

The Integrating and Disintegrating Factors in Nigeria's Political System

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ABSTRACT

Since the 1970's and even more recently, Nigeria continues to witness spates of violent conflicts usually of an ethno-religious nature that have not only threatened the security of the populace, but also made governance for the political elites unreasonably tedious. This development raised doubt about the future of Nigeria to develop the necessary internal capability to evolve into a stable political system. Nigeria with its huge cultural diversity and divisions along tribal, linguistic, ethnic and religious lines has been an important actor in the African inter-state relations. Therefore, its political stability/instability will affect not only its domestic politics but also regional and international systems.

The basic aim of this thesis is to examine the integrating and disintegrating factors, which are prevalent within the Nigerian political system which may lead to stability or instability. To this end, this thesis firstly aims to present the roots of cultural diversity in Nigeria. Secondly, it tries to provide a general description of institutional characteristics of Nigerian federalism. Thirdly, since studying the integrating and disintegrating factors requires an analysis of the major economic, political and socio-cultural dynamics of Nigerian society, the thesis focuses on such economic, political and socio-cultural factors as uneven economic development, rapid population growth and unemployment, educational system, party system and electoral system, military-civilian government relations, secessionism, tribalism, interregional migration and ethnic/religious/linguistic diversity. Finally, the conclusion consists of a synthesis aiming at developing a perspective on the effects of such factors on political stability. Based on the synthesis of the general findings the conclusion also includes a number

of recommendations towards fostering political stability in Nigeria which could be considered by the political elites.

Keywords: Nigeria, cultural diversity, ethnic conflict, political disintegration, political integration, political stability.

ÖZ

1970’li yıllardan buyana ve özellikle son dönemlerde, Nijerya sadece halkın güvenliğini tehdit etmekle sınırlı kalmayan, bunun ötesinde siyasal elitlerin yönetim süreçlerinde ciddi sorunlarla karşılaşmasına yol açan yoğun etnik ve dinsel içerikli çatışmalara sahne olmaktadır. Bu gelişme, Nijerya federalizminin geleceği ve Nijerya’da istikrarlı bir siyasal sistem kurulmasına yönelik yerel imkânların geliştirilmesi hakkında kuşkular oluşmasına neden olmuştur. Dil, kabile, etnik ve dinsel temellerde devasa bir kültürel çeşitliliği ve bölünmeleri bünyesinde barındıran Nijerya Afrika kıtasında devletlerarası ilişkilerde önemli bir aktör olagelmıştır. Bu nedenle Nijerya’nın istikrarı/istikrarsızlığı sadece ülke siyasetini değil aynı zamanda bölge siyaseti ve uluslararası sistemi etkilemeye adaydır.

Bu tezin başlıca amacı, Nijerya siyasal sisteminde istikrar veya istikrarsızlığa yol açabilecek olan başlıca bütünleştirici ve parçalayıcı unsurları irdelemektir. Bu amaca dönük olarak, tez ilk olarak Nijerya’da kültürel çeşitliliğin kökenini ele almaktadır. Bunun ardından, Nijerya federalizmin kurumsal özellikleri genel olarak anlatılmaktadır. Üçüncül olarak, tez bütünleşme veya parçalanmaya yol açabilecek eşitsiz ekonomik gelişme, hızlı nüfus artışı ve işsizlik, eğitim sistemi, parti sistemi ve seçim sistemi, ordu-sivil yönetim ilişkileri, ayrılıkçılık, kabilecilik, bölgelerarası göç ve etnik/dinsel/ dilsel çeşitlilik gibi başlıca ekonomik, siyasal ve sosyo-kültürel unsurları ele almaktadır. Sonuç bölümü başlıca ekonomik, siyasal ve sosyo-kültürel unsurlarla siyasal istikrar arasındaki ilişkiyi açıklamaya yönelik bazı saptamaları içermektedir. Sonuç bölümünde ayrıca genel bulgular sentez edilerek siyasal

istikrarın güçlendirilmesi için siyasal karar alıcıların dikkate alabileceği bazı öneriler yapılmaktadır.

Anahtar kavramlar: Etnik çatışma, kültürel çeşitlilik, Nijerya, siyasal bölünme, siyasal bütünleşme, siyasal istikrar.

To My Family

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT	iii
ÖZ	v
DEDICATION	vii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT	viii
LIST OF FIGURES	xii
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS	xiii
1 INTRODUCTION	1
1.1 Statement of Research Question.....	3
1.2 Importance of the Study.....	3
1.3 Justification of the Study.....	8
1.4 Research Methodology.....	8
1.5 Scope and Limitations.....	9
1.6 Dimensions of Cultural Diversity in Nigeria.....	10
1.7 Historical Background of Nigeria’s Cultural Diversity.....	12
1.7.1 Pre-Colonial Period.....	12
1.7.2 Colonial Period	17
1.7.3 Post-Colonial Period	27
1.8 The Effects of Creating an Independent Nigerian State on Cultural Diversity.....	30
2 INSTITUTIONAL CHARACTERISTICS OF NIGERIAN FEDERALISM	37
2.1 Federal Government (Central).....	50
2.1.2 The Federal Legislature.....	54
2.1.3 The Federal Judiciary	56
2.2 Regions (Constituent Entities).....	58

2.2.1 Regional (State) Legislature.....	59
2.2.2 The State Executive.....	62
2.2.3 The State Judicature	64
2.3 Local Governments.....	65
2.4 Federal-State Relations.....	66
3 FACTORS OF INTEGRATION AND DISINTEGRATION	73
3.1 Economic Factors.....	75
3.1.1 Uneven Economic Development.....	75
3.1.2 Rapid Population Growth and Unemployment.....	79
3.2 Political Factors.....	85
3.2.1 Integrative and Disintegrative Roles of the Educational System and Language Policy.....	86
3.2.2 Party System and Electoral System.....	103
3.2.3 Transition to Democracy Military-Civilian Relations	118
3.2.4 Religious Insurgency, Militancy and Secessionism.....	133
3.3 Socio-Cultural Factors.....	146
3.3.1 Tribalism	146
3.3.2 Internal Migration	151
3.3.3 Ethnic/Linguistic Diversity	160
4 FINDINGS, RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION.....	167
4.1 Traditional Structures and Identities.....	168
4.2 Constitutional Arrangements (Federalism).....	170
4.3 Economic Factors.....	173
4.4 Political Factors.....	175
4.5 Socio-Cultural Factors.....	180

REFERENCES..... 191

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1: Territorial Distribution of Ethnic Groups According to Area of Concentration.....	11
Figure 2: A comparison of 2011 and 2015 presidential elections on the basis of regional support for the major parties as published by INEC.....	110

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ACP	African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States
APC	All Progressive Peoples Party
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
EVS	Electronic Voting System
F.C.T.	Federal Capital Territory
FTO	Foreign Terrorist Organizations
FCP	Federal Character Principle
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GNI	Gross National Index
GNP	Gross National Product
HDI	Human Development Index
HI	Horizontal Inequalities
ILO	International Labour Organization
INA	Immigration and Nationality Act
INEC	Independent National Electoral Commission
JTF	Joint Task Force
MEND	Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta
MIS	Internal Migration Survey
MPI	Multi-dimensional Poverty Index
NAPEP	National Poverty Eradication Programme
NBS	National Bureau of Statistics
NDE	National Directorate of Employment

NER	Nigeria Economic Report
NIC	National Intelligence Council
NLC	Nigerian Labour Congress
NLP	Nigeria Language Policy
NPC	National Population Commission
NPE	National Policy on Education
NYSC	National Youth Service Corps
OSBS	Open Ballot System
PDP	Peoples Democratic Party
PPP	Purchasing Power Parity
SURE-P	Subsidy Reinvestment & Empowerment Programme
UN	United Nations
YOUWIN	Youth Enterprise with Innovation in Nigeria

Chapter 1

INTRODUCTION

The Federal Republic of Nigeria is located along the West African Coast. With a total land area of 923,768km^{sq1} and an estimated population of 177,156,000², it is the most populous black country on the African continent. Present day Nigeria was once a site for a number of separate tribal kingdoms which had been in existence for over a millennia. The modern Nigerian state undisputedly has its roots in the British colonial rule which began in the 19th century. During colonialism, the evolution of the Nigerian modern state began through a series a mergers which brought the separate ethnic kingdoms together and which eventually led to the amalgamation of the southern and northern protectorates in 1914 under a single administrative and legal structure. Like most colonies, Nigeria fought many anti-colonial struggles and was able to gain its independence on 1st October 1960. The Nigerian state that emerged after independence was an entirely different one from which had existed in the pre-colonial period. There were aspirations by the elites to make Nigeria different from what it was during colonialism as many felt that the institutions inherited from the British could not best represent what an independent Nigeria meant. Nigeria since then has made efforts at restructuring the Nigerian administrative system to better meet the needs of the citizens, however, the greater task the country faces is at nation building which requires devising mechanisms to forge a lasting and durable union

¹The World Fact Book (2014). <http://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/fields/2147.html>. Accessed on 28 May, 2015.

²The World Fact Book: "Nigeria" Central Intelligence Agency. <http://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/fields/2147.html>. Accessed on 28 May, 2015.

amongst the diverse ethno-cultural, linguistic, religious and regional groups that have become part of Nigeria. Nigeria has struggled with this task right from her pre-democratic and even into its democratic era. In a nation with over 250 ethnic groups and over 500 spoken ethnic dialects which also happens to be sharply divided along religious lines (of Christianity, and Islam) the task of nation building has indeed proved challenging as many times these primordial identities have stifled the efforts for the entrenchment of a strong Nigerian identity. Many times ethnic, religious and regional differences has been the cause of the instability in the country. Indeed in many instances the ethno-religious bigotry that characterizes the political arena was a key factor which led to the military intervention in politics and for a long time has continued to affect the regimes which have emerged. Similarly, this same ethno-religious divisions continued to characterize Nigeria's many failed attempts at transitioning to a democracy, leaving the country with a checkered history of failed Republics and 28 years of military rule and deeply divided.

Although Nigeria started a transition to democracy in 1999, the extent to which the state can be identified as a democratic regime is open for debate. Indeed all evidence points that Nigeria rather fits into the category of semi-democracies and this is evident when one considers the instability prevalent in the society, the culture of impunity exhibited by the politicians, high levels of poverty, gross human rights violations, and the hijacking of the state public funds by the political elites for their own personal use, circumstances all which under a true democracy would be unacceptable. Since the 1970's and even more recently, Nigeria continues to witness spates of violent conflicts usually of an ethno-religious nature that have not only threatened the security of the populace, but also made governance for the political elites unreasonably tedious and continues to question the effectiveness of

the federal arrangement. This development could easily raise doubt about the feature of Nigerian federalism to develop the necessary internal capability to evolve into a stable political system.

1.1 Statement of Research Question

This thesis aims at describing and evaluating the role of specific factors affecting political stability in Nigeria. The thesis argues that specific factors have integrative or disintegrative forces and therefore they may have either positive or negative impacts on political stability in Nigeria. To this end, the thesis first enquires into the roots of cultural diversity and characteristics of Nigerian federalism in order to evaluate the possible impacts of traditional structures and constitutional regulations on political stability. Secondly it focuses on a number of selected economic, political and socio-cultural factors such as uneven economic development, rapid population growth and unemployment, educational system, party system and electoral system, military-civilian government relations, militancy and secessionism, tribalism, interregional migration and ethnic/religious/ linguistic diversity to understand and explain their impacts on political stability in Nigeria.

1.2 Importance of the Study

This study addresses on issues which are not only crucial to the survival of the Nigerian state, but the African continent at large. The predicament of many African states in this century tells a story of its own and is an area of much concern among political scholars. The African continent has been plagued by many plights a number which has stemmed from high poverty rates, ethnic conflicts, human right violations and most importantly the sit-tight tendency of the political leaders. This predicament has left very little room for democracy to flourish in many of these African states. Africa in general has become a hotbed for all sorts of heinous crimes and conflicts as

a result of its deeply divided societies. Societies can in fact be divided in many ways, however what is special about deeply divided societies is that areas of cleavages often acquire some degree of political salience,³ and because these differences assume political salience, this often makes conflict which occur intense.

(...) a conflict is intense (or a society is deeply divided) when a large number of conflict group members attach over whelming importance to the issue at stake, or manifest strongly held antagonistic beliefs and emotions towards the opposing segment or both.⁴

Many divided societies are often characterized by certain divisions which could be “class and caste, religion and sectarianism, language and race, ethnicity, clan” etc.⁵ As Guelke points out, many factors which cause divisions are binary.⁶ Binary divisions tend to exist in forms such as the division of society into ‘natives’ and ‘settlers’, ‘indigenes’ and ‘immigrants’, land owners and peasants, agriculturists and nomads etc.⁷ When these binary divisions overlap with the categories mentioned above this can make a recipe for political conflict. As Lustick points out, in many deeply divided societies there is a tendency for issues to be debated along the society’s major cleavages:

The tendency in such societies [is] for all political issues to be viewed through the prism of their impact on the societies principal fault lines (...) and such a tendency effectively prevents the formation of political coalitions on issues that cut across the main societal divide.⁸

No doubt a fundamental mark of deeply divided societies is that many of these polities lack legitimacy.⁹ The political situation of many African nations has for a

³Guelke, A. (2012). *Politics in Deeply Divided Societies*. Cambridge: Polity Press.

⁴Nordlinger (1972). p. 9. In Guelke, A. (2012). p. 30.

⁵Guelke, A. (2012). pp. 14-20.

⁶Guelke, A. (2012). p. 20.

⁷Guelke, A. (2012). p. 22.

⁸Guelke, A. (2012). p. 29.

⁹Guelke, A. (2012). p. 32.

long time been predominantly one of chaos and instability and has often been characterized as deeply divided. In the North African Maghreb for example, we witness the unsuccessful attempts of these states to change political regime through the Arab Spring that swept many Arab nations in 2011. Many of these North African nations like Egypt, Libya, Tunisia and Algeria have been left in a constant state of conflict and an overall failure of the newly emerged regimes to deliver peace, stability and democracy. Amidst a fragile political system, is also the economic decline and constant protests by the masses who are eager to reap the fruits of their revolution. The case is also not different when one turning to east Africa which over the years has not only been dealing with ethnic conflicts in states like Darfur, Somali, Sudan and South Sudan but also with the rise of terrorists groups like the El Shabab and Al Nusrah who have stood in clear opposition to the state rather striving towards establishing an Islamic caliphate of their own. Likewise, in countries like Burundi we see the classical example of the sit-tight tendency of African political leaders through the actions of their president (Nkurunziza) who seeks a (constitutionally debated) third term in government, an action which has sparked anger among the Burundians and forced them to go out into the streets to protests and with the gradual descent into chaos, lies the possibility for a military take over. No doubt the conflicts in East Africa has made it one of the most unstable regions in the world today¹⁰ and not only do these conflicts wreak havoc for local, state and regional security, but because most of these armed conflicts are concentrated near border areas, and include powerful cross border drivers, interests and actors,¹¹ the spill over of these conflicts not only pose a challenge for these states and their neighbours but also for the entire

¹⁰“USAID East Africa Regional Mission (USAID/EA) covers Sudan, South Sudan, Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, Djibouti, Somalia, Republic of Congo (ROC) Central African Republic (CAR) Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Rwanda and Burundi.” USAID, (2011) *Conflict Assessment Framework 2.0. (Analytics)*.

¹¹USAID (2012) East African Regional Conflict and Stability Assessment (final report). p. 1.

African continent. Although the south of Africa has proved to be relatively more stable, many South Africans are however still poor and land distribution remains a major area of contention between the white and black south Africans.¹² Recently, south Africa also experienced a wave of ‘xenophobic’ attacks (of indigenes against resident immigrants) directed against foreigners. However these attacks cannot be disconnected from economic stagnation and high poverty rates which could be a major factor which has fuelled the tensions between the locals and foreign nationals.¹³ west Africa also faces huge challenges from civil wars, coup d’états, as well as ethnic and religious clashes. Likewise, poverty, corruption, and political despotism have prevented the dreams for an “economically integrates and politically united west Africa into a living night mare for most of its citizens.”¹⁴ Apart from the problem of weak states and greedy elites, in contemporary times west Africa has also witnessed the rise of rebel groups and terrorist groups in the region.

Zooming in on Nigeria, we see that its situation is no different from many African states. The country has had its own share of civil strife, ethno-religious conflicts and more recently the emergence of militant and terrorists groups such as the Movement for the Emancipation of Niger Delta (MEND) and Boko Haram, all amidst high levels of unemployment, poverty and economic stagnation the country struggles with. It is necessary to focus the study on the Nigerian polity because of the important role the country plays in the regional affairs of west Africa as well as the entire African continent. As Mandela once stated there is a belief among the political

¹²BBC News (2015) South Africa Profile- overview. Available at <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-14094760>. Accessed on 31 May, 2015.

¹³Aljazeera (2015) Xenophobia in South Africa. Available at <http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth.inpictures/2015/05/xenophobia-south-africa-150501090636029>. Accessed on 31 May, 2015.

¹⁴Adebajo, A. (2002). Building Peace in West Africa: Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea- Bissau. Boulder: Lynne Rienner. p. 39.

elites that “the world will not respect Africa until Nigeria earns that respect. The black people of the world need Nigeria to be great as a source of pride and confidence.”¹⁵ This is because upon gaining its independence, Nigeria has always held Africa as the center piece of its foreign policy (Afrocentrism) and has always sought to maintain this doctrine through its role in organizations such as the African union, ECOWAS as well as peace keeping missions. For long Nigeria has been looked upon as the ‘big brother’, a giant amongst other African states. However, many scholars have recently described Nigeria as a giant with clay feet as a result of its inability to ‘get its act right’ the country faces many internal challenges which is hard to wrap ones head around since it has been blessed with abundant human resource potential, and natural resources especially crude oil making it the largest African oil producing nation, the 6th largest oil exporter in the world and with a proven reserve of “180 trillion cubic feet, the 8th largest in the world.”¹⁶ Corruption, resource mismanagement, and conflict has however made it impossible for Nigeria to fully utilize these resources for sustained growth and development. This inability to harness these resources makes it almost impossible for Nigeria to hold up to its Afrocentric policy for a nation who cannot sort out its own internal insecurities economic challenges, and political instabilities cannot help others do so. This study is premised on the assumption that understanding the factors at play in the Nigerian socio-political dynamics is a right step in understanding the problems of the African continent not only because Nigeria presents a classic example of the diversity which has existed in many of these African states but because it has for long been looked

¹⁵Baba El-Yakubu J. B. (2013). ABU, Zaria, Nigeria. Available at <http://www.npub-2015.org/baba-el-yakubu.html>. Accessed on 24 June, 2015.

¹⁶Energy Information Administration (eia). *Nigeria: Nigeria's key energy statistics*. Available at <http://www.eia.gov/beta/international/countrt.cfm?iso=NGA>. Accessed on 1 June, 2015.

upon as a role model by many African states.¹⁷ Therefore, as the most populous country on the African continent as well as a country which holds much potential of becoming a key player in regional affairs, a study into this phenomenon will go a long way in making sure Nigeria can effectively play its role as an exemplary multi-cultural state model for its fellow regional partners.

1.3 Justification of the Study

This research stands on a number of grounds which have been stated above. By pointing out the important role of Nigeria on the African continent, it therefore becomes necessary to have a clear picture of the factors that could generate political stability or instability within the country. This understanding will in turn not only help in understanding the ways by which Nigeria can address its own challenges, but also will constitute as a contribution to the researchers in this area to accumulate knowledge towards understanding the potential effects of Nigerian politics on the continent at large.

1.4 Research Methodology

The research analyses primary sources such as constitutional regulations, laws, government reports and other official statements as well as secondary sources such as scholarly Journals, books, articles and credible statements of government officials and agencies in examining stability with regards to the factors of integration and disintegration. The research is based on descriptive method in the case of a one-country study aimed at describing the factors of stability and instability. In this sense, the research provides a detailed analysis of the current dynamics of stability/instability. Historical approach is also employed to shed light on the effects of the historical developments on the current stability/instability dynamics in Nigeria.

¹⁷IMF Survey No.15 (2004) International Monetary Fund available at <http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/survey/so/home.aspx>. Accessed on 05 June, 2015.

1.5 Scope and Limitations

This research focuses primarily on the Nigerian political system and how certain factors work to influence the stability of the system. The research is also limited in a number of areas. Firstly the economic, political, and socio-cultural factors available are inexhaustible as there are a vast number which could have been considered, however for the sake of the time limit of the study, the research has focused only on a few factors which are more pronounced and seem to have greater influence on the dynamics of the Nigerian society. Another area of limitation has been on the limited data available for the study as the possibility of going to Nigeria to conduct a field survey was unlikely, this research has relied majorly on a limited number of primary as well as secondary sources.

1.6 Dimensions of Cultural Diversity in Nigeria

Nigeria is quite the multi-cultural society. With a population of about 173.6 million and an annual population growth of 2.3%,¹⁸ it is ranked the most populous country on the African continent and the 8th most populous in the world. Nigeria is home to over two hundred and fifty ethnic groups, but the three major groups are: the Hausa/Fulani, Yoruba and Igbo. The Hausa/Fulani make up 29% of the Nigerian Population, the Yoruba's 21% and the Igbo's 18%. Additionally, there are other ethnic tribes like the Ibibio, Tiv, Kanuri and Ijaw which make up 3.5%, 2.5%, 4% and 10% of the population respectively.¹⁹ In terms of regional distribution amongst the three major groups; the Hausa/Fulani's are predominantly located in the Northern part of the country, the Yoruba's in the south-west and the Igbo's in the south-east. (For territorial distribution of ethnic groups see Figure 1).

¹⁸See World Bank: Population Estimates and Projections (2013). Available at <http://data.worldbank.org/country/nigeria>. Accessed on 25 October, 2014.




Figure 1: Territorial Distribution of Ethnic Groups According to Area of Concentration.²⁰

Looking at the above figure, what seems to be implied is that there is no physical contact between Yoruba's and Hausas, between Yoruba's and Igbos and between Igbos and Hausas due to the existence of a large buffer zone (of ethnically mixed region) separating these groups (other 12%). However, it is important to point out that this map only shows the area in which these ethnic groups are concentrated and does not necessarily mean that they cannot be found in other regions. There is in fact a reasonable amount of intermingling between the ethnic groups especially in major commercial cities like Lagos, Port Harcourt, Kano and Kaduna. No doubt the large buffer zone does not facilitate easy interaction between the ethnicities (especially for those in the rural area).

²⁰This map was produced by Ulrich Lamm. *Mapping Nigeria's Diversity*. http://africacenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/06/AfricaBriefFinal_14.pdf. Accessed on 25 April, 2015.

In terms of religious beliefs, Nigeria has three major religions, namely: - Christianity, Islam and the African traditional belief. Islam comprises around 50% of the religious beliefs in Nigeria, and although more common in the Northern region, there are reasonable pockets of Muslim groups in the predominantly Yoruba south-western region. Forty percent (40%) of the population make up the Christian religion and a majority of them are from the predominantly Igbo south-eastern region. Lastly, are the Traditionalists which make up 10% of the population that are found scattered throughout the country.

1.7 Historical Background of Nigeria's Cultural Diversity

To understand present day Nigeria, it is of outmost importance to examine the history of pre-colonial and colonial Nigeria. These two periods have been a defining factor in shaping the country's post-colonial experience. Nigeria and its diverse ethno-linguistic and religious groups have undergone various stages of development under colonialism. This experience has greatly shaped modern day Nigeria from the way the people speak, what they eat, clothing, music, art, religious and marriage rites. Etc. Bits and pieces of each cultural group's customs and traditions have seeped through every aspect of societal life to create a rich Nigerian heritage. Modern technology, politics and economics has also helped the nation to attain a certain respectable status both regionally and internationally.

1.7.1 Pre-Colonial Period

Before its gradual colonization by Britain, (in the early 1900's), what is now known as Nigeria never existed, and it was not until later on that the name 'Nigeria' was given by Flora Shaw.²¹

²¹Flora Shaw, Lady Lugard (1852–1929) in 1897, coined the name 'Nigeria' for the colony under the administration of the Royal Niger Company. Available at http://orlando.cambridge.org/public/svPeople?person_id=shawfl. Accessed on 22 October, 2014.

To speak of pre-colonial Nigeria is anachronistic (...). Over the course of human history, many different groups of people have migrated into and out of the region that is now known as Nigeria (...). Many societies, states and vast empires have risen and fallen, none of them having had any direct correlation to the Nigerian state that exists today.²²

Rather, what existed prior to 'Nigeria' were independent ethnic tribes,²³ with the three major ones being the Yoruba, Igbo and the Hausa Kingdoms, each with its distinct political and cultural systems. The Yoruba pre-colonial kingdoms operated a political administrative system in which the ruler (referred to as the *Oba* or the *Alaafin*) was a political as well as spiritual head.²⁴ The Yoruba administrative system was considered loosely centralized because their ruler did not have absolute control over all affairs, rather, there were forms of checks and balances put in place to curb excesses.²⁵ The religion of the Yoruba's was largely based on the African traditional belief. They believed in a supreme being (*Olodumare*) and other intermediaries between man and the supernatural.²⁶ The Yoruba's also had a vibrant economy where activities such as agriculture, hunting, wood carving, leather works, and arts were part of its people's daily lives.²⁷ In terms of social interaction, association was mostly based on occupational guilds,²⁸ social clubs, religious units and

²²Falola, T., & Heaton, M.M. (2008). *A History of Nigeria*. Cambridge University Press. P.17. Available at <http://books.google.com.tr/books?id=XygZjbNRap0C>. Accessed on 23 October, 2014.

²³Kingdoms of Nigeria (2008) "Pre-Colonial History of Nigeria". Available at <http://www.kingdomsofnigeria.com/precolonialhistory.php>. Accessed on 11 November, 2014.

²⁴Chuku, G. (ed.) (2010). *A History of Nigeria. International Journal of African Historical Studies*. 43(1). p. 183. Boston: Boston University of African Studies Centre. Available at: <http://www.jstor.org/stable/25741414>. Accessed on 10 October, 2014.

²⁵Chuku, G. (ed.) (2010). pp. 184-187.

²⁶For further reading see: Kofi J. & Oyinade, T.R. (2004). *The Concept of God: The People of Yoruba. Thinking About Religion*. 3. Available at http://organizations.uncfsu.edu/ncrsa/journal/v03/johnsonoyinade_yoruba.htm. Accessed on 04 January, 2015.

Courlander, H. (1973) *Tales of Yoruba gods & heroes*. New York: Original Publications.

²⁷Adeuyan, O.J. (2011). *Contributions of Yoruba people in the Economic & Political Developments of Nigeria*. Author house. p. 72. Accessed on 30 December, 2014

Abimbola, K. (2006). *Yoruba Culture: A Philosophical Account*. Iroko Academic Publishers.

²⁸Some examples of such occupational associations were the Egbe Oode (Hunters Guild) and the Parakoyi (League of Traders)

Secret/initiatory societies. These associations all played an important role in sustaining commerce, vocational education and overall social stability in the Yoruba polities.²⁹

The Igbo communities operated a more decentralized administrative system with no permanent leadership. This system is commonly likened to a republic which comprises of independent sovereign states.³⁰ In general, sovereignty was embodied in institutions like the Family clan,³¹ village council, title holders and age grades. Sub-groups were also formed based on clan, lineage, village affiliation and dialect. Of the various institutions, the clan was the most important, each village was a separate entity and each clan was headed by the family head (*Okpara*).³² The Igbo religious traditions (known as *Odinani*.) was based on the belief in a supreme solar deity (referred to as *Chukwu* -Great Spirit).³³ The Igbos were mostly craftsmen,

Adeuyan, O.J. (2011). *Contributions of Yoruba people in the Economic & Political Developments of Nigeria*. Author house. p. 72. Accessed on 30 December, 2014.

²⁹Adeuyan, O.J. (2011); Akintoye, S. (2010). *A History of the Yoruba People*. Dakar: Amalion Publishing. p.512.

³⁰Miers, S. & Roberts, L.R. (eds.) (1988) *the End of Slavery in Africa*. University of Wisconsin Press. p. 437.

³¹The family clan in the Igbo society is comprised of people of the same group of families or households they were a close knit group of interrelated families which extended beyond the nuclear setting of the father mother and children to include the extended family members. This group served as the most basic and primary unit of every political institution in the Igbo societies.

³²“The *okpara* is the *umunna*’s (a group of people descended from the same father) political leader and its representative to the village’s governing council in some groups, this individual is the oldest male of the oldest branch of the lineage; in others, he is the oldest male overall. In both instances, his power is limited because collective pronouncements are never fully binding, and decision making and administrative actions must follow somewhat of a democratic process.” Meek, C.K. (1970) *Law and Authority in a Nigerian Tribe: A Study in Indirect Rule*. New York: Barnes and Nobles. Available at: https://umanitoba.ca/faculties/arts/anthropology/tutor/case_studies/igbo/functions.html. Accessed on 11 November, 2014.

³³Ene, M.O. (2003). *The fundamentals of Odinani*. Available at: <http://www.kwenu.com/odinani/odinani.htm>. Accessed on 04 January, 2015.

Elechi, O. O. (2006). *Doing Justice without the State: The Afikpo (Ehugbo) Nigeria Model*. CRC Press. p. 32.

farmers and traders.³⁴ These communities also had had their own system of law, banking (*Isusu*) and calendar.³⁵

Northern Nigeria, (which is presently three times the size of the western and eastern region combined) was once scattered, independent kingdoms referred to as the Habe kingdoms and the Kanem-Borno dynasty.³⁶ These kingdoms were independent and the only time they opted to cooperate was to ward off a common enemy. However, with the conquest by Usman Shehu Dan Fodio in 1804,³⁷ this system ended and an amalgamation brought the whole region under one administrative territory thereby establishing a powerful empire known as the Sokoto Caliphate.³⁸ The Caliphate system of administration was an Emirate and monarchical in structure. The ruler was embodied as the absolute authority. Rulers known as '*Emirs*' headed each emirate under the Caliphate and the Islamic law (*Sharia*) was adopted as the rules of the land. The people of this kingdom engaged in economic activities such as farming, livestock rearing (of cattle, goats, and sheep's), dyeing as well as iron and ore smelting.³⁹

³⁴Isichei, E. (1976). A History of the Igbo People. London: Macmillan. excerpted in "Cultural Harmony I: Igboland — The World of Man and the World of Spirits," section 4 of Ogbaa, K. (ed.), Understanding Things Fall Apart. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press. pp. 83-85.

³⁵"A week had four days, a month consisted of seven weeks and 13 months made a year. In the last month, an extra day was added. The Igbo New Year, started with the month *Ọnwá Mbú* (First Moon) which occurs on the third week of February. This calendar is still used in indigenous Igbo villages and towns to determine market days."

Holbrook, J. C., Medupe R.T., & Urama, O.J (2007). African Cultural Astronomy: Current Archaeoastronomy and Ethno astronomy Research in Africa. *Springer*. p. 235.

Holbrook, J. C. (2007). African Cultural Astronomy: Current Archaeoastronomy and Ethno astronomy Research in Africa *Springer*. p. 35.

Njoku, O. N. (2002). *Pre-colonial economic history of Nigeria*. Ethiope Publishing Corporation, Benin City, Nigeria.

³⁶'Habe' was the Pre-Islamic name for the Hausa Kingdom.

³⁷The war and subsequent conquest of the Hausa kingdoms are commonly referred to as the Holy Jihad or Holy War.

³⁸Nwabara (1963). pp. 231-232.

³⁹Audu, J. (2014). Pre-Colonial Political Administration in the North central Nigeria: A Study of the Igala Political Kingdom. *European Scientific Journal*.10 (19).

These three major pre-colonial ethnic communities were much different from one another with respect to their political traditions, economic organizations and socio-cultural characteristic. While the Igbos, for example, were famous for their bronze work, the Yoruba's were well known for their farming and dyeing and the Hausas for their livestock rearing. Religiously, the Hausa/Fulani societies were predominantly Muslims as a result of their contact with the Islamic civilization earlier on before the advent of colonialism. The Yoruba and Igbo societies on the other hand practiced more of the African traditional beliefs. Similarly, language has always served as a strong uniting factor amongst the peoples of the same tribes as well as an important factor in separating the tribes from one another. In this regard, one may argue that diversity in Nigeria was not created but inherited and that the challenge for the modern state has been focused on creating a unifying base for all these inherited identities.

Interaction amongst these diverse ethnic societies was mainly via long distance trade, migration due to natural disasters, as well as wars and conquests served as the major connecting bridge.⁴⁰ Before the Nigerian economy became dominated by British businesses, there was an existing system of exchange which used items like: "brass rods, copper wires, cowries, iron rods, cloth and salt" for transactions.⁴¹ Of all these mediums, the cowry was the most widely accepted means of exchange amongst the various ethnic groups in pre-colonial Nigeria.⁴² The cowry was strong even into the

⁴⁰Isumonah, V. A. (2003). "Migration, Land Tenure, Citizenship and Communal Conflicts in Africa". *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics*. Routledge. 9 (1): pp. 1-19. Gatawu, M.M. (2013). "Integration through Long Distance Trade and Migration". *African Journal of History and Culture*.5 (9): pp. 171-177

⁴¹Aghalino, S.O. (2002). *Pre-Colonial Economic History of Nigeria*. "Trade Currencies in Pre-Colonial Nigeria" (Chapter 7). Ethiope Publishing Corporation.

⁴²Aghalino, S.O. (2002). p. 85.

nineteenth century and was used by the British for internal trade as well as exchange for goods such as palm oil.⁴³

1.7.2 Colonial Period

Modern Nigeria was no doubt Britain's creation. In the course of the roughly over sixty years in which Britain ruled Nigeria (1900-1960), they were able to bring entirely distinct cultures and merge them under a single administrative structure, using a combination of tactics which included military conquest, coercion as well as diplomacy. The driving force behind the European expansion and struggle for trading posts on the West African Coast was part of the wider struggle by many European empires to acquire forts that would profit their trades in the Atlantic. By the late 18th century, Britain had become the dominant commercial power in West Africa⁴⁴ and by the 19th century, it had begun seeking markets for its manufactured goods as well as access to cheap raw materials like palm oil and ivory. In order to ensure a steady supply of these materials, this required that Britain seize power from the coastal chiefs in what later became Nigeria. Therefore, the eventual colonization of Nigeria not only prevented claims on the Nigerian hinterland by other colonial powers (such as France), but also served as a strategy to safeguard Britain's trade interests on the

⁴³“The utility and longevity of the cowry as a trade currency and a legal tender could be sought largely in its usefulness and advantages. The cowry served as an effective measure of value and a unit of account which made it convenient for traders to know the value of particular goods in relation to another and to fix prices on all types of products.” Its size and shape made it handy to carry, convenient to count and, its uniqueness made it impossible to counterfeit, while its durability made it possible for it to be stored for several years. These peculiar attributes and advantages made it widely acceptable as a legal tender, and as unit of account for translating small sums into larger entities. In nineteenth century Lagos, the multiplication table for the cowry currency read thus: - 40 cowries = 1 String; 50 strings = 1 head (2,000 cowries); 10 heads = 1 bag (20,000 cowries).” See: Payne, J.A.O (1875). *Payne's History of Lagos and West African Almanack and Diary*. Hopkins A.G. (1879). *The Currency Revolution*. p.472. Ogunremi, G.O. (1982). *Counting the Camels: The Economics of Transportation in Pre Industrial Nigeria*. London: NOK. p.43.

⁴⁴This coincides with the end of the French Revolution and the subsequent Napoleonic Wars (1799-1815).

Metz, C.H. (1991). (ed.) *Nigeria: A Country Study*. The Colonial Economic Legacy. Washington: GPO for the Library of Congress. Available at: <http://countrystudies.us/nigeria/53.htm>. Accessed on 13th April, 2015.

West African coast.⁴⁵ By 1861 Britain's formal administration of Nigeria began with the annexation of Lagos and its proclamation as a crown colony. With this, other territories gradually followed suit and by the end of the nineteenth century all of southern Nigeria was incorporated into the British Empire.⁴⁶ In the early twentieth century, the British began subjugating the Islamic Emirate from as far as Sokoto in the North-west to Borno in the North-east and also the non-Hausa/Fulani's areas (Ilorin, Bida, Kontagora etc.) South of the emirate.⁴⁷ By 1906, all of present day Nigeria was under British control.⁴⁸ With the pacification of any form of resistance also came the need for Britain to realize her imperial needs. What this meant was the establishment of a political administrative structure "(...) that would ensure an atmosphere of peace, orderliness and tranquillity (...) including law and order that is necessary for exploitation"⁴⁹

Interaction between the various cultural, ethno-linguistic and religious groups took on a different dimension during colonialism. This is because these groups were now all absorbed and assembled together as one geopolitical entity, governed under a single administrative apparatus. Despite this, interaction between these groups at the first stages of the colonial period was very minimal and it was not until the amalgamation of the two provinces in 1914 by Lord Frederick Lugard that there was any semblance of a central political administrative body. The central administrative

⁴⁵In the 1850's, Britain concentrated more on her trading interests in the Lagos and the Niger Delta.

Metz, C.H. (1991). (ed.) *Nigeria: A Country Study*. The Colonial Economic Legacy. Washington: GPO for the Library of Congress. Available at: <http://countrystudies.us/nigeria/53.htm>. Accessed on 13th April, 2015.

⁴⁶Oyebade, A. (2003). *The foundations of Nigeria: Essays in Honour of Toyin Falola*. African World Press. pp. 15-16.

⁴⁷Oyebade, A. (2003). p. 16.

⁴⁸Britain's decision to completely colonize Nigeria was a response to certain factors such as: "curtailing the now-illegal activities of slave traders, checkmating the disruption of trade by the Yoruba civil wars, the fears of the French conquest of Lagos, and lastly as a series of steps designed to facilitate trade."

Oyebade, A. (2003). p. 15.

⁴⁹Oyebade, A. (2003). p. 16.

body of colonial Nigeria was made up of primarily British officials and it was only at the local level that the indigenous peoples became involved in political affairs.⁵⁰ Even at the local level, the British colonist used the local leaders (i.e. Obas, Obis, and Emirs) as their agents and as a means to exercise their authority and implement their colonial policies.⁵¹ This system was however more successful in the Northern Province than it was in the Southern Province, this was largely owing to the difference in their pre-existing political structures. While the Northern Province was already a centralized hierarchical political arrangement, the southern provinces were a mixture of loosely centralized systems embodied in the Yoruba lands and fragmented communities attributed to the Igbos. These differences was what informed the variances in the way the British chose to rule each province. With the absence of administrative structures with which the British could maintain and utilize to their advantage like they did in the north, the colonist found it more difficult to gain the necessary compliance from the people of the southern province.⁵² This often led to clashes between the government agents (warrant chiefs) and the indigenous people. A popular example is the Aba women riots of 1929 where “thousands of Igbo women marched in protest against the tax policies imposed by British colonial administrators” in south eastern Nigeria.⁵³ To this extent, the colonial authority did not bring about abrupt changes in these societies diverse cultures and consequently, traditional rulers continued to exercise a considerable amount of authority especially

⁵⁰This has however had no implications on the modern day Nigerian political system that has emerged which is less centrist than the one during colonialism.

⁵¹Oyebade, A. (2003). p. 17.

⁵²This colonial reality has seemed to rub off on contemporary Nigerian politics especially during election times many politicians lobby through traditional chiefs in order to gain wide acceptance or support from the rural people and this is especially the case in the Northern region where traditional rulers still play a significant role in the peoples social lives.

⁵³Dorward, D. C. (ed.) (1983). The Igbo "Women's War" of 1929: Documents Relating to the Aba Riots in Eastern Nigeria. Wakefield, England: East Ardsley. Available at: <http://www.blackpast.org/gah/aba-womens-riots-november-december-1929#sthash.56x1eLVO.dpuf>. Accessed on 11 February, 2015.

in the Northern Province.⁵⁴ It is important to note that the lack of a centralized leadership in the Southern Province made it easier for the colonialists to influence the local structures and shape them according to modern principles than it was in the Northern Province where a strong presence of Islamic tradition and a centralized leadership made it more challenging. Although there were no sudden changes for these ethno-religious linguistic regional groups, the British presence might in-fact have stunted the indigenous cultural development of these groups.⁵⁵ In other words, these groups development was cut short and essentially manipulated to fit into another developmental arrangement that suited that colonial agenda. Unlike many western nations, Nigeria (like many former colonies in Africa) was not allowed to steer the course of its political, economic, and socio-cultural development but rather served as appendages to the British empire whose development was moulded to suit the political and economic expansionist objectives of the colonialists.

Since colonialism was primarily based on the exploitation of resources, most especially raw materials, minerals and agricultural produce that were crucial to western industrial development and trade, economic activities in these colonies became positioned around the production and exportation of raw materials.⁵⁶ In other words, the British colonial system was used for the extraction of cash crops as well as the allotment of these colonies as outlets for its manufactured goods. This situation led to sweeping economic changes to fit the colonialist's policies. For example, to ease the transportation of raw materials from one region to another, the colonial administration built railroad networks and constructed new roads between

⁵⁴Oyebade, A. (2003). *The foundations of Nigeria: Essays in Honor of Toyin Falola*. African World Press. p. 5.

⁵⁵Oyebade, A. (2003). pp. 5-6.

⁵⁶Oyebade, A. (2003). p. 6.

the 1890's to 1930's. This was to help connect all regions producing raw materials to the coastal port cities like Lagos and Port Harcourt.⁵⁷ A second colonial policy was the introduction of the Pound sterling and other financial institutions such as banks and credit systems (albeit catering more to foreign businesses and to the detriment of indigenous businesses). These changes no doubt promoted external trade as well as the emergence of many foreign businesses and companies.⁵⁸ Lastly, through all these processes, Nigeria became incorporated into the International capitalist market system where it played the dual role as a primary producer of raw materials to the metropolis on one hand, and a consumer of the metropolis finished goods on the other hand.⁵⁹

Economic transformations also led to socio-cultural changes in Nigeria, one of which was the urbanization experience. In general, there was a large influx of labour power from the rural into urban areas. This migration from rural to urban centres was largely in response to the “modern economic opportunities in the emerging colonial urban centres.”⁶⁰ With road and railway networks connecting cities from all regions colonialism, through migration, was able to increase interaction between the regional groups. Examples of such colonial economic migration are the early 20th century migration of southern immigrants (Igbos and Yoruba's) into northern cities like Kano, Kaduna, Zaria and Jos.⁶¹ This resulted in socio-cultural changes which created a blend of communities in urban-industrial areas. This ‘blending’ however was only prima-facie, since it did not lead to a far-reaching integration of the diverse cultures.

⁵⁷Metz, H. C. (ed.) (1991). *Nigeria: A Country Study*. Washington: GPO for the Library of Congress. Available at <http://countrystudies.us/nigeria/> Accessed on 27 October, 2014.

⁵⁸Examples of such businesses are: the John Holt and company, United Africa Company (UAC), as well as the Lebanese dominated retail sector. *The Colonial Economic Legacy*. pp. 18-19.

⁵⁹The Colonial Economic Legacy. pp. 18-19.

⁶⁰Suberu, R. T. & Osaghae E.E. (2005). p. 15.

⁶¹Suberu, R. T. & Osaghae E.E. (2005). p. 15.

This ‘mal-integration’ was partly due to the acute sense of territoriality exhibited by the regional ethnic groups as well as the manner in which the British colonist handled this situation.⁶² In the north for example, the colonialists’ response to this territoriality was to help maintain the Islamic puritanism and prevent “potential inter-group tensions by discouraging movement of non-Muslim migrants into the core Muslim areas.”⁶³ This was done by isolating migrants in to quarters known as *sabongari* (stranger’s quarters).⁶⁴ This was similarly the case for northerners who also migrated to the south.

Another factor with regards to colonial policies which had socio-cultural implications that had a significant integrative result was the introduction of western education. Although the British colonialists did not promote education, they did tolerate its growth especially in the south⁶⁵ by allowing Christian missionaries to establish primary and secondary schools based on government guidelines.⁶⁶ The introduction of western education in Nigeria automatically meant the adoption of the English language as a medium of instruction. It is important to note here that the introduction of the English language and its subsequent adoption in the educational system as well as all other spheres of national activity was not premeditated. In fact, English only became a necessity because it was the available medium through which the natives could converse with missionaries, and how converts (mostly traditional

⁶²Suberu, R. T. & Osaghae E.E. (2005). p. 16.

⁶³Suberu, R. T. & Osaghae E.E. (2005). p. 16.

⁶⁴Suberu, R. T. & Osaghae E.E. (2005). p. 15.

⁶⁵Access to western education in the North was more limited largely because of the strong Islamic presence and the fact that the colonial authorities did not wish to introduce anything that would “rock the Islamic boat” caused them to out rightly discourage the establishment of missionary schools. Oyebode (2003). p. 20.

⁶⁶Oyebode, A. (2003). p. 19.

worshippers) could learn to read the Bible.⁶⁷ Education initially served as an instrument towards promoting religion and the increase of these educational institutions led to a form of integration as different tribes became bound by a new forms of identity: - one of western education and religion. Colonial government intervention in education began with the Education Ordinance of 1882 which made teaching English language compulsory in schools as well as a condition for school proprietors to secure government grants. This policy was one of the few that was met with little local resistance.⁶⁸ Gradually the English language also found its way into the economic and civic spheres.⁶⁹ Eventually, the mastery of the English language became an invaluable symbol of status for every Nigerian. To a very large extent, the English language continues to remain an invaluable symbol of status in Nigeria as it usually indicates the level of one's education and 'sophistication'. In most cases those who have a mastery of the English language are believed to have better opportunities in the wider spheres of society. Because western education was largely pioneered by early Christian missionaries, it was used as a tool to champion the cause of religion, especially Christianity. The new educated class basically extolled Christian virtues and shunned their traditional beliefs. As people began to convert to Christianity, features of traditionalism began eroding especially in the cities and particularly in the south. Thus, we see Nigerians adopting Christian first names instead of traditional ones.⁷⁰ People deserted rural farmlands to go to the city in

⁶⁷In order to speed up this evangelization process, different missions thought it wise to establish schools. By the late 90's the Baptists, the Catholics, the Methodists and many other Christian denominations had schools which they used to propagate the teachings of their respective beliefs. Omodiaogbe, A. S. (1992). 150 years on: English in the Nigerian school system - past, present, and future. *ELT Journal* 46 (1) Oxford University Press. p. 19.

⁶⁸Omodiaogbe, A. S. (1992). p. 20.

⁶⁹Omodiaogbe, A. S. (1992). pp. 20-21.

⁷⁰Oyebode, A. (2003). pp. 20-22.

search for wage labour and modern life that had become a contrast to that of rural life.⁷¹

While the opportunities brought about by colonial economic transformations did bring these diverse ethno-religious, linguistic and cultural groups together into one arena, but did it really foster greater socio-cultural integration? One may argue that although colonial urban cities and colonial education played a key role in the development of ethnic contact, competition, consciousness and organization, however, the policies adopted by the British colonialists promoted the formation of tribal, kinship and ethnic associations primarily as a means of protection from the insecurities, instabilities, alienation and competitiveness of colonial urban life.⁷² Eventually this had the profound impact of turning these centres more into aggregations of tribal unions than places for healthy cross-cutting cultural bonds to be nurtured.⁷³ For example, the amalgamation of the Northern and Southern protectorates in 1914 and the gradual urbanization facilitated migrations from the South to the North and vice-versa, however these migrations did not mean integration as migrants were often separated from the indigenes and made to live in separate areas called *Sabon Gari* (strangers quarters).⁷⁴ This resulted in the creation of ethnic niches where you see a small area dominated by one ethnic group. The territorial demarcations were a deliberate move by the colonial rulers to facilitate effective rule over the people as they felt that less intermingling amongst the different ethnic/religious groups would make administration of the provinces easier. This policy became known as ‘divide and rule’. In the south where the colonialists

⁷¹Oyebode, A. (2003). p. 22.

⁷²Suberu, R. T. (2005). p. 16.

⁷³Coleman, J.S. (1958). *Nigeria: Background to Nationalism*, Berkeley: University of California Press. p. 8.

⁷⁴Oyelaran & Adediran (1997). p. 15.

decided to use 'direct-rule' system, this did not go down well with the indigenes as the agents (warrant chiefs) appointed by the colonialists often lacked legitimacy. This made coordination of the natives problematic and often times resulted in skirmishes between the natives and colonial authorities. Thus, we see that as Nigeria was becoming more urbanized, colonial policies were not consistent with these realities. Colonial policies, only succeeded in putting the groups at logger heads. For example in the period leading to independence we see occurrences of violent conflicts: such as the 1945 riots in the town of Jos between Igbo and Hausa migrant over residential and trading opportunities in the city.⁷⁵ In 1953 another clash between the Hausa and Igbos erupted, this time in the city of Kano over attempts by the southern parties to hold rallies in the city in support for Nigerian independence, a move seen by the northerners as an attempt by the south to establish domination over them.⁷⁶

Although Colonialism extensively influenced the socio-political system of modern Nigeria as well as coming along with some material benefits, by and large, many people felt alienated and frustrated.⁷⁷ Most people regarded it as a system which had not only eroded their traditional cultures and institutions, but was exploiting Nigerian labour at the expense of Nigerians and to the benefit of foreign firms and businesses.⁷⁸ In the early years of colonialism, there were pockets of resistance put up by the indigenous peoples, but these were never organized. It was not until the early 1920's and further into the 1940's and 50's that anti-colonial resistance become more organized around a 'pan-Nigerian' consciousness. This consciousness was

⁷⁵Nnoli, O. (1978). *Ethnic Politics in Nigeria*, Enugu: Fourth dimension. p. 235.

⁷⁶Nnoli, O. (1978). p. 236.

⁷⁷Falola, T. & Heaton M.M. (2008). p. 136.

⁷⁸Falola, T. & Heaton M.M. (2008). *A History of Nigeria*. Cambridge University Press. p. 136.

basically an ideology which sought to be all-encompassing by transcending the boundaries of the tribe or ethnic group to focus more on building a ‘Nigerian’ identity and making the people of the regions aware of this identity. By the 1930’s a new generation of anti-colonial activists emerged in Nigeria, mostly from the educated class. This educated class comprised of individuals from diverse ethnic, religious and tribal backgrounds. This is another instance in which western education provided a unifying base. These individuals that eventually made up the political elite, were able to found a unifying factor through western education and understanding the language of the colonialists. The activists’ goal was the eventual ‘indigenization’ of the foreign government.⁷⁹ The pressures exerted by these group led to a number of constitutional reforms that gradually increased Nigerians self-governance at the regional levels and eventually led to the country’s independence.⁸⁰ Some of such anti-colonial movements were: - the National Congress of British West Africa (WANCBWA) in the Gold Coast (present day Ghana),⁸¹ and the West African Students Union (WASU). Similarly, individual activists such as Herbert Macaulay and Nnamdi Azikiwe also played important roles in the anti-colonial struggle. The media through disseminating anti-colonial ideas as well as organized protests and associations increased the anti-colonial consciousness of many Nigerians.⁸² Other associations which played important roles in the anti-colonial struggle were trade and labour unions such as the Nigeria Civil Service Union (NCSU), the Nigerian Union of Teachers (NUT), and the Nigerian Youth Movement (NYM). Although many of these associations were ethnically based and served the primary role of offering

⁷⁹The activist’s sought to achieve this goal by making certain demands such as: more involvement of Nigerians in government, they demanded better development planning measures such as increased spending on infrastructures, education and health facilities. Falola, T & Heaton M. M. (2008). p. 140.

⁸⁰Falola, T. & Heaton M.M. (2008). p. 137.

⁸¹The West African National Congress of British West Africa was established in the 1920’s

⁸²Falola, T. & Heaton M.M. (2008). p. 138.

assistance to fellow kinsmen who had recently migrated to urban centres,⁸³ however, through solidarity and cooperative action, these groups were able to exert a fair amount of pressure on the colonial government most especially through work stoppage (strikes). Most importantly, these movements showed to all parties involved (government and people) that reforms were possible if people could unite on a large scale for a common purpose.⁸⁴

1.7.3 Post-Colonial Period

By the late 1930's, Britain's ability to effectively control its colonies had significantly weakened, and as the impact of these anti-colonial groups became even more manifest, the colonialists came under pressure with no choice but to grant independence to these colonies. With Nigeria, the issue became how to maintain this simulated political arrangement made up of diverse ethnicities. Consequently, the foundations of a federal structure were gradually laid down. Nationalist movements in the colonial period metamorphosed into regionally based political parties with membership divided along ethnic lines. It was against this backdrop that Nigeria went on to gain her independence on 1st October, 1960. Because of this 'ethnic' factor, the Independence attained was to a large extent fragile and in deep contrast to the aspirations of what the nationalist movement sought. This was largely due to the failure to establish a strong 'all-Nigerian' identity which gave way for the emergence of politically conscious ethnic groups vying for control of government through their respective ethnically based political parties.⁸⁵ For example, nationalist organizations like the National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons (NCNC) and National Youth

⁸³Falola, T. & Heaton M.M. (2008). p. 139.

⁸⁴The 1921 strike by the Mechanics Union of railway works, the 1929 coal workers strike and the general strike of 1945 which shutdown all railway, postal and telegraphic as well as technical services are but a few examples of such instances where stoppage of labour helped to inform government decision on whether to reduce or increase wages, increase taxes and whether it was safe introduce certain policies. Falola, T. & Heaton M.M. (2008). pp. 139-141.

⁸⁵Falola, T & Heaton M.M. (2008). p. 150.

Movement (NYM) (respectively) became associations for predominantly the Igbo and Yoruba ethnic group and the Nigerian People's Congress NPC for the northern Hausa-Fulani's.

Considering the ethno-cultural composition of the Nigeria polity, a positive outcome of independence was the creation of a federal system.⁸⁶ Toward independence, it boiled down to two options: either Nigeria was to remain as one indivisible entity learning to manage its diversity through various mechanisms, or it was to dissolve into separate ethnically based nations. The former it seems was chosen not necessarily because it was the best option, but most likely because the British did not have the time to sit around and meticulously plan out every new detail of an independent nation(s). The product of many decades of colonial rule was a Nigeria that was simply going to be too difficult to tear apart. The choice of a federal system therefore, not only reflected the country's major ethnic configuration but also the historical pattern by which Britain acquired and administered Nigeria,⁸⁷ indeed this federal system was a right step towards fostering integration among the diverse groups. However, previous inconsistencies in the British colonial policies had already fortified cleavages and animosities which continued to hunt the nation even after independence. As Suberu points out, the British colonial policies rather than being a factor for integration was used to promote the crystallization of identities which has now manifested in the contemporary identity conflicts prevalent in Nigeria.⁸⁸ The British strategy of divide and rule aided in exacerbating the already existing ethnic and religious differences as well as politicizing and mobilizing these identities towards violence. Similarly, by attempting to take on the task of

⁸⁶Suberu, R. T. (2005). p. 16.

⁸⁷Suberu, R. T. (2005). p. 16.

⁸⁸Suberu, R.T. (2005). p. 16.

simultaneously preserving the indigenous cultures of each region and introducing western political and social ideas, the British policies fostered uneven social, economic and political development among these regional groups. An indirect result of this for example was the nationalist outlook of each of the regions. In the north where Islamic legitimacy upheld the rule of Emirs, the nationalist outlook and sentiments tended to be somewhat anti-western, while the nationalist thinking in the south was principally shaped by European ideas.⁸⁹ The lop-sidedness of the federal structure was also manifested by the manner in which the country's borders were drawn which basically represented primarily the three major ethnicities, neglecting the non- Hausa/Fulani, non-Yoruba and non-Igbo ethnicities. The grievances of marginalization subsequently led to ethnic-minority agitations for the creation of more regions. "Given the multiple cumulative ethnic contradictions and tensions built into the colonial experience in Nigeria, it is therefore not surprising, that this period actually witnessed the initial major instances of inter-ethnic violence in the country."⁹⁰ For example, in the early 1960's there eschewed a series of conflicts by a number of ethnic groups like the Tiv riots of 1962 and 1964. Similarly in 1966 a secession attempt was made by the Ijaw people. A result of bitter political contestation in the western region, resulted in a state of emergency to be imposed in the region in 1962. There were also wider ethno-regional crisis such as the disputed 1962-63 census figures, the 1964 federal election crisis and the 1965 western election controversies. All of which culminated in a coup that overthrew the first republican democratic government and paved the way for subsequent military intervention into politics.⁹¹

⁸⁹Metz, H. M. (1991). (ed.) *Nigeria: A Country Study*. Washington: GPO for the Library of Congress.

⁹⁰Suberu, R. T. (2005). p.16.

⁹¹Suberu R. T. & Osaghae, E.E. (2005). p. 17.

1.8 The Effects of Creating an Independent Nigerian State on Cultural Diversity

Perhaps the most profound legacy of British colonial rule was its choosing to lump various pre-existing ethno-religious, linguistic and regional groups into a single country without actually fostering proper integration amongst them.⁹² However, the lumping together of these ethno-cultural groups was not necessarily the genesis of the problem, rather it was how the colonialists chose to administer these diverse peoples. Indeed as General Obasanjo puts it: “The only point on which Nigerian political leaders spoke with one voice was the granting by the British of political independence - and even then they did not agree on the timing.”⁹³ These realities, coupled with the lopsided federal structure passed on to the political elites of that time made a recipe for political catastrophes. Grievances were often expressed in violent outbursts which soon accelerated the countries descent into not only military intervention in politics, but also into a civil war (commonly referred to as the Biafran war 1967-1970).⁹⁴ After independence the polarization between groups along ethno-cultural lines has led to a number of minority grievances, some of which developed into secessionist campaigns. For example, the Biafran secessionist movement by the eastern region for the creation of an independent Republic of Biafra.⁹⁵ The primary cause for the secessionism leading up to the war is traced to the coup and counter-coup of 1966 where an easterner, toppled down the government of a northerner. However, the former’s allegedly inability to effectively manage the political situation of the country resulted in a counter coup by another northerner in

⁹²Oyebade, A. (2003). pp. 24-25.

⁹³Oluda, O. (2011). “The History, Causes, Course and Post Conflict Reconstruction Efforts of the Nigerian Civil War”. Available at: <http://oludaseyi.blogspot.com/2011/10/history-causes-course-and-post-conflict.html> Accessed on 29 October, 2014.

⁹⁴Suberu, R. & Diamond, L. (2003). “Nigeria: The Challenges and Travails of Governance.” In Shively, P. (ed.), *Comparative Governance*. New York: McGraw-Hill. p. 120.

⁹⁵Suberu, R. (2005). pp. 17-18.

July that same year. Many scholars have opined that this counter coup crushed the hopes of the Igbos and put them once again under the feeling of oppression. These feelings were not unfounded as on a daily bases there were reports of how easterners living in the north were being killed, molested and their property looted. Immediate steps to address the situation included posting military personnel to barracks within their respective regions of origin, and Nigerians of non-eastern origin were advised to move out of the east in their own interest. However, Easterners at home and abroad were already with news of the ‘brutality’ carried out against them and what eschewed was a virulent exchange of words between the east and north through media outlets (i.e. newspapers and radio stations) which served to escalate tensions.⁹⁶ In a bid to forestall and decimate the strength of eastern secession bid, the then military Head of State on 27th May, 1967 proclaimed Decree No. 8 for the creation of twelve states.⁹⁷ This act was met with a declaration of an independent eastern region known as the Republic of Biafra.⁹⁸ The federal government saw this act as illegal and the country was faced with possible disintegration. The chaos of this reality resulted in the outbreak of a civil war on 6 July 1967 in a last attempt to salvage the nation from threatened division. Indeed, the war has been described as the culmination of an uneasy peace and stability that had plagued the nation from

⁹⁶Atofarati, A.A (1992). The Nigerian Civil War, Causes, Strategies, and Lessons Learnt. Available at: <http://www.africamasterweb.com/BiafranWarCauses.html>. Accessed 28 October, 2014.

⁹⁷Three states were created in each of the regions.

⁹⁸“Colonialism and Independence: Nigeria as a case study”. Available at: <http://www.123helpme.com/view.asp?id=38538> Accessed on 28 October, 2014.

independence.⁹⁹ Decades after the war, and possibly as a result of negative feelings still retained, many Igbos still believe that their ethnic group faces discrimination.¹⁰⁰

Indeed even in contemporary times Nigeria faces the challenge of creating a democratically united nation with strong attachments to the state. Interaction between the diverse ethno-religious, linguistic and regional groups tend to be very fluid and emotive, making the tendency to resort to violence highly probable especially on issues of socio-economic and political importance. Indeed this attachment to kinship is yet to be overcome as even modern social and political groups and organizations, (be it gender based, youths, work/trade unions and even the political parties) which are ideally meant to be civic, always tend to retain a tribal or religious undertone to them.¹⁰¹ The instability and distrust amongst Nigerians makes the country's road to democratization and integration difficult as violence constantly evolves to take on new dimensions such as militancy or religious insurgency. Many Nigerians are left to wonder if the country can eventually overcome these challenges and work towards greater integration with the aid of the institutional mechanisms put in place.

Despite these benefits and opportunities which colonialism presented Nigerians with, it unfortunately left a greater problem, one of politicized identities which continue to hunt the nation till date. Among the identities which exists in the country, those of religion, tribe, and ethnicity seem to be the strongest and in many instances, easily overshadow the 'Nigerian' consciousness. Even though Nigeria's federal structure

⁹⁹Major Abubakar A. A. (1992). *The Nigerian Civil War, Causes, Strategies, And Lessons Learnt* US Marine Command & Staff College. Available at: <http://www.africamasterweb.com/BiafranWarCauses.htm> Accessed 16 October, 2014.

¹⁰⁰Huber, L. (2013). "Ethno-Religious Tensions in Nigeria: Bridge Building or Bridge Burning" *Sigma Iota Rho (SIR) Journal of International Relations*. Available at: <http://sirjournal.org/2013/04/02/ethno-religious-tensions-in-nigeria-bridge-building-or-bridge-burning/> Accessed 28 October, 2014.

¹⁰¹Suberu, R. (2005). p. 19.

has adapted and designed mechanism to address the many issues that come with diversity, Nigeria's colonial legacy has been one of the contributing factors to the challenges faced by the government on how to effectively promote integration amongst the diverse cultures in the society.

The pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial characteristics and experiences of the Nigerian state has indeed shaped many aspects of the country and the kind of modern nation it has evolved into after independence. An important aspect was in the establishment of a central federal administrative body to replace the different ones operated in each ethnic kingdoms. Therefore, unlike the loosely centralized system in the Yoruba kingdoms, the decentralized systems of the Igbo communities and the centralized system of the Hausa/Fulani, all ethnicities were bond under a federal arrangement. This federal arrangement also facilitated the emergence of the Nigerian bureaucracy. With the emergence of the modern state came the Nigerian bureaucratic system of which the Nigerian Civil Service has become an important institution in facilitating the smooth functioning of government policies towards the provision of tangible services for the population.¹⁰² The civil service became the institution responsible for designing, formulating and implementing public policy as well as ensuring the effective and efficient discharge of government functions and developmental programmes.¹⁰³ This was indeed a new phase in Nigeria's political development as the new bureaucracy shed away previous colonial administrative structures that were more concerned with the extraction of natural resources than

¹⁰²Ogunrotifa, A. B. (2012). Federal Civil Service Reform in Nigeria: The Case of Democratic Centralism. *RADIX International Journal of Research in Social Science*. 1 (10). p. 1. Available at: <http://www.rierc.org>. Accessed on 13 April, 2015.

¹⁰³Ogunrotifa, A.B. (2012). p. 2.

with human and economic development.¹⁰⁴ The civil service was therefore fashioned in a way to ensure and promote accountability, transparency, efficiency and effectiveness, and this meant switching the focus of civil service away from the role tax collection to that of one capable of helping the government in planning and accelerating the pace of Nigeria's socio-economic development through social service delivery, infrastructural development and nation building.¹⁰⁵ However, some of the challenges the modern bureaucracy faces today can be linked to the conflict between traditional and 'western' political administrative systems. When the colonial bureaucracy was established, many natives did not regard them as legitimate, saw them as foreign and therefore did not demand any accountability from them as they felt they had their own traditional system for demanding accountability and punishing wrong doers. After colonialism and even when the bureaucracy was 'Nigerianized' it became difficult to cultivate and entrench a culture of accountability and transparency from these institutions and which many of those in public offices used to their advantage to commit many corrupt acts and which no doubt has led to the culture of impunity many politicians exhibit.

Similarly the educational system also underwent changes particularly in ensuring a more uniform curriculum across the nation. At independence, the Nigerian educational system was based on the British system, which many believed did not fit into the needs, interests and aspirations of the Nigerian society. What later eschewed was the curriculum conference of 1969 that focused on the primary needs of the Nigerian children and which subsequently led to the formulation of the National

¹⁰⁴Corkery, J. (1995). Civil Service Reforms: Hurdles and Helps. Available at: <http://www.euforic.org/dpmf/951jcgm.htm?&username=guest@euforic.org&password=9999&groups=EUFORIC&workgroup>. Accessed on 13 April, 2015.

¹⁰⁵Okotoni, O. (2004). Problems and Prospects of Nigerian Bureaucracy. *Journal of Social Sciences*. 7 (3) p. 224.

policies on Education of 1977 (with reforms in 1981,1998 and 2004) with the prime objective of improving Nigerian education.¹⁰⁶ Educational reforms not only meant the adoption of a single curriculum for the entire nation but also the establishment of unity primary schools as well as federal secondary and tertiary institutions. These reforms in the educational sector was one of the ways many believed that the freedom of self-rule which Nigeria was enjoying could match with educational progress in all spheres as well as foster a stronger unity.

The creation of the Nigerian Army consisting of members from various ethnic and religious groups was also a very crucial and important step in Nigeria's post-independence development. The army became a symbol of the new sovereignty the nation possessed. It was also one of the means for enforcing the 'Nigerian' identity. Through the quota system introduced in the recruitment of persons into the Nigerian Army and Navy, this ensured an equitable representation of all ethnic groups into the army. This also shifted the role of security agencies as instruments of the ruling class to be used at their disposal to an institution charged with the responsibility of defending Nigerians from all forms of external aggression or treats of disintegration.

The post-independence era also witnessed the establishment of institutional links between, localities, regions and state through federal administration especially through budget allocation and revenue systems. The budget allocation system was one of the primary ways which ensured inter-relationship between the central federal

¹⁰⁶Adeyemi, B. A., Oribabor, O.A. & Adeyemi, B.B. (2012). An Overview of Educational Issues in Nigeria: Thoughts and Reflections. p. 1.

government and the regional governments. This way Nigeria's federal structure gradually took form and was able to evolve to better cater to the needs of all regions

The above factors were no doubt facilitated by the emergence of a Nigerian consciousness. This consciousness was a major driving force that made many especially from the emerging middle class (who subsequently became political elites) put aside tribalist and ethnocentric tendencies and embrace the notion of being a Nigerian before any other thing. One could argue that it was this new disposition that facilitated the creation and reform of the Nigerian bureaucracy, educational system, Nigerian army as well as links from the regional government to the central government.

Chapter 2

INSTITUTIONAL CHARACTERISTICS OF NIGERIAN FEDERALISM

A majority of mainstream literature on federalism accept that ‘federalism’ captures the idea of the recognition of difference and diversity as the driving force of a political system. According to Michel Burgess, “difference and diversity produce federalism and federalism produces federation.”¹⁰⁷ A federal system by and large strives to share both territorial power and sovereignty among the component units in the system.¹⁰⁸ This ‘federal idea’ is expressed through institutions used in promoting territorial division of powers that will enable each layer of authority to perform a number of functions autonomously. Similarly, federalism is manifested in many forms and as a result, there may be no identical federal systems existing in the world today. While in most cases federalism seeks to ensure a symmetric territorial division of powers between all constituents, some federal systems are however more asymmetric than others. For example, Quebec in Canada, which as a result of its French cultural heritage has always agitated for greater autonomy and recognition than the rest of the other Canadian provinces.¹⁰⁹ Although Quebec’s request for special provisions has been a source of much tension in the country’s history, it seems that stability can sometimes only be achieved through federal asymmetry. No

¹⁰⁷Burgess M. (2012). “Federalism in Africa: An Essay on the Impacts of Cultural Diversity, Development and Democracy” *The Federal Idea*.: Available at: <http://ideefederale.ca/wp/?p=1623&lang=ang>. Accessed on 2 November, 2014.

¹⁰⁸Hague, R. & Harrop, M. (2004). *Comparative Government and Politics: An Introduction*. Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan. p. 228.

¹⁰⁹Hague, R. & Harrop, M. (2004). p.230.

doubt meeting the aspirations of the French speaking Quebec by giving them control over their cultural and social life as well as some constitutional and financial benefits¹¹⁰ has helped maintain a stability in the country. Similarly, among Malaysia's 13 states, the regions of Sabah and Sarawak seemingly have more autonomy than the rest of the other regions especially with regards to matters of immigration.¹¹¹ The decision to opt for a federal system by any country can be as a result of several factors, one of which is size (in land area or population). Federal states like the USA, Canada, Australia and Brazil have large land areas, while others like India and Germany have large populations. Similarly, this decision could also be as a result of other variables. For example, a country like India, apart from its large population, has also accommodated religious divides such as Hindus, Sikhs, Muslims and Christians. Also, the Swiss federation with its 23 cantons integrates three languages (German, French, and Italian) as well as two religions (Catholics and Protestants).¹¹² Likewise, there is the Belgian federal system which uses not only the factor of regional territories, but also that of linguistic communities in its federal arrangement.¹¹³

Nigeria, also is classified as a federation with institutions devised according to the principles of federalism. According to the 1999 Constitution, Nigeria is a federation

¹¹⁰The Canadian constitution requires that three Supreme Court Justices must come from Quebec. Supreme Court of Canada. Parliament of Canada Available at:

<http://www.parl.gc.ca/parlinifo/compilations/SupremeCourt.aspx?Menu=SupremeCourt&Current=True>. Accessed on 24 May, 2015.

¹¹¹Baubock, R. (-). Asymmetry in Multinational Federation. ICE Working Paper Series (No.26)

¹¹²Hague, R. & Harrop, M. (2004). p. 231.

¹¹³Belgium is divided into three regions: the Flemish region (Flanders), the Wallon Region (Wallonia) and Brussels, the capital region. Similarly Belgium also has three linguistic communities: the Flemish community which brings together the Dutch speakers who live in Flanders and Brussels, the French community brings together its speakers in Wallonia and Brussels and lastly there is a tiny German speaking community east of the country.

Swenden, W. (2003). "Belgian Federalism: Basic Institutional Features and Potential as a Model for the European Union." *The Royal Institute of International Affairs*. RIIA Conference.

constituting of 36 states¹¹⁴ and a Federal Capital Territory (F.C.T). The Nigerian political system operates through the activities and distinct structures of three different layers of authority: the federal (central) government, the regional (state) government and local government councils.¹¹⁵ Each unit has its own competence and roles to play. Federalism enables Nigeria in its efforts to foster unity in diversity based on territorial autonomy benefited largely by the ethno-cultural and religious entities. The most recent manifestation of Nigeria's federal system is the 1999 Constitution which was endorsed after the last period of the military regime (1983-1999).¹¹⁶ Like other federal systems, the major characteristic of the Nigerian federation is that it divides powers between a federal centre and constituent entities with a written constitution which guarantees for each layer of authority a degree of autonomy in its own sphere. It also serves as the 'holding together' mechanism that ensures no persons or group of persons can take control of the government of Nigeria (be it at the centre, regional or local level) except within the stipulated procedures laid down by the constitution.¹¹⁷ Nigeria is regarded as "(...) one indivisible and indissoluble sovereign state" known as the Federal Republic of Nigeria.¹¹⁸ However, this notion of 'indivisibility' and 'insolubility' of the country has not hindered certain group's aspirations to secede from the state.

Much literature exists about the Nigerian federal system with regards to its general and specific performance, stability, sustainability and shortcomings. Scholars of

¹¹⁴There are 36 states in Nigeria: Abia, Adamawa, Akwa Ibom, Anambra, Bauchi, Bayelsa, Benue, Borno, Cross River, Delta, Ebonyi, Edo, Ekiti, Enugu, Gombe, Imo, Jigawa, Kaduna, Kano, Katsina, Kebbi, Kogi, Kwara, Lagos, Nasarawa, Niger, Ogun, Ondo, Osun, Oyo, Plateau, Rivers, Sokoto, Taraba, Yobe and Zamfara. 1999 Constitution

¹¹⁵ The Local Government Area exists however, it is not necessarily an element of federalism.

¹¹⁶Burgess, M. (2012). p. 13.

¹¹⁷The 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria Chapter I General Provisions Part I Art. I Para.1-2

¹¹⁸1999 Nigerian Constitution: Art. 2 Para.1

federalism are of the opinion that Federations are formed based on principally two purposes: either with an aim of ‘coming together’ or ‘holding together’.¹¹⁹ Similarly, the explanations for why a country might want to come or hold together under a federal structure has often been explained from a socio-economic or political viewpoint.¹²⁰ The socio-economic perspective argues that, federations come into being because of certain social, economic, historical and geographical factors; whilst the political perspective argues that federations are products of the presence of certain political forces, such as the need for territorial expansion or to raise armies.¹²¹ Many factors make the study of Nigeria’s federal system unique. Firstly, because it is one of the few states in Africa which has been able to maintain this system. Secondly, Nigeria is not only the most populous African nation but also a cultural bed of diverse ethno-religious, linguistic and regional groups who have managed to co-exist for more than four decades. What was the motivating factor behind the British colonizers opting to adopt a federal system for Nigeria? No doubt socio-cultural factors such as ethnicity and religion have played a major role in informing this decision. But it may also be argued that federalism was initially adopted in Nigeria not specifically for the purpose of ‘holding together’ its people but for the colonialists political and economic reasons; which included the expansion, exploitation and management of the resources of the northern and southern provinces. However, the final decision by the nationalists to retain this system was in a bid to ‘hold together’ these diverse ethno-religious, linguistic and regional groups. Even where it was certain that federalism may not necessarily be the best for the

¹¹⁹Babalola, D. (2013). The Origins of Nigerian Federalism: The Rikerian Theory and Beyond. *Federal Governance*, 10(1). Available at <http://library.queensu.ca/ojs/index.php/fedgov/article/view/4549/4724>. Accessed on 18 December, 2014.

¹²⁰Stepan, A. (2001). *Arguing Comparative Politics*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. p. 320.

¹²¹ Riker, W. (1964). *Federalism: Origin, Operation, Significance*. Boston: Little, Brown and Company. p. 13.

country, however, at the dawn of independence, this system remained the much desirable form of governance available for the nationalist leaders, if they were going to realize their desire for self-rule at the soonest time possible; shared-rule became necessary to reconcile the antagonistic forces within the nation.

Many scholars of Nigerian federal system¹²² are of the opinion that Federalism, ethnicity and religion are intertwined clutches, each dependent on the other, which is why they are more likely to be found together than separated. No doubt Nigeria's federalism is characterized by certain centripetal and centrifugal forces which often manifested along ethnic and religious lines. As argued by Fawole and Bello, ethno-religious conflicts have made Nigerian federalism a fragile system.¹²³ Perhaps this is why despite the governments elaborate plans for development and sustainability, it has resulted in little or no results.¹²⁴ Although countries like Lebanon, Iraq and Cyprus seem to show the unpleasant side of ethnicity and/or religion and how conflicting interests could lead to complete chaos, failed states, and sometimes political or geographical separation, those of Belgium, USA, India and Switzerland show the other end of the spectrum. Indeed the latter countries show that religion and ethnicity within any society does not necessarily have to be a negative attribute. In a country like Nigeria which has often been labelled as having one of the most 'religious' people in the world, factors such as religion can become a tool to ease tensions.¹²⁵ This is because when tensions that may lead to violent conflicts manifest themselves as a result of certain disintegrative factors, religious and ethnic leaders can help calm the situation by sensitizing their people on the importance of peace

¹²²See: Suberu (2001); Osaghae (2005); Salawu (2010); Fawole & Bello (2011); Aleyomi (2012).

¹²³Fawole, O. A. & Bello, M. L. (2011). The Impact of Ethno-Religious Conflict on Nigerian Federalism. *International NGO Journal*. 6 (10) October 2011. p. 211. Available at www.academicjournals.org/INGOJ. Accessed on 25th November, 2014.

¹²⁴Fawole, O. A. & Bello, M. L. (2011). p. 212.

¹²⁵Fawole, O. A. & Bello, M. L. (2011). p. 212.

and order. So where certain anomalies in the federal arrangement causes conflict, ethnicity and religion through the principles which they teach (i.e. tolerance and love) can help restore order.¹²⁶ But then again, if these religious and ethnic leaders preach hate speeches against other ethnic or religious groups, then this may also present a problem for integration, which is why the federal system on its own has to be able to present itself as an effective mechanism for limiting the disintegrative factors prevalent within its society.

Suberu and Horowitz¹²⁷ see the Nigerian federal structure as a model for federalist ethnic conflict-management. According to them, certain fundamental changes in the evolution of Nigerian federalism has created mechanisms which should ‘ideally’ help manage conflicts that may arise.¹²⁸ For example, state creation at the regional levels. The division of the regions into smaller states has helped in the protection of other minority groups which do not belong to the Hausa, Yoruba or Igbo majority groups. The current 36 state structure has created 14 states that have placed some minority groups in the majority,¹²⁹ and this has helped with the crystallization of these larger ethnic groups into smaller ones. This crystallization will also help stimulate genuine inter-ethnic alignments and coalitions needed to run an effective and integrative form of democratic system.¹³⁰ Suberu remarks, that despite the increased insurgency in the Niger-Delta communities, state creation has helped quell secessionist sentiments and

¹²⁶Fawole, O. A. & Bello, M. L. (2011). p. 213.

¹²⁷Suberu, R. (2010). The Nigerian Federal System: Performance, Problems and Prospects. *Journal of Contemporary African Studies*. 28(4). pp. 459-477. Available at <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02589001.2010.512741>.

Horowitz, D. L. (2000). *Ethnic Groups in Conflict*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Horowitz, D. L. (2007). The Many Uses of Federalism, 55 *Drake Law Review* 953-966. Available at http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/faculty_scholarship/1855. Accessed on 25 May, 2013.

¹²⁸Suberu, R. (2010). p.467; Horowitz, D. L. (2007). p. 55.

¹²⁹Examples of states that have a high number of minority groups are: Niger state, Kogi state, Kwara state.

¹³⁰Suberu (2010). pp. 462-465.

increased the support for the continued existence of Nigeria.¹³¹ Another thing which Nigeria's federal system has served is to diffuse conflicts, what Suberu terms as the 'localization of conflicts'. Because state creation has created some minority dominated states and helped re-distribute the majority groups into at least five states, the benefit of this has not been only the alleviation of fears of domination, but also the mitigation of ethnic cleavages which have led to political contestation along ethnic line in the past. Currently, most conflicts are non-sectarian emanating from functional and jurisdictional cleavages on issues such as revenue sharing, anti-corruption reforms, decentralization of governmental functions and other matters of state rights.¹³² This lessens the possibility of conflicts engulfing all constituent states.¹³³ Similarly, the provision for asymmetry in the federal system has helped to cater to the distinct needs of each ethnic group. An example of this asymmetry is the provision for states to establish Shari'a or Customary courts to cater to the needs of their people's traditional or religious beliefs. Another example of asymmetry is with regards to revenue allocation. The government has stipulated a revenue sharing formula based on derivation of resources, which demands that not less than 13% of revenue accruing to the federation goes to the constituent unit from which the resources were derived.¹³⁴ What this means is that places like the Niger Delta who are known to supply the nation's crude oil automatically get a larger share of oil revenue than states that do not produce oil. In terms of electoral reforms, unlike the lopsided federal structure of the First Republic which gave the northern region- specifically the Hausa-Fulani - an unfair advantage over the south during elections, the present federal arrangement has undermined this advantage, this is because the

¹³¹Suberu, R. (2004). Nigeria: Dilemmas of Federalism. In *Federalism and Territorial Cleavages*. Amoretti, U. & Bermeo, N. (eds.) Blatimore, MD: John Hopkins University Press.

¹³²Suberu, R. (2010). p. 464.

¹³³Suberu, R. (2010). p. 463.

¹³⁴1999 Constitution Art. 162, Para. 2.

‘Hausa-Fulani’ which constitute only 50% out of the northern population¹³⁵ can no longer use population size as an advantage. This has helped promote greater proportionality between ethnic groups in terms of electoral strength.¹³⁶ This reform has also encouraged inter-ethnic coalitions, since it has become almost impossible for one ethnic group to control the whole government. These coalitions’ also help to capture more than one groups interest thereby, reducing conflicts and providing an avenue for integration. An example of such inter-regional coalitions is manifest in one of Nigeria’s biggest party alliance to form the APC in 2013¹³⁷ which is more representative of a north-south consensus.¹³⁸ Similarly, the introduction of federal policies like the Federal Character and the establishment of national institutions such as the National Youth Service Corps (NYSC) are also mechanisms meant to help promote understanding and tolerance of one another as well as fairness and equity in the employment of workers on all levels of the federal system.

Despite these measures that have been put in place, in some cases political matters still have the tendency to be vigorously and violently contested along ethnic, religious and regional divisions.¹³⁹ According to Fawole and Bello, conflict in any multi-cultural society is possible because of the prevalence of mutual suspicion and lack of cooperative interaction amongst the groups.¹⁴⁰ Indeed, federalism in some cases has served to formalize these differences. For example, despite the fact that

¹³⁵Horowitz. (2007). p. 962.

¹³⁶Suberu, R. (2010). p. 463.

¹³⁷The APC is a coalition between ACN (whose support is in the south west), CPC, ANPP (north) and a faction of APGA (south east).

¹³⁸Mazen, M. (2013). Nigerian Biggest Opposition Parties Agree to Merge. Bloomberg. Available at <http://mobile.bloomberg.com/news/2013-02/07/nigerian-biggest-opposition-parties-merging-against-ruling-party.html>.

¹³⁹Suberu, R.T. & Osaghae, E.E. (2005). “A History of Identities, Violence, and Stability in Nigeria.” (Centre for Research on Inequality, Human Security and Ethnicity (CRISE) Working Paper No.6). Queen Elizabeth House.

¹⁴⁰Fawole, O. A. & Bello, M. L. (2011). p. 211.

state creation has crystalized the majority groups into smaller and more dispersed geographical areas as well as also giving some minorities states of their own, it has however presented an endless cycle of agitations for the creation of more states. For example, although the creation of Kogi state in 1991 from parts of Kwara and Benue state solved certain issues and elevated a once minority group (Igala) to the status of majority, this has however been to the detriment of some other smaller groups in the newly created states who as a result, have also been agitating for a state of their own. Ultimately, the policy of state creation has presented itself as a problem to national integration since most Nigerians are more concerned with creating boundaries of inclusion and exclusion (in the quest for political power) than at political integration.¹⁴¹ Despite the multi conflict-management roles of the Nigerian federalism, it has also “entailed enormous costs and contradictions”.¹⁴²

Apart from the problems state creation presents, there are also contradictions in three other areas of the Nigerian federal system. First is the crisis of internal citizenship which has resulted in the ‘indigene-settler’ conflicts. The indigene-settler conflict has been a defining feature of the crisis that have occurred mostly in the north-central states (i.e. Plateau and Benue states). The second contradiction is the continuous legal contention between the federal and state governments over the reorganisation, funding and elections of local government areas/councils: - which brings to light the question of how truly ‘federal’ the Nigerian system is. The third is the persistence of massive political corruption that occurs at the federal and state level which indicates how these positions serve as grounds for self-aggrandizement as well as exposing

¹⁴¹Alapiki, E.H. (2011) State Creation in Nigeria: Failed Approaches to National Integration and Local Autonomy. *African Studies Review*. 48 (3). p. 64. African Studies Association. Available at <http://www.jstor.org/stable/20065139>. Accessed on December 20, 2014.

¹⁴²Suberu, R. (2010). p. 466.

how the economic and democratic environment of the Nigerian federalism might be a contributing factor to disintegration.¹⁴³

However, to conclude that the lapses in Nigeria's federal system is as a result of diversity's tendency to breed conflict would be wrong. Rather, it could be argue that "diversity is a necessary but not sufficient condition for conflict".¹⁴⁴ In other words, just because a country is highly polarized does not make conflict inevitable, rather violent conflict can be associated with conditions that favour insurgency.¹⁴⁵ "These conditions could be poverty, the size of the groups relative to the national arena, the role of formal and informal institutions for conflict regulation, and the extent to which all these different identities cut across or overlap."¹⁴⁶ Thus, in line with Eghosas argument, there invariably exist sets of intervening variables between diversity and conflict.¹⁴⁷ A similar argument to Eghosa's is Oyelaran and Adediran's in which they state that:

Conflicts between ethnic groups are not inevitable nor are they eternal, but they arise out of specific historical situations which are moulded by particular and unique circumstances (...) constructed to serve certain interests of idealists and ideologues, as well as political leaders and ethnic power brokers of various kinds.¹⁴⁸

¹⁴³Suberu (2010). p. 466.

¹⁴⁴Osaghae, E.E. (2007). "State fragility: Development in practice". Available at <https://www.informationworld.com>. p. 4. Accessed November 10, 2014.

¹⁴⁵Osaghae, E.E. (2007). p. 5.

¹⁴⁶Osaghae, E.E. (2007). pp. 5-6.

¹⁴⁷ Osaghae, E.E. (2007). p. 6.

¹⁴⁸Oyelaran, O.O. & Adediran, M.O. (1997) "Colonialism citizenship and fractured national identity: The African case", in Oommen, T.K. (ed.) *citizenship and national identity: from colonialism to globalism*. New Delhi: Sage. pp. 173-198.

According to Frances Stewart,¹⁴⁹ it is neither culture nor economy that causes conflict rather it is the existence of Horizontal Inequalities (HI) that bring the ethnic and socio-economic motive together. Stewart defines these Horizontal Inequalities as those inequalities that exist among culturally perceived groups with meaning.¹⁵⁰ Horizontal Inequalities are multi-dimensional and can have a political, economic, social and cultural dimension to it.¹⁵¹ Therefore, high levels of horizontal inequalities make conflict more likely in a society as it combines identity and grievances to bind the group together towards a common purpose.¹⁵² The case of militancy in the Niger Delta reflects this reality. These ethnic communities to a great degree feel deprived out of the oil wealth that is derived from their lands, and their environment has been polluted leaving them with no means to make a proper means of livelihood. The people of the Niger Delta feel deprived of their full rights as Nigerians and their protests to get the government to address their situation has fallen on deaf ears. These people have been bond in a common economic goal and the young men have been easily mobilized and convinced to take up arms with the motive of fighting for their emancipation.

Although the discourse on federalism hinges on plural issues, in Nigeria's case, this has been primarily centred on ethnic and regional conflict as these factors have become the most defining factor of the country's federal system. Conflict in Nigeria's polity is multi-facet and can be readily linked with the factors mentioned earlier. Although not all federal boundaries are based on ethnic criteria, but in the case of Nigeria, this might have likely been the case with the initial structure adopted

¹⁴⁹Stewart, F. (2008). *Horizontal Inequalities and Conflict: Understanding Group Violence in Multi-ethnic Societies*.

¹⁵⁰By groups with meaning Stewart means members that belong to them and serves as a basis of identity for them i.e. ethnic, religious, racial, clan, caste, regional.

¹⁵¹Stewart, F. (2008). p. 11.

¹⁵²Stewart, F. (2008). p. 14.

in 1945.¹⁵³ This structure which Coakley refers to as ‘ethnic federations’,¹⁵⁴ was the characteristic element of Nigeria’s federal system at independence. Even with the creation of more states, little has changed as the north connotes Hausas, the west Yoruba’s and the east Igbos. Even though state creation has served to minimize the influence of these majority groups, evidence seems to show that these groups are finding other means to maintain ethnic solidarity. This can be seen in the formation of regional/ethnic based associations such as the Arewa Consultative Forum (ACF)¹⁵⁵ which seeks to establish unity among the northern leaders towards achieving progress in the northern region. Similarly, there is the Arewa People’s Congress (APC) that aims to protect the interests of the Hausa-Fulani, and which has often been described as the militant wing of the former.¹⁵⁶ In the south west there is the Oodua People’s Congress (OPC) which seeks to unite the Yoruba’s.¹⁵⁷ Similarly, the south east have the Ohanaeze Ndigbo which is a body representing Igbo communities within and outside Nigeria, with the objectives of creating and fostering unity among its members so as to allow them a better chance at participating in the country’s political affairs.¹⁵⁸ In the years there have been conflicts between these groups most especially the APC and the OPC over cases of mistreatment of their people residing in the north or south.¹⁵⁹ The emergence of these groups have been closely linked to the inability of the federal government to provide basic security.

¹⁵³This federal structure was based on a predominantly Hausa/Fulani Muslim north, a western and mid-western region that was largely Yoruba’s and a largely Igbo eastern region.

¹⁵⁴Guelke, A. (2012). p. 124.

¹⁵⁵Arewa means north/northern.

¹⁵⁶Arewa Consultative Forum. (2012). Available at <http://acf.com.ng/>. Accessed on 21 February, 2015

¹⁵⁷Agbu, O. (2004). Ethnic Militias and the Threat to Democracy in Post-Transition Nigerian. Nordic Africa Institute. p. 31.

¹⁵⁸Agbu, O. (2004). p. 28.

¹⁵⁹Agbu, O. (2004). p. 27.

A topic which is also related to the discourse on federalism is that of identity. This is because what a federal system in most cases seeks to do, is address ethnic or communal differences in a polity through a territorial division and establishment of a “(...) multi-level system of governance where power is divided between the centre and the constituent regions”.¹⁶⁰ Federalism, through territorial division and devolution of power especially in cases where ethnic or religious groupings are geographically concentrated in certain areas, aims not only at granting these component regions a certain degree of autonomy, but also a chance to preserve their religion, costumes and culture. Identity is an important factor when discussing not only the Nigerian federation but also the conflicts that have occurred within the polity; this is because most violent clashes have been characterised as ‘ethno-religious’, ‘ethno-regional’, inter-ethnic’, ‘intra ethnic/religious or inter-group economic’ clashes.¹⁶¹ As Frances states, conflict is more likely where there is a higher level of horizontal inequalities by ‘*perceived culturally diverse groups*’¹⁶² and these groups can be ethnic, religious, or regional. These identities are not only important for the individuals who belong to them as they provide them with a sense of belonging, but they are also important because they can easily be mobilized and politicized for violence purposes.

Ethnic nations contrary to Geertz argument, are not the only nations who have natural rights to self-determination.¹⁶³ Although ethnicity and religious bigotry have become the point for the emergence of various forms of nationalism (in most cases entirely different from what the early leaders had in mind when they thought towards

¹⁶⁰Guelke, A. (2012). *Politics in Deeply Divided Societies*. Cambridge: Polity Press. p. 123.

¹⁶¹Suberu, R. (2010). pp. 467-469.

¹⁶²Steward F. (2008). pp. 1-5.

¹⁶³Brown, D. (2000). *Contemporary Nationalism: Civic, Ethno-cultural & Multicultural Politics*. London: Routledge. p. 6.

nation building) these ties are more prevalent in African and Asia societies and it is their resilience in these societies which makes it difficult for civic ties through integrative revolution to be firmly established.¹⁶⁴ However, to conclude that these primordial groupings are in fact the only true nations seems to consolidate Fawole and Bello's point that conflict is inevitable in any culturally diverse society.¹⁶⁵ Nigeria has experienced so many conflicts, but despite the surge of violence which has pushed the federal state to the brink of collapse, somehow and perhaps by a miracle, the country still stands, albeit on hostile and shaken foundations. How then do we explain a situation where every ethnic group seems to be at each other's throats, yet there is still a call for the preservation of 'one Nigeria for Nigerians'. Clearly, apart from these primordial identities which exists within Nigeria, there are also other identities of political salience.¹⁶⁶ Nigeria's identity diversity which has been a source of many conflicts, is no doubt hinged on both the civic and primordial identities and both continue to reinforce each other toward integration and disintegration.

2.1 Federal Government (Central)

The central government is made up of branches of a modern state, namely: - the federal executive, the federal judiciary, and the federal legislature. The federal executive includes the office of the president¹⁶⁷ who is vested with the executive powers of the federation. The president is the Head of State, the Chief Executive of

¹⁶⁴Geertz, C. (ed.) (1963). pp. 105-157.

¹⁶⁵Many societies today are characterized by multi-culturalism and even the ones who seem to take on a 'national' outlook are seizing to do so under the influence of globalization.

¹⁶⁶These identities include gender based associations such as: the federation of Muslim Women's Associations, the Federation of Ogoni Women's Associations, and the Southern Kaduna Women's Organization labour associations. Similarly there are trade associations, and youth organizations such as the Odua People's Congress, the Arewa People's Congress, the Ijaw Youth Council, the Egbesu Boys of Africa, the Niger Delta Peoples Volunteer Force, the Bakassi Boys, the Movement for the Actualization of the Sovereign State of Biafra, the Hisba or Sharia Vigilante groups in the Muslim north.

¹⁶⁷"There shall be for the federation a president." The 1999 Constitution Art. 130 Para.(1)

the Federation and the Commander in Chief of the Federal Armed Forces.¹⁶⁸ The president is able to exercise his executive powers either directly, through the vice-president, the ministerial departments or other offices in the public service of the federation.¹⁶⁹ The scope of his executive powers are enshrined and described in the constitution. In general these powers extend to ‘the execution and maintenance of the constitution in all laws made by the National Assembly’.¹⁷⁰ In order to qualify for the office of the president, a person, among other conditions, must be a member of a political party, sponsored under that party and educated up to at least school certificate level.¹⁷¹ The constitution does not make provisions for independent candidates to contest in elections but rather emphasises on party membership. Party membership is most likely a way of ensuring that parties enjoy legitimacy from the wider populace thereby serving as integrative mechanisms.¹⁷² By ensuring that political parties are national in their outlook this helps present a united front thereby strengthening the Nigerian consciousness over ethnic, religious or regional differences; this consciousness is no doubt an important factor in maintaining stability in the country. The president is elected directly by voters and brings the whole federation together as one constituency.¹⁷³ A candidate contesting for the office of the president is considered ‘duly’ elected if: “(a) he has the highest number of votes cast at the election; and (b) he has not less than one-quarter of the votes cast at the election each of at least two-thirds of all the States in the Federation and the

¹⁶⁸1999 Nigerian Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. Art. 130 Para. (2)

¹⁶⁹1999 Nigerian Constitution: Art. 5, Para.1(a)

¹⁷⁰1999 Nigerian Constitution: Art. 5 Para. 1(b)

¹⁷¹“School certificate or its equivalent” here means a person should have a secondary school certificate, a Grad II teachers certificate or a primary six school leaving certificate. 1999 Nigerian Constitution: Art. 130-134.

¹⁷²In a recent case regarding the upcoming elections scheduled to take place in February, it was alleged that one of the presidential aspirants-Muhammad Buhari- did not have any certificates to attest to his educational background, and as expected this news sparked huge debates amongst Nigerians with some insisting that he must be disqualified.

¹⁷³1999 Nigerian Constitution: Art. 132 Para. 4.

Federal Capital Territory, Abuja.”¹⁷⁴ The rationale behind this is to certify the legitimacy of the president by validating that his/her support base truly cuts across the nation and is not just a simple national majority derived from three or four major states in which he or his party has a strong support base. Another reason of having such a requirement is to encourage informal coalitions between several groups (interethnic, interreligious, interregional) across the federation. Because the competing parties would clearly understand that without such coalition their candidates cannot be elected. In the case where candidates do not meet the above requirements on the first ballot, then a second ballot (run-off elections) will be conducted where the winner will be decided based on who gets the majority votes.¹⁷⁵ The president is elected for a fixed period of four years term with the vice-president.¹⁷⁶ Although there is no constitutional provision which states that the president and his vice cannot be from the same state, ethnic or religious background, the norm in many of the elections held in the country has been to apply the Federal Character Principle thus the president and vice are usually from different regions and religion. Another reason for this is that a party with a president and vice from different ethnic, regional and religious background stands a better chance of capturing votes from a wider cross section of the population. Furthermore, the president wields extensive executive powers with regards to the nomination of the vice president, appointment of all federal ministers to respective ministerial departments and parastatal’s and assigning responsibilities to them. The president also appoints other public officers, all of which are subject to the approval of the

¹⁷⁴1999 Constitution: Art. 133-134.

¹⁷⁵1999 Constitution: Art. 134 Para. 5.

¹⁷⁶1999 Constitution: Art.133-134.

Senate and in reflection of the federal character of the country.¹⁷⁷ The Federal Character Principle requires that there be appointed not more than one minister from a specific state. Ministers may however be removed from office by the president for non-performance or other dereliction of responsibilities.¹⁷⁸ The Constitution also provides for the establishment of certain federal executive bodies.¹⁷⁹ In exercising these powers of appointment into these executive bodies, the President is to have regard for the principle of the federal character and the need to promote national unity.¹⁸⁰

¹⁷⁷The “federal character” principle, is a constitutional provision which requires “proportional sharing of all bureaucratic, economic, media, and political posts at all levels of government,” (Nigerian Constitution, Third Schedule, Part 1, Federal Executive Bodies, C.) Including at least one minister in the cabinet from each of the 36 states, provided that the ministers are “indigenes” of such states. “First enshrined in the 1979 constitution, the Federal Character Principle applies (at least in theory), to parastatals, the armed forces, allocation of public revenue, distribution of public projects, composition of executive bodies, and admission to federal secondary schools and federal universities.” (Art. 157 Para.3, Art. 197, and Art. 197 Para.2 of the 1979 Nigerian Constitution and amended in the 1999 constitution) While ensuring representation at the centre, the principle has been difficult to enforce in all federal agencies. “Moreover, it has been criticized for being undemocratic, disregarding merit, being discriminatory, defining diversity only in terms of ethnicity and state origin without due attention to other social divisions, and favouring politically dominant groups over minorities.” For further reading See: Orji Nkwachukwu, “Theories and Practice of Ethnic Conflict Management in Nigeria,” *lecture at the Department of Political Science and Public Administration, Ebonyi State University, Abakaliki, Nigeria.*

¹⁷⁸Osieke, E. (2013). “The Federal Republic of Nigeria” International Association of Centres for Federal Studies (IACFS) pp7-8. Available at: <http://www.thomasfleiner.ch/files/categories/IntensivkursII/Nigeriag3.pdf>. Accessed on 31st October, 2014.

¹⁷⁹“These executive bodies include: - the Code of Conduct Bureau; Council of State; Federal Character Commission; Federal Civil Service Commission; Federal Judicial Service Commission; Independent National Electoral Commission; National Defense Council; National Economic Council; National Judicial Council; National Population Commission; National Security Council; Nigeria Police Council; Police Service Commission; and Revenue Mobilization Allocation and Fiscal Commission. 1999 Constitution: Art. 153. Para.1 the composition and powers of each body established by this section are contained in Part I of the Third Schedule to the Constitution. There is also provision for a civil service of the Federation which carry out the day to day administrative functions of the federation, some offices in these institutions include: Secretary to the Government of the Federation; Head of the Civil Service of the Federation; Ambassadors, High Commissioners or other Principal Representatives of Nigeria abroad; Permanent Secretaries in any Ministry or Head of any Extra-Ministerial Department of the Government of the Federation. Subject to the provisions of the Constitution, the Federal Civil Service Commission may, with the approval of the President and under suitable conditions, delegate any of the powers conferred upon it by the Constitution to any of its members or to any officer in the civil service of the Federation.” 1999 Constitution: Art. 170. Para 4 & 5

¹⁸⁰The “federal character” principle, which has been enshrined in Nigeria's Constitution since 1979, seeks to ensure that appointments to public service institutions is a fair reflection of the linguistic, ethnic, religious, and geographic diversity of the country.

2.1.2 The Federal Legislature

The legislative powers of the Federal Republic of Nigeria are vested in a National Assembly¹⁸¹ which is bicameral in structure comprising of a house of Senate (Upper House) and a House of Representatives (Lower House).¹⁸² The national assembly may legislate on any item on the exclusive or concurrent legislative list (the latter which it shares with the states).¹⁸³ The exclusive list defines the areas in which the federal legislature enjoys the sole powers to legislate on, while the concurrent list defines the extent of both the central and state legislative powers. The power of the National Assembly to make laws is exercised through bills which can originate from either chambers.¹⁸⁴ In order for bills on monetary issues to become laws, there are concurrent agreement's needed between the Senate and the House of Representatives by at least two-thirds majority from each house.¹⁸⁵ Although bills passed by the

Adamolekun, L., Erero, J. & Oshionebo, B. (1991). "Federal Character" and Management of the Federal Civil Service and the Military *Publius* 21 (4): pp. 75-88. Available at: <http://publius.oxfordjournals.org/content/21/4/75.abstract>. Accessed on 10 November, 2014.

¹⁸¹1999 Constitution: Art. 4 Para. 1.

¹⁸²1999 Constitution: Art. 4 Para. 2.

"Each house is headed by a President and Deputy President and a Speaker and Deputy Speaker for the Senate and House of Representatives respectively. A person is deemed qualified to be elected as a member of the House of Assembly if he is a citizen of Nigeria and has attained the age of 35 (for Senate) and 30 years (House of Representatives); if he has been educated to at least school certificate level and if he is a sponsored member of a political party (1999 Constitution: Art.65 Para.1-2) Similarly no person shall be qualified to contest for a seat in either house who is found to be a non-citizen; convicted of a crime; declared bankrupt; not resigned from public service; indicted of embezzlement; forged his certificate; under a death sentence or medically proven to being of un-sound mind. It is worth mentioning that these measures of disqualification from contesting for any office applies to all levels of official government positions. (1999 Constitution Art. 66 Para.1 and 2). both houses are expected to sit for a period of not less than one hundred and eighty-one days in a year and at the expiration of a period of four years both houses stand dissolved unless in cases of emergencies such as during wartime."

(1999 Constitution Art. 63 – 64 Para. 1)

¹⁸³ Among the powers of the National Assembly include: the right to make treaties on behalf of Nigeria; the control and scrutiny of public funds and expenditures of the federation; the scrutiny of government and government associated inquiries; as well as the right to pass and domesticate laws.

¹⁸⁴1999 Constitution Art.58 Para.1.

¹⁸⁵These include: an appropriation bill or a supplementary appropriation bill; any bill for the payment, issue or withdrawal from the Consolidated Revenue Fund or any other public fund of the Federation; any bill for the imposition of, increase or reduction, withdrawal or cancellation in any tax, duty or fee.1999 Constitution: Art. 59 Para.1.

parliament need the assent of the president, if the president exercises his veto powers, the bill can still become law with a two-third majority.¹⁸⁶

With regards to the structure of the federal legislature, the Senate comprises of three senators from each state and one from the F.C.T making a total of one hundred and nine (109) seats. The House of Representatives consists of three hundred and sixty (360) members “(...) representing constituencies of nearly equal population.”¹⁸⁷ This arrangement is believed to reflect on both the equality of constituent entities (states) through equal representation in the Senate and democratic participation of electorate through proportional representation of people in the House of Representatives.¹⁸⁸ The decision making model of the federal House of Assembly is based on a simple majority vote.¹⁸⁹ However, for any sitting in which any decision has to be taken to be deemed legal, the quorum should meet the one-third requirement of members present (for either of the houses or in any joint sitting).¹⁹⁰ As other federal systems may also suggest, this constitutional arrangement is designed to help to alleviate ethnic suspicion and fear of political and economic domination by any majority group at the federal level.¹⁹¹ The businesses of the National Assembly can be carried out in English, Hausa, Igbo and Yoruba.¹⁹² Although there are more than 250 ethnic groups, the constitution tends to encourage integration through a neutral language (English) and through the three main languages.

¹⁸⁶However the president does have the power to veto the bill. 1999 Constitution Art. 58 Para.2-5

¹⁸⁷1999 Constitution Art. 48-49.

¹⁸⁸Bakare, I. (2009) ‘1 – Bicameral Legislature: Justification, Conflict and Hierarchy: A Case Study of the National Assembly of Nigeria.’ *National Assembly Legislative Digest*. Available at <http://www.nasslegisdigestonline.com/newsdesc.php?id=194>. Accessed on 04th November 2014

¹⁸⁹This provision applies to an appropriation bill or a supplementary appropriation bill; any bill for the payment, issue or withdrawal from the Consolidated Revenue Fund or any other public fund of the Federation; any bill for the imposition of, increase or reduction, withdrawal or cancellation in any tax, duty or fee. 1999 Constitution: Art. 59 Para.1.

1999 constitution Art. 56 Para.1&2.

¹⁹⁰1999 constitution Art. 54 Para.1&2.

¹⁹¹Bakare, I. (2009).

¹⁹²1999 Constitution: Art. 55.

2.1.3 The Federal Judiciary

The Nigerian federal structure also provides for a judicial branch for the federation. The Federal Judiciary consists of such branches as: the Supreme Court,¹⁹³ the Federal Court of Appeal,¹⁹⁴ the Federal High Court,¹⁹⁵ the Sharia and Customary Court of Appeal of the F.C.T.¹⁹⁶ All appointments into any of the bodies is done by the President through the recommendations of the National Judicial Council¹⁹⁷ and in special cases, subject to the approval of the senate. The Supreme Court has “original” jurisdiction in any dispute between the federation and a state, between states or between an individual and the federal government.¹⁹⁸ The Court of Appeal comprises of fifty judges of which at least not less than three should be learned in Islamic personal law and not less than three in customary law.¹⁹⁹

¹⁹³1999 Constitution: Art. 230 Para. 1.

¹⁹⁴1999 Constitution: Art.237 Para. 1.

¹⁹⁵1999 Constitution: Art. 249 Para. 1.

¹⁹⁶The sharia and customary court of the FCT handle matters relating to Islamic and customary laws respectively.1999 Constitution: Art. 260 and 265.

¹⁹⁷The National Judicial Council (NJC) is a federal executive body established by the constitution, it is a 23 member committee comprising of the chief Justice of the federation, five retired justices and five chief judges of states who are chosen from states in rotation, the apart from recommendations to the president, the council is also in charge of disciplinary matters, court budgets, and the removal of judges. Osieke, E. (2013). pp. 10-11.

¹⁹⁸There have been a number of cases relating to the above provision, for example a case was brought by Nigeria's federal government against coastal states concerning allocation of revenues from "Off-Shore" petroleum resources.

SC28/2001 Judgment By The Supreme Court Of Nigeria On the Case Brought By Nigeria's Federal Government Against Littoral States Concerning Allocation of Revenues From "Off-Shore" Petroleum Resources. Available at <http://www.waado.org/nigerdelta/essays/resourcecontrol/SupremeCourt.html> . Accessed on 25 November, 2014.

¹⁹⁹“The Court of Appeal has original jurisdiction over matters relating to election petitions over the election of the President and his vice, it also exercises appellate jurisdiction from the federal High Court and from state courts, including state sharia and customary courts. The Federal High Court exercises broad original federal jurisdiction on matters relating to revenue, taxation, customs duties, excise duties and export duties, monetary issues of banks and other financial institutions, etc. They also deal with matters of Federal enactment relating to copyright, patent, designs, trademarks, business names, commercial and industrial monopolies, combines and trusts, standards of goods and commodities, shipping and navigation; diplomatic, consular and trade representation; citizenship and deportation of persons who are not citizens of Nigeria; bankruptcy and insolvency; aviation and safety of aircraft.; arms, ammunition and explosives; drugs and poisons; mines and minerals (including oil fields, oil mining, geological surveys and natural gas);weights and measures among many other matters.” (1999 Constitution Art. 251 and 237.)

“In the execution of their powers, the Judiciary is to hold the Constitution as supreme from which any law inconsistent with it are null and void, The courts cannot determine whether law or government

Essentially, the Nigerian legal system is based on two models: - the English common law (secular law) and the traditional customary laws (ethnic/non-Muslim and Shari'a law).²⁰⁰ The ethnic/non-Muslim laws are the indigenous laws that applies to the different ethnic groups in Nigeria. This reflects the culture, customs, values and habits of the people whose activities it regulates (i.e. Yoruba, Igbo, and Hausa) and usually pertains to matters such as marriage, divorce, custody of children, and succession. On the large part these are unwritten rules which are usually flexible and often times uncertain and difficult to ascertain.²⁰¹ The Shari'a law (Islamic law) on the other hand, is different from the former in a number of ways. Firstly, it is a set of written rules clearly articulated and defined based on the Islamic religion. Secondly, it is more limited in space and more common in the north where early encounters with the Muslim civilization gradually succeeded in supplanting in some areas, the pre-existing traditional laws.²⁰² While in most states in the north like Zamfara, Kano, Kaduna and Sokoto where a loose form of 'Shari'a' law is implemented, it is regarded as different in its origin, nature, territorial and personal scope of application and therefore treated as a distinct system in relation to Muslim personal law.²⁰³ In the south however, where Islamic law exists, it has been integrated and treated as an aspect of customary law.²⁰⁴ Although non-Muslims living in states which adopt sharia laws have other options of seeking redress, often times it has resulted in controversies and tensions between religious groups especially in regions which

action is consistent with the Fundamental Objectives and Directive Principles of State policy, nor can they deal with questions about whether laws were lawfully made during the periods of military rule. All final matters on the right of appeal lies with the Supreme Court of Nigeria." (Set out in Chapter II of the Constitution.)

²⁰⁰Yemisi, D, Akintayo, J. & Ekundayo, F. (2005). Guide to Nigerian Legal Information. Hauser Global Law School Program. Available at: <http://www.nyulawglobal.org/globalex/nigeria.htm>
Obilade, A.O. (1979). *the Nigerian Legal System*. Ibadan: Sweet &Maxwell

²⁰¹Yemisi, D, Akintayo, J. & Ekundayo, F. (2005).

²⁰²Yemisi, D, Akintayo, J. & Ekundayo, F. (2005).

²⁰³Yemisi, D, Akintayo, J. & Ekundayo, F. (2005).

²⁰⁴Yemisi, D, Akintayo, J. & Ekundayo, F. (2005).

consist of people from various religious background.²⁰⁵ In many cases these tensions have aggravated to instances where groups take the law into their own hands. This duality in the legal system (religious-traditional law and secular law) often times has led to crisis between the Muslim and Christian population of certain states and the harbouring of ill feelings by the respective religious groups.

2.2 Regions (Constituent Entities)

The institutional structure of the federal government is broadly replicated in the regional governments known as 'states'. In each of the thirty-six (36) states can be found a similar three-branched government comprising of an executive, legislature and judicature. Although there are slight differences in the function of these state institutions, there are however no separate constitutions for each state and the framework and powers of the federal and state institutions emanate from the 1999 Constitution.²⁰⁶ This provides a united front and helps to foster more integration

²⁰⁵The first is with regards as to whether or not these states can and should incorporate these laws into their state legal systems and secondly, because of certain provisions the Nigerian Criminal Code (Section 204) which prohibits and prescribes punishments on 'insult to religion' as often generated blasphemy cases in these states with the consequences of harsher punishments than the one prescribed in the Criminal Code. Indeed this fear has often been manifest in many cases such as the 1999 beheading of Abdullahi Umaru in Kebbi state for blasphemy against the Prophet. (Nigeria: Blasphemy Issue Surfaces in Legal Tensions. Compass Direct News (1999)). In 2002 the rampaging of the cities of Abuja and Kaduna by Muslims and Christians began as a direct consequence of an article published in one of the national newspapers which the Muslim mob regarded as blasphemous. (Jackson, I. (2002) Nigeria Redux. Available at <http://after-words.org/grim/mtarchives/2002.11/Nov261252.shtml> . Accessed on 09 January, 2015). In 2007 a Shari'a court in Kano charged a Christian for blasphemy and convicted him to three years imprisonment (this sentence was later overturned in an appeal court) Blake, D. (2009) Nigerian Christian freed after false imprisonment for 'blasphemy'. Christian today. Available at

<http://www.christiantoday.com/article/nigerian.christian.freed.after.false.imprisonment.for.blasphemy/22535.htm> Accessed on 09 January, 2015. In march that same year, some Muslim students of Government Secondary School Gandu in Gombe state beat to death on of their teachers for allegedly touching a bag which had a copy of the Quran in it, thereby 'defiling' the Quran. Minchakpu, O. (2007) Muslim in Nigeria Club Christian Teacher to Death. Compass Direct News. Available at <http://www.christianhealines.com/news/muslims-in-nigeria-club-christian-teacher-to-death-11532579.html> Accessed on 09 January, 2015. Similarly in 2008, a fifty year old Muslim man was beaten to death for allegedly blaspheming against the Prophet, and in April the same year, Muslim rioters burned shops and vehicles of Christian traders after one allegedly spoke badly about their Prophet. In 2009 a mob in Jigawa state that burned down a police outpost and injured twelve people for an alleged blasphemy again the Prophet.

Laws of the Federation of Nigeria (1990) Criminal Code Act. Chapter 77. Nigeria. Available at <http://www.nigeria-law.org/Criminal%20Code%20Act-Tables.htm> Accessed on 09 January, 2015.

²⁰⁶Osieke, E. (2013). p. 11.

especially between the federal and constituent entities. However, this may also mean a centralised federal system and this uncertainty can result in conflict between federal and regional governments.

2.2.1 Regional (State) Legislature

Unlike the National Assembly of the federation which is bicameral in structure, the states' legislative structure is unicameral, comprising of three or four times the number of seats which that State has in the National House of Representatives.²⁰⁷

This provision however does not seem to adequately allow effective representation and participation of the various groups in the society and also limits the efficiency of the committee work in the assemblies. The State House of Assembly is vested with the power to make laws in such areas as.²⁰⁸ This is important because it demonstrates the autonomy that each tier of government possesses in its own sphere which should be essentially the idea behind a federal state. The national and regional governments operate independently and are bound only by the constitutional compact that exists between them.²⁰⁹ The regional House of Assembly of each state “perform the same functions for the states as does the National Assembly for the federation.”²¹⁰ However, the legislative powers of the state assemblies are limited to the list of concurrent powers which it also shares with the national legislature. “If a federal law is inconsistent with a state law on a matter in the concurrent list, then, to the extent of the inconsistency, the federal law will prevail and the state law will be void.”²¹¹ With regards to ‘in whose hands lies the power to declare a law void’, it is primarily determined by the Supreme Court whose power to do so emanates from the constitution. The constitution implicitly provides guidelines as to the purpose any

²⁰⁷1999 Constitution. Art. 91.

²⁰⁸1999 Constitution. Art. 100 Para. 1.

²⁰⁹ Hague, R. & Harrop, M. (2004). p.241.

²¹⁰1999 constitution Art. 106.

²¹¹Osieke, E. (2013). p11.

law should fulfil which is: to safeguard the security and welfare of the people.²¹² Laws which protect the security and welfare of the people are to be fulfilled without violating the fundamental rights of the citizens.²¹³ A controversial example which has remained an area of contention is the issue of Shari'a and "whether Shari'a courts have the jurisdiction to try criminal cases under the Nigerian constitution."²¹⁴ The debate has been centred on several sections in the constitution, one of which is Article 10 which states that "the Government of the Federation or of a State shall not adopt any religion as State Religion." Many critiques have equated the adoption of Shari'a law as equivalent to adopting a state religion in some of the states in the north. Northern state governors, however, have argued contrary stating that Shari'a applies only to Muslims of the respective states in which these laws have been adopted.²¹⁵ Many critiques for and against Shari'a have also linked the earlier argument with section 38 of the constitution which states that "(...)every person shall be entitled to freedom of thought, conscience and religion (...)and freedom(...)to manifest and propagate his religion or belief in worship, teaching, practice and observance."²¹⁶

[While] non-Muslims have argued that the imposition of Shari'a violates the right to freedom of religion and affects non-Muslims, advocates of Shari'a have referred to the same provision to justify the application of Shari'a, stating that is an integral part of Islam and have described attempts to stop the implementation of Shari'a as a violation of their own right to freedom of religion as Muslims.

²¹²1999 constitution: Art. 13 Para. 2(b); Art. 15-21.

²¹³These rights are set out in chapter 4 of the constitution and they include: - "the right to life, right to dignity of persons, right to personal liberty, right to fair hearing, right to private and family life, right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion, right to freedom of expression and the press, right to peaceful assembly and association, right to freedom of movement, right to freedom from discrimination and the right to acquire and own immovable property anywhere in Nigeria."

²¹⁴"Political Shari'a"? Human Rights and Islamic Law in Northern Nigeria (2004) 16(9a) chpt XIII. Shari'a and the Nigerian constitution. Available at

<http://www.hrw.org/reports/2004/nigeria0904/index.htm> . Accessed on 10 January, 2015.

²¹⁵"Political Shari'a"? Human Rights and Islamic Law in Northern Nigeria (2004) 16(9a) chpt XIII. Shari'a and the Nigerian constitution. Available at

<http://www.hrw.org/reports/2004/nigeria0904/index.htm> . Accessed on 10 January, 2015.

²¹⁶ 1999 Constitution Art. 38.

It is of interest to note that although the constitution does mention Shari'a state courts of appeal (in Article 275 to 279) it however refers to their jurisdiction only in the area of "civil proceedings involving questions of Islamic personal law"²¹⁷ and is not explicit on whether or not they have powers to try criminal cases.²¹⁸ Based on this, critics of Shari'a have argued that it is unconstitutional for Shari'a courts to try criminal cases.²¹⁹ States that have adopted sharia law in the north, have however insisted that they have the powers to do so, even though Article 1(1) of the constitution clearly states that "(...) the constitution is supreme and its provisions are a binding force on all authorities and persons through the Federal Republic of Nigeria."²²⁰ This debate no doubt highlights important issues on the scope and the extent to which the constitution is truly binding across the country. It seems that some state government officials and Shari'a court judges overlook certain provision in the constitution and some have argued that the Shari'a has supremacy over the Nigerian constitution, because it has its source in religion, and therefore cannot bound by constitutional requirements.²²¹ Ironically, the federal government has avoided taking a clear position on this matter, leaving lawyers, academics and non-governmental organizations to debate on the issue. Meanwhile, criminal cases are still brought before the Shari'a courts.²²²

The Constitution also allows the central government interference in the affairs of the states under certain circumstances. This includes if a state house is incapable of performing its functions due to certain situation happening in the state. The president

²¹⁷In this case Islamic personal law refers to matters such as: marriage, divorce, custody of children, resolution of disputes etc.

²¹⁸Political Shari'a? Human Rights and Islamic Law in Northern Nigeria (2004)

²¹⁹Political Shari'a? Human Rights and Islamic Law in Northern Nigeria (2004)

²²⁰Article 1 (3) also states that if any other law is inconsistent with the provisions of the constitution, that of the constitution shall prevail.

²²¹Political Shari'a? Human Rights and Islamic Law in Northern Nigeria (2004).

²²²Political Shari'a? Human Rights and Islamic Law in Northern Nigeria (2004).

may also declare a state of emergency in a state with the request of the state governor and a two-third majority in the house. In the case of breakdown of law and order, natural disasters and other related calamities, the president may also issue a proclamation of emergency without state request. It could be argued that this constitutional regulation enables the federal government to discourage any attempt for secession.

2.2.2 The State Executive

For each state in the federation, there is to be an office of the Governor who is the Chief Executive of the state,²²³ and on whom the executive powers of the state are vested upon. Alongside the office of the governor is the deputy-governors (who is elected on the same ticket as the governor). A person is qualified for election to the office of Governor of a State if he is a citizen of Nigeria, has attained the age of thirty-five years; is a member of a political party, sponsored by that political party; and has been educated to at least School Certificate level or its equivalent.²²⁴ In order for a candidate to be regarded as duly elected, he must not only receive a majority of votes but also the majority support from at least one-quarter of the votes in at least two-thirds of the local government areas in a state. The rationale behind this is similar to that of presidential elections (to ensure the election of a government based on a broad mandate and not just the majority ethnic group or communities in that state).²²⁵ The governor has the power to appoint commissioners as well as assigning functions and responsibility of departments to them. State executive power is to be exercised in such a way that it does not impede or endanger any federal asset or investment, nor endanger the existence of the national government. However, the

²²³1999 Constitution Chapter V part II Art. 170 Para. 1&2.

²²⁴1999 Constitution Art. 177.

²²⁵Baker, H. P. (2012). *Getting Along: Managing Diversity for Atrocity Prevention in Socially Divided Societies. Policy Analysis Brief*: the Stanley Foundation. p. 6.

federal government does not have a supervisory role over the activities of governors of the states.²²⁶ The above provision, while serving as a check on the excesses of the states and making sure they do not jeopardize the federal union, also entrenches the powers states have in managing their internal affairs with regards to specific areas, as well as serving as an institutional check and balance on the abuse of power by the executive and legislative branch of the central government.²²⁷ A recent case of how this provision serves to check government excesses was the dispute over the creation of new local government by a number of states in 2004. The president argued that the number of local governments are fixed by the constitution and by extension states had no rights to create more, and in effect withheld payments to those states from the Federation account. The states challenged the decision of the presidency in the Supreme Court, and judgment was passed in the latter's favour based on the provisions of the constitution which vests the power to create new local governments in the hands of the states.²²⁸

There is also a State Public Civil Service which carries out the administrative functions of the state. A states' civil service commission may, with the approval of the Governor delegate any of the powers conferred upon it by the Constitution to any of its members or any officer in the civil service of the state.²²⁹ In creating administrative bodies, the states are required to take into account the diversity of the people of the state and the need to promote national unity.²³⁰ One of the guidelines on how to ensure this is provided by a policy similar to the 'Federal Character

²²⁶Osieke, E. (2013). p. 6.

²²⁷Mwakikagile, G. (2001). *Ethnic Politics in Kenya and Nigeria*. Nova Publications p. 79.

²²⁸1999 constitution: Art.8 Para.3; Osieke, E. (2013). pp. 6-7.

The Supreme Court of Nigeria Attorney-General of Lagos state vs. Attorney General of the Federation: S.C. 70/2004. Available at: <http://www.nigeria-law.org/Attorney-General%20of%20Lagos%20State%20V%20Attorney-General%20of%20the%20Federation.htm>.

²²⁹1999 Constitution Art. 207; 1999 Constitution Art.197 Para. 1.

²³⁰1999 Constitution Art. 208 Para. 4.

Principle ' which at the state level is referred to as 'indigenization policy' or 'indigene preference', this policy tries to ensure that access to employment, education, properties etc. is distributed equitably amongst the ethnicities within the state.²³¹ Similarly, like the federal government have often exercised their powers to create more states as a tool to manage diversity and ethnic grievances, states also are given this power to create local governments. Also, the constitutional provision that a candidate contesting for a political office in a state must capture not only a majority of the popular votes but a certain percentage in two-thirds of the local governments serves similar purposes.²³²

2.2.3 The State Judicature

For each state of the federation, there is a judicial branch which comprises of – the High Court, magistrate and district courts, as well as a provision for a Sharia Court of Appeal and a Customary Court of Appeal for any state that so requires.²³³ The historical legacy of the country as well as modernization, has resulted in dual legal system embodied in the English common law and traditional customary laws at both the federal and regional level thereby helping to maintain the balance between pre-existing traditional systems (Islamic law and non-Islamic law) peculiar to the diverse ethnicities in the regions as well as the modern legal systems used in many countries today. Appeals from the district or magistrate courts are taken to the high court of the state or to the Sharia or Customary court of appeal of the state (as the case may be). The high court, being the highest state court, has jurisdiction over all civil and criminal matters within the state as long as they do not fall within the exclusive

²³¹Mallam Dendo (2003). Position Paper: The Dimensions of Ethnicity, Language and Culture in Nigeria. *Nigeria: Drivers of Change*. Component Three – Output 28. Cambridge: Roger Blench p. 12.

²³²Baker, H. P. (2012). p. 3.

²³³1999 Constitution: Art. 275 and 280.

jurisdiction of the federal High Court.²³⁴ Appeals from the state high court are taken to the federal Court of Appeal. The high court of a state consists of a chief judge and a number of judges (as prescribed by state law). “All judges are appointed by the governor of the state on the recommendation of the State Judicial Council. In addition, the appointment of the chief judge is subject to confirmation by the state house of assembly.”²³⁵

2.3 Local Governments

The Nigerian constitution requires the establishment of ‘democratically elected local government councils’²³⁶ and empowers the regions (state) to enact legislation to establish local government councils as well as to determine their structure, composition, finance and functions. All laws are to take into consideration: the common interest of the communities in the area; the traditional association of the community; and administrative convenience.²³⁷ Because of their proximity and the ease of communication with indigenes, Local Governments serve as the most effective instruments for rural transformation and integration by making sure social services are being delivered. It is therefore the duty of local government councils within the state to participate in the economic and developmental planning of their area.²³⁸ With regards to election into the Local Government Councils, the government of the state is to ensure that every person entitled to vote or be voted for in an election to the house of Assembly can also vote or contest. Local Government Councils comprise of a Chairman, his deputy, and three or four other supervisory councillors (who are elected for three-year terms) constituting the legislative arm of

²³⁴1999 Constitution: Art. 275 and 280.

²³⁵Osieke, E. (2013). p. 13.

²³⁶ 1999 constitution Art. 7 Para. 1.

²³⁷1999 constitution Art. 8 Para. 2.

²³⁸1999 constitution Art. 8 Para. 3.

the local government body.²³⁹ Local elections are organized and conducted by the state Independent Electoral Commission. The National Assembly is entrusted with making provisions for the allocation of public funds to local government councils in the federation.²⁴⁰ Presently, there are a total of 774 local governments in the federation.²⁴¹ With regards to state-local government relation, both have a say in organizing and providing specific educational, agricultural and health services²⁴²

2.4 Federal-State Relations

There is no arrangement set out in the constitution regarding the relationship either between the office of the president and state governors or between the federal and state legislature. The only body which brings all the three tiers of the government together is the Council of State,²⁴³ which is supposed to meet once a month serving solely as an advisory body to the president. The only provision that seem to provide an overlap of legislative functions between the two tiers is with regards to the concurrent legislative list.²⁴⁴ The concurrent list provides thirty items on which both the National Assembly and regional assemblies can legislate on. This provision to a

²³⁹Osieke, E. (2013) p. 14.

²⁴⁰1999 constitution Art. 8, 6 Para.a&b

²⁴¹Some of Local government powers include: “making of recommendations to a state commission on economic planning; the economic development of the state; collection of rates, radio and television licenses; establishment and maintenance of cemeteries and home for the destitute; maintenance of slaughter houses, markets, motor parks and public conveniences; the construction and maintenance of roads; the registration of all births, deaths and marriages” etc. For a full list of Local Government functions and responsibilities see : 1999 Nigerian constitution , Fourth Schedule

²⁴² With regards to State-Local government relation, both have a say in matters such as: the provision and maintenance of primary, adult and vocational education; the development of agricultural and natural resources; the provision and maintenance of health services and any other function as may be conferred upon it by the House of Assembly of the state1999 constitution: The Fourth Schedule Art.2

²⁴³The Nigerian Council of State is an organ of the Nigerian Government which functions as an advisory body for executive policy making. The body is made up of the president{as chairman}, the vice president{as deputy chairman}, all former presidents of the federation, all former state governors, all former chief justices, president of the senate, speaker of the house of representatives, all governors of the federation and the attorney general of the federation. apart from its advisory role on policy making, the council also plays as role in population census{compilation, publication and record keeping}, prerogative of mercy; award of national honours; recommendations in appointing members of the Independent National Electoral Commission, The National Judicial Council, National population Commission and any other matter that deals with the maintenance of public order. The 1999 Nigerian Constitution, third Schedule Part I (B)

²⁴⁴1999 Nigerian Constitution: Second Schedule Part II

large degree implies a principle aiming at regulating the relations between the central and state government. The federal and state legislature both have power to legislate on matters regarding the delivery of core public services such as health care, education, the management, transmission and distribution of electricity as well as tax collection.²⁴⁵ In the past years there have been a number of federal-state partnerships especially with regards to the provision of infrastructural and welfare facilities and services. An example of such partnership is the Universal Basic Education (UBE) which was launched on 30th September 1999. The programme aimed at providing basic educational opportunities to primary school age children, girls, women and other underserved groups in poor, rural or remote areas, with an aim of eradicating mass illiteracy across the nation.²⁴⁶ Another area which provides a high level of inter-relation between the two tiers of government is on fiscal issues such as revenue derivation and allocation. In fact, this relationship has often been criticized of promoting a vertical interaction between the two levels of government- where the states now have almost been reduced to administrative units of the central government. The National Legislature possesses a greater degree of power in dealing with matters of taxation and revenue appropriation. The revenue sharing arrangement is one which allows for the allocation of public revenue from the federal account at the centre to the component units.²⁴⁷ The centre also give grants to states to

²⁴⁵Freinkam, L. (2007). Intergovernmental Relations in Nigeria: Improving Service Delivery in Core Sectors. *The World Bank MPRA paper No.2 p3*. Available at <http://mpa.ub.uni-muenchen.de/10032>. Accessed on 7th November 2014.

²⁴⁶Babalola, S.K. (2000). Blueprint for the Management of the UBE at the Secondary School Level. Paper presented at the National Workshop on Effective School Management and Challenge of Conducting School Examination in Nigeria. All Nigerian Conference of Secondary School Principals (ANCOPSS). Universal Basic Education Commission (UBEC). Available at <http://www.ubeconline> . Accessed on 10 November, 2014.

²⁴⁷This may be either between the federation and states, among the states of the federation, between the state and local government councils or among the local government councils in the states, 1999 Constitution Art. 7 Para 6; Art. 162 Para. 1-8; Second Schedule Part II Art. 1(a).

supplement their revenues when need arises.²⁴⁸ Revenues are shared on a basis where 48.5% goes to the central government and 24% to the states, this situation has not only created room for fiscal dominance of the central government over the states but leaves most states unable to execute projects as the revenue allocated to them is sometimes insufficient.²⁴⁹ A resulting outcome of fiscal dependency has been the ‘subtle synchronization’ of almost all civil service and financial management institutions. Similarly, salary scales, budget formats, accounting standards, procurement regulation as well as personnel rules have become almost harmonized across the federation. Another level of inter-government relations is with regards to the issue of security vis-à-vis the Nigerian Police force. The police force rests solely under the jurisdiction of the central-federal government,²⁵⁰ who has sole jurisdiction to determine how it is organized and administered. The Nigerian police force since the 1990’s has been on a decline and many states in order to checkmate the short comings of government’s response to security challenges, have resorted to establishing state vigilantes groups as their campaign for a state police has been met with stiff resistance from the central government.²⁵¹ The resistance by the federal government to allow each state establish its own police force can be explained in light of the fragility of the Nigerian state and its volatile tendency. Having a central police force can be viewed as an integrative measure which check mate’s ethnic, religious and regional bias within the police force since all security personnel are under the direct jurisdiction of the central federal government. This fear is not

²⁴⁸There is a specific account for this known as the “Federal Grants- in aid”. 1999 Constitution Art.164 Para.1.

²⁴⁹Barkan, J.D., Gboyega, A. & Stevens, M. (2001). State and Local Governance in Nigeria. *The World Bank: Public Sector and Capacity Building Program, African Region*

²⁵⁰1999 Nigerian Constitution Chapter VI Part III Art. 214 Para. (1).

²⁵¹Examples of such vigilante are: The Bakassi Boys (BB) in the south east, the Oodua People’s Congress (OPC) in the South West and Hisbah in the North.

Ikuteyijo, L & Rotimi, K. (2012). Community Partnership in Policing: The Nigerian Experience. Available at <http://www.open.ac.uk/Arts/copp>. Accessed on 12 January, 2015.

unfounded as some of the state vigilantes that have sprung up have either been used by the regional government to maintain their personal interests especially during election. Similarly, as in the case of some northern states like (i.e Kano) these state vigilantes (*Hisbah*) have taken on a religious undertone in which they are regarded as the upholders of the morality in society. Although the government's decision to prohibit state security is based on sound concerns, this has however worked towards the over centralization of the federal system.

This section has been an examination of the institutional characteristics of Nigeria's federal system. The Nigerian federal system is three-tiered comprising of a central, state and local government. The 1999 Nigerian Constitution is the Supreme document which spells out the structure, functions, and powers of each unit and sub-unit as well as the procedures for qualification/disqualification for election, tenure in office, declaration of assets and liabilities, oaths and set conducts to be taken and abided by. There is a duplication of institutional functions especially on the part of the central and state branches which is to allow for the autonomy of states to run their affairs independently, albeit according to the rules spelled out for them in the constitution. As a federal state, autonomy of the component units is a key factor, and for this reason the constitution tries to uphold this principle. Although we see in practice that there seems to be much more dependence from the states on the centre when it comes to matters like revenue, this situation has had the overall consequence of weakening the principle of the autonomy of the states.

As has been previously stated, the decision to form a federation is as a result of different factors be it economic, military or ethnic.²⁵² In Nigeria's case it is difficult to identify solely one factor responsible for this federal arrangement. This is because of the circumstances through which the Nigerian federal system came into existence. Indeed one may argue that the initial decision by the colonialist to amalgamate the northern and southern province as well as the subsequent establishment of a central political administrative structure was both economically and militarily motivated; seeing that there were greater advantages to reap (in terms of natural resources, and human power, which could be used in production as well as defence) from the unification. However, the decision by the Nigerian elites at the dawn of independence to remain a federal entity was influenced more by the ethnic factor, "(...) the fear of the consequence of remaining separate overcomes the natural desire to preserve independence".²⁵³ In essence, securing military and economic advantages was what led Britain to bring these diverse regions together, but the decision to maintain or entrench this federal system which was propagated by the anti-colonial activists, the political elites and the intelligentsia which emerged was to enable these diverse ethno-religious, linguistic and regional groups with sometimes conflicting identities and interests to continue to co-exist. Perhaps, a majority of the interests sprang from the belief that a single Nigeria could serve as an influential demographic and political force in regional and international politics.

As Harrop and Hague rightly noted, the federal-state relations is 'the crux of federalism'.²⁵⁴ Although Nigeria tries to replicate a dual federal system similar to that of the USA, the 'duality' of this system is left for debate. Dual federalism is

²⁵²Hague, R. & Harrop, M. (2004). p. 231.

²⁵³Hague, R. & Harrop, M. (2004). p. 231.

²⁵⁴Hague, R. & Harrop, M. (2004). p. 231.

idealistic to a fault that it is hard to actually implement. In many cases, the central and regional governments do not operate independently of one another but follow the European version of cooperative federalism where the centre and the state actually work hand in hand, complimenting each other in their own spheres towards building a more integrated society.²⁵⁵ Indeed this fact manifests in the provision of a concurrent list which accords the centre and the states powers to legislate together. Similarly this cooperation is maintained through the financial strength of the centre in relation to the regions which to a fault, gives more power to the centre than is necessary in a federal system.

Nigeria's federalism is a double sided coin. One side reveals how through certain mechanism Nigeria has been able to foster integration of all groups within the society, while the other reveals how the system has partially failed in its task to develop resilient structures and policies to tackle ethno-religious and regional based crisis. The dismal political performance of the federal state has served to formalize cleavages that has led to disintegration within the system. Nigeria should be working towards establishing constitutionalism in its federalism. Constitutionalism is a very crucial element in federalism as it is the binding factor which connects all the diverse groups in the society as well as providing them with common norms and values to abide by as civic-citizens rather than ethnic ones. the only way Nigeria can formulate a federal constitution which will be respected among its citizenry is to ensure that in the process of a constitutional reform, the opinions of every group is heard and given due consideration as people are more likely to respect and protect what they had contributed in establishing. Most especially, Nigeria's federal

²⁵⁵Hague, R. & Harrop, M. (2004). p. 233.

experience shows how institutions are on their own not fully capable of bringing about integration.

In general, federalism in Nigeria like many multi-cultural societies has served to reconcile two things: first it has guaranteed a certain level of economic and military advantage for the nation as well as retaining and encouraging diversity. Indeed as Van Deth puts it ‘the rewards of federalism are evident when the alternatives of secession, oppression and war are considered’²⁵⁶ but to a degree these rewards have not been forthcoming in Nigeria. Like many systems, federalism has its glitches and in Nigeria it has so often resulted to slow and uncoordinated decision making process between the centre and the regions and when decisions are eventually made, it has resulted in poor, ineffective ones or what Scharf refers to as the ‘decision trap’ where there is a tendency for the quality of decisions made to decline as the number of interests increase.²⁵⁷ With over 250 ethnic groups in Nigeria and with each group struggling to be heard, this is no doubt going to be a constant problem. Contrary to Harrop and Hague’s argument on the ‘luxury of choice’ that federalism provides by seeking to encourage healthy competition and opportunities, or how Harrop and Hague put it ‘if they (citizens) dislike governance in one state, they can always move to another’²⁵⁸ the extent to which this healthy competition and opportunities is true for Nigerians is subject of debate as explained in the next chapter.

²⁵⁶Van Deth, J. (2000) ‘Interesting but Irrelevant: Social Capital and the Salience of Politics in Western Europe. *European Journal of Political Research* 37. p. XV.

²⁵⁷Hague, R. & Harrop, M. (2004). p. 235.

²⁵⁸Hague, R. & Harrop, M. (2004). p. 235.

Chapter 3

FACTORS OF INTEGRATION AND DISINTEGRATION

The dynamics of integration and disintegration in a given political system has been of much interest to political scientists.²⁵⁹ Ample literature on the theories, hypothesis and concepts of integration exist. Theories of integration can be classified under titles such as political integration, regional/subnational integration, nation-building, theories of political stability and theories of federalism. The main focus in this section is on how integration applies to the principles of federalism. In other words, this section attempts to elaborate on the effects specific factors on political stability in a federation. A Federation is usually regarded as a constitutional device which brings diverse groups into a territorial arrangement that seeks to foster the autonomy of these diversities and at the same time present an integrated political entity. It is therefore important to recognize the circumstances under which federalism integrates diverse groups and entities. According to Etzioni, a community is integrated if “(a) it has an effective control over the use of the means of violence (...) (b) it has a centre of decision- making that is able to affect significantly the allocation of resources and reward throughout the community; and (c) it is the dominant focus of political identification for the large majority of politically aware citizens.”²⁶⁰ Deutsch, on the other hand refers to integration as “the attainment of a sense of community,

²⁵⁹Lijphart. A. (1971). Diversity and Theories of Political Integration. *Canadian Journal of Political Science / Revue canadienne de science politique*. p. 14. (1) pp. 1-14. Canadian Political Science Association and the Société québécoise de science politique. Available at <http://www.jstor.org/stable/3231439?origin=JSTOR-pdf> . Accessed on 21 January, 2015.

²⁶⁰Lijphart. A. (1971). p. 11.

accompanied by formal or informal institutions or practices, sufficiently strong and widespread to assure peaceful change among members of a group.”²⁶¹ Haas sees integration as the “existence of a new centre (not necessarily a sovereign government), whose institutions possess or demand jurisdiction over the pre-existing national states.”²⁶² Lijphart concurs with Deutsch’s definition, describing it as more appropriate to the discourse on political stability since the interest is on integration within states, and a federation is essentially labelled as a particular form of integration relating to a formal merger to form a sovereign state.²⁶³

Based on this general characteristic of an integrated community, this thesis aims at examining how a federal state remains integrated. This thesis is based on the argument that the economic, political and socio-cultural factors play a role in achieving integration in a community. There is need for a significant level of uniformity in all of the above areas for integration to happen and these diverse cultural groups on their own are not capable of providing this homogeneity.²⁶⁴ It therefore becomes necessary to examine the federal structure and the mechanisms that have been set up to create and help promote this unity without aiming at destroying diversity. Closely related to the discourse on integration is the term disintegration. Disintegration refers to the presence of destabilizing factors which create dynamics for the breakdown of political, economic or socio-cultural support systems (traditional and modern). Disintegration also essentially indicates intergroup competence laden with conflictual outcomes resulting from the lack of accommodative structures for ethno-religious groups. These factors (economic,

²⁶¹Lijphart. A. (1971). p. 11.

²⁶²Lijphart. A. (1971). p. 13.

²⁶³Lijphart. A. (1971). p. 13.

²⁶⁴By homogeneity we do not refer to likeness between the diverse groups in terms of assimilating them into the dominant ethnic culture but rather the homogeneity provided by a national identity in this case – being a Nigerian.

political and socio-cultural) shall therefore serve as a bases to examine how groups within the Nigerian federation are included or excluded from the system.

3.1 Economic Factors

3.1.1 Uneven Economic Development

Recently in April 2014, the Nigerian National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) released official figures that put the country's Gross Domestic Product (GDP) at \$521.8 billion.²⁶⁵ Before this announcement, Nigeria, along with several other countries, had undertaken a 'rebasings' procedure aimed at restructuring its economic data to include previously excluded sectors of the economy (i.e. e-commerce, telecommunication, and music and film industry). Nigeria's GDP witnessed an 89% jump, from 42.3 trillion Naira to 80.3 trillion Naira (\$521.8 billion) making it the largest economy on the continent and also pushing it up to become the 26th largest economy in the world.²⁶⁶ However the concern is how this sudden doubling of GDP translates for the ordinary Nigerian. According to the Statistician-General of the Federation, while the GDP depicts how rich a nation is, this however does not translate into better standards of living for the population.²⁶⁷ To a large extent, economic indicators such as GDP are not enough to measure the actual development of a country. Indeed many Nigerians regard this new development as having no change on their welfare and

²⁶⁵World Bank (2014). Data: Nigeria GDP Current. Available at:

<http://data.worldbank.org/country/nigeria>. Accessed on 18 November, 2014.

²⁶⁶Nigeria becomes Africa's largest economy – get the data. The Guardian News. (2014, April).

Available at <http://www.theguardian.com/global-development/datablog/2014/apr/07/nigeria-becomes-africa-largest-economy-get-data>. Accessed on 18 November, 2014.

²⁶⁷Even though Nigeria's GDP per capita might have doubled to \$3,006 it is still far below those of countries like South Africa, Poland, and Belgium, as well as Argentina, Austria and Iran whose GDP it is far above. Udo, B. (2014). Rebased GDP has no effect on welfare of Nigerians-NLC. Available at: <http://www.premiumtimesng.com/business/158242-rebased-gdp-effect-welfare-nigerians-nlc.html> Accessed on 18 November, 2014.

GDP per capita (current US\$). World Bank national accounts data, and OECD National Accounts data files. World Development Indicator. (2014). Available at <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD>. Accessed on 18 November, 2014.

living conditions.²⁶⁸ In this case, one may argue that economic development in terms of increase in GDP might not necessarily serve as the perfect tool for measuring how economic development promotes integration.²⁶⁹

In a country like Nigeria, it is not uncommon that a small group within the population is responsible for growing and spending a large amount of the country's wealth, in which case, there is no trickle-down effect to the lower class. Nigeria's Human Development Index (HDI) ranking²⁷⁰ shows an entirely different picture from its GDP ranking. According to the 2014 HDI Report, Nigeria ranks 152 out of 187 countries placing it under the low human development category.²⁷¹ Similarly, its Purchase Power Parity (PPP) stands at \$5,353, which is quite low when compared to countries like Angola, Burundi, Ethiopia Liberia, Mali and Niger Republic.²⁷² We see that despite records of strong economic growth, the overall human development indicators for the county is a dismal sight and indicates that poverty is still rampant within the country.²⁷³

²⁶⁸Udo, B. (2014). p. 10.

²⁶⁹Economic development is more than just a measure of the value of a country's output of goods and services over a period of time, as it is also a measure of the welfare of humans and their living conditions in a society.

²⁷⁰The Human Development Index (HDI) which not only considers monetary factors but also socio-economic ones like life expectancy (longevity), literacy rates (knowledge), and the standard of living (Purchasing Power parity (PPP)). The HDI therefore emphasizes on people and their capabilities as the ultimate criteria for assessing the development of a country, and not solely on economic growth. Human Development Index (HDI). United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). (2014) Available at <http://hdr.undp.org/en/content/human-development-index-hdi>. Accessed on 18th November, 2014.

²⁷¹Human Development Report (2014). Sustaining Human Progress: Reducing Vulnerabilities and Building Resilience. p.2

²⁷²Human Development Report (2014). Sustaining Human Progress: Reducing Vulnerabilities and Building Resilience.

²⁷³The country suffers from inadequate infrastructure, poor quality basic education and health services, high rates of unemployment exacerbated by the massive growing youth population, poor governance as well as corruption at all levels.

Ayonrinde, F. & Olayinka, O. (2002). Trade Liberalization and Technology Acquisition in the Manufacturing Sector: Evidence from Nigeria. African Economic Research Consortium. Nairobi.

The Nigeria Economic Report (NER) notes that there is a “strong and growing divide between the south and north” of the country with regards to poverty levels and development in general”.²⁷⁴ Although the macro economic data on growth, poverty and living standards shows that the country is experiencing strong economic growths averaging 7% annually, however, the national per-capita poverty rate is still relatively high reflecting on more than 60% of the population.²⁷⁵ It is estimated that as of 2012 and 2013, 33.1% of the Nigerian population are living below the poverty line.²⁷⁶ While there are efforts to reduce these figures, efforts seem to be one sided. This is evident in the fact that poverty seems to be 44.9% much higher in rural areas than in urban areas (12.6%).²⁷⁷ This indicates that efforts toward poverty reduction are stronger in urban areas than in rural areas. Similarly, there are indications of discrepancies in the poverty level and living standards across the geographical regions. The southern region in general has relatively low poverty rates (south west- 16%; south east- 28.8%) than the north (north west- 45.9%; north east- 50.2%).²⁷⁸ In fact, the case of the northern region indicates that while poverty reduction has remained stagnant in the north west, the north east has witnessed increased levels of poverty. The north west and the north east together make up the 52% majority of poor Nigerians and if the north central is added, the percentage of poor in the north rises to 66%.²⁷⁹ In general, the disparities in poverty and living standards between the

²⁷⁴ World Bank. 2014. Nigeria economic report. Nigeria economic report; no. 2. Washington, DC: World Bank Group. Available at <http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2014/07/19883231/nigeria-economic-report-no-2>. Accessed on 17 November, 2014.

²⁷⁵ This figure is much higher than that of countries like Niger or Benin Republic. 46% of the population (adult equivalent approach) or 62% in strictly per capita terms. This indicates only a slight decline from 48% and 64%, respectively that were recorded in 2003/2004. Nigeria Economic Report. (2014) Document for the World Bank. p. 17. Available at <http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2014/07/19883231/nigeria-economic-report-no-2>. Accessed on 17th November, 2014.

²⁷⁶ Nigeria Economic Report. (2014).

²⁷⁷ Nigeria Economic Report. (2014).

²⁷⁸ Nigeria Economic Report. (2014). p. 17.

²⁷⁹ Nigeria Economic Report. (2014). p. 18 Para. 40.

two regions is on a steady increase. Similarly, while average per capita consumption increased, income distribution became more unequal showing a rise in polarization not only between the north and south but the rich and poor as well.²⁸⁰ These facts show three levels of uneven-economic development: - between the north and south, the rich and poor and the urban and rural areas.

This reality cannot be divorced from the current situation Nigeria faces in terms of security, conflicts and various other social vices. Since 2000, the north has been a breeding ground for insurgent movements like Boko Haram, and their activities have posed grave security challenges both at federal and regional levels. The activities of this group has for the most part been predominantly focused in the north. It is not much of a coincidence that the region which is heavily laden with poverty accommodates insurgent groups as well as a majority of violent activities which have threatened political order and stability. This strong indication that poverty breeds insurgency is not only evident in the north, The Niger Delta in the south-south for example has been a hot bed for militancy in the recent years as well. Ironically, this area is naturally endowed with resources such as crude oil from which the government immensely benefits from. Unfortunately, the activities of the government as well as the multinational oil companies in the region has left the indigenes victims of various environmental, health, as well as socio-economic hazards.²⁸¹ It is indeed a paradox that a people surrounded by water do not have access to portable water. Despite the fact that the nations crude oil is derived from this region, the indigenes have to purchase the same oil at higher prices. Similarly, revenue from crude oil sales assigned for the region have either not been forth

²⁸⁰Nigeria Economic Report. (2014). p. 18.

²⁸¹Tyoyila, A. G. & Terhenmen, G. D. (2012). Challenges of Democracy and Development in Nigeria's Niger Delta Region: An Appraisal. *European Scientific Journal* 8(16). p. 58.

coming or mismanaged as there are no solid infrastructures on ground thereby leaving the people almost cut off from the rest of civilization. The Niger Delta youths in their millions are largely unemployed. No doubt, these people feel neglected, and many grow up and die in the region without much hope and chance of a better future. It is amidst this marginalization and deprivation that militants have emerged as they feel that the only medium through which their plight can be heard is to engage in violent activities.²⁸²

3.1.2 Rapid Population Growth and Unemployment

Over the past years, Nigeria has experienced a rise in population growth. With a population of approximately 173.62 million²⁸³ Nigeria is the 8th most populous country in the world, the most populous on the African continent, and on a steady increase at an annual growth rate of about 2.8.²⁸⁴ Unfortunately, job creation has not kept pace with population growth. Each year about 1.8 million Nigerian youth's entre the labour market, amidst a steady rise in unemployment rate. In 2010, Nigeria's unemployment rate was at 21.10 %, as of 2011 to 2013 it reached an all-time high of 23.90%.²⁸⁵ With the youth making up 60% of the population, youth unemployment is over 50% leaving around 64 million Nigerian youngsters unemployed.²⁸⁶ Employment is agreed to be one of the crucial elements in maintaining the stability needed for any country to embark on poverty-reduction,

²⁸²Mamkaa, I. H. (2010). "Internal Conflicts and National Security in Nigeria (2000-2007)" Department of Political Science, BSU, Makurdi; Biakpara, Y. P. (2010). "The Niger Delta Question: Critical Challenges of Development and Democracy" Annual General Summit of Ijaw Youths held at Yenogoa, Bayelsa State in August, 2010.

²⁸³World Bank (2014). Available at <http://data.worldbank.org/country/nigeria>. Accessed on 25 November, 2014.

²⁸⁴World Bank (2014). Available at <http://data.worldbank.org/country/nigeria>. Accessed on 25 November, 2014.

²⁸⁵National Bureau of Statistics. Available at <http://www.nigerianstat.gov.ng/nbslibrary/social-economic-statistics/labour>. Accessed on 27 November, 2014.

²⁸⁶*Rate of Job Creation Insufficient to Tame Unemployment in Nigeria. Business Day.* (2014). Available at <http://businessdayonline.com/2014/09/rate-of-job-creation-insufficient-to-tame-unemployment-in-nigeria/#.VG8IFCOUfJY>. Accessed on 21 November, 2014.

growth and development in all areas. Nigeria needs to harness its enormous human resource potentials to be used towards the development of the country in all sectors. But the greatest fear of having a large number of unemployed persons in a society is that it manifests itself in societal nuisance and overall instability in society. Based on a report released by the International Labour Organization (ILO) in 2011, unemployment is among the biggest threats to social stability in many countries. This increased inactivity not only exacerbates the levels of poverty but leads to a generation who may likely develop distrust for the political and economic system in the long run. More importantly, unemployment becomes one of the primary contributor to social hazards.²⁸⁷ The increase in security challenges that Nigeria faces today is not unrelated to the frustrations caused by chronic unemployment. With the country's low income status, many Nigerians are subjected to a vicious cycle of working poverty,²⁸⁸ which leaves 79.2% of the people who manage to find jobs still living below \$2 a day.²⁸⁹ Although unemployment is not restricted to the youths, the reason why, in Nigeria's case, unemployment is frequently associated with the youth is because young people are three times more likely to be unemployed than adults.²⁹⁰ Secondly, by the UN international standard definition for 'youth', these are people of

²⁸⁷ILO warns of a Generation 'scarred' by a Worsening Global Youth Employment Crisis. International Labour Organization (2011). Available at http://www.ilo.org/global/about-the-ilo/newsroom/news/WCMS_165465/lang--en/index.htm#

²⁸⁸Working poor or working poverty is a term used to describe "individuals and families who remain as poor even though they have regular employment. The working poor are distinct from paupers, poor who are supported by government aid or charity. The "working poor" can also be defined as the proportion of employed persons in a household whose members are living below the US\$1.25 international poverty line. Many economists have broadened this definition, to include those whose incomes do not cover basic needs such as food, clothing, housing, transportation, child care, and health care." United States. *Bureau of Labour Statistics*, "A Profile of the Working Poor", <http://hdl.handle.net/SSDS/11323> [Version]. Accessed on 21 November, 2014.

²⁸⁹The World Bank. Poverty headcount ratio at \$1.25 a day (PPP) (% of population). Available at <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SI.POV.DDAY>. Accessed on 25 November, 2014.

²⁹⁰ILO press release (2011).

the ages 15 to 35 years,²⁹¹ which coincidentally also represents not only the bulk of the country's population, but also those who forms a greater percentage of the unemployed.

There have been concerted efforts to mitigate rising unemployment among the population, yet all efforts seem unsatisfactory. A recent report released by the NBS after a job creation survey it carried out during the first, second and third quarters of 2014, shows that the economy had succeeded in creating a total of 849,567 jobs across the country.²⁹² This report has been received with mixed feelings, and the question remains, as to why there are still so many unemployed.²⁹³ The major challenge facing government today, is ineffective developmental programmes as a result of poor or barely existing institutional capacities needed to harness the potential benefits of these initiatives. An indirect effect of this has not only been youth unemployment but also the new trend of kidnappings, armed robbery, militancy as well as insurgent activities sweeping the whole nation. This reality becomes all the more pathetic when one considers the abundant human and natural resources the country has which is capable of providing sufficient jobs for the teeming unemployed in the country.

²⁹¹This age range differs from one country to another. United Nations: (1992). Statistical Charts and Indicators on the Situation of Youth 1970-1990. New York.

²⁹²*Nigerian Bureau of Statistics (NBS): 1st and 2nd Quarter, 2014 Job Creation survey Report*
Nigerian Bureau of Statistics (NBS): Selected Tables from Job Creation and Employment Survey 3rd Quarter, 2014. Available at <http://www.nigerianstat.gov.ng/nbslibrary/social-economic-statistics/labour>.

These figures include jobs created in the formal and informal sectors as well as public institutions of the economy, in all 36 states and the FCT.

²⁹³According to the minister of finance, the reason why the impact of job creation is yet to be felt is because for over 50 to 60 years, Nigeria has been working without the key institutions that other countries have (i.e. Bureau for Public Procurement; Debt Management Office) So many of the institutions that Nigeria now has are new with still many lapses to be addressed.

Baiyewu, U. (2013). Unemployment giving me sleepless nights — Okonjo-Iweala. *The Punch*. Available at <http://www.punchng.com/news/unemployment-giving-me-sleepless-nights-okonjo-iweala/> Accessed on 21 November, 2014.

Over the years a number of efforts have been made by the government to address this problem. Many of these federal initiatives have included programmes such as: the Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP); Operation Feed the Nation (OFN); Green Revolution (GR); Directorate of Food Road and Rural Infrastructure (DFRRI); and more recently, the National Directorate of Employment (NDE) and its skills acquisition programmes such as the National Poverty Eradication Programme (NAPEP), the Subsidy Reinvestment & Empowerment Programme (SURE-P), Youth Enterprise with Innovation in Nigeria (YOUWIN) and National Economic Empowerment and Development Strategy (NEEDS). Many of these programmes build on medium term initiatives which stem from the country's long term goals of poverty reduction, wealth creation, job creation and national integration.²⁹⁴ These national frameworks usually work in close collaboration with the state and local governments. For example, the NEEDS programme is adopted as SEEDS (State Economic Empowerment and Development Strategy) at the state level and at the local level as LEEDS (Local Government Economic Empowerment and Development Strategy). This is to provide for not only coordination at all levels, but to make sure that these programmes lay good foundations for sustained development that will have a far reaching impact on the entire population. It is unfortunate that many of these programmes have performed below expectation. For example, the programme NAPEP²⁹⁵ which was put in place in 2001 to eradicate absolute poverty

²⁹⁴Chukwuemeka, E. E. O. (2009). Poverty and the millennium development goals in Nigeria: The nexus. *Educational Research and Review* 4(9), p. 407. Available at <http://www.academicjournals.org/err>. Accessed on 21 November, 2014.

²⁹⁵The programme was arranged into four schemes: (i) the Youth Empowerment Scheme (YES), which was concerned with providing unemployed youth opportunities in skills acquisition, employment and wealth generation. (ii) the Rural Infrastructure Development Scheme (RIDS) to ensure that the provision and development of infrastructural needs in the areas of transport, energy, water and communication, quality primary and special education, strengthening the economic power of farmers, providing primary health care especially in rural areas. (iii)The Social Welfare Services Scheme (SOWESS) which aims at ensuring the provision of basic social services, quality primary and special education, strengthening the economic power of farmers and providing primary health care.

in Nigeria by the year 2010 has been unable to achieve its goal as a result of a number of factors which it shares with many previous initiatives. Firstly, many of these policy goals are unrealistic, for example NAPEP's goal of wiping out absolute poverty in nine years, one may say is quite unrealistic accounting to the time factor. Secondly, corruption which has become engrained in the Nigerian society has led to mismanagement of funds appropriated for these programmes and enfeebled the state and its capacity to promote development and social justice through these initiatives.²⁹⁶ Thirdly, political patronage has also resulted in the use of these funds for politicking and succour to loyal party members.²⁹⁷ Fourthly, there has been a strong indication on the lack of consideration for the socio-political environment of these targeted regions as most times policies are not packaged to meet the needs of these beneficiaries. This is because the policies are usually drafted in the centre and handed down to the regions for implementation without looking at the peculiarities of each state. This situation also highlights the challenges of having a centralised federalism. Omoniyi rightly comments that one cannot expect the same policies that would be implemented in Jigawa state (north) where there is a high educational disadvantages to be the same as the one in Ekiti state (west) where there are a high number of graduates and professors.²⁹⁸ In other words, the needs of each region is different and therefore programmes should be drafted to meet specific as well as general needs of each component state. Lastly, the top-down nature of these policy

(iv)The Natural Resources Development and Conservation Scheme (NRDCS). The vision of this scheme was to bring about a participatory and sustainable development of agricultural, mineral and water resources." Elumilade D. O., Asaolu T. O. & Adenreti S. A (2006). Appraising the Institutional Framework for Poverty Alleviation Programmes in Nigeria. *International Research Journal of Finance and Economics, Euro Journal*, 3 (79). Available at <http://www.eurojournals.com/finance.htm>.

²⁹⁶Omoniyi, V. A. (2013). Policy Implementation and Rural Poverty Reduction in Nigeria (An Analysis of the National Poverty Eradication Programme (NAPEP) in Ado-Odo Ota Local Government Area, Ogun State. 1st Annual International Interdisciplinary Conference, AIIC 2013, 24-26 April, Azores, Portugal- Proceedings. p. 241.

²⁹⁷Lazarus, S. (2010). NAPEP Fund left Idle in Over #7.2 billion in Two Banks- Senate Committee. Sunday Trust Online, 24 October.

²⁹⁸Omoniyi, V.A. (2013). p. 242.

formulation and implantation has alienated rural communities in the decision making process which has been a strong reason why the impact of these policies is less felt and often fails to meet the targeted beneficiaries.

There seems to be an indication of unevenness with regards to the regions, and although this is not explicitly stated in most literatures, it can however be deduced. Based on the NBS National Poverty Profile, we observe that poverty levels are higher in the northern regions (east, west and central) than in the southern regions.²⁹⁹ Similarly, there are also grievances in the Niger Delta (south-south) which also shows that not enough is being done in terms of job creation and poverty alleviation. Despite these circumstance, we cannot conclude that these cases have to do with the discrimination of one region or group over the other as much as it has to do with the factors stated above. Rather, what seems to be the common case is the absence of an agreed policy that can be used by all concerned bodies (i.e. federal government, state government, local government and International Donor Agencies).³⁰⁰

The number of jobs created in the first half of 2014 is encouraging and goes to show that if effective mechanisms are put in place, the problem of unemployment can be drastically reduced. A country with a rapid population growth as Nigeria's requires that the people are given opportunities to cater to their needs and this can only be achieved by giving them something to do. The process of job creation means not only focusing on white collar jobs, but equipping people towards creating their own

²⁹⁹ According to the report, about 59% of people in the North-Central (areas of Benue, Kogi, Kwara, Nasarawa, Niger and Plateau State) are absolutely poor, 69% of the people living in the North-East (areas of Adamawa, Bauchi, Borno, Gombe, Taraba and Yobe State) are absolutely poor with less than 1 dollar income per day, and 70% of the people in the North-West (areas of Kaduna, Katsina, Kano, Kebbi, Sokoto, Jigawa and Zamfara State) are absolutely poor with less than 1 dollar income per day National Bureau of Statistics Nigeria, Poverty Profile, NBS Abuja, 2012.

³⁰⁰ Akindiya, B. (2013). Effects of National Poverty Eradication Programme in Nigeria.

means of livelihood through the acquisition of entrepreneurial skills. If population surpasses employment opportunities, not only will it result in the underutilization of human resource potentials, but also redundancy which will eventually lead to the increase of social vices, a fact Nigeria is presently coming to terms with. In order to create sufficient jobs, Nigeria needs to be current on the rate at which its population is changing both structurally and aggregately (in terms of its growth rate, births and deaths recorded).³⁰¹ An accurate population statistics goes a long way in making sound developmental plans. Similarly, combatting the factors mentioned above will help address the problem of unemployment and lead to greater foresight in formulating and implementing development policies that are not only specific to the needs of each region, but also aimed at fostering a greater evenness between the regions thus leading to overall integration amongst the populace.

3.2 Political Factors

With regards to the political factors, this study looks at five main factors namely, the educational system/language policy, party/electoral system, federalism, democracy/military-civilian relations, and religious insurgency, militancy and secessionism. Although many other factors can be examined when talking about stability, these factors however seem to be more relevant in the study of Nigeria and no doubt have a greater tendency to influence integration in the polity.

³⁰¹Nigeria is yet to implement the compulsory registration of births and deaths as legislated since 1979.

3.2.1 Integrative and Disintegrative Roles of the Educational System and Language Policy

Nigeria is ethnically diverse as well as linguistically heterogeneous. The number of individual languages officially listed for the country is 529.³⁰² However, the many other unrecorded languages makes it hard to identify the exact number and percentage distribution of ethnic languages spoken in the country. Nigerian languages can however be broadly divided based on regional languages of the three major ethnic groups (Hausa, Yoruba and Igbo). Twenty-one percent (21%) of the population speak Hausa (North),³⁰³ 16% speak Igbo (East),³⁰⁴ and 21% speak Yoruba (West).³⁰⁵ In terms of Languages of Wider Communication (LWC), languages such as: Arabic/Shuwa, Efik, Fulfulde, Pidgin, Tiv, Ibibio, Kanuri and Nupe form part of the larger minority languages spoken in certain areas across the country.³⁰⁶ English however remains the most widely used language (with over 60,000,000 speakers) in

³⁰²Lewis, M. Paul, Gary F. Simons, & Charles D. Fennig (eds.). 2014. *Ethnologue: Languages of the World, Seventeenth edition*. Dallas, Texas: SIL International. Online version: Available at <http://www.ethnologue.com>.

³⁰³The Hausa language is the De facto provincial language in northern region spoken by over 18,500,000 in Nigeria most especially in Sokoto, Kaduna, Katsina, Kano, Bauchi, Jigawa, and Zamfara, Kebbi, and Gombe states. Igbo: with over 18,000,000 speakers. Lewis, M. Paul, Gary F. Simons, & Charles D. Fennig (eds.). 2014.

³⁰⁴The Igbo language is the De facto language of the south east and it is spoken in Abia State; Anambra State, Aguata, Anambra, Awka, Idemili, Ihiala, Njikoka, Nnewi, and Onitsha LGAs; Enugu State, Awgu, Enugu, Ezeagu, Igo-Etiti, Igbo-Eze, Isi-Uzo, Nkanu, Nsukka, Udi, and Uzo-Uwani LGAs; Imo State; Rivers State, Ikwerre, Bonny, and Ahoada LGAs; Delta State, Oshimili, Aniocha, and Ndokwa LGAs; Akwa Ibom State, Ika LGA; northeast Delta State; southeast Rivers State, Igbo LGA and Opobo part of Opobo-Nkoro LGA, and alongside Ibani language area in Bonny LGA. It is the only or majority language in Abia, Anambra, Ebonyi, Enugu, and Imo states.” Lewis, M. P., Gary F. S., & Charles D. F. (eds.). 2014.

³⁰⁵The Yoruba language is spoken by 18,900,000 people in Nigeria and serves as the regional language of the South west spoken in Most of Oyo, Ogun, Ondo, Osun, Kwara, and Lagos states; Kogi State, west LGAs; northeast Ondo State. Lewis, M. Paul, Gary F. Simons, & Charles D. Fennig (eds.) (2014); Oladipupo, A. (2010). U.S. English Foundation Research: Nigeria. *Nigerian Compass*. Available at http://www.compassnewspaper.com/NG/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=65968:linguistic-multiplicity-a-curse-or-a-blessing-&catid=634:education&Itemid=695. Accessed on 14 January, 2015.

³⁰⁶ For further reading see: Lewis, M. Paul, Gary F. Simons, & Charles D. Fennig (eds.). 2014. *Ethnologue: Languages of the World, Seventeenth edition*. Dallas, Texas: SIL International. Online version Available at <http://www.ethnologue.com>.

most of the formal socio-political and economic institutional spheres of the country.³⁰⁷

The colonial experience was a major factor which led to the adoption of English as the lingua franca in Nigeria. The use of English especially during the colonial period served as the primary medium of communication (mostly for trade) between the different ethnicities as well as with the Europeans. Since then, the English language in Nigeria has played a very important role in the socio-linguistic lives of Nigerians, not just as a second language, but as a language of commerce, education, politics, law and the administration of the entire affairs of the country.³⁰⁸ As emphasized by Danladi “(...) English, as an official language has played an influential role as a medium of communication (...) hence, an integrative role for the Nigerian nation (...).”³⁰⁹ English has become an essential tool for anyone who wants to live in a wider context of the community. According to Crystal,³¹⁰ language is “magical”, “mystical” as well as “unique” because it plays an important role in capturing the “human thoughts and endeavour.”³¹¹ Nigerian intellectuals have seen language as an integrating element in Nigeria by arguing that: language forms a large part of a people’s culture through which they are able to express their folk tales, myths, proverbs and history.³¹² This means that for a country to function properly, it needs the cooperation and understanding of the people³¹³ especially if that country is a

³⁰⁷Lewis, M. Paul, Gary F. Simons, & Charles D. Fennig (eds.). (2014).

³⁰⁸Lewis, M. Paul, Gary F. Simons, & Charles D. Fennig (eds.). (2014).

³⁰⁹Danladi, S.S. (2013) Language Policy: Nigeria and the Role of English Language in the 21st century. 9(7). *European Scientific Institute (ESI)* p. 1.

³¹⁰Crystal, D. (1987). *The Cambridge encyclopaedia of language*. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University.

³¹¹Crystal, D. (1987). *The Cambridge encyclopaedia of language*. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University.

³¹²Achebe, C. (1988). *The African Trilogy*. Picador Books.

³¹³Rufai, A. (1977). The Question of a National Language in Nigeria: Problems and Prospects. In Kotey, P.F. & Der-Houssikian, H. (eds.) *Language and Linguistic Problems in Africa: Proceedings of the VII Conference on African Linguistics*. pp. 68-83. Columbia, SC: Hornbeam.

multi-ethnic one. Therefore, the existence of a single language is seen as a factor facilitating integration of diverse groups in a given state:

A single language does not guarantee civil peace, but it can help sustain a common nationality, enable groups to understand each other better, and make markets national in scope.³¹⁴

However, Switzerland for example, which has three official languages seems to demonstrate how language (if backed by an effective language policy) is not necessarily a barrier to the maintenance of peaceful co-existence amongst diverse groups in a federal system.³¹⁵ But, it is important to note that every federal system has its own distinctiveness. In addition, the existence of diverse variables should be taken into account while attempting to understand why something is observed in a given system. Switzerland only had the option of choosing a single language amongst three languages to serve as the lingua franca, in which case, the decision to make a compromise and adopt all three would not have been so biased. Nigeria however has over 500 ethnic dialects. This will obviously make coming up with a solution on which languages to adopt very difficult. A solution such as deciding to adopt the three major ethnic languages is a mere simplification of a far more intricate issue if one considers the nature of the Nigerian society with regards to group perceptions of one another. Therefore, the adoption of English as an official language, was and is agreeably the greatest legacy bequeathed to the people at the end of colonialism.³¹⁶ This is because with over 250 ethnic groups, three major spoken languages (with which the three biggest ethnic groups identify themselves), and more than 500 minor languages and dialects, English has served as a common

³¹⁴Aleinikof, T. A. (1998). Essay: A Multicultural Nationalism? Cross national group loyalties can neither be wished away nor erased. *American Prospect*, 36: pp. 80-87.

³¹⁵In Switzerland people can speak the three main languages: German, French and Italian. Because all are taught as the compulsory language courses in the schools.

³¹⁶Bamgbose, A. (1971). The English language in Nigeria. In *The English language in West Africa*, (ed.) Spencer, J. London: Longmans.

means for communication.³¹⁷ Not having this common base for understanding one another could possibly lead to further disintegration.

In the context of a federal setting where each component is to be held as autonomous, there is need for a factor which will link all component states to an inclusive ‘Nigerian’ identity. Consequently, choosing either of the major spoken languages (Hausa, Yoruba or Igbo) will not only defeat the purpose of fostering a common identity but will be considered a symbol of the hegemony by the ‘other’ group, thereby increasing violent competition and conflict between these ethnic groups. The illusion of hegemony of one group over the others will not only defeat the idea behind a federalism, but might likely also lead to disintegrative tendencies such as secessionist attempts. The adoption of English as the official language has so far not resulted in any violent reaction or counter oppositions by any of the ethno-cultural groups. English therefore has become the determining factor of forging common values, norms, basis of conduct and loyalties between groups in a nation like Nigeria. As Danladi puts it “(...) Nigeria is a country made up of three nations (...)” (Hausa, Yoruba and Igbo) (...) not to mention other smaller ethnic groups, therefore, “(...) English seems to be the only unifying solution to this merger.”³¹⁸ English as a lingua franca in Nigeria is able to play an integrative role because it has an air of neutrality. The notion of English being neutral means no group can lay claim of ownership to it, therefore it belongs to all Nigerians and since it belongs to all Nigerians, learning the language means reaching out to others as well as forming social bonds, values and collective awareness. Another factor which has made English an enduring legacy in the Nigerian colonial experience, is the status it enjoys

³¹⁷Danladi, S.S. (2013). p. 2.

³¹⁸Danladi, S.S. (2013). p. 3.

as an internationally spoken language. It is widespread in the sphere of international trade, dialogue and diplomacy. For Nigeria, This serves the convenience of dual integration at the domestic and international level.

Despite the fact that English serves as the connecting bridge between these ethnicities, it is crucial not to relegate the power and potentials of multilingualism, which can serve (in a number of ways) as a source of blessing and development for a country. Linguistic plurality should be an asset for communication at the local, national and international levels.³¹⁹ Nigeria to a large extent understands the importance of linguistic plurality which is why the Article 55 of 1999 Constitution as well as the Nigerian Language Policy (NLP) and the National Policy on Education (NPE) emphasize on the importance of language in promoting social interaction, national cohesion, as well as the preservation of diverse cultures. Most importantly, multilingualism serves as a mechanism for healthy national integration by challenging people to be willing members of the larger community, and at the same time allowing them to maintain their identities, roots, and traditions.³²⁰

Modern educational policy can be traced back to 1877 when the colonial government began making concerted efforts to interfere in the educational system, in order to provide a uniform curriculum needed to produce clerks for the growing administration and expanding commercial enterprise of the colonial political

³¹⁹Skutnabb-Kangas, T. (2002). *Why Should Linguistic Diversity be Maintained and Supported in Europe? Some Arguments: Guide for the Development of Language Education Policies in Europe from Linguistic Diversity to Plurilingual Education*. Council of Europe, Strasbourg. p. 13-15

³²⁰Chikwem, R. Lifting the Veil of Ignorance: The Issue of Discrimination, Ethnicity and National Integration in Nigeria. Available at <http://www.gamji.com/article6000/NEWS7928.htm> . Accessed on 08 January, 2015.

economy.³²¹ In 1882, the Education Ordinance, addressed some of the imbalance in the educational system, and to establish a substantial amount of control on the activities of the missionary bodies.³²² This was followed by the ordinance of 1916 which incorporated both the southern and northern provinces.³²³ The 1926 educational ordinance however, is believed to have laid the foundations for modern education in Nigeria.³²⁴ Unlike previous educational policies which were narrow and basically sought to train the Nigerian based on the standards and needs of the native English child, the 1962 ordinance recognized the need for education to be suited to the local needs of the recipients as well as enabling them to contribute their own quota to the growth and development of their nation.³²⁵ It is within similar vein that the NPE (revised in 1977, 1981, 1998 and 2004) has been structured.³²⁶

The NPE aims at producing a trilingual Nigerian identity by promoting the use of English, the mother tongue, an additional Nigerian language, and French in schools.³²⁷ This is with the aim of developing the ordinary Nigerian into ‘a sound and effective citizen’ fully integrated into the community with equal access to

³²¹Osokoya, O.I. (1987). *6-3-3-4 Education in Nigeria: history, strategies, issues and problems*, Lagos: Bininaike Educational Publishers. p. 2.

Folasade R. S. (2012). Internationalization in Education: The British Colonial Policies on Education in Nigeria 1882 – 1926. *Journal of Sociological Research*, 3(2) p. 91 Available at <http://dx.doi.org/10.5296/jsr.v3i2.2222>.

³²²Folasade R. S. (2012). pp. 92-94.

³²³Folasade R. S. (2012). Internationalization in Education: The British Colonial Policies on Education in Nigeria 1882 – 1926. *Journal of Sociological Research*, 3(2) p. 86. Available at <http://dx.doi.org/10.5296/jsr.v3i2.2222>.

³²⁴Osokoya, I. O. (2002). *History and Policy of Nigerian Education in World Perspective*. Ibadan: AMD Publishers.

³²⁵Folasade R. S. (2012). p. 87.

National Policy on Education: Art. 3(11).

³²⁶Folasade R. S. (2012). p. 90.

³²⁷Efurosibina, A. (2004). *Language Policy and Planning in Nigeria*. *Routledge*

Language Planning. 5 (3). pp. 181-246 Available at <http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/14664200408668258>. Accessed on 22 November, 2014.

educational opportunities at all levels (primary, secondary and tertiary levels) both inside and outside the formal school system.³²⁸ According to Osokoya:

Education is a distinctive way in which the society inducts its young ones into full membership (...) every modern society needs some educational policies to guide it in the process of such initiation.³²⁹

This is especially crucial for multi-cultural societies whose aim is to foster unity among diversity. Education can be an effective tool in forging this desired unity. By teaching acceptance for the other group to children at the critical stages of their lives, education will no doubt play a great role in producing a generation more tolerant and accommodating than the previous. This open-mindedness and national solidarity would help foster loyalties not based on the tribe but on the idea of a nation. It is therefore commendable that the government recognizes the benefits of incorporating multiple languages into the modern educational system.

By giving children a chance to learn in their mother tongue in the early stages of their education (pre-primary and lower primary level) and then adopting English along with two other languages in the latter stages (upper primary, secondary, university), the NPE seeks to serve as an integrative tool. This is important because the mother tongue or the language of the immediate community (LIC) in the early stages of education sets the tone for the child to get accustomed to the habits and culture of his immediate environment. Another important role of the mother tongue

³²⁸National Policy on Education. (2004). Art. 1 Para. 5.

³²⁹Osokoya, O.I. (1987). *6-3-3-4 Education in Nigeria: history, strategies, issues and problems*, Lagos: Bininaike Educational Publishers. p. 2.

Osokoya I. O. (2008). *Contemporary issue in history and policy on education in Nigeria*. Ibadan: Laurel Educational Publishers Ltd.

is in the easing of learning difficulties of the child.³³⁰ The Ife Six Year Project³³¹ demonstrated that teaching and learning is easier conducted in the mother tongue than in any other language. In the project, the pupils were divided into two groups (the control and the experimental groups.) The experimental group was taught all subjects except the English language subject in Yoruba and the control group was taught every subject in English. In the final examinations, it was discovered that the students who were taught in Yoruba performed better in all the subjects except English than the students taught in English. This result shows to a large degree, that the mother tongue is a better medium of instruction than a second or foreign language because the teacher and learner are at home with the learning situation.³³² With this solid foundation, Ansre postulates, the individual is equipped with the ability to harness resources productively and prudently for the equitable distribution and beneficial use of its members and towards national development.³³³

Similarly, the NLP which is the federal government statement that guides the teaching, learning and official use of different languages in the country states that the government acknowledges the importance of language as a means of promoting

³³⁰Mbah, B.M. (2012). Language Policy, Mother tongue Education and the Role of the Nigerian Language Teacher in Nigerian Language Education. *Journal of Education and Practice*. 3(10) p. 51 Available at <http://www.iiste.org>. Accessed on 15 January, 2015.

³³¹“The Ife Six- Year Primary Project (SYPP) was an experiment conducted by Aliu Babatunde Fafunwa between January 1970 and 1989. The main objective of the Ife Six-Year Primary Project was to develop a coherent primary education that would use the mother tongue as the medium of instruction. The project employed the Yoruba language as the medium of instruction on the assumption that the child would benefit cognitively, socially, culturally and linguistically through the use of his/her mother tongue as the language of instruction throughout primary school. The gap between the home and the school would also be bridged. English was taught as a second language using specially trained teachers throughout the six years. The project was continually evaluated with a view to determining its effectiveness.”

Fasokun, T. O. (2000) Aliu Babatunde Fadunwa. *The quarterly review of comparative education*. Paris, UNESCO: International Bureau of Education.

³³²Mbah, B.M. (2012). p. 51.

³³³Ansre, G. (1970). *Language policy for the promotion of national unity and understanding in West Africa: paper presented at the International Conference on Cultural Diversity and National Understanding within West African Countries at University of Ife, Nigeria*. Ghana: Institute of African Studies.

social interaction, national cohesion and the preservation of cultures. Every child is therefore expected to “(...) learn the language of his immediate environment (...)” as well as one of the three major Nigerian languages, in the interest of national unity.³³⁴ Similarly, for smooth interaction with its neighbouring countries, it is desirable for every Nigerian to speak French, which is why it is made compulsory in all schools.³³⁵ Because of the existence of such state policies which recognizes linguistic diversity, there is no attempt by the larger linguistic groups to establish cultural hegemony on other smaller groups. This has been achieved through limiting the perception of dominance by any of the indigenous linguistic groups in the country, placing all languages on equal standing as well as giving people the free choice of learning any of the indigenous language best suited to their needs. This has been a step in the right direction as most times linguistic hegemony can easily be translated as political hegemony and may in turn lead to the resentment of one group over the other, thereby, serving as a disintegrative force to the unity that it is meant to forge.³³⁶ However, it is important to note that the only languages which these policies have given recognition to are the three major ethnic languages (Hausa, Yoruba and Igbo). This may likely have the tendency of creating these hegemonic lines by making these groups seem more superior to the rest. It is also worth mentioning that religion plays an important role in the Nigerian society and as such the educational curriculum does provide options for subjects such as Christian Religious Studies (CRS) and Islamic Religious Knowledge (IRK) to be taught in schools.

³³⁴The NLP gives more consideration to the three major languages spoken in Nigeria, which are Hausa, Yoruba and Igbo.

³³⁵Federal Republic of Nigeria. (2004). National Policy on Education. Nigerian Language Policy Art 1 Para. 10.

³³⁶Keith, A. (1978). Nation, Tribalism and National Language: Nigeria's Case. *Cahiers d'etudes Africaines*. 18 (71) pp. 397- 415.

Any language policy should attempt at systematically resolving the communication problems of a community and this can only be achieved by first studying the various dialects used in the society. A comprehensive understanding of how the various languages are used within any given society goes a long way in helping any government develop a viable policy within its borders.³³⁷ A crucial part of this process is seeking to understand the available languages and then planning the importance of the selected ones with regards to their use for various functions.³³⁸ Although it is acknowledged that English has played an integrative role in Nigeria, it is also important to keep in mind that English occupies the position of a second language. Many people have their mother tongues and are committed to its survival.³³⁹ This strong allegiance to the mother tongue is as a result of it being a strong vehicle of ethno-cultural solidarity and identity.³⁴⁰ In many of the Nigerian communities, the attitudes to 'other' languages range from indifference and hostility to outright stigmatization. Only in circumstances such as trade, religion and intermarriages does the 'other' language become tolerated, and even this toleration is accompanied by the tendency for the larger ethnic groups to want to dominate or assimilate the smaller groups into their own culture.³⁴¹ This notion of the 'other' language can largely be attributed to the nature of the economic structures and socio-political organizations that have become salient in Nigeria. In as much as tribal structures do not encourage civic identity, it is unfortunately one of the disintegrative

³³⁷Crystal, D. (1990). (ed.) *The Cambridge encyclopaedia*. Cambridge. p. 174.

³³⁸Crystal, D. (1990). p. 175.

³³⁹Ogunsiji, Y. (2012). The Challenges and Prospects of Hybridizing Aspects of L1 & L2 in the Teaching of Language and Literature in Nigeria. *British Journal of Arts and Social Sciences* 5 (1) pp. 7-8. British Journal Publishing, Inc. Available at <http://www.bjournal.co.uk/BJASS.aspx> . Accessed on 14 January, 2015.

Efurosibina E. A. (2004). *Multilingualism: A Nigerian Case Study*. Africa World Press. pp. 57-58.

³⁴⁰Efurosibina, A. (2004). p. 57.

³⁴¹A subtle case is of intermarriages where the wife might have to learn the language, cuisine and overall traditions of her husband, similarly, the children often grow up to be identified predominantly with father's ethnic group.

dynamics that has found its way into the language planning process of the country. In most cases, the speakers of minority languages would rather learn English than any other indigenous language. Efurosibina refers to this tendency as ‘ones-own-language-preservation ploy’, often used as protection against possible domination by majority groups.³⁴² Similarly, majority groups would also prefer to learn another majority language than they would a minority language, and this too is often done with suspicion.³⁴³ There are rare cases where majority groups do learn minority languages, an example is of the Yoruba traders who have settled in parts of Plateau state and have had to learn some of the local languages for ease in conducting their daily businesses.³⁴⁴ This situation where even language is looked upon with suspicion and regarded as a tool for domination arises from the existence or perceived existence of economic or political deprivation or threat of one group over another. Because federalism does not seek to tamper with each group’s distinctiveness in the process of promoting unity, it is important that it ensures that these groups are not threatened. As Lewis argues:

(...) Any guideline for language representation in the system of education (...) or any other sphere of the state (...) has to take account of the attitude of those likely to be affected (...). No policy will succeed if it does not conform to the express attitude of those involved.³⁴⁵

The extent to which the NPE and NLP have been implemented has been to a great extent very ineffective. Education as one of the key development index has not been faring so well in the country, the national literacy rate stands at 57%³⁴⁶ and 49%³⁴⁷ of the teaching staff is unqualified or underqualified to implement these policies.

³⁴²Efurosibina, A. (2004). p.57.

³⁴³Efurosibina, A. (2004). p.57.

³⁴⁴Some languages spoken in plateau include: Berom,Angas,Mada. Efurosibina, A. (2004). pp. 57-58.

³⁴⁵Lewis-Williams, D.J. (1981). *Believing and seeing: symbolic meanings in southern San rock painting*. p. 4 Academic Press, London.

³⁴⁶ World Bank (2014).

³⁴⁷ World Bank (2014).

Evidence points towards a lack of proper language policy planning and implantation, which has in fact done more in creating mutual ethnic suspicion. English has taken primacy over other languages, it has become the perquisite for attaining better living conditions and has posed itself in direct contradiction to the aims and objectives of the NPE and NLP. In most cases, private schools fail to use the mother tongue as a medium of instruction and prefer to teach students strictly in English. Speaking any other language in these schools has become a violation of school rules as native languages are accorded the position of vernaculars. It is only public/rural schools that have put in some efforts to promote the use of indigenous languages at early stages of the child's education. Unfortunately, the public schools often fail to make the switch to English at the recommended latter stages of the child's education. This results in unequal opportunities since to a large extent, the type of school one attends is a determining factor of the opportunities open to them. Children who school in public school do not properly grasp the English language, while those who attend the private schools are presented with a better chance in becoming fully integrated members of the nation. This reality often presents itself with a regional dimension which is an educational imbalance between the North and the South. Manpower Statistics published by the Federal Character Commission (FCC), show that indigenes who dominate the senior force of the Federal Civil Service are mostly from the south (Akwa Ibom (4.2%), Anambra (5.5%), Imo (6.8%), Delta (5.8%), Edo (5.0%), Ogun (7.1%), Kogi (4.8), Ondo (4.6%) and Osun (4.3%)).³⁴⁸ These states also have the largest enrolment in universities. On the other hand, states that have the lowest university enrolment are also the lowest represented in the senior civil service

³⁴⁸Ukoha U. (2006). Education, horizontal inequalities and ethnic relations in Nigeria. *International Journal of Educational Development* 27(3) pp. 266–281.

which (apart from Kogi state in the north-central), are mostly northern states.³⁴⁹ This educational imbalance between the north and south has also translated in the “lopsided distribution of professionals, technicians and business enterprises between the two regions.”³⁵⁰ Similarly, Ogbe notes that there is a slight “correlation between attainments in western education and rates of commercial and industrial growth. There are also indications that educational attainment is positively related with social well-being.”³⁵¹ The north west and north east (usually referred to as the ‘Core North’) have the lowest rates of school enrolment and the highest number of people regarded as ‘Core Poor’.³⁵² The relatively higher educational attainment of the southern states also comes with its costs such as higher rates of graduate unemployment in southern states.³⁵³ This leaves a situation where the northern states are barely able to fill their quota in federal tertiary institutions, and the demand for higher education among southerners exceeding existing spaces in both federal and states universities. The result is that every year more southerners are competing for fewer positions while the north is left feeling educationally deprived. Mustapha describes this as the “paradox of modern Nigerian politics- the resilience of tri-polar ethnic mobilisation in the face of repeated efforts at political engineering and nation-building”.³⁵⁴ This no doubt puts a strain on the integration efforts.

³⁴⁹Federal Character Commission 6th Annual Report (2001).FCC, Abuja. pp. 20–21.

³⁵⁰Mustapha, A.R., 2004. Nigeria: ethnic structure, governance and public sector reform. In: *UNRISD Conference on Ethnic Structure, Governance and Public Sector Reform, 2004*.

³⁵¹Ogbe, A. (2003). Northern Nigeria: politics and economic growth. pp. 121-122.

³⁵²Ogbe, A. (2003). Northern Nigeria: politics and economic growth. pp. 121-122.

Yakubu, A.M., Nda-Isaiah, S. & Zarma, B. (eds.) (2003). *Management of Social Conflict in a Plural Society*. Kaduna: Arewa Consultative Forum. pp. 120–126.

³⁵³Dabalén, A. B. & Adekola O.A. (2000). Labour market prospects for university graduates in Nigeria

The World Bank, Washington DC .The World Bank. pp. 12-13.

The World Bank, Washington DC (2004). *School Education in Nigeria: Preparing for Universal Basic Education*. p. 19.

³⁵⁴Mustapha, A. R., (2004). Nigeria: ethnic structure, governance and public sector reform. In: *UNRISD Conference on Ethnic Structure, Governance and Public Sector Reform*.

The cause of this situation is not unrelated to the unconscious elevation of English as a language of prestige and a representation of political supremacy. English has become a language necessary in the workplace, media, and many prominent governmental and societal institutions. In other words, English offers better chances in society. Yet this supremacy given to English is unrealistic as it does not capture the reality of many Nigerian homes. A majority of homes in Nigeria communicate in their mother tongue, which means that children most times are only exposed to the English language in their schools. In most cases, a child grows up learning their mother tongue first and many parents frown at the idea of their child speaking in a foreign language at home. The irony is that, while native languages are vernacular in schools, English becomes the vernacular at home. The tendency to promote primarily English only programs for students in the Nigerian educational system results in the loss of native language skills, coupled with the lack of mastery for the English language all which are not far from being responsible for the high record of poor performance among students.

Nigeria's language policy raises many concerns and some have suggested that another language(s) be given the position of the official language of the country. Suggestions have been made for Hausa or Yoruba assuming the status of the nation's Lingua-franca. However, this will be almost impossible to actualize since all groups would want their language to sit in that position. More deeply rooted is the connotations the words 'majority' and 'minority' have within the country. The phrase 'majority language' or 'minority language' could easily translate to the "distribution of socio-political and economic power and prestige"³⁵⁵ and by extension, belonging to the 'majority' language group means gaining access to these

³⁵⁵Dalandi, S.S. (2013). p. 5.

powers leaving the 'minorities' in a weaker power status.³⁵⁶ Therefore, making any of the three major languages a lingua franca is tantamount to promoting disintegration in the polity. Another suggestion which seems more workable is the adoption of the Pidgin English as an official language. The concerns for a language policy more representative of the African experience is expressed vividly by many, and as Achebe put it: "It was humiliating to have to speak to one's Countryman in a foreign language, especially, In the presence of the proud owners of that Language. They would naturally assume that, One had no language of one's own."³⁵⁷ Similarly, Bisong argues that "if English is to carry the weight of the African experience, it should be a new English, still in full harmony with its ancestral home, but altered to fit its new African surroundings."³⁵⁸ But contrary to Bisong's argument, taking the English language and altering it to fit the African surrounding will amount to it no longer being in full harmony with its ancestral home as cases have proved that many a times when Pidgin English is spoken to those without any experience or knowledge of it, communication becomes a barrier. Despite the strong argument for the use of Pidgin English as the new lingua franca, much evidence seems to disprove that it will have any sway as often at times, the pidgin English has been stigmatised and labelled a language of the illiterate and resorting to speaking it is seen as an abuse to ones intellect and sophistication.

The only language which seems to hold as much sway as English is the Hausa language. Hausa maintains a dominant role in the regional communication and

³⁵⁶Dalandi, S.S. (2013). p. 5.

³⁵⁷Chinua Achebe, *Things falls apart*. p. 214.

³⁵⁸Bisong, J. (1995). Language Choice and cultural Imperialism: a Nigerian Perspective. *English Language Teaching (ELT) Journal*. 49 (2). p. 125.

education of its people in the north. Omojuwa et al³⁵⁹ notes that northerners, in general, tend to actively promote Hausa over other Nigerian languages whereas in the south, opposite is the case. This however does not confirm that the Hausa language will emerge as the new lingua franca of Nigerians after more than fifty years of independence. What seems more likely is that English has come to stay and will for a long time continue to play a major role in the society. The reality remains that English has served as the only means open to individuals from different ethno-linguistic groups to interact.³⁶⁰ English performs the five dominant roles of officiating, education, media broadcasting, religious observance and interpersonal relations,³⁶¹ and has been pioneering accommodation, participation and social mobility at all wider levels of society.

A reform of the educational system to fit Nigeria's language policy is however crucial. This is because education is the medium which plays a crucial role in fully integrating the individual into the wider society by providing him with the skills and knowledge necessary. These reforms could mean "the discontinuation of the National Policy on Education fashioned after the American system and the adoption of the model practiced by Asian countries such as Japan, China and India which takes the culture of the people into consideration."³⁶² Language is not only a marker of identity but also of individuality and sovereignty, as it is the key to the hearts of the people which unlocks their knowledge, treasure and potentials. Thus, subjecting

³⁵⁹Omojuwa, A., Abdurrahman, A. M., Ozigi, A., & Institute of Education. (1976). *Syllabus of diploma courses in the teaching of Hausa*. Zaria: Inst. of Education, Ahmadu Bello Univ.

³⁶⁰Odebunmi, A. (2006). *Meaning in English: an introduction*. Ogbomoso: Critical sphere.

³⁶¹A clear evidence of this is that although the 1979 (Article 51), 1989 (Article 53) and 1999 (Article 55) Constitution provides for the use of other languages other than English to conduct the affairs of the National Assembly, this option has rarely been used Jowitt, D. (1991). *Nigerian English usage: An introduction*. Ikeja: Longman Nigeria Plc. p. 54.

³⁶²Bamgbose, A. (1995). English in the Nigerian environment. In Bamgbose, A., Banjo, A., & Thomas, A. (eds.), *New Englishes* pp. 9-26. Ibadan: Mosuro Publishers.

people to a dominant foreign language stunts their potentials and diminishes their innovativeness. As the former Minister of Education once said:

Africans have been unable to invest anything of note in the scientific field because we think in a foreign language and this tends to inhibit our native intelligence. We are forced early in life to imitate our erstwhile colonial masters in thought, word and action. Yet, we know the imitators are not usually capable of original thinking, neither are they inventive by nature.³⁶³

There are many possible solutions that can be adopted to make sure the educational and language policies foster integration. One of such possibility is that, while Nigeria retains English as a national language, it should promote the use of other Nigerian languages thereby de-limiting the role of English especially at state and local government levels. Another option is the complete revision of the nation's language policies especially with regards to proper implementation. Lack of proper implementation could be as a result of insufficient capacities or intellectual know-how. Policy formulation is only one stage, there needs to be concerted efforts made by all levels of government to ensure that these policies are not only formulated but implemented in a way which will serve the ultimate purpose of bridging the gap between the various ethnic nationalities in the north and south and creating an integrated society, this requires a lot of commitment. A way in which this commitment can be achieved is by creating a body charged with the responsibility of visiting these schools, not only to inspect, but ensure that they rise and maintain the standards and expectations the policy. Commitment can also be shown in the form of providing sufficient funds to acquire the needed resources for implementing this

³⁶³Adekanmbi, D. (2013). The language question in Nigeria. Available at <http://listserv.linguistlist.org/pipermail/lgpolicy-list/2013-November/015916.html>. Accessed on 20 November, 2014.

policy across the various schools. Similarly, there is need for further efforts to be made in the area of staff training and orientation on how best to instruct students and ensuring that they attain their maximum potentials as well as inculcating in them the spirit of a 'Nigerian' identity by making them learn to appreciate other cultures. Perhaps only then can Nigeria dream for a better integrated society.

3.2.2 Party System and Electoral System

The emergence of political parties has been closely tied to Nigeria's constitutional development.³⁶⁴ Since independence, Nigeria has experienced an unstable party system³⁶⁵ resulted in a cycle of successive military regimes and for a long period, parties were not allowed to be established. In the long period of transition to democracy, Nigeria demonstrated the basic characteristics of a two-party system. Similarly, in the process of vying for electoral support, it was common for two or more parties to form alliances in presidential elections if it offered them better chances at getting into government.³⁶⁶ For the most part these alliances have tried to create state wide political parties through the elimination of any semblance of the parties belonging to a specific ethnic, regional or religious group. For the most part, state wide parties have emerged by presenting candidates (especially for the

³⁶⁴The Clifford constitution (1922) for example made the provision of four elective seats for Nigerians in the Legislative council which led to the formation of the Nigerian Democratic Party (NDP). Similarly, the Richards' constitution (1944) and its additional provision for regional assemblies stimulated the emergence of more parties. The Macpherson constitutions (1951) establishment of regional assemblies, regional executive councils and a system of indirect elections into Nigerian Legislative Houses, also served to strengthen the activities and emergence of political parties' in pre-independent Nigeria.

Olarinmoye, O.O. (2008) Godfathers, political parties and electoral corruption in Nigeria. *African Journal of Political Science and International Relations* 2 (4). p. 68. Available at <http://www.academicjournals.org/AJPSIR>. Accessed on 16 January, 2015.

³⁶⁵An unstable party system usually refers to the inconsistencies in the type of electoral preferences and socio-political dynamics in a polity. This is mostly as a result of major shifts in the interests of the parties involved. This constant realignment usually challenges old party lines and splits members of major parties, often resulting in the emergence of a new party system. In Nigeria, we see that party affiliations among voters and even within party ranks are capricious and often changing from one electoral contest to the next. Until recently, most cases parties in the country have been viewed as transitory rather than institutionally entrenched.

Hicken, A. & Kuhonta, E.M. (2014). Party System Institutionalization in Asia: Democracies, Autocracies, and the Shadows of the Past. Cambridge University Press. pp. 260-2261.

³⁶⁶This was very much the case shortly before independence and in the First Republic (1963-1966).

presidential elections) who are from different ethnic, regional and religious background. For instance, if the presidential candidate of any political party is a Christian or southerner, then his vice president is a Muslim or northerner (in most cases this balancing is religiously motivated but since the religious and regional divide is often blurred, the religious motivation becomes less pronounced) and vice versa. For example, at the dawn of the general elections leading to independence, there were growing concerns that the structural weakness of the federal system was ultimately going to resort to a northern hegemony due to the advantage of population size.³⁶⁷ The need to deflate the effects of the ethnic and regional party system led to a coalition between the NPC (north) and the NCNC (south-eastern party) bringing about the much desired north-south consensus to constitute a national government.³⁶⁸ Also, the 1964 general elections witnessed fierce competition between two opposing alliances (NNA and UPGA).³⁶⁹ However, because competitive political contestation was highly polarized by the parties' ethnic and regional bases, this meant that there were no cross sectional political parties formed, rather what existed were ethno-political parties representing regional ethnic interests. For example, the Action Group (AG), Unity Party of Nigeria (UPN) and the Alliance for Democracy (AD) had their bases in the Yoruba dominated south-west of Nigeria. Similarly, the NCNC and the Nigerian People's Party (NPP) had their political strong hold in the predominantly Igbo south-east region, while the NPC, National Party of Nigeria (NPN) and the All Nigeria People's Party (ANPP) had theirs in the Hausa-Fulani heartland of northern

³⁶⁷ Because the tripartite federal structure was an irregularly lopsided one, it easily promoted the political hegemony of the Hausa/Fulani dominated north over the other two regions. Suberu, R. T. (2005) p. 17.

³⁶⁸ Metz, C. H. (ed.) (1991). Nigeria: A Country Study. The first republic. Washington: GPO for the Library of Congress. Available at <http://countrystudies.us/nigeria/68.htm> Accessed on 16 January, 2015.

³⁶⁹ Metz, C. H. (ed.) (1991).

Nigeria.³⁷⁰ This defining feature of early political parties has to some extent influenced modern party formation in the country thereby making them prone to serious inter-party conflicts, divisions, and cross-carpeting. This, by extension makes political parties serve more as a disintegrative than integrative factor.³⁷¹

The Nigerian socio-political dynamics has always oscillated towards a two-party system. The Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) which is charged with the responsibility of conducting and supervising elections³⁷² has since 1999 tried to 'de-clutter' Nigeria's electoral system by de-registering some parties who are considered non-active. This has however come with challenges, as often times the decisions of INEC face criticisms.³⁷³ Similarly, the Supreme Court has repeatedly nullified their decisions on grounds that they have no power to set out conditions for the registration of political parties that are contradictory to the ones already set out in the Nigerian constitution.³⁷⁴ The constant tug between the INEC and the federal legislature indicates the governments caution in ensuring that such bodies do not use the powers conferred upon them to instigate feelings of exclusion in the attempt to integrate all interest groups in the political process. However, no restrictions have

³⁷⁰Suberu, R. T. (2005). p. 17.

³⁷¹Agarah, B.A. (2004). "Political Parties and Pressure Groups in Nigeria", in Ayam J (ed.) *Introduction to Politics*. Ota: Covenant University Press, pp. 133-166.

Adejumobi, S. (2007). *Political Parties in West Africa: The Challenge of Democratization in Fragile States. Report prepared for the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (International IDEA)/Global Programme on Research and Dialogue with Political Parties.*

³⁷²The 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. Third Schedule: Part I (f) Art. 14-15.

³⁷³For example, in the 1999 general elections, the decision of INEC to recognize only three political parties- PDP, APP, and AD- sparked ill feelings that resulted in a number of court suites against them. Similarly in April 2011, sixty-three political parties were registered, and INEC once more decided to exercise its constitutional power, through three deregistration exercises (targeting parties that did not contest in the 2011 elections) INEC was able to reduce this number to twenty-five.

The 2010 electoral Act gives INEC the power to de-register any party that fails to win executive or legislative seats in elections Federal Republic of Nigeria: Electoral Amendment Act (2010) Section 78(6). *Official Gazette*. 97 (92). Lagos: Federal Government Printers.

³⁷⁴Abuja Court of Appeal. Alhaji Abdulkadir Balarabe Musa & ORS. Vs. Independent National Electoral Commission & ANOR. (2002). LPELR-CA/A/74/2002. In the Court of Appeal (Abuja Judicial Division). Available at

http://www.lawpavilionpersonal.com/lawreportsummary_election.jsp?suite=olabisi@9thfloor&pk=C/A/A/74/2002&apk=19895. Accessed on 25 November, 2014.

been put on the number of parties allowed to contest in so far as they fully meet the requirements stipulated in the constitution. Nonetheless, there is still much concern over the high number of non-functional parties that exists, and many have stressed on the need to sanitise the process of registering political parties. The rationale behind this argument has been that, a multi-ethnic country like Nigeria needs a limited number of parties in order to promote national unity.³⁷⁵ However, one may argue that the constitution already provides solutions to the problem of political parties creating divergences along ethno-religious lines; such as prohibiting any political association from bearing a symbol or logo of any religious or ethnic connotation. Similarly, the constitution bans these associations from restricting or giving semblance of restricting their activities to only specific parts of the geographical entity of Nigeria.³⁷⁶ Unlike the parties of the First Republic whose social base was predominantly regional, ethno-tribal or religious, present day parties are more oriented toward drawing support from a wide spectrum of ethnic, religious, regional and interest groups. These provisions no doubt have been important developments towards fostering integration in the country. The PDP for example enjoys the patronage of traditional chiefs from various communities in the country, including academic and business groups. However it has also been criticized of being an elitist party which enjoys the sympathy of the military, as since 1999, over 100 retired senior officers have joined.³⁷⁷ However, it seems that the APC which was established in 2013 enjoys a broader social base than the former, as its supporters come from a

³⁷⁵Many scholars have based this argument on the 1993 elections, which was conducted on the bases of a two parties and was judged as the most free and fairest elections because many believed that two parties provided very little room for ethnic or regional affinities to be formed and therefore parties focused on issues which could fetch them support from the wider spectrum of the populace.

Ibrahim, J. (2013) Remoulding the Nigerian Party System. Available at <http://www.premiumtimesng.com/opinion/142394-remoulding-the-nigerian-party-system-by-jibrin-ibrahim.html>. Accessed on 25 November, 2014.

³⁷⁶1999 Constitution: Art. 222 (e).

³⁷⁷Ibrahim, J. (2013).

broad spectrum of groups in the society. The wider support which the APC receives is not unrelated to the much anticipated change many people desire and which they feel the PDP has failed to provide in the fifteen years of its being in power.

Since the inception of the Fourth Republic (1999), the country has oscillated more towards a dominant party system. Evidence points to the fact that PDP has constantly formed the majority component of the executive at the national level and in many of the states. In the last elections conducted in 2011, the PDP won the presidency by 58.89% of the popular vote as against the 31.98% and 5.41% of the other two major parties that also contested.³⁷⁸ In the House of Representatives, the PDP won 202 seats out of 360, and 71 seats out of 109 in the senate.³⁷⁹ They also won 20 governorships out of the 36 states.³⁸⁰ The PDP has dominated the national government for fifteen years, but its popularity has been dwindling. Indeed the credibility of the internal structure of most existing political parties has been questioned, as many have argued that most of these parties do not allow democracy in their internal affairs. Consequently, political parties in Nigeria have been likened to cartel parties where those in power use the resources of the state to maintain their position within the political system and in most cases political mobilisation is based on monetary, religious, ethnic and regional basis. It is believed that most parties are controlled by political ‘godfathers’ and ‘barons’ who see politics as an investment.³⁸¹ Political godfathers are willing to secure lucrative positions for their political godsons by any means, and this is one of the defining factors that makes elections in

³⁷⁸House of Representatives (2012).

³⁷⁹ House of Representatives (2012). Available at <http://www.nassing.org/nass2/memlist.pdf>.

³⁸⁰House of Representatives (2012). Available at <http://www.nassing.org/nass2/memlist.pdf>. With regards to the other major parties in the parliamentary elections, the CPC won 35 seats; ANPP won 25; and APGA won 6.

³⁸¹Federal Republic of Nigeria. (1986). Report of the Judicial Commission Inquiry into the Affairs of Federal Electoral Commission: 1979–1983. p. 348.

the country a do-or-die-affair.³⁸² Like most parties in semi-democracies, Nigerian political parties lack cohesion, mass membership and most importantly, ideologies,³⁸³ and for the most part, they serve merely as campaigning institutions for elections. Where these parties do formulate ideologies, they are not dynamic and innovative enough, and are quite redundant.³⁸⁴ The distinguishing factor of these political parties are hinged on the personalities around which they are organized. People show sympathy for a party not necessarily because of the party's vision but in most cases because of affiliations to the persons contesting. Although personality and charisma are important, it is sometimes dangerous to base party membership or affiliation strictly on these qualities as they often have the tendency of generating these ethnic, tribal, regional or religious sentiments which the federal system seeks to moderate in the political process of the nation.

Dominant parties like the PDP often end up serving as their very own Achilles heels as the internal power tussle that happens inside the party creates factions within the party structure.³⁸⁵ Factions within parties tend to form distinct identity structures separate from that of the main party and they act almost as independent political parties with their separate offices and officials at the district, local government and state levels.³⁸⁶ In most cases these factions do not represent ethnic, religious or regional interests, however, they can assume any of such whenever the need arises. This instance makes it very easy for parties to assume ethnic, linguistic or religious

³⁸²Ihonybere, J.O. (ed.) (1989). *The Political Economy of Crisis and Underdevelopment in Africa: Selected works of Claude Ake*. Lagos: JAD Publishers.

³⁸³Hauge, R & Harrp, M. (2004). p. 200.

³⁸⁴Hauge, R & Harrp, M. (2004). p. 200.

³⁸⁵These factional problem have been witnessed in many states like Abia, Adamawa, Borno, Delta, Edo, Enugu, Imo, Kano, Lagos Nassarawa, Plateau, and Ogun, to mention a few.

³⁸⁶Indabawa, S. A. (2012). Building Strong Party Chapters and Raising the Political Consciousness of Party Members. *Paper presented at the retreat on capacity building for zonal/state publicity and organizing secretaries, publicity and organization staff of the national secretariat and resident press corps members of the People's Democratic Party (PDP)*.

undertones. Another factor in the party system which has presented a disintegrative tendency is the new dimension to the principle of federal character introduced by the PDP shortly after 1999 known as the rotation principle.³⁸⁷ This informal principle was a measure adopted by the party to ensure political inclusion of all groups and regions. The ‘zoning’ formula urges the rotation of presidential nominations in the party between southerners and northerners (which has largely come to connote ‘Christian’ and ‘Muslim’) every two terms in order to avoid domination by one group. Although this mechanism was supposedly meant to serve as an integrative tool, quite contrary to its purpose, it has ended up creating succession crisis.³⁸⁸ The encouragement of such informal power sharing mechanisms can most likely create a culture of informal power sharing which may likely cause more problems in the long run. After the death of President Umaru Yar’adua in 2010 before the expiration of his tenure in office, going by the constitution, his vice -Goodluck Jonathan- would have been next in office, but because he was a southerner (Christian) it caused a lot of debate where the northerners disputed the legitimacy of his succession on the grounds that it would violate the party’s rotational principle. The southerners on the other hand, argued that the constitution should supersede the party’s zoning rule.³⁸⁹ Although Jonathan became president, these controversies carried on throughout the 2011 election campaign when he was again nominated for the presidency by the PDP. Most northern elites believed that they were not given a chance to complete their term. Despite Jonathan winning the 2011 elections in what international and local observers have commented as one of the fairest elections in the country, there

³⁸⁷The Rotation principle is popularly referred to in Nigeria as the ‘zoning’ formula. It is also known as power shifting or rotational rule.

³⁸⁸Baker, H. P. (2012). p. 12.

³⁸⁹Baker, H. P. (2012). p. 13.

were records of post-election violence especially in the north as many in that region were aggrieved that the elections were ‘stolen’.³⁹⁰

Although it was observed that voting patterns in the federal parliamentary and regional executive elections were mixed, voting in the presidential election however showed a sharp spilt along north/south lines with Jonathan capturing majority votes in the predominantly Christian south and north-central mostly Christian region, while the major opposition’s votes came mainly from the predominantly Muslim north.³⁹¹

Figure 2³⁹² includes a comparison of the results of the 2011 and 2015 presidential elections:

S/N	States	Years			
		2015		2011	
		PDP	APC	PDP	CPC
1.	Abia**	96.40%	3.60%	98.96%	0.31%
2.	Adamawa*	40.93%	59.07%	56.00%	37.96%
3.	Akwa Ibom**	94.23%	5.77%	94.58%	0.43%
4.	Anambra**	97.36%	2.64%	98.96%	0.36%
5.	Bauchi*	14.23%	85.77%	16.05%	81.69%
6.	Bayelsa**	98.64%	1.36%	99.63%	0.14%
7.	Benue	46.15%	53.85%	66.31%	10.47%
8.	Borno*	5.22%	94.78%	17.58%	77.25%
9.	Cross River**	93.91%	6.09%	97.67%	0.55%
10.	Delta**	97.47%	2.53%	98.59%	0.64%
11.	Ebonyi**	94.03%	5.97%	95.57%	0.20%
12.	Edo**	58.52%	41.48%	87.28%	2.86%
13.	Ekiti**	59.44%	40.56%	51.56%	1.03%
14.	Enugu**	97.50%	2.50%	98.54%	0.46%

³⁹⁰Baker, H. P. (2012). Getting Along: Managing Diversity for Atrocity Prevention in Socially Divided Societies. *Policy Analysis Brief: The Stanley Foundation*. pp. 5-6.

³⁹¹Baker, H. P. (2012). Getting Along: Managing Diversity for Atrocity Prevention in Socially Divided Societies. *Policy Analysis Brief: The Stanley Foundation*. pp. 6-8.

³⁹²Figure 2 was prepared by the author of this thesis through using electoral results as published by the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC). * symbolizes a regional entity (state) with Muslim majority, ** symbolizes a regional entity with Christian majority population. The others are mixed regions including people from Muslim, Christian and traditional faiths.

15.	Gombe*	21.15%	78.85%	37.71%	59.73%
16.	Imo**	67.14%	32.86%	97.98%	0.54%
17.	Jigawa*	13.89%	86.11%	36.75%	58.21%
18.	Kaduna*	28.44%	71.56%	46.31%	51.92%
19.	Kano*	10.18%	89.82%	16.48%	60.77%
20.	Katsina*	6.85%	93.15%	26.13%	70.99%
21.	Kebbi*	15.61%	84.39%	39.95%	54.26%
22.	Kogi	36.16%	63.84%	71.17%	23.53%
23.	Kwara	30.50%	69.50%	64.68%	20.16%
24.	Lagos**	44.35%	55.65%	65.90%	9.77%
25.	Nassarawa	53.59%	46.41%	58.89%	40.05%
26.	Niger*	18.57%	81.43%	31.54%	64.03%
27.	Ogun**	40.28%	59.72%	56.86%	3.25%
28.	Ondo**	45.60%	54.40%	79.57%	2.44%
29.	Osun**	39.45%	60.55%	36.75%	1.36%
30.	Oyo**	36.46%	63.54%	56.14%	10.70%
31.	Plateau	54.13%	45.87%	72.98%	25.27%
32.	Rivers**	96.11%	3.89%	98.04%	0.71%
33.	Sokoto*	18.47%	81.53%	33.97%	59.44%
34.	Taraba	57.79%	42.21%	61.07%	34.91%
35.	Yobe*	6.30%	93.70%	18.83%	54.26%
36.	Zamfara*	18.76%	81.24%	25.35%	66.25%
37.	FCT Abuja	51.78%	48.22%	63.66%	33.05%

Figure 1: A comparison of 2011 and 2015 presidential elections on the basis of regional support for the major parties as published by Independent National Electoral Commission April 2011/March 2015. See http://inecnigeria.org/?page_id=31.

The table above shows the percentage obtained by the major political parties in each of the 36 states and capital territory in the 2011 and 2015 presidential elections.³⁹³

The percentage figures indicate a divide where the PDP is more popular in the southern states and the APC (formerly CPC) has its support base predominately in the north. It is easy to translate this to mean that the PDP is a Christian party and the APC a Muslim party since the regional distribution in the country is also closely associated with the religious divide. However, it will be incorrect to conclude such because based on the 2011 figures we see that while the CPC is barely existing in the southern states, the PDP is still able to gather a reasonable percentage of votes in the north especially the north central. It can therefore be argued that for a long time,

³⁹³ Although the aim was to examine the results of three consecutive elections, the electoral results for the 2007 presidential elections are unavailable therefore only results for two have been analysed.

the PDP has occupied the position of a state wide party that has served as an integrating factor than the other parties have. However it is important to note that many of the past elections held have been characterized by post-election violence which could indicate that the PDP has used other means of electoral rigging to create their seeming popularity. Based on the latest 2015 elections conducted, the percentage distribution of what the parties obtained seems to indicate a slight shift in voting patterns. For while in previous elections the APC has been unable to capture significant votes in the south. It however, was able to do so in most of the south-western states even though it is still non-existent in the south east and south-south. Although the recent results might indicate a shift in which party better presents itself as an integrative factor, the PDP is indeed still relatively strong in the north and south and is most likely denied sole representation because of the voting pattern of the country (which is plurality representation). Like many advantages of the plurality system, it encourages the formation of broadly based political parties which is important in ethnically and regionally divided societies and this may explain why for years the PDP has been able to be a state wide party and more importantly why the APC through a broader coalition by the three main political parties was able to capture many elements of society. Most importantly, this table indicates that voting patterns are not entirely based on religion.

Nonetheless, voting patterns in Nigeria continues to be interpreted along religious divides and this has continued to create some disintegrative elements within the Nigerian polity as many have linked the emergence of the Boko Haram sect to the 2011 elections in which the north felt out-witted. Although the general public does not support the sect and its tactics, many, especially in the south are often quick to raise allegations against the northern political elites of financing the group as a

revenge tactics aimed at destabilizing the government. No doubt the party's 'rotational' principle which was designed to be inclusive, has ended up having a divisive impact that continues to deepen tensions and foster animosities amongst the diverse ethno-regional and religious groups.³⁹⁴ Although many have criticised on the negative effects of the rotational principle so far nothing has been done to address its adverse effects.

3.2.2.2 Electoral System

In terms of parliamentary elections, Nigeria operates a single member constituency type on the basis of 'First Past the Post system'.³⁹⁵ Competitiveness in this system has been encouraged through wide political parties with conditions that at all times they are to "(...) uphold the rights and freedoms of the Nigerian people, as guaranteed by law (...) as well as providing equal opportunity to qualified persons to participate in electoral activities."³⁹⁶ For the most part, many of the registered parties have been able to fulfil the above requirement as it would be seem unlikely that any party be registered if was believed to have elements of religious, ethnic or linguistic bias. This national outlook of political parties has been achieved through a number of mechanism: firstly, by making sure that the membership of each party is open to every citizen of Nigeria irrespective of his place of origin, circumstance of birth, sex, religion or ethnic grouping.³⁹⁷ Secondly, that the name of the party, its symbol or

³⁹⁴Baker, H. P. (2012). p. 3.

³⁹⁵The parliamentary elections include both the House of Representatives as well as the house of senate. The 'first past the post system' is also known as 'Winner Take All System' (US) or Plurality System. "Under First past the Post (FPTP) voting takes place in single-member constituencies. Voters put a cross in a box next to their favoured candidate and the candidate with the most votes in the constituency wins and all other votes count for nothing. This system is the second most common voting system and is used the elections for the House and Senate in the United States as well as for the House of Commons in the United Kingdom. Many countries that were once colonies of Britain also use this system." Available at: <http://www.electoral-reform.org.uk/first-past-the-post/#sthash.aOa0OSw1.dpuf>. http://faculty.georgetown.edu/kingch/Electoral_Systems.htm . Accessed on 24 November, 2014.

³⁹⁶Code of Conduct for Political Parties. Available at: http://www.inecnigeria.org/?page_id=18. Accessed on 15 April, 2015.

³⁹⁷1999 constitution Art. 222(a).

logo does not contain any ethnic or religious connotation or give the appearance that the activities of the party are confined to only a part of the geographical area of Nigeria.³⁹⁸ Thirdly, that the headquarters of each political party is situated in the FCT, Abuja as well as having branches or at least a presence in majority of the states, local governments, as well as the 8,816 electoral wards of the federation.³⁹⁹ Additionally, each party is expected to present a copy of its constitution to be registered in the principal office of the INEC as well as being available for anybody who wants to be informed about the name, functions, objectives, membership requirements, decision making process and overall ideology of the party.⁴⁰⁰ Through these provisions, the constitution aims at fostering integrative factors.

Nigeria constant struggle with regards to the electoral system has been on how to conduct a credible election. This is a crucial matter for Nigeria, as most post-election violence are often caused by disagreements over the election results. Despite all efforts to make these elections credible, the electoral process has always been criticized of being marred by serious electoral corruption which according to Suberu, have ‘undermined the incentives for inter-ethnic coalition and accommodation’.⁴⁰¹ In the past two elections conducted in the country (2007 and 2011) INEC took steps to remedy this situation through a number of electoral reforms, which included the introduction of a new system of voting (in 2007) known as the Electronic Voting

³⁹⁸1999 constitution Art. 222 (e).

³⁹⁹1999 constitution Art. 222(f).

⁴⁰⁰1999 constitution Art. 222(c).

Political Party Constitutions (2011). Available at http://www.aec.gov.au/parties_and_representatives/party_registration/constitution-guidance.htm. Accessed 17 January, 2015.

⁴⁰¹Candidates during elections have used all forms of electoral corruption, from the use of force, fake ballot papers, falsification of results, as well as fraud to manufacture a seemingly broad-based support. This has contributed in undermining the development of a stable and ‘robust nationally integrated party system’.

Suberu, R. (2010). The Nigerian Federal System: Performance, Problems and Prospects. *Journal of Contemporary African Studies*. 28 (4) p. 470. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02589001.2010.512741>. Accessed on 28th November, 2014.

System (EVS).⁴⁰² The EVS was believed, would not only capture the names of eligible voters, but also eliminate duplication and minimize discrepancies in the electoral system.⁴⁰³

Election in any country is crucial not only because it consolidates democracy, but also because it is a way through which the power of the masses become evident. Nigeria's history reveals a pattern through which the military has always perpetuated itself in power. In many cases it has been as a direct or indirect result of the chaos witnessed after elections. For example, the 1964/65 general elections witnessed gross irregularities where electoral officers were used by the federal government to manipulate the results in order to frustrate some of the parties.⁴⁰⁴ The widespread violence that eschewed was one of the major factors that led to the first military coup of 1966. Similarly, the 1979 general elections have been described as a replica of the preceding election, this time with the military playing a dubious role in the election outcome. The 1983 and 1987 general elections were also characterized by rigging in which the ruling party (NPN) used its powers to rig the election that resulted in violence which plunged the nation once more into another era of military rule. Similarly, the 1999, 2003, 2007 and 2011 democratic elections have also been controversial and have often been associated with political tension, crisis and

⁴⁰²Prior to the 2007 elections, and based on reviews conducted after the 2003 elections via conferences which engaged INEC officials, Political Parties, Local and International Observer groups, Civil Society Organizations, etc. the INEC introduced the Nigerian Electronic Voting System (EVS) this system is considered far more effective than the outdated OSBS system which is much dependent on paper records and polling cards. "The EVS is an imaged based integrated programme which consists of: Electronic voter's registration; eligible voters' authentication; electronic balloting via voting machines; and electronic transmission of results."

⁴⁰³Iwu, M. M. (2008). "Electronic Voting and the Future of the electoral system in Nigeria". *The Nigerian Electoral Journal*. 2(1) pp. 1-29.

⁴⁰⁴Moshood, B.A. (2009). Election Rigging and Governance in Nigeria: An Appraisal. *LASU Journal of Humanities*. 6.

violence.⁴⁰⁵ In general, politics in Nigeria has historically been plagued by deeply rooted suspicion amongst the various ethnic groups which has proved difficult to eradicate thus sustaining a vicious cycle of instability.⁴⁰⁶ It has been through this vicious cycle that many politicians have been constantly able to perpetuate themselves to power. No doubt electoral corruption and violence remains a major source of worry in the country because it shows that Nigeria is not getting its democracy right. It is important to note that a majority of the people who are active in this violence are the poor and unemployed.⁴⁰⁷ The National Intelligence Council (NIC) discovered that bulging youth population (who largely fall under the category of unemployed/underemployed) is a demographic feature that is linked with the ‘emergence of political violence and civil conflicts.’⁴⁰⁸ This fact is not unrelated to Nigeria’s situation since in most instances, it is the youth who are mobilized to carry out acts of political intimidation and thuggery on behalf of their political sponsors.

As Nigeria conducted another election in March 2015, despite high tensions, the elections were judged to be one of the most peaceful elections ever conducted in the country many who have claimed marks a new era in the country’s democratization. What made the 2015 elections a source of serious concern was the fact that insecurity in the country is at an all-time high. Amidst these challenges is was the inability of state security agencies to guarantee the needed safety during the elections. Prior to

⁴⁰⁵The 1999 elections were criticized of not being democratic in the true sense but merely a transfer of power from one military man to another. The 2003 general elections was also adjudged by many international and local observers as flawed by massive rigging. The 2007 and 2011 general elections, have also not been different from the previous conducted elections, tensions were higher and the usual anticipated aftermath was that of violence.

Ezeani, E. O. (2004). “Electoral Malpractice in Nigeria: The Case of 2003 General Elections” *Nigerian Journal of Public Administration and Local Government*. XII (1) pp. 143-162.

⁴⁰⁶Ugandan, I.A. (2010). “Political Accountability in Nigerian Governance: Implications for Long-Term Development” *Journal of Social Science and Public Policy*. 2(-) pp. 86-95. p.90.

⁴⁰⁷Ugandan, I.A. (2010). p. 84.

⁴⁰⁸National Intelligence Council (2014). Available at: <http://www.dni.gov/index.php>. Accessed on 1 December, 2014.

the elections many suggested public enlightenment programmes that will help inform people about what is expected from them during elections as well as how they can help combat violence and extremism. These programmes were especially targeted at flash point areas such as the Niger Delta region and Plateau state. Similar initiatives were also encouraged in the three north eastern states of Adamawa, Yobe and Borno states that have been the hot bed of the Boko Haram terrorist group. Other regions such as Imo and southern Kaduna have also been listed as areas needing special attentions as a result of their susceptibility to violent outbursts.⁴⁰⁹

The security challenges confronting Nigeria as election approaches are more daunting when one considers the chaos of human trafficking in the south east, oil bunkering in the south- south, indigine-settler crisis and communal clashes in the north central and north west as well the insurgency in the north east which has left massive numbers of internally displaced persons in the country. Not only are the security agencies over stretched in their capacity, but there is also an absence of consensus in the planning for the conduct of the elections. More so, there is the need for Nigerians to recognize that the security challenges facing the country is a national and not a regional problem. When this is accepted, then the next step is to deal with the layers of mistrust that is prevalent: between politicians, the political parties, regional groups, and other interest groups.⁴¹⁰

⁴⁰⁹“Nigeria's 2015 Elections: Engaging Voters” (2014). Roundtable on Security and Nigeria’s National Elections. Richard Downie sits down with a group of security experts and civil society leaders in Washington D.C. *Centre for Studies and International Studies (CSIS)*. Available at <http://csis.org/program/csis-nigeria-forum>. Accessed on 20 December, 2014.

⁴¹⁰Nigeria's 2015 Elections: Engaging Voters (2014). *Panel 1: Lessons from 2011 and INEC's Outreach Strategy*. Available at <https://csis.org/event/nigerias-2015-elections-engaging-voters>. Accessed on 30 December, 2014.

According to Ambassador Laseinde, the problem with elections in Nigeria is the politicians' culture of impunity and not INEC or the security agencies.⁴¹¹ However, one cannot deny the fact that political intimidation, in many cases, has been carried out with the help and collaboration of the electoral officials and security agencies. The ineffectiveness of security agencies justifies the need for security sector reforms,⁴¹² while the culture of impunity demonstrated by some political elite' calls for the culture of good governance and stricter penalties for the instigation of electoral violence and other politically related crimes. Electoral violence no doubt, has negative physical and emotional impacts on the integration of Nigerians as these attacks and assaults not only result in deaths but lack of trust in the system as well as increased divisions among the ethno-religious and regional groups.

3.2.3 Transition to Democracy Military-Civilian Relations

After fifty four years of independence, the general opinion remains that Nigeria is yet to get the art of governance right. Nigeria has tried consecutive times at transitioning to a democratic government (1977, 1989 and 1999); a transition which has been marred by three decades of military rule.⁴¹³ But even after almost sixteen years of uninterrupted 'democracy' (1999-2015), the effects of military intervention still lingers and continues to exert some negative influences on civil management.⁴¹⁴ The Nigerian democratic system has fallen short of expectations in many aspects, and the

⁴¹¹Nigeria's 2015 Elections: Engaging Voters (2014). *Panel 1: Lessons from 2011 and INEC's Outreach Strategy*. Available at <https://csis.org/event/nigerias-2015-elections-engaging-voters> . Accessed on 30 December, 2014.

⁴¹²Osinakachukwu, P. N. (2011). The Electoral Process and Democratic Consolidation in Nigeria. *Journal of Politics and Law*, 4 (2). pp. 129-138. Available at www.ccsenet.org/jpl. Accessed on 18 December, 2014.

⁴¹³The country altogether, has witnessed seven coups, counter-coup and failed coups. In 1999 Nigeria finally made the transition to a democratic governance.

Alaga E. & Akum, R. (2013). Civil-Military Relations and Democratic Consolidation in Nigeria: Issues and Challenges. p. 215. In Blair, D.C. (ed.) *Military Engagement: Influencing Armed Forces Worldwide to Support Democratic Transitions*. Washington: Brookings Institution Press. Accessed on 25, November 2014.

⁴¹⁴Alaga, E. & Akum, R. (2013). pp. 215-216.

masses are yet to reap the dividends this democracy. It seems that ‘democracy’ in Nigeria has widened the gap between the ‘haves’ and the ‘have-not’, hence, only the few people at the corridors of power have access to public funds. Essentially, a democracy ought to guarantee the basic personal rights and political freedoms, as well as giving citizens the chance to influence the government through the freedoms they are guaranteed. Although democracy does not guarantee instant economic miracles, it ought to create the opportunities and the environment for the improvement of people politically, economically and socially.⁴¹⁵ Therefore, a country fails to qualify as ‘democratic’ until it meets certain requirements such as: freedom of speech and association, rule of law, majoritarian rule, minority rights, acceptance of opposing views, free choice, competitive elections which are not only periodic, but are conducted freely and fairly and succession from one leader to another is peaceful.⁴¹⁶ In Nigeria’s case, the above is the opposite, there has been a series of lack of free and fair elections, lack of freedoms, corruption and lack of observance for the rule of law.⁴¹⁷ However, this third wave of democracy into which Nigeria falls seems to have blurred the paradigm for categorizing a democratic state from a non-democratic one. It is this unclear dichotomy between ‘democratic’ and ‘non-democratic’ systems that makes one careful not to disqualify countries like Nigeria from the list of democratic states. Like many new democracies, it is not

⁴¹⁵Shin, C.D. (1994). On the Third Wave of Democratization: A Synthesis and Evaluation of Recent Theory and Research. *World Politics*. 47 (1). p. 157.

⁴¹⁶Idada, W. & Uhumwangho, S.O. (2012) Problems of Democratic Governance in Nigeria: the Way Forward. *Journal of Sociology and Anthropology*. 3 (1) p. 50.

⁴¹⁷Adekola, A. A. (2010). Introduction. In *West Africa’s Security Challenges: Building Peace in a Troubled Region*. Adekeye, A. & Ismail, R. (eds.) pp. 1–18. Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner. p1.

uncommon for manifest differences in the way democracy is practiced,⁴¹⁸ and in Nigeria it seems that the transition to democracy has not been fully completed.

Like many developing or post-communist states, there seems to be a blending of democratic and authoritarian elements resulting in a hybrid type of government that is in-between. As Harrop and Hague noted, in these type of democratic states, it is not that the legitimacy is completely lacking; rather, it is that the legitimacy acquired is exploited in dubious ways.⁴¹⁹ Indeed in Nigeria's case, elections are held periodically and power is transferred through the democratic institutions, but on the other hand, the behaviour of the political elites seem to tell a different story. In most cases these elites use 'ethnic diversity, fear of political instability and demand for economic development as reasons for departing from the liberal aspects of established democracies.'⁴²⁰ Although the general perception is that democracy and authoritarianism are two incompatible forms of government, Harrop and Hague point to cases like Malaysia which has been successful in combining the features of the two in a manner that seems to have provided the foundation for 'a remarkably stable political order'.⁴²¹ This hybrid form of government may in fact work for some countries, but the possibility of favourable disposition towards the dominant ruler or party is dependent on the efficacy of governance.⁴²² Cases of political parties like the Singapore's People's Action Party and personalities like President Putin show how competent leadership can serve as the bases for wide support despite discrepancies in the organization of government.⁴²³ However, in the case of Nigeria, it may be

⁴¹⁸Hague, R. & Harrop, M. (2004). *Comparative Government and Politics: An Introduction*. New York: Plagrave Macmillan. pp. 46-47.

⁴¹⁹Hague, R. & Harrop, M. (2004). p. 47.

⁴²⁰Hague, R. & Harrop, M. (2004). p. 47.

⁴²¹Hague, R. & Harrop, M. (2004). p. 47.

⁴²²Hague, R. & Harrop, M. (2004). p. 46.

⁴²³Hague, R. & Harrop, M. (2004). pp. 48-49.

difficult to say the same judging from its notoriety for leaving behind records of bad governance.⁴²⁴ The Nigerian government best fits into a category of semi-democracies, where power is concentrated in few hands and most often, those on the seat of authority have little power and serve merely as puppets for the political barons and godfathers.⁴²⁵

Ake points out that the type of democratization going on in countries like Nigeria is one of disempowerment. In these nations, the state remains ‘ambushed, privatized, repressive and unpopular’.⁴²⁶ Similarly, Ukiwo adds that this “unbridled competition for power, and the failure of government to deliver democratic dividends (...)”⁴²⁷ is what manifests itself in violent conflicts between ethnic and religious groups, and endangers the country’s nascent democracy.⁴²⁸ In Nigeria, the central role of the democratic state has for the most part, served as an avenue for primitive accumulation of wealth with hardly any push by the elites for principles such as accountability, due process and rule of law. These circumstances have resulted in the country’s low ranking in terms of democratic principles.⁴²⁹ It is therefore of no surprise why most Nigerians have decided to turn their backs on the state and pledge their loyalty to sub-national social formations such as the community, religious

⁴²⁴In a survey conducted by Transparency International (TI) 2013 Nigeria was ranked 144 out of 177 countries surveyed in the Corruption Perceptions Index. In the 2013 Global Corruption Barometer, a public opinion survey by TI, 72 percent of Nigerian respondents believed that corruption had increased “a lot” since 2011. Corruption was perceived to be greatest among the Nigerian Police, political parties, and the parliament. Freedom House: Nigeria (2014). Available at <https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2014/nigeria#.VMkiE9KUdmw> . Accessed on 28 January, 2015.

⁴²⁵Hague, R. & Harrop, M. (2004). pp. 48-49.

⁴²⁶Ake, C. (2000). *The Feasibility of Democracy in Africa*. Codesria book series. Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa. Available at <http://books.google.com.cy/books?id=i0h0AAAAMAAJ>. p. 114.

⁴²⁷Ukiwo, U. (2003). pp. 115-138.

⁴²⁸Ukiwo, U. (2003). Politics, Ethno-Religious Conflicts and Democratic Consolidation in Nigeria. *Journal of Modern African Studies* 41(1): pp. 115-138.

⁴²⁹Available at <https://freedomhouse.org/country/nigeria#.VMkodtKUdmw>

groups, ethnic associations, etc.⁴³⁰ which for the most part, has worked to the detriment of efforts to forge a strong integrated nation.

The long years of military rule has greatly influenced the military-civilian relations and by extension, the country's implementation of democratic principles.⁴³¹ During the colonial period, the primary role of the military was as defenders of the colonial authority and oppressors of the people. The 'colonial-civilian control' did not establish a tradition of legitimate civilian institutions to maintain democratic principles,⁴³² as in most cases, it resorted to force and intimidation as well as manipulation of traditional rulers in order to get what they wanted. At independence, Nigeria had the basic arrangement necessary for a democratic state to emerge. There was a federal constitution that devolved a reasonable measure of autonomy to the regions, it operated a parliamentary democratic system similar to that of the British Westminster system, the constitution guaranteed freedoms through its elaborate bill of rights as well as ensuring a multi-party system, albeit, regionally based.⁴³³ However, alongside these democratic structures, the Nigerian political elites also inherited another set of structures which involved the use of security forces for similar purposes as in the case of the colonialist. This dual contradictory structure which combined tenets of modern liberal political systems with those of the oppressive colonialists, developed a skewed military-civilian relation. The constant interference of the military in political affairs and the influence they exercised over the civilian government not only accorded them a new sense of political power but

⁴³⁰ Ake, C. (2000). *The Feasibility of Democracy in Africa*. Codesria book series. Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa. Available at: <http://books.google.com.cy/books?id=i0h0AAAAMAAJ>. Accessed on December 25, 2015. p. 114.

⁴³¹ Alaga E. & Akum, R. (2013). p. 215.

⁴³² Nowa, O. (2013). Available at <http://www.gamji.com/nowa/nowa10htm>. Accessed on

⁴³³ Idang, G. J. (1970). The Politics of Nigerian Foreign Policy: The Ratification and Renunciation of the Anglo-Nigerian Defence Agreement," *African Studies Review*. 13(2) pp. 227–251.

was a major factor which led to the gradual politicization of the military.⁴³⁴ The quota system in military recruitment also played a role in this already developing politicization of the armed forces by adding ethnic undertones. The quota system which was based on a 50/20/ 25/5 percentage for the north, west, east and mid-western region respectively; was in order to ensure fair representation of all ethnicities in all government institutions. However, it also served to increase regional affinities among the military personnel thus compromising their loyalty to the Nigerian state.⁴³⁵ Some scholars have noted that the appearance of a democratic civilian control over all spheres of government including the military was only deceiving, as it is believed that many of the middle and low ranked officers in the army did not share the neutrality and professionalism of the more British influenced senior officers.⁴³⁶ The political elites also contributed to the armed forces' lack of neutrality by appointing them into government offices. For example, the Defence Minister was also appointed as the chairman of the Economic Committee of the federal cabinet and used his position to increase the defence budget substantially, from £5.5 million to £19.5 million in a period of seven years.⁴³⁷ The military is one of the most stable institutions capable of maintaining its hegemonic identity among other institutions, consequently, as political squabbles intensified among the political elites who were organized into predominantly ethnic/tribal based parties, and as many became disappointed with the elites corrupt and selfish agendas, the military (mainly from the Eastern (Igbo) Region) staged the first coup in January 1966. Although the action was not devoid of partisan and ethnic sentiments which other ethnic factions in the military saw as a ploy by the Igbo fraction to impose their

⁴³⁴Alaga, E. & Akum, R. (2013). pp. 221-222.

⁴³⁵Alaga E. & Akum, R. (2013) p. 221.

⁴³⁶Omoigui, N. (2013). "History of Civil-Military Relations in Nigeria (Part 2)". Available at <http://www.gamji.com/nowa/nowa10htm>.

⁴³⁷Omoigui, N. (2013). Available at <http://www.gamji.com/nowa/nowa10htm>.

hegemony over the other ethnic groups, nonetheless, the coup plotters saw themselves as custodians of the state, and were in fact widely “lauded as heroes because they promised to maintain law and order and to guarantee the safety of lives and property.”⁴³⁸ Nonetheless, the sectarian character of the coup led to stiff opposition especially from the northern faction, which culminated in a countercoup the same year.⁴³⁹ The issue was not so much that the intention of the military was bad but more so that it had been corrupted. It will be recalled that the January 1966 coup (in which prominent northern politicians were killed) was led by a young group of mostly eastern officers. General Ironsi (an easterner) who subsequently became head of government after the coup, did not only desist from punishing the coup plotters, but went ahead to surround himself with advisers from his region.⁴⁴⁰ His subsequent action to promulgate decree No. 33 and 34 which abolished political, ethnic and cultural associations and also put in place a unitary government, respectively, was seen especially by the northerners as threatening as it would put them at a disadvantage vis-à-vis their southern counterparts who had more personnel especially in the civil service.⁴⁴¹ It is believed that the coup which was masterminded by officers of northern extraction was in an effort to restore the ‘political balance’ (albeit somewhat in favour of the north).⁴⁴² From the very onset of military involvement in government, we see an Ironic contradiction where the same ethnic bigotry which divided the political elites of the civilian regime, also became the

⁴³⁸ Omoigui, N. (2013). Available at <http://www.gamji.com/nowa/nowa10htm>.

⁴³⁹ Alaga, E. & Akum, R. (2013). pp. 216.

⁴⁴⁰ Ajayi, A. I. (2013). p. 140.

⁴⁴¹ Ajayi, A. I. (2013). p. 140.

⁴⁴² Similarly, the northern elements were also accused of carrying out pogroms against the easterners in the north in an attempt to decimate the ranks of the Igbo elements residing in the north. When it appeared that the head of state who was a northerner was unable (or unwilling?) to stem the tide of the persecution directed against the Igbos in the north, the Military Governor of the eastern Region directed the Igbo resident in the North to return home and what followed was the declaration of a sovereign Republic of Biafra in 1967, a development which inevitably led to the civil war. Ajayi, A. I. (2013). p. 140.

dividing factor within the military. This is perhaps the reason why a lot of coups and counter coups were instigated by one group over another. These inflamed ethnic passions pushed the ethnically divided military to use their powers against each other, thus the battle became not of national integration, but one of which ethnic group was best fit to rule.⁴⁴³ With these divisions within the military, it became impossible for them to integrate all groups in society. After the 1967-1970 civil war (Biafaran War), the relation between the military and political elites took another significant shift.⁴⁴⁴ The once formal nature that characterized the two spheres gradually evolved into one of a client-patron relationship where the military and the political elites were working hand in hand to run the affairs of the state. The military's command structure as well as their 'centralism' in which virtually all powers and resources were appropriated for the centre, ensured a strong grip on the polity so much that Nigeria emerged more united than previously, however it was a unity based on authoritarian leadership and control.⁴⁴⁵

One cannot however downplay efforts put in by military regimes to integrate the nation's diverse groups. In fact, the early political institutions of the Nigerian state were to a large extent erected by the military and one may argue that this explains the role the military in the development of the Nigerian socio-economic and political institutions. Before the start of the Second Republic (1979), the military government had created nineteen states, moved the capital of the country from Lagos to Abuja, introduced a new constitution, switched to a presidential system of government,

⁴⁴³ Ajayi, A. I. (2013). Military regimes and nation building in Nigeria, 1966-1999. *African Journal of History and Culture*. 5(7), pp. 138-142. Academic Journals. Available at <http://www.academicjournals.org/AJHC>. p. 140.

⁴⁴⁴ Alaga E. & Akum, R. (2013). p. 216.

⁴⁴⁵ Ajayi, A. I. (2013). p. 140.

established national councils and even replaced the national anthem.⁴⁴⁶ The creation of states, initially served the purpose of quelling secessionist tendencies, the military however realized that creation of states was not enough to foster integration, stability and political development and that new integrating institutions had to be built as well as old ones re-enforced.⁴⁴⁷ One of the first steps taken in this direction was the 1979 constitutional reform which stipulated that the seizure of power was unconstitutional. The constitution also “banned military personnel from joining political parties or openly participating in political activities.”⁴⁴⁸ “Military personnel with political ambitions or interests were required to retire from active service.”⁴⁴⁹ The constitution provided for “a clear command structure in which the elected president was commander in chief, head of government, as well as the chair of the defence and security councils.”⁴⁵⁰ The chief of defence staff was also to report directly to the president rather than the minister of defence, as had been the case in the First Republic. All these measures were in an attempt to neutralize and restore professionalism in the armed forces as well as to promote self-sustained growth, and a smooth democratic transition.⁴⁵¹ Similarly, the institutionalization of some cross-cultural events and institutions such as the National Sports Festival, National Festival of Arts and Culture and the National Youth Service Corps Scheme (NYSC) were put in place to assist in reinforcing efforts at integration.⁴⁵² It is important to note that when the military consists of elements mainly from a particular ethnic/religious group it becomes difficult to serve as an integrative force. This may explain why

⁴⁴⁶National councils were institutions that were set up by military decree to deal with specific subject areas like education, housing, health agriculture and finance. They served as consultative bodies for the coordination of all national activities. p. 60.

⁴⁴⁷Odetola, O.T. (1978). *Military Politics in Nigeria: Economic Development and Political Stability*. Transaction Publishers. pp. 60-61.

⁴⁴⁸Odetola, O.T. (1978). p. 59.

⁴⁴⁹Odetola, O.T. (1978). p. 59.

⁴⁵⁰Odetola, O.T. (1978). p. 59.

⁴⁵¹Odetola, O.T. (1978). pp. 59-60.

⁴⁵²Odetola, O.T. (1978). p. 62.

many of these structures operated at a superficial level as there was lack of a solid foundation for enduring unity. Similarly, The festivals have been described as mere ‘jamborees’ and avenues for corrupt state officials to enrich themselves, and even the NYSC scheme initiated in 1973 eventually succumbed to corruption and maladministration.⁴⁵³ Likewise, formulas like ‘Quota system’ and the ‘Federal Character’ which the military came up with in order to remove fear of marginalization and give every ethnic group a sense of belonging through ensuring some sort of balance in matters of admission or recruitment into public institutions and appointment into public offices, were regularly manipulated to promote subnational interests. The military also showed double standards in the handling of religious matters. On one hand while they constantly echoed the secular nature of the Nigerian nation as enshrined in the constitution, many of the military rulers on the other hand, were giving covert and overt support to a particular religion. A popular example of this was Nigeria’s membership of the Organisation of Islamic Conference (OIC) in 1986, which generated a lot of crises that threatened to pull the country apart on several occasions.

Essentially, the structures set up by the armed forces were largely ineffective and the civilian-military practices were in contrast from the constitutional reforms. By the Third Republic, military interference in political appointments seemed to be the norm. After the 1983 general elections for example, instigated a silent veto.⁴⁵⁴ Many times, the reasons given by the military for taking over government was that “elections were fraudulent, the economy was in decline, the civilian government was

⁴⁵³Odetola, O.T. (1978). p. 63.

⁴⁵⁴The army tried to influence the choice of ministers to be appointed by sending a list of their “preferred candidates”. Omoigui, N. (2013) “History of Civil-Military Relations in Nigeria (5): The Second Transition (1979–83, Part 2)” Available at: www.dawodu.com/omoigui7.htm. Accessed on 25 November, 2014.

hopelessly corrupt, and the general populace was undisciplined.”⁴⁵⁵ Despite campaigns like the War Against Indiscipline (WAI) to remedy social ills, it seemed that whenever the military took over, human rights violations were further exacerbated. The lack of accountability and human rights violations not only undermined the freedom of association, due process and rule of law, but also developed a culture of impunity which continues to plague the Nigerian political system. While it is true that ethnic antagonisms were minimized in the 1970s, this was not sustained as illustrated by the resurgence of conflicts in the 1990’s. Even after transitioning to democracy, many scholars are of the opinion that the democratic government has had the tendency to exhibit that high-handedness of the military especially when it comes to suppressing ethnic tension.

Efforts have been made to restore normalcy in the civilian-military relations with regards to their roles and responsibilities in the state. For example, the 1999 constitution clearly spells out that the purpose of the armed forces is “to defend Nigeria from external aggression; maintain territorial integrity and secure its borders from violation on land, sea and air; and (...) to suppress insurrection and restore order when called upon to do so by the president (...)”.⁴⁵⁶ Similarly, their performance and functions are put under the scrutiny and prescription of the National Assembly. In addition to this, in 1999 president Olusegun Obasanjo established the Human Rights Violations Investigation Commission (HRVIC) popularly known as the Oputa Panel,

[T]o establish the causes, nature and extent of human rights violations/abuses between 1966 and 1999⁴⁵⁷; identify perpetrators (individuals or institutions) of these human rights violations; determine the role of the state in the violations; and to recommend means (whether

⁴⁵⁵“Nigeria’s Muhammadu Buhari in Profile,” BBC News, April 17, 2011. Available at www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-12890807.

⁴⁵⁶1999 Nigerian constitution. Art. 217 Para. 1-2.

⁴⁵⁷In particular, the assassinations and attempted killings between January 15, 1966 and May 28, 1999.

judicial, administrative, legislative or institutional) to pursue justice, redress the injustices of the past and prevent or forestall future violations or abuses of human rights.⁴⁵⁸

The commissions mandate to investigate the period from 1966 to May 1999, was deliberate as it covers a critical periods in Nigeria's political history (i.e. the first ever military coup down to the inception of a democratic dispensation in the country). This panel was a welcome development for Nigeria and Nigerians. As a new democratic state, it gave Nigeria a chance to turn a new leaf in its history that was marred by violence and injustices, as well as a chance for Nigerians to seek redress for the crimes committed against them and state institutions. It was meant to be a starting point for the healing process of bitter resentment harboured by one ethnic group against another; in other words, this commission was to serve as an instrument for integration.⁴⁵⁹ Some of the conclusions of the commission were as follows:

- i. Firstly, that "the Nigerian military was responsible for gross human rights violations."⁴⁶⁰
- ii. Secondly, that "apart from the military elite, there was also the collaboration of powerful and rich civilians in the preparation of numerous coups."⁴⁶¹

⁴⁵⁸Human Rights Violations Investigation Commission Charter. Statutory Instrument No. 8 of 1999.

⁴⁵⁹During the two year and eleven month period which the commission was in operation (1999-2002) it received about "10,000 testimonies of human rights violations and conducted public hearings across Nigeria, About 150 cases were heard, while most others were sent to a ministerial commission for adjudication. The final report of the commission was submitted to the president in June 2002 but unfortunately, it was never officially released to the public."

⁴⁶⁰ *Truth Commission: Nigeria Human Rights Violations Investigation Commission*. United States Institute of Peace (USIP) Available at <http://www.usip.org/publications/truth-commission-nigeria>. Accessed on 25 June, 2015.

⁴⁶¹ *Truth Commission: Nigeria Human Rights Violations Investigation Commission*. United States Institute of Peace (USIP) Available at <http://www.usip.org/publications/truth-commission-nigeria>. Accessed on 25 June, 2015.

iii. Thirdly, that “some State Councils in the Ministries of Justice violated fundamental rights of due process in attempts to protect perpetrators in specific, named cases.”⁴⁶²

Although the commission did summon some top military officials who were at the helms of power at one time during the military era, all failed to appear before the panel to answer the charges of “human rights abuses in which they were implicated.”⁴⁶³ Despite that many of the commission’s recommendations were not implemented, the commission did however encourage the legislation of some anti-corruption laws and the establishment of a commission to handle matters of corruption, transparency and accountability of government officials and institutions.⁴⁶⁴ In addition, a number of ethno-regional associations such as the Arewa Consultative Forum, Ohae-neze Ndigbo, and Afenifere have tried incorporating some military retirees in their leadership to act as a “bridge between civil and military constituencies.”⁴⁶⁵ Under the current presidential dispensation, there has also been the establishment of the department of Civil-Military Affairs

⁴⁶²*Truth Commission: Nigeria Human Rights Violations Investigation Commission*. United States Institute of Peace (USIP) Available at <http://www.usip.org/publications/truth-commission-nigeria>. Accessed on 25 June, 2015.

⁴⁶³This was one of the setbacks of the commission as it not only revealed the level of impunity and disregard for the rule of law by these elites, but also brought into question the actual powers of the commission to bring any form of justice to the people coupled along with this was the financial constraints which made it impossible for the commission to undertake further investigation or corroboration into cases outside the questioning that took place at the hearings.

⁴⁶⁴“(i) The commission recommended combating corruption, a drastic reduction of the armed forces, a review of security forces’ internal disciplinary procedures, and reform of the military intelligence, police and academic institutions. (ii) Victims of human rights abuses were recommended to receive compensation. (iii) The panel also recommended a broad consultation of civil society about Nigeria’s constitutional structure, improved human rights education, a moratorium on the creation of further states, more local governments to avoid corruption and the fragmentation of the political system. (iv) In addition, the commission recommended that funds be provided for the Ministry of Women Affairs, that the report be disseminated widely and that the government closely monitors the social, political and environmental conditions in the Niger Delta and elsewhere.”

Nigerian Democratic Movement. “Press Release: NDM Releases Full Version of Oputa Panel Report.” Available at http://www.kwenu.com/record/2005/ndm_oputa.htm . Accessed December 12, 2014.

⁴⁶⁵Nowa, O. “History of Civil-Military Relations in Nigeria, Part 8: The Current Transition (Continued)” Available at www.dawodu.com/omoigui10.htm. Accessed on 22 December, 2014.

(2011) with the aim of ‘re-branding’ the image of the military and ‘winning back’ the public’s support and trust in the military. These mechanisms have been established to act as an interface between the Nigerian military and the civilian populace, with the aim of promoting effective civil-military relations in the areas of “human rights, rule of law, negotiations, and liaison and conflict management.”⁴⁶⁶ We can say that these measure put in place have achieved a reasonable amount of progress in restoring the military’s professionalism judging from the fact that despite the security challenge and political instability Nigeria faces recently, the military have remained in the barracks.

One thing Nigerian politics has inherited from the years of military rule is the authoritarianism that comes with the command structure of the armed force. Indeed even on its journey from democratic transition to consolidation, many of the elites still have that culture of impunity ingrained in them and the culture for the rule of law is yet to be fully rooted into the country’s political process. Certainly, the mere retention of a democratic regime is not enough, as there is need for democratic consolidation. As Lawrence Whitehead rightly argues, democratic consolidation involves “an increasingly principled rather than instrumental commitment to the democratic rules of the game”⁴⁶⁷

A consolidated democracy is one in which none of the major political actors, parties, organized interest groups, or institutions consider that there is any alternative to the democratic process to gain power, and that no political institutions or groups has a claim to veto the action of democratically elected decision makers(...). This (consolidation) cannot be achieved without abandoning the formal and informal institutions, procedures and arrangements that constrain the performance of a newly democratic regime (...) as well as converting expedient or superfluous

⁴⁶⁶Ecoma, A. & Akum, R. (2013). Civil-Military Relations and Democratic Consolidation in Nigeria: Issues and Challenges. In Blair, D.C. (ed.). *Military Engagement: Influencing Armed Forces Worldwide to Support Democratic Transitions*. Washington: Brookings Institution Press. pp. 299-230.

⁴⁶⁷Whitehead, L. The Consolidation of Fragile Democracies. in Shin, C.D. (1994) p. 144

democrats among both elites and masses into authentic believers in democracy.⁴⁶⁸

Certainly Nigeria seems to be practicing a democracy without democrats. The “(...) extensive prerogatives which have been accorded to the Nigerian military (...) have not only strengthened authoritarian tendencies”,⁴⁶⁹ but is having a great impact on the countries democratic consolidation. The high handedness of the military and the brutality against those who dared speak against them as well as the damning revelation of the cooperation they received from some civilian elites has left Nigeria with a very chequered political history and harboured resentments not only between the civilian and military but by one ethnic group against another.⁴⁷⁰ Despite the commendable efforts put in place to right these wrongs and instil democratic practices, the case of Nigeria proves to a large extent the argument that institutions, be it in the form of democracy, proportional representation or federalism are not enough on their own to build the level of unity desired in multi-ethnic states.⁴⁷¹ As Elkins & Sides suggest, “democratizing countries may be more susceptible to state disaffection as transitional periods provide opportunities for citizens to mobilize based on countervailing identities”⁴⁷² the ‘paradox mirrors’ and uncertainties these institutions present necessitate Nigeria not only to work on perfecting them, but in the process, finding complimentary and effective solutions to bridge the gap of ethnic divisions. In other words, what is needed is not only institutional effectiveness and efficacy, but creativity in devising long-term confidence building policies.

⁴⁶⁸Shin, C.D. (1994). On the Third Wave of Democratization: A Synthesis and Evaluation of Recent Theory and Research. *World Politics*, 47 (1) pp. 135-170. p.145

⁴⁶⁹Adeakin, I. (2012). Military Prerogatives, Authoritarianism and Prospects for Democratic Consolidation in Nigeria. Available at www.cpsa-acsp.ca/papers-2012/Adeakin.pdf Accessed on 4 December, 2014.

⁴⁷⁰Ecoma, A. & Akum, R. (2013). p. 230.

⁴⁷¹Elkins, Z. & Sides, J. (2007). Can Institutions Build Unity in Multiethnic States? *American Political Science Review*. 101(4). p. 706.

⁴⁷²Elkins, Z. & Sides, J. (2007). p. 706.

No doubt the transition stage of democratization is filled with great political uncertainties and the risk of reversion has been a constant reality in Nigeria's experience. The perpetual military intervention in governance has played a decisive role in not only determining the relationship between the civilian and the armed forces but also in the type of democratic federal state Nigeria is turning out to be. The Nigerian military like many have always seen themselves as custodians of the state, and therefore see it as their responsibility to save the nation from any threat that may lead to disintegration. Certainly, the political environment right after independence was a chaotic one and the tribal politics and animosity was leading the nation towards disintegration. By taking over the helms of power, the military served as an integrating factor to Nigeria's existence. A result of the over centralization by the military regimes is that, it has left Nigerians with a 'choice-less democracy' and this lack of genuine choice has created a credibility gap which has not only resulted in the de-linkage of the people from the state, but has pushed social forces to struggle for empowerment by any means.⁴⁷³

3.2.4 Religious Insurgency, Militancy and Secessionism

Shortly after gaining its independence in 1960, Nigeria experienced a threat to its very existence as a nation when the eastern region attempted to secede and form the Independent Republic of Biafra, an act in which attempts by the central government to prevent, broke into a civil war (1967-1970) that claimed thousands of lives and property. The infamous Biafaran movement still exists as MASSOB⁴⁷⁴ and unites Igbos who still dream of leaving Nigeria.⁴⁷⁵ According to the group's leader, Edeson Samuel:

⁴⁷³Ukiwo, U. (2003). p. 139.

⁴⁷⁴Movement for the Actualization of the Sovereign State of Biafra.

⁴⁷⁵In an interview published by BBC's Will Ross, it was found that many people in these eastern communities still hold on to the Biafaran dream, in fact such illegal associations have resulted in a

We were forced into this unholy marriage but we don't have the same culture as the northerners, our religion and culture are quite different from the northerners. No amount of threats or arrests will stop us from pursuing our freedom -self- determination for Biafran's (...).⁴⁷⁶

After a relative period of eased tensions succeeding the civil war, the early 1980's ushered in a new form of conflict, this time with a more religious undertone, notoriously referred to as the Maitatsine (Yan Tatsine) movement.⁴⁷⁷ Maitatsine had a long history as an unorthodox preacher in Kano and had been imprisoned on many occasions as well as deported in 1962. His supporters were mainly rural people who felt threatened by the 'social disturbances of the new oil wealth' and the 'modernizing changes brought about by government, and western education.'⁴⁷⁸ This group had several clashes with the government first in 1972 at the Sabongari Mosque, and again in 1979. The largest clash was in 1980 when thousands of the group members confronted the police; this led to the subsequent death of Mallam Maitatsine including 4,177 other people.⁴⁷⁹ However, the death of Maitatsine did not put an end to this religious rebellion as between the periods of 1980 to 1985 there were reported clashes between the police and members of this sect across the

number of conflicts between the government and the indigenous people of the south eastern communities; on 5th November for example, about a 100 men and women were arrested for holding up the Biafaran flag whilst marching on the streets, an act which was considered as treason, and although the charges were dropped, one point which remains certain is that forty two years after the end of the devastating civil war, the dream, of the Biafaran independence has not died with it as government struggles to clamp down on such agitations let alone allow it to gain momentum, an equal amount of determination to actualize the Biafaran reality is readily met by these groups.

Will Ross "the Biafrans who still dream of leaving Nigeria" *BBC News*. Available at <http://m.bbc.com/news/world-africa-20801091>. Accessed on 09 December, 2014.

⁴⁷⁶Edeson Samuel, is the national chairman of the Biafran Zionist Movement (BZM).

⁴⁷⁷The Maitatsine movement was started by Mallam Muhammadu Marwa, a convert to Islam who migrated to Kano in 1945 from north Cameroon and began preaching his ideology to the locals. Mallam Marwa popularly went by the nickname Mallam Maitatsine because he was fond of saying in Hausa- "Wanda bata yarda ba Allah ta Tchine" (May Allah curse the one who disagrees with his version) thus, 'Maitatsine'.

⁴⁷⁸Hinnells, J.R. (1995). "Maitatsine Movement." *A New Dictionary of Religions*. Blackwell Publishing, Blackwell Reference Online. Available at

http://www.blackwellreference.com/subscriber/tocnode.html?id=g9780631181392_chunk_g978063118139214_ss1-22. Accessed on 09 December, 2014.

⁴⁷⁹Aniagolu, A. N. (1981). "Report of Tribunal of Inquiry on Kano Disturbances" para 171. *New Nigerian*, 23 December, 1980.

northern states of Plateau, Maiduguri, Kaduna, Gongola (Taraba), Jimeta (Adamawa) and Gombe.⁴⁸⁰ It is worth noting that unlike contemporary Islamic-related movements (like Al Qaeda, Al Shabab, ISIL etc.) which have sprung up in West Africa and around the world, the Maitatsine movement of the 1980's has been described as a form of 'closed Islam' with Maitatsine, as the infallible prophet and interpreter of the Quran, rejecting all other Islamic sources.⁴⁸¹

Recent literatures dealing with Nigeria's security challenges have revealed that since 1999, the nation has been experiencing an increase in the number and intensity of terror-related attacks within the polity,⁴⁸² contributing to 70% of all terrorist attacks being recorded annually for the West-African region.⁴⁸³ These attacks have taken different forms from hostage situations, kidnappings, sabotage of economic infrastructures (such as destruction of gas and crude oil pipelines) as well as bombings of political, social and religious places.⁴⁸⁴ These attacks have primarily come from two major groups that have emerged since 1999; they include: The Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) and the Boko Haram terrorist group.

The Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) was established in 2004,⁴⁸⁵ and is one of the largest militant group in the oil rich Niger Delta region

⁴⁸⁰Okoli, E.J. (1982). "More religious rioting in Nigeria," *West Africa*. 8 November. p. 2873.

⁴⁸¹Hinnells, J.R. (1995)

⁴⁸²Pogson, I. A. (2011) "Nigeria's Foreign Policy, 1999-2007: The Socio- Political Elements of the Domestic Environment." *African Journal of International Affairs and Development*. 5(1),p. 32.

⁴⁸³Imohe, (2010) p. 242.

⁴⁸⁴Mbacu, D. (2008). "How Much Can 'Big Oil' Risk in Nigeria" *International Relations and Security Network (ISN)*, Zurich.

⁴⁸⁵The MEND is an offshoot of the Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP) founded in 1990 by Ken Saro-Wiwa, the organization was committed to using non-violent means to stop the exploitation and repression of the Ogoni people by these Multi-National Corporations, through his campaigns and writings, Wiwa was able to bring the attention of the world to the human rights violations happening in the Ogoni.

located in the south-south of Nigeria. Since the late 1950's, this region has been subjected to the devastating impact of the activities of numerous oil companies. The oil spills, gas flaring and the deforestation has resulted not only in environmental degradation, but also destroyed the chances of the people engaging in any form of subsistence living such as farming or fishing.⁴⁸⁶ MEND seeks to address the exploitation and oppression of its people by exposing the devastation brought to their environment as a result of the activities of government and Multi-National Corporations on their land. MEND is often seen as an umbrella organization accommodating other militant groups like the Niger Delta People's Volunteer Force, Niger Delta Liberation Front and Joint Revolutionary Council.⁴⁸⁷ The Economist describes the organization as one that “portrays itself as a political organisation that wants a greater share of Nigeria’s oil revenues to go to the impoverished region that sits atop the oil (...)”⁴⁸⁸ In other words, this group wants to localize control of Nigeria’s oil and secure reparations for its people from the federal government for the pollution caused by the oil industry. Hence, their targets have been largely multi-national oil companies like Shell Royal Dutch, Chevron, Exxon mobile, as well as governmental infrastructures. Their tactics are usually to attack petroleum operations through sabotage, theft, property destruction, guerrilla warfare, kidnapping of oil workers and more recently, bombings. It is important to note that from the onset, these groups were non-violent associations. The Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP) is a popular example of the initial non-violent nature of the Niger Delta protests, but after the execution of the group’s leader and some of its

⁴⁸⁶ Akwen, G.T & Gever, D.T. (2010). Challenges of Democracy and Development in Nigeria’s Niger Delta Region: an Appraisal. *European Scientific Journal*. 8 (16).

⁴⁸⁷ Hanson, S. (2007). MEND: the Niger Deltas Umbrella Militant Group. Council on Foreign Relations. Available at <http://www.cfr.org/nigeria/mend-niger-deltas-umbrella-militant-group/p12920>. Accessed on 10 December, 2014.

⁴⁸⁸ Risky Toughness. The Economist. (2008). Available at <http://www.economist.com/node/12267373>. Accessed on 09 December, 2014.

members (the Ogoni nine) by the Nigerian government in 1995, these groups began to employ more violent tactics.⁴⁸⁹ This event is perhaps a major reason why groups such as MEND have been widely successful in their activities in the region. During the time of peaceful protests, the Nigerian government preferred to offer protection to the oil companies while meeting the people's complaints with violence in the form of beating, imprisonment or even death in the hands of the military deployed to keep peace.⁴⁹⁰ The execution of the Ogoni nine fostered more resentment by the people against the government. This resentment has translated into widespread support which the group enjoys among the "region's approximately 20 million people, most of whom live in poverty despite the enormous wealth generated in the oil-rich region."⁴⁹¹ The executive director of Human Rights Watch, Kenneth Roth remarks that the Nigerian government and oil companies cannot pretend they don't know what is happening in the region and that the government has the primary responsibility to stop these human right abuse.⁴⁹² Similarly, one of the chiefs of the communities in the Niger Delta equates life in the region to that of paradise and hell:

⁴⁸⁹In 1994 allegations were brought against Saro-Wiwa and eight other activists of killing their local chiefs, as well as allegedly orchestrating a number of hijackings, a three man tribunal was set up to look into these allegations levelled against the 'Ogoni-nine', (as they have come to be popularly referred to as) a majority of people as well as organizations like the human rights watch have criticized the proceedings of the trial as lacking any form of justice as firstly for the fact that as civilians, they were tried in military courts and secondly, they were not only denied a fair trial but also the opportunity to appeal their case. The Ogoni nine were convicted and executed on November 10, 1995. Despite efforts of the families of the executed to file for further hearings, all petitions have been thrown out of court and it is quite unfortunate that the only avenue where the families would be heard was under the Alien Tort Statue of 1789 which gives non-U.S citizens the right to file suits in US courts for international human rights violations, torture or extrajudicial killings regardless of where the violations take place.

Centre for Constitutional Rights (2009). *The Case Against Shell: Landmark Human Rights Trial (Wiwa v. Shell)* Available at <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=L9NAz0j7h9o#t=13>. Accessed on 24 December, 2014.

⁴⁹⁰Centre for Constitutional Rights (2009). *The Case Against Shell: Landmark Human Rights Trial (Wiwa v. Shell)* Available at <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=L9NAz0j7h9o#t=13>. Accessed on 24 December, 2014.

⁴⁹¹Howden D. (2006). Corpwatch: Nigeria: Shell may pull out of Niger Delta after 17 die in a boat raid. Available at <http://www.corpwatch.org/article.php?id=13121>. Accessed on 09th December 2014.

⁴⁹²Human Rights Watch (2002). *The Niger Delta: No Democratic Dividend*. Vol 14(7). Available at <http://www.hrw.org/>. Accessed on 11 Dec 2014.

“they have everything, and we have nothing (...) if we protest, they send soldiers.”⁴⁹³

One of the reasons the Niger Delta militancy poses a great challenge to Nigeria is because it is an expression of the grievances a society has against the government. The Niger Delta is an important region in Nigeria owing to the natural oil resources present in the land which contributes to the bulk of the federal revenue. The leaders of these regions exercise great influence in the political affairs of the country, for almost sixteen years this region has been a stronghold of the dominant party (PDP) however despite this regions geographic importance, the leaders have failed in using the revenues allocated to them to develop these areas. If these groups continue to feel deprived it may possibly lead to further disintegration within the polity, possibly in the form of secession attempts.

In order to address the disintegrative nature of this situation, the Nigerian government especially since 2007 has taken important steps to bring an end to the insurgency in the Niger Delta. After the late president, Musa Yar’adua assumed office in 2007, he made the issue of the Niger-Delta a part of his administrations seven point agenda. This led to the creation of a new ministry known as the Niger-Delta ministry whose main focus was on the needs and grievances of the people.⁴⁹⁴ Alongside this development, came the decision in 2009 to grant the militants amnesty. The amnesty programme was focused on the disarmament, demobilization and rehabilitation of the militants.⁴⁹⁵ Efforts were also put in place to see that more of the oil wealth was used to develop these communities. However, some of the

⁴⁹³Human Rights Watch (2002). <http://www.hrw.org/>. Accessed on 11 Dec 2014.

⁴⁹⁴Ubhenin, E.O. (2013). The Federal Governments Amnesty Programme in the Niger-Delta: An Appraisal. *Yonetim Bilimleri Dergisi*. 11 (21) pp. 179-203. p. 183.

⁴⁹⁵As a part of the rehabilitation process, these militants were, counselled and trained in skill acquisition and apart from the \$439 monthly allowance, they were given loans at the end of their training to start businesses, Ubhenin, E.O. (2013). p. 183.

methods taken to address the problem have come under criticism. For example, the government annually pays millions of dollars into the accounts of some of these groups' leaders as a way to get them to protect oil pipelines instead of destroying them.⁴⁹⁶ This action is no doubt a cause for worry as it seems to send the message that militancy does in fact pay. A greater cause for worry is the undeniable fact that these groups might one day relapse and continue their acts of terror if the flow of money stops or if the government does not fulfil its agreement to improve the lives of the people in the Niger Delta. It can also result in the emergence of new groups who might also want to exploit the seeming 'generosity' of the government.

Although terrorism is not a new phenomenon, however, it has especially since the 9/11 attack on the US World Trade Centre taken a new dimension. Indeed Huntington's predictions of a clash of civilization seems to have taken a religious tone; one which has projected itself as a war between the Islamic world and everything western. The more recent terror attacks which has been plaguing the Nigerian nation since the 9/11 incident in the US are not far from the reality presented above. Acts of terrorism have been carried out across the country by an extremist religious militant sect known as the *Jama'atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda'Awati Wal-Jihad* (People Committed to the Prophet's Teachings for Propagation and Jihad) but popularly referred to as Boko Haram which is a mixture of Hausa and Arabic terms that means: '*western education is prohibited*'. The group's activities have been the primary source of national insecurity within the Nigerian polity especially in the north. This groups' activities has also been closely connected to the rising trends of 'Islamic' militias springing up in various parts of the world especially the Middle-

⁴⁹⁶Hinshaw, D. (2012). "Nigeria's former oil bandits now collect government cash" *Wall Street Journal*. Available at www.wsj.com/article/SB100014240. Accessed on 29 December, 2014.

East. Boko Haram's activities have succeeded in creating a rather tense environment within Nigeria; their attacks have not only become more frequent, but recently, their tactics are becoming more complex and sophisticated. Nigeria's Boko Haram have been linked with other terror networks such as Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and the Arabian Peninsula, Al Shabab and Al Nusra.⁴⁹⁷ In November 2013, the United States Bureau on Counterterrorism made a formal declaration listing Boko Haram as a terrorist group.⁴⁹⁸

The Boko Haram sect whose activities are predominantly carried out in the northern part of the country claim that it is implementing Shari'a law with the ultimate aim of the 'Islamization' of the entire country. The origin of the group can be traced back to a man by the name of Mohammed Yusuf who it is believed, conducted religious sermons within the state of Borno (Maiduguri) mostly criticizing the government and the northern elites of not doing enough to improve the living standards of the people. It is believed that there was a call made by him for the need to go back to the Islamic traditions and the Sharia, but this push was for mostly the northern states and was based on the belief that anybody the right to freely practice what they believed in.⁴⁹⁹

The 2009 killing of hundreds of the sects followers as well as the public execution of their leader by the State Security agencies have been considered by human rights

⁴⁹⁷Johnson, T. & Sergie, A. M. (2014). Boko Haram. *Council on Foreign Relations (CFR)*. Available at <http://www.cfr.org/nigeria/boko-haram/p25739>. Accessed on 25 October, 2015.

⁴⁹⁸The Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) Section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) Art. 1(b) of the Executive Order 13224.

⁴⁹⁹Speculations have also been made that from the onset, Yusuf received the support of the former Borno state gubernatorial candidate, Ali Modu Sheriff who for the support of his large youth movement, promised the group full implementation of Shari'a and top positions in government in event of his electoral victory. It has however been difficult to confirm the veracity of this allegations as many times the state government as well as Sheriff have denied of ever having anything to do with the group.

International Crisis Group (2014). *Curbing Violence in Nigeria (II): The Boko Haram Insurgency*. Africa Report No.216. <http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/africa/west-africa/nigeria/216-curbing-violence-in-nigeria-ii-the-boko-haram-insurgency.aspx>. Accessed on 23 January, 2015.

Campbell J. (2014). Boko Haram: Origins, Challenges and Responses. *Council on Foreign Relations*. www.cfr.org Accessed on 29 December, 2014.

activists as extrajudicial, and many people have suggested that the brutality used by the military and police against this sect was what encouraged the groups radicalization. This is an important point because it is similar to the case of the radicalization of the Niger Delta militants who it is also believed took up arms as a result of the brutality and insensitivity of the government. It seems that the manner in which government handles these situations can be a possible factor which breeds violence and subsequent disintegration within the polity. It is against the backdrop of the observed antecedents that recommendations on how to tackle such groups have advised on the discontinued use of heavy handedness by the military and police as they risk pushing more restless and jobless youths into extremism.⁵⁰⁰

From the period of 2010, Boko Haram have attacked police stations, military barracks, political figures, religious places of worship, public institutions, including civilians. More recently, they have extended their acts of terror against 'secular' schools and students who attend them, health workers, markets, bars, and basically anywhere known for large gatherings. These attacks have sometimes included key personalities who have dared to speak out against the groups' actions. Initially when the group emerged, it claimed to be in pursuit of vengeance for the extra-judicial killings of their leader, Mohammed Yusuf as well as their Muslim brothers and sisters who had been victims of violent clashes between Christians and Muslims in various regions across the country. However, of recent it has become increasingly difficult to identify who Boko Haram sympathizers are. Unlike their counterparts in the Niger Delta, Boko Haram do not enjoy wide support from the general Muslim

⁵⁰⁰*International Crisis Group* (2014). <http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/africa/west-africa/nigeria/216-curbing-violence-in-nigeria-ii-the-boko-haram-insurgency.aspx>. Accessed on 23 January, 2015.

population, and on numerous occasions, Islamic clerics who have come out to condemn the acts of these group referring to their actions as un-Islamic, have been the target of assassination attempts by the group. In November 2014, the group detonated three IED's and engaged in random shootings in the central Mosque in Kano during the weekly Friday prayers that killed more than 500 people.⁵⁰¹ It seems no one is safe and everyone who criticizes the group or engages in activities antagonistic to the groups' ideology becomes a target. Earlier on in 2014, Boko Haram had carried out series of attacks on schools. In February they stormed into a boarding school in the state of Yobe and killed over 59 school children in their sleep.⁵⁰² Barely two month later, they raided the Government Girls Secondary School in Chibok town of Borno state and kidnapped over 200 school girls, and in a video released shortly after the incident, their leader claims to have converted the girls to Islam and married them off to some of the group's members.⁵⁰³ In mid-2014, the group has resorted to seizing territories across the north-eastern states; this is in a bid to establish a Caliphate.⁵⁰⁴ This development is not only a complete departure from the groups earlier hit and run tactics, but also an imitation of the trends happening in parts of Iraq and Syria by ISIS.⁵⁰⁵ More importantly, the act of seeking to establish their caliphate within Nigeria, is not only an attempt to arbitrarily form another sovereign nation within an already defined geographical sovereign entity, but also a direct challenge to the legitimacy of the federal government.

⁵⁰¹Muhammad, A. & Daniel, S. (2014). Bomb blast kills 200 in Kano Central Mosque. Vanguard Newspaper. Available at <http://vanguardngr.com>. Accessed on 30 December, 2014.

⁵⁰²BBC News. (2014). Nigeria School raid in Yobe state leaves 29 dead. Available at www.bbc.com. Accessed on 27 December, 2014.

⁵⁰³Aminu, A. & Levs, J. (2014). "I will sell them" Boko Haram Leader says of Kidnapped Nigerian girls. Available at www.bbc.com/world-africa-29335637.

Heaton, L. (2014). "Nigerian Kidnapped schoolgirls sold as wives to Islamist fighters." The Daily Telegraph. Available at <http://telegraph.co.uk>. Accessed on 29 December, 2014.

⁵⁰⁴The group has managed to capture towns close to the borders of Cameroon, such as Gwoza, Gamboru, Ngala and Banki as well as towns in Adamawa such as Mincika and Mubi.

⁵⁰⁵The Economist (2014). Nigeria's Jihadist, The other Caliphate: Boko Haram is now taking territory and threatens a state capital. Available at www.economist.com. Accessed on 29 December, 2014.

The seeming ineptitude of the government to handle this group is breeding frustrations among Nigerians who feel insecure in their localities. This may lead to further disintegration since the basis for national solidarity is eroding as many southerners regard the acts of Boko Haram as being encouraged by the northern elites in a bid to make the nation ungovernable for the southern president and as a revenge on the south for denying them their right to complete their term in office. These insinuations are however, becoming more unfounded since a larger number of the casualties have been in the north than in the south. This situation has further created enormous humanitarian challenges in the country as thousands have fled their homes seeking sanctuary in other towns including neighbouring countries. These Internally Displaced Persons (IDP) is estimated at 9,000 with another 2,000 fleeing to neighbouring countries like Cameroon, Chad and Niger Republic.⁵⁰⁶ According to the Human Rights Watch, from the period of 2009 to 2013 over 3000 people have been killed⁵⁰⁷ and if the figures for 2014 are added, this brings the number of deaths to more than 5,000.⁵⁰⁸

With the widespread and systematic murders carried out by Boko Haram many people question the commitment of the government in tackling the issue. Boko Haram have not only committed gross crimes against humanity, but have left the security of the Nigerian polity dangling on a thin rope. What makes this war even more difficult is the fact that unlike the Biafaran, Niger delta militants or the Maitatsine uprisings, this war is being waged by faceless group who are very diffuse and employ guerrilla warfare. All attempts to get them to the negotiating table have

⁵⁰⁶The Economist (2014). *Nigeria's Jihadist*.

⁵⁰⁷Africa Program at the Council on Foreign Relations (2014). "Nigeria Security Tracker" *Council of Foreign Relations*. Available at www.cfr.org. Accessed on 30 December, 2014.

⁵⁰⁸Human Rights Watch (2012). *Nigeria: Boko Haram Attacks Likely Crimes against Humanity*. Available at www.hrw.org. Accessed on 29 December, 2014.

failed and in many instance the group has made it clear that they do not seek to negotiate with the government. The Nigerian security forces efforts to roll back the insurgency are becoming slimmer by the day and the presidents promise to end what is a serious threat to national security and territorial integrity looks increasingly empty. Despite the increased spending on security, corresponding gains against the group appears insignificant as many of the troops have complained of not getting the necessary supplies needed to push back this group. There is also the issue of the forces not getting paid on time or at all, which is bound to affect their morale in negative ways. There needs to be a change of tactics in the way government manages the threat presented by Boko Haram, but to get the security agencies to fully commit to this cause, their welfare is also important. The army represents a factor which integrates the nation, and its deterioration is synonymous to the gradual erosion of a country's unity.

The Biafaran war, the Maitatsine movement, the Niger Delta Militancy and the Boko Haram insurgency all have one thing in common, their adherents are mainly drawn from the improvised, unemployed and religiously uneducated youth. These people feel cheated in life, they are the homeless and jobless young men, they are the petty traders and idle foreigners, the members of society who in order to earn a living have to shine shoes, cut nails, sharpen knives, hawk, and do various other odd jobs that fetch very little income. Iscihei refers to this warfare as a 'revolt of the disinherited'.⁵⁰⁹ These movements appeal to the 'disinherited' because they feel deprived and these associations become the only means which readily provide them with an outlet to vent their frustrations. Therefore, they jump at any opportunity to

⁵⁰⁹Iscichei, E. (1987). Maitatsine Risings in Nigeria 1980-85: A revolt of the disinherited. *Journal of Religion in Africa*. 17 (3). pp. 194-208. Available at: <http://www.jstor.org/stable/1580874>. Accessed on 29 December, 2014.

attack those in affluence and use these avenues to make war on a society that has excluded them from the rewards of either oil wealth, dividends of modernization or their rights as citizens of the country. Nigeria has one of the lowest minimum wages in the world⁵¹⁰ and like Chinua Achebe puts it:

the peasant scratching out a living in the deteriorating rural environment, the petty trader with all his wares on his head, the beggar under the fly-over (...)Twenty of these would be glad any day to be able to share one minimum wage package.⁵¹¹

In most cases, these movements flourish amid economic ills, high prices, scarcity, retrenchment and unemployment. The fact is that most Nigerians are poorer today than they were at independence.⁵¹² Many are victims of resource curse, rampant corruption and the government's inability to provide security, good roads water, health, reliable power supply and basic standard education. The religious or ethnic factor inherent in Insurgent groups like Biafaran movement, Maitatsine, MEND and Boko Haram, are multi-dimensional and the poor system helps to fuel the frustrations and alienations that drive many to join these 'self-help' ethnic, religious or tribal groups that often times end up threatening the very existence of the state.

⁵¹⁰Fapohunda, T. M., Olusegun, S. A., & Olanrewaju, I. L. (-) Minimum Wage Implementation and Management in a Post-Recession Economy: The Nigerian Experience. *European Scientific Journal* 8 (7).

⁵¹¹Chinua Achebe. *The Trouble with Nigeria* (Enugu, 1983). pp. 22-24

⁵¹²In 1980 only an estimated 27% of Nigerians lived in poverty, by 1990 the figures increased to 70% and in 2010 it was estimated that over 58% of the population lived under the poverty threshold of \$1.25 a day. Nigeria is ranked the 25th poorest country in the world and one of the most unequal nations. Poverty is also distributed unevenly within the country, being more severe in the north east and less evident in the south-west.

El-rufai, N. (2011). *Nigeria: Rich Country, Poor People*. Available at <http://www.thisdaylive.com/articles/nigeria-rich-country-poor-people/96703>.

3.3 Socio-Cultural Factors

3.3.1 Tribalism

Like most social science terminologies, it is difficult to provide a clear-cut definition on what tribalism is, the term ‘tribalism’ most often, is used to refer to ‘the behaviour and attitudes that stem from strong loyalty to one’s own tribe’.⁵¹³ According to Ropeik ‘tribalism is pervasive as it controls a lot of our behaviour, readily overriding reason’.⁵¹⁴ ‘Tribalism’ is derived from the root word ‘tribe’ which is a very general concept with varying definitions. A ‘tribe’ can be define as a unit having common descent.⁵¹⁵ Also, a tribe could mean “having a relationship to a lineage of spiritual leaders.”⁵¹⁶ More commonly, a tribe has been defined as any group of people “numerically larger than a family but smaller than an ethnic group (extended family) whose members often lay claim to a common origin by virtue of a common name, language, culture and origin and a specified geographical territory, with a common leadership.”⁵¹⁷ However, according to Paliga:

Although they [the tribes] might have shared many of their daily life activities with their village neighbours, they often had political loyalties to rulers elsewhere, and connections through trade and secret societies to people in other villages and towns.⁵¹⁸

⁵¹³Oxford Dictionaries. ‘Tribalism’. Available at www.oxforddictionaries.com. Accessed on 25 December, 2014.

⁵¹⁴Ropeik, D. (2011). “How Tribalism Overrides Reason and Makes Risky Times More Dangerous. Available at www.bigthink.com. Accessed on 25 December, 2014.

⁵¹⁵Johnson, D. H. (2003). *The Root Causes of Sudan’s Civil Wars*. Preface p. xv, Bloomington: Indiana University Press. p. 20.

⁵¹⁶Johnson emphasizes that “tribes are in no way rigid categories” or permanent fixtures, in fact he believes that what we call ‘tribe’ is usually a reference to ethnic groups. Johnson, D. H. (2003). p. 20.

⁵¹⁷Kwame A. A. (1999). Ethnicity and Identity in Africa: An Interpretation, p.703 *Africana: The Encyclopaedia of the African and African-American Experience*, New York: Civitas Books.

⁵¹⁸Paliga points to the problems the definition of ‘tribe’ presents; stating that since it belongs in the 19th century colonial era, it therefore cannot be used in modern times. Reason for this she argues, is because, contrary to early beliefs that all African peoples lived in tribes, many modern African identities are not as primitively homogeneous as it was presupposed to be, as many African identities do not all share common ancestors and well defined regions. Similarly, because of the manner in which the word was used, it has often been stressed of having discriminatory connotations which underlines the primitiveness of one group relative to the advance of another group. More so, as Akiwow remarks, some tribal groups could be considered state or nations; as some reveal a level of

In essence the difference between nationalism and tribalism comes down to the context in which it is applied and which in the 19th century was largely determined by the colonialists and what they considered ‘primitive’ and ‘civilized’. For example, a paper published by the Africa Policy Information Centre in 1997 demonstrated this with the word ‘*isizwe*’ in Zulu which is often translated to mean ‘tribe’, however a majority of Zulu linguists unanimously agree that a better translation of ‘*isizwe*’ is ‘nation’ or ‘people’.⁵¹⁹ The continuous use of the word ‘tribe’ in the 19th century context poses a problem. This is because colonization, urbanization, migrations as well as civil wars have contributed to blurring the lines of former ‘tribal’ identities.⁵²⁰ Paglia notes that ‘tribal’ identities have become less important especially after World War II,⁵²¹ therefore, leading to decrease in the emphasis on geographical location and common ancestry in the definition of tribe.⁵²² As to the reason why tribe is still used in African discourse, Appiah remarks that when the word ‘tribe’ is used today, it represent the ‘ethnonym’ of a specific group who have been products of the interaction between the European colonial ideas and the pre-existing ways of classifying people in African pre-colonial societies’.⁵²³ Argyle draws a similarity between European nationalism and African tribalism stating that

political integration more complex than a community of kin. The colonial concept of tribe is therefore oversimplified since within such a ‘tribal’ state there can exist other levels of social identification such as village communities, clans and sub-clans.”

Paglia, P. (-) Ethnicity and Tribalism: are these the Root Causes of the Sudanese Civil Conflicts? African conflicts and the Role of Ethnicity: a Case Study of Sudan. Africa Economic Analysis. pp .7-8 Kwame A. A. (1999). p. 704.

⁵¹⁹Background Paper, Talking About “Tribe”, Moving from Stereotypes to Analysis, November 1997, Africa Policy Information Center. Available at: <http://www.africaaction.org/bp/ethall.htm>. Accessed on 20 December, 2014.

⁵²⁰Kwame A. A. (1999). p. 704.

⁵²¹Secret societies were often deliberately targeted for destruction in the colonial period, because they involved rituals and religious beliefs inconsistent with Christianity or Europeans norms of civilization. Paglia, P (-). p. 8.

⁵²²Paglia, P. (-). p. 8.

⁵²³Paglia, P. (-). p. 8.

both be equated since both are hinged on the possession of a common language customs and culture.⁵²⁴ In essence, the difference between nationalism and tribalism boils down to the context in which it is applied, and in the 19th century, it was largely determined by what the colonialists considered ‘primitive’ and or ‘civilized’.⁵²⁵ When tribalism is used nowadays in African political discourse it usually refers to the urban or national struggle for power and resources through the use of ethnic and language ties as a means to aggregating power and authority.⁵²⁶ Although debates on proper use of the word ‘tribe’ seems to be endless and understanding the proper use of the word seems difficult, however, one factor that may stand is that a ‘tribe’ especially in African studies deals with homogeneity which binds a certain group of people together be it in culture, religion, language, traditions, or geography. As Schwarz rightly points out, when it comes to politics in most developing countries, ideological issues often takes second place, while tribe and religion takes the primary position:

Political argument is largely argument between individuals competing for power or groups of people quarrelling over the best way to share the limited national cake.⁵²⁷

Sharing of this ‘national cake’ becomes important not because it has anything to do with altruistic concerns, but because it matters to the people, and this is what makes tribalism fierce. In the African experience, fierceness becomes an element of tribe not because these tribe necessarily dislike each other, but because they are competing

⁵²⁴Argyle, W. G. (-). European Nationalism and African Tribalism. p. 41. In Gulliver, P. H. (1969). *Tradition and transition in East Africa: introduction*. University of California Press.

⁵²⁵Background Paper, Talking About “Tribe”, Moving from Stereotypes to Analysis, November 1997, Africa Policy Information Centre. Available at: <http://www.africaaction.org/bp/ethall.htm>. Accessed on 20 December, 2014.

⁵²⁶Paglia, P. (-) pp. 8-9.

⁵²⁷Schwarz, W. (1966). Tribalism and Politics in Nigeria. *The World Today*. 22 (11). Royal Institute of International Affairs. p. 460. Available at: <http://www.jstor.org/stable/40393799>. Accessed on 20 December, 2014.

for scarce resources such as scholarships, jobs, and overall social amenities.⁵²⁸ Nigeria is one of such countries that suffers from the fierce passions of tribal feelings, and these feelings are usually felt tremendously because the country accommodates three very large tribes:- Hausa, Yoruba and Igbo which on their own, are big enough to form separate nations. Tribalism in Nigeria has become so strong that it is practically inseparable from politics, some scholars have even argued that tribalism has been elevated to national culture in the sense that it controls how people think and talk as well as who they oppose and support. What is even more tragic as Raji notes, is that tribalism is promoted by the educated and the powerful because it serves as an effective tool for those who want to gain an advantage in their places of work or in politics.⁵²⁹

What makes tribalism a strong weapon in a country such as Nigeria? As diverse as the country may be, there are many other African countries which are similarly diverse, yet few are half as obsessed with their diversity as most Nigerians are. Many have offered answers such as greed, corruption, or competition as the reason why tribalism flourishes. As true as these viewpoints may be, however, at the heart of the issue lies the undeniable fact that group identities have become politicized. The ordinary Nigerian is brought up to reason in terms of 'us' and 'them' which is why many hold on to the notion of 'my-tribe-right-or-wrong'. Many issues which arise in the country often end up assuming an ethnic or religious tone. For example, the environmental problems of the Niger Delta have often been presented in light of an ethnic problem (i.e. the 'Ijaw' or 'Ogoni' problem) and many do not seem to realize that a more generic stance on the matter could be adopted: such as one on poverty,

⁵²⁸Schwarz, W. (1966). p. 460.

⁵²⁹Chile, R. (2013). The 'Tribalization' of Nigeria's Politics. *Premium Times*.

pollution, unregulated oil companies or corruption. By ascribing ethnic labels to problems which arise in the country, what results is putting one ethnic or religious group against another. Tribalism has promoted mediocrity and suppressed meritocracy giving way to nepotism which in turn has fuelled the embers of corruption that continues to stand in the way of national cohesion and consensus. Indeed tribalism has been one of the main reasons why Nigeria still struggles with corruption as many who engage in corrupt acts do so under the guise of 'tribal interest' and unfortunately, as many Nigerians may say they hate corruption, they are more likely and willing to forgive and even support the perpetrators of such crimes in so far as the individual is from their tribe. As Achebe notes, "nothing in Nigeria's political history captures her problems of national integration more graphically than the chequered fortune of the word 'tribe' in her vocabulary".⁵³⁰ In almost every state, there is always a battle of opposing tribes: in Benue it is the Tiv versus Idoma, in Plateau we have the indigenes versus the Hausa/Fulani settlers and in Kogi it is the Igala versus Egbira. The geographical entity of what is Nigeria has become synonymous to a large battle arena made for settling duels.

Similarly, the constitution is not neutral with regards to promoting such tribalist tendencies. For example, in the appointment of ministers to various departments, the constitution stipulates that there should be a minister from every state (in the constituent regions). This seemingly harmless provision has caused more harm than good for a country which is already struggling to unite, as the issue then becomes not looking for eligible persons who are qualified and well equipped to effectively conduct the affairs of their departments, but that of every political godfather lobbying and pulling strings to see that someone from his state or tribe gets into the position.

⁵³⁰Achebe, C. (1984). *The Trouble with Nigeria*. Heinemann Educational Publishers. p. 5.

This provision also proves to be contradictory as it disregards the fact that there is a provision which ensures that every state is already represented in the National Assembly. Principles such as the federal character sometimes also do more harm than good as many people come to believe that it is their rights that they get certain jobs and not necessarily by merit. Tribalism is the reason why some political parties in Nigeria have adopted formulas like ‘zoning’ which requires the rotation of the presidential seat between the north and the south. Tribalism has been the spring board for ethnic violence in Nigeria and has been occasionally used by politicians who manipulate ethnic loyalties to stir up passions that will suite their purpose, which is why in many cases during elections, voting is largely conducted along ethnic lines. Indeed in this twenty first century, Nigerians need to put aside tribalism. No country can progress if there is suspicion, stereotype judgements and historical resentments still prevailing. It then becomes the responsibility of the leaders to rise to the challenge of setting an excellent personal example for the populace.

3.3.2 Internal Migration

Based on an Internal Migration Survey (MIS) conducted by the National Population Commission (NPC) in 2010 and further research conducted in 2013 by the African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States (ACP) Observatory on Migration,⁵³¹ new findings on internal migration in Nigeria have emerged. According to the ACP report, although migration in Nigeria has had many negative impacts on the society, to however conclude that these impacts are only negative would be wrong. According to the ACP, migration has also been a positive contributor to human

⁵³¹The ACP Observatory on Migration is “a reference network of migration researchers and specialists working on South-South migration. It has been created as one of three components of the Intra-ACP Migration Facility. The ACP Observatory on Migration is an initiative of the ACP Secretariat, funded by the European Union, implemented by the International Organization for Migration and with the financial support of IOM and its Development Fund, the United Nations Population Fund and Switzerland.” The observatory was officially inaugurated in October 2010.

development in terms of access to better education, living standards and life expectancy.⁵³² With a high urban growth rate estimated at 3.84%,⁵³³ 45% of Nigeria's population are of the ages 14 and 35 which not only happens to form the chunk of the country's unemployed, but also the average age of most internal migrants.⁵³⁴ The study also found out that migration in Nigeria is not dependant on education or skill but mostly occurs where there is poverty, a severe shortage of viable employment and educational opportunities. These factors listed seem to indicate that uneven development is a major contributor for migration as people tend to move from less lucrative areas to places which can offer them better opportunities.⁵³⁵ Internal migration is therefore a result of complex multi-facet circumstances which can be economic, social, cultural and psychological. The high rate of urban growth is not entirely unconnected to this migration trend as forty six percent (46%) of the migrant population are between the ages of 20 and 34 years; this says a lot about why the search for better living standards is a major indicator in migration patterns in the country.

The most common kind of migration pattern in Nigeria is the rural-urban trend. Many Nigerians tend to migrate from their rural localities to urban-city centres such as Lagos, Ibadan, Port-Harcourt and Abuja in search of better opportunities. It is

⁵³²Oyeniya, B.A. (2013). *Internal Migration in Nigeria: A Positive Contribution to Human Development*. ACPOBS/2013/PUBO1. P. 17; Sibiri, A. E., Ayinmoro, A. D. & Jack Jackson, T.C.B. (2014). The Socio-Cultural Effect of Internal Migration among the People of Akutupa Kiri in the North-Central Zone, Nigeria. *Mediterranean Journal of Social Sciences*. 5(15) Italy: MCSER Publishing.

⁵³³United Nations Development Programme. (2009). *Human Development Report 2009: Overcoming Barriers: Human Mobility and Development*. Available at: <http://hdr.undp.org/en/reports/global/hdr2009/>. Accessed on 20 November, 2014.

⁵³⁴Oyeniya, B.A. (2013). *Internal Migration in Nigeria: A Positive Contribution to Human Development*. ACPOBS/2013/PUBO1. p. 17; Sibiri, A.E., Ayinmoro, A.D. & Jack Jackson, T.C.B. (2014). The Socio-Cultural Effect of Internal Migration among the People of Akutupa Kiri in the North-Central Zone, Nigeria. *Mediterranean Journal of Social Sciences*.5 (15) Italy: MCSER Publishing.

⁵³⁵Other minor factors responsible for migration include: marriages, civil-service transfers, NYSC mobilizations and human trafficking Oyeniya, B.A. (2013).

estimated that as of 2006, the population of residents of Abuja has doubled to around 778,567.⁵³⁶ It is also not uncommon to find Hausa-Fulani communities in the south, and likewise Yoruba or Igbo communities in the North engaging in various business activities such as kola nut trade, foreign exchange, security-men, domestic workers and many other odd jobs which provide some income.⁵³⁷ It is estimated that 15.3% of the rural-urban migrants are Hausa-Fulani, 8.5% are Yoruba, whilst 40.1% are Igbos.⁵³⁸ This seeming large percentage of Igbo migrants maybe as a result of the fact that compared to the other ethnic groups, the Igbos find it easier to leave their towns to places that would offer better opportunities.⁵³⁹ It is estimated that around 40% of Igbos live in the south-south of the country, there are another 40% in the south west and 20% residing in the north.⁵⁴⁰ In terms of areas more favourable to migrants, the north tends to be the least attractive and this has been attributed to the environmental conditions of the north which is predominantly semi-desert.⁵⁴¹ Similarly, religion and the practice of Islamic law has been an attributed factor of why the north is less appealing to migrants.

No doubt migration comes with its positive and negative consequences. In the extreme case, migration trends have resulted in disintegrative tendencies especially in the north-central region, which has witnessed fierce competition for limited

⁵³⁶Blessing U. Mberu, Roland Pongou. (2010). Nigeria: Multiple Forms of Mobility in Africa's Demographic Giant. Migration Policy Institute(MPI) Available at: <http://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/nigeria-multiple-forms-mobility-africas-demographic-giant>. Accessed on 20 April, 2014.

⁵³⁷Oyeniya, B.A. (2013). p. 4.

⁵³⁸Chukwuedozie K. A. & Onokala, C. P. (2013). The Effects of Rural-Urban Migration on Rural Communities of south eastern Nigeria. *International Journal of Population Research*, p. 10. Available at: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2013/610193>. Accessed on 20, January, 2015.

⁵³⁹Lee, E.S. (1966). *A Theory of Migration*. University of Pennsylvania. Available at: <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2060063>. Accessed on 10 July, 2013.

⁵⁴⁰International Organization for Migration (IOM): Migration in Nigeria: A Country Profile (2009). Switzerland: International Organization for Migration Publishers. Available at: <http://www.iom.int>. Accessed on October 20, 2014.

⁵⁴¹Oyeniya, B. A. (2013). Internal Migration in Nigeria: A Positive Contribution to Human Development. Available at: www.acpmigrationGobs.org/node/7314 . Accessed on October 20, 2014.

resources such as land and employment. Politically, it has also been used as a tool to exclude certain groups out of political participation. Internal migration in Nigeria has led to the formation of slum/ghetto areas in larger cities and has constituted a ground for violent clashes between the ‘indigenes’ and ‘settlers’.⁵⁴² Some of the most bloody inter-ethnic/religious clashes that have occurred in Nigeria can be attributed to the ‘native-settler’ dichotomy.⁵⁴³ Plateau state is most notorious for this issue and since 2001 has been home to spates of violent conflicts which have resulted in the loss of thousands of lives and property. Adesoji remarks that the root of the Plateau indigene crisis stems from the argument promoted that “one can only belong to a particular ethnic group and that by virtue of that, one might not be in a position to enjoy those benefits associated with settling in a place or among groups with different history, culture and language.”⁵⁴⁴ In other words, indigeneship of a particular society, group or region gives some people certain rights, which others should not enjoy simply because they are labelled settlers, migrants or strangers. These rights include access to education, employment opportunities, land, political participations or even the right to produce the chief or head of a community.⁵⁴⁵ In Taraba state this mentality has also informed the disposition of the Jukun⁵⁴⁶ to the Tiv minority groups that have settled in their communities. The Jukun essentially see the Tiv as settlers, hence the strictness in refusing them access, relevance, entitlements, political participation and power.⁵⁴⁷ Similarly, the relationship between the Hausa-Fulani settlers and the

⁵⁴²IOM (2011). ACP Observatory Research Guide on Migration, 2011a. Available at: <http://www.acpmigration-obs.org/node/168>. Accessed on October 20, 2014.

⁵⁴³Suberu R. (2001). *Federalism and Ethnic Conflict in Nigeria*. Washington: United States Institute for Peace.

⁵⁴⁴Adesoji, O.A. & Alao, A. (2009). Indigeneship and Citizenship in Nigeria: Myth and Reality. *The Journal of Pan African Studies*. 2 (9). pp. 151-165. p. 153.

⁵⁴⁵Adesoji, O.A. & Alao, A. (2009). p. 155.

⁵⁴⁶The Jukun are a majority group in north eastern part of Taraba State.

⁵⁴⁷Best, S. G., Idyorough A. E. & Shehu, Z. B. (1999). “Communal Conflict and the Possibilities of Conflict Resolution in Nigeria. A Case Study of the Tiv-Jukun Conflicts in Wukari Local Government

indigenes of Plateau state also illustrates the mentality of the indigenous⁵⁴⁸ ethnic groups of the state in which, they regard themselves as the indisputable indigenes as against the Hausa-Fulani who they believe migrated into the region for various reasons.⁵⁴⁹ Crises arising from this clash of interests have resulted in chaos in the state at different times from 1994 to 2002, this violence still continues, though at lesser levels from 2010.⁵⁵⁰

In other cases where certain groups seem to have settled well into their host communities, this also sometimes tends to be prima facie. For example, although the Igbos outside Igbo land as well as the Yoruba in the north have managed to establish semblances of political structures⁵⁵¹ in order to safeguard their interest and attain a measure of relevance in these communities,⁵⁵² this however has not changed their ethnicity, neither has it guaranteed them entitlements, and even where entitlements are given, they are mostly a product of political (i.e. as rewards of political participations) rather than ethnic alignment.⁵⁵³ Circumstances which result in the exclusion of one ethnic group by another based on the belief that their ancestors did not originate from those communities not only serve to ignite the embers of hate and suspicion between the ethnic and religious groups of those communities, but sometimes these conflicts have far-reaching consequences. These type of ethno-

Area, Taraba State".in Onigu, O. & Olawale, I. A. (eds.) *Community Conflicts in Nigeria: Management, Resolution and Transformation*. Ibadan: Spectrum, pp. 82-115.

⁵⁴⁸Berom, Amo, Buji, Anaguta, Jere, Jarawa and Afizere.

⁵⁴⁹However, for the Hausa-Fulani settlers, the contention is that they had produced the ruler ship in Jos since 1902 up to 1947, and since they have aspired to political leadership and succeeded a few times, therefore they cannot be labelled as strangers or settlers.

Mvendiga, J., Simbine, A.I. & Galadima, H.S. (2001). *Ethnic Groups and Conflicts in Nigeria Vol 4: The North Central Zone of Nigeria*. Ibadan: PEFS. pp. 64-82.

⁵⁵⁰Best, S. G., Idyorough A. E. & Shehu, Z. B. (1999). p. 100.

⁵⁵¹With the creation of 'Eze N'digbo' and 'Oba Yoruba' just like the Hausa-Fulani also have 'Sarkin Hausawa' in the south. These titles are usually given to the head of an ethnic group settled in a community in which they are not the minority, the head of this association serves as a leader for these ethnicities and as a means through which their interests are protected.

⁵⁵²Best, S. G., Idyorough A. E. & Shehu, Z. B. (1999). p. 100.

⁵⁵³Adesoji, O.A. & Alao, A. (2009).

religious clashes have always had the tendency of producing a violent ripple effect, spilling over to other localities, states and regions of the federation.⁵⁵⁴ For this very reason migration has in a way served as a disintegrating factor amongst the various ethno-religious, linguistic and regional groups.

On the other hand, migration has also promoted a certain level of cultural integration. A recent survey conducted in the Kabbah Local Government Area of Kogi State showed that there has been a considerable amount of socio-cultural effects on the migrants of the town. In terms of language, 36% of the migrants said they don't speak their ethnic dialects as often as they did in their hometowns. Sixty five percent (65%) of the migrants also said they do not celebrate their cultural festivals in their host towns while 13% said they still do. In terms of native attires, 43% said they only occasionally wear their native attires while 25% claimed they always wore it. Similarly in terms of native food, 54% of migrants said they do not eat their native food while 25% claimed that they always did.⁵⁵⁵ This study seems to indicate that the settlers in this community have to a large degree let go to some of their practices and culture, perhaps due to the influence of the dominant culture. Although this may be a slight indication of socio-cultural integration, it could however also indicate a tendency of cultural domination by the majority group, in this case we cannot talk of integration but of assimilation which then might have the tendency to be disintegrative for the polity.

⁵⁵⁴Suberu, R. T. & Osaghae, E.E. (2005). "A History of Identities, Violence, and Stability in Nigeria" (*Centre for Research on Inequality, Human Security and Ethnicity (CRISE) Working Paper No. 6*). Queen Elizabeth House. p. 19.

⁵⁵⁵Sibiri, A. E., Ayinmoro, A. D. & Jack Jackson, T. C. B. (2014). The Socio-Cultural Effects of Internal Migration among the People of Akutupa Kiri in the North-Central Zone, Nigeria. *Mediterranean Journal of Social Sciences*. 5 (15) Rome: MCSER Publishing. pp. 494-403.

As people leave their place of origin for more economically favourable locations, what has been frequent is that over time these host locations for migration become drained with barely any development happening. Thus, the result is the emergence of slums and ghettos and in extreme cases ethno-religious tensions between the members of the host communities and the migrants. It seems that existing government policies and programmes are not enough to adequately harness the positive contribution of migration towards national unity, in many instances these policies have served as barriers towards integration. The constitutional provisions on citizenship and fundamental human rights has failed to provide the needed answer to the indigene-settler dichotomy and steer the country towards a national outlook. The constitutions failure to do so is perhaps as a result of shortcoming and contradictions within. For example, the principle of federal character under the 1999 constitution was aimed at guaranteeing and promoting group rights and equality while chapter four of the same constitution guarantees individual rights as a citizen of Nigeria. But on the matter of indigeneship, particularly in the context of the Federal Character Principle , the provision emphasizes on showing evidence of belonging to a community indigenous to a state or local government through one's parents or grandparents.⁵⁵⁶ Ironically, experience shows that these groups referred to as 'settlers' or 'strangers' had settle in these communities several years ago and in fact several generations of these groups, were born and/or grew up in their present locations.⁵⁵⁷ This problem has created much contention especially for second generation migrants who were born in these communities but for reasons such as

⁵⁵⁶Which in effect suggests membership of a local ethnic and linguistic community.

⁵⁵⁷Sibiri, A. E., Ayinmoro, A. D. & Jack Jackson, T. C. B. (2014). p. 495.

their parents not being originally from these localities are deprived of certain rights and privileges.⁵⁵⁸

Certain steps have been taken to correct this problem. For example, a Bill has been brought before the National Assembly which seeks to provide the right of Nigerians to be regarded as indigenes in which ever locality they may find themselves irrespective of their religion, tribe, political belief etc.⁵⁵⁹ However, much more has to be done as the notion of ‘indigenes’ and ‘settlers’ is entrenched into the mind of most Nigerians; for example, following a recent sectarian crisis in Plateau state, the governor of one of the south-western states (Oyo State) was quoted to have called on all Oyo state ‘indigenes’ residing in Plateau to ‘come back home’⁵⁶⁰ as if to indicate that the geographical entity that exists as Nigeria is not in fact home for all Nigerians. No doubt the indigene-settler dichotomy is hampering on the benefits which could be reaped from migration trends in Nigeria, and is sowing the seeds of disintegration among the people instead, as many see a person who comes to stay in their area as not a bringer of good but as someone who has come to steal away their opportunities and limited resources. Many scholars are of the opinion that the way to address this situation is through constitutional reforms which will strengthen individual/citizenship rights over group rights. One suggestion on how this could be achieved is by tying citizenship rights to ones place of birth and residency instead of

⁵⁵⁸This goes quite contrary to the preamble found in the Constitution which provides that all Nigerians are united as part of one ‘indivisible and indissoluble sovereign nation under God [...] and will live in harmony for the purpose of promoting the good government and welfare of all persons in the country, on the principles of freedom, equality and justice, and for the purpose of consolidating the unity of the people’. 1999 Nigerian Constitution: Preamble.

⁵⁵⁹Senator Abu Ibrahim. A Bill: For an Act to Make Provisions for the Right of Person to be an Indigene of a Locality in Nigeria and for Purpose Connected therewith. SB. 154. Available at: www.nassnig.org/nass/legislation.php?id=297. Accessed on 13 December, 2014

⁵⁶⁰Okereke, C. U. (2010). *The Indigenization of Nigerians- the Politics of one Nigeria*. Available at: <http://ngex.com/news/public/article.php?ArticleID=1567>. Accessed on 14 December, 2014.

where ones ethnic group is located. With regards to residency right, the political bureau set up in 1987 suggested that ten years was enough for one to be accorded the full rights normally available to the traditional indigenes of the states.⁵⁶¹ Similarly, a once governor of Plateau state had proposed a similar solution to the problem in Plateau state suggesting that “any Nigeria born in Plateau state or from any other state who has lived in Plateau state for twenty years should enjoy all the rights and privileges of a native of Plateau State.”⁵⁶² Unfortunately, none of such recommendations have been incorporated into the constitution. Apart from implementing residency rights as a national policy, suggestions have also been made on the need to incorporate within the constitution, provisions that give any citizen of Nigeria who “has resided continuously for a period of five years in any state of the federation and performs his/her civic duties, the entitlement to all the rights and privileges of the state.”⁵⁶³ This is believed would also remove certain restriction such as who can contest elections in different parts of the country.⁵⁶⁴ Similarly there has been a call to also reform section 147 of the 1999 Constitution which requires that ministers appointed from each state of the Federation must be indigenes of that state.⁵⁶⁵ By clearly defining who indigenes of a state are and laying down concrete steps on how to meet the residency requirements of any particular state, these recommendations will no doubt reduce the tensions caused by internal migration since it would shift emphasis away from ethnicity as the basis for right to entitlements and focus on more civic elements such as paying taxes. Furthermore, there is a need to ensure that these provisions do not remain just on paper but that

⁵⁶¹Oyeweso, S. (2006). *The Undertakers, the Python’s Eye and Footsteps of the Ant: The Historian’s Burden* (22nd Inaugural Lecture, Lagos State University) Lagos: Faculty of Arts, Lagos State University. p. 36-37.

⁵⁶²Oyeweso, S. (2006). p. 37.

⁵⁶³Oyeweso, S. (2006). p. 38-39.

⁵⁶⁴Bamidele, O. & Ikubaje, J. (2004). *Positions of Citizens’ Forum for Constitutional Reform on the 1999 Constitution*. Lagos: CFCR, pp. 65, 81-82.

⁵⁶⁵Bamidele, O. & Ikubaje, J. (2004). p. 65.

relevant channels and institutions are set up to supervise the implementation of these critical reforms of the document.⁵⁶⁶

Emphasis needs to be put not only on the role of the government but also on what Nigerians are required to do. This entails setting up an elaborate program for creating awareness among the masses (who are often victims of indigenes-settler crises) to the dangers of allowing themselves to become pawns of the political elite. Likewise, the masses also need to be aware about the importance of making choices on leaders based on the quality of candidates, and their ability to deliver.⁵⁶⁷ More efforts should also be centred on creating awareness among Nigerians on ways in which they can enforce their rights by making them aware of all legal avenues they can explore in seeking legal redress, constitutional interpretation on citizenship, residency rights and the constitutional provisions backing them up in cases of infringement or denial.

3.3.3 Ethnic/Linguistic Diversity

There has been an ongoing debate on whether Nigeria's ethno-linguistic diversity has presented itself as a blessing or curse. Nigeria is a country of stunning diversity which manifests in the ethnic, linguistic and religious spheres. While some have described this phenomenon as the blight of Nigeria, many have been keen on the potentials such diversity holds. Indeed not many Nigerians are cognisant of the many ways in which other cultures have influenced and shaped their own cultures; from the food they eat to the clothes they wear and even the few words they incorporate into their daily vocabulary.

⁵⁶⁶Bamidele, O. & Ikubaje, J. (2004). p. 65.

⁵⁶⁷Akinyele, R.T. (2002). "Ethnicity and Religion in Election 2003: Potential Conflicts and Resolution" *The Constitution: A Journal of Constitutional Development*. 3(1) pp. 24- 39.

After a twelve day visit around Nigeria earlier in February 2014, Rita Izsak noted that while there are some parts where minority and majority communities exist in harmony, there are still many other places that do not.⁵⁶⁸ She noted that in ensuring minority rights, equality and peaceful coexistence for all Nigerian citizens there is need for good and inclusive governance, and that it is the exclusion of some groups, partisan politics, corruption, bias and favouritism along ethnic and religious lines that have fuelled distrust suspicion and anger.⁵⁶⁹ In order to resolve this, Izsak recommended formal and informal measures to be put in place in order to promote Nigeria's rich cultural heritage. Izsak's insights and recommendations are no doubt accurate and would go a long way in solving the country's drawbacks at nation building. But on another note, her suggestions are not much different from what many experts and scholars on Nigeria's political system have recommended. It seems that the problem is not the lack of knowledge on what it takes to solve these political and socio-cultural challenges, rather it is the genuine willingness to embark on such initiatives towards solving these problems. Unfortunately, Nigeria is yet to jump on board embracing these recommendations towards full implementation, and this is where the problem lies. Gambari remarks on the government's failure to implement the recommendations of many reports such as the Turaki committee (2013) and

⁵⁶⁸Rita Izsak is an independent expert for the Human Rights Council on minority issues, *United Nations Human Rights*.

⁵⁶⁹*United Nations Human Rights*. Good governance key to ensuring equality, peaceful coexistence, UN expert tells Nigeria. Available at: <http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=14294&LangID=E>. Accessed on 23 December, 2014.

Galdimari committee (2011) who were on different occasions set up to tackle issues like ethnic conflict and security challenges of the nation.⁵⁷⁰

Nigeria no doubt has made efforts to manage its diversity. For example, since 1996 the country has been divided into 36 states and 774 local governments, but it seems like when trying to solve one problem, the government has always ended up creating another. The move for the creation of more states for the purpose of effective federalism has in turn created a new division in the form of agitations by minority groups for states of their own. Similarly, the idea of 'Indigeneship' has since the 1979 constitution been rooted into the political system of the country till date. This idea of 'Indigeneship' categorizes all Nigerians as indigenes or non-indigenes/settlers to a region based on where their parents or grandparents were born.⁵⁷¹ The concept of 'indigene' which was a mechanism whose intent was to ensure ethnic parity in education, employment and the protection of traditional cultures has unfortunately been used to systematically marginalize millions of Nigerians as well as encourage ethno-linguistic identity politics that have resorted to inter-communal/ethnic and religious violence.⁵⁷² The problem of 'indigenes and settlers' stems from the fact that it is impossible to clearly define which groups are indigenous to a location and which are not. The impossibility of making such delineations is what breeds so much controversies and also makes it easy for 'indigenes' of a said community to exclude 'settlers' from the educational and employment opportunities even if they have been

⁵⁷⁰Ajakaye, R. (2014). Is Nigeria's Boko Haram a 'faceless' group? Available at: <http://www.aa.com.tr/en/news/335397--is-nigerias-boko-haram-a-faceless-group>. Accessed on 23 December, 2014.

⁵⁷¹Omotoso, F. (2013). Settlers and Indigenes Phenomenon in Nigerian Federalism: An Assessment of Jos Plateau. *Journal of Regional Development*. <http://files.journalofregionaldevelopment.webnode.cz>. Accessed on 30 December, 2014.

⁵⁷²International Crisis Group (2007). Nigeria: Failed Elections, Failing State? Africa Report No.126. <http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/africa/west-africa/nigeria/126-nigeria-failed-elections-failing-state.aspx>. Accessed on 26 December 2014.

life-long residents of the said community. It is this reality which has led to the fierce resentment and contestations between the people of Plateau state and has further given it a tone of the 'Christian indigenes' against the 'Muslim Hausa/Fulani' settlers. Between 1999 and 2004 the inter-communal clashes in Plateau state arising over land and religion created over 250,000 Internally Displaced Persons and fighting which has extended from 2006 till present has left thousands killed and an additional 8,000 displaced persons.⁵⁷³

Diversity no doubt makes it difficult to formulate, articulate and implement strategies that will be widely accepted among the constituencies but this does not mean that the problem which this situation breeds should be given a blind eye. As Mbakogu rightly notes, "the absence or denial of linguistic and cultural rights could promote conflict and violence".⁵⁷⁴ This is not to say that diversity necessarily causes conflicts, but rather, because the consciousness of one's ethnic origin is a universal and natural psycho-sociological reality,⁵⁷⁵ this invariably means that differences which arise from this consciousness of differences is bound to generate one form of conflict or the other either in the form of violence or non-violence.⁵⁷⁶ The problem arises when these conflicts become uncontrollable thus degenerating into violence, this violence according to Osaghae, happens when government fails to respond to the persistent

⁵⁷³World Directory of Minorities and Indigenous Peoples: Nigeria Overview. Available at <http://www.minorityrights.org/5757/nigeria/nigeria-overview.html>. Accessed on 26 December, 2014.

⁵⁷⁴Mbakogu, I. (2002). Socio-cultural Factors and Ethnic Group Relationships in Contemporary Nigerian Society. *African Anthropologist*. 9 (2). p. 118.

⁵⁷⁵Obioha, E. (1999). "Ethnic Conflicts and the Problem of Resolution in Contemporary Africa: A Case for African Options and Alternatives". *Anthropology of African and the Challenges of the Third Millennium – Ethnicity and Ethnic conflicts*. PAAA/APA. Most Ethno-Net Publications.

⁵⁷⁶Non-violent conflicts are normal and is a daily occurrence in any society either in the form of competitive party politics, judicial redress, media protests or peaceful demonstrations, Mbakogu, I. (2002). p. 119.

expressions of displeasure.⁵⁷⁷ This feeling of being ignored can eventually manifest itself in many forms of social ills.

As the state becomes derelict in its responsibility to its citizens, that it is being unable to cater for the common good of its citizens, they (the citizens) gradually withdraw into their tribal or ethnic enclaves for social fulfilment. This withdrawal is enhanced because of the great value traditional Africans attach to their communal way of life.⁵⁷⁸

In the case of Nigeria where identities like religion and ethnicity are also geographical in their concentration, this makes the case worse, “Just as ethnic separatism is more vital when ethnic groups are concentrated in space, so are religious conflicts more troubling when they are accompanied by geographical concentration”.⁵⁷⁹ This means that government not only needs to take into consideration the grievances of all groups, but need to be extra careful when it comes to the type of laws and policies they enact. For example, the 1999 constitution of Nigeria provides for the establishment of Sharia courts in any state that so requires, this seemingly harmful provision which is an expression of the freedoms and autonomy states have, has been the source of many controversies which have led to bloody rioting.⁵⁸⁰ Although the law clearly states that non-Muslims do not have to be subjected to the Sharia laws, this provision still sits uncomfortably with the non-Muslim population of the northern states as many strongly believe that such provision is not only an attempt to exert dominance over them, but that such a decision could eventually have an impact on their daily activities and social lifestyle. Similarly, in September 2001 violence also broke out in plateau over the giving of a

⁵⁷⁷Osaghae, E. (1993). “Manifestation of Conflict Situations in Africa”. In Andah, B. &Bolarinwa K. (eds.) *A Celebration of Roots and Legacy*. Ibadan: Fajee Publications LTD.

⁵⁷⁸Ebijuwa, I. (1999). “Ethnic Conflict, Social Dislocation and the Search for a New Order in Africa”. *Anthropology of African and the Challenges of the Third Millennium – Ethnicity and Ethnic conflicts*. PAAA/APA. Most Ethno-Net Publications.

⁵⁷⁹Standard 10 Report on Nigeria (2001). Nigeria Background information. “Cultural Mosaics of Nigeria”

⁵⁸⁰Such as the ones that took place in mid-February of 2000 in Kaduna.

strategic position in the state to a Muslim to lead. These few cases no doubt verifies one thing about Nigeria: that politics is to a large degree ethnically oriented, in fact ethnicity has not only found its way into politics but even the work place and educational institutions thereby transforming these places to locations for solidifying ethnic ties.

Nigeria has been unable to adopt a proper language policy because of the sensitivity attached to the subject and how it is seen that the promotion of one language over another is the promotion of ethno-cultural domination. Indeed, the saying that every issue in Nigeria is ethnic and if not, it eventually becomes so, holds much water as we have seen in many cases. For example in the 90's, as a reaction to domination of few ethnic groups over certain spheres, the Nigerian government adopted a quota system policy in many spheres of public life ranging from university admission, jobs in the public service, passport application etc. In the educational system this policy⁵⁸¹ sought to promote fairness in the admission of candidates into federal educational institutions. Twenty seven (27) years later, this policy has been misused and politicized, as academic excellence as a criteria for admission into these institutions is relegated to second place and most of these institutions have become breeding grounds for ethnic patronage.⁵⁸² Similarly, a number of places in the public service are reserved for the 'indigenous' population of the state, which means that for people to get into these positions, they have to present a certificate which will prove that they are actually indigenes of the said community. In recent years, these certificates have become more elaborate requiring one to disclose details of one's

⁵⁸¹The Quota system provided 20% slots for educationally underdeveloped states. 30% slot for candidates of the geographical area which the institution was established, 40% slot based on academic merit and 10% on discretionary admissions.

⁵⁸²Mbakogu, I. (2002). p. 126.

religion, language, tribe etc. and since a settler connotes anyone not likened to the dominant ethnic group, many have been refused these certificates of indigene even though they have been living in these societies for decades. In plateau state for example, the Birom-dominated local governments have often times refused certificates to Fulani's and Hausas, consequently, these excluded individuals have been applying for these certificates in more docile states, such as Bauchi state.⁵⁸³

So far ethno-linguistic diversity in Nigeria has shown more of its ugly sides than it has its good side, however, this is not enough to conclude that diversity in a state is essentially evil. As Diallo rightly opines, cultural and linguistic diversity can be a tool for development. "Every development policy must value its national languages and make use of them irrespective of their number and differences".⁵⁸⁴ Sustainable development cannot happen based solely on economic factors, as socio-cultural factors also play an important role for they are the key to human development. Human development leads to real economic development, the promotion of social justice that provides the link between political and economic democracy. Experience should teach Nigeria that power in the hands of a the majority can have negative consequences, as there is a need to empower minorities as well, for this might be what is needed to create the much desired transparency and far-reaching changes needed in the country's political process.⁵⁸⁵

⁵⁸³Blench, R. & Dendo, M. (2003). Position Paper: "The Dimension of Ethnicity, Language and Culture in Nigeria". Department for International Development (DFID). Component3: Output 28. Cambridge. Available at: <http://www.rogerblench.info/RBOP.htm>. Accessed on 26 December.2014.

⁵⁸⁴Diallo, N.A (2004). Nigeria: Cultural and Linguistic Diversity as Development Factor. Available at: <http://allafrica.com/stories200405270557.html>. Accessed on 27 December, 2014.

⁵⁸⁵Blench, R. & Dendo, M. (2003). p. 6.

Chapter 4

FINDINGS, RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION

In the course of this study, the major aim has been to provide a balanced approach regarding the integrating or disintegrating potentials of all the factors examined. Every factor examined shows that while under specific conditions it tilted towards the integration of the diverse groups, changing conditions transforms the effect of the same factor possibly leading towards disintegration. This is why we can conclude that some political factors such as the educational system, language policy, party system and electoral system can be both integrative and disintegrative and can therefore lead to national cohesion or in-cohesion. Similarly, socio-cultural factors like ethnic/linguistic diversity or internal migration within the country cannot be considered as having entirely negative impacts on political stability in Nigeria.

It is true that the political situation in many divided societies vary and take different forms,⁵⁸⁶ and Nigeria's conditions are not different from this reality. Political instability within Nigeria has been as a result of the many factors which this study has examined. The instability within Nigeria's political system, has notoriously come to be associated with violence that can be strongly linked to ethnic conflicts amongst the ethno-linguistic, religious and regional groups found within the polity. The number of factors considered in this literature does not in any way limit or discredit

⁵⁸⁶Gueleke, A. (2012) p. 154.

countless others such as high level corruption, bad governance, legitimacy crisis and ethnic competition for resources that exists when examining the integrating and disintegrating factors within Nigeria's political system. The case of integration and disintegration in Nigeria is the classical example of a two sided coin, comprised of both the appropriate and inappropriate, however, the factors examined here not only give a solid foundation to the historical antecedents of the situation Nigeria finds herself in today, but also builds on the rudimentary factors that many scholars of ethnic conflict or federalism would likely pay attention to and that are peculiar to many African states. Similarly, the study offers a starting point for subsequent work in this field to be conducted. For the sake of our findings and general conclusions, each of the major factors examined in the thesis are discussed in terms of their integrative and disintegrative outcomes.⁵⁸⁷ This background also provides the basis for this study to provide recommendations on the strategies that could help equip and strengthen the Nigerian authorities to deal with the realities of the economic, political, and socio-cultural system.

4.1 Traditional Structures and Identities

With regards to the discourse on disintegration within the Nigerian polity, a reoccurring pattern which seems to shape how instability manifests within society is the north-south divide which has also become synonymous with the religious divide. The examination of pre-colonial traditional structures shows that diversity has been an inherited attribute and not a created one. The Hausa/Fulani, Yoruba and Igbo communities all exhibited different political and economic structures as well as socio-cultural organizations. Therefore, the amalgamation of these societies in 1914

⁵⁸⁷It is important to mention again that our finding show that there is no clear cut distinction between which factors are integrative and which are disintegrative. Rather, what seems to be the case is an overlapping of the two tendencies in every factor measured.

did not translate to the automatic integration of these diverse ethnic, religious and regional groups. This is because while the decentralized political systems of the southern (Yoruba and Igbo) communities made them more autonomous, the highly centralized political structures of the north did not guarantee the same level of autonomy, thus each group was used to different systems of administration. A major task during colonialism therefore was to create suitable and effective integrative mechanisms through various colonial policies. However, while some colonial policies such as the introduction of the English language managed to have positive impacts and therefore enforce stability, others such as deciding to administer each region differently created specific destabilizing tendencies that have come to characterize the Nigerian polity. One of the consequences of poor colonial policies has been the 'politicization' of these ethnic, religious and regional identities. Because diversity in Nigeria is closely tied to geographical locations, thus, it has become very easy to translate any sort of conflict that occurs as having to do with ethnicity or religion and this is no wonder why many conflicts which have happened have been usually termed as ethnic, religious or ethno-religious. The 'ethnicization' of conflicts even when they can be categorized under generic terms stems from the high level of ethno-cultural and religious consciousness prevalent within the society. While ethno-cultural and religious awareness should not by nature be a negative phenomenon in diverse societies, however, the politicization of these identities and its subsequent use by either political leaders, individuals or group of persons with political motives often makes ethnicity and religion an instrument to propagate hate and put one segment of society at logger heads with another. Friction in society therefore exists as a result of the dual identities prevalent in the society, in other words, there is a

constant tug of war between modern and traditional institutions and the inability to find a harmonious synchronization between the two is what often leads to instability.

In order to solve the problems that arise from the crises of dual loyalties to traditional and modern administrative structures, federal government and regional authorities have to develop a zero tolerance attitude towards ethnic politics, and the only way this can be achieved is to develop neutral policies beyond the lenses of tribe, ethnicity, religion and language focusing rather on the promotion of democratic institutions and principles. It is essential that Nigeria develops a truly national leadership. This is because it is the responsibility lies on the leaders of the country to set the pace and lay a pristine example for those who have given them the trust of leading them. Much emphasis is to be placed on the leadership of the country as they are the symbol of Nigerian unity and because it seems that the 'Nigerian' consciousness is stronger among those at the centre, it therefore becomes their responsibility to carry every citizen under this umbrella of a united nation rather than resort to using ethnic politics for their selfish wants when the need arises.

4.2 Constitutional Arrangements (Federalism)

The federal constitutional arrangement and provisions have been able to create certain integrative mechanisms that have maintained stability within the polity. Although the unitary system has always been an optional arrangement for Nigeria to adopt, the likelihood of it having much success in integrating is minimal, this is evident in the 1966 coup d'état in which the military leader (who also happened to be Igbo) that took over abolished the federal system and replaced it with a unitary one. This action was not only met with strict opposition but eventually led to a counter coup. A unitary system therefore is incompatible with a society like Nigeria's not

only because of its diversity but also because of the fact that these diverse groups have long been used to the idea of having a degree of autonomy. A unitary system therefore will not only raise the suspicion that one ethnic, religious or regional group wanting to dominate another but has the tendency to actually create way for the majority group to dominate over minority groups. The three tier federal government structure at the central, regional, and local level has not only accorded each constituency its jurisdictional sphere of autonomy, but also helped in forging unity amongst these diverse identities. To further solidify the idea of integration is the idea of the Federal Character Principle which ensures the distribution of positions in all sectors based on an equitable quota system that has been used for political appointments, recruitment in to the military, police force, civil service, university admissions as well as in the allocation of federal revenues. The Federal Character Principle has been an effort in restoring stability amidst the north-south imbalance established by colonial administrative institutions which failed to fully integrate and mould the various ethnic groups inhabiting Nigeria into a true nation. Indeed the Federal Character Principle as an integrative mechanism is ideally meant to ensure the fair and effective representation of all constituents (in terms of position of power, status and influence) in the country.⁵⁸⁸ The Federal Character Principle is an additional bonus to Nigeria's federal arrangement and has come to stand out as an important feature of what makes Nigeria's federal system unique. The FCP not only touches an array of matters such as ethnicity, the national question, minority problem, discrimination based on indigeneship, resources allocation, power sharing, employment and placement in institution,⁵⁸⁹ but can also create the popular feeling

⁵⁸⁸Bello, M.I. (2012) Federal Character as a Recipe for National Integration: the Nigerian Paradox. *International Journal of Politics and Good Governance* 3 (3.3) Quarter III.

⁵⁸⁹Ojo, E. (1999). "Federal Character: Principle and Practice" *The Herald* 18 April.

which ensures that no section of the country is excluded or dominated.⁵⁹⁰ Therefore, “if every segment of the federation participates in governance, there would be almost equality in the country in the scheme of things and expectedly, it will engender a sense of belonging and national integration.”⁵⁹¹ The seeming effectiveness of this principle to re-inforce integration and thus ensure stability has led to its adoption in most political parties who have used it as a guideline in ensuring that their parties membership and candidates running for presidency are inclusive of all regions, religions and ethnicity.

However, findings also show that although the FCP is a laudable idea and has been able to provide a level of stability, unfortunately its current way of application and operation has always tended to generate grievances among the population on grounds that it differentiates, formalises and even institutionalizes this north-south dichotomy in the many spheres in which it has been adopted. This dissatisfaction is especially evident in the federal bureaucracy which relies heavily on this principle for the recruitment of persons. Most often, people from certain regions have been denied jobs, promotions and positions because the quotas allocated to their states have been filled. However, despite the shortcomings of the principle (as is the case with many idealistic principles) retaining it would be better than scraping it entirely. Like most quota systems there is always bound to be feelings of being cheated as it seems that the more qualified ones do not get what they deserve, but as the FCP is not based on technical ideals but is rather politically motivated, there is bound to be a sort of positive discrimination, which focuses on the ‘lesser evil’ of which in this case is not

⁵⁹⁰Ojo, E. (1999). “Federal Character: Principle and Practice” *The Herald* 18 April.

⁵⁹¹Ojo, E. (1999). “Federal Character: Principle and Practice” *The Herald* 18 April.

necessarily getting the most qualified people for the job but rather on the inclusion of including all segments of society into the political process.

However, in order to curb dissatisfaction that stems from the FCP, there is need for the certain reforms to be carried out. One of such reforms could be working towards increasing the quota system for each region but in order for this to happen there also needs to be improvement in the country's economic capacity and thus its ability to sustain such an increase. Another reform which should be carried out is making sure that the when the FCP is used in the allocation the national resources, that it is used strictly in terms of regions and not ethnicity, tribe or religion. Although this is difficult to achieve in a country where ethnicity and religion are closely tied to a certain space, it is not impossible to achieve. The use of FCP in terms of regions will go a long way in alleviating grievances as most times frustrations over this principle stem from the idea that one ethnic or religious group is favoured over the other. If indeed Nigerians are to accept that the intentions of the FCP carries a far reaching integration mandate, then the present definition and application of the concept no doubt has to be examined so as to ensure that no Nigerian feels aggrieved or is excluded from certain privileges on grounds of his/her place of origin, sex, religion or ethnicity.

4.3 Economic Factors

Uneven economic development and the rapid population growth in relation to unemployment have for the most part created negative impacts on integration. Uneven economic development which has assumed a regional dimension has intensified the north-south divide. The high poverty levels in the north in contrast to the south (which has a lower rates) has sometimes instigated negative feelings of

depravity by the north as well as lack of confidence in the government in providing basic and essential necessities. Similarly, employment has been unable to keep up with the rate of population growth. With the over saturation of the labour market and over a million youths trooping into the labour market on a yearly basis, the unemployment rates are soaring yearly. High unemployment rates has constituted a societal nuisance as many of the unemployed who are left idle are youths with so much energy and no positive means to direct it. This study finds that the frustrations felt by many youths have led to them becoming easy targets for mobilization by specific groups towards achieving certain ethnic, religious and regional objectives, thus, this explains the emergence of militant groups in the south of the Niger delta as well as extremist groups like the Boko Haram sect in the north.

A major problem the study reveals is that many a times, the instability results from the fact that the economic situations are dreary for many Nigerians, and the democratic political system which is meant to bring about the desired change the people want, is failing to do so. Therefore, in a country where primordial identities holds much influence, many people prefer to go back and pledge their loyalties to their tribal and ethnic associations since the national institutions have failed them, and this is what results in the many opposing views that often result in violence. If the Nigerian government wants to bring about the unity of groups within the polity, it is very important that they cater to the economic demands of the populace. The Nigerian government has to engage in better and more effective human development initiatives to meet the employment demands of its teeming youth population as well as ensuring a more even development amongst the regions.

In order to tackle the problem of uneven development and unemployment there needs to be government policies specifically targeting these issues. With regards to high unemployment rates amidst high population growth, it is not just enough to embark in job creation initiatives as experience has shown that despite millions of jobs created on a yearly bases, it has still not been able to solve the unemployment dilemma. If the Nigerian economy does not have the capacity to accommodate the yearly influx of people into the labour market, then perhaps another way of tackling the problem should be examined. One of such solution is that rather than focusing solely on unemployment, the government should also focus on the issue of population growth. Population growth can regulated through different policies, incentives and educational programs which encourage people to partake in various population control initiatives such as family planning. In order to ensure a more even economic development there is also need to ensure the fair and equal distribution of wealth among the masses. Because many times the public wealth are syphoned by few individuals, there is need for stricter anti-corruption laws to be put in place in order to ensure that public wealth is not diverted into private pockets.

4.4 Political Factors

From the analysis made in chapter three, the findings indicate that political factors have varying levels of integrative and disintegrative tendencies. The language policy and the use of the English language as the lingua franca for example has been an enduring colonial policy which has had immense positive impacts on the integration and thus stability of the country. Not only has the use of the English language in almost all political, economic and social spheres provided a bases for a Nigerian identity based on common, values and norms to emerge, findings also show that the language policy has been one of the few policies that have been met with little

opposition by the mass population. Even though there are few who oppose the strict use of the English language especially in the educational sector, their arguments are technical and based on the notion that learning with a language that is not one's native tongue often results in difficulties for the students, however this is a common problem in many places and not only peculiar to Nigeria. Perhaps one of the factors that holds much transformative power is the educational system as it has the ability to socialize/re-socialize pupils into developing a mind-set that allows them to think in terms of being citizens of Nigeria rather than from a particular ethnic group. The educational system can also help pupils appreciate the diverse cultures present around them and this is an important factor in promoting tolerance. It is therefore laudable that the federal government has seen the integrative potential the educational system provides and have tried to provide a holistic curriculum for the entire nation through policies such as the NPE and NLP. The NPE for example has helped to foster more integration in the educational institutions as it has adopted uniform curriculum for all students across the nation, this curriculum ensures that no group can promote ethnic, religious or regional ideas in schools and that everything taught is based on the notion of a Nigerian identity. This idea is further reinstated in schools with the flying of the national flag as well as the singing of the national anthem every morning on assembly grounds. Similarly, the establishment of federal school (primary, secondary and tertiary) provides an atmosphere for people from all ethnicities to come together and build lasting cross cultural ties. Strengthening the language policy and educational system towards ensuring that it effectively socializes and inculcates the notion of the 'Nigerian identity' in pupils will go a long way in the indoctrination of the future generation, thereby making them better

equipped to do a better job at building a more united nation as well as presenting a united front than the past leaders were able to.

With regards to party systems and electoral system, the constitution has been able to make provisions that have curbed the likelihood for the emergence of ethnic, religious or regional parties. This has therefore facilitated the emergence of state-wide political parties as well as political elites who are national in mind and scope and therefore able to formulate nation-wide ideologies and policies to tackle problems that concern all, this way, no ethnic, religious or regional group feels left out of the political activities of the country. The level of integration political parties have provided was measured by a comparing the percentage of votes obtained by the two major political parties in the 2011/2015 presidential elections. Although indications show that political parties are indeed state-wide in scope, however some parties have managed to supersede others in their integrative strength and capabilities. This shows that political parties hold much potential in playing an integrative role for all Nigerians. However, the study also reveals how political parties have not completely transcended primordial sentiments and therefore could still serve as a disintegrative factor. The study shows that although the PDP was able to capture votes in both the northern and southern regions and that a majority of the APC votes came from the north, further examination reveals that sometimes these parties have the tendency to stand for regional parties because of the regions they are able to pull the most votes from. Therefore, although the PDP obtains votes in the north and south, its highest votes are derived from the south and vice versa for the APC. This shows the dangers that is inherent as these parties can so easily be associated with regions, religion and ethnicities.

The electoral system has also been an instrument for integration as it has ensured that elections reflect the nature of the Nigerian society. through the electoral system, not only have state-wide political parties been encouraged to emerge, but careful steps have been taken to ensure that elections especially one for presidential candidacy are a reflection of the wider support and not just regional support. This is why any candidate running for the presidency cannot win with just a majority vote but also has to meet the requirement of obtaining at least 25 percent of votes in at least two-thirds of the total 36 states and the F.C.T. Similarly, the fact that individuals are prohibited from taking part in elections unless under the umbrella of a political party has ensured an organization and orderliness in the electoral process as well as helped in curtailing the emergence of regionally, ethnically or religiously motivated persons or group of persons from pervading into the nation's political process. The party system and electoral system have no doubt proved to be effective integration tools and what can only be suggested is that these systems continue to be strengthened to ensure that they provide greater means to achieving integration.

The study also shows that the with regards to military-civilian relation, the military, especially after independence have been a key player in the country's political affairs. The military has not only been in rule for a long time but have served as a stabilizing factor for the country in times when politics in the country was deeply characterized by ethnic, religious and regional bigotry. The military command structure made it so that they were able to keep a tight grip on the nation albeit through force, nonetheless, it did ensure a level of calm and stability throughout the nation. Similarly, the military can be commended for establishing various integrative mechanisms which not only served to strengthen the nation's lopsided federal structure but also brought together all segments of society culturally and socially.

Although the military was able to maintain stability, its high handed nature resulted in various human rights abuses and the harbouring of ill sentiments by many groups, which is why the transition to democracy in 1999 was welcomed as it opened a new avenue for the wrongs of the past to be addressed. Despite the positive role played by the military towards integration at crucial points in Nigeria's development, it was perhaps becoming more evident that Nigeria could no longer maintain stability through coercion and force especially in an era where the wind of democracy was sweeping across the globe. Since 1999 Nigeria has sought to maintain integration through democratic institutions and although it still suffers from the after effect of years of military rule, becoming a democracy is indeed a step in the right direction to ensuring that integration and hence political stability is kept through popular consent.

Religious insurgency, militancy and secessionism has always threatened stability in Nigeria. The activities of religious extremist groups like Boko Haram and militant groups like MEND not only reveal the incapacity of the government to curb them but most importantly, the fact that these groups are able to gather support from certain segments of society shows deeper problems which is the level of dissatisfaction these people harbour with the state authorities due to certain political, social or economic grievances. Divided loyalties are not only unhealthy for the country's efforts at nation building but will continue to undermine the legitimacy of the government as has been seen through groups such as Boko Haram. Similarly, there is the greater threat of secessionist groups like the Biafra who for various political, social and economic grievances have continued to carry out covert propaganda to unite all Igbo's for the greater cause of their 'emancipation' from Nigeria. The fact that secessionist groups like Biafra still exist shows that integration in Nigeria through various mechanisms have not been far reaching and that if stability is to be

maintained, there is need for greater efforts to be made. Although Nigeria is facing security issues that need urgent attention, adopting a solely militaristic strategy cannot solve this problem, rather, government should complement their efforts by addressing the societal malaise which is leading to instances where youths decide to join extremist groups like MEND and *Boko Haram*. Government should use the political, economic, financial, and technological opportunities to improve the living standards of the people by providing them with the basic necessities as well as jobs with good income.

4.5 Socio-Cultural Factors

With regards to socio-cultural factors, tribalism has had the most negative impact for the country. This is because it thwarts all efforts at integration and does not provide any bases for national loyalties to be formed. Tribalism contributes to weaken the emergence of a strong Nigerian identity and has been a major contributor to reduced capacity of many governmental institutions. This is because ethnic, regional and religious affiliations have become the most considered factors in recruitment into federal institutions thus downplaying the importance of merit. Many people therefore feel that they can get away with anything by virtue of 'their own' being at the helms of power. It seems the most effective way to fight tribalism is to make it (tribalism) irrelevant in the allocation of national resources, positions in government, and other federal institutions. Rather than focusing on the tribe, allocation of resources should be based on regional quota system. This is however not a one night job as Nigerians have to be sensitized towards the mind-set of focusing on the strength of structures and institutions of governance rather than the individuals who hold these positions. The government should therefore implement an 'anti-tribalism' policy which will help curb the promotion of tribalism in all public spheres. Tribal practices have been

dominating because of the lack of strong democratic institutions, and this is possibly why many prefer to look up to the individuals who hold the positions as they believe if the office holder is from their region, religion or ethnicity, they may likely benefit. Therefore, there needs to be a systematic attempt at strengthening democratic institutions and political parties if tribalism is to be relegated. Nigeria could also learn from Zambia who has established a non-governmental organization known as the Zambia Anti Tribalism and Youth Organization (ZATYO) to help curb the dangers of tribalism in its society.⁵⁹² Through similar anti-tribal movements/organizations, Nigerians can help raise awareness within their communities. By organizing rallies and events in areas like bus stations, markets or any place known for large gatherings, and by engaging in meaningful talks with the masses, many can be educated about the dangers of tribalism and how they can play a part to help make it become a thing of the past. This no doubt is a grand task to achieve if one considers how primordial identities have been politicized and mobilized for political action as far back into Nigeria's political history. A grand task it may seem, but it is not impossible to achieve, indeed Nigeria cannot run away from her diversity, but she can decide to use it towards greater benefits and potentials, and this involves the need for leaders, politicians, business men/women, the intelligentsia and citizens to work together.

Although internal migration can be a positive contributor to development, life expectancy and knowledge. The type of uncontrolled migration happening in Nigeria has for the most part been disintegrative as it has not only led to brain drain from rural to urban areas but most importantly the development of slum and ghetto areas

⁵⁹²*Lusaka times* (2015). Anti Tribalism Sensitisation Campaigns Launched. Available at <http://www.lusakatimes.com/2015/03/18/anti-tribalism-sensitisation-campaigns-launched/> accessed on 13 June, 2015.

in these urban city centres which in turn become hotspots for all sorts of criminal activities. Similarly, city centres often become so populated that the purpose of migration is defeated as a result of fierce competition for scarce resources. Thus, while over population of urban centres has led to stagnation in development and growth, the rural areas also suffer from underdevelopment. The outcome of this reality has been the indigene/settler dichotomy that plagues many states in the federation. Many people who have migrated to certain areas for better opportunities often end up becoming victims of discrimination and marginalization and are deprived of many essential amenities because they do not 'ethnically' belong to the said host communities. Mechanisms such as state (regional government) creation which served the purpose of preventing the domination of one ethnic group by another has assumed a whole new dimension, where most ethnic groups have come to believe that having a state of their own in which they are in the majority accords them a certain right over others minorities especially with regards to political, social and economic influence, power and wealth. Unfortunately, this struggle is often fought vehemently by these ethnic groups, at the expense of strengthening the Nigerian identity. Uncontrolled migration has thus been disintegrative and has threatened the stability of the country as often, frustration has resulted in violent conflict between the said indigenes and settlers of the said localities leading to the destruction of countless lives and property as well as the harbouring of resentments and distrust.

In order to stop the negative effects of migration, there is need to ensure that less emphasis is placed on indigeneship rights but rather focus should be drawn to citizenship and residency rights. This involves constitutional reforms that will state out requirements that make a person entitled to certain rights and privileges in any

locality he/she decides to settle in. Similarly, there is also the need to transform every urban and rural community across the nation into a place that can offer any body living there a chance to succeed, economically, socially, educationally and politically. This involves both the efforts of the government and citizens, but most importantly, it involves the government finding a way to carry its citizens along and make them part of the developmental process. An effective way for the leadership to carry citizens along is through ‘community development programs’ where the unemployed are employed by the federal government to achieve specific public jobs such as environmental protection, road construction, public sanitation, digging of boreholes for portable water, etc. These programs should be done in collaboration with the regional states and extended to the Local Government level as well as this will ensure that as many people are included and are empowered with the skills to bring about positive changes within their communities. Providing an avenue for groups of people to come together and work for a common agenda not only brings about stronger and resilient local communities but has the potential of playing a significant role for social, economic, environmental and political development of the entire country.

The study also reveals that although ethnic and linguistic diversity does not naturally cause instability. However, the policies which a government adopts can either direct these identities towards integration or disintegration. Therefore our findings indicate that it is as a result of poor policy planning that diversity in Nigeria has for the most part put ethnic, religious and regional groups at logger heads with one another and caused instability. No doubt diversity on so many levels makes it increasingly difficult to formulate and implement popular policies and strategies, but if the government is to maintain stability it is expedient that it finds a way of fostering

unity through effective and integrative policies. According to Dov Ronen, identities are but ‘functional aggregations’⁵⁹³ which are not instinctive or natural but rather a resource “employed by groups of individuals for the pursuit of their common interests.”⁵⁹⁴ Similarly, “as the type of threats and opportunities with which people are faced change, so do their options and their responses. Thus, the utility of ethnicity and nationalism and the form which they take varies in response to changing situations.”⁵⁹⁵ This point is further elaborated by Ranger who points out that pre-colonial Africa never consisted of a single ‘tribal’ identity and most Africans moved in and out of multiple identities “(...) defining themselves at one moment as subject to this chief, at another moment as a member of that cult, at another moment as part of this clan.”⁵⁹⁶ This argument somewhat bares similarities to the liberalists assumption that individuals in general are out to promote their individual freedoms and this is manifested in the pursuit of their self-interests. It is therefore in the pursuit of these interests that individuals find it useful to ally with others in what they refer to as ‘interest groups’. Individuals thus join these groupings based on rational choices. But where then is the rationality when these groups turn against each other and engage in violent bloodletting as in the case of Nigeria? Whose interests are being met since most researchers who have examined the Nigerian situation have agreed that these sectarian conflicts are doing more harm than good for the economic, political and social well-being of the country.

No doubt the politicization of regional/ethnic/religious identities within the country’s federal system has been a major contributor of instability. Consequently, the issue

⁵⁹³Ronen, D. (1979). *The Quest for Self Determination*. New Haven: Yale University Press. pp. 54-62.

⁵⁹⁴Ronen, D. (1979). p. 54.

⁵⁹⁵Brown, D. (2000). p. 13.

⁵⁹⁶Hobsbawn, E. & Ranger, T. (1983). *The Invention of Tradition*. U.K.: Cambridge University Press. p. 211.

boils down to the need for a stronger ‘national’ or ‘Nigerian’ identity. According to a PEW survey conducted in 2006, 91% of Muslims and 76% of Christians said their religious identities more important than their identities as an African or Nigerian, similarly, inter-faith trust is relatively low as 62% of Christians and 61% of Muslims said that they were less likely to trust someone of another faith than theirs.⁵⁹⁷ These percentages to a large degree confirms that in general, Nigerians are more ethnic than national. As Eghosa has noted, diversity does not make conflict inevitable, the lack of a strong Nigerian identity remains a major problem with Nigeria’s federal system, if the people feel more aligned to ethnic and religious affiliations than they do to national ones, the likelihood for sharper divisions to exist in the society and amongst the diverse groups is higher. Perceived or existing inequalities can be a strong mobilizing agent because it combines the identities and grievances of the people and mobilizes them toward political action. Among these groups, ethnic and religious groups are the most powerful source of mobilization, and where socio-economic as well as political inequalities are not catered to, then there is a higher chance that violent conflicts will be inevitable. In the presence of a dual identity, how does Nigeria build a stronger national identity? Which is crucial to its perseverance as a federal entity. There has to be a way in which Nigerians can be unified under an umbrella identity, transcending ethnicity and religion and regions. The first step is to view identities as something malleable and thus susceptible to change, this way the very effectiveness by those who make claim (of these identities) and use these identities as a means of advancing ‘group interests’ will diminish. Many of the victims who are lured into these ethnic, religious and regional conflicts are aggrieved

⁵⁹⁷ *PEW Survey: Religion and Public Life Project* (2006) Nigeria’s Presidential Election: The Christian-Muslim Divide. Available at: <http://www.pewforum.org/2007/03/21/nigerias-presidential-election-the-christian-muslim-divide/>. Accessed on 20 November, 2014.

over economic, social and cultural inequalities as well as political exclusion thus the orchestrators of these group mobilize them around the promise of a better social, economic, cultural and even religious livelihood, and to the people who fall these promises are reasons real enough to die for.

What Nigeria needs therefore is efforts at consolidating a strong umbrella identity (Nigerian identity), not only through exemplary characters of the leadership but also through state-wide parties, fair distribution of wealth among the regions supported by effective federal mechanism to overcome poverty, comprehensive national policies and most of all the elimination of corruption in all sectors, as well as the entrenchment of transparency and accountability in all public institutions. Gellner defines nationalism as a political principle which holds that “the political and the national unit should be congruent.”⁵⁹⁸ He further goes on to say that nationalistic sentiments can be two sided; either a feeling of anger or that of satisfaction aroused by the violation or fulfilment of this principle.⁵⁹⁹ In the case of Nigeria, violent conflicts can be said to be the consequence of the violation of the nationalist principle. As Gellner points out, the national principle can be violated in many ways and one of the many ways is through failing to include all members of the ‘appropriate nations.’ The instability that is waging within Nigeria can be attributed on large degree to the fact that many groups feel alienated from the centre and this harbours within them feelings of deprivation from what is due to them as Nigerians. Normatively, the state represents the specialized authority which concentrates on the maintenance of order,⁶⁰⁰ and since it is that institution concerned with the enforcement of law, a large part of the work is left to it. As Habermas points out

⁵⁹⁸Gellner, E. (1983). *Nations and Nationalism*. Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press. p. 1.

⁵⁹⁹Gellner, E. (1983). p. 4.

⁶⁰⁰Gellner, E. (1983). p. 4.

“complex modern societies cannot be sustained by a substantive consensus on values, but only by a consensus on the procedure to the legitimate enactment of laws and the legitimate exercise of power”⁶⁰¹ what this means is that no theory on its own can fully address the problem in Nigeria as the identities and needs are too many to address and too many to favour only but a few. How then do we distribute equity and fairness to all ethno-cultural, linguistic and religious groups without falling short of favouring some groups over others? Perhaps what is needed is something different. An interesting proposition made by Jan-Werner Muller is what he refers to as ‘constitutional patriotism’. According to Muller, political allegiance should not be owed to a national culture nor the worldwide community of human beings, but rather should be centred on the norms, values and procedures of a liberal democratic constitution.⁶⁰² Constitutional patriotism is different from other types of nationalistic theories as it does not seek to assimilate nor create a homogeneous nation but rather to promote civic nationalism. Constitutional patriotism can be viewed as a normatively more “attractive form of civic, non-national attachment for increasingly multi-cultural societies”.⁶⁰³ Thus, constitutional patriotism where citizens are oriented to attach themselves to the norms and values found in the constitution⁶⁰⁴ seems an attractive method in the process of creating a sustained integration and social cohesion in deeply divided societies, thereby resulting in a stable political systems which promotes civic solidarity.

Conclusively, Guelke points out that although deeply divided societies are associated with ‘intractable violent political conflicts’ this is not a permanent condition. This

⁶⁰¹Gellner, E. (1983). p. 58.

⁶⁰²Jan-Werner, M. (2007). *Constitutional Patriotism*. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press. pp. 1-2.

⁶⁰³Jan-Werner, M. (2007). p. 2.

⁶⁰⁴Jan-Werner, M. (2007). p. 58.

realization no doubt gives hope to a country like Nigeria, and it shows that these violent outburst could as well just be a phase in Nigeria's political development. However, this is not to say that conflict will be completely eradicated since even the most homogeneous states have their areas of disagreements, thus it is only expected that less homogeneous states will likely have even more areas of divergence and perhaps on a more intense level. However, the intensity of these conflicts and their tendency to turn out violent is what Nigeria should seek to mitigate and no doubt Nigeria has had some success in doing so.

Similarly, the existence of a collective identity based on being Nigerian also has played an important role fostering the stability of the country. But it seems that the emergence of a Nigerian identity cannot be discussed without acknowledging the role of Nigerian intellectuals in building this identity through their literary works as well as public speeches, sensitization and exemplary character. It is also of paramount importance to state that unlike other cases, Nigerian identity is not being monopolized by any ethnic, religious or regional group towards concealing particularistic interests. But rather 'being Nigerian' provides a kind of neutrality, a sense of comprehensiveness and ethno-religious blindness with regard to ethnic, religious or segmental regional interests. Although the 'Nigerian' consciousness is still relatively weak when compared to the ethnic and religious consciousness, the 'Nigerian identity' has helped and played an important role especially in terms of quelling ethnic tensions and many have attributed this consciousness as one of the reasons why Nigeria still exists today. No doubt, the crux of the matter when talking about stability in Nigeria is the idea of the 'Nigerian identity' this is because for stability to be possible, each member and segment of the society has to feel that they are bound by a sense of common values, goals, norms and objectives. the efforts

at integration in Nigeria can essentially be seen as efforts to solidify the ‘Nigerian identity’. Not only have the army worked in consolidating this identity but so have the Nigerian intellectuals, the federal system and regional authorities, political parties, the media, democratic system, and educational system. etc. and although these systems forces are not devoid of their own problems, they have no doubt evolved and superseded the deeply ethnic based settings of the First Republic thereby becoming more cross cultural, cutting across ethnic and religious divides to accommodate groups from all walks of life, who are driven by the same ideologies that are not tied to region, ethnicity, or religion but on how to progress as a nation.

Looking at the economic, political as well as the socio-cultural factors, it is worthy to note that all factors are interrelated. One cannot simply talk about internal migration without looking into the uneven economic development that is prevalent among the regions. Similarly religious fundamentalism cannot be isolated from the rapid population growth and unemployment which the country is witnessing at this time. Tribalism has not only negatively influenced the country’s practice of democracy but so as the electoral system and the electoral violence that has characterized many elections in the country. Likewise, ethno-linguistic diversity has more than often been utilized by the political elite to foster hate and resentment between the various cultural groups for the sole purpose of remaining in power.

Nigeria has always had aspirations of being a leader regionally as well as attaining global recognition and respect,⁶⁰⁵ this is indeed a normal aspiration for any nation, and globalization with its cutting edge transformations in all spheres (i.e. financially, technologically, political) has opened up new ways and avenues for any country who

⁶⁰⁵Adenrian, T. (2008). “Foreign Policy, External Image and International Relations.” *Governance and Politics in Nigeria: The IBB and OBJ Years*. In Oyovbair, S. Ibadan: Spectrum Books LTD. p. 12.

has such grandeur dreams to achieve them, but in an effort to achieve this prestigious status, the government must not relegated the needs of its people to the background and for the mean time it is advisable that they give more priority in pursuing its interests in ways which are not at the expense of the stability of the country.

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