

**The Role of the European Union in Promoting
Regional Integration in Africa. A Case study of
CEMAC.**

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ABSTRACT

With the creation of the African Union (AU) in the year 2000, came into existence the New Economic Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) and Regional Economic Communities (RECs). One of such RECs is the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) and six major members of the ECCAS have formed the Economic Community of the Central African States (CEMAC). The AU has stressed several times that regional integration is a prerequisite for the attainment of a 'United States of Africa' and the means for a better development on the continent.

The European Union (EU) remains the highest contributor to development on the continent today. The EU has done so through forging economic partnerships with each of the RECs (including CEMAC) as well as with each of the member states on the continent. In this connection, in assessing the EU's contribution towards regional integration in Africa, it shall go a long way towards assessing the EU's role "as the number one provider of financial aid on the globe". This has been done through documents analysis, theoretical approaches, contextual and differential analysis. Furthermore, this study shall look as well into how important a monetary union is to the overall development of any region.

The EU and CEMAC have this particular characteristic of a monetary union. It therefore concludes with the assertion that "though the EU is a major actor on the African continent, it still needs to foster its presence in the Central African region in particular as well as on the continent as a whole and that a monetary union is a prerequisite for the absolute attainment of regional integration in Africa".

ÖZET

Afrika Birliđinin (AU) 2000 yılında oluşumu ile, Afrikanın gelişimi için ‘Yeni Ekonomik Ortaklık’ (NEPAD) ve Bölgesel Ekonomik Topluluklar (RECs) oluşumu meydana gelmiştir.

Bölgesel Ekonomik Topluluklardan bir tanesi ‘Merkezi Afrika Ülkeleri Ekonomik Topluluđu (ECCAS) ve altı üye ile bu topluluk CEMAC olarak oluşmuştur. Afrika Birliđi (AU) birçok toplantısında bölgesel birleşmenin, ‘Birleşik Afrika Devleti’nin oluşumu ve kıtanın gelişimi ön gereklilik olduğunu önemini vurgulamıştır.

Bugün Avrupa Birliđi (EU) kendi üyeleri arasında en çok katkıda bulunarak gelişen bir birliktir. Avrupa Birliđi (EU) bu başarısını diđer ülkelerle yapmış olduđu Bölgesel Ekonomik Toplulukları, Ana Birliđe dahil etmesiyle olmuştur. Bu bağlamda, Avrupa Birliđi (EU) deđer paylaşımı yolunda Bölgesel Afrika Birliklerine mali katkıda bulunmaktadır. Bu süreç dökümanların incelenmesi, teorik yaklaşımlar, kontekst ve deđişim analiz sonuçlarına göre yapılmaktadır. Bunun ötesinde, bu çalışmanın parasal birlikteliđin bir bölgenin gelişiminde ne kadar önemli olduğunu göstermektedir.

Avrupa Birliđi ve CEMAC özellikle bu para birliđi özelliđine sahiptir.Sonuç olarak bu iddia Avrupa Birliđinin Afrika Kıtası üzerinde esas etkileyici rol oynayan ve bu nedenle orta Afrika bölgelerinin varlığını sürdürebilmesi için önkoşul olarak bölgelerin birliđe dahil edilmesi ve para birliđine geçilmesi öngörmektedir..

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DEDICATION

I dedicate this piece of study to my father, Mr. John Fru Williams and mother, Mrs. Bernadette Tago Fru who have always been and will always remain the inspiration, pillars and the role models in my life.

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

The European Union (EU) and Africa have for decades now been having a very special relationship, which transcend the mere geographical sphere of influence. Among all other institutions in the globe, the EU has been regarded as one of the most influential institutions in promoting development in Africa. The EU has been very influential in promoting regional institutions in which they see as a means of promoting peaceful co-existence, economic prosperity and a more rapid development as regards welfare development. Hence, the EU has been influential in promoting regional as well as continental and global sponsored peace agreements, which are the norm on the continent today.

The global economy for decades now has witnessed the reinforcement of the globalization concept. The international sphere up till the 1970s was limited to the exchange of goods and services as well as little capital. In order to face this risk of globalization, various economies have tried to reinforce their regional integration by building up new regional blocks or simply complementing the already existing ones.

This led to a new euphoria as regards the African continent; at the political level, it was necessary to build up new structures to reflect the ‘modern state’. It was also necessary to build up new economies of modern characteristics and diversities. The diversification of economic structures should permit African countries escape from the ‘imposed rentage’ practiced by the former colonial masters. At the level of the

social domain, the phenomenon would help in the emergence of a new modern elite, which shall serve as a driving force behind the national projects of modernization.

Ever since the advent of independence in Africa and in particular the creation of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) in 1963, the importance of regional organizations for the development of the African continent has been reaffirmed through regular intervals. First of all in Monrovia in 1979, in Lagos in 1980, by the United Nations in 1986, in Abuja in 1991 and by the African Union (AU) in 2001. This also has been dubbed by various bi-lateral and multi-lateral partnerships of which that of the African-Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) and the EU relationship stands out as a reference. Ever since its inception as early as the 1960s, the relationship since then has engaged in encouraging the efforts of regional integration within the ACP states in general and the African states in particular.¹

Regional integration became the ‘federal theme’ of all initiatives and projects of development of the African continent. Regional Economic Communities (RECs) started thinking about common projects to be put in place with regards to different domains of cooperation like economic relations, industrial politics, agriculture and infrastructure.²

Hence, it is of prime importance to understand what ‘regional integration’ is all about. Regional integration is a process in which states enter a regional organization in order to increase regional cooperation and diffuse regional tensions. Past efforts at regional integration have often focused on removing barriers to free trade in the region, increasing the free movement of people, labor, goods and capital across

¹ Barthelemy Biao. “Integration Regionale en Afrique Centrale: Bilan et Perspectives”, in Hammoudou Ben Hakim, Bekolo-Ebe Bruno and Mama Touna. Eds. L’Integration Regionale en Afrique Centrale: Bilan et Perspectives. Paris: Editions Karthala, (2003). pp. 29-30.

² Hammoudou, Ben Hakim, Bekolo-Ebe, Bruno and Mama Touna. L’Integration Regionale en Afrique Centrale: Bilan et Perspectives. Paris: Editions Karthala, (2003). pp. 5-7.

national borders, reducing the possibility of regional armed conflict and adapting cohesive regional stances on policy issues, such as the environment.³

Regional integration has been defined as an association of states upon location in a given geographical area, for the safeguarding or promotion of the participants, an association whose terms are fixed by a treaty or other arrangements. “Regional integration could also be regarded as a worldwide phenomenon of territorial systems that increase the interactions between their components and create new forms of organization, co-existence with traditional forms of state-led organization at the national level. In short, regional integration is the joining of individual states within a region into a larger whole. The degree of integration depends upon the willingness and commitment of independent sovereign states to share their sovereignty”.⁴

1.1 The Importance of the Study

1.1.1 The aim of the Study

Africa has become a very vital continent as regards relations with other superpowers. For the past decades, major countries such as the U.S, Canada, China and Russia have forged long lasting relations with the continent. The question we may ask ourselves is why? In this connection, in undertaking this study between the EU and Africa in general and Central African Economic and Monetary Community (CEMAC) in particular, major answers maybe given to this concept.

The EU happens to be a major actor on the continent of Africa. It maintains economic, political and military relationships with every country on the continent

³ Van Ginkel, H. and Van Langenhove, L. “Introduction and context” in Hans Van Ginkel, Julius Court and Luke Van Langenhove. Eds. Integrating Africa: Perspectives on Regional Integration and Development, UNU Press, (2003). pp. 1-9.

⁴De Lombaerde P. and Van Langenhove, L. “Regional Integration, Poverty and Social Policy”. Global Social Policy. Volume 1, No. 7 (2007): pp. 377-383.

making it the number one contributor to financial aid in Africa. Africa is still endowed with most of the ills on the globe today: constant wars, disease, poverty and corruption. For the EU to foster its presence on the continent, it shall help in reducing the above mentioned ills especially in the sector of conflicts through advocating for more dialogs. This shall promote peaceful co-existence on the continent. Also, in helping in the “policing” on the continent, it shall drastically reduce conflicts. Hence, in accessing the EU’s relationship with Africa in general and CEMAC in particular vis-à-vis regional integration, it shall help in the promotion of peaceful co-existence in Central Africa.

Furthermore, in undertaking the study of the relationship between CEMAC and the EU, it is evident that it shall help in one way or the other towards promoting regional integration strategies. In the course of the study, we shall come to understand that though there are bold initiatives put in place by the EU in promoting regional integration in Africa, the overall objective has not been attained. In undertaking this study therefore, it is the view of the author that in portraying such “omissions” of the strategy, it may serve as reference to the institutions to try to *fill in the gaps* where the strategy and/or partnerships have left *loop holes*.

Again, it is evident that the size of CEMAC can never be compared to that of ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States) or SADC (Southern African Development Community), however, being a sub-regional organization, CEMAC still upholds as much importance as any of the two institutions named above. In undertaking this study, it is the view of the author to make the EU foster its presence in the region which may enable CEMAC to be a regional institution to reckon with just like ECOWAS or SADC. Even though this is a Herculean task, it is clear that with time and constant effort, it may occur.

Moreover, in undertaking this study, the author sincerely wishes to appeal to the AU to reconsider its Banjul decision and give CEMAC a legal recognition by making it one of the RECs. The fact that CEMAC has not been recognized by the AU as a REC has drastically reduced its development capabilities.

Finally, recently, the world has been struck by the global financial crisis which has drastically affected the continent of Africa as well especially the Central African region. In trying to ‘soften’ the effects felt on the continent, strong financial agreements are to be brokered between major institutions such as the EU as well as between African states themselves. In this connection, bilateral and multilateral financial agreements are of necessity for solving the global financial agreements. Such partnership agreements have been signed between major European Countries and the United States. In this connection, in doing the same with African states, it will help in solving some of the major ills the continent still experiences. It can therefore be said that fostering *multilateralism* (which is one of the major purpose of this study) shall help in one way or the other in solving the global financial crisis.

1.1.2 Reasons for the EU-Africa (CEMAC) Relationship

Even though the relationship between the EU and Africa has been in existence ever since the 1960s, it was only in April 2000 that the heads of States from both continents ever met for the first time in which they decided to focus their relationship on eight areas; external debt, the return of stolen goods, conflict prevention, human rights, democracy and good governance, regional integration, HIV/AIDS, food security and the environment.⁵

⁵ Africa and the European Union. Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities. 2003. p. 7.

Many have tried to advance several reasons for the special relationship that exists between Europe and Africa. While others have advanced a *morality factor*; that is, the European states somehow feel ‘guilty’ for the underdevelopment of Africa due to the colonial period Africa underwent, and so feel ‘responsible’ for their underdevelopment, others have advanced the *win-win factor*, that is, while Africa deals in trade facilities with the EU, they gain financially through the transactions and which helps in their development. At the same time, Europe gets an ‘assured and permanent’ supplier for raw materials needed for their growing companies. Finally, there is the *supremacy factor*; for the EU to maintain its status as the ‘number one provider of global financial aid’ thereby standing as the only hindrance to United States supremacy, the EU must forge new partnerships and provide more assistance to the world. This will boost their ‘global integrity and economy’ thereby increasing their global supremacy. In this connection, the EU is to play a decisive role as concerns global security and peaceful coexistence. Africa is decisively one of the continents in the world with the worst statistics as concerns insecurity. Hence, forging a relationship with Africa is a guarantee for EU’s supremacy.

Moreover, the European Commission is partner and share a particular commitment to the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness which has as main objective finding better ways to ‘deliver and manage aid in order to better implement the UN five year review of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs)’.⁶

Furthermore, it is evident that according to the general objectives in relation to the external relations or policies of the EU; according to Article 177 of the Treaty creating the European Community, the policies in relation to cooperation and development favors;

⁶ Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness signed by Ministers of Developed and Developing countries responsible for promotion of Development and Heads of Multilateral and Bilateral Development Institutions. www.oecd.org/dtaoecd/11/41/34428351.pdf. March 2005. Accessed on June 16th 2009.

1. The lasting economic and social development of developing countries particularly unfavorable countries;
2. The harmonious and progressive integration of developing countries into the global economy; and
3. The fight against poverty in developing countries.⁷

These are commitments the EU takes very seriously and thus shows their willingness to maintain the special partnership with Africa.

1.1.3 Background of Study

1.1.3.1 What is CEMAC?

The Economic Monetary Community of Central Africa (CEMAC) (from its name in French, *Communaute Economique et Monetaire de L'Afrique Centrale*) is an organization of States of Central Africa established to promote economic integration among countries that share a common currency; *the CFA Franc*. CEMAC is the successor of the Customs and Economic Union of Central Africa (UDEAC) (from its name in French, *L'Union Douaniere et Economique de L'Afrique Centrale*). UDEAC was created on the 8th of December 1964 by six states, namely; Cameroon, the Central African Republic (CAR), Chad, Congo, Equatorial Guinea and Gabon. CEMAC completely superseded from UDEAC on the 25th of June 1999 and still maintain the same member states. The aims of CEMAC are; (i) the harmonization of judicial and economic policies favorable to relaunch investment and (ii) the

⁷ “Document de Strategie Pays (Republique Gabonaise – Communaute Europeene) et Programme Indicatif Nationale pour la periode 2008-2013”. Strategie de Cooperation Regionale avec L'Afrique Centrale- 10eme FED (2008): p. 70.

realization or establishment of a common market. The Union which constitutes an approximate of 28million inhabitants has been one of the major institutions dealing with regional integration in Central Africa.

Furthermore, in 1981 the member states of CEMAC (known as UDEAC back then) agreed in principle to form a wider economic community of Central African states. This was done by merging with the states of the Economic Community of the Great lakes (CEPGL) which are the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Burundi and Rwanda as well as Sao Tome and Principe. They formed the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS). ECCAS is the recognized REC of the AU making CEMAC somehow ‘powerless’ with regards to regional integration initiatives in Central Africa. CEMAC is not one of the pillars of the African Economic Community (AEC), but its members are associated with it through ECCAS.

1.1.3.2 Historical relationship between EU and CEMAC

The first ever formal meeting or agreement that took place between both institutions was on the 24th of January 2003, in which the EU concluded a financial agreement with ECCAS and CEMAC, conditional on ECCAS and CEMAC merging into one organization, with ECCAS taking responsibility for the peace and security of the sub-region through its security pact COPAX (*Commission Pour la Paix en Afrique Centrale* “Commission for Peace in Central Africa”). Before this date, each of the member states were linked to the EU through the various EU-ACP agreements that have taken place over the years for the five decades. It covers the relationship between “some of the world’s richest countries with that of some of the world’s

poorest countries and also at a time when Europe's founding fathers were adamant about promoting peace and prosperity in the interest of overall stability".⁸

The Treaty of Rome 1958 laid down certain rules on the relations between Europe and Africa. This was the period that European states were granting independence to their African colonies. This was the first ever document dealing with the relationship between Europe and Africa. Then the Yaoundé agreement was signed in 1963 followed by the Lome Agreement in 1974 which finally led in the year 2000 to the signing of the Cotonou Agreement. It is the agreement which serves as the basis of the relationship between Africa and the EU today for it has a lifespan of 20 years. It has been hailed for its "bottom-up" processes of development in which individual ACP countries or groups of them produced their own plans for sustainable development to be negotiated with the EU. Hence, the EU's development assistance policies have thus had to respond to the changing nature of the world economy. The Cotonou Agreement also prioritized regional integration of the ACP because it is strongly believed to be a pre-requisite for development or 'effective development' and brought in the flexibility enabling additional resources to be granted to countries that use their funds most efficiently.⁹

1.2 Research Questions

From the above discussion on the aim of the study, it is to be understood that there are two main research questions which characterize this study. These research

⁸ Bernard Petit, (Deputy Director General, European Commission). "Europe in action for 50 years", The Courier- The magazine of Africa-Caribbean-Pacific and European Union Cooperation and Relations 15th March 2008: p. 2.

⁹ Smith, Michael. "European Union External Relations". In Cini Michelle, European Union Politics. Second Edition. New York: Oxford University Press, 2007. pp. 229-230. See also, Hegel Goutier, "Unique in the World: 50 years of North-South Cooperation". The Courier- The Magazine of Africa-Caribbean-Pacific and European Union Cooperation and Relations 15th March 2008: pp. 5-9.

questions are the grounds or the basis of the thesis. Taking a closer look at the aim of the study, we shall realize that three things are important. First of all, the fact about *multilateralism*, this is simply the union of institutions or the union of states in order to solve major issues on the globe. Another important issue raised in the aim of the study is the fact of the *European Union as an actor* on the African continent. Finally, there is the issue of the *monetary union*. In taking these three factors into consideration, two major research questions have been developed. These are discussed below.

1. Taking into consideration the dependency theory and the cooperation theory,¹⁰ is it more probable that cooperative arrangements between states and institutions of major importance to substantial development to Africa in general and to regional economic communities in particular? Hence, has the cooperation between the European Union and African institutions contributed either adversely or positively in the development of regional integration in Africa in general and the Central African region in particular?
2. Another major research question is to the effect that; taking into consideration the concept of a monetary union, is it an important factor for the development of both the African and European continent? Hence, is it a pre-requisite for development or not?

1.3 Hypotheses

Hence, in answering the above mentioned questions, the formulation of the hypotheses of the study shall be possible. A hypothesis is conjecture about the

¹⁰ For more information See pages 21-23.

relationships between two or more concepts.¹¹ In this connection, in response to the research questions, the author through careful and scrutinized research and analysis has been able to come up with the following assertions:

1. *Ceteris paribus* (all things being equal), regional institutions are prone towards development when they are subject to the criteria of cooperation theory. That is to say even though they are likely to be affected by the dependency theory; it is more probable that cooperation may lead to more rapid development. Hence, it is more probable to state that “bilateral and multilateral agreements are likely to be of more importance to the development of the African continent” than unilateralism.
2. In this connection, haven taken into consideration the aspect of bilateral and multilateral agreements, it is also likely that for African countries to better develop, forging relationships with the developed nations may eventually lead to this goal.
3. A single currency, monetary and customs union which entails the freedom of movement of goods and services will likely lead to a more rapid development of the African continent in general and the Central African region in particular.

1.4 Research Methodology

“The major purpose of any design is to answer some specific research question utilizing well developed principles of scientific inquiry... the design of

¹¹ Miller, P. Mc C and Wilson, M.J. A Dictionary of Social Science Methods. New York: John Wiley, 1983. p. 58.

actual social science investigations is often quite complex and difficult due to several factors including limitations on the degree of control an investigator can exert over human beings and social systems, instruments of limited validity, complex interrelationships among large numbers of variables and lack of well developed and validated theoretical models”.¹²

This may be one of the reasons why an empirical study was not undertaken in the course of this study. This may be partly due to insufficient funds to undertake the study on the terrain (that is at the Headquarters of CEMAC in Bangui in the Central African Republic). Nevertheless, a short interview with Mr. Assamba Ongodo who is Foreign Affairs adviser and Sub-Director of the European Union at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Cameroon resulted in the provision of part of the data that has contributed in the evaluation of the overall thesis.

Furthermore, apart from the correlational design or technique of analysis; that is, variables borrowed from other sources in order to be analyzed, weighed and coming to a particular conclusion, the experimental design of comparison, randomization and control will also be of great importance in order to have a firm conclusion to the particular thesis. These methods of research design are chosen by the author simply because it is evident that “experimental studies are considered to be more powerful than non-experimental designs in uncovering causal relationships among variables”.¹³

From the above discussion, it is evident that there are two major research methods being used in this study. These are *content analysis* and *differential analysis*. In this light, the *content analysis* shall be done through analyzing treaties, agreements and partnerships (both bi-lateral and multi-lateral) between the EU and

¹² Paul E. Spector. Research Design. Beverly Hills and London: Sage Publications Inc., (1981). p. 19.

¹³ *Ibid.* p. 20.

Africa in general and the Central African region in particular. They shall undergo proof-reading, review and analysis and therefore applied to suit the appropriate issue at hand. The agreements entail a great deal of issues and in order to fit the facts to the aim of the study, content analysis shall be of essence. In doing this, the data and variables collected shall be analyzed in order to fit the appropriate context to determine the hypothesis of the study.

Also, *differential analysis* in this sense shall be done in order to determine the impact or effectiveness of the EU strategy in Central Africa. This shall be done principally through juxtaposing the EU-CEMAC relationship to that of the EU-ECOWAS relationship. The reason why ECOWAS has been chosen as the main institution to lay down the *impact* is simply because ECOWAS and CEMAC have several similarities. For example; they both use similar currencies: the *CFA Franc* and their members are both members of the OHADA Treaty.¹⁴ In doing this, it is believed that an appropriate conclusion shall be arrived at which shall go hand in hand with the hypothesis.

To the above methods can also be added *historical analysis*. In this connection, in trying to understand better the relationship between each of the major institutions which are; The United Nations, the European Union, the African Union and CEMAC, the history of their relationships are of importance for the better understanding of the overall study. Hence, historical analysis is an important methodology for the understanding of the study.

¹⁴ OHADA means Organisation d'Harmonisation des Droits des Affaires en Afrique "Organisation for the Harmonization of Business Law in Africa".

1.5 Outline of the Study

Having said everything so far, it is worthy to give a detail outlook into how the whole thesis is organized. From the discussion given in this chapter, it has served as an overall introduction to the study talking *inter alia* on the literature review, research methods, theories and many more. This gives us a scope of the paper.

The next chapter shall try to give the importance of *multilateralism* to the contemporary implementation of regional integration in Africa. In this connection, as earlier mentioned, the EU's relationship with CEMAC does not exist in vacuum. The EU in implementing the MDGs for Africa shall always draw inspiration from the United Nations and shall need the help of the African Union so as to channel its strategies to the RECs. In looking in detail between the interactions of the three main institutions, the author shall try to prove one of the major aspect of the hypotheses which is that "bi-lateral and multi-lateral agreements are like to be of importance to the development of the African continent as a whole and Central Africa in particular".

Chapter three in looking in detail into the *strict senso* relationship of the EU and CEMAC through its strategies and policies propounded by the European Development Fund (EDF) it shall prove several things; (i) that the European Union is an important actor as regards development in Africa in general and Central Africa in particular, and (ii) that the Banjul decision taken by the African Union which has as effect the non-recognition of new RECs (making CEMAC a non legal regional organization in Central Africa) should be reconsidered. This has been done through portraying the various short comings of the Banjul decision.

The fourth chapter has as objective showing how important the EU strategy for Central Africa has been. This has been done through analyzing its impact in the

West African region to that of the Central African region in the hopes of coming to the conclusion that ‘though the EU is an important actor in relation to development in Central Africa, it still needs to foster its presence in the region’. Furthermore, this particular chapter shall try to bring out the importance of a single currency as a prerequisite for the attainment of regional integration in Africa. In doing this, the author tries to prove another major hypotheses of that ‘a single currency, monetary and customs union will likely lead to a more rapid development of the African continent.’

Finally, the last chapter which is the conclusion of the study will give a summary of the study and in doing so; give an analysis of the various chapter conclusions thereby giving comparatively the outlook of the study and the means undertaken in proving the hypotheses of the study. Recommendations shall also be made at this part of the study.

1.6 Literature Review

The Literature on the relationship between Africa and the European Union in relation to regional integration is enormous and the literature has been extensive over the years. There are both secondary and primary sources which have served as literature for the overall understanding of the paper. These include strategies between Europe and Africa such as the “EU Strategy for Africa: Towards a Euro-African Pact to Accelerate Africa’s Development” and the “Document of regional Cooperation (Region of Central Africa) and Regional Indicative Program for the period of 2002-2007”. These two documents have been of great use for the overall understanding of the study. However, what matters the most have been the various books or authors that have spoken on the matter of regional integration in Africa and its relationship

with the European Union. Furthermore, of major concern are the authors who have written extensively on the issue of monetary union and single market policy.

In this connection, it is but normal to state Michael Smith's assertion that "although the EU claims to be the world's largest donor of development aid, the majority of the aid figure consists of aid given by member states as part of their national programs".¹⁵ The slowness in the provision of both financial and humanitarian aid has been due to two main factors which are "an internal institutional problem: the mixture of policy competences between the EU and its member states and the second is an external factor: the ways in which development assistance policies have been increasingly politicized in the contemporary world arena."¹⁶ When we look at the above assertion, we realize that it goes hand-in-hand with the hypotheses of the study that "though the European Union is a major actor vis-à-vis regional integration development on the continent, it still needs to foster its presence in the Central African region".

Furthermore, Danziger James N. poses the question in his book that: "do you agree with the proposition that under most circumstances, a state is likely to accomplish more of its goals at lower costs if it can develop mutually advantageous cooperative arrangements with other states?"¹⁷ In answering this question, he clearly outlines the various advantages of international law, diplomacy and international organizations thereby leading to the affirmative answer. In taking a closer look at the question, it goes hand in hand with the research question of the study. The author just like Danziger James has concluded also to the affirmative.

¹⁵ Smith, Michael. "European Union External Relations". in Cini, Michelle. Ed. European Union Politics. Second Edition. New York: Oxford University Press. 2007. pp. 225 - 235.

¹⁶ *Ibid*, p. 230.

¹⁷ Danziger James N. Understanding the Political World: A Comparative Introduction to Political Science. Eighth Edition. New York: Pearson Longman, 2007. pp. 296 – 298.

Moreover, it has been affirmed that “globalization encompasses many trends including expanded international trade, telecommunications, monetary coordination, multinational corporations, technical and scientific cooperation, cultural exchanges of new types and scales, migration and refugee flows, and relations between the world’s rich and poor countries...”¹⁸ In this connection, “one of the popular conception of globalization is the widening, deepening and speeding up of worldwide inter-connectedness in all aspects of contemporary social life...”¹⁹ In this connection, one of the major purposes of this particular study is to bring out the numerous advantages of the concept of globalization which is seen as the basis for a successful development in any given region. This is usually done through forging efficient trade links. Hence, “successful trade strategies are those that achieve mutual gains from cooperation with other states... the benefits of trade depend on international cooperation-to enforce contracts, prevent monopolies and discourage protectionism”.²⁰

In this context, most of the literature for this paper is as a result from the analysis of both the regional and national strategies by the EU vis-à-vis regional integration in Africa. Nevertheless, many articles and books have written extensively on the matter. These authors shall be revealed in the course of the study. Furthermore, “The Enlarging European Union at the United Nations: Making Multilateralism Matter”,²¹ happens to be an important paper vis-à-vis the overall study of the paper. Hence, it is strongly believed that the relationship between EU-CEMAC does not exist in a vacuum for the EU’s aims and objectives centers around

¹⁸ Goldstein, Joshua S. and Pevehouse, Jon C. International Relations. 2006 – 2007 Edition. New York: Pearson International Edition, 2007. p. 301.

¹⁹ Held, David, Anthony, McGraw, David Goldblatt, and Jonathan Perraton. Global Transformations: Politics, Economics and Culture. Stanford: Stanford University Press. 1999. p. 2.

²⁰ Goldstein, Joshua S. and Pevehouse, Jon C. International Relations. 2006 – 2007 Edition. New York: Pearson International Edition, 2007. p. 320.

²¹ “The Enlarging European Union at the United Nations: Making Multilateralism Matter”. (2004). http://www.europa-eu-un-org/articles/en/article_1001_en.htm. Accessed on 17th March 2009.

implementing the United Nations Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) in Africa.

Furthermore, due to the EU's role in trying tremendously and encouraging a peaceful process in the troubled Darfur region, (which happens to be in the CEMAC zone as a border between Chad and Sudan), it proves that the EU's *nickname* of being regarded as 'civilian power' is gradually fading away; for the EU has been very influential in promoting military and police intervention in the troubled region. Hence, Hedley Bull's assertion that, the EU is neither "an actor in international affairs and does not seem likely to become one"²² is an overstatement.

Moreover, Benjamin J. Cohen writes that "... governments cannot simultaneously achieve the objectives of exchange-rate stability, capital mobility and monetary policy autonomy...".²³ This assertion is some kind of an over statement because in bringing out some of the success stories or advantages of the various monetary unions that exist between the CEMAC member states and some of the EU member states, it shall gradually disprove the above mentioned assertion. This shall be done through drawing inspiration and arguments from various books dealing with the concept such as Niehans J.'s book.²⁴

1.7 Theorizing the EU-CEMAC relationship

The relationship between the EU and Africa in general and that of CEMAC in particular is centered mostly on integration. Also, it is clear that the topic for this study is centered or based mostly on regional integration. In this connection, there is

²² Bull, Hedley. "Civilian Power: A Contradiction in terms?". Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol.21, No.2, (1982), p.151.

²³ Cohen, Benjamin J. "The Triad and the Unholy Trinity: Problems of International Cooperation". in Frieden Jeffrey A. and David Lake A. International Political Economy: Perspectives on Global Power and Wealth. Routledge Taylor and Francis Group, 2006. p. 261.

²⁴ Niehans J. International Monetary Economics. Deddington: Phillip Allan, 1984.

no better theory that relates the relationship between the institutions such as the *neo-functional approach*. There are three characteristics that are evident when dealing with neo-functionalism. These are; *the concept of spillover, the role of societal groups and the elitist approach*. While the role of the societal groups has to deal with interest groups and political groups as key actors in driving integration forward, the elitist approach propagates for political integration being driven by functional and technocratic needs.²⁵

However, the sector that concerns specifically the relationship between the EU and CEMAC is that of *spillover*. First of all, it is worthy to note that “political integration (to neo functionalists) is the process whereby political actors in several distinct national settings are persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectations and political activities toward a new centre, whose institutions possess or demand jurisdiction over the pre-existing national states. The end result of a process of political integration is a new political community, superimposed over the pre-existing ones”.²⁶ This kind of gives us a basis of the regional integration process and also the basis of the relationship between Europe and Africa. Furthermore, “spillover refers... to the process whereby members of an integration scheme-agreed on some collective goals for a variety of motives but unequally satisfied with their attainment of the goals- attempt to resolve their dissatisfaction by resorting to collaboration in another, related sector (expanding the scope of mutual commitment) or by intensifying their commitment to the original sector (increasing the level of mutual commitment) or both”.²⁷ Thus, it is evident that spillover process may be seen partly

²⁵ Jensen Carsten Stroby. “Neofunctionalism”. in Cini, Michelle. Ed. European Union Politics. Second Edition. New York: Oxford University Press, 2007. p. 86-87.

²⁶ Haas, E.B. The Uniting of Europe: Political, Social and Economic Forces. Stanford, CA: Stanford University, (1950-1957). p. 16.

²⁷ Schmitter, P. “Three Neofunctional Hypothesis about International Integration”. International Organization. 23/1: p. 162.

as the result of unintended consequences. Member states might deliberately accept the political integration and the delegation of authority to supranational institutions on a particular issue however; they may sometimes need even more delegation. Hence, it is evident that the establishment of supranational institutions may be seen as the result of unintended consequences of actions among the actors involved in decision making.

Another major theory when dealing with the EU-CEMAC relationship is that of *Normative Power Europe*. According to this theory propounded fairly recently by the English School of the International Relations theory and their study of the EU, they have laid down five basic rules or factors which are necessary for the EU's relationship with the international community. These are mostly centered on the EU's *acquis communautaire* and *acquis politique* and are fostering; *peace, liberty, democracy, rule of law* and *human rights* when dealing with the international community especially developing nations. To these five main norms can be added four 'minor' norms which are; *social progress, anti discrimination, sustainable development* and *good governance*.²⁸

Hence, it is evident that "over the past five years, the EU has increasingly been exercising normative power in its areas of common concern as it seeks to shape international norms in its own image".²⁹ It is evident that the EU is resolved to reinforce 'the European identity' and 'assert its identity on the international scene' in order to 'promote peace, security and progress in Europe and in the world'. This

²⁸ Manners, Ian. "Normative Power Europe: The European Union between International and World Society". University Association for Contemporary European Studies. 31st Annual Conference and 6th Annual Research Conference- University of Bristol. (Sept. 2001): p. 9.

²⁹ *Ibid.* p. 7.

normative power dimension is important because ‘the debate about civilian power involves fundamental choices about EU’s international identity’.³⁰

In applying the basic concepts of the normative power in Africa, especially in relation to development aid, the EU followed the lead of the Jubilee 2000 movement in its demands to drop the debt for the world’s poorest countries and to revise the Highly Indebted Poor Countries Initiatives (HIPC). This has resulted in the recent everything but arms (EBA) commitment by the EU to open up its markets to these countries for tariff-free trade in all areas except arms.³¹

Furthermore, another major concept which has to deal with the EU-CEMAC relationship is *Organizational Conception* which is characterized mostly by economic and money integration. According to this principle or concept propounded by Hugon Pierre, it aims at portraying the failure of liberal and voluntarist means with reference to market and therefore needs or warrants the contribution of products and actors.³² It is based or centered on games of coalition, cooperation, concurrence, leading sometimes to compatible contradictory objectives. It therefore calls for permanent coordination of national policies, in this connection, laying emphasis on voluntarist conceptions. The realization of a long and irreversible interdependence supposes that actors are mostly firms, commissions and intergovernmental organizations. Among their actions, involves putting in place regional projects with the collaboration of both private and public economic agents on a number of well precised domains.³³

³⁰ Smith, Karen, “The End of Civilian Power Europe: A welcome demise of cause for Concern”, The International Spector. Vol. 23. No. 2, (2000): p.27.

³¹ Manners, Ian. “Normative Power Europe: The European Union between International and world Society”. University Association for Contemporary European Studies; 31st Annual Conference and 6th Annual research Conference- University of Bristol, (Sept 2001): p. 10.

³² Hugon P. “Les Politiques d’ajustement et le Dualisme Financiere Africain”. Techniques Financieres et Developpement, No. 23 (June 1991): p.10.

³³ Avom, Desire, “Integration Monetaire: Prealable ou Resultat d’une Integration Economique? : Discussions a la Lumiere des Experiences de L’Union Europeene et de la CEMAC”, in Hammoudou

One of the major theories that characterize the EU-Africa relationship is that of the *dependency theory*. Several aspects characterize this theory which include the fact that former colonial nations are underdeveloped due to their dependence on the industrialized nations and also that “the fact that the currencies of developing countries are inconvertible in international markets” shall lead to underdevelopment thereby leading to “the external instability of domestic currencies in the periphery hindering the process of capital accumulation”.³⁴

The dependency theory is contrary to “the free market ideology which holds that: at its most basic, that open markets and free trade benefit developing nations, helping them eventually to join the global economy as equal players.”³⁵ Hence, the dependency theory advocates that “developing nations have been adversely affected by unequal trade, especially in the exchange of cheap raw materials from developing nations for the expensive, finished products manufactured by advanced industrialized nations.”³⁶

Another major theory that characterizes the EU-Africa relationship is the *cooperation theory*. In this connection, it is evident that “the basic problem what cooperation theory addresses is the common tension between what is good for the individual actor in the short run, and what is good for the group in the long run.”³⁷ The cooperation theory is characterized by the prisoner’s dilemma which is to the effect that “the temptation payoff for unilateral defection, leads to the possible

Ben hakim, Bekolo-Ebe Bruno and Mama Touna. Eds. L’Integration Regionale en Afrique Centrale: Bilan et Perspectives. Paris: Editions Karthala, 1999, pp.146-148.

³⁴ Vernengo, Mathias. “Dependency Theory”. <http://www.econ.utah.edu/~vernengo/papers/princeton.pdf>. Accessed on July 11th 2009.

³⁵ “What is Dependency Theory?”. Wise Geek. <http://www.wisegeek.com/what-is-dependency-theory.htm>. Accessed on July 11th 2009.

³⁶ “Dependency Theory”. Encarta Encyclopedia. http://encarta.msn.com/encyclopedia_761589416/dependency_theory.html. Accessed on July 11th 2009.

³⁷ Axelrod, Robert. “On Six Advances in Cooperation Theory”. Analyze and Kritik: The Evolution of Cooperation Jan. 2000. p. 3.

payoffs and the reward for mutual cooperation which is greater than the punishment for mutual defection and the sucker's payoff for unilateral cooperation.”³⁸ This simply means that mutual cooperation is a particular characteristic of the cooperation theory.

³⁸*Ibid.* p. 4.

CHAPTER 2

INTERSECTING MULTILATERALISM: THE EFFECTIVENESS ON THE CEMAC REGION

2.1 Introduction

It is believed that the relationship between EU and CEMAC does not exist in a vacuum. The EU draws inspiration from other institutions such as the UN and in applying its strategies for Central Africa in particular and Africa in general; it usually requires the help and aid of the AU. As earlier mentioned, the main aim of the EU is to implement and assure the smooth functioning of the UN Millennium Development Goals (MDG) for Africa. This shows that the EU and UN are linked together in one-way or the other. Also, in implementing these goals, the AU stands out as the recipient of such goals and they oversee that these strategies are clearly and justifiably implemented in all the sub-regions in Africa including Central Africa.

This kind of gives us a pattern of how the EU's pattern of development vis-à-vis regional integration is carried out. In this connection, the UN stands out as a big picture; the EU is at the middle with the AU as the intermediary recipient and CEMAC as the final recipient. It is worth noting at this point that the AU does not recognize the CEMAC as a regional organization responsible for the whole region of Central Africa. However, the member states are linked to the AU through ECCAS which is the institution that is recognized by the AU. Nevertheless, this has not stopped the EU from having a formal relationship with CEMAC.

Hence, the EC has a relationship with both CEMAC and ECCAS but concentrates more on CEMAC (because they make up a greater part of the membership of ECCAS and also because it is the institution that guarantees the economic development of most Central African states). ECCAS mostly deals with the peace and security of the Central African region as a whole.

This particular chapter tries to look into how effective the relationships between the three main institutions of the globe (the UN, the EU and the AU) have been to the development of Central Africa. This particular section thus seeks to answer two main questions; has the relationship between the three main institutions been of significant benefit to the central African region? In this connection, it shall prove a main part of the objective of the study, which is that ‘bi-lateral and multi-lateral agreements are likely to be of more importance to the development of the African continent as a whole and the Central African region in particular.’

Having said this; it is worth understanding what multilateralism is all about. Multilateralism is often used to describe the policies states use that are inclined towards cooperation with other states including (or mostly) through international organizations.³⁹ One of the major principles of multilateralism is the fact that there should be an unlimited prohibition on the use of force in the pursuit of political goals, and the recognition that national interests can be better realized through cooperation than through nation-state competition.⁴⁰

The UN and the AU emphasize on the importance of regional blocs for several decades and in so doing, the UN has tried to share the burden of peacekeeping with such regional blocs or groupings (though it has not been met

³⁹ Laatikainen, Katie Verlin and Smith, E. Karen. Eds. The European Union at the United Nations. Intersecting Multilateralisms. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006. p. 5.

⁴⁰ Gareis, Sven Bernard and Johannes Varwick. The United Nations: An Introduction. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004. p. 244.

several times with success). Regional groupings several at times refuse to act as the UN's 'subcontractor' and will prefer to maintain their autonomy and authority in the region even if this undermines the UN's role.⁴¹ The EU being a regional grouping in its own right has been regarded as the world's most 'success story' as regards multilateralism and in so doing is stretching a helping hand to similar institutions including CEMAC. The AU as earlier said, has not been ignorant on the benefits of regional groupings in Africa and has made this clear on several occasions: first of all in Monrovia in 1979, in Lagos in 1980 during the course of the Lagos Plan of Action (LPA) and in Abuja in 1991 during the negotiations of the Abuja Treaty.⁴²

In so doing, it is worth looking in more detail the relationship of the three institutions and how important their actions have been on the central African region while at the same time trying to bring out the effectiveness of both multilateralism and institutionalism on the global, African and regional scale (in this sense, central Africa). At the global level, we are simply looking at the relationship between the UN and the EU. At the African or continental level, we are looking at the EU and the AU relationship and at the regional level, we are looking at the AU and the CEMAC relationship. This gives a considerable pattern and trend of how regional integration is tackled institutionally. Hence, it shall be important to look into a brief historical background to all the relationships and how the relationship has developed over the years.

⁴¹ See Terry, O'Neil and Nicholas Rees, Peacekeeping in the Post-Cold-War Era. New York: Routledge, 2005.

⁴² Fouda, Seraphin Magloire, "Des Arrangements Institutionnels Pour une Veritable Integration Regionale en Afrique: Quelques Pistes". in Hammoudou, Ben Hakim, Bekolo-Ebe, Bruno and Mama Touna. L'Intégration Régionale en Afrique Centrale; Bilan et Perspectives. Paris : Editions Karthala, 2003. pp. 10-12.

2.2 The Historical Development of the UN and the EU

2.2.1 Overview

The historical development of the relationship between the UN and the EU has been regarded simply as *'sui generis'*. It is kind of unique because many of the EU member states were members of the UN long before the creation of the EU. The EU was created as a result of the two world wars that devastated Europe tremendously and in so doing trying to find a solution for a long lasting peace on the continent which it has succeeded in achieving so far. While the UN was created in 1945, the EU was created in the early parts of the 1950s. Nevertheless, several member states of the EU have been members of the UN long before the creation of the EU.

For a very longtime after the creation of the UN, the EU did not have a single voice at the UN and most of the member states were represented individually. It was not up till 1974 when the EU through the European Commission was given an original information office in New York granting it an observer status at the 29th General Assembly by Resolution 3208. As an observer within the UN General Assembly and most UN specialized agencies, the EU has no vote as such, but is party to more than 50 UN multilateral agreements and conventions as the only non-state participant.⁴³ It has obtained a special 'full participant' status in a number of important UN conferences, as well as for example in the "UN Commission on Sustainable Development (CSD) and the Intergovernmental Forum on Forests (IFF). In 1991, the European Community was accepted as a full member of the UN's Food and Agriculture Organization, the first time it had been recognized as a full voting

⁴³ "The EU at the UN: Overview". in "The Enlarging European Union at the United Nations: Making Multilateralism Matter". Chapter 1, (May 1st 2004). p. 1. http://www.europa-eu.org/articles/en/article_1001_en.htm. Accessed on March 17th 2009.

member by a UN agency. The European Community speaks and votes on behalf of all EU member states in areas where powers have been transferred to it”.⁴⁴

The EU is a crucial and highly valued partner of the UN. The EU has shared (and still does) and promotes the values for which the UN stands for and together, the EU member states and the European Commission channel significant resources to support the UN’s work. A deep commitment to multilateralism and to a strong UN lies at the heart of the EU’s policies. In 2000, at the UN Millennium Summit, the world’s leaders made a wide-ranging set of commitments in the Millennium Declaration.⁴⁵ Building on the UN Charter, they committed to act for the achievement of peace, security and disarmament; development and poverty eradication; protection of our common environment; human rights, democracy and good governance; protection of the vulnerable and meeting the special needs of Africa.

The EU has been a key partner to the UN in each of these critical domains. The relationship with the EU is indispensable to the UN’s work and to the achievement of the objectives set out in the Millennium Declaration. The UN and the EU’s Commission Partnership are based on a united and shared value, shared objectives and shared responsibilities. The Partnership between them is founded first and foremost on shared aspirations of common objectives. The UN-EU Commission partnership spans all regions of the world. In 2006, the Commission approved more than 1.3billion Euros for the implementation of its programs in 105 countries, including least-developed, middle-income and transition countries where European Commission delegations cooperate directly with the UN country teams. The partnership also includes policy dialogue and cooperation at the global level as well

⁴⁴ *Ibid.* p. 2.

⁴⁵ “United Nations Millennium Declaration”. (September 2000).
www.un.org/millennium/declarations/ares552e.htm. Accessed on 16th June 2009.

as around issues internal to the European Union, such as asylum, health and decent work.⁴⁶

This particular section tries to look into how important the EU-UN relations have been to the overall development of the African continent in general and the Central African region in particular. Hence, it is evidence that the High Level Panel report (2003) has attached the importance of regional organizations (such as CEMAC) and has recommended that the UN and such organizations work together⁴⁷ and it has been noted that “the UN is not seeking to drag the member states of the EU into UN Peace Operations but does want to work with the EU, its member states and other regional organizations”.⁴⁸

2.2.2 The Effectiveness of the Relationship between the UN and the EU

The EU together with the UN have joined forces in order to tackle the most pressing matters, which renders such institutions ‘ineffective’. In this connection, “in the view of the EU, multilateral institutions can remain effective only if they adapt to changing conditions so that they remain capable of mounting an effective response to new threats and challenges as they emerge. At the same time, they must persist in their efforts to address long-standing challenges, taking into account on-going economic and social change as well as lessons learnt”.⁴⁹ Meanwhile, effective multilateralism can best be understood as an effective system of global governance, that is, a system able to ensure at the global level, access to the core public goods that

⁴⁶ “Improving Lives: Results from the Partnership of the United Nations and the European Commission in 2006”. United Nations Regional Information Center in Brussels (UNRIC), 15 Mar. 2007, pp. 9-12.

⁴⁷ High Level Panel Report on Threats, Challenges and Change (2003). Paragraph 272. www.un.org/secureworld/report2.pdf. Accessed on 16th June 2009.

⁴⁸ UN Official, Presentation, EU Presidency Seminar, Dulin, 12 May 2004.

⁴⁹ “A World Player, The European Union’s External Relations”, Brussels: DG Press and Communication 2004a (2004).

at the national level the state provides- or is supposed to- to its citizens: stability and security, an enforceable legal order, an open and inclusive economic order and global welfare in all of its aspects (such as access to health, a clean environment, education, etc).⁵⁰

In this connection, it is worthy of note to know that there are four ways in which ‘effectiveness’ could be defined in the context of EU-UN relations;

- *Internal Effectiveness*, which tries to look at the EU as an international actor: are the member states ready to act collectively at the UN through the EU, or are national priorities and action preferable?
- *External Effectiveness*, which can be regarded as the importance of the EU as a ‘frontrunner’ at the UN: is it seen as a unitary and influential actor, does it achieve its objectives and does it influence other actors?
- *Effective Multilateralism*, which can simply be regarded as the EU’s capability and effectiveness in strengthening the UN’s influence in international relations.
- *UN Effectiveness*, which simply tries to look at the UN’s influence in international relations.⁵¹

For the purpose of this paper and for its appropriate conclusions as to the aim and hypothesis, the second and third field of effectiveness shall be looked at in more detail in order to establish the effectiveness of the multilateralism between the institutions while determining whether the impact has been felt globally as well as in Africa in particular. It should be noted here that with the exception on environmental

⁵⁰ Biscop, Sven. “Effective Multilateralism: A Positive Agenda for a Global EU-UN Partnership”, in Sven, Biscop. Ed. Audit of European Strategy. Brussels: Royal Institute of International Relations, 2004. pp. 27.

⁵¹ Laatikainen, Katie Verlin and Smith, E. Karen. Eds. The European Union at the United Nations: Intersecting Multilateralisms. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006. p. 9.

issues, the EU has been weak in acting collectively towards reforms in the UN.⁵² Though a supranational institution, the EU has not been effective in the UN most of the time due to the supremacy of the member states at the UN than the institution as a whole. Also, the rotating presidency (every six months) has made it difficult for the EU to have a ‘single’ voice at the UN with each state assuming the presidency determining the institution’s foreign policy within the UN. However, despite these shortcomings, the relationship between the EU and the UN has been met with several successes.⁵³

The UN and the European Commission are both partners and share a particular commitment to the Paris Declaration and Aid Effectiveness.⁵⁴ The Declaration constitutes a roadmap to improve the quality and impact of aid and improve accountability. The UN and EU’s relationship stems directly from commitments under the Paris Declaration. Also, the communications in 2001 led to a strategic paper on ‘Building and effective partnership with the UN in the fields of Development and Humanitarian affairs’ and in 2003 on ‘The European Union and the United Nations: The Choice of Multilateralism’. These papers provided a basis for the development of more structural relations within the UN. Notable examples include identifying multilateralism as a basic principle of the EU’s foreign policy and calling for a comprehensive strengthening and mainstreaming of EU-UN relations, through systematic policy dialogue, greater cooperation in the field, better crisis

⁵² *Ibid.* p. 10.

⁵³ *Ibid.* p. 11. See also the conclusions of Rees Nicholas. “The Institutional Dynamics of EU-UN Security Cooperation: Problems and Prospects”. Paper to be Presented at the UACES Annual Research Conference. University of Limerick 31 August- 2 September 2006. pp. 16-17.

⁵⁴ Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness signed by Ministers of developed and developing countries Responsible for Promotion of Development and heads of Multilateral and Bi-lateral Development Institutions. www.oecd.org/dataoecd/11/41/34428551.pdf. March 2005. Accessed on June 16th 2009.

management and prevention, and strategic partnerships between the Commission and selected UN organizations.⁵⁵

With the UN and EU having similar views, objectives and aims, for example in promoting democracy, solidarity, sustainability, market based economy, cultural diversity and the rule of Law, and the maintenance of international peace and security, there is no doubt and it comes as no surprise that the EU and UN should be deepening their relationship at this time. It is also important to note that the EU works with all UN bodies, agencies and programs across virtually the whole range of UN activities. Nevertheless, EU member states together are the largest financial contributor to the UN system. At the moment, the EU-27 pays 38% of the UN's regular budget, more than two-fifths of UN peacekeeping operations and around half of all member states' contributions to UN funds and programs.



Figure 1: Contributions to United Nations Regular Budget 2003

Furthermore, the EU and the UN relationship are of top priority to each other towards seeking multilateral solutions to global problems especially in the field of

⁵⁵ "Improving Lives: Results from the Partnership of the United Nations and the European Commission in 2006", United Nations Regional Information Center in Brussels (UNRIC) 15 Mar. 2007. pp. 12-13.

peace and security. With the UN drawing on well-equipped European Troops from national armed forces. The EU has undertaken to create a rapid reaction force of 60.000 soldiers as part of its European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP).⁵⁶ Depending on the circumstance, this force can be made available to provide prompt assistance for UN Peacekeeping operations, like the ‘Artemis’ EU military operation launched in the Democratic Republic of the Congo in June 2003 in response to the UN Secretary General Annan’s request (and as authorized by UNSC Resolution 1484). This operation reflects the contribution the ESDP can make to crisis management in cooperation with the UN. This cooperation has also stretched to the Balkans where the EU and UN have cooperated intensively in recent times and will continue to do so into the future for example in the UN mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), where the EU is in charge of the construction ‘pillar’, the current EU police mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (based on UNSC Resolution 1396); and the ongoing EU military operation ‘Concordia’ in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (based on UNSC Resolution 1371) to help build peace and stabilize the political situation there.⁵⁷

Moreover, recently, the Presidency of the Czech Republic of the EU welcomed the successful handover of responsibilities from the European Union Force for Chad and Central African Republic (EUFOR Tchad/CAR) peacekeeping mission to a United Nations military force of the UN mission in Chad/Central African Republic (MINURCAT), one year after the EUFOR had achieved its initial operating capability. The European operation in Chad/CAR has been the longest most heavily manned and most multinational military operation that the EU has ever

⁵⁶ “The Enlarging European Union at the United Nations: Making Multilateralism Matter”, Chapter 1, (May 1st 2004), p.1. http://www.europa-eu-un.org/articles/en/article_1001_en.htm. Accessed on March 17th 2009. p. 7.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.* p. 8.

conducted in Africa. The positive outcomes in fulfilling its mandate were also achieved due to the exemplary cooperation between the EU and the UN, from the launching of the operation to its successful handover and even though EUFOR's mandate has formally ended, the EU will remain an active player in the region. Out of almost 3700 soldiers who participated in the European operation, around 2000 will remain on the ground and serve the MINURCAT banner. Also, the European Commission contributed 10million Euros to MINURCAT's fund to finance its training, equipment and support program for the deployment of Chadian police and gendarmes.⁵⁸

Many results of the partnership between the EU and UN have been achieved in individual countries thanks to the help of regional organizations and the regional approach. This was particularly the case in the capacity building for border control on heroin routes in Central Asia, promotion of social cohesion in Latin America, demobilization of child soldiers in the Mano River area, nutritional surveys in Africa and access to environmental information in Europe. In this connection, the two institutions strongly believe that there are both good reasons and considerable scope for expanding its interaction with the Commission at the regional and sub regional levels. Also, in the field of upholding human rights and international standard, the EU through the Commission has cooperated extensively with the UN (through various UN agencies) in facilitating regional Cooperation to prevent violence against children through which they supported the regional declaration 'Act Now on

⁵⁸ "EU Presidency Welcomes Successful Handover from EUFOR Chad/CAR to MINURCAT". 17 Mar. 2009. http://www.europa-eu-un.org/articles/en/article_8581_en.htm. Accessed on 22nd March 2009.

Violence against children' among 52 countries in Europe and Central Africa, calling for urgent action to combat the global scourge and care for its young victims.⁵⁹

Furthermore, the EU through the Commission together with the UN has been a key partner in the intergovernmental work on public health, innovation and intellectual property, drawing up a global strategy on essential health research relevant to diseases that disproportionately affect developing countries. The EU plays a key role as funder of health-oriented research, a partner in clinical trials, and through cooperation with the UN in over 50ACP countries to increase the availability, affordability, safety and more rational use of medicines.⁶⁰

2.3 Survey of the Relationship between the EU and the AU

2.3.1 Historical analysis of the Relationship

The relationship of the EU and AU started as early as 1957 during the signing of the Treaty of Rome in which the creators of the EU had Africa in mind when they stated *inter alia* that in order “to strengthen the Unity of their economies and to ensure their harmonious development by reducing the differences existing between the various regions and the backwardness of less favored regions”,⁶¹ the EU shall ensure; (i) the sustainable economic and social development of the developing countries and more particularly the most disadvantaged among them; (ii) the smooth

⁵⁹ “Improving Lives: Results from the Partnership of the United nations and the European Commission in 2006”. United Nations Regional Information Center in Brussels (UNRIC) 15th Mar. 2007. pp. 16-23.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.* pp. 41-42.

⁶¹ “Treaty of Rome 1957”. Preamble. <http://www.hri.org/docs/Rome57/preamble.html>. Accessed on 31st May 2009.

gradual integration of the developing countries into the world economy; and (iii) the campaign against poverty in the developing countries”.⁶²

Then came the Yaoundé Agreement in 1963 and then the Lome Agreement signed in 1975 and finally the Cotonou Agreement signed in the year 2000. The Cotonou Agreement with a life span of twenty years still guarantees and serves as the ‘guidelines’ for the relationship between Europe and the ACP. However, it was in April 2000 that the Heads of States from both continents ever met for the first time in which they decided to focus their relationship on eight areas; external debt, the return of stolen cultural goods, conflict prevention, human rights, democracy and good governance, regional integration, HIV/AIDS, food security and environment.⁶³

However, Europe’s relationship with Africa is not a new phenomenon. “It is deeply rooted in history and has gradually evolved from often painful colonial arrangements into a strong and equal partnership based on common interests, mutual recognition and accountability. Some EU member states retain longstanding political, economic and cultural links with different African countries and regions, while others are relative newcomers to African politics and development. At the community level, over the last few decades, the European Commission has built up extensive experience and concluded a number of contractual arrangements with different parts of Africa that provide partners with a solid foundation of predictability and security”.⁶⁴

This particular ‘unique’ relationship between Europe and Africa led to the high Panel and high level talks for an EU strategy for Africa which first of all took

⁶² Article 130u of the Treaty of Rome 1957. For more information, see Article 130v, w, x and y of the Treaty of Rome 1957.

⁶³ Africa and the European Union. Luxembourg: Office of Official Publications of the European Communities, 2003. p. 7.

⁶⁴ “EU Strategy for Africa: Towards a Euro-African Pact to accelerate Africa’s Development”. 12th October 2005. http://www.ec.europa.eu/development/.../eu_strategy_for_africa_12_10_2005_en.pdf. Accessed on June 16th 2009.

place on the 12th of December 2005 serving as a starting point for the relationship which has led to the ‘Joint Africa-EU Strategy’ which was clearly enshrined in the Lisbon Treaty which was ratified on the 9th of December 2007 paving the way for development in Africa through the EU.⁶⁵

2.3.2 The Effectiveness of the Relationship

It is now evident that with the advent of institutions such as the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) and the reinforced roles of the Regional Economic Communities (RECs) within the AU, it has also strategically improved and changed the relationship that exists between the EU and the AU. As earlier mentioned, this particular relationship is not new; it is about five decades old today. Though there is a particular agreement between the EU and ACP states, the Joint Africa-EU Strategy for the first time, shall address Africa as a single entity and under this forum, the EU shall reinforce its dialogue with Pan African institutions through revising the Cotonou Agreement, the Trade Development and Cooperation Agreement (TDCA) and the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership.

In this connection, it is evident that the main purpose of the EU strategy for Africa is to promote the achievement of the UN Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) in Africa through the principles of *equality*, *partnership* and *ownership*.⁶⁶ Also, the relations between EU and Africa are highly characterized by a culture of dialogue which forms a basic element of the contractual relationship. The EU’s

⁶⁵ “The Africa-EU STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP: A Joint Africa-EU Strategy”. 2007. http://www.africa-union.org/root/AU/Conference/2007/December/eu-au/docs/joint_strategy_3_years.html. Accessed on May 31st 2009.

⁶⁶ “EU Strategy for Africa: Towards a Euro-African Pact to accelerate Africa’s Development”. 12th Oct. 2005. pp. 2-3. http://www.ec.europa.eu/development/.../eu_strategy_for_africa_12_10_2005_en.pdf. Accessed on June 16th 2009.

relationship or partnership with Africa makes a clear link between the political dimension, trade and development. It is based on five pillars:

- Reinforcement of the political dimension of relations between African countries and the European Union;
- Involvement of civil society, the private sector and non-state players;
- Poverty reduction, confirmed as a key objective within the context of the objectives and targets agreed at international level;
- An innovative economic and trade cooperation framework;
- Rationalization of financial instruments and a system of flexible programming.⁶⁷

With all these bold aspirations and strategies put in place, and the commitment of both institutions in tackling the major issues at hand, it is now clear that, without substantial additional political will and financial resources, Africa will not be able to attain the MDGs by 2015 as targeted by the international community. As stated by Louis Mitchell, the European Commissioner for Development and Humanitarian Aid, “We know that not enough progress has been made and at the current pace we will have to wait over 100 years before the Goals are achieved. The findings of the report commissioned by the Secretary-General of the United Nations Kofi Annan, to Professor Jeffrey Sachs are very clear: funding needs to be increased to the tune of USD 60billion per year if these goals are not to remain a dead letter”.⁶⁸

However, such assertions have not discouraged the actors and it is now evident that attaining the MDGs is therefore a shared objective and common goal. In

⁶⁷ Moreau Francois. “The Cotonou Agreement: Building on the experience of 30yrs of ACP-EC Partnership”. Foreword to the 2005 Revised Cotonou Agreement. 2005. pp. 11-12.

⁶⁸ Mitchell Louis. “The Cotonou Agreement Benefits the Poorest: The International Development agenda: 5years of Cotonou Agreement”. Foreword to the Revised Cotonou Agreement. 2005. pp. 6-7.

this connection, various prerequisites have been established or laid down in order to attain these objectives, which may simply be;

1. Attaining *peace* and *security*, which is an essential part for sustainable development through conflict prevention and post conflict reconstruction. It is now a major priority for both Africa and Europe.
2. Developing *good* and *effective governance* through being regularly monitored in the framework of the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM), and promoting transparency and effective exchange of information between authorities in order to fight corruption, money laundering and terrorism.
3. Creating an *economic environment for achieving the MDGs* through the building of larger harmonized markets which are more attractive for investment in the productive sectors and increasing the development of South-South, North-South and multilateral trade thereby attaining economic growth and regional integration.⁶⁹

The importance of the relationship between both institutions has been evident through the various networks of bi-lateral and multi-lateral agreements which have taken place over the years making it a ‘unique’ relationship and reflecting the continent’s diversity on terms of history, policies and needs. These agreements range from the Lome Agreement signed in 1975, which was revised several times until the year 2000 when the Cotonou agreement was signed and revised in the year 2005. These agreements were signed with various countries of sub-Saharan Africa while a signatory of the Cotonou agreement concluded a separate parallel ambitious TDCA.

⁶⁹ “EU Strategy for Africa: Towards a Euro-African Pact to accelerate Africa’s development”, Brussels. 12th Oct. 2005. pp. 4-6.
http://www.ec.europa.eu/development/.../eu_strategy_for_africa_12_10_2005_en.pdf. Accessed on June 16th 2009.

Hence, apart from the fact that these EU strategies serve and provide a common coordinated and coherent initiative and response to the challenges faced by Africa, in April 2005 (the year the European Neighborhood Policy [ENP] came into force), the Commission took a giant step by implementing the ‘MDG package’, providing the basis for the ambitious commitments made by the European Council in June 2005.⁷⁰ Basing on this package, in July 2005 the Commission proposed to the Council and the Parliament to go even further and adapt a joint declaration on the EU’s new development policy, the ‘European Consensus’. Once this document is to be adopted, hopefully at the Lisbon Summit, (and which it has been done by the way on the 20th of December 2005), it will set a landmark and precedence through providing for the first time ever, a common framework of objectives, values and principles that the member states, the commission and the European Parliament supports and promotes as a global player and partner. Also, this is a special way to show the special relationship that exists between the two continents.⁷¹

Furthermore, with several amendments which have taken place throughout the years and in particular in 2005 when the Cotonou Agreement was amended, and making particular reference to Article 8 which shall permit the European Commission and African Partners to use political dialogue swiftly and effectively and under almost all circumstances through using sanctions as the last resort to political conflicts. In this way, political dialogue can be used to prevent violation of the ‘essential elements’ of the Cotonou Agreement instead of as in the past- being a reaction mechanism only when a problem occurs. In this connection, the importance

⁷⁰ Communications from the Commission “Speeding up progress towards the MDGs-the EU Contribution” (Com [2005] 132); “Accelerating progress towards attaining the MDGs-financing for development and aid effectiveness” (Com [2005] 133); and “Policy coherence for development-accelerating progress towards attaining the MDGs (Com [2005] 134).

⁷¹ The European Consensus on Development 2005. <http://europa.eu/scadplus/leg/en/lub/r12544.htm>. Accessed on 31st May 2009.

of the relationship has been crystallized through the enhanced ministerial meetings and raising the dialogue to the highest political level.

The EU strongly believes that better infrastructural development is a prerequisite for development. In so doing, potentially lucrative use of a country's natural resources becomes difficult due to insufficient or unsuitable infrastructure and trade links. Hence, the EU Commission therefore proposed to 'establish an EU-African Partnership for Infrastructure to support and initiate programs (Trans-African Networks) that facilitate interconnectivity at continental level for the promotion of regional integration'. This Partnership for Infrastructure shall include financing and investments in trans-boundary and regional infrastructures such as: transport networks (roads, railways, inland waterways, ports and airports), water and energy infrastructure and connections as well as ground-based, space-based electronic communications infrastructure and services.⁷² The agreement is based on a number of principles, which include;

- The *coherence* and *complementarity* with the actions taken at country and regional levels and its long term *sustainability*;
- Through ensuring African ownership by maintaining close ties and engagement with the African continental and regional institutions- the AU and the RECs- in accelerating the AU-NEPAD action plan on infrastructure.⁷³

With the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty in the year 2007 by the EU and ACP states, most, if not, all of the above strategies outlined by the EU-Africa partnership have been implemented by the Lisbon Treaty and clearly enshrined in the EU-Africa strategic Partnership 2007. This particular Treaty clearly states in Article 10 which is under the heading 'Strategic Framework' that; "The four main objectives of this

⁷² The EU-Africa Partnership on Infrastructure 2007. pp. 8-16. <http://www.elo-online.org/infrastuctures%20Partnerships-Matos%20Rosappt>. Accessed on May 31st 2009.

⁷³ *Ibid.* p. 8.

long-term strategic partnership set the comprehensive framework within which specific strategies will have to be put in place in the following areas; (a) peace and security, (b) governance and human rights, (c) trade and regional integration and (d) key development issues". This therefore shows that regional integration happens to be an important factor as regards EU-African relationship.

Furthermore, according to this renewed Partnership with Africa, it is clearly enshrined in Article 45 that the cooperation will be used mainly on stronger bilateral development-oriented trading relationships through various ways which include; (i) the implementation of Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) with African EPA regions which involve the RECs and other African organizations; (ii) by supporting African business in its efforts to meet EU norms and standards and to develop its productive capacity, and (iii) by cooperating in developing export strategies and business to business relations. In this connection, it is important that the AU-EU dialogue remains relevant to the overall process of regional integration and interface with developing RECs. In so doing, stressing the need for the EPA to be supported by Africa's regional and continental integration agenda on the basis of the Abuja Treaty.⁷⁴

Moreover, the integration of Africa is not limited only to intra-regional integration but extra-regional integration is important as well. In this sense, globally, Europe will seek to promote global economic governance, and sustain Africa's efforts to integrate into the World economy. In obtaining this, the EU will promote the participation of Africa and EU's positions through coordinating in various international fora. In this context, Africa and the EU will cooperate to build technical

⁷⁴ "The Africa-EU Strategic Partnership: A Joint Africa-EU Strategy". 2007. pp. 11-12. http://www.africa-union.org/root/AU/Conference/2007/December/eu-au/docs/joint_strategy_3_years.html. Accessed on May 31st 2009.

and institutional capacity for negotiations in trade and related areas, such as quality and food safety and industrial goods.⁷⁵

Also, the case of Darfur in Sudan has been a clear example where the UN, NATO and EU have supported the AU in several instances by its member states via the African Peace Facility. In this light, the EU provided a civilian policing contribution to the AU mission (AMIS II) in order to help develop its policing capacity. The EU has also contributed enormously through military assistance to AMIS including planning and management support, funding and logistics.⁷⁶ The aim for this has been to develop local capacity and ownership as well as helping to stabilize the peace through provision of peace, rule of law support and humanitarian efforts.⁷⁷

2.4 Understanding the relationship between the AU and CEMAC

2.4.1 The historical perspective

Regional integration in Africa in general and in the CEMAC zone in particular dates as far back as the 1960s during the period of independence. Due to the idea of intensification of globalization, the idea which is being propagated now a days which is aimed at intensifying Africa's regional integration consists of the liberalization of African economies, the intensification of the freedom of movement of goods and services and the acceleration of the movement of capital. Furthermore, with the creation of the AU, the old idea of a 'United States of Africa' has been

⁷⁵ *Ibid*, Article 47, p.11.

⁷⁶ Rees Nicholas, "The Institutional Dynamics of EU-UN Security Cooperation: Problems and Prospects", Paper to be Presented at the UACES Annual Research Conference, University of Limerick 31 August- 2 September 2006. p. 12.

⁷⁷ *Ibid*. p. 11.

envisaged by several AU member states, which are to be governed or characterized by several continental institutions. Hence, the reinforcement of regional blocks happens to be one of the ‘intermediary stages’ towards the attainment of the United States of Africa. This is clearly enshrined in the Lagos Plan of Action (LPA) 1980 and the Abuja Treaty 1991.⁷⁸ However, the process did not begin in the 1980s, it is thus important to take a look at the trend.

As early as 1976, during the Eleventh Extraordinary Session of the OAU Council of Ministers and a year later during the Third Economic Commission for Africa (ECA), held on February-March 1977 and in July 1977, the concept of individual autonomy and collective self reliance were clearly enshrined in the ‘Kinshasa Declaration’. Two years later during the Fifth ECA meeting, ‘The African Development Strategy’ as well as the ‘Monrovia Strategy’ was introduced which stated *inter alia* that “the Monrovia Declaration of commitment by the OAU Heads of State and Government to the guiding principles to be followed and to measures to be taken in favor of national and collective self sufficiency in economic and social development with a view of establishing a new economic order in Africa”.⁷⁹

Furthermore, with the “commitment to establish by the year 2000, on the basis of a treaty to be concluded, an African Economic Community (AEC) in order to ensure the economic, cultural and social integration in Africa”, the Lagos Plan of Action was brokered serving as the origin of regional integration in Africa which had as objectives among others; (i) to promote cooperation among African countries and integration in all economic, social and cultural fields, (ii) the development and

⁷⁸ Fouda, Séraphin Magloire. “Des Arrangements Institutionnels Pour une véritable Intégration Régionale en Afrique: Quelques Pistes”. in Hammoudou, Ben Hakim, Bekolo-Ebe, Bruno and Mama Touna, *L’Intégration Régionale en Afrique Centrale: Bilan et Perspectives*. Paris : Editions Karthala, 2003. p. 10.

⁷⁹ Kouassi, Rene N’Guetta. “The Itinerary of the African Integration Process: An Overview of the Historical Landmarks”. *African Integration Review*. Volume 1, No. 2 (July 2007). p. 3.

progression of AECs through greater sectoral integration and the harmonization of development strategies, policies and plans of member states.⁸⁰

Finally, with the ratification of the Abuja Treaty establishing the AEC by 49 of the 51 states of the continent in 1991 clearly commits the leaders of the African states along the path of economic, regional integration and collective development. With the signing of this treaty, eight Regional Economic Communities (RECs) were created with ECCAS being one of them. The members of CEMAC are linked to the AEC through the ECCAS regional block. This particular treaty has as its main objective (among others); “the promotion of economic, social and cultural development as well as African integration with a view to increasing economic self-sufficiency and promoting endogenous and self-supporting development”.⁸¹

Hence, as earlier mentioned, the AU does not recognize CEMAC as an REC. In this connection, most of the strategies and plans which have been carried out in the region have been done so through ECCAS which is the legally recognized institution for Central Africa. In this connection, most of the strategies and plans carried out between the AU and Central Africa have been done through ECCAS and not CEMAC. Hence, it should not come as a surprise that this particular section of the study shall have no direct relationship with CEMAC *stricto sensu*. However, ECCAS and CEMAC do have important and landmark agreements, making it in such a way that most agreements entered into between ECCAS and third party to be directly acceptable within the CEMAC as a whole and the member states in particular but there are limitations to this as well.

Hence, with the adoption of the LPA and the Abuja Treaty and the establishment of the African Community, its modalities are supposed to be carried

⁸⁰ *Ibid.* pp. 4-5.

⁸¹ *Ibid.* p. 6.

out mainly by means of coordination, harmonization and gradual integration of the activities of the RECs and it is supposed to take place over a period of 34 years. With the signing of these treaties, NEPAD was created and which came into force in 1999 and the quest for efficient and lasting solutions to the major challenges gave rise to the Sirte Declaration which like all the other treaties and declarations had as objectives among others; “the strengthening and consolidation of the RECs which form the pillars for achieving the objectives of the AEC and proposed union” and to “promote sustainable development in the economic, social and cultural fields as well as the integration of the African economies”.⁸² RECs still remain very vital for the African continent for they still remain the sole institutions for the implementation of NEPAD strategies and programs in conjunction with the private sector and civil society and individual countries.⁸³

2.4.2 The Effectiveness of the Relationship

One of the major areas where the AU has placed substantial effort is in the field of peace and security. It is noted that “armed conflicts contribute immensely to the deterioration in socio-economic development with attendant sufferings of civilian populations, increase in refugees and displaced persons, and denial of basic human rights, and diminished hope for African people”.⁸⁴ The CEMAC zone has been home to several of these conflicts for example; the Darfur crisis (between Chad and Sudan)⁸⁵, the crisis in the Democratic Republic of Congo (D.R.C) and in the Central

⁸² *Ibid.* p. 8-10.

⁸³ *Ibid.* p. 17.

⁸⁴ African Union Commission. “The Review of the Millennium Declaration and the Millennium Development Goals”. 2006. p. 47.

⁸⁵ The crisis in the Darfur region still persists till date leading to full scale ‘invasion’ by the Chadian Air Force on Darfur in April 2009. Nevertheless, an accord was signed on May 4th 2009 to ease tensions between Chad and Sudan in Doha.

African Republic (CAR). Also notable are the border conflicts between Cameroon and Nigeria, between Gabon and Equatorial Guinea and fairly recently the political crisis between Cameroon and Equatorial Guinea. In the recognition of this fact and in an attempt towards solving the crisis in the region, the AU has pioneered the establishment of a continental peace and security architecture, which includes the protocol relating to the establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union (PSC).⁸⁶

Furthermore, due to the fact that numerous African countries remain marginalized in the world market thanks to maintenance of high tariffs on imports from developing countries with regards to trade by 'rich countries', the NEPAD came up with the advancement of 'intra-African' trade. Despite the fact that inter-institutional trade has not registered tremendous success over the years with as little as 3.4% registered by the CEMAC states in which Cameroon alone stands out as the main contributor to such trade, however, several progress has been made with trade agreements being brokered between the CEMAC and COMESA (Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa) for example. Despite the major hindrance to this success, which includes poor infrastructures; financial weakness and poor trade regulations and policies, the AU is gradually registering success in the field of trade through NEPAD initiatives.

Moreover, in order to better accelerate in the field of regional integration, the AU is currently working on the establishment of three main financial institutions, namely; the African Investment Bank (AIB), the African Monetary Fund (AMF) and the African Central Bank (ACB), which are to foster integration between the RECs through the implementation of common currencies and the establishment of free

⁸⁶ Mkwezalamba, Maxwell M, and Chinyama, J. Emmanuel. "Implementation of Africa's Integration and Development Agenda: Challenges and Prospects". African Integration Review. Volume 1, No. 1 (Jan. 2007). pp. 2-3.

trade areas and customs union. In so doing, it will promote intra-African trade through establishing large regional markets and harmonizing and coordinating national policies. With the completion of this strategy, RECs will become efficient and effective instruments for continental integration as building blocks of the AU.⁸⁷

Another major breakthrough propounded by the NEPAD initiative is the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM). The APRM aims at fostering the adoption of policies, standards and practices that lead to high economic growth, sustainable development and accelerated sub-regional and economic integration through sharing of experiences and reinforcement of successful and best practices, including identifying deficiencies and assessing the needs of capacity building. The Peer review process aims to scrutinize all levels of government, parliament and the judiciary as well as the private sector. All the members of the AU are signatories to the APRM including all the CEMAC states. Nevertheless, none of the CEMAC states have offered any Peer review report ever since its inception in January 2007. However, the initiative is still undergoing great success on the African continent with Kenya and Tanzania having given reports on the development of governance in their countries. The APRM seems to be a concrete demonstration of African countries' commitment to addressing governance issues decisively and controlling their own destinies.⁸⁸

Furthermore, during the AU General Assembly meeting held in Banjul, The Gambia in July 2006, the AU took a decision not to recognize any new RECs. Also, as earlier mentioned, CEMAC is linked to the AU through ECCAS. Nevertheless, over the years, it has been evident that there has been a reduction in efficiency of interaction between CEMAC and ECCAS. Despite numerous attempts for CEMAC

⁸⁷ *Ibid.* p. 73.

⁸⁸ Kouassi, Rene N'Guetta. "The Itinerary of the African Integration Process: An Overview of the Historical Landmarks". African Integration Review. Volume 1, No.2, (July 2007). p. 18.

to be recognized as a full REC, this has failed. This lack of interaction between both institutions has reduced the regional integration capabilities in the region. It has been experiencing disputes with both institutions claiming ‘supremacy’ over the other and with member states having divergent alliances and mixed up agendas towards both institutions. Nevertheless, no major conflicts between both institutions have been registered. However, this kind of downplays Africa’s regional integration process in Central Africa.

It can also be said that despite the successful coup that took place in the CAR in 2003 by General Bozize who ousted President Felix Patassé, the AU was very instrumental in trying to find a lasting peaceful process to the crisis (even though it failed). The crisis in the CAR eventually led to a border conflict as well as political conflict between the CAR and the Republic of Chad. The decision arrived at which included among others, the creation of an AU office in Bangui in CAR and an update on a regular basis to the AU institutions on the situation in the CAR. Despite the fact that the mission was not a success, the AU office in Bangui still exists and it shows a special concern the AU has for the Central African region and it monitors presently not only the situation in the CAR but goes a long way towards monitoring the situation in the whole of Central Africa.⁸⁹

2.5 Chapter Conclusion

In conclusion therefore, it can be said that multilateralism is an important concept towards the development of the African continent as a whole and CEMAC in

⁸⁹ For the basis of the decisions arrived at by the AU on the crisis, please see; African Union Commission. “Report of the Interim Chairperson of the Commission of the African Union on the Situation in the Central African Republic (CAR) and on Relations between Chad and the CAR”. Central Organ Mechanism for Conflict Prevention Management. Resolution/MEC/AMB/3, (LXXXVIII) January 2003. pp. 6-10.

particular. International and regional organizations are a pre-requisite for the development of the continent. Hence, the institutional arrangement of regional integration for the better implementation of strategies (that is between the UN and EU, the EU and AU and finally the AU and CEMAC) has encountered great success.

However, the decision taken by the AU in Banjul in July 2006 not to recognize any new REC has reduced the AU's influence in Central Africa. This has not stopped the EU from having a formal relationship with CEMAC. That is the reason why the next chapter shall try to look into the EU's regional integration strategies with CEMAC in particular. In this connection shall show that in one way or the other, the AU should 'rethink' its Banjul decision and should heed to CEMAC's call of being an acceptable, recognized and legal regional organization for Central Africa.

CHAPTER 3

THE EU-CEMAC RELATIONSHIP TOWARDS REGIONAL INTEGRATION⁹⁰

3.1 Introduction

The Cooperation that exists between the EU and CEMAC has been going on for a very long time now. Hence, it is evident that the EU has been very influential in the implementation of strategies for the development of regional integration in the CEMAC zone. This chapter has as objective to portray the role of the EU in the promotion of regional integration in the CEMAC zone. This shall therefore help in portraying the hypothesis that the “European Union is an important actor in relation to regional integration in Africa. Nevertheless, the EU still needs to foster its presence in the Central African region in particular”. While the first part of this hypothesis shall be shown in more detail during the course of this chapter, the next part shall be shown or proven in the next chapter, which shall be done through juxtaposing the EU-CEMAC relationship with that of the EU-ECOWAS relationship.

In this connection, it is worthy to note that the EU’s relationship with Central Africa is based upon agreements with two main institutions; ECCAS and CEMAC. As aforementioned, ECCAS deals mainly with relations to security in the region meanwhile CEMAC deals with the economic, political and social policies or

⁹⁰ Most of the data or sources used for this chapter are in French. Hence, the accuracy in translation shall not be 100%.

strategies in the region. It should be understood therefore that to the six main states of CEMAC can be added the state of Sao Tome and Principe to make ECCAS. Also, the strategies with CEMAC are based on two perspectives; first of all, with that concerning the whole of the Central African region and secondly, with strategies concerning the various member states of the CEMAC region. This chapter therefore shall give a vivid perspective of the important actions taken by the EU vis-à-vis the progress of the regional integration policies both at the regional as well as the national level. In other words, all the actions taken by the EU to foster regional integration in the region shall be analyzed.

As earlier mentioned, the Banjul decision of July 2006 which has as objective the non-recognition of new RECs in Africa has had tremendous and landmark consequences not only for the African continent but also vis-à-vis the implementation of the EU's strategies to foster regional integration in Africa as a whole and the CEMAC region in particular. In this connection, this particular chapter shall also try to portray the impact of this decision on the CEMAC zone. This decision has fostered the slowness of regional integration in Central Africa because it made CEMAC a non-recognizable regional organization. The institution that the AU recognizes is ECCAS.

However, the Banjul decision has not discouraged the EU to have a direct relationship with CEMAC. This has caused several conflicts between the EU and AU; nevertheless, this has not dissuaded the EU from continuing its activities in Central Africa via CEMAC. In this connection, this chapter in portraying the EU's policies and strategies with CEMAC, shall one way or the other show the *shortcomings* of the Banjul decision vis-à-vis regional integration development in Central Africa.

Thus, this chapter shall proceed by showing some of the limitations to the Banjul decision. In this connection, it shall portray some of the conflicts the AU has had with the EU while also showing some of the weaknesses of the decision in the Central African region. Then, it shall continue by showing the EU's strategy for CEMAC; here, the various policies of the EU-CEMAC relationship shall be analyzed. In doing this, it is therefore believed that the appropriate conclusion shall be arrived at which is that the EU's relationship with CEMAC has helped in the development of Central Africa vis-à-vis regional integration and this has proven that the Banjul decision should be *reconsidered*. Having shown this, it is strongly believed that it shall serve as grounds for distinguishing the EU's relations with CEMAC to that of ECOWAS in the next chapter.

3.2 The Limitations of the Banjul decision

During the 7th Summit of the African Union in Banjul, the Gambia on the 1st and 2nd of July 2006, several decisions were taken which included the decision on the trial of former Chadian President Hissene Habre in Senegal and the meeting of the African Court on Human and People's Rights among others. Nevertheless, the main decision was to recognize the eight RECs⁹¹ proposed by the Ouagadougou Ministerial in March 2006 and to suspend the recognition of new RECs. The rationalization of the RECs was officially the main topic of the summit. However, it is evident that this particular decision of not recognizing new RECs has downplayed the regional integration process in Central Africa in particular and Africa in

⁹¹ The eight RECs are; Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD), Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), East African Community (EAC), Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), Intergovernmental Authority for Development (IGAD), Southern African Development Community (SADC) and Union Maghreb Arab (UMA).

general.⁹² In this connection, it is worthy to look at some of the shortcomings in the Central African region below.

First of all, it is evident that the AU has been influential in the field of regional integration through the establishment of landmark financial institutions such as the African Investment Bank (AIB), African Monetary Fund (AMF) and the African Central Bank (ACB). These institutions have as aim to foster intra-regional integration for example through providing finances for the ease of intra-regional trade.⁹³ However, the main financial institution for Central Africa the BEAC (*Banque des Etats de L'Afrique Centrale* “Bank of Central African States”) which is linked directly with CEMAC and as earlier stated, CEMAC is *stricto sensu* not a recognized institution for the AU. Although, various technicalities have been arrived at as to how these landmark institutions work directly with BEAC, it is evident that this kinds of downplays the AU’s efficacy as to the implementation of the AU’s economic regional integration in Central Africa. Hence, interaction between the AIB, AMF and ACB with BEAC is somehow minimal. We can have the Banjul decision to thank for this.

Furthermore, the fact that over the years, there has been little interaction between the CEMAC and ECCAS and also between the member states themselves makes it even more difficult for there to be coherent actions between the Central African institutions on the one hand and the institutions with the AU on the other. In this connection, the member states of CEMAC have not been willing to transfer their economic and political authority to the ECCAS. However, defense and security

⁹² Marie-Laure de Bergh. “The Banjul Summit: What Consequences for the EU-Africa relationship?”. *EU-Africa e-alert- No.1*. (Aug. 2006). p. 1. <http://europafrika.net/2006/08/30/the-banjul-summit-what-consequences-for-the-eu-africa-relationship/>. Accessed on June 6th 2009.

⁹³ Mkwezalamba, Maxwell M. and Chinyama, J. Emmanuel. “Implementation of Africa’s Integration and Development Agenda: Challenges and Prospects”. *African Integration Review*. Volume 1, No. 1 (Jan. 2007). pp. 2-3.

issues have been granted to the ECCAS. This is evident through the creation of MARAC (*Mecanisme d'Alerte Rapide de L'Afrique Centrale* “Central African Rapid Alert Mechanism”).⁹⁴ Hence, the lack of political authority of the ECCAS has weakened its capabilities tremendously. In this light, the Banjul decision has contributed in the slowness of regional integration in the Central African region through the refusal to recognize the CEMAC as the required regional institution.

Moreover, it is evident that the Banjul decision has not dissuaded foreign institutions such as the EU to have relationships with CEMAC. In one way or the other, this kind of reduces the AU's authority both at the continental as well as the regional level. In this connection, it is clear that “the European Commission is negotiating an EPA with CEMAC meanwhile ECCAS is the one recognized by the AU. In their Nairobi Declaration on EPAs, African Ministers of Trade has raised concerns on the fact that on-going trade negotiations should not adversely affect the regional integration programs in Africa. The Central African example demonstrates the lack of coherence between the set up recognized by the AU and the reality on the ground supported by external actors”.⁹⁵ It is therefore evident from the above argument that the Banjul decision has helped in making it more difficult for there to be concrete economic progress in the region vis-à-vis third party institutions and states.

⁹⁴ For more information, see, Fanta, Emmanuel. “The Capacity of African Regional Organizations in Peace and Security” 16-17 April 2009: pp. 7-8. <http://www.erd.eui.eu/media/fanta.pdf>. Accessed on May 31st 2009.

⁹⁵ Marie-Laure de Bergh. “The Banjul Summit: What Consequences for the EU-Africa relationship?”. *EU-Africa e-alert- No.1*. (Aug. 2006). p. 2. <http://europafrika.net/2006/08/30/the-banjul-summit-what-consequences-for-the-eu-africa-relationship/>. Accessed on June 6th 2009.

⁷ “Document de Stratégie de Coopération Régional (Région de L'Afrique Centrale), et Programme Indicatif Regionale pour la période 2002-2007”. *Stratégie de Coopération Regionale avec L'Afrique Centrale- 9eme FED* (2002). p.8.

3.3 The Impact of the EU-CEMAC relationship

3.3.1 Overview

Despite the Banjul decision, the EU still holds legal and formal relationships with the CEMAC and the relationship has helped tremendously in the development of the Central African region. These strategies have been implemented thanks to the European Development Fund (EDF), which have provided sufficient finance for development purposes in the region. They range from economic, social and political field. In this connection, the various strategies and their impacts shall be looked into more detail below.

First of all, it is evident that the global objective of the EU strategy for CEMAC has been the “harmonious and progressive integration of the Central African economies into the world economy through the consolidation of the regional economic atmosphere and the putting into place of policies aimed at reducing poverty”.⁹⁶ In this connection, it is evident that the overall aim in the region is;

- Facilitating and helping in the fulfillment of the network of basic and regional transport infrastructures;
- The follow up of the long term management of the natural resources and the conservation of essential zones for the maintenance of biodiversity and of its potentials;
- The installation of a mechanism for the prevention of conflicts and the advancement of political dialogue at the regional level.⁹⁷

Furthermore, it is evident that “economic cooperation as well as commercial is based on the initiatives of regional integration of the ACP states, taking into

⁹⁷ *Ibid.* p. 9.

consideration the fact that regional integration is a key factor in relation to their integration towards the global economy”.⁹⁸

It should be noted that EU strategies for Africa (including CEMAC) are done through *complimentarity*. That is, they are there to complement the strategies already put in place by the regional organization or the member states. In this connection, to help the Central African region in obtaining its agenda, the regional indicative program of the EU for CEMAC shall reinforce mechanisms of integration, regional institutions as well as the private sector through;

1. Enforcing the institutional arrangement of CEMAC (the executive and the Court of Justice), which will help in ameliorating the capacity of the organization, programming and management. In this connection, the regional indicative program shall ameliorate and harmonize the statistical disposition necessary in the elaboration of economic policies and the implementation of policies in relation to information, communication and of formation;
2. Strengthening also the member states in their effective application of community decisions and shall contribute in particular to the reinforcement of capabilities of the national administrations in their efforts in implementing the regional reforms. In this connection, the main point of focus will be the putting into place of the customs union and the common market through the modernization and rationalization of customs services.⁹⁹

Furthermore, it is also important to know that several member states of the EU have been influential in the promotion of regional integration in the region in particular and Africa in general. In this light, mention should be made of France,

⁹⁸ Article 35 of the Cotonou Agreement 2000.

⁹⁹ “Document de Stratégie de Coopération Régionale (Région de L’Afrique Centrale), et Programme Indicatif Regionale pour la periode 2002-2007”, Strategie de Cooperation Regionale avec L’Afrique Centrale- 9eme FED (2002). p. 29.

which is one of the partners for finance in the region through the auspices of the EU, and other financial institutions such as the World Bank and the African Development Bank (ADB) have been very influential for the creation, adoption and execution of the OHADA Treaty. Most of the member states to the agreement are former colonies of France in Sub-Saharan Africa, which includes all the member states of CEMAC.¹⁰⁰ The objectives of the OHADA Treaty range from economic regional integration, facilitating the activities of companies, guaranteeing the judicial security of economic activities so as to favor and encourage investment and financing the education of Magistrates and Judges.¹⁰¹

The two focal points of the EU-CEMAC relationship are; (a) governance, in particular through the domain of the judiciary and public finance, the forest resources and elections. This shall help tremendously in efficiency and transparency of regional administrative activities; (b) commerce and regional integration through stressing on one part the amelioration of competitiveness and the support of economic partnership by reinforcing the capacity of production and on the other hand, on road infrastructures in order to strengthen the sectors of production and social activities.¹⁰² Haven said all this, it is now of necessity to look at the impact of the EU-CEMAC relationship on the Central African region.

¹⁰⁰ The OHADA Treaty is the harmonization of financial and business law as well as contractual affairs. It has its headquarters (Secretariat) in Yaoundé, Cameroon.

¹⁰¹ “The OHADA Treaty” (1993). p. 1. www.jurisint.org/ohada/pres/pres.00.en.html. Accessed on June 16th 2009.

¹⁰² “Document de Stratégies Pays (République du Cameroun - Communauté Européenne) pour la période 2008-2013”. Stratégie de Coopération Régionale avec L’Afrique Centrale-10eme FED (2008). p. 4.

3.3.2 Impact

Bearing in mind the two focal points of the EU-CEMAC relationship we shall try to look into the impact of the relationship on the region. Apart from the economic point of view, it is evident that the impact has been felt (to a lesser extent) socially and politically.

Economically, thanks to this relationship, the regional corridor of enclavement of Chad, which links Douala (Cameroon) to N'djamena (Chad) was completed and has helped tremendously in the trade between Cameroon and Chad. In collaboration with other EU partners such as France, this particular concept became reality through the eventual finance of the 10th European Development Fund (EDF).¹⁰³

Furthermore, it is evident that the EU still remains the major contributor to the Central African Republic (CAR) through the EDF; it is followed by France while the International Monetary Fund (IMF) maintains only a minimal presence in the country. In this light, through the EDF, thanks to the structural adjustment program, a total of 20million Euros have been made available in order to pay the salary arrears of its retired citizens as well as its arrears due to the European Bank of Investment (EBI) and in 2005, the remainders from this project were used to help finance elections as well as maintain the Bamberry-Ippy-Bria road, which is a major link within the country and brings together major cities of the country. Also, the CAR benefits from 'policies of support of Peace' of the EU in Africa. It has helped in financing FOMUC (Force Multinationale en Afrique Centrale "the Multinational

¹⁰³ *Ibid.* p. 26.

Force in Central Africa”) for up to 23.4 million Euros in the hopes of contributing to the restoration and maintenance of peace in the CAR.¹⁰⁴

Moreover, taking into consideration the focal points of the EU-CEMAC relationship, it is evident that in the Republic of Chad, the field of transport infrastructure has been greatly advanced through the finance of the Kelo-Moundou road (110km), the first tarred road that is creating a linkage between two big towns (Moundou-N’djamena). This helped in the reduction of prices for goods. Also, concerning the transport sector, the 10th EDF greatly financed the ‘regional road’; Ngoundere-Touboro-Moundou (a new road linking Chad to Cameroon with a distance of 390km) with a total of 155million Euros and this is one of the highest projects undertaken in the region. With the construction of this regional road also comes the availability of a checkpoint at the frontier equipped with a “system of computerized registration of customs operations”. This is one of the projects undertaken vis-à-vis the EU’s plans to promote the customs union initiative in the Central African region.¹⁰⁵

Also, with regards to the focal point of the EU-CEMAC relationship in relation to infrastructural development, the budget of the EDF has helped in the financing of the road between Pointe-Noire and Brazzaville and between the Center of the Country and the sub-region. This particular road serves as a focalization point with regards to regional integration, economic development; national, regional as well as social development. This shall also permit the allocation of basic products in

¹⁰⁴ “Document de Stratégies Pays (République Centrafricaine- Communauté Européenne) et Program Indicatif Nationale pour la periode 2008-2013”. Stratégie de Coopération Régionale avec L’Afrique Centrale- 10eme FED (2008). pp. 24-25.

¹⁰⁵ “Document de Stratégie pays (République du Tchad – Communauté Européenne) et Programme Indicatif Nationale pour la periode 2008-2013”. Stratégie de Coopération Régionale avec L’Afrique Centrale- 10eme FED (2008). p. 5.

the market towards rural and urban areas, which shall have a positive impact on price thereby having a positive impact on the national economy.¹⁰⁶

Again, one of the major roads that portray the regional integration process in the Central African region is the road linking the CAR to Cameroon, which goes all the way from Ngaoundere-Garoua-Gouar then to Garoua Boulai. The two first towns are situated in Cameroon while the other two are situated in the CAR. This project was entirely financed by the EU through the 10th EDF. This shows that the EU-CEMAC relationship has experienced great achievements economically vis-à-vis its focal point of infrastructural development which is considered a pre-requisite for regional integration.¹⁰⁷

Socially, the EU-CEMAC relationship has helped in the promotion of cultural awareness in the region, in the promotion of education in the region (for example through the finance of Inter-States Center for Public Health and the project of the creation of the Catholic University for Central Africa) and also in domain of agricultural research (through the creation of the Regional Center for the research of banana and plantains). All of these projects have helped tremendously in the development of the Central African region.¹⁰⁸

Furthermore, in the plans for the fight against HIV/AIDS and diseases linked with poverty, the EU has been very influential in establishing and overseeing the running since 2006 of the “Center of ambulatory treatment for the support of persons living with AIDS” in the CAR. This center has become the center of reference for the

¹⁰⁶ “Document de Stratégie Pays (République du Congo – Communauté Européenne) et Program Indicatif Nationale pour la période 2008-2013”. Stratégie de Coopération avec L’Afrique Centrale- 10eme FED (2008). p. 8.

¹⁰⁷ “Document de Stratégie Pays (République Centrafricaine – Communauté Européenne) et Program Indicatif Nationale pour la période 2008-2013. Stratégie de Coopération Régionale avec L’Afrique Centrale- 10eme FED (2008). p. 61.

¹⁰⁸ “Document de Stratégie de Coopération Régionale (Région de L’Afrique Centrale), et Programme Indicatif Regionale pour la période 2002-2007”. Stratégie de Coopération Régionale avec L’Afrique Centrale- 9eme FED (2002). p. 23.

treatment of HIV/AIDS in the Central African region. Also, the associations of the French Red Cross and UNICEF have been influential in providing access to clean water in the CAR through supplying and cleaning up portable water in the regions of L'Ouham Pende, Nana Gribizi and Dekoa.¹⁰⁹

Moreover, in Cameroon, a sum of 35,85 million Euros has been made available to the government in order to ameliorate the agricultural productivity capacity so as to reduce poverty and to ameliorate the living conditions of the rural population and actions have been taken to develop socio-economic infrastructures. Hence, this has witnessed the construction and/or rehabilitation of points of portable water in the regions of Extreme North, North West and South West and a particular attention has been given to the towns which form boundaries with other countries. In this connection, Bakassi and Lake Chad have been given a priority. This has helped tremendously in the stability of the region.¹¹⁰

Furthermore, the cooperation between the EU-CEMAC has enabled the Republic of Chad to benefit socially as well. For example, the cooperation financed through the 8th and 9th EDF; the Committee for the Management of Water Points. This has witnessed the establishment and creation of water points in smaller villages of less than 300 inhabitants representing 35% of the rural population of Chad. Such villages include Moundou-Touboro and Kelo-Moundou in which they have benefited enormously from this strategy.¹¹¹ As a follow up of this particular strategy for water, it is evident that the 10th EDF has been greatly elaborated. In this connection, “a

¹⁰⁹ “Document de Stratégie Pays (République Centrafricaine – Communauté Européenne) et Programme Indicatif National pour la période 2008-2013”. Stratégie de Coopération Régionale avec L’Afrique Centrale- 10eme FED (2008). p. 27.

¹¹⁰ “Document de Stratégie Pays (République du Cameroun – Communauté Européenne) et Programme Indicatif National pour la période 2008-2013”. Stratégie de Coopération Régionale avec L’Afrique Centrale- 10eme FED (2008). p. 41.

¹¹¹ “Document de Stratégie Pays (République du Tchad – Communauté Européenne) et Programme Indicatif National pour la période 2008-2013”. Stratégie de Coopération Régionale avec L’Afrique Centrale- 10eme FED (2008). p. 101.

support on the policies relating to water” was initially destined for 1100 points of water in the occidental sectors of Chad. However, with the aid of the EDF, this number was increased to 1650 village drillings throughout various sectors of the country. This supplies about 700.000 people with portable water, which is about a 10th of the population of the country. The water points have had a socio-political, sanitary and economic importance, which has helped in the creation of spontaneous markets and repairs and maintenance activities.¹¹²

Politically, it is evident that the EU has been very influential in the survey of elections in each of the CEMAC member states. The EU has helped in the provision of ballot boxes, logistics and international presence. This has helped tremendously for the transparency of elections in Cameroon for example thereby giving more credibility for the government. The human rights clause into every EU Partnership with African states in general and that of the CEMAC in particular has also helped in the development of human rights in the Central African region. Though it is slow in progress, it is however witnessing some success. This has helped in the promulgation of Human Rights Bill in 2006 by the Cameroonian National Assembly. Furthermore, through the EU-CEMAC relationship, the Republic of Chad has experienced the active participation of the civil society in the governance and administration of the country. This is evident through the drastic increase of women in the active participation in the government.¹¹³

¹¹² *Ibid.* pp. 19-22.

¹¹³ “Document de Stratégie de Coopération Régionale (Région de L’Afrique Centrale), et Program Indicatif Regionale pour la pour la periode 2002-2007”. Stratégie de Coopération Régionale avec L’Afrique Centrale- 9eme FED (2002). Chapitre 5. pp. 25-27.

3.4 Chapter Conclusion

It can be concluded therefore that due to the various impacts of the EU-CEMAC strategy both at the regional as well as national level, the EU is definitely an important actor for development of regional integration in Central Africa. It is strongly believed by the EU that one of the major pre-requisites for regional integration is infrastructural development. This is the reason why the EU has helped tremendously in the development and construction of national roads as well as roads linking one Central African country to the other. This shall help tremendously in the development of intra-regional trade.

Furthermore, it is evident that the Banjul decision through its various *shortcomings* illustrated in this chapter should be re-considered and that the CEMAC should be given a ‘legal recognition’ and vested with the status of the regional organization for Central Africa.

In this connection, it is worthy to look into *how effective* the EU’s Strategy in Central Africa has been so far. This shall be done through juxtaposing the EU-CEMAC relationship to that of EU-ECOWAS which shall prove that though the EU has been active in the Central African region, it still has to foster its presence in the region. Furthermore, the next chapter shall also try to see how important the monetary union (which is a characteristic of both CEMAC and EU) has been to both continents and whether it is a pre-requisite for the subsequent achievement of a successful regional integration.

CHAPTER 4

THE IMPACT OF THE EU POLICY IN CEMAC AND THE IMPORTANCE OF MONETARY UNION¹¹⁴

4.1 Introduction

This particular chapter of this study has as objective showing how important the EU policy for CEMAC has been. In this sense, differentiating the EU's policy in the ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States) with that of CEMAC shall show whether the EU has been very 'influential' in its strategies in the Central African region. The reason why the ECOWAS has been chosen as a point of differentiation in order to prove the 'influence' of the EU in Central Africa is because both the CEMAC and ECOWAS have similar characteristics. For example, they both share the same currency; *the CFA franc*. Also, the chapter shall try to bring out the importance of a single currency for the development of any given region or state. In this connection, it shall take as reference the *Euro zone* and the *CFA franc zone* of Europe and West and Central Africa respectively. In the process, shall try to show if one of them has served as a model for the other and whether their laid down goals have been achieved.

In this connection, it is evident that the region of West Africa is faced with numerous challenges; be it political or economical. On the political aspect, the region presents the image of a region with a poor transitional phase towards democracy, and it is characterized by a high trans-frontal criminal activity. Economically, there is a

¹¹⁴ Some of the data or sources used for this chapter are in French. Hence, the accuracy in translation shall not be 100%.

high lack of infrastructures relating to development and poor industrial tools which has reduced competitiveness between states thereby reducing regional integration and economic prosperity. Furthermore, the high price of oil has also served as a hindrance to economic development in the region. However, this has not despaired the EU from providing aid through the EDF for the region.

Moreover, it should be noted that ECOWAS is the oldest REC in Africa. It was created in 1975 and it has a total of 15 member states¹¹⁵ making it also the largest REC in Africa. The EU's relationship with West Africa is based principally with operations based on two regional blocs in the region. The two principal organizations responsible for regional integration in the region are; the Economic Community for West African States (ECOWAS) and the West African Economic and Monetary Union (UEMOA).¹¹⁶ The financial resources of both regional organizations are controlled by a communal mechanism of which the application is to be reinforced at the national level. In conformity with the principle of subsidiarity, ECOWAS and UEMOA can delegate certain activities to other regional organizations.

According to the 1975 Treaty creating the ECOWAS, it remains the organization of reference with regards to economic development in West Africa. It aims at creating a monetary union, freedom of movement of goods and services as well as persons and introducing principles of solidarity by creating control organs and mechanisms of finance which assures a better functioning of the community. UEMOA was created in 1994 as a result of the devaluation of the CFA franc and principally to assure in the future coherence between the monetary politics of the

¹¹⁵ The member states of ECOWAS are; Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Cote D'Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone and Togo.

¹¹⁶ The UEMOA is an economic institution and it is made up of Benin, Burkina Faso, Cote D'Ivoire, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Niger, Senegal and Togo. These member states all use the same currency.

union and the economic and political budgeting of the member states. The Central Bank of West African States (BCEAO) and the West African Bank of Development (BOAD) happen to be the specialized institutions of UEMOA.

It can be said thus that the aim of the EU in West Africa through its economic and political regional strategy can be resumed to four main factors;

- The management of conflicts and the promotion of democracy and good governance in order to reinforce the social cohesion and efficiency of policies.
- Deepen integration of the economic space to reduce the cost of commerce and increase competitiveness in order to accelerate the diversification and intensity growth.
- Food security/ assurance, sectoral policies and development/interconnection of infrastructures in support of economic integration atmosphere and the amelioration of its competitiveness.
- The reinforcement of human capital and the facilitation of mobility throughout the common atmosphere to support growth and to render it distributive.¹¹⁷

From the above assertion, it is therefore clear that the EU objectives in the region are far broader and more effective in West Africa than in Central Africa. The West African economic regional integration vis-à-vis the EU has experienced great success through its objectives. For more details, it shall be discussed below.

¹¹⁷ “Document de Stratégie de Coopération Régionale (Région de L’Afrique de L’Ouest) et Programme Indicatif Régionale pour la période 2008-2013”. Stratégie de Coopération Régionale avec L’Afrique de L’Ouest-10eme FED (2008). pp. 25-26.

4.2 Differentiating the EU's Relations with ECOWAS to that of CEMAC

It is evident that the ECOWAS is a far larger and older institution than CEMAC and due to this fact; the EU's influence in the region has been more influential and more rampant. Nevertheless, this is not to serve as an excuse for the 'less interest or attention' given to CEMAC. In this connection, we shall try to point out some major areas of difference between the engagement of EU towards ECOWAS and CEMAC. However, there are major issues that serve as hindrance to the effective implementation of the EU strategy in the ECOWAS which are worth looking into.

First of all, the fact that there are two main bodies (ECOWAS and UEMOA) which deal with the EU makes it more difficult for the implementation of strategies. While the UEMOA is concerned with the economic activities of certain states, it does not involve the whole West African region. This makes it all the more difficult for the implementation of certain policies.

Secondly, the climate factor makes it all the more difficult for the implementation of the EU strategy in West Africa. The region is made up mostly of 'Saharan-like-climate'; that is to say, agriculture is at a very minimal rate in this area due to excessive heat and dryness. The recurrent dryness which has occurred for the past decades has helped in the reduction of the biomass and the formation of dry forest which is predominant in this eco-climatic zone affected by the pluviometrical deficit.¹¹⁸

Thirdly, there is the issue of the leadership factor between Ghana and Nigeria. Ghana enjoys political stability economic prosperity meanwhile Nigeria is

¹¹⁸ *Ibid.* p. 70.

endowed with oil potentials and the greatest population in the region. These two countries have been battling for 'leadership' of the region. This has weakened the management of aid flows in the region and subsequently hindering the smooth functioning of ECOWAS. This reduces the capacity of the EU to comply with the ease in aid flows in the region.¹¹⁹

Fourthly, the fact that there are several currencies in the region has subsequently hindered the EU's progress in the region. While CEMAC enjoys and operates under a single currency economy (the CFA franc), several countries in the ECOWAS also do the same thing (that is use the single currency CFA franc as well). However, they do this alongside other countries such as Nigeria (which uses the Naira), Ghana (which uses the cedi), Liberia (which uses the Liberian dollar) and many more. This means that the West African region have several currencies contrary to the Central African region which uses a unique currency. This makes it difficult for economic activity to be done with ease in the region.

Finally, as mentioned before, the greatest threat in the region is that of insecurity. The region happens to be the most unstable in the whole of Africa. It has experienced countless coups and bloodsheds ever since its inception in 1975. The most recent is that of Guinea following the death of former President Lansana Conte where the military headed by Captain Moussa Dodis Camara took over power. Though no bloodshed was experienced, it still suffered suspension from both the AU and ECOWAS.¹²⁰

Despite all these shortcomings, the ECOWAS region still enjoys numerous economic relations with the EU. The EU's influence in the region is far more than

¹¹⁹ Lavergne, Real. "Reflections on an Agenda for Regional Integration and Cooperation in West Africa". Chapter 1, Introduction. http://www.idrc.ca/en/ev.68350-201-1-DO_TOPIC.html. Accessed on June 10th 2009.

¹²⁰ "African Union bars Guinea on Coup". <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7802803.stm>. Accessed on June 10th 2009.

that of CEMAC and ECCAS combined. It has contributed to the creation of landmark institutions and initiatives. These distinctions shall then be analyzed below.

4.2.1 Customs Union

The EU's role in the creation of the Customs Union in West Africa is unprecedented. It covers the first area of concentration in West Africa-regional integration and strengthening commerce in West Africa of which its principal success was the installation of the custom union in the UEMOA zone in the year 2000. This has served as an example to the whole of ECOWAS and was a particular 'inspiration' for the creation of the ECOWAS customs union in the year 2008.¹²¹

In this connection, though the EU's point of concentration with CEMAC happens to be "strengthening also the member states in their effective application of community decisions... and putting into place the customs union and the common market..."¹²² the overall objective has not been attained in the region. No customs union has been achieved and the steps towards attaining such an institution have been very slow particularly due to nationalistic tendencies and political differences between the member states.

4.2.2 Institutions

The EU has been very influential in the creation of landmark institutions in the ECOWAS region. These are; the *Convention of Subvention*, the Court of Justice

¹²¹ "Document de Stratégie de Coopération Régionale (Région de L'Afrique de L'Ouest) et Programme Indicatif Regionale pour la periode 2008-2013". Stratégie de Coopération Régionale avec L'Afrique de L'Ouest- 10eme FED (2008). p. 70.

¹²² "Document de Stratégie de Coopération Régionale (Région de L'Afrique Centrale) et Programme Indicatif Regionale pour la periode 2002-2007". Stratégie de Coopération Régionale avec L'Afrique Centrale- 9eme FED (2008). p. 29.

and Parliament. The Convention of Subvention (as it is so called in the regional strategy paper) has as main objective the coordination between national and regional institutions so as not to cause any discrepancies in the allocation of budget and the implementation of strategies. The ECOWAS Court of Justice and Parliament which are fully operational (contrary to that of the CEMAC which is in existence only on paper) has as main objective the promotion of regional integration through fostering intra-regional trade¹²³ and increasing multilateral surveillance and developing economic activities among the member states.¹²⁴

4.2.3 Technology

The EU has been very influential in developing the sector of science and technology as well as energy. Thanks to the EU-ECOWAS joint strategy, the region has experienced the *pooled energy* initiative. That is, several member states have been able to pool their energy together in order to help others which are lacking for example the pooling of electrical energy sources by Nigeria and Ghana in order to provide smaller nations such as Niger. Furthermore, the West African region enjoys initiatives such as the Erasmus Mundus. The Erasmus Mundus has as objective the free education of nationals from this region up till the masters' level in any given EU country. Another important initiative is the Nyerere program which supports doctorates and exchange programs from Universities in the ECOWAS region with European Universities. This is not the situation with that of the CEMAC community in which such initiatives are very rare.

¹²³ It should be noted that ECOWAS has the highest level of intra-regional trade in Africa.

¹²⁴ The Council of the European Union. "11th ECOWAS-EU Ministerial Troika Meeting", Luxembourg: Official Office for Publications of the European Communities. 8825/07 [Presse 92] (24th Apr. 2007). p. 9.

4.2.4 Migration

Concerning migration, the EU has been engaged through the Partnership for migration, mobility and employment signed at the Lisbon Summit in December 2007 to deal more effectively with the issues of migration and employment within the EU and with its member states. This cooperation is particularly effective in West Africa. In this connection, a Centre of Information and management of Migration (CIGEM) has been installed in Mali, an initiative which will eventually be replicated in the region if the other countries find it interesting. Also, the EU has been very influential in the *effective installation* and *distribution* of the ECOWAS passport which is fully operational in the region. An initiative which has helped tremendously in promoting regional integration in West Africa.

It is evident that though the CEMAC passport has been given ‘approval’ by the six heads of states, its *effective distribution* has been tampered by the *partial approval* of both Gabon and Equatorial Guinea who still demand visas from nationals of other CEMAC states. Hence, we can say that the CEMAC passport is an acceptable travelling document in relation with *some* member states and third countries (that is, countries other than CEMAC states). This reduces regional integration in Central Africa.

4.3 The Importance of a Monetary Union

4.3.1 Overview

Part of the EU and all of CEMAC are both characterized by a monetary union. That is, they use the same currency (Euro for EU and the CFA franc for

CEMAC). In this condition, it is evident that a monetary union exists between two or more states when;

- The value of a unit of the currency used in States A has a fixed relationship to the value of the currency unit in state B.
- This fixed relationship is enshrined in Law (for example a Treaty between sovereign states).
- The states participating in the monetary union are subject to a single monetary policy, set and implemented by a single common central bank.

In Principle a monetary union need not have a single currency and this was acknowledged by the Delors Report.¹²⁵

4.3.2 Survey of the Monetary Union from both Continents

The CFA franc is a currency used in twelve formerly French ruled African countries, as well as in Guinea-Bissau (a former Portuguese colony) and in Equatorial Guinea (a former Spanish Colony). “The CFA franc was established on 26 December 1945, along with the CFP (*Colonies Francaise Pacifique*). The reason for their creation was the weakness of the French franc immediately after World War II. When France ratified the Bretton Woods Agreement in December 1945, the French franc was devalued in order to set a fixed exchange rate with the US dollar. New currencies were created in the French colonies to spare them the strong devaluation. The CFA franc was created with a fixed exchange rate versus the French franc. This exchange rate was changed only twice: in 1948 and in 1994.”¹²⁶

¹²⁵ “Committee for the study of Economic and Monetary Union (the Delors Report)”. Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications for the European Communities, (1989).

¹²⁶ Global Financial Data, “Global History of Currencies (Franc Communaute Financiere Africaine): An Exclusive Feature of Global Financial Fata”.

There actually exist two different currencies called CFA franc: the West African CFA franc (where CFA simply means *Communaute Financiere d'Afrique* “Financial Community of Africa”) and the Central African CFA franc (where CFA means *Cooperation Financiere en Afrique Centrale* “Financial Cooperation in Central Africa”). These two CFA francs have the same exchange rate with the euro (1euro is an equivalent of 655.5296 CFA Franc) and they are both guaranteed by the French treasury but the West African CFA Franc cannot be used in Central African countries and vice versa. In West Africa, it is issued by the BCEAO (*Banque Centrale des Etats de L'Afrique de L'Ouest* “The Central Bank of West African States”) meanwhile in Central Africa it is issued by BEAC (*Banque des Etats de L'Afrique Centrale* “Bank of Central African States”). The member states are those of both UEMOA and CEMAC respectively.¹²⁷

Meanwhile, the idea of a single currency came into being in Europe as early as 1968 when a group of experts headed by Pierre Werner, Prime Minister and Finance Minister of Luxembourg drafted the blueprint. In the mid-1980s, the Single European Act (SEA) facilitated completing the single internal market and the SEA mentioned the need to relaunch the Economic and Monetary Union. Though the SEA was signed in 1992, it was not up to 2002 that the single currency was initiated due to several reasons; (a) difficulties with the ratification of the Treaty; (b) difficulties in the avoidance of deficits; and (c) difficulties with the implementation of the Stability and Growth pact. Furthermore, to join the EMU, the member states needed to meet up with the ‘convergence criteria’ which *inter alia* required that; (i) long-term interest rates should be no more than two points above the average of the lowest

[https://www.globalfinancialdata.com/index.php3?action=showghoc&country_name=Franc_Communaute_Financiere_Africaine_\(CFA\)](https://www.globalfinancialdata.com/index.php3?action=showghoc&country_name=Franc_Communaute_Financiere_Africaine_(CFA)), (accessed on 4th May 2009).

¹²⁷ “Communaute Financiere Africaine Franc”. Encyclopedia Britannica Online. <http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/128988/Communaute-Financiere-Africaine-Franc>. Accessed on 4th May 2009.

three and (ii) inflation should not exceed by more than one-and-a half points the average of three best performers.¹²⁸

The Euro zone is made up of 19 member states.¹²⁹ The monetary policy of all countries in the euro zone is managed by the European Central Bank (ECB) and the European System of Central Banks (ESCB) which comprises the ECB and the central banks of the EU member states that have joined the zone. Countries outside the EU, even those with monetary agreements such as Monaco, are not represented in these institutions.¹³⁰

From the above assertion, it can be said that while the CFA monetary union was as a result of the acquired economic activities of the previous colonial Master which was France,¹³¹ the European Monetary Union came into existence after long negotiations characterized by various political upheavals which ended up in a landmark approval. Also, while the *euro zone* is subject to conditionality prior to admission, this not the case with the CFA franc zone, where member ship has been over the years due to a similar colonial master.¹³²

It can therefore be said that: (i) none of the currencies served as an ‘inspiration’ to the other. Every currency was established in its own rights; however, there have been serious landmark agreements between both institutions in relation to trade and financial stability.¹³³ One of them includes the EU’s council adoption of

¹²⁸ Verdun, Amy. “Economic and Monetary Union”. in Cini, Michelle. European Union Politics. Ed. Second Edition. New York: Oxford University Press, 2007. pp. 321-329.

¹²⁹ Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia and Spain.

¹³⁰ “Fifth Report on the Practical Preparations for the Future Enlargement of the Euro Area”. COM (2007) 434 final. Brussels, (2007): p. 1.

¹³¹ Nevertheless, no particular member was forced to join after independence.

¹³² The two member states which were not former colonies of France were subject to little or no scrutiny.

¹³³ For more details on the agreement, see “Communaute Financiere Africaine Franc”. Encyclopédia Britannica Online. <http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/128988/Communaute-Financiere-Africaine-Franc>. Accessed on 4th May 2009.

the agreements France has with the CFA zone and Comoros which among others included the adoption of a fixed exchange rate; and (ii) both institutions are progressing in their overall objectives which is based *prima facie* on regional integration; though the African counterpart still has a long way to go in order to achieve regional integration, the European states are very much advanced in this sector.

4.4. The Implications of a Monetary Union

4.4.1 Disadvantages

The disadvantage of a monetary union does not outweigh the advantages. That is why monetary union is considered one of the major pre-conditions for a possible regional integration. In this connection, it is supposed that the loss of national autonomy in monetary policy implies costs. Two aspects are important to note as regards the shortcomings of a monetary union; first, governments participating in a monetary union cannot claim their own seigniorage but have to share the Common Central Bank Surplus. In particular monetization of public deficits is no longer at the discretion of national fiscal authorities. The exclusion of national inflation taxes is the very argument by which a common currency gains. Second, member states of a currency union dispense with their national exchange rate policies as instruments of economic stabilization.¹³⁴ Thirdly, multiplicity of

¹³⁴ Pentecost, Eric J and Poeck, Van Andre. Eds. European Monetary Integration: Past, Present and Future. Gloucestershire: Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, 2001. p. 70.

currencies increases international trade costs as businessmen are confronted with the cost of changing from one currency to another.¹³⁵

4.4.2 Advantages

As concerns the advantages, an evident benefit of a common currency is that transaction costs are reduced. In a currency union, there is no need to calculate prices in different currencies and to hold cash balances in different currencies. Transactions costs are particularly important, if the currencies involved are not perfectly convertible. Moreover, the uncertainty of the value of money is reduced. A monetary union creates more reliability in credit contracts and reduces the liquidity premium ‘which we require to make us part with money’.¹³⁶

It is the outcome of economic policies that produce, sometimes imbalances in inter-related markets, if these policies are not coordinated. In particular, in international monetary relations, monetary disequilibria are far more often induced by differing national monetary policies than by shifts in the money demand. Against this background, a common monetary policy that is institutionalized in a monetary union may prove to be a device best fitted to stabilize expectations in integrated markets. In particular, a monetary union sets up new rules which exclude piecemeal deviations from the joint course of policy. This creates the credibility of the common monetary policy.¹³⁷

It is a symbol of intended durability of the monetary union and of the commitment of the member states which will have sacrificed their national currency symbol and it reduces the cost of transactions between different countries by

¹³⁵ Quattara, A. D. “Regional Integration in Africa: An Important Step toward global Integration”. First Conference of Ministers of Economy and Finance of French Speaking Countries, (1999). p. 6.

¹³⁶ Keynes, J. M. The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money. London: Macmillan, 1973. p. 226.

¹³⁷ Niehans, J. International Monetary Economics. Deddington: Phillip Allan, 1984.

eliminating the need for currency conversion; and it is politically neutral- before the Maastricht Treaty, there was some concern that the Deutschmark would become the de facto single currency.¹³⁸

Furthermore, monetary union will permit greater and less inflation prone growth. Growth, it is argued, will be stimulated by the combined effects of;

- A stimulus to cross-border trade induced by the elimination of currency risk and the lowering of cross-border transaction costs.
- The encouragement of greater investment once countries previously at risk of devaluing against the Deutschmark no longer have to pay interest premiums.¹³⁹

Inter-bank interest rates are likely to be less volatile when the money market is larger and more liquid. In the Euro area, the bid-ask spreads in the three-month deposit market narrowed from around 14 basis points in 1996 to under nine basis points following the introduction of the euro. This brought the average spread above those found in the United States and Japan to below them. It was also notable that by 2000 the spreads were identical across the different countries within the area, whereas there had been significant dispersion when the countries had separate, albeit linked, currencies.¹⁴⁰

Furthermore, developing regional banking systems is likely to be easier within a regional currency area. For example, the two RECs in Africa have established supranational banking supervisory agencies. However, in practice such gains do not appear to have been fully realized, perhaps because the development of

¹³⁸ Levitt, Malcolm and Lord, Christopher. The Political Economy of Monetary Union. The European Union Series, July 1999. pp. 11-12.

¹³⁹ *Ibid.* p. 17.

¹⁴⁰ See Galati, G and K. Tsatsaronis. "The Impact of the Euro on Europe's Financial Markets". BIS Working Paper, 2001. p. 100.

an integrated banking system depends on many factors other than the use of a common currency.¹⁴¹

Hence, in West and Central Africa, lessons relating to intra-regional integration commitment have clearly shown that the CFA zone has particularly been able to transform their economic and monetary cooperation into a powerful driving force for economic policy coordination. Meanwhile, the EU single currency has been identified as one of the contributing factors to the low cost of trade related and transport operations in Europe.¹⁴²

4.5 Chapter Conclusion

It can be concluded therefore that the EU's relations with ECOWAS are more influential and have led to greater results. In this connection, from the above discussions, it is evident that the 'EU needs to foster its presence in the CEMAC region'. This is partly thanks to the fact that though the EU has promulgated for a more active role in the region towards the Customs Union, this has not been realized up till date.

Furthermore, we cannot blame entirely the EU for the *lack of concentration* in the Central African region. Most of the member states simply have little trust towards one another. There are still petty political differences between the member

¹⁴¹ Artus, Patrick, Cartapanis Andre and Legros Florence. Eds. Regional Currency Areas in Financial Globalization. Gloucestershire: Edward Edgar Publishing Limited, 2005. p. 24.

¹⁴² Alaba, Olumuyiwa B. "EU-ECOWAS EPA: Regional Integration, Trade Facilitation and Development in West Africa", A Draft Paper for Presentation at the GTAP Conference, United Nations Commission for Africa (UNECA), Addis Ababa: Ethiopia, 16 May 2006. pp. 6-24.

states. For example, the situation existing between Equatorial Guinea and Cameroon.¹⁴³

Finally, it can be concluded that monetary union is a benefit and a prerequisite for regional integration. From the above discussion in the chapter through its numerous advantages, it is evident that, monetary union has been a *blessing* and not a *burden* for both the EU and the CEMAC.

Haven said this; the next chapter which is the conclusion of the overall study shall give an extensive conclusion vis-à-vis the discussions undertaken during the course of this study. This shall be done hand-in-hand with the hypothesis discussed at the introduction of this study. Several recommendations which the author sees necessary shall be discussed during the overall conclusion. This shall help in making the EU-CEMAC relationship vis-à-vis regional integration more successful.

¹⁴³ The Equatorial Guinea has shown its disapproval to cohabit with Cameroonians in their country through deporting Cameroonians from their country regularly. This reduces the freedom of migration in the region.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSION

At the annual meeting of the American Economic Association of 1989, the renowned historian David S. Landes decided to pronounce an allocution on the following subject: “Why are rich countries so rich, and poor countries so Poor?”¹⁴⁴ This is the characteristics of the EU-Africa relations. It is evident that Africa is still endowed with all the global ills that still exist in the world: poverty, disease, economic depravity and corruption. Furthermore, the dependency theory discussed at the introduction of this study has a major role to contribute to this fact. Nevertheless, this should not dissuade the major actors concerned from continuing the cooperation that is going on between them.

It is evident from the institutional arrangements of CEMAC that it becomes very difficult to assure safety of democracy and transparency coupled with the lack of commitments to the organization. The lack of *interest groups* to lobby for the interests of the citizens and the fact that members of the various organs are appointed by the Heads of States of the member states displaces their loyalties. That is, they are more accountable to their governments than to CEMAC as a whole. Hence, it can be said that even though CEMAC and its organs are based principally on the concept of “the primacy of communal Law over national law”, the distribution of powers through the various institutions does not *stricto sensu* guarantee this notion.

¹⁴⁴ Landes D. “Why are we so rich and they so poor?”. American Economic Association Papers and Proceedings 8th Mar. 1989. pp. 1-13.

Nevertheless, CEMAC still remains an active organ which assures the monetary unity, peaceful co-existence and development in the Central African region. Though slow in progress, it is achieving its goals gradually.

It is evident that multilateral agreements are a pre-requisite for the effective development of the African continent. Regional integration is an important concept for the basis of substantial development in Africa via the EU. In this connection, the EU shall always require the cooperation of other organizations and institutions in order to better implement its strategies. While it shall gather ‘inspiration’ from the UN by implementing the UN Millennium Development Goals for Africa, it shall always need the help of the AU to implement the strategies through its Regional Economic Communities (RECs). Hence, the institutional arrangement which shows the effective *‘intersection of multilateralism’* is a vital concept vis-à-vis the development of regional integration. It can be said hence that the EU-CEMAC relationship with regards to regional integration does not exist in a vacuum. Hence, from this particular assertion above, it could be said that it is as a result of the hypothesis which is to the effect that “bilateral and multilateral agreements will likely lead to better development of the African continent through forging relationships with the developed nations”.

Nevertheless, regional integration in Africa has not witnessed ‘total success’ not only due to the fact that the EU has not ‘actively implemented’ its strategies (in this sense, we can take as reference the fact that the EU has not been able to implement fully its strategies in relation to the Customs Union in Central Africa), but also thanks to the decision taken at Banjul in 2006. This decision thereby ignores CEMAC as a regional institution by the AU. Due to the fact that ECCAS is the only Central African regional institution, it has in one way or the other reduced the EU’s

effective implementation of policies in the region. This has led sometimes to open conflicts between the AU and the EU.

Furthermore, as discussed during the course of this study, ECCAS and CEMAC have experienced several conflicts. For example, CEMAC member states are more attached to CEMAC than ECCAS and refuse to relinquish authority to ECCAS. In this connection, there has not been coherence between both institutions. Unlike the *Convention of Subvention* that exists in the ECOWAS region, which guarantees interaction between the member states and the institution, and between ECOWAS and UEMOA, such an institution does not exist in Central Africa. Hence, it is the recommendation of the author that for there to be active economic regional integration in Central Africa, there should be a creation of such an institution to coordinate the activities between CEMAC and ECCAS. Also, the AU should *reconsider* its Banjul decision and give CEMAC the status of a regional institution.

Finally, it can be said that from a quick survey of the EU's contribution to CEMAC as a whole and its member states in particular, it is evident that the EU through its commission has helped tremendously in the area of regional integration. This is evident through various political, social and economic strategies put in place by the EDF for the region as a whole. This particular strategy could be felt more efficiently in the field of infrastructure where the EU sees as the front runner for development in Africa. The EDF has helped in the construction of various intra-regional roads, bridges and sea ports which have helped tremendously in the development of intra-regional trade thereby fostering regional integration and development.

However, we can realize that there is still much to be done in order to achieve an appropriate level of regional integration in the region. This could be seen

by juxtaposing the EU's relations with the ECOWAS with that of CEMAC. A vivid survey of the differences in strategy from both institutions (that is CEMAC and ECOWAS) vis-à-vis the EU shows that there is still much to be done in Central Africa in order to promote regional integration in Central Africa in particular and Africa in general.

Nevertheless, it is evident that a monetary union, freedom of movement of goods and services will likely lead to a more rapid development of the African continent as a whole and of CEMAC in particular. This has been seen through the perspectives of the various strategies and issues both institutions have enjoyed during the course of the utilization of the single currency.

Hence, the 'bold' goals and objectives undertaken by the EU for the development of the continent are very good initiatives but they still undergo various risks in order to achieve 'effective implementation'. This may be the case of lack of basic infrastructures such as railways, roads, sea ports and poor air lines transportation systems and the slowness in economic growth and the economic stagnation.

However, the EU's relationship with Africa should be encouraged for though they are somehow 'slow' in achieving their objectives, it is evident that the objectives shall be attained in the long run. It is thus evident that the over all aim for the EU strategy in Africa is the promotion of regional integration through reinforcing the RECs as well as developing the MDGs on the continent. All of these conditions have been considered as the pre-requisites for the attainment of a 'United States of Africa' which is one of the objectives of the African Union.

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