# Oil Price Risk Exposure at Industry and Subsector Levels: A Case Study 

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#### Abstract

This thesis consists of two separate studies. The first study examines the oil price risk exposure of U.S. financial and non-financial industries over the period of January 1983 to March 2015 at the subsector level. The oil price risk factor is appended to the Fama and French (2015) five-factor asset pricing model. The magnitude of oil prices’ impact on the financial subsectors is considerably lower than the magnitude of its impact on the non-financial subsectors. Among the non-financial subsectors, Airlines and Oil Equipment Services have the largest negative and positive oil price risk exposures, respectively. The time-varying oil price risk exposure of these subsectors is estimated using a time-varying parameter model in state-space form. Moreover, via the rolling window causality test introduced by Hill (2007), the time-varying causality in return is estimated. The second study investigates the interaction between crude oil prices and the stock prices of oil, technology, and transportation companies listed on U.S. stock exchanges, using weekly data covering the period from January 2, 1990 to February 3, 2015. Considering the importance of regime shifts or structural breaks in econometric analysis, this study employs the Carrion-iSilvestre et al. (2009) unit root tests and the Maki (2012) cointegration tests allowing for multiple breaks. Cointegration results confirm the existence of long-run equilibrium relationships between these stock indices, crude oil prices, short-term interest rates and the S\&P 500.


Keywords: Oil price risk exposure; equity returns; multiple structural breaks; FamaFrench five-factor model; state-space model; time-varying causality; cointegration

## öZ

Bu tez iki kısımdan oluşmaktadır. Birinci kısım Amerikan Borsanın petrol fiyatları riskinin etkisini mali ve mali olmayan endüstri üzerinde 1983 Ocak ile 2015 Mart dönemi içerisinde sektörel bazda inceler. Fama ve French'in (2015) Beş Faktörlü Varlık Fiyatlama modeli kullanılarak petrol fiyatları risk faktörü belirlenmeye çalışılmıştır. Mali alt sektörlerdeki petrol fiyatları etkisinin büyüklüğü mali olmayan sektörlere göre çok daha düşük bulunmuştur. Mali olmayan alt sektörler arasında Havayolları ve Petrol Araç-gereç Servisleri hem en büyük negative hemde positif petrol fiyatlerı risk etkisine sahip olan alt-sektörlerdir. Parameter modeli kullanılarak alt sektörlerdeki zaman içinde değişen petrol fiyatlerı risk etkisi tahmin edilmiştir. Ayrıca, Hill (2007) nedensellik testi kullanılarak zaman içerisinde değişen nedenleri tahmin etmiştir. Tezin ikinci kısmı ham petrol fiyatları, borsadaki petrol fiyatları, teknoloji ve ulaştırma şirketleri arasındaki ilişkiyi haftalık veriler kullanılarak 1990 Ocak ile 2015 Şubat dönemi içerisinde endüstri bazda inceler. Bu kısımda Carrion-iSilvestre ve diğ. (2009) Birim Kök testi ve Maki (2012) eşbütünleme testi uygulanarak yapısal değişikliklerin etkisi ölçülmeye çalışılmıştır. Eşbütünleme testinin sonuçları ışığında borsa endeksleri, ham petrol fiyatları, kısa dönem faiz oranları ve S\&P 500 endeksi arasında, uzun dönemli denge ilişkisi bulunmuştur.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Petrol fiyatları risk etkisi, özkaynak getirileri, çoklu yapısal kırılmalar, Fama-French Beşli Faktör modeli, devlet-uzay modeli, nedensellik testi, eşbütünleme testi

TO MY WIFE

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## Chapter 1

## INTRODUCTION

Energy has acted a momentous role in the economic development of almost all the countries. Out of few energy sources, crude oil is the main resource being substantially used throughout the world. It is also considered as an essential driver of contemporary economic activities. Several factors are responsible for crude oil price variations which can be listed as the world demand for oil by developed and emerging markets, supply conditions of oil exporting countries, and energy security concerns due to political instability in the oil-rich nations.

The outlook of the crude oil market is not completely clear since the largest oil reserves are not situated on the territory of the largest oil-consuming countries. Almost $60 \%$ of the global oil consumption occurs in North American and Asia Pacific countries. However, they only hold $15 \%$ of the total global proved oil reserves. Contrariwise, countries like Saudi Arabia, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, and United Arab Emirates have almost $50 \%$ of the world's proved oil reserves, while they account for less than $10 \%$ of the world's oil consumption (BP, 2015). Hence, it can be suggested that Middle East has a significant role in the global energy market.

Furthermore, member-nations of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) possess almost $81 \%$ of the world's proved oil reserves $(1,200$ billion barrels), and their respective governments control these reserves through their
national oil companies (OPEC, 2014). This creates a great opportunity for these countries to pursue their petropolitics in line with their national and international interests, thus benefiting from this natural wealth. Since, most OPEC membernations are located in geopolitical hotspots; their political instability and social unrest create concerns about energy security for the larger oil-consuming countries.

According to Mussa (2000), higher oil prices have an adverse effect on the world economy. He indicates that a $\$ 5$ per barrel rise in the oil price can probably shrink the world output by roughly $0.25 \%$ within the first 4 years. In the same way, International Energy Agency is also suggesting that a $\$ 10$ rise in the oil price would lower the global GDP by $0.5 \%$ in the year following (IEA, 2004). This is because higher oil prices may lead to higher incomes for the oil-exporting countries but in turn, these increased earnings would be less than its negative impact on the economies of the oil-importing countries.

Historically, the volatility in crude oil prices has had a significant impact on economic activities (Mork, 1994). A large body of literature has been developed examining the interactions between oil price fluctuations and economic activities (e.g., Hamilton, 1983; Gisser and Goodwin, 1986; Cunado and Perez de Gracia, 2005; Cologni and Manera, 2008; Hamilton, 2009; Kilian, 2009). Specifically, studies have shown that oil price fluctuations influence equity prices via at least two channels. First, since oil is one of the most important inputs in the production of many goods and services, any volatility in its price influences future cash flows.

Higher oil prices increase production costs, decreasing future cash flows and reducing equity prices (Sadorsky, 1999; Apergis and Miller, 2009; Arouri and Nguyen, 2010). Second, the discount rate used in stock valuation models is affected by oil price changes. Central banks usually control the inflationary pressures of higher oil prices by raising the interest rates, and higher interest rates ultimately exert a negative impact on share prices via higher discount rates (Huang et al., 1996; Miller and Ratti, 2009; Mohanty et al., 2011).

Furthermore, unpredictability of crude oil prices can influence risk premiums demanded by investors on assets that have higher oil price risk exposures. Sensitivity of stocks to oil prices can negatively or positively influence their prices based on the sign of a firm's exposure to oil prices. These reasons justify a comprehensive sectoral investigation focusing on the interdependence of equity returns and crude oil prices.

In general, the way that we compute the oil price risk whether at the firm, subsector, sector or industry levels, and also the sign of the oil risk premiums determine the overall impact of oil price on the stock markets. Undoubtedly, such implications cannot be made using market level data since by combining all the stocks, important features of industries, sectors, and subsectors cannot be uncovered. A number of studies have evaluated the exposure of stock markets to oil price risk at the aggregate level (e.g., Kling, 1985; Chen et al., 1986; Jones and Kaul, 1996; Wei, 2003; Park and Ratti, 2008; Sorensen, 2009; Gogineni, 2009; Miller and Ratti, 2009; Kilian and Park, 2009; Dhaoui and Khraief, 2014).

Some of the studies have examined the sensitivity of industry equity returns to oil price risk (e.g., Sadorsky, 2001; Nandha and Faff, 2008; Nandha and Brooks, 2009; Gogineni, 2010; Mohanty and Nandha, 2011a, b; Bredin and Elder, 2011; Aggarwal et al., 2012; Mohanty et al., 2013). Hence, the principal aim of this thesis is to offer an ample study covering both industry- and subsector-level analyses in order to reveal their oil price risk exposures from the standpoint of the asset pricing theory.

### 1.1 Energy Market Review

Being curious about the energy market and following its related news, is not just for energy companies, it is something which affects all of us. The future condition of energy market is very important for almost all of the countries. Many dimensions of lives are affected by energy such as heating, electricity, industrial production, transportation, lubricants, and petrochemical materials. Therefore, it is very crucial to have an idea about the future path of energy market. Actually, in order to have this insight, we should be able to anticipate the future conditions of the population, economy, energy sources, technological advances, and political situation of energy producing countries. Otherwise, it is impossible to understand the climate of the energy market.

### 1.1.1 Global Energy Market

In this section, the ins and out of the World energy market will be reviewed from both producers' and consumers' perspectives. Global primary energy production increased from 8580 MTOE (Million Tons of Oil Equivalent) in 1995 to 13273 MTOE in 2015 and it is expected to rise to 17279 MTOE in 2035. Figure 1 shows the outlook of global energy production on regional basis. This figure illustrates the historical and forecasted production of all types of energy sources till 2035 (BP Energy Outlook, 2016).

As you can see, although the energy production has been rising up through the whole period but the production growth rate of all the energies declined in the period of 2005-2015 compared with the period of 1995-2005 except for hydroelectricity and renewables. It shows that the production growth of oil decelerated from 19.95\% in 1995-2005 to $10.17 \%$ in 2005-2015. The production growth of natural gas also slowed from $32 \%$ to $26.60 \%$, for coal from $34 \%$ to $26.08 \%$, and for nuclear from $19.12 \%$ to $-5.86 \%$ between the aforementioned periods.

On the other hand, the production growth for hydroelectricity increased from 17.53\% in 1995-2005 to $34.25 \%$ in 2005-2015 and for renewables from $127.26 \%$ to $317.66 \%$. This shows more demand tendency toward these two types of energies. Surprisingly, both of these energies are considered as green energy sources. Remarkably, the production growth of renewables skyrocketed by more than two folds between these two periods which indicates the importance this type of energy in the future.

According to this outlook, by 2035, Middle East will still remain as the largest producer of oil followed by North America. Inversely, North America will become the largest natural gas producer followed by Middle East in 2035. Moreover, Asia Pacific region will be the largest producer of coal, nuclear, hydroelectricity, and renewables in 2035. Figure 2 presents the outlook of global energy consumption by fuel on regional basis.

## Global Energy Production by Source



Note: All the figures are in terms of million tonnes of oil equivalent.
Source: BP Energy Outlook 2016
Figure 1. The outlook of global energy production by source

Global energy consumption increased from 8600 MTOE in 1995 to 13080 MTOE in 2015 and it is expected to rise to 17307 MTOE in 2035. This figure illustrates the historical and forecasted consumption of all types of fuels till 2035 (BP Energy Outlook, 2016). Oil is the world's prevailing fuel with $32.6 \%$ of global energy consumption, but its market share has been reduced in the last 15 years. The oil industry comprises subsectors such as exploration, extraction, production, refining and transportation. The result of interconnectedness between these subsectors is the input for the other industries.

This indicates that other industries are heavily dependent on the outputs of the oil industry such as petrochemical materials, various types of liquid fuels, asphalt, tar, lubricants and many other products. Thus, it is an important concern for many countries to have access to oil or oil derivatives. Since its discovery till now, it has been considered as one of the most strategic commodities for all countries. Beside from its financial benefits, some countries use oil as a multirole weapon to reach different political goals in the international scene (Graf, 2012). The OPEC oil embargo of 1974 against Israel and its allies is the best example for this case.

Therefore, the "petropolitics" of the oil exporting countries displays the substantial role of oil in today's world. As you can see in Figure 2, while the energy consumptions have been growing through the whole period but the consumption growth rate of all the energies (fuels) dropped in the period of 2005-2015 compared with the period of 1995-2005 except for hydroelectricity and renewables. It shows that the consumption growth of liquid (oil-based) fuels slowed from $19.08 \%$ in 19952005 to $9.54 \%$ in 2005-2015.


Note: All the figures are in terms of million tonnes of oil equivalent.
Source: BP Energy Outlook 2016

Figure 2. The outlook of global energy consumption by fuel

The consumption growth of natural gas also slowed from $30.15 \%$ to $26.14 \%$, for coal from $38.30 \%$ to $21.54 \%$, and for nuclear from $19.12 \%$ to $-5.86 \%$ between the aforementioned periods. In contrast, as it is mentioned before, the consumption growth for hydroelectricity increased from $17.53 \%$ in 1995-2005 to $34.25 \%$ in 20052015 and for renewables from $127.26 \%$ to $317.66 \%$. According to this outlook, by 2035, Asia Pacific will still remain as the largest consumer of liquid fuels followed by Middle East. Additionally, North America will surpass Europe \& Eurasia and become the largest natural gas consumer in 2035.

Moreover, Asia Pacific region will be the largest consumer of coal, nuclear, hydroelectricity, and renewables in 2035. Figure 3 displays the outlook of global energy consumption in terms of industry, power, transportation, and other sectors. The power generation sector is the largest consumer of energy followed by industry, transportation and other sectors. According to this outlook, Asia Pacific region is the biggest energy consumer in all sectors in 2015 and it will remain like this up to 2035.

Like the previous figures, although the energy consumptions of these sectors have been growing but the consumption growth rate slowed between two periods of 19952005 and 2005-2015. For the industry sector it reduced from $23.67 \%$ to $20.19 \%$, for the power sector from $36.32 \%$ to $25.20 \%$, for the transportation sector from $27.27 \%$ to 18.85 , and for the other sectors from $8.27 \%$ to $1.66 \%$. This diminishing production and consumption growth rates can be linked to several factors such as the slower global economic growth, improving efficiency in the industry, transportation and power generation sectors.


Note: All the figuresare in terms of million tonnes of oil equivalent.
Source: BP Energy Outlook 2016
Figure 3. The outlook of global energy consumption by sector

### 1.1.2 The U.S. Oil Market

In this thesis, the impact of oil prices on the U.S. industry subsectors will be examined. For this reason, it is necessary to review the U.S. oil market before further progress. The West Texas Intermediate (WTI) is the crude oil produced in the U.S. and considered as a benchmark in crude oil pricing market along with Brent crude oil and OPEC Reference basket. It is also known as "Texas light sweet" due to its relatively low density (light) and its low sulfur (sweet) content. It is lighter and sweeter than Brent crude oil. The main trading hub for WTI crude oil is the city of Cushing, Oklahoma. For the last three decades, Cushing has been the price settlement point for crude oil contracts and also a delivery point for WTI on the New York Mercantile Exchange (CME Group, 2016).

Figure 4 shows the historical prices of WTI during 1983M01 to 2016M01 along with the major events which affected the oil market. These major events can be listed as follows:

OPEC excess supply (1985)
End of Iran-Iraq war (1988)
First Persian Gulf war (1990)
The U.S. recession (1990-91)
Asian financial crisis (1997)
Russian financial crisis (1998)
OPEC production cutbacks (1999)
The U.S. recession (2001)
9/11 Attacks (2001)
Venezuelan labor unrest (2002-03)
Second Persian Gulf war (2003)
Hurricane Katrina (2005)
Hurricane Rita (2005)
Oil price spike (2007)
Global financial crisis (2008-09)
OPEC cutbacks (2009)
The onset of Arab Spring (2011)
Global excess supply of oil (2014-15)


West Texas Intermediate crude oil (\$/bbl)

Note: shaded areas show recessions in the U.S.
Source: Datastream

Figure 4. History of WTI (January 1983 to January 2016)

The infographic of the U.S. oil industry in 2015 is illustrated in Figure 5. As you can see, U.S. became the largest crude oil producer in the World in 2015 by producing 11.6 million barrels per day. By the end of 2015, the U.S. share of global oil reserves is $2.9 \%$, its share of global oil production is $12.3 \%$, its share of global oil refinery is $18.4 \%$ and its share of global oil consumption is $19.9 \%$.

## U.S. OIL INDUSTRY FACT SHEET

U.S. share of global oil reserves
 global oil production


## 11.6 mbd

U.S. became the largest producer of oil in the World


Source: BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2015
Figure 5. The U.S. oil industry fact sheet in December 2015

### 1.2 Aim and Importance of the Study

The earlier studies have mainly focused on the impact of crude oil prices on the oil, gas, and transportation companies and industries. Henceforth, there is a momentous gap in the literature for an all-encompassing study that takes into account the impact of crude oil prices on all industries and their subsectors. In the first study, it is tried to ascertain which subsectors in both financial and non-financial industries are relatively highly exposed to oil price risk by using various econometrics and risk measurement techniques. The models and approaches which have been used in this study can be enumerated as Fama and French five factor model, breakpoint regression with the ability to detect multiple structural breaks, GED-EGARCH, value-at-risk (VaR), and time-varying causality in return and risk.

In the second study, the nexus between crude oil prices and the stock prices of the listed U.S. oil, technology, and transportation companies has been investigated by using weekly data. Taking into consideration the importance of structural breaks or regime shifts in econometric analysis, this study hires the Carrion-i-Silvestre et al. (2009) unit root tests and the Maki (2012) cointegration tests allowing for multiple breaks. The cointegration test is used to examine the presence of long-run equilibrium relationships among these stock indices and crude oil prices. Later, the dynamic OLS (DOLS) approach can be used to estimate the long-run coefficients for the stock indices of oil, technology and transportation companies and crude oil prices. Using the Bai and Perron (2003) test and breakpoint regression, the oil price exposure of these companies can be estimated in a regime-dependent manner.

### 1.3 Structure of the Study

The remainder of this thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 presents the first study entitled as "oil price risk exposure: a comparison of financial and non-financial subsectors". Chapter 3 gives the second study dubbed as "the nexus between oil prices and stock prices of oil, technology and transportation companies". Chapter 4 concludes these studies and provides some policy implications.

## Chapter 2

# OIL PRICE RISK EXPOSURE: A COMPARISON OF FINANCIAL AND NON-FINANCIAL SUBSECTORS 

### 2.1 Introduction

The impact of crude oil prices on the economy has always been the center of attention for various reasons. Mork (1994) asserts that the volatility in crude oil prices has had a significant impact on economic activities. The relevant literature is filled with studies examining the nexus between oil price fluctuations and economic activities (e.g., Hamilton, 1983; Gisser and Goodwin, 1986; Cunado and Perez de Gracia, 2005; Cologni and Manera, 2008; Hamilton, 2009; Kilian, 2009). Particularly, some papers have shown that oil price variations affect stock prices through at least two channels. As crude oil is one of the most key inputs in the production of various goods and services, any instability in its price impacts forthcoming cash flows.

The second way which permits crude oil to affect equity prices is the use of discount rate in asset valuation models. The interest rate has always been as one of most crucial tools in the hands of central banks to limit the inflationary pressures of higher oil prices. In order to avoid these pressures, they usually raise interest rates which eventually have an adverse effect on equity prices as it is raising discount rates (Huang et al., 1996; Miller and Ratti, 2009; Mohanty et al., 2011).

These whys and wherefores vindicate an ample sectoral analysis aiming on the interdependence of crude oil prices and equity returns. As it is mentioned before, some researchers have done aggregate-level studies to assess the exposure of equity markets to oil price risk (e.g., Kling, 1985; Chen et al., 1986; Jones and Kaul, 1996; Wei, 2003; Park and Ratti, 2008; Sorensen, 2009; Gogineni, 2009; Miller and Ratti, 2009; Kilian and Park, 2009; Dhaoui and Khraief, 2014). Some other works have inspected the sensitivity of equity returns to oil price risk at the industry level (e.g., Sadorsky, 2001; Nandha and Faff, 2008; Nandha and Brooks, 2009; Gogineni, 2010; Mohanty and Nandha, 2011a, b; Bredin and Elder, 2011; Aggarwal et al., 2012; Mohanty et al., 2013). Nonetheless, the majority of these studies have focused on the oil, gas, and transportation industries.

Hence, there is a significant gap in the literature for a comprehensive study that takes into account the effect of crude oil prices on all industries and their subsectors. This study aims to determine which subsectors in both financial and non-financial industries are relatively highly exposed to oil price risk. Mohanty and Nandha (2011a) studied the U.S. oil and gas industry and demonstrated that the extent of oil price exposure differs across its subsectors and over time. Similarly, Mohanty et al. (2014) assessed the oil price sensitivity of all the subsectors within the U.S. travel and leisure industry. They concluded that the oil price sensitivities of subsectors differ considerably. Nevertheless, to the best of our knowledge, no previous study has measured and compared the oil price risk exposure of the financial and nonfinancial industries by conducting a comprehensive subsectoral analysis. Such an analysis is important because an industry-level study may not capture the true influence of oil price changes on each subsector.

This study contributes to the literature in four ways. First, the oil price risk exposures of both financial and non-financial subsectors are examined and compared. Second, this study covers all available industry subsectors in the U.S. economy according to the Datastream industry classifications at level six. Third, the sensitivity of industry subsectors to oil prices is examined using the newly introduced Fama and French (2015) five-factor asset pricing model (FF5F). Fourth, a multifactor asset pricing model is tested under the presence of multiple structural breaks. In this study, we use the approach of Bai and Perron (2003) to identify the structural breaks in the relationship between equity returns of subsectors and the multifactor model variables for the period of January 1983 to March 2015.

The time-varying oil price risk exposure of these subsectors is estimated the by using a time-varying parameter model in state-space form. This study yields some noteworthy results. First, the majority of financial and non-financial subsectors are affected by oil price changes. However, though the magnitude of the impact is quite limited on average, the degree of oil price sensitivity differs noticeably across subsectors and over time. Second, the magnitude of oil price exposure of the financial subsectors is considerably lower than the magnitude of oil price exposure of the non-financial subsectors.

Third, the majority of the financial subsectors (10 out of 12 significant subsectors) are negatively affected by oil prices while most of the non-financial subsectors (14 out of 20) are positively affected. Fourth, only 12 out of 20 financial subsectors exhibit a statistically significant exposure to the price of oil in at least one of the subperiods, whereas for the non-financials, all of the 20 most sensitive subsectors show
a statistically significant exposure to the price of oil. Fifth, for the both types of subsectors, the monthly return on the market portfolio (MKT) has the highest share among other risk factors in determining the subsectors' returns. However, the monthly return on West Texas Intermediate crude oil (OIL) has the least important role in explaining the subsectors' returns for the both financials and non-financials. Empirically, Fama and French (1993) show that the their three-factor model (FF3F) performs better in explaining the stock returns, and the systematic risk factor of beta $(\beta)$ in the theoretical capital asset pricing model (CAPM) does not fully capture the systematic risk associated with individual stocks or stock indices.

They show that in addition to the beta ( $\beta$ ) risk factor, factors such as firm size and book-to-market ratio can be good proxies for measuring the systematic risk not completely captured by CAPM (i.e., the FF3F model). Subsequently, Fama and French (2015) extend the FF3F model to five-factor model (FF5F) by adding two more factors (i.e., profitability and investment patterns). The results show that, in addition to the oil risk exposure factor, the return premiums (factor loadings) of these factors are statistically significant in explaining the stock index returns.

Sixth, by applying the method of time-varying causality in return, it is found that after the 1990-91 and 2008-09 recessions, there are high levels of causality in return running from oil market to financial and non-financial subsectors. Seventh, by employing the method of time-varying causality in risk, it is confirmed that there are high levels of risk spillover effect running from the oil market toward financial and non-financial subsectors during and after the 2008-09 financial crisis.

### 2.2 Literature Review

Chen et al. (1986) were among the first researchers to examine the oil price sensitivity of equity returns in the U.S. over the period 1958-1984, and they show that oil prices do not significantly affect equity returns. Similarly, by using the U.S. daily data, Huang et al. (1996) show that oil price changes have no significant effect on either the aggregate or industry levels over the period 1983-1990. Sadorsky (2001) investigates the oil price exposure of Canadian oil and gas industry stocks over the period of 1983M04-1999M04. He uses a multifactor market model and estimates it using ordinary least squares (OLS) regression.

He shows that some risk elements, such as oil prices, interest rates, and market index, determine the equity returns of the Canadian oil and gas industry. Click (2001) studies the long-run nexus between equity returns of oil companies and oil price fluctuations for the period 1979-1999. He concludes that oil price risk explains the equity returns of oil companies. Hammoudeh and Li (2004) confirm that oil price is a determining factor in explaining the equity returns of the U.S. oil and transportation industries. They also find similar results for the stock markets of Norway and Mexico. Via a multifactor framework, Boyer and Filion (2007) analyze the influence of oil price shocks on equity returns of oil and gas companies in Canada. They estimate a multifactor model using generalized least squared (GLS) regression, and their results indicate that the equity returns of this industry are positively affected by natural gas and oil prices. They also assert that the oil and natural gas risk exposures of these stocks vary significantly over time.

In an industry-level study, Nandha and Faff (2008) evaluate 35 worldwide equity indices over the period 1983M04-2005M09. They demonstrate that stock returns of all sectors, except for the mining, and oil and gas sectors, are negatively affected by oil price shocks. Kilian (2008) estimates the effects of oil price shocks on the restaurant and lodging industry and finds them to be adverse. He also gives evidence regarding the negative influence of energy price shocks on the airline industry. Park and Ratti (2008) inspect the effect of oil price shocks on the equity markets of the U.S. and thirteen European states over 1986M01-2005M12. They employ a vector autoregressive (VAR) methodology and show that oil price shocks significantly affect real equity returns. They find that only in Norway, an oil exporting country, the equity market reacts positively to a positive oil price shock.

Miller and Ratti (2009) examine the long-term nexus between oil prices and equity markets of six OECD countries for the period 1971M01-2008M03 using a vector error correction model (VECM). After finding evidence for breaks in the data, they divide the period of the study into three sub-periods. For the two sub-periods of 1971M01-1980M05 and 1988M02-1999M09, they find that stock market indices negatively respond to positive oil price shocks. However, during 1980M061988M01, stock market indices do not significantly react to positive oil price shocks. At the industry level, Gogineni (2010) finds that oil-intensive industries are the most sensitive ones to oil prices. Moya-Martínez et al. (2014) inspect the exposure of the stock market to oil price fluctuations in Spain for the period 1993-2010. Under the presence of structural breaks, they study the Spanish market at the industry level. According to their results, Spanish industries have limited exposure to oil price changes, but these results vary across industries.

They find that in the 1990s, a period of relatively low oil prices with low volatility, the sensitivity of industries to oil prices is very weak. However, during the 2000s, the nexus between stocks and crude oil prices have increased. Mohanty et al. (2014) assess the oil price sensitivity of the U.S. travel and leisure industry at the subsector level. They employ the four-factor asset pricing model of Carhart (1997), which is based on the prominent FF3F model plus a momentum factor. They embed the oil price as a risk factor into this model. Their results indicate that the oil price sensitivities of these subsectors (i.e., Airlines, Hotels, Gambling, Recreational Services, Restaurants \& Bars, and Travel \& Tourism) vary considerably but they are generally negative.

By incorporating dummy variables for the recessions in the model, they also show that the 2007-2009 financial crisis had a crucial impact on the oil price sensitivity of the Airlines subsector. Tsai (2015) examine the reaction of stock returns to oil price shocks before, throughout, and after a financial crisis. He uses daily data of 682 U.S. firms for the period of 1990M01 to 2012M12. By using the firm-level data, he confirms the asymmetric effects of oil price shocks on stock returns throughout and after the crisis. During and after the crisis, the oil-intensive industries are more positively affected by oil price shocks compared to the less oil-intensive industries. In order to examine the impact oil price shocks across various firm sizes, he employs different proxy variables such as the number of employees, total revenue, and total assets. The results indicate that oil price shocks affect the big size firms more significantly and negatively prior to the crisis. However, medium size firms are positively affected by oil price shocks in the post-crisis period.

Using a cross-sectional data, Demirer et al. (2015) investigate the oil price risk exposure in the stock markets of net oil exporting countries for the period of 2004M03 to 2013M03. They incorporate both the oil price risk factor and an idiosyncratic volatility factor into the FF3F model. The results show that the oilsensitive stocks harvest significantly higher returns indicating that oil price exposure can be used as a predictor of stock returns in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) stock markets.

### 2.3 Data and Methodology

### 2.3.1 Data

This study investigates the oil price exposure of the U.S. industry subsectors over the period of January 1983 to March 2015. Monthly stock price indices of the subsectors are obtained from the Datastream. According to the Datastream industry classification of level six (subsector level), there are a total of 109 subsectors, and all are included in this study. These subsectors are divided into two categories: financials (20 subsectors) and non-financials (89 subsectors). Table 1 shows the Datastream industry classification hierarchy. Datastream divides the whole economy into 10 industries namely, Oil \& Gas, Basic Materials, Industrials, Consumer Goods, Health Care, Consumer Services, Telecommunications, Utilities, Financials, and Technologies. Also, these 10 industries are divided into 19 supersectors, 40 sectors, and 109 subsectors. The Fama-French factors are obtained from Kenneth French's data library ttp://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.htm). For the oil price, we use the monthly returns on the West Texas Intermediate (WTI), expressed in USD/barrel. WTI is selected for two reasons. First, in North America, it is the most widely used benchmark for crude oil prices. Second, most of the hedging
instruments used by North American companies, such as futures, forwards, and other derivatives, are based on the WTI.

Table 1. Datastream industry classification hierarchy

| Industry | Supersector | Sector | Subsector |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Oil \& Gas | Oil \& Gas | Oil \& Gas Producers | Exploration \& Production Integrated Oil \& Gas |
|  |  | Oil Equipment, Services \& Distribution | Oil Equipment \& Services Pipelines |
|  |  | Alternative Energy | Renewable Energy Equipment |
| Basic Materials | Chemicals | Chemicals | Commodity Chemicals Specialty Chemicals |
|  | Basic Resources | Forestry \& Paper | Forestry Paper |
|  |  | Industrial Metals \& Mining | Aluminum <br> Nonferrous Metals Iron \& Steel |
|  |  | Mining | Coal <br> Gold Mining <br> Platinum \& Precious Metals |
| Industrials | Construction \& Materials | Construction \& Materials | Building Materials \& Fixtures Heavy Construction |
|  | Industrial Goods \& Services | Aerospace \& Defense | Aerospace <br> Defense |
|  |  | General Industrials | Containers \& Packaging Diversified Industrials |
|  |  | Electronic \& Electrical Equipment | Electrical Components \& Equipment Electronic Equipment |
|  |  | Industrial Engineering | Commercial Vehicles \& Trucks Industrial Machinery |
|  |  | Industrial Transportation | Delivery Services <br> Marine Transportation <br> Railroads <br> Transportation Services <br> Trucking |
|  |  | Support Services | Business Support Services <br> Business Training \& Employment Agencies <br> Financial Administration <br> Industrial Suppliers <br> Waste \& Disposal Services |
| Consumer Goods | Automobiles \& Parts | Automobiles \& Parts | Automobiles <br> Auto Parts <br> Tires |
|  | Food \& Beverage | Beverages | Brewers <br> Distillers \& Vintners <br> Soft Drinks |
|  |  | Food Producers | Farming \& Fishing Food Products |
|  | Personal \& Household Goods | Household Goods \& Home Construction | Durable Household Products <br> Nondurable Household Products <br> Furnishings <br> Home Construction |
|  |  | Leisure Goods | Consumer Electronics <br> Recreational Products <br> Toys |
|  |  | Personal Goods | Clothing \& Accessories <br> Footwear <br> Personal Products |
|  |  | Tobacco | Tobacco |

Table 1. Continued

| Industry | Supersector | Sector | Subsector |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| Health Care | Health Care Equipment \& Services | Health Care Providers <br> Mealth Equipment |  |
|  |  |  | Medical Supplies |

### 2.3.2 Methodology

### 2.3.2.1 The Fama-French Model

The FF3F model has become a widely used asset pricing model in the literature of empirical finance. In the model, two more factors are introduced, namely the size (SMB) and book-to-market (HML) factors, which are not fully captured by the CAPM's beta. Later, Carhart (1997) develops a four-factor asset pricing model by adding the momentum factor to the FF3F model. Some studies, such as Rajgopal (1999), Sadorsky (2001), and Jin and Jorion (2006), use this four-factor model and add a commodity price risk factor (e.g., the oil price risk factor).

These authors conclude that, although this model accounts for the systematic risk factors at the aggregate level, at the industry level, it may not detect commodity price risk. Mohanty et al. (2014) apply this model in order to measure the oil price sensitivity of the U.S. travel and leisure industry. Contrary to others, they demonstrate that the augmented oil price risk factor explains the subsectors' returns in the aforesaid industry.

In 2015, Fama and French have introduced a five-factor model (FF5F). They incorporate the profitability (RMW) and investment patterns (CMA) factors into the FF3F model. They assert that this new model outperforms the FF3F model in predicting stock returns. This study applies the FF5F model at the subsector level for the first time by integrating the oil price risk factor in the form of the following multifactor model:
$R_{i t}=\alpha_{i}+\beta_{i} M K T_{t}+\gamma_{i} S M B_{t}+\delta_{i} H M L_{t}+\theta_{i} R M W_{t}+\mu_{i} C M A_{t}+\sigma_{i} O i l_{t}+$ $\varepsilon_{i t}$
where $R_{i t}$ is the monthly $\log$ return on subsector $i$ in excess of the 1 -month Treasury bill rate; $M K T_{t}$ is the monthly return on the market portfolio, which is calculated as the value-weighted return of all CRSP stocks incorporated in the U.S. in excess of the 1-month Treasury bill rate; $S M B_{t}$ (Small Minus Big) is the monthly return of a small-cap portfolio in excess of a large-cap portfolio; $H M L_{t}$ (High Minus Low) is the monthly return of a portfolio with high book-to-market ratio (a value portfolio) in excess of a portfolio with low book-to-market ratio (growth portfolio); $R M W_{t}$ (Robust Minus Weak) is the monthly return of a portfolio with robust operating profitability in excess of a portfolio with weak operating profitability; $C M A_{t}$ (Conservative Minus Aggressive) is the monthly return of a portfolio with conservative investment in excess of a portfolio with aggressive investment; and Oil $_{t}$ is the monthly return on West Texas Intermediate crude oil (WTI). For subsector $i$, the coefficients $\beta_{i}, \gamma_{i}, \delta_{i}, \theta_{i}, \mu_{i}$, and $\sigma_{i}$ quantify the market, size, book-to-market, profitability, investment patters, and oil price risk exposure, respectively. The idiosyncratic error term is $\varepsilon_{i t}$.

Given the occurrence of some structural changes in oil and financial markets over the last three decades, the existence of structural breaks should be tested in the relationship between subsector equity returns and oil price changes. Hence, the test of Bai and Perron (2003) is employed in order to find the structural shifts in the relationship between subsector equity returns and oil price changes. This method allows testing for multiple structural breaks in a linear model and, using least squares estimation, it can detect breaks at a priori unknown dates.

Allowing for multiple breaks in the factors, the Eq. (1) can be reformulated and use the following regression model with $m$ breaks ( $m+1$ regimes $^{1}$ ):

$$
\begin{align*}
& R_{i t}=\alpha_{i j}+\beta_{i j} M K T_{t}+\gamma_{i j} S M B_{t}+\delta_{i j} H M L_{t}+\theta_{i j} R M W_{t}+\mu_{i j} C M A_{t}+\sigma_{i j} O i l_{t}+ \\
& \varepsilon_{i t}  \tag{2}\\
& \quad \mathrm{t}=T_{j-1}+1, \ldots, T_{j}
\end{align*}
$$

for $j=1, \ldots, m+1$. The breakpoints $\left(T_{1}, \ldots, T_{m}\right)$ are explicitly treated as unknown, and by convention, $T_{0}=0$ and $T_{m+1}=T$ where $T$ is the total sample size. The rest of parameters (factors) are previously described. The Bai-Perron sequential test statistics detects the number of breaks. The $\operatorname{SupF}(l+1 \mid l)$ test is a sequential test of the null hypothesis of $l$ breaks versus the alternative of $l+1$ breaks. Later, the breakpoint regression is used to estimate the multifactor model in Eq. (2) for the subperiods based on breakpoint(s) determined by the Bai-Perron sequential test results.

### 2.3.2.2 Time-varying Parameter Model

To check the robustness of the results of breakpoint regressions, a time-varying parameter model is employed to examine the stability of subsector equity returns and oil price relationships. This model is in state-space form and is characterized by the following system of equations:
$R_{i t}=\alpha_{i t}+\beta_{i t} M K T_{t}+\gamma_{i t} S M B_{t}+\delta_{i t} H M L_{t}+\theta_{i t} R M W_{t}+\mu_{i t} C M A_{t}+\sigma_{i t} O i l_{t}+$ $\varepsilon_{i t}$
$\alpha_{i t}=\alpha_{i t-1}+\omega_{\alpha t}$
$\beta_{i t}=\beta_{i t-1}+\omega_{\beta t}$
$\gamma_{i t}=\gamma_{i t-1}+\omega_{\gamma t}$
$\delta_{i t}=\delta_{i t-1}+\omega_{\delta t}$
$\theta_{i t}=\theta_{i t-1}+\omega_{\theta t}$
$\mu_{i t}=\mu_{i t-1}+\omega_{\mu t}$

[^0]$\sigma_{i t}=\sigma_{i t-1}+\omega_{\sigma t}$
where $\alpha_{i t}, \beta_{i t,} \gamma_{i t}, \delta_{i t}, \theta_{i t,} \mu_{i t}$, and $\sigma_{i t}$ represent the state variables to be estimated. The disturbance terms are $\varepsilon_{i t}, \omega_{\alpha t}, \omega_{\beta t}, \omega_{\gamma t}, \omega_{\delta t}, \omega_{\theta t}, \omega_{\mu t}$, and $\omega_{\sigma t}$. The disturbance terms are assumed to be normally distributed with zero mean, and they are not serially correlated. In the above state-space model, Eq. (4) is the measurement equation, and Eqs. (5)-(11) are the transition equations. The maximum likelihood, along with the Kalman filter (Kalman, 1960), can be used to estimate the model parameters. The Kalman filter is a recursive process for computing the minimum mean square error (MSE) estimate of the state vectors at time $t$, using information available at time $t-1$. These estimates are updated when further information becomes available.

### 2.3.2.3 Time-varying Causality in Return

In order to test the return spillover between oil prices and the subsectors' returns, the causal linkages between them should be examined. The most conventional way of testing this causal relationship has been the Granger causality test in finance and economic literature. According to Brooks (2014), the concept of Granger causality (Granger, 1969, 1980) does not imply a 'causes-and-effects'" relationship between two variables. Instead, it merely indicates a "correlative" relationship among the past values of one variable and the current value of another. Hong et al. (2009) describe Granger causality as "incremental predictive ability" which can be utilized as a proper tool for inspecting and forecasting risk spillovers between different financial assets and markets. Although, this method has been used in a large body of the literature, but it is unable to capture the non-linear causal linkages (Billio et al., 2012).

Several methods have been introduced for testing causality since Granger presented the causality concept for the first time in 1969. Most of these tests use the vector autoregressive (VAR) model introduced by Sims (1972). In 1976, an asymptotically chi-squared test introduced by Haugh based on the residual cross correlations in order to check Granger causality in mean. As an extension to the work of Haugh (1976), Cheung and Ng (1996) introduce the test of causality in variance. Due to convenience of Granger-type causality tests for forecasting and causal inferences, they have been extensively adopted in finance and economics. Newly, time-varying Granger causality has gained great attention from scholars. As a result, a limited number of new tests have been introduced.

For instance, Aaltonen and Östermark (1997) propose a fixed-length rolling window Granger causality test to measure the time-varying Granger causality among the Japanese and Finnish security markets in 1990s. Moreover, a Bayesian VAR model with time-varying parameters is introduced by Cogley and Sargent (2001) to test the causal dynamics between inflation, interest rate, and unemployment in the United States.

Given the structural breaks and crises in the financial time series, non-linear causal relationships may exist due to volatility and return spillover effects. As the linear and non-linear causal relationships are dependent to the sample data, a causality framework with dynamic rolling window is employed. In this study, the Hill's (2007) fixed-length rolling window causality test will be used. He suggests a successive multi-horizon non-causality test, which can be adopted to detect non-linear causalities in terms of linear parametric restrictions for a trivariate process.

The Wald-type test statistics is used in this causality test under joint null hypothesis of zero parameter linear constraints. This time-varying causality test has a vector autoregressive (VAR) structure of order $p$ at horizon h , as the following:
$W_{t+h}=\alpha+\sum_{k=1}^{p} \pi_{k}^{(h)} W_{t+1-k}+u_{t+h}$
where $\mathrm{W}_{\mathrm{t}}$ is a $m$-vector process with stationarity, $\mathrm{m} \geq 2, \alpha$ is the constant term, $\pi_{k}^{(h)}$ are matrix-valued coefficients, and $u_{t}$ is a zero mean white noise process ( $m \times 1$ vector) with non-singular covariance matrix. This study utilizes the bivariate case where $m=2$. Therefore, the aim is to test the null hypothesis of non-causality running from oil prices (WTI) to the subsectors' returns. Causality takes place at any horizon if and only if it takes place at horizon 1 (first month in each window). $W_{t}$ is a 2 vector stationary process, $W_{t}=\left\{\mathrm{S}_{\mathrm{t}}, \mathrm{R}_{\mathrm{t}}\right\}$ where R does not linearly causes S at 1-step ahead if and only if the RS-block $\pi_{R S, 1}^{(h)}=0$ for $k=1$. Due to likely substandard performance of the chi-squared distribution in small samples, Hill (2007) proposed a parametric bootstrapping approach for estimating small sample $p$-values.

### 2.3.2.4 Time-varying Causality in Risk

In order to test the risk spillover between oil prices and the subsectors' returns, the causal linkages between them should be investigated. In this case, the same methodology of Hill's (2007) time-varying causality will be adopted. The only difference is that instead of the oil and subsectors' returns, their value-at-risks (VaR) will be used to measure the risk spillover from crude oil market to the subsectors. The main rationale to investigate the risk spillover between markets is "financial contagion" in the event of global crises, causing them to suffer from a same shock. The VaR approach is selected to measure market risk, because it illustrates market risk through the probability distribution of a random variable and estimates the risk
with a single real number. Therefore, VaR has turn out to be an important tool for financial risk measurement (Fan, 2000; Tan and Chan, 2003; Hartz et al., 2006; Fan et al., 2004). The VaR approach is also appropriate for measuring the risk in oil markets, and a number of authors have done promising research using VaR (Cabedo and Moya, 2003; Feng et al., 2004; Fan et al., 2008).

The VaR can be calculated in three different ways such as the historical simulation (HS), the historical simulation with ARMA forecasts (HSAF) and the variancecovariance approach based on ARCH or autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity family models forecasts. In this study, an ARCH-type model will be adopted to estimate the VaR model for the crude oil prices and the subsectors' returns. When using ARCH family models to estimate the VaR, most of researchers assume that residuals have standard normal or student distributions.

But indeed, the oil and stock prices usually have leptokurtic or fat-tailed distribution which is pretty different from their assumptions (Wu et al., 2012). Consequently, the developed VaR model based on these assumptions seems to be inefficient which eventually affects the risk assessment. The solution is to estimate the ARCH-type models based on generalized error distribution (GED) which provides a comprehensive distribution (Nelson, 1990). Furthermore, the adequacy of the developed VaR model can be evaluated via a backtesting method proposed by Kupiec (1995).

### 2.3.2.4.1 GED-EGARCH-VaR Model

This study employs an ARCH-type model based on GED in order to capture the oil and subsectors' returns volatilities to be used in the VaR model. This is because

ARCH family models can be advantageous when there is volatility clustering. Most of financial time series are often prone to this phenomenon. Engle (1982) introduced the standard ARCH model to describe the volatility clustering. The generalized version of ARCH model known as GARCH (Bollerslev, 1986) can be utilized when the lag of ARCH models became too large. The $\operatorname{GARCH}(\mathrm{p}, \mathrm{q})$ model can be expressed as follows:
$r_{t}=x_{t}^{\prime} \beta+\varepsilon_{t}$
$\sigma_{t}^{2}=\omega+\sum_{i=1}^{p} \alpha_{i} \varepsilon_{t-i}^{2}+\sum_{j=1}^{q} \beta_{j} \sigma_{t-j}^{2}$
where $r_{t}$ denotes the oil price and subsectors' returns, $\mathrm{x}_{\mathrm{t}}$ is a column vector of independent variables, $\beta$ is a column vector coefficient, and $\sigma_{t}^{2}$ is conditional variance. This GARCH model can be estimated by choosing $\mathrm{p}>0$ and $\mathrm{q} \geq 0$ where p is the order of the moving average terms (ARCH) and q is the order of the autoregressive terms (GARCH). Empirically, it is proven that the stock and commodity prices respond asymmetrically to shocks (Cont, 2001). A negative past return affects the current volatility more considerably than a positive return. Thus, when using financial data, it is essential to use a GARCH model which recognizes the asymmetry effect. The solution is the exponential generalized autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity (EGARCH) model which proposed by Nelson (1991). Many researchers have applied the EGARCH model because of its characteristic (He et al., 2002; Mikosch and Rezapour, 2013; Winterberger, 2013; Racicot and Theoret, 2016). The EGARCH model can be defined as follows:
$\log \left(\sigma_{t}^{2}\right)=\omega+\sum_{i=1}^{p} \alpha_{i}\left|\frac{\varepsilon_{t-i}}{\sigma_{t-i}}\right|+\sum_{j=1}^{q} \beta_{j} \log \left(\sigma_{t-j}^{2}\right)+\sum_{k=1}^{r} \gamma_{k} \frac{\varepsilon_{t-k}}{\sigma_{t-k}}$
where $\omega, \alpha, \beta, \gamma$, are real numbers, and $\varepsilon_{t} \sim \operatorname{IID}(0,1)$. The EGARCH model is stationary when $|\beta|<1$, and if $\varepsilon_{t}$ derives from GED with shape parameter $>1$. Equation 14 adds an asymmetry term into the conditional variance $\left(\sigma_{t}^{2}\right)$. The sign of $\varepsilon_{t-k}$ determines asymmetric effect. If $\varepsilon_{t-k}>0$, the total effect of $\varepsilon_{t-k}$ on the $\log \left(\sigma_{t}^{2}\right)$ can be measured by $\left(\alpha_{i}+\gamma_{k}\right)\left|\frac{\varepsilon_{t-i}}{\sigma_{t-i}}\right|$, whereas if $\varepsilon_{t-k}<0$, this effect can be measured by $\left(\alpha_{i}-\gamma_{k}\right)\left|\frac{\varepsilon_{t-i}}{\sigma_{t-i}}\right|$. Therefore, the asymmetric leverage effect which first noted by Black (1976) can be measured by the coefficient $\gamma_{k}$.

The leverage effect can be defined as a tendency of negative correlation between the stock price changes and their volatility. This is known as leverage effect because when the market value of the firm with debt and equity outstanding falls (stock price falls), the firm becomes more leveraged (the debt to equity ratio increases). This finding is also empirically supported by Christie (1982), Schwert (1989), and Bollerslev et al. (1994). Accordingly, the negative $\varepsilon_{t-k}$ which can be considered as bad news, may have larger impact on volatility compared with the positive $\varepsilon_{t-k}$. Hence, the leverage effect $\left(\gamma_{k}\right)$ is expected to be negative.

As it is mentioned before, because the oil price and subsectors' returns are prone to have a leptokurtic (fat-tailed) distribution, hence the assumption that residuals are normally distributed seems to miscalculate the extreme risk. For this reason, the Nelson's (1990) generalized error distribution (GED) is employed here to estimate the residuals of the EGARCH models. The GED's probability density function can be presented as follows:
$f(\varepsilon)=\frac{k\left[\exp \left(-0.5|\varepsilon / \lambda|^{k}\right)\right]}{\lambda 2^{[(k+1) / k]} \Gamma(1 / k)} \quad(0 \leq k \leq \infty)$
where $\lambda=\left[\frac{2^{(-2 / k)} \Gamma(1 / k)}{\Gamma(3 / k)}\right]^{1 / 2}, \Gamma(\bullet)$ denotes the gamma function, and $k$ is the degree of freedom. $k$ also known as GED parameter which displays the fatness of the tail. Specially, $k<2$ indicates its tail is thicker than that of the standard normal distribution; $k=2$, the GED exactly follows the standard normal distribution; and $k>2$ suggests its tail is thinner.

The value-at-risk ( VaR ) is a renowned technique applied to measure the possible risk of economic losses in a portfolio of financial assets. Originally, J.P. Morgan introduced VaR in 1994 and has turn out to be a standard measure of extreme market risk (Duffie and Pan, 1997; Engle and Manganelli, 2004). Financial regulatory bodies like the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision use VaR as an important tool for determining the capital risk requirements of financial institutions to ensure that they can endure catastrophic consequences of financial crises (Hong et al., 2009).

VaR estimates the maximum amount of a portfolio's value that can be lost with a given confidence level over a given time horizon, as a result of exposure to the market risk (Hendricks, 1996 and Hilton, 2003). One can be exposed to market risk by holding a short position (upside risk) or a long position (downside risk). Statistically, VaR indicates the left or the right quantile of the distribution function. The likelihood of extreme downside market risk can be shown by left tail probabilities (Embrechts et al., 1997). Volatility does not differentiate between losses and gains. Nonetheless, financial risk is apparently linked with losses but not profits.

Hence, an optimal measure of risk should consider large adverse market movements or large losses (Hong et al., 2009). The key notion behind downside risk is that the left quantile of a return distribution implicates risk whereas the right quantile encompasses the upside gain or better investment prospects (Grootveld and Hallerbach, 1999).

In line with this concern, in this thesis, the left quantile of the oil price and subsectors' returns is used to measure the downside risk, which implies the undesirable unexpected loss. For the downside risk, VaR model can be defined as follows:

$$
\begin{equation*}
\operatorname{VaR}_{m, t}=-\mu_{m, t}+z_{m, \alpha} \sqrt{\sigma_{m, t}^{2}} \quad(m=1,2, \ldots, 109 \text { subsectors plus WTI }) \tag{16}
\end{equation*}
$$

where $\mu_{m, t}$ and $\sigma_{m, t}^{2}$ are conditional mean and conditional variance in market $m$ at time $t$, respectively. $z_{m, \alpha}$ indicates the left $\alpha$-quantile of generalized error distribution (GED) in the residuals of EGARCH model in market $m$. In order to check the reliability of VaR estimates, it is necessary to backtest their adequacy for measuring the extreme market risk. For this reason, the Kupiec's (1995) backtest technique is used here. He proposed a likelihood ratio test with the null hypothesis $\mathrm{f}=\alpha$ as follows: $L R=2 \ln \left[(1-f)^{T-N} f^{N}\right]-2 \ln \left[(1-\alpha)^{T-N} \alpha^{N}\right]$
where T, N, f and 1- $\alpha$ denote sample size, days of failure, frequency of failure ( $\mathrm{f}=\mathrm{N} / \mathrm{T}$ ) and confidence level. The null hypothesis assumes $L R \sim x^{2}(1)$, and its $95 \%$ critical value is 3.84 . Given the $x^{2}$ distribution, the null hypothesis should be rejected if $L R$ value is greater than the critical value meaning that $\operatorname{VaR}$ estimate is not adequate.

### 2.4 Data Analysis and Empirical Results

### 2.4.1 Descriptive Statistics and Unit Root Test

Table 2-4 present the descriptive statistics and unit root test results of financial, regressors and non-financial subsectors. The mean monthly equity returns of financial subsectors ranges from -0.0003 (Investment Companies) to 0.0134 (Real Estate Holding \& Development) and for the non-financial subsectors, it ranges from 0.0003 (Gold Mining) to 0.0233 (Internet). According to the standard deviation results, oil price has the highest volatility (0.0940) among the explanatory variables (regressors), showing a high level of instability in crude oil prices.

Among the financial subsectors, Real Estate Services shows the highest standard deviation (0.1425) and Mortgage REITs and Property \& casualty insurance have the lowest standard deviation (0.0539). Among the non-financial subsectors, Renewable Energy Equipment shows the highest standard deviation (0.1931) and Multiutilities has the lowest standard deviation (0.0425). Figure 6 illustrates the variation of standard deviation among these subsectors.

The conventional unit root tests like Phillips and Perron (PP) and Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) do not take into account the structural breaks and for this reason they have low power to reject the null hypothesis of unit root when one or more structural breaks are present (Perron, 1989). For this reason, this study opts the Zivot and Andrews (1992) test to determine the order of integration of the variables under the presence of one structural break in each series. As it is reported in Table 24, all variables are stationary at level form, or they are $\mathrm{I}(0)$.

Table 2. Descriptive statistics and unit root test results for the financials

| Subsector | Period | Mean | Median | Max. | Min. | Std. dev. | ZA stat. | Break date |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Asset Managers | 1983M01-2015M04 | 0.0084 | 0.0147 | 0.2795 | -0.3846 | 0.0910 | -18.03** | 1999M05 |
| Banks | 1983M01-2015M04 | 0.0059 | 0.0104 | 0.2729 | -0.3807 | 0.0664 | -17.75* | 2009M03 |
| Consumer Finance | 1983M01-2015M04 | 0.0093 | 0.0132 | 0.3319 | -0.3436 | 0.0710 | -17.75* | 2009M04 |
| Full Line Insurance | 1983M01-2015M04 | 0.0025 | 0.0095 | 0.5216 | -1.1099 | 0.1098 | -6.87* | 2009M03 |
| Hotel \& Lodging REITs | 1983M01-2015M04 | 0.0069 | 0.0069 | 0.5499 | -0.5491 | 0.0971 | -9.88** | 2009M04 |
| Industrial \& Office REITs | 1988M10-2015M04 | 0.0042 | 0.0100 | 0.4298 | -0.5676 | 0.0761 | -8.35* | 1991M02 |
| Insurance Brokers | 1983M01-2015M04 | 0.0081 | 0.0084 | 0.3022 | -0.3422 | 0.0611 | -22.47* | 2000M11 |
| Investments Companies | 1997M10-2015M04 | -0.0003 | 0.0145 | 0.3857 | -0.7260 | 0.1113 | -16.86* | 2008M12 |
| Investments Services | 1983M01-2015M04 | 0.0076 | 0.0137 | 0.2864 | -0.4981 | 0.0960 | -18.60** | 2000M09 |
| Life Insurance | 1983M01-2015M04 | 0.0086 | 0.0181 | 0.3922 | -0.6084 | 0.0764 | -9.20* | 2009M03 |
| Mortgage Finance | 1983M01-2015M04 | 0.0037 | 0.0146 | 0.3507 | -0.8154 | 0.1057 | -14.95* | 2008M11 |
| Mortgage REITs | 1997M12-2015M04 | 0.0080 | 0.0107 | 0.2091 | -0.2129 | 0.0539 | -9.86* | 2009M04 |
| Property \& Casualty Insurance | 1983M01-2015M04 | 0.0080 | 0.0107 | 0.2091 | -0.2129 | 0.0539 | -19.79** | 2009M03 |
| Real Estate Holding \& Development | 1983M01-2015M04 | 0.0134 | 0.0131 | 0.4315 | -0.5480 | 0.0916 | -17.68** | 2009M04 |
| Real Estate Services | 2004M08-2015M04 | 0.0123 | 0.0159 | 0.6879 | -0.7197 | 0.1425 | -17.56** | 2008M12 |
| Reinsurance | 1990M08-2015M04 | 0.0093 | 0.0033 | 0.2679 | -0.1585 | 0.0569 | -18.10** | 2007M11 |
| Residential REITs | 1983M01-2015M04 | 0.0063 | 0.0069 | 0.2664 | -0.3854 | 0.0635 | -8.60* | 2009M04 |
| Retail REITs | 1983M01-2015M04 | 0.0071 | 0.0101 | 0.4359 | -0.5486 | 0.0646 | -7.73* | 2009M04 |
| Speciality Finance | 1983M01-2015M04 | 0.0080 | 0.0137 | 0.2062 | -0.3580 | 0.0601 | -15.07* | 2009M04 |
| Speciality REITs | 1983M01-2015M04 | 0.0077 | 0.0104 | 0.2530 | -0.3091 | 0.0615 | -10.34* | 1991M02 |

Note: This stable provides the descriptive statistics and the data time span for all variables. ZA stat. refers to the Zivot-Andrews (1992) unit root test statistics and the last column presents the corresponding break date identified by this test. ${ }^{*}, *^{*}, *^{* *}$ denote $1 \%, 5 \%$, and $10 \%$ level of statistical significance, respectively.

Table 3. Descriptive statistics and unit root test results for the regressors

| Regressors | Period | Mean | Median | Max. | Min. | Std. dev. ZA stat. Break date |  |  |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| MKT | 1983M01-2015M03 | 0.0067 | 0.0117 | 0.1247 | -0.2324 | 0.0443 | $-18.58^{*}$ | 2009M03 |
| SMB | 1983M01-2015M03 | 0.0011 | -0.0001 | 0.1905 | -0.1526 | 0.0297 | $-12.73^{*}$ | 1999 M 04 |
| HML | 1983M01-2015M03 | 0.0031 | 0.0024 | 0.1388 | -0.1002 | 0.0293 | $-8.26^{*}$ | 2000M09 |
| RMW | 1983M01-2015M03 | 0.0048 | 0.0033 | 0.1760 | -0.0886 | 0.0237 | $-16.2^{*}$ | 2000 M 02 |
| CMA | 1983M01-2015M03 | 0.0032 | 0.0015 | 0.0893 | -0.0676 | 0.0197 | $-10.72^{*}$ | 2000M01 |
| Oil | 1983M01-2015M03 | 0.0012 | 0.0080 | 0.3825 | -0.4252 | 0.0940 | $-16.60^{* *}$ | 2008M07 |

Note: See Table 2.

Table 4. Descriptive statistics and unit root test results for the non-financials

| Subsector | Period | Mean | Median | Max. | Min. | Std. de | A | reak date |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Aerospace | 1983M01-2015M03 | 0.0087 | 0.0133 | 0.1546 | -0.3233 | 0.0610 | -14.73* | 2009M03 |
| Airlines | 1983M01-2015M03 | 0.0044 | 0.0089 | 0.2434 | -0.3905 | 0.0879 | -14.71* | 2009M04 |
| Alternative Electricity | 1983M01-2012M01 | -0.0002 | 0.0028 | 0.1986 | -0.2064 | 0.0589 | -10.69** | 2003M03 |
| Aluminum | 1983M01-2015M03 | 0.0030 | 0.0064 | 0.4268 | -0.6821 | 0.0998 | -9.55** | 2009M03 |
| Apparel Retails | 1983M01-2015M03 | 0.0119 | 0.0162 | 0.2565 | -0.5696 | 0.0921 | -13.6** | 2009M02 |
| Auto Parts | 1983M01-2015M03 | 0.0047 | 0.0089 | 0.3252 | -0.4450 | 0.0643 | -11.02* | 2009M03 |
| Automobiles | 1983M01-2015M03 | 0.0032 | 0.0009 | 0.5923 | -0.5949 | 0.0938 | -18.75* | 2009M03 |
| Biotechnology | 1983M04-2015M03 | 0.0145 | 0.0152 | 0.3647 | -0.3961 | 0.0968 | -8.56* | 2000M03 |
| Brewers | 1983M01-2015M03 | 0.0097 | 0.0082 | 0.2110 | -0.1773 | 0.0550 | -20.33** | 2000M12 |
| Broadcasting \& Entertainment | 1983M01-2015M03 | 0.0117 | 0.0117 | 0.2803 | -0.2810 | 0.0791 | -20.13* | 2009M03 |
| Broadline Retailers | 1983M01-2015M03 | 0.0080 | 0.0083 | 0.1800 | -0.3060 | 0.0615 | -13.06** | 1998M07 |
| Building Materials \& Fixtur | 1983M01-2015M03 | 0.0074 | 0.0140 | 0.4326 | -0.3855 | 0.0703 | -18.51** | 2009M03 |
| Business Support Services | 1983M01-2015M03 | 0.0069 | 0.0153 | 0.1346 | -0.2749 | 0.0562 | -18.46* | 1998M07 |
| Business Train. \& Emp. | 1991M07-2015M03 | 0.0177 | 0.0135 | 0.3666 | -0.2939 | 0.0929 | -13.15* | 2009M03 |
| Clothing \& Accessories | 1983M01-2015M03 | 0.0104 | 0.0148 | 0.2163 | -0.3816 | 0.0782 | -17.46* | 2009M03 |
| Coal | 1983M01-2015M03 | 0.0034 | 0.0077 | 0.3891 | -0.4588 | 0.1083 | -10.14* | 2008M07 |
| Commercial Vehicles \& Trucks | 1983M01-2015M03 | 0.0068 | 0.0093 | 0.2790 | -0.3998 | 0.0792 | -19.52* | 2008M01 |
| Commodity Chemicals | 1983M01-2015M03 | 0.0066 | 0.0096 | 0.2639 | -0.3150 | 0.0643 | -20.18* | 2009M03 |
| Computer Hardware | 1983M01-2015M03 | 0.0080 | 0.0127 | 0.2319 | -0.3460 | 0.0757 | -20.09* | 2000M09 |
| Computer Services | 1983M01-2015M03 | 0.0068 | 0.0108 | 0.2358 | -0.2907 | 0.0593 | -20.79** | 2000M01 |
| Consumer Electronics | 1986M12-2015M03 | 0.0122 | 0.0159 | 0.4491 | -0.6634 | 0.1370 | -16.55*** | 2000M04 |
| Containers \& Packaging | 1983M01-2015M03 | 0.0076 | 0.0129 | 0.1927 | -0.3185 | 0.0617 | -15.66* | 2009M03 |
| Conventional Electricity | 1983M01-2015M03 | 0.0042 | 0.0072 | 0.1253 | -0.1441 | 0.0425 | -18.61** | 2002M10 |
| Defense | 1983M01-2015M03 | 0.0068 | 0.0158 | 0.1860 | -0.3464 | 0.0591 | -9.25** | 1998M03 |
| Delivery Services | 1983M01-2015M03 | 0.0058 | 0.0060 | 0.3183 | -0.2377 | 0.0787 | -11.05** | 1999M06 |
| Distillers \& Vintners | 1983M01-2015M03 | 0.0098 | 0.0092 | 0.2442 | -0.3241 | 0.0658 | -11.96* | 2009M04 |
| Diversified Industrials | 1983M01-2015M03 | 0.0049 | 0.0089 | 0.2076 | -0.3092 | 0.0587 | -19.4* | 2009M03 |
| Drug Retailers | 1983M01-2015M03 | 0.0088 | 0.0127 | 0.1798 | -0.2982 | 0.0656 | -18.33* | 1999M01 |
| Durable Household Products | 1983M01-2015M03 | 0.0063 | 0.0071 | 0.3670 | -0.3662 | 0.0726 | -9.43* | 2009M03 |
| Electrical Comp. \& Equipment | 1983M01-2015M03 | 0.0101 | 0.0155 | 0.2367 | -0.3514 | 0.0649 | -15.22** | 2000M09 |
| Electronic Equipment | 1983M01-2015M03 | 0.0079 | 0.0127 | 0.3242 | -0.3212 | 0.0817 | -18.74* | 2000M03 |
| Electronic Office Equipment | 1983M01-2015M03 | 0.0056 | 0.0075 | 0.1934 | -0.3537 | 0.0783 | -21.569** | 1999M02 |
| Exploration \& Production | 1983M01-2015M03 | 0.0058 | 0.0056 | 0.2646 | -0.2772 | 0.0712 | -20.31** | 2008M07 |
| Farming \& Fishing | 2000M11-2015M03 | 0.0128 | 0.0129 | 0.2568 | -0.4013 | 0.0915 | -17.19** | 2009M03 |
| Financial Administration | 1983M01-2015M03 | 0.0117 | 0.0130 | 0.2049 | -0.2852 | 0.0560 | -20.76* | 2000M12 |
| Fixed Line Telecommunications | 1983M01-2015M03 | 0.0036 | 0.0074 | 0.2736 | -0.2070 | 0.0539 | -8.47* | 1999M07 |
| Food Products | 1983M01-2015M03 | 0.0090 | 0.0095 | 0.1915 | -0.1940 | 0.0445 | -19.99* | 2009M04 |
| Food Retailers \& Wholesalers | 1983M01-2015M03 | 0.0106 | 0.0108 | 0.3177 | -0.2711 | 0.0545 | -18.82** | 1999M01 |
| Footwear | 1983M01-2015M03 | 0.0114 | 0.0161 | 0.2939 | -0.4631 | 0.0967 | -14.79** | 1997M03 |
| Forestry | 2008M02-2015M03 | 0.0090 | 0.0159 | 0.2204 | -0.1936 | 0.0708 | -16.89** | 2009M03 |
| Furnishings | 1983M01-2015M03 | 0.0077 | 0.0152 | 0.3110 | -0.3328 | 0.0787 | -10.73* | 2009M03 |
| Gambling | 1983M01-2015M03 | 0.0083 | 0.0130 | 0.6072 | -0.6851 | 0.1107 | -9.20* | 2009M04 |
| Gas Distribution | 1983M01-2015M03 | 0.0053 | 0.0101 | 0.2024 | -0.2154 | 0.0562 | -12.32* | 2001M01 |
| Gold Mining | 1983M01-2015M03 | -0.0003 | 0.0017 | 0.4143 | -0.8166 | 0.1079 | -11.95* | 2000M11 |

Note: See Table 2.

Table 4. Continued

| Subsector | Period | Mean | Median | Max. | Min. | Std. de | ZA stat | Break date |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Health Care Providers | 1983M01-2015M03 | 0.0109 | 0.0192 | 0.1891 | -0.3895 | 0.0796 | -21.94** | 2006M01 |
| Heavy Construction | 1983M01-2015M03 | 0.0059 | 0.0061 | 0.4067 | -0.3442 | 0.0822 | -18.05*** | 2008M06 |
| Home Construction | 1983M01-2015M03 | 0.0075 | 0.0071 | 0.3507 | -0.4398 | 0.1017 | -14.68* | 2005M08 |
| Home Improvement Retail | 1983M01-2015M03 | 0.0098 | 0.0117 | 0.1936 | -0.3651 | 0.0681 | -15.91* | 2000M01 |
| Hotels | 1983M01-2015M03 | 0.0083 | 0.0123 | 0.4252 | -0.3234 | 0.0864 | -10.68* | 2009M03 |
| Industrial Machinery | 1983M01-2015M03 | 0.0087 | 0.0101 | 0.2517 | -0.3763 | 0.0685 | -20.34** | 2009M03 |
| Industrial Suppliers | 1983M01-2015M03 | 0.0092 | 0.0121 | 0.2271 | -0.3542 | 0.0695 | -20.86** | 2000M10 |
| Integrated Oil \& Gas | 1983M01-2015M03 | 0.0073 | 0.0096 | 0.1963 | -0.1682 | 0.0490 | -22.14** | 2008M01 |
| Internet | 1992M04-2015M03 | 0.0233 | 0.0312 | 0.3679 | -0.3523 | 0.1256 | -15.59* | 2000M01 |
| Iron \& Steel | 1983M01-2015M03 | 0.0054 | 0.0108 | 0.2816 | -0.4696 | 0.0958 | -19.13** | 2003M04 |
| Marine Transport | 1983M01-2015M03 | 0.0038 | 0.0143 | 0.2966 | -0.5156 | 0.1040 | -19.33*** | 1987M12 |
| Media Agencies | 1983M01-2015M03 | 0.0090 | 0.0102 | 0.3341 | -0.4035 | 0.0741 | -19.98* | 2000M01 |
| Medical Equipment | 1983M01-2015M03 | 0.0096 | 0.0131 | 0.1627 | -0.2546 | 0.0506 | -18.65** | 1998M08 |
| Medical Supplies | 1983M01-2015M03 | 0.0095 | 0.0105 | 0.1481 | -0.1876 | 0.0487 | -19.28*** | 1999M01 |
| Mobile Telecommunications | 1983M01-2015M03 | 0.0063 | 0.0188 | 0.3612 | -0.4184 | 0.0924 | -9.55* | 2000M01 |
| Multiutilities | 1983M01-2015M03 | 0.0046 | 0.0081 | 0.1256 | -0.1660 | 0.0425 | -20.49* | 2003M04 |
| Nondurable Household Products | 1983M01-2015M03 | 0.0081 | 0.0122 | 0.2194 | -0.3842 | 0.0565 | -20.89** | 1999M04 |
| Nonferrous Metals | 1983M01-2015M03 | 0.0061 | 0.0088 | 0.3780 | -0.4490 | 0.0967 | -9.97*** | 2007M11 |
| Oil Equipment Services | 1983M01-2015M03 | 0.0044 | 0.0102 | 0.3086 | -0.4071 | 0.0873 | -18.56*** | 2008M07 |
| Paper | 1983M01-2015M03 | 0.0042 | 0.0075 | 0.5384 | -0.4718 | 0.0851 | -10.13* | 2009M03 |
| Personal Products | 1983M01-2015M03 | 0.0085 | 0.0130 | 0.1965 | -0.2435 | 0.0511 | -16.17** | 1998M05 |
| Pharmaceuticals | 1983M01-2015M03 | 0.0090 | 0.0125 | 0.1466 | -0.1810 | 0.0479 | -20.37* | 1999M04 |
| Pipelines | 1983M01-2015M03 | 0.0068 | 0.0105 | 0.1736 | -0.2665 | 0.0573 | -10.18** | 2001M05 |
| Platinum \& Precious Metals | 1995M01-2011M07 | 0.0009 | 0.0000 | 0.4578 | -0.5365 | 0.1455 | -16.48* | 2009M03 |
| Publishing | 1983M01-2015M03 | 0.0050 | 0.0040 | 0.1548 | -0.2887 | 0.0530 | -18.71* | 2009M03 |
| Railroads | 1983M01-2015M03 | 0.0090 | 0.0154 | 0.2206 | -0.3643 | 0.0624 | -18.96** | 2009M03 |
| Recreational Products | 1995M01-2015M03 | 0.0114 | 0.0160 | 0.4406 | -0.3412 | 0.0974 | -15.3** | 2009M04 |
| Recreational Services | 1983M01-2015M03 | 0.0094 | 0.0120 | 0.2769 | -0.3392 | 0.0785 | -18.69* | 2009M02 |
| Renewable Energy Equipments | 2006M12-2015M03 | 0.0070 | 0.0271 | 0.5464 | -0.4778 | 0.1931 | -10.00* | 2012M06 |
| Restaurants \& Bars | 1983M01-2015M03 | 0.0110 | 0.0149 | 0.1746 | -0.1893 | 0.0542 | -18.95** | 1999M04 |
| Semiconductors | 1983M01-2015M03 | 0.0085 | 0.0121 | 0.2923 | -0.4223 | 0.1022 | -20.4* | 2000M09 |
| Soft Drinks | 1983M01-2015M03 | 0.0098 | 0.0129 | 0.1738 | -0.2030 | 0.0536 | -20.25* | 1998M07 |
| Software | 1983M01-2015M03 | 0.0157 | 0.0152 | 0.3579 | -0.2840 | 0.0893 | -20.74* | 2000M01 |
| Specialized Consumer Services | 1983M01-2015M03 | 0.0098 | 0.0163 | 0.2354 | -0.2464 | 0.0704 | -9.23* | 2005M01 |
| Specialty Chemicals | 1983M01-2015M03 | 0.0099 | 0.0136 | 0.2033 | -0.3275 | 0.0573 | -19.5** | 1998M05 |
| Specialty Retailers | 1983M01-2015M03 | 0.0108 | 0.0133 | 0.2343 | -0.3146 | 0.0695 | -15.82* | 2000M01 |
| Telecommunications Equipment | 1983M01-2015M03 | 0.0079 | 0.0156 | 0.2828 | -0.4909 | 0.0896 | -19.82* | 2000M04 |
| Tires | 1983M01-2015M03 | 0.0013 | -0.0005 | 0.5740 | -0.5908 | 0.1238 | -8.23** | 2003M03 |
| Tobacco | 1983M01-2015M03 | 0.0109 | 0.0196 | 0.2791 | -0.2886 | 0.0714 | -19.62** | 2000M03 |
| Toys | 1983M01-2015M03 | 0.0070 | 0.0108 | 0.2444 | -0.5133 | 0.0757 | -17.66** | 2009M02 |
| Transportation Services | 1983M01-2015M03 | 0.0044 | 0.0048 | 0.2310 | -0.5004 | 0.0865 | -9.82*** | 2001M01 |
| Travel \& Tourism | 1983M10-2015M03 | 0.0126 | 0.0152 | 0.4777 | -0.5376 | 0.1215 | -9.83* | 2009M04 |
| Trucking | 1983M01-2015M03 | 0.0077 | 0.0088 | 0.1568 | -0.3496 | 0.0549 | -15.2*** | 1997M10 |
| Waste \& Disposal Services | 1983M01-2015M03 | 0.0057 | 0.0103 | 0.2520 | -0.4777 | 0.0801 | -18.55** | 1990M07 |
| Water | 1983M01-2015M03 | 0.0109 | 0.0086 | 0.2569 | -0.1823 | 0.0610 | -22.28*** | 2000M03 |

Note: See Table 2.


Figure 6. Ranking of the subsectors based on standard deviation

### 2.4.2 Testing for Structural Breaks

The Bai and Perron (2003) test results for detecting the multiple structural breaks in the relationship between subsectoral index returns and the multifactor model variables are reported in Table 5 and 6. The results of the $\operatorname{SupF}_{\mathrm{t}}(1 \mid 0)$ sequential test imply that most of the industries have at least one structural break at 5\% statistical significance. This indicates that the assumption of constant oil price sensitivity over time is not correct, and it verifies the drawbacks of previous studies based on this assumption. In both Tables, columns five, six and seven show the number of breaks identified by the sequential approach of the Bai and Perron (2003) test and the BIC and LWZ information criteria, correspondingly.

Table 5. Multiple structural breaks in the relationship between equity returns of financial subsectors and the multifactor model variables

| Subsector | $\operatorname{SupF}_{\mathrm{t}}$ |  |  |  | Number of breaks |  |  | Break dates |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | $(1 \mid 0)$ | (2\|1) | $(3 \mid 2)$ | $(4 \mid 3)$ | Seq. | BIC | LWZ |  |
| Asset Managers | 41.429* | 19.048 | - | - | 1 | 0 | 0 | 2001M08 |
| Banks | 35.590* | 32.532* | 23.093 | - | 2 | 1 | 0 | 1998M09; 2007M09 |
| Consumer Finance | 40.939* | 18.230 | - | - | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1991M09 |
| Full Line Insurance | 37.640* | 71.564* | 11.873 | - | 2 | 1 | 0 | 1998M09; 2008M02 |
| Hotel \& Lodging REITs | 18.245 | - | - | - | 0 | 0 | 0 | - |
| Industrial \& Office REITs | 26.427* | 17.752 | - | - | 1 | 1 | 0 | 2004M12 |
| Insurance Brokers | 9.8045 | - | - | - | 0 | 0 | 0 | - |
| Investments Companies | 9.0344 | - | - | - | 0 | 0 | 0 | - |
| Investments Services | 27.305* | 35.656* | 22.532 | - | 2 | 1 | 1 | 1995M12; 2001M01 |
| Life Insurance | 28.876* | 31.868* | 16.245 | - | 2 | 1 | 0 | 1997M09; 2008M10 |
| Mortgage Finance | 55.898* | 22.404 | - | - | 1 | 0 | 0 | 2007M11 |
| Mortgage REITs | 22.673* | 15.536 | - | - | 1 | 0 | 0 | 2001M09 |
| Property \& Casualty Insurance | 44.581* | 25.051* | 11.233 | - | 2 | 0 | 1 | 1993M04; 2001M02 |
| Real Estate Holding \& Development | 22.086* | 13.520 | - | - | 1 | 1 | 0 | 2006M06 |
| Real Estate Services | 13.107 | - | - | - | 0 | 0 | 0 | - |
| Reinsurance | 35.549* | 10.525 | - | - | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1994M03 |
| Residential REITs | 27.165* | 20.805 | - | - | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1988M02 |
| Retail REITs | 18.319 | - | - | - | 0 | 0 | 0 | - |
| Speciality Finance | 37.056* | 29.258* | 17.133 | - | 2 | 0 | 0 | 2003M05; 2008M11 |
| Speciality REITs | 36.031* | 34.724* | 27.214* | 25.440 | 3 | 2 | 1 | 1989M08; 1996M04; 2009M09 |

Note: This table shows the test results for the endogenous structural breaks as developed by Bai and Perron (2003). Five breaks are allowed at most and the trimming parameter is 0.15 . The $\operatorname{SupF}_{t}(1+1 \mid 1)$ is a sequential test of the null of $l$ breaks versus the alternative of $l+l$ breaks. Sequential, BIC and LWZ denote the procedure of sequentially determined breaks, Bayesian Information Criterion and Information Criterion proposed by Liu, Wu and Zidek (1997), respectively. * denotes statistical significance at 5\% level.

Table 6. Multiple structural breaks in the relationship between equity returns of nonfinancial subsectors and the multifactor model variables

| Subsector | $\operatorname{SupF}_{\mathrm{t}}$ |  |  |  | Number of breaks |  |  | Break dates |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | $(1 \mid 0)$ | (2\|1) | $(3 \mid 2)$ | $(4 \mid 3)$ | Seq. | BIC | LWZ |  |
| Aerospace | 24.164* | 22.545 | - | - | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1998M12 |
| Airlines | 34.528* | 19.529 | - | - | 1 | 0 | 0 | 2002M03 |
| Alternative Electricity | 31.877* | 36.944* | 28.792* | 21.988 | 3 | 2 | 1 | 1987M08; 1998M10; 2007M07 |
| Aluminum | 22.382* | 18.341 | - | - | 1 | 0 | 0 | 2000M01 |
| Apparel Retailers | 30.783* | 23.775 | - | - | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1991M02 |
| Auto Parts | 28.325* | 26.755* | 7.134 | - | 2 | 2 | 1 | 1990M08; 2000M07 |
| Automobiles | 11.153 | - | - | - | 0 | 0 | 0 | - |
| Biotechnology | 35.364* | 20.746 | - | - | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1995M12 |
| Brewers | 21.452 | - | - | - | 0 | 0 | 0 | - |
| Broadcasting \& Entertainment | 35.508* | 6.373 | - | - | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1991M02 |
| Broadline Retailers | 55.183* | 29.601* | 17.023 | - | 2 | 2 | 1 | 2003M04; 2009M02 |
| Building Materials \& Fixtures | 53.809* | 19.748 | - | - | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1987M12 |
| Business Support Services | 19.208 | - | - | - | 0 | 0 | 0 | - |
| Business Train. \& Emp. Agencies | 31.660* | 56.257* | 27.000* | 0.000 | 3 | 2 | 1 | 1997M08; 2001M04; 2010M02 |
| Clothing \& Accessories | 23.724* | 31.008* | 17.775 | - | 2 | 1 | 0 | 1993M08; 2001M02 |
| Coal | 44.053* | 16.092 | - | - | 1 | 0 | 0 | 2001M05 |
| Commercial Vehicles \& Trucks | 36.903* | 29.044* | 16.301 | - | 2 | 0 | 0 | 1995M08; 2002M10 |
| Commodity Chemicals | 23.523* | 18.338 | - | - | 1 | 0 | 0 | 2003M08 |
| Computer hardware | 36.601* | 43.782* | 28.607* | 10.584 | 3 | 1 | 0 | 1993M05; 2000M08; 2010M05 |
| Computer Services | 42.399* | 13.033 | - | - | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1997M07 |
| Consumer electronics | 20.712 | - | - | - | 0 | 0 | 0 | - |
| Containers \& Packaging | 19.118 | - | - | - | 0 | 0 | 0 | - |
| Conventional Electricity | 24.501* | 55.688* | 22.770* | - | 2 | 0 | 0 | 1995M12; 2007M04 |
| Defense | 48.956* | 26.116* | 24.369 | - | 2 | 1 | 0 | 1998M03; 2003M01 |
| Delivery Services | 10.129 | - | - | - | 0 | 0 | 0 | - |
| Distillers \& Vintners | 15.502 | - | - | - | 0 | 0 | 0 | - |
| Diversified Industrials | 31.416* | 20.602 | - | - | 1 | 0 | 0 | 2008M04 |
| Drug Retailers | 22.216* | 14.649 | - | - | 1 | 0 | 0 | 2004M07 |
| Durable Household Products | 16.908 | - | - | - | 0 | 0 | 0 | - |
| Electrical Comp. \& Equipment | 36.083* | 17.965 | - | - | 1 | 0 | 0 | 2001M01 |
| Electronic Equipment | 36.820* | 20.544 | - | - | 1 | 0 | 0 | 2002M08 |
| Electronic Office Equipment | 21.398 | - | - | - | 0 | 0 | 0 | - |
| Exploration \& Production | 31.790* | 18.817 | - | - | 1 | 0 | 0 | 2001M10 |
| Farming \& Fishing | 27.613* | 50.646* | 16.062 | - | 2 | 1 | 0 | 2006M06; 2009M05 |
| Financial Administration | 22.158* | 18.466 | - | - | 1 | 0 | 0 | 2001M09 |
| Fixed Line Telecommunications | 40.316* | 15.511 | - | - | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1990M11 |
| Food Products | 44.033* | 20.755 | - | - | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1996M10 |
| Food Retailers \& Wholesalers | 27.195* | 20.0252 | - | - | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1996M11 |
| Footwear | 23.711* | 9.428 | - | - | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1998M11 |
| Forestry | 43.145* | 18.215 | - | - | 1 | 0 | 0 | 2009M02 |
| Furnishings | 23.075* | 22.772 | - | - | 1 | 1 | 0 | 2008M02 |
| Gambling | 23.379* | 21.736 | - | - | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1998M02 |
| Gas Distribution | 20.112 | - | - | - | 0 | 0 | 0 | - |
| Gold Mining | 41.498* | 14.221 | - | - | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1998M10 |

Note: See Table 5.

## Table 6. Continued

| Subsector | SupF ${ }_{\text {t }}$ |  |  |  | Number of breaks |  |  | Break dates |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | $(1 \mid 0)$ | (2\|1) | (3\|2) | $(4 \mid 3)$ | Seq. | BIC | LWZ |  |
| Health Care Providers | 21.396 | - | - | - | 0 | 0 | 0 | - |
| Heavy Construction | 55.688* | 24.262* | 20.284 | - | 2 | 1 | 0 | 2001M01; 2008M12 |
| Home Construction | 34.203* | 18.136 | - | - | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1994M06 |
| Home Improvement Retail | 10.169 | - | - | - | 0 | 0 | 0 | - |
| Hotels | 15.194 | - | - | - | 0 | 0 | 0 | - |
| Industrial Machinery | 35.488* | 36.949* | 14.487 | - | 2 | 2 | 0 | 1991M02; 2001M01 |
| Industrial Suppliers | 15.856 | - | - | - | 0 | 0 | 0 | - |
| Integrated Oil \& Gas | 23.186* | 39.861* | 13.705 | - | 2 | 0 | 0 | 2002M11; 2008M05 |
| Internet | 44.842* | 16.589 | - | - | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1999M03 |
| Iron \& Steel | 12.142 | - | - | - | 0 | 0 | 0 | - |
| Marine Transport | 16.096 | - | - | - | 0 | 0 | 0 | - |
| Media Agencies | 15.096 | - | - | - | 0 | 0 | 0 | - |
| Medical Equipment | 70.275* | 40.916* | 16.572 | - | 2 | 1 | 0 | 1998M08; 2008M10 |
| Medical Supplies | 59.604* | 32.285* | 24.455 | - | 2 | 0 | 0 | 1997M01; 2002M05 |
| Mobile Telecommunications | 21.718 | - | - | - | 0 | 0 | 0 | - |
| Multiutilities | 29.400* | 15.356 | - | - | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1988M02 |
| Nondurable Household Products | 14.334 | - | - | - | 0 | 0 | 0 | - |
| Nonferrous Metals | 40.749* | 26.029* | 16.601 | - | 2 | 0 | 1 | 1988M02; 2004M12 |
| Oil Equipment Services | 18.981 | - | - | - | 0 | 0 | 0 | - |
| Paper | 49.847* | 19.924 | - | - | 1 | 0 | 0 | 2008M05 |
| Personal Products | 33.734* | 13.432 | - | - | 1 | 0 | 0 | 2000M08 |
| Pharmaceuticals | 31.910* | 15.086 | - | - | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1998M07 |
| Pipelines | 16.474 | - | - | - | 0 | 0 | 0 | - |
| Platinum \& Precious Metals | 16.865 | - | - | - | 0 | 0 | 0 | - |
| Publishing | 41.952* | 35.069* | 13.529 | - | 2 | 1 | 0 | 1989M05; 2004M05 |
| Railroads | 32.571* | 37.206* | 14.738 | - | 2 | 1 | 1 | 1996M07; 2001M06 |
| Recreational Products | 18.811 | - | - | - | 0 | 0 | 0 | - |
| Recreational Services | 9.286 | - | - | - | 0 | 0 | 0 | - |
| Renewable Energy Equipments | 31.479* | 19.667 | - | - | 1 | 1 | 0 | 2009M02 |
| Restaurants \& Bars | 11.754 | - | - | - | 0 | 0 | 0 | - |
| Semiconductors | 20.657 | - | - | - | 0 | 0 | 0 | - |
| Soft Drinks | 36.172* | 22.623 | - | - | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1999M11 |
| Software | 24.180* | 65.925* | 20.182 | - | 2 | 0 | 0 | 1988M01; 2002M07 |
| Speciality Chemicals | 47.099* | 47.909* | 14.386 | - | 2 | 1 | 0 | 1996M11; 2005M11 |
| Specialized Consumer Services | 13.921 | - | - | - | 0 | 0 | 0 | - |
| Specialty Retailers | 8.928 | - | - | - | 0 | 0 | 0 | - |
| Telecomm equipment | 24.719* | 18.322 | - | - | 1 | 0 | 0 | 2000M12 |
| Tires | 32.759* | 14.819 | - | - | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2004M11 |
| Tobacco | 15.741 | - | - | - | 0 | 0 | 0 | - |
| Toys | 32.324* | 22.171 | - | - | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1991M06 |
| Transportation services | 24.460* | 25.432* | 9.813 | - | 2 | 2 | 1 | 1989M01; 2000M12 |
| Travel \& Tourism | 21.388 | - | - | - | 0 | 0 | 0 | - |
| Trucking | 37.570* | 17.686 | - | - | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1995M04 |
| Waste \& Disposal Services | 28.977* | 22.111 | - | - | 1 | 0 | 0 | 2000M01 |
| Water | 27.802* | 28.605* | 33.201* | 10.598 | 3 | 2 | 1 | 1991M05; 1999M01; 2005M10 |

Note: See Table 5.

Using the Monte Carlo approach, Bai and Perron $(2003$, 2006) show that the information criteria do not perform well relative to the sequential procedure in detecting breaks. Consequently, we use the sequential approach for determining the number of structural breaks, and the last column in Table 5 and 6 provide the estimated break dates detected by this approach.

Although the estimated breakpoints are not exactly identical for all subsectors, there are some common break dates that can be justified through historical and economic milestones. The first series of structural shifts, occurs between 1988 and 1989, and shared by subsectors such as Nonferrous Metals, Residential REITs, and Specialty REITs. These breaks may be due to the increase in crude oil production as a result of the end of the eight-year Iran-Iraq war in 1988. Two other major milestones are the fall of Communism in Eastern Europe and the German reunification in 1989.

The second cluster of breakpoints, shared by subsectors such as Consumer Finance and Property \& Casualty Insurance, occurs between 1990 and 1993. These structural breaks may be due to the effects of the U.S. recession in the early 1990s and the 1990 oil price shock resulting from Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. The third cluster of breakpoints, which are common among subsectors such as Banks, Full Line Insurance, Life Insurance, Business Training \& Employment Agencies, and Gold Mining, occurs between early 1997 and late 1998. These structural changes might be linked to the effects of the Asian financial crisis in 1997, the collapse of Long-Term Capital Management (LTCM), and the Russian financial crisis in 1998.

The largest number of breaks shared by several subsectors, namely Asset Managers, Investments Services, Mortgage REITs, Property \& Casualty Insurance, Airlines, Business Training \& Employment Agencies, Coal, Exploration \& Production, Heavy Construction, Integrated Oil \& Gas, and Internet, occurs between late 1999 and late 2002. During this period, the U.S. economy witnessed some milestones, including the burst of dot-com bubble, the $9 / 11$ terrorist attacks, and the scandals of Enron, Tyco, and WorldCom. The next round of structural shifts (2003-2006) may be triggered by the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003 and tremendous damages inflicted by Hurricane Katrina in 2005, the latter of which was the costliest catastrophe in the history of the U.S. insurance market (Insurance Information Institute, 2015). Moreover, the price of oil had increased from $\$ 26$ in May 2003 to $\$ 60$ in September 2005.

These breaks are shared by subsectors such as Industrial \& Office REITs, Real Estate Holding \& Development, Specialty Finance, and Nonferrous Metals. The next cluster of breaks happens during the period 2007-2009 as a result of the collapse in the U.S. subprime mortgage market, leading to a contiguous global financial crisis. Specifically, the burst of the U.S. housing bubble in late 2007 triggered the stock market failure of various industries. As shown in Table 5 and 6, these breaks occur in many subsectors, such as Banks, Full Line Insurance, Life Insurance, Mortgage Finance, Specialty Finance, Specialty REITs, Furnishings, Heavy Construction, Integrated Oil \& Gas, and Renewable Energy Equipment. This cluster of breakpoints captures and demonstrates the significance of this crisis. Figure 7 illustrates the frequency of detected breakpoints for both financial and non-financial subsectors. For the sake of comparability, the 20 most sensitive non-financial subsectors along
with all the financial subsectors are shown here. The 20 most sensitive non-financial subsectors are selected based on the weighted-average exposures (WAE) of their statistically significant oil coefficients in the breakpoint regressions. As shown in Figure 7, most of the structural changes occur in 2001 and 2008. This indicates that majority of structural shifts in the stock returns of these subsectors are mainly caused by the early 2000s recession in the U.S. and the 2008 U.S. subprime mortgage crisis and its spillover to the rest of the world.


Note: The shaded areas show the recessionary periods in the U.S.

Figure 7. Frequency of structural breaks in equity returns of subsectors (January 1983 to March 2015)

Interestingly, during the period 2001-2002, non-financial subsectors had six breaks while financial subsectors had four breaks. During the period of 2007-2008, financial subsectors had five breaks while non-financial subsectors had three breaks. The recession periods are highlighted in gray.

This figure shows that non-financial subsectors are affected more by the 2001-2002 recession while financial subsectors are affected more by the 2007-2008 financial crisis. Amid these crises, the price of crude oil reached its highest level ever (\$147 per barrel) in July 2008, fueling the global financial turmoil. During the next five months, oil lost almost $80 \%$ of its value. This was a result of the great plummet in oil demand due to the sudden deterioration in global economic activities and the substantial cutback of speculative positions from crude oil futures contracts (MoyaMartinez et al., 2014). The last cluster of breakpoints emerges in 2010. This is attributable to the European sovereign debt crisis, the U.S. Flash Crash of 2010, a trillion-dollar stock market crash, and the onset of the Arab Spring across the Middle East, which raised concerns about the oil supply.

### 2.4.3 Regression Results

Due to the existence of multiple structural breaks, Eq. (2) is estimated for the subperiods based on the breakpoint(s) identified by the Bai-Perron sequential test. Results of the breakpoint regressions are presented in Table 7 and 8. Table 7 shows the results for the financial subsectors, and Table 8 shows the results for the nonfinancial sectors. Based on the results, the adjusted R2 values for the financial subsectors vary between 0.207 (Mortgage REITs) and 0.761 (Banks) and, for the non-financial subsectors, between 0.223 (Gold Mining) and 0.751 (Electrical Component \& Equipment). The results in both tables show that the market risk premium (MKT) is a key factor in determining the stock returns across all financial and non-financial subsectors, and its coefficient is statistically significant and positive for all subsectors.

Table 7. Estimation results of the multifactor model for the financials

| Subsector | Breaks | Sub-samples | C | MKT | SMB | HML | RMW | CMA | Oil | Adj. $\mathrm{R}^{2}$ | DW |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Asset Managers | 1 | 1983M02-2001M07 | 0.000 | 1.682* | 0.256 | 0.447 | -0.170 | -0.746*** | -0.128** | 0.662 | 2.064 |
|  |  | 2001M08-2015M03 | -0.001 | 1.297* | -0.020 | 0.200 | -0.284** | 0.217 | 0.048*** |  |  |
| Banks | 2 | 1983M02-1998M08 | -0.001 | 1.182* | 0.184** | 1.108* | 0.380* | -0.885* | -0.004 | 0.761 | 2.037 |
|  |  | 1998M09-2007M08 | 0.000 | 0.991* | -0.303** | 0.525* | 0.056 | -0.018 | -0.058 |  |  |
|  |  | 2007M09-2015M03 | -0.007 | 1.185* | -0.253 | 1.933* | -0.608 | -0.729 | -0.121*** |  |  |
| Consumer Finance | 1 | 1983M02-1991M08 | 0.008*** | 1.444* | 0.046 | 0.673* | -1.181* | -1.102* | -0.004 | 0.672 | 2.224 |
|  |  | 1991M09-2015M03 | -0.001 | 1.324* | -0.178*** | 0.371** | 0.283** | 0.127 | -0.001 |  |  |
| Full Line Insurance | 2 | 1983M02-1998M08 | 0.009* | 0.992* | -0.425* | 0.359** | -0.789* | $-0.638^{* *}$ | -0.058** | 0.605 | 1.774 |
|  |  | 1998M09-2008M01 | 0.000 | 0.834* | -0.363** | 0.236*** | 0.200 | 0.309** | -0.111* |  |  |
|  |  | 2008M02-2015M03 | $-0.032^{* * *}$ | 3.071* | -1.728** | 0.927 | -2.296** | -1.437 | -0.121 |  |  |
| Hotel \& Lodging REITs | 0 | 1983M01-2015M03 | $-0.008^{* *}$ | 1.439* | 0.891* | 1.044* | 0.466** | -0.136 | -0.063 | 0.486 | 2.110 |
| Industrial \& Office REITs | 1 | 1988M09-2004M11 | 0.004 | 0.320** | 0.460* | 0.945* | -0.411** | -0.336 | -0.014 | 0.438 | 2.024 |
|  |  | 2004M12-2015M03 | -0.006 | 1.369* | 0.316 | 1.070* | -0.389 | -1.369*** | -0.109 |  |  |
| Insurance Brokers | 0 | 1983M01-2015M03 | 0.001 | 0.905* | -0.309* | 0.322** | 0.215 | -0.180 | $-0.062^{* *}$ | 0.404 | 2.290 |
| Investments Companies | 0 | 1997M10-2015M03 | -0.009 | 1.309* | 0.594** | 1.194** | -0.350 | -0.418 | 0.031 | 0.459 | 2.257 |
| Investments Services | 2 | 1983M02-1995M11 | 0.005 | 1.818* | 0.137 | -0.022 | -1.617* | -0.734 | 0.020 | 0.705 | 1.968 |
|  |  | 1995M12-2000M12 | 0.012 | 1.867* | -0.161 | 0.182 | -0.380 | -0.015 | -0.317** |  |  |
|  |  | 2001M01-2015M03 | -0.003 | 1.378* | -0.134 | -0.020 | -0.507* | -0.422** | 0.043 |  |  |
| Life Insurance | 2 | 1983M02-1997M08 | 0.006*** | 1.099* | -0.084 | 0.518** | -0.460 ** | -0.529*** | -0.084** | 0.741 | 2.125 |
|  |  | 1997M09-2008M09 | 0.002 | 1.051* | -0.235** | 0.567* | 0.321** | 0.106 | -0.052 |  |  |
|  |  | 2008M10-2015M03 | $-0.014^{* * *}$ | 1.979* | -0.076 | 1.472* | -0.327 | -1.513*** | -0.070 |  |  |
| Mortgage Finance | 1 | 1983M02-2007M10 | -0.003 | 1.368* | 0.010 | 0.397 | 0.798* | 0.365 | -0.143* | 0.382 | 1.606 |
|  |  | 2007M11-2015M03 | -0.037* | 2.107* | -1.066** | -2.268* | -1.228*** | 1.535*** | -0.225** |  |  |
| Mortgage REITs | 1 | 1997M11-2001M08 | 0.013 | 0.279 | 0.922* | 1.763* | -0.357 | -2.016* | 0.044 | 0.207 | 1.996 |
|  |  | 2001M09-2015M03 | -0.005 | 0.478* | -0.106 | 0.155 | 0.097 | 0.394 | 0.029 |  |  |
| Property \& Casualty Insurance | 2 | 1983M02-1993M03 | $0.013^{*}$ | $0.879^{*}$ | $-0.213$ | $0.358^{* * *}$ | $-0.852^{*}$ | $-0.959 *$ | $-0.021$ | 0.654 | 2.294 |
|  |  | 1993M04-2001M01 | -0.008*** | 1.281* | -0.179 | $1.042 *$ | $0.354 * * *$ | $0.260$ | $-0.037$ |  |  |
|  |  | 2001M02-2015M03 | -0.001 | 0.848* | 0.063 | 0.338* | 0.126 | 0.276 | $-0.055^{* * *}$ |  |  |
| Real Estate Holding \& Development | 1 | 1983M02-2006M05 | 0.006 | 0.983* | 0.138 | 0.809* | 0.133 | -0.081 | -0.028 | 0.367 | 2.107 |
|  |  | 2006M06-2015M03 | -0.003 | 1.439* | 0.771** | 0.491 | 0.095 | -1.214 | 0.135 |  |  |
|  |  | 2004M08-2015M03 | 0.001 | 1.788* | 0.739*** | 0.849** | -0.711 | -1.209 | 0.203** | 0.586 |  |
| Reinsurance | 1 | 1990M07-1994M02 | 0.009 | 1.091* | -0.053 | 0.194 | -0.694 | -1.738 | 0.042 | 0.334 | 2.107 |
|  |  | 1994M03-2015M03 | 0.006*** | 0.543* | -0.284** | 0.456* | -0.271*** | 0.216 | -0.035 |  |  |
| Residential REITs | 1 | 1983M02-1988M01 | 0.018*** | $0.322 * * *$ | 1.302*** | 0.000 | -0.288 | -0.921 | 0.261*** | 0.375 | 2.161 |
|  |  | 1988M02-2015M03 | -0.001 | 0.745* | 0.434* | 0.776* | 0.097 | -0.076 | -0.021 |  |  |
| Retail REITs | 0 | 1983M01-2015M03 | -0.001 | 0.802* | 0.506* | 0.916* | 0.090 | -0.191 | 0.003 | 0.400 | 2.248 |
| Specialty Finance | 2 | 1983M02-2003M04 | 0.001 | 1.000* | 0.061 | 0.247** | 0.364* | 0.022 | -0.032 | 0.665 | 2.270 |
|  |  | 2003M05-2008M10 | -0.012 | 1.855* | 0.217 | $0.925^{* * *}$ | 0.137 | -0.352 | -0.126*** |  |  |
|  |  | 2008M11-2015M03 | -0.002 | 1.216* | -0.197 | -0.242 | -0.366 | -0.131 | -0.026 |  |  |
| Specialty REITs | 3 | 1983M02-1989M07 | $0.007^{* * *}$ | 0.952* | 0.230 | -0.457** | 0.521 | 0.101 | -0.085** | 0.595 | 2.294 |
|  |  | 1989M08-1996M03 | -0.003 | 1.437* | 0.704* | 0.496 | -0.136 | 0.209 | -0.151*** |  |  |
|  |  | 1996M04-2009M08 | -0.003 | 0.734* | 0.557* | 0.832* | 0.021 | -0.084 | -0.031 |  |  |
|  |  | 2009M09-2015M03 | 0.000 | 0.751* | -0.415 | -0.229 | -0.379 | 0.393 | -0.043 |  |  |

Note: This table reports the breakpoint regression results of the multifactor linear model in Eq. (2) for the financial subsectors and sub-samples based on the breakpoints identified by the test of Bai and Perron (2003). Standard errors of the estimated coefficients are corrected for heteroscedasticity by the White procedure. Breaks denote the number of breaks selected by the sequential procedure of Bai and Perron (2003) at $5 \%$ statistical significance level. ${ }^{*},{ }^{* *}$, and ${ }^{* * *}$ denote statistical significance at the $1 \%, 5 \%$ and $10 \%$ levels, respectively.

Table 8. Estimation results of the multifactor model for the non-financials

| Subsector | Breaks | Sub-samples | C | MKT | SMB | HML | RMW | CMA | Oil | Adj. $\mathrm{R}^{2}$ | DW |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Aerospace | 1 | 1983M01-1998M11 | -0.001 | 1.077* | 0.162 | -0.096 | 0.260 | 0.249 | -0.069* | 0.6152 | 2.116 |
|  |  | 1998M12-2015M03 | -0.001 | 1.095* | -0.107 | 0.524* | 0.388** | 0.125 | 0.058*** |  |  |
| Airlines | 1 | 1983M01-2002M02 | -0.008*** | 1.338* | 0.319** | $0.782^{*}$ | 0.518** | -0.55 | -0.038*** | 0.471 | 1.967 |
|  |  | 2002M03-2015M03 | -0.003 | 1.105* | 0.501*** | 0.646** | -0.293 | -0.449 | -0.466* |  |  |
| Alternative Electricity | 3 | 1983M01-1987M07 | -0.007 | 0.832* | -0.531 | 1.526* | 0.121 | -1.785* | -0.027** | 0.433 | 2.064 |
|  |  | 1987M08-1998M09 | 0.001 | 0.489* | -0.529* | 0.186 | -0.534** | 0.262 | -0.063*** |  |  |
|  |  | 1998M10-2007M06 | -0.008 | 0.704* | -0.224 | 1.479* | -0.633* | 0.178 | -0.055 |  |  |
|  |  | 2007M07-2012M01 | -0.014 | 0.751* | 0.231 | 0.211 | -0.079 | -1.353** | -0.080** |  |  |
| Aluminum | 1 | 1983M01-1999M12 | 0.006 | 1.006* | 0.313 | 0.188 | -0.785** | -0.384 | $0.074$ | 0.493 | 2.195 |
|  |  | 2000M01-2015M03 | -0.021 | 1.979* | 0.265 | 0.306 | 0.671*** | 0.287 | 0.136** |  |  |
| Apparel Retailers | 1 | 1983M01-1991M01 | 0.015*** | 1.756* | 1.229* | 0.385 | 0.951 | -1.487** | 0.053 | 0.542 | 2.019 |
|  |  | 1991M02-2015M03 | 0.001 | 1.107* | 0.397** | 0.124 | 0.491** | -0.518 | -0.066 |  |  |
| Auto Parts | 2 | 1983M01-1990M07 | -0.001 | 0.973* | 0.107 | -0.153 | -0.285 | $0.699 * * *$ | -0.057** | 0.672 | 2.037 |
|  |  | 1990M08-2000M06 | -0.009* | 0.977* | 0.397* | 1.090* | 0.257 | -0.171 | -0.053 |  |  |
|  |  | 2000M07-2015M03 | -0.005 | 1.408* | 0.496* | 0.153 | 0.633* | -0.047 | 0.081** |  |  |
| Automobiles | 0 | 1983M01-2015M03 | -0.008** | 1.471* | 0.163 | 1.114* | -0.151 | -0.375 | -0.011 | 0.495 | 2.157 |
| Biotechnology | 1 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | 0.469 | 1.932 |
|  |  | 1995M12-2015M03 | $0.015$ | $0.532$ | $0.095$ | $-0.836^{* *}$ | $-0.819 *$ | $0.379$ | $-0.015$ |  |  |
| Broadcasting \& Entertainment | 1 | 1983M01-1991M01 | 0.011 | 1.108* | 0.676** | $0.568$ | $1.171^{* *}$ | $-1.399$ | $-0.001$ | 0.472 | 2.184 |
|  |  | 1991M02-2015M03 | 0.004 | 1.009* | -0.001 | $0.089$ | $-0.522 * *$ | $0.172 * *$ | $-0.046 * *$ |  |  |
| Brewers | 0 | 1983M01-2015M03 | 0.001 | 0.756* | -0.032 | -0.053 | 0.838* | 0.384*** | -0.026 | 0.313 | 2.022 |
| Broadline Retailers | 2 | 1983M01-2003M03 | -0.003 | 1.161* | 0.477* | 0.19 | 0.620* | 0.189 | -0.121* | 0.542 | 2.109 |
|  |  | 2003M04-2009M01 | -0.001 | 0.914* | 0.702* | -0.162 | 1.354* | 1.079* | $0.09^{* *}$ |  |  |
|  |  | 2009M02-2015M03 | -0.001 | 0.837* | -0.217 | -0.617** | 0.527** | 0.619*** | -0.104*** |  |  |
| Building Materials \& Fixtures | 1 | 1983M01-1987M11 | 0.002 | 1.276* | -0.125 | -0.124 | 0.725 | -0.018 | -0.069 | 0.629 | 2.058 |
|  |  | 1987M12-2015M03 | -0.006** | 1.205* | 0.507* | 0.820* | 0.525* | -0.032 | -0.056*** |  |  |
| Business Support Services | 0 | 1983M01-2015M03 | -0.001 | 1.021* | 0.324* | -0.20** | 0.265** | 0.121 | -0.011 | 0.699 | 2.103 |
| Business Train. \& Emp. Agencies | 3 | 1991M07-1997M07 | 0.033* | 0.747** | 1.527* | 0.267 | 0.136 | 0.133 | 0.638* | 0.475 | 2.031 |
|  |  | 1997M08 - 2001M03 | $0.006$ | 1.199* | $-0.661 * *$ | $1.046$ | $-0.57$ | $0.224$ | $-0.203$ |  |  |
|  |  | 2001M04-2010M01 | -0.009 | 1.013* | $1.219^{*}$ | 0.19 | 1.082* | 0.343 | $0.019$ |  |  |
|  |  | 2010M02-2015M03 | -0.013 | 1.741* | -0.219 | -1.065** | -1.834* | 0.193 | -0.113 |  |  |
| Clothing \& Accessories | 2 | 1983M01-1993M07 | 0.005 | 1.374* | 0.296 | $-0.558^{* * *}$ | 0.389 | 0.162 | -0.103*** | 0.635 | 2.052 |
|  |  | 1993M08-2001M01 | 0.002 | 0.938* | 0.242 | 1.159* | 0.742* | -1.125** | -0.063 |  |  |
|  |  | 2001M02-2015M03 | -0.003 | 1.363* | 0.464* | 0.013 | 0.761* | -0.274 | 0.002 |  |  |

Note: See Table 7.

Table 8. Continued

| Subsector | Breaks | Sub-samples | C | MKT | SMB | HML | RMW | CMA | Oil | Adj. $\mathrm{R}^{2}$ | DW |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Coal | 1 | 1983M01-2001M04 | -0.012** | 1.324* | 0.914* | 0.205 | 0.963* | 1.183** | -0.029 | 0.414 | 1.983 |
|  |  | 2001M05-2015M03 | -0.007 | 1.236* | 0.416 | -0.122 | -0.031 | -0.809 | 0.500* |  |  |
| Commercial Vehicles \& Trucks | 2 | 1983M01-1995M07 | 0.002 | 1.259* | 0.624* | -0.019 | -1.210* | 0.311 | -0.025 | 0.645 | 2.028 |
|  |  | 1995M08-2002M09 | -0.011 | 1.264* | 0.286*** | 0.850* | 0.614** | -0.079 | 0.108** |  |  |
|  |  | 2002M10-2015M03 | -0.004 | 1.597* | 0.446** | -0.151 | 0.172 | -0.154 | 0.109** |  |  |
| Commodity Chemicals | 1 | 1983M01-2003M07 | -0.005 | 1.190* | 0.092 | 0.169 | 0.376** | 0.596* | -0.029 | 0.641 | 2.19 |
|  |  | 2003M08-2015M03 | -0.004 | 1.356* | -0.105 | $0.365 * * *$ | 0.042 | -0.583** | 0.037 |  |  |
| Computer Hardware | 3 | 1983M01-1993M04 | -0.004 | 0.843* | 0.197 | -0.010 | 0.019 | -0.388 | 0.031 | 0.689 | 2.265 |
|  |  | 1993M05-2000M07 | 0.017* | 0.606* | 0.127 | -0.804** | 0.733** | -0.574 | -0.036 |  |  |
|  |  | 2000M08-2010M04 | $0.008^{* * *}$ | 1.387* | 0.175 | -0.883* | -0.382*** | -0.132 | 0.048 |  |  |
|  |  | 2010M05-2015M03 | -0.005 | 1.364* | -0.476 | -0.348 | 1.047* | -0.640 | -0.030 |  |  |
| Computer Services | 1 | 1983M01-1997M06 | 0.005 | 0.962* | 0.466* | -0.353** | -0.156 | -0.422*** | 0.011 | 0.648 | 2.29 |
|  |  | 1997M07-2015M03 | -0.001 | 0.950* | -0.126 | -0.458* | 0.093 | 0.544** | 0.052** |  |  |
| Consumer electronics | 0 | 1983M12-2015M03 | 0.005 | 1.405* | 0.920* | -0.091 | $-0.708 * *$ | -0.114 | 0.025* | 0.388 | 2.046 |
| Containers \& Packaging | 0 | 1983M01-2015M03 | -0.002 | 1.144* | 0.253* | 0.175 | 0.405* | 0.231 | -0.026 | 0.611 | 2.032 |
| Conventional Electricity | 2 | 1983M01-1995M11 |  | $0.547 *$ |  | 0.704* | $-0.378 * *$ | $-0.754^{*}$ | $-0.041 * *$ | 0.438 | 2.113 |
|  |  | 1995M12-2007M03 | $-0.001$ | $0.582 *$ | $-0.034$ | 1.064* | $-0.461 *$ | $-0.043 *$ | $0.009 * *$ |  |  |
|  |  | 2007M04-2015M03 | -0.003 | 0.601* | -0.394*** | -0.331 | -0.364 | 0.522*** | -0.007 |  |  |
| Defense | 2 | 1983M01-1998M02 | 0.004 | 0.845* | 0.117 | $0.151$ | $-0.148$ | $-0.361$ | 0.040 | 0.456 | 2.024 |
|  |  | 1998M03-2002M12 | -0.017 | 0.871* | 0.128 | $0.773 * * *$ | $0.618 * *$ | $0.294$ | 0.211** |  |  |
|  |  | 2003M01-2015M03 | 0.003 | 0.874* | -0.086 | 0.238 | -0.279 | -0.374 | -0.023 |  |  |
| Delivery Services | 0 | 1983M01-2015M03 | -0.003 | 0.895* | 0.378* | 0.1321 | 0.596* | 0.022 | -0.063** | 0.249 | 1.961 |
| Distillers \& Vintners | 0 | 1983M01-2015M03 | -0.002 | 0.964* | 0.078 | 0.061 | 0.911* | 0.374*** | -0.019 | 0.348 | 2.171 |
| Diversified Industrials | 1 | 1983M01-2008M03 | 0.000 | 0.911* | -0.151 | -0.018 | $0.102$ | $0.136$ | $-0.029$ | 0.655 | 2.286 |
|  |  | 2008M04-2015M03 | -0.012* | 1.421* | -0.164 | 0.418** | $-0.070$ | $0.640^{* * *}$ | $-0.072^{* *}$ |  |  |
| Drug Retailers | 1 | 1983M01-2004M06 | $-0.002$ | 0.799* | $0.275$ | $-0.263$ | 1.148* | $0.348$ | $-0.042$ | 0.375 | 1.875 |
|  |  | 2004M07-2015M03 | $0.004$ | $0.941 *$ | $0.015$ | $-0.495^{* * *}$ | $-0.609$ | $0.924^{*}$ | $-0.074 * *$ |  |  |
|  | 0 | 1983M01-2015M03 | -0.007 | 1.422* | 0.446* | 0.478* | 0.576* | 0.188 | -0.059** | 0.694 | 2.207 |
| Electrical Comp. \& Equipment | 1 | 1983M01-2000M12 | 0.003 | 1.090** | -0.277* | -0.208 | 0.254*** | 0.133 | $-0.039$ | 0.751 | 2.226 |
|  |  | 2001M01-2015M03 | -0.002 | 1.324* | $0.289^{*}$ | $-0.191$ | $0.040$ | $0.097$ | $0.075 * *$ |  |  |
| Electronic Equipment | 1 | 1983M01-2002M07 | 0.012* | 1.115* | 0.110 | $-0.373 * * *$ | -1.173* | -0.252 | -0.041 | 0.740 | 2.182 |
|  |  | 2002M08-2015M03 | -0.003 | 1.103* | 0.365* | -0.770* | $-0.239^{* * *}$ | 0.922* | 0.105* |  |  |
| Electronic Office Equipment | 0 | 1983M01-2015M03 | $-0.005$ | 1.084* | 0.374** | 0.011 | 0.363 | 0.386 | -0.061 | 0.353 | 2.032 |
| Exploration \& Production | 1 | 1983M01-2001M09 | $-0.010^{*}$ | 1.191* | $0.041$ | $0.850^{*}$ | $0.172$ | $0.289$ | $0.317^{*}$ | 0.573 | 2.1 |
|  |  | 2001M10-2015M03 | $0.001$ | 0.873* | 0.310*** | 0.18 | 0.343 | -0.690** | $0.367^{*}$ |  |  |

Note: See Table 7.

Table 8. Continued


Note: See Table 7.

Table 8. Continued

| Subsector | Breaks | Sub-samples | C | MKT | SMB | HML | RMW | CMA | Oil | Adj. $\mathrm{R}^{2}$ | DW |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Industrial Suppliers | 0 | 1983M01-2015M03 | -0.001 | 1.003* | 0.298** | 0.000 | 0.653* | 0.289 | 0.012 | 0.359 | 2.175 |
| Integrated Oil \& Gas | 2 | 1983M01-2002M10 | -0.002 | 0.859* | -0.078 | 0.340* | 0.07 | 0.496* | 0.177* | 0.572 | 2.096 |
|  |  | 2002M11-2008M04 | 0.001 | 1.224* | -0.283 | 0.722*** | 0.053 | -1.180** | 0.279* |  |  |
|  |  | 2008M05-2015M03 | -0.006*** | 0.747* | -0.403** | -0.234 | 0.184 | 1.046* | 0.136** |  |  |
| Internet | 1 | 1992M04-1999M02 | 0.074* | 0.652*** | 0.38 | -0.795 | -2.135* | -3.020* | -0.464* | 0.622 | 2.036 |
|  |  | 1999M03-2015M03 | 0.009*** | 1.220* | -0.329*** | -0.678* | -0.784** | -1.061* | 0.05 |  |  |
| Iron \& Steel | 0 | 1983M01-2015M03 | -0.007 | 1.501* | 0.476* | 0.584* | 0.306 | -0.198 | 0.091** | 0.492 | 2.012 |
| Marine Transport | 0 | 1983M01-2015M03 | -0.011** | 1.331* | 0.185 | 0.207 | 0.576** | 0.689** | 0.362* | 0.371 | 2.070 |
| Media Agencies | 0 | 1983M01-2015M03 | 0.001 | 1.207* | 0.264** | 0.072 | 0.142 | -0.099 | 0.033 | 0.549 | 2.043954 |
| Medical Equipment | 2 | 1983M01-1998M07 | 0.007* | 0.889* | -0.412* | -0.894* | -0.012 | 0.434** | -0.033 | 0.664 | 2.163 |
|  |  | 1998M08-2008M09 | 0.002 | 0.552* | -0.124 | 0.054 | 0.152 | 0.273 | 0.020 |  |  |
|  |  | 2008M10-2015M03 | 0.000 | 0.907* | -0.051 | -0.393 | -1.122* | -0.096 | 0.033 |  |  |
| Medical Supplies | 2 | 1983M01-1996M12 | 0.004 | 0.873* | -0.418* | -0.870* | 0.080 | 0.564*** | -0.020 | 0.545 | 2.103 |
|  |  | 1997M01-2002M04 | 0.002 | 0.527* | $-0.257^{* *}$ | -0.292 | 0.550* | 0.628** | 0.019 |  |  |
|  |  | 2002M05-2015M03 | 0.006** | 0.578* | -0.270 | 0.018 | -0.584* | -0.592** | -0.007 |  |  |
| Mobile Telecommunications | 0 | 1983M01-2015M03 | 0.006 | 0.924* | -0.245 | -0.057 | -0.800* | $-0.767^{* *}$ | 0.044 | 0.380 | 1.950 |
| Multiutilities | 1 | 1983M01-1988M01 | -0.004 | 0.677* | $-0.422 * * *$ | 1.401* | $-0.530 * * *$ | -1.301* | $-0.062 * * *$ | 0.630 | 2.174 |
|  |  | 1988M02-2015M03 | 0.002 | 0.444* | -0.171** | 0.280* | -0.144 | 0.200 | 0.023 |  |  |
| Nondurable Household Products | 0 | 1983M01-2015M03 | 0.000 | 0.730* | -0.124 | -0.412* | 0.600* | 0.774* | -0.020 | 0.734 | 2.008 |
| Nonferrous Metals | 2 | 1983M01-1988M01 | 0.022** | 0.845* | 0.557 | -0.887 | -2.403* | 0.523 | -0.012 | 0.521 | 2.086 |
|  |  | 1988M02-2004M11 | -0.007 | 1.577* | 0.265*** | 0.433*** | 0.197 | 0.43 | 0.118** |  |  |
|  |  | 2004M12-2015M03 | -0.008 | 1.690* | -0.299 | -0.457 | 0.481 | -0.835 | 0.399* |  |  |
|  | 0 | 1983M01-2015M03 | -0.005 | 1.168* | -0.016 | 0.300*** | 0.022 | -0.033 | 0.384* | 0.521 | 2.118 |
| Paper | 1 | 1983M01-2008M04 | -0.008** | 1.176* | 0.198*** | 0.205 | 0.462** | 0.431** | -0.031 | 0.626 | 2.242 |
|  |  | 2008M05-2015M03 | -0.004 | 1.917* | 0.141 | 1.731* | 0.615 | -1.771* | $0.062$ |  |  |
| Personal Products | 1 | 1983M01-2000M07 | -0.001 | 1.073* | -0.287** | -0.372** | 0.429** | 0.819* | -0.067*** | 0.574 | 2.033 |
|  |  | 2000M08-2015M03 | -0.001 | 0.693* | -0.209** | 0.148 | 0.568* | 0.435** | 0.036 |  |  |
| Pharmaceuticals | 1 | 1983M01-1998M06 | 0.008* | 0.841* | -0.448* | -0.741* | 0.058 | 0.473*** | $-0.047 * * *$ | 0.553 | 2.105 |
|  |  | 1998M07-2015M03 | 0.001 | 0.639* | -0.487* | -0.105 | 0.013 | 0.417* | -0.040** |  |  |
| Pipelines | 0 | 1983M01-2015M03 | 0.002 | 0.737* | -0.173 | 0.335*** | -0.284*** | 0.055 | 0.054** | 0.336 | 2.125 |
| Platinum \& Precious Metals | 0 | 1995M01-2011M07 | -0.012 | 1.426* | 0.610*** | 0.581 | -0.102 | -0.02 | 0.258** | 0.292 | 2.185 |
| Publishing | 2 | 1983M01-1989M04 | -0.002 | $1.236^{*}$ | $0.001$ | -0.418** | 0.704* | 0.510 | $-0.101 *$ | 0.726 | 2.258 |
|  |  | 1989M05-2004M04 | 0.000 | 0.846* | 0.153** | 0.421* | 0.228*** | -0.198 | $-0.054 * * *$ |  |  |
|  |  | 2004M05-2015M03 | -0.007* | 0.996* | 0.148 | -0.360* | 0.052 | 0.325 | 0.065*** |  |  |
| Recreational Products | 0 | 1995M01-2015M03 | -0.006 | 1.389* | 1.146* | 0.183 | 1.031* | 0.553*** | 0.040 | 0.449 | 1.958 |

Table 8. Continued

| Subsector | Breaks | Sub-samples | C | MKT | SMB | HML | RMW | CMA | Oil | Adj. $\mathrm{R}^{2}$ | DW |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Railroads | 2 | 1983M01-1996M06 | 0.003 | 1.200* | 0.023 | 0.229 | -0.508** | -0.436 | 0.051*** | 0.579 | 2.034 |
|  |  | 1996M07-2001M05 | -0.010 | 0.727* | 0.112 | 1.020* | 0.506 | -0.432 | 0.093 |  |  |
|  |  | 2001M06-2015M03 | 0.005 | 1.059* | 0.099 | 0.203 | 0.383*** | -0.272 | 0.056*** |  |  |
| Recreational Services | 0 | 1983M01-2015M03 | -0.001 | 1.315* | 0.278** | 0.386*** | 0.061 | 0.093 | -0.132* | 0.542 | 2.014 |
| Renewable Energy Equipments | 1 | 2006M12-2009M01 | 0.097** | 0.699 | -1.476 | -0.157 | -2.821 | -4.528*** | 0.255** | 0.401 | 1.69 |
|  |  | 2009M02-2015M03 | $-0.039^{* * *}$ | 2.105* | 0.694 | 2.211** | 0.178 | -4.937* | -0.353 |  |  |
| Restaurants \& Bars | 0 | 1983M01-2015M03 | 0.002 | 0.927* | -0.042 | -0.116 | 0.671* | 0.361** | -0.045** | 0.477 | 1.971 |
| Semiconductors | 0 | 1983M01-2015M03 | 0.002 | 1.396* | 0.173 | -0.721* | -0.237 | -0.055 | 0.011 | 0.555 | 1.982 |
| Soft Drinks | 1 | 1983M01-1999M10 | 0.000 | 0.992* | $-0.238 * * *$ | -0.248 | 0.928* | 0.778* | -0.119* | 0.470 | 2.176 |
|  |  | 1999M11-2015M03 | -0.002 | 0.648* | -0.112 | -0.252*** | 0.498* | 0.655* | 0.047 |  |  |
| Software | 2 | 1983M01-1987M12 | 0.046* | 1.093* | 0.288 | -2.438* | -1.045 | 0.955 | 0.073 | 0.705 | 2.184 |
|  |  | 1988M01-2002M06 | 0.024* | 0.693* | 0.049 | -0.508** | -0.023 | -1.786* | -0.014 |  |  |
|  |  | 2002M07-2015M03 | -0.001 | 1.129* | -0.096 | -0.374* | -0.151 | -0.164 | 0.005 |  |  |
| Specialty chemicals | 2 | 1983M01-1996M10 | 0.003 | 1.111* | 0.083 | -0.050 | -0.084 | -0.101 | -0.042 | 0.684 | 2.078 |
|  |  | 1996M11-2005M10 | -0.005 | 0.923* | 0.044 | 0.662* | 0.198 | 0.086 | 0.007 |  |  |
|  |  | 2005M11-2015M03 | $0.008^{* *}$ | 1.045* | -0.166 | -0.178 | -0.084 | -0.437 | 0.174* |  |  |
| Specialized Consumer Services | 0 | 1983M01-2015M03 | 0.003 | 0.990* | 0.067 | -0.275 | 0.021 | 0.262 | -0.041 | 0.409 | 2.017 |
| Specialty Retailers | 0 | 1983M01-2015M03 | 0.002 | 1.115* | 0.363* | -0.198 | 0.472* | -0.223 | -0.095* | 0.603 | 2.071 |
| Telecomm equipment | 1 | 1983M01-2000M11 | $0.001 * *$ | 1.151* | $0.360 * *$ | $-0.527 * *$ | $0.086$ | $-0.339$ | $-0.002$ | 0.693 | 1.959 |
|  |  | 2000M12-2015M03 | -0.002 | 1.264* | $-0.080$ | $-0.756^{*}$ | $-1.126^{*}$ | $-0.145$ | $0.010$ |  |  |
| Tires | 1 | 1983M01-2004M10 | -0.018* | 1.541* | $0.400 * * *$ | 0.951* | $0.227$ | 0.084 | -0.115*** | 0.465 | 1.857 |
|  |  | 2004M11-2015M03 | -0.003 | 2.029* | 0.781*** | 0.465 | -1.673** | -1.058 | 0.029 |  |  |
| Tobacco | 0 | 1983M01-2015M03 | -0.002 | 0.972* | -0.025 | -0.285*** | 1.033* | 0.923* | 0.013 | 0.290 | 2.051 |
| Toys | 1 | 1983M01-1991M05 | $0.002$ | $1.491^{*}$ | $1.050^{*}$ | 0.531 | $0.914 * * *$ | -0.321 | -0.049** | 0.446 | 2.030 |
|  |  | 1991M06-2015M03 | -0.006 | 0.864* | 0.352** | -0.103 | 0.714* | 0.591** | 0.077 |  |  |
| Transportation services | 2 |  | 0.010 | 1.204* |  | $-0.508$ | -0.300 | $-0.714$ | 0.047 | 0.504 | 1.991 |
|  |  | 1989M01-2000M11 | -0.008 | $1.032^{*}$ | 0.413** | 1.075* | 0.184 | -0.899*** | -0.213* |  |  |
|  |  | 2000M12-2015M03 | -0.004 | 1.245* | 0.412** | 0.248 | 0.737** | 0.379 | 0.206* |  |  |
| Travel \& Tourism | 0 | 1983M10-2015M03 | 0.001 | 1.566* | 0.998* | -0.271 | 0.598** | -0.056 | 0.002 | 0.421 | 2.130 |
| Trucking | 1 | 1983M01-1995M03 | $0.002$ | 1.177* | $0.143$ | $0.267$ | $-0.393 * * *$ | $-0.328$ | $0.013$ | 0.554 | 2.086 |
|  |  | 1995M04-2015M03 | $0.000$ | $0.798^{*}$ | 0.229** | 0.272** | $0.547 *$ | -0.060 | $-0.010$ |  |  |
| Waste \& Disposal Services | 1 | 1983M01-1999M12 | $-0.011 * * *$ | $1.415^{*}$ | $0.185 * *$ | $0.895$ | $0.596$ | $-0.868$ | $0.002$ | 0.362 | 1.824 |
|  |  | 2000M01-2015M03 | $0.001$ | $0.633^{*}$ | $0.173$ | $0.124$ | 0.351 | $0.576 * * *$ | $-0.014$ |  |  |
| Water | 3 | 1983M01-1991M04 | 0.020* | 0.451* | $0.605^{* *}$ | 1.004* | $-0.463$ | -1.932* | 0.160** | 0.247 | 2.215 |
|  |  | 1991M05-1998M12 | 0.008 | 0.480** | $-0.361 * *$ | -0.482 | -0.187 | 0.352 | 0.075 |  |  |
|  |  | 1999M01-2005M09 | 0.021* | $-0.346$ | -0.028 | 0.768** | $-0.684 * *$ | -0.215 | -0.230* |  |  |
|  |  | 2005M10-2015M03 | 0.000 | 0.565* | -0.008 | -0.911* | -0.496 | 1.276* | -0.085 |  |  |

Note: See Table 7

Moreover, the range of coefficients is in line with the typical beta coefficients. This result is consistent with the findings of Fama and French (1993) and the others who applied this model (Mohanty and Nandha, 2011; Elyasiani et al., 2011; Mohanty et al., 2014). For the financial subsectors, MKT ranges from 0.279 (Mortgage REITs) to 3.071 (Full Line Insurance); SMB (size premium) ranges from -1.728 (Full Line Insurance) to 1.302 (Residential REITs); HML (value premium) ranges from - 2.268 (Mortgage Finance) to 1.933 (Banks); RMW (profitability premium) ranges from 2.296 (Full Line Insurance) to 0.798 (Mortgage Finance); and CMA (investment strategy premium) ranges from -2.016 (Mortgage REITs) to 1.535 (Mortgage Finance).

For the non-financial subsectors, MKT ranges from -0.697 (Forestry) to 2.105 (Renewable Energy Equipment); SMB ranges from -1.476 (Renewable Energy Equipment) to 1.527 (Business Training \& Employment Agencies); HML ranges from - 2.438 (Software) to 2.211 (Renewable Energy Equipment); RMW ranges from -2.858 (Gold Mining) to 1.354 (Broadline Retailers); and CMA ranges from -4.937 (Renewable Energy Equipment) to 1.564 (Gold Mining).

Considering the effect of oil prices on the subsector equity returns in Table 7, 12 out of 20 financial subsectors exhibit a statistically significant exposure to the price of oil in at least one of the sub-periods, whereas for the non-financials in Table 8, all of the 20 most sensitive subsectors show a statistically significant exposure to the price of oil. It is worthwhile to mention that the magnitude and sign of oil price sensitivity varies over time and across industries.

In order to identify which subsector is more exposed to oil price risk, both financial and non-financial subsectors are ranked based on their weighted average of oil price exposures (WAE) using the following equation:
$\mathrm{WAE}_{x}=\sum_{i=1}^{k}\left[S S C_{i}\left(\frac{S O_{i}}{T o_{\chi}}\right)\right]$
where $\mathrm{WAE}_{x}$ refers to the weighted average of oil price exposure of $x$ subsector, $k$ is the maximum number of sub-samples (regimes) in the breakpoint regression, $S S C_{i}$ is the statistically significant oil coefficient in the $i_{t h}$ sub-sample, $\mathrm{SO}_{i}$ is the number of observations in the $i_{t h}$ sub-sample, and $T O_{x}$ is the total number observations of $x$ subsector. We only take into account the statistically significant oil coefficients $\left(S S C_{i}\right)$ in the breakpoint regressions and multiply each of them by the fraction of the number of observations in the corresponding sub-period over the total number of observations.

This is due to the empirical observation in our results that some subsectors have large significant oil coefficients but that these values correspond to relatively short time periods. For instance, the Business Training \& Employment Agencies subsector has a significant oil coefficient of 0.638 but it only lasts for 73 months out of 284 months. Figure 8 exhibits the magnitude and sign of oil price exposure of the financial and non-financial subsectors.

For the sake of comparability, the 20 most sensitive non-financial subsectors along with all the financial subsectors are shown here. The 20 most sensitive non-financial subsectors are selected based on the WAE of their statistically significant oil coefficients in the breakpoint regressions. As is shown in Figure 8, the majority of the financial subsectors are negatively affected by oil prices.

Conversely, most of the non-financial subsectors are positively affected. Moreover, the magnitude of the impact of oil price on the financial subsectors is considerably less than the magnitude of its impact on the non-financial subsectors. In order to quantify this difference, the averages of absolute values of oil coefficients are calculated as 0.08 and 0.22 for the financials and non-financials, respectively.


Figure 8. Oil price risk exposure of the subsectors (January 1983 to March 2015)

In order to be able to clarify and measure the magnitude and role of each risk factor in explaining the subsectors' returns, the WAE of all the other risk factors are calculated using the Eq. (18). Later, sum of the absolute values of the WAE of risk coefficients are calculated. Again for the sake of comparability of the financial and non-financial subsectors, the factor loadings of the Fama-French and oil risk factors are presented on percentage basis to imply the total impact magnitude of each risk sources. Figure 9 illustrates the proportion (percentage role) of each risk factor in explaining the subsectors' returns for the financial and non-financial (the 20 most sensitive) subsectors.


Figure 9. The proportion of risk factors in determining the subsectors' returns

As you can see from the figure, MKT, SMB and HML which are the risk factors in the FF3F model have relatively higher role in explaining the returns for the financial subsectors than those for the non-financial subsectors. Interestingly, the recently introduced Fama-French risk factors, RMW and CMA, along with OIL, play more important role in determining the equity returns for the non-financial subsectors than those for the financial subsectors. For the financial subsectors, MKT (46.6\%), HML (23.6\%), SMB (12.5\%), RMW (8.1\%), CMA (7.7\%) and OIL (1.6\%) risk factors have the highest proportion in explaining the stock returns, respectively. On the other hand, MKT (41.7\%), CMA (16.6\%), HML (13.1\%), RMW (11.7\%), SMB (10.8\%), and OIL (6.1\%) risk factors have the highest proportion in explaining the stock returns for the non-financial subsectors, respectively.

For the both types of subsectors, the monthly return on the market portfolio (MKT), which is calculated as the value-weighted return of all CRSP stocks incorporated in the U.S. in excess of the 1-month Treasury bill rate, has the highest share among other risk factors in determining the subsectors' returns. The second most important risk factor for the financials, HML, is the monthly return of a portfolio with high book-to-market ratio (a value portfolio) in excess of a portfolio with low book-tomarket ratio (growth portfolio) which suggests the important role of book-to-market ratio in asset valuation of financial stocks. The second most important risk factor for the non-financials, CMA, is the monthly return of a portfolio with conservative investment strategies in excess of a portfolio with aggressive investment strategies. This indicates the importance of CMA in pricing non-financial stocks. However, the monthly return on West Texas Intermediate crude oil (OIL) has the least important role in explaining the subsectors' returns for the both financials and non-financials.

Table 9 reports the rankings of oil price risk exposures for the five most negatively and positively exposed subsectors in both the financial and non-financial subsectors using the WAE procedure. Among the financial subsectors, Mortgage Finance, Insurance Brokers, Full Line Insurance, Asset Managers, and Investment Services are those most negatively exposed to oil price risk. However, among the financial subsectors, only two, namely Real Estate Services and Residential REITs, are positively exposed to oil price risk. The list of positively exposed non-financials is dominated by the real estate-related subsectors, and this finding implies that, in general, real estate subsectors are positively related to oil prices.

Table 9. The oil price risk exposure of industry subsectors

| Most negatively exposed subsectors (top five) <br> Financials |  |
| :--- | :---: |
| Mortgage Finance | Weighted Average Exposure (WAE) |
| Insurance Brokers | -0.162 |
| Full Line Insurance | -0.062 |
| Asset Managers | -0.060 |
| Investment Services | -0.053 |
| Non-Financials | -0.050 |
| Airlines |  |
| Home Construction | -0.190 |
| Internet | -0.147 |
| Recreational Services | -0.140 |
| Home Improvement Retail | -0.132 |
|  | -0.125 |
| Most positively exposed subsectors (top five) |  |
| Financials | Weighted Average Exposure (WAE) |
| Real Estate Services | 0.203 |
| Residential REITs | 0.041 |
| - | - |
| - | - |
| - |  |
| Non-Financials |  |
| Oil Equipment Services | 0.384 |
| Marine Transport | 0.362 |
| Exploration \& Production | 0.338 |
| Platinum \& Precious Metals | 0.258 |
| Coal | 0.217 |

Note: The above subsectors are ranked based on their weighted-average of significant oil price coefficients in the breakpoint regression of the multifactor model.

Among the non-financial subsectors in Table 5, Airlines, Home Construction, Internet, Recreational Services, and Home Improvement Retail are ranked, respectively, as those most negatively exposed to oil price risk. Meanwhile, Oil Equipment Services, Marine Transport, Exploration \& Production, Platinum \& Precious Metals, and Coal are ranked, respectively, as the non-financial subsectors most positively exposed to the oil price risk. Oil Equipment Services is the most sensitive industry subsector to the oil price risk in the U.S. market, with a weightedaverage oil price exposure of 0.384 .

These results are consistent with most of the prior studies (Nandha and Faff, 2008; Kilian and Park, 2009; Arouri and Nguyen, 2010; Elyasiani et al., 2011) which find that the oil and gas industry in general is the most sensitive industry to oil price risk. However, these studies ignore the subsector sensitivities. Given the consistency with the existing literature for Airlines (e.g., Loudon, 2001; Mohanty et al., 2014), the substantial exposure of Airlines $(-0.190)$ to oil price risk is still surprising in spite of the fact that most airline companies are expected to be hedged against oil price spikes. According to the oil exposure results, although these industry subsectors are affected by oil price changes, these impacts are, on average, limited compared with the impact of other explanatory factors in the FF5F model.

### 2.4.4 Time-varying Parameter Model

To check the robustness of the results in Table 7 and 8, a time-varying parameter model is employed to examine the stability of subsector equity returns and oil price relationships. As it is mentioned before, this model is in state-space form comprising the measurement and transition equations. Figure 10-13 exhibit the estimated timevarying oil price exposure of financial and non-financial subsectors along with its
$90 \%$ confidence interval. The estimated coefficients are smoothed using the Kalman smoother as this enables us to obtain less noisy and more precise estimates relative to the Kalman filter. It should be noted that a point estimate of time-varying oil price exposure is considered significant only when the confidence interval around that point does not contain zero. The results of the time-varying exposure model are mostly consistent with the findings of the breakpoint regressions discussed before. As illustrated in Figure 10-13, the financial subsectors with highest time-varying exposure are Mortgage Finance, Full Line Insurance, Investment Services, and Real Estate Services. Accordingly, the subsector Oil Equipment Services has the highest time-varying oil price exposure, followed by Marine Transportation, Exploration \& Production, Airlines, and Coal, respectively. The financial subsectors show a lower degree of time-varying exposure to oil price risk relative to non-financial subsectors.


Figure 10. Time-varying oil price risk exposure (positively exposed financials)


Figure 11. Time-varying oil price risk exposure (negatively exposed financials)


-_ Marine Transportation --- $90 \% \mathrm{Cl}$

_Oil Exploration \& Production $===\mathbf{9 0 \%} \mathbf{C I}$




Figure 12. Time-varying oil price risk exposure (positively exposed non-financials)


Figure 13. Time-varying oil price risk exposure (negatively exposed non-financials)

### 2.4.5 Time-varying Causality in Return

In order to test the return spillover between oil prices and the subsectors' returns, the causal linkages between them should be examined. This study employs the Hill's (2007) fixed-length rolling window causality test. He suggests a successive multihorizon non-causality test, which can be adopted to detect non-linear causalities in terms of linear parametric restrictions for a trivariate process (two different time series plus an auxiliary variable). This study utilizes the bivariate case where causality between two different time series is measured. Therefore, the aim is to test the null hypothesis of non-causality running from oil prices (WTI) to the subsectors' returns. Causality takes place at any horizon if and only if it takes place at horizon 1 (first month in each window).

Due to likely substandard performance of the chi-squared distribution in small samples, Hill (2007) proposed a parametric bootstrapping approach for estimating small sample p-values. Also, the length rolling window is fixed at 60 months and the maximum order of the VAR model is 4 lags. Table 10 and 11 present the timevarying causality in return for the financial and non-financial subsectors, respectively.

For the financials, the rejection rate of null hypothesis implying time-varying noncausality in return ranges from $12.23 \%$ (Mortgage REITs) to $38.53 \%$ (Full Line Insurance). This means that, for instance, there is a causality running from oil to Full Line Insurance $38.53 \%$ of the time. For the non-financials, the rejection rate of null hypothesis implying time-varying non-causality in return ranges from $2.14 \%$ (Mobile Telecommunications) to $53.52 \%$ (Auto Parts).

Table 10. Time-varying causality in return for financial subsectors

| Null hypothesis $\left(\mathrm{H}_{0}\right)$ | Avg. VAR <br> order | Avg. BPV | Rejection <br> rate of $\mathrm{H}_{0}$ |  |
| :--- | :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Oil $\nrightarrow$ Asset Managers | 1.6177 | 0.2505 | 24.1590 |  |
| Oil $\nrightarrow$ Banks | 1.7554 | 0.2767 | 34.2508 |  |
| Oil $\nrightarrow$ | Consumer Finance | 1.5902 | 0.2578 | 28.7462 |
| Oil $\nrightarrow$ | Full Line Insurance | 1.5046 | 0.3435 | 38.5321 |
| Oil $\nrightarrow$ | Hotel \& Lodging REITs | 1.9450 | 0.2078 | 33.9450 |
| Oil $\nrightarrow$ | Industrial \& Office REITs | 1.9692 | 0.3031 | 27.8287 |
| Oil $\nrightarrow$ | Insurance Brokers | 1.6728 | 0.2737 | 32.7217 |
| Oil $\nrightarrow$ | Investment Companies | 4.0000 | 0.6440 | 29.9694 |
| Oil $\nrightarrow$ | Investment Services | 1.6422 | 0.2155 | 14.3731 |
| Oil $\nrightarrow$ | Life Insurance | 1.8471 | 0.3834 | 34.8624 |
| Oil $\nrightarrow$ | Mortgage Finance | 1.6453 | 0.2671 | 20.1835 |
| Oil $\nrightarrow$ | Mortgage REITs | 4.0000 | 0.5436 | 12.2324 |
| Oil $\nrightarrow$ | Property \& Casualty Insurance | 1.8287 | 0.3525 | 26.9113 |
| Oil $\nrightarrow$ | Real Estate Holding \& Development | 1.8685 | 0.3698 | 21.7125 |
| Oil $\nrightarrow$ | Real Estate Services | 4.0000 | 0.5014 | 14.5455 |
| Oil $\nrightarrow$ | Reinsurance | 1.3945 | 0.2424 | 29.3578 |
| Oil $\nrightarrow$ | Residential REITs | 1.8165 | 0.2209 | 33.6391 |
| Oil $\nrightarrow$ | Retail REITs | 1.7401 | 0.4154 | 29.0520 |
| Oil $\nrightarrow$ | Specialty Finance | 1.6177 | 0.2804 | 26.6055 |
| Oil $\nrightarrow$ | Specialty REITs | 1.9664 | 0.2011 | 32.1101 |

Notes: $\rightarrow$ denotes the non-causality null hypothesis. VAR denotes Vector Autoregressive model and BPV denotes the bootstrap P-values. The maximum order of VAR model is 4 lags. Size of the fixed rolling-window is 60 months. Bootstrap iterations are 1000 times. BPV of less than $5 \%$ indicates causality within that window.

Figure 14 and 15 exhibit the subsectors which receive the highest level of return spillover from crude oil. Among the financials, Full Line Insurance, Life Insurance, Banks, Hotel \& Lodging REITs, and Residential REITs are the top subsectors receiving highest causality in return from oil market. For the non-financials, Auto Parts, Electronic Office Equipment, Tires, Furnishings, and Commodity Chemicals are the top subsectors which receive the highest level of return spillover from crude oil during the period of the study. In these figures, the U.S. recessions are highlighted in gray. Interestingly, after the 1990-91 and 2008-09 recessions, there are high levels of causality in return running from oil market to financial and non-financial subsectors. This may be due to the higher demand and more dependency on oil during the expansionary phase of the economic cycle. Nonetheless, this is not often the case for the 2001 recession perhaps because it was very short-lived and shallow.

Table 11. Time-varying causality in return for non-financial subsectors

| Null hypothesis ( $\mathrm{H}_{0}$ ) |  | Avg. VAR order | Avg. BPV | Rejection rate of $\mathrm{H}_{0}$ |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Oil $\rightarrow$ | Aerospace | 1.6942 | 0.2863 | 29.9694 |
| Oil $\rightarrow$ | Airlines | 1.4862 | 0.4412 | 12.2324 |
| Oil $\rightarrow$ | Alternative Electricity | 1.8318 | 0.2986 | 23.5474 |
| Oil $\rightarrow$ | Aluminum | 1.5413 | 0.3096 | 42.8135 |
| Oil $\rightarrow$ | Apparel Retailers | 1.7187 | 0.3582 | 29.9694 |
| Oil $\rightarrow$ | Auto Parts | 1.7951 | 0.2270 | 53.5168 |
| Oil $\rightarrow$ | Automobiles | 1.6453 | 0.2615 | 32.1101 |
| Oil $\rightarrow$ | Biotechnology | 1.4771 | 0.4061 | 19.8777 |
| Oil $\rightarrow$ | Brewers | 1.4679 | 0.4132 | 16.8196 |
| Oil $\rightarrow$ | Broadcasting \& Entertainment | 1.6758 | 0.3946 | 14.6789 |
| Oil $\rightarrow$ | Broadline Retailers | 1.5780 | 0.4277 | 20.7951 |
| Oil $\rightarrow$ | Building Materials \& Fixtures | 1.7615 | 0.2780 | 36.3914 |
| Oil $\rightarrow$ | Business Support Services | 1.6024 | 0.3166 | 31.1927 |
| Oil $\rightarrow$ | Business Training \& Employment Agencies | 1.8805 | 0.4311 | 39.4495 |
| Oil $\rightarrow$ | Clothing \& Accessories | 1.7003 | 0.3109 | 28.7462 |
| Oil $\rightarrow$ | Coal | 1.5902 | 0.4790 | 18.0428 |
| Oil $\rightarrow$ | Commercial Vehicles \& Trucks | 1.5138 | 0.2867 | 31.8043 |
| Oil $\rightarrow$ | Commodity Chemicals | 1.5138 | 0.2031 | 44.0367 |
| Oil $\rightarrow$ | Computer Hardware | 1.3547 | 0.3584 | 15.9021 |
| Oil $\rightarrow$ | Computer Services | 1.5627 | 0.3651 | 20.1835 |
| Oil $\rightarrow$ | Consumer Electronics | 1.5125 | 0.3408 | 16.2080 |
| Oil $\rightarrow$ | Containers \& Packaging | 1.4862 | 0.3007 | 33.0275 |
| Oil $\rightarrow$ | Conventional Electricity | 1.8379 | 0.3746 | 22.6300 |
| Oil $\rightarrow$ | Defense | 1.5657 | 0.3738 | 19.8777 |
| Oil $\rightarrow$ | Delivery Services | 1.8012 | 0.3787 | 19.8777 |
| Oil $\rightarrow$ | Distillers \& Vintners | 2.0948 | 0.4069 | 13.7615 |
| Oil $\rightarrow$ | Diversified Industrials | 1.7584 | 0.2871 | 26.9113 |
| Oil $\rightarrow$ | Drug Retailers | 1.7064 | 0.2169 | 34.5566 |
| Oil $\rightarrow$ | Durable Household Products | 1.6667 | 0.2356 | 39.7554 |
| Oil $\rightarrow$ | Electrical Components \& Equipment | 1.8135 | 0.2773 | 31.4985 |
| Oil $\rightarrow$ | Electronic Equipment | 1.4862 | 0.3730 | 20.1835 |
| Oil $\rightarrow$ | Electronic Office Equipment | 1.8410 | 0.1943 | 52.2936 |
| Oil $\rightarrow$ | Exploration \& Production | 1.7982 | 0.4652 | 12.2324 |
| Oil $\rightarrow$ | Farming \& Fishing | 4.0000 | 0.5084 | 29.6636 |
| Oil $\rightarrow$ | Financial Administration | 1.7554 | 0.2623 | 31.4985 |
| Oil $\rightarrow$ | Fixed Line Telecommunications | 1.6514 | 0.4059 | 13.7615 |
| Oil $\rightarrow$ | Food Products | 1.8777 | 0.3354 | 23.5474 |
| Oil $\rightarrow$ | Food Retailers \& Wholesalers | 1.6330 | 0.3213 | 26.2997 |
| Oil $\rightarrow$ | Footwear | 1.5994 | 0.3259 | 30.5810 |
| Oil $\rightarrow$ | Forestry | 4.0000 | 0.4929 | 11.9403 |
| Oil $\rightarrow$ | Furnishings | 1.7737 | 0.1971 | 47.0948 |
| Oil $\rightarrow$ | Gambling | 1.7554 | 0.3574 | 26.6055 |
| Oil $\rightarrow$ | Gas Distribution | 1.3578 | 0.3893 | 7.0336 |
| Oil $\rightarrow$ | Gold Mining | 1.6055 | 0.3630 | 12.5382 |

[^1]Table 11: Continued

| Null hypothesis ( $\mathrm{H}_{0}$ ) |  | Avg. VAR order | Avg. BPV | Rejection rate of $\mathrm{H}_{0}$ |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Oil $\rightarrow$ | Health Care Providers | 1.5015 | 0.3631 | 18.6544 |
| Oil $\rightarrow$ | Heavy Construction | 1.5260 | 0.3987 | 19.5719 |
| Oil $\rightarrow$ | Home Construction | 1.5413 | 0.4205 | 25.3823 |
| Oil $\rightarrow$ | Home Improvement Retailers | 1.5963 | 0.3518 | 20.1835 |
| Oil $\rightarrow$ | Hotels | 1.7645 | 0.3401 | 40.0612 |
| Oil $\rightarrow$ | Industrial Machinery | 1.7095 | 0.2115 | 43.4251 |
| Oil $\rightarrow$ | Industrial Suppliers | 1.6483 | 0.3938 | 25.6881 |
| Oil $\rightarrow$ | Integrated Oil \& Gas | 1.3639 | 0.4493 | 13.1498 |
| Oil $\rightarrow$ | Internet | 4.0000 | 0.5099 | 10.7034 |
| Oil $\rightarrow$ | Iron \& Steel | 1.4220 | 0.3367 | 21.4067 |
| Oil $\rightarrow$ | Marine Transportation | 1.4648 | 0.4653 | 22.9358 |
| Oil $\rightarrow$ | Media Agencies | 1.7676 | 0.3092 | 27.5229 |
| Oil $\rightarrow$ | Medical Equipment | 1.5810 | 0.2786 | 25.3823 |
| Oil $\rightarrow$ | Medical Supplies | 1.5076 | 0.4233 | 13.4557 |
| Oil $\rightarrow$ | Mobile Telecommunications | 1.8930 | 0.5835 | 2.1407 |
| Oil $\rightarrow$ | Multiutilities | 1.6453 | 0.4123 | 21.7125 |
| Oil $\rightarrow$ | Nondurable Household Products | 1.8226 | 0.3674 | 31.1927 |
| Oil $\rightarrow$ | Nonferrous Metals | 1.4190 | 0.3548 | 30.5810 |
| Oil $\rightarrow$ | Oil Equipment \& Services | 1.4434 | 0.4859 | 5.1988 |
| Oil $\rightarrow$ | Paper | 1.6636 | 0.2690 | 39.4495 |
| Oil $\rightarrow$ | Personal Products | 1.8410 | 0.3152 | 27.8287 |
| Oil $\rightarrow$ | Pharmaceuticals | 1.4373 | 0.3744 | 17.7370 |
| Oil $\rightarrow$ | Pipelines | 1.4373 | 0.4256 | 6.7278 |
| Oil $\rightarrow$ | Platinum \& Precious Metals | 4.0000 | 0.4610 | 8.8889 |
| Oil $\rightarrow$ | Publishing | 1.8196 | 0.2516 | 34.8624 |
| Oil $\rightarrow$ | Railroads | 1.4801 | 0.3426 | 33.3333 |
| Oil $\rightarrow$ | Recreational Products | 2.1223 | 0.3264 | 34.2508 |
| Oil $\rightarrow$ | Recreational Services | 1.4343 | 0.3673 | 27.5229 |
| Oil $\rightarrow$ | Renewable Energy Equipment | 4.0000 | 0.4168 | 20.1835 |
| Oil $\rightarrow$ | Restaurants \& Bars | 1.6544 | 0.3275 | 18.6544 |
| Oil $\rightarrow$ | Semiconductors | 1.6300 | 0.3343 | 18.6544 |
| Oil $\rightarrow$ | Soft Drinks | 1.5719 | 0.3954 | 20.1835 |
| Oil $\rightarrow$ | Software | 1.6820 | 0.2966 | 22.6300 |
| Oil $\rightarrow$ | Specialty Chemicals | 1.4343 | 0.3357 | 18.3486 |
| Oil $\rightarrow$ | Specialized Consumer Services | 1.7370 | 0.4514 | 11.9266 |
| Oil $\rightarrow$ | Specialty Retailers | 1.9113 | 0.2617 | 32.7217 |
| Oil $\rightarrow$ | Telecommunications Equipment | 1.8287 | 0.3674 | 22.6300 |
| Oil $\rightarrow$ | Tires | 1.8440 | 0.2149 | 51.3761 |
| Oil $\rightarrow$ | Tobacco | 1.6208 | 0.2814 | 32.4159 |
| Oil $\rightarrow$ | Toys | 1.4281 | 0.2914 | 26.6055 |
| Oil $\rightarrow$ | Transportation Services | 1.9144 | 0.3720 | 22.6300 |
| Oil $\rightarrow$ | Travel \& Tourism | 1.5505 | 0.4405 | 20.7951 |
| Oil $\rightarrow$ | Trucking | 1.4220 | 0.3503 | 31.4985 |
| Oil $\rightarrow$ | Waste \& Disposal Services | 1.7554 | 0.4121 | 18.9602 |
| Oil $\rightarrow$ | Water | 1.6361 | 0.4165 | 21.1009 |

[^2]



——Oil =/=> Hotel \& Lodging REITs - Rejection Line (5\%)

—Oil =/=> Residential REITs —— Rejection Line (5\%)

Figure 14. Time-varying causality in return (top-five financial subsectors)


- Oil =/=> Auto Parts - Rejection Line (5\%)




_Oil =/=> Commodity Chemicals Rejection Line (5\%)

Figure 15. Time-varying causality in return (top-five non-financial subsectors)

### 2.4.6 Time-varying Causality in Risk

For the aim of testing the risk spillover between oil prices and the subsectors' returns, the causal relationships between them should be examined. In this case, the same methodology of Hill's (2007) time-varying causality will be applied here. As it is pointed out before, the only difference is that instead of the oil and subsectors' returns, their value-at-risks (VaRs) will be used to measure the risk spillover from crude oil market to the subsectors. The main motivation to explore the risk spillover between these markets is "financial contagion" in the event of worldwide crisis, which makes them to be exposed to a same shock.

### 2.4.6.1 Estimation of EGARCH Model

The VaR methodology is used to measure market risk, since it shows market risk through the probability distribution of a random variable and appraises the risk with a single real number. This study uses variance-covariance method based on the generalized autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity (GARCH) family model for VaR estimation. But before using the GARCH family models, the existence of ARCH effect in the return series should be confirmed specially for the WTI series which is prone to have substantial volatility clustering. Consequently, the ARCH-LM test (Engle, 1982) is applied on the residual of all the series. Table 11-13 exhibit the results of the ARCH-LM test and Ljung-Box test statistics for autocorrelation for the financial and non-financial subsectors along with the WTI. The results confirm the existence of a high-order ARCH effect or volatility clustering as the null hypothesis of homoscedasticity is rejected for almost all the series. Also, the null hypothesis of no autocorrelation is also rejected for most of the squared residuals of the return series. Thus, it is essential to employ a GARCH family model here.

As it is explained before, the stock and commodity prices react asymmetrically to shocks (Cont, 2001). A negative past return affects the current volatility more considerably than a positive return. Accordingly, when using financial data, it is necessary to use a GARCH model which identifies the asymmetry effect. There are two renowned asymmetric GARCH models namely the Threshold GARCH or TGARCH which introduced by Zakoian (1994) and the exponential GARCH or EGARCH which proposed by Nelson (1991).

Table 12. Diagnostics tests before EGARCH estimation for the WTI

| Series | ARCH-LM | P-value | Q $^{2}(20)$ | P-value |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| WTI crude oil | 30.4284 | 0.000 | 75.499 | 0.000 |

Note: ARCH-LM is Engle's (1982) Lagrange multiplier test for the heteroscedasticity in the residual of the return series up to order $20 . \mathrm{Q}^{2}(20)$ is the Ljung-Box test statistics for serial correlation in the squared standardized residuals with 20 lags.

Table 13. Diagnostics tests before EGARCH estimation for the financials

| Subsector | ARCH-LM | P-value | Q $^{2}(20)$ | P-value |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Asset Managers | 8.110 | 0.005 | 51.870 | 0.000 |
| Banks | 39.811 | 0.000 | 225.760 | 0.000 |
| Consumer Finance | 29.361 | 0.000 | 34.421 | 0.023 |
| Full Line Insurance | 89.564 | 0.000 | 156.190 | 0.000 |
| Hotel \& Lodging REITs | 26.447 | 0.000 | 47.318 | 0.001 |
| Industrial \& Office REITs | 20.300 | 0.000 | 76.495 | 0.000 |
| Insurance Brokers | 6.518 | 0.011 | 25.152 | 0.196 |
| Investment Companies | 15.851 | 0.000 | 42.934 | 0.002 |
| Investment Services | 17.120 | 0.000 | 26.266 | 0.157 |
| Life Insurance | 5.817 | 0.016 | 130.190 | 0.000 |
| Mortgage Finance | 235.487 | 0.000 | 301.240 | 0.000 |
| Mortgage REITs | 15.779 | 0.000 | 23.240 | 0.277 |
| Property \& Casualty Insurance | 12.462 | 0.001 | 117.180 | 0.000 |
| Real Estate Holding \& Development | 11.609 | 0.001 | 47.422 | 0.001 |
| Real Estate Services | 2.890 | 0.092 | 36.342 | 0.014 |
| Reinsurance | 18.118 | 0.000 | 33.431 | 0.030 |
| Residential REITs | 17.482 | 0.000 | 51.866 | 0.000 |
| Retail REITs | 15.211 | 0.000 | 117.910 | 0.000 |
| Specialty Finance | 22.876 | 0.000 | 126.470 | 0.000 |
| Specialty REITs | 6.122 | 0.014 | 62.001 | 0.000 |

Note: See Table 12

Table 14. Diagnostics tests before EGARCH estimation for the non-financials

| Subsectors | ARCH-LM | P -value | $\mathrm{Q}^{2}$ (20) | P-value |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Aerospace | 2.942 | 0.087 | 36.183 | 0.017 |
| Airlines | 3.919 | 0.049 | 35.722 | 0.017 |
| Alternative Electricity | 13.576 | 0.000 | 144.260 | 0.000 |
| Aluminum | 16.035 | 0.000 | 44.217 | 0.001 |
| Apparel Retailers | 20.528 | 0.000 | 39.736 | 0.005 |
| Auto Parts | 27.076 | 0.000 | 63.696 | 0.000 |
| Automobiles | 4.404 | 0.037 | 129.480 | 0.000 |
| Biotechnology | 9.370 | 0.002 | 83.134 | 0.000 |
| Brewers | 5.230 | 0.021 | 45.019 | 0.001 |
| Broadcasting \& Entertainment | 3.170 | 0.076 | 64.227 | 0.000 |
| Broadline Retailers | 16.454 | 0.000 | 43.316 | 0.002 |
| Building Materials \& Fixtures | 31.052 | 0.000 | 36.849 | 0.012 |
| Business Support Services | 34.103 | 0.000 | 25.041 | 0.201 |
| Business Training \& Employment Agencies | 6.132 | 0.016 | 36.845 | 0.012 |
| Clothing \& Accessories | 10.314 | 0.001 | 28.548 | 0.097 |
| Coal | 26.912 | 0.000 | 55.868 | 0.000 |
| Commercial Vehicles \& Trucks | 11.578 | 0.001 | 31.490 | 0.049 |
| Commodity Chemicals | 14.881 | 0.000 | 56.590 | 0.000 |
| Computer Hardware | 29.361 | 0.000 | 144.710 | 0.000 |
| Computer Services | 15.938 | 0.000 | 22.916 | 0.293 |
| Consumer Electronics | 14.735 | 0.000 | 31.423 | 0.076 |
| Containers \& Packaging | 3.558 | 0.060 | 31.385 | 0.050 |
| Conventional Electricity | 23.856 | 0.000 | 43.376 | 0.002 |
| Defense | 6.502 | 0.011 | 35.386 | 0.018 |
| Delivery Services | 18.125 | 0.000 | 82.169 | 0.000 |
| Distillers \& Vintners | 2.625 | 0.106 | 29.610 | 0.076 |
| Diversified Industrials | 8.152 | 0.005 | 80.888 | 0.000 |
| Drug Retailers | 3.857 | 0.050 | 34.673 | 0.022 |
| Durable Household Products | 9.538 | 0.002 | 70.581 | 0.000 |
| Electrical Components \& Equipment | 10.161 | 0.002 | 39.200 | 0.006 |
| Electronic Equipment | 34.134 | 0.000 | 475.330 | 0.000 |
| Electronic Office Equipment | 3.199 | 0.075 | 36.315 | 0.016 |
| Exploration \& Production | 8.328 | 0.004 | 31.117 | 0.054 |
| Farming \& Fishing | 26.062 | 0.000 | 45.117 | 0.001 |
| Financial Administration | 5.830 | 0.018 | 35.734 | 0.017 |
| Fixed Line Telecommunications | 11.431 | 0.001 | 174.200 | 0.000 |
| Food Products | 7.015 | 0.008 | 64.198 | 0.000 |
| Food Retailers \& Wholesalers | 3.719 | 0.052 | 25.903 | 0.169 |
| Footwear | 8.516 | 0.004 | 74.024 | 0.000 |
| Forestry | 10.903 | 0.001 | 99.198 | 0.000 |
| Furnishings | 54.925 | 0.000 | 171.940 | 0.000 |
| Gambling | 1.835 | 0.176 | 93.324 | 0.000 |
| Gas Distribution | 36.150 | 0.000 | 176.600 | 0.000 |
| Gold Mining | 6.405 | 0.042 | 45.682 | 0.010 |

Note: See Table 12.

Table 14. Continued

| Subsectors | ARCH-LM | P-value | $\mathrm{Q}^{2}(20)$ | P -value |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Health Care Providers | 10.114 | 0.001 | 20.098 | 0.452 |
| Heavy Construction | 23.610 | 0.000 | 44.437 | 0.001 |
| Home Construction | 8.952 | 0.003 | 35.040 | 0.021 |
| Home Improvement Retailers | 1.764 | 0.185 | 30.101 | 0.058 |
| Hotels | 4.087 | 0.044 | 50.915 | 0.000 |
| Industrial Machinery | 8.252 | 0.005 | 32.369 | 0.040 |
| Industrial Suppliers | 3.758 | 0.056 | 31.577 | 0.049 |
| Integrated Oil \& Gas | 3.928 | 0.048 | 32.194 | 0.041 |
| Internet | 26.726 | 0.000 | 157.420 | 0.000 |
| Iron \& Steel | 23.381 | 0.000 | 43.131 | 0.002 |
| Marine Transportation | 6.317 | 0.012 | 43.708 | 0.002 |
| Media Agencies | 12.137 | 0.000 | 28.020 | 0.109 |
| Medical Equipment | 31.123 | 0.000 | 52.391 | 0.000 |
| Medical Supplies | 6.374 | 0.012 | 47.379 | 0.001 |
| Mobile Telecommunications | 28.622 | 0.000 | 133.580 | 0.000 |
| Multiutilities | 6.115 | 0.014 | 22.642 | 0.307 |
| Nondurable Household Products | 3.776 | 0.053 | 30.344 | 0.064 |
| Nonferrous Metals | 31.628 | 0.000 | 48.642 | 0.000 |
| Oil Equipment \& Services | 19.085 | 0.000 | 34.188 | 0.025 |
| Paper | 39.274 | 0.000 | 214.100 | 0.000 |
| Personal Products | 3.085 | 0.080 | 57.171 | 0.000 |
| Pharmaceuticals | 3.188 | 0.075 | 52.941 | 0.000 |
| Pipelines | 8.021 | 0.005 | 226.620 | 0.000 |
| Platinum \& Precious Metals | 4.244 | 0.041 | 71.619 | 0.000 |
| Publishing | 9.121 | 0.003 | 30.232 | 0.066 |
| Railroads | 89.564 | 0.000 | 30.956 | 0.066 |
| Recreational Products | 6.014 | 0.018 | 66.225 | 0.000 |
| Recreational Services | 12.837 | 0.000 | 80.996 | 0.000 |
| Renewable Energy Equipment | 9.274 | 0.009 | 31.018 | 0.053 |
| Restaurants \& Bars | 5.609 | 0.018 | 34.951 | 0.020 |
| Semiconductors | 4.496 | 0.035 | 120.820 | 0.000 |
| Soft Drinks | 12.954 | 0.000 | 79.328 | 0.000 |
| Software | 16.664 | 0.000 | 228.340 | 0.000 |
| Specialty Chemicals | 16.104 | 0.000 | 29.047 | 0.087 |
| Specialized Consumer Services | 6.013 | 0.015 | 195.740 | 0.000 |
| Specialty Retailers | 4.150 | 0.042 | 33.879 | 0.027 |
| Telecommunications Equipment | 20.749 | 0.000 | 102.040 | 0.000 |
| Tires | 14.381 | 0.000 | 110.710 | 0.000 |
| Tobacco | 9.694 | 0.002 | 46.083 | 0.001 |
| Toys | 10.569 | 0.001 | 20.566 | 0.423 |
| Transportation Services | 18.825 | 0.000 | 37.270 | 0.011 |
| Travel \& Tourism | 39.611 | 0.000 | 53.237 | 0.000 |
| Trucking | 4.640 | 0.039 | 32.367 | 0.061 |
| Waste \& Disposal Services | 5.335 | 0.021 | 47.681 | 0.000 |
| Water | 4.534 | 0.034 | 39.275 | 0.006 |

Note: See Table 12.

Therefore, both of the EGARCH and TGARCH models have been tested on the data in order to find out which one is more suitable for this study. Given the requirements of having significant model coefficients and the minimum AIC, the $\operatorname{EGARCH}(1,1)$ model is chosen as the best model after numerous trials. So, this model is used to explore the volatility features of the subsectors and WTI returns. Due to the fat-tailed structure of the return series, the generalized error distribution (GED) is applied to describe the residual of the selected GARCH model. Table 14-16 exhibit the estimation results of EGARCH for the WTI, financial and non-financial subsectors.

Table 15. Estimation results of EGARCH model for the WTI

| Series | $\Phi$ | $\omega$ | $\alpha$ | $\beta$ | $\gamma$ | GED | AIC | Log <br> Likelihood |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| WTI crude oil | 0.001 | $-0.992^{*}$ | $0.514^{*}$ | $0.880^{*}$ | -0.055 | $1.681^{*}$ | -2.088 | 410.070 |

Note: ${ }^{*},{ }^{* *},{ }^{* * *}$ denote $1 \%, 5 \%$, and $10 \%$ level of statistical significance, respectively. GED denotes the generalized error distribution degree parameter. AIC refers to the Akaike Information Criterion.

Table 16. Estimation results of EGARCH model for the financials

| Subsectors | $\Phi$ | $\omega$ | $\alpha$ | $\beta$ | $\gamma$ | GED | AIC | Log <br> Likelihood |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Asset Managers | 0.012* | $-0.348^{* *}$ | 0.227* | 0.966* | -0.056 | 1.563* | -2.065 | 405.731 |
| Banks | 0.008* | -0.714** | 0.254* | 0.91* | -0.123** | 1.481* | -2.894 | 565.995 |
| Consumer Finance | 0.012* | $-0.573 * * *$ | 0.175*** | 0.919* | -0.077 *** | 1.384* | -2.56 | 501.531 |
| Full Line Insurance | 0.009* | -0.607* | 0.304* | 0.932* | -0.131* | 1.321* | -2.667 | 522.145 |
| Hotel \& Lodging REITs | 0.009* | -0.46** | 0.219* | 0.939* | -0.075** | 1.131* | -2.151 | 422.274 |
| Industrial \& Office REITs | 0.006** | $-0.451^{* * *}$ | 0.131 | 0.937* | -0.143* | 1.257* | -2.751 | 446.245 |
| Insurance Brokers | 0.009* | $-1.007 * * *$ | 0.277** | 0.86* | -0.040 | 1.320* | -2.877 | 562.823 |
| Investment Companies | 0.011* | -0.201 | -0.003 | 0.967* | -0.241* | 1.006* | $-2.203$ | 239.591 |
| Investment Services | 0.011* | $-0.473^{* *}$ | 0.215* | 0.937* | -0.086** | 1.515* | -1.969 | 387.023 |
| Life Insurance | 0.013* | -0.781* | 0.223** | 0.893* | -0.217* | 1.256* | -2.785 | 544.991 |
| Mortgage Finance | 0.011* | -0.565* | 0.287* | 0.932* | -0.085** | 1.366* | -2.176 | 427.087 |
| Mortgage REITs | 0.000 | -9.815* | 0.293 | -0.749* | -0.010 | 1.354* | -2.632 | 282.362 |
| Property \& Casualty Insurance | 0.009* | -0.652* | 0.236* | 0.922* | $-0.108 *$ | 1.664* | -3.148 | 615.163 |
| Real Estate Holding \& Dev. | 0.013* | -0.982*** | 0.174*** | 0.827* | -0.088 | 1.183* | -2.117 | 415.821 |
| Real Estate Services | 0.016** | -0.601*** | 0.367** | 0.927* | $-0.158 * * *$ | 1.235* | -1.523 | 105.019 |
| Reinsurance | 0.005*** | $-0.746 * * *$ | 0.167 | 0.892* | -0.149** | 1.218* | -3.018 | 455.75 |
| Residential REITs | 0.006* | -0.305 | 0.125*** | 0.962* | $-0.037$ | 1.082* | -2.938 | 574.526 |
| Retail REITs | 0.009* | -0.570** | 0.228* | 0.931* | -0.071 | 1.212* | -3.069 | 600.04 |
| Specialty Finance | 0.011* | -1.020* | 0.252* | 0.859* | -0.171** | 1.553* | -2.977 | 582.24 |
| Specialty REITs | 0.009* | $-0.511^{* * *}$ | 0.209** | 0.939* | -0.028 | 1.415* | -2.886 | 563.315 |

Note: See Table 15.

Table 17. Estimation results of EGARCH model for the non-financials

| Subsectors | $\Phi$ | $\omega$ | $\alpha$ | $\beta$ | $\gamma$ | GED | AIC | Log <br> Likelihood |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Aerospace | 0.011* | -0.707** | 0.197*** | 0.903* | -0.111 | 1.342* | -2.903 | 567.769 |
| Airlines | 0.007*** | -3.172* | 0.318** | 0.408** | -0.243* | 1.706* | -2.066 | 405.845 |
| Alternative Electricity | 0 | -0.844** | 0.209** | 0.883* | -0.152** | 1.804* | -2.966 | 522.089 |
| Aluminum | 0.007*** | -0.692* | 0.252* | 0.895* | -0.071 | 1.380* | -1.943 | 382.132 |
| Apparel Retailers | 0.011* | -0.952* | 0.37* | 0.867* | $-0.147 *$ | 1.778* | -2.083 | 409.111 |
| Auto Parts | 0.008* | -0.936** | 0.186*** | 0.862* | -0.194* | 1.373* | -2.879 | 563.273 |
| Automobiles | 0.002 | -0.45** | 0.22* | 0.944* | -0.096** | 1.625* | -2.118 | 415.847 |
| Biotechnology | 0.016* | -0.171** | 0.122** | 0.985* | 0.067* | 1.458* | -2.075 | 405.566 |
| Brewers | 0.01* | -0.339** | 0.081*** | 0.953* | 0.093* | 1.933* | -2.986 | 583.875 |
| Broadcasting \& Entertainment | 0.011* | -0.463** | 0.286* | 0.955* | -0.081** | 1.793* | -2.37 | 464.662 |
| Broadline Retailers | 0.007* | -2.275* | 0.455* | 0.662* | -0.133** | 1.708* | -2.814 | 550.608 |
| Building Materials \& Fixtures | 0.011* | -0.892*** | 0.212** | 0.866* | -0.113*** | 1.246* | -2.634 | 515.808 |
| Business Support Services | 0.011* | $-0.534 * * *$ | 0.144*** | 0.928* | -0.058 | 1.310* | -3.003 | 587.138 |
| Business Train. \& Emp. Agencies | 0.015* | -0.652 | 0.256** | 0.907* | -0.094*** | 1.714* | -1.976 | 288.697 |
| Clothing \& Accessories | 0.012* | -1.094* | 0.325* | 0.839* | -0.189* | 1.330* | -2.422 | 474.657 |
| Coal | 0.006 | -0.295*** | 0.163** | 0.961* | 0.024 | 1.446* | -1.679 | 330.974 |
| Commercial Vehicles \& Trucks | 0.01* | -1.305** | 0.266* | 0.788* | -0.121** | 1.460* | -2.345 | 459.911 |
| Commodity Chemicals | 0.008* | -1.214** | 0.146 | 0.804* | -0.194** | 1.409* | -2.777 | 543.525 |
| Computer Hardware | 0.009* | -0.523*** | 0.204* | 0.931* | -0.026** | 1.815* | -2.419 | 474.241 |
| Computer Services | 0.009* | -1.176 | 0.15 | 0.815* | -0.132*** | 1.329* | -2.908 | 568.827 |
| Consumer Electronics | 0.018* | -0.376 | 0.118 | 0.929* | -0.049 | 1.398* | -1.183 | 207.705 |
| Containers \& Packaging | 0.009* | -2.041* | 0.051 | 0.65* | -0.328* | 1.372* | -2.848 | 557.277 |
| Conventional Electricity | 0.005* | -7.103 | 0.014 | -0.122 | 0.097 | 1.462* | -3.475 | 678.543 |
| Defense | 0.015* | -0.497* | 0.225 ** | 0.945* | -0.074 | 1.191* | -3.043 | 594.981 |
| Delivery Services | 0.005*** | -0.512** | 0.243* | 0.937* | -0.061 | 1.457* | -2.355 | 461.796 |
| Distillers \& Vintners | 0.009* | -1.31** | 0.253** | 0.801* | -0.23* | 1.503* | -2.749 | 538.075 |
| Diversified Industrials | 0.007* | -0.452** | 0.23* | 0.953* | -0.046 | 1.384* | -3.06 | 598.256 |
| Drug Retailers | 0.011* | -1.088* | 0.047 | 0.814* | -0.232* | 1.489* | -2.733 | 534.929 |
| Durable Household Products | 0.007** | -2.059* | 0.388* | 0.68* | -0.386* | 1.468* | -2.647 | 518.35 |
| Electrical Comp. \& Equipment | 0.01* | -1.549* | 0.282* | 0.763* | -0.207* | 1.522* | -2.759 | 540.059 |
| Electronic Equipment | 0.009* | -0.452* | 0.264* | 0.953* | -0.032 | 1.402* | -2.456 | 481.3 |
| Electronic Office Equipment | 0.005 | -0.62* | 0.267* | 0.921* | -0.133* | 1.365* | -2.43 | 476.327 |
| Exploration \& Production | 0.006*** | -2.268* | 0.222*** | 0.611* | -0.262* | 1.642* | -2.53 | 495.608 |
| Farming \& Fishing | 0.012** | -2.294** | 0.567* | 0.633* | -0.277* | 1.999* | -2.134 | 191.678 |
| Financial Administration | 0.012* | -0.904** | 0.297* | 0.885* | -0.1*** | 1.427* | -3.051 | 596.445 |
| Fixed Line Telecommunications | 0.006** | $-0.464 * * *$ | 0.208* | 0.949* | -0.009 | 1.631* | -3.129 | 611.603 |
| Food Products | 0.009* | -0.573** | 0.262* | 0.941* | -0.006 | 1.477* | -3.51 | 685.341 |
| Food Retailers \& Wholesalers | 0.011* | -6.187* | -0.076 | -0.063 | $-0.241^{* *}$ | 1.350* | -3.041 | 594.565 |
| Footwear | 0.014* | -0.201** | 0.161* | 0.984* | -0.009 | 1.349* | -1.998 | 392.779 |
| Forestry | -0.001 | -0.201 | -0.219 | 0.924* | -0.253* | 1.206* | -2.864 | 130.607 |
| Furnishings | 0.009* | -0.865** | 0.194*** | 0.864* | -0.159** | 1.610* | -2.378 | 466.257 |
| Gambling | 0.011** | -0.386*** | 0.06 | 0.926* | -0.129* | 1.239* | -1.758 | 346.275 |
| Gas Distribution | 0.009* | -1.66* | 0.314* | 0.762* | -0.203* | 1.428* | -3.12 | 609.827 |
| Gold Mining | 0.002 | -0.773 | 0.197** | 0.862* | 0.067 | 1.499* | -1.678 | 330.759 |

Note: See Table 15.

Table 17. Continued

| Subsectors | $\Phi$ | $\omega$ | $\alpha$ | $\beta$ | $\gamma$ | GED | AIC | Log <br> Likelihood |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Health Care Providers | 0.016* | $-0.234 * * *$ | 0.108 | 0.972* | -0.069 | 1.233* | -2.363 | 463.416 |
| Heavy Construction | 0.006*** | -0.506 | 0.197** | 0.929* | -0.033 | 1.303* | -2.273 | 445.902 |
| Home Construction | 0.008*** | -0.147 | 0.041 | 0.975* | -0.035 | 1.673* | -1.76 | 346.569 |
| Home Improvement Retailers | 0.009* | -0.416 | 0.137*** | 0.943* | 0.006 | 1.572* | $-2.555$ | 500.419 |
| Hotels | 0.012* | -0.686** | 0.243** | 0.901* | -0.134** | 1.161* | -2.29 | 449.206 |
| Industrial Machinery | 0.008* | -2.198** | 0.348* | 0.647* | -0.181 * | 1.458* | -2.624 | 513.818 |
| Industrial Suppliers | 0.011* | -0.63 | 0.156 | 0.904* | -0.009 | 1.455* | $-2.531$ | 495.886 |
| Integrated Oil \& Gas | 0.006* | -2.02 | 0.13 | 0.683* | -0.149** | 1.501* | -3.222 | 629.513 |
| Internet | 0.02* | -0.231* | 0.22* | 0.989* | 0.056 | 1.213* | -1.53 | 217.92 |
| Iron \& Steel | 0.007 | -2.492* | 0.039 | 0.489* | -0.373* | 1.582* | -1.958 | 385.008 |
| Marine Transportation | 0.01** | -0.228** | 0.1 *** | 0.968* | -0.059*** | 1.401* | -1.778 | 350.187 |
| Media Agencies | 0.011* | -0.517** | 0.26* | 0.94* | -0.019 | 1.378* | $-2.518$ | 493.25 |
| Medical Equipment | 0.011* | -2.972* | 0.155 | 0.528* | -0.217* | 1.556* | -3.19 | 623.359 |
| Medical Supplies | 0.009* | $-0.383 * * *$ | 0.141*** | 0.955* | -0.026 | 1.510* | -3.244 | 633.823 |
| Mobile Telecommunications | 0.014* | $-0.567 *$ | 0.345* | 0.938* | 0.002 | 1.401* | -2.24 | 439.472 |
| Multiutilities | 0.007* | -0.831 | 0.124 | 0.883* | -0.015 | 1.436* | -3.495 | 682.375 |
| Nondurable Household Products | 0.009* | $-4.334 * * *$ | 0.169 | 0.28 | $-0.196 * * *$ | 1.377* | -3.004 | 587.33 |
| Nonferrous Metals | 0.008** | -0.331** | 0.182* | 0.959* | -0.009 | 1.523* | -1.923 | 378.19 |
| Oil Equipment \& Services | 0.007*** | -1.902* | 0.146 | 0.643* | -0.258* | 1.655* | -2.128 | 417.86 |
| Paper | 0.003 | -0.5** | 0.192** | 0.933* | -0.144* | 1.439* | -2.442 | 478.655 |
| Personal Products | 0.012* | -5.982* | -0.148 | 0.001 | -0.415* | 1.122* | -3.291 | 642.987 |
| Pharmaceuticals | 0.011* | $-6.357 * *$ | 0.096 | -0.03 | $-0.173 * * *$ | 1.449* | -3.249 | 634.726 |
| Pipelines | 0.01* | -0.869* | 0.222** | 0.883* | -0.146** | 1.411* | -3.117 | 609.285 |
| Platinum \& Precious Metals | 0.000 | -1.597 | 2.25 | -0.296 | 0.101 | 1.106* | $-2.985$ | 370.261 |
| Publishing | 0.004** | -3.125* | 0.224*** | 0.509* | -0.396* | 1.510* | -3.163 | 618.194 |
| Railroads | 0.012* | -0.9*** | 0.273** | 0.877* | -0.052 | 1.491* | $-2.792$ | 546.287 |
| Recreational Products | 0.014* | $-1.164 * * *$ | 0.128 | 0.775* | -0.199 | 1.243* | -1.895 | 237.293 |
| Recreational Services | 0.011* | -0.719** | 0.214** | 0.894* | -0.103** | 1.468* | -2.374 | 465.402 |
| Renewable Energy Equipment | 0.01 | -0.853 | 0.145 | 0.777*** | -0.042 | 1.735* | $-2.367$ | 458.57 |
| Restaurants \& Bars | 0.011* | 0.038** | -0.011 | 1.005* | -0.018 | 1.862* | -3.032 | 592.772 |
| Semiconductors | 0.01** | -0.358** | 0.245* | 0.964* | 0.004 | 1.494* | $-1.859$ | 365.758 |
| Soft Drinks | 0.012* | $-0.261 * *$ | 0.152** | 0.974* | 0.075*** | 1.180* | -3.17 | 619.561 |
| Software | 0.014* | -0.432* | 0.302* | 0.963* | 0.026 | 1.884* | $-2.24$ | 439.531 |
| Speciality Chemicals | 0.013* | $-1.289 * *$ | 0.222*** | 0.808* | -0.14*** | 1.207* | -3.046 | 595.555 |
| Specialized Consumer Services | 0.013* | $-0.586 * * *$ | 0.219* | 0.923* | 0.011 | 1.555* | $-2.562$ | 501.859 |
| Specialty Retailers | 0.009* | -0.626** | 0.251* | 0.921* | -0.095*** | 1.654* | -2.57 | 503.413 |
| Telecommunications Equipment | 0.012* | -0.434** | 0.232* | 0.949* | -0.039 | 1.639* | -2.127 | 417.594 |
| Tires | 0.000 | -0.291 ** | 0.154** | 0.959* | -0.12* | 1.323* | -1.58 | 311.88 |
| Tobacco | 0.018* | -7.267* | -0.238 | -0.399 | -0.12 | 1.135* | $-2.528$ | 495.324 |
| Toys | 0.009* | -1.78** | 0.222 | 0.695* | -0.176** | 1.355* | -2.445 | 479.126 |
| Transportation Services | 0.005 | -1.452* | 0.032 | 0.715* | $-0.253 *$ | 1.460* | -2.158 | 423.764 |
| Travel \& Tourism | 0.014* | -0.28** | 0.155** | 0.964* | -0.079** | 1.470* | -1.505 | 291.29 |
| Trucking | 0.008* | -2.218 | 0.013 | 0.621** | -0.147 | 1.491* | -2.988 | 584.198 |
| Waste \& Disposal Services | 0.009* | -0.219** | 0.206* | 0.988* | 0.013 | 1.303* | -2.458 | 481.775 |
| Water | 0.009* | $-0.52 * * *$ | 0.24* | 0.94* | -0.03 | 1.209* | $-2.878$ | 562.912 |

Note: See Table 15.

In the Table $14-16, \Phi$ and $\omega$ denote the constant terms in the mean and variance equations in the Equation (14), respectively. Moreover, $\alpha, \beta$ and $\gamma$ represent the ARCH, GARCH and asymmetric leverage effects, correspondingly. The ARCH effect ( $\alpha$ ) measures the magnitude or the symmetric effect of the model. The GARCH effect ( $\beta$ ) evaluates the persistence of current conditional volatility regardless of the market conditions. Thus, when $\beta$ is relatively big, then volatility takes an extensive time to fades away subsequent a market turmoil.

The asymmetric leverage effect $(\gamma)$ which first noted by Black (1976) can be defined as a tendency of negative correlation between the stock price changes and their volatility. This is known as leverage effect because when the market value of the firm with debt and equity outstanding falls (stock price falls), the firm becomes more leveraged (the debt to equity ratio increases). Accordingly, a negative $\gamma$ can be considered as bad news, may have larger impact on volatility compared with a positive $\gamma$. Therefore, the leverage effect ( $\gamma$ ) is expected to be negative.

As can be seen from Table 14-16, the GED degree parameters of the estimated models are all less than 2 , which verify the point that the tails of financials, nonfinancials and WTI returns are heavier than the tails of standard normal distribution. Regarding the $\beta$ coefficients, almost all of them are significant and relatively large which indeed imply the sluggish deterioration of the volatility shock. This also gives clear-cut evidence for the existence of the volatility clustering. For instance, the $\beta$ of WTI is 0.880 , which suggests that $88 \%$ of existing volatility shock can be viewed in the next period.

Moreover, the average $\beta$ of the financials and non-financials are 0.83 and 0.78 , respectively. This shows that volatility shocks are more persistent in the financials rather than non-financials. Also, the majority of $\gamma$ coefficients are negative and significant in both financial and non-financial subsectors which imply that bad news generates more volatility than good news for these subsectors.

The residual series of the $\operatorname{EGARCH}(1,1)$ models for all subsectors and WTI have been investigated. Table 17-19 give the results for ARCH-LM and Ljung-Box $\mathrm{Q}^{2}$ tests. The results of ARCH-LM test suggest that volatility clustering has wiped out from the residual series since the null hypothesis of homoscedasticity cannot be rejected for all the subsectors. Additionally, the null hypothesis of no autocorrelation also cannot be rejected for all the EGARCH estimates at 5\% significance level. Therefore, it can be concluded that there are not any more volatility clustering and autocorrelation in the residual of the EGARCH estimates.

Table 18. Diagnostics tests after EGARCH estimation for the WTI

| Series | ARCH-LM | P-value | Q $^{2}(20)$ | P-value |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| WTI crude oil | 2.401 | 0.121 | 16.484 | 0.686 |

Note: ARCH-LM is Engle's (1982) Lagrange multiplier test for the heteroscedasticity in the residual of the return series up to order $20 . \mathrm{Q}^{2}(20)$ is the Ljung-Box test statistics for autocorrelation in the squared standardized residuals with 20 lags.

Table 19. Diagnostics tests after EGARCH estimation for the financials

| Subsector | ARCH-LM | P-value | Q $^{2}(20)$ | P-value |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Asset Managers | 0.020 | 0.886 | 10.239 | 0.964 |
| Banks | 0.098 | 0.753 | 7.796 | 0.993 |
| Consumer Finance | 0.655 | 0.418 | 7.798 | 0.993 |
| Full Line Insurance | 0.175 | 0.675 | 7.819 | 0.993 |
| Hotel \& Lodging REITs | 0.487 | 0.485 | 3.996 | 0.997 |
| Industrial \& Office REITs | 0.128 | 0.729 | 4.282 | 0.998 |
| Insurance Brokers | 0.056 | 0.811 | 5.632 | 0.999 |
| Investment Companies | 0.325 | 0.568 | 11.408 | 0.996 |
| Investment Services | 0.282 | 0.595 | 4.404 | 0.998 |
| Life Insurance | 0.243 | 0.621 | 7.623 | 0.994 |
| Mortgage Finance | 1.056 | 0.304 | 20.377 | 0.435 |
| Mortgage REITs | 0.035 | 0.849 | 11.961 | 0.917 |
| Property \& Casualty Insurance | 0.497 | 0.481 | 13.744 | 0.843 |
| Real Estate Holding \& Development | 0.064 | 0.799 | 13.697 | 0.846 |
| Real Estate Services | 0.426 | 0.515 | 23.667 | 0.257 |
| Reinsurance | 1.301 | 0.254 | 25.026 | 0.289 |
| Residential REITs | 0.263 | 0.654 | 6.746 | 0.997 |
| Retail REITs | 0.036 | 0.847 | 7.619 | 0.994 |
| Specialty Finance | 0.166 | 0.683 | 9.737 | 0.973 |
| Specialty REITs | 0.375 | 0.541 | 11.446 | 0.934 |
| Nets Sabs |  |  |  |  |

Note: See Table 18.

Table 20. Diagnostics tests after EGARCH estimation for the non-financials

| Subsectors | ARCH-LM | P -value | $\mathrm{Q}^{2}$ (20) | P -value |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Aerospace | 0.446 | 0.504 | 12.804 | 0.886 |
| Airlines | 0.286 | 0.592 | 15.749 | 0.732 |
| Alternative Electricity | 1.227 | 0.268 | 20.084 | 0.453 |
| Aluminum | 2.300 | 0.130 | 21.479 | 0.369 |
| Apparel Retailers | 5.178 | 0.123 | 17.938 | 0.591 |
| Auto Parts | 0.036 | 0.849 | 10.294 | 0.963 |
| Automobiles | 0.392 | 0.531 | 22.525 | 0.313 |
| Biotechnology | 0.301 | 0.583 | 9.396 | 0.978 |
| Brewers | 0.235 | 0.627 | 20.050 | 0.455 |
| Broadcasting \& Entertainment | 1.068 | 0.301 | 12.365 | 0.903 |
| Broadline Retailers | 0.005 | 0.942 | 20.879 | 0.404 |
| Building Materials \& Fixtures | 0.605 | 0.437 | 19.770 | 0.472 |
| Business Support Services | 0.001 | 0.971 | 17.229 | 0.638 |
| Business Training \& Employment Agencies | 1.835 | 0.176 | 31.443 | 0.059 |
| Clothing \& Accessories | 0.009 | 0.923 | 23.463 | 0.267 |
| Coal | 0.820 | 0.365 | 27.536 | 0.121 |
| Commercial Vehicles \& Trucks | 0.263 | 0.608 | 12.697 | 0.890 |
| Commodity Chemicals | 0.204 | 0.651 | 16.405 | 0.691 |
| Computer Hardware | 0.001 | 0.972 | 27.708 | 0.116 |
| Computer Services | 0.035 | 0.851 | 6.429 | 0.998 |
| Consumer Electronics | 0.428 | 0.513 | 5.811 | 0.999 |
| Containers \& Packaging | 0.310 | 0.577 | 11.857 | 0.921 |
| Conventional Electricity | 1.487 | 0.223 | 40.847 | 0.056 |
| Defense | 0.285 | 0.593 | 7.569 | 0.994 |
| Delivery Services | 0.437 | 0.508 | 17.750 | 0.604 |
| Distillers \& Vintners | 0.812 | 0.368 | 24.285 | 0.230 |
| Diversified Industrials | 0.199 | 0.655 | 7.432 | 0.995 |
| Drug Retailers | 0.175 | 0.675 | 17.301 | 0.633 |
| Durable Household Products | 0.094 | 0.758 | 11.856 | 0.921 |
| Electrical Components \& Equipment | 0.116 | 0.733 | 17.862 | 0.596 |
| Electronic Equipment | 0.127 | 0.720 | 9.155 | 0.981 |
| Electronic Office Equipment | 0.699 | 0.403 | 16.949 | 0.656 |
| Exploration \& Production | 0.063 | 0.801 | 24.433 | 0.224 |
| Farming \& Fishing | 0.025 | 0.874 | 22.016 | 0.340 |
| Financial Administration | 0.011 | 0.916 | 25.454 | 0.185 |
| Fixed Line Telecommunications | 2.164 | 0.142 | 13.107 | 0.873 |
| Food Products | 0.584 | 0.445 | 24.381 | 0.226 |
| Food Retailers \& Wholesalers | 0.051 | 0.820 | 22.846 | 0.296 |
| Footwear | 0.012 | 0.910 | 21.210 | 0.385 |
| Forestry | 0.816 | 0.368 | 31.206 | 0.253 |
| Furnishings | 0.001 | 0.965 | 11.527 | 0.931 |
| Gambling | 1.159 | 0.282 | 20.473 | 0.429 |
| Gas Distribution | 0.022 | 0.881 | 15.002 | 0.776 |
| Gold Mining | 0.247 | 0.618 | 10.182 | 0.965 |

[^3]Table 20. Continued

| Subsectors | ARCH-LM | P -value | $\mathrm{Q}^{2}(20)$ | P -value |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Health Care Providers | 0.002 | 0.958 | 16.130 | 0.709 |
| Heavy Construction | 0.480 | 0.488 | 15.221 | 0.764 |
| Home Construction | 0.567 | 0.451 | 14.764 | 0.790 |
| Home Improvement Retailers | 0.030 | 0.861 | 8.165 | 0.991 |
| Hotels | 0.162 | 0.687 | 13.827 | 0.839 |
| Industrial Machinery | 0.009 | 0.923 | 23.228 | 0.278 |
| Industrial Suppliers | 0.238 | 0.625 | 11.196 | 0.941 |
| Integrated Oil \& Gas | 0.227 | 0.634 | 30.780 | 0.158 |
| Internet | 0.140 | 0.708 | 18.504 | 0.554 |
| Iron \& Steel | 0.488 | 0.484 | 18.297 | 0.568 |
| Marine Transportation | 2.113 | 0.146 | 20.496 | 0.427 |
| Media Agencies | 0.133 | 0.715 | 20.866 | 0.405 |
| Medical Equipment | 0.630 | 0.427 | 28.115 | 0.108 |
| Medical Supplies | 1.645 | 0.200 | 26.030 | 0.165 |
| Mobile Telecommunications | 0.847 | 0.357 | 18.028 | 0.586 |
| Multiutilities | 0.274 | 0.600 | 17.949 | 0.591 |
| Nondurable Household Products | 0.078 | 0.778 | 28.328 | 0.102 |
| Nonferrous Metals | 3.085 | 0.079 | 17.379 | 0.628 |
| Oil Equipment \& Services | 0.644 | 0.422 | 18.698 | 0.542 |
| Paper | 0.516 | 0.472 | 10.500 | 0.958 |
| Personal Products | 0.020 | 0.886 | 25.485 | 0.131 |
| Pharmaceuticals | 0.025 | 0.873 | 21.128 | 0.245 |
| Pipelines | 0.571 | 0.450 | 19.262 | 0.505 |
| Platinum \& Precious Metals | 0.783 | 0.377 | 50.327 | 0.568 |
| Publishing | 0.094 | 0.758 | 55.928 | 0.683 |
| Railroads | 0.166 | 0.683 | 13.397 | 0.860 |
| Recreational Products | 1.032 | 0.310 | 38.176 | 0.065 |
| Recreational Services | 0.028 | 0.866 | 18.451 | 0.558 |
| Renewable Energy Equipment | 0.402 | 0.527 | 20.246 | 0.443 |
| Restaurants \& Bars | 1.261 | 0.262 | 24.590 | 0.218 |
| Semiconductors | 0.172 | 0.678 | 19.385 | 0.497 |
| Soft Drinks | 0.197 | 0.656 | 20.341 | 0.437 |
| Software | 0.615 | 0.433 | 10.953 | 0.947 |
| Specialty Chemicals | 0.013 | 0.908 | 8.189 | 0.991 |
| Specialized Consumer Services | 0.988 | 0.320 | 14.895 | 0.782 |
| Specialty Retailers | 0.493 | 0.482 | 11.432 | 0.934 |
| Telecommunications Equipment | 0.138 | 0.709 | 12.492 | 0.898 |
| Tires | 0.571 | 0.450 | 27.402 | 0.113 |
| Tobacco | 0.006 | 0.936 | 29.219 | 0.108 |
| Toys | 0.003 | 0.950 | 10.602 | 0.956 |
| Transportation Services | 0.027 | 0.868 | 18.355 | 0.564 |
| Travel \& Tourism | 0.083 | 0.773 | 20.967 | 0.399 |
| Trucking | 0.017 | 0.895 | 13.039 | 0.876 |
| Waste \& Disposal Services | 0.000 | 0.983 | 13.252 | 0.866 |
| Water | 0.000 | 0.979 | 14.554 | 0.801 |

Note: See Table 18.

### 2.4.6.2 Estimation of VaRs based on GED-EGARCH

The downside VaRs for financials, non-financials, and WTI can be obtained by means of the Eq. (16). The summary statistics of the estimated VaRs at the $95 \%$ confidence level are presented in Table 20-22. Several findings can be drawn from the outcomes in these Tables. With the exception of the one financial and two nonfinancial subsectors, all of the other LR statistics are less than the critical value of 3.84 .

Table 21. Summary of VaRs for the WTI

| Series | Mean | Std. <br> deviation | Min. | Max. | Failure <br> time | Failure <br> rate | LR <br> stat. |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| WTI crude oil | -0.139 | 0.043 | -0.262 | -0.061 | 17 | 0.044 | 0.313 |

Note: LR denotes to the Kupiec's (1995) likelihood ratio test. Its $95 \%$ critical value is 3.84 . * indicates the inadequacy of VaR estimate.

Table 22. Summary of VaRs for the financials

| Subsector | Mean | Std. <br> deviation | Min. | Max. | Failure <br> time | Failure <br> rate | LR <br> stat. |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Asset Managers | -0.139 | 0.043 | -0.262 | -0.061 | 17 | 0.044 | 0.313 |
| Banks | -0.094 | 0.047 | -0.419 | -0.059 | 20 | 0.052 | 0.023 |
| Consumer Finance | -0.105 | 0.028 | -0.231 | -0.074 | 18 | 0.047 | 0.101 |
| Full Line Insurance | -0.121 | 0.132 | -1.256 | -0.068 | 18 | 0.047 | 0.101 |
| Hotel \& Lodging REITs | -0.140 | 0.054 | -0.428 | -0.093 | 12 | 0.031 | 3.379 |
| Industrial \& Office REITs | -0.105 | 0.053 | -0.429 | -0.069 | 14 | 0.044 | 0.274 |
| Insurance Brokers | -0.090 | 0.025 | -0.249 | -0.067 | 19 | 0.049 | 0.007 |
| Investment Companies | -0.155 | 0.095 | -0.624 | -0.086 | 11 | 0.052 | 0.016 |
| Investment Services | -0.148 | 0.049 | -0.349 | -0.076 | 22 | 0.057 | 0.367 |
| Life Insurance | -0.101 | 0.067 | -0.603 | -0.051 | 19 | 0.049 | 0.007 |
| Mortgage Finance | -0.144 | 0.089 | -0.813 | -0.082 | 20 | 0.052 | 0.023 |
| Mortgage REITs | -0.108 | 0.024 | -0.202 | -0.071 | 12 | 0.057 | 0.216 |
| Property \& Casualty Insurance | -0.077 | 0.027 | -0.193 | -0.049 | 20 | 0.052 | 0.023 |
| Real Estate Holding \& Dev. | -0.128 | 0.029 | -0.343 | -0.104 | 12 | 0.031 | 3.379 |
| Real Estate Services | -0.194 | 0.133 | -0.848 | -0.100 | 6 | 0.046 | 0.042 |
| Reinsurance | -0.082 | 0.022 | -0.170 | -0.058 | 7 | 0.023 | $5.442 *$ |
| Residential REITs | -0.091 | 0.027 | -0.215 | -0.067 | 21 | 0.054 | 0.144 |
| Retail REITs | -0.086 | 0.045 | -0.411 | -0.058 | 12 | 0.031 | 3.379 |
| Specialty Finance | -0.086 | 0.036 | -0.359 | -0.053 | 20 | 0.052 | 0.023 |
| Specialty REITs | -0.089 | 0.025 | -0.212 | -0.063 | 19 | 0.049 | 0.007 |

Note: See Table 21.

Table 23. Summary of VaRs for the non-financials

| Subsector | Mean | Std. deviation | Min. | Max. | Failure time | Failure rate | LR stat. |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Aerospace | -0.089 | 0.030 | -0.221 | -0.053 | 21 | 0.054 | 0.144 |
| Airlines | -0.140 | 0.041 | -0.458 | -0.114 | 21 | 0.054 | 0.144 |
| Alternative Electricity | -0.092 | 0.028 | -0.225 | -0.065 | 17 | 0.049 | 0.010 |
| Aluminum | -0.152 | 0.048 | -0.559 | -0.115 | 14 | 0.036 | 1.716 |
| Apparel Retailers | -0.134 | 0.053 | -0.571 | -0.085 | 20 | 0.052 | 0.023 |
| Auto Parts | -0.095 | 0.040 | -0.459 | -0.064 | 20 | 0.052 | 0.023 |
| Automobiles | -0.139 | 0.053 | -0.512 | -0.095 | 15 | 0.039 | 1.112 |
| Biotechnology | -0.132 | 0.052 | -0.270 | -0.064 | 19 | 0.049 | 0.003 |
| Brewers | -0.093 | 0.008 | -0.099 | 0.009 | 11 | 0.028 | 4.463* |
| Broadcasting \& Entertainment | -0.116 | 0.042 | -0.230 | -0.047 | 18 | 0.047 | 0.101 |
| Broadline Retailers | -0.091 | 0.027 | -0.338 | -0.068 | 22 | 0.057 | 0.367 |
| Building Materials \& Fixtures | -0.104 | 0.027 | -0.268 | -0.066 | 22 | 0.057 | 0.367 |
| Business Support Services | -0.084 | 0.019 | -0.160 | -0.060 | 22 | 0.057 | 0.367 |
| Business Train. \& Emp. Agencies | -0.131 | 0.035 | -0.280 | -0.085 | 11 | 0.038 | 0.868 |
| Clothing \& Accessories | -0.115 | 0.045 | -0.391 | -0.077 | 26 | 0.067 | 2.182 |
| Coal | -0.172 | 0.034 | -0.304 | -0.117 | 23 | 0.059 | 0.685 |
| Commercial Vehicles \& Trucks | -0.119 | 0.033 | -0.382 | -0.078 | 20 | 0.052 | 0.023 |
| Commodity Chemicals | -0.094 | 0.027 | -0.259 | -0.059 | 19 | 0.049 | 0.007 |
| Computer Hardware | -0.112 | 0.030 | -0.277 | -0.064 | 13 | 0.034 | 2.468 |
| Computer Services | -0.088 | 0.016 | -0.200 | -0.073 | 16 | 0.041 | 0.647 |
| Consumer Electronics | -0.212 | 0.017 | -0.275 | -0.126 | 16 | 0.047 | 0.069 |
| Containers \& Packaging | -0.091 | 0.028 | -0.281 | -0.027 | 22 | 0.057 | 0.367 |
| Conventional Electricity | -0.065 | 0.013 | -0.115 | -0.039 | 28 | 0.072 | 3.598 |
| Defense | -0.088 | 0.035 | -0.245 | -0.037 | 17 | 0.044 | 0.313 |
| Delivery Services | -0.121 | 0.034 | -0.225 | -0.070 | 21 | 0.054 | 0.144 |
| Distillers \& Vintners | -0.095 | 0.037 | -0.369 | -0.062 | 17 | 0.044 | 0.313 |
| Diversified Industrials | -0.086 | 0.035 | -0.252 | -0.054 | 17 | 0.044 | 0.313 |
| Drug Retailers | -0.095 | 0.029 | -0.271 | -0.057 | 24 | 0.062 | 1.096 |
| Durable Household Products | -0.109 | 0.060 | -0.524 | -0.067 | 16 | 0.041 | 0.647 |
| Electrical Comp. \& Equipment | -0.093 | 0.035 | -0.398 | -0.071 | 18 | 0.047 | 0.101 |
| Electronic Equipment | -0.116 | 0.053 | -0.350 | -0.059 | 23 | 0.059 | 0.685 |
| Electronic Office Equipment | -0.122 | 0.048 | -0.337 | -0.067 | 18 | 0.047 | 0.101 |
| Exploration \& Production | -0.108 | 0.030 | -0.326 | -0.080 | 25 | 0.065 | 1.596 |
| Farming \& Fishing | -0.126 | 0.058 | -0.588 | -0.092 | 9 | 0.052 | 0.011 |
| Financial Administration | -0.079 | 0.027 | -0.239 | -0.051 | 21 | 0.054 | 0.144 |
| Fixed Line Telecommunications | -0.081 | 0.023 | -0.210 | -0.058 | 23 | 0.059 | 0.685 |
| Food Products | -0.062 | 0.021 | -0.147 | -0.029 | 18 | 0.047 | 0.101 |
| Food Retailers \& Wholesalers | -0.078 | 0.012 | -0.206 | -0.033 | 15 | 0.039 | 1.112 |
| Footwear | -0.142 | 0.046 | -0.284 | -0.071 | 22 | 0.057 | 0.367 |
| Forestry | -0.102 | 0.038 | -0.224 | -0.045 | 6 | 0.069 | 0.592 |
| Furnishings | -0.116 | 0.035 | -0.314 | -0.086 | 18 | 0.047 | 0.101 |
| Gambling | -0.161 | 0.042 | -0.431 | -0.119 | 22 | 0.057 | 0.367 |
| Gas Distribution | -0.083 | 0.035 | -0.281 | -0.061 | 16 | 0.041 | 0.647 |
| Gold Mining | -0.172 | 0.022 | -0.308 | -0.146 | 17 | 0.044 | 0.313 |

Note: See Table 21.

Table 23. Continued

| Subsector | Mean | Std. deviation | Min. | Max. | Failure time | Failure rate | LR stat. |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Health Care Providers | -0.118 | 0.028 | -0.317 | -0.079 | 23 | 0.059 | 0.685 |
| Heavy Construction | -0.126 | 0.029 | -0.294 | -0.089 | 20 | 0.052 | 0.023 |
| Home Construction | -0.159 | 0.010 | -0.202 | -0.104 | 17 | 0.044 | 0.313 |
| Home Improvement Retailers | -0.102 | 0.017 | -0.159 | -0.075 | 18 | 0.047 | 0.101 |
| Hotels | -0.128 | 0.048 | -0.333 | -0.081 | 17 | 0.044 | 0.313 |
| Industrial Machinery | -0.101 | 0.034 | -0.406 | -0.067 | 15 | 0.039 | 1.112 |
| Industrial Suppliers | -0.104 | 0.016 | -0.188 | -0.075 | 16 | 0.041 | 0.647 |
| Integrated Oil \& Gas | -0.072 | 0.010 | -0.142 | -0.060 | 17 | 0.044 | 0.313 |
| Internet | -0.173 | 0.075 | -0.372 | -0.052 | 17 | 0.061 | 0.705 |
| Iron \& Steel | -0.147 | 0.042 | -0.489 | -0.079 | 23 | 0.059 | 0.685 |
| Marine Transportation | -0.163 | 0.035 | -0.304 | -0.116 | 22 | 0.057 | 0.367 |
| Media Agencies | -0.166 | 0.015 | -0.209 | 0.008 | 5 | 0.013 | 15.720* |
| Medical Equipment | -0.072 | 0.017 | -0.220 | -0.058 | 20 | 0.052 | 0.023 |
| Medical Supplies | -0.069 | 0.012 | -0.112 | -0.051 | 22 | 0.057 | 0.367 |
| Mobile Telecommunications | -0.134 | 0.061 | -0.364 | -0.059 | 21 | 0.054 | 0.144 |
| Multiutilities | -0.065 | 0.006 | -0.101 | -0.056 | 22 | 0.057 | 0.367 |
| Nondurable Household Products | -0.081 | 0.021 | -0.361 | -0.026 | 23 | 0.059 | 0.685 |
| Nonferrous Metals | -0.149 | 0.037 | -0.303 | -0.093 | 22 | 0.057 | 0.367 |
| Oil Equipment \& Services | -0.134 | 0.038 | -0.415 | -0.092 | 19 | 0.049 | 0.007 |
| Paper | -0.119 | 0.054 | -0.527 | -0.079 | 22 | 0.057 | 0.367 |
| Personal Products | -0.073 | 0.015 | -0.182 | -0.013 | 14 | 0.036 | 1.716 |
| Pharmaceuticals | -0.069 | 0.011 | -0.101 | -0.049 | 25 | 0.065 | 1.596 |
| Pipelines | -0.082 | 0.036 | -0.306 | -0.048 | 20 | 0.052 | 0.023 |
| Platinum \& Precious Metals | -0.334 | 0.215 | -0.966 | 0.000 | 4 | 0.010 | 3.341 |
| Publishing | -0.080 | 0.030 | -0.332 | -0.054 | 14 | 0.036 | 1.716 |
| Railroads | -0.092 | 0.026 | -0.274 | -0.058 | 19 | 0.049 | 0.007 |
| Recreational Products | -0.145 | 0.038 | -0.331 | -0.070 | 14 | 0.057 | 0.267 |
| Recreational Services | -0.115 | 0.034 | -0.341 | -0.087 | 26 | 0.067 | 2.182 |
| Renewable Energy Equipment | -0.308 | 0.026 | -0.383 | -0.280 | 5 | 0.050 | 0.001 |
| Restaurants \& Bars | -0.083 | 0.023 | -0.111 | -0.030 | 19 | 0.049 | 0.007 |
| Semiconductors | -0.155 | 0.051 | -0.304 | -0.067 | 18 | 0.047 | 0.101 |
| Soft Drinks | -0.076 | 0.023 | -0.145 | -0.041 | 19 | 0.049 | 0.007 |
| Software | -0.123 | 0.057 | -0.280 | -0.040 | 18 | 0.047 | 0.101 |
| Specialty Chemicals | -0.081 | 0.027 | -0.261 | -0.041 | 17 | 0.044 | 0.313 |
| Specialized Consumer Services | -0.102 | 0.027 | -0.212 | -0.072 | 20 | 0.052 | 0.023 |
| Specialty Retailers | -0.102 | 0.032 | -0.258 | -0.064 | 20 | 0.052 | 0.023 |
| Telecommunications Equipment | -0.134 | 0.047 | -0.371 | -0.076 | 18 | 0.047 | 0.101 |
| Tires | -0.192 | 0.073 | -0.492 | -0.110 | 20 | 0.052 | 0.023 |
| Tobacco | -0.104 | 0.024 | -0.181 | -0.047 | 21 | 0.054 | 0.144 |
| Toys | -0.114 | 0.034 | -0.483 | -0.096 | 20 | 0.052 | 0.023 |
| Transportation Services | -0.134 | 0.033 | -0.374 | -0.063 | 21 | 0.054 | 0.144 |
| Travel \& Tourism | -0.181 | 0.053 | -0.374 | -0.113 | 17 | 0.045 | 0.208 |
| Trucking | -0.082 | 0.010 | -0.145 | 0.000 | 18 | 0.047 | 0.101 |
| Waste \& Disposal Services | -0.120 | 0.046 | -0.271 | -0.046 | 17 | 0.044 | 0.313 |
| Water | -0.089 | 0.024 | -0.180 | -0.051 | 17 | 0.044 | 0.313 |

Note: See Table 21.

Thus, by the Kupiec's (1995) backtest approach, it can be concluded that the $\operatorname{EGARCH}(1,1)$ model has sufficiently estimated the VaRs at the $95 \%$ confidence level for the 107 out of 110 return series. The model was unable to adequately estimate the VaRs for the Reinsurance, Brewers and Media Agencies subsectors. From Table 20, it can be seen that on average, the maximum monthly loss for the WTI crude oil is not more than $13.9 \%$ with $95 \%$ probability. In other words, there is a $5 \%$ possibility that the average monthly loss for the WTI may exceed $13.9 \%$. The average of estimated VaRs for the financials and non-financials are -0.1141 and 0.1174 , respectively. This shows that on average, they both nearly experience the same level of risk. Additionally, it can be drawn from the results that the VaR estimates of non-financials are more precise than those of the financials as the average LR statistics of the former is 0.7371 and that of the latter is 0.8632 .

According to the estimated VaRs, the top-five riskiest financial subsectors are Real Estate Services (-19.4\%), Investment Companies (-15.5\%), Investment Services (14.8\%), Mortgage Finance (-14.4\%), and Hotel \& Lodging REITs (-14.0\%). On the other side, Platinum \& Precious Metals (-33.4\%), Renewable Energy Equipment (30.8\%), Consumer Electronics ( $-21.2 \%$ ), Tires ( $-19.2 \%$ ), and Travel \& Tourism ($18.1 \%$ ) are the top-five riskiest non-financial subsectors. Moreover, the least risky financial subsector is Property \& Casualty Insurance (-7.7\%) and the least risky nonfinancial subsector is Food Products $(-6.2 \%)$. Figure 16 and 17 exhibit the top-five riskiest financial and non-financial subsectors. Interestingly, for almost all the subsectors, the VaRs fail to estimate the maximum amount of risk during the U.S. recessions (shaded areas) especially throughout the 2008-2009 crisis. As a result, the subsectors' negative returns exceed the VaR estimates during these periods.

-Hotel \& Lodging REITs - VaR

Figure 16. VaR estimations for the top-five riskiest financial subsectors

_Platinum \& Precious Metals $=$ VaR

_Renewable Energy Equipment $\quad$ VaR




- Tires $\quad$ VaR

-Travel \& Tourism - VaR

Figure 17. VaR estimations for the top-five riskiest non-financial subsectors

### 2.4.6.3 Risk Spillover Test from WTI to Subsectors

For testing the risk spillover between WTI and the subsectors' returns, the causal interactions between them should be inspected. With this respect, the aforesaid methodology of Hill's (2007) time-varying causality will be employed here. This is a bivariate test where causality between two different time series is measured. The length rolling window is fixed at 60 months and the maximum order of the VAR model is 4 lags. As it is explained before, instead of using the oil and subsectors' returns in the model, their estimated VaRs will be used to test the risk spillover from crude oil market to the subsectors. Hence, the aim is to check the null hypothesis of non-causality running from WTI to the subsectors' returns. Causality takes place at any horizon if and only if it takes place at horizon 1 (first month in each window).

Table 24. Time-varying causality in risk for financial subsectors

| Null hypothesis ( $\mathrm{H}_{0}$ ) | Avg. VAR order | Avg. BPV | Rejection rate of $\mathrm{H}_{0}$ |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Oil $\rightarrow$ Asset Managers | 1.8777 | 0.5023 | 10.7034 |
| Oil $\rightarrow$ Banks | 2.1009 | 0.3895 | 25.0765 |
| Oil $\rightarrow$ Consumer Finance | 1.6177 | 0.5324 | 8.8685 |
| Oil $\rightarrow$ Full Line Insurance | 1.8966 | 0.3908 | 27.5862 |
| Oil $\rightarrow$ Hotel \& Lodging REITs | 1.9419 | 0.3552 | 24.4648 |
| Oil $\rightarrow$ Industrial \& Office REITs | 1.8731 | 0.4339 | 18.8462 |
| Oil $\rightarrow$ Insurance Brokers | 1.8960 | 0.3214 | 35.4740 |
| Oil $\rightarrow$ Investment Companies | 4.0000 | 0.5825 | 9.3750 |
| Oil $\rightarrow$ Investment Services | 1.9052 | 0.4516 | 16.2080 |
| Oil $\rightarrow$ Life Insurance | 1.9939 | 0.3601 | 26.6055 |
| Oil $\rightarrow$ Mortgage Finance | 4.0000 | 0.5673 | 24.2604 |
| Oil $\rightarrow$ Mortgage REITs | 4.0000 | 0.4450 | 12.6316 |
| Oil $\rightarrow$ Property \& Casualty Insurance | 1.8471 | 0.4264 | 15.5963 |
| Oil $\rightarrow$ Real Estate Holding \& Development | 1.9021 | 0.3822 | 11.6208 |
| Oil $\rightarrow$ Real Estate Services | 4.0000 | 0.4092 | 10.9091 |
| Oil $\rightarrow$ Reinsurance | 1.6849 | 0.3746 | 9.6639 |
| Oil $\rightarrow$ Residential REITs | 1.7920 | 0.4822 | 19.2661 |
| Oil $\rightarrow$ Retail REITs | 1.7890 | 0.5176 | 12.5382 |
| Oil $\rightarrow$ Specialty Finance | 1.7309 | 0.4523 | 15.9021 |
| Oil $\rightarrow$ Specialty REITs | 1.9939 | 0.3312 | 31.8043 |

Notes: $\rightarrow$ denotes the non-causality null hypothesis. VAR denotes Vector Autoregressive model and BPV denotes the bootstrap P-values. The maximum order of VAR model is 4 lags. Size of the fixed rolling-window is 60 months. Bootstrap iterations are 1000 times. BPV of less than $5 \%$ indicates causality within that window.

Table 25. Time-varying causality in risk for non-financial subsectors

| Null hypothesis ( $\mathrm{H}_{0}$ ) |  | Avg. VAR order | Avg. BPV | Rejection rate of $\mathrm{H}_{0}$ |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Oil $\rightarrow$ | Aerospace | 1.7554 | 0.3998 | 24.1590 |
| Oil $\rightarrow$ | Airlines | 1.4893 | 0.2606 | 30.5810 |
| Oil $\rightarrow$ | Alternative Electricity | 2.0000 | 0.4641 | 20.3448 |
| Oil $\rightarrow$ | Aluminum | 1.9969 | 0.3299 | 25.6881 |
| Oil $\rightarrow$ | Apparel Retailers | 1.7134 | 0.5493 | 3.0488 |
| Oil $\rightarrow$ | Auto Parts | 1.9238 | 0.3455 | 35.9756 |
| Oil $\rightarrow$ | Automobiles | 1.7012 | 0.4504 | 14.0244 |
| Oil $\rightarrow$ | Biotechnology | 1.8720 | 0.4285 | 9.7561 |
| Oil $\rightarrow$ | Brewers | 1.7165 | 0.4370 | 23.4756 |
| Oil $\rightarrow$ | Broadcasting \& Entertainment | 1.9052 | 0.6050 | 0.3058 |
| Oil $\rightarrow$ | Broadline Retailers | 1.8140 | 0.3196 | 35.3659 |
| Oil $\rightarrow$ | Building Materials \& Fixtures | 1.9419 | 0.3999 | 10.7034 |
| Oil $\rightarrow$ | Business Support Services | 1.6128 | 0.5110 | 6.0976 |
| Oil $\rightarrow$ | Business Training \& Employment Agencies | 1.5627 | 0.5228 | 8.8685 |
| Oil $\rightarrow$ | Clothing \& Accessories | 1.6402 | 0.3706 | 18.5976 |
| Oil $\rightarrow$ | Coal | 1.7095 | 0.4732 | 11.9266 |
| Oil $\rightarrow$ | Commercial Vehicles \& Trucks | 1.9085 | 0.5108 | 1.8293 |
| Oil $\rightarrow$ | Commodity Chemicals | 1.8720 | 0.4022 | 16.4634 |
| Oil $\rightarrow$ | Computer Hardware | 1.6341 | 0.5778 | 3.9634 |
| Oil $\rightarrow$ | Computer Services | 1.5902 | 0.4945 | 6.4220 |
| Oil $\rightarrow$ | Consumer Electronics | 1.6477 | 0.5283 | 9.2527 |
| Oil $\rightarrow$ | Containers \& Packaging | 1.9205 | 0.4156 | 22.9358 |
| Oil $\rightarrow$ | Conventional Electricity | 2.0153 | 0.2412 | 34.5566 |
| Oil $\rightarrow$ | Defense | 1.6239 | 0.3825 | 22.3242 |
| Oil $\rightarrow$ | Delivery Services | 1.9626 | 0.4105 | 11.2805 |
| Oil $\rightarrow$ | Distillers \& Vintners | 1.8598 | 0.5298 | 8.8415 |
| Oil $\rightarrow$ | Diversified Industrials | 1.9207 | 0.4149 | 22.8659 |
| Oil $\rightarrow$ | Drug Retailers | 1.6982 | 0.4449 | 11.2805 |
| Oil $\rightarrow$ | Durable Household Products | 1.7805 | 0.3940 | 21.3415 |
| Oil $\rightarrow$ | Electrical Components \& Equipment | 1.6098 | 0.3996 | 15.8537 |
| Oil $\rightarrow$ | Electronic Equipment | 1.6646 | 0.5470 | 13.4146 |
| Oil $\rightarrow$ | Electronic Office Equipment | 1.7095 | 0.4309 | 19.5719 |
| Oil $\rightarrow$ | Exploration \& Production | 1.7370 | 0.5856 | 4.5872 |
| Oil $\rightarrow$ | Farming \& Fishing | 4.0000 | 0.5297 | 6.4935 |
| Oil $\rightarrow$ | Financial Administration | 1.6829 | 0.4932 | 4.8780 |
| Oil $\rightarrow$ | Fixed Line Telecommunications | 1.6422 | 0.5371 | 3.0581 |
| Oil $\rightarrow$ | Food Products | 1.6677 | 0.4090 | 17.3780 |
| Oil $\rightarrow$ | Food Retailers \& Wholesalers | 1.5183 | 0.5102 | 6.4024 |
| Oil $\rightarrow$ | Footwear | 1.4512 | 0.3265 | 28.9634 |
| Oil $\rightarrow$ | Forestry | 4.0000 | 0.3694 | 14.9254 |
| Oil $\rightarrow$ | Furnishings | 2.2012 | 0.3195 | 37.5001 |
| Oil $\rightarrow$ | Gambling | 1.7982 | 0.3709 | 16.2080 |
| Oil $\rightarrow$ | Gas Distribution | 1.9083 | 0.4562 | 11.6208 |
| Oil $\rightarrow$ | Gold Mining | 1.4220 | 0.4818 | 14.6789 |

[^4]Table 25. Continued

| Null hypothesis ( $\mathrm{H}_{0}$ ) |  | Avg. VAR order | Avg. BPV | Rejection rate of $\mathrm{H}_{0}$ |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Oil $\rightarrow$ | Health Care Providers | 1.5152 | 0.5087 | 7.9268 |
| Oil $\rightarrow$ | Heavy Construction | 1.5199 | 0.4267 | 16.5138 |
| Oil $\rightarrow$ | Home Construction | 1.7195 | 0.3879 | 5.4878 |
| Oil $\rightarrow$ | Home Improvement Retailers | 1.6402 | 0.4232 | 12.1951 |
| Oil $\rightarrow$ | Hotels | 1.5810 | 0.3419 | 15.9021 |
| Oil $\rightarrow$ | Industrial Machinery | 1.7805 | 0.4063 | 30.1829 |
| Oil $\rightarrow$ | Industrial Suppliers | 1.6860 | 0.5459 | 8.5366 |
| Oil $\rightarrow$ | Integrated Oil \& Gas | 1.4557 | 0.5187 | 9.1743 |
| Oil $\rightarrow$ | Internet | 4.0000 | 0.5054 | 11.6732 |
| Oil $\rightarrow$ | Iron \& Steel | 1.7645 | 0.4279 | 20.4893 |
| Oil $\rightarrow$ | Marine Transportation | 1.8994 | 0.4597 | 4.2683 |
| Oil $\rightarrow$ | Media Agencies | 2.0457 | 0.4345 | 6.6788 |
| Oil $\rightarrow$ | Medical Equipment | 1.6616 | 0.5454 | 5.4878 |
| Oil $\rightarrow$ | Medical Supplies | 1.7348 | 0.3800 | 23.1707 |
| Oil $\rightarrow$ | Mobile Telecommunications | 1.6086 | 0.4050 | 10.0917 |
| Oil $\rightarrow$ | Multiutilities | 1.9939 | 0.2473 | 40.3670 |
| Oil $\rightarrow$ | Nondurable Household Products | 1.5793 | 0.3901 | 28.3537 |
| Oil $\rightarrow$ | Nonferrous Metals | 1.7278 | 0.3638 | 16.8196 |
| Oil $\rightarrow$ | Oil Equipment \& Services | 1.5994 | 0.4254 | 15.2905 |
| Oil $\rightarrow$ | Paper | 1.8991 | 0.3762 | 31.1927 |
| Oil $\rightarrow$ | Personal Products | 1.6098 | 0.4758 | 15.2439 |
| Oil $\rightarrow$ | Pharmaceuticals | 1.8994 | 0.4147 | 25.0000 |
| Oil $\rightarrow$ | Pipelines | 1.9807 | 0.4657 | 7.8768 |
| Oil $\rightarrow$ | Platinum \& Precious Metals | 1.5924 | 0.4914 | 2.1739 |
| Oil $\rightarrow$ | Publishing | 1.7768 | 0.4287 | 29.3578 |
| Oil $\rightarrow$ | Railroads | 1.6494 | 0.4985 | 13.1098 |
| Oil $\rightarrow$ | Recreational Products | 2.2390 | 0.4004 | 21.6355 |
| Oil $\rightarrow$ | Recreational Services | 1.7615 | 0.3947 | 24.7706 |
| Oil $\rightarrow$ | Renewable Energy Equipment | 4.0000 | 0.4451 | 16.0494 |
| Oil $\rightarrow$ | Restaurants \& Bars | 1.5657 | 0.4978 | 12.5382 |
| Oil $\rightarrow$ | Semiconductors | 1.6128 | 0.6064 | 4.2683 |
| Oil $\rightarrow$ | Soft Drinks | 1.7744 | 0.4477 | 14.0244 |
| Oil $\rightarrow$ | Software | 1.7982 | 0.4891 | 5.5046 |
| Oil $\rightarrow$ | Specialty Chemicals | 1.5627 | 0.5183 | 7.0336 |
| Oil $\rightarrow$ | Specialized Consumer Services | 1.5366 | 0.5460 | 15.2439 |
| Oil $\rightarrow$ | Specialty Retailers | 1.5535 | 0.5466 | 5.8104 |
| Oil $\rightarrow$ | Telecommunications Equipment | 1.6758 | 0.5863 | 12.2324 |
| Oil $\rightarrow$ | Tires | 1.5335 | 0.4219 | 6.7073 |
| Oil $\rightarrow$ | Tobacco | 1.4573 | 0.5050 | 18.9024 |
| Oil $\rightarrow$ | Toys | 1.5000 | 0.5107 | 3.3537 |
| Oil $\rightarrow$ | Transportation Services | 1.9268 | 0.2592 | 34.4512 |
| Oil $\rightarrow$ | Travel \& Tourism | 1.4832 | 0.2733 | 37.3089 |
| Oil $\rightarrow$ | Trucking | 1.4634 | 0.3746 | 20.1220 |
| Oil $\rightarrow$ | Waste \& Disposal Services | 2.2591 | 0.3887 | 20.4268 |
| Oil $\rightarrow$ | Water | 1.5291 | 0.4343 | 11.9266 |

[^5]Table 23 and 24 display the time-varying causality in risk for the financial and nonfinancial subsectors, respectively. For the financials, the rejection rate of null hypothesis implying time-varying non-causality in risk ranges from $8.87 \%$ (Consumer Finance) to $35.47 \%$ (Insurance Brokers). This means that, for instance, there is a risk spillover effect from oil to Insurance Brokers in $35.47 \%$ of the time. For the non-financials, the rejection rate of null hypothesis implying time-varying non-causality in risk ranges from $0.30 \%$ (Broadcasting \& Entertainment) to $40.37 \%$ (Multiutilities). This means that, for example, $0.30 \%$ and $40.37 \%$ of risk from the oil market spillover to Broadcasting \& Entertainment and Multiutilities subsectors during the time span of the study, accordingly. This result is very compelling as the former subsector has almost no dependence on the oil but the latter subsector has a heavy reliance on the oil as it is the main input in their production process.

Figure 18 and 19 show the financial and non-financial subsectors which accept the highest level of risk spillover from crude oil. Among the financials, Insurance Brokers, Specialty REITs, Full Line Insurance, Life Insurance, and Banks are the subsectors receiving the highest causality in risk from the oil market. For the nonfinancials, Multiutilities, Furnishings, Travel \& Tourism, Broadline Retailers, and Auto Parts are the subsectors which receive the highest level of risk spillover effect from the crude oil market during the period of the study. The recessionary periods in the U.S. are highlighted in gray in these Figures. Remarkably, during and after the 2008-09 financial crisis, there are high levels of risk spillover effect running from the oil market toward financial and non-financial subsectors as the bootstrap p-values fall below 5\%. Among the financials, the most continuous risk spillover effect occurs for Insurance Brokers starting from mid-2007 to mid-2013.




—— Oil =/=> Life Insurance - Rejection Line (5\%)


> _Oil =/=> Banks —— Rejection Line (5\%)

Figure 18. Time-varying causality in risk for the top-five financial subsectors


Figure 19. Time-varying causality in risk for the top-five non-financial subsectors

For the non-financials, the most continuous risk spillover effect happens for Travel \& Tourism starting from mid-2008 to mid-2014 (with exception of few months). Overall, it can be inferred that the risk from the crude oil market tends to spill over to the above markets mainly during financial crisis periods. Furthermore, during the 1990s, some of the subsectors such as Specialty REITs, Full Line Insurance, Life Insurance, Multiutilities, Furnishings, and Auto Parts, experience the risk spillover from the crude oil market. It may be due to the impacts of the U.S. recession in the early 1990s and the 1990 oil price shock subsequent of Iraq's invasion of Kuwait which doubled the oil price from July to October, 1990.

### 2.5 Conclusion

This study investigates the oil price risk exposure of the financial and non-financial subsectors in the U.S. stock markets over the period from January 1983 to March 2015. In these estimates, the existence of structural breaks in the equity returns of the industry subsectors is taken into account. The Bai and Perron (2003) approach is used to identify multiple breakpoints. By employing the Fama and French (2015) five-factor asset pricing model integrated with oil price risk factor, the oil price risk exposures of the financial and non-financial industries are estimated.

Given the heterogeneity in the oil price risk exposure of different industries, this study measures the effect of oil price risk on all U.S. industries at the subsector level because an industry-level study may conceal important subsector effects. The results show that majority of financial and non-financial subsectors are affected by oil price changes, but the magnitude of the impact appears to be rather limited. The size of oil price sensitivity differs noticeably across subsectors and over time.

Evidently, some industries have experienced substantial changes in oil price exposure throughout the period of the study. For example, the oil price risk exposure of some subsectors is low in the pre-break period but becomes higher and more significant in the post-break period. The financial subsectors that display this behavior are Banks, Full Line Insurance, Investment Services, Mortgage Finance, Specialty Finance, and Specialty REITs. The non-financial subsectors that display similar behavior are Airlines, Coal, Exploration \& Production, Furnishings, Gambling, Gold Mining, Heavy Construction, Nonferrous Metals, and Integrated Oil \& Gas. This pattern-changing behavior may be caused by various important milestones, such as the early-1990s recession in the U.S., the Asian and Russian financial crises of 1997-1998, the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003 followed by the oil price doubling from mid-2003 to late 2005, and the U.S. sub-prime mortgage crisis of 2007.

Moreover, it is shown that majority of financial subsectors are affected negatively, and most of the non-financial subsectors are affected positively, by oil prices. Furthermore, the magnitude of the impact of oil prices on the financial subsectors is much lower than the magnitude of their impact on the non-financial subsectors. Among the financial subsectors, Mortgage Finance and Real Estate Services have the largest negative and positive exposures to the oil price risk, respectively. For the non-financial subsectors, Airlines and Oil Equipment Services have the largest negative and positive oil price risk exposures, respectively. Furthermore, it is shown that MKT, SMB and HML which are the risk factors in the FF3F model have relatively higher role in explaining the returns for the financial subsectors than those for the non-financial subsectors.

Interestingly, the recently introduced Fama-French risk factors, RMW and CMA, along with OIL, play more important role in determining the equity returns for the non-financial subsectors than those for the financial subsectors. For the both types of subsectors, the monthly return on the market portfolio (MKT), which is calculated as the value-weighted return of all CRSP stocks incorporated in the U.S. in excess of the 1-month Treasury bill rate, has the highest share among other risk factors in determining the subsectors' returns.

The second most important risk factor for the financials, HML, is the monthly return of a portfolio with high book-to-market ratio (a value portfolio) in excess of a portfolio with low book-to-market ratio (growth portfolio) which suggests the important role of book-to-market ratio in asset valuation of financial stocks. The second most important risk factor for the non-financials, CMA, is the monthly return of a portfolio with conservative investment strategies in excess of a portfolio with aggressive investment strategies. This indicates the importance of CMA in pricing non-financial stocks.

However, the monthly return on West Texas Intermediate crude oil (OIL) has the least important role in explaining the subsectors' returns for the both financials and non-financials. Additionally, via the analysis of time-varying causality in return, the subsectors which receive the highest level of return spillover from crude oil have been identified. Among the financials, Full Line Insurance, Life Insurance, Banks, Hotel \& Lodging REITs, and Residential REITs are the top subsectors receiving highest causality in return from crude oil market.

For the non-financials, Auto Parts, Electronic Office Equipment, Tires, Furnishings, and Commodity Chemicals are the top subsectors which receive the highest level of return spillover from crude oil during the period of the study. It is pointed out that after the 1990-91 and 2008-09 recessions, there are high levels of causality in return running from oil market to financial and non-financial subsectors. This may be due to the higher demand and more dependency on oil during the expansionary phase of the economic cycle. Nonetheless, this is not often the case for the 2001 recession perhaps because it was very short-lived and shallow. By the help of the GED shape parameters in the estimated $\operatorname{EGARCH}(1,1)$ models, it is has been verified that the tails of financials, non-financials and WTI returns are heavier than the tails of standard normal distribution.

These results justify the use this type of distribution here. The results also show that investors should not ignore the tail risk as they are very costly when they occur (Rajan, 2010). Based on the estimated results of the $\operatorname{EGARCH}(1,1)$, it can be suggested that volatility persistence is relatively high for almost all of the subsectors and WTI. This indicates that volatility shocks decay calmly and it also gives explicit evidence for the existence of the volatility clustering. Moreover, the average $\beta$ of the financials and non-financials are 0.83 and 0.78 , respectively.

This shows that volatility shocks are more persistent in the financials rather than non-financials. In testing the leverage effect, it is revealed that the majority of $\gamma$ coefficients are negative and significant in both financial and non-financial subsectors which indicate that bad news generates more volatility than good news for these subsectors.

Furthermore, by the help of the Kupiec's (1995) backtest method, it is proved that the $\operatorname{EGARCH}(1,1)$ model has sufficiently estimated the VaRs at the $95 \%$ confidence level for the 107 out of 110 return series. It can be seen from the results that on average, the maximum monthly loss for the WTI crude oil is not more than $13.9 \%$ with $95 \%$ probability. In other words, there is a $5 \%$ possibility that the average monthly loss for the WTI may exceed $13.9 \%$. The average of estimated VaRs for the financials and non-financials are -0.1141 and -0.1174 , respectively. This shows that on average, they both have approximately the same level of risk.

Another finding is that the VaR estimates of non-financials are more precise than those of the financials as the average LR statistics of the former is 0.7371 and that of the latter is 0.8632 . This means that modeling the risk for the financials is more difficult than that of the non-financials. According to the estimated VaRs, the topfive riskiest financial subsectors are Real Estate Services (-19.4\%), Investment Companies (-15.5\%), Investment Services (-14.8\%), Mortgage Finance (-14.4\%), and Hotel \& Lodging REITs (-14.0\%). On the other side, Platinum \& Precious Metals (-33.4\%), Renewable Energy Equipment (-30.8\%), Consumer Electronics ($21.2 \%$ ), Tires ( $-19.2 \%$ ), and Travel \& Tourism ( $-18.1 \%$ ) are the top-five riskiest nonfinancial subsectors.

Moreover, the least risky financial subsector is Property \& Casualty Insurance (7.7\%) and the least risky non-financial subsector is Food Products (-6.2\%). It should be noted that for almost all the subsectors, the VaRs are unable to effectively define the maximum amount of risk during the U.S. recessions especially throughout the 2008-2009 crisis.

As a result, the subsectors' negative returns exceed the VaR estimates during these periods. Thus, there is really a need for developing a new technique in order to overcome the shortcomings of VaR method during crisis periods. Through the use of VaRs and the Hill's (2007) time-varying causality, the risk spillover from WTI to the financial and non-financial subsectors have examined. For the financials, the rejection rate of null hypothesis implying time-varying non-causality in risk ranges from $8.87 \%$ (Consumer Finance) to $35.47 \%$ (Insurance Brokers). This implies that, for instance, there is a risk spillover effect from oil to Insurance Brokers in $35.47 \%$ of the time.

For the non-financials, the rejection rate of null hypothesis implying time-varying non-causality in risk ranges from $0.30 \%$ (Broadcasting \& Entertainment) to $40.37 \%$ (Multiutilities). This means that, for example, $0.30 \%$ and $40.37 \%$ of risk from the oil market spillover to Broadcasting \& Entertainment and Multiutilities subsectors during the time span of the study, accordingly. This result is very convincing as the former subsector has almost no dependence on the oil but the latter subsector has a heavy dependence on the oil as it is the main input in their production process.

Among the financial, Insurance Brokers, Specialty REITs, Full Line Insurance, Life Insurance, and Banks are the subsectors receiving the highest causality in risk from the oil market. For the non-financials, Multiutilities, Furnishings, Travel \& Tourism, Broadline Retailers, and Auto Parts are the subsectors which receive the highest level of risk spillover effect from the crude oil market during the period of the study.

It is found that during and after the 2008-09 financial crisis, there are high levels of risk spillover effect running from the oil market toward financial and non-financial subsectors as the bootstrap p-values fall below 5\%. Among the financials, the most continuous risk spillover effect occurs for Insurance Brokers starting from mid-2007 to mid-2013.

For the non-financials, the most continuous risk spillover effect happens for Travel \& Tourism starting from mid-2008 to mid-2014 (with exception of few months). Overall, it can be concluded that the risk from the crude oil market tends to be transferred to these markets mainly in the course of financial crisis periods. In addition, during the 1990s, some of the subsectors such as Specialty REITs, Full Line Insurance, Life Insurance, Multiutilities, Furnishings, and Auto Parts, experience the risk spillover from the crude oil market. It may be due to the impacts of the U.S. recession in the early 1990s and the 1990 oil price shock subsequent of Iraq's invasion of Kuwait which doubled the oil price from July to October, 1990.

## Chapter 3

# THE NEXUS BETWEEN OIL PRICES AND STOCK PRICES OF OIL, TECHNOLOGY AND TRANSPORTATION COMPANIES 

### 3.1 Introduction

Crude oil is one of the most closely watched commodities in the world and its price is determined by global oil demand and supply conditions. The driving forces behind oil price movements include: increasing global demand for oil by emerging markets, environmental issues like global warming, and energy security issues like potential supply disruptions due to political instability in oil exporting countries. Moreover, concerns of future oil shortages due to the estimates of reaching "peak oil" between 2016 and 2040 affect oil prices as well (Appenzeller 2004). Predicting the future of the oil market is intricate, as the largest oil-consuming nations do not have the largest oil reserves.

North America and Asia Pacific account for approximately $60 \%$ of the world's oil consumption while they just comprise $15 \%$ of the world's proved oil reserves. On the other hand, five Middle Eastern countries including Saudi Arabia, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, and United Arab Emirates have almost $50 \%$ of the world's proved oil reserves, but their share of the world's oil consumption is less than $10 \%$ (BP 2014). Therefore, this oil-rich region has a great export potential and plays a substantial role in the global energy market.

Developed economies heavily rely on the consumption of oil for their economies to thrive, despite the fact that a major proportion of it must be imported from other countries. Therefore, oil price swings, regardless of their causes, can have severe impacts on these economies. Oil price movements affect the production process and financial performance of companies, ultimately influencing their dividend payments, retained earnings, and stock prices (Huang et al. 1996).

Higher oil prices force businesses to slash their consumption and purchase more energy-efficient products in an attempt to shift toward renewable energy sources in the long term. This also encourages technology companies to allocate more funds towards the research and development of new, "green" technologies in order to reduce energy use and costs. Furthermore, higher oil prices are less likely to have similar impacts on different economic sectors as they have dissimilar dependencies on the oil industry. For instance, according to an estimate, higher oil prices will stimulate investment in cutting-edge technologies for more efficient oil extraction methods, leading to higher oil production by drilling companies in the next five years (IEA 2013).

Consequently, the expected boost in oil production can be translated into more cash flow and better financial performance for these companies. However, unlike the oil companies, technology and transportation companies may suffer due to higher oil prices. In the short run, their production costs may rise, but in the medium to long run, they might even experience better financial performance by developing and consuming new energy-efficient products.

A good example of this is the production of the Airbus A350 XWB by EADS in June 2013. This lightweight, carbon composite airliner burns $25 \%$ less fuel than the previous generation of comparable aircraft. This is equal to 10.5 million liters of fuel savings per year, which is equivalent to the fuel consumption of roughly 7,500 midsize cars per year. ${ }^{2}$ Although, Airbus spent significant amount of money on the development of this new aircraft, immediately after its first flight in June 2013 the company secured 613 orders worth billions of dollars (the number of orders increased to 780 by the end of February 2015). ${ }^{3}$

This implies that even with higher oil prices, technology companies can achieve better financial performance in the long term. In addition, those transportation firms, which utilize these energy-conserving products, can benefit a lot in terms of fuel cost savings and lower maintenance costs, thus directly affecting their profitability. The purpose of this paper is to empirically investigate the long-run and spillover impacts of crude oil prices on the stock prices of oil, technology and transportation companies listed in U.S. stock markets. The remainder of the study is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the relevant literature. Section 3 discusses the empirical methodology and data. Empirical analysis and results are presented in Section 4, while Section 5 provides concluding remarks.

### 3.2 Literature Review

While it is broadly accepted that oil price fluctuations have important effects on the financial performance of a wide variety of companies, there have been relatively few empirical works conducted to examine how sensitive the stock prices of oil, technology and transportation companies are to changes in oil prices. Nandha and

[^6]Faff (2008) studied the impact of oil price changes on 35 Datastream global industry indices over the period of April 1983 to September 2005. They demonstrated that oil price increases have a negative impact on stock returns of all sectors except mining, and oil and gas companies. Henriques and Sadorsky (2008) measured the impact of oil prices on the stock market performance of alternative energy firms. They employed a four-variable vector autoregressive model to examine the nexus between oil prices, interest rates, stock prices alternative energy and technology companies.

Their results confirm the existence of unidirectional Granger causality running from both oil prices and technology stock prices to the alternative energy stock prices. Using impulse response functions, they demonstrate that a shock to stock prices of technology firms has a larger effect on the stock prices of alternative energy companies than does a shock to oil prices. Aggarwal et al. (2012) examined the effect of oil price changes on the S\&P transportation companies. They used the daily data of WTI over two decades and found that transportation firms' returns are affected negatively by oil price rises.

Scholtensa and Yurtseverc (2012) study the industry impact of oil price shocks in the EU for the period 1983-2007. They construct dynamic VAR models with various oil price specifications to assess the impact of oil price shocks on 38 different industries. They assert that the influence of oil price shocks considerably varies across the industries under the study. Results indicate that most of the industries are positively affected by negative price shocks while they are not considerably influenced by increasing oil prices.

On the other hand, some industries like oil and gas and mining positively respond to oil price surges and negatively respond to plunging oil prices. Chang et al. (2013) examines the volatility spillovers and conditional correlations between the oil and financial markets. They use daily data of the spot, futures, and forward prices of the WTI and Brent crude oils, and the NYSE, FTSE100, Dow Jones and S\&P500 stock index returns from 2 January 1998 to 4 November 2009. They use multiple GARCH family models such as VARMA-GARCH, VARMA-AGARCH, CCC and DCC models. By using the CCC model, they explore the conditional correlations of returns across markets. They find that conditional correlations are very low, and some cases are not statistically significant. They conclude that the shocks are conditionally correlated only in the same market and not between markets. They also find little evidence of volatility spillovers between the crude oil and financial markets using the VARMA-GARCH and VARMA-AGARCH models.

Mohanty et al. (2014) explore the exposure of the U.S. travel and leisure industry to oil price risk. They apply the four-factor asset pricing model of the Fama-FrenchCarhart (1997) along with the oil price as a risk factor. The results show various degrees of oil price risk exposure across six subsectors. The exposure sign is mostly negative, but it is only significant for some of subsectors including airlines, restaurants and bars, and recreational services. The results also suggest that the exposure of the subsectors to oil price risk vary significantly over time. For instance, the oil price risk exposure of airline industry was the most during the 2007-2008 U.S. subprime mortgage crisis. Wang and Zhang (2014) study the responsiveness of China's major industries to oil price shocks using an ARJI-GARCH method. They concentrated on four major industries: metals, grains, oil fats, petrochemicals.

They also examined the impact of extreme price fluctuations; called jumps. The asymmetric impacts of oil price shocks have been confirmed. According to results, the negative oil price shocks had tougher effects on the four industries. The least sensitive market to oil price shocks was the grains market and the most sensitive market was the petrochemical. In the presence of jumps in the crude oil market, the reactions of four commodity markets would be different. In fact, the petrochemicals and oil fats markets had a tendency to overreact to oil price jumps but there was not such a behavior in the grain and metal markets.

Reboredo and Rivera-Castro (2014) investigate the relationship between oil and stock markets by using wavelet multi-resolution analysis in EU and the US at the aggregate and sectoral levels. They use data for the period June 2000 to July 2011. They employ wavelet decomposition analysis in order to measure interdependence and contagion effects between oil and stock price at various time frames. They find that except for oil and gas companies, oil price fluctuations had no impact on stock market returns in the pre-crisis period at either the sectoral or aggregate level. Contrariwise, they find evidence of positive interdependence and contagion between these markets at the time of financial crisis at the both levels.

### 3.3 Data and Methodology

### 3.3.1 Data

This study uses weekly data over the period of January 2, 1990 to February 3, 2015 to assess the short-run and long-run relationships between crude oil prices and the stock prices of oil, technology, and transportation companies. All data were obtained from Thomson Reuters's Datastream for a total of 1310 weekly observations for each variable. Weekly data is selected as it is less noisy compared to daily data and it
relatively captures market movements better than monthly data. The stock market performance of oil companies is measured using the NYSE Arca Oil Index (OIL). This is a price-weighted stock index of the world's top oil companies who deal with the exploration and production of petroleum. The performance of the oil industry is measured by this index through changes in total stock prices of the component.

The index was introduced on August 27, 1984 with a base level of $125 .{ }^{4}$ Further, the NYSE Arca Tech 100 Index (TEC) is used to examine the stock market performance of leading technological companies. This is a price-weighted stock index of technology-related firms listed on various US exchanges. The main aim of the index is to benchmark the performance of the firms using technological innovations across different types of industries. The index covers top companies from numerous industries, such as aerospace, biotechnology, electronics, computer software and hardware, semiconductors, telecommunications, and defense.

The index was developed by the Pacific Stock Exchange in 1982 and still operates with the ticker symbol of PSE under NYSE Euronext supervision. ${ }^{5}$ Another selected index for this study is the Dow Jones Transportation Average, DJTA (TRA). It is known as the best indicator for the US transportation sector. Its founding date backs to 1884 by Dow Jones \& Company, making it the oldest US stock index still in use.

[^7]

Figure 20. Time series plot of the variables

The index was initially composed of only railroad companies, but now it includes airlines, trucking, marine transportation, and logistics companies as well. The DJTA is also a price-weighted stock index and maintained by Dow Jones Indexes. ${ }^{6} 3$-month U.S. Treasury bill is chosen as the short-term interest rate (SIR) because according to many researchers (Chen et al., 1986; Chen, 1991; Sadorsky, 1999, 2001), it can explain stock price movements. The Standard and Poor's 500 Index (SPX) is also selected to capture market movements at aggregate level.

[^8]This study uses West Texas Intermediate crude oil (WTI) spot prices in order to measure the effect of oil prices on stock market performance of oil, technology and transportation companies. Hereafter, the natural logarithm of the data is being used in order to reduce unwanted variability (heteroskedasticity) in the series. Figure 20 illustrates the time series plot of the data. This shows that these stock indices tend to move together and also their movements are very similar to the oil price fluctuations. This means that these variables are highly correlated. The global financial crisis of 2008-2009 had a great impact on the stock prices of oil, technology and transportation companies, and also on crude oil prices.


Figure 21. Correlation plot matrix of the variables

As a result, all of the indices experienced a huge plunge ranging from $39 \%$ to almost 70\% between September 2008 and March 2009. For better understanding of the correlation conditions between these variables, the correlation plot matrix is presented in Figure 21.

### 3.3.2 Methodology

### 3.3.2.1 Empirical Model

In this study, we assume the short-term interest rate and the oil prices can explain fluctuations in the aforementioned stock price indices. Thus, the following equations are suggested:
$O I L_{t}=\beta_{1}+\beta_{2} S I R_{t}+\beta_{3} S P X_{t}+\beta_{4} W T I_{t}+\varepsilon_{t}$
$T E C_{t}=\alpha_{1}+\alpha_{2} S I R_{t}+\alpha_{3} S P X_{t}+\alpha_{4} W T I_{t}+\varepsilon_{t}$
$T R A_{t}=\gamma_{1}+\gamma_{2} S I R_{t}+\gamma_{3} S P X_{t}+\gamma_{4} W T I_{t}+\varepsilon_{t}$
where at period t , OIL, TEC and TRA are the natural logarithms of stock indices of oil, technology and transportation companies; SIR is the natural logarithm of shortterm interest rate; SPX is the natural logarithm of S\&P500 Index; WTI is the natural logarithm of West Texas Intermediate crude oil spot prices; and $\varepsilon$ is the error disturbance.

### 3.3.2.2 Testing for Breaks in the Time Series

Perron and Yabu (2009) introduce a method in an attempt to test the existence of a structural break or regime shift in a univariate time series. The method computes the EXP- $\mathrm{W}_{\mathrm{RQF}}$ test in order to find a break in a time series that is valid regardless of whether the error term is stationary or not. In other words, the EXP- $\mathrm{W}_{\mathrm{RQF}}$ test can be employed without knowing whether the series contains an autoregressive unit root or is trend stationary. By using robust quasi-flexible GLS (generalized least squares), this test can detect an unknown break in the intercept, deterministic trend or in both.

### 3.3.2.3 Unit Root Tests under Multiple Structural Breaks

When the existence of regime shifts is the case, the conventional unit root tests like Phillips and Perron (PP) and Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) cannot be applied due to lack of power. As a result, various unit roots tests in the econometrics literature consider structural breaks. Some of these tests can consider one or two structural breaks (see, for example, Zivot and Andrews, 1992; Lumsdaine and Papell, 1997; Ng and Perron, 2001; Lee and Strazicich, 2003). The newest unit root testing technique available is the one developed by Carrion-i-Silvestre et al. (2009) which allows for up to five breaks in the series. Hence, the unit root test that we apply in this study is superior to other unit root tests employed in the relevant literature, allowing us to be more confident about the unit root test results.

The unit root test of Carrion-i-Silvestre et al. (2009) uses the algorithm of Bai and Perron (2003) in order to identify structural breaks through a quasi-GLS (Generalized Least Squares) method and it minimizes the residual sum of squares through a dynamic programming process. Regarding the stochastic data generation process (DGP) $y_{t}=d_{t}+\mu_{t}\left(\right.$ where $\mu_{t}=\alpha \mu_{t-1}+v_{t}$ for $\left.\mathrm{t}=0,1, \ldots ., \mathrm{T}\right)$, Carrion-iSilvestre et al. (2009) developed the following five different statistics for testing the null hypothesis of a unit root under multiple structural breaks:

$$
\begin{equation*}
P_{T}\left(\lambda^{0}\right)=\frac{\left[S\left(\bar{\alpha}, \lambda^{0}\right)-\bar{\alpha} S\left(1, \lambda^{0}\right)\right]}{S^{2}\left(\lambda^{0}\right)} \tag{22}
\end{equation*}
$$

where $\mathrm{P}_{\mathrm{T}}$ stands for Gaussian point optimal statistic and S stands for spectral density function.
$M P_{T}\left(\lambda^{0}\right)=\frac{\left[c^{-2} T^{-2} \sum_{t=1}^{T} \tilde{y}_{t-1}^{2}+(1-\bar{c}) T^{-1} \tilde{y}_{T}^{2}\right]}{s\left(\lambda^{0}\right)^{2}}$
where $\mathrm{MP}_{\mathrm{T}}$ stands for the modified feasible point optimal statistic according to Ng and Perron (2001).

$$
\begin{align*}
& M Z_{\alpha}\left(\lambda^{0}\right)=\left(T^{-1} \tilde{y}_{T}^{2}-s\left(\lambda^{0}\right)^{2}\right)\left(2 T^{-2} \sum_{t=1}^{T} \tilde{y}_{t-1}^{2}\right)^{-1}  \tag{24}\\
& \operatorname{MSB}\left(\lambda^{0}\right)=\left(s\left(\lambda^{0}\right)^{-2} T^{-2} \sum_{t=1}^{T} \tilde{y}_{t-1}^{2}\right)^{1 / 2}  \tag{25}\\
& M Z_{t}\left(\lambda^{0}\right)=\left(T^{-1} \tilde{y}_{T}^{2}-s\left(\lambda^{0}\right)^{2}\right)\left(4 s\left(\lambda^{0}\right)^{2} T^{-2} \sum_{t=1}^{T} \tilde{y}_{t-1}^{2}\right)^{1 / 2} \tag{26}
\end{align*}
$$

where $\mathrm{MZ}_{\alpha}$, MSB , and $\mathrm{MZ}_{\mathrm{t}}$ are M-class test statistics which can obtained using GLS detrending approach (see Carrion-i-Silvestre et al., 2009). The asymptotic critical values are generated through a bootstrapping approach. Rejection of the null hypothesis indicates the stationarity of the series.

### 3.3.2 4 Maki (2012) Cointegration Test Under Multiple Structural Breaks

According to Westerlund and Edgerton (2006), the conventional cointegration tests for non-stationary series, which do not consider the existence of structural breaks, are likely to provide biased results. To deal with this risk, various methods are available in the relevant literature. For instance, cointegration tests of Carrion-i-Silvestre and Sansó (2006), and Westerlund and Edgerton (2006) allow for one or two breaks in the series. However, when dealing with a long sample period like in this study, the probability of existence of more than two structural breaks is higher and if they are not detected, may compromise the reliability of the results. To address this issue, we employ the newest cointegration test developed by Maki (2012) which allows for consideration of up to five structural breaks. In Maki's (2012) cointegration test, every period can be a possible breaking point and for this reason, a t-statistic for each period is computed. Periods with the lowest t-ratios are recognized as breaking
points. Maki (2012) developed four different models that are called "regime shift models" for testing the cointegration, as illustrated below.

Model 1, with a break in the level:
$y_{t}=\mu+\sum_{i=1}^{k} \mu_{i} K_{i, t}+\beta x_{t}+v_{t}$
Model 2, with a break in the level and coefficients:
$y_{t}=\mu+\sum_{i=1}^{k} \mu_{i} K_{i, t}+\beta x_{t}+\sum_{i=1}^{k} \beta_{i} x_{i} K_{i, t}+v_{t}$
Model 3, with a break in the level and coefficients, and with trend:
$y_{t}=\mu+\sum_{i=1}^{k} \mu_{i} K_{i, t}+\gamma x+\beta x_{t}+\sum_{i=1}^{k} \beta_{i} x_{i} K_{i, t}+v_{t}$
Model 4, with a break in the level, coefficients, and trend:
$y_{t}=\mu+\sum_{i=1}^{k} \mu_{i} K_{i, t}+\gamma t+\sum_{i=1}^{k} \gamma_{i} t K_{i, t}+\beta x_{t}+\sum_{i=1}^{k} \beta_{i} x_{i} K_{i, t}+v_{t}$
where $\mathrm{K}_{\mathrm{i}}$ stands for dummy variables that are defined by Maki (2012) as:
$K_{i}=\left\{\begin{array}{cc}1 & \text { when } \mathrm{t}>\mathrm{T}_{\mathrm{B}} \\ 0 & \text { otherwise }\end{array}\right.$
where $T_{B}$ stands for break point. The Monte Carlo simulations are used for computation of critical values to test the null hypothesis of 'no cointegration' under multiple structural breaks (see Maki, 2012).

### 3.3.2.5 Estimation of Long-Run Coefficients using DOLS

Once a cointegrating vector is determined, then the dynamic OLS (DOLS) approach can be used to estimate the long-run coefficients of equations (19-21). As suggested by Stock and Watson (1993), by addition of lagged structures and differenced of independent variables to their level forms, consistent estimators can be obtained by
eradicating any autocorrelation, endogeneity and simultaneity problems. Therefore, DOLS models can be employed regardless of the order of integration of the variables. The DOLS models will be used to estimate equations (19-21), which can be expressed as follows:

$$
\begin{align*}
& \text { OIL }=B^{\prime} X+\sum_{i=-q}^{q} \mu_{i} \Delta S I R_{t-i}+\sum_{i=-q}^{q} \eta_{i} \Delta S P X_{t-i}+\sum_{i=-q}^{q} \lambda_{i} \Delta W T I_{t-i}+\varpi D_{i}+\varepsilon_{t}  \tag{31}\\
& T E C_{t}=B^{\prime} X+\sum_{i=-q}^{q} \mu_{i} \Delta S I R_{t-i}+\sum_{i=-q}^{q} \eta_{i} \Delta S P X_{t-i}+\sum_{i=-q}^{q} \lambda_{i} \Delta W T I_{t-i}+\varpi D_{i}+\varepsilon_{t}  \tag{32}\\
& \text { TRA }_{t}=B^{\prime} X+\sum_{i=-q}^{q} \mu_{i} \Delta S I R_{t-i}+\sum_{i=-q}^{q} \eta_{i} \Delta S P X_{t-i}+\sum_{i=-q}^{q} \lambda_{i} \Delta W T I_{t-i}+\varpi D_{i}+\varepsilon_{t} \tag{33}
\end{align*}
$$

where $B=[\mathrm{c}, \alpha, \beta, \gamma], X=\left[1, \operatorname{SIR}_{\mathrm{t}}, \operatorname{SPX}_{\mathrm{t}}, \mathrm{WTI}_{\mathrm{t}}\right]$, and q stands for the lag structure to be determined by the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC), and t is a time trend. $\mathrm{D}_{\mathrm{i}}$ stands for dummy variables of week breaks which are allowed up to a maximum of five, and they are selected based on the Model 4 of Maki's (2012) cointegration test.

### 3.3.2.6 Breakpoint Regression

Given the occurrence of some structural changes in oil and financial markets over the last three decades, it is necessary to test the existence of structural breaks in the relationship between the stock prices of oil, technology, transportation companies, and crude oil price. This can be done using the method introduced by Bai and Perron (2003). This approach allows testing for multiple structural breaks in a linear model. Then, via using least squares estimation, it can detect breaks at a priori unknown dates. Allowing for multiple breaks in the explanatory factors, the Eq. (19-21) can be reformulated and use the following regression model with $m$ breaks ( $m+1$ regimes ${ }^{7}$ ):

[^9]$O I L_{t}=\alpha_{j}+\beta_{j} S I R_{t}+\gamma_{j} S P X_{t}+\delta_{j} W T I_{t}+\varepsilon_{t}$
$T E C_{t}=\alpha_{j}+\beta_{j} S I R_{t}+\gamma_{j} S P X_{t}+\delta_{j} W T I_{t}+\varepsilon_{t}$
$T R A_{t}=\alpha_{j}+\beta_{j} S I R_{t}+\gamma_{j} S P X_{t}+\delta_{j} W T I_{t}+\varepsilon_{t}$
where $t=T_{j-1}+1, \ldots, T_{j}$ and $j=1, \ldots, m+1$. The breakpoints $\left(T_{1}, \ldots, T_{m}\right)$ are explicitly treated as unknown, and by convention, $T_{0}=0$ and $T_{m+1}=T$ where $T$ is the total sample size. The Bai-Perron sequential test statistics detects the number of breaks. The $\operatorname{SupF}(l+1 \mid l)$ test is a sequential test of the null hypothesis of $l$ breaks versus the alternative of $l+1$ breaks. Later, the breakpoint regression is used to estimate the Eqs. (34-36) for the sub-periods based on breakpoint(s) determined by the Bai-Perron sequential test results.

### 3.3.2.6 Time-varying Causality

In order to test the spillover between oil prices and the stock indices of the oil, technology, and transportation industries, the causal linkages between them should be examined. This method is explained in detail in section 2.3.2.3.

### 3.4 Empirical Analysis and Results

The Perron and Yabu (2009) Exp- $\mathrm{W}_{\mathrm{RQF}}$ test statistics and the corresponding breaking weeks are reported in Table 26. The Exp- $\mathrm{W}_{\mathrm{RQF}}$ test statistic is estimated based on the Model 3 of Perron and Yabu (2009) which permits structural break in both level and trend. According to the results that are shown in Table 26, we can strongly reject the null hypothesis of not having structural break in both level and trend. Alternatively, it is indicating that there is at least one regime shift in each series under consideration.

Table 26. Perron and Yabu (2009) break test results

|  | OIL | SIR | SPX | TEC | TRA | WTI |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| EXP-W $_{\text {RQF }}$ | $31.2509^{\mathrm{a}}$ | $46.8299^{\mathrm{a}}$ | $24.6342^{\mathrm{a}}$ | $23.5144^{\mathrm{a}}$ | $15.3095^{\mathrm{a}}$ | $14.2044^{\mathrm{a}}$ |
| TB | 2005 W 38 | 2008 W 43 | 2008 W 21 | 2001 W 30 | 1999 W 42 | 2004 W 16 |

Note: a denotes statistical significance at $1 \%$ level. The asymptotic critical values for the EXP- $\mathrm{W}_{\mathrm{RQF}}$ are 2.48, 3.12 , and 4.47 (for a break in the constant and time trend slope) at $10 \%, 5 \%$, and $1 \%$ significance level, respectively (Perron \& Yabu, 2009).

Table 27 provides the Carrion-i-Silvestre et al. (2009) unit root tests results for the variables under consideration. The results suggest five structural breaks in each series. Given these breaks, all the series seem to be non-stationary in levels because the null hypothesis of having a unit root cannot be rejected. On the other hand, all the series become stationary in their first differences. Evidently, it is concluded that the series of the present study are integrated of order one, $\mathrm{I}(1)$. Since all the series are integrated of the same order, $I(1)$, the existence of any cointegrating relationship can be examined by using cointegration tests. As it is mentioned before, this study employs Maki's (2012) approach to test for cointegration.

Table 27. Carrion-i-Silvestre et al. (2009) unit root test results

|  | Levels |  |  |  |  | Breaking Weeks |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | $\mathrm{P}_{\mathrm{T}}$ | $\mathrm{MP}_{\mathrm{T}}$ | $\mathrm{MZ}_{\alpha}$ | MSB | $\mathrm{MZ}_{\mathrm{t}}$ |  |
| OIL | 11.55 | 11.4 | -39.17 | 0.11 | -4.41 | 1996W22; 1998W18; 2001W36; 2003W32; 2005W45 |
|  | [9.56] | [9.56] | [-46.49] | [0.10] | [-4.75] |  |
| SIR | 24.72 | 20.95 | -16.86 | 0.17 | -2.9 | 1999W41; 2001W36; 2005W49; 2008W52; 2011W15 |
|  | [7.92] | [7.92] | [-44.01] | [0.10] | [4.70] |  |
| SPX | 19.15 | 17.37 | -25.94 | 0.14 | -3.57 | 1994W50; 1999W41; 2002W41; 2005W42; 2008W21 |
|  | [9.33] | [9.33] | [-47.10] | [0.10] | [4.83] |  |
| TEC | 12.76 | 11.38 | -39.7 | 0.11 | -4.45 | 1998W40; 2000W35; 2002W39; 2004W30; 2009W09 |
|  | [9.51] | [9.51] | [-46.97] | [0.10] | [-4.80] |  |
| TRA | 13.29 | 11.1 | -39.92 | 0.11 | -4.46 | 1997W27; 1999W18; 2003W10; 2006W18; 2009W09 |
|  | [9.21] | [9.21] | [-47.48] | [0.10] | [-4.86] |  |
| WTI | 18.74 | 17.06 | -26.27 | 0.13 | -3.62 | 1997W02; 1999W01; 2000W02; 2003W39; 2008W29 |
|  | [9.36] | [9.36] | [-47.11] | [0.10] | [-4.82] |  |
| First Differences |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| DOIL | $0.19{ }^{\text {a }}$ | $0.19{ }^{\text {a }}$ | $-471.27^{\text {a }}$ | $0.03^{\text {a }}$ | $-15.34^{\text {a }}$ | - |
|  | [5.54] | [5.54] | [-17.32] | [0.16] | [-2.89] |  |
| DSIR | $0.19^{\text {a }}$ | $0.19{ }^{\text {a }}$ | -472.34 ${ }^{\text {a }}$ | $0.03^{\text {a }}$ | $-15.36{ }^{\text {a }}$ | - |
|  | [5.54] | [5.54] | [-17.32] | [0.16] | [-2.89] |  |
| DSPX | $0.19{ }^{\text {a }}$ | $0.19{ }^{\text {a }}$ | $-473.64{ }^{\text {a }}$ | $0.03{ }^{\text {a }}$ | $-15.39^{\text {a }}$ | - |
|  | [5.54] | [5.54] | [-17.32] | [0.16] | [-2.89] |  |
| DTEC | $0.19{ }^{\text {a }}$ | $0.19{ }^{\text {a }}$ | $-469.23^{\text {a }}$ | $0.03{ }^{\text {a }}$ | $-15.31^{\text {a }}$ | - |
|  | [5.54] | [5.54] | [-17.32] | [0.16] | [-2.89] |  |
| DTRA | $0.19{ }^{\text {a }}$ | $0.19^{\text {a }}$ | -470.79 ${ }^{\text {a }}$ | $0.03^{\text {a }}$ | $-15.34^{\text {a }}$ | - |
|  | [5.54] | [5.54] | [-17.32] | [0.16] | [-2.89] |  |
| DWTI | $0.19{ }^{\text {a }}$ | $0.19{ }^{\text {a }}$ | $-465.13^{\text {a }}$ | $0.03^{\text {a }}$ | $-15.24^{\text {a }}$ | - |
|  | [5.54] | [5.54] | [-17.32] | [0.16] | [-2.89] |  |

Note: a denotes the rejection of the null hypothesis of a unit root at the 5\% level. Numbers in brackets are critical values derived from the bootstrap approach after 1000 simulations. Breaking weeks are automatically estimated and determined by Carrion-i-Silvestre et al. (2009) unit root tests in GAUSS software.

Table 28. Maki (2012) cointegration tests

| Cointegration model: OIL $=f(S I R, ~ S P X, ~ W T I) ~$ |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Model options | Statistics | CV 1\% | CV 5\% | Break weeks |
| Model 1 | $-7.53{ }^{\text {a }}$ | -6.55 | -6.03 | 1991W47; 1994W28; 1996W04; 2004W21; 2008W36 |
| Model 2 | $-7.76{ }^{\text {a }}$ | -6.78 | -6.25 | 1996W04; 1999W21; 2001W14; 2004W21; 2007W01 |
| Model 3 | $-9.21{ }^{\text {a }}$ | -8.67 | -8.11 | 1994W34; 1996W11; 1999W21; 2004W21; 2008W37 |
| Model 4 | -9.97 ${ }^{\text {a }}$ | -9.43 | -8.81 | 1991W47; 1996W40; 2000W36; 2003W48; 2007W12 |
| Cointegration model: TEC $=f($ SIR, SPX, WTI) |  |  |  |  |
| Model options | Statistics | CV 1\% | CV 5\% | Break weeks |
| Model 1 | $-37.07^{\text {a }}$ | -6.55 | -6.03 | 1996W46; 1999W24; 2000W20; 2004W31; 2008W12 |
| Model 2 | $-37.82^{\text {a }}$ | -6.78 | -6.25 | 1998W01; 2000W25; 2001W11; 2006W39; 2008W11 |
| Model 3 | $-37.51^{\text {a }}$ | -8.67 | -8.11 | 2001W21; 2006W38; 2008W12; 2010W46; 2012W06 |
| Model 4 | $-38.30^{\text {a }}$ | -9.43 | -8.81 | 2002W19; 2004W32; 2008W21; 2012W05; 2013W23 |
| Cointegration model: $T R A=f($ SIR, SPX, WTI) |  |  |  |  |
| Model options | Statistics | CV 1\% | CV 5\% | Break weeks |
| Model 1 | -5.43 | -6.55 | -6.03 | 1996W37; 2000W21; 2001W27; 2005W10; 2008W09 |
| Model 2 | $-6.80{ }^{\text {a }}$ | -6.78 | -6.25 | 1991W17; 1995W13; 2000W21; 2004W41; 2007W11 |
| Model 3 | -7.43 | -8.67 | -8.11 | 1994W32; 2001W28; 2005W11; 2008W19; 2012W21 |
| Model 4 | $-9.30{ }^{\text {b }}$ | -9.43 | -8.81 | 1996W37; 1998W43; 2001W26; 2005W08; 2009W19 |

Notes: a and $b$ denote the rejection of the null hypothesis of no cointegration at the $1 \%$, and $5 \%$ levels, respectively. Critical values (CV) were gathered from Table 1of Maki (2012): which allows breaks in trend and intercept through two independent variables.

Table 28 present the Maki's (2012) cointegration tests results. As can be seen from the results, in the presence of multiple structural breaks or regime shifts, the null hypothesis of 'no cointegration' can be rejected by all of the four models suggested by Maki (2012). The results reveal that equations (19-21) cointegrate and thus, there are long-run equilibrium relationships between these variables. Furthermore, according to the Granger representation theorem, an equilibrium correction model can be constructed for any cointegrating relationship (Brooks, 2014). It should be noted that the breaking weeks that have been identified by the model 4 of Maki (2012) are added to the estimation of the long-run coefficients via dummy variables (D1-D5).

Table 29 exhibits the level coefficients of the long-run models as shown in Eq. (3133) that are estimated via the DOLS method. The results suggest that short-term interest rate (SIR) exerts a negative significant impact on the stock price indices of oil, technology, and transportation companies. The S\&P 500 (SPX) has a positive and significant effect on the stock price indices. But, as expected, the impact magnitude of SPX is much higher than that of SIR and WTI on the stock price indices which indicates the importance of the broad market index in determining stock prices.

Table 29. Estimation of level coefficients in the long-run models using DOLS

|  | SIR | SPX | WTI | D1 | D2 | D3 | D4 | D5 | C | R $^{2}$ | DW |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| OIL | $-0.005^{\text {c }}$ | $0.601^{\mathrm{a}}$ | $0.569^{\mathrm{a}}$ | -0.053 | -0.051 | $-0.325^{\mathrm{a}}$ | $-0.270^{\mathrm{b}}$ | 0.163 | $0.221^{\mathrm{a}}$ | 0.963 | 1.87 |
|  | $(0.003)$ | $(0.092)$ | $(0.085)$ | $(0.124)$ | $(0.124)$ | $(0.125)$ | $(0.124)$ | $(0.124)$ | $(0.056)$ |  |  |
| TEC | $-0.056^{\mathrm{c}}$ | $1.664^{\mathrm{b}}$ | $0.204^{\mathrm{b}}$ | $0.496^{\mathrm{c}}$ | 0.222 | $-0.884^{\mathrm{b}}$ | -0.041 | $-0.683^{\mathrm{c}}$ | -0.598 | 0.778 | 1.92 |
|  | $(0.033)$ | $(0.710)$ | $(0.101)$ | $(0.298)$ | $(0.297)$ | $(0.390)$ | $(0.304)$ | $(0.399)$ | $(0.659)$ |  |  |
| TRA | $-0.034^{\mathrm{c}}$ | $0.762^{\mathrm{b}}$ | $0.210^{\mathrm{b}}$ | 0.304 | $1.498^{\mathrm{b}}$ | $-1.194^{\mathrm{b}}$ | -0.231 | -0.096 | 2.027 | 0.901 | 2.04 |
|  | $(0.019)$ | $(0.350)$ | $(0.101)$ | $(0.642)$ | $(0.686)$ | $(0.659)$ | $(0.645)$ | $(0.701)$ | $(1.961)$ |  |  |

Note: a, b, and c denote significance at $1 \%, 5 \%$, and $10 \%$ levels respectively. Standard errors of the estimated coefficients are corrected for heteroscedasticity by the White procedure. Dummy variables have been assigned for breaking weeks (D1-D5) and these breaks are selected based on the Model 4 of Maki's (2012) cointegration test. DW shows the Durbin-Watson test statistics.

On the other hand, West Texas Intermediate crude oil (WTI) has a positive and statistically significant impact on all of the stock price indices. The positive oil coefficient of technology stocks suggests that even high oil prices can improve the financial performance and profitability of technology companies as they move toward innovating more new energy-efficient and sustainable products. For instance, in June 2012 Tesla Motors unveiled an all-electric sedan (Model S), which is one of the most advanced electric vehicles. Due to its rapidly growing sales, the company's stock price skyrocketed from almost $\$ 30$ in June 2012 to $\$ 282$ in July 2015, which is equivalent to a $940 \%$ return in two years! This shows that the market is moving
toward a future less reliant on fossil fuels. Moreover, it should be noted that the extent of impact of WTI on oil companies is much higher than that of WTI on technology and transportation companies. This suggests that the oil-sensitive stocks have a tendency to be affected relatively more by crude oil price fluctuations. This result is in accordance with findings of Click (2001), Sadorsky (2001), Hammoudeh and Li (2004), Nandha and Faff (2008), Gogineni (2010), Mohanty et al. (2014), Demirer et al. (2015), and Shaeri et al. (2016). The majorities of dummy variables are also significant and have mixed signs.

Table 30. Structural breaks in the relationship between stock indices and the explanatory variables

| Company | SupF ${ }_{\text {t }}$ |  |  |  |  | Number of breaks |  |  | Break dates |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | $(1 \mid 0)$ | $(2 \mid 1)$ | $(3 \mid 2)$ | $(4 \mid 3)$ | (5\|4) | Seq. | BIC | LWZ |  |
| OIL | $472.09^{\text {a }}$ | $159.38^{\text {a }}$ | $83.72^{\text {a }}$ | $84.76^{\text {a }}$ | 0.00 | 4 | 3 | 2 | 1997W22; 2001W20; |
|  | (16.19) | (18.11) | (18.93) | (19.64) | (20.19) |  |  |  | 2005W07; 2008W47 |
| TEC | $514.18{ }^{\text {a }}$ | $413.60{ }^{\text {a }}$ | $149.33^{\text {a }}$ | $336.12^{\text {a }}$ | 0.00 | 4 | 1 | 1 | 1996W02; 1999W49; |
|  | (16.19) | (18.11) | (18.93) | (19.64) | (20.19) |  |  |  | 2006W19; 2010W09 |
| TRA | $543.03^{\text {a }}$ | $231.82^{\text {a }}$ | $172.52^{\text {a }}$ | $67.88^{\text {a }}$ | 0.00 | 4 | 2 | 1 | 1994W31; 1999W32; |
|  | (16.19) | (18.11) | (18.93) | (19.64) | (20.19) |  |  |  | 2002W19; 2008W14 |

Note: This table shows the test results for the endogenous structural breaks as developed by Bai and Perron (2003). Five breaks are allowed at most and the trimming parameter is 0.15 . The $\operatorname{SupF}_{t}(1+1 \mid 1)$ is a sequential test of the null of 1 breaks versus the alternative of $1+1$ breaks. Sequential, BIC and LWZ denote the procedure of sequentially determined breaks, Bayesian Information Criterion and Information Criterion proposed by Liu, Wu and Zidek (1997), respectively. a denotes statistical significance at 5\% level.

Table 30 reports the results of Bai and Perron (2003) test for identifying the multiple structural breaks in the relationship between the stock indices and the explanatory variables. The results of the sequential test show that the oil, technology, and transportation companies have four structural breaks at 5\% significance level. This implies that assuming the oil price sensitivity is constant over time is not true. Thus, it confirms the shortcomings of prior studies based on this assumption. In this Table, columns seven, eight and nine show the number of breaks identified by the
sequential approach of the Bai and Perron (2003) test and the BIC and LWZ information criteria, accordingly. Once the structural breaks in the relationship between the stock indices and the explanatory variables are identified, Eqs. (34-36) are estimated for the sub-periods based on the breakpoints identified by the BaiPerron sequential test.

Table 31. Breakpoint regression results

| Company | Breaks | Obs | Sub-samples | SIR | SPX | WTI | C | $\mathrm{R}^{2}$ | DW |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| OIL | 4 | 387 | 1990W01-1997W21 | $0.142^{\text {a }}$ | $0.623^{\text {a }}$ | 0.157 | $1.082^{\text {b }}$ | 0.812 | 1.95 |
|  |  |  |  | (0.053) | (0.058) | (0.095) | (0.467) |  |  |
|  |  | 206 | 1997W22-2001W19 | $-0.360{ }^{\text {c }}$ | 0.053 | $0.253^{\text {a }}$ | $1.616^{\text {a }}$ |  |  |
|  |  |  |  | (0.207) | (0.155) | (0.085) | (1.008) |  |  |
|  |  | 196 | 2001W20-2005W06 | 0.091 | $0.832^{\text {a }}$ | $0.380{ }^{\text {a }}$ | -0.845 |  |  |
|  |  |  |  | (0.058) | (0.203) | (0.083) | (1.349) |  |  |
|  |  | 196 | 2005W07-2008W46 | $-0.140^{\text {b }}$ | $1.384^{\text {a }}$ | $0.213{ }^{\text {c }}$ | -1.630 |  |  |
|  |  |  |  | (0.060) | (0.333) | (0.112) | (2.034) |  |  |
|  |  | 325 | 2008W47-2015W05 | -0.017 | $0.545^{\text {a }}$ | $0.140^{\text {c }}$ | $2.511^{\text {a }}$ |  |  |
|  |  |  |  | $(0.023)$ | (0.082) | (0.072) | $(0.509)$ |  |  |
| TEC | 4 | 314 | 1990W01-1996W02 | $0.226^{\text {a }}$ | $2.192^{\text {a }}$ | $-0.109^{\text {a }}$ | $-1.697^{\text {a }}$ | 0.921 | 1.96 |
|  |  |  |  | $(0.010)$ | (0.029) | (0.025) | (0.323) |  |  |
|  |  | 204 | 1996W02-1999W48 | -0.350 | $1.518^{\text {a }}$ | $0.482^{\text {c }}$ | -1.473 |  |  |
|  |  |  |  | (0.756) | (0.369) | (0.281) | (0.911) |  |  |
|  |  | 335 | 1999W48-2006W18 | $-0.056{ }^{\text {c }}$ | $1.800^{\text {a }}$ | 0.068 | -1.309 |  |  |
|  |  |  |  | (0.030) | (0.059) | $(0.106)$ | $(0.724)$ |  |  |
|  |  | 199 | 2006W19-2010W08 | -0.040 | $0.874^{\text {a }}$ | $0.075{ }^{\text {b }}$ | 0.185 |  |  |
|  |  |  |  | (0.046) | (0.215) | (0.033) | $(1.607)$ |  |  |
|  |  | 258 | 2008W09-2015W05 | $-0.011^{\text {a }}$ | $1.216^{\text {a }}$ | $0.034^{\text {a }}$ | $-1.874^{\text {a }}$ |  |  |
|  |  |  |  | (0.002) | (0.007) | (0.008) | (0.073) |  |  |
| TRA | 4 | 239 | 1990W01-1994W30 | $0.106^{\text {a }}$ | $1.617^{\text {a }}$ | $-0.193^{\text {a }}$ | $-1.082^{\text {a }}$ | 0.597 | 1.96 |
|  |  |  |  | (0.016) | (0.054) | (0.023) | (0.389) |  |  |
|  |  | 262 | 1994W31-1999W31 | $0.535^{\text {a }}$ | $0.936{ }^{\text {a }}$ | 0.065 | 0.506 |  |  |
|  |  |  |  | (0.092) | (0.192) | (0.279) | (2.105) |  |  |
|  |  | 143 | 1994W32-2002W18 | -0.050 | 0.223 | 0.128 | 1.982 |  |  |
|  |  |  |  | $(0.242)$ | $(0.418)$ | $(0.571)$ | $(1.661)$ |  |  |
|  |  | 308 | 2002W19-2008W13 | 0.066 | $1.050^{\text {a }}$ | 0.187 | -0.037 |  |  |
|  |  |  |  | $(0.214)$ | (0.298) | $(0.504)$ | (0.390) |  |  |
|  |  | 358 | 2008W14-2015W05 | -0.001 | $1.182^{\text {a }}$ | $-0.057{ }^{\text {a }}$ | $0.293{ }^{\text {a }}$ |  |  |
|  |  |  |  | (0.002) | (0.009) | (0.008) | (0.067) |  |  |

Note: This table reports the breakpoint regression results of linear models in Eqs. (16-18). Subsamples are based on the breakpoints identified by the test of Bai and Perron (2003). Five breaks are allowed at most. Standard errors of the estimated coefficients are corrected for heteroscedasticity by the White procedure. Breaks denote the number of breaks selected by the sequential procedure of Bai and Perron (2003) at 5\% statistical significance level. DW shows the Durbin-Watson test statistics. Obs shows the number of observations in each sub-sample. $a$, $b$, and $c$ denote statistical significance at the $1 \%, 5 \%$ and $10 \%$ levels, respectively.

This method instead of putting break dates as the dummy variables into the regression model, it segments the regression into multiple regimes based on the identified break dates. Results of the breakpoint regressions are presented in Table 31. The results help us to see how regression coefficients are evolving throughout the time. Due to the existence of four breaks in each regression, there are five different regimes and each regime has its own coefficients. For instance, the negative effect of SIR changes over time and in some periods becomes positive. The results also show that the SPX is a key factor in determining the stock prices of these companies and its coefficients are statistically significant and positive for all companies. Overall, TEC companies receive the highest impact from SPX compared to OIL and TRA companies. Regarding the impact of crude oil on stock prices of the companies, it is clear that oil companies (OIL) relatively receive the highest impact from WTI price movements. However, the impact magnitudes of WTI on the companies' stocks are changing over time and regimes. The results are almost consistent with the results of DOLS.

In order to test the spillover effect between oil prices and the stock indices of the companies, the causal linkages between them should be examined. This study employs the Hill's (2007) fixed-length rolling window causality test. He suggests a successive multi-horizon non-causality test, which can be adopted to detect nonlinear causalities in terms of linear parametric restrictions for a trivariate process (two different time series plus an auxiliary variable). This study utilizes the bivariate case where causality between two different time series is measured. Causality takes place at any horizon if and only if it takes place at horizon 1 (first week in each window).

Due to likely substandard performance of the chi-squared distribution in small samples, Hill (2007) proposed a parametric bootstrapping approach for estimating small sample p-values. Also, the length rolling window is fixed at 250 weeks and the maximum order of the VAR model is 4 lags.

Table 32. Time-varying causality using bootstrap rolling-window approach

| Null hypothesis $\left(\mathrm{H}_{0}\right)$ | Avg. VAR order | Avg. BPV | Rejection rate of $\mathrm{H}_{0}$ |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| WTI $\rightarrow$ OIL | 1.5655 | 0.2026 | 51.6494 |
| WTI $\rightarrow$ TEC | 1.9877 | 0.3981 | 22.8087 |
| WTI $\rightarrow$ TRA | 1.5749 | 0.3550 | 30.2544 |
| OIL $\rightarrow$ WTI | 1.5655 | 0.4311 | 9.6136 |
| TEC $\rightarrow$ WTI | 1.9877 | 0.3444 | 21.6776 |
| TRA $\rightarrow$ WTI | 1.5749 | 0.4068 | 16.5881 |

Notes: This table reports the results of Hill's (2007) time-varying causality test. $\rightarrow$ denotes the non-causality null hypothesis. VAR denotes Vector Autoregressive model and BPV denotes the bootstrap P-values. The maximum order of VAR model is 4 lags. Size of the fixed rolling-window is 250 weeks. Bootstrap iterations are 1000 times. BPVs of less than $5 \%$ indicate causality within that window.

Table 32 presents the time-varying causality between oil prices and the stock prices of the oil, technology, and transportation companies. The results show that the null hypotheses of non-causality running from WTI to the sock indices of oil, technology, and transportation companies are rejected at $51.6 \%, 22.8 \%$, and $30.2 \%$ of the time, respectively. In other words, the strongest causality exists from WTI to oil companies which is quite logical as the crude oil is the main product of these companies. Furthermore, the second-strongest causal linkage exits between WTI and transportation companies since fuel is the key input for this industry. The results also show that the null hypotheses of non-causality running from the sock indices of oil, technology, and transportation companies to WTI are rejected at $9.6 \%, 21.7 \%$, and $16.6 \%$ of the time, respectively. Unlike the previous causality results, OIL has a little causal impact on WTI as the causality degree has dropped from $51.6 \%$ to $9.6 \%$.


Note I: =/=> denotes "non-causality" running from WTI to the stock indices.
Note II: Shaded areas indicate the recessionary periods in the U.S.
Note III: Y-axis shows the bootstrap p-values based on 1000 iterations.
Source: Authors' calculation

Figure 22. Time-varying causality (from WTI to the stock indices)


Note I: =/=> denotes "non-causality" running from the stock indices to WTI.
Note II: Shaded areas indicate the recessionary periods in the U.S.
Note III: Y-axis shows the bootstrap p-values based on 1000 iterations
Source: Authors' calculation

Figure 23. Time-varying causality (from the stock indices to WTI)

Therefore, we can say that WTI is relatively more likely to affect the stock prices rather than to be affected by them. The results suggest that technology companies relatively have more ability to influence crude oil prices, most probably through the channel of technological changes and innovations. Figure 22 and 23 illustrate the time-varying causality between WTI and the stock indices. By means of this method we can easily understand the causal dynamics between these variables in a timevarying manner. As can be seen from the Figure 22, after the global financial crisis of 2008-2009, there are high levels of causality running from WTI to all of the stock indices of companies. But except from crisis period, there are not strong causal relationship running from WTI to the companies. Thus, we can say that return spillovers from WTI to these companies mainly occur during financial crises. On the other hand, Figure 23 exhibits the time-varying causality running from stock indices of the companies to WTI. This Figure shows that the degree of causality is from OIL, TEC, and TRA to WTI is relatively low. This demonstrates that the stock prices of these companies are not relatively powerful enough to affect crude oil prices. This also implies that the causal linkage between WTI and these stock indices is more unidirectional rather than to be bidirectional.

### 3.5 Conclusion

The present study has investigated the impact of crude oil prices on the stock prices of oil, technology, and transportation companies listed on U.S. stock exchanges, using weekly data covering the period from January 2, 1990 to February 3, 2015. The Maki (2012) cointegration tests results reveal that long-run equilibrium relationships exist between these stock indices, crude oil prices, short-term interest rate, and S\&P 500 in the presence of multiple structural breaks.

These findings indicate that crude oil prices, short-term interest rates, and the S\&P 500 are long-run determinants of the stock prices of oil, technology, and transportation firms. The DOLS results show that stocks prices of oil companies are positively and significantly affected by crude oil prices to a greater degree than that of technology and transportation stocks. This implies that the oil-sensitive stocks have a tendency to be affected relatively more by crude oil price fluctuations.

Results also point out that technology stocks are positively and significantly affected by crude oil prices which indicates that increasing crude oil prices put more pressure on technology firms to lower their energy-related costs and innovate more energyconserving products due to high demand from other sectors. Therefore, if technology companies are successful in meeting these demands, their financial performances will also improve. Consequently, as these demanding industries utilize these innovative products, they can benefit a lot in terms of fuel cost savings and lower maintenance costs, thus directly affecting their profitability.

The results of the breakpoint regressions are almost in line with the DOLS results, but they give us a hint about how the oil price exposure of these companies changing over time as it takes multiple regimes into account and provides regime-dependent coefficients. Time-varying causality results show that WTI is relatively more likely to affect the stock prices of oil, technology, and transportation companies rather than to be affected by them. Evidently, it is confirmed that financial crises have a substantial ability to intensify the causal linkage between WTI and the stock indices of these companies.

These findings contribute to the relevant literature suggesting that although oil price swings may not be the main reasons behind the stock price movements of technology and transportation companies, but they have enough power to stimulate a movement toward a business environment that would be less reliant on fossil fuels. This is because investors may perceive technological advancements and innovations as the most important factors that influence the profitability of these companies and therefore affect their stock prices.

The implications of this study are important and beneficial for financial managers, CFOs, hedge funds, and portfolio managers. They have to pay special attention to the oil prices exposure of their companies or portfolios as the degree of causality and cross-market spillover tend to be intensified between these markets in the course of financial crises. Finally, it should be noted that in the future, crude oil will probably lose more of its influence on the stock prices of these firms due to the dominance of renewable energies and the proliferation of energy-efficient and sustainable products.

## Chapter 4

## CONCLUSION AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS

### 4.1 Concluding Remarks

### 4.1.1 First Study

This study examines the oil price risk exposure of the financial and non-financial subsectors in the U.S. stock markets over the period from January 1983 to March 2015. In these analyses, the existence of structural breaks in the equity returns of the industry subsectors is taken into account. The Bai and Perron (2003) approach is used to identify multiple breakpoints. By employing the Fama and French (2015) five-factor asset pricing model integrated with oil price risk factor, the oil price risk exposures of the financial and non-financial industries are estimated. Additionally, via the Hill's (2007) time-varying causality in return, the subsectors which receive the highest level of return spillover from crude oil have been identified. Lastly, by means of the GED-EGARCH-VaR approach, the risk spillover from WTI to the financial and non-financial subsectors have examined in a time-varying manner. The most important outcomes of this study can be listed as follows:

1. The majority of financial and non-financial subsectors are affected by oil price changes, but the magnitude of the impact appears to be rather limited.
2. The size of oil price sensitivity differs noticeably across subsectors and over time.
3. Some industries have experienced substantial changes in their oil price exposures in the pre- and post-break periods.
4. The majority of financial subsectors are affected negatively, and most of the non-financial subsectors are affected positively, by oil prices.
5. The magnitude of the impact of oil prices on the financial subsectors is much lower than the magnitude of their impact on the non-financial subsectors.
6. Among the financial subsectors, Mortgage Finance and Real Estate Services have the largest negative and positive exposures to the oil price risk, respectively.
7. Among the non-financial subsectors, Airlines and Oil Equipment Services have the largest negative and positive oil price risk exposures, respectively.
8. MKT, SMB and HML which are the risk factors in the FF3F model have relatively higher role in explaining the returns for the financial subsectors than those for the non-financial subsectors.
9. The recently introduced Fama-French risk factors, RMW and CMA, along with OIL, play more important role for defining the equity returns for the non-financial subsectors than those for the financial subsectors.
10. For the both types of subsectors, market portfolio, MKT, has the highest share among other risk factors in determining the subsectors' returns.
11. HML is the second most important risk factor for the financials, which suggests the important role of book-to-market ratio in asset valuation of financial stocks.
12. CMA is the second most important risk factor for the non-financials, which points out the importance of conservative and aggressive investment strategies in pricing non-financial stocks.
13. OIL has the least important role in explaining the subsectors' returns for the both financials and non-financials.
14. Full Line Insurance, Life Insurance, Banks, Hotel \& Lodging REITs, and Residential REITs are the top financials subsectors, receiving the highest time-varying causality in return from crude oil market.
15. Auto Parts, Electronic Office Equipment, Tires, Furnishings, and Commodity Chemicals are the top non-financials subsectors which receive the highest level of return spillover from crude oil during the period of the study.
16. There are high levels of return spillover from oil market to financial and nonfinancial subsectors in the post 1990-91 and 2008-09 recessions.
17. It is verified that the tails of financials, non-financials and WTI returns are heavier than the tails of standard normal distribution.
18. The volatility persistence is relatively high for almost all of the subsectors and WTI. Hence, volatility shocks decay calmly.
19. Volatility shocks are relatively more persistent in the financials rather than non-financials.
20. In testing the leverage effect, it is revealed that for the both financial and nonfinancial subsectors, bad news generates more volatility than good news.
21. The VaR estimates of non-financials are more precise than those of the financials. Thus, modeling the risk for the financials is more difficult than that of the non-financials.
22. The top-five riskiest financial subsectors based on the estimated VaRs, are Real Estate Services, Investment Companies, Investment Services, Mortgage Finance, and Hotel \& Lodging REITs.
23. The top-five riskiest non-financial subsectors based on the estimated VaRs, are Platinum \& Precious Metals, Renewable Energy Equipment, Consumer Electronics, Tires, and Travel \& Tourism.
24. Based on the VaRs, the least risky financial subsector is Property \& Casualty Insurance and the least risky non-financial subsector is Food Products.
25. The VaRs are unable to effectively define the maximum amount of risk during the U.S. recessions especially throughout the 2008-2009 crisis.
26. Consumer Finance and Insurance Brokers are the financial subsectors which receive the lowest and highest levels of risk spillover from crude oil, respectively.
27. Broadcasting \& Entertainment and Multiutilities are the non-financial subsectors which receive the lowest and highest levels of risk spillover from crude oil, respectively.
28. Among the financials, Insurance Brokers, Specialty REITs, Full Line Insurance, Life Insurance, and Banks are the subsectors receiving the highest causality in risk from the oil market.
29. Among the non-financials, Multiutilities, Furnishings, Travel \& Tourism, Broadline Retailers, and Auto Parts are the subsectors which receive the highest level of risk spillover effect from the crude oil market.
30. Risk spillovers from the oil market toward financial and non-financial subsectors intensify during and after the 2008-09 financial crisis.
31. Among the financials, the most continuous risk spillover effect occurs for Insurance Brokers starting from mid-2007 to mid-2013.
32. For the non-financials, the most continuous risk spillover effect happens for Travel \& Tourism starting from mid-2008 to mid-2014.
33. Overall, it can be concluded that the risk from the crude oil market tends to be transferred to these markets mainly in the course of financial crises.

### 4.1.2 Second Study

This study investigates the impact of crude oil prices on the stock prices of oil, technology, and transportation companies listed on U.S. stock exchanges, using weekly data covering the period from January 2, 1990 to February 3, 2015. Considering the importance of regime shifts or structural breaks in econometric analysis, this study employs the Carrion-i-Silvestre et al. (2009) unit root tests and the Maki (2012) cointegration tests allowing for multiple breaks. DOLS results show that stock prices of oil companies are positively and significantly affected by crude oil prices to a greater degree than that of technology and transportation stocks. Later, the breakpoint regression is used to estimate regime-dependent coefficients. The most important findings of this study can be enumerated as follows:

1. The Perron and Yabu (2009) test indicates that there is at least one regime shift in each series under consideration.
2. The Carrion-i-Silvestre et al. (2009) unit root tests show that all the series are integrated of the same order, $\mathrm{I}(1)$.
3. Since all the series are $I(1)$, the existence of any cointegrating relationship can be examined by using cointegration tests.
4. The Maki's (2012) cointegration tests reveal that in the presence of multiple structural breaks all of the three models are cointegrated.
5. Cointegration results confirm the existence of long-run equilibrium relationships between these stock indices, crude oil prices, short-term interest rates, and S\&P500.
6. These findings indicate that crude oil prices, short-term interest rates, and S\&P500 are long-run determinants of the stock prices of oil, technology, and transportation companies.
7. The DOLS results show that stocks prices of oil companies are positively and significantly affected by crude oil prices to a greater degree than that of technology and transportation stocks.
8. The results of the breakpoint regressions are almost in line with the DOLS results, but they give us a hint about how the oil price exposure of these companies changing over time as it takes multiple regimes into account and provides regime-dependent coefficients.
9. Time-varying causality results show that WTI is relatively more likely to affect the stock prices of oil, technology, and transportation companies and not vice versa.
10. It is confirmed that financial crises have a substantial ability to amplify the causal linkage between WTI and the stock indices of these companies.

### 4.2 Policy Implications

### 4.2.1 First Study

The findings of this study improve our insight about the nexus between oil price changes and equity returns of financial and non-financial subsectors. The implications of the oil price risk exposure results are important for investors, corporate executives, portfolio managers, hedge funds, and policy makers. Managers working in highly oil-sensitive subsectors should pay special attention to their hedging practices. For instance, portfolio managers, investors, and CFOs should take into account the discrepancy in oil price exposure across subsectors to optimally allocate their portfolios and find potential subsectoral hedging opportunities. It is believed that the present study will generate further research interests to investigate the oil price risk exposure of industry subsectors in other countries.

Specifically, it can lead to studies examining the oil price risk exposure of industry subsectors in developed countries and developing countries, and in oil exporting and non-oil exporting countries.

### 4.2.2 Second Study

The results of the DOLS long-run models show that crude oil prices positively and significantly influence technology stocks. This points out that even high oil prices have the ability to enhance the financial performance of technology companies as they shift toward inventing new energy conserving and green products. Consequently, if technology companies are prosperous in achieving these demands, this will also improve their financial performances.

It is believed that the implications of this study are important and valuable for portfolio managers, CFOs, financial managers, and hedge funds. They have to pay special attention to the oil prices exposure of their companies or portfolios as the degree of causality and cross-market spillover tend to be amplified between these markets in the event of financial crises.

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[^0]:    ${ }^{1} \mathrm{~A}$ "regime" means a period. If there is one break, there will be two regimes.

[^1]:    Note: See Table 10.

[^2]:    Note: See Table 10.

[^3]:    Note: See Table 18.

[^4]:    Note: See Table 24.

[^5]:    Note: See Table 24.

[^6]:    ${ }^{2}$ http://www.a350xwb.com/cost-effectiveness
    ${ }^{3}$ http://www.a350xwb.com/

[^7]:    ${ }_{5}^{4} \mathrm{http}: / / \mathrm{www}$. nyse.com/ listed/lcddata.html? ticker=xoi
    ${ }^{5}$ http://www.nyse.com/ about/ listed/ pse_i.shtml

[^8]:    ${ }^{6}$ http://www.djaverages.com/?go=transportation-overview

[^9]:    ${ }^{7}$ A "regime" means a period. If there is one break, there will be two regimes.

