

The Lebanese Civil War: Effects on the Contemporary Political System

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ABSTRACT

On the 6th of June 1982, without taking into consideration the international law that prohibits the use of force between states Israel invaded South Lebanon under the orders of Defence Minister Ariel Sharon. Israel invaded South Lebanon under the pretext of expelling the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO) in retaliation to the assassination of Israeli Diplomat to the United Kingdom. Initially, the Israelites declared that they will not transgress into Lebanon however, in 1982 under the orders of Ariel Sharon, Israel invaded Lebanon which was known as Operation Peace for Galilee or the First Lebanon War. The situation escalated in South Lebanon and many fronts were now opened. The Israelite Defence Forces formed a security zone and the Litani River was their target. A proxy Israeli- Lebanese militia alliance was also created and funded by the state of Israel. In an unexpected turn the South Lebanese people formed resistant fronts and fought back, which eventually led to the liberation by South Lebanon.

This thesis explores whether aggression of the SLA (SLA) contributed to the birth of resistance or whether the presence of Israel and other militia forces had contributed to the birth of resistance in South Lebanon.

Keywords: Lebanon, Israel, Resistance, Hezbollah, S.L.A, P.L.O

ÖZ

6 Haziran 1982'de İsrail, Savunma Bakanı Ariel Şaron'un emriyle Güney Lübnan'ı işgal etti. İsrail, Birleşik Krallık 'da görevli diplomatının suikastına misilleme olarak Filistin Kurtuluş Örgütü'nü (FKÖ) kovma bahanesiyle Güney Lübnan'ı işgal etti. İsraililer başlangıçta Lübnan'a karşı gelmeyeceklerini açıklasalar da 1982'de Ariel Şaron'un emriyle İsrail, Celile Barış Operasyonu veya Birinci Lübnan Savaşı olarak bilinen harekâtla Lübnan'ı işgal etti. Güney Lübnan ve birçok cephede tırmanmış durum artık aktif duruma geçti. İsraili Kuvvetler bir güvenlik bölgesi oluşturdu ve Litani Nehri onların hedefi oldu. Ayrıca, İsraililer tarafından bir vekil İsrail-Lübnan milis ittifakı da yaratıldı ve finanse edildi. Beklenmedik bir şekilde, Güney Lübnan halkı dayanıklı cephele kurdular ve savaştılar, bu da sonunda Güney Lübnan'ın özgürleşmesine yol açtı.

Bu tez, Güney Lübnan Ordusu'nun (GLO) saldırganlığının direnişin doğuşuna katkıda bulunup bulunmadığını veya İsrail ve diğer milis kuvvetlerinin varlığının Güney Lübnan'da direnişin doğuşuna katkıda bulunup bulunmadığını araştırıyor.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Lübnan, İsrail, Direniş, Hizbullah, GLO, FKÖ

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ADF	Arab Deterrent Forces
AI	Amnesty International
IDF	Israel Defence Forces
IRGC	Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps
LNМ	Lebanese National Movement
MI	Military Intelligence
PFLP	Popular Front of the Liberation of Palestine
PLO	Palestinian Liberation Organisation
PNP	Palestinian National Movement
PSM	Progressive Socialist Party
SAM's	Surface to Air Missiles
SLA	SLA
SSNP	Syrian Socialist Nationalist Party
UN	United Nations
UNIFIL	United Nations Interim Forces in Lebanon
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
US	United States

Chapter 1

INTRODUCTION

Since having its borders established by France after the First World War, Lebanon has not been able to define a conveyable national identity because of the troubled past due to colonization. Independently Lebanon was suffering from the rhythm of global culture and internal problems. Its national identity is very hard or even impossible to define because of its populace living under popularity of religions with a majority of Christians, Sunni Muslims, Druze and Shi'a Muslims. In order to avoid sectarian conflict in the country the Lebanese elites made a confessional structure framework that apportioned power among the nation's religious organizations.

The frame keeps on being founded on Lebanon's last official enumeration, which was directed in 1932(Humud, 2018, p. 313). In the decades that pursued, Lebanon's partisan parity stayed a point of grinding between networks. Christian strength in Lebanon was tested by various occasions, including the flood of (fundamentally Sunni Muslim) displaced Palestinians because of the Arab-Israeli clashes, and the activation of Lebanon's Shi'a Muslim people group in the South, which had been politically and monetarily minimized. These and different elements led the nation into a civil war that occurred from 1975 to 1990 and resulted in the death of nearly 150,000 individuals. While the war set partisan networks against each other, there was likewise huge battling inside systems.

For quite a long time preceding the intrusion, Israel had expressed worries towards the PLO arms development in South Lebanon. The last demonstration which set off the Israeli attack happened on June 4, 1982, when Palestinian militants in London allegedly conducted an assassination attempt against the Israeli Ambassador to Great Britain. Israel censured the PLO for this assault, yet the PLO denied the accusations. The next day Israel's aviation based armed forces and ordnance terminated upon PLO bases and arms stations in Beirut and South Lebanon. The PLO, thus, shelled the northern Israeli settlements. Within twenty-four hours, Israel sent its forces into Lebanon. On June 6, 1982, the Israeli military authorized a full-scale military attack on South Lebanon. The expected attack was the epilogue of profound established pressures and threats among Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). The underlying objectives of Israel's attack were to drive the PLO out of the scope of Israel's Northern settlements and to set up a twenty-five-mile military "safe zone" along the Lebanese-Israeli frontier. The Lebanese were not able to administer the activities of the PLO situated in its region for a considerable length of time the equal assaults among Israel and the PLO. Lebanon portrayed Israel's attack as an infringement of its regional power and required the withdrawal of every foreign force from Lebanese soil.

The Lebanese civil war arose in April 1975; however, the South remained moderately calm for over a year (Beydoun, 1992, p. 39). Nevertheless, in the mid-year of 1976, the situation was about to change for the South, a significant period that prepared for the ensuing foundation of the "security zone." Towards the beginning of August, less than two weeks before the fall of the Palestinian Refugee Camp Tal al-Zaatar, the South faced a catastrophic influx of thousands of destitute and displaced

people converging on villages that were ill-prepared to shelter them. Eventually, the civil war was triggered due to national and sectarian tensions.

Following the siege of September, the Israelis named Major Saad Haddad, a Lebanese soldier initially from Marjayun, to bring together the military exertion and organize the nearby local armies, which at the time were fundamentally divergent town units working pretty much independently from one another, however, all communications by Israel were communicated through the Kataeb's stations.

These were the beginnings of what was to turn into the SLA (SLA), and from that time forward Haddad set about fashioning the structure of the power. He was backed by few other nonconformist officials from the Lebanese armed force; however, for the most part, the order of the units was depended to non-charged officials who quickly ascended in the positions, bouncing evaluations (Beydoun, 1992, pp. 42-43).

1.1 Research Question

This study will answer the following questions:

- (1) Did the formation of the SLA give more empowerment to the resistant parties in the South to resist Israel invasion?
- (2) In what means did these resistant parties act to defeat Israel and its allies?

The first question will focus on whether the SLA or "Jaish Lahd" as it was known then (Israeli backed armed force) gave more empowerment to the people of the South to resist Israel and its allies or was it just the mere "occupation" of Israel in the South that made the Southerners want to resist and liberate their country. The first question

will also analyse how Israel was successfully able to divide the South successfully take the SLA as an ally.

The second question will focus on the definition of resistance in the context of Lebanon crisis, the means used and the establishment of the resistance. Moreover, the second question will present a liberal view of the resistance giving the descriptions of the complex nature of the resistance in South Lebanon.

1.2 Hypotheses

The hypothesis in this work is predicting whether the SLA had been the motivation that led the Southerners to engage in an active resistance.

1.3 Theoretical Framework

Different scholars, authors and researchers in the area of resistance have implemented a number of theories which will assist to provide a better understanding of reasons for the rationale behind resistance. As it is commonly recognized that theories helps clarify and provide understanding to a case or an event. Researchers relate these theories to explain an occurrence from their own point of view.

The emergence of resistant groups has been connected with a couple of theories that are helpful in assisting scholars to comprehend the causes and the development of resistance: just war tradition, liberalism, regionalism and structuralism and a couple of others. For the purpose of this research, just war tradition and regionalism will be used as the theories that will aid us to comprehend the emergence and growth of resistant parties.

The idea of resistance has been applied generally, and often times, to young people. To Louis Miron, resistance ranges from understudies' remarks that are reproachful of school practices to the wants of "at risk" and African-American understudies to challenge generalizations through scholastic excellence. Not voting, clowning around, wearing Nazi images and watching Madonna recordings have all been examined in scholastic texts as resistance. Regardless of its ambiguities, the idea of resistance ought not to be dismissed, for it perceives and values oppositional conduct as political. Yet in the event that we are going to discuss resistance, it needs to be situated within a more extensive hypothetical position on such issues as power and agency.

Taking the just war theory for instance, Igor Primoratz contends that the most promising record with respect to the equity of war is embodied in the just war theory. The just war tradition depends on paradox that killing might be important to accomplish a greater good, for example, sparing lives and maintaining a strategic distance from the destruction of profoundly held values. As a rule, the just war tradition is partitioned into three arrangements of standards: *jus ad bellum*, which sets out the conditions under which an element may turn to war; *jus in bello*, which endorses the conduct of fighting; and *jus post bellum*, which portrays the rights and obligations which belligerents have opposite each other once the war is finished. Heinze and Steele (2009) call attention to the set of standards of the above mentioned three perspectives that represent just war tradition. Ongoing work on just war tradition has demonstrated that it is conceivable to apply the theory to situations where non-state actors use power and violence for political purposes. Primoratz accepts that just war focuses on the use of sustained and organised political violence,

regardless of whether it is utilized by states or by sub-state specialists as political movements.

Heather Wilson takes note of that the issue with just war theory is that it naturally thinks about that the state is the legitimate real power to direct war. Finlay claims that for non-state actors to turn into an authentic source for the utilization of violence, they have to satisfy the equivalent or identical conditions as would be important for a state to proclaim a just war. Thus, non-state actors need to take legitimate actions that would separate their savagery from that of ordinary criminals, and to legitimize their activities as indicated by the need of brutality, imminence and proportionality. Buchanan contends that any entity has a political authenticity if and just in the event that it is ethically defended in using political force.

The literature on just war hypothesis legitimizes the exercises of non-state actors to utilize violence as a mean for accomplishing freedom from an oppressed group. Indeed, even Walzer mirrors this principle while clarifying that guerrillas take on comparative ways of life as that of armed forces since they are political instruments, servants of a community that thusly offers types of assistance for its fighters. Somehow, Walzer legitimizes guerrilla exercises as long as the populace are useful and complicitous. Notwithstanding, more often than not, when resistance organisations use violence to free their country from a trespasser or colonizing power, this group is marked as a terrorist organisation since they are battling against a state and neglecting the job of the state in inciting violence. In this way, so as to assess these allegations, we ought to consider the aims of the terrorist groups, and furthermore think about the civilian casualties and from the state and the non-state entertainer.

This drives us to Jackson's meaning of terrorism: "Terrorism is violence or danger planned as a symbolically act in which the immediate casualties of activity are instrumentalized as a methods for making a mental impact of terrorizing and dread in an intended interest group for a political goal". This definition is comprehensive of state psychological warfare and non-state exercises, the two of which are applicable to the instance of Lebanese resistance, since the terrorist strategies created by Lebanese non-state actors were a reaction to the large scale of terrorism warfare utilized by Israel against citizens during the attack of Lebanon in 1982. A last measurement in this theory is the connection between Islamic conduct of fighting and the justness of war. It is imperative to clarify this relationship since the majority of resistance exercises in Lebanon have been led by Hezbollah, a Shiite Islamic military organisation planned for battling Israel. In Islamic religious philosophy, Muslims are called to take part in jihad (battle) just to safeguard oneself and in endeavouring to review an unjust activity; their response ought to likewise have the right intent and be corresponding also.

1.4 Methodology and Methods Used

In this study I am using qualitative data by using mainly secondary sources such online journals, articles, news channels, YouTube, documentaries and books.

For a better response to the research questions mentioned earlier the online journals, articles, news channels, YouTube videos, documentaries and books will guide this thesis into a better understanding of the SLA and the resistance in South Lebanon.

1.5 Scope and Limitation

This study focuses on the development of the SLA in South Lebanon and what prompted their extension. This research will likewise concentrate on the manners in which the individuals in the South reacted to the control of both Israel and the SLA.

This investigation will likewise reveal insight into the diverse resistant groups that battled back as a reaction to the monstrosities submitted by the SLA. Finally, this paper will also touch on the experiences and memories that people in the South had to endure from the year 1982-2000.

The limitation ranges from the failure to arrive at any previous individual from the SLA to request their motives of engaging with the Israelites. Another constraint is the restricted access to sources concerning the SLA and the 1982 Lebanese civil war.

1.6 Significance of the study

This research topic was roused by the agony my father, relatives and people of the South needed to suffer during the time of Jaish Lahd (SLA). This thesis will, in general look at the reasons that drove a good number of Lebanese soldiers to abandon the Lebanese military and join Israel. This thesis also will, in general, shed light on why the South had the full right to formulate the resistance army to liberate their towns.

Another significance of this theory is additionally to analyze the result of the Israeli control of 1982 remaining on Lebanese contemporary political issues today. Resistance is still questioned in Lebanon, and there is no shared view on the meaning of resistance. Another importance of this thesis is to comprehend what resistance meant to the South and why the resistance organizations that were formulated in light of the SLA ought not to be viewed as illicit organizations.

This research will also offer a suggestion to the Lebanese government as an issue of urgency to arrive at an agreement on the authenticity of resistance organizations,

such as Hezbollah. Some of the Parliament individuals ought to comprehend that Lebanon is a secular state and that Hezbollah is a partner and not the adversary. The government will likewise need to lessen the unemployment pace of the nation to a reasonable level to debilitate the recruiting of young men and women into espionage.

1.7 Organizations of Chapters

This research will be organized of five (5) chapters. The first chapter is the prologue of the thesis, and it gives an outline of the research topic by examining the main events, the aim of the research, methodology and the hypotheses of the study. It offers insights concerning the scope of the study, the impediments, in other words, the limitations that are probably going to be likely to experience and talk about the theoretical framework.

The second chapter will briefly talk about the different literature reviews regarding the term 'resistance'. The second chapter will also analyse the different literatures on the occupations of South Lebanon and the Lebanese Civil War 1982.

The third chapter will touch on formation of the SLA, personnel's of the SLA and the Khiam Detention Centre.

Chapter four will discuss the birth of resistance and the formation of the resistance. Hence, this chapter will be discussing the birth of Hezbollah.

Chapter five will focus on the collapse of the SLA and the withdrawal of Israel forces from South Lebanon.

The conclusion will focus on recommendations and individual analysis of this research.

Chapter 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

This section analyses articles, journals, point of views and works of various authors to understand the idea of resistance. This chapter additionally analyses the different literatures on the occupation of the South and the Lebanese Civil War 1982.

2.1 Introduction: Occupation, Civil War and Resistance

On June 6, 1982, Israel attacked Lebanon. Defence Minister Ariel Sharon was the attack's organizer. Some American authorities upheld the attack, in light of the fact that the P.L.O and Syria had gotten weapons from the Soviets. The US additionally had history of helping Israel and its foes. America endeavoured to make harmony among Israel and its enemies. The US sent marines to Lebanon twice. On October 23, 1983, 241 marines were executed in a bombing credited to an Iranian supported group. On February 8, 1984, President Reagan pulled back American forces (IV, 2001, p. II). Forming Lebanon's future was the establishing of the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO) in Jerusalem in 1964. The P.L.O spoke to activist Palestinians in remote issues. Its two principle goals were to crush Israel, and to oversee Palestine, The P.L.O quickly turned into a power in the Middle East. It battled in the 1967 "sixty-day war" and acquired Middle Easterner support.

In Lebanon, the P.L.O built up a 'state inside a state'. It expanded the quantity of Muslims in Lebanon, rendering the Constitution's capacity sharing game plan out of date. It gathered its own assessments, financed its very own schools, and sorted out a

military that could challenge Israel's Northern outskirt. It achieved this by raising a ten-thousand in number military power and acquiring Egyptian and Syrian support (Ibid, pp. 5). In 1968, the Palestinians were given Katyusha rockets by the Soviets. From 1968-1982, they used to bomb Northern Israel. Periodically, the P.L.O assaulted Israel also. In 1968, the Israelis attacked the Beirut Universal Air terminal in light of a P.L.O strike. In 1978, Israel attacked Lebanon in light of the fact that the P.L.O had bombed a bus in Haifa and set up a nine-mile security zone in Lebanon (Ibid, pp.7). On July 16, 1981, an unpleasant clash happened when Prime Minister Begin requested air-raids on Southern Lebanon. Israel likewise besieged Beirut, killing not less than 134 individuals. The following day, Arafat requested the firing of Katyusha rockets towards Northern Israel. He likewise ventured up his talk, expressing that Prime Minister Begin, as Adolph Hitler, needed to demolish the P.L.O and force his last arrangement. In light of the Israeli assaults, numerous individuals from the U.S Congress benevolent to Israel, just as individuals from the Reagan Administration, showed their surprise at these advancements. Assistant Secretary of State William Clark compromised that the United States probably would not have the option to keep backing Israel if the battling proceeded (Ibid, pp. 8).

Since the late 1970s and mid 1980s the idea of resistance has gotten pervasive inside contemporary social human sciences. When theorizing or speculating resistance, notwithstanding, has been dangerous from the beginning and a huge piece of the issue dwells in the anti psychological setting taken by most social anthropologists (Resistance, 2006, p. 303). The idea of resistance has gotten universal in contemporary social human studies.

Ongoing citizen manoeuvres in Europe, the United States and the Arab World have provoked a recovery of enthusiasm for resistance, as both a custom and civic ideal (McDaniel, 2018, p. 397). However contemporary political theory offers no transparent point of view on the different implications of resistance, its authenticity or its cut off points. 'Resistance to oppression' was recorded as one of the 'common and imprescriptibly privileges of man' in the 1789 French Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen, and in this pretence the 'right to oppose or resist' shows up as one of the basic parts of present day modern citizenship (Ibid, p. 397). A change is beginning to occur notwithstanding, regarding both acknowledgment of the effect of extra-institutional powers and non-state actors on political and lawful frameworks all through the world, yet additionally in the new powers that are normally promising more up to date types of resistance and militarisation from networks the world over, for example, globalization (Rajagopal, 2003). Nonetheless, brutality and armed resistance are just legitimate in instances, for example, self defence against an assailant.

In 1949, the Geneva Convention 4 pledged to shield regular folks experiencing remote occupation and gave the green light for civil disobedience if the attacker state continues its unlawful occupation and abuse of the individuals (Bothe, Partsch, & Solf, 1982). Concurrently, the UN Resolutions and choices made after the Israeli control of the Southern Lebanese soil during the 1982 viewed Israel's presence in Lebanon as an illicit occupation and requested Tel Aviv to pull back its powers alluding to Geneva Convention Four (Mowles, The Israeli Occupation of South Lebanon , 1986). Beirut had the option to perceive any equipped resistance by the Lebanese against the Israeli occupation. Here, it was Hezbollah . It is worth to touch

on the fact that the Lebanese Armed Forces is inadequately prepared for territorial conflicts because of persistent insecurity and sectarian framework in Lebanon.

2.2 The Invasion of Israel in the South

Around the time that the Shiite towns were being overpowered by the huge flood of evacuees, another occurrence was happening with urgent repercussions for the eventual fate of the south. This was the deluge into the Maronite fringe towns of tons of discharged officers coming all the way back after the Lebanese armed force split along partisan lines that started in mid 1976 (Ibid, p. 40). It was against this framework that the Israelis started to intercede more antagonistically, and at various levels. As far back as the late 1960s and mid 1970s, they had started to abuse the inter-confessional occurrence in the frontier district and had attempted to set up systems of witnesses, both Christian and Muslim. The exertion stayed restricted, in any case, and it was the point at which the civil war broke out that the Israelis started intensely to play the partisan card (Ibid, p.40-41). To begin with, they started the "good fence" approach pointed mainly yet not only at the Maronite towns. They disseminated nourishment and supplies, and, the Lebanese medical administrations being in turmoil, provided emergency services to the escapee and acknowledged some Lebanese patients in their emergency clinics. Before long a few people from this low-cost territory were offered passes to work in Israel. At a subsequent level, the Israelis increased their contacts with the Maronite frontier towns, which had up to this point existed together calmly with their Muslim neighbours, trading visits on the event of memorial services and long periods of grieving, weddings, and devout feast days (Ibid, p.41).

Israel's intrusion of Lebanon on June 5, 1982 was coordinated against two particular adversaries, Syria and the PLO, and the key basis for assaulting each contrasted. Syria had for quite some time been Israel's most unyielding enemy, and with the Israeli–Egyptian peace treaty of 1979, it presently succeeded Egypt as the essential one also. Lebanon, then again, was the just one of Israel's neighbours that had shunned starting threats against it as far back as 1949. The relaxing and preservation of this hitherto peaceful frontier, presently tested by both the developing Syrian and PLO jobs in Lebanon, comprised a principal key goal for Israel (Freilich, 2012, p. 43). In April 1981, Syria conveyed surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) in Lebanon, representing a reasonable test to Israel's airborne opportunity of move, however more critically to its general security interests in the north and general hindrance pose. From Israel's point of view, to assent to the organization of those rockets would have implied tolerating Syrian authority in Lebanon; Lebanon turning out to be a piece of the encounter states; and an adjustment in the general provincial level of influence. Significantly more unfavourably from Israel's point of view, Military Knowledge (MI) cautioned that Syria was currently finishing a gigantic arms development, intended to empower it to take up arms against Israel all alone, without Egypt, and that it proposed to start threats in 1982. A Syrian rocket umbrella would likewise significantly expand the threat the PLO presented to Israel (Ibid, p.43). The Syrian and PLO dangers were seen by Israel as establishing serious changes in its condition that necessary similar reactions. In acting in Lebanon, Israel's inspirations were at first unmistakably receptive, yet when of the intrusion, a year had gone since the arrangement of the Syrian rockets and PLO shelling. All things considered, the attack was an instance of Israel stepping up to the plate and shape its condition and achieve targets surpassing those militated by prompt conditions.

The war in 1982 was intended to be a short activity. For sure, the essential military stage the genuine intrusion was. When the intrusion finished, notwithstanding, Israel's whole system started unwinding. By 1984, Syria had recuperated from the battling and prevailing with regards to reasserting its power over Lebanon, driving it to annul the harmony settlement with Israel and closure the Israeli–Maronite entente. Radicalization of the Shiites, halfway in light of the intrusion, added to the foundation of Hezbollah now (Ibid, p.44). The parameters of Israel's inclusion in south Lebanon were moulded by choices of senior IDF officials of the Northern Sector Commander aimed for fending off the outfitted Palestinian guerrillas from Israel's region by 'assisting the Christian outskirt towns with helping themselves.' These choices frequently surpassed the administration's commonly careful arrangement on this issue yet were later received as *fait accompli*. By late 1977, Israel had formally expressed and for all intents and purposes expected a military support over the Christian enclaves and their state armies, including a developing nearness of IDF officials and heavily clad units in south Lebanon, notwithstanding stretching out common administrations to the Lebanese townspeople on Israel's side of the frontier (Ibid, p.59).

2.3 South Lebanon Security Zone

Israel adopted a retaliatory policy of inflicting painful cost on states allowing or sponsoring such warfare from their territories. This policy was indeed effective in forcing Egypt and Jordan in the 1950s, and Jordan again in the late 1960s and early 1970s, to coerce Palestinian militant groups and impose law and order within their own borders. In the case of Lebanon, however, as of the late 1960s, this policy of retaliation against both Palestinian guerrilla organizations operating in Lebanon and purely Lebanese targets, not only failed to achieve its goals but expedited the

deterioration of Lebanon into a civil war which erupted in 1975. (Sela, 2007, p. 58). The security zone was conceived of the Lebanese civil war and the developing Palestinian military dangers to the Christian towns of south Lebanon which, without a compelling government, went to Israel for support. Israel's enthusiasm for collaboration with the Christian populace of south Lebanon (and, thusly, additionally with the Lebanese Powers, the umbrella association of the Christian alliance drove by Bachir Gemayel) drew on a conventional journey for provincial partners, be it non-Arab ethnic minorities or fringe non-Middle Easterner states. All the more explicitly, it spoke to the developing view of Lebanon among Israeli investigators and leaders as a "non state," which advocated Israel's impedance in this current nation's issues as a fundamental malice. Along these lines, towards the Syrian military intrusion of Lebanon, Israel characterized the region extending from the Mediterranean, south of Sidon directly to Lebanon Valley in the east (around 40 km from the outskirts) as a "red line," carefully imperative for its national security (Ibid, p. 59).

The security zone in south Lebanon was combined in the wake of Israel's Litani Operation, propelled in March 1978 in light of an ocean borne assault executed by Fatah, which brought about the slaughtering of 32 residents only a couple of miles north of Tel Aviv. The activity empowered Israel to verify a coterminous belt north of the Israeli-Lebanese fringe with almost 150000 men, mostly Christian Maronite with a minority of Shiites and Druze, under the order of Major Sa'ad Haddad. With Israel's supporting, Haddad looked to remove the UN Interim Forces in Lebanon (UNIFIL)- built up by Security Council Resolution 425 to be sent along the fringe and keep future assaults from Lebanon on Israeli region confining these powers to

the region north of the security zone. In the next years, UNIFIL's method of sending and ineffectualness turned into a consistent wellspring of grinding with Haddad's civilian army and, in a roundabout way, with Israel (Ibid, p.60). The security zone was set up to avert Palestinian guerrilla invasions into Israeli region and - given its constrained profundity (8-12 km)- was not able avoid shelling and rocket propelling into Israel's region, which for sure kept, including from the UNIFIL controlled zone. The strain amongst Israel and the Palestinian military development over the security zone topped in the substantial ordnance trade which emitted in the mid year of 1981. In spite of the fact that the encounter was finished by a US-interceded truce, Israel's military and political pioneers were a long way from submitting in the proceeded with develop of the Palestinian ordnance danger to Israeli territory, clearing the road to Israel's Lebanon War of 1982 (Ibid, p.60).

2.4 Resistance: Change of Equation amongst Southern Fractions, Resistance to the Southern Lebanese Army and Supporting of Newly Formed Resistant Groups

As the war broke out, many Lebanese political parties immediately formed into militia forces. They recruited the young, pulled in newcomers, and gave the political, military, and propaganda framework for fighting. What's more, with the standardization of the war framework, standard ties/state armies rose as the primary recipients of the war both politically and financially. State army pioneers were in an ideal situation overseeing strife as opposed to discovering approaches to put an end to it. Whilst the primary period of the war between 1975 to the year 1976 has been fought by volunteering people on the two camps and the view of mutual as well as political risk was at the peak, the consequent stages - from 1977 to the Israeli attack in 1982, and from that date until 1990 were battled by composed local armies

(notwithstanding the P.L.O, Syria, and Israel) within fulltime contenders accepting compensations and different advantages.

As far as the conflict proceeded, militias turned out to be more and more reliant on outside factors for help (PLO, Syria, Israel, and Iran). The conflict likewise prompted the fracture of volunteer armies and blood thirsty encounters among militias having comparative goals and inside a similar network as well as area. The militias "civil wars" brought about thousands of non military personnel losses and in huge devastation of property. Also, a few civilian armies stopped to work within the war period, eminently the Fatah-supported Sunni volunteer army Al-Murabitun, meanwhile new militias have been framed.

In spite of the fact that Hezbollah's foundations return to the Da'wa Party in Iraq, its official discovering was in 1985, after they announce their contract distinguishing the group to be an Islamist party focused on foundation of an Islamic state in Lebanon and embracing Ruhollah Khomeini's Wilayat al-Faqih. Hezbollah's underlying contribution in the war was in the Israeli attack of 1982. Equipped and subsidized by Iran, Hezbollah conflicted against the Leftists groups and has not been in good terms vis a vis Syria meanwhile the relationship between Amal Movement drove by Nabih Berri since 1980, and Damascus has been at its pinnacle, especially in the mid-1980s. Prevailing with regards to pulling in an inexorably huge Shi'i following, initially from inside the positions of Amal, Hezbollah turned into Amal's principle rival in the Shi'i people group. Equipped showdowns among Amal and Hezbollah at the end 1980s has been finished by a functioning intercession by Syria and Iran. (Ibid, p.611).

Chapter 3

THE SOUTH LEBANON ARMY

3.1 The Creation of the South Lebanon Army

In 1985, Israel formally acknowledged the South Lebanon Army (SLA) in the "security zone" as a unified local army that it completely subsidized and prepared. The South Lebanese Army was an outgrowth of Major Sa'ad Haddad's "Free Lebanon" powers, which were made out of Lebanese soldiers who broke from the Lebanese armed force in 1978 and worked intimately with Israel. In shielding the "security zone" with the Israel Defence Forces (IDF), the SLA bore a huge portion of the confrontation against Hezbollah (Party of God) and, to a lesser degree, Amal Movement (Hope), two Lebanese Shi'a alliances that battled to banish Israel from the "security zone." As indicated by a SLA representative, since its establishment to March 2000, the SLA endured 621 military fatalities and 200 regular citizen fatalities. In comparison, the Israeli Defence Force (IDF) endured about 250 fatalities in the "security zone" since its foundation in 1985 to April 2000 (Ibid, p.1-2).

In 1976, Sa'ad Haddad, a mutinous Greek Catholic armed force major upheld by the Maronite Chamoun family, pronounced Southern Lebanon 'Free Lebanon' and set up together a band of native Christians and Shi'a committed to driving the PLO out of the prompt borderline area. Breaking custom by straightforwardly pronouncing basic reason with Israel, Haddad requested help and his Free Lebanon Armed force (later the South Lebanon Armed force, SLA) acquired weapons, materiel, recruiting and

financing from the Yitzhak Rabin regime (EISENBERG, 2009, pp. 383-384). The SLA was directed by the now 73-year-old General Antoine Lahad and had an expected 2,500 to 3,000 warriors. Despite the fact that the SLA was frequently depicted in sectarian terms as a Christian civilian army engaging Shi'a local armies, as a general rule, the SLA fairly mirrored the common confession booth assorted variety of Lebanon. In spite of the fact that the greater part of its leaders were Christian, just 50% of the individuals from the civilian army were Christian, with the rest of made out of Shi'a Muslims (30%), Druze (13%), and Sunni Muslims (7%). Some onlookers reckoned that Shi'a Muslims may have made up to half out of the militia. According to media reports, Israel paid a normal month to month compensation of somewhere in the range of \$500 and \$800 to South Lebanon Army members. Together with upkeep and foundation uses, it is assessed that Israel spent an aggregate of \$35 million yearly on the SLA and its dependents. The generally significant compensations that Israel paid individuals from the SLA made an amazing financial motivation for nearby occupants to join the militants. Living amidst a territory that has been crushed economically financially by decades of about consistent clash, the SLA was customarily the main potential wellspring of solid job for some inhabitants of south Lebanon. As per Human Rights Watch, the SLA additionally filled its positions through the automatically induction of inhabitants of the "security zone," including youngsters (Ibid, p.2).

3.2 Khiam Detention Centre

An Amnesty International delegation visiting South Lebanon showed that the crimes submitted in Khiam Detention Centre as the most genuine infringement of human rights and international humanitarian laws, considering them as war crimes atrocities. The delegation proceeded to consider Israel and its previous SLA militiamen as

completely responsible for the arbitrary confinement, torment and different maltreatment submitted in Khiam. In this specific circumstance, Amnesty International noticed that while Lebanon is entitled for exercise sympathy or even forgiveness ex-SLA militia men for their taking-up of arms in favour of Israel, there ought to be no sweeping pardon for any genuine maltreatment they have submitted in Khiam. "For torment and different genuine maltreatment, they ought to be brought to justice in fair trials without death penalty, "Amnesty International noted (International, 2000, p. 1). For over ten years, this jail has been kept out of any control by humanitarian organizations, during which different kinds of torment were carried out before it was entered by the International Red Cross in 1995 and provided a few upgrades, for example, building restrooms and enabling correspondence to the inmates.

Many prisoners depicted the torment they endured during the long periods of their families. A few human rights reports and various books were provided. Among the reports that were issued the declaration of the Norwegian official, "Vidar Lehmann", a specialist who was then working within the jurisdiction of the United Nations monitoring team for the armistice committee board between Lebanon and Israel, as he expounded on the state of confinement in the tents: The cross examination of prisoners proceeded for a while, some of the time, and prison guards and inspectors had unconditional powers to utilize what they regard fitting to extricate admissions from detainees. For instance, when prisoners hang on to the roof and overturned once in a while, their feet scarcely touched the ground, and during that the militia army and Israeli officers poked the detainees with sticks, at that point they are compelled to kneel and knock on their feet while pouring cold or hot water. Notwithstanding "the usage of electric shocks coordinated at the left part of the chest." Lehman sent

his report to the Norwegian Ministry of Defence in 1992, yet the ministry did not issue it, since it was excessively compelling. He sent it to the paper "Aftenposten", which published it on the 19th of April 1995. This year, the Red Cross was granted entry into the detention centre.

The site was transformed into an impromptu exhibition hall with some previous prisoners going about as its aides. During the Israeli-Hezbollah war, which went on for thirty-four days over the mid year of 2006, the site of Khiam was demolished to the ground by Israeli besieging. The site, at that point, has experienced endless supply of changes: from military enclosure, to jail, to historical centre, to ruin... (Launchbury, 2014, p. 516).

3.3 Conclusion

In 1985, Israel formerly founded the South Lebanon Army (SLA) in the "security zone" as a proxy local army that completely financed and fully equipped. The SLA was an outgrowth of Major Sa'ad Haddad's "Free Lebanon" division, which were made out of soldiers who parted from the Lebanese armed force in 1978 and worked intimately with Israel. In protecting the "security zone" with the Israel Defence Forces (IDF), the SLA bore a huge portion of the battling against Hezbollah (Party of God) and, to a lesser degree, Amal (Hope), two Lebanese Shi'a associations that battled to remove Israel from the "security zone." As per SLA representative, since its beginning to March 2000, the SLA endured 621 military fatalities and 200 non military personnel fatalities (Ruebner, 2000, p. 2).

In the course of recent years Lebanese nationals, generally those suspiciously associated with the resistance to the Israeli control of part of Lebanon, have been

held for a considerable length of time in confinement by Israeli or Israeli-controlled powers, cut off from the outside world, regularly without charge or legal proceedings. Some of them were subtly moved from Lebanon to Israel. Others are held in Khiam Detention Centre in South Lebanon, a centre run by a Lebanese militia army associated to Israel, the South Lebanon Army (SLA) (Arnold, 2002, p. 1). Israel refuted that it had any power over Khiam. Nevertheless, Khiam lies in part of South Lebanon, styled by Israel as its security zone, which has been involved by Israel since 1978. Israel's impact over subsidizing and supervision of the SLA are not in question. Moreover, as the occupying powers it is in charge, as per international law, for the individuals in the security zone (Ibid, p.1). The majority of the prisoners were accepted to have engaged in armed operations against Israeli or SLA rule over South Lebanon. However, they were not considered as prisoners of war under the Geneva Conventions and Israel does not concede prisoner of war status to its adversaries in Lebanon.

An Amnesty International (AI) report discharged in May 1992 has denounced the Khiam Detention Centre in Khiam, Lebanon, as a bastion of torment and abuse toward the Palestinian and Lebanese detainees held there. Khiam falls inside the borderlines of the Israeli self-proclaimed "security zone" in Southern Lebanon, and the detention area has been managed with the Israeli-funded South Lebanon Army (SLA) (Macha, 1992, p. 1).

During Israel's withdrawal from Lebanon, the SLA chose to desert its stations and disband instead of keep battling alone against Hezbollah, a much better prepared and trained force. The crumble of the SLA demonstrated to be a chance occasion that encouraged Israel's generally smooth withdrawal from Lebanon and will probably

add to precede household serenity in South Lebanon. The U.N. obviously had moulded its confirmation of Israel's withdrawal on Israel incapacitating and cutting off its ties with the SLA, a stage that Israel was reluctant to actualize. The breakdown of the militia army rendered this issue unsettled, along these lines expelling a potential post-withdrawal bone of conflict among Israel and the U.N. Additionally, Hezbollah (notwithstanding to all Lebanese) saw the South Lebanon Army as an expansion of the Israeli military occupation and expressed that it would have proceeded with its battle against the South Lebanon Army on the off chance that it didn't disband when Israel withdrew. The breakdown of the South Lebanon Army prevented this situation from happening (Ruebner, 2000, p. 4).

Chapter 4

RESISTANCE: THE BIRTH OF HEZBALLAH

4.1 Creation of the Resistance Parties in Lebanon 1982

It is likewise essential to take note of that "after 1967, the Palestine Resistance Movement had assumed the type of a patriot uprising and not a social upheaval." Notwithstanding, the advancement of the Palestinian Resistance Movement was a destabilizing factor for the Middle Easterner systems. The Palestinians found that "all Arab authorities were unequipped for freeing Palestine or taking care of their own issues and the main power equipped for doing the revolt was the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO)." (Odeh, 1987, pp. 923-924). In Lebanon, the Palestinian military organization after 1967 was seen as the end or depletion of the Palestinian resistance movement from the more extensive Middle Easterner world to Lebanon and explicitly to its Southern area. Subsequently, the existence of the primary Palestinian fida'iyin bases in South Lebanon started to show up in the winter of 1968-69. From that point forward, Palestinian military tasks had been started against Israel, and it was noticed that "somewhere in the range of 1968 and 1970 fida'iyin activity got profound famous help in the South. Moreover, huge numbers of the more youthful, more politicized Lebanese southerners joined their positions as fighters" in light of the fact that those (neighbourhood southern Lebanese) locals found that "supporting the Palestinian revolt turned into a methods for challenging a degenerate and careless system." The Palestinians' political and military reputation in Lebanon advanced rapidly.

Parallel to this Palestinian power and so as to wipe out the Palestinian opposition ubiquity and its exercises and availability of natives of Lebanon, Israel carried out animosities against the Lebanon citizen living in the South. Such hostilities occurred against the Lebanese towns of Houla on May 12, 1968, Mays al-Jabal on June 15, 1968, and Majihdeih on October 27, 1968 (Fakher, 2006). Israeli hostility proceeded and extended to arrive to the International Airport of Beirut during December 1968, within minutes, 13 non military personnel planes eight of them having a place with the Lebanese National Airlines, MEA were exploded.

In spite of the inward Lebanese circumstance, the Palestinian resistance proceeded with its operations against Israel. A significant advancement in the Palestinian resistance activities happened, which denoted a beginning of another phase in the resistance exercises. A Palestinian fida'i gathering of 13 individuals, drove by Dalal Moughrabi succeeded with regards to breaking the Israeli hindrances and propelled an activity on the coastline of Occupied Palestine among Haifa and Tel Aviv on Saturday, March 11, 1978 (Smit, 2000, p. 114). This Palestinian activity was viewed as a huge stun for Israel concerning its security. It likewise implied that the security zone that Israel had set up was insufficient in keeping the Palestinian resistance from arriving at any of the Israeli targets. Of course, it didn't take Israel long to begin its hostility against Lebanon. After three days, Israel started a full-scale attack of Lebanon with an expected 30,000 soldiers. The attack was started during the evening of March 14–15, 1978. Israel proclaimed that its primary target was "to clear a zone of 30-40 kilometres and purify it of guerrilla bases and to construct a 'Security Belt' zone for 7 to 10 kilometres." Soon after the 1978 invasion, Israel established a "Security Belt" in Southern Lebanon. The overall area of this belt (established between 1978 and 1982) was over 700 square kilometres with a length of up to 80 to

85 kilometres and a width of between 4 and 12 kilometres. The belt reduced the Palestinian military presence and area of operations from the Lebanese-Palestinian borders and forced the fida'iyin to withdraw from the occupied zone and set up new military bases northward. Yet further problems occurred between the fida'iyin and some local (Lebanese) people. However, and with all the above mentioned Israeli efforts during their invasion, the outcomes of the Litani Operation cannot be considered a success for Israel because the fida'iyin operations continued and resumed with considerable frequency soon after.

The 1978 invasion was seen as the major driving force causing further deterioration in the relations between the Palestinian resistance and the local Lebanese villagers. In return, the Israeli invasion constituted an advantage for the Amal Movement to reinforce its presence in Southern Lebanon after 1978. Consequently, many Shi'ites broke away from the Palestinian organizations to join Amal. The increasing numbers of Shi'ites who joined Amal was also verified by the notion that those Shi'ite were looking for a militia to protect them after the Palestinian organizations failed to do so. Indeed, the Israeli aggression on Shi'ite areas began to attain success by turning the local villagers against the Palestinian fida'iyin after 1978 (Sankari, 2005, p. 168). The most dangerous results of the 1978 Israeli attack were the expanded pressure that advanced between the PLO and some locals. All the more explicitly, Amal's relations with the PLO and the Palestinians (generally) crumbled. Thus, another status quo started to surface among Amal and the different existing forces inside Southern Lebanon, including the Palestinians. In addition, the PLO by and large and Yassir Arafat specifically upheld Saddam Hussein during the Iran-Iraq war, and this assumed a crucial role in raising the pressure among Amal and the Palestinians. From this, it is conceivable to contend that Southern Lebanon turned into an open

state for the polarization, constructed on regional political issues (Siklawi, 2017, p. 930). Israeli air assaults against Southern Lebanon and Beirut heightened from prior levels during the initial two days of the intrusion and prompted a substantial number of civilian casualties: 190 dead and 450 injured. Plainly Israel's fundamental target in the attack of 1982, did not exclusively aim to wreck the military forces of Palestine existence yet additionally to target legitimately the authority of the PNM and the spirit of the resistance. It was likewise an endeavour to set up the base of another world request through the end of the resistance movement in the Middle Eastern World and the end of the Palestinian right of return.

4.2 The Birth of Hezbollah

Hezbollah authoritatively was born with the 1985 Open Letter that was published in the midst of a continuous civil war and the second of Israel's significant offensive onto Lebanese soil.

The birth of Hezbollah can be traced to the Lebanese Civil War, which lasted from 1975 until 1990. This period caused a great deal of turmoil for the Shia in Southern Lebanon. The power vacuum created after the death of Musa al-Sadr was filled by two prominent resistance movements, Amal and Islamic Jihad, the latter of which became the resistance wing of Hezbollah. Amal initially enjoyed the primary support of the Shia population because they picked up where Musa al-Sadr left off, albeit with a militant rhetoric. Amal, however, lacked a clear ideological platform as they directed their primary anger at Palestinian guerrillas and not the Lebanese government. The southern Shiites were weary of violence and initially approved the invasion of Israeli in 1982 to crush the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO). Before the invasion the Shiites had been sympathetic to the PLO's attacks against

Israel from Southern Lebanon, but when these battles resulted in the Shiite community being caught in the crossfire public opinion shifted. Shiites began to view the Palestinians as “an occupying force prone to high-handedness and brutality.” (Norton, 2007, p. 22) Throughout the civil war, Amal Movement and Islamic Jihad had a typical enemy in Israel however after the war's decision their ideological polarities were the subject of a fierce dispute. Hezbollah (Party of God) in general is agreed to have been built up in 1982 a period that marks the resistance movement against the Israeli invasion of Lebanon. That group was recruited by a 1,500-member delegation of Iran's Revolutionary Guard Corp (IRGC), who landed in the Beqa'a Valley with the endorsement of the Syrian Government. The militant wing of Hezbollah undertook the name Islamic Jihad while asserting credit for the strong operations and they were the chief recipients of capitalizing during the civil war. While not the principal organisation to effectuate suicide bombers, it before long got infamous for utilizing this strategy during their activities. Hezbollah saw the utilization of suicide bombers as "a military strategy, as opposed to an approach to get to paradise” that is seen by Muslim extremists nowadays.

One of the primary suicide attacks started by Hezbollah was a 1983 assault on an eight-story Israeli military base in the town of Tyre. A fifteen-year-old kid, Ahmad Qassir, drove an explosives-loaded truck to a checkpoint and exploded the vehicle, killing 75 Israeli soldiers and 14 Arabs. The Israelis presently couldn't seem to encounter a suicide assault and right up till today; a few Israelis still guarantee that occurrence was the after effect of a gas spill (Baer, 2008, p. 212). Hezbollah still glorifies Ahmad Qassir, and he is as often as possible referred to in talks given by their Secretary General, Sayyid Hassan Nasrallah. Qassir's story lines up well to the Shiite account established on a chivalrous battle of martyrs defending Islam. This

historical narrative can be tracked to the destiny of Muhammad's grandson, Imam Hussein. Imam Hussein is a focal and cherished figure in the Shiite heritage, referred to for his "bravery, austerity, and empathy." (Norton, 2007). Imam Hussein speaks to the conviction that one ought to never surrender to passivity; rather, one should battle for their honourability and the preservation of Islam. Hezbollah sees Qassir's martyrdom as a present day likeness Imam Hussein and the model that he set. The month of Ashura featuring Imam Hussein's self-sacrifice is commemorated yearly by Shia around the globe. On October 16, 1983, a blunder made by an Israeli official established the antagonism of the Shiite people group toward the Israeli armed force's existence in Lebanon. On that day, around 60,000 Shiites were assembled in the town of Nabatiya when a lost Israeli escort erroneously endeavoured to pass through the Ashura commemoration. The infuriated crowd deemed this as a desecration of one of their most loved holy people, and started to toss stones, bottles and topple army vehicles. The Israeli soldier's terrified and opened fire on the group, executing two individuals and injuring 15 others.

From its inception, Hezbollah showed a substantial aptitude to direct fruitful assaults against all the more dominant adversaries and has shown continued power through the span of three decades. Thusly, the movement has been eluded to be the "A-Team of terrorists" but also has been broadly viewed as one of the most unprecedented non-state actors in the world (Devore & Stähli, 2015). As per the most normally acknowledged variant of its history, Hezbollah is a movement of resistance. However that depiction neglects to catch the genuine idea of this militant group. Hezbollah, indeed, wears three caps today. Concerning the first place, in its very own words, it is a resistance movement. Second, it is additionally a political movement with an Islamist purpose that participates in the domain of political quibbling with rival non-

Shiite parties inside Lebanon. Also, third, it is a movement with revolutionary purposes conformed to an extraordinary Shiite way of thinking that tries to set up Islamist state dependent on extreme belief system of the Islamic Republic of Iran: Wilayat al-Faqih or "rule of the jurist." (Abdul-Hussain, 2009, p. 68) .

The introduction of the Hezbollah Movement was not a peaceful occurrence. As a matter of fact, it emitted onto the Lebanese scene in a hurricane of violence that found both Lebanese and Western leaders unprepared. That Lebanon, which was considered as the "Switzerland" of the Middle East but also depicted as a Western-oriented society, could so definitely change into a hotbed of "Shiite radicals" set on cancelling the American and Western existence from its region was an excessive amount to comprehend. From its early stages, Hezbollah would select itself as the U.S's. staunchest rival. In Lebanon, it would turn into America's and Israel's deadliest opponent (Jaber, Consequences of Imperialism: Hezbollah and the West, 1999, p. 163). At the point when the Shiites' political arousing at last happened, it was not a Lebanese leader who brought them out of their enigma, however an Iranian religious scholar. Of Lebanese parentage, Imam Musa Sadr was conceived in Qom, Iran and taught in Najaf, Iraq-two of the most significant philosophical focuses of Shiite Islam. He was welcome to lead the Shiite people group in South Lebanon (Ibid, p.167). A charismatic leader, Sadr became the hero of the Shiite movement and prevailed with regards to building up a community identity. Within 10 years, he established the Majlis-al-Shia-al-Aala (Lebanese Shiite Higher Council), of which he was named president. This organization enabled Shiites to pursue the example of other religious societies and increase official representation. Sadr then established Harakat-al-Mahroumeen (Development for the Dispossessed) and a socio-religious movement requesting equity and social justice. This movement likewise furnished

Sadr with a stage from which to activate the majority and constraint the Lebanese government for political and financial change (Jaber, Hezbollah born with a vengeance , 1997). To understand the events that set off the radicalization of Lebanon's Shiite movement, some of the historical framework is required. As ahead of schedule as the Peace Conference at Versailles in 1919, Zionist leaders met in Europe to display their territorial requests to a committee of the British Mandate requested Israel's northern borderline to be reached out similarly as the Litani River in Lebanon. The Zionists' main concern was water. In 1919, Chaim Weizman, the leader of the Zionist organisation and later the leader of Israel, kept in touch with Lloyd George underscoring the "vital importance of water" and the requirement for the Litani River to guarantee the eventual fate of Palestine. France, watching out for its very own advantages in Lebanon and Syria, dismissed the Zionists' requests (Ibid, P.168). As Hezbollah approved its resistance against Israel in South Lebanon, its leaders built up its political representation. With the rest of the groups sealed in the civil war, the Iranian-backed movement reinforced its political and social divisions. By the late eighties, Hezbollah had figured out how to assemble an incredibly viable social base in Beirut and the Beqa'a Valley, replacing the more secular Amal party that once portrayed Shiite societies. Absence of government spending in these zones combined with long disregard and a corrupt, incompetent, and unorganised Amal incited Hezbollah to step in to handle the circumstance itself (Ibid, P.171).

4.3 Conclusion

Since its development Hezbollah has carried out a wide scope of military missions: In the first instance they led a 18-year-long uprising between the years of 1982, to 2000, quickly hindered with the fight of civil war against rival Shiite group Amal Movement during 1980s. Hezbollah at that point went through the following six

years planning for the following round and propelling restricted assaults, before it battled a quasi-conventional 34-day war in 2006. Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah in 2013 conceded that it was working as a counter-insurgency power helping the Syrian Baathist system. Hezbollah's military movement is unquestionably consistently developing (Gabrielsen, 2014, p. 257). Between the years of 1982 and 1983, Hezbollah effectively mounted assaults on Israeli, French, and United States powers, driving Israel to pull back toward the south of Lebanon by 1985. From various assaults and revolts Hezbollah prevailing in their nationalist objective to liberate Lebanon of direct Western intercession, and asserted a self-announced triumph vis a vis Israel when it singularly pulled back from Lebanon in 2000. The Ta'if Accord restored the Lebanese state and made a strained, however generally steady, peace that has been enjoyed over decades. The objective for Hezbollah at the time was to discover its position inside the new world of politics.

That is to say, Hezbollah's genesis comes from "emergency" conditions. Those emergency conditions ranged poor financial improvement, political stagnation, unfair distributions of assets, and prominent Westernization and the presence of foreign military occupation in South Lebanon, hence in this case, Israel.

Chapter 5

THE WITHDRAWAL OF ISRAEL AND COLLAPSE OF THE SLA

5.1 Collapse of the SLA

Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah of Hezbollah infused his own threatening portion of disheartening within the positions of the south by pronouncing that his Shi'ite warriors would murder all SLA "associates with Israel" and not leave their dead bodies in Lebanon. For the SLA to have stayed and battled, they would have required consolation and a solid partner. They had not one or the other. Hezbollah's psychological fighting stressed their nerves, and the Lebanese government's allegations de-legitimized their battle.

When the Israeli choice to pull back from Lebanon was declared, the SLA steadily crumbled with practically no opposition. A portion of its individuals fled with the withdrawing Israeli armed force, living right until the present time in a state of banishment, and griping sharply that they never got the prize they merited from the Israelis. By far most, in any case, gave themselves over to the resistance soldiers, or took asylum in mosques or in the homes of town notables, who, under decree from Hezbollah, had guaranteed them security from the normal retaliation on condition that they give up and turn themselves in. In the long run they were altogether given over to Lebanese Army Intelligence, which took them by the truck or bus load North to jail, and henceforth to the preliminaries that were without a doubt held over the

couple months. Nobody was slaughtered: later, the Secretary General of Hezbollah, Sayyid Hassan Nasrallah, brought up proudly that, detested however they were, but rather none of them had gotten an insult from those they had sold out and tormented for such a significant number of years (Makdisi, Makdisi on Bechara "Resistance: My Life for Lebanon", 2013, p. 2) .

The civil war in Lebanon seethed for a long time, powered by both inward and outer factors, and didn't end until all constituents were ready and prepared for an answer. As it were, the conflict went through various stages and saw various unsuccessful endeavours, to give some examples, however didn't reach a conclusion aside. It was in the late 1980s and mid 1990s that guns fell quiet and negotiations moved to the negotiation table, which united surviving individuals from the 1972 Lebanese Parliament in Saudi Arabia (Ghosn & Khoury, 2011, p. 383). On the 17th of April, 2000, the UN Secretary-General was advised 'of the choice of the Government of Israel to pull back its powers present in Lebanon, to be withdrawn by July 2000.' Thus the UN and its peacekeeping power, UNIFIL (the UN Interim Force in Lebanon, were all of a sudden looked with the possibility of really applying resolution 425: an implementation that would essentially start with 'affirming the withdrawal of Israeli Forces.' (Meier, 2013, p. 27). For more than fifteen years, Israelis accepted that their essence in Southern Lebanon was a deplorable prerequisite. Just such "security zone," it was generally thought, could issue Northern Israel with sufficient protection from psychological terrorist attacks coming from a Lebanese region. Not withheld, within a couple of years the Israeli consensus moved, prompting for a unilateral evacuation from Lebanon. In spite of military unification bound together by military resistance to a unilateral withdrawal, Israeli powers pulled back from the security zone on 24 May 2000. The choice to pull back

from southern Lebanon denoted a dramatic defining moment in Israeli security policy (Friedman, 2000). Political elites helped move the account on Lebanon and reframed the issue in such a way that made withdrawal an adequate and even ideal strategy to the Israeli public.

In 1983 Israel reached a peace agreement with Lebanon terminating the war, but Syria constrained Lebanon to repeal the settlement in March 1984. Without having a concrete Peace settlement with Lebanon, the Israel forces stayed in southern Lebanon, rejecting the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 425 of 1978, which required an Israeli withdrawal to the recognized international borderline and for the United Nations Interim Forces in Lebanon (UNIFIL) to affirm the withdrawal and secure the outskirts region.

Virtually after 20 years since the end of the civil war, and Lebanon is as yet a troubled and distressed nation.

5.2 Conclusion

The Israeli complete withdrawal occurred on 24 May 2000. No Israeli fighters were killed or injured during the redeployment to the internationally recognized borderline. The SLA nonetheless in no time crumbled, with most officials and organization authorities escaping to Israel with their families, as Hezbollah produced pressure on the rest of the units. At the point when Israel permitted the pouring refugees in, somewhere in the range of 7,000 refugees, including SLA fighters, Security Zone officials and their families landed in Galilee.

Barak prompted the choice of withdrawal of the IDF to the Israeli borderline. With the producing pressure on South Lebanon Armed force and the South Lebanon

security belt organization, the framework started to fall apart, with numerous individuals from the military and administration seeking refuge in Israel and different countries. With mounting assaults of Hezbollah, the positions of the South Lebanese Army dropped, with diminished induction and high rates of renunciation at lower positions. In April 2000, when it was clear the Israeli withdrawal was going to occur within weeks or months, a few SLA executives started moving their families to Northern Israel.

Showing up before parliamentary lobbyists for the representing the SLA in Israel, Abu Arz announced the administration of Israel had deceived its partners. In an alternate vein, Uri Lubrani, the head of coordinator of the Israeli activities in Lebanon and a key authority in moulding approach vis-à-vis the SLA, kept up that Israel had not surrendered the SLA since its individuals were permitted into Israel

Chapter 6

CONCLUSION

This war and its repercussions enormously affected the Israeli general and it can in this way be presumed that the Lebanon War speaks to a defining moment in the Israeli open's view of its administration and military. As for the war that erupted in 1957 pitted Palestinian forces linked to Arafat's PLO against Gemayel's Lebanese Phalanges. In a secret Accord- signed in Cairo in November 1969 under pressure from Egypt and Syria and complemented by the Melkart Protocol (May 1973)- Arafat obtained the right to prepare the battle with Israel in coordination with the Lebanese Army, which was charged with guaranteeing state sovereignty. The Jordanian Army's elimination of the Palestinian fedayeen in September 1970 (Black September) gave rise to a mass influx of Palestinians into Lebanon (Avon, Khatchadourian, & Todd, 2012, p. 17). Similarly as the 1948 Arab-Israeli clash resulted to a vague of Palestinians to go to Lebanon, the 1967 war had been the same with a flood of refugees from Palestine. This in the long run activated complex national state conflicts (Khazen, 1997). Palestinian Militants, as well as numbers of armed PLO (Palestine Liberation Organization) members that kept growing established a state inside a state in Lebanon. In 1972 the PLO installed its headquarters in Beirut and periodically launched attacks on northern Israel (Ibid). The state of affairs in Lebanon reached an emergency point. Muslims were the dominant sect by the mid 1960s; however Christians still held military and political power. Presently, with the appearance of the PLO, the balance of military control

moved toward Muslims and Arabs patriots. The Christian government ensured their capacity by the National Accord, were not going to enable the Muslim militias to pick up control. Furthermore, the well known level, most Christians felt undermined by the Palestinian existence, paying little mind to the way that Israel was the Palestinian's fundamental objective. Palestinians included 8% of Lebanon's populace and were 85% Sunni and 15% Christian. Politically empowered, they could assume a critical part against the Maronite (Harris, 1996, p. 49). By 1967, there were more than 110.000 Palestinian displaced people in the century with all the more showing up and more landed after the 1967 Arab-Israeli war and the Jordanian common war. From 1975 they numbered around or more than 300.000 (Jousiffee, 1998). What pursued was seventeen years of unhappiness, civil war and external occupation.

PLO assaults on Northern Israel pursued during this period and Israel attacked Southern Lebanon in 1978 to build up a proclaimed security zone of itself on Lebanon's South frontier. The zone was constrained by the Southern Lebanon Army, a Lebanese Christian militia forces. In the mid 1980s the fighting increased in Beirut with car bombings, kidnappings, and assassinations were systematic occurrences (Ibid, 17). Jaber, a renowned Lebanese correspondent who covered the Middle East for the Associated Press and Reuters writing various articles on the civil war in Lebanon, Israeli intrusion of Lebanon, and the Gulf war, portrays in her book "Hezbollah , Born with a Vengeance", how "Operation Peace for Galilee" immediately prompted the making of the Shiite Resistance movement.

On June 6, 1982, UN officers at the Hamra Bridge in South Lebanon saw thirteen Israeli centurion tanks thundering towards their position at the beginning of Israel's full-scale attack on Lebanon. Israel's planned to drive the Palestine Liberation

Organization (PLO) from Israel's Northern frontier. However "Operation Peace for Galilee" planned to force the political will of Israel on Lebanon, the Lebanese government attempted to stay unbiased. Secured by France, the Christians State militias needed more weapons and didn't need to be engaged with this war. The Sunnis, ensured by other Arab states, trusted that the Lebanese government will step in. The Druze battled the Christians in North Lebanon. The populace generally hurt by the war was the Shiites in South Lebanon. This before long made another rival on Israel's Northern borderline, Hezbollah, Muslim Shiites (Jaber, 1997, p. 7). In 1975 the Lebanese National Development (LNM), a Druze power drove by Kamal Jumblat and the Lebanese Front, a Maronite power drove by Chamoun, joined powers with different militias. As for the LNM Lebanese, they got together with the PLO as well as Muslim groups while the Lebanese Front aligned with Christian militias. The LNM got weapons from Iran and Syria and opted for a termination of the National Accord. The Lebanese Front thought about the proposition, yet just if the PLO was ousted from Lebanon. The LNM repudiated this and assaulted the Christian forces. Syrian president Hafez al-Assad, dreadful that if the Muslim LNM won the war Israel may attack Lebanon, sent soldiers to intercede on the Christian Lebanese Front.

The origination of the security zone started with the growth of the Palestine Freedom Association (PLO) nearness in Southern Lebanon in the mid 1970s, when PLO base moved from Jordan to Beirut. Southern Lebanon turned into a sanctuary for terrorist activities and attacks over the Israeli borderline. Such assaults prompted Israeli vengeance and to two Israeli occupation. The 1978 Litani Activity and the broader 1982 Operation were deliberated in general to expel the PLO from Southern Lebanon and eradicate the organization. While the principal objective was achieved in the

1982 war, the PLO pulled through and moved its operations to Tunisia. In spite of the fact that the war prevailing with regards to expelling the PLO from Lebanon, it "failed to form the new order Israel desired; instead of the PLO, Israel now confronted Hezbollah, an Iranian proxy movement of radical Shiite Muslims." Indeed, the Lebanese war prompted an extraordinary open addressing of the Israeli military's aims and widespread calls to end the wars quickly as would be prudent.

The security zone of Israel's turned into a liberated zone for Lebanon as the last Israeli soldiers hauled out of the zone of south Lebanon today, quickly finishing the Jewish state's 22-year control of this country. Covertly under darkness and Israeli air force, segments of Israeli armed force tanks and armoured personnel's moved south as Islamic Hezbollah guerrillas backed up the military vacuum; this helped them celebrate what is known as the "Glorious Victory" of Israel's withdrawal. The SLA, a pro-Israeli militia army, deserted its camps, leaving heavy war materials and their tanks all through the 9-mile-profound frontier swath. Early by the crack of dawn, armed force of Israel had likewise packed up the entirety of their camps, as well as its head office for the town of Marjayoun in Lebanon, and from the air it was exploding materials and left behind ammo. The last entourage went under heavy Hezbollah fire; however there were no losses as the withdrawal wrapped up, armed force spokesperson Lt. Col. Sharon Grinker said (MILLER, DANISZEWSKI, & WILKINSON, 2020). The withdrawing Israeli warriors were satisfied to have a no-win battle in Lebanon. Unmistakably relieved, they peeled off their flak jackets, embraced comrades and cheered one another. Many snatched phones and called their mums. "Mother, we're getting back home!" one yelled. Around 5,000 SLA fighters and relatives had looked for shelter in Israel, Israeli authorities stated, and a few

thousand more were anticipated. Lebanese authorities said at any rate 175 SLA militiamen gave up Tuesday; overall 300 were in the Lebanese Army custody (Ibid).

Israel used to ridicule Hezbollah fighters as an undisciplined group of ragtag fear mongers. Today those same combatants were virtually pursuing Israel's occupation powers out of South Lebanon, taking town after town, travelling in seized military vehicles and flaunting caught tanks. What's more, the returning locals of South Lebanon who as of not long ago viewed the Party of God as legends, as conquering heroes (MacDonald, 2000). As Hezbollah guerrillas propelled, individuals from Israel's puppet militia army the SLA disintegrated. Hundreds surrendered, tossing themselves under the sympathy of Hezbollah and on the Lebanese Armed force. Others went to Israel for help. Israel has recognized its gratitude to the SLA militia army for having kept up the occupation for a long time. The individuals who went to Israel for insurance are currently evacuees. A camp has been set up for them close to the Ocean of Galilee (Ibid). Israeli soldiers having endured many dead throughout the years on account of Hezbollah couldn't be more content to get out. Some prayed, some sang with celebration and most smiled the route back home. Less thrilled were the Israelis living along the northern outskirts frontier who presently have Hezbollah soldiers as close neighbours. Thousands have fled south. The individuals who have remained gone through the night were in bomb shelters. Hezbollah attempted to play on Israeli agitation today. The Lebanese Party of God is well on its approach to turning into a legend in the Arab world, having outmanoeuvred Israel and destroyed its compelling military image. That is something practically no single Middle Eastern force has ever figured out how to do.

In conclusion, the purpose of this thesis was to find out whether the SLA contributed to the birth of the resistance in South Lebanon. The aggression of Israel on the South and the presence of the Fidayah was what contributed to the birth of the resistance party in Lebanon before the presence of the SLA. The Lebanese Government then was absent and failed to protect the Southerners (for the reason that another ongoing civil war was happening in the far North and in Beirut itself) was what influenced the Southerners to fight for their freedom. The presence of the SLA was the tip of the ice. The Southerners had enough of the atrocities and mistreatments that they underwent them by the SLA and by the Israeli's themselves and they then took matters into their hands, hence, Hezbollah or the Party of God was formed. Israel officially withdrew from South Lebanon on the May 25th 2000.

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