliani (1989) noted, the use of metaphors, exemplars, catchphrases, depictions, and visual images is very important for increasing the value of news.

### 2.3.3.1 Effects of Framing

This section will focus on the power of frames; “[r]esearch has shown that media framing can have an effect on the way audience members end up interpreting an issue” (Severin and Tankard, 2001, p. 279). The importance of the frame is that it “determines whether most people notice and how they understand and remember a problem, as well as how they evaluate and choose to act upon it. The notion of framing thus implies that the frame has a common effect on large portions of the receiving audiences, though it is not likely to have a universal effect on all” (Entman, 1993, p. 54).

As Entman (1993) notes, “…frames simultaneously direct attention away from other aspects. Most frames are defined by what they omit as well as include, and the omissions of potential problem definitions, explanations, evaluations, and recommendations may be as critical as the inclusions in guiding the audience” (p. 54). Research conducted about how framing affects human perception, for example Sniderman, Brody, and Tetlock (1991), provides a clear instance of the power of presence and absence in framing:

The effect of framing is to prime values differentially, establishing the salience of the one or the other. [Thus]…a majority of the public supports the rights of persons with AIDS when the issue is framed [in a survey question] to accentuate civil liberties considerations – and supports…mandatory testing when the issue is framed to accentuate public health considerations (p. 52) (cited in Entman, 1993, p. 54).

Another important research result comes from Pan and Kosicki’s (1993) study. In their view, “news reports use designators such as ‘sources’ or ‘the administration’ to give indications of the authoritativeness of an action or a statement. By using ‘Iraqi dictator’, a news report places Saddam Hussein in the same category with Hitler, Noriega, Stalin, and other, generally hated men in American culture. By designating the 1989 uprising in China as a ‘prodemocracy movement’, news reports interpreted the meaning of the uprising and categorized it in the same general category that the American Revolution might belong” (p. 62). Pan and Kosicki’s (1993) example of framing shows how important culture is for understanding the background of the news. If an audience is not associated with the culture, news may not affect him/her as much as it affects those who are within that culture. For instance, if one does not know Cypriot culture, he or she may not experience the same emotions created by the news media as Cypriots.

Severin and Tankard (2001), in their book *“Communication Theories”,* define the power of framing as follows: “The framing of news stories may also have more subtle – and powerful – influences on audiences than bias in news stories. It does not mean that audiences are affected by media in the same way.” From a framing perspective, “news media texts are not fixed entities to be received uniformly by audience members; rather, framing involves interactions among texts, text producers, and audience members operating in the context of various social influences” (van Dijk, 1988; Pan & Kosicki, 1993) (cited in Woo, 1996, p. 67).

Although there are debates on the effects of media, the media do have the effect of creating public opinion among people who do not have an opinion on issues/events:

Previous studies suggest that there are circumstances in which news framing may be particularly influential on audience framing: when news media are the main source of information, when there is little direct experience or personal history that provides alternative information, and when independent cognitive frames of the audience are absent or weakly developed (Graber, 1988; lyengar, 1991; Entman, 1993) (cited in Woo, 1996, p. 68).

As discussed earlier, culture plays a significant role in human perception. Other important elements are life experiences, education level and knowledge. All these elements either increase or decrease the effects of media. “As studied by researchers, [the journalist] does not guarantee their influence on the thoughts of audience” (Entman, 1989; Graber, 1988) (cited in Entman, 1993, p. 53). Altough people are independent for perceiving and giving meaning to the messages which comes from outside, generally they tend to appropriate the dominant meaning which surrounds them. According to Entman (1993), “dominant meaning consists of the problem, cause, evaluative, and treatment interpretations with the highest probability of being noticed, processed, and accepted by most people” (p. 56). The dominant meaning, which is accepted by a large part of society, is also a factor contributing to the effect of the message.

### 2.3.3.2 Differences of Framing and Agenda-Setting

This section discusses how framing and agenda-setting theories differ from each other. Some researchers are critical of framing theory and claim it is similar to agenda-setting theory; this discussion will focus on what makes framing distinct from agenda-setting and other theories. Both concepts complement each other, but there are some distinctions. Takeshita (2005) explains the distinction between agenda-setting and framing as follows:

Agenda-setting affects telling people not what to think but what to think *about*, the basic agenda-setting process is assumed to remain in the cognitive dimension. In contrast, framing affects, as Entman (1993) describes, can cover not only the cognitive dimension (such as ‘problem definition’ and ‘causal interpretation’) but also the affective one (‘moral evaluation’), and can even reach into the behavioral dimension (‘treatment recommendation’) (p. 281).

Some researchers refer to framing as the second phase of agenda-setting; however, the basic question for both concepts is similar: “what do people think about”. As a supplement to this question, framing poses a further question, which is: “how do people think about it?” In other words, agenda-setting wants to see if the media have the effect of creating their own agenda in people’s minds, whereas framing takes this process one step further and seeks to find out how the media affect people’s perceptions on certain issues.

In the 1990s, researchers developed a new concept called “second level of agenda-setting” or “attribute agenda-setting”: “Like framing, attribute agenda-setting also puts forward that, when covering a certain issue, the news media select some of its attributes (e.g. subissues or aspects) to emphasize and ignore others, which will influence how audiences perceive the issue” (Takeshita, 2005, p. 279).

Takeshita (2005) describes how attribute agenda-setting and framing resemble each other in the following way:

As a result, agenda-setting research and framing research are exploring almost the same problem: how the mass media define an individual issue for us. This is why some framing researchers argue that agenda-setting researchers are unduly expanding the realm of agenda setting and colonizing other theories (Kosicki, 1993; Pan & Kosicki, 1997) (cited in Takeshita, 2005, pp. 279-280).

The most famous agenda-setting expert Maxwell Mccombs (2004), in his book entitled *“Setting the Agenda, the Mass Media and Public Opinion,”* clarifies how these two concepts are distinct from each other:

Positioning the concept of framing in the context of agenda-setting theory underscores its subsequent consequences as well as this power to organize and structure thought. Agenda-setting theory emphasizes the dynamics between communicators and their audiences. This emphasis on the consequences of media content for cognitions, opinions and behavior among the public also suggests a criterion for deciding which specific objects and attitudes to study. (p. 89)

Framing basically focuses on the micro level of effects of the message, but agenda-setting deals with the macro level of the media message. Here, the “micro level” means that framing concentrates on the detail of the media messages and effects of these messages, such as how people think about media messages. The “macro level,” on the other hand, concentrates on the general effects of the media message, such as what people think about, rather than how people think. As Coleman and Thorson (2002) comment, “Agenda setting concerns a more macro level of influence than framing theory; whereas agenda setting deals with the subjects or topics of media messages, framing can be thought of as the focus or angle within those subjects” (pp. 405-406).

### 2.3.3.3 Framing and Peace Journalism

Several studies have emphasized that the media provide negative and conflicting coverage of their news. For instance, Anderson (1988) suggested that “the American media create a distinction between ‘we’ and ‘them’ in its coverage of Latin America; ‘they’ are uncivilized, violent and evil, while ‘we’ represent culture, order and goodness” (cited in Neiger and Zandberg, 2004, p. 431).

The concept of peace journalism expressly states that if the media covers events in a more positive frame, that is, a common-ground frame and a solution-seeking frame, they will reduce conflict between the parties. Although there are some objections to peace journalism from conventional journalists, communication academics and media are beginning to accept peace journalism news values. That is why framing is a crucial concept for peace journalism. Most of the advice of peace journalism is on news framing; as Maslog and Lee (2005) state, “theoretically, peace journalism is supported by framing theory” (p. 313).

During the conflict process, media coverage of conflict is an important aspect. For instance, the most prominent peace researcher and the founder of peace journalism, Johan Galtung, suggests (1998) a peace journalism frame rather than a war journalism frame for media workers during times of conflict. Galtung’s concept of peace journalism was expanded by McGoldrick and Lynch (2000), who made 17 proposals for media workers covering conflict. These proposals suggest the inclusion of solution-oriented framing, reporting long-term effects of conflict, giving voice to the voiceless, reporting all sides, using ordinary people as news sources and using fastidious language. The opposite approach would be conflict-oriented framing; that is, reporting the short-term effects of conflict, giving voice to elites, reporting only one side and using inattentive language. Peace journalism is theoretically supported by framing.

The choice of words and their organization into news is important, especially in reporting on the conflict process. The media have a great responsibility in choosing the words and setting the agenda for discussion. Gregory Kent (2003) gives an example from the Bosnia war on media framing:

‘Media framing’, in essence, the underlying language, key terms, labels and phrases used to describe events, played a critical role in establishing how the actual problem of Bosnia came to be defined, particularly through selection of language and decisions about balancing and what kinds of evidence would be reported. The resultant framing, by obfuscating important issues about responsibility for the war and the manner in which it was conducted, limited potential policy options to ineffectual and inappropriate options (p. 3).

As Entman (1993) stated, “framing in this light plays a major role in the exertion of political power, and the frame in a news text is really the imprint of power – it registers the identity of actors or interests that completed to dominate the text” (p. 55). George W. Bush’s statements after September 11, 2001 are good examples as to how to use the “good and evil” frame for political power.

Another common frame in media is the “otherness” frame. According to First (2001), “examining the representation of Arab citizens as the ‘Other’ in the last decades reveals that they suffer from a ‘double otherness’: “Not only is the Arab citizen a minority in Israeli society, but his nationality and loyalty to the country are questioned” (94) (cited in Neiger and Zandberg, 2004, p. 433). Because of the “otherness frame” and other conflict frames in media, there is an urgent need to develop peace journalism and peace journalism news values.

Another similar example comes from Aburaiya, Avraham, and Wolfsfeld’s (1998) study, which found that “Arab citizens were given little coverage in Israel’s Hebrew-language media, and that their protest was covered within the frame of ‘security matters and subversive activity’” (cited in Neiger and Zandberg, 2004, p. 433). Most of the people in Israel use this frame in order to perceive Arab citizens. Peace journalists do not accept this one-sided picture and putting all the blame on Palestinians; they try to show all sides of the picture, to show how conflict unwillingly causes problems.

The elites of society have a significant effect on journalists and their framing; and a lot of research has been conducted to support this thesis. Entman (1993) gives various examples of how elites affect journalist’s frames on certain issues:

…in the pre-war debate over U.S. policy toward Iraq, there was a tacit consensus among U.S. elites not to argue for such options as negotiation between Iraq and Kuwait. The news frame included only two remedies, war now or sanctions now with war (likely) later, while problem definitions, causal analyses, and moral evaluations were homogeneous. Between the selected remedies, however, framing was contested by elites, and news coverage offered different sets of facts and evaluations (p. 55).

Sometimes we are aware of how we frame an issue, but sometimes we are not: the problem is how we frame and perceive situations. The same arguments may be true for media workers, who also frame issues in certain ways. Ownership structure, newspaper policy, education level, knowledge, culture and beliefs are all important elements of media framing. The number of these elements may be increased, but the important point is to understand how issues are framed and how people think about those issues.

### 2.3.4 Gatekeeping Theory

The term “Gatekeeping” was first used by Kurt Lewin in 1947. Kurt Lewin was a social psychologist and his assistant David Manning White expanded his theory into the communication field in 1950. White (1950) researched the news selection process of wire editors at a Midwestern newspaper and “[w]hen White (1950) asked that editor to write on copy why he selected or rejected the stories, White got answers that mirrored traditional news principles: significant, controversial, unusual, and interesting to the audience” (Harmon, 1998, p. 75). For White, the wire editors were making final decisions, and therefore they were the most important people at the newspaper.

In White’s gatekeeping model, the gatekeeper or “Mr. Gate” (White’s term) inside plays an important role. Mr. Gate or the editor selects the sources of news items, and after this selection, he decides which news is suitable for their audience. According to White, “quality of writing and “way of writing” are also factors in news selection (Zhou, 2001, p. 4). Being on the agenda, importance, interest, and timelessness are important factors during the selection process, but the style of writing of the reporter is also a factor, and other important factors are added during the editors’ selection process. Generally editors select conflict-oriented rather than peace-oriented news, because of the values of Western journalism. Bad news creates a more sensational impact and curiosity in society, increasing the circulation/ratings of newspapers/television.

Anyone, who looks at journalism values, can see easily that conflict is good news. Unfortunately, every country has these kinds of journalism values such as conflict, sensation and negative news. Journalists’ experience, attitudes, expectations, news judgment and personal values are factors in the news selection process; therefore Cyprus media journalism values should be investigated.

“Gatekeepers might be reporters, copy tasters, sub-editors, editors and, to a lesser extent, media owners and sometime might be page designers” (Underwood, 2003). Gans (1979) explains: “The gatekeeper has the authority to choose what information is conveyed to the audience and how that information will be framed” (cited in Stringer, 1999, p. 16).

According to White, “Mr. Gates rejected about 90% of the items he got through the wires and that the items he chose to publish dealt mainly with human interest, national politics and international politics” (Meyer, no date, pp. 9-10). The most important reasons for rejecting stories were space problems and the arrived time of the story. Other reasons were lack of interest, and dull or lengthy writing.

Shoemaker (1996) states, “White found that the section decisions were ‘highly subjective’” and she continues: “About a third of the articles coming across the wires were rejected on Mr. Gates’ personal evaluation of the merits of the stories’ content, particularly whether he believed them to be true. Other stories were rejected because of a lack of space or because similar stories had already run” (cited in Salwen and Stacks, 1996, p. 82).

### 2.3.5 Spiral of Silence Theory

The Spiral of Silence Theory was developed by German sociologist Elizabeth Noelle-Neumann in 1974. The theory tries to study the relationship between public opinion and media. As Noelle-Neumann (1974) defines it, the spiral of silence theory “predicts that people who perceive their opinions to be popular or gaining public support will be more likely to express their views than those who believe that their opinions are not shared by most people or are losing ground.”

The Spiral of Silence Theory claims that when individuals express their opinions they are accepting the messages which are provided to them by mass communication tools as effective opinions. Abdullah Özkan (2006) explains why individuals accept such news or information as effective: “Even if they have views against those that have been ‘developed’ by the media, they are reluctant to reveal these views because they are afraid of being marginalized; in fact most of the time they prefer not to voice their opinions at all. This is due to the fact that society cannot tolerate and excludes views outside those which are generally accepted because of the environment formed by the media” (p. 15).

Since the media has a tendency to legitimize dominant/elitist discourse[[13]](#footnote-14) in society, the Spiral of Silence Theory is important as it suggests to the audience not to be afraid to talk even if their thoughts are not accepted by the majority.

### 2.3.6 How these theories relate to Peace Journalism: Brief Discussion

Peace journalism has developed the position that journalists, editors or mass media have the power to affect public opinion. It is obvious that media is efficient in agenda-setting, news framing, gatekeeping and silencing some radical voices in the society. All the above-mentioned theories (Agenda-setting, Framing, Gatekeeping and Spiral of Silence) have a common view on forming public opinion and having the power of affecting the people. The position of peace journalism is similar to these four theories: it adopts the opinion of the possibility of using this “power” of the media for positive purposes, when wanted.

If the media have the power to set the agenda, set the frame, provide dominant discourse and support the status quo, they could use this power in a positive way, especially in conflict situations. This is why peace journalism gives more responsibility to the journalists and editors in conflict zones for helping the peace process.

*Peace Journalism-Agenda-Setting:* Instead of politicians manipulating societies by using media channels or setting their own agendas for their own benefit, the media need to set the agenda individually and to take a position in favor of solutions. The media, but not with the initial purpose of making money, must provide more educational information to citizens. If the media offer something by dictating according to this power it has, acceptance of dictated information by the people will become more difficult and require more time.

*Peace Journalism-Framing:* Journalists need to look at situations with a multiple perspective. If journalists are framing issues using a peace journalism perspective (which is people, solution, peace, truth orientated) they will contribute to a solution and peace in a conflict situation. “The choices that journalists make – what stories to report, what sources to use, and how to structure narratives – have a dramatic impact on reader attitudes and beliefs” (Carter, Thomas, and Ross, 2008, p. 8).

*Peace Journalism-Gatekeeping:* As Entman (1993) argues, “Framing essentially involves selection and salience”. That means gatekeepers (editors) make this selection and create this salience. Editors can select either a negative or positive side, the “Other” and make it more salient in the news. Editors also have the opportunity to use more conflict- and anti-solution frames instead of peace and solution frames; gatekeepers therefore have an important role to play in peace journalism.

*Peace Journalism-Spiral of Silence:* One can notice that elite-oriented news sources are dominating the mass media and alternative discourses are always extinguished by gatekeepers. Consequently, these alternative discourses keep their silence in society. However peace journalists support giving voice to the voiceless in their news coverage.

## 2.4 Conflict Oriented Reporting vs. Peace Oriented Reporting

In this section, conventional journalism and peace journalism are discussed in detail, together with the values of news and the role of the media in conflict situations.

### 2.4.1 Conventional News Reporting: “If It Bleeds, It Leads”,

### Defining News

The Longman dictionary of English defines the news as “information about something

that has happened recently. Reports of recent events in the newspapers or on the radio or television.” Many dictionaries define the meaning of news as “information about an experienced event” or “reports about the events diffused by mass media”, but these definitions have some gaps. News is a product which reconstructed with certain ideologies, configured and defined the gathering of the information by journalists. In other words, news is a “product” in which some topics are put forward and others suppressed within the industrialized media sector. In this way, all these products are conveyed to the target masses under the control of the media and by reconstituting them every day. The factors affecting the formation of these products (news) are also missing in the defining of news. Factors affecting the news are: the ideology of the newspaper, the structure of ownership and economical and political benefits of the boss, the education of the journalist, value judgements of the news, etc. If these factors which affect the news can be seen clearly by the target masses, the impartiality, reliability and persuasiveness of the news will be decreased; this is why news is defined in many sources as an impartial report which only reflects events.

According to Alankus in her book *Gazetecilik ve Habercilik* (2003) “... news is something which pretends to be impartial, objective and by this way acts as if it tells the truth, but in fact it tells us a fictional story” (p. 30). Alankus’s news definition (2003) stresses how media cannot be objective and how this affects news production. It is hard to believe that news is objective because the journalist tries to describe the event for the audience, and during this description the journalist is affected by ideology, experience, and education level and news values. The journalist constructs his/her reality in the news in order to describe the news for the audience; this is why, if two journalists cover the same event, both journalists’ news articles would be different. As Jamieson and Campbell (1982) explain, “[n]ews is gathered, written, edited, produced, and disseminated by human beings who are part of organizations and who have beliefs and values” (p. 16). It is hard to escape these boundaries which have been with us since we were born; as Gans (1979) mentions, “Journalists try hard to be objective, but neither they nor anyone else can in the end proceed without values” (p. 39).

According to the *Liberal Pluralist Approach*, the journalist is accepted as objective and this reflects his or her understanding of news. The liberal approach believes that journalism is the mirror of reality. In other words, there is an event, and the journalist simply reports the fact as it is. *Critical Approaches*, however, look with doubt at the “journalist is the mirror that reflects reality” understanding. As Dursun (2003) stresses, “Critical approaches, first of all, due to the fact that media operates in a capitalist society and hence reflects the benefits of certain classes, emphasize that ‘objective and impartial reporting cannot exist’” (p. 64). It can be said that, in addition to the capitalist world order, news definitions and understandings of media are affected by monopolization, globalization in the media and ownership structure.

Professor of Communication, Michael Schudson (2003) also does not accept news as a mirror of reality. He argues, in his book entitled *“Sociology of News,”* that “[i]t (the news) is a representation of the world, and all representations are selective. This means that some humans must do the selecting; certain people make decisions about what to present as news and how to present it” (p. 33). Schudson (2003) emphasizes the gatekeeping and news gathering processes of news production. His basic reason for not seeing news as a mirror of reality is because of the selection process; he believes that this process could not be impartial or objective. Another similar definition which underlines decision and selection process of news comes from Jamieson and Campbell (1982): “…news is what reporters, editors, and producers decide is news.”

It is important to mention Wilbur Schramm’s (1949) definition, “News exists in the minds of men. It is not an event; it is something perceived after the event” (p. 259) (cited in Bovee, 1992, p. 27); Schramm (1949) also stresses how news is constructed in the minds of human beings.

Dursun (2004) pointed out in her book titled, *“Relation Between News, Truth and Power”,* that“Throughout the day, some of the events taking place in the world and in our country, although with incomplete information or with a ‘partial’ view, are presented to us in some way or another” (p. 39). Dursun defines news as the presentation of bias and misinformation, which is very common in the media.

Park (1940) has a different definition: “News, as a form of knowledge, is not primarily concerned either with the past or with the future but rather with the present – what has been described by psychologists as ‘the specious present’” (p. 12). Park (1940) stresses the “specious” feature of news which is in effect the construction of reality, a form of knowledge, because as one knows from Francis Bacon, "knowledge is power." For this reason, state authorities and many people try to control the information flow of the media. John Fiske (1987) uses Bacon’s assumption in news practice: “news is knowledge, and since knowledge is power, then news is power” (cited in Mellor, 2005, p. 81).

Some scholars define news as a product and point of view. Hough (1995) in his book entitled *“News Writing”,* suggests that “[n]ews is both a product and a point of view. As a product, news is gathered, processed, packaged and sold by newspapers, news services, news magazines, and other periodicals as well as by radio, television and cable stations and networks” (p. 1). Hough (1995) goes on to define news as a point of view: “News is also what a reporter or an editor at any particular moment considers interesting or exiting or important – something that the reporter or editor thinks will interest or be useful to readers” (p. 1). Hough’s (1995) news definition divides news into two areas: first, he sees it as a product which is based on a capitalist way of looking. It is dangerous to look at the news as a product, because if it is a product it will be legitimate to make it more negative, interesting and sensational in order to sell it. Hough’s (1995) second area concerns how editors or reporters decide what news is for the audience.

Ciler Dursun (2003) in her article titled *“Thinking About News and Reporting/Journalism”*, defines news as “the most recent and interesting information about the people, things or events taking place somewhere in the real world” (p. 63).

In the *“Temel Gazetecilik”* *[Basic Journalism]* book Oya Tokgoz (2003) defines the news with these words: “Among the first definitions made of news, there have been ones such as “everything that happens is news”, “what we did not know yesterday is news”, “what people talk about is news”, “news is what readers want to know about” (p. 187). The first definition of news emphasizes the information need of humans. As Aziz (1996) mentions in her book entitled *Elektronik Yayıncılıkta Temel Bilgiler* [Basic Information on Electronic Broadcasting], “the necessity of giving and getting news began with human history”. Media institutions serve a great deal of news/information in order to fulfill the human need for that product.

Tokgoz’s (2003) definition is that “News is/are fictional texts. For this reason, news have an expression as it is in all fictional texts. News add meaning to the events and realities they outline and tell. Events/realities are fictionalized, animated and conveyed to the people with a style within the expression of the news on the one hand. On the other hand, the dominant expressions within the structure of the news become neutralized, the dominant ideology is reestablished. The top expression of all the news brought to us everyday is the expression of the bourgeois ideology” (p. 185). Tokgoz’s definition stresses how news is constructed and how news discourse is constructed by journalists; Tokgoz underlines the most common problem in the news media, which is that the media present the elite/ bourgeois ideology, in other words, media mostly give voice to elite persons.

Van Dijk makes similar comments on how news becomes an elite discourse: he “ considers news not as a genre but as a discourse, and sees this discourse as the product of dominant discourses present in society. Stuart Hall and others point to the fact that dominant discourses are re-written within the news text” (cited in Tokgoz, 2003, p. 183).

### 2.4.1.1 Sources for Conventional Reporting

According to Tokgoz (2003), “News are at the same time are formed by the presentation

of the views of distinguished people in power. Among the chosen people whom we come across everyday on the news are ministers, party leaders, leading politicians, top level bureaucrats, businessmen, top level officials of police or justice, and the speakers of various pressure groups. We can also come across very extraordinary people appearing in news as chosen ones”. (p. 186). While discussing the relationship between news and the sources, Tokgoz (2003) shows that while news gathering, journalists fulfil their news source demand from elite sources which are government, state authorities, business, and famous or wealthy people. There is a mutual unwritten agreement between the two sides. Media need sources, and these sources also need media in order to transfer/diffuse their messages to audience. Both sides can satisfy their own needs in this flow. This flow is good for elite sources but it is bad for the journalism profession. Journalists like to use elite sources because they can be reached easily and elite sources give a speech every day. However there are three problems here: (i) journalists become a voice of the elite sources, rather than give voice to public (ii) journalists become passive as a transfer medium only, rather than active (iii) journalists edge away from criticizing their actions, because they have strong relations with their sources.




Figure : Media need sources, and these sources also need media in order to transfer/diffuse their messages to the audience.

A model was developed in this study for setting forth the relation between media and the sources of news. There is an interdependent relation especially between the media and the elite news sources. This dependency is illustrated in Figure 1 and works in Cyprus as explained below: The initial news topic/material of the media in Cyprus is the Conflict of Cyprus. The greatest number of statements in daily news flow are given by elite sources and primary definers such as the president, the prime minister, political authorities, state and government officials, etc. These statements save the media of Cyprus which is in expectation of news. Cyprus media helps the elite sources which want to diffuse their messages to the people. Thus the process continues within a cycle. NGOs and individuals of the society in Cyprus are seen as important secondary sources of news. Furthermore, messages diffused by the elite sources are conveyed to the society and the NGOs by the channels of the media. It is also possible that the society and the NGOs affect the elites and the media, and this is why they are located in the middle of the figure.

“The appearance in an organized way of the definitions of the states of source persons and establishments, whose views are often included in the news, leads to the re-establishment of the credibility of their discourses within the news texts, and also forms a base to legitimize the state by concealing the relation between capitalist enterprise and the state” (İnal, 1995, p. 57).

Stuart Hall et al. (1978) define this relation with media and elite orientated source as: ‘primary and secondary’ definers. As Negrine states “...one can make use of Hall et al.’s distinction between ‘primary and secondary’ definers: an incident is defined as a threat, authoritative persons pronounce on it (the ‘primary definers’[[14]](#footnote-15)) and the media (the ‘secondary definers’) exaggerate and amplify the threat” (p. 148).

In other words, media play a transmitting role (or in Hall’s definition, a secondary definer role) in diffusing the elites or “primary definers” messages to audience. Molotch and Lester (1974) define the news sources as “news providers”. It can be said that media re-construct the dominant ideology in their news stories by giving too much space to “primary definers”. Through this relationship media give the chance to elite sources to legitimize their ideas/thoughts. This is problematic because media frame the issues from the perspective of elite sources and audiences begin discussion based on one set of parameters. When the journalist uses the elitist frames often, this does not open up space for other perspectives in the news stories.

Gans (1979) in his book entitled *“Deciding What’s News,”* looked at who appears in the news in US media. Gans conducted his research on television stories and newsmagazine columns. During his study, known people, those in official position, took up between 70 and 85 percent of domestic news.

### 2.4.1.2 News Values

In order to understand conventional reporting, one should know the news values of this sort of reporting style. Conventional news values help media workers to decide what news is. It is important to stress that the “(news values) the criteria journalists use for selecting the news vary from one culture to another, reflecting various ideological, political, and cultural realities” (Mellor, 2005, p. 75). Some criteria could be different from culture to culture but many study results show that there are basic news values which journalists follow.

The first systematic research on news values was conducted by Galtung and Ruge in 1965. According to Galtung and Ruge there are nine factors, which influence the flow of news, and they analyse these nine factors in the foreign news. The nine factors are: “Time span, intensity or threshold value, clarity/lack of ambiguity, cultural proximity or relevance, consonance, unexpectedness, continuity, composition, and socio cultural values of the receiving society or gatekeepers. All these factors are affecting the gatekeeper’s selection or rejection process of original news” (Zhou, 2001, p. 6).

Each day journalists deal with the news in several important ways. First, they decide which news to cover and report and which to ignore. Next, all these available reports must be assessed. On the typical daily newspaper, over 75% of the potential news of the day is rejected out of hand and never transmitted to the readers. Johan Galtung and Mari Ruge (1981) provide a framework for understanding the way in which “news” is selected.

*1) “Timeliness:* News, by its very nature, is new. This means that events, which have just taken place, have far more value than those which occurred weeks or days ago.

*2) Frequency:* Related to timeliness, frequency refers to the time-span taken by an event. Murders, for example, take very little time to occur or to cover and their meaning is clear, while economic, social or cultural trends take longer to unfold and be made meaningful.

*3) Threshold:* This refers to the size of an event, in relation to the news organization (i.e., local vs. national news). A big story has a high threshold of drama and therefore added drama will keep it going. An example is in war reporting, an already big news story, which will generate news which may not be directly related to the story.

*4) Unambiguity:* This refers to the clarity of an event. The news media seek “closure," stories with a limited range of possible meanings, which already fit a common narrative such as a clear identification of right and wrong, or good and bad, or with a beginning and an end.

*5) Meaningfulness:* This can include cultural proximity, and refers to events that are in keeping with the cultural background of news gatherers and the perceived audience. These are seen as more meaningful than events that relate to other less dominant cultures. Events, which happen in the same region or country, or in other countries of similar cultural background, are covered more frequently than those occurring elsewhere. In foreign news, for example, this leads to a systemic exclusion of much news about developing worlds.

*6) Consonance:* This refers to the predictability of, or preference for, an event. “If the media expect something to happen then it will” (Hartley, 1982, p. 77). Sometimes this results in stories being filed about events where very little actually happened, or in stories focusing on what was expected at the expense of what may actually have emerged as the dominate theme.

*7) Unexpectedness or novelty:* News covers the unexpected and the unusual. In the classic explanation, if a dog bites a man, this is a common experience and therefore does not warrant a news story. However if a man bites a dog this is considered newsworthy since it is not common. Thus news tends not to reflect day-to-day activities but to highlight the unusual or spectacular.

*8) Recurring themes and continuity:* Themes or stories, which have already been covered, will tend to continue to be covered by the media. The media will also use stereotypes as “shortcuts” to social meaning or audience understanding, especially if the stereotypes fit a recurring theme in the story.

*9) Composition:* Related to the news narrative, this refers to the mixture of different kinds of stories. For example, the news organization will alternate between foreign and domestic stories, or political and novelty stories to provide balance and variety to the newscast or coverage.

*10) Personalization:* According to this news value, individuals make news and history, not the institutions or organizations to which they belong or the structures within which they act. Events are described in terms of the effects on individuals. Political conflict is seen as debates between personalities, not policies.

*11) Human Interest:* This is related to personalization and novelty, but refers specifically to “soft” stories about missing dogs being found or other “feel good” episodes in day-to-day life. Often television newscasts will end with a human-interest story in order to soften the impact of the rest of the newscast.

*12) Focus on elite personalities/nations:* Celebrities, politicians, and major economic nations gain far more focus than the non-elites. Herbert Gans (1980) reviewed the American television networks CBS, NBC, and Newsweek and Time magazines and found that the news was dominated by known, prominent people, with officials accounting for three-quarters of all news sources.

*13) Sensationalism:* Crime, death, conflict and drama. Studies have noted an over-emphasis on violence in the news (relative to the amount of violence in real life)—represented mostly in the coverage of violent crime. Death resulting from violence is more likely to be covered than from disease. British studies have noted that crime reporting has no relationship to the relative frequency of crime and the over-reported crimes in both TV and print news were murder, fraud, black mail and drug offences. Other sensational stories such as political sex scandals or deviance (the violation of social norms) also gain more coverage.

*14) Negativity:* Related to sensationalism, unambiguity, frequency and consonance, this news value follows the saying that “bad news is good news." News coverage focuses on conflict, harm and deviance” (cited in Cross and Hackett, 2000).

Newsworthiness is a controversial issue. An event that seems extremely important to one person may be of little interest to another. There are events of which some audiences do not wish to be informed.

Conventional news values is defined by Denis McQuail (1994) in *Mass Communication Theory* as “primary news values in Western media, scale of events, closeness, clarity, short time scale, relevance, consonance, personification, negativity, significance, drama and action” (p. 271). McQuail summarizes the conventional news values; however, more news values could be added.

Based on McQuail’s news values, *truth* could be added. Arsan (2003) stresses that “news should be true” (p. 136), and goes on to say that even if any event is true, it needs some values in order to become news. Journalists need certain news values while they are deciding what news is and what is going to be published.

Pape and Featherstone (2005), contribute some new criteria for conventional news values. They believe that if the event includes such criteria it should be published.

*(i) The power elite:* Stories concerning powerful individuals, organizations, or institutions.

*(ii) Celebrity:* Stories concerning people who are already famous.

*(iii) Entertainment:* Stories concerning sex, show business, human interest, animals, an unfolding drama or offering opportunities for humorous treatment, entertaining photographs or witty headlines.

*(iv) Surprise:* Stories that have an element of surprise or contrast.

*(v) Bad news:* Stories with particularly negative overtones, such as conflict or tragedy.

*(vi) Good news:* Stories with particularly positive overtones, such as rescues or cures.

*(vii) Magnitude:* Stories that are perceived as sufficiently significant, either in terms of the number of people involved or their potential impact.

*(viii) Relevance:* Stories about issues, groups and nations perceived to be relevant to the audience.

*(ix) Follow-ups:* Stories about subjects already in the news.

*(x) Newspaper’s agenda:* Stories that set or fit the news organization’s own agenda (p. 21).

Pape and Featherstone’s (2005) news values basically focus on how power elites cover the events. Other important categories are bad news and surprise. Obviously, these two criteria are linked closely to human nature. People like to hear some bad news and some news which makes them surprised.

As Hough (1995) pointed out,

Despite their protests about the bad news, however, newspaper readers seem to enjoy it. They relish news of conflict and violence. Stories about violent crimes, murders, battles and wars, conflicts between nations and political parties, staged conflicts in sports arenas and even competition between the sexes attract readers to newspapers and hold their attention. (p. 21)

Pape and Featherstone’s (2005) news values contain good news as a category but they believe that this category has to include something interesting or unexpected.

Hartley (1982), in his book titled “*Understanding News”* puts frequency at the top of his list. He explains frequency as “the time-span taken by an event” (p. 76). Mencher’s (1991) news values include impact, timeliness, prominence, proximity, conflict and currency. Pape and Featherstone’s (2005) magnitude news value is similar to *impact*. If news has a large impact it is published. Mencher defines timeliness as, “events that are immediate, recent” (p. 58). It would seem that freshness of news which is the basic idea of news is important here. Prominence means here, “events involving well-known people or institutions” (p. 58). Again this news value is similar to Pape and Featherstone’s (2005) power elite principle. Proximity is another important news value for conventional reporting. Mencher (1991) explains proximity as, “events in the circulation or broadcast area” (58). People are more interested in the closest event; that is why newspapers try to publish more local news.

Conventional news values, as is evident in news reporting today, propagates the, “It is not my job, I just report the facts” philosophy. However, the conventional journalist reports the facts in a negative way, because only this sort of provocative news increases the circulation of newspapers.

According to Tokgoz (2003), “One of the most important changes which brought about the development of journalism in the 19th century is the acceptance of the principle of attracting peoples’ attention. With this principle, journalism gained a new dimension and a direction towards giving importance to people’s feelings when reporting events, ideas and thoughts in news was brought about” (p. 60). Tokgoz (2003) emphasizes the human interest/sensation principle in the media, but it should be stressed that the sensation principle in the news creates mistrust of the media. Some news media use the sensation principle in the news-producing process, in order to reach more people in the society; however, some of the news could be wrong and this creates problem for the media. Martin and Chaudhary (1983) in their book entitled *“Comparative Mass Media Systems”,* made similar comments on the Western news media: “Interest is a major criterion of news value in the Western world” (p. 3).

Tokgoz (2003) made a suggestion to conventional news media that it should cover events of more significance and consequence. She pointed out that, “Establishing criteria for determining the value of news based on the axis of importance/meaningfulness instead of interestedness/interestingness is a big guarantee in preventing the leniency towards sensational news in journalism” (pp. 210-211).

Gans (1979) stresses essential news value which is commonly used by media in every country, and defines this news value as ethnocentrism: “Ethnocentrism comes through most explicitly in foreign news, which judges other countries by the extent to which they live up to or imitate American practices and values, it also underlies domestic news” (p. 42). Gans’s ethnocentrism news value shows how media encounter a pressure from states to follow national ideologies.

### 2.4.1.3 Discussion

Tokgoz (2003) suggests some points for journalism students. She says, “It is mandatory to teach journalism students that change is inevitable. It must be stressed that in order to maintain continuous development, learning is a must.” Tokgoz’s suggestions are suitable for the journalism sector as well; most journalists are still insensitive to the changes and improvements in the journalism profession. For instance, peace journalism is making some improvements for journalism profession and journalists. Unfortunately, some journalists are making negative comments/criticisms on peace journalism even though they have no idea about it.

As an example, Volkan Newspaper Editor Aydın Akkurt published a column on 4 June 2007 titled, *“Barış Gazeteciliği” ve Güney’deki Şehitlerimiz…* *[Peace Journalism and martyries from the South]*, in which he misunderstands peace journalism and has strong objections to it:

“And what is “Peace journalism”?... “Peace journalism” is hiding the atrocities and barbarism done by the Greek Cypriots. It means that if Greek Cypriots in South Cyprus attack Turks, it should not be made into news...It means just watching Turks be examined in the most private areas with gynaecological gloves by Greek Cypriot policeman at Greek Cypriot barricades and not saying anything...If you hide these events and not report them, you become a “peace journalist”... But if you report these, they accuse you of carrying out Greek Cypriot enmity... you become chauvinist, fundamentalist, and marginal… (Akkurt, 2007)

The journalist speaks with an understanding which is not accepted by peace journalism and basic principles of journalism, by assuming that peace journalism is concealing something for the sake of peace. In journalism, there is no question of accepting an event as if it had not happened. The explanation “peace journalism is to conceal the barbarism accomplished by Greek Cypriots” cannot be accepted by any journalistic understanding. On the contrary, peace journalism wants all the bad events to be revealed without mentioning “our side” and “your side”; in this way any future clashes can be avoided. Naturally all the experienced events will be shaped as news, but the expression and the framework of the news is very important. All these will be discussed in later chapters.

### 2.4.2 Peace Journalism News Reporting: “More quality in the news”

### Defining Peace Journalism

Peace journalism is a new concept in the academic circles and media sector. The final chapter of this dissertation provides a normative set of principles dealing with peace journalism. Although, there have been several attempts to establish a global approach to peace journalism, we have to be careful in adapting these to local conditions. It is important to stress that peace journalism is a new kind of reporting, news selecting and news framing for the journalism profession. Because the profession of journalism is in need of such a new understanding of reporting. Peace journalism is new as reporting, because it consists of a conflict analysis technique. For instance, it suggests journalists should look at the event from many angles while making news about a conflict, and emphasize the reasons for the conflict. Peace journalism argues that the negative sides, violence, clashes and similar elements looked at by journalists while reporting serve the solutionlessness of the conflicts more than their solution, and recommends that the frameworks of the news must contain solution perspectives.

“At the start of the 21st century, Galtung (1998, 2002), Kempf (1996, 2002), Shinar (2003), and others (see, e.g., Austrian Study Center for Peace and Conflict Resolution, 2003; Lynch & McGoldrick, 2005) advocated creative models and training programs … to transform the role of media” (cited in Ross, 2006, p. 4).

The most prominent peace researcher, Johan Galtung,[[15]](#footnote-16) began using the term ‘Peace Journalism’ in the 1990s. Galtung (2002) defines peace journalism as follows: “Peace journalism stands for truth as opposed to propaganda and lies, ‘truthful journalism’ being, as mentioned, one aspect in peace journalism. It is not ‘investigative journalism’ in the sense of only uncovering lies on ‘our’ side. The truth aspect in peace journalism holds for all sides, just like exploration of the conflict formation and giving voice (glasnost) to all” (p. 5).

Lynch and McGoldrick (2005) define peace journalism as “*remedial*- a deliberate, creative strategy to seek out and bring to our attention those portions of the ‘the facts’ routinely under-represented; the significant views and perspectives habitually unheard” (p. 224). According to Galtung (2002) “peace journalism gives a more realistic image of what goes on in the world” (p. 5). One can see from Gatekeeping Theory[[16]](#footnote-17) that some news events are not reported by a journalist or are not selected by editors; peace journalism tries to present the uncovered issues. As Galtung and Vincent (1992) stress, “Journalists should focus on visible and invisible effects of violence and conflict”; it would seem that, peace journalism can be used for any kind of news issues and not only conflict news.

Shinar (2007b) develops a similar definition, and explains how a peace journalist explores and creates demands for learning backgrounds and contexts of conflict formation:

Peace Journalism and peace-oriented strategies of media usage aim at improving both media representations of reality and how they are perceived by the public. They propose to frame stories in broader, fairer, and more accurate terms than the ones dictated by the biases of the “ratings culture and structure”, and of the interests of governments and movements. They explore and create demands for learning backgrounds and contexts of conflict formation in order to make media sources, processes, and effects more relevant. (Shinar, 2007b, p. 56)

Shinar’s (2007b) peace journalism definition shows that commercial or traditional media news values are problematic because of the “ratings culture and structure”. Kempf (2006) sees traditional media as “escalation-oriented conflict coverage” and he labels peace journalism as “de-escalation-oriented conflict coverage”. Kempf (2006) argues that, “…traditional escalation-oriented conflict coverage has a higher news values than de-escalation-oriented peace journalism” (Kempf, 2006, p. 3).

Consequently, “‘Peace Journalism’ is related to alternative patterns of covering news reports. Differences in expression carry ideological distinctions and thus differences in representation” (Fowler, 1991). Peace journalism is an alternative for traditional news reporting and it could be said that it can help reporters to cover conflict from a multiple perspective, with balance and critical awareness. In peace journalism, balance is an element required by everyone; it is necessary to mention not only one of the sides of the conflict, but two or more of them; in this way it will not be expressed as if there are only two sides of the conflict. If conflicts are shown as involving only two parties, this will lead to an ignorance of the ones who are seeking for peace. For this reason, balance in news must be considered as most critical. Balance requires objectivity; however, “[o]bjectivity alone, without balance is not helpful; the same holds for balance without objectivity” (Galtung, 2006, p. 5). The concept of objectivity as described by Galtung shows that objectivity and balance go together. Some scholars believe that objectivity is for the journalist; journalists should just reports the facts without any comment. Galtung does not accept this argument, and he argues that one should combine objective and balanced reporting.

According to Galtung (2006) balanced reporting comprises three concerns:

1. Balance in a conflict means to give attention to all goals of all parties.

2. Balance means to give attention to people as well as to elites.

3. Balance means to give attention to all phases of a conflict, before, during, after violence (p. 5).

The first matter is related to the solution task of peace journalism: the peace journalist should seek to promote processes which lead to solutions and give voice to all parties in order to find some common ground. The second matter is about the people-oriented understanding of peace journalism: peace journalists should allow people to talk about their problems. The third stresses the process-oriented news understanding of peace journalism. Traditional journalists tend to do event-based reporting, which focuses on how many people died, which bridge was destroyed etc. Before and after the violence, however, the media do not follow the process to show the negative sides of the conflict.

Peace journalism does not exclude objectivity; in fact it uses objectivity for different purposes. This is a “methodological objectivity, which requires journalists to subject their reports to objective controls such as the careful presentation of facts, reliable and varied sources, expert opinion, supporting documentation, accurate quotations, and a fair representation of major viewpoints” (Hanitzsch, 2004, p. 488; Ward, 1998, p. 122; emphasis added) (cited in Bratic, 2007, p. 10).

Peace journalism focuses on methodical “objectiveness”; that is, on researching, criticizing and looking for the correct information before reporting the event, before collecting information and while reporting the event; in other words, at every step of creating the news. It can be said that news is a sort of constructed information which is gathered by the journalist, and during this construction the journalist cannot be objective because of certain values, the sociocultural environment, and media structure.

As Arsan (2003) argues in *Çatışma ve Savaş Dönemlerinde Gazetecilik [Journalism in Conflict and War Period]* article: “Journalism with peace axis, is a kind of journalism which grounds on both the person and the ‘correct’ and ‘solution’; pays regard to balance and extent in the preference of the sources of the news, makes the the reasons of the conflict transparent, setting up empathy with they/others instead of establishing contradictions like ‘we’ and ‘they’, tries to prevent the violence before it emerges, emphasizes on the invisible foundations of violence” (cited in Alankus, 2003, pp. 51-52).

According to Arsan’s (2003) definition, it could be said that peace journalism is an innovative understanding of the journalism profession, which uses conflict analysis techniques such as empathy with “others” and understanding.

### 2.4.2.1 Peace Journalism as a Normative Theory

The premise of peace journalism is a normative theory. As Shinar (2007a) notes, “[p]eace journalism is a normative mode of responsible and conscientious media coverage of conflict, that aims at contributing to peacemaking, peacekeeping, and changing the attitudes of media owners, advertisers, professionals, and audiences towards war and peace” (p. 2).

Shinar (2007a), Kempf (2003) and Melone, Terzis, & Ozsel (2002) stress the normative premise of peace journalism, because they believe that peace journalism can play a positive, constructive role in the peace process or conflict situation. Irvan (2006) states that, “if media play a negative role in terms of increasing the tensions between and among the sides of the conflict, they can also play a positive role by promoting peace” (p. 34).

Shinar (2007a), Kempf (2003) and Irvan’s (2006) evaluations on peace journalism have also focused on peace journalism as responsible journalism. Bandakov (2006) also stresses the responsibility role of peace journalism: “The key word of the peace journalism concept is responsibility. In most of the cases, PJ is defined as a special mode of socially responsible journalism which contributes to the peaceful resolution of conflicts” (p. 2).

According to Mandelzis (2007), “Peace journalism could develop theories and strategies to help create an awareness of higher news values and responsibilities, in both the local and the global spheres” (p. 3). Although there are peace journalism news values, it is hard to put them into practice; this is why Mandelzis’ (2007) suggestion is essential to create awareness within the media sector and among the audience. If the media believe that there is “public demand” and if they try to respond to this demand, peace journalism should develop strategies to meet the audience’s peace demand, and in this way the media could change and develop.

As Ottosen (2003) holds, the prerequisite for changing conflict coverage is a social movement within audiences. “Only when the public demands alternative conflict coverage, only when there is a real market for something like peace journalism, will it be possible to achieve constructive conflict coverage. The assumption is that if the market were there, everything else – such as journalistic guidelines and strategies, interest in specific competencies, changes in media structures – would follow” (cited in Blösi, 2004; p. 6-7).

The global survey research which has been conducted by Lynch and McGoldrick (2004) has shown that the profession needs peace journalism; in other words, journalists have started to adopt a public service role: “Sixty percent of journalists who responded to a global survey (Lynch and McGoldrick 2004b) believed that the media in their own country today is not performing this essential public service. Most blamed “journalistic convention”, with “market conditions” a close second” (cited in McGoldrick, 2006; p. 5).

### 2.4.2.2 The Task of Peace Journalism

Current journalism or mainstream news values are conflict-oriented, and it has become a paradox within UNESCO’s[[17]](#footnote-18) universal journalism principles. The second principle says that the “journalist is against war”, but in conventional journalism war is good news, because with it newspaper circulation increases.

Peace journalism seems directly opposed to conventional journalism; however, we should not forget that it is not an invention. Conventional journalism moves away from social problems and becomes the power tool of government.

Galtung (2002) addresses some of the tasks of the peace journalist. He stresses that, “[t]he task of peace journalism is serious, professional reporting, making these processes more transparent. The task of peace advocacy is better left to peace workers” (p. 5). When Galtung (2002) emphasizes transparent reporting, he means that he wants the peace journalist to give more information on the political geography and history in order to make the conflict or peace process transparent. Galtung’s (2002) task of peace journalism is essential, but it could be said that the journalist needs more time and space to make conflict more transparent.

Galtung (1998) states that “The first task of peace journalism, therefore, must be to map the conflict, identifying all the parties and their goals. In place of the supposedly objective reporting of facts, it must discuss the process by which some facts are selected, and others suppressed, by competing information sources” (p. 16). Galtung (1998) gives serious responsibilities to the peace journalist, including “truth oriented”, “good”, “accurate”, “responsible”, and “de-escalation oriented conflict reporting”.

According to Kempf (2003) the first step of peace journalism is called “‘de-escalation oriented conflict reporting’ and broadly coincides with what is usually called quality journalism” (p. 8). In order to understand how a peace journalist practises de-escalation oriented conflict reporting or quality journalism, Shinar (2007a) comments that “Peace Journalism does not mean necessarily “good news”, it is conceived as a fairer way to cover conflict, relative to the usual coverage, and suggests possibilities to improve professional attitudes and performance; strengthen human, moral and ethical values in the media; widen scholarly and professional media horizons; and provide better public service by the media” (p. 2).

One can understand from Shinar’s (2007a) peace journalism description that the media needs to take more responsibility while they are covering the parties to the conflict. While journalists are getting more responsible, they should not forget to follow the news process. Galtung (2002) argues that “[t]he time cosmology of news is punctual, based on events. Processes that need more time to reveal where they are headed, need more time to unfold” (p. 6). Journalists obviously need more time to cover news process rather than the events themselves. This means after violence, for example, such as a suicide bombing or any kind of violent attack, journalists should continue their coverage to make the conflict transparent. For instance, the journalist should ask more questions about the history of the conflict and its political conditions.

Nabi (1989) sees news as “a process through which the reader acquires real knowledge of different events that took place in society during a certain time span.” He makes a distinction between events and processes: “a train crash is an event, while repairing the rails is a process” (cited in Mellor, 2005, p. 82). It would seem that peace journalism focuses on repairing, cooperation, and the construction process of conflict.

Another task suggestion for peace journalism comes from Peleg (2007), who believes that peace journalism should play a constructive role in the conflict resolution process:

Peace Journalism, has the characteristics and capabilities of encouraging constructive communication… Peace journalism, as a motivator of peace and as a promoter of depolarization and de-escalation, (Galtung, in Hackett and Zhao, 2005) can accomplish a significant role by inspiring journalists to portray disputes in a different manner than that to which they usually ascribe. A successful conflict resolution process must be based on genuine and honest interaction between antagonists, whereby unmet human needs are frankly discussed and interests and motivations rather than positions are candidly aired. (Peleg, 2007, p. 1)

Like Peleg (2007), Galtung (2002) also suggests journalists should search for solutions such as giving more space to civil society while they are covering the news. “‘Peace Journalism’ thus becomes an alternative coverage method that focuses on the actual conflict of interests including all the parties, not only two, and preferably discussing possible solutions” (cited Mandelzis, 2007, p. 1).

### 2.4.2.3 Conflict More Exciting Than Peace, Mainstream News Values

Some peace studies scholars see the universal news values or conventional news values as problematic, particularly in conflict regions. Conventional news values are problematic also for peace journalism; however, this does not mean that peace journalism does not use news values which are used by conventional news media. PJ uses the conventional/traditional news values; the problem is how to use these news values, how media presents the news with these news values. The journalism profession obviously needs some additional news values while they are covering conflict issues; this is why the journalism sector needs PJ to develop conventional/traditional news values and make these values more useful for constructing positive peace between conflicting sides. Wolfsfeld (2004) in his book *Media and the Path to Peace*, argues that “due to a fundamental contradiction between the nature of a peace process and news values, the media often play a destructive role in attempts at making peace” (p. 15) and he continues: “there are four major values that are the most problematic in the production of such news: immediacy, drama, simplicity and ethnocentrism” (p. 15).

These four criteria are important for editors (gatekeepers) and journalists. For the journalist, news should include at least one of immediacy, drama, simplicity and ethnocentrism, and this is normal because “journalists are trained to look for certain types of stories” (Wolfsfeld, 2004, p. 16).

*Immediacy:* As Wolfsfeld (2004) mentions, “The press covers events, not processes” (p. 17), and another problem of journalism values lies in the search for *drama*. Wolfsfeld (2004) criticizes this kind of journalism as follows: “Every act of violence, every crisis, and every sign of conflict is considered news. Areas of calm and cooperation, on the other hand, will be ignored because they are not considered interesting” (p. 18).

The *simplicity* value of journalism appears when the journalist puts forward the space and time problem in the newspaper or television. As Wolfsfeld (2004) argues, “Instead of focusing on the complex political and historical underpinnings of an event, the standard professional routine is to ask leaders and citizens to relate to what has just happened” (p. 21).

The final problematic news value of journalism is *Ethnocentrism*. Ethnocentrism is also a very important concept for this study: “[e]very news medium operates from a certain political and cultural base that defines its language, beliefs, values, attitudes, and prejudices” (Bar-Tal and Teichman, in press; Liebes and Curran, 1998; Libes, 1997; Shudson, 1996; Wolfsfeld, 1997a) (cited in Wolfsfeld, 2004, p. 22).

Wolfsfeld (2004) argues that, “…scholars simply find conflict more exciting than peace” (p. 9). The nature of human beings includes reflex reactions to extraordinary things; and the basic idea behind this reaction is protection. This is why human beings are interested in conflict news rather than peace news. The media, however, uses this human interest in a negative way: the traditional claim by the media is that “the public demands the kind of news which includes violence and conflict”. Even though there is this kind of demand from the public, Kempf’s (2005) studies show how escalation-oriented reporting affects the conflict between adversaries.

Shoemaker and Reese (1996), however, see some advantages of this kind of “bad” news. They argue that “[t]he media are often accused of carrying too much “bad” news. But bad news often means a problem that needs action. We can easily see that this is more efficient than if the media dwelled only on what was going right” (p. 112). Shoemaker and Reese (1996) are right to make this statement; however, according to this explanation, media have the ability to set an agenda in order to make problems more visible. It could be said that media should follow the process, not the event.

Some scholars make similar comments on how peace stories have lower news values in news media: “War is more compatible than peace with media professional standards, conventional discourse and economic structures. War provides visuals and images of action. It is associated with heroism and conflict, focuses on the emotional rather than on the rational, and satisfies new-value demands: the present, the unusual, the dramatic, simplicity, action, personalization, and results (Galtung and Ruge, 1970; Bird and Dardenne, 1988)” (cited in Shinar, 2003, p. 5).

Galtung (2002) also stresses how traditional news values are creating obstacles for peace journalism: “Peace journalism starts with a major handicap: while violence is obviously negative, peace is positive, hence boring, trivial, not to be reported” (p. 8).

Shinar (2003, 2004), Wolfsfeld (2004) and other peace scholars are right to draw this conclusion. However, Mandelzis (2007) does not accept the arguments that peace is boring and conflict is more exciting than peace or peace situation contain low news values:

Although peace does not provide the kind of images and action as conflicts and war it holds a valuable contribution and even surprising events for reporters and audiences. …the historical Oslo handshake on the White House lawn in September 1993, are often fascinating ceremonies, such as, the Oslo ceremony 13 September, 1993), the ceremony marking the peace agreement between Israel and Jordan (27 October, 1994), Elton John’s peace concert in Belfast (May 1998) celebrating the peace agreement in Northern Ireland, and the Nobel peace prizes which were comprehensively reported in the frame of reconciliation discourse are other examples. These events raised media interest and stirred hopes for peace but they were covered by the media only for short periods during which the media presented an unrealistic reality. (Mandelzis, 2007, p. 16)

When peace news is mentioned, people understand it refers to peace treaties, peace celebrations, etc. This is why journalists report such news only once: because peace news is understood in this way, it will attract less interest than war. Peace reporting is based on an understanding far beyond peace events and treaties. For example, how can it be guaranteed that violence will not be experienced after the signing of a peace treaty by the leaders? Journalists must search for and reveal the potential dangers which may spoil the peace treaties in the future. Only then can the sustainability of the treaty be achieved. Therefore, the increasing and decreasing the interest towards the news is comprised within their reporting practices. If some negative issues are not reported with a prejudice of “they may spoil the peace medium”, this will harm the peace. The most important aspect of the subject you are reporting is in which framework you handle it in, the structure of the expression you use, and the perspective of public benefit.

Wolfsfeld, Khouri, and Peri (2002) also mention how difficult it is to sell peace in the media market. They state that “There is good reason to believe that mobilizing the news media for peace is a much more difficult endeavor. Whereas news and conflict have a very natural fit, news and peace make awkward bedfellows” (p. 190). Galtung (2006) however, suggests how to make news more interesting: “It can also be argued that good journalism will attract many and good readers, for instance many more women - even if some over-macho men are lost” (p. 5). Galtung (2006) puts women readers in the middle, and he believes women readers could support the peace reporting style in the media.

Azar and Cohen’s (1979) definition of peace in the Middle East: “Peace as crisis and war as status quo” (p. 8) also summarizes the media. According to conventional news values “War is status quo but peace is crisis”; this is why we need an alternative journalism style in order to see the other side of the image and break this artificial status quo. This process is artificial because war is not normal or the status quo; human beings create war. However, peace is always there. Peace is the status quo but as we have seen this has been usurped and turned on its head.

As Ross (2006) stresses, “It is clear peace journalists and activists promoting peace must abandon the tactics of conflict and the reactive rhetoric of negativity, blame, and criticism (Coles, 2002; Gorsevski, 1999; Harvey, 1991; Ivie, 1987) to engage in a positive discourse of principled, compassionate humanism, and provide positive alternatives to the status quo” (p. 11).

### 2.4.2.4 Gender Difference in Peace Journalism

Galtung (2002) describes how gender plays an important role in journalism praxis “…with men more interested in the negative (eg., violence, and the male hunter-warrior has to be on guard) and women more in the positive (eg., romance, and the female gatherer-reproducer is stirred)” (p. 9). The result of Ersoy’s (2003) MA Thesis, “Peace Journalism in TRNC news media,” have shown that female journalists are more peace journalism oriented than male journalists in the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus news media. These results do not tell us that the female journalists in the TRNC are practising peace journalism. Ersoy’s (2003) study results can only indicate that the majority of the journalists ideally believe that the values of peace journalism are better than the values of conflict-oriented traditional journalism.

According to Galtung (2002) there are also other reasons why women may be better at peace journalism, “…in no way saying that the burden of this civilizing mission should fall on women alone. Peace is more holistic than war; women may be more sensitive to a broader range of variable than men (expressed in tendency for women to use more adjectives?)” (pp. 10-11). Galtung (2002) sees women journalists as more sensitive than men, and this is why he expects women journalist to write more peace reports than men journalists.

### 2.4.2.5 Peace Journalism and Conventional Journalism: Exploring the Differences

Peace journalism promotes a different understanding of journalism to conventional journalism, particularly in how is sees journalists play a role in conflict situations. Lesley Fordred Green and Phillip Visser (2000) have explained these differences within four main categories, which cover role, style and approach to audience:

*The Role of Journalism:* Green and Visser (2000) argue that the conventional journalist is a watchdog, commentator, independent of issues covered and spectator/observer. However, the peace journalist’s role is different from that of the conventional journalist. The peace journalist is an enabler and communicator between the conflicting sides, and is not independent of issues he or she covers. The peace journalist is involved in the issues and participates in the solutions.

*Style of Journalism:* There is a marked difference between conventional and peace journalism. The conventional journalist focuses on debate, polemic and difference in the news, but the peace journalist establishes a dialogue among the conflicting sides. The peace journalist also focuses on common ground in order to construct dialogue during the conflict process, and establishes a discussion platform for all conflict sides. According to Green and Visser (2000), peace journalism has a new journalistic understanding of norms and news values.

*Approach to Journalism:* Green and Visser (2000) argue that the conventional journalist seeks simplicity in news, is reactive to violent events, and makes event-based reporting. The conventional journalist also believes in “objectivity” and that “they just report the facts” This belief puts distance between the journalist and the event. Conventional journalism understands balanced reporting as different from peace journalism. The conventional journalist believes that balanced reporting covers both sides in equal proportions. On the other hand, the peace journalist has developed this balanced reporting, which is the reporting that represents qualitatively both sides’ stories and perceptions.

Although the conventional journalist uses simplicity in news, the peace journalist tries to explore complexity through the development of strategies to understand/uncover the conflict. Another important point is that the peace journalist makes “process based” reporting within the conflict process, but conventional journalist uses “event based” reporting. This means peace journalists do not make news only about the conflict/violence process; they continue the news after the violence and try to show the invisible effects of violence/conflict. The peace journalist also covers how violence affects lives and makes news about the difficulties for people in different regions.

*Approach to Audience:* The last difference between conventional journalism and peace journalism is: “approach to audience”. According to conventional journalism, violence/conflict genre news is interesting and has an effect on the audience. The newsroom sets the news agenda and leaders/experts know “best” in the conventional journalism news understanding. Society has a right to know in conventional journalism and they claim that “this is the way journalism is done”. Peace journalism’s approach to the audience is different. The peace journalist considers “public participation” in problem solving/building as important, and gives space to different solution suggestions from members of the public. Peace journalists believe the public has a role in setting the news agenda and ordinary people need to be consulted; the public have a right to participate in democratic processes and be given the chance to transmit their “voice.”

### 2.4.2.6 Obstacles to Peace Journalism

Criticisms of peace journalism have rested on the argument that theoretically it is a good model but practically it is insufficient. This can be partly true, because peace journalism has suffered some important difficulties/obstacles in the news producing process. However this does not mean that journalists do not apply peace journalism news norms and news values in their profession.

### 2.4.2.6.1 News Discourse of the Newspapers

In order to practice peace journalism, the journalist needs to attach importance to the selection and use of words. During peace negotiations some terminologies and words can escalate the conflict or will not constitute a positive contribution to the solution such as: “our side – other side”, “we won - they lost”, “ball is on the other side”, “last match”. Conventional journalists generally prefers to use sport journalism discourse while they are writing something about conflict. If the journalist evaluates the conflict within sport game frame, automatically one side will win, and the other side will lose. The peace journalist accepts “win-win” frame but not in sport game mentality. The conflict-oriented news understanding in journalism needs to identify a winner and a loser in events. If one look at the negotiation process in Cyprus, journalists are constructing such discourses in news stories that attempt to find out who make concessions, and who changes his or her position, thus emphasizing which side loses and wins. Whereas if the Cypriot press were to see the peace process as a “take-give” process, they could investigate the potential problem issues that might cause problems in the future for this process. They could take these problems into account as needing to be solved within constructive news discourse, and in this way the Cypriot press could help the negotiation process.

### 2.4.2.6.2 Event Based Reporting

The best known advocacy statement of conventional journalism is “we just report the facts.” If media just report the events, it is not enough to contribute to the peace process when there are conflicting sides. Media have power to reduce/escalate conflict, and should therefore follow “process based reporting” in order to expose the invisible effects of conflict/violence rather than only the visible effects. The peace journalist applies process-based reporting in order to understand the reasons for the conflict historically and culturally.The Israel-Palestine conflict can be seen as an example for event-based reporting rather than process-based reporting. Conventional media prefer to focus on visible effects of conflict, such as how may people died or were injured, which building was bombed. However, they should engage in process-based reporting in order to reveal invisible effects and the sufferings of people in conflict regions. In this way people will see the horrific sides of the conflict/war and will set the public agenda for policy makers.

### 2.4.2.6.3 News Framing

Another obstacle to the practice of peace journalism is news framing. A lot of journalists use the “self and other” frame in conflict news. The basic reason for this kind of framing is the news values of conventional journalism. According to peace journalism, while producing news stories media should take care not to use only one perspective. Peace journalism requires the journalist to look at the events in multi perspective. The ideal way to do this is by increasing news sources. If journalists increase their news sources, this will enable them to give voice to all conflict sides and present the opportunity to find out the dynamics of the conflict.

### 2.4.2.6.4 News Sources

The government administrations, community leaders and outstanding peoples in society speak publicly more than ordinary people in society and get more news coverage than the general public. The use of elite sources is another obstacle to peace journalism. Peace journalism makes the suggestion that to give voice to the voiceless as additional sources in the society is a worthwhile thing. In other words, peace journalists accept to give voice to individuals to create a more participatory society and set their agenda in the news. Peace journalists spend more time in news reporting in order to give more sources; they always have to be focused, investigative, use process-based reporting, which is critical for balanced and quality news. However, many journalists make concessions in quality in order to convey their news faster to their readers and audience.

Shoemaker and Reese (1996) stress the imbalance relations between media and their news sources:

Sources have a tremendous effect on mass media content, because journalists can’t include in their news reports what they don’t want. The most obvious influence occurs when sources withhold information or lie; but they may also influence the news in more subtle ways, by providing the context within which all other information is evaluated, by providing usable information that is easier and cheaper to use than that from other sources (what Gandy [1982] calls “information subsidies”), and by monopolizing the journalists’ time so that they don’t have an opportunity to seek out sources with alternative views. (p. 179)

Using elite sources is more dangerous, because according to peace journalism the role of the media is not just transmitting the messages between the sides. For peace journalism, the media should take the responsibility and consequences of their news and make quality news to help the peace climate in societies. “Journalists [however] find it easier to follow the official line, or to ‘index’ themselves to the ‘official politics’” (Irvan, 2006, p. 34). Certain case studies and researches that have been conducted have revealed that media choose to follow the official politics of their state (Mandelzis, 2007; Herman and Chomsky, 1988; Wolfsfeld, Khouri & Peri, 2002; Gans, 2004; Shoemaker & Reese, 1996; Wolfsfeld, 1997, Lynch, 2003).

Wolfsfeld (2004) comments in his book entitled *Media and the Path to Peace,* that “[w]hen governments have complete control over the media, news is simply another form of propaganda” (p. 10). Wolfsfeld puts the source and media relation debate into a different position; he sees that as a result of this relationship, the media becomes a tool for propaganda. Lynch (2006) defines propaganda with these words: “Propaganda, according to a classic definition, is “the deliberate and systematic attempt to shape perceptions, manipulate cognitions and direct behaviour to achieve a response that furthers the desired intent of the propagandist” (Jowett and O’Donnell, 1999, p. 6) to map out in advance a particular path along which the knower, in critical realist terms, may apprehend the thing known” (p. 75). Jowett and O’Donnell’s classic propaganda definition is right to define propaganda as a “systematic attempt to shape perceptions, manipulate cognitions and direct behaviour” in particular war time or conflict situation. During conflict situations, governments tend to dehumanize their enemy and they want to show themselves as “good”; the media helps to shape national interests. Papanikolatos and Dimitras (1999) summarize media propaganda with these words: “Media propaganda prepared public opinion for, was usually supportive of and thus legitimized the multiple ethnically motivated conflicts and cleansing operations in Yugoslavia. That was not an exception, though, but merely the most extreme example media serving, if not contributing to shaping, ‘national interests.’” (p. 1). Within these media conditions it is hard to develop peace journalism, but this does not mean that peace journalism is impossible.

Piers Robinson (2002) in the book entitled “*The CNN Effect,”* explains how media coverage is elite-oriented: “...news media coverage is indexed to elite opinion...” (p. 14). Another example of how news is dominated by the elite of the society is provided in Herbert Gans’ (1979) analysis of CBS, NBC, Newsweek, and Time, which found that news is dominated by the “known,” people already prominent (71 percent of television stories, 76 percent of magazine columns in 1967)” (cited in Shoemaker & Reese, 1996, p. 48).

### 2.4.2.6.5 Monopolized Media and Circulation

Monopolized media have a commercial anxiety and they construct news policy on this basis, but assumptions prevalent in peace journalism do not accept this. The commercial anxiety of media will bring the circulation anxiety into the sector; in other words, if one newspaper has circulation anxiety or wants to earn money, the editors should publish different news from the other newspapers. In this sense, generally different and interesting news is seen as conflict/violence oriented news. That is why Cypriot media give more space to the Cyprus Conflict than to other news: sensation and conflict increase the newspaper circulation but they are obstacles to the practice of peace journalism. This is reflected in an “us-them”, “we are good-they are bad” perspectives by journalists. This is not to say that one should not use sensation or conflict news; journalists have to use these, but the news framing, representation of “Other” in the news is important. Journalists need to ask themselves this question before publishing the news story: “Am I escalating the conflict by using an ‘us’ and ‘them’ news frame on this event?” If the answer is “yes,” the journalist needs to re-evaluate the news framing and construct news frames for seeking solutions to the conflict.

### 2.4.2.6.6 Ownership Structure of Newspapers and “Ratings Culture”

Although the editor has an active role during the news selection process, generally he follows the newspaper owner’s news policies. As we have seen, the structure of media is conducive to direct intervention from the newspaper owner. That is why peace journalists first convinces their media owner before practising peace journalism, because if a newspaper owner’s commercial relationships are likely to be harmed by that kind of news policy it will be much more difficult to apply.

Hackett (2007) stresses how difficult it is to practice peace journalism within the current structure of the news media. “To the extent that “the structure is the message” (Tehranian, 2002), the full implementation of PJ would require changing not only the training and ethos of journalists – work that is fortunately underway – but also the institutional framework of incentives, resources and constraints, towards a public service rather than commercial ethos; towards diversity and pluralism and towards transnational and intercultural models of communication” (p. 51). The media structure is not only one obstacle to peace journalism in the media sector; there is another important factor which is, as Shinar (2007b) defines it, the “ratings culture” of media. Blösi (2004) argues that “The fact that media products have to hold their own in markets means that they must at least attract a reasonable number of readers or viewers and that in the end every story must sell” (p. 3).

### 2.4.2.9 Some Critics of Peace Journalism

There are some critics of peace journalism. BBC correspondent David Loyn (2003) is one example who has strongly objected to peace journalism. Loyn (2003) claims that:

Now there is ‘peace journalism’ – the most pernicious of the lot, especially since it is so well funded, academically backed and superficially attractive. I want to appeal for more traditional values such as fairness, objectivity and balance – the only guiding lights of good reporting. News is what’s happening and we should report it with imagination and scepticism (where appropriate). Full stop. We do not need to load any other demands on to it. And we certainly do not need to seek out peacemakers unless they are actually successful.

Loyn (2003) believes that “News is what’s happening”. He is right to define news in these terms; however, he miscalculates some effects on the journalist, such as ideology, framing, cognition. Loyn (2003) still believes “objectivity” which is problematic and is not fully achieved. Loyn’s (2003) “objectivity” is easy because he tends to be playing a transmitter role between the audience and source. In other words, he chooses the easy way, which is to be passive, and just reports the fact without taking any responsibility.

Loyn (2003) critics Galtung’s peace journalism understanding, because Galtung believes that peace journalism can play an important role in conflict resolution. Loyn (2003) argues, “Galtung’s track record at conflict resolution is admirable. But he misunderstands our role. We are always outside – observers not players. His demand that journalists should become active participants, seeing every conflict is as a complicated matrix, echoed in a series of manuals by the *‘Reporting the World’* group in Britain, is wrong. Anyway it would have every viewer or listener reaching for the off button.” Loyn (2003) confuses two things here: if journalists do not accept their social responsibility role in the conflict process, it is hard to practice peace journalism. This is why peace journalism strongly disagrees with the statement that “We are always outside – observers not players”. This is the kind of paradox which conventional journalism experiences. Conventional journalists believe journalists are powerful and can form public opinion or set the agenda, but they see themselves as outside the conflict. If one has power, why not use it to contribute something for peace. Obviously, according to conventional media, conflict news sells more than peace and peace is “boring.”

Loyn (2003) claims that, “I am not arguing against proper ethical standards, nor responsible journalism. Of course, we are not cold neutral unseen eyes. But our task is always to seek to find out what is going on, not carrying any other baggage. If there is conflict resolution we report on it in context. We do not engage in it.” Again here Loyn (2003) does not mention how media play a crucial role in the conflict process and how they escalate conflict if they are not careful about the content of the messages. Loyn (2003) tends to assume the role of the media as “neutral” but he should calculate the effect of the media to de-humanize the enemy. As Wolfsfeld, Khouri, and Peri (2002) comment, “News is fundamentally ethnocentric, especially news about enemies (Dorman & Livingston, 1994; Liebes, 1997; Ottosen, 1995; Mowlana, Gerbner, & Schiller, 1992; Wolfsfeld, 2001a). Enemies are newsworthy because they threaten us. News stories about enemies are based on a common set of cultural assumptions, beliefs, myths, and symbols all of which intensify the level of hostility and suspicion toward the other side. Journalists routinely feed into these fears because they resonate with their audience. We are the victims and they are the aggressors” (p. 191).

Wolfsfeld, Khouri, and Peri’s (2002) news definition shows us how the role of the media in conflict process is not “natural”. Loyn (2003) does not want “to carry any other baggage”[[18]](#footnote-19) but journalists, willing or not willing, are carrying some messages and these messages are never innocent.

Lynch (2003) gives response to Loyn’s (2003) assertions on peace journalism in online platform. “Neither Peace Journalism nor Reporting the World is a ‘brand’ to everyone’s taste. But the onus is firmly on journalists everywhere to think critically about the concepts we use in the everyday jobs of reporting, producing, editing and commissioning; to home in on examples of where those concepts impede us in meeting aspirations to provide a useful public service; and to devise workable ways of taking responsibility for the consequences of our journalism.[[19]](#footnote-20)”

News Dissector Danny Schechter (2003) agrees with Lynch’s (2003) peace journalism premises and he defines peace journalism as follows: “The ‘peace journalism’ option presents an enterprising and provocative alternative way of thinking about what is often missing in the coverage.[[20]](#footnote-21)” Schechter (2003) also stresses the news gathering process. Time and space limitations of the media are forcing journalists to cover the news quickly. However, during this coverage journalists miss some parts of the conflict, and they just report the visible effects of the story rather than invisible ones.

Peace journalism appears as an alternative approach to the currently accepted journalism understanding in the mass communication sector. Peace journalism as an alternative gradually finds acceptance and expands among academics in the communication field. It is possible to argue that peace journalism is the most effective journalism understanding to make a positive contribution in conflict zones of the world, if it is duly exercised.

### 2.4.2.10 Potential Solutions and Discussion

Media should inform the public fairly by using the peace journalism news frame while producing news stories about the “other”. Fairness in news frames for peace journalism means that journalists should look at events by adopting a multi perspective while they are writing the news stories. If a journalist is writing the news in one perspective, such as giving only the elites voice and official resources oriented news it will not constitute fair news framing. If journalists increase the number of sources while they are writing the news, it will help to give fair and true information to the public.

Peace journalism theoretically seems like a good model for journalism profession and it can be acceptable; however, when we look at the praxis of this model we need to look over dominant journalism practices. As Suleyman Irvan (2005) mentions in a newspaper article, “Peace journalism adopts the view that conflicts between societies and countries can be solved without resort to violence and the journalist can play an effective role in this process” (Basin newspaper, p. 24).

Shinar (2007b) has another suggestion to develop peace journalism and peace reporting in the media. Shinar (2007b) says that “The Bank may, in turn, provide low interest loans to support independent media and interactive communication aimed at audiences with low or no media access, and committed to the above-mentioned strategies, and to peace-oriented communication ethics and practices” (p. 60). Shinar (2007b) believes independent media can perform peace journalism better than mainstream media, because mainstream media are bounded by certain news values, and ownership structures.

Kasbari (2007) suggests good documentaries on the conflict; she believes that thesewill contribute to the understanding of conflict and each other. Kasbari (2007) gives a particular example from Palestinian and Israeli television channels. She says, “There are very good documentaries on the conflict which could be categorized under the Peace Journalism approach and they are shown many times on Israeli channels, or on the private Palestinian TV stations but on the other hand and on the same channels there are lots of propaganda” (p. 4).

Even though there are a lot of obstacles to peace journalism, some NGOs and enterprises have started to do something to develop peace journalism, de-escalate the media impact and use this impact with a positive purpose. The Independent Media Commission (IMC) is one of the well known commissions in Bosnia, to prevent the propagation of hate messages.

Shinar (2007b) explains that some NGOs which “based on European sponsorship, Keshev, the Israeli Association for the Protection of Democracy, and its Palestinian Counterpart Miftah, have been monitoring media coverage of the conflict, and publishing reports that have had considerable impact. In addition, the Israeli-Palestinian jointly operated All for Peace Radio has been successfully engaged in peace journalism. Common Ground News Service (a SFCG project) was established as a news agency to provide information to both sides in the conflict” (p. 58).

Shinar (2007b) gives some names of NGOs which are working to develop new discourses and peace oriented media structures in media rather than hate or conflict oriented media structures.

* *Mission of the Organization for Security and Cooperation* in Europe (OSCE) to Kosovo.
* *Search for Common Ground* to Angola, Rwanda, Burundi, and Sierra Leone.
* *Fondation Hirondelle* to Central African Republic, Liberia, and Democratic Republic of Congo.
* *Studio Ijambo* to Burundi.
* *Support Programming for Emergency Assistance* by Radio to Macedonia, Kosovo (Serbia) and Albania (Shinar, 2007b)
* *Medios para la Paz* (Media for Peace), to Colombia (Baker, 2005)

Ozgunes and Terzis (2000) suggest that journalists, in order to develop peace-oriented reporting, “can send more reporters to each other’s side” (p. 417). We can transfer this suggestion to Cyprus. This will result in more coverage from the other side. They can employ reporters from each other’s community. The newspapers can publish the articles of the columnists from the other community. More interaction will bring more understanding” (p. 37).

### 2.4.3 Conventional vs. Peace Reporting in Conflict Situation

Certain case studies and research studies that have been conducted have revealed that media plays a crucial role in conflict situations (Kempf, 2003; Wolfsfeld 2001; Howard, 2003; Spurk, 2002; First & Avraham, 2003).

Galtung (2002) explains the role of the media as follows:“Peace journalism tries to depolarize by showing the black and white of all sides, and to de-escalate by highlighting peace and conflict resolution as much as violence. How successful it is has yet to be seen. But changing the discourse within which something is thought, spoken of and acted upon is a very powerful approach” (p. 5). Galtung (2002) sees the journalist as an active person who could help to de-escalate conflict and help conflicting sides.

### 2.4.3.1 Conflict is a Part of the Human Condition

Galtung (2002) perceives conflict as an opportunity for development. He says “…in conflict there is also a clear opportunity for human progress, using the conflict to find new ways, being imaginative, creative, transforming the conflict so that the opportunities take the upper hand without violence. And, as conflict is a part of the human condition and violence may be the outcome anywhere in the world when the parties see no way out, the place to start is everywhere” (p. 12). When Galtung (2002) defines conflict as a part of the human condition, he gives responsibility to the journalist to use this opportunity and contribute to human progress. Differences provide great opportunities to learn something new. However, during the conflict situation, media tend to focus on differences in order to show bad sides of the “enemy”. Peace journalism believes that, instead of focusing on differences, journalists should try to learn something from differences to make conflict more transparent; consequently media would contribute to human development.

Lynch and Goldrick (2005) define the role of peace journalism with these words: “Peace journalism uses the insights of conflict analysis and transformation to update the concepts of balance, fairness and accuracy in reporting. Peace journalism provides a new route map tracing the connections between journalists, their sources, the stories they cover and the consequences of their intervention. Peace journalism builds an awareness of non-violence and creativity into the practical job of everyday editing and reporting” (p. 5). Lynch and Goldrick (2005) stress the news reporting style of peace journalism which peace journalists use: conflict analysis and transformation. Although some conventional journalists do not accept the use of conflict analysis and transformation techniques in news reporting, this alternative news writing is very useful for de-escalating the conflict or reduce the tension between the conflicting sides. Detailed examples on the role of the media will be given below.

### 2.4.3.2 Media and Third Party

Although there is some objection by mainstream/conventional/ traditional media workers to peace journalism because it obligates the journalist to behave as a responsible mediator , some peace and conflict resolution scholars believe that the journalist could play an important role in conflict resolution. As Howard (2002) argues, “In some conflict environments, journalists see their role as more complex than simply carriers of information, and they actively seek to facilitate the most important peace building dialogues needed in their communities” (p. 9). In other words, active media are needed rather than passive with only a transmitter role.

According to Howard (2003) the media “can be an instrument of conflict resolution. When it responds well to its own professional strictures such as accuracy, impartiality and independence, the media can have an influence on peace building. It can present alternatives to stereotypes and conflict. It can enable citizens to make well-informed decisions in their own best interests, which if freely exercised, is less likely to be a violent process” (p. 1). If media has been seen as an instrument of conflict resolution, peace journalism is one of the important assumption which suggests practical tool for journalists to help conflict resolution.

As Manoff and others have pointed out, “professional journalism in its normal pursuits has innate potential for contributing to conflict resolution. The similarities of function, position and even attitudes among reporters and mediators who assist disputants to resolve their differences are considerable, although largely unrecognized by journalists” (cited Howard, 2003, pp. 7-8). One might wonder from Manoff’s explanation, since media has the power to form public opinion why do we not use this power to mediate the conflict sides? There are two important problems here. The first is: “Do journalists accept this mediation role?” The second problem is: “If journalists do accept it, how do they report their news?”

Like all peace studies scholars, Kempf (2005) also tries to find solutions to the second problem. Kempf (2005) divided media into two camps, escalation oriented reporting and de-escalation oriented reporting. Mainstream media could be defined as “escalation oriented”, whereas, peace journalism could be labeled as “de-escalation oriented.” According to Kempf (2003) “An escalation oriented framework is guided by the questions: “Who is the aggressor?” and “How can he be stopped?” It tends to take sides and to polarize conflict. A de-escalation oriented framework, on the other hand, is guided by the questions: “What are the issues?” and “How can they be resolved?” It tends to taka an impartial stance and tries to depolarize conflict” (p. 3). Galtung (1998) makes a similar distinction, “Victory Orientated” or “Solution Oriented”.

Arno (1984) argues media can and do “operate as effective third parties” in conflict resolution (p. 233) (cited in Ross, 2006; p. 6). Peleg (2007) also stresses third party role of the media during the conflict resolution process. According to Peleg (2007) “... peace journalism will assume the role of the third party in its facilitation capacity: allowing for the rivaling sides to get to know one another, to uphold understanding and empathy, to focus on creativity and human ingenuity to resolve conflicts and to emphasize truth-oriented, people-oriented and solution-oriented journalism to expedite peace” (p. 2). Peleg (2007) assumes that peace journalism can play a third party role between the conflicting sides. Peleg’s (2007) premises of this assumption are Galtung’s basic criteria for peace journalism which are truth, people and a solution-oriented reporting style in order to make conflict more transparent and conflict analysis techniques. Peleg (2006) defines the third party’s role with these words: “The third party’s role is to stimulate mutual positive motivation to reduce conflict” (p. 2).

While peace journalists use conflict analysis techniques to report the conflict events, it could be mentioned what kind of techniques are needed to cover the event. According to Siebert (1998) the journalist needs to build confidence between the conflicting parties:

…they can further build confidence and mediate between conflicting parties by fostering communication, generating alternative options to violent conflict, reflecting the ordinary person’s desire and need for peace, communicating the process of negotiations to the constituencies involved and providing a forum for on-going dialogue. (cited in Melone, Terzis and Ozsel, 2002, p. 4)

Siebert (1998) stresses that media should represent the ordinary person’s desire and need for peace rather than conflict. Another technique used by media in order to reduce tension between the conflicting parties is “peace building”. As Kelman (1996) argued the media support conflict resolution by encouraging and facilitating positive commitment to negotiation and peace building, and Burton (1969) indicated that this “media role is tied to its ability to control the pace and content of communication” (cited in Susan, 2006, p. 6). This does not mean that media should cover only the positive or good news. It has been seen that while the media are covering the event, there are always other ways to frame the news. Peace building is a problem for the media, because they believe that so-called peace does not sell in the market.

Adam and Holguin (2003) express the media’s role in peace-building as follows: “Journalists and media workers have more direct access to more people than at any time in the past – they need to be aware of how they are being manipulated, and on the impact their reporting can have on exacerbating or calming the conflict” (p. 3). Adam and Holguin (2003) point out some advantages of media workers in conflict situation if they use this opportunity to de-escalate the conflict.

The media’s role in conflict resolution is defined by Van Geelen (2002) as “…acting as a channel between parties, identifying underlying interests, counter misperceptions, serve as a emotional outlet, encourage a balance of power, foster consensus building, create accountability for behavior and so on” (p. 8). Nevertheless, Gilboa (2005) terms this mediation role of the media ““media-broker diplomacy.” Gilboa (2005) states: “I suggest viewing journalists as acting independently as third parties pursuing track-two diplomacy, particularly in pre-negotiation stages. I suggest the term “media-broker diplomacy” to define these roles of journalists” (p. 101). Gilboa (2005) sees journalist as a kind of diplomat that helps conflicting sides to construct bridging. Dmedia intervention of the journalist in conflict situations could be dangerous. The journalist cannot solve the problem alone; however, the journalist helps to construct positive environment for successful peace process.

How do the media “construct positive environment”? Van Geelen (2002) pointed out 5Ws and1 H for conflict reporting and he added options and common ground also.

*Who:* Who is affected by this conflict; who has a distinct stake in its outcome? What is their relationship to one another, including relative power, influence, affluence?

*What:* What triggered the dispute; what drew it to your attention at this time? What issues do the parties need resolve?

*When:* When did this conflict begin; how often have the circumstances existed that gave rise to this dispute?

*Where:* What geographical or politic jurisdictions are affected by the dispute? How has this kind of thing be handled in other places?

*Why:* Why do the parties hold the positions they do; what needs, interests, fears and concerns are the positions intended to address?

*How:* How are they going to resolve this e.g. negotiation, mediation, arbitration, administrative hearing, court, armed warfare; what are the costs/benefits of the chosen method?

*Options:* What options have the parties explored, how do the various options relate to the interests identified?

*Common Ground:* What common ground is there between the parties; what have they agreed to so far?

### 2.4.3.3 Peace Journalism and Conflict Situation

According to Bratic (2007) “[t]he ultimate goal of peace journalism is to find better ways to resolve conflict, not to eliminate the evil of others who supposedly cause problems (e.g., unreasonable violence). Peace journalism concerns contexts, backgrounds, and the broad, negative consequences of violent conflicts, and seeks solutions. In this way, peace journalism opens more options to resolve a conflict constructively” (p. 8). Certain case studies and researches have shown that peace oriented reporting has the power to de-escalate conflict. For instance the Tılıç (2006) and Kondopoulou (2002) studies have shown how the media plays an important role in the conflict process; a recent example[[21]](#footnote-22) is the dispute over the island of Imia (“Kardak” in Turkish) in 1996.

According to Howard (2002) “Journalists should seek out other parties and other points of view. They should not only repeat old grievances by the old elites. Journalists should examine what the parties are seeking and the possibility for withdrawal, compromise or transcendence. Journalists should write about these possibilities. With conflict analysis, journalists can understand what diplomats and negotiators are trying to do, and can report it more reliably. With conflict analysis, journalists can identify more sources to go to for information” (p. 13). Howard (2002) uses the term “conflict analysis,” which is useful for journalists to understand and better cover the conflict.

“Tehranian (2002) is an exemplar of those peace journalism scholars who assert that peace building requires a media system that promotes peace rather than war, understanding rather than obfuscation, tolerance rather than hatred, celebration of diversity rather than xenophobia” (p. 74) (Galtung, 2000, 2000b, cited in Ross, 2006; pp. 6-7). Tehranian’s (2002) suggestion to media is important; however, there are a lot of obstacles to peace journalism which were discussed above. For instance, structure of the media, language of the media, “rating culture” (Shinar’s term), news values, and market pressure are all determines the news structure.

Wolfsfeld (2004) stresses how a successful peace process needs time but mainstream media do not have time to wait. Media workers want to be conveying their news faster to their audience. Wolfsfeld (2004) states that:

A successful peace process requires patience, and the news media demand immediacy. Peace is most likely to develop within a calm environment and the media have an obsessive interest with threats and violence. Peace building is a complex process and the news media deal with simple events. Progress toward peace requires at least a minimal understanding of the needs of the other side, but the news media reinforce ethnocentrism and hostility toward adversaries. (p. 2)

### 2.4.3.4 The Role of the Media in Conflict Resolution, Examples

Obviously, the media do not cause conflict by themselves, but they may provoke conflict in the news stories. It should not be claimed that media should solve the problems among the conflicting parties.

Melone, Terzis and Ozsel (2002) argue that “The media in conflict-ridden countries often play a significant role in creating and furthering both facilitating factors and triggering factors, for example by utilizing ‘oppositional metaphors’ (‘us’ and ‘them’) linked to internal and external issues of ‘threats’ facing the nation” (p. 1).

It is, however, unfair to accuse only media about the conflict, but media has power and while the journalist is framing the news, he or she also contributes something for peace and reconciliation.

The Cyprus Conflict is a good example of how the media are covering and framing the news stories in order to establish positive or negative public opinion. Another important pointy is that if the journalist does peace oriented reporting, everything could be different. The 24th April Annan Plan referendum is an important example of how Cyprus media play a positive and negative role on the public opinion. During the referendum period Turkish Cypriot media had a positive role and they contributed something to the acceptance of the Annan Plan. For instance, Kıbrıs newspaper, which has the highest circulation in North Cyprus, gave voice to peace oriented NGOs and they supported the big peace demonstrations. That is why the news coverage of the Cyprus media is essential. According to Sevda Alankus (2005), in her article “Writing for Peace Without the Words for Peace,”

…the first three most-circulated newspapers, together with some of the private TV channels and radio stations, and also the public television and radio channel (BRT) under the control of the new government, were all strongly peace, “yes”, EU oriented in their coverage. But, still, there was a problem; their discourse was not consistent with their aim for promoting peace. (p. 4)

Conflict is good news in Cypriot media. The existing situation of Cyprus media unfortunately does not contribute anything for peace. Media do not have a ‘problem solver’ position, but they have great opportunities to inform public fairly and using peace frame while producing news stories about the “other”. For example, according to Goldhagen (1996) “The German media …played a central role in shaping the image of the ‘other’, i.e. the Jewish people, into an evil figure that had to be exterminated” (cited in Terzis, nd, p. 2). Wolfsfeld (2004) in his book *Media and the Path to Peace*, states that “Oslo Peace Process is an important example how media escalate the conflict between the Palestine and Israel sides. Several studies show how media have played a crucial role during this process. As Wolfsfeld (2004) mentions, “The media emphasized the negative aspects of the process and tended to ignore the more positive developments associated with Oslo” (p. 75).

Wolfsfeld (2004) mentions the constructive role of the media in Northern Ireland conflict. He says, “The media environment in Northern Ireland was also more conducive to peace. Citizens from both sides of that conflict use the same news media and…this leads the press play a more constructive role” (p. 159). According to Wolfsfeld the media environment is important to de-escalate the conflict; however the political environment is also important. If the political environment also demands peace, the media environment could change their reporting style from victory to solution oriented. Several studies have shown how political elites have an influence on media (Mandelzis, 2007; Herman and Chomsky, 1988; Wolfsfeld, Khouri & Peri, 2002; Gans, 2004; Shoemaker & Reese, 1996; Wolfsfeld, 1997, Lynch, 2003).

Media support “national interests” and demonize the “other” sides in the Middle East. Mainstream media use “sensationalism” criterion to sell the news and escalate the conflict. Rinnawi (2007) states that, “…al-Jazeera is often admonished with sensationalism: reporting live from funerals, sites of conflict, filming dead bodies and the ubiquitous checkpoints dividing up Palestinian territories and lives.” This kind of presentation of stories is not helping anybody, because it does not make conflict transparent and understandable. It just creates sensations and escalates the conflict rather than contributing something to a solution.

The Middle East’s mass media is an important example for peace and conflict journalism. Kasbari (2007) points out that the media in the Middle East make no positive contribution to the peace in the region. Kasbari (2007) states that:

For the past seven years, and since the outbreak of the Intifada, media in the Middle East has been engaged in reporting on conflict rather than on conflict prevention and some media may even, voluntarily or involuntarily have added to the conflicts. Exercising considerable influence over public opinion, Middle East media may be seen as having contributed to the escalating cycle of violence through incitement, stereotyping and supporting the growing disillusionment with the peace process. (p. 1)

Another example of media in conflict situations comes from Foqaha (2006). He gives Palestinian media as an example to show how media follows the national policy and does not suggest anything for peace. Foqaha (2006) states that, “The Palestinian media failed to take an impartial role in covering the conflict. Instead, the Palestinian media reported events from a purely Palestinian national perspective. Being neither war nor peace media, the Palestinian media has not play a very constructive role in covering the Palestinian – Israeli conflict in part because it left no space for the “Other” to address the Palestinian public and in part because it failed to carry the Palestinian message of peace to the public on the “other side”. The media has been under the influence of politics and has finally come to reflect the political reality prevailing in the region” (p. 9). The same things could be said for Israeli media, as Shinar (2007b) stresses: “In the Middle East, most Israeli, Arab, and Palestinian mainstream media have not been investing serious efforts in peace-oriented communication.”

Moreover, Kasbari (2006) notes that “Many Palestinian journalists think that the profession is a sort of national patriotic task for them – playing a role in the struggle for freedom *through* the press and taking an active political role as journalists” (p. 40). If Palestinian journalists were able to shrug off this weight of patriotism within the profession they could play a more positive and constructive role in order to successfully affect the peace process.

Bishop, Roy, Hmielowski, Han, White, Baltodano, Kang-Graham and Ross’s (2007) study of discourses of the US and Canadian media in their representations of Israel and Hezbollah have shown that “Israel is characterized in a positive light while Hezbollah is consistently demonized. The responsibility of the conflict is placed squarely on the shoulders of Hezbollah and there is very little historical and cultural specificity of the conflict in this discourse” (p. 17). US and Canadian media also do not make the conflict more transparent to their audience. They are framing the Israel and Hezbollah conflict in a “zero-sum” perspective and in this way they are legitimizing the war.

Bratic (2007) points out that the role of the media in the Bosnian conflict is problematic. He states that, “…Bosnian conflict was that the propaganda of the ethnic television stations was instrumental in spreading the message of hate and inciting the conflict. During the war, all three ethnic groups utilized radio and television broadcasting to further their strategies and demonize their opponents” (Buric 2000; Sadkovich, 1998; Thompson, 1999) (p. 14). Bratic’s (2007) example is another reason for journalists to take responsibility and does not become a tool of propaganda, because the results would lead to undesirable problems.

Papanikolatos and Dimitras (1999) claim that “Mass media in the Balkans do not promote diversity” (p. 1). They give some examples from Balkans countries’ mass media. They state that:

The Macedonian press, which is a major participant in the shaping of national consciousness, finds it essential to present Macedonians as superior to their neighbors. In Albanian media the images of Greeks are closely related to Greece’s policy towards its Albanian immigrants. Oftentimes this leads to hostile collective generalizations or extreme characterizations. Croatian media are full of pejorative characterizations of Serbs and Macedonians, leading to the ‘logical’ conclusion that Croats are a superior race. Hate speech in Greek media is directed mainly towards Turks and Macedonians. (Papanikolatos & Dimitras, 1999, p. 3)

Another example could be Turkish – Greek media. Tilic (2006) describes the Greek and Turkish media coverage of each other, which was conflict oriented until the earthquake in Turkey in 1999. After the earthquake both Turkish and Greek mass media started to publish/broadcast more positive news. A few years later the media on both sides returned to the same discourse which is “we” and “the other” rhetoric. As Tilic (2006) mentions, “Often, Greece is presented as the bad "other" against which "we" the good Turks are defined. There have also been times during which this general tendency changed radically. However, this change has never been initiated by the media itself or independent of state policies. If the image of Greece in Turkish newspapers changed from negative to positive or if Turkish papers stopped referring to Greece as "the other", it corresponded with a change in the official attitude of Turkey towards their neighbor” (p. 19). Tilic (2006) also stresses the official attitude or political environment are essential to media. Otherwise, the Turkish and Greek mass media do not have a demand to change their reporting style.

Jaeger’s (2004) quantitative content analysis of German press coverage of French-related issues from 1946 to 1970 indicates that “the German press actively contributed to the reconciliation process by, e.g. overcoming media selection routines and the depiction of French actors in a mostly positive or at least neutral way” (p. 27). This finding is important, but we should not forget that the political environment at that time in Germany. Germany had to cooperate with France because of capitulation. Jaeger’s (2004) study also argues that media could not create peace alone; they always need the proper political environment.

Northern Ireland’s mainstream media is a good example of peace journalism in conflict situations. For Baker (2005) “There has been a general consensus in support of the peace process and Agreement [Good Friday Agreement] among Northern Ireland’s mainstream media. The three regional daily newspapers - the nationalist Irish News, the unionist News Letter and the slightly less partisan, though editorially unionist, Belfast Telegraph/all regarded the Agreement as an opportunity for Northern Ireland to break from its violent past” (p. 381). Several studies show that (Wolfsfeld, 2001; Bratic, 2007) news media in Northern Ireland played an essential role during this peace process “thus facilitating its adoption in the referendum” (Bratic, 2007, p. 2). Gadi Wolfsfeld’s analysis (2001) of Northern Ireland newspaper editorials shows “how editorial practices helped the peace agenda while maintaining journalistic integrity and professionalism” (Bratic, 2007, p. 2). Editorial practices are enough however, for a peace process. The structure of the media, news values, political elites and ordinary people’s demand for peace is also important within this process. The Northern Ireland example shows how media and political environment worked together for successful peace. On the contrary, the use of government control on the media for hatred and propaganda could negatively influence the conflicting parties. As Howard (2003) argues, “The use of government-controlled Radio-Television Libre de Mille Collines, to foment genocidal impulses in Rwanda in 1994, is one appalling contemporary example” (p. 1).

Another extreme example of escalating the role of the journalist in a conflict situation is Hutu radio station. Fröhlich argues that, “An extreme example of “hate media” is the incitement to violence against ethnic Tutsi (who were referred to as cockroaches) and moderate Hutu in the build-up phase of the 1994 Rwandan genocide by Radio Milles Collines, the Hutu extremist radio station” (p. 34).

We should not overestimate the role and effect of the media in society in any particular conflict situation. For instance, in the First World War journalists did not inform society enough. Tony Harcup argues, in “*Journalism Principles and Practice”* (2004) that: “If people really knew, the war would be stopped tomorrow. But of course they don’t know and can’t know. The correspondents don’t write and the censorship would prevent the truth” (p. 62).

Another example is US coverage of the Vietnam War. Thussu and Freedman (2003) explain how media played a vital role and helped finishing the US-Vietnam war. “One of the key turning points of the war was the transmission of a special report by the country’s most celebrated news anchor, Walter Cronkite of CBS” (p. 5). These examples show that the role of the media in conflict situations is serious, but because of the monopolization of media industries, media start to be the tool of certain people and this is an important obstacle in peace journalism.

**Chapter 3**

# 3 RESEARCH METHODOLOGIES

## 3.1 Research Design

In this study, quantitative research and framing analysis were employed. Quantitative content analysis was used to see what kind of news topics are selected, which sources are used, and how these news stories are presented; “[q]uantitative content analysis is a useful method to analyze the manifest content. It is also claimed to be ‘objective and systematic’” (Singletary, 1993, p. 281).

Together with the results of the quantitative content analysis, framing analysis was used, so that the way that the columnists represent the “other” side would be revealed by examples. Frame analysis is defined by Robert Entman (1993) as “selecting some aspects of perceived reality and make them more salient in communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or recommendation.” This theory suggests that the media use particular frames when covering issues. This study looks at whether the media in Cyprus use conflict frame or peace frame while producing news stories and opinion articles about the “other”.

Greek and Turkish Cypriot newspapers were used for quantitative content analysis. This analysis shows how Greek and Turkish Cypriot media cover the North/South, and which frames “they” tend to use.

## 3.2 Sample of the Study

Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot newspapers are the subjects of this study, as newspapers have an impact on building peace among the communities and decreasing the conflicts among them.

Five Turkish and five Greek Cypriot newspapers were selected as samples for a “news analyzing” study, in order to evaluate Turkish/Greek Cypriot press coverage of the Cyprus conflict. The Greek Cypriot newspapers are Alithia, Haravghi, Phileleftheros, Simerini and Politis; the Turkish Cypriot papers are Kıbrıs, Afrika, Yenidüzen, Halkın Sesi and Volkan. The samples for this research study were publications in May 2006.

The first aim of this study was to find out the type of news made by the Cypriot press on issues related with each other and especially on the Cyprus conflict. In order to understand the tendencies of the Cypriot press on this issue, the date 2006 was taken as a sample and news analyses were carried out. After the data was compiled and analyses carried out, upon the suggestion of the thesis observation committee members the columnists were also included in the study. Columnists have the capacity to affect a lot of people with their ideas, so not including columnists would lead to incompleteness in the evaluation of the issue. So in October 2006, in addition to the news analysis, columnists were also examined. Although a different date was chosen for the columnists the content was the same. At the end of the research, the opportunity was provided to carry out evaluation of both news and columns. The opinion columns published in the Greek Cypriot press are translated daily word-by-word by the Greek Service of TRNC Presidency and by the Press Office of the Embassy of Turkey in Nicosia.[[22]](#footnote-23)

## 3.3 Instruments and Data Gathering Procedures

In order to examine the news coverage of the Cyprus conflict and how the Turkish and Greek Cypriot press are covering the “other side” a ‘Content Analysis Coding Schema’ was developed.

In this ‘Content Analysis Coding Schema’, there are 16 questions related to the coverage: evaluation of the headline, quoted sources in the story, topic of news story, framing of the news, and some other technical information such as page number, size of the news, date etc.

The essential aim of this study is to explore the news coverage of the Turkish/Greek Cypriot media and how each news media frames the “other” within their coverage. This will help in formulating a peace journalism approach for journalism professionals in Cyprus.

The ‘Content Analysis Coding Schema’ also addresses these issues: how Turkish/Greek Cypriot journalists select headlines [positive, natural, negative], who writes the stories [source[[23]](#footnote-24) of the stories], who are the most quoted sources in the stories? What is the length of the story? What are the word choices of the journalist/newspaper? What are the dominant frames? [Peace or conflict oriented frames].

The samples for this research study were publications in May 2006. The ‘Content Analysis Coding Schema’ was applied to news stories related to the Cyprus Conflict, Turkey, Greece, and Turkish and Greek Cypriots. The selected items ranged between: 1110 news items from the Turkish Cypriot newspapers and 309 news items from the Greek Cypriot newspapers. Although 1110 news items were found for the Turkish Cypriot press, the analysis must be done with caution. It is very difficult to explore the Turkish Cypriot press coverage with these 666 news items on the Cyprus Conflict, Greece, or Greek Cypriots. In order to see how Turkish Cypriot press frames the “other” in their coverage, 444 news items produced in the Turkish Cypriot press have been selected for analysis.

Five Turkish and five Greek Cypriot newspapers were selected as samples for this study, in order to analyze Turkish/Greek Cypriot press coverage of the Cyprus Conflict. The Greek Cypriot newspapers are Alithia, Haravghi, Phileleftheros, Simerini and Politis; the Turkish Cypriot papers are Kıbrıs, Afrika, Yenidüzen, Halkın Sesi and Volkan. The Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot newspapers included in the study were analyzed from original newspapers. The Greek Cypriot newspapers were read with the help of Şifa Aslan, who is a translator of the Greek language working in the Turkish News Agency. Within the scope of this research, the news in five chosen newspapers from the Greek Cypriot Press was assessed together with Şifa Aslan according to the “Content Analysis Coding Schema”. While choosing news from original newspapers care was given to choose topics related to Turkish Cypriots, Turkey and the Cyprus problem.

The basic aim of this chapter is to explore the Turkish/Greek Cypriot columnist’s articles and their coverage of each other to see how they frame the “other” in their coverage. This will help us to understand the role of opinion leaders in the newspapers in creating a negative/positive effect on the Cyprus Conflict members of both societies.

In order to examine the Turkish/Greek Cypriot columnist’s article coverage of the Cyprus Conflict and how they are covering the “other side” a *‘Columnist Content Analysis Coding Schema’* has been developed.

In this schema there are 28 questions related to the article coverage: general topic of the article, quoted sources such as official or unofficial sources, ethnic, antagonistic and politic descriptions, and dominant frames in the article [Peace or conflict oriented frames].

The samples for this research study were publications in October 2006. The ‘Columnist Content Analysis Coding Schema’ was conducted on columnist articles related to the Cyprus conflict, Turkey, Greece, and Turkish and Greek Cypriots. The selected items ranged between; 246 columnists’ articles from the Turkish Cypriot newspapers and 100 columnists’ articles from the Greek Cypriot newspapers. The fact that the number of columnists of the Turkish Cypriot Press was more than double the number in Greek Cypriot Press is related to the number of columnists. There were 64 columnists who wrote articles in the Turkish Cypriot Press that were included in the study during the period of research, whereas there were 49 columnists who wrote articles in the Greek Cypriot Press. In other words, there were 15 extra columnists in the Turkish Cypriot Press. Also if the custom of writing daily columns is kept in mind, an increase in the number of articles is inevitable.

Five Turkish and five Greek Cypriot newspapers were selected as samples for this study, in order to analyze Turkish/Greek Cypriot columnist articles coverage of the Cyprus Conflict. The Greek Cypriot newspapers are Alithia, Haravghi, Phileleftheros, Simerini and Politis; the Turkish Cypriot papers are Kıbrıs, Afrika, Yenidüzen, Halkın Sesi and Volkan.

## 3.4 Research Statement and Hypothesis

This study will seek to answer the research question: “To what extent are the print media of each of the two communities in Cyprus negatively oriented towards their constructed other in coverage of the Cyprus Conflict?”

One major and three minor hypotheses are tested. The major hypothesis is: “The coverage and framing of news by Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot journalists are negatively oriented towards their respective “Other.” The basic rationale for this hypothesis is that, in the current practice of journalism in Cyprus, and in the context of the ongoing ethnic conflict, bad news about the other is seen as good news as it serves certain political agendas; traditional Western-oriented news values are also conflict-oriented.

Minor hypotheses:

1. Turkish and Greek Cypriot journalists’ framing of news about the “other” side is more conflict-oriented than peace-oriented.

2. The Cyprus media more likely choose stories such as crime, rape, and drug use which can be considered as negative rather than positive stories from the other side when they are not covering Cyprus Conflict.

3. The values and practices of journalism in Cyprus are not contributing to reconciliation and peace between the Turkish and Greek Cypriot communities.

Chapter 4

# ANALYSIS OF THE “NEWS COVERAGE” OF THE CYPRUS CONFLICT

## 4.1 Findings and Interpretations of Greek Cypriot Press

Before revealing the results of the study, the following evaluation benchmarks used in the process must be explained: (i) Positive (towards the other), (ii) Neutral (descriptive) and (iii) Negative (towards the other)[[24]](#footnote-25). If the headline of the news includes any *positive* description towards the other such as, empathy, or solution oriented etc. it is marked as positive. An example of a positive headline would be: “Barış kırlangıcı sandıklarda” [Peace dovetail at the polls] (Politis), “Barışa şarkılar yeniden sahnede” [Songs for peace are back on stage] (Yenidüzen).

*A neutral* headline describes what happened without passing judgment by making direct quotation in the headline from a source. For example: “Türkiye’den Larnaka’ya uçuşlar” [Fligths from Turkey to Larnaka] Haravghi newspaper, “Sahte 10 KL” [Fake 10 Cyprus Pound] (Afrika).

*A negative* headline can be categorized as a headline which labels the ‘other’ as the adversary, portraying distrust towards the ‘other’ within a win-lose frame. Examples of negative headlines are: “Güney Kıbrıs, uyuşturucu merkezi” [South Cyprus, a safe heaven for drugs] (Volkan), “Türkiye için çetin poker. Viyana’da yoğun perde gerisi” [Crucial poker for Turkey. Intensive backstage at Vienna] (Phileleftheros).

### 4.1.1 Evaluation of Greek Cypriot Press Headlines

The ‘Content Analysis Coding Schema’ results show the majority of the Greek Cypriot newspaper headlines related to the Cyprus Conflict, Turkey, and Turkish Cypriots[[25]](#footnote-26) are neutral or descriptive (65.4%). The negative headlines (31.1%) are not to be underestimated; only 3.6% of the news headlines were positive.

However, we must be cautious in our interpretation of the results in Table 1, as they do not show us the majority of the journalists who are doing neutral reporting (65.4%). Therefore, we can deduce that Greek Cypriot press tends to describe the events through a transmitter rather than playing a positive role within the spectrum of both Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities.

The ‘Content Analysis Coding Schema’ shows that Politis newspaper (7.3%) has published more positive headlines than the other Greek language newspapers. Simerini newspaper (39.3%) has published a surplus of negative headlines; Alithia (79.2%) newspaper has published additional neutral headlines.

Politis newspaper’s editorial policy is in support of peace initiatives and as such, publishes more positive headlines (7.3%) in relation to the other newspapers. The editorial policy of the Simerini newspaper has aligned itself with the fanatic right wing, thus, they publish more negative headlines (39.3%). Alithia can be described as a liberal newspaper and tends to provide more neutral headlines (79.2%). More neutral headlines alone do not represent quality journalism. If any journalist needs to practice quality journalism, he or she needs to use peace journalism principles, such as giving voice to all parties in the conflict, trying to find common ground, being human- and solution-oriented. Furthermore, Alithia journalists/editors tend to play a passive role when selecting headlines. As Kocaman (2006) states “…point of view or the ideological stance of the paper affects the way news is represented in the headline” (p. 14).

Table : Evaluations of the headlines of Greek Cypriot press on Cyprus Conflict, Turkey, or Turkish Cypriots.

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### 4.1.2 The Source of Greek Cypriot Press Stories

Table 2 shows that the majority of the news reports on the Cyprus conflict, Turkey, and Turkish Cypriots published the Greek Cypriot newspapers were written by their own reporters (52.4%). The majority of Greek Cypriot newspapers are financially capable of employing journalists to meet their requirements. As such, most Greek Cypriot newspapers are independent in covering their own stories; therefore they are not dependent on the information made available by press agency sources. As a result, only 6% of the Greek Cypriot press use news agencies and other media (2.9%) such as newspapers from North Cyprus as the source of their stories. The percentage of the “unknown source” in the stories is important: 44% of news stories do not state any source of the story in the Greek Cypriot press.

Table : The sources of stories in the Greek Cypriot press on the Cyprus conflict, Turkey, or Turkish Cypriots.

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### 4.1.3 Quoted Sources in the Greek Cypriot Press

According to Table 3, a clear majority of Greek Cypriot press use only one quoted source (57.3%) in their stories on the Cyprus conflict, Turkey, or Turkish Cypriots. 20.1% of news stories include two quoted sources. The Table 4.1.3 results are significant for peace journalism news values.

Even though the percentage of the one quoted source (57.3%) in the stories is high, more than two quoted sources (33.3%) are also significant. According to peace journalism news values it is important to increase the number of quoted sources in the story. Table 3 indicates that a minority of the Greek Cypriot press (33.3%) cover their stories with more than two quoted sources.

Table : The quoted sources in the Greek Cypriot press on the Cyprus conflict, Turkey, or Turkish Cypriots.

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### 4.1.4 Greek Cypriot Quoted Sources in the Stories of the Greek Cypriot Press

Table 4 shows that the Greek Cypriot press tends to give more voice to public officials (23.6%). When we calculate the percentages of all elite quoted sources such as the president, president of the general assembly, ministers, and public officials, the figure reaches 37.74%.

For peace journalism, elite-oriented news coverage is problematic. Journalists tend to provide elite-oriented coverage because they can reach these sources easily. There are three problems with using elite sources: (i) journalists become a voice of the elite sources, rather than giving voice to the public; (ii) journalists become passive and act only as a transfer medium, rather than as active creators of the news; (iii) journalists edge away from criticising actions, because they have strong relations with their sources (the president, president of the general assembly, ministers, and public officials’).

Table 4 indicates the lack of attention given to non-governmental organizations (2.3%) and the public (2.3%), by the Greek Cypriot press. Instead, they give voice to elite authorities. 13.3% of the news stories include two or more sources.

Table : The Greek Cypriot quoted sources in the stories of the Greek Cypriot press on the Cyprus conflict, Turkey, or Turkish Cypriots.

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### 4.1.5 Turkish Cypriot Quoted Sources in the Stories of the Greek Cypriot Press

Table 5 illustrates the fact that the Greek Cypriot press do not give space to Turkish Cypriot sources in their news stories. The results signify a clear majority (83.8%) of Greek Cypriot newspapers do not quote sources from Turkish Cypriots. The resources used in the news published in the Greek Cypriot Press are Greek Cypriot, which shows the lack of communication between the two sides.

Table : The Turkish Cypriot quoted sources in the stories of the Greek Cypriot press on the Cyprus conflict, Turkey, or Turkish Cypriots.

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### 4.1.6 International Sources Quoted in the Stories of the Greek Cypriot Press

Table 6 shows that a clear majority of the Greek Cypriot press tend to quote Greek officials (8.7%) as international sources in their stories, and international non-governmental organizations or experts. Results also indicate that Greek Cypriot press do not quote (68.9%) international sources in general.

Table : The international quoted source in the stories of the Greek Cypriot press on the Cyprus conflict, Turkey, or Turkish Cypriots.

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### 4.1.7 Length of the Story in the Greek Cypriot Press

In peace journalism, the length of the story is important: while journalists are writing their stories about any conflict, they generally do not need to give background information, and because of this most of the audience does not understand the dynamics of the conflict. This is why the peace journalism approach encourages journalists to provide as much background information as they can. As George A. Hough (1995) notes, “...longer stories, [are] often more important stories” (p. 303).

The author of this study has determined the number of the story categories he has used, but has taken David Carr’s (2002) article as a reference for this division. Carr notes in his article how print media have reduced the word number in their news stories: “…the 4,000-word article has become a relic, first replaced by the 800-word quick take and then further boiled to a 400-word blurb that is little more than a long caption.” The length of the story is divided into three categories: (i) short (less than 200 words), (ii) medium (between 201-499 words) and (iii) long (more than 500 words).

Table 7 shows that the Greek Cypriot newspapers write articles of medium length (51.8%) for news related to the Cyprus conflict, Turkey, and Turkish Cypriots. Newspapers in the South do not write long news articles about the Cyprus conflict or Turkey/Turkish Cypriots; the majority of the Greek Cypriot press provide their news as medium or long length stories (69.6%). In other words, the news values of the Cyprus Conflict, Turkey and Turkish Cypriots oriented news are significant.

Table : The story length in the Greek Cypriot press on the Cyprus conflict, Turkey or Turkish Cypriots.

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### 4.1.8 Page Numbers of the News of Greek Cypriot Press

According to the results, the news items under study are usually on page 6 (20.4%) and page 8 (10%). The Cyprus conflict, Turkey, or Turkish Cypriots as the subject matter of news stories mostly appear on pages 1 to 8. The percentage of news stories published between pages 1 and 8 is 64.1%. The 64.1% shows that the Cyprus conflict, Turkey or Turkish Cypriot related stories are valuable news for the Greek Cypriot press, and they tend to publish them on the front pages of the newspaper.

### 4.1.9 Photo Usage in the Greek Cypriot Press

Table 8 indictes that a clear majority of Greek Cypriot newspapers use photographs (69.9%) in the Cyprus conflict, Turkey or Turkish Cypriot -related stories. In the press, editors believe that to make a news story more visible and attractive on the page, they should publish a photograph. Like words, a photograph has the power to set the agenda and affect readers. Another reason why editors publish a photograph is to increase the credibility of the news, which thus has a stronger effect on the readers.

Table : The photo usage of the news in the Greek Cypriot press on the Cyprus conflict, Turkey or Turkish Cypriots.

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### 4.1.10 Size of the News Stories within Greek Cypriot Press

When the editors of newspapers set the agenda, they also pay attention to the size of the news stories. Editors tend to provide extra space for important stories, either because of the importance of the news or because the editor wants to set the agenda on that subject.

The results indicate that the Greek Cypriot press tends to give significant space for the Cyprus conflict, Turkey or Turkish Cypriots related news stories. According to Table 9, 41.7% of stories were published as a half page in the Greek Cypriot press; 1/4 page followed the half page in 23.9% of the cases.

Table : Size of the news stories in the Greek Cypriot press on the Cyprus conflict, Turkey or Turkish Cypriots.

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### 4.1.11 Story/Item Types in the Greek Cypriot Press

The results show that the Greek Cypriot press has a tendency to publish “news stories” rather than “interviews”. A clear majority of Greek Cypriot newspapers published 95.1% of their stories as news stories.

Table : Story/item types within Greek Cypriot press on Cyprus Conflict, Turkey or Turkish Cypriots.

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In peace journalism news values, “journalists must spend more time in news reporting precisely because they must investigate more. Interview type of story takes more time. Deadline pressures encourage many otherwise fine journalists to make concessions in quality in order to convey their news faster to readers and audience” (Ersoy, 2006, p. 73). As such, the percentages of interview stories are in the minority (4.2%).

### 4.1.12 Story Topics within Greek Cypriot Press

One of the minor hypotheses of this study is that Cypriot media prefer to choose negative stories such as crime, rape, and drug use rather than other positive stories from the other side. This hypothesis was partly supported. Police, courts, accidents and disasters as news from the other side could be counted as negative stories. The percentage of all these news is 15.5%. The significant result is that the number of story topics related to th Cyprus conflict (34.6%) and Turkey (25.9%) is high.

Another interpretation of these results is that most of the Greek Cypriot newspapers publish 25.9% of their stories on Turkey. There is a general tendency in the Greek Cypriot press to depict Turkey as a basic reason for the Cyprus Conflict. According to Greek Cypriots, the Cyprus problem was started in 1974, and Turkey is still occupying the north side of the island. For this reason, 25.9% of news topics are related to Turkey. The Greek Cypriot media tries to prove that Turkey is an occupier of North Cyprus through these news articles.

The number of news articles about social and cultural activities is unusually low (5.8%): social and cultural activities do not only mean bi-communal activities; an unofficial meeting of politicians would alsobe in this category.

Table : Story topics in the Greek Cypriot press on the Cyprus conflict, Turkey or Turkish Cypriots.

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### 4.1.13 Content of news on the Cyprus Conflict

Results show that if the topic of the news is on the ‘Cyprus conflict’[[26]](#footnote-27), it is generally related to negotiations (14.2%) and general (9.7%) issues. The Annan Plan in general (2.6%) is not the most prominent subject in the news topics, and it has lost its popularity among the Greek Cypriot press.

Table : Story topics in the Greek Cypriot press on the Cyprus conflict, Turkey or Turkish Cypriots.

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### 4.1.14 Criticism Regarding Government’s Cyprus Policy within Greek Cypriot Press

Table 13 illustrates that there is no criticism (95.8%) regarding the government’s Cyprus policy: the Greek Cypriot press just serves the news related to the Cyprus conflict as it is, without any criticism of government policy. In other words, it functions simply as a transmitter between the source of the news and the audience. This is a passive role which does not question the source or the validity of the information; as a result, the sources of the news are able to insist on their own realities and legitimize their ideas within the news.

Table : Criticism regarding government’s Cyprus policy in the Greek Cypriot press on the Cyprus conflict, Turkey or Turkish Cypriots.

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## 4.2 Findings and Interpretations of Turkish Cypriot Press

### 4.2.1 Evaluation of Turkish Cypriot Press Headlines

The ‘Content Analysis Coding Schema’ was conducted on news stories related to the Cyprus conflict, Greece, and Greek Cypriots in the Turkish Cypriot press. The number of selected items was 1110.

The Turkish Cypriot press tends to use the daily Turkish News Agency (TAK)[[27]](#footnote-28) which publishes a “Greek Cypriot Press Bulletin.”[[28]](#footnote-29) There are various reasons why the Turkish Cypriot press tends to publish these news stories; and one is financial. The economic power of most of the Turkish Cypriot newspapers is insufficient to fund the employment of journalists to meet their requirements. As a result, they prefer to use ready-made news distributed by TAK. The press sector is another reason: the press has to be fast in order to convey their news to readers throughout the world; therefore, it uses ready-made news stories. The usage of the Greek Cypriot Press Bulletin in the Turkish Cypriot newspapers is highly significant. 666 out of 1110 news items published in Greek Cypriot newspapers have been published in the Turkish Cypriot press. In other words, *444* news items have been covered by Turkish Cypriot journalists. Although we have 1110 news items for Turkish Cypriot press, we must be cautious while analyzing them. It is very difficult to explore the Turkish Cypriot press coverage through these 666 news items on the Cyprus conflict, Greece, or Greek Cypriots. In order to see how the Turkish Cypriot press frames the “other” in their coverage, 444 news items produced in the Turkish Cypriot press have been selected for analysis.

Table 14 shows that a clear majority of the Turkish Cypriot newspapers’ headlines (72.1%) on the Cyprus conflict, Greek, or Greek Cypriots are neutral or descriptive. 24.9% of news headlines are negatively oriented towards the “other”; positive headlines make up only 2.9 percent.

The ‘Content Analysis Coding Schema’ results show that Volkan newspaper has published more negative headlines (38.8%) among the Turkish-language newspapers. Halkın Sesi has 29% and Kıbrıs 23.4% negative headlines. Afrika has published more positive headlines 5.3% compared to the others (4.3%) and the headlines of Yenidüzen followed Afrika in terms of publishing positive headlines (4.3%). Yenidüzen has published more neutral (82.6%) headlines compared to the other newspapers.

According to Volkan’s editorial policy as an opposition paper and hence nationalist in ideology, it does not support unification. The paper tends to use more negatively oriented news headlines and to try to highlight the bad sides of the “other” for its readers. Halkın Sesi is the second newspaper that published the most negative headlines; the basic reason is that it is a right-wing newspaper that does not support initiatives towards unification of the island. Kıbrıs is the third newspaper which published the most negative headlines. With the highest circulation in the North, Kıbrıs is highly influential; however, after the Annan Plan referenda in 2004, its editorial policy was modified.[[29]](#footnote-30) The results show that Kıbrıs has more negatively oriented headlines on the Cyprus conflict, in line with its editorial policy. The editorial policy of Afrika, an opposition paper in North Cyprus, is to take an active stand on resolving the Cyprus problem; thus the paper publishes more positive headlines 5.3%.

Yenidüzen published more neutral headlines (82.6%) for its readers. Yenidüzen chooses more descriptive news headlines, which describe what happened without passing judgment, and by making direct quotations from sources in the headlines.

Table : Evaluations of the headlines of the Turkish Cypriot press on the Cyprus conflict, Greece or Greek Cypriots.

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### 4.2.2 The Source of Turkish Cypriot Press Stories

The ‘Content Analysis Coding Schema’ results show that in the clear majority of Turkish Cypriot newspapers, sources of the stories are unknown (70.3%). Most of the newspapers use the Turkish News Agency’s ‘Turkish News Bulletin’. The significant consequence is that the Turkish Cypriot press do not write the names of their sources, such as TAK, Anatolian Agency, Reuters, and Associated Press. Only Yenidüzen newspaper tries to put in the names of its sources; as the results indicate, Yenidüzen has the lowest percentage (37.4%) of unknown sources for its stories. The other Turkish Cypriot newspapers do not explain the sources of the stories (Kıbrıs 67.7%, Halkın Sesi 82.6%, Volkan 88.3%, and Afrika 80.7%).

Results also indicate that, 11.5% of the news is written by Turkish Cypriot journalists and 18.2% is taken from news agencies. This means that the majority of Turkish Cypriot newspapers are not financially capable of employing journalists.

444 news items were covered by Turkish Cypriot journalists; whereas, 666 out of 1110 items of translated news from the Greek Cypriot press were used. In other words, 666 news items, or 59.8% of the sources of the stories published in the Turkish Cypriot press, were based on Greek Cypriot press summaries.

Table : The source of Turkish Cypriot press stories on the Cyprus conflict, Greece or Greek Cypriots.

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### 4.2.3 The Quoted Sources in the Turkish Cypriot Press

According to the results of table 16, a clear majority of Turkish Cypriot press use only one attributed source (69.9%) in their stories on the Cyprus conflict, Greece or Greek Cypriots. 13.3% of news stories have attributed sources.

From the perspective of peace journalism, a single attributed source in a news story is very problematic. According to peace journalism, while producing news stories, media should take care for not using a single attributed source. Peace journalism suggesting to journalist to look at the events in multi perspectives. The ideal way to look multi perspective in the news stories is; increasing news sources. If journalist increases the news sources it will allow them to give voice to all conflict sides and opportunity to find out truth in conflict process.

The Table 16 results are significant for peace journalism news values. It will help to provide fair and true information to the public if journalists increase the number of their cited sources while they are writing the news. The Turkish Cypriot press, however, tends to use only one attributed source in its articles. There are two basic reasons; firstly Turkish Cypriot newspapers do not have enough reporters to cover stories and increase the number of quoted sources; secondly, they prefer to take the easy way in reporting; they do not investigate issues deeply and prefer to report news as it appears.

Table : The quoted sources of the stories in the Turkish Cypriot press on the Cyprus conflict, Greece, or Greek Cypriots.

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### 4.2.4 Turkish Cypriot Quoted Sources in the Turkish Cypriot Press

Table 17 shows that the Turkish Cypriot press gives more voice to public officials (14%). When calculated, the percentages of all the elite quoted sources, such as the president, president of the general assembly, ministers, and public officials, reach 31.4%.

Table 17 indicates that the Turkish Cypriot press gives voice to non-governmental organizations (8.3%), which is significant for peace journalism; however, they give voice to public in only 2.3% of the cases, because they prefer to use the voices of elite authorities. 9.7% of news stories included two or more sources in the stories.

Table : The Turkish Cypriot quoted sources in the stories of the Turkish Cypriot press on the Cyprus conflict, Greece or Greek Cypriots.

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### 4.2.5 Greek Cypriot Quoted Sources in the Turkish Cypriot Press

The Table 18 results indicate that a clear majority of the Turkish Cypriot press (80.6%) do not give space to Greek Cypriot sources in their news stories. The significance of these results is that while the Turkish Cypriot press covers the “other” side in their news, journalists tend to identify Greek Cypriots as “Rum(s)” in general rather than giving their official titles and names. For instance, *“Rumlar, Kıbrıslı Türkler için hazırlanan 259 milyon Euro’luk yardımı bloke ediyor*” [Rums are blocking the 259 million Euro’s aid allocated for the Turkish Cypriots] in Volkan newspaper. In this example, the news story is related to Greek Cypriots but there is no quoted Greek Cypriot source. There are two important problems with this sort of news story. Firstly, there is a generalization of the Greek Cypriot community, and when the Turkish Cypriot press use only “Rum” to specify the Greek Cypriot community it is problematic. It is dangerous to generalize Greek Cypriot society when any Greek Cypriot does something bad.[[30]](#footnote-31) The second problem is that Turkish Cypriot journalists just cover the story without providing a quotation from any source of the “other side”. From the perspective of peace journalism, journalists should cover both sides’ opinions, and if possible, increase the number of sources.

Table : The Greek Cypriot quoted sources in the Turkish Cypriot press on the Cyprus conflict, Greece or Greek Cypriots.

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### 4.2.6 International Quoted Sources in the Stories of the Turkish Cypriot Press

Table 19 shows that a clear majority of the Turkish Cypriot press tends to quote Turkish officials (7%) and European Union officials (5.2%) as sources. The results also indicate that a clear majority of the Turkish Cypriot press (76.6%) are not quoting from international sources in general.

Table : The international quoted sources in the stories of the Turkish Cypriot press on the Cyprus conflict, Greece or Greek Cypriots.

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### 4.2.7 Length of the Story in the Turkish Cypriot Press

The length of the story is divided into three categories: (i) short (less than 200 words), (ii) medium (between 201-499 words) and (iii) long (more than 500 words).

Table 20 indicates that Turkish Cypriot newspapers use a short length (48.6%) for news items related to the Cyprus conflict, Greece, and Greek Cypriots. 36.5% of news stories published by the Turkish Cypriot press are of medium length. Another result is that newspapers in the north do not write lengthy (14.9%) news articles regarding the Cyprus conflict, Greek or Greek Cypriots. The majority of the Turkish Cypriot press provide their news as short or medium length (69.6%).

Table : The story length in the Turkish Cypriot press on the Cyprus conflict, Greece, or Greek Cypriots.

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### 4.2.8 Page Numbers of the News in the Turkish Cypriot Press

According to the results, the distribution of the news on pages varies in Turkish Cypriot newspapers. Cyprus conflict, Greece, or Greek Cypriots related news stories are generally published on pages 1 to 15. The percentages of news stories published on these pages is equal to 70.1%. This figure indicates that the Cyprus conflict, Greece, or Greek Cypriots related stories are valuable news for Turkish Cypriot press and they tend to publish them on the front pages of the newspaper.

Most Turkish Cypriot newspapers give two pages (22.7%) for Cyprus conflict, Greece, or Greek Cypriots related news stories. The results also show the significance of the Cyprus Conflict as news for the Turkish Cypriot press.

### 4.2.9 Photo Usage in the Turkish Cypriot Press

Table 21 shows that photograph usage in the Turkish Cypriot press is 52.5% in Cyprus conflict, Greece, or Greek Cypriots related stories. 47.5% of news items do not include a photograph. Here again, economic problems become important: first of all, most of the Turkish Cypriot press do not have journalists to cover stories related to the Cyprus conflict or Greece/Greek Cypriots; and secondly, even if the newspaper or news agency had a reporter he/she would not cross the borders and cover the story with photographs.

Most of the published photographs are related to elite persons, such as the president of the republic, the prime minister, ministers and experts. According to table 17, the percentages of all elite quoted sources reach 31.4%. These results indicate that it is normal to find elite persons’ photos in the newspapers.

Table : The photograph usage in the news of the Turkey Cypriot press on the Cyprus conflict, Greece or Greek Cypriots.

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### 4.2.10 Size of the News Stories in the Turkish Cypriot Press

When the editors of newspapers set the agenda, they pay attention to the size of the news stories. Editors tend to provide extra space for important stories, either because of the importance of the news or because the editor wants to set the agenda on that subject.

The results indicate that the Turkish Cypriot press tends to give a significant place to the Cyprus conflict, Greece or Greek Cypriots related news stories. According to Table 22, 33.1% of stories are published as a quarter page (1/4) in the Turkish Cypriot press. The half page (1/2) percentage follows the quarter page (22.7%).

Table : Size of the news stories in the Turkish Cypriot press on the Cyprus conflict, Greece, or Greek Cypriots.

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### 4.2.11 Story/Item types in the Turkish Cypriot Press

The results indicate that the Turkish Cypriot press has a tendency to publish “news stories” rather than “interviews” or “opinion editorials.” A clear majority of the Turkish Cypriot newspapers published 98% of their stories as news stories.

From the standpoint of peace journalism news values, journalists should spend more time in news reporting precisely because they must investigate more. The interview type of story takes more time for journalists, and industrial time limits encourage many otherwise fine journalists to make concessions in quality in order to convey their news faster to their readers (Ersoy, 2006, p. 73). As a result, the percentages of interview stories are in the minority (1.4%).

Table : Story/Item types in the Turkish Cypriot press on the Cyprus conflict, Greece, or Greek Cypriots.

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### 4.2.12 Story Topics in the Turkish Cypriot Press

One of the minor hypotheses of this study is that the Cypriot media prefer to publish negative stories on topics such as crime, rape, and drug use rather than other positive stories from the other side. This hypothesis is partly supported. News from the other side on the police, courts, accidents and disasters could be counted as stories in the negative category. The percentage of all this news is 8.5%. The significant result is that the Cyprus conflict (47.5%) and Turkey (36.5%) related story topics are high.

Another significant result is that most of the Turkish Cypriot newspapers publish 36.5% of their stories on Turkey. Table 24 shows that there is a general tendency in the Greek Cypriot press to pinpoint Turkey as the basic cause of the Cyprus Conflict; Turkish Cypriot authorities thus publish press releases about Turkey in order to respond to the claims published in the Greek Cypriot press.

Social and cultural activity related story topics are low in number (4.7%); Turkish Cypriot editors are not interested in events related to socio-cultural activities.

Table : Story topics in the Turkish Cypriot press on the Cyprus conflict, Greece, or Greek Cypriots.

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### 4.2.13 Content of News on the Cyprus Conflict

Results show that if the topic of the news is on the ‘Cyprus Conflict’, it is usually related to general matters (31.8%)[[31]](#footnote-32) and the Annan Plan in general (6.5%). The Annan Plan in general (6.5%) is still a relevant news subject for the Turkish Cypriot press. Table 25 indicates that in the Greek Cypriot press the Annan Plan has lost its news value; however, the Turkish Cypriot press still publishes this kind of news, and keeps it on the agenda.

The Cyprus policies of the governments on both sides also affect this process. The general tendency of the Greek Cypriot government regarding the Annan Plan is not to believe that the plan is on the negotiation table and that it may be opened for negotiation. The Turkish Cypriot government however, believes the Annan Plan is on the negotiation table and when the negotiations start again, it may be reopened. When the elites talk in the media, they also shape the news topics; as a result, the percentage of topics on the Annan Plan in the Turkish Cypriot newspapers is higher than in Greek Cypriot newspapers.

Table : Story topics in the Turkish Cypriot press on the Cyprus conflict, Greece, or Greek Cypriots.

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### 4.2.14 Criticism Regarding Government’s Cyprus Policy in News in the Turkish Cypriot Press

Table 26 shows that there is no criticism (97.3%) of government in the papers; the Turkish Cypriot press covers the news as it is concerning the Cyprus conflict without providing any criticism of the government’s policies.

Actually there are many opposition voices to the government’s Cyprus policy in the Turkish Cypriot press; however; because they use the Turkish News Agency as a news source, it is difficult to identify these criticisms in the news. Only 12 percent of news included criticism of the government’s Cyprus policy.

Table : Criticism regarding the government’s Cyprus policy in the Turkish Cypriot press on the Cyprus conflict, Greece, or Greek Cypriots.

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Chapter 5

# ANALYSIS OF GREEK CYPRIOT “COLUMNISTS”

## 5.0 Introduction

The basic aim of this chapter is to explore Greek Cypriot columnists’ articles to see how they frame the “other” in their coverage. This will help us to provide an understanding the role of opinion leaders in the newspapers in influencing readers about the Cyprus conflict in both communities.

In order to find out the Turkish/Greek Cypriot columnists’ article coverage of the Cyprus Conflict and how they deal with the “other side” a ‘Columnist Content Analysis Coding Schema’ was been developed.

In this schema there are 28 questions related to article coverage: the general topic of the article, quoted official or unofficial sources, ethnic, antagonistic and politic descriptions, and dominant frames in the article [peace or conflict oriented frames].

The samples for this research study were publications in October 2006. The schema was applied to columnists’ articles that were related to the Cyprus conflict, Turkey, Greece, and Turkish and Greek Cypriots. The selected items ranged between 246 columnists’ articles from the Turkish Cypriot newspapers and 100 columnists’ articles from the Greek Cypriot newspapers.

Five Turkish and five Greek Cypriot newspapers were selected as samples, in order to analyze Turkish/Greek Cypriot columnists’ articles’ coverage of the Cyprus conflict. The Greek Cypriot newspapers were Alithia, Haravghi, Phileleftheros, Simerini and Politis; the Turkish Cypriot papers were Kıbrıs, Afrika, Yenidüzen, Halkın Sesi and Volkan.

The Greek Cypriot columnists’ articles were taken from the Office of the Presidency of the TRNC and the Republic of Turkey’s Nicosia Embassy Press Office.[[32]](#footnote-33) Both institutions translate daily the Greek Cypriot columnists’ articles related to Turkey, Cyprus and Turkish Cypriots.

Framing Anaysis was also applied to Cypriot journalist’s opinion columns. Dominant frames in the opinion articles [peace, conflict, descriptive/informative oriented frames] were analysed from the perspective of the Framing Analysis.

There are five main categories under the name of “PEACE FRAMES”: (i) Solution Frame, (ii) Balance and Descriptive Frame, (iii) Empathy Frame, (iv) Win – Win Frame, (v) Anti-nationalist Frame.

*(i) Solution Frames* have four subcategories: a. Inclusive Oriented, b. We Are Friends Oriented, c. Common-Ground Oriented, d. Friendly Speech Oriented. Here are some examples for each category of the solution frames:

a. Inclusive Oriented: These kinds of peace frames do not exclude, and accept the opposite side without any discrimination on grounds of ethnicity, as in the frame used by Yenidüzen newspaper columnist Sevgül Uludağ in her column: *Whether they are Turkish Cypriots, Greek Cypriots, or coming from another nation, all missing persons are humans... We must return them to their families”* (4 October, 2006). Another example in this category is the nonexcluding frame used by Alithia newspaper columnist Vasos Georgiou: *“I belong to a group of few people who think that the respect and value one gives to another person has nothing to do with race, colour, wealth, ideology, or belief. It has nothing to do with the car he/she uses or the house he/she lives in. No matter how much it is justified, I detest hate. I also reject the worst kind of hate. This is not the hate one feels towards another person or some people, but, if it is possible (which it is) it is the hate felt towards an entire nation”* (3 October, 2006).

b. We Are Friends Oriented: These frames have been spotted in opinion columns where people perceive each other as friends rather than enemies, such as, for example, in Alithia columnist Glafkos Ksenos’s friendship-focussed framed article entitled “Salih’s humanity”: *“As he was leaving, Salih gave me a bottle of whiskey. He told me, ‘drink to my health and remember me. We, the poor people, despite the bad things that happened to us and despite the sufferings we endured caused by those who destroyed you and us, we have not lost our humanity. I, too, have lots of property in Paphos. Do you think that I do not wish to return there? I learned a lot of things about your father, about the goodness of your mother, my son.’”* (3 October, 2006). Another example comes from Şener Levent, the editor of Afrika newspaper: *“Those who walk the same roads cannot end up at different places, Greek brother”* (1 October, 2006).

c. Common Ground Oriented: Ideas and proposals put forward to find and establish middle ground in disputes fall under this category, such as the frame used by Halkın Sesi columnist Özcan Özcanhan in his article entitled “first let’s look at ourselves”: *“But, if we, for a moment, could stop a little and with a clear head look at ourselves first, make a sound evaluation, and face the facts!!” (*7 October, 2006). Similarly, Alithia columnist Glafkos Ksenos’ frame is as follows: *“And Tafal (Special envoy of the UN secretary general at the time) once told me that Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots are crazy, because instead of being entrenched in war and changing this country into a divided hell, we could have cooperated in peace transforming it into a welfare heaven”* (1 October, 2006).

d. Friendly-Speech Oriented: Frames formed from a friendly conversational style are placed in this category: when dealing with the opposite side in a friendly manner, rather than in conversations with swearing, vengeance, or hate, as in Vasos Georgiu’s article in Alithia: *“I declare that I do not hate Turkish Cypriots, I do not hate Turks, I do not hate settlers, I do not hate anyone. To the contrary, I love the whole world without any discrimination parallel to the teachings of Christianity and our Orthodox Church”* (3 October, 2006). Another example shows how even in the saddest events the issue can be discussed without any feelings of vengeance or hate. Sevgül Uludağ frames her article as follows: *“If those that are still alive would tell and confirm the things that took place there, then the bishop at Cikko should ask for an investigation, find out who were responsible of those events at the monastery and if it is true, he should come forward and apologize to the public about what has happened”* (4 October, 2006).

*(ii) Balance and Descriptive Frames* have three subcategories: a. Fair Play Oriented, b. Criticize Own Government Oriented, c. Applause Oriented. Examples for each category of the balance frames are given below:

a. Fair Play Oriented: Rather than place events in frames like “we won, they lost,” as is done in the sports press, events need to be put into a fair and defining frame. As Niyazi Kızılyürek, Yenidüzen columnist, writes in his article “Turkish Cypriot democracy and criticizing Turkey”: *“The Turkish Cypriots who began to form their institutions starting from the beginnings of the 20th century, started to organize and react in various ways to the Greek Cypriots who wanted to unite the island with Greece”* (4 October, 2006). Another example is the defining frame used by Politis columnist Makarios Drousiotis: *“On this issue there is similarity with the Greek Cypriot theses, but their purpose is entirely different. The Greek Cypriots say that there are no isolations, Whereas Turkish Cypriots want the immediate implementation of the direct trade regulation of April 24, 2004”* (1 October, 2006).

b. Criticize Own Government Oriented: A wrong is wrong everywhere in the world; there can be no “our” side and “opposite” side. If the government that governs the community one lives in makes mistakes, journalists should not ignore them. Frames that identify the mistakes in the community one lives in are placed in this catagory. One example is Alithia columnist Glafkos Ksenos’ article “a scorpion closed in a bottle” criticising the government: *“Saying that we have put the government of Turkey in a tight corner, the government spokesman is trying to beautify the situation. But instead of convincing others about our stand, we are continuously arguing with everyone. We are isolated in the bottle of an uncompromising policy and of a poisonous behaviour. We ignore the famous saying ‘A scorpion in a closed bottle can only bite itself’”* (5 October, 2006). And although Kıbrıs newspaper columnist Hasan Hastürer bases his article on a frame of “us and them”, it serves as another example as he criticizes the community he lives in[[33]](#footnote-34): *“On the one hand the desire to join the EU family was expressed, but on the other, ... we have been reluctant to contribute to solution formulae where everyone will be a winner, we failed to be credible”* (7 October, 2006).

c. Applause Oriented: This frame was added to the diagram as an opposite to “blame”. If there is something nice and praiseworthy in any of the communities, this should be “applauded” and praised, no matter which community it is in. Articles that applaud good works without any ethnic discrimination are placed in this category. Thus in his article “You harvest what you sow...” Kıbrıs newspaper columnist Hasan Hastürer uses an example of an “applause frame” when he praises Greece and the Greek Cypriots: *“By speaking in the European language and by achieving the necessary work according to those principals, Greece and the Greek Cypriots have arrived at this point. They have succeeded in bringing their demands and the European criteria together. They have not harmed themselves with zigzags, with back and forths, or with machinations”* (7 October, 2006). No articles in the “Applause Oriented” frame were encountered in the Greek Cypriot press during the period of this study (October, 2006).

*(iii) Empathy Frames* have three subcategories: a. Understanding the Other Oriented, b. Trust Oriented, c. Unprejudiced Oriented, d. Accept Other As It Is Oriented, e. Other In The Self Oriented. Below are some examples for each category of the empathy frames:

a. Understanding the Other Oriented: Ideas and thoughts in articles trying to understand the views and thoughts of the opposite side were evaluated in this category. Vasos Georgiou’s article published in Alithia newspaper is an example of this frame: *“Independent from whether I consider them to be right or wrong, Turkish Cypriots feel unwanted and their pride is hurt after the strong ‘no’ reply. Even though most Greek Cypriots would not believe me, I found out that Turkish Cypriots have pride, too”* (3 October, 2006). Yenidüzen columnist Sevgül Uludağ’s article dealing with the process of excavations and the finding of missing persons remains is another frame that tries to understand the suffering of both Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot missing persons: *“One must show respect to the period of grieving, the issue should not be used in “mediatic” programs for the sake of discussion, this should be avoided, we should refrain from increasing the deep suffering by the families of missing persons”* (7 October, 2006).

b. Trust Oriented: Opinion columns expressing trust in the other side and evaluating issues within this framework have been handled under this category. However, no articles were encountered in the “Trust Oriented” frame in the Cyprus press during the study period (October, 2006) in the newspapers studied.

c. Unprejudiced Oriented: Frames free from prejudice and not formed from rigid ideas are identified as “frames with no prejudices” in the diagram. However, no articles were encountered in the Cyprus press reflecting an “Unprejudiced Oriented” frame in newspapers during the study period (October, 2006).

d. Accept Other As It Is Oriented: These are frames that accept the opposite side as it is and tries to understand this stance. No article in the frame “Accept Other as it is Oriented” was encountered in the papers of the Cyprus press during the study period (October 2006).

e. Other In The Self Oriented: Article frames where writers talk about the (other), without discriminating between “us and them” while evaluating the issues, were studied under this heading. Here writers accept that human evil comes to them from outside, but they do not think that evil can exists within them, as well. However, no article in the “Other in the Self Oriented” frame was encountered in the newspapers of Cyprus during the study period (October, 2006).

*(iv) Win – Win Frames* have two subcategories: a. Emphasize Both Sides’ Pains Oriented, b. Good/Good or Bad/Bad Oriented. Examples for each category of the win-win frames are given below:

a. Emphasize Both Sides’ Pains Oriented: Journalists prioritize the sufferings of the community they live in during conflict. Conflict creates suffering for all segments of society, so giving priority to the sufferings of one side would amount to belittling the sufferings of the “other” side. This type of frame could even lead to violence in the future by the side whose suffering is not given importance. Frames mentioning joint sufferings were considered, and Kıbrıs newspaper columnist Düzgün’s article under the title “Turkeys and chickens” serves as an example[[34]](#footnote-35): *“Everyone grieved for their own and shaped their history, their ideology, and their culture accordingly. And this formed the separate ethnic identities of the Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots. “The concept “the other” came into being which did not include the sufferings of the other side and was completely opposite to each other. Due to traumatic experiences, ethnic identity can turn into a ticking time bomb. When instigations and scratchings begin it may explode at any time. Well, what needs to be done? According to Vamik Hoca, “the Swiss cheese with holes formula” can be tried”* (2 October, 2006). Politis newspaper columnist Kiriakos Cambazis’ frame reflects not only the problems of Greek Cypriots, but also those of Turkish Cypriots: *“The Akritas Plan was a coup plan put into action in December 1963. The tragic events that came later created the two essential data: The first; The Turkish Cypriots were expelled from all state organs. And the second, they were declared as “rebels” by the Greek propaganda, that is they were declared as the enemy of the state of which themselves wanted to dissolve. They created a special army with the state’s approval in order to destroy the rebels. However, those who killed Turkish Cypriots - not only the rebels – instead of surrendering to justice and being tried, they became heroes. After 43 years, as we today look for the bones of these individuals, we declare that ‘during those days even the noses of Turkish Cypriots were not broken”* (7 October, 2006).

b. Good/Good or Bad/Bad Oriented: It should not be considered right to portray a good thing as “bad” just because there is a conflict, or just the opposite, to portray something bad as “good.” Articles frames that say “good” for good and “bad” for bad were studied, such as the frame in an article by Yenidüzen columnist Sevgül Uludağ: “Unknown assassins remain unknown... Families of murdered victoms and families of the missing, and people who were harassed – whether Turkish Cypriot or Greek Cypriot - continue to suffer” (4 October, 2006). Alithia columnist Mihalis Papapetru, in an article where he evaluates the Annan Plan, uses the “bad/bad” frame with self-criticism and without ethnic discrimination: “*It was to show that the Greek Cypriot side, at the most critical turning point, was not ready to accept a solution inspired by the philosophy of the Annan plan. Let us be honest... What was rejected was not some articles of the Annan plan. If we did not like them, we could have negotiated to change them. What we rejected was the essence. It was the philosophy of the plan. And without even taking into account that the UN plans we accepted before (The Indicators, the Joint Plan, the Ghali Set of Ideas, and even the 3rd Annan Plan in La Hague) were inspired by the same plan… with only one difference… At that time, there was Denktash and we were able to hide behind his uncompromising attitude and we were able to collect the merits of moderation from the international community”* (4 October, 2006).

*(v) Anti-nationalist Frames* have two subcategories: a. Forgiveness Oriented, b. History – Culture Oriented. Examples for each category of the anti-nationalist frames are as follows:

a. Forgiveness Oriented: Unforgiveness is a psychological situation which harms both the unforgiving persons themselves and those not forgiven. To forgive does not mean “to forget”; it is an act that needs to be done in order that there will be no more suffering and to learn lessons from the past while building the future. It can be said that nationalist segments develop a vindictive attitude rather than a forgiving one after clashes. Articles written with a forgiving and constructive style have been studied under this category; however, no article with the “Forgiveness Oriented” frame was encountered in the newspapers in the study period (October 2006).

b. History – Culture Oriented: When analyzing events, benefiting from history and culture helps columnists. In order to understand the dynamics of a clash, the historical and cultural events of that period should be mentioned and analysis should be made in that direction. Articles that evaluate events with a focus on history and culture and in a non-nationalistic frame were studied. One example is Sevgül Uludağ’s article “will we be able to show the light to the dark side of our common history?”: *“I wonder about how much light we are able to sho light to the dark side of our history. From the traumas of war, from the anger of our communities hit squads, from harassments, from rapes, from actions of suppression, the dark face of our commun history formed by eyes blinded by nationalism is looking at us through the mirror… How much are we disturbed by this? Do we find serenity from living on this island like this?”* (4 October, 2006). No article in the “History-Culture Oriented” frame was encountered in Greek Cypriot newspapers in the period (October, 2006) of the study.

There are five main categories under “CONFLICT FRAMES”: (i) Status Quo Frame, (ii) Unbalance Frame, (iii) Antipathy Frame, (iv) Win – Lose Frame, (v) Nationalist Frame.

*(i) Status Quo Frames* have five subcategories: a. Exclusive Oriented, b. They Are Our Enemy Oriented, c. Just War Oriented, d. Hate Speech Oriented. Examples for each category of the status quoframes are provided below:

a. Exclusive Oriented: These kinds of conflict frames exclude the opposite side and practice ethnic discrimination; they consider the opposite side as the “other” and see it as apart from themselves. Simerini columnist Lazaros Mavros in his article specifically excludes the TRNC citizens who are of Turkish mainland origin with this frame: *“First of all, they see a fantastic mirage. Especially in the ‘Turkish Cypriots’ factor. The dream of sharing is being established together with the ‘Turkish Cypriots.’ Above all, as if they do not see, they do not understand, and they do not know that this factor is a population created by the Turkish military administration... The majority of the settlers ... together with the present leadership are obedient organs of the expastionism of the Kemalist Turkish state and of the military administration... Here is an obvious proof: They say he comes from the ‘left’ and they say he is among ‘progressives, but he is no other than Attila’s present political agent, 1974’s proud fighter, Memet Ali Talat”* (5 October, 2006). Volkan columnist Rauf Raif Denktaş’s excluding and insulting frame for Greek Cypriots, showing them as “separate” from the Turkish Cypriot community is as follows: *“Then let us repeat the national formula and let us inform the EU that this will be defended to death so that the EU, thinking that Turkish Cypriots have given up their argument for separate national sovereignty, state, that it is one of the two separate, equal, and sovereign people, will not attempt to stick us to the lying machine of the Greek administration with blood on its hands, with a bad record, an administration that can say “no Turk was killed between 1963 and 1974”* (6 October, 2006).

b. They Are Our Enemy Oriented: These frames perceive those that are different from oneself as “the enemy”. In this way, any attack against the “enemy” is legitimized and shown to be right. Volkan columnist Seyyan Uzunoğlu’s article, in which he uses the frame which sees Greek Cypriots as “the enemy” is an example: *“Yes my esteemed readers. They are not giving us the possibility to forget that pig’s tail. Because that pig’s tail will not become straight even until doomsday. And so long as it does not become straight, hoping that the heathen will become a friend is unfortunately beyond naivety, beyond good intentions. To think otherwise is obviously harmful for us. Hundreds of years of enmity will not go away with neither “gali-merhaba” programs nor with ‘foreign son-in-law” series; niether with hands waiting in the air, nor with being one step ahead; niether compromise upon compromise, nor wearing cross earings and the like will appease the heathen’s vengeance and hate towards the Turk or will it make him forget” (*2 October, 2006). Fileleftheros columnist Mihalis Pasardis’ use of the frame showing Turkey as the “Attila”, that is, as the enemy, is another example: *“A big section of Cyprus’ territory continues to be under the occupation of Turkey since the barbarous invasion of Attila who turned the country into ruins”* (4 October, 2006).

c. Just War Oriented: Frames that seek the solution in clashes/violence and war rather than establishing a middle ground in disagreements were evaluated in this category. Halkın Sesi columnist İsmet Kotak, in his article entitled “on two statements” uses such a frame while evaluating the results of unification: *“Not division but unification is a mistake. Unification brings war, brings destruction”* (1 October, 2006). Fileleftheros columnist Yanakis Omirou’s use of the war terminology frame in his article is another example: *“In addition, we have also emphasized that the right to use the veto, should be an inseparable part of our arsenal.”* (1 October, 2006).

d. Hate Speech Oriented:Frames that include a phraseology of swearing, vengeance, hate, while mentioning the opposite side, were added to this category. Some expressions used by Fileleftheros columnist Yanakis Omirou are examples: *“What a pity that Turkey, despite its impudence, its conceitedness, its provocativeness, and despite its distortion of reality, has received the ticket to begin accession nigotiations”* (1 October, 2006). Volkan columnist Hasan Keskin’s article “a study in south Cyprus” uses a frame which includes swearing, vengeance, and hate: *“If members of EOKA with blood on their hands can cross to the north, if baby-killer National Guard officers can roam in north Cyprus, why can’t I? Why can’t I cross? I cross no matter what. And the Greek is also ready for unification they say. Every Greek I saw turned their behind towards me, pulled down their pants, and showed their asses”* (1 October, 2006).

*(ii) Unbalance Frames* have three subcategories: a. Sport Oriented, b. Accuse Other Side’s Government Oriented, c. Blame Oriented. Examples are as follows:

a. Sports Oriented: To reflect events as in the sports press with frames such as “we won, they lost.” Frames which try to establish which side won by reporting the clashes as if they are sports fall into this category. Kıbrıs columnist Bilbay Eminoğlu uses sports jargon in the following frame: *“For this reason, until isolations on the Turkish Cypriots are lifted, Turkey will not open its ports to Greek Cypriot ships and planes” said Prime Minister Erdoğan. To this “What are our theses. Prime Minister Erdoğan’s responsibilities are towards the EU" said the Greek Cypriot Leader Papadopoulos, throwing the ball to the EU”* (4 October, 2006). Alithia columnist Mihalis Papapetrou in his article “looking for perspective” uses sports jargon as follows: *“The ball is completely in Christofias’ court”* (4 October, 2006).

b. Accuse Other Side’s Government Oriented: If the governments administering the community you live in make mistakes and by ignoring these you see only the mistakes of the governments of the “opposite” or the “other” side. Frames expressing this are studied under this category. In the “view column” of Fileleftheros, the government of the Turkish Cypriot side is accused as follows: *“On one day Pertev would reach a compromise on issues discussed, the next day he would challenge everything. The delaying tactics were obvious and it was related to EU-Turkey issues and their implementation. The UN spokesman put forward ideas but these ideas were rejected by Talat”* (4 October, 2006). Yenidüzen columnist Hasan Erçakıca’s frame accusing the Greek Cypriot side is as follows: *“The Greek Cypriot side is putting up obstacles to finding pragmatic solutions to daily life problems”* (2 October, 2006).

c. Blame Oriented: This is a frame accusing the “other” side; the type of frame where the responsibility of a conflict is completely passed on to the opposite side in order to demonstrate one’s righteousness. Volkan columnist Sabahattin İsmail accuses the Greek Cypriot side as follows: *“The Turkish Cypriot people have not done anything to deserve the embargoes... Resisting against Greek aggression, against ethnıc cleansıng, agaınst genocide, claming its legal rights and interests gained through agreements, defending its independence, sovereignty, freedom, and partnership rights are not actions necessitating the implementation of an embargo”* (2 October, 2006). Simerini columnist Savvas Yakovidis’ frame accusing Turkey is as follows: *“Because here, freedoms, values and principals, the ideals and democratic institutions on which the EU is founded are being violated totally by Attila”* (4 October, 2006).

*(iii) Antipathy Frames* have five subcategories: a. Other Is The Threat Oriented, b. Distrust Oriented, c. Prejudiced Oriented, d. Inferior Oriented, e. Self And Other Oriented. Below are some examples of each category:

a. Other Is The Threat Oriented: These are frames where the content of the articles dwell on seeing the other side as a “threat” rather than trying to understand its views and thoughts. In an article published in the opinion column of Simerini, Turkey is being threatened with “veto”: *“We will acquiesce to bitter compromises – perhaps more bitter – by paying the price and compromising in our national cause and the president will come again gilding it and making us swallow it: ‘Do not worry. We still have about 30 little vetos”* (4 October, 2006). Seyyan Uzunoğlu’s frame seeing the Greek Cypriots as a threat is as follows: *“As a matter of fact, the Greek, by applying terror excluded its Turkish partner and organized massacres and attempted genocide on Christmas evening in 1963. Those who think that with so-called joint membership to the EU stitched to the sly and bad-intentioned Greek will get us anywhere; they should understand where it will take us by looking a little back to history. We always say and we will continue to say: Here is the minority of Western Thrace Turks in a EU member Greece! Never mind about making use of their rights as EU members, our brothers are even forbidden to say they are Turks. If today you have not yet learned what kind of struggle they are waging to live as human beings, please make an effort and research it. Because to be stitched to the Greek only to become a member of the EU, will first take us to the position of our brothers in western Thrace, and then take us to Crete. There is no other way to this”* (2 October, 2006).

b. Distrust Oriented: Opinion columns that express mistrust to the other side and evaluate issues within this framework were taken up in this category. A section in Volkan newspaper columnist Seyyan Uzunoğlu’s article is an example: *“We always say and we will continue to say: Here is the minority of Western Thrace Turks in a EU member Greece! Never mind about making use of their rights as EU members, our brothers are even forbidden to say they are Turks. If today you have not yet learned what kind of struggle they are waging to live as human beings, please make an effort and research it. Because to be stitched to the Greek only to become a member of the EU, will first take us to the position of our brothers in western Thrace, and then take us to Crete. There is no other way to this”* (2 October, 2006). Alithia columnist Mihalis Papapetru in his article entitled “Looking for perspective” expresses his mistrust of the other side in the following frame: *“A very strong, wounded and an unrefined neighbour will bully trying to solve its internal problems. Then, are we aware of the danger we will be facing?”* (4 October, 2006).

c. Prejudiced Oriented: These are frames that approach events with prejudices and with rigid ideas. In an article entitled “Critical hours” published in Haravgi newspaper, there is prejudice against Turkey: *“What is certain is this: In the end, Turkey, as if she is the compromising side, “contrary to what she does) will appear to be the side who is contributing to find a sollution to the Cyprus problem. This was the aim from the very start of those who were thinking of lifting the so-called isolations towards the Turkish Cypriots “in return” for Turkey’s compliance to her EU responsibilities”* (6 October, 2006). Volkan columnist Tanju Müezzinoğlu puts forward his prejudices towards Greek Cypriots in his article within this frame: “*THE GREEKS WILL NOT SIGN ANY AGREEMENT WHICH IS CLOSED TO ENOSIS”, “They will put the Turkish Cypriots into whatever dark holes they want and the rest is obvious. Something similar to Crete will be applied in Cyprus. And the EU will be a spectator to the massacres ast happened in Bosnia”* (7 October, 2006).

d. Inferior Oriented: These are frames that do not accept the opposite side as it is but see it as “lacking quality” or being “inferior”. Volkan columnist Günay Yorgancıoğlu’s article is an example, showing Greek Cypriots as “inferior”: *“Do not see the Greek as an angel. ‘You will fall into the Greek’s trick, but then it will be too late’ we said”* (7 October, 2006). In an article published as the view of Simerini newspaper, the proposals of the opposite side are framed as inferior and it is emphasized that the Turks have remained the same throughout the years: *“What we are facing is the obvious immoral Turkish bargaining, something which the years did not wear out”* (3 October, 2006).

e. Self And Other Oriented: Ideas and thoughts that make the differentiation of “us” and “them” when evaluating issues are gathered under this category. In these differentiations, while “we” are continuously framed as good, clean, and innocent, “they” are continuously framed as bad, dirty, and guilty. In an article by Simerini columnist Savvas Yakovidis, such a differentiation is made between Turks and Europeans: *“In Europe and with us, the familiar Turkish bargainings do not pass”* (4 October 2006). The frame of “us” and “them” used by Halkın Sesi columnist Reşat Akar[[35]](#footnote-36) is another example: *“During that period, it was us who were oppressed economically, it was us who could not produce enough and could not export what we produced, never mind about going abroad, it was us who could not even go to the Kyrenia harbour...”, “We are here and we are ready for peace... how about them?”* (4 October, 2006).

*(iv) Win – Lose Frames* fall into two subcategories: a. Emphasize One Side’s Pains Oriented, b. Good and Evil Oriented. Below are some examples of each category of the win-lose frames:

a. Emphasize One Side’s Pains Oriented: Ideas and views that frame sufferings from clashes focussing only on one side and viewing events from only one angle were taken up here. Halkın Sesi columnist Osman Güvenir’s article entitled “The bones of eleven innocent Turks” is an example of this category since it focuses only on the sufferings of the Turkish Cypriot side: *“The bones of eleven Turks finally came out from under the ground to daylight. The rounding up of innocent people from the streets, beginning in 1964, and being murdered and buried at misterious places, has been documented today”* (7 October, 2006). In a frame found in an article published in Haravgi newspaper, it is mentioned that Greek Cypriots became “victoms” in the Cyprus issue and a one-sided suffering is indicated: *“They have come to a point where they are asking the change not from the victimizer, but from the victim”* (6 October, 2006).

b. Good and Evil Oriented: Frames based on the dichotomy “we are ‘good,’ they are ‘the devil’” were studied under this section: The use of this type of frame justifies the violence done by the demonized and dehumanized side. The frame used in an article by Abdullah Azizoğlu of Volkan newspaper, vilifying the “opposite“ side is an example: *“AKEL secretary general and the head of demons; the most pro EOKA of the enemies sent a mesage to the Turks of Cyprus and “By standing upright in our “common homeland” Cyprus and to struggle in order to prevent partision ” he said and continued his blabber “in order to preven partition, we can struggle together, Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots…”* (7 October, 2006). The frame of Haravgi columnist Lenia Stilyanu, when she shows the government of the community she lives in as good and the other one as bad is as follows: *“The Cyprus government, by demonstrating its goodwill, has given a positive reply to the demand of the Turkish Cypriots to open the occupied Famagusta harbour for trade with other countries”* (6 October, 2006).

*(v) Nationalist Frames* fall into two subcategories: a. Revenge Oriented, b. Who Threw the First Stone Oriented. Examples for each category are given below:

a. Revenge Oriented: Expressions/sentences based on retribution which nationalists promote after clashes are marked as “revenge oriented”. In these frames, a phraseology of vengeance and retribution rather than a phraseology of forgiveness is dominant, as in the frame based on revenge and retribution used by Alithia columnist Vasos Georgiu: *“Because as done by most of the displaced, if we forget our suffering, if we tend to our wounds and if we get comfortable through legal, but mostly illegal methods, then the spark that will bring the final light will die out forever, and then dreams will not be able to take revenge”* (3 October, 2006). Halkın Sesi columnist Osman Güvenir’s frame, far from forgiveness and based on retribution, is another example: *“But the sufferings and the retributions will always remain the same. These children of the missing who have been suffering for years and condemned to live without fathers, will they forgive the Greeks and their terrorist presidents? What gut can get rid of that hatred?”* (7 October, 2006).

b. Who Threw the First Stone Oriented: The metaphor “who threw the first stone” describes the first defence mechanism a person resorts to in order to apportion responsibility to the opposite side. It would be useful in reducing tension to research the dynamics of causes that brought the communities to the point of clashes rather than who started them. Volkan columnist Hasan Keskin in his article entitled “One truth remains” fictionalizes the beginning of clashes in Cyprus from a one-sided perspective: *“At one stage EOKA members attacked the Turkish Cypriots, the cries EOKA members killed Turkish Cypriots were heard all over the country. Mother and fathers rose up, Turkish youth became one fist. The TMT was founded, after many years we saw the Turkish soldiers on this land. Then the announcements that the Greeks will take Cyprus and unite it with Greece and that barbarous attacks began were heard. Hundreds of Turks were killed. Despite the fighters army the Greeks turned all of the island into an abattoir”* (3 October, 2006). Alithia columnist Glafkos Ksenos blames the opposite side and shows it to be the source of the conflict as follows: *“The opposite side says that it is conforming to international advice, however, their statements that are praised internationally, are not tested today by those who deal with the Cyprus problem. It seems that they are continuing the harmful approach of 1960”* (1 October, 2006).

## 5.1 Findings and Interpretations of Greek Cypriot Columnists

The Cyprus Conflict has significant value for the Greek and Turkish Cypriot media, and columnists from both sides are given large amounts of space for Cyprus conflict oriented news subjects.

The results from the Greek Cypriot columnists’ articles’ topics can be explained in this way: there is a general tendency in the Greek Cypriot media to depict Turkey as a basic reason for the Cyprus conflict. According to Greek Cypriots the Cyprus problem was started in 1974, with Turkey still occupying the north side of the island. In contrast, 40% of column topics are related to Turkey and its European Union affairs. The Greek Cypriot media try to prove that Turkey is an occupier of North Cyprus in their columnist articles; and Table 27 shows that the majority of the Greek Cypriot columnists write on Turkey-European Union affairs.

Table : The percentage of Turkey-EU affairs related subjects in Greek Cypriot columnist’s articles.

Another significant result is that 46 percent of articles are related to the Cyprus Conflict. Table 28 shows the percentages for Greek Cypriot columnists in terms of the subjects they cover:

Table : Topic of the articles in the Greek Cypriot columnist’s.

|  |
| --- |
|  |

Table 29 illustrates that when the articles’ subject is related to the Cyprus Conflict, 12% are about the Annan Plan in general, 10% the Finland Proposal[[36]](#footnote-37) and 4% the property issue. The Annan Plan and other proposals are still relevant subjects for Greek Cypriot columnists.

Table : If article is about the Cyprus Conflict here is the context.

|  |
| --- |
|  |

### 5.1.1 Evaluation of Greek Cypriot Columnists’ Official Sources

The ‘Columnist Content Analysis Coding Schema’ results show that the majority of the Greek Cypriot columnists are not using the official government authorities as the mentioned or quoted sources of articles (88.8%). Greek Cypriot columnists tend to use Greek Cypriot (9%), Turkish (6%) and International (6%) official sources. An additional meaning of these results is that the Greek Cypriot columnists do not give voice to Turkish Cypriot (3%) and Greek (2%) official sources.

Table : Turkish Cypriot Officials mentioned in the Greek Cypriot papers’ opinion articles.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Newspaper** | **President** | | **Prime minister** | | **Minister(s)** | | **Other Officials** | |
|  | *Cnt.* | *Per.* | *Cnt.* | *Per.* | *Cnt.* | *Per.* | *Cnt.* | *Per.* |
| **Phileleftheros** | 0 | .0% | 0 | .0% | 0 | .0% | 0 | .0% |
| **Alithia** | 0 | .0% | 0 | .0% | 0 | .0% | 0 | .0% |
| **Haravghi** | 0 | .0% | 0 | .0% | 0 | .0% | 0 | .0% |
| **Politis** | 0 | .0% | 0 | .0% | 0 | .0% | 1 | 1.0% |
| **Simerini** | 1 | 1.0% | 0 | .0% | 0 | .0% | 0 | .0% |
| **TOTAL** | 1 | 1.0% | 0 | .0% | 0 | .0% | 1 | 1.0% |

Table 31 shows how Turkish Cypriot official sources are not mentioned in the Greek Cypriot columnists’ articles. However, Greek Cypriot official sources (94.5%) are given more space than Turkish Cypriot official sources in these articles. The Greek Cypriot columnists use the President of the Republic of Cyprus (9%), public officials (7%) and the general assembly (5%) as the sources of articles.

Table : Greek Cypriot Officials mentioned in the Greek Cypriot papers’ opinion articles.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Newspaper** | **President** | | **General Assembly** | | **Minister(s)** | | **Other Officials** | |
|  | *Cnt.* | *Per.* | *Cnt.* | *Per.* | *Cnt.* | *Per.* | *Cnt.* | *Per.* |
| **Phileleftheros** | 3 | 3.0 % | 0 | .0% | 0 | .0% | 1 | 1.0% |
| **Alithia** | 4 | 4.0% | 2 | 2.0% | 0 | .0% | 5 | 5.0% |
| **Haravghi** | 0 | .0% | 1 | 1.0% | 0 | .0% | 0 | .0% |
| **Politis** | 1 | 1.0% | 0 | .0% | 1 | 1.0% | 1 | 1.0% |
| **Simerini** | 1 | 1.0% | 2 | 2.0% | 0 | .0% | 0 | .0% |
| **TOTAL** | 9 | 9.0% | 5 | 5.0% | 1 | 1.0% | 7 | 7.0% |

### 5.1.1.1 The Official Quoted Sources in Greek Cypriot Columnists

According to Table 32 the majority of Greek Cypriot columnists use only one quoted official source (33%) in their articles on the Cyprus conflict, Turkey, or Turkish Cypriots. 9% of articles includes two quoted sources. From the perspective of peace journalism news standards it is important to increase the number of quoted sources in the story.

Table : Official government source identified in the Greek Cypriot columnists’ articles.

### 5.1.2 Evaluation of Greek Cypriot Columnists’ Unofficial Sources

Table 33 indicates that Greek Cypriot columnists do not give more voice to unofficial sources in the articles (95.8%). They give 2% voice to Turkish Cypriot unofficial sources. However, the Greek Cypriot unofficial space is 12%. For peace journalism news standards, elite-oriented news sources are problematic; journalists in Cyprus tend to provide elite-oriented sources for the reason that they can reach them easily.

Table : Unofficial sources mentioned in the Greek Cypriot papers’ opinion articles.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Newspaper** | **Turkish Cyp.** | | **Greek Cyp.** | | **Turkish** | | **Greek** | | **International** | |
|  | *Cnt.* | *Per.* | *C.* | *Per.* | *C.* | *Per.* | *C.* | *Per.* | *Cnt.* | *Per.* |
| **Phileleft.** | 1 | 1.0% | 2 | 2.0% | 1 | 1.0% | 0 | .0% | 1 | 1.0% |
| **Alithia** | 1 | 1.0% | 7 | 7.0% | 1 | 1.0% | 0 | .0% | 0 | .0% |
| **Haravghi** | 0 | .0% | 1 | 1.0% | 1 | 1.0% | 0 | .0% | 0 | .0% |
| **Politis** | 0 | .0% | 2 | 2.0% | 1 | 1.0% | 0 | .0% | 1 | 1.0% |
| **Simerini** | 0 | .0% | 0 | .0% | 0 | .0% | 0 | .0% | 1 | 1.0% |
| **TOTAL** | 2 | 2.0% | 12 | 12.0% | 4 | 4.0% | 0 | .0% | 3 | 3.0% |

When Greek Cypriot columnists use Turkish Cypriot unofficial sources, they tend to use Non-governmental organizations (NGO) as their sources (12%). Table 33 shows that the Turkish Cypriot journalists/newspapers (4%) and expert (2%) unofficial sources are followed by the NGOs.

Table : Turkish Cypriot unofficial sources mentioned in the Greek Cypriot papers’ opinion articles.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Newspaper** | **Experts** | | **NGO’s** | | **Journalists/**  **newspapers** | | **Wo/man on the street** | |
|  | *Cnt.* | *Percent* | *Cnt.* | *Percent* | *Cnt.* | *Percent* | *Cnt.* | *Per.* |
| **Phileleft.os** | 0 | .0% | 0 | .0% | 1 | 1.0% | 0 | .0% |
| **Alithia** | 0 | .0% | 0 | .0% | 0 | .0% | 1 | 1.0% |
| **Haravghi** | 0 | .0% | 0 | .0% | 0 | .0% | 0 | .0% |
| **Politis** | 0 | .0% | 0 | .0% | 1 | 1.0% | 0 | .0% |
| **Simerini** | 0 | .0% | 0 | .0% | 0 | .0% | 0 | .0% |
| **TOTAL** | 0 | .0% | 0 | .0% | 2 | 2.0% | 1 | 1.0% |

The Greek Cypriot unofficial sources are almost identical to the Turkish Cypriot unofficial sources. Greek Cypriot columnists give 8% voice to journalists/newspapers and 4% voice to the wo/man on the street. Table 35 shows how Greek Cypriot columnists do not give voice to experts and NGOs as the source of their articles.

Table : Greek Cypriot unofficial sources mentioned in the Greek Cypriot papers’ opinion articles.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Newspaper** | **Experts** | | **NGO’s** | | **Journalists/**  **newspapers** | | **Wo/man on the street** | |
|  | *Cnt.* | *Percent* | *Cnt.* | *Percent* | *Cnt.* | *Percent* | *Cnt.* | *Per.* |
| **Phileleft.os** | 0 | .0% | 0 | .0% | 2 | 2.0% | 0 | .0% |
| **Alithia** | 0 | .0% | 0 | .0% | 5 | 5.0% | 2 | 2.0% |
| **Haravghi** | 0 | .0% | 0 | .0% | 1 | 1.0% | 0 | .0% |
| **Politis** | 0 | .0% | 0 | .0% | 0 | .0% | 2 | 2.0% |
| **Simerini** | 0 | .0% | 0 | .0% | 0 | .0% | 0 | .0% |
| **TOTAL** | 0 | .0% | 0 | .0% | 8 | 8.0% | 4 | 4.0% |

### 5.1.2.1 The Unofficial Quoted Sources in Greek Cypriot Columnists’ Articles

According to results of Table 36, the majority of Greek Cypriot columnists use only one quoted unofficial source (22%) in their articles on the Cyprus conflict, Turkey, or Turkish Cypriots.

Table : Unofficial sources identified in the Greek Cypriot columnists’ articles.

### 5.1.3 Evaluation of Greek Cypriot Columnists’ Ethnic Descriptions for Themselves

The Table 37 results show that Greek Cypriot columnists emphasize Greek Cypriotness rather that Greekness (2%) or Cypriotness (0%). The Greek Cypriot columnists tend to use Greek Cypriot (23%) ethnic descriptions for describing themselves in the articles.


Table : Greek Cypriot Ethnic Description in the Greek Cypriot papers’ opinion articles.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Newspaper** | **Greekness** | | **Cypriotness** | | **Greek Cypriotness** | |
|  | *Cnt.* | *Percent* | *Cnt.* | *Percent* | *Cnt.* | *Percent* |
| **Phileleftheros** | 0 | .0% | 0 | .0% | 3 | 3.0% |
| **Alithia** | 1 | 1.0% | 0 | .0% | 8 | 8.0% |
| **Haravghi** | 0 | .0% | 0 | .0% | 3 | 3.0% |
| **Politis** | 0 | .0% | 0 | .0% | 6 | 6.0% |
| **Simerini** | 1 | 1.0% | 0 | .0% | 3 | 3.0% |
| **TOTAL** | 2 | 2.0% | 0 | .0% | 23 | 23.0% |

### 5.1.4 Evaluation of Greek Cypriot Columnists Politic Descriptions for Themselves

Table 38 shows that Greek Cypriot columnists mostly use the “Republic of Cyprus” (35%) to politically describe the Greek Cypriots. The “Greek Cypriot Side” (11%) as a political description follows the “Republic of Cyprus”. The usage of other political descriptions such as “South Cyprus Greek Administration” (1%), “Greek Side” (3%), “Greek Administration” (1%), and “Government of Cyprus” (1%) are in the minority.

Table : References to the Greek Cypriots within the Greek Cypriot papers’ opinion articles.

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**5.1.5 Evaluation of Greek Cypriot Columnists’ Ethnic Descriptions for Turkish Cypriots**

The ethnic descriptions are another important part of this research. According to peace journalism it is significant how the Other is referred to in news and columnists’ article. The results of table 39 show that the Greek Cypriot columnists have a general consensus on the ethnic descriptions for Turkish Cypriots. The Greek Cypriot columnists emphasize the “Turkish Cypriotness” of the Turkish Cypriots (40%), and do not emphasize “Turkishness” or “Cypriotness” of Turkish Cypriots in their articles.

Table : Turkish Cypriot Ethnic Description in the Greek Cypriot papers’ opinion articles.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Newspaper** | **Turkishness** | | **Cypriotness** | | **Turkish Cypriotness** | |
|  | *Cnt.* | *Percent* | *Cnt.* | *Percent* | *Cnt.* | *Percent* |
| **Phileleftheros** | 0 | .0% | 0 | .0% | 5 | 5.0% |
| **Alithia** | 0 | .0% | 0 | .0% | 8 | 8.0% |
| **Haravghi** | 0 | .0% | 0 | .0% | 8 | 8.0% |
| **Politis** | 0 | .0% | 0 | .0% | 11 | 11.0% |
| **Simerini** | 0 | .0% | 0 | .0% | 8 | 8.0% |
| **TOTAL** | 0 | .0% | 0 | .0% | 40 | 40.0% |

If one looks at the results of ethnic descriptions in the Greek Cypriot columnists in different newspapers, it can be said that Politis columnists emphasize “Turkish Cypriotness” 73.3% of the time, Haravghi 50%, Simerini 44.4%, Alithia 32%, and Phileleftheros 19.2%. The reason the Greek Cypriot columnists emphasize the term “Turkish Cypriot” when talking about Turkish Cypriots is in order to distinguish Turks and Turkish Cypriots from each other. Since this is not ethnic discrimination, it is a definition that is acceptable in peace journalism.


Table : The Greek Cypriot columnist ethnic descriptions for Turkish Cypriots by newspaper to newspaper.



### 5.1.6 Evaluation of Greek Cypriot Columnists Politic Descriptions for Turkish Cypriots

Table 41 shows that Greek Cypriot columnists mostly use the “Turkish Side” (6%) for politically describing the Turkish Cypriots. The “Cyprus Turkish Side” (4%) and “Turkish Cypriot Community” (4%) as political descriptions follow the “Republic of Cyprus.”. The usage of other political descriptions such as “Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus” (1%) and “Turkish Cypriot state” (1%) are in the minority. As the Turkish Cypriots declared their own state in 1983, Greek Cypriot columnists do not use “TRNC” as a political description for the Turkish Cypriots.


Table : References to the Turkish Cypriots within the Greek Cypriot papers’ opinion articles.



### 5.1.7 Evaluation of Greek Cypriot Columnists’ Antagonistic Descriptions for Turkish Cypriots

Table 42 shows that 34% of articles written by Greek Cypriot columnists consist of antagonistic descriptions of Turkish people and Turkish Cypriots.[[37]](#footnote-38)

Table : Turkish Cypriot Antagonistic Description in Greek Cypriot papers’ opinion articles.



### 5.1.8 Evaluation of Greek Cypriot Columnists Dominant Frames for Turkish Cypriots

Tables 43 shows the majority of Greek Cypriot columnists use conflict frames (54%) in their articles while they are writing on the Cyprus Conflict, Turkey, or Turkish Cypriots. 16% peace frames have been used in the articles; and only 11% of columnists’ articles consist of both peace and conflict frames.

Table : The Greek Cypriot columnists’ dominant frames for the Turkish Cypriots from newspaper to newspaper.

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### 5.1.8.1 Evaluation of Greek Cypriot Columnists’ Conflict Frames for Turkish Cypriots

Table 44 shows that Simerini uses 100% conflict frames in its columnists’ articles. The basic reason for this is that Simerini is an ultra right-wing newspaper in the Greek Cypriot media and they do not have any special policy on peace; this is also reflected in their columnists’ articles.

Phileleftheros (69.2%) and Haravghi (69%) newspapers are similar to Simerini in the usage of conflict frames in articles. Phileleftheros has the highest circulation in the South, and their columnists also use conflict frames.

The results shown in Table 44 are significant in this matter. Haravghi is a newspaper of AKEL, the communist party currently in the government, but its columnists use conflict frames while they are covering the Cyprus Conflict, Turkey, or Turkish Cypriots. Politis (33.3%) and Alithia (8%) are in the minority. Politis is an independent newspaper which supports peace initiatives with Turkish Cypriot columnists also contributing. This is why their conflict usage ratio is lower than that of the other newspapers. Alithia has close ties with DISI, the main opposition party. It opposes governmental policies and supports unification initiatives. Alithia can be described as a liberal newspaper, and one can see the direct relationship between the party policy and newspaper publishing policy: the DISI party supports the unification initiatives, and this is why Alithia columnists tend to use peace frames rather than conflict frames.

Table : Conflict frame used by columnists in the Greek Cypriot press.



Table 45 results indicate that Greek Cypriot columnists tend to use the “Antipathy Frame” (36%) as a conflict frame in their articles. Antipathy frames are the threat-oriented, distrust-oriented, prejudiced-oriented, inferior-oriented, and self-and-other oriented frames. The second popular conflict frame among Greek Cypriot columnists is the “Unbalance Frame” (30%), which is sport-oriented, accuse-other-side’s-government oriented, and blame-oriented. The percentage of the “Status Quo Frame” is also significant (26%): exclusive orientation, they-are-our-enemy orientation, just-war orientation, and hate-speech orientation are the basis of this frame. The “Win-Lose Frame” (14%) and the “Nationalist Frame” (13%) are other essential conflict frames for the Greek Cypriot columnists. One can identify the Win-Lose Frame when the columnist emphasizes one side’s pains and good-and-evil orientations. The “Nationalist Frame” can be identified as revenge-oriented and who-throws-the-first-stone oriented.

Table : Conflict Frame(s) in the Greek Cypriot papers’ opinion articles.




Table 46 indicates that Simerini newspaper columnists use the Status Quo Frame 55.5% of the time, followed closely by Haravghi (38%), Phileleftheros (26.9%) and Alithia (12%). Politis columnists who are supporting peace initiatives do not use any status quo frames in their articles.

Table : The use of status quo frame by Greek Cypriot press.



The Greek Cypriot columnists tend to use unbalance frames when they are writing on the Cyprus Conflict, Turkey and Turkish Cypriots. Table 47 shows that Haravghi columnists have the highest percentage of usage of the unbalance frame (56%). Simerini (33.3%), Phileleftheros (26.9%), Politis (26.6%) and Alithia (16%) columnists demonstrate lower percentage usages respectively. The results also show that most Greek Cypriot columnists use the unbalance frames which are are sport-oriented, accuse-other-side’s-government oriented, and blame-oriented in their articles.

Table : The use of unbalance frame by Greek Cypriot press.



The ratio of the usage of “Antipathy Frame” is significant. The most important antipathy frame among the Greek Cypriot columnists is the “self and other” frame. Prejudiced and distrust orientated frames can also be seen in the articles. 55.5% of the articles by columnists in the rightwing newspaper Simerini are set in an antipathy frame. Columnists for other newspapers also use this frame: Politis (40%), Haravghi (38%), Phileleftheros (30.7%) and Alithia (24%).

Table : The use of antipathy frame by Greek Cypriot press.



### 5.1.8.2 Evaluation of Greek Cypriot Columnists’ Peace Frames for Turkish Cypriots


Table 49 shows similar findings to those in Table 43. According to these results Simerini and Haravghi columnists do not use the peace frame in their articles. Alithia (40%) and Politis (26.6%) newspapers use peace frames. Phileleftheros newspaper is in the minority with its peace frame usage (7.6%). According to the way they are looking at the Cyprus conflict, Turkey and Turkish Cypriots, Alithia (40%) and Politis (26.6%) newspaper provide more peace frames in their columnists’ articles.

Table : The use of peace frame by Greek Cypriot press.



Table 50 shows that Greek Cypriot columnists mostly use “Balance-Descriptive Frames” (18%) in their articles. Balance-Descriptive Frames could be described as fair-play oriented, criticize-own-government oriented, and applause-oriented. “Solution Frames” are the second most accepted frames by the Greek Cypriot columnists (10%). One can identify the solution frame from its inclusive orientation, we-are-friends orientation, common-ground orientation, and friendly-speech orientation. The usage ratios of the “Empathy Frames” (5%) and the “Anti-nationalist Frames” (5%) are very low. Understanding-the-other orientation, trust orientation, unprejudiced orientation, accept-other-as-it-is orientation, and other-in-the-self orientation are the “Empathy Frames” in the articles. The “Anti-nationalist Frames” are forgiveness oriented and history-culture oriented. The “Win-Win Frames” which have great significance for peace journalists, are not favoured by the Greek Cypriot columnists (2%). According to peace journalism, a journalist should emphasize both sides’ pains; he or she should frame an issue in a good/good or bad/bad orientation rather than one that is “good-and-evil oriented”. When the journalist looks from the good-and-evil oriented perspective, this legitimizes any violence against the “evil” side. However, journalists should show the both good and bad things on all sides, not only the Other’s. Representing the Other as (d)evil also helps to produce “fear” in society (Chomsky’s (2005) term). In this way journalists easily convince the audience that “we need to protect ourselves” from evils, and thus legitimize the violence.

Table : Peace Frame(s) in the Greek Cypriot papers’ opinion articles.



Chapter 6

# ANALYSIS OF TURKISH CYPRIOT “COLUMNISTS”

## 6.0 Presentation

The basic aim of this chapter is to explore the Turkish Cypriot columnists’ articles coverage of each other to see how they frame the “other.”

## 6.1 Findings and Interpretations of Turkish Cypriot Columnists

If one looks at the Turkish Cypriot columnists’ article topic results (table 51) one sees that the Cyprus Conflict is a significant topic for columnists. 77.7% of columnists’ articles in Yenidüzen were related to the Cyprus conflict; Halkın Sesi followed with 77%, Volkan 74%, Afrika 72% and Kıbrıs with 65.2%.

While Turkish Cypriot columnists are writing on Greece, or Greek Cypriots, columnists tend to mention the Cyprus conflict in general (74%). Table 52 illustrates that Turkey and EU affairs is the second most important article topic for the Turkish Cypriot columnists (5.7%). Table 52 shows the percentages of the Turkish Cypriot columnists selecting the article subjects.

Table : The percentage of the Cyprus conflict related subjects in Turkish Cypriot columnists’ articles.



Table : Topics of the articles in the Turkish Cypriot columnists’ articles.

|  |
| --- |
|  |

The Table 53 results show that when the articles’ subject is related with the Cyprus Conflict, 27.6% are about the Finland proposal, 5.3% about Annan Plan in general, 5.3% about missing persons and mass graves, and 2.8% about political activities. The Finland proposal and Annan Plan are still relevant article subjects for the Turkish Cypriot columnists.

Table : If article is about the Cyprus Conflict here is the context.

|  |
| --- |
|  |

### 6.1.1 Evaluation of Turkish Cypriot Columnists’ Official Sources

The ‘Columnist Content Analysis Coding Schema’ results show the majority of the Turkish Cypriot columnists are not using the official government authorities as the source of the articles (74.8%). The Turkish Cypriot columnists are tending to use Turkish Cypriot (25.2%), Turkish (15.9%), Greek Cypriot (12%) and International (10%) official sources. An additional meaning of these results is that the Turkish Cypriot columnists do not give voice to Greek (1%) official sources.

Table : Greek Cypriot Officials mentioned in the Turkish Cypriot papers’ opinion articles.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Newspaper** | **President** | | **General Assembly** | | **Minister(s)** | | **Other Officials** | |
|  | *Count* | *Percent* | *Count* | *Percent* | *Count* | *Percent* | *Count* | *Percent* |
| **Kıbrıs** | 2 | .8% | 2 | .8% | 0 | .0% | 1 | .4% |
| **Halkın Sesi** | 5 | 2.0% | 2 | .8% | 1 | .4% | 1 | .4% |
| **Yenidüzen** | 2 | .8% | 3 | 1.2% | 0 | .0% | 0 | .0% |
| **Afrika** | 2 | .8% | 3 | 1.2% | 0 | .0% | 0 | .0% |
| **Volkan** | 5 | 2.0% | 1 | .4% | 2 | .8% | 3 | 1.2% |
| **TOTAL** | 16 | 6.5% | 11 | 4.5% | 3 | 1.2 % | 5 | 2.0% |

Table 54 shows how Greek Cypriot official sources are not mentioned in the Turkish Cypriot columnists’ articles. Turkish Cypriot columnists tend to give voice to the “President” (6.5%) and General Assembly (4%), but other official sources do not appear often in the Turkish Cypriot columnists’ articles.

Turkish Cypriot official sources such as the “President” (17.5%) have better space than Greek Cypriot official sources in the Turkish Cypriot columnists’ articles. The Turkish Cypriot columnists use the Prime Minister (5%), public officials (4%) and ministers (.4%) as the source of their articles.

Table : Turkish Cypriot Officials mentioned in the Turkish Cypriot papers’ opinion articles.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Newspaper** | **President** | | **Prime minister** | | **Minister(s)** | | **Other Officials** | |
|  | *Count* | *Percent* | *Count* | *Percent* | *Count* | *Percent* | *Count* | *Percent* |
| **Kıbrıs** | 2 | .8% | 0 | .0% | 1 | .4% | 0 | .0% |
| **Halkın Sesi** | 14 | 5.7% | 3 | 1.2% | 0 | .0% | 3 | 1.2% |
| **Yenidüzen** | 3 | 1.2% | 0 | .0% | 0 | .0% | 0 | .0% |
| **Afrika** | 9 | 3.7% | 2 | .8% | 0 | .0% | 3 | 1.2% |
| **Volkan** | 15 | 6.1% | 7 | 2.8% | 0 | .0% | 5 | 2.0% |
| **TOTAL** | 43 | 17.5% | 12 | 4.8% | 1 | .4% | 11 | 4.4% |

### 6.1.1.1 The Official Quoted Sources in Turkish Cypriot Columns


According to the results of table 56, a majority of Turkish Cypriot columnists are using only one quoted official source (26%) in their articles on the Cyprus Conflict, Greece, or Greek Cypriots. 14% of article is including two quoted sources. According to peace journalism news values it is important to increase the number of quoted sources in the article to give a balanced point of view.

Table : Official government source identified in the Turkish Cypriot columnists’ articles.

### 6.1.2 Evaluation of Turkish Cypriot Columnists Unofficial Sources

Table 57 results show that the Turkish Cypriot columnists do not give voice to unofficial sources in the articles (95.38%): they give 11.8% voice to Turkish Cypriot unofficial sources. However, the Greek Cypriot unofficial space is 6%. The Turkish Cypriot columnists’ usage of unofficial sources results is almost the same as the Greek Cypriot columnists’. Both sides’ columnists tend to provide elite oriented sources, for the reason that they can reach them easily.

Table : Unofficial sources mentioned in the Turkish Cypriot papers’ opinion articles.



When the Turkish Cypriot columnists use Turkish Cypriot unofficial sources, they tend to use experts as the sources of their articles (4.9%). Table 58 shows that the wo/man on the street (4%), the Turkish Cypriot journalist/newspaper (2%) and NGOs (2%) as unofficial sources follow the experts.

Table : Turkish Cypriot Unofficial sources mentioned in the Turkish Cypriot papers’ opinion articles.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Newspaper** | **Experts** | | **NGO’s** | | **Journalists/**  **newspapers** | | **Wo/man on the street** | |
|  | *Count* | *Percent* | *Count* | *Percent* | *Cnt.* | *Percent* | *Count* | *Percent* |
| **Kıbrıs** | 3 | 1.2% | 0 | .0% | 0 | .0% | 1 | .4% |
| **Halkın Sesi** | 1 | .4% | 2 | .8% | 4 | 1.6% | 0 | .0% |
| **Yenidüzen** | 2 | .8% | 1 | .4% | 0 | .0% | 4 | 1.6% |
| **Afrika** | 2 | .8% | 0 | .0% | 1 | .4% | 4 | 1.6% |
| **Volkan** | 4 | 1.6% | 2 | .8% | 0 | .0% | 1 | .4% |
| **TOTAL** | 12 | 4.9% | 5 | 2.0% | 5 | 2.0% | 10 | 4.1% |

The Greek Cypriot unofficial sources are almost in the same situation as the Turkish Cypriot unofficial sources. The Turkish Cypriot columnists provide 4.1% voice to journalists/newspapers and 1% voice to the wo/man on the street. Table 59 shows how the Turkish Cypriot columnists do not give voice to experts and NGOs as the source of their articles.

Table : Greek Cypriot Unofficial sources mentioned in the Turkish Cypriot papers’ opinion articles.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Newspaper** | **Experts** | | **NGO’s** | | **Journalists/**  **newspapers** | | **Wo/man on the street** | |
|  | *Count* | *Percent* | *Count* | *Percent* | *Cnt.* | *Percent* | *Cnt.* | *Pct.* |
| **Kıbrıs** | 1 | .4% | 0 | .0% | 1 | .4% | 1 | .4% |
| **Halkın Sesi** | 0 | .0% | 0 | .0% | 4 | 1.6% | 0 | .0% |
| **Yenidüzen** | 0 | .0% | 1 | .4% | 1 | .4% | 1 | .4% |
| **Afrika** | 0 | .0% | 0 | .0% | 3 | 1.2% | 1 | .4% |
| **Volkan** | 0 | .0% | 0 | .0% | 1 | .4% | 0 | .0% |
| **TOTAL** | 1 | .4% | 1 | .4% | 10 | 4.1% | 3 | 1.2% |

### 6.1.2.1 The Unofficial Quoted Sources in Greek Cypriot Columnists’ Articles

According to results of Table 60, the majority of Turkish Cypriot columnists are using only one quoted unofficial source (20.2%) in their articles on the Cyprus Conflict, Greece, or Greek Cypriots.

Table : Unofficial sources identified in the Turkish Cypriot columnists’ articles.

### 6.1.3 Evaluation of Turkish Cypriot Columnists’ Ethnic Descriptions for Themselves

Table 61 shows that the Turkish Cypriot columnists emphasize Turkishness (31.7%) rather that Turkish Cypriotness (19.1%) or Cypriotness (10%). The Turkish Cypriot columnists tend to use Turkish (31.7%) as an ethnic description for describing themselves in the articles. However, the Turkish Cypriot ethnic description percentage is also significant (19.1%).


Table : Turkish Cypriot Ethnic Description in the Turkish Cypriot papers’ opinion articles.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Newspaper** | **Turkishness** | | **Cypriotness** | | **Turkish Cypriotness** | | **Not mentioned** | |
|  | *Count* | *Percent* | *Count* | *Percent* | *Count* | *Percent* | *Cnt.* | *Pct.* |
| **Kıbrıs** | 3 | 1.2% | 0 | .0% | 10 | 4.1% | 11 | 4.5% |
| **Halkın Sesi** | 18 | 7.3% | 1 | .4% | 14 | 5.7% | 27 | 11.0% |
| **Yenidüzen** | 3 | 1.2% | 8 | 3.3% | 12 | 4.9% | 7 | 2.8% |
| **Afrika** | 0 | .0% | 15 | 6.1% | 10 | 4.1% | 27 | 11.0% |
| **Volkan** | 54 | 22.0% | 0 | .0% | 1 | .4% | 25 | 10.2% |
| **TOTAL** | 78 | 31.7% | 24 | 9.8% | 47 | 19.1% | 97 | 39.4% |

### 6.1.4 Evaluation of Turkish Cypriot Columnists’ Political Descriptions for Themselves

Table 62 shows that the Turkish Cypriot columnists mostly use “TRNC” (35.4%) for politically describing the Turkish Cypriots. The North Cyprus (9%) political description follows the “TRNC”. The usage of other political descriptions such as Cyprus Turkish Side (5.7%), Turkish Side (5%) and Turkish Cypriot Community (1%) are in the minority.

Table : References to the Turkish Cypriots in the Turkish Cypriot papers’ opinion articles.



### 6.1.5 Evaluation of Turkish Cypriot Columnists Ethnic Descriptions for Greek Cypriots

The ethnic descriptions are another important part of this research. According to peace journalism it is significant how you refer to the Other in your news article and/or column. The results of table 63 show that the Turkish Cypriot columnists have a general consensus on the ethnic descriptions for Greek Cypriots. The Turkish Cypriot columnists emphasize the “Ruminess” of the Greek Cypriots (64.2%). The Turkish Cypriot columnists do not emphasize “Greek Cypriotness” (12.6%) or “Cypriotness” (4%) of the Greek Cypriots in their articles.

There are common descriptions such as “Rum” in the Turkish Cypriot community for the Greek Cypriots. The history of this description comes from Anatolia and the Balkans:

“Rûm, also Roum or Rhum, is a very indefinite term used at different times in the Muslim world to refer to the Balkans and Anatolia generally, and for the Byzantine Empire in particular, for the Seljuk Sultanate of Rûm in Asia Minor, and for Greeks inhabiting Ottoman or modern Turkish territory as well as for Greek Cypriots. The name is loaned from the Byzantine Greek self-designation Ρωμιοί "Romans"” (Retrieved March, 2010, from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki-/R%C3%BBm).

Turkish Cypriot columnists often use the term ‘Rum’ to make a distinction between Greek Cypriots and Greeks from Greece.

Table : Greek Cypriot Ethnic Description in the Turkish Cypriot papers’ opinion articles.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Newspaper** | **Ruminess** | | **Cypriotness** | | **Greek Cypriotness** | |
|  | *Count* | *Percent* | *Count* | *Percent* | *Count* | *Percent* |
| **Kıbrıs** | 8 | 3.3% | 0 | .0% | 6 | 2.4% |
| **Halkın Sesi** | 47 | 19.1% | 0 | .0% | 6 | 2.4% |
| **Yenidüzen** | 9 | 3.7% | 5 | 2.0% | 8 | 3.3% |
| **Afrika** | 27 | 11.0% | 5 | 2.0% | 11 | 4.5% |
| **Volkan** | 67 | 27.2% | 0 | .0% | 0 | .0% |
| **TOTAL** | 158 | 64.2% | 10 | 4.1% | 31 | 12.6% |


If one looks at the results of ethnic descriptions in the Turkish Cypriot columnists from newspaper to newspaper, onecan say that Volkan newspaper columnists emphasize “Ruminess” 82.7%, Halkın Sesi newspaper 77%, Afrika newspaper 50%, Kıbrıs newspaper 34.7%, Yenidüzen newspaper 33%.

Table : The Turkish Cypriot columnists’ ethnic descriptions for Greek Cypriots from newspaper to newspaper.

### 6.1.6 Evaluation of Turkish Cypriot Columnists Political Descriptions of Greek Cypriots


Table 65 shows that the Turkish Cypriot columnists mostly use “Republic of Cyprus” (24.8%) for politically describing the Greek Cypriots. Greek Side (12.6%) and South (9.3 %) politic descriptions follow the “Republic of Cyprus”. The usage of other political descriptions such as Greek Administration (10.6%) are significant; South Cyprus Greek Administration (4.9%) and South Cyprus (4.5%) descriptions are in the minority.

Table : Referring to Greek Cypriots within the Turkish Cypriot papers’ opinion articles.



### 6.1.7 Evaluation of Turkish Cypriot Columnists Antagonistic Descriptions for Greek Cypriots

Table 66 shows that 15.4% of articles written by Turkish Cypriot columnists consist of antagonistic descriptions for the Greek people and Greek Cypriots.

Table : Greek Cypriot Antagonistic Description in the Turkish Cypriot papers’ opinion articles.

### 6.1.8 Evaluation Dominant Frames by Turkish Cypriot Columnists about Greek Cypriots

Tables 67 tells the majority of Turkish Cypriot columnists use conflict frames (52%) in their articles while they are writing on Cyprus Conflict, Greece, or Greek Cypriots. 12.6% peace frames have been used in the articles. Only 7.3% of columnist articles consist of both peace and conflict frames.

Table : The Turkish Cypriot columnists’ dominant frames for the Greek Cypriots by newspaper to newspaper.

|  |
| --- |
|  |

### 6.1.8.1 Evaluation of Turkish Cypriot Columnists’ Conflict Frames for Turkish Cypriots

Table 68 shows thatVolkan newspaper uses 80.2% conflict frame in its columnists’ articles. The basic reason for this is that Volkan newspaper is an ultranationalist newspaper in the Turkish Cypriot media. They support a “two separate states” solution on the Cyprus Conflict and this is reflected in their columnists’ articles.

Halkın Sesi (75.4%) newspaper follows Volkan I its the usage of conflict frames in articles. Halkın Sesi is the oldest Turkish language newspaper on the island; it is privately owned and can be described as a rightwing newspaper. Table 68 shows how rightwing newspapers use more conflict rather than peace frames.

Kıbrıs has the highest circulation in the North; it is highly influential, and it supports peace initiatives. According to table 68 Kıbrıs newspaper holds the third position regarding usage of conflict frames among the columnists’ articles (30.4%).

Afrika (12.9%) and Yenidüzen (11%) newspapers are in the minority. Since they have a leftist- oriented stance, both newspapers’ opinion columnists have used fewer conflict frames than other Turkish Cypriot newspapers.


Table : Conflict frames used by columnists in the Turkish Cypriot press.



Table 69 results indicate that the Turkish Cypriot columnists tend to use the “Antipathy Frame” (37%) as a conflict frame in their articles. The antipathy frames concentrate on “other is the threat,” distrust, prejudiced, inferiority, and self and other. The second popular conflict frame among the Turkish Cypriot columnists is the “Unbalance Frame” (26%), which is sport oriented, accuse other side’s government oriented, and blame oriented. The percentage of the “Nationalist Frame” is also significant (21%); this is revenge oriented and who throw the first stone oriented in the articles.[[38]](#footnote-39)

The “Win-Lose Frame” (20%) and “Status Quo Frame” (19.5%) are other essential conflict frames for the Turkish Cypriot columnists. Once can identify the Win-Lose Frame when the columnist emphasizes one side’s pains and good and evil orientations. Exclusive orientation, they are our enemy orientation, just war orientation, and hate speech orientation are the “Status Quo Frame” in the articles.

Table : Conflict Frame(s) in the Turkish Cypriot papers’ opinion columns.



According to Table 70, Volkan newspaper columnists use the Status Quo Frame 35.8% of the time, and Halkın Sesi (24.5%), Yenidüzen (7%), Kıbrıs (4.3%) and Afrika (1.8%) newspapers follow. Exclusive orientation, they are our enemy orientation, just war orientation, and hate speech orientation are the “Status Quo Frame” in the articles.

Table : The use of the status quo frame by the Turkish Cypriot press.



The Turkish Cypriot columnists tend to use unbalance frames when they are writing on the Cyprus Conflict, Greece and Greek Cypriots. Table 71 shows that Halkın Sesi columnists have the highest percentage of unbalance frame usage (36%). Volkan (33.3%), Kıbrıs (26%), Yenidüzen (15%) and Afrika (9.2%) columnists follow the Halkın Sesi columnists. The results also indicate that most of the Turkish Cypriot columnists use “the unbalance frames” which are are sport oriented, accuse other side’s government oriented, and blame oriented in their articles.

Table : The use of unbalance frame by Turkish Cypriot press.



The ratio of the usage of the “Antipathy Frame” is significant. The most important antipathy frame among the Turkish Cypriot columnists is the “self and other” frame. Prejudiced and distrust orientated frames also occur in the articles. 51.8% of the ultra nationalist newspaper Volkan’s columnists’ articles are in the antipathy frame. Other newspaper columnists in Halkın Sesi (42.6%), Kıbrıs (30%), Afrika (22.2%) and Yenidüzen (15%) also use the antipathy frame.

Table : The use of antipathy frame by Turkish Cypriot press.



Table 73 shows that the rightist and nationalist newspaper Halkın Sesi’s columnists use 31.1% “Win-Lose Frame” in their articles. The ultranationalist newspaper Volkan’s columnists (29.6%) following Halkın Sesi. Other newspaper columnists, in Yenidüzen (11%), Kıbrıs (8.6%) and Afrika (1.8%), use the win-lose frame. If one looks at the results, one could claim that the leftist newspapers columnists do not tend to use win-lose frame in their articles.

Table : The use of win-lose frame by Turkish Cypriot press.



According to table 74 results the ratio of the usage of “Nationalist Frame” is significant. Both two nationalist and rightist newspapers Volkan (54%) and Halkın Sesi (29.5%) columnists tend to use “Nationalist Frame” while they are writing on the Cyprus Conflict, Greece and Greek Cypriots. Two leftist newspapers Yenidüzen and Afrika columnists do not use “Nationalist Frame”. “Nationalist Frame” could be identified as revenge oriented and who throw the first stone oriented in the article. Kıbrıs newspaper columnists use 4.3% nationalist frame.

Table : The use of nationalist frame by Turkish Cypriot press.



### 6.1.8.2 Evaluation of Turkish Cypriot Columnists Peace Frames for Greek Cypriots

According to table 75 results the usage of “Peace Frame” of Volkan’s (1.2%) and Halkın Sesi’s (3.2%) columnists are very low. Yenidüzen’s (37%) and Afrika’s (25.9%) newspapers columnists are using peace frames. Kıbrıs newspaper columnists’ peace frame usage is also significant (17.3%). According to the way they look at the Cyprus conflict, Greece and Greek Cypriots Yenidüzen and Afrika newspapers provide more peace frames in their columnist articles.

Table : The use of peace frame by Turkish Cypriot press.



Table : Peace Frame(s) in the Turkish Cypriot papers’ opinion articles.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **News-paper** | **Solution Frame** | | **Balance/**  **Descriptive Frame** | | **Empathy Frame** | | **Win-Win Frame** | | **Anti-nationalist**  **Frame** | |
|  | *Cnt* | *Per.* | *Cnt* | *Per.* | *Cnt* | *Per.* | *Cnt* | *Per.* | *Cnt* | *Per.* |
| **Kıbrıs** | 5 | 2.0% | 3 | 1.2% | 2 | .8% | 4 | 1.6% | 0 | .0% |
| **Halkın Sesi** | 3 | 1.2% | 1 | .4% | 1 | .4% | 0 | .0% | 0 | .0% |
| **Yenidzn** | 6 | 2.4% | 2 | .8% | 4 | 1.6% | 6 | 2.4% | 7 | 2.8% |
| **Afrika** | 9 | 3.7% | 14 | 5.7% | 2 | .8% | 10 | 4.1% | 0 | .0% |
| **Volkan** | 1 | .4% | 0 | .0% | 0 | .0% | 0 | .0% | 0 | .0% |
| **TOTAL** | 24 | 9.7% | 20 | 8.1% | 9 | 3.7% | 20 | 8.1% | 7 | 2.8% |

Table 76 results depict the Turkish Cypriot columnists do not tend to use peace frames in their articles. The Turkish Cypriot columnists mostly use “Solution Frames” (9.8%) in their articles. Once can identify the solution frame such as, inclusive orientation, we are friend orientation, common ground orientation, and friendly speech orientation.

“Balance-Descriptive Frames” (8%) and “Win-Win Frames” (8%) are the second accepted frames by the Turkish Cypriot columnists. “Balance-Descriptive Frames” could be describe as fair play orientation, criticize own government orientation, and applaud orientation. The “Win-Win Frames” which has significant meaning for peace journalist, are not accepted by the Greek Cypriot columnists (2%). According to peace journalism journalist should emphasize both sides’ pains, he or she should frame the issue in good/good or bad/bad orientation rather than “Good and Evil Oriented”. When the journalist looks at the good and evil oriented perspective it legitimizes any violence to “evil” side. However, journalist should show both good and bad things of all sides.

The usage ratio of the “Empathy Frames” (4%) and the “Anti-nationalist Frames” (3%) are very low. Understanding the other orientation, trust orientation, unprejudiced orientation, accept other as it is orientation, other in the self orientation are the “Empathy Frames” in the articles. The “Anti-nationalist Frames” are forgiveness oriented and history – culture oriented in the articles.

Table : The use of balance-descriptive frame by Turkish Cypriot press.



If one looks at the usage of the “Balance-Descriptive Frame” he or she could identify that the Afrika columnists use “Balance-Descriptive Frame” for writing about the Cyprus Conflict, Greece and Greek Cypriots (25.9%). Kıbrıs (13%) and Yenidüzen (7%) newspapers columnists follow the Afrika columnists in regards the balance-descriptive frame usage. Table 77 results show both two nationalist newspapers Halkın Sesi (1.6%) and Volkan (0%) columnists do not tend to use the balance-descriptive frames in their articles.

Chapter 7

# RESULTS, DISCUSSION, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

## 7.1 Results

As stated earlier, the basic aim of this study was to explore the Turkish and Greek Cypriot media coverage of each other to see how they frame the “other.” News stories and columnists’ articles written by both Turkish and Greek Cypriot journalists were examined; therefore the results obtained need to be divided into two parts: (i) general results of news story coverage, (ii) general results of columnists’ articles coverage.

### 7.1.1 General Results of the News Stories Coverage[[39]](#footnote-40)

In light of the analysis of the news stories, the following evaluations can make for Cypriot press:

*•HEADLINES:* The great majority of Turkish (72.1%) and Greek Cypriot (65.4%) press tend to use neutral or description-oriented headlines in news stories. One can deduce that the Cypriot press tend to describe events as transmitters of information rather than playing a positive role within the spectrum of both the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities. However, negatively oriented headlines are relied upon to get the attention of both sides (G/C: 31.1%, T/C: 24.9%).

*•THE SOURCE OF THE NEWS STORIES:* The Greek Cypriot press employs more reporters (52.4%) than the Turkish Cypriot press does. Economically, most of the Turkish Cypriot newspapers have insufficient funding to employ journalists to meet their requirements. As a result, they prefer to use ready-made news distributed to the media by TAK.

*•THE QUOTED SOURCES IN THE NEWS STORIES:* The Cypriot press tends to use one quoted source in news stories. According to the principles of peace journalism, journalists should have a multiperspective while they are writing news stories; if a journalist writes the news from only one perspective, such as giving voive only to elites and official resources, the news framing will be biased. If journalists increase the number of sources while they are writing the news, this will help to provide fair and true information to the public.

*•GREEK/TURKISH CYPRIOT QUOTED SOURCES IN THE NEWS STORIES:* According to the research results, the Cypriot press does not give voice to the “other” side (G/C: 80.6%, T/C: 83.8%). When Cypriot journalists are writing news about the “other” side, they tend to give voice only to their side’s public officials instead of to the “other side”.

*•INTERNATIONAL QUOTED SOURCES IN THE NEWS STORIES:* The Cypriot press does not use international sources in news stories, unless the news is related to the Cyprus conflict.

*•LENGTH OF THE NEWS:* There are a few differences between the Greek and Turkish Cypriot press on the length of the news stories they publish. The Greek Cypriot press tends to use medium (51.8%) length for their news but the Turkish Cypriot press uses short length (48.6%) news. The peace journalism approach encourages journalists to give as much background information as possible; as George A. Hough (1995) comments, “...longer stories [are] often more important stories” (p. 303).

*•PAGE NUMBERS OF THE NEWS STORIES:* The page number where the news story appears shows the importance of the news for the newspaper. If the news is important, editors tend to feature it on the front pages. In the Cypriot press, editors significantly use front pages for the Cyprus Conflict and news related to the “other” side.

*•PHOTO USAGE OF THE CYPRIOT PRESS:* According to the results, the Greek Cypriot press uses more photography (69.9%) in news stories than the Turkish Cypriot press (52.5%).

*•SIZE OF THE NEWS STORIES:* The results show that the Greek Cypriot press allocates more pages (41.7% half page) for Cyprus conflict oriented news and news related to the “other” side. The Turkish Cypriot press gives 33% of its news stories on 1/4 –page spreads.

*•TYPE OF THE STORY/NEWS:* Both the Greek and Turkish Cypriot press tend to use a “news story” format rather than an interview format.

*•NEWS STORY TOPICS:* The news story topic is an important part of this study; it shows which news topics are considered more valuable in the press on both sides. The results indicate that Cyprus Conflict oriented news appeared in the coverage of the Cypriot press I the following proportions: G/C: 34.6%, T/C: 47.5%. Turkey is the second most important news subject in the print media on both sides. “Police, courts, accidents and disasters” are the third most significant news topics.

*•IF THE TOPIC IS ON THE “CYPRUS CONFLICT”, WHAT IS IT ABOUT?:* As stated earlier, the Cyprus Conflict oriented news is considered valuable in the Cypriot press. For the Turkish Cypriot press, “general issues” on the Cyprus Conflict are covered in 31.8% of news topics. General issues are typically solution packages offered by foreign countries and general press releases on Cyprus Conflict.

*•CRITICISM REGARDING GOVERNMENT’S CYPRUS POLICY IN THE NEWS:* There are many opposition voices regarding the government’s Cyprus policy in the Turkish Cypriot press. However, the media use the Turkish News Agency as their primary news source; this is why it is difficult to assess these criticisms in the news. In the Greek Cypriot press 4.2% of news stories contain criticism regarding the government’s Cyprus policy.

### 7.1.2 General Results of the Columnist’s Articles Coverage[[40]](#footnote-41)

From the analysis of the columnists’ articles in the Cypriot press, one can draw several

conclusions:

*•TOPICS OF THE ARTICLES:* It can be said that the “Cyprus Conflict” is the most important article topic in the Cypriot press. Turkey and its relations with the European Union are the second most significant topic in articles.

*•IF ARTICLE IS ABOUT THE CYPRUS CONFLICT:* If an article is about the Cyprus Conflict it is mostly related to the Annan Plan in general and proposals for a solution made by Finland.

*•USAGE OF OFFICIAL GOVERNMENT SOURCES:* Turkish and Greek Cypriot columnists tend to use official government sources in their articles. The results indicate that Turkish and Greek Cypriot columnists do not use the “other” side’s official sources in their articles. From the perspective of peace journalism, it is even problematic to give too much voice to elites; Cypriot columnists do not give enough voice to the elites of the “other” side, ignoring a basic principle of peace journalism, giving voice to the voiceless.

*•TURKISH CYPRIOT OFFICIAL GOVERNMENT SOURCES IDENTIFIED IN CYPRIOT COLUMNIST ARTICLES:* Most of the Turkish Cypriot official government sources identified only exist in the Turkish Cypriot press. In other words, Greek Cypriot columnists do not give enough space to Turkish Cypriot official sources.

*•GREEK CYPRIOT OFFICIAL GOVERNMENT SOURCE IDENTIFIED IN CYPRIOT COLUMNIST ARTICLES:* The results show that Greek Cypriot columnists do not use many Greek Cypriot official government source in their articles. The same thing can be said about the Turkish Cypriot columnists, who do not give voice to Greek Cypriot official government sources in their articles.

*•HOW MANY OFFICIAL QUOTED GOVERNMENT SOURCES IDENTIFIED?:* According to the principles of peace journalism, journalists need to increase their quoted sources in their articles. However, Cypriot columnists tend to use only one quoted source in their articles. Since columnists freely make comments without showing any proof in their articles, they tend not to use any sources, either official or unofficial.

*•UNOFFICIAL GOVERNMENT SOURCES IDENTIFIED IN THE CYPRIOT COLUMNIST ARTICLES:* The results show that both Turkish and Greek Cypriot columnists rarely use unofficial government sources in their articles.

*•TURKISH CYPRIOT UNOFFICIAL SOURCES IDENTIFIED IN THE CYPRIOT COLUMNIST ARTICLES:* Greek Cypriot columnists give more space to Turkish Cypriot unofficial sources (18%) than Turkish Cypriot columnists do (12.9%).

*•GREEK CYPRIOT UNOFFICIAL SOURCES IDENTIFIED IN THE CYPRIOT COLUMNIST ARTICLES:* Greek Cypriot columnists give more voice to Greek Cypriot unofficial sources (12%) in their articles than Turkish Cypriot columnists do (5.5%). As is known from conventional news standards, unofficial sources are generally overestimated and are not newsworthy.

*•HOW MANY UNOFFICIAL SOURCES IDENTIFIED?:* When Cypriot columnists do use these they tend to use one source in an article. In other words, columnists on both sides do not use unofficial sources (77.4%).

*•CYPRIOT COLUMNIST ETHNIC DESCRIPTIONS FOR THEMSELVES:* As the results show, Turkish Cypriot columnists emphasize the ethnic[[41]](#footnote-42) Turkishness of their identity (31.7%); for example, using expressions such as “Turks of Cyprus”. “Turkish Cypriotness” (19.1%) follows these results (“Turkish Cypriot”). Greek Cypriot columnists believe in ethnic “Greek Cypriotness” (23%).

*•CYPRIOT COLUMNIST POLITIC DESCRIPTIONS FOR THEMSELVES:* If one looks at the political[[42]](#footnote-43) descriptions of the Greek Cypriot columnists in their articles, 35% of the articles describe the Greek Cypriots in terms of the Republic of Cyprus. The Turkish Cypriot columnists tend to describe their community as the “Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus” (TRNC). Because of the negative image and United Nations decisions on the TRNC since 1983[[43]](#footnote-44), some Turkish Cypriot writers use “North Cyprus” or “the Cyprus Turkish Side”.

*•CYPRIOT COLUMNIST ETHNIC DESCRIPTIONS FOR THE “OTHER” IN GENERAL:* Greek Cypriot columnists generally emphasize the ethnic Turkish Cypriotness[[44]](#footnote-45) (40%) of the Turkish Cypriots; however, Turkish Cypriot columnists tend to emphasize the ethnic Greekness[[45]](#footnote-46) of the Greek Cypriots (64.2%).

*•CYPRIOT COLUMNISTS’ ETHNIC DESCRIPTIONS FOR THE “OTHER” BY NEWSPAPER:* The results show that Politis newspaper columnists have the highest percentage for emphasizing the ethnic “Turkish Cypriotness” of the Turkish Cypriots (73.3%), followed by Politis (50%), Haravghi (44.4%), Simerini (32%), Alithia (19.2%), and Phileleftheros. In the Turkish Cypriot press, Volkan has the highest percentage (82.7%) for emphasizing the ethnic “Greekness” of Greek Cypriots, followed by Halkın Sesi (77%), Afrika (50%), Kıbrıs (34.7%), and Yenidüzen (33%).

*•CYPRIOT COLUMNISTS’ POLITIC DESCRIPTIONS FOR THE “OTHER”:* Since 1983 the TRNC has not been recognized by any other nation except Turkey, and this is why Greek Cypriot columnists tend to politically describe the Turkish Cypriots as: the “Turkish Side (6%), Cyprus Turkish Side (4%) and Turkish Cypriot Community (4%).” Turkish Cypriot columnists politically emphasize Greek Cypriots as the “Republic of Cyprus” (24.8%), and this is followed by “Other”[[46]](#footnote-47) descriptions.

*•CYPRIOT COLUMNIST ANTAGONISTIC DESCRIPTIONS:* According to the results, Turkish Cypriot columnists’ articles consist of more antagonistic descriptions (85%)[[47]](#footnote-48) than those of Greek Cypriot columnists (34%).

*•CYPRIOT COLUMNISTS’ DOMINANT FRAMES:* In general, both Turkish and Greek Cypriot columnists tend to use the “Conflict Frame” when they are writing about the “Other” side. As the results indicate, the percentage of “Peace Frames” usage is very low in the press of both sides.

*•CYPRIOT COLUMNISTS’ CONFLICT FRAMES FOR THE “OTHER” BY NEWSPAPER:* The extreme nationalist and leftist newspapers such as Simerini (100%) and Volkan (80.2%) columnists are the top of the league for using conflict frames for the “Other”. Since Alithia politically supports unification initiatives, the writers of Alithia use “Conflict Frames” (8%) less. The same is also true for Yenidüzen in the north. The columnists of Yenidüzen politically believe in re-unification and peace initiatives, and this is why they do not prefer to use “Conflict Frames” in their articles (11%).

*•CYPRIOT COLUMNIST CONFLICT FRAMES[[48]](#footnote-49) FOR THE “OTHER:* According to the results, both Turkish and Greek Cypriot columnists tend to use the “Antipathy Frame” in their articles (T/C: 37%, G/C: 36%).

* *The “Antipathy Frame” section contains 5 categories:* The Other is the threat-oriented, distrust-oriented, prejudice-oriented, inferior-oriented, self-and-other oriented. It can be said that Greek and Turkish Cypriot columnists represent the “Other” as the threat, as unrustable, and as inferior. Writers also frame the issues in a self-and-other perspective, and demonstrate prejudice towards the “Other”.
* The *“Unbalanced Frame”* is the second frame used by Cypriot columnists (T/C: 26%, G/C: 30%). This is sport-oriented, accuse-other-side’s-government oriented and blame-oriented.

The results show that Turkish Cypriot columnists tend to use the “Nationalist Frame” (21%) in the conflict frames. This is revenge-oriented and who-threw-the first-stone oriented. However, Greek Cypriot columnists use the “Status Quo Frame” (26%) in the conflict frames; this is exclusive-oriented, they-are-our-enemy oriented, just-war oriented and hate-speech oriented.

The “Win-Lose Frame” is the fourth most commonly used by the Cypriot press in their conflict frames; this is one-side’s-pains oriented, and good-and-evil oriented.

*•CYPRIOT COLUMNISTS’ STATUS QUO FRAMES FOR THE “OTHER” FROM NEWSPAPER TO NEWSPAPER:* Nationalist newspapers Simerini (55.5%) and Volkan (35.8%) used the “Status Quo Frame” which is exclusive-oriented, they-are-our-enemy oriented, just-war oriented and hate-speech oriented. The columnists who write in favour of peace initiatives in newspapers such as Alithia, Politis, Yenidüzen, Afrika and Kıbrıs, rarely use “status quo frames” in their articles.

*•CYPRIOT COLUMNISTS’ UNBALANCED FRAMES FOR THE “OTHER” FROM NEWSPAPER TO NEWSPAPER:* The unbalanced frame, which is sport-oriented, accuses-other-side’s-government oriented and blame-oriented, is mostly used by Haravghi (56%) on the Greek Cypriot side and Halkın Sesi (36%) on the Turkish Cypriot side. It could be said that the writers who write for pacifist newspapers do not use unbalanced frames in their articles.

*•CYPRIOT COLUMNISTS’ WIN-LOSE FRAMES FOR THE “OTHER” FROM NEWSPAPER TO NEWSPAPER:* The columnists of Haravghi (25%) and Halkın Sesi (31.1%) tend to use the “Win-Lose Frame,” which emphasizes one side’s pains and is good-and-evil oriented. Nationalist newspapers Simerini (22.2%) and Volkan (29.6%) use the “Win-Lose Frame” in the second rank. Bailie and Azgin’s (2008) research on the Cypriot media described how the Win-Lose Frame is used by editors as a news value: “…conflict is never presented as multi-sided, neither are the beliefs or pain of the “Other” ever considered (p. 72).”

*•CYPRIOT COLUMNISTS’ NATIONALIST FRAMES FOR THE “OTHER” FROM NEWSPAPER TO NEWSPAPER:* As we have already seen, the history of the Cypriot press is based on nationalism, which means the Greek and Turkish communities try to show the other side as the cause of the Cyprus conflict. This is why both sides’ columnists try to find who threw the first stone instead of understanding the dynamics of the problem. Columnists also tend to take revenge positions while they are writing their articles: in the north, Volkan columnists use the “Nationalist Frame” most often (54%). The writers of Phileleftheros newspaper have highest percentage (30.7%) of use of the nationalist frame in the Greek Cypriot press. Pacifist newspapers writers tend not to use nationalist frames in their articles.

*•CYPRIOT COLUMNISTS’ ANTIPATHY FRAMES FOR THE “OTHER” FROM NEWSPAPER TO NEWSPAPER:* The results indicate that nationalist newspapers Simerini and Volkan have the highest percentage use of the “Antipathy Frame” in their articles. In this frame, the Other is the threat, is untrustable, and is inferior. Writers also frame the issues in a self-and-other perspective and are being prejudiced against the“Other”. The writers of both newspapers tend to show the bad sides of the “Other.”.

*•CYPRIOT COLUMNISTS’ PEACE FRAMES FOR THE “OTHER” BY NEWSPAPER:* The results show that the writers of pacifist newspapers Alithia, Politis, Yenidüzen and Afrika tend to use peace frames in their articles. Nationalist newspapers Simerini and Volkan’s writers use these frames less.

* *CYPRIOT COLUMNISTS’ PEACE FRAMES[[49]](#footnote-50) FOR THE “OTHER” IN**DETAIL:*

*o “Balance-Descriptive Frames”:* could be described as fair-play oriented, criticize-own-government oriented and applause-oriented. Greek Cypriot columnists tend to use more balance-descriptive frames (18%) in the peace frames than do Turkish Cypriot columnists (8%).

*o “Solution Frames”:* are inclusive oriented, we-are-friends oriented, common-ground oriented, and friendly-speech oriented, and are important in the perspective of peace journalism. Turkish Cypriot columnists tend to use solution frames (9.8%) most among the peace frames; the usage of the solution frames by the Greek Cypriot columnists is significant: 10%.

*o “Empathy Frames”:* 5% of articles published in the Greek Cypriot press support empathy frames, which are understanding-the-other oriented, trust-oriented, unprejudiced-oriented, accept-other-as-they-are oriented and other-in-the-self oriented. The usage of empathy frames in the Turkish Cypriot press is almost the same as in the Greek Cypriot press (4%).

*o “Anti-nationalist Frames”:* Anti-nationalist frames are essential frames for peace journalism; they are forgiveness-oriented and history-culture oriented. However, the Cypriot columnists’ articles do not use this frame often in their articles (G/C: 5%, T/C: 3%).

*o “Win-Win Frames”:* The Win-Win frame is another basic element of peace journalism. Journalists should focus on language that is both-sides’-pains oriented and good/good or bad/bad oriented. However, columnists in Cyprus tend to emphasize their own sides’ pains. If something good happens on the “Other” side, columnists do not want to appreciate it. Turkish Cypriot columnists (8%) use more Win-Win frames than Greek Cypriot columnists do (2%).

*•CYPRIOT COLUMNISTS’ SOLUTION FRAMES FOR THE “OTHER:* The results show that Alithia (32%), Yenidüzen (22.2%) and Kıbrıs (21.7%) columnists tend to use solution frames in their articles. Although these results are not sufficient for practicing peace journalism, they show that the newspapers which support peace initiatives on the island use more solution frames than other newspapers such as Simerini (0%) and Volkan (1.2%).

*•CYPRIOT COLUMNISTS’ BALANCE-DESCRIPTIVE FRAMES FOR THE “OTHER:* The writers of pacifist newspapers often use balance-descriptive frames: Alithia (% 44), Politis (40%) and Afrika (25.9%). Nationalist Simerini and Volkan columnists tend not to use balance-descriptive frames in their articles.

*•CYPRIOT COLUMNISTS’ EMPATHY FRAMES FOR THE “OTHER:* According to the results the columnists of the nationalist newspapers such as Simerini and Volkan do not use empathy frames for understanding the “Other’s” feelings. However, Yenidüzen (14.8%) and Politis (13.3%) writers tend to use empathy frames in their articles.

*•CYPRIOT COLUMNISTS’ WIN-WIN FRAMES FOR THE “OTHER:* The Win-Win Frames could be described in this way: journalists should emphasize both sides’ pains; they should not feel that “if the ‘Other’ side has pains this is our happiness.” Since the Cypriot press has a nationalist background, it is hard to see a Win-Win frame operating in most articles. However, Yenidüzen writers who support unification and have a leftist ideology use a Win-Win frame more than other newspapers do. Nationalist writers from both sides of Cyprus tend not to use Win-Win frames.

*•CYPRIOT COLUMNISTS’ ANTI-NATIONALIST FRAMES FOR THE “OTHER:* Nationalism is a major obstacle for a journalist practicing peace journalism. The Cypriot press is suffering from nationalism: the results show that in the north only Yenidüzen writers (25.9%) use Anti-Nationalist frames in their articles. In the south, Alithia writers tend to use Anti-Nationalist frames (12%). The writers of the nationalist press do not use Anti-Nationalist frames (Simerini, Volkan, Halkın Sesi).

### 7.1.3 Discussion of the News Coverage

The news coverage of the Cypriot press is discussed here in light of the approach of peace journalism. Suleyman Irvan (2006) has outlined an ethical code for peace journalism “in the works of Mowlana (cited in Becker, 2004, pp. 4-5), Tehranian (2002, p. 80-81), Galtung & Vincent (1992) and Lynch & McGoldrick (2005)” (p. 37). Irvan (2006) has divided these codes into three categories: (i) mission oriented principles, (ii) principles on news gathering, (iii) principles on news writing.

*i) Mission oriented principles:* In these principles there are three missions for peace journalists. The first is that “journalists should seek peaceful solutions.” The second is that “peace journalism is truth-oriented journalism. Journalists should expose untruths”; and the third is: “Journalists should avoid becoming part of the problem -- they should try to become part of the solution” (Irvan, 2006, p. 37).

According to the results the Cypriot press do not practice these missions. The majority of the Cypriot press are hiding behind an “objectivity” argument, and they do not seek peaceful solutions. Journalists are waiting for a solution to come from the elites of their society, as the results of the quoted sources show. Both presses are giving voice to elite sources: most reporters in the media have close links with politicians, and they believe these associations give them power and prestige. Within these limits, not only do they not do background checks and confirm the news items provided to them by their resources; they also treat the news items which concern the other parts of the society as secondary. As a result, news reporting becomes a profession that serves politicians more than it serves society. This can be understood from the fact that the elites have a greater say in the media. News reporters, in short, continue to be part of the problem.

Instead of exposing untruths, the Cypriot press plays a passive role and acts like a transmitter of information; the results of this study show there is very little criticism regarding governments’ Cyprus policies.

As stated earlier, the Cypriot press accepts traditional/conventional news values that claim objectivity, and stay away from the issues. One can see this in the news headlines, where the Cypriot press tend to use neutral or descriptive news headlines. Journalists do not see themselves in the same boat; they do not want to become part of the solution, because according to traditional journalistic understanding, this attitude will damage their trustworthiness.

*ii) Principles on news gathering:* The second set of principles concerns news gathering:

o “Journalists should seek “non-elite” sources. Journalists should give more positive attention to peace-makers.

o Journalists should try hard to verify all claims. Scepticism is an important quality of good journalists.

o Journalists should investigate the wrongdoings of all sides of a conflict. Journalists should focus on the process, not only on the specific events” (Irvan, 2006, p. 37).

According to the results, the Cypriot press do not seek “non-elite” sources; they tend to use elite sources for news stories. In other words, the news gathering process of both the Turkish and Greek Cypriot press is problematic. If only one part of society, the elite, dominates the news coverage, it is hard to find a solution for the problem.

*iii) Principles on news writing:* The final set of ethical principles of peace journalism concerns news writing:

o “Journalists should highlight peace initiatives.

o Journalists should focus on visible and invisible effects of violence and conflict.

o Journalists should provide background information.

o Journalists should always exercise the ethics of accuracy, veracity, fairness, and respect for human rights.

o Journalists should avoid victimizing, demonizing, derogatory, and inflammatory language.

o Journalists should avoid relying on the simple “us versus them” dichotomy” (Irvan, 2006, p. 37).

In general, the news writing in the Cypriot press is problematic; for instance, journalists, instead of highlighting peace initiatives, highlight more negative aspects of each other. It can be seen in the results that Cypriot media tend to focus on criminal news topics rather than on social and cultural activities. This is also a basic characteristic of conventional journalistic news values.

Another problematic issue in news writing is the visible and invisible effects of the Cyprus Conflict. Some journalists in Cyprus take the initiative and write about the invisible effects of this conflict, but in general it is not possible to read this kind of news stories in the press on both sides.

Background information is another difficulty in newspapers: since newspapers have space problems, journalists are not allowed to write long news articles, and are therefore unable to provide sufficient background information. The results show that the length of the news about the Cyprus conflict and related to the “other side” is either medium or short in size.

Suleyman Irvan’s (2006) last three suggestions are mostly related to the language usage of the press. If one looks at language usage in the Cyprus press, it can be said that generally there is a tendency to use negative headlines towards the “Other” (G/C: 31.1%, T/C: 24.9%).

### 7.1.4 Discussion of the Columnist’s Articles

Columnists are the opinion leaders of societies, and should give opinions/ideas and enlighten their readers through their articles. One should be critical and not accept every piece of information as it is. From a peace journalism perspective, opinion leaders or columnists are valuable because they can provide multiple perspectives for their readers through comments in their columns. Because of these features, they can create an effect on the audience and help them to think in different ways. As a columnist, even if one does not like the publishing policy of the newspaper one still has a chance to work with them. In other words, the columnist can have a different ideology from that of his/her newspaper; this is why this study included columnists’ articles in the research.

According to the results, most Cypriot columnists did not pass the peace journalism test: there are many unacceptable mistakes in their articles. The long list below shows how the majority of Cypriot columnists are not aware of peace journalism as a concept:

• Cypriot columnists tend to write about the “Cyprus Conflict” and current events; for instance they wrote a lot of articles on the Finish proposal.

• Turkish and Greek Cypriot columnists tend to use official government sources in their articles.

• Cypriot columnists tend not to give voice to the “Other” side.

• Cypriot columnists tend to use only one quoted source in their articles.

• Turkish and Greek Cypriot columnists rarely use unofficial government sources in their articles.

• Turkish Cypriot columnists emphasize the ethnic Turkishness of their identity (31.7%). On the Greek Cypriot columnists’ side, they believe in ethnic “Greek Cypriotness” (23%).

• 35% of articles in the Greek Cypriot press politically describe the Greek Cypriots as the “Republic of Cyprus.” Turkish Cypriot columnists tend to politically describe their community as the “Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus” (TRNC).

• Greek Cypriot columnists generally emphasize the ethnic Turkish Cypriotsness (40%) of Turkish Cypriots. However, Turkish Cypriot columnists tend to emphasize the ethnic “Rumness” of the Greek Cypriots (64.2%).

• Greek Cypriot columnists tend to politically describe the Turkish Cypriots as the “Turkish Side (6%), Cyprus Turkish Side (4%) and Turkish Cypriot Community (4%).” Turkish Cypriot columnists politically emphasize Greek Cypriots as the “Republic of Cyprus” (24.8%).

• Turkish Cypriot columnists use more antagonistic descriptions for the “Other” than the Greek Cypriot columnists do.

• Both Turkish and Greek Cypriot columnists tend to use the “Conflict Frame” when they are writing about the “Other” side.

• The writers of pacifist newspapers Alithia, Politis, Yenidüzen and Afrika tend to use peace frames in their articles; nationalist newspapers Simerini and Volkan use the peace frames less.

### 7.1.5 Conclusion of the Study

After content analysis and framing analysis the question of this study “To what extent is the Cyprus press negatively oriented towards the other when covering the Cyprus Conflict?” has been answered. Through evaluations of news and editorials, it has been explained why the Cyprus press on each side is more likely to be negative when dealing with news and editorials of the other side concerning the “Cyprus problem.”

The general thesis of this study, “News coverage and news framing of Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot journalists are negatively oriented towards the “Other” has been proven partly true. When we look at the news headlines there are more neutral and positive headlines (T/C: 75%, G/C: 69%) than the negative ones (T/C: 24.9%, G/C: 31.1%). On the other hand when we look at the editorials, Turkish Cypriot press used 54% conflict frames in the editorials on issues concerning “the other side,” while the Greek Cypriot press published 52% conflict frames in opinion articles.

The first hypothesis of the study, “Frames used in the opinion articles and news headlines in the Turkish and Greek Cypriot newspapers about the ‘other’ side are more conflict/negatively oriented than peace oriented,” was supported only with a small majority. On issues concerning the other side, “conflict frames” were used more often compared to “peace frames” in editorials. While during the period of this study, opinion columns in the Turkish Cypriot press included 54% conflict frames, the Greek Cypriot press used 52% conflict frames. The low percentage of peace frames in editorials is noticeable: the Turkish Cypriot press included 16% peace frames in editorials, while in the Greek Cypriot press this percentage was 12.6%. 31.1% of news headlines published in the Turkish Cypriot press and 24.9% in the Greek Cypriot press included negative expressions. The ratio of “no dominant frame” category is also significant. 15% in the Greek Cypriot press included “no dominant frame” and in the Turkish Cypriot press this percentage was 27.6%.

The second hypothesis, that “the Cyprus media more likely choose stories such as crime, rape, and drug use which can be considered as negative rather than positive stories from the other side when they are not covering Cyprus Conflict” was supported. While issues about Cyprus are chosen to have a first-degree news value (34.6 % in the Turkish Cypriot press and 47.5 % in the Greek Cypriot press), news about Turkey took second place (34.6 % in the Turkish Cypriot press and 36.5 % in the Greek Cypriot press). When they are not covering Cyprus Conflict or Turkey, the next major category belongs to crime stories.

Stories relating to crime mentioned in the hypothesis take the third place. When the choice of news relating to the Cyprus problem and stories on crime is evaluated, it is observed that the Cyprus press emphasizes sensation, violence, and conflict in stories concerning the opposite side (Turkish Cypriot press: 15.5 %, Greek Cypriot press: 8.5 %).

The last hypothesis, that “The news values of Cyprus journalism are not helping reconciliation and peace between Turkish and Greek Cypriot communities” was tested, and the results obtained supported the third minor hypothesis as well. Results show that the Cypriot press does not give voice to the “other” side (G/C: 80.6%, T/C: 83.8%). When Cypriot journalists are writing news about the “other” side, they tend to give voice only to their side’s public officials instead of to the “other side”. They do not quote each other and they “deaf” to each other which shows us the press in Cypriot do not listen to each other. The Cyprus press, with its news values, its style of news writing, and its choice of news topics is not contributing to the reconciliation of the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities. It was observed that the purposes of using news values are problematic in the Cyprus press; they are being used by the Cyprus press to demonstrate one’s “own” righteousness, to find out who started the conflict and look for the guilty party, and to continuously blame the opposite side.

### 7.1.5.1 Evaluation of News Coverage

The results and proposals concerning news were discussed under three main headings: (i) news practices, (ii) technical details of the news and (iii) subject of the news.

*NEWS PRACTICES:* In the newspapers and the period which was a sample for the study, news was made from expressions based on a single source, andfrom the “elite” sources of the society in which the journalists were living. From the point of peace journalism, this kind of news is problematic in various ways. The single source used in the news provides a one-sided view; when issues are evaluated from varying points of view, news sources are qualitatively increased and various understandings and solutions can be produced. Giving more voice to members of the community he/she lives in with regard to news concerning the “opposite” community, the journalist creates an imbalance in the news items. This imbalance brings the risk of the views and ideas of the opposite community not being understood. Johan Galtung’s (1998) peace journalism, puts forward the perspective “giving voice to all parties; empathy, understanding.” In this way, by giving voice to the opposite side, one tries to understand its ideas. It is unfortunate that the Cyprus press does not implement this in relation to news about the opposite side. Another problem is the dominance of “elite oriented” journalism in the Cyprus press. If one takes into account that elite sources have the most say in the Cyprus press, it is inevitable that the headlines in the papers would be elite-focused. For this reason, many headlines use neutral/descriptive discourse. The basic reasons are that journalists are the windows of elite sources opening to society and they make an effort to be seen as “impartial” according to traditional journalism. However, peace journalism, through its proposal to “focus on people peace-makers,” advises a focus on all strata of society. From the point of view of peace journalism, it is important that news reporters should also be employees of the paper. Taking news stories directly from news agencies and placing them onto the page without changing anything is not the right kind of journalism. What is problematic from the point of view of peace journalism is that while journalists are using these news items they are assuming a “passive” role. On the contrary, a journalist should be proactive. Before a conflict, an incident or a problem, he/she should find the issues, bring them forth and form a discussion platform. The Turkish Cypriot press is having difficulties employing reporters due to economic problems, and this situation causes journalists to be “reactive.” Although the Greek Cypriots press is in a better position, they have not adopted proactive journalism and are still practicing elite-focused reporting.

*TECHNICAL DETAILS OF THE NEWS:* From the point of view of peace journalism, it is important that news stories are detailed. News stories about a conflict/problem should include certain details: historical background, the dynamics of the conflict, and its solution prospects. The scarcity of long news stories is noticeable in the Cyprus press. In medium- and short-length news stories, no in-depth discussion or information can take place. News stories about the Cyprus problem mostly find their place in the front pages. The reason for this is the importance given to the Cyprus issue. Another technical detail in the Cyprus press is the use of photographs. Since photographs can be recalled for a longer time compared to words, the Cyprus press uses photographs to have the issues that concern the other side be read and to be noticed. Peace journalism gives importance to interview reporting for better explaining problems/conflicts. The scarcity of the interview reporting format in the Cyprus press is also noticeable; the Cyprus press finds the “standard news” format more applicable than the interview structure, which is more time consuming because it requires research.

*SUBJECT OF THE NEWS:* From the point of view of journalism and news values, issues that include conflict, violence, and sensation are topics that journalists find to have high news value. The Cyprus problem takes first place in the news, because of the connotations given to the “Cyprus Conflict” by the parties and the statements of elites and especially of politicians. The fact that news values include so much conflict and sensation is problematic from the point of view of peace journalism. Because the media looks for such news values in events and when it finds them it makes use of them, news that appears in the press is treated from the perspective of “closed space, closed time” and “who threw the first stone”. However, if such events were discussed from the angle of peace journalism of “open space, open time; causes and outcomes anywhere, also in history/culture” perspective, this would mean finding the dynamics of the problem and contributing to the solution rather than the parties leveling accusations at each other and looking for victims. Peace journalism does not advocate not using such news values; it is only objecting to the purposes and ways of using news values such as sensation, conflict, negativism, and violence in the press. Such news is being used by the press to demonstrate the righteousness of “one’s side”, to look for the guilty one by showing who started the conflict, and to continuously blame the opposite side.

### 7.1.5.2 Results and Proposals for Editorials, Evaluation of Opinion Columns

Results and proposals concerning editorials are evaluated under 3 main headings: (i) subject of the article, (ii) writing style of the article and (iii) dominant frame of the article.

*SUBJECT OF THE ARTICLE:* As a result of the study, the topics of columnists are seen to usually be the political issues of the day. During the period of this study, October 2006, an editorial was written about the Finish proposal submitted to the Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot sides by the interim president of the European Union. In addition, articles about Turkey’s accession to the European Union, which was a topic on the agenda of politicians during the same period, were noticeable. From the point of view of peace journalism, it is important for columnists to follow the agenda and in a “proactive” way discuss the issues and submit their views to the people. The reason why it is valuable is because people can find various issues of the day in the press. But the language of accusation, the conflict frame, and the effort to demonstrate the righteousness of their side used by most of the columnists in the Cyprus press while discussing issues concerning the “opposite” side, is problematic from the point of view of peace journalism. Opinion articles formed this way are contributing to polarization of the parties by creating chasms.

*WRITING STYLE OF ARTICLE:* Most columnists in the Cyprus press use information given by the official sources of the community they live in for their articles. The first problem from the point of view of peace journalism is that instead of implementing the rule “Focus on people peace-makers”, advocated by peace journalism, the focus is only on “elite peace-makers”. In this way, the solution is an object coming from only one segment of the population. The second problem is the denial of the right to speak to the opposite side. It is evident that the proposal by Galtung (1998) “Giving voice to all parties; empathy, understanding” is not being implemented by most authors. When the opposite side does not have the right to speak, its views are not understood. In addition, the feelings of the empathized opposite side are not given any importance by most columnists. Many Greek Cypriot columnists emphasize the ethnic aspect of Turkish Cypriots as “Turkish Cypriots” in their articles. And many Turkish Cypriot columnists emphasize the ethnic side of Greek Cypriots as “Rum.” In addition to these ethnic definitions, the frequency of antagonistic definitions is also noticeable. Antagonistic definitions are problematic from the point of view of peace journalism, because they creates the dichotomy of us and them. In addition, it must not be forgotten that “demonizing labels” leveled at the other side could in the future prompt those individuals to resort to violence. Instead, using their given names when defining the opposite side would reduce conflict.

*DOMINANT FRAME OF THE ARTICLE:* In articles on issues concerning the opposite side, Cypriot columnists generally make use of the “conflict frame.” Authors’ use of the conflict frame more than the peace frame means not seeing the problem as one which is soluble. It means finding who threw the first stone, thus finding the culprit, and looking for victims and murderers in the conflict. By dehumanizing “them”, they are made to be seen as not human. This is to focus only on the apparent effects of the conflict. The conflict frames used by many Cypriot columnists in their articles can be summarized in this way. The number of the above conflict frames can be increased; such frames are far from discussing problems; the aftermath of conflict it holds within it the “winner” and the “loser.” Instead of understanding the opposite side through the use of empathy, a form of phraseology is used to apportion blame and responsibility to the opposite side in order to show oneself to be righteous and good. Focusing on the sufferings of the community one lives in and belittling the sufferings of the opposite side will divide the sides into us and them, making it problematic from the point of view of peace journalism. However, similar frames to the conflict frames have been observed in many articles. It is unfortunate that the use of “peace frames” by Cypriot columnists has been very limited in numbers. And this summarizes the existing problems in the press.

### 7.1.5.3 Things That Need to be Done for the Cypriot Press: From the Perspective of Peace Journalism

There are things that need to be done in order to develop the concept of peace journalism in Cyprus. It is necessary to develop the concept of local peace journalism up to the global standard, and so the possible implementation and development of peace journalism in Cyprus is examined under the heading “Normative set of principles for Peace and Conflict Oriented Journalism in Cyprus”.

### 7.1.5.4 Normative Set of Principles for Peace Oriented Journalism in Cyprus

Scientific researchers have made proposals to people in literature for peace oriented journalism; some of them are as follows: Mowlana (1986), Galtung and Vincent (1992), Tehranian (2002), Lynch and McGoldrick (2005), Irvan (2006). When the proposal “normative set of principles for peace oriented journalism” was made for the Cyprus press, other proposals in literature were not overlooked.

Peace journalism suffers from lack of practice, because journalists tend to follow the traditional, conflict oriented reporting. Most of the journalists in Cyprus write their stories without doing any further investigation of them. They rarely double-check the sources and reliability of the information. Journalists think that if they spend some time to investigate the story before publishing it, they will lose time and competitiveness. Peace journalism, on the other hand, is time-consuming and expensive. It requires doing more research and talking to more people. Some principles to be discussed below in the name of the Cyprus press are some form of proposals similar to the ethical principals put forward for journalists up to today. These principles are “suggestive” and not “exhaustive,” and as proposals are similar to the philosophy of many ethical values prepared for journalists. As with the ethical values, the principles should be comprehended as “ought to be.” As Hamid Mowlana argues (1986) “The concept of ethics does not imply force. It is the study of what ought to be, so far as this depends upon the voluntary action of individuals” (p. 244). Mowlana’s ethical concept of “individual volunteerism” can also be said about peace journalism. It seems possible most of the time for journalists in Cyprus to make a preference on values of peace journalism on a micro/individual scale.

* **(RE)FRAMING THE ISSUE IN A POSITIVE WAY**

Most conflict resolution theorists believe that framing plays an important role in our lives, especially during the conflict process. Roger Fisher, William Ury and Bruce Putton (1991), in their book *“Getting to Yes”* describing how how framing affects people’s understanding of the conflict. Fisher, Ury and Putton (1991), state “All of us make sense out of our world through language. How we describe an event not only influences our understanding of it but also often affects how the event unfolds. Conflicts are both exacerbated and alleviated by the language disputants use to characterize them and by the way in which disputants frame the issue, their concerns, or their views” (p. 132).

For Fisher, Ury and Putton (1991), the role of the media becomes even more important in conflict situations. They see (re)framing as “one of the most powerful tools for resolving conflict” (p. 132). The media can use either positive frames or negative frames. Conflict-oriented reporters prefer to use negative and antagonistic frames in their news stories. Bar-On (1999) and Bar-Tal (2000b) describe them as “negative representations and images of opponents” (cited in **Yaacov Bar-Siman-Tov, 2004,** p. 230). **Yaacov Bar-Siman-Tov (2004), in his book *“From Conflict Resolution to Reconciliation”* suggests that** “…events, processes, and issues, can be also framed in a way that encourages cooperation and reconciliation” (pp. 232-233). Framing the issue in a positive way does not mean to change the context. For instance in Cyprus, if journalists frame issues in a positive way, they will help change the negative attitudes towards these issues in their respective communities.

According to Morton Deutsch (2006), what is needed is “… reframing the conflict as a mutual problem to be resolved (or solved) through joint cooperative efforts. Reframing helps to develop a cooperative orientation to the conflict even if the goals of the conflicting parties are seen, initially, to be negatively interdependent” (p. 34). Deutsch’s (2006) argument is useful for the Cypriot press, which should emphasize mutuality of understanding and respect in order to help create peace on the island.

Stephen W. Littlejohn and Kathy Domenici (2001) in their book *“Engaging Communication in Conflict: Systemic Practice”*suggest six reframing strategies which can be employed by the Cypriot journalists. These six framing strategies are:

1. *Reframe from negative to positive:* The Cypriot press should change their news language from negative to positive. They should stop negatively presenting the “other side” in the news stories and opinion articles.
2. *Reframe from past to future:* The Cypriot press should stop blaming each other about what happened in the past and who was “guilty” or “victim”. They should concentrate more on the future.
3. *Reframe from hostile to neutral*: Cypriot press should stop seeing each other as “enemy” or “hostile”. They should stop antagonistic discourse in their news stories and opinion articles.
4. *Reframe from individual interests to community interests:* The Cypriot press should reframe the issues in a way that underlines community interests rather than individual interests.
5. *Reframe from compliant to vision:* The Cypriot press should stop being compliant because of the past events or issues. They should look at the future, and create a positive vision of the island of Cyprus.
6. *Reframe from criticism to request:* The Cypriot press should stop criticizing/blaming each other. They should spend more time talking about what kind of requests they have from each other.

Some principles in presenting events in a positive/negative frames were given under the title “Ten Commandments of Peace Journalism”[[50]](#footnote-51) by Majid Tehranian (2002). Two of these principles are as follows:

“Your representation of conflict problems can become part of the problem if it exacerbates dualisms and hatreds. Your representation of conflict problems can become part of the solution if it employs the creative tensions in any human conflict to seek common ground and nonviolent solutions” (p. 80).

As it is ascertainable from Tehranian’s (2002) proposals, the frame making up the story can make the journalist part of the problem or the solution. To avoid becoming part of the problem, journalists can facilitate the understanding of issues by giving more detail in the story. According to Galtung ve Vincent’s (1992) proposal under the title “*Ten Proposals for a Peace-oriented News Media”[[51]](#footnote-52)* can also be applicable for the Cypriot press.“...the media should pay attention to enhancing the retention elements of news reporting, and not talk down to its audience and reader. In this sense, journalists could be more interested in maximizing audience “learning” of news. Not only could stories be reported in greater detail, but journalists could give some thought to how increased viewer/reader comprehension and recall could be accomplished” (p. 134). If the Cyprus press gives details about the problem in news stories, as proposed by Galtung and Vincent, issues will be better grasped and discussed by the target audience.

Hamid Mowlana’s (1986) proposal of four articles includes ideas to find solutions to problems[[52]](#footnote-53): “Increase the amount of information available on peaceful solutions to conflict” (Mowlana, 1986, p. 244). Increasing the information in the news stories and giving more detail will not only help the solution of problems, but also can establish a platform for dialog.

* **POSITIVE PERCEPTION**

Perception is an important element for journalists and societies. Conflicting sides always tend to perceive the events in win-lose or zero-sum game perspective. Ronald Fisher (2000) explains the win-lose approach as follows: “The *win-lose approach* is all too common. People learn the behaviors of destructive conflict early in life – competition, dominance, aggression and defense permeate many of our social relationships from the family to the school playground” (pp. 4-5). It is unfair to accuse media alone for creating a negative perception. This is a feature of all societies. However, people need to do something to change this perception. **Yaacov Bar-Siman-Tov (2004) sees negative perception as a barrier to reconciliation. He suggests that, “**techniques should presumably focus more substantially on existing negative perceptions the sides have of each other and of the relationship between them, and on changing these perceptions toward once more conducive to reconciliation” (p. 233). The Cypriot press can play a constructive role in the conflict process. Peace journalism encourages reporters to play a constructive role in order to build up a good relationship, trust and confidence between the conflicting sides.

When issues are looked at from the point of view of peace journalism, the approach of “positive perception” can be achieved by providing more information about the conflict. As in the model of peace journalism of Galtung (1998),[[53]](#footnote-54) the conflict should be seen through the eyes of a journalist and the way the conflict came into being should be explained to the target audience. This explanation should be made as in Galtung’s proposal of “open space, open time; causes and outcomes anywhere, also in history/culture” (cited in Lynch and McGoldrick, 2005, p. 6). Hence, as the journalist perceives the issue without being bogged down by historic and cultural misconceptions and more than finding who threw the first stone, it will be necessary to have the issue discussed in detail and establish a dialog between the parties.

* **“AN EYE FOR AN EYE MAKES ALL BLIND”**

“An eye for an eye” was the old law. In Mahatma Gandhi’s words, “An eye for an eye and we all go blind” (cited in Ury, 1999, p. 88). Instead of all conflicting parties going blind, we should talk about our differences and problems. Conflict resolution suggests a win-win approach: “The *win-win approach*is a conscious and systematic attempt to maximize the goals of both parties through collaborative problem solving. The conflict is seen as a problem to be solved rather than a war to be won” (Fisher, 2000, p. 5). The win-win approach sees conflict as a problem to be solved. However, media tend to give more conflict-oriented news in order to create sensation and increase the circulation/rating of their business. This is one side of the problem. The win-win approach has in recent years found its way into the literature of the media through peace journalism. The conflict-focused journalism approach needs a winner and a loser party in order to explain the events. If one looks at the issue of negotiations in Cyprus, it will be seen that journalists bring forward the idea of who compromised, who changed their position and thus, which side won and which side lost. However, if the Cyprus press could see the negotiation process as a process of “give and take”, it could make a positive contribution by investigating the sources of the problem and by discussing the factors that will help solve the problems so that both sides can be winners.

What Galtung (1998) proposed in his “humanisation of all sides” for peace oriented media in the peace journalism model, is valid for the Cyprus press. If the press makes news about the opposite side looking for retribution, in time it will increase the desire to annihilate the opposite side. Furthermore, such view points of retribution in the news, would instigate vengeance by dehumanizing the opposite side. It is possible that dehumanized parties would in the future use violence with vengeance. In other words, it can be said that media’s “monsterization” and “demonization” of the opposite side would contribute to the increase of violence in the future. However, the concept of peace journalism demonstrates to the press that issues can be resolved without resorting to violence. As emphasized by Jake Lynch and Annabel McGoldrick (2005) “Peace journalism builds an awareness of non-violence and creativity into the practical job of everyday editing and reporting” (p. 5). It is one of the serious principles of peace journalism to instill in the press the awareness of news with creativity and without violence.

One of the proposals of Mowlana (1986) for the press is as follows: “They should promote interpersonal communication by facilitating more interaction among people rather than narcotizing them through mass-distributed programming” (p. 245). Mowlana proposes to the press “interpersonal communication,” which is the most powerful form of communication. Hence, to the degree that the press establishes a dialog with the opposite side, to the degree that it gives voice to everyone, and to the degree that it details problems, factors creating conflict will cease to exist. The retribution frame is a factor diminishing communication and creating contradiction between parties.

“An eye for an eye” frame is a practice which comes across often in the Cyprus press in issues concerning the opposite side. From the point of view of peace journalism this frame can also be called propaganda-oriented. In other words, many news stories and editorials in the press employ various forms of propaganda to legitimize this kind of a retribution frame. The ones most often employed are the following: “we are under threat”, “we are innocent”, “we are good – they are bad”.

Whereas, if there is a mistake, a lie, propaganda, and manipulation, the press should expose it no matter which party it affects. Continuously drawing attention to the mistakes of the opposite side will not contribute to the solution. On this, Galtung (1998) proposes to the media the following: “explore untruths on all sides”.

* **EMPATHY CREATES UNDERSTANDING**

Fisher, Ury and Putton (1991) state that

How you see the world depends on where you sit. People tend to see what they want to see. Out of a mass of detailed information, they tend to pick out and focus on those facts that confirm their prior perceptions and to disregard or misinterpret those that call their perceptions into question. Each side in a negotiation may see only the merits of its case, and only the faults of the other side’s (p. 23).

This is a statement which sheds light on the journalism practice in Cyprus. Most of the journalists tend to see what they want to see, and important examples of this come from the 2004 Annan Plan referenda period. After the referenda, Cypriot journalists did not use the “empathy creates understanding” epigram; in other words, they did not empathize in order to understand the “Other” side’s perceptions and feelings. If as in the Galtung (1998) model the principle of “giving voice to all parties” were accepted by giving the right of expression to the opposite side, the reason why the plan was accepted or rejected would have been understood. The Cyprus press, even today, does not give very much voice to the opposite side in news relating to each other and handles issues in a monological frame.

As Fisher, Ury and Putton (1991) comment, “they may well believe that their views are “right” as strongly as you believe yours are” (p. 23). “Blaming is an easy mode to fall into, particularly when you feel that the other side is indeed responsible” (p. 25). The general tendency among both Turkish and Greek Cypriot press is toward accusation, blame, and the creation of suspicion of the “other” side. Within a win-lose paradigm, the Cypriot press focuses on who will “win” in the process toward resolving the Cyprus conflict. But even if blaming is justified, it is usually counterproductive. “Under attack, the other side will become defensive and will resist what you have to say” (Fisher, Ury and Putton, 1991, p. 25). Peace journalism encourages empathy for the other while covering issues important for all sides.

In order to achieve “empathy creates understanding” in issues relating to the opposite side, Mowlana’s (1986) proposal seems useful: “Put peace makers on opposite sides in touch with one another” (p. 245). We can also include journalists in Mowlana’s ‘peace makers’ definition. In other words, with journalists’ being in contact with their colleagues on the opposite side, they will increase their grasp of the issues, but also by overcoming prejudices and by increasing communication they will create a better understanding. Suleyman Irvan’s[[54]](#footnote-55) (2006) proposal of “empathy for the Cyprus press” envisages sending journalists to the “other” side. “This will result in more coverage from the other side. They can employ reporters from each other’s community. The newspapers can publish the articles of the columnists from the other community. More interaction will bring more understanding” (Irvan, 2006, p. 37). This way, members of the press can have a chance to somewhat understand the views of the “opposite” side by empathy through the principle of “put yourself in their shoes”.

Table : Normative set of principles for Peace Oriented Journalism, 2010.

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **PEACE ORIENTED REPORTING** | **NON-PEACE ORIENTED REPORTING** |
| (Re)framing the issue in a positive way | (Re)framing the issue in a negative way |
| Positive perception | Negative perception |
| “An eye for an eye makes all blind” | “An eye for an eye” |
| Empathy creates understanding | Antipathy creates conflict |

This study presented definitive evidence that news and columnists’ article coverage in Cyprus is far from contributing to peace building. In light of the renewed negotiations in Cyprus for reunification, the Cypriot media should engage in responsible reporting. It is of the utmost importance that peace journalism is introduced and supported in Cyprus now.

There are prevailing perceptions among journalists such as “I write the report, I don’t care about the rest” or “My business is news reporting, don’t put additional burdens on my shoulder”[[55]](#footnote-56). “Traditional journalists should first of all accept the fact that their practice of news reporting is problematic. It is not possible to come up with a solution to a problem, without first acknowledging the problem” (Ersoy, 2010, p. 94).

A great majority of journalists do not bother to give room for statements of the parties facing incrimination in a news story, nor to enrich their news sources. Likewise, most of the journalists abide by state- and government-oriented news reporting, thus considering only the statements made by state authorities as stories having news value. They tend to report only the apparent or visible parts of a story or the action itself. In other words, most do not make an effort to do process-based and investigative reporting that also reveal the invisible parts of the story. For, doing research and seeking the invisible does not only entail an arduous work, but also takes time.

With the advent of technology as well as the industrialization and monopolization of media, the media has gained a new structure in which news agencies race with one another and do anything they can to dodge their rivals. Within this framework, journalists who continue racing sacrifice their news quality. Just for the sake of being the first one to service the news story and to discard other news agencies, journalists report news which is incomplete, ordinary, lacking information and covered in a partial manner. Peace journalism will remain as an alternative for overcoming those kinds of problems seen in the media.

The results of this study reveal that Turkish and Greek Cypriot newspapers operating in Cyprus cannot refrain from traditional journalism and have not yet started practising responsible reporting and selecting news values relevant to peace journalism. A number of journalists believing in peace journalism are either not able to practice it full-scale or are not informed properly about the concept itself.

All three hypotheses used in this study are proven to hold true for the Cypriot media. It can consequently be stated that Turkish and Greek Cypriot newspapers make use of negative expressions in their headlines while covering news stories and columnists’ articles about one another. Under these circumstances, given the fact that news agencies are busy competing in smearing each other, a possible positive contribution to the peace process by the media cannot be expected. Considering the power and potential positive role the media can play as a peace bridge between the two parties, it becomes necessary for the media to revise its current role.

The Cypriot media frequently covers negative stories including news about murder, rape, drug abuse and criminal offences while reporting about one another. Such a reporting practice which tries to depict the Other as evil can only add fuel to the fire, let alone contributing to a solution. From the perspective of peace journalism, Cypriot newspapers are problematic in terms of selecting stories, framing their news and preparing headlines.

It is proven that the Cypriot media has severe problems, and that it is in its infancy from the perspective of peace journalism.

In conclusion, any novelty in the media sector faces resistance and is likely to face resistance in the future, which also holds true for the concept of peace journalism. People have always been prejudiced about the act of changing and the change itself. A majority of the journalists in Cyprus are not willing to overturn the existing mechanisms, nor willing to exert efforts and show the dedication needed to do so. As Alankus (2008) notes, media is not a “scapegoat” alone; as citizens we need to be aware of our responsibilities for developing democratic societies.

Although peace journalism appears contradictory due to its name, it can be said that this term is not against any kind of journalism, but on the contrary is an understanding which defends the idea that radical precautions should be taken for journalism. Peace journalism is not the opposite of either war journalism or traditional journalism. It is a journalistic understanding which has been developed to complement that type of journalism which has been named traditional journalism and which is being practiced extensively throughout the world. If we consider peace reporting and conflict reporting as two separate concepts, then we repeat the same mistakes that the media make. Media confrontations are often discriminative with expressions like ‘us and them’ or ‘the good and the bad’. Such segregations lead to polarization within society and this inhibits a solution. On the contrary, peace reporting in its nature is far from discrimination or segregation, and it not only points out to the problems in the media but also it provides a range of suggestions for the solution. Instead of making differentiations such as ‘we are peace reporter but they are conflict reporter’, we need to work on ways to make media an effective means to establish peace within and welfare of the society.

Journalism is a difficult profession, in which there is news which has to be distributed in a very short time, and continuous stress is caused by the urgency of “let’s give this news first”. When all of these come together, we are faced with a “fast-food news” concept: these types of products are prepared and consumed fast. The fact that news can be consumed fast is understandable, but what is not understandable is the fast preparation of news at the cost of leaving out important parts.

News reporting which is widespread in the world presents itself with the fast-food idea. This type of reporting can be stopped by peace journalism which produces satisfying, high quality, and well-balanced news. Even in tight and stressful working conditions, it seems possible to implement the idea of peace journalism with some caution and thought.

### 7.1.6 Recommendations for Further Researchers

This study takes a comparative approach in terms of analyzing the news coverage of both sides in print media. Further researchers must investigate the radio and television stations and the Internet news coverage of the Cyprus conflict. The Internet especially could be an alternative place for peace activists to create a dialog platform between the parties to the conflict.

There are ideological, political and economical factors that need to be investigated in order to understand the day-by-day decisions of the Cypriot journalists.

Since Cyprus has more than 10 universities it could be great opportunity for the local media to work with universities. Journalists need to know more about the peace journalism concept, and this is why academia needs to cooperate with the unions of journalists and organize workshops on the basics of peace journalism. Eastern Mediterranean University’s Faculty of Communication and Media Studies has put the peace journalism course into its curriculum; and in this way, new generations of journalists will be familiar with peace journalism before they graduate.

Another suggestion is to create an association for peace journalists on the island. In this association, the journalists on both sides could come together to work on guidelines for reporting. This association will encourage reporters to practice peace journalism.

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APPENDICES

## Appendix A: Evaluation of the Headlines

**POSITIVE (TOWARDS THE OTHER)**

1. ‘Inclusive’ Frame (to be inclusive of the “Other”)

2. ‘Solution Oriented’ Frame (includes suggestion and solution on the event)

3. ‘Understanding the Other’ Frame (try to understand opposition side)

4. ‘Forgiveness’ Frame (using forgiveness expressions)

5. ‘Empathy’ Frame (put yourself in “their” shoes)

6. ‘Trust’ Frame (trust the “Other” side)

7. ‘Unprejudiced’ Frame (being unprejidice to the “Other”)

8. ‘Fair Play’ Frame (representing the issues in fair perspective)

9. ‘Balance Background’ Frame (providing balance and background information)

10. ‘Self Reflexive Criticism of Government Policy’ Frame. (criticizing own government policies)

11. ‘Emphasize Both Sides’ Pains’ Frame (pain is pain, it is same in all over the world)

12. ‘We are Friend’ Frame (representing the “Other” in friend prespective)

13. ‘Win-Win’ Frame (includes mutual satisfaction)

14. ‘Accept Other As It Is’ Frame (considering the “Other”s ideas)

15. ‘Anti-nationalist’ Frame (emphasize unification and living together perspective)

16. ‘History – Culture’ Frame (providing historical and cultural information inorder to understand the roots of the conflict)

17. ‘Friendly Speech’ Frame (providing constructive statements to the opposition side)

18. ‘Applaud’ Frame (if opposition side makes any good things, it needs to appreciate)

19. ‘Other in the Self’ Frame (try to seek the other in the self)

20. ‘Common Ground’ Frame (seek for common ground instead of conflict)

21. ‘Good/Good or Bad/Bad’ Frame. (seeking good and bad things of both sides, appreciate the good things and condemn the bad things of both sides)

**NEGATIVE (TOWARDS THE OTHER)**

1. ‘Exclusive’ Frame (to be exclusive of the “Other”)

2. ‘Status Quo Oriented’ Frame (supporting status quo forever)

3. ‘Other is the Threat’ Frame (using theraten statements to the “Other”)

4. ‘Revenge’ Frame. (encouraging revenge to the community)

5. ‘Antipathy’ Frame (stay in your shoes)

6. ‘Distrust’ Frame (disrust the “Other” side)

7. ‘Prejudiced’ Frame (being prejidice to the “Other”)

8. ‘Sport’ Frame (representing the issues like sport match perspective)

9. ‘Unbalance Background’ Frame (providing unbalance background information)

10. ‘Criticize Other Side’s Government Policy’ (criticizing the “Other” side’s government policies)

11. ‘Emphasize One Side’ Pains Frame (emphasizing only own side pains)

12. ‘They are our Enemy’ Frame (representing the “Other” in eternal enemy prespective)

13. ‘Win-Lose’ Frame (includes distinct satisfaction)

14. ‘Inferior’ Frame (underestimate the “Other”s ideas)

15. ‘Nationalist’ Frame (emphasizing red lines and as a national problem)

16. ‘Who Throw The First Stone’ Frame (providing no historical and cultural information and emphasizing who started the conflict)

17. ‘Hate Speech’ Frame (providing hate speech and insultive statements to the opposition side)

18. ‘Blame’ Frame (blaming the “Other” and show them as a cause of the problem)

19. ‘Self and Other’ Frame (making self and other distinction)

20. ‘Just War’ Frame (emphasizing only war related with the opposition side)

21. ‘Good and Evil’ Frame (we are good and they are evil perspective)

**NEUTRAL (DESCRIPTIVE)**

1. It just describes what happened without passing comment.

2. Transferring the information without questioning it.

## 3. Providing direct quotation in the headline from the source of the story.Appendix B: The Turkish and Greek Cypriot Columnists Antagonistic, Political Descriptions (Other)

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Newspapers** | **Dates** | **Columnists** | **Political Descriptions For Turkish Cypriots in OTHER category** | **Political Descriptions**  **For Greek Cypriots in**  **OTHER category** | **Antagonistic Descriptions**  **in OTHER category** |
| YENIDÜZEN | 03Oct06 | Ferdi S.Soyer | Kıbrıs Türk Halkı | Rum Toplumu |  |
| YENIDÜZEN | 03Oct06 | Hüseyin Aktığ |  | Zone of Cyprus Greek |  |
| YENIDÜZEN | 04Oct06 | Sevgül Uludağ | North | Side of Cyprus Greek |  |
| YENIDÜZEN | 09Oct06 | Hasan Erçakıca |  | Side of Cyprus Greek |  |
| YENIDÜZEN | 09Oct06 | Sami Özuslu |  | Greek Cypriot Community |  |
| YENIDÜZEN | 11Oct06 | Niyazi Kızılyürek |  | Greek Cypriot Community |  |
| YENIDÜZEN | 11Oct06 | Sami Özuslu | North |  |  |
| YENIDÜZEN | 12Oct06 | Sami Özuslu | Leadership of Cyprus Turks |  |  |
| YENIDÜZEN | 14Oct06 | Nazım Beratlı |  | The Greek Cypriot Administration |  |
| VOLKAN | 01Oct06 | Hasan Keskin | North |  |  |
| VOLKAN | 01Oct06 | Seyyan Uzunoğlu |  |  | Pirate Republic of Cyprus |
| VOLKAN | 02Oct06 | Hasan Keskin |  |  | “Rum” - Greeks together |
| VOLKAN | 02Oct06 | Sabahattin İsmail |  | State of “Rum” | “Rum” - Greeks together |
| VOLKAN | 02Oct06 | Seyyan Uzunoğlu |  | Republic of Cyprus “Rum” | “Rum” - Greeks together , Non-Moslem or atheist |
| VOLKAN | 02Oct06 | Tanju Müezzinoğlu |  | The Greek Cypriot Administration |  |
| VOLKAN | 03Oct06 | Sabahattin İsmail |  |  | “Rum” - Greeks together |
| VOLKAN | 04Oct06 | Ahmet Gülay |  | Zone of Cyprus Greek, Rum Yönetimi |  |
| VOLKAN | 04Oct06 | Hüseyin Laptalı |  | The Greek Cypriot Administration, Republic of Cyprus Sign | Republic of Cyprus Sign |
| VOLKAN | 04Oct06 | Kamil Özkaloğlu |  |  | Killer of Turk, chauvinist, fascist |
| VOLKAN | 04Oct06 | Sabahattin İsmail |  | State of “Rum” | “Rum” - Greeks together |
| VOLKAN | 04Oct06 | Seyyan Uzunoğlu |  |  | Non-Moslem or atheist |
| VOLKAN | 05Oct06 | Seyyan Uzunoğlu |  | Pirate Republic of Cyprus | Pirate Republic of Cyprus, Non-Moslem or atheist |
| VOLKAN | 06Oct06 | Kamil Özkaloğlu |  |  | Fascist, Killer of Turk, chauvinist Papadopulos |
| VOLKAN | 06Oct06 | Sabahattin İsmail |  | State of “Rum” | No supporter Papadopulos |
| VOLKAN | 06Oct06 | Seyyan Uzunoğlu |  |  | “Rum” - Greeks together |
| VOLKAN | 07Oct06 | Abdullah Azizoğlu |  |  | Head of the devils, the best EOKA supporter foe |
| VOLKAN | 07Oct06 | Asaf Ertaç |  |  | Socalled Republic of Cyprus |
| VOLKAN | 07Oct06 | Günay Yorgancıoğlu |  | Rum Administration |  |
| VOLKAN | 07Oct06 | Kamil Özkaloğlu |  |  | Killer of Turk, bloody hand, murderer, terrorist Priest |
| VOLKAN | 08Oct06 | Ethem Durak |  |  | Non-Moslem or atheist |
| VOLKAN | 08Oct06 | Sabahattin İsmail |  | State of “Rum” |  |
| VOLKAN | 09Oct06 | Abdullah Azizoğlu |  | Side of Rum |  |
| VOLKAN | 09Oct06 | Aydın Akkurt | Community of Cyprus Turks |  | “Rum” - Greeks together |
| VOLKAN | 09Oct06 | Hasan Keskin |  | Zone of Cyprus Greek |  |
| VOLKAN | 09Oct06 | Sabahattin İsmail | Community of Cyprus Turks | State of “Rum” |  |
| VOLKAN | 10Oct06 | Sabahattin İsmail | Community of Cyprus Turks, North | State of “Rum”, Rum Administration |  |
| VOLKAN | 11Oct06 | Günay Yorgancıoğlu |  |  | Socalled Mayor of "Omorfo" |
| VOLKAN | 12Oct06 | Rauf R. Denktaş | Community of Cyprus Turks |  | “Rum” - Greeks together |
| VOLKAN | 12Oct06 | Günay Yorgancıoğlu | Community of Cyprus Turks |  |  |
| VOLKAN | 12Oct06 | Sabahattin İsmail | Community of Cyprus Turks |  | “Rum” - Greeks together |
| VOLKAN | 12Oct06 | Tanju Müezzinoğlu |  | State of “Rum” |  |
| VOLKAN | 13Oct06 | Günay Yorgancıoğlu |  |  | Socalled Major of Maraş |
| VOLKAN | 13Oct06 | Sabahattin İsmail | Community of Cyprus Turks |  |  |
| VOLKAN | 14Oct06 | Aydın Akkurt | Community of Cyprus Turks |  | “Rum” - Greeks together |
| VOLKAN | 14Oct06 | Mehmet S. Bayram | Community of Cyprus Turks | The Greek Cypriot Administration, Community of Rum, Administration of South Cyprus | Propoganda of Fascist Rum |
| VOLKAN | 15Oct06 | Kamil Özkaloğlu |  |  | Occupier “Rum”s |
| VOLKAN | 15Oct06 | Seyyan Uzunoğlu |  |  | Non-Moslem or atheist |
| VOLKAN | 15Oct06 | Tanju Müezzinoğlu |  | State of “Rum” |  |
| HALKIN SESI | 01Oct06 | Ersin Tatar | Community of Cyprus Turks |  |  |
| HALKIN SESI | 01Oct06 | Reşat Akar | North Cyprus |  |  |
| HALKIN SESI | 02Oct06 | Ata Atun |  | Republic of Cyprus (Rum) |  |
| HALKIN SESI | 02Oct06 | İsmet Kotak |  |  | Occupier Rum |
| HALKIN SESI | 03Oct06 | Eşref Çetinel | North |  |  |
| HALKIN SESI | 04Oct06 | İsmet Kotak |  |  | Occupied “Republic of Cyprus” by Rum |
| HALKIN SESI | 04Oct06 | Orhan Aydeniz |  | Administration in the South |  |
| HALKIN SESI | 04Oct06 | Özcan Özcanhan |  | The Leadership of Cyprus Rum |  |
| HALKIN SESI | 06Oct06 | Rauf R. Denktaş |  | Administration of Rum |  |
| HALKIN SESI | 06Oct06 | İsmet Kotak |  |  | Occupier Rum |
| HALKIN SESI | 06Oct06 | Reşat Akar |  |  | Ferocious leader of EOKA |
| HALKIN SESI | 07Oct06 | İsmet Kotak |  |  | Occupier Rum |
| HALKIN SESI | 07Oct06 | Osman Güvenir |  |  | Terrorist president |
| HALKIN SESI | 08Oct06 | İsmet Kotak |  | Republic of Cyprus “Rum” | Occupier Rum |
| HALKIN SESI | 08Oct06 | Özer Hatay |  | The Greek Cypriot Administration |  |
| HALKIN SESI | 09Oct06 | Rauf R. Denktaş |  | State of “Rum” |  |
| HALKIN SESI | 10Oct06 | Eşref Çetinel | North |  |  |
| HALKIN SESI | 10Oct06 | Osman Güvenir |  |  | Bloody hand Papadopulos, spoiled child of spoiled Greek’s |
| HALKIN SESI | 10Oct06 | İsmet Kotak |  | Republic of Cyprus (Rum) | Republic of Cyprus which occupied by Rum |
| HALKIN SESI | 11Oct06 | Adnan Işıman |  | South of the Cyprus |  |
| HALKIN SESI | 11Oct06 | Eşref Çetinel | Community of Cyprus Turks |  |  |
| HALKIN SESI | 11Oct06 | İsmet Kotak | Community of Cyprus Turks |  |  |
| HALKIN SESI | 11Oct06 | Özer Hatay |  | Administration of Rum |  |
| HALKIN SESI | 12Oct06 | Akay Cemal | Community of Cyprus Turks |  |  |
| HALKIN SESI | 12Oct06 | Ata Atun |  | Zone of Cyprus Greek |  |
| HALKIN SESI | 12Oct06 | Mehmet S. Bayram |  | The Greek Cypriot Administration | Propaganda of Fascist Rum |
| HALKIN SESI | 13Oct06 | Rauf R. Denktaş |  | Administration of Rum, Leadership of Rum |  |
| HALKIN SESI | 13Oct06 | Eşref Çetinel | North |  |  |
| HALKIN SESI | 13Oct06 | İsmet Kotak |  | Republic of Cyprus (Rum) | Propaganda of Rum, Occupier Rum |
| HALKIN SESI | 15Oct06 | Eşref Çetinel | Turkish Community |  |  |
| AFRIKA | 01Oct06 | Şener Levent |  |  | racist, nationalist, chauvinist |
| AFRIKA | 02Oct06 | Mehmet Levent |  | The Greek Cypriot Administration |  |
| AFRIKA | 04Oct06 | Damla Özhan | North of the Cyprus |  |  |
| AFRIKA | 05Oct06 | Damla Özhan | North of the Cyprus |  |  |
| AFRIKA | 05Oct06 | Şener Levent | North of the Cyprus |  |  |
| AFRIKA | 06Oct06 | Elvan Levent |  | The administration of South Cyprus |  |
| AFRIKA | 06Oct06 | Serhat İncirli | Artificial |  |  |
| AFRIKA | 07Oct06 | Mehmet Levent |  | Community of Rum |  |
| AFRIKA | 08Oct06 | Şener Levent | North |  |  |
| AFRIKA | 10Oct06 | Ali Osman | North of the Cyprus |  |  |
| AFRIKA | 10Oct06 | Şener Levent | North |  |  |
| AFRIKA | 11Oct06 | Mehmet Levent |  | Güney Republic of Cyprus “Rum” |  |
| AFRIKA | 15Oct06 | Mehmet Levent | Community of Cyprus Turks |  |  |
| AFRIKA | 15Oct06 | Şener Levent |  | The government of Rum |  |
| KIBRIS | 04Oct06 | Bilbay Eminoğlu |  |  | No supporter Community of Rum |
| KIBRIS | 05Oct06 | Ahmet Tolgay | Community of Cyprus Turks |  | Fanatic “Rum”s, Terrorists of |
| KIBRIS | 13Oct06 | Hasan Hastürer |  | The Greek Cypriot Administration |  |
| KIBRIS | 13Oct06 | Başaran Düzgün |  | Zone of Cyprus Greek |  |
| PHILELEFTHEROS | 01Oct06 | Paris Potamitis |  |  | Socalled isolation, illegal Ercan |
| PHILELEFTHEROS | 01Oct06 | Yanakis Dmiru |  |  | Turkish occupier army |
| ALITHIA | 01Oct06 | Pampos Haralmabus |  |  | Turkish occupation |
| SIMERINI | 01Oct06 | Marios Manusopulos |  |  | Illegal structure and institutions, socalled isolation |
| ALITHIA | 01Oct06 | Glafkos Ksenos |  |  | Semi occupation |
| PHILELEFTHEROS | 02Oct06 | Görüş Sütunu |  |  | Socalled isolation, illegal airport Ercan |
| PHILELEFTHEROS | 03Oct06 | Görüş Sütunu |  |  | Socalled isolation |
| SIMERINI | 03Oct06 | Simerini gazetesinin görüşü |  |  | Socalled isolation |
| SIMERINI | 04Oct06 | Savvas Yakovidis |  |  |  |
| PHILELEFTHEROS | 04Oct06 | Mihalis Pasardis |  |  | Atilla, barbarianian, invasion, Turkish occupation |
| ALITHIA | 04Oct06 | Alithia'nın görüşü |  |  | Soldier of occupation |
| PHILELEFTHEROS | 04Oct06 | Mihalis Ignatiu |  |  | Egoistic, boast |
| HARAVGHI | 04Oct06 | Görüş Sütunu |  |  | Socalled isolation |
| ALITHIA | 04Oct06 | Mihalis Papapetru |  |  | Occupation and invasion, Turkish occupation |
| PHILELEFTHEROS | 04Oct06 | Andonis Kutalyanos |  |  | Socalled economical isolation, socalled direct trade regulation |
| ALITHIA | 05Oct06 | Alekos Konstantinidis |  | Cyprus State of “Rum” |  |
| HARAVGHI | 05Oct06 | Lenia Stilyanu |  |  | socalled isolation |
| HARAVGHI | 05Oct06 | Andrula Giurof |  |  | Occupation of Ankara, occupier Türkey |
| SIMERINI | 05Oct06 | Hristoforus Papastilianu |  |  | Turkish ogre |
| PHILELEFTHEROS | 05Oct06 | Kiriakos Cimillis |  | State of Cyprus | Occupation. Pillage of Ankara |
| SIMERINI | 05Oct06 | Lazaros Mavros |  |  | Conquest, settler |
| HARAVGHI | 06Oct06 | Niki |  |  | bully |
| HARAVGHI | 06Oct06 | Lenia Stilyanu |  |  | Turkish occupation |
| HARAVGHI | 06Oct06 | Makale Sütunu |  |  | socalled isolation, dispute of Turks |
| ALITHIA | 06Oct06 | Alekos Konstantinidis |  |  | settler |
| ALITHIA | 07Oct06 | Alekos Konstantinidis |  |  | North under occupation |
| HARAVGHI | 08Oct06 | Makale Sütunu |  |  | occupation |
| PHILELEFTHEROS | 08Oct06 | Stefanos Konstantinidis |  |  | Occupation |
| PHILELEFTHEROS | 08Oct06 | Görüş Sütunu |  |  | Bargaining culture |
| PHILELEFTHEROS | 08Oct06 | Paris Potamitis |  |  | Illegal Ercan |
| SIMERINI | 08Oct06 | Lazaros Mavros |  |  | Atilla |
| SIMERINI | 08Oct06 | Simerini gazetesinin görüşü |  |  | Turkish bargaining |
| ALITHIA | 09Oct06 | Glafkos Ksenos |  |  | occupation army |
| SIMERINI | 10Oct06 | Simerini gazetesinin görüşü |  |  | Turkish boast, Turkish rejection, Turkish bargaining |
| POLITIS | 10Oct06 | Görüş Sütunu |  |  | Illegal Ercan, occupied North. |
| ALITHIA | 10Oct06 | Takis Agathokleus |  | The Greek Cypriot Administration |  |
| SIMERINI | 11Oct06 | Lazaros Mavros |  |  | Atilla |
| SIMERINI | 11Oct06 | Savvas Yakovidis |  |  | Atilla |
| PHILELEFTHEROS | 11Oct06 | Phileleftheros |  |  | occupation |
| ALITHIA | 12Oct06 | Alithia'nın görüşü |  |  | Free zones |
| ALITHIA | 12Oct06 | Alekos Konstantinidis | Ground of Cyprus Turks |  |  |
| HARAVGHI | 12Oct06 | Niki Kulermu |  |  | occupation |
| HARAVGHI | 13Oct06 | Andrula Giurof |  |  | Occupier Turkey |
| HARAVGHI | 13Oct06 | Makale Sütunu | Leadership of Cyprus Turks |  |  |
| POLITIS | 13Oct06 | Andreas Parashos |  |  | occupation |
| POLITIS | 15Oct06 | Vangelis Vasiliu |  |  | Free zones |
| SIMERINI | 15Oct06 | Yannos Haralambidis |  |  | Leader of occupation, illegal Ercan, socalled isolation |

## Appendix C: General Results of the News Stories Coverage

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | **GREEK CYPRIOT**  **PRESS** | **TURKISH CYPRIOT PRESS** |
| **HEADLINES** | * % 65.4 neutral or descriptive oriented. * % 31.1 negative oriented. * % 3.6 positive oriented. | * % 72.1 neutral or descriptive oriented. * % 24.9 negative oriented. * % 2.9 positive oriented. |
| **THE SOURCE OF THE STORIES** | * % 52.4 reporter. | * % 70.3 unknown sources. |
| **THE QUOTED SOURCES IN THE STORIES** | * % 57.3 one quoted source. * % 20.1 two quoted sources. * % 33.3 more than two quoted sources. | * % 69.9 one quoted source. * % 13.3 two quoted sources. |
| **GREEK CYPRIOT QUOTED SOURCES IN THE STORIES** | * % 23.6 public officials. * % 2.3 Non Government Organizations. * % 2.3 public. | * % 80.6 no source. |
| **TURKISH CYPRIOT QUOTED SOURCES IN THE STORIES** | * % 83.8 no source. | * % 14 public officials. * % 8.3 Non Government Organizations * % 2.3 public. |
| **INTERNATIONAL QUOTED SOURCES IN THE STORIES** | * % 68.9 no source. * % 8.7 Greek officials. | * % 76.6 no source. * % 7 Turkish officials. * % 5.2 European Union officials. |
| **LENGTH OF THE NEWS** | * % 51.8 medium * % 30.4 short. * % 17.8 long. | * % 48.6 short. * % 36.5 medium. * % 14.9 long. |
| **PAGE NUMBERS OF THE NEWS** | * % 20.4 page number 6. * % 10 page number 8. * % 64.1 between page numbers 1 to 8. | * % 70.1 between page numbers 1 to 15. * % 22.7 two pages. |
| **PHOTO USAGE** | * % 69.9 has photo. * % 30.1 no photo. | * % 52.5 has photo. * % 47.5 no photo. |
| **SIZE OF THE NEWS STORIES** | * % 41.7 half page. * % 23.9 1/4 page. | * % 33.1 1/4 page. * % 22.7 half page. |
| **TYPE OF THE STORY/NEWS** | * % 95.1 news story. * % 4.2 interview. | * % 98 news story. * % 1.4 interview. |
| **STORY TOPICS** | * % 34.6 Cyprus conflict. * % 25.9 Turkey. * % 15.5 Police, courts, accidents and disasters. * % 5.8 Social and cultural activities. | * % 47.5 Cyprus conflict. * % 36.5 Turkey. * % 8.5 Police, courts, accidents and disasters. * % 4.7 Social and cultural activities. |
| **IF THE TOPIC IS ON THE “CYPRUS CONFLICT”, WHAT IS IT ABOUT** | * % 14.2 negotiations. * % 9.7 general issues. * % 2.6 Annan Plan. | * % 31.8 general issues. * % 6.5 Annan Plan. |
| **CRITICISM REGARDING GOVERNMENT’S CYPRUS POLICY IN NEWS** | * % 95.8 no criticism. | * % 97.3 no criticism. |

## Appendix D: General Results of the Columnist’s Articles Coverage

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | **GREEK CYPRIOT PRESS** | **TURKISH CYPRIOT PRESS** |
| **TOPIC OF THE ARTICLES** | * % 46 The Cyprus Conflict. * % 39 Turkey-EU Affairs. * % 15 other. | * % 74 The Cyprus Conflict. * % 5.7 Turkey-EU Affairs. * % 13.8 other. |
| **IF ARTICLE IS ABOUT THE CYPRUS CONFLICT** | * % 12 Annan Plan in general. * % 10 Finland Proposal. * % 4 property issue. | * % 5.3 Annan Plan in general. * % 27.6 Finland Proposal. * % 5.3 Missing persons/mass graves * % 2.8 political activity |
| **USAGE OF THE OFFICIAL GOVERNMENT SOURCES** | * % 9 Greek Cypriot. * % 6 Turkey. * % 6 International. * % 3 Turkish Cypriot. * % 2 Greek. | * % 12 Greek Cypriot. * % 15.9 Turkey. * % 10 International. * % 25.2 Turkish Cypriot. * % 1 Greek. |
| **TURKISH CYPRIOT OFFICIAL GOVERNMENT SOURCE IDENTIFIED IN CYPRIOT COLUMNIST ARTICLES** | * % 1 President. * % 0 Prime minister. * % 0 Minister(s). * % 1 Public officials. | * % 17.5 President. * % 5 Prime minister. * % 0.4 Minister(s). * % 4 Public officials. |
| **GREEK CYPRIOT OFFICIAL GOVERNMENT SOURCE IDENTIFIED IN CYPRIOT COLUMNIST ARTICLES** | * % 9 President. * % 7 Public officials. * % 5 General assembly. * % 1 Minister(s). | * % 6.5 President. * % 2 Public officials. * % 4 General assembly. * % 1.2 Minister(s). |
| **HOW MANY OFFICIAL QUOTED GOVERNMENT SOURCE IDENTIFIED?** | * % 33 one quoted sources. * % 9 two quoted sources. * % 58 no source. | * % 26 one quoted sources. * % 14 two quoted sources. * % 55 no source. |
| **UNOFFICIAL GOVERNMENT SOURCE IDENTIFIED IN THE CYPRIOT COLUMNIST ARTICLES** | * % 2 Turkish Cypriot * % 12 Greek Cypriot * % 4 Turkish * % 0 Greek * % 3 International | * % 11.8 Turkish Cypriot * % 6 Greek Cypriot * % 3.3 Turkish * % 0 Greek * % 2 International |
| **TURKISH CYPRIOT UNOFFICIAL SOURCE IDENTIFIED IN THE CYPRIOT COLUMNIST ARTICLES** | * % 12 NGO * % 4 Journalist/newspaper * % 2 experts * % 0 Wo/man on the street | * % 2 NGO * % 2 Journalist/ newspaper * % 4.9 experts * % 4 Wo/man on the street |
| **GREEK CYPRIOT UNOFFICIAL SOURCE IDENTIFIED IN THE CYPRIOT COLUMNIST ARTICLES** | * % 8 journalist/newspaper * % 4 wo/man on the street * % 0 NGO * % 0 Experts | * % 4.1 journalist/ newspaper * % 1 wo/man on the street * % 0 NGO * % 0.4 Experts |
| **HOW MANY UNOFFICIAL SOURCE IDENTIFIED?** | * % 22 one source. * % 78 no source. | * % 20.2 one source. * % 76.8 no source. |
| **CYPRIOT COLUMNIST ETHNIC DESCRIPTIONS FOR THEMSELVES** | * % 23 Greek Cypriot * % 2 Greekness * % 0 Cypriotness | * % 31.7 Turkishness * % 19.1 Turkish Cypriotness * % 10 Cypriotness |
| **CYPRIOT COLUMNIST POLITIC DESCRIPTIONS FOR THEMSELVES** | * % 35 Republic of Cyprus * % 11 The Greek Cyprus Side * % 1 South Cyprus Greek * % 3 Administration Greek Side * % 1 Greek Administration * % 1 Government of Cyprus | * % 35.4 TRNC * % 9 The North Cyprus * % 5.7 Cyprus Turkish Side * % 5 Turkish Side * % 1 Turkish Cypriot Community * % 0 Turkish Administration |
| **CYPRIOT COLUMNIST ETHNIC DESCRIPTIONS FOR “OTHER” IN GENERAL** | * % 40 Turkish Cypriots * % 0 Turkishness * % 0 Cypriotness | * % 64.2 Greekness * % 12.6 Greek Cypriotness * % 4 Cypriotness |
| **CYPRIOT COLUMNIST ETHNIC DESCRIPTIONS FOR “OTHER” BY NEWSPAPER TO NEWSPAPER** | *EMPHASIZE*  *TURKISH CYPRIOTNESS*   * % 73.3 Politis * % 50 Haravghi * % 44.4 Simerini * % 32 Alithia * % 19.2 Phileleftheros | *EMPHASIZE GREEKNESS*   * % 82.7 Volkan * % 77 Halkın Sesi * % 50 Afrika * % 34.7 Kıbrıs * % 33 Yenidüzen |
| **CYPRIOT COLUMNIST POLITIC DESCRIPTIONS FOR “OTHER”** | * % 6 Turkish Side * % 4 Cyprus Turkish Side * % 4Turkish Cypriot Community * % 1 Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus * % 1 State of Turkish Cypriot | * % 24.8 Republic of Cyprus * % 20 Other * % 12.6 Greek Side * % 11 Greek Administration * % 9 South * % 5 South Cyprus Greek Administration * % 4 South Cyprus |
| **CYPRIOT COLUMNIST ANTAGONISTIC DESCRIPTIONS** | * % 34 of articles are consisting antagonistic descriptions. | * % 85 of articles are consisting antagonistic descriptions. |
| **CYPRIOT COLUMNIST DOMINANT FRAMES** | * % 54 conflict frames * % 16 peace frames * % 11 both peace and conflict frames. * % 4 Informative frames | * % 52 conflict frames * % 12.6 peace frames * % 7.3 both peace and conflict frames. * % .1Informative frames. |
| **CYPRIOT COLUMNIST CONFLICT FRAMES FOR THE “OTHER” BY NEWSPAPER TO NEWSPAPER** | * % 100 Simerini * % 69.2 Phileleftheros * % 69 Haravghi * % 33.3 Politis * % 8 Alithia | * % 80.2 Volkan * % 75.4 Halkın Sesi * % 30.4 Kıbrıs * % 12.9 Afrika * % 11Yenidüzen |
| **CYPRIOT COLUMNIST CONFLICT FRAMES FOR THE “OTHER”** | * % 36 Antipathy Frame * % 30 Unbalance Frame * % 26 Status Quo Frame * % 14 Win-Lose Frame * % 13 Nationalist Frame | * % 37 Antipathy Frame * % 26 Unbalance Frame * % 19.5 Status Quo Frame * % 20 Win-Lose Frame * % 21 Nationalist Frame |
| **CYPRIOT COLUMNIST STATUS QUO FRAMES FOR THE “OTHER” BY NEWSPAPER TO NEWSPAPER** | * % 55.5 Simerini * % 38 Haravghi * % 26.9 Phileleftheros * % 12 Alithia * % 0 Politis | * % 35.8 Volkan * % 24.5 Halkın Sesi * % 7 Yenidüzen * % 4.3 Kıbrıs * % 1.8 Afrika |
| **CYPRIOT COLUMNIST UNBALANCE FRAMES FOR THE “OTHER” BY NEWSPAPER TO NEWSPAPER** | * % 56 Haravghi * % 33.3 Simerini * % 26.9 Phileleftheros * % 26.6Politis * % 16 Alithia | * % 36 Halkın Sesi * % 33.3Volkan * % 26 Kıbrıs * % 15 Yenidüzen * % 9.2 Afrika |
| **CYPRIOT COLUMNIST WIN-LOSE FRAMES FOR THE “OTHER” BY NEWSPAPER TO NEWSPAPER** | * % 25 Haravghi * % 22.2 Simerini * % 20 Politis * % 11.5 Phileleftheros * % 0 Alithia | * % 31.1 Halkın Sesi * % 29.6 Volkan * % 11 Yenidüzen * % 8.6 Kıbrıs * % 1.8 Afrika |
| **CYPRIOT COLUMNIST NATIONALIST FRAMES FOR THE “OTHER” BY NEWSPAPER TO NEWSPAPER** | * % 30.7 Phileleftheros * % 12.5 Haravghi * % 11.1 Simerini * % 6.6 Politis * % 0 Alithia | * % 54 Volkan * % 29.5 Halkın Sesi * % 4.3 Kıbrıs * % 0 Yenidüzen * % 0 Afrika |
| **CYPRIOT COLUMNIST ANTIPATHY FRAMES FOR THE “OTHER” BY NEWSPAPER TO NEWSPAPER** | * % 55.5 Simerini * % 40 Politis * % 38 Haravghi * % 30.7 Phileleftheros * % 24 Alithia | * % 51.8 Volkan * % 42.6 Halkın Sesi * % 30 Kıbrıs * % 22.2 Afrika * % 15 Yenidüzen |
| **CYPRIOT COLUMNIST PEACE FRAMES FOR THE “OTHER” BY NEWSPAPER TO NEWSPAPER** | * % 40 Alithia * % 26.6 Politis * % 7.6 Phileleftheros * % 0 Haravghi * % 0 Simerini | * % 37 Yenidüzen * % 25.9 Afrika * % 17.3 Kıbrıs * % 3.2 Halkın Sesi * % 1.2 Volkan |
| **CYPRIOT COLUMNIST PEACE FRAMES FOR THE “OTHER” IN DETAIL** | * % 18 Balance-Descriptive Frames * % 10 Solution Frames * % 5 Empathy Frames * % 5 Anti-nationalist Frames * % 2 Win-Win Frames | * % 9.8 Solution Frames * % 8 Balance-Descriptive Frames * % 8 Win-Win Frames * % 4 Empathy Frames * % 3 Anti-nationalist Frames |
| **CYPRIOT COLUMNIST SOLUTION FRAMES FOR THE “OTHER”** | * % 32 Alithia * % 6.6 Politis * % 3.8 Philelefteros * % 0 Haravghi * % 0 Simerini | * % 22.2 Yenidüzen * % 21.7 Kıbrıs * % 16.6 Afrika * % 4.9 Halkın Sesi * % 1.2 Volkan |
| **CYPRIOT COLUMNIST BALANCE-DESCRIPTIVE FRAMES FOR THE “OTHER”** | * % 44 Alithia * % 40 Politis * % 3.80 Phileleftheros * % 0 Haravghi * % 0,00 Simerini | * % 25.9 Afrika * % 13 Kıbrıs * % 7 Yenidüzen * % 1.6 Halkın Sesi * % 0 Volkan |
| **CYPRIOT COLUMNIST EMPATHY FRAMES FOR THE “OTHER”** | * % 13.3 Politis * % 8 Alithia * % 3.8 Phileleftheros * % 0 Haravghi * % 0 Simerini | * % 14.8 Yenidüzen * % 8.6 Kıbrıs * % 3.7 Afrika * % 1.6 Halkın Sesi * % 0 Volkan |
| **CYPRIOT COLUMNIST WIN-WIN FRAMES FOR THE “OTHER”** | * % 6.6 Politis * % 3.8 Phileleftheros * % 0 Alithia * % 0 Haravghi * % 0 Simerini | * % 22.2 Yenidüzen * % 18.5 Afrika * % 17.3 Kıbrıs * % 0 Halkın Sesi * % 0 Volkan |
| **CYPRIOT COLUMNIST ANTI-NATIONALIST FRAMES FOR THE “OTHER”** | * % 12 Alithia * % 6.6 Politis * % 3.8 Phileleftheros * % 0 Haravghi * % 0 Simerini | * % 25.9 Yenidüzen * % 0 Afrika * % 0 Kıbrıs * % 0 Halkın Sesi * % 0 Volkan |

## Appendix E: The List of the Conflict and Peace Frames Evaluation

**CONFLICT FRAMES**

**1. Status Quo Frame**

a. Exclusive Oriented

b. They Are Our Enemy Oriented

c. Just War Oriented

d. Hate Speech Oriented

**2. Unbalance Frame**

a. Sport Oriented

b. Accuse Other Side’s Government Oriented

c. Blame Oriented

**3. Antipathy Frame**

a. Other Is The Threat Oriented

b. Distrust Oriented

c. Prejudiced Oriented

d. Inferior Oriented

e. Self And Other Oriented

**4. Win – Lose Frame**

a. Emphasize One Side’s Pains Oriented

b. Good and Evil Oriented

**5. Nationalist Frame**

a. Revenge Oriented

b. Who Throw The First Stone Oriented

**PEACE FRAMES**

**1. Solution Frame**

a. Inclusive Oriented

b. We Are Friend Oriented

c. Common Ground Oriented

d. Friendly Speech Oriented

**2. Balance Frame**

a. Fair Play Oriented

b. Criticize Own Government Oriented

c. Applaud Oriented

**3. Empathy Frame**

a. Understanding the Other Oriented

b. Trust Oriented

c. Unprejudiced Oriented

d. Accept Other As It Is Oriented

e. Other In The Self Oriented

**4. Win – Win Frame**

a. Emphasize Both Sides’ Pains Oriented

b. Good/Good or Bad Bad Oriented

**5. Anti-nationalist Frame**

a. Forgiveness Oriented

b. History – Culture Oriented

## Appendix F: Johan Galtung’s Peace Journalism Model

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **PEACE/CONFLICT JOURNALISM** | **WAR/VIOLENCE JOURNALISM** |
| ***I. PEACE/CONFLICT-ORIENTATED***    Explore conflict formation, x parties, y goals, z issues. General “win, win” orientation.    Open space, open time; causes and outcomes anywhere, also in history/culture.  Making conflicts transparent.    Giving voice to all parties; empathy, understanding.  See conflict/war as problem, focus on conflict creativity.    Humanization of all sides; more so the worse the weapons.    Proactive: prevention before any violence/war occurs.    Focus on invisible effects of violence. (trauma and glory, damage to structure/culture) | ***I. WAR/VIOLENCE ORIENTATED***    Focus on conflict arena, 2 parties, 1 goal (win), war general zero-sum orientation.    Closed space, closed time; causes and exits in arena, who threw the first stone.    Making wars opaque/secret    “Us-them” journalism, propaganda, voice, for “us”.  See “them” as the problem, focus on who prevails in war.    Dehumanization of “them”; more so the worse the weapon.    Reactive: waiting for violence before reporting.    Focus only on visible effect of violence. (killed, wounded and material damage) |
| ***II. TRUTH-ORIENTATED***    Expose untruths on all sides / uncover all cover-ups. | ***II. PROPAGANDA-ORIENTATED***    Expose “their” untruths / help “our” cover-ups/lies. |
| ***III. PEOPLE-ORIENTATED***    Focus on suffering all over; on women, aged children, giving voice to voiceless.    Give name to all evil-doers.    Focus on people peace-makers. | ***III. ELITE ORIENTATED***    Focus on “our” suffering; on able-bodied elite males, being their mouth-piece.    Give name to their evil-doers.    Focus on elite peace-makers. |
| ***IV. SOLUTION ORIENTATED***  Peace = non-violence + creativity.    Highlight peace initiatives, also to prevent more war.    Focus on structure, culture, the peaceful society.    Aftermath: resolution, reconstruction, reconciliation. | ***IV. VICTORY ORIENTATED***    Peace = victory + ceasefire.    Conceal peace-initiative, before victory is at hand.    Focus on treaty, institution, the controlled society.    Leaving for another war, return if the old flares up again. |

1. In this work the word “source” is used to mean the person, institution or place/establishment from which the reporter received the news. If an article or news report has been referred to, the word “attribution” is used instead of “source”. [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
2. “The Megali Idea was adopted by the Grand National Organization of the Greek People, which was established in 1814. Its tenet is the gradual liberation of Greek land from the Ottoman rule and the re-establishment of Byzantine Empire” (Sozen, 1999, p. 5). [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
3. EOKA: Ethniki Organosis Kyprion Agoniston [National Organization of Cypriot Fighters] was a Greek Cypriot underground organization established in 1955 by under the leadership of Archbishop Makarios and General George Grivas, a former career officer in the Greek Army. [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
4. TMT: “Türk Mukavemet Teşkilatı [Turkish Resistance Organization] was organized by the Turkish Cypriots with the support of Turkey” (Sözen, 1999, p. 5). In 1957 Turkey sent arms to the Turkish Cypriots to fight against EOKA, and the Turkish Cypriots set up the TMT on 1 August, 1958. 1 August, 1958 is an official declareted date of TMT set up, however some writers believe that TMT set up on 8 November, 1957. [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
5. Before the TMT, Turkish Cypriots established another underground organization, VOLKAN, in order to protect their community from EOKA attacks. On this subject, Nihat Erim, Turkey’s former prime minister (1970-1972) commented: “Since the British did not trust the Greeks (Greek Cypriots), they were appointing Turkish Cypriots to the police force. Of course, because of these once-a-day protests, EOKA supporters were shooting at police and they killed a policeman who was Turkish (Cypriot)….Therefore the Turkish community organized and established the VOLKAN underground organization against the EOKA” (Kizilyurek, 2001, p. 53). VOLKAN eventually became dispersed, and the Turkish Cypriots established a more organized structure under the name of TMT, with the support of Turkey. [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
6. “A new approach to history teaching has been undertaken since 2004 by a newly elected to power Turkish Cypriot leftist party (CTP), an approach that (it states) aims to develop a culture of peace while highlighting cultural interactions, internal divisions, and discontinuities” (Papadakis, 2008, p. 1). However, when Turkish Cypriot rightis party (UBP) came to the power in 2009, new history textbooks are not using anymore. [↑](#footnote-ref-7)
7. Jürgen Habermas explains the concept of public domain as follows: “By “public sphere” we mean first of all a domain of our social life in which such a thing as public opinion can be formed. Access to the public sphere is open in principle to all citizens” (Habermas, 1989, p. 231). [↑](#footnote-ref-8)
8. Habermas comments on the concept of public opinion: “The term ‘public opinion’ refers to the functions of criticism and control of organized state authority that the public exercises informally, as well as formally during periodic elections” (Habermas, 1989, p. 231). [↑](#footnote-ref-9)
9. The government of Ankara and the then Vice Premier and Foreign Minister Abdullah Gül continued to make statements about the referendum. On March 2004, by referring to direct democracy, Abdullah Gül declared: “Cypriots will use their right of self determination.” Similar statements appeared in the newspapers; e.g. “The last word belongs to the people” (Kıbrıs, April 1, 2004). In reality, if one looks at these statements, it is clear that although direct democracy was the chosen approach to the issue, governments were directing public opinion. The plan was announced to the press by the UN secretary general and the prime ministers of Greece and Turkey after it was finalized at a high-level meeting on Cyprus in Switzerland. [↑](#footnote-ref-10)
10. The list of newspaper names which are publishing in North Cyprus was updated in 27th of May, 2010. [↑](#footnote-ref-11)
11. The list of newspaper names which are published in South Cyprus was updated in 27th of May, 2010. [↑](#footnote-ref-12)
12. Entman (1993) defines salience as follows: “The word salience itself needs to be defined: It means making a piece of information more noticeable, meaningful, or memorable to an audience” (p. 53). [↑](#footnote-ref-13)
13. As Van Dijk (2005) emphasizes, “We have seen the monotonous appearance of many people in power (and their speeches) in the news media, thereby enabling the further approval and legitimization of their positions in power” (pp. 349-350). [↑](#footnote-ref-14)
14. According to Hall et al. (1978), “the media obtain their information from the primary definers of social reality, those in powerful and authoritative positions. The media (secondary definers) amplify the perceived threat to the existing social order, and the police and courts then act to eliminate the threat” (cited in Killingbeck, 2001, p.188). [↑](#footnote-ref-15)
15. Johan Galtung, Peace Professor and Director of the TRANSCEND Peace and Development Network. (www.transcend.org) [↑](#footnote-ref-16)
16. “Gatekeeping in the communication literature is conceived mainly as a selection process. The literature treats the gatekeeper in a similar way to Lewin’s concept where it is applied to both interpersonal and mass communication” (Shoemaker, 1991, Shoemaker, Eichholz, Kim, & Wrigley, 2001) (cited in Barzilai-Nahon, 2007, p. 3). [↑](#footnote-ref-17)
17. In article 2 of the Report of UNESCO on communications tools, we apparently stated that: “Communication tools should be in favor of peace and should be used with mentality for strengthen the peace” (Tilic, 2001, p. 196). [↑](#footnote-ref-18)
18. Retrieved April 10, 2010, from http://www.opendemocracy.net/media-journalismwar/article\_993.jsp [↑](#footnote-ref-19)
19. Retrieved April 10, 2010, from www.basicint.org/iraqconflict/Pubs/Discussion%20Papers/DS080903-.htm [↑](#footnote-ref-20)
20. Retrieved April 10, 2010, from http://www.opendemocracy.net/media-journalismwar/article\_1227.jsp [↑](#footnote-ref-21)
21. Detailed examples will be given at next topic. [↑](#footnote-ref-22)
22. The author of this thesis conducted interviews on translations of the opinion columns in the Greek Cypriot press with the Greek Service of the TRNC Presidency and the Press Office of the Embassy of Turkey in Nicosia, on May 6, 2010. The first interview was conducted with Bilgin Şenyurt Polatcan and Şerife Damdelen working at the Greek Service of the TRNC Presidency. The second interview was conducted with Nazan Er, Press Counsellor of the Embassy of Turkey in Nicosia. The basic question asked at the interviews was “Are all opinion columns published in the Greek press translated?” Bilgin Şenyurt Polatcan said that they do not translate all the opinion columns and that they only translate those they think are important. She explained the criteria for the translation of articles defined to be important as follows: “We translate all articles that concern the Turkish Cypriot side and Turkey. We translate articles that are useful for the negotiations; articles with analysis, articles concerning the Cyprus problem, articles that get secret information and those that deal with these.” Nazan Er answered the same question as follows: “We translate the very important articles”. When asked to expand a little and explain the criteria, “We translate the articles that are about Cyprus and Turkey. We select the articles about the negotiations, those that are related to the agenda, the Cyprus issue, National Council and the like.” [↑](#footnote-ref-23)
23. In this work the word “source” is used to mean the person, institution or place/establishment from whom the reporter received the news. If any article/news has been referred to, then the word “attribution” is used instead of “source”. [↑](#footnote-ref-24)
24. The list of the headline evaluation is provided in Appendix A. [↑](#footnote-ref-25)
25. The Greek Cypriot print media do not put the Turkish Cypriots and Turkey in the same pan of a balance in news stories; they generally criticize Turkey as being responsible for the Cyprus conflict. [↑](#footnote-ref-26)
26. Under the name of the Cyprus Conflict these topics became news: *Property, Annan Plan in general, political activity, trade-economy, negotiations and general issues of the Cyprus Conflict*. [↑](#footnote-ref-27)
27. Turkish News Agency is a state-owned news agency which was established in 1973 in North Cyprus. [↑](#footnote-ref-28)
28. The Turkish News Agency has six Greek language translators who translate the newspaper, radio, TV and Internet news every day. While they are translating news stories written in Greek, they rewrite the news. [↑](#footnote-ref-29)
29. For more information on Turkish Cypriot newspaper editorial policies changing after the Annan Plan referenda, see Alankus, Sevda, *Writing for Peace Without the Words for Peace*, unpublished manuscript, 2005. [↑](#footnote-ref-30)
30. Niyazi Kizilyurek (2007) criticizes the usage of “Rum” terminology in the history textbooks of the Turkish Cypriot community. He argues that “[t]he author considered the whole Greek Cypriot community as a homogenous entity and used the term “Greek” as the third singular person to describe the whole community” (p. 9). [↑](#footnote-ref-31)
31. The subjects which lie outside those that are news under the heading “Cyprus Problem,” such as property, the Annan Plan, political activity, settlers, trade-economy and negotiations, have been coded as “general”. For example: solution packages proposed by foreign countries, general explanations presented on the Cyprus problem, the accusatory statements made by both sides on the Cyprus issue, etc.

    The subjects which were included in the “Not about Cyprus Problem” part were those which had nothing to do with this issue - for example, the police and courts (the other side), accidents and disasters, education, social and cultural activities, the economy, and Turkey. [↑](#footnote-ref-32)
32. The author of this thesis conducted an interview with the translators on 6 May, 2010, at the Greek Service of the TRNC Presidency and the Press Office of the Embassy of Turkey in Nicosia, about the opinion columns published in the Greek Cypriot press. As explained by translators Bilgin Şenyurt Polatcan, Şerife Damdelen and Nazan Er, they pay attention to the fact that the content of the articles to be translated concerns the Turkish Cypriots and Turkey, and that they are informative, and give technical terms, rather than looking at whether they include nationalistic and negative expressions. [↑](#footnote-ref-33)
33. During the period of this study in the year 2006, Hasan Hastürer was working at Kibris newspaper as a columnist. Hastürer left that paper in 2009 and now writes for Havadis, a newspaper established in the same year. [↑](#footnote-ref-34)
34. During the period of this study in 2006, Başaran Düzgün was working at Kibris newspaper as editor-in-chief. He left the paper in 2009 and together with his colleague, Hüseyin Ekmekçi established Havadis newspaper. The first issue of the paper was published on Feburary 14, 2009. [↑](#footnote-ref-35)
35. During the period of this study in 2006 Reşat Akar was working as a columnist for Halkın Sesi newspaper. Akar became editor-in-chief of Kibris newspaper in 2009. [↑](#footnote-ref-36)
36. *Suggestions by Finland* include the following points.

    • Opening the Famagusta Harbor for 2 years under the control of the European Union.

    • Opening Closed Maraş for 2 years under the supervision of the United Nations.

    • In response to applying the trade by-law, Turkey opens some of its harbors to Greek Cypriot ships and the Turkey Grand National Assembly approves and applies the Ankara Agreement Supplementary Protocol. [↑](#footnote-ref-37)
37. The press in Southern Cyprus does not put Turkey and Turkish Cypriots into the same category. Turkey is criticized in most of the published columns and held responsible for the Cyprus Issue by the Greek Cypriot columnists. In line with this, Greek Cypriot columnists use diverse sets of antagonistic expressions for Turkish Cypriots and Turks from Turkey. For example, while for Turkey and Turks, they use expressions like Turkish ogre, Atilla, barbarian, Turkish occupation, soldier of occupation, invasion, invader Turkey; for Turkish Cypriots and Northern Cyprus, they use expressions such as so-called isolation, illegal airport Ercan, so-called economic isolation. As Papadakis (2008) argues, “The shift in ascriptions (from Greeks to Greek Cypriots and Turks to Turkish Cypriots) was employed to indicate their commonality and to sharply distinguish Turkish Cypriots from both Turkish settlers and immigrants, and Turks in general who were the 1974 aggressors, designated as the “Turkish Attila” (p. 12). [↑](#footnote-ref-38)
38. Richard Falk (2008) defines the “nationalist frame” as “nationalization of truth”, he says: “This nationalization of truth means that only our bloodshed is tragic, while theirs is generally applauded or at most ignored” (Lynch, 2008, p. vi). [↑](#footnote-ref-39)
39. The list of the general results of the news stories coverage is provided in Appendix C. [↑](#footnote-ref-40)
40. The list of general results of the columnists’ articles coverage is provided in Appendix D. [↑](#footnote-ref-41)
41. The term “ethnic” is used here mostly in relation to the individual level. A journalists individually believes that ethnically he/she is Turkish Cypriot or Cypriot. [↑](#footnote-ref-42)
42. The term “political” is used here mostly in relation to the communal level, and how you describe your community in your article – e.g. in terms of the “Republic of Cyprus,” or the “Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus,” etc. [↑](#footnote-ref-43)
43. The United Nations took a decision on the TRNC after the Turkish Cypriot community declared their state in November 1983. Decision 541 (1983), article 7 “Calls upon all States not to recognise any Cypriot state other than the Republic of Cyprus.” There are other similar decisions. http://www.un.int/cyprus/scr541.htm [↑](#footnote-ref-44)
44. For example: “Turkish Cypriot”. [↑](#footnote-ref-45)
45. For example: “Rumlar”. [↑](#footnote-ref-46)
46. “Other” political descriptions of Turkish Cypriot columnists are provided in Appendix B. [↑](#footnote-ref-47)
47. The list of antagonistic descriptions of Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot columnists is provided in Appendix B. [↑](#footnote-ref-48)
48. The list of the conflict frames evaluation is provided in Appendix E. [↑](#footnote-ref-49)
49. The list of the peace frames evaluation is provided in Appendix E. [↑](#footnote-ref-50)
50. Majid Tehranian’s (2002) full proposals under the title “Ten Commandments of Peace Journalism” are as follows: “1. Never reduce the parties in human conflicts to two. Remember that when two elephants fight, the grass gets hurt. Pay attention to the poor grass. 2. Identify the views and interests of all parties to human conflicts. There is no single Truth; there are many truths. 3. Donot be hostage to one source, particularly those of governments that control sources of information. 4. Develop a good sense of skepticism. Remember that reporting is representation. Bias is endemic to human conditions. You, your media organization, and your sources are not exceptions. 5. Give voice to the oppressed and peacemakers to represent and empower them. 6. Seek peaceful solutions to conflict problems, but never fall prey to panaceas. 7. Your representation of conflict problems can become part of the problem if it exacerbates dualisms and hatreds. 8. Your representation of conflict problems can become part of the solution if it employs the creative tensions in any human conflict to seek common ground and nonviolent solutions. 9. Always exercise the professional media ethics of accuracy, veracity, fairness, and respect for human rights and dignity. 10. Transcend your own ethnic, national, or ideological biases to see and represent the parties to human conflicts fairly and accurately” (pp. 80-81). [↑](#footnote-ref-51)
51. Galtung ve Vincent’s (1992) full proposals submitted for the news media under the title Ten “Proposals for a Peace-oriented News Media” are as follows: “1. Report all sides. 2. Clarify the frame of reference. 3. Media ownership should not matter. 4. Don’t overemphasize certain views. 5. Enhance educational side of news. 6. Understand reality of arms issue. 7. Attend to arms race inner dynamism. 8. Realize weakness of media. 9. Consider North-South dynamics. 10. Clearly portray peace benefits” (p. 127). [↑](#footnote-ref-52)
52. The main headings of Hamid Mowlana’s (1986) four-article proposal are as follows: “1. Prevention of war and promotion of peace. 2. Respect for culture, tradition and values. 3. Promotion of human rights and dignity. 4. Preservation of the home, human association, family and community” (pp. 244-245). [↑](#footnote-ref-53)
53. Johan Galtung’s peace journalism model is provided in Appendix F. The details of the model could be found in Lynch and McGoldrick’s (2005) book named “Peace Journalism”. [↑](#footnote-ref-54)
54. In Suleyman Irvan’s (2006) study on the Cyprus press, he advises on creating an “ethical code of peace journalism” for the press. And for this purpose, he summarizes the principles found in peace journalism literature in the studies of authors such as Mowlana (cited in Becker, 2004, pp. 4-5), Tehranian (2002, p. 80-81), Galtung & Vincent (1992) and Lynch & McGoldrick (2005) as follows: “a) Mission oriented principles: Journalists should seek peaceful solutions. Peace journalism is truth oriented journalism. Journalists should expose untruths. Journalists should avoid becoming part of the problem -- they should try to become part of the solution.

    b) Principles on news gathering: Journalists should seek “non-elite” sources. Journalists should give more and positive attention to peace-makers. Journalists should try hard to verify all claims. Skepticism is an important quality of good journalists. Journalists should investigate the wrongdoings of all sides of a conflict. Journalists should focus on the process, not only on the specific events.

    c) Principles on news writing: Journalists should highlight peace initiatives. Journalists should focus on visible and invisible effects of violence and conflict. Journalists should provide background information. Journalists should always exercise the ethics of accuracy, veracity, fairness, and respect for human rights. Journalists should avoid victimizing, demonizing, derogatory, and inflammatory language. Journalists should avoid relying on the simple “us versus them” dichotomy” (p. 37). [↑](#footnote-ref-55)
55. For instance, British journalist David Loyn says: “My response is clear and simple: creating peacemaking politicians is not the business of a reporter” (p. 2). [↑](#footnote-ref-56)