

Underdevelopment, Relative Deprivation and Insurgency: A Case-Study of Boko Haram in Northeast Nigeria

Abisola Itunu King

Submitted to the
Institute of Graduate Studies and Research
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

Master of Arts
in
International Relations

Eastern Mediterranean University
September 2018
Gazimağusa, North Cyprus

Approval of the Institute of Graduate Studies and Research

Assoc. Prof. Dr. Ali Hakan Ulusoy
Acting Director

I certify that this thesis satisfies all the requirements as a thesis for the degree of Master of Arts in International Relations.

Prof. Dr. Ahmet Sözen
Chair, Department of Political Science
and International Relations

We certify that we have read this thesis and that in our opinion it is fully adequate in scope and quality as a thesis for the degree of Master of Arts in International Relations.

Prof. Dr. Erol Kaymak
Supervisor

Examining Committee

1. Prof. Dr. Erol Kaymak

2. Assoc. Prof. Dr. Sertaç Sonan

3. Asst. Prof. Dr. Aylin Gürzel

ABSTRACT

The insurgency in Nigeria's northeast has brought about across the board displacement, gross human rights violations, security dangers as well as an extending humanitarian emergency. Presently in its ninth year, the Boko Haram insurgency shows no sign of abating and is adding to the long history of marginalization; severe underdevelopment; and an outstanding prevalence level of poverty; illiteracy and unemployment in this West African country (Nigeria). Since the beginning of the Boko Haram crisis in 2009, about 100,000 individuals have lost their lives, a huge number of women and young girls were kidnapped while children drafted as alleged "suicide" bombers into the insurgency.

After a visit to Nigeria in 2014, former US Secretary of State John Kerry, identified poverty as one of the driving force behind the Boko Haram insurgency. This study probes into the aforementioned debate by examining if a link exist between relative deprivation and insurgency using the advent of Boko Haram in the Northeast of Nigeria as a case-study. From an online survey with Northeast youths, elite interviews with some Northeast elites, corroborated with perspectives from scholars, and politicians drawn from secondary sources, this study postulates that relative deprivation stands out as the most substantial theoretical explanation of the Boko Haram insurgency in the Northeast of Nigeria.

Keywords: Relative Deprivation, Boko Haram, Insurgency, Northeast Nigeria, Underdevelopment

ÖZ

Nijerya'nın kuzeydoğusundaki isyan, kurulun yerinden edilmesine, büyük insan hakları ihlallerine, güvenlik tehlikelerine ve insani yardımın artmasına yol açtı. Halen dokuzuncu yılında, Boko Haram isyanı, hiçbir münakaşa belirtisi göstermiyor ve marjinalleşmenin uzun tarihine katkıda bulunuyor; şiddetli azgelişme; ve olağanüstü bir yaygınlık düzeyi yoksulluk; Bu Batı Afrika ülkesinde (Nijerya) okur yazarlık ve işsizlik. 2009 yılında Boko Haram krizinin başlangıcından bu yana, yaklaşık 100.000 kişi hayatını kaybetti, çocuklar çok sayıda kadın ve genç kız kaçırdı, çocuklar ise “intihar” bombacıları olarak isyana sürüklendi.

2014 yılında Nijerya'ya yaptığı ziyaretten sonra, eski ABD Dışişleri Bakanı John Kerry, yoksulluğu Boko Haram isyanının ardındaki itici güçlerden biri olarak tanımladı. Bu çalışma, Nijerya'nın kuzeydoğusundaki Boko Haram'ın gelişimini kullanarak bir durum çalışması olarak göreceli yoksunluk ve isyancılık arasında bir bağlantının var olup olmadığını inceleyerek yukarıda bahsedilen tartışmayı incelemektedir. Kuzeydoğu gençleri ile yapılan bir anketten, bazı Kuzeydoğu elitleriyle yapılan elit röportajlardan, akademisyenlerden gelen bakış açıları ve ikincil kaynaklardan alınan politikacılar ile desteklenmiş olan bu çalışma, göreceli yoksunluğun Kuzeydoğu'daki Boko Haram isyanının en önemli teorik açıklaması olarak öne çıktığını öne sürüyor. Nijerya

Anahtar Kelimeler: Göreceli Yoksunluk, Boko Haram, İsyen, Kuzeydoğu Nijerya, Azgelişmişlik

DEDICATION

This study is wholeheartedly dedicated to my beloved parents, who have been my source of inspiration and gave me strength when I thought of giving up, who continually provide their moral, spiritual, emotional, and financial support. To my extended family, relatives, friends, and classmates who shared their words of advice and encouragement to finish this study. And lastly, I dedicate this work to the Almighty God, thank you for the guidance, strength, power of mind, grace, protection and skills and for giving me a healthy life. All of these, I offer to you.

ACKNOWLEDGMENT

I would first like to thank my thesis advisor Prof. Dr. Erol Kaymak of the International Relations department at Eastern Mediterranean University. The door to Prof. Erol Kaymak's office was always open whenever I ran into a trouble spot or had a question about my research or writing. He consistently allowed this paper to be my own work, but steered me in the right direction whenever he thought I needed it.

I also acknowledge my good friend Mr. Asanga who helped me greatly with this thesis, thank you so much for rendering your time and intellectual guidance. To my friend Isti who helped with the administration of the Elite interview questionnaire, I deeply appreciate your efforts.

Finally, I must express my very profound gratitude to my Parents Mr Olujimi King and Ms Olubunmi Utoh, my Grandma, my Cousin Nifome and my partner Oluwaranmilowo, my friends Vivian, Oluwanikinyo and Adewunmi for providing me with unfailing support and continuous encouragement throughout my years of study and through the process of researching and writing this thesis. This accomplishment would not have been possible without them. Thank you

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT	iii
ÖZ	iv
DEDICATION	v
ACKNOWLEDGMENT	vi
LIST OF TABLES	x
LIST OF FIGURES	xi
1 STATEMENT OF PROBLEM	1
1.1 Research Question	3
1.2 Hypothesis	3
1.3 Methodology	3
1.4 Significance of Study	4
1.5 Scope and Limitation	5
1.6 Organisation of Study	5
2 LITERATURE REVIEW	6
2.1 Underdevelopment and Insurgency	6
2.2 Theoretical Framework	8
2.2.1 Insurgency	8
2.2.2 Relative Deprivation	9
2.2.3 Rational Choice Theory	11
2.2.4 Class Theory of Terrorism	12

2.2.5 Relational/Vengeance Theory	13
2.2.6 Islamic State Theory	14
3 RELATIVE UNDERDEVELOPMENT IN NORTHEAST NIGERIA	16
3.1 Introduction	16
3.1.1 Education	17
3.1.2 Health.....	19
3.1.3 Infrastructures	19
3.2 Economic Underdevelopment in Northeast Nigeria	20
3.2.1 Poverty.....	20
3.2.2 Unemployment/ Underemployment	21
4 ORIGINS AND EXPANSION OF BOKO HARAM IN NORTHEAST NIGERIA	23
4.1 Introduction	2
4.2 Origins of Boko Haram	23
4.3 Expansion of Boko Haram	26
4.3.1 Internal Expansion.....	26
4.3.2 External Expansion.....	29
4.3.3 Effects of the Boko Haram Insurgency	3
5 THE CAUSAL LINK BETWEEN RELATIVE DEPRIVATION AND INSURGENCY IN NORTHEAST NIGERIA.....	34
5.1 Introduction	34
5.2 Scholars and Politicians’ Perspective on Causal Link between Relative Deprivation and Boko-Haram Insurgency	35
5.2.1 Political and Institutional Leaders' Perspective on the Link between Relative Deprivation and Boko Haram Insurgency.....	37

5.3 Public and Elite Opinion on the Causal Link between Relative Deprivation and Boko Haram Insurgency.....	39
5.3.1 Results and Analysis on Survey of Northern Youths on the Cause of the Boko Haram Insurgency.....	39
5.3.2 Analysis of Elite Interview with Northern Elites on the Cause of the Boko Haram Insurgency.....	46
5.3.2.1 Data Collection Method	47
5.4 Conclusion.....	53
6 GENERAL CONCLUSION	56
REFERENCES.....	59
APPENDICES	69
Appendix A: Online Survey Questionnaire	70
Appendix B: Elite Interview Questions	72

LIST OF TABLES

Table 5.1: List of respondent and their respective functions	47
Table 5.2: Respondents Keys	48
Table 5.3: Relative level of development between the Northeast and the other geopolitical zones by sectors.....	49
Table 5.4: Comparative availability of opportunities for youths by sectors	51
Table 5.5: Motivation for joining Boko Haram	52
Table 5.6: Reasons why Boko Haram originated from the Northeast	52

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 3.1: Map of the six geopolitical zones of Nigeria.....	17
Figure 3.2: Incidence of poverty between the North and South from 1980 – 2000.....	21
Figure 4.1: Internally displaced persons and refugees fleeing Boko Haram atrocities.....	32
Figure 5.1: Gender representation.....	40
Figure 5.2: Age representation.....	41
Figure 5.3: State representation	42
Figure 5.4: Educational level of respondents	42
Figure 5.5: Level of opportunities for youths in the Northeast zone compared to other zones.....	43
Figure 5.6: Does the relative lack of opportunity make Northeast youths vulnerable to Boko Haram recruitment?.....	43
Figure 5.7: Willingness of youths of the Northeast to join Boko Haram if offered the opportunity	44
Figure 5.8: Motivation for wanting to join Boko Haram.....	44
Figure 5.9: Satisfaction with the level of development of the Northeast zone	45
Figure 5.10: Willingness to relocate to other geopolitical zones.....	46

Chapter 1

STATEMENT OF PROBLEM

The political landscape of Nigeria in the past two decades of the Twenty-first Century has been significantly characterised by the upsurge of terrorist activities and insurgency by Boko Haram beginning from Northeast and spreading to the rest of the country. Thomas Hayden defined insurgency as "an organized movement aimed at the overthrow or destruction of a constituted government through the use of subversion, espionage, terrorism and armed conflict." (Procon, 2008). His definition is corroborated by a more detailed version from the US Department of Defense (DoD) which perceives the phenomenon of insurgency as:

an organized resistance movement that uses subversion, sabotage, and armed conflict to achieve its aims. Insurgencies normally seek to overthrow the existing social order and reallocate power within the country. They may also seek to (1) Overthrow an established government without a follow-on social revolution. (2) Establish an autonomous national territory within the borders of a state. (3) Cause the withdrawal of an occupying power. (4) Extract political concessions that are unattainable through less violent means
(Ibid.)

The appellation "Boko Haram" is interpreted in English as "Western Education is forbidden/sacrilegious". As an entity, Boko Haram to be referred to as: "Jama'atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda'awati Wal-Jihad" which is translated "People Committed to the Propagation of the Prophet's Teachings and Jihad" (Maiangwa, 2014; 2013). Since its establishment in 2010, Boko Haram has led an insurgency against the Nigerian government predominantly concentrated around the Northern Nigerian states of Yobe, Katsina, Kaduna, Bauchi and Gombe. Presently in its ninth year, the Boko

haram insurgency shows no sign of subsiding and is adding to the long history of marginalization and severe underdevelopment and an abysmal level of poverty, high unemployment and illiteracy. Since the beginning of the Boko Haram crisis in 2009, about 100,000 individuals have lost their lives, a huge number of women and young girls were kidnapped while children drafted as alleged "suicide" bombers into the insurgency. About 2.1 million individuals absconded from their homes due to conflict and the fear of Boko Haram, 1.7 million of whom are still at present displaced and near 200, 000 individuals still reside as refugees in Cameroon, Chad and Niger, after having no option but to abscond.

The three states that have suffered the highest level of devastation from Boko Haram in Nigeria are the North-eastern states of Adamawa, Borno, and Yobe with 7.7 million individuals being subjected to severe poverty due to the insurgency; more than 50 percent of those afflicted are children. More than 80 percent of Borno State is viewed as high or very hazard risk prone areas.

The Boko Haram insurgency seems to have been accompanied by economic stagnancy in the various states harbouring insurgent activities in the North east of Nigeria. The insecurity created by the insurgency has adversely impacted foreign direct investments into the economy and caused the government to divert huge amount of funds (which would have alternatively served in its economic recovery) to security expenditures, exacting from the country around two percent of its economic output (Oluoch, 2012). The UN structure overseeing trade, development and investment, UNCTAD reveals, Kano and Kaduna only, made Nigeria's economy to lose N1.3 trillion due to the Boko Haram attacks (Aro, 2001). Due to the above scenarios, this research work is prompted. This research study examines the causal

link between underdevelopment and insurgency using the north-eastern part of Nigeria as a case study.

1.1 Research Question

The present study seeks to respond to the following interrogation:

How does underdevelopment trigger insurgency in Northern Nigeria?

1.2 Hypothesis

The following supposition shall provide a framework for analysis in this MA thesis:

The main cause of the Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria's Northeast geopolitical zone is the relative underdevelopment of Northeast compared to other geopolitical zones in the country. The dependent variable in this case is insurgency and the independent variable is underdevelopment. The supposition tested in this research study is whether or not underdevelopment leads to insurgency within the Northeast region of Nigeria.

1.3 Methodology

This MA Thesis sets out to test the causal link between underdevelopment and insurgency and with the latter being the dependent variable and the former independent variable. Using the theory of relative deprivation as its theoretical framework, the thesis shall examine how the relative level of underdevelopment in a society can fuel tensions and generate insurgency. This study shall make use of case study design. The importance and advantages of case-study research method cannot be overemphasized. Zainal notes that case study research is quite useful in in depth explanation and holistic investigation of social behaviour (such is the case of the phenomenon under this study--insurgency). He adds, it is a "robust research method" acknowledge as a useful tool in many social science disciplines. Cronin (2014) on his

part affirms the legitimacy and importance of case study research methods in both quantitative and qualitative research.

It shall present a case-study focused on insurgency in the rise of Boko Haram in the North-east of Nigeria. It shall make use of both primary and secondary sources. The analysis shall combine both qualitative (mostly through the analysis of secondary sources) and quantitative methods (essentially through the administration and analysis of questionnaire survey).

An analysis of the data collected and information obtained through the aforementioned methods would enable us to not only better understand the phenomenon of insurgency in Northeastern Nigeria but to also provide a basis for the validation or rejection of the hypothesis of the study

1.4 Significance of Study

This study will be useful to the government, security apparatus, academia and the general public in dealing with these social issues (especially from the useful recommendations suggested). It will also contribute to existing knowledge on the cause of Boko Haram insurgency in the Northeast of Nigeria. In addition, this work would serve as a guide to state experiencing insurgence in their country, providing implementable solutions to the world at large.

1.5 Scope and Limitation

This research work will examine underdevelopment as the major cause of the current insurgency in Northeast Nigeria which has undermined the country's security and economy. The study is limited because it delves into an on-going and continuous issue (insurgency in North East Nigeria) which witnesses changes as the day goes by.

1.6 Organisation of Study

This MA Thesis is divided into six chapters. Chapter One is the introductory chapter and covers the statement of problem, methodology and theoretical framework. Chapter Two focuses on the relative underdevelopment in the Northeast comparative to other geopolitical zone in Nigeria. Chapter Three traces the origins and spread of the Boko Haram insurgent group. Chapter Four analyses the correlation between relative deprivation (in terms of underdevelopment) and insurgency. Chapter Five explores alternative theoretical explanations that account for the rise of the Boko Haram insurgency in Northeast Nigeria. Chapter six presents general conclusion and recommendations.

Chapter 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1 Underdevelopment and Insurgency

The causal link between underdevelopment and insurgency and has increasingly influenced the thought of several scholars exploring the causes of terrorism and insurgency in the contemporary era. There is evidence in existing literature that shows a nexus between underdevelopment and insurgency. Several authors have explored the causal link between insurgency and underdevelopment with specific and practical examples. Exploring the link between underdevelopment and insurgency in Northeast Nigeria, Plouch points out the following:

Understanding Boko Haram's appeal among some citizen in Nigeria's far north requires an examination of underlying development challenges facing northern Nigeria, where high rates of poverty and unemployment are exacerbated by extreme population growth and low level of literacy. These factors combined with weak governance, rampant corruption and inadequate public service delivery, has contributed to the widespread disaffection that some suggest may facilitate Boko Haram recruitment - (Blanchard, 2014: 10)

Barna (2014) also acknowledged the role poverty and lack of development plays in generating insecurity by pointing out the Boko Haram insurgency has exposed the limitations of the Nigeria's Federal government which include corruption, bad governance and poor social indicators in the north of the country.

Several other writers have also examined also probed into the causal link between underdevelopment and insurgency in Nigeria. Khan and Cheri (2016) explore the

causal link between the poverty indices in Northern Nigeria (77.7% in the Northwest, 76.3% in the Northeast and 67.5% in the North-central) and prevailing turmoil in the region. They authors point to a correlation between persistent poverty and turbulence in the society.

Using the poverty theory, Adenrele (2012), identified severe poverty among the principal driving forces behind the Boko Haram insurgency in the Northeast of Nigeria. Unumen and Oghi (2016) on their part examined the adverse consequences of the failure of democracy in Nigeria's Fourth Republic which to them has contributed to the impoverishment and underdevelopment of a majority of Nigerians consequently leading to the intensification of the phenomenon of insurgency and terrorism.

Ofongo (2016) also corroborate to the causal link between underdevelopment and Boko Haram insurgency. Employing the fragile state theory, he argues that the government's inability to avail employment and educational opportunities as well as the prevalence of widespread poverty has rendered youths vulnerable to criminalization, indoctrination and terrorism.

Another author who adds more perspective to the aforementioned contention (correlation between underdevelopment and insurgency) is Usman Ayegba. In a paper on the causes and aftermath of insecurity in Nigeria, Ayegba (2015) underscores the nexus or link that exists between poverty, and unemployment on the one hand and the existing insecurity in the North of Nigeria on the other.

2.2 Theoretical Framework

Scholars have advanced different theoretical frameworks to explain the rise of the Boko Haram insurgency. Prominent among the different theoretical frameworks are the following: relative deprivation; rational choice; class theory of terrorism; relational/vengeance theory and Islamic theocratic state theory.

2.2.1 Insurgency

The US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) defines insurgency as "a protracted political- military activity directed toward completely or partially controlling the resources of a country through the use of irregular military forces and illegal political organizations." (Ruvalcaba, 2004; p.1) The US Department of Defence also holds a similar though more concise perception of insurgency as "an organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through use of subversion and armed conflict." (Morris, 2005; p.2).

From a scholarly angle, Fearon and Laitin (2003) provide a more limited definition of insurgency entirely in military terms. They define insurgency as "a technology of military conflict characterized by small, lightly armed bands practicing guerrilla warfare from rural base areas," (Ibid; p. 75). Ruvalcaba (2004) gives insurgency a broader characterization admitting it involves: political mobilization, terrorism and guerrilla warfare all in a bid to undermine the authority and legitimacy of government at the gain of that of the insurgent.

2.2.2 Relative Deprivation

The theory of relative deprivation has been defined by Ted Gurr as 'the tension that develops from a discrepancy between the 'ought' and the 'is' of collective value satisfaction, and this disposes men to violence' (Gurr as cited in Saleh, 2013). The theory of relative deprivation accounts the decision to resort to political violence to

"a gap between expected and achieved welfare" rather than a fixed measure of deprivation (Richardson, 2011).

Relative deprivation originated from a study carried out by Stouffer and his colleagues among American soldiers to account for a set of unanticipated connections between sentiments of satisfaction and a person's position in the military (Walker & Smith, 2002). However, researchers on the theory later on developed a distinction between individual feeling of deprivation and that of a member of a representative group (Walker & Smith, 2002). Though other theories have been advanced to explain insurgency (like the theories of rational choice and remedial secession), the theory of relative deprivation is more fitting in this present study given the fact that it addresses the aspect of comparison in the level of development and economic prosperity between states. In contrast to absolute deprivation which may lead to individual consideration and self-improvement, relative deprivation lays the case for revolt against a system under which a certain group of people may feel less considered than others.

Gurr (1971) argues that the intensity of the frustration and discontentment people feel from the inability to attain their societal values and harsh depression makes them more open to revolt. The frustration experienced by a group of people who feel alienated or discriminated from their own share of what collectively belong to a society can lead towards violent and extremist solutions like insurgency and terrorism. In this light, Gurr further maintains that the level of frustration is proportionate to the level of political instability (Ibid).

A number of scholars have explored the causal link between relative deprivation and insurgency. Gurney and Tierney (1982) focus on the link between relative deprivation and social movements. They account this link to two principles of social psychology: frustration-aggression theory and cognitive balance approach. They point out that writers like Gurr, Davies and Feierabend employed the frustration-aggression model to substantiate the link relative deprivation has with civil strife (Gurr), revolution (Davies) and political violence (Feierabend). The cognitive balance approach on its part identifies the linkage between relative deprivation and social movement by pointing out participation in social movement relieves the underlying state of a person's psychological tension.

Macours (2006) on her part takes a case-study to illustrate the link between relative deprivation and violence. In a paper that probes into causal link between relative deprivation and civil conflict escalation in Nepal, the author makes some startling findings. Based on national-representative household surveys and information on mass abduction conducted by Maoists, Macour underscored household possessing comparatively huge land property secured a disproportionate gain from recent growth to the disadvantage (relative deprivation) of those who possess little or no land. Such inequality made the relatively deprived districts a fertile ground for the recruitment by the Maoists insurgents.

Muller and Weede (1994) acknowledge the frustration-aggression theory assumptions of relative deprivation and the utility assumptions of the rational choice theory are the two theoretical foundations on which hypotheses to elucidate the cross-national divergence in levels of insurgent conflicts.

2.2.3 Rational Choice Theory

Green and Fox (2007: p.269) define rational choice theories as those "predicated on the notion that individual actors pursue their goals efficiently". They further point out that whether or not such individual actors are well informed or not at all informed, they choose a course of action among the alternatives available to them which they believe has the potential of delivering them the largest overall benefit. Quoting from M. Hollis, Boudon underscores rational choice is basically self-explanatory since a "rational action is its own explanation" (Boudon; p.179). In the context of Boko Haram insurgency, rational choice presupposes that those engaged in Boko Haram insurgency are rational beings that must have weighed the cost and benefit of their course of action and made a decision they believe would yield them a net benefit at the end. In such case and within the logic of Hollis one does not have to go far searching for motivating factors.

Sokoto State University professor Saheed Rufai identifies rational choice theory to be of great relevance in understanding the upsurge of Boko Haram. He points out motivation for terrorism according to the rational choice theory is based on utility maximization and that the fundamental motivating factor behind individual participation in collective terrorism action is that the benefits outweighs the cost (Rufai, 2017).

Another scholar who espouses the rational choice theory framework in explaining Boko Haram is Utibe (2016). He points out that actors, within the framework of the rational choice theory, actors (in this case terrorist) are guided by a motive and targeted payoffs when they execute a mission. He intimates that the decision of Boko Haram to continue its bombing activities despite having accepted a proposed

agreement of lay down arms can be explained by the fact that they are rational actors in pursuit of goals and motives.

2.2.4 Class Theory of Terrorism

Another theoretical approach that has been put across to explain the emergence of Boko Haram is the class theory of terrorism. The theory, according to its main proponent Ogunrotifa, holds that "terrorism is an expression of an unending class struggle implicit in the hidden structures of oppression and structured contradictions of global capitalist system."(Ogunrotifa, 2013) It views state and individual level terrorism as a response to the antagonistic relations between the ruling class on the one hand and what he termed the "lumpen class". He argues that this theoretical approach is adaptable to Boko Haram insurgency as it helps situate the emergence of the insurgency to the endemic socio-economic woes global capitalism has generated.

Ogunrotifa stresses that:

it also makes eminent sense to locate the root of present day terrorism at the behest of the class antagonism inherent in contemporary global capitalist society, and how the existing capitalist social relations requires the use of terrorist tactics by all the classes in the society or state rather than that of the lumpen (suppressed) class.

(Ibid., p. 27).

Though he attempts a nexus between the Boko Haram insurgency and the implantation of capitalism in Nigeria through the agency of colonialism and the introduction of Western education, the causal link between the two (class struggle and insurgency) is not well substantiated in the current literature.

2.2.5 Relational/Vengeance Theory

The Boko Haram insurgency can also be viewed from the prism of the relational/vengeance theory. This theory, according to Alozieuwa (2012), seeks an explanation of violent conflicts pitting groups by examining the sociological, historical, political and economic relationships between them. It is premised from the

fact that the relationship between groups and individuals is shaped by cultural and value differences between them. From this perspective, Faleti (2006) underscores several conflicts are born from the past history of feud between that has engendered negative stereotypes, discrimination and racial intolerance. He adds that:

The fact that 'others' are perceived as different makes us feel they are entitled to less or are inferior by reason of [...] values. This disrupts the flow of communication between us and them and to that extent, twists perceptions that we have about each other.
(Ibid., p. 55)

One can deduct from the aforementioned theoretical premise that the past activities of Boko Haram has built a deep seated antagonism and dichotomy between the group and the Nigerian society. There is a "We" and "Others" distinction that has emerged in the minds of Boko Haram members with regards to how they perceive themselves and how they are perceived the Nigerian society. In their mind they see themselves as a brotherhood bonded by the common desire to fight against "infidels" who do not believe in Allah. On the other hand, the Nigerian society is bewildered by the blood-thirsty disposition of the members of this group which in tend creates a situation of mutual antagonism between the two groups (Boko Haram and the Nigerian society) that may be express through violence. The example Alozieuwa (2012) cites is the killing of Boko Haram members by the security forces of the Nigerian government and the subsequent reprisals against the forces of law and order by the group.

2.2.6 Islamic State Theory

Another important theoretical premise in understanding the upsurge of Boko Haram insurgency is the Islamic theory. Proponents of this theory like Anyadike (2013) and Alozieuwa (2012) contend that the emergence of the Boko Haram insurgency is rooted in the group's quest to topple the Nigerian government and establish an Islamic theocracy in the country.

Many scholars share the belief Boko Haram is fundamentally rooted in the desire of radical Islamists to create a theocracy ruled by the Sharia. Addaney, Boshoff, and Olutola (2017) point out that the goal of Boko Haram is to wage war against the corrupt and fake Muslims that have usurped power in northern Nigeria and the federal government itself in order to establish a pure Islamic state governed by the Sharia law. In the context of the Islamic state theory, Aghedo and Osumah (2012) postulate that the Boko Haram insurgency originated from political Islam which is led by a philosophy of a fanatical practice of Islam. Campbell (2014) on his part points out that Boko Haram derives its uniqueness from its ability to combine "sectarian, radical Islamic agenda with violence" all in a bid to achieve its fundamental goal of establishing a Sharia state.

Among the aforementioned theories, relative deprivation shall be employed as the theoretical framework for this thesis because it is more suited for the hypothesis being tested in this study—the causal link between the relative underdevelopment of the Northeast geopolitical zone (compared to other zones in Nigeria) and the rise of Boko Haram insurgency.

To the specific case of the phenomenon under study in this thesis, Agbibo (2013) in his incisive briefing entitled "Why Boko Haram Exists: The Relative Deprivation Perspective" attributes the rise of Boko Haram to relative deprivation. He finds a correlation between the fact that Boko Haram originated from the North and the level of socioeconomic deprivation existing in that part of Nigeria (compared to other geopolitical zones).

This contention is more glaring when it comes to the state where Boko Haram, originated (Borno State) in which it has been reported: “only 2% of children under 25 months have been vaccinated; 83% of young people are illiterate; 48.5% of children do not go to school” (Agbiboa, 2013, p. 151). In addition, statistics from the Nigerian National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) also indicate that poverty is most prevalent in the Northeast zone (64.8%), trailed by the North-West area (61.2%). This is in stark contrast to the South of Nigeria with the South-East region emerging with the lowest national rate of 31.2% followed by the South-West with 40.2% (Ibid.).

Chapter 3

RELATIVE UNDERDEVELOPMENT IN NORTHEAST NIGERIA

3.1 Introduction

The theory of relative deprivation semantically presupposes comparison. Contrary to absolute deprivation that is endogenous in character, relative deprivation is exogenous in the sense that it compares an individual, society or entity's level of deprivation (welfare, development, living standard or other parameters) with others. This Chapter would focus on the relative level of development the Northeast region of Nigeria in comparison to the other geographical zones. It should be noted that Nigeria is divided into six geopolitical zones established during the regime of former President Ibrahim Babaginda (see Figure 2.1). These six geopolitical zones are: North East comprising Adamawa, Bauchi, Borno, Gombe, Taraba, and Yobe states; North Central comprising Benue, Kogi, Kwara, Nassarawa, Niger, Plateau states and the Federal Capital Territory (FCT) Abuja; North West comprising: Jigawa, Kaduna, Kano, Katsina, Kebbi, Sokoto, and Zamfara states; South South comprising: Akwa-Ibom, Bayelsa, Cross-River, Delta, Edo and Rivers states; South East comprising: Abia, Anambra, Ebonyi, Enugu, and Imo states; and South West comprising: Ekiti, Lagos, Ogun, Ondo, Osun, and Oyo states (ABOUT NIGERIANS, 2018). This Chapter shall undertake a comparative analysis of the level of development from the social, economic and political (distribution of power and participation in decision-making) domains. This is fundamental in illustrating the factual basis of relative

deprivation which makes the region vulnerable to the radical Islam rhetoric and recruitment to Boko Haram insurgency.




Figure 3.1: Map of the six geopolitical zones of Nigeria

Source:

https://www.researchgate.net/publication/283770788_Current_Prevalence_Pattern_of_Hypertension_in_Nigeria_A_Systematic_Review/figures?lo=1

3.1.1 Education

Northeast Nigeria is among the lowest among all six geopolitical zones in Nigeria in terms of literacy rate. A Nigeria Education Data Survey conducted in 2010 by the National Population Commission (NPC) of Nigeria revealed that the North-east and

the North-west zones topped the chart when it comes to unschooled children, children unable to read and the lowest literacy rate (Edet, 2011). States of the Northeast zones are among the lowest when it comes to literacy. Borno (one of the Northeast states) leads from the bottom with the lowest literacy rate (14.5%) according to a survey on national literacy carried out by the NBC (National Bureau of Statistics). Other states of the Northeast zone such as Taraba, Yobe, Bauchi and Gombe are among the lowest with 23.3%, 26.6%, 34.1%, and 39.3% respectively. When it comes to youth literacy rate by State, the states of the Northeast zone still lag behind. In terms of literacy in the country's official language (English), Bauchi is among second in the bottom with 39.5%, Yobe and Gombe are also among the low performing states with 42.5% and 45.6% respectively (UNESCO, 2012).

Another issue in the educational domain is what Adenrele (2012) described as "The Almajirai factor". This refers the Almajirai to the Almajirai system of education which is Qur'anic education "under half-baked Mallams" merged with the begging of alms by male children from 7 - 15 in Northern Nigeria (Adetoro, 2010). Given their large population and disorderly teaching arrangements (a single cleric placed in charge of as many as 4000 children), the failure of the government to harmonize the educational program with the Universal Basic Education of the country, the Almajiri became potentially vulnerable to terrorist recruitment. To this end, Adenrele notes: "the Almajiris can be seen as the neglected, rejected and schizophrenic maladjusted youngs of Northern Nigeria that are usually with violent aggression, willing to become Boko Haram suicide bombers on a platter of frivolous promises." (Adenrele, 2012 p. 22). The Almajiri factor which is a peculiarity of Northern Nigeria and unaddressed by the Nigerian government therefore constitute a huge security threat in terms of exposing young people to recruitment by Boko Haram insurgents.

3.1.2 Health

In the health domain, the Northeast geographical zone has lingered for long in a relatively precarious health situation compared other states. Statistics from the Ministry of Health in Nigeria places the Northeast zone at the zenith when it comes to maternal infant mortality with a ratio of 1,549/100,000 live births in comparison to the South West zone which recorded 165/100,000 live births (making a difference of nearly ten-fold). The Northeast and the Northwest zones also shared the top spot as concerns the rate of neonatal mortality, as well as the highest under-five mortality rate (UNICEF, 2018). Generally, maternal mortality in Northern Nigeria has been described as the highest in the globe with Nigeria harbouring approximately one out of every nine maternal deaths in the world (Doctor et al, 2011). Scholars affirmed the issue is worse in Northern Nigeria as a whole "where strong cultural beliefs and practices on childbirth and fertility-related behaviours partly contribute significantly to the maternal morbidity and mortality picture compared to southern Nigeria." (Ibid.)

3.1.3 Infrastructures

Another domain where relative deprivation is prevalent between the Northeast and other geographical zones in Nigeria is that of infrastructures. Baba and Abubakar (2015) in their study on the decaying nature of infrastructure and facilities in Northeast Nigeria noted the following:

facilities in the education, health, water, electricity and other sectors are seriously collapsing in the region. Population is growing, state efforts towards infrastructural development in the north-east are minimal and the living conditions of the people of the region are in severe state of agonies.
(Ibid.,p.37)

This desolate image of infrastructural decay opens the population more to rhetoric of revolt often used by insurgents to pursue their goal of political conquest.

3.2 Economic Underdevelopment in Northeast

The Northeast of Nigeria is also lagging behind in terms of economic development. The relative underdevelopment of the Northeast can be seen when one considers the level of poverty and unemployment.

3.2.1 Poverty

On the overall, a report from the NBS published in January 2011 notes rise in the percentage of Nigerians living in abject poverty from 55% in 2004 - 61% in 2010. However, Anthony and Humphrey (2017) point out categorically that there is an uneven distribution of poverty in Nigeria with the north at the bottom. They underscore: "70% of Nigerians in the north-eastern part of the country (Boko Haram's traditional stronghold) lived on less than one US dollar a day compared to 50 and 59% in the south-western and south-eastern Nigeria respectively." (Ibid., p.650). From a broader perspective, the prevalence of poverty in Nigeria has always been higher in the North than in the South. Available statistics for over three decades (1980 - 2000) lends credence to this assertion (see Figure 2.2).




Figure 2.2: Incidence of poverty between the North and South from 1980 – 2000

The relative disparity between the north and south in terms of poverty is well articulated in the following statement from Borno State governor and Chairman of the Northern State Governors Forum:

Nigeria is a country of two nations, the South is much more stable and prosperous, the north on the other hand is in a poverty trap. In Nigeria, poverty wears a northern cap, if you are looking for a poor man, get somebody wearing a northern cap,”
 (Odunsi, 2016)

3.2.2 Unemployment/Underemployment

Most states of the Northeast zones are among those with the highest unemployment rates in Nigeria. State like Bauchi, Gombe, Yobe, and Borno have witnessed a relatively steady increase in their unemployment rate from 2002 - 2011 (Aiyedogbon and Ohwofasa, 2012).

Conclusion

It is evident from the preceding analyses that the Northeast geopolitical zone has been relatively deprived in terms of development and living standards (education, health, employment and overall welfare). Going by relative deprivation theory, the various predicament of the Northeast (in contrast to other geopolitical zones in Nigeria) predisposes them to succumb to the appeal of insurgents. It is not surprising therefore that Boko Haram took advantage of the prevailing situation to establish their base in Northeast Nigeria. The Chapter that follows will examine the origins and expansion of Boko Haram in the Northeast of Nigeria.

Chapter 4

ORIGINS AND EXPANSION OF BOKO HARAM IN NORTHEAST NIGERIA

4.1 Introduction

Boko Haram insurgency has been the predominant theme in the political history of the Northeast in particular and the Federal Republic of Nigeria in general in the second decade of the 21st Century. The aforementioned phenomenon that began within some states in the Northeast zone quickly spread its tentacles over the entire federal territory of Nigeria beyond (extending to other neighbouring states like Cameroon, Tchad, and Niger). The origins and expansion of Boko Haram constitutes the focus of this Chapter. Aside tracing the origin and evolution of the insurgent movement, attention shall also be placed on the devastation it has caused on the socio-economic life and welfare of the inhabitants of the Northeast zone in particular and Nigeria as a whole.

4.2 Origins of Boko Haram

The name Boko Haram etymologically originated from the Moslem "Jama'atu Ahlus-Sunnah Lidda'Awati Wal Jihad", which is translated in English as "people committed to the propagation of the Prophet's teachings and jihad." (Forest, 2012; Ajayi, 1990). The group was founded in 2002 by Ustaz Mohammed Yussuf (at the time a charismatic Muslim cleric aged 32). A "Salafist" educated Moslem, Yusuf put in place in Maiduguri in Borno state a religious complex comprising an Islamic boarding school and a mosque (Forest, 2012). It was there that he launched his

"Jama'atu Ahlus-Sunnah Lidda'Awati Wal Jihad" prayer group which later grew up to be the insurgent and terrorist organisation known as "Boko Haram". Yusuf's religious complex brought together poor Moslems not just from the Northeast region but also those from nearby country. Boko Haram's fundamental purpose was the rejection of Western education and culture as well as the imposition of the Sharia throughout the Federal Republic of Nigeria (Thomson, 2012). Yusuf had a Salafist conception Islam which involved the use of jihads (religious wars) in its propagation.

To this end, Forest notes that:

A devout Salafist, Yusuf embraced the view, first promulgated by the 13th century religious scholar Taqi al-Din Ibn Taymiyya, that the reason Muslim communities are made to suffer is because their leaders have not been true to the faith. He preached that it was necessary to engage in active jihad in order to defend the ummah (global community of Muslims) and spread the faith, and that a leader who does not enforce Sharia law completely, and wage active jihad against infidels, is unfit to rule.
(Forest, 2012; p.62).

Campbell (2014) on his part notes that one of the distinguishing characteristics of Boko Haram is its unique combination of sectarianism and violence. He underscores the following concerning Boko Haram:

According to the movement's rhetoric, its goal is to create God's kingdom on earth through justice for the poor achieved by the rigid application of Islamic law, or sharia. Anything that gets in the way of this goal must be destroyed. For Boko Haram, violence is not a perversion of Islam; it is a justifiable means to a pure end.
(Campbell, 2014; p. 2)

As a Salafist movement that espoused a radical and fundamentalist conception of Islam, some scholars believe Boko Haram had its historical antecedence in the "Maitatsine movement" of the 1980s (Thomson, 2012; Forest, 2012; Ajayi, 1990; Adesoji, 2011; Loimeier, 2012). To this end, Ajayi (1990; p. 104) clearly underscores "Boko Haram had its roots in and drew inspiration from the Maitatsine

uprisings of the early 1980s". The founder of the Maitatsine movement was Muhammad Marwa, a Cameroonian Moslem cleric with the reputation of radicalisation including the rejection of "all non-Qu'anic innovations" (among which are things made from the west like dresses, watches, bicycles as well as ritual prayers).

The group was involved in several violent skirmishes with the Nigerian army from 1980 - 1987 including one involving an attack on Kano's major Friday mosque. That attack encountered a heavy reprisal from the Nigerian army and claimed the lives of about 6000 persons including Marwa himself (Loimeier, 2012). Forest (2012) also notes a clear similarity between the Maitatsine movement and Boko Haram in terms of their philosophy and mode of recruitment. In terms of philosophy, both movements called for the rejection of Western civilization and the strict implementation of the Sharia law. Concerning modes of recruitment, both drew their membership essentially from disillusioned youths (unemployed graduates and university and disaffected youths).

Generally, in tracing the origins of Boko Haram there are two other historical contexts that cannot be left out. The first factor is the militant Islamic background of Northern Nigeria and the adoption of the Sharia law by states in the North. Militant religiosity in Northern Nigeria began at the dawn of the 19th Century when Usman dan Fodio launched a Jihad against the apostate and corrupt Hausa ruling class which led to the establishment of the Sokoto Caliphate across Northern Nigeria and other parts of sub-Saharan Africa (Agbibo, 2013; Forest, 2012). Agbibo (2013; p. 4) contends that radical Islamic movements in the North of Nigeria like Boko Haram can be perceived as an attempts towards "the enforcement of Sharia in the spirit of

earlier times as inspired by Usman dan Fodio and the sharia-governed Sokoto Caliphate."

Another important historical context in the origins of Boko Haram was the adoption and application of the Shari'a law by twelve Nigerian Moslem states (for the judgement of civil and criminal matters among Moslems) and in the aftermath of the country's return to civilian rule in 1999 (Thomson, 2012). This environment favoured the rise of Boko Haram who Salafist fundamentalist brand of Islam emphasized the strict implementation of the Shari'a system.

4.3 Expansion of Boko Haram

From a local insurgent Moslem fundamentalist group that rein terror in certain states of the Northeast geopolitical zone in Nigeria, Boko Haram has grown in leaps and bound extending its insurgency and terrorism across the entire nation of Nigeria and beyond (to Niger, Tchad and Cameroon). The expansion of Boko Haram can be analysed both internally (within Nigeria) and externally (at the international level).

4.3.1 Internal Expansion

Boko Haram's internal expansion can be divided into two phases: The pre-2009 phase and the post-2009 phase. The pre-2009 phase was less violent as the group was not so keen on violently topple the government in place. Yusuf concentrated his efforts on criticizing the Moslems of the North for their participation in what he deemed an "illegitimate" and "non-Islamic state". (Sergie and Johnson, 2014).

Though its overriding goal was to establish a Moslem Caliphate in Nigeria, with the implementation of the Shari'a law, the group did not radicalize to the present state of insurgency and terrorism at which it is before 2009. Thomson (2012) notes prior to 2009, Boko Haram's violent activities were limited to sporadic skirmishes with

police and sectarian violence. Campbell (2014; p.2) points out "Although the movement was hostile to the Nigerian state and rejected Western education as non-Islamic, it remained generally non-violent until 2009."

The decision by governors of the Northern states to implement full Sharia law in 1999 and its reluctant implementation by some of them provided an opportunity for proponents of the Shari'a system like Yusuf. In 2003, the incumbent governor of Borno State (where Boko Haram was based at the time), Mala Kachalla wavered on the implementation of Shari'a which precipitated his defeat in the 2003 State elections. Yusuf, who was a member of Kachalla's committee overseeing the implementation of the Shari'a voiced criticism over the inadequacy of Shari'a codes. He established a new political alliance with the incoming governor, Ali Modu Sheriff (Thurston, 2016).

However, 2009 marked a turning point as severe treatment by the government (involving police brutality on its members), and violent interreligious conflict (between Christians and Moslems) pushed the group towards radicalization (Sergie and Johnson, 2014).

2009 is recognized by most authors (Campbell, 2014; Walker, 2012; Agbiboa; 2013; Thomson, 2012) as a watershed moment in the Boko Haram insurgency with the group fully radicalized and engaged in violent insurgent and terrorist activities. In July 2009, Boko Haram launched an uprising that extended to four northern states (From Bauchi where it started to Borno, Kano and Yobe) after their refusal to adhere to a motorbike helmet law prompted a muscular police intervention (Sergie and Johnson, 2014).

The incident and the ensuing revolt were brutally suppressed by the Nigerian police and army. According to Walker (2012; p.4), following unrest in Maiduguri created by members of the Boko Haram (after a police crackdown and arrest of some of them) the police "embarked on a bloody purge of the group's members and anyone they suspected of being a Boko Haram supporter or sympathizer." Several Boko Haram members were arrested and killed in custody including Boko Haram's founder Yusuf and his father-in-law. (Ibid.).

Boko Haram activities became increasingly violent after 2009 with the insurgent movement exacting various acts of terror, war, destruction against a variety of targets. Abubakar Mohammed Shekau took over from his former master Yusuf as the new leader of the movement. Boko Haram invaded a prison in September 2010 and liberated 150 of its followers held in custody. From 2011 to 2012, the movement focused its attack on Christian churches in response to criticism the movement was creating civil strife among Moslems rather concentrating their efforts in targeting Christians who represented the true enemy (Loimeier, 2012).

In 2011 Boko Haram made a significant by moving its activities from the Northeast to the South of Nigeria with two major bomb attacks. The first was a bomb attack on the Abuja headquarters of the Nigerian Police on 16 June and the second was an attack on the United Nations House in Abuja on 19 September (Anyadike and Nkechi, 2013).

In 2013, Boko Haram orchestrated a string of heinous terrorist activities which made some analysts to perceive a significant influence of their association with the terrorist group Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb. These included the September 2013 murder

of 65 students in their sleep at an agricultural college in Yobe state, the killings of hundreds of people on the northern Nigeria roads, and the chainsaw beheading of truck drivers (Sergie and Johnson, 2014).

4.3.2 External Expansion

Over the years, the activities of Boko Haram's activities have grown beyond the territorial boundaries of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. The Boko Haram insurgency has been transformed into a regional conflict that spans across four neighbouring states of West and Central Africa: Nigeria, Tchad, Cameroon and Niger. The expansion of Boko Haram can be analysed in two dimensions: In terms of partnership, logistic and financial support from other international terrorist organizations and the expansion of its operations in neighbouring countries.

Concerning partnership, logistic and financial support, some scholars have argued that Boko Haram's international expansion is due strongly to its links with other international terrorists organisation notably Al Qaida in the Maghreb (AQIM). Gilbert (2014; p. 152) underscores Boko Haram has "established links with Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), Al-Shabaab in Somalia and Al-Qaeda in the Arabian peninsula from where it has received advanced training and monetary support for its strategic insurgent activities in Nigeria". Thomson (2012) on his part contends that the improvement of Boko Haram's operations from 2011 (use of vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices, the success rate and tempo of operations) all point to inspiration from two likely sources: AQIM and Al-Shebaab. Oyewole (2015) points out Boko Haram has participated in several terrorist operations across the African continent in partnership with AQIM, Al Shabaab, the Ansar Al-Dine group in Mali, the Séléka Rebels in Central African Republic, Al-

Mua'qi'oon Biddam Brigade in Niger and Islamist Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Arica (MUJAO).

On 7 March 2015, Boko Haram pledge allegiance to the Islamic State (ISIS). CNN reported that the pledge came through an audio message attributed to Boko Haram's leader Abubakar Shekau in Boko Haram is also named "Wilayat Gharb Afriqiyya" interpreted as the Islamic State of West Africa (CNN, 2018).

In terms of operations, Boko Haram has extended its terrorist activities in neighbouring countries notably Cameroon, Tchad and Niger. In February 2013, Boko Haram militants kidnapped a French family of seven in a national park situated in Cameroon's northern regions (Ibid.). According to a BBC report, Boko Haram carried out 80 attacks in Nigeria, 26 in Cameroon, 18 in Niger and three in Tchad in the year 2016 (Wilson, 2018). In a visit to Cameroon in 2017, the UN Assistant Secretary General for Humanitarian Affairs revealed that Boko Haram conducted more than 60 suicide attacks in Cameroon in 2017 (Journal du Cameroun, 2018).

Boko Haram also recruits its members from West and Central Africa. Oyewole (2015) intimates the recruitment ground for Boko Haram fighters include: Nigeria, Tchad, Ghana, Cameroon and Niger. It has been reported that Boko Haram has membership strength of 15,000 - 50,000 fighters.

4.3.3 Effects of the Boko Haram Insurgency

The insurgency and terrorist activities of Boko Haram has led to huge loss of lives and untold suffering within Nigeria some of its neighbours (Cameroon, Tchad and Niger). In 2014 it was reported that Boko Haram terrorist activities claimed the lives of 6,664 persons making it the most lethal terrorist group before ISIS which killed

6,073 persons (Searcey and Santora, 2015). Concerning displacement, an IRIN report entitled "Lost in the city" revealed that Boko Haram had caused 2.15 million internally displaced persons in Nigeria with similar troubling figures in neighbouring Cameroon, Tchad and Niger (See Figure 4.1).




Figure 4.1: Internally displaced persons and refugees fleeing Boko Haram atrocities.

Conclusion

From a Salafist sectarian group operating in Northeast Nigeria, Boko Haram has over the years extended its tentacles to become perhaps the greatest regional security threat in West and Central Africa today. The Islamic insurgent group has diversified its strategies and extended its operations beyond Northeast Nigeria. Its activities now span the length and breadth of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, Cameroon, Tchad and Niger. Boko Haram has also established partnerships with other like-minded terrorist organisation like AQIM to enhance its effectiveness and enable it achieve its primordial goal of establishing a Moslem Caliphate in Nigeria and neighbouring territories.

Chapter 5

THE CAUSAL LINK BETWEEN RELATIVE DEPRIVATION AND INSURGENCY IN NORTHEAST NIGERIA

5.1 Introduction

The birth and rapid expansion of the Salafist Islamic group Boko Haram has been one of the most remarkable phenomenon in Nigerian Politics. The previous chapter traced the aforementioned evolution in details as well as the impact the terrorist activities has had on the national and international front. This chapter focuses on the causal relationship between relative deprivation and the Boko Haram insurgency. It is divided into two parts. The first part examines the perspectives of scholars and political leaders who uphold a causal link exist between the two (relative deprivation and insurgency). The second part analyses the feedback of what people from Nigeria's Northern think concerning the aforementioned causal link. This shall be expressed in the analyses of the results of a survey on the opinion of Northern youths on the cause of Boko Haram and an elite interview with some elites of the Northern regions on the same issue.

5.2 Scholars and Politicians' Perspective on Causal Link between Relative Deprivation and Boko-Haram Insurgency

5.2.1 Scholar's Perspective on the Link between Relative Deprivation and Boko Haram Insurgency

Several scholars (mostly Nigerians) have identified a causal link between relative deprivation and the Boko Haram insurgency in Northeast Nigeria. Prominent among scholars with the aforementioned school of thought is George Mason University's Daniel Agbiboa. In an article entitled "The ongoing campaign of terror in Nigeria: Boko Haram versus the state", Agbiboa contends that the magnitude of relative poverty and inequality in the north of Nigeria has brought many analysts and organisations to the conclusion that the main driving force behind the Boko Haram's insurgency in the northern part of Nigeria is socio-economic deprivation (Agbiboa, 2013).

In "Why Boko Haram Exists: The Relative Deprivation Perspective" (2013b) and "No retreat, no surrender: Understanding the religious terrorism of Boko Haram in Nigeria (2013c), Agbiboa uses relative deprivation theory to account for the outbreak of the Boko Haram rebellion. Using Gurr's book *Why Men Rebel* as his baseline, Agbiboa ties the origins of the Boko Haram insurgency in Northern Nigeria clearly with socio-economic deprivation of that part of the country (Agbiboa, 2013b). He puts forward the following statistics to back his claim:

In Borno State, the birthplace of Boko Haram, "Only 2% of children under 25 months have been vaccinated; 83% of young people are illiterate; 48.5% of children do not go to school" (Rogers, 2012: 3). Another recent report by the National Population Commission (2009: 118–120) found that literacy rates were much lower among states in the north, and that 72% of children around the ages of 6–16 had never attended schools in Borno State, where Boko Haram was founded (Forest, 2012). Also, the National Bureau of Statistics data on poverty in Nigeria shows that looking into each specific zone, the highest

poverty rate of 64.8% is recorded in the North-East zone, followed by 61.2% in the North-West (NBS, 2010). On the other hand, the lowest poverty rate of 31.2% is recorded in the South-East, followed by 40.2% in the South-West.

(Ibid., p.76)

Another proponent of relative deprivation as the theoretical premise of Boko Haram insurgency is Ayegba. He also draws inspiration from Gurr's *Why Men Rebel* as he contends that poverty and unemployment merged with the indifference of the government laid the foundation for Boko Haram terrorism to thrive (Ayegba, 2015).

Àrendàs (2016) also underlines relative deprivation as one of the driving force behind the Boko Haram insurgency in Northern Nigeria, noting the region has some of the poorest human development indicators in the globe. He underscores categorically that "The policies of the Nigerian elites gave birth and fostered the phenomenon of 'relative deprivation' in Northern Nigeria." (Àrendàs, 2016; p. 33)

Olojo (2013) also acknowledged the overall level of deprivation of the north compared to the South (in terms of relative poverty and education) but blames the situation to the poor governance of successive leaders from the north within the constituency they come from.

Shuaibu, Salleh and Shehu (2015) on their part point out that relative deprivation of the Northeast (especially in the economic domain with a poverty rate of 76.3% and a high level of unemployment among youths) makes the region a fertile ground for recruitment and support for the Boko Haram terrorist group.

5.2.2 Political and Institutional Leaders' Perspective on the link between Relative Deprivation and Boko Haram Insurgency

The causal relationship between relative deprivation and the Boko Haram insurgency has also been explored by political and institutional leaders. Nigerian politicians especially top present and former government officials have acknowledge the aforementioned link. After a visit to the Borno State capital, Maiduguri (the birth place of Boko Haram) in 2011) former Nigerian president Olusegun Obasanjo said he briefed the then Nigerian President Goodluck Jonathan about the revendications of the terrorist group. He unequivocally pointed out that the root cause of the insurgency was the relative deprivation of the northeast: “Boko Haram will not be over; it started from a position of gross under-development, unemployment, youth frustration in the north-east. So we must be treating the disease not the symptom.”(Ebuzor, 2017)

Another politician who holds strongly to the relative deprivation-Boko Haram insurgency nexus is former Central Bank of Nigeria Governor and Northern elite, Sanusi Lamido Sanusi. Sanusi accounted the rise of Boko Haram to the inequitable distribution of federal revenue claiming that it is done in a way that is unfavourable to the north. On this score the former banker points out:

revenue sharing formula that gave 13 percent derivation to the oil-producing states was introduced after the military relinquished power in 1999 among a series of measures aimed at redressing historic grievances among those living closest to the oil and quelling a conflict that was jeopardising output. [...] There is clearly a direct link between the very uneven nature of distribution of resources and the rising level of violence.
(Adibe, 2014)

Both of Nigeria's present leaders, President Muhammadu Buhari and Vice-President Yemi Osinbajo have tacitly acknowledged the relative deprivation-Boko Haram insurgency connection. In an op-ed published in the New York Time after his election in 2015, President Buhari pointed out the poverty and hunger makes young people vulnerable to Boko Haram ideology and recruitment, He underscored: "If you are starving and young and in search of answers as to why your life is so difficult, fundamentalism can be alluring...." and that Boko Haram offers "...impressionable young people money and the promise of food, while the group's mentors twist their minds with fanaticism." (Campbell, 2015)

Buhari's deputy, Vice-President Osinbajo also share the same believe though from a general perspective of underdevelopment of the Nigeria's North. Addressing the 7th meeting of Defence Ministers of the Community of Sahel-Sahara States (CED-SAD), Osinbajo affirmed that stable success over terrorism and violent extremism can only be attained through the implementation of policies that tackles the root causes of the problem like poverty, frustration and illiteracy. He told the CED-SAD Defence chiefs:

Indeed, the military aspect of the fight against terrorism is the short-term one; enduring victory will only come from swiftly and diligently building on military victory by implementing, over the long term, policies that comprehensively tackle the poverty, illiteracy and frustration that predispose individuals and communities to imbibe extremist beliefs and ideologies.

If there is one thing we have learned from our experience fighting Boko Haram in Nigeria, it is that the battle is as much social and economic as it is a military one.

(PM NEWS, 2018)

From the diplomatic standpoint, there is a neutral voice that corroborates to that of the aforementioned Nigerian politicians on the relative deprivation-Boko Haram insurgency nexus. After a visit to countries of the Lake Chad Basin (Nigeria, Niger,

Chad and Cameroon) in December 2016, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees Filippo Grandi, maintained the Nigerian government had to tackle the challenges of poverty, underdevelopment and insecurity especially in the Northeast zone in order to defeat Boko Haram. (Premium Times, 2016)

From the foregone analysis, it is evident that Nigerian politicians and international institution leaders through their rhetoric have acknowledge the causal relationship between relative deprivation and the rise of Boko Haram.

5.3 Public and Elite Opinion on the Causal Link between Relative Deprivation and Boko Haram Insurgency

The causal relationship between relative deprivation and the emergence of Boko Haram in Northeast Nigeria can also be ascertained by sampling the opinion of a cross-section of the inhabitants of the area. It is within this framework that this researcher employed both quantitative and qualitative research tools to elicit the opinion of inhabitants of the Northeast in particular and Nigeria's Northern region in general.

From the quantitative standpoint, an online survey was conducted to sample the opinion of the youths of the Northeast and Northern region about the cause of Boko Haram. From the qualitative perspective, an elite interview was also conducted to gauge the opinion of elites of the Northeast and Northern regions. This section shall analysis the results of the online survey with youths and the elite interview to ascertain what the people of Northeast and Northern Nigeria think about the causal link between relative deprivation and the Boko Haram insurgency.

5.3.1 Results and Analysis on Survey of Northern Youths on the Cause of the Boko Haram Insurgency

The goal of the online survey was to seek the opinion of youths from the Northeast in particular and the broader Northern Region of Nigeria on the cause of Boko Haram. The survey employed a structured questionnaire which allowed for multiple choice responses for the participants. In terms of participation, a total of 101 youths from different states belonging to the aforementioned regional location responded to the online survey. Concerning gender representation, 53 out of the 101 respondents were women making a total of 52.5%. 48 men took part in the survey constituting 47.5% of the respondents (See Figure 1). In terms of age demographics, a majority of the respondents were aged between 24 and 25 years (See Figure 2).

Gender

101 responses




Figure 5.1: Gender representation

Level of Education

101 responses




Figure 5.4: Educational level of respondents

Questioned if they thought youths in the Northeast zone has the same level of opportunities and chances for personal welfare enhancement like their counterparts in the other geopolitical zones, 69 (68.3%) of them said no (See Figure 5.5). For those who said no, a question was further asked if they thought such situation made the youths of the Northeast vulnerable to recruitment into Boko Haram. Here, 64 (66%) of the respondent said yes (See Figure 5.6). Concerning the appeal of Boko Haram to youths of the North, 26 (26%) of participants to the survey responded to the affirmative (Yes) when asked if they would choose to join Boko Haram if they were offered an opportunity to join Boko Haram with attractive incentives (Figure 5.7). Concerning their motivation (for those who indicated a willingness to join Boko Haram if offered the chance), 59.7% said it was because of poverty or unemployment (See Figure 5.8). This shows that poverty and unemployment are important factors that makes youths of the North vulnerable to Boko Haram recruitment.

1. In your opinion, do youths in the Northeast zone have the same opportunities and chances for their personal welfare enhancement (access to education, employment opportunities, health care) as youths in other geopolitical zones?

101 responses




Figure 5.5: Level of opportunities for youths in the Northeast zone compared to other zones

2. If no, do you think such situation makes them vulnerable to recruitment into Boko Haram?

97 responses




Figure 5.6: Does the relative lack of opportunity make Northeast youths vulnerable to Boko Haram recruitment?

4. If you are offered an opportunity to join Boko Haram with attractive incentives, will you join?

100 responses




Figure 5.7: Willingness of youths of the Northeast to join Boko Haram if offered the opportunity

5. If Yes, what would be your motivation?

62 responses




Figure 5.8: Motivation for wanting to join Boko Haram

Interrogated on whether or not they are satisfied with the level of development of their geopolitical zone compared to other geopolitical zones in their country 75 of the 101 respondent (74.3%) said no (See Figure 5.9). Asked if they would relocate to other geopolitical zones with better welfare advantages if given the chance 73

(72.3%) said yes (See Figure 5.10). Both of these overwhelming "Yes" answers are indicative of the fact that they youths of the Northeast believe their region is relatively underdeveloped and lack opportunities compared to other geopolitical zones in Nigeria.

8. As a youth from/resident in Northeast Nigeria, are you satisfied with the level of development in your geopolitical zones comparative to others?

101 responses




Figure 5.9: Satisfaction with the level of development of the Northeast zone

6. If you have the opportunity to relocate to another geopolitical zone with better welfare advantages, would you?

101 responses




Figure 5.10: Willingness to relocate to other geopolitical zones

5.3.2 Analysis of Elite Interview with Northern Elites on the Cause of the Boko Haram Insurgency

In order to triangulate information retrieved from the online survey, and secondary sources concerning the causal relationship between the independent variable (relative deprivation) and the dependent variable (insurgency) of this study, an elite interview was carried out with 12 state and local government officials of some Northeast states. Based on the hypothesis set forth in this study and the information and arguments unearthed in the previous chapters, five interview questions (relating to the causal link between the independent and dependent variables) were formulated. The interviewees' responses were carefully analysed to determine specific factors mentioned by respective interviewee and the thematic categories of their responses. This researcher then undertook the delicate task of organizing the data (thematic categories) into tables from which discussions would be made.

5.3.2.1 Data Collection Method

In consideration of the hypothesis and the effort to examine the causal relationship between the independent and dependent variables, five interview questions were formulated (see Appendix 2). The questions covered the following themes: relative level of development between the Northeast and other geopolitical zones in Nigeria; comparative availability of opportunities for youths, motivation for joining Boko Haram, reason for the origin of Boko Haram in Northeast Nigeria and the possible remedies to the Boko Haram insurgency. The questions were then subsequently administered to state and local government officials from states and local government areas in the Northeast zone. Based on the researcher's acquaintances and field trip, a total of 15 prospective respondents (in active service or retired) were contacted. 12 of these contacts responded to the interview (see Table 5.1) and three declined because of time constraints and inability to adequately respond to the interview questions. All the interview responses were sent in early August.

Table 5.1: List of respondent and their respective functions

	NAMES OF RESPONDENT	FUNCTION
1.	Ayuba UMAR	Secretary to Senior program officer, Bogoro Local Government (LG) council, Bauchi State.
2.	Dorcas HASSAN	Retired civil servant, Maiduguri Secretariat, Borno
3.	Elijah JAMES	Retired Poll clerk Demsa LG, Adamawa State
4.	Emmanuel IKODOR	Logistics Fofure, Adamawa LG council
5.	Garkuwa ABDULKADIR	Retired civil servant, Bauchi State
6.	Godwin HABU	Retired locality manager Karawa LG, Yobe
7.	Kande IBRAHIM	Assistant Finance secretary Biu LG

8.	Katherine SHEIDU	Potiskum LG pension scheme officer, Yobe
9.	Ndaks ATELE	Local government councilor, Gwoza Borno
10.	Raphael AIYEOLA	Kirfi Local Government Official, Bauchi
11.	Sunday ADAMU	Social service administrator, Maiduguri Secretariat, Borno
12.	Stella AHMADU	Compliance officer, Damaturu, Yobe

5.3.2.2 Data Analysis

To ease the presentation and analysis of tables related to the elite interview, the following keys were used to designate the various respondents:

Table 5.2: Respondents Keys

	NAMES OF RESPONDENT	KEY
1.	Ayuba UMAR	U
2.	Dorcas HASSAN	Ha
3.	Elijah JAMES	J
4.	Emmanuel IKODOR	Ik
5.	Garkuwa ABDULKADIR	Ab
6.	Godwin HABU	Hab
7.	Kande IBRAHIM	Ib
8.	Katherine SHEIDU	S
9.	Ndaks ATELE	At
10.	Raphael AIYEOLA	Ai
11.	Sunday ADAMU	Ad
12.	Stella AHMADU	Ah

The analysis of the interviewees' responses would be done according to the five thematic categories on which the interview was based. In line with the focus of this chapter (on examining the causal relationship between relative deprivation and Boko Haram insurgency) four of the five thematic categories of the elite interviews would be tabulated and discussed: relative level of development between the Northeast and other geopolitical zones in Nigeria; comparative availability of opportunities for youths, motivation for joining Boko Haram, reason for the origin of Boko Haram in Northeast Nigeria.

The fifth category (on possible remedies to the Boko Haram insurgency) would be discussed in the last chapter of this study that deals with recommendation on how to redress the prevailing phenomenon (Boko Haram insurgency). Apart from carefully identifying the various responses and arranging them according to the various themes, the responses were aggregated into percentages for easy analysis. Discussion shall follow each of the table indicating the responses of the participants.

Table 5.3: Relative level of development between the Northeast and the other geopolitical zones by sectors

SECTOR	ASSESSMENT	RESPONDENTS	PERCENTAGE
Education	Better than other zones	J	8.3
	Same with other zones	At, Ab,	16.7
	Below that of other zones	Ib, S, Ad, Hab, U, Ik, Ha,	58.3
	Not enough knowledge to respond	Ai, Ab	16.7
Health	Better than other zones		0
	Same with other zones	J, Ad, Ah, At	33.3
	Below that of other zones	Ha, Ik, U, Hab, S, Ib,	50

	Not enough knowledge to respond	Ab, Ai	16.7
Infrastructure	Better than other zones		0
	Same with other zones	Ah, Ad, J	25
	Below that of other zones	At, Ib, S, Hab, U, Ik, Ha,	58.3
	Not enough knowledge to respond	Ab,Ai	16.7
Employment	Better than other zones	Hab	8.3
	Same with other zones	Ad, At	16.7
	Below that of other zones	Ha, Ik, U, J, Ah, S, Ib	58.3
	Not enough knowledge to respond	Ab, Ai	16.7

The question on the relative level of development between the Northeast and other geopolitical zones in Nigeria was subdivided into sectors. Concerning education, a majority of the respondents (58.3%) were of the opinion that the level of development in the Northeast was below that of the other geopolitical zones (as opposed to 16.7% who said it was the same). Same was the case with infrastructure (58%), employment (58%) and health (50%) with majority respondents saying the level of development in those sectors was relatively lower in the Northeast than other zones. In a nutshell, the overall assessment of all four sectors (education, health, infrastructure, and employment) indicates majority of the respondents believe that the Northeast is trailing behind the other geopolitical zones in terms of development

Table 5.4: Comparative availability of opportunities for youths by sectors

SECTOR	ASSESSMENT	RESPONDENTS	PERCENTAGE
Access to Educational opportunities	Better than other zones		0
	Equal with other zones	Ah, J, At	25
	Below that of other zones	Ai, Ad, U, Ik, Ha	41.7
	Not enough knowledge to respond	Ib, S, Hab, Ab	33.3
<hr/>			
Access to employment opportunities	Better than other zones		0
	Equal with other zones	Ad, At	16.7
	Below that of other zones	Ai, Ib, Ah, J, U, Ik, Ha	58.3
	Not enough knowledge to respond	S, Hab, Ab	25
<hr/>			
Access to health care	Better than other zones		0
	Equal with other zones	Ah, Ad, At	25
	Below that of other zones	Ai, Ib, Hab, J, Ha	41.7
	Not enough knowledge to respond	S, Ab, U, Ik	33.3
<hr/>			

Concerning the issue of comparative availability of opportunities for youths in the Northeast and other geopolitical zones, 41.7% of the respondents said it was below that of the other zones (as opposed to 25% who said it was equal). In the area of access to employment opportunities, 58.3% of the respondents felt youths from the Northeast was underprivileged compared to their counterparts in other zones (with just 16.7% saying they had equal employment opportunities). About access to health care, 41.7% of the respondents said youths from the Northeast had lesser access to health care than those of other zone (comparative to 25% who thought it was equal). These responses highlights the relative disadvantage in terms of welfare enhancement youths in the Northeast has compared to their counterpart in the other zones. This may also explain their vulnerability to Boko Haram ideology and recruitment.

Table 5.5: Motivation for joining Boko Haram

CIRCUMSTANCES/REASONS FOR JOINING BOKO HARAM	RESPONDENTS	PERCENTAGE
Poverty	At, Ab, S, Ai	33.3
Unemployment	Ha, Ik, U, Ib, Ai	41.7
Lack of access to social amenities	Ai	8.3
Illiteracy	At, Ha, Ik, U, Ad, S,	50
Selfish interest	S	8.3
Manipulation by political elite	Ah	8.3
Financial motivation	Ab, Ad	16.7
Religious indoctrination (Radical Islam)	At, Hab, Ad	25
Misinformation	Hab,	8.3
Indigenous favouritism	J	8.3
Poor infrastructures	J	8.3
Poor health care facilities	J	8.3

This researcher also sought from the interviewees their thoughts on what was the motivation behind people of the Northeast (especially youths) joining Boko Haram. According to the responses, top among the motivating factors were illiteracy (50%), unemployment (41.7%) and poverty (33.3%). All of these factors all indices of underdevelopment and help substantiate the causal effect it has on the Boko Haram insurgency.

Table 5.6: Reasons why Boko Haram originated from the Northeast

REASONS FOR THE ORIGIN OF BOKO HARAM IN THE NORTHEAST	RESPONDENTS	PERCENTAGE
Poor living standards	Hab, At	16.7
Illiteracy	Ab	8.3
Radical Islamic doctrine	Ai, Ha	16.7
Religious and political differences	U, Ik	16.7
Bad governance/Corruption	Hab,	8.3
Religious solution to socio-political problems (through the imposition of the Sharia Law)	Hab,	8.3
Insecure borders which facilitates the inflow of terrorist from neighbouring countries	S, Ad	16.7
Accessibility to support from foreign Islamic terrorist organisations like ISIL.	Ad	8.3

Conspiracy to destabilize the government in place	Ib, Ah	16.7
Enrichment scheme by some individuals	Ib	8.3
A religious cleansing campaign against Christians	Ib,	8.3

Concerning the reasons why Boko Haram began in the Northeast, the respondents alluded to multiple factors with no clear preponderance of a particular factor. The major factors ranged from radical Islamic doctrine (16.7%), religious and political differences to insecure borders and conspiracy to destabilize the government in place.

5.4 Conclusion

From the forgone analysis, it is evident that a causal relationship can be said to exist between relative deprivation and the Boko Haram insurgency. This causal relationship has been explored in this chapter by looking at the opinions of various scholars, politicians and corroborating them with both an online survey with youths of the Northeast and Northern region as well as an elite interview with some active and former civil servants of the Northeast. The existence of a causal link between relative deprivation and the Boko Haram insurgency does not necessarily limit the phenomenon under study (Boko Haram insurgency) to a unique cause (relative deprivation).

Chapter 6

GENERAL CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

General Conclusion

The origin and evolution of the Boko Haram insurgency has been a subject of predilection and controversy in Nigerian politics. Various theoretical and conceptual approaches have been advanced to decipher the phenomenal rise and expansion of the radical Islamic group from its hub in Maiduguri (Borno State) to the Lake Chad Basin (spanning across Nigeria, Cameroon, Chad, and Niger). This research study focused on relative deprivation as its theoretical framework. It sought to examine if there be a causal relationship between relative deprivation (the independent variable) and insurgency (the dependent variable) when it comes to the emergence and expansion of Boko Haram in Northeast Nigeria. The hypothesis put forward for testing in this study was that the relative underdevelopment of Nigeria's Northeast geopolitical zone is the main cause of the insurgency in the region.

A review of existing literature was done to understand the various angles and approaches other scholars and researchers have taken concerning the topic in question. The literature review also touched on previous scholarly work pointing to the relationship between underdevelopment and insurgency. The theoretical framework to be used in this study was also explained, borrowing largely from Ted Gurr's conception of relative deprivation. Analysis of the topic spanned into four chapters: chapter two probed into the relative underdevelopment of the Northeast of Nigeria with respect to the other geopolitical zones of the country; chapter three dealt

with the origins and expansion of Boko Haram; chapter four examined the causal link between relative deprivation and Boko Haram insurgency and chapter five examined alternative theoretical explanations for the origins of Boko Haram.

In order to triangulate the data derived from secondary sources two opinion sampling instruments were used to elicit data from those who are directly affected by the Boko Haram insurgency: An online survey was conducted with youths of the Northeast and broader Northern region of Nigeria; and an elite interview conducted with State and local government level administrative authorities.

The result of the study to a large part validated the arguments derived from secondary sources establishing a causal link between the two variables of the study (relative deprivation and Boko Haram insurgency). Five alternative theoretical explanations of the emergence of Boko Haram were also examined: rational choice; class theory of terrorism, relational/vengeance theory, Islamic theocratic state theory, and conspiracy theories. Though some of them are largely plausible, their explanatory value is not as strong as that of relative deprivation as demonstrated in the arguments presented in this study.

In conclusion therefore, the evidences explored, data gathered and analysis lends more credence to the hypothesis put forward in this study--that relative deprivation is the main theoretical explanation for the origin and expansion of Boko Haram insurgency in the Northeast of Nigeria.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Based on the knowledge gained on the Boko Haram insurgency in the course of this research study and an examination of the recommendations put forward by the elites interviewed, the following measures are suggested to the government and other stakeholders on how to address the Boko Haram predicament:

- i. A reorientation of the strategy in the fight against Boko Haram insurgency to priorities the human security dimension (which is more fundamental to the continuation of the battle) than the military option which so far has not succeeded to eradicate the problem.

- ii. The provision of social adequate social amenities (hospitals, schools, recreational facilities etc) and development projects (construction of roads, markets, and other important infrastructures) for the people of the Northeast zone.

- iii. A prioritization by the Federal government of special schemes and projects to create jobs and promote entrepreneurship among youths from the Northeast zone.

- iv. The intensification of the fight against corruption and embezzlement at state and federal levels to curb the swindle of state and federal resources by corrupt officials that fuels the outcry of Boko Haram members for an Islamic state.

- v. The intensification of border security through trans-frontier cooperation among states affected by Boko Haram to prevent the recruitment and migration of Boko Haram militants from neighbouring countries.

vi. A de-radicalization campaign can be organized through a partnership between the federal and Northeast state governments on the one hand and moderate or mainstream Muslim Imams and leaders.

The aforementioned recommendations, if put in place, would complement the ongoing efforts of the government and go a long way to increase the possibility of a final victory over the Boko Haram insurgency.

REFERENCES

- About Nigerians (2018). List and map of Geopolitical Zones with their states in Nigeria - ABOUT NIGERIANS. [online] ABOUT NIGERIANS. Available at: <http://aboutnigerians.com/list-and-map-of-geopolitical-zones-with-their-states-in-nigeria/> [Accessed 26 Jun. 2018].
- Addaney, M., Boshoff, E., & Olutola, B. (2017). The Climate Change and Human Rights Nexus in Africa. *Amsterdam LF*, 9, 5.
- Adenrele, A. R. (2012). Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria as a symptom of poverty and political alienation. *IOSR Journal of Humanities and Social Science*, 3(5), 21-26.
- Adesoji, A. O. (2011). Between Maitatsine and Boko Haram: Islamic fundamentalism and the response of the Nigerian state. *Africa Today*, 57(4), 99-119.
- Adetoro, R. A. (2010). The Almajirai syndrome as a potential threat to Nigeria national security: the role of social studies education. *Nigerian Journal of Social Studies*, vol. XIII (1&2): 141-150.
- Adibe, J. (2014). *Explaining the Emergence of Boko Haram*. [online] Brookings. Available at: <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/africa-in-focus/2014/05/06/explaining-the-emergence-of-boko-haram/> [Accessed 16 Aug. 2018].

- Agbibo, D. (2013). The ongoing campaign of terror in Nigeria: Boko Haram versus the state. *Stability: International Journal of Security and Development*, 2(3).
- Agbibo, D. E. (2013b). Why Boko Haram exists: The relative deprivation perspective. *African Conflict & Peacebuilding Review*, 3(1), 144-157.
- Agbibo, D. E. (2013c). No retreat, no surrender: Understanding the religious terrorism of Boko Haram in Nigeria.
- Aghedo, I., & Osumah, O. (2012). The Boko Haram Uprising: How Should Nigeria Respond?. *Third World Quarterly*, 33(5), 853-869.
- Ajayi, A. I. (2012). 'Boko Haram' and terrorism in Nigeria: Exploratory and explanatory notes. *religion*, 55, 65.
- Alozieuwa, S. H. (2012). Contending theories on Nigeria's security challenge in the era of Boko Haram insurgency. *Peace and Conflict Review*, 7(1), 1-8.
- Anthony, I. and Humphrey, N. (2017). Governance Failure and the Rise of Boko Haram Insurgency in North-Eastern Nigeria: A Critical Analysis. [online] Idosi.org. Available at: [https://www.idosi.org/wasj/wasj35\(4\)17/21.pdf](https://www.idosi.org/wasj/wasj35(4)17/21.pdf) [Accessed 30 Jun. 2018].
- Anyadike, N. O., & Nkechi, O. (2013). Boko Haram and national security challenges in Nigeria; causes and solutions. *Journal of Economics and Sustainable Development*, 4(5), 12-23.

- Àrendàs, Q. U. A. (2016). The Boko Haram Insurgency-Driving Factors Behind the Existence of the Boko Haram Group in Nigeria.
- Ayegba, U. S. (2015). Unemployment and poverty as sources and consequence of insecurity in Nigeria: The Boko Haram insurgency revisited. *African Journal of Political Science and International Relations*, 9(3), 90-99.
- Aiyedogbon, J. O., & Ohwofasa, B. O. (2012). Poverty and youth Unemployment in Nigeria, 1987-2011. *International Journal of Business and Social Science*, 3(20).
- Baba, I., & Abubakar, M. (2015). Decaying Nature of Facilities and the Need for Infrastructural Development in North-east Nigeria. *Universal Journal of Industrial and Business Management*, 3(2), 37-45.
- Boudon, R. (2009). Rational choice theory. *Social Theory*, 2009, 179.
- Campbell, J. (2015). *Buhari's Strategy for Stopping Boko Haram*. [online] Council on Foreign Relations. Available at: <https://www.cfr.org/blog/buharis-strategy-stopping-boko-haram> [Accessed 16 Aug. 2018].
- Campbell, J. (2014). Boko Haram: origins, challenges and responses. *NOREF Policy Brief*.
- CNN (2018). *Boko Haram Fast Facts*. [online] CNN. Available at: <https://edition.cnn.com/2014/06/09/world/boko-haram-fast-facts/index.html> [Accessed 13 Jul. 2018].

- Cronin, C. (2014). Using case study research as a rigorous form of inquiry. *Nurse Researcher* (2014+), 21(5), 19.
- Dell, M. (2012). Path dependence in development: Evidence from the Mexican Revolution. Harvard University, mimeograph.
- Doctor, H. V., Bairagi, R., Findley, S. E., Helleringer, S., & Dahiru, T. (2011). Northern Nigeria maternal, newborn and child health programme: selected analyses from population-based baseline survey. *Open Demogr J*, 4, 11-21.
- Ebuzor, C. (2017). *Obasanjo says GEJ did not take Boko Haram seriously*. [online] Pulse.ng. Available at: <https://www.pulse.ng/news/local/obasanjo-says-gej-did-not-take-boko-haram-seriously-id7297024.html> [Accessed 16 Aug. 2018].
- Edet, B. (2011). Nigeria: North East, North West Have Highest Illiteracy Rates - Survey. [online] Available at: <http://allafrica.com/stories/201105170829.html> [Accessed 28 Jun. 2018].
- Faleti, S. A. (2006). Theories of social conflict. *Introduction to Peace and Conflict Studies in West Africa*. Ibadan: Spectrum Books.
- Fearon, J. D., & Laitin, D. D. (2003). Ethnicity, insurgency, and civil war. *American political science review*, 97(1), 75-90.
- Forest, J. J. (2012). *Confronting the terrorism of Boko Haram in Nigeria* (No. JSOU-12-5). JOINT SPECIAL OPERATIONS UNIV MACDILL AFB FL.

- Green, D. P., & Fox, J. (2007). Rational choice theory. *Social Science Methodology*.
L.: Sage Publications, 269-281.
- Gilbert, L. D. (2014). Prolongation of Boko Haram Insurgency in Nigeria: The
International Dimensions. *Research on Humanities and Social Sciences*,
4(11), 150-156.
- Gurney, J. N., & Tierney, K. J. (1982). Relative deprivation and social movements:
A critical look at twenty years of theory and research. *The Sociological
Quarterly*, 23(1), 33-47.
- Gurr, T. R. (1971). *Why Men Rebel*, New Jersey: Princeton University Press
- Imai, K., & Weinstein, J. M. (2000). *Measuring the economic impact of civil war*.
Boston, MA: Center for International Development, Harvard University.
- Journal du Cameroun (2018). *Cameroon: More than 60 Boko Haram attacks in
2017-UN Official - Journal du Cameroun*. [online] Journal du Cameroun.
Available at: [https://www.journalducameroun.com/en/cameroon-60-boko-
haram-attacks-2017-un-official/](https://www.journalducameroun.com/en/cameroon-60-boko-haram-attacks-2017-un-official/) [Accessed 13 Jul. 2018].
- Kalyvas, S. N., & Kocher, M. A. (2007). How “Free” is Free Riding in civil wars?:
Violence, insurgency, and the collective action problem. *World politics*,
59(2), 177-216.

- Khalif, Z. K., & Oba, G. (2013). 'Gaafa dhaabaa-the period of stop': Narrating impacts of shifta insurgency on pastoral economy in northern Kenya, c. 1963 to 2007. *Pastoralism: Research, Policy and Practice*, 3(1), 14.
- Khan, A., & Cheri, L. (2016). An examination of poverty as the foundation of crisis in northern Nigeria. *Insight on Africa*, 8(1), 59-71.
- Loimeier, R. (2012). Boko Haram: The development of a militant religious movement in Nigeria. *Africa Spectrum*, 137-155.
- Macours, K. (2006). Relative deprivation and civil conflict in Nepal.
- Maiangwa, Benjamin. "West Africa's terrorist challenge and the dynamics of regional response." *Insight on Africa* 5, no. 1 (2013): 1-18.
- Maiangwa, Benjamin. "Jihadism in West Africa: Adopting a three-dimensional approach to counterterrorism." *Journal of Peacebuilding & Development* 9, no. 3 (2014): 17-32.
- Morris, M. F. (2005). *al-Qaeda as Insurgency*. ARMY WAR COLL CARLISLE BARRACKS PA.
- Muller, E. N., & Weede, E. (1994). Theories of rebellion: Relative deprivation and power contention. *Rationality and Society*, 6(1), 40-57.
- Odunsi, W. (2016). South is prosperous, North in poverty - Shettima - Daily Post Nigeria. [online] Daily Post Nigeria. Available at:

<http://dailypost.ng/2016/01/16/south-is-prosperous-north-in-poverty-shettima/> [Accessed 30 Jun. 2018].

Ohuocha, C. (2012). Nigeria insurgency beginning to take toll on economy. [online] Reuters. Available at: <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-economy-nigeria-security/nigeria-insurgency-beginning-to-take-toll-on-economy-idUSTRE8190KD20120210> [Accessed 9 May 2018].

Ruvalcaba, J. (2004). Understanding Iraq's Insurgency. The Fletcher School Online Journal for issues related to Southwest Asia and Islamic Civilization, Spring.

Olojo, A. (2013). Nigeria's troubled North: interrogating the drivers of public support for Boko Haram. *Retrieved August, 12, 2014.*

Oyewole, S. (2015). Boko Haram: Insurgency and the war against terrorism in the Lake Chad region. *Strategic Analysis*, 39(4), 428-432.

PM NEWS (2018). *Terrorism: Osinbajo calls for policies to tackle poverty, illiteracy* - PM NEWS Nigeria. [online] PM NEWS Nigeria. Available at: <https://www.pmnewsnigeria.com/2018/06/21/terrorism-osinbajo-calls-for-policies-to-tackle-poverty-illiteracy/> [Accessed 16 Aug. 2018].

Premium Times (2016). *Nigeria must tackle poverty, underdevelopment to defeat Boko Haram* - UNHCR - Premium Times Nigeria. [online] Premium Times Nigeria. Available at: <https://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/top->

news/218461-nigeria-must-tackle-poverty-underdevelopment-defeat-boko-haram-unhcr.html [Accessed 16 Aug. 2018].

ProCon.org. (2008, June 11). What is the difference between insurgency and terrorism? Retrieved from <http://usiraq.procon.org/view.answers.php?questionID=000931>

Richardson, C. (2011). Relative deprivation theory in terrorism: A study of higher education and unemployment as predictors of terrorism. Politics Department, New York University.

Rufai, S. (2017). *How to Effectively Defeat Boko Haram - THISDAYLIVE*. [online] THISDAYLIVE. Available at: <https://www.thisdaylive.com/index.php/2017/01/06/how-to-effectively-defeat-boko-haram/> [Accessed 20 Aug. 2018].

Saleh, A. (2013). Relative deprivation theory, nationalism, ethnicity and identity conflicts.

Searcey, D. and Santora, M. (2015). *Boko Haram Ranked Ahead of ISIS for Deadliest Terror Group*. [online] Nytimes.com. Available at: <https://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/19/world/africa/boko-haram-ranked-ahead-of-isis-for-deadliest-terror-group.html> [Accessed 13 Jul. 2018].

Sergie, M. A., & Johnson, T. (2014). Boko Haram. *Council on Foreign Relations*, 7(10), 2014.

Shuaibu, S. S., Salleh, M. A., & Shehu, A. Y. (2015). The impact of Boko Haram insurgency on Nigerian national security. *International Journal of Academic Research in Business and Social Sciences*, 5(6), 254-266.

Thomson, V. (2012). Boko Haram and Islamic Fundamentalism in Nigeria. *Global Security Studies*, 3(3).

Thurston, A. (2016). 'The disease is unbelief': Boko Haram's religious and political worldview.

UNESCO (2012). [online] Unesco.org. Available at: <http://www.unesco.org/new/fileadmin/MULTIMEDIA/HQ/ED/pdf/Nigeria.pdf> [Accessed 28 Jun. 2018].

UNICEF (2018). Mother, Newborn and Child Health Mortality in Nigeria. [online] Unicef.org. Available at: https://www.unicef.org/nigeria/ng_publications_advocacybrochure.pdf [Accessed 30 Jun. 2018].

Unumen, J. O., & Oghi, F. E. (2016). Democracy, Development and Insurgency: The Nigerian Experience in the Fourth Republic. *African Research Review*, 10(2), 31-46.

Utibe, T. (2016). [online] ResearchGate. Available at: https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Titus_Monday/publication/316839954_The_Impacts_of_the_Upsurge_of_Terrorism_to_the_Contemporary_International_Relations/links/59131048aca27200fe4b258a/The-Impacts-of-the-

Upsurge-of-Terrorism-to-the-Contemporary-International-Relations.pdf?origin=publication_detail [Accessed 20 Aug. 2018].

Walker, A. (2012). *What is Boko Haram?* (Vol. 17). US Institute of Peace.

Wilson, M. (2018). *Why January is Boko Haram's deadliest month*. [online] BBC News. Available at: <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-42735414> [Accessed 13 Jul. 2018].

Walker, I., & Smith, H. J. (Eds.). (2002). *Relative deprivation: Specification, development, and integration*. Cambridge University Press.

Zainal, Z. (2007). Case study as a research method. *Jurnal Kemanusiaan*, 5(1).

APPENDICES

Appendix A: Online Survey Questionnaire

ONLINE SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE ON RELATIVE DEPRIVATION AND THE RISE OF BOKO HARAM IN NORTHEAST NIGERIA

The goal of this anonymous survey is to gauge the opinion of Northeast Nigerian youths on the origin and spread of Boko Haram. The responses would be useful in the assessment of the validity of the hypothesis of this study.

Target respondents: Youths of the various states in the Northeast zone

Gender: Male Female

Age:

Level of Education:

State:

QUESTIONS

1. In your opinion, do youths in the Northeast zone have the same opportunities and chances for their personal welfare enhancement (access to education, employment opportunities, health care) as youths in other geopolitical zones?
 - i. Yes
 - ii. No.
 - iii. I don't know.
2. If no, do you think such situation makes them vulnerable to recruitment into Boko Haram?
 - i. Yes
 - ii. No
 - iii. No idea
3. Have you ever come into contact or communicated a Boko Haram recruiter?
 - i. Yes.
 - ii. No.
4. If yes, what did he say to try to convince you to join them?
 - i. Your government (Federal/Local) have failed you, come with us and we promise to give you a better future?

- ii. You are poor and have no future with your State/Local Government. Pledge allegiance to us and we shall provide for you and your family.
 - iii. Join us to fight against Western education and civilization.
 - iv. Religious motivations.
5. As a youth from/resident in Northeast Nigeria, are you satisfied with the level of development in your geopolitical zones comparative to others?
- i. Yes
 - ii. No
 - iii. Not sufficient knowledge to respond.
6. Why do you think Boko Haram has more roots in the Northeast than any other geographical zones in Nigeria?
- i. Simple coincidence
 - ii. Relatively low level of underdevelopment.
 - iii. Too many extremist and fundamentalist preachers.
7. What in your opinion should the Federal and local government do to address the Boko Haram insurgency?
- i. Improve on the welfare and wellbeing of the citizens of the Northeast region.
 - ii. Provide Northeast youths with better access to education and more employment opportunities.
 - iii. Intensify the fight against Boko Haram militants till their defeat.

Appendix B: Elite Interview Questions

ELITE INTERVIEW ON RELATIVE DEPRIVATION AND THE RISE OF BOKO HARAM IN NORTHEAST NIGERIA

The goal of this interview is to sample the views of local authorities (at state and local government levels) of Northeast Nigeria as to the probable cause of the Boko Haram insurgency. The questions and responses would be used to ascertain the validity of the hypothesis guiding this study: that relative deprivation of the Northeast is the main cause of insurgency in the zone.

Target Interviewees: Local Government Area (LGA) authorities in States in the Northeast zone; Religious authorities (Moslems), and traditional authorities.

QUESTIONS

8. How will you compare the level of development of the Northeast geopolitical zone with that of other geopolitical zones in the country with specific reference to the following:
 - a. Education.
 - b. Health.
 - c. Infra-structure.
 - d. Employment.

9. What is your opinion about opportunities available to youths in the Northeast zone (access to education, employment opportunities, health care) as compared to youths in other geopolitical zones?

10. What are circumstances or reasons, in your opinion, that pushed people (especially youths) to join Boko Haram?

11. Why do you think Boko Haram originated and has more roots in the Northeast Nigeria?

12. What in your opinion should the Federal and local government do to address the Boko Haram insurgency?