

Nigeria's Oil and Gas Sector: Understanding the Niger Delta Militant Problem

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ABSTRACT

The Niger Delta Region of Nigeria has been plagued by the problem of Militant groups springing up in the region to perpetrate unlawful acts primarily targeted at profiting from the abundance of oil riches and also, to bring the attention of the Federal Government to the environmental and economical plights of people in the region.

The Frustration and aggression Theory and The Stakeholder theory shine light on how actions of the Federal Government and Multinational Oil Companies culminated to the rise of militant groups in the Niger Delta. The fact that Multinational Oil Companies have failed in their corporate Social responsibility contributed to the rise of Militant groups and the damaging effect of oil exploration on the environment is also cited as one of the reasons for the rise of militant groups. On the part of the Federal Government, the use of military force and the failure of the Federal Government to regulate the behavior of Multinational Oil Companies are often cited as reasons for the rise of militant groups in the Niger Delta.

The thesis discusses in-depth ways MNOCs and the Federal government led to the rise of Militant groups in the region. It concludes with findings and recommendations that can help defuse the tension and lead to a more peaceful resolution of disagreement in the oil-rich region.

Keywords: Militant Group, Oil Production, Multinational Oil Companies, Niger Delta

ÖZ

Nijerya'nın Nijer Deltası Bölgesi, öncelikle petrol zenginliklerinin bolluğundan yararlanmayı ve ayrıca Federal Hükümetin dikkatini çevresel ve ekonomik koşullara getirmeyi amaçlayan yasa dışı eylemleri sürdürmek için bölgede çıkan Militan gruplarının sorunu ile boğuşuyor. Bölgedeki insanların.

Hayal kırıklığı ve saldırganlık teorisi ve Paydaş teorisi, Federal Hükümet ve Çokuluslu Petrol Şirketlerinin eylemlerinin Nijer Deltası'nda militan grupların yükselişine nasıl yol açtığına ışık tutuyor. Çokuluslu Petrol Şirketlerinin kurumsal Sosyal sorumluluklarında başarısız olmaları, Militan gruplarının yükselmesine katkıda bulundu ve petrol araştırmalarının çevre üzerindeki zararlı etkisi de militan grupların yükselmesinin nedenlerinden biri olarak gösteriliyor. Federal Hükümet adına, kuvvet kullanımı ve Federal Hükümetin Çok Uluslu Petrol Şirketlerinin davranışlarını düzenlemede başarısız olması Nijer Deltası'ndaki militan grupların yükselişinin sıklıkla belirtildiği nedenlerdir.

Tez, ÇÜ'lerin ve Federal hükümetin bölgedeki Militan gruplarının yükselişine yol açan derinlemesine yollarını tartışıyor. Gerilimi etkisiz hale getirmeye yardımcı olabilecek ve petrol zengini bölgede anlaşmazlıkların daha barışçıl bir şekilde çözülmesine yol açabilecek bulgular ve önerilerle sonuçlanmaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Askeri Grup, Petrol Üretimi, Çok Uluslu Petrol Şirketleri, Nijer Deltası

To My Family

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

CSR	Corporate Social Responsibility
FGN	Federal Government of Nigeria
JTF	Joint Task Force
MNOC	Multinational Oil Companies
MOU	Memorandum of Understanding
NDDC	Niger Delta Development Commission
RNC	Royal Niger Company
WBCSD	World Business Council for Sustainable Development

Chapter 1

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background

Oil abundance bears similar consequences in developing countries, weak institutions, authoritarian regimes, impoverishment and unbalanced development are common occurrence in these developing countries (Luong and Weinthal 2010, p. 1). Most developing countries tend to undergo frustration when the presence of oil does not translate to buoyant economy. According to Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian (2013, p. 3), in Nigeria for instance, the rate of poverty rose from 36% when it had an agricultural economy, to 70% when it became an oil economy despite the great amount of accrued revenue from oil resources.

Freedman (2006, p. 31), corroborates the fact that oil resources have often served as a curse because most oil resource-rich developing states lack both freedom and peace. The Niger Delta region of Nigeria could be considered a typical oil-rich region, experiencing huge revenue from oil on one hand, and inadequate freedom on the other hand.

The existing conflict in the Niger Delta region predates Nigeria's colonialization and appears to have been largely reinforced in the early 1990s following the increased awareness of people in the region about the changes to their environment brought about by oil explorations. Hence, Ken Saro-wiwa and eight other comrades undertook

peaceful demonstrations against multinational oil companies and the government of Nigeria. A reprisal measure was used in response to the military regime of Major Gen. Sani Abacha, culminating in the deaths of Ken Saro-wiwa and eight others. This judicial killing of the 'Ogoni Nine' on the 10th of November 1995, not only attracted foreign attention but was soon considered the catalyst to the oil resource conflict in the Niger Delta (Maier, 2001).

Militant groups such as IYC, MEND, and NDPVF emanated during this period, continuing the protests started by the 'Ogoni Nine'. According to Naanen (1995), the conflict which he termed 'The Ogoni Wars' was primarily due to unemployment, underdevelopment, poverty and environmental degradation brought about by multinational oil companies.

Shell-BP started its exploration for oil in Nigeria in 1921. The search for oil, nicknamed the 'Black gold', ended in the mid-1950s when oil in Oloibiri, in present-day Bayelsa state, was discovered. The discovery of oil led to influx of multinational oil companies. People of the region perceived the presence of the multinational oil companies as advents of instruments of development - the eradication of poverty, unemployment, and inequalities (Seers, 1973). In a paradox, their advent does not imply development, and ironically, they instead indulged in activities that caused environmental degradation, gas flaring, destruction of fauna and flora, unemployment as a result of decimation of farmlands, etc. The rise in unemployment has been attributed to destruction of farmlands in host communities because of seismic explorations and wastes from drilling which deepened poverty in the region. It does not come as a surprise that Barnett and Muller (1974) assert that multinational oil companies contribute to worldwide exacerbation of poverty, inequality, and

unemployment today; multinational oil companies are profit-oriented and have less focus on offering solutions to social problems of their hosts. These aforementioned persistent conditions of underdevelopment and poverty contribute to the political conflict and agitation of youths in the Niger Delta.

This research will seek to assess the linkage between conflict and corporate social responsibility (CSR) of Oil companies with Niger Delta region being the case study.

The concept of CSR dates back to the 1950s and commenced as an act of philanthropy. At that time, corporations made corporate giving to the host communities at will, without a contract or agreement. In recent times, it has become a strategic part of corporations' activities. Kramer (2006) defined CSR as the obligation of organizations; implying that it was no longer philanthropic but required legally by an organization to be socially responsible within their host communities. Lack of organization engagement in vital CSR can pose damages to its corporate image. For this reason, multinational oil companies in the Niger Delta have faced corporate scandals with poor environmental practices of mining.

1.2 The Niger Delta Region of Nigeria

This region's name was coined from its position at the mouth of the River Niger (Etekpe, 2009). Niger Delta has an abundance of oil and gas deposits - onshore and offshore - including deposits located in Agbami, Bonga, Usan, and Kpono/Amenam field, inhabited by over 20 million people. This region's uniqueness is not just down to abundance of oil deposits, as it is characterized by the existence of coastal low waters and lands - marshlands, tributaries, creeks, and lagoons (Osaghe et al. 2007, p. 6). Similar to other Delta regions across the world, it has a warm humid subtropical

climate with very short rainy seasons and long dry seasons. The region was expanded as a result of the concept of the South-South geopolitical zone of Gen. Sani Abacha, which would make the Niger Delta synonymous with regional states producing oil. States like Imo, Abia, and Ondo, although historically outside the region, now form part of it, without possessing the features of a delta (Etekpe, 2009). The administration of Olusegun Obasanjo(1999-2007) confused the identity of the region further, following the creation of the Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC) Act in the year 2000, hence redefining the region to include the nine oil and gas producing Nigerian states (Abia, Akwa Ibom, Bayelsa, Cross River, Delta, Edo, Imo, Ondo, and Rivers). Jaja (2008, pp. 140-1), commented on the absence of scholarly unanimity on the actual boundaries of the Niger Delta. Ako (2009) maintains succinctly, that there can be three definitions of the region: described in economic terms due to its resources, marking the region as an economic hub in both eras of palm oil then, and now crude oil. Politically, in line with the NDDC Act of 2000, expressed synonymously with its oil production, and then there is the geographical definition.

The extant studies on the conflicts in the Niger Delta conflicts are limited mostly to the commercial exploitation period of crude oil which commenced in 1958 (Ukeja, 2005, p. 5). This is constraining because there is a failure to put the historical ingredients of the Niger Delta conflict into consideration. Hence, the historic marginalization of the traditional institutions of the Niger Delta by the British merchants, who were notorious for their commercial business with the establishment of the Royal Niger Company (RNC) at Akassa in 1895, and the consequent war that took place. This section of the thesis highlights this history to establish a holistic view of the conflict. The two major economic and conflict-prone eras in the Niger Delta

included the palm oil and crude oil eras. It is important to amplify the parallels by analyzing both eras.

Before the crude oil era was the palm oil period. According to Ako and Okonmah (2009, p. 55), the palm oil era became significant in 1865, and recorded an annual export of 2500 tonnes of palm oil, accounting for the regional national output by 87%, making it significant like crude oil is to the economy of Nigeria in more contemporary periods. Palm oil had both domestic and international significance. Domestically, it was used in the purchase of essential items (salt and gun power), cooking, and for traditional and social obligations (dowry payments). Tamun and Edoumiekumo (2012, p. 115), stated that the trunk of the oil palm was essential for building constructions, where the fiber was used for making fishnets after it had been produced into a woven material. Oil palm veins were used to make brooms, whereas the fronds were used for constructing thatched-roofs and buildings. The cracked kernels were used for family snacks, and remnants re-used for feeding local fowls and goats, and so much more benefits like all-purpose therapeutic pomade-oil. The region's fate changed with the advent of the British rule and the palm oil mills and plantation schemes that accompanied it in 1932; this had negative impacts on the people, although intended to improve agricultural production. Local farmers were not interested in new implements, but the British administration introduced mechanized systems for planting and harvesting oil palm to increase productivity. The exploitation of the people and the products soon followed and served as the topmost attraction for the British merchants working in the Niger Delta (Crowder, 1968). Traditional leaders, however, perceived control of the region's trade by the British and the altered farming system, as an encroachment. This denigrated into colonialism, characterized as the overthrowing

and control of an existing economy by another for exploitation (Ako and Okonmah, 2009, p. 54; Fidelis and Samuel, 2011, p. 1).

The people of the Niger Delta were plagued with the issue of resource control and allocation, during the colonial era. The RNC had interfered with their rights to trade and they fought to re-possess it. Etekpe (2007, p. 1) traced the region's conflict to the 1895 Akassa Raid - a protest by the traditional institutions of the Niger Delta, against British policies and that of the Royal Niger Company (RNC), following failed diplomatic measures and the adoption of punitive measures by the British. The resistance of the communities of the Niger Delta appears to account for the custom federalism adopted by the colonists in Nigeria. This is not distinct from the more contemporary experiences of the people in the region, following responses from the Nigerian government against protests.

With the rich resources of the region, especially crude oil, many multinational oil companies found it to be a fertile business ground. Today, the region is home to one of the richest centers of biodiversity worldwide, attracting tourists and scientists (Ojakorotu, 2009). Moff and Linden (1995), stated that Niger Delta is considered as the richest region in Nigeria, as a result of natural resources.

Oil exploration in Nigeria goes back to 1908, but the discovery of commercial quantities of oil in Oloibiri in present-day Bayelsa in 1956, marked the commencement of the crude oil era in the Niger Delta. In 1958, the first oil exploration occurred with Shell's exportation of 5100 barrels of crude oil to England (Ako and Okonmah, 2009, p. 55). This quantity has since increased to 2 million barrels per day (Tamuno and

Edoumiekumo, 2012, p. 117), with approximately 90% of Nigeria's GDP, contributed by oil currently.

Oil ownership has fostered ongoing conflicts in the Niger Delta. A key reason for such conflict is that the 1978 Land Use Act denied the locals ownership of the oil even though they had ownership of land. The Nigerian oil industry is jointly operated by multinational oil companies and the Federal Government of Nigeria, under the Nigerian Constitution implying that locals in host communities are excluded from partaking in petro-business, although they cultivate the land. The 1978 Act also denies the rights of communities to participate in the oil business, as well as the right to compensation with regards to environmental degradation (Ako and Coker, 2007, p. 435), possibly denying them from participating in unfriendly environmental activities that affect their standard of living and health. The locals have made protests in the form of petitions, litigation, and civil demonstrations but to no avail (Ako and Okonmah, 2009, p. 65). In the early 1990s, the people began engaging in violent measures including the kidnapping of multinational oil companies' expert staff (mostly foreigners), vandalization of pipelines, oil installation disruptions, and so on. The government and multinational oil companies have responded with punitive measures, perceived similarly as the measure employed by British merchants in the pre-colonial era, which led up to the Akassa War in 1895. Levels of conflict have only been exacerbated by repressive measures.

The parallels that can be drawn from the two eras is that the two resources were both in high demands in respective times (palm oil in 1865 and crude oil in 1958). The former was essential during the industrial revolution in Europe, employed in the processing of lubricants for maintaining industrial machinery, producing soap and

margarine, and domestically, to provide heat at home. Crude oil has contemporary development components domestically and industrially. It is used in fueling cars, airplanes, motorcycles, industrial cars, and machines. Both eras were plagued by resource conflicts involving the local communities, government, and foreign experts (ibid., p. 59). These two eras were both plagued by resource conflicts between the exploiters and government, against the host communities, in a bid to protect revenue generated from the resources of the communities, but controlled by the central government. Nowadays, the union of alleged foreign resource exploiters and the government has been legalized with a 60-40 joint venture relationship between the oil corporations and the Nigerian government, signed originally by the Nigerian government and Shell in 1938.

It is possible that the denial of host communities' rights in controlling the palm oil trade, known to have contributed to the Akassa War of 1895, is similar to the struggle of the community's leadership to participate and gain recognition in the oil business in contemporary times. Okonta (2007) maintained that a direct correlation exists between this non-participation and the conflict in the Niger Delta, and traceable to the historical underpinnings of the region. Both the Akassa War and contemporary conflict has been due to the resistance of superior powers and the oppressive measures of the government in denying Niger Delta residents means of livelihood.

Oyefusi (2007, p. 1), attributed violence in the Niger Delta to the presence of weak institutions, the marriage between multinational oil companies and the Nigerian government, and lack of law enforcement; stimulating the government to undertake repressive measures against the local communities during periods of crisis between the host communities and multinational oil companies. In the same way the government-

controlled security forces to protect its economic interest and ensure the monopoly of oil palm trade by the RNC, residents were levied with similar punitive measures which is evident in the killing of the Ogoni Nine in 1995.

This thesis is focused on ascertaining the role of each player (government, multinational oil companies, and the host communities) in exacerbating the conflict and possible ways of managing this conflict.

1.3 Statement of Research Problem

The Niger Delta has faced recurrent oil conflict since the commercialization of oil exploration in 1958. This problem stem from neglect, marginalization, environmental dilapidation, and oppression caused by exploration and production activities (Okakorotu, 2009; Olawuyi, 2015). Following long periods of neglect, communities of the region took up arms to draw attention to the problem. This resultant conflict or militancy can be linked to the failure of multinational oil companies CSR project and the government military approach to quelling peaceful protests in the Niger Delta (Ako, 2014).

The Saro-Wiwa peaceful protest in the early 1990s was inspired by inadequacy of CSR programme and its implementation by multinational oil companies. The communities remain unhappy with projects ranging from education, energy, infrastructure, socio-economic and health problems because they want to either be directly involved in CSR in the decision-making or the delivery of the project, or companies undertake participation via ad hoc perspectives to avoid preclusion of the possible rejection by the communities of the corporate giving. Despite Shell's increase in annual expenditure in 1994 from \$25m to \$60m in 2000, it continues to be blamed by host

communities and face consequences like public safety breaches and insecurity (Okodudu, 2008).

The government of Nigeria established specialized institutions catering to the needs of the region, including the now-defunct Oil Minerals Producing Areas Development Commission (OMPADC), and the current Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC). The basic mandate of the latter is to pursue further the objectives and missions of the paradigm of community development, concentrating on socio-economic infrastructural provisions. Communities in the region viewed these attempts as paltry gifts compared to the perceived value of resources exploited by the government and multinational oil companies from their region, and hence conflicts continue unabated (Isola, 2015).

An increased consciousness persists in the region; with the communities being at the receiving end of oil spillage, environmental hazards, and gas flaring that emanate from oil mining. The resultant effect has been heightened demands by host communities for more CSR policies and projects from multinational oil companies. While multinational oil companies' double efforts, agitations rise from these communities for such initiatives. This either means the CSR projects should be more tailored to communities' needs or that the demand of these locals is unreasonable. Previous studies on CSR conform in stating that CSR is still at growth stages, in terms of their effectiveness and implementation in the region.

Implementers are often accused of fund misappropriation and contributing to programs' ineffectiveness in worst cases (Watts, 2005). Accusations of low-level commitment abound, as well as pessimism and ambivalent responses to CSRs

(Owolabi and Oluwolobi, 2009). Others include corruption and faulty execution of programs, and negative impacts of delivery contribute to the dissatisfaction of communities (Okududu, 2008; Eweje, 2007).

This study aims to investigate whether or not the absence of concrete strategies of multinational oil companies for CSR has contributed to the conflicts/militancy in the Niger Delta region, with the following objectives:

- i) assessing the key causes of conflicts and consequences on the host communities in the region
- ii) evaluating some of the CSR program/projects of the multinational oil companies, and their effects on conflict management
- iii) evaluating the efforts of the Federal government in managing the conflict in the region.

1.4 Research Question(s)

- I) How did the actions of the Federal Government contribute to the conflict in Niger Delta?
- II) How did multinational oil companies and their CSR programme contribute to the conflict in Niger Delta?

1.5 Significance of Study

This study has several significances and can be discussed briefly via three perspectives: based on theoretical significance, methodological, and practical. Stakeholders' theory will be explained. Through explicating CSR and conflict management in oil communities of the Niger Delta, this study is predominantly expository, as it reviews existing scholarly literature on the conflict in the region. Previous studies do not capture the interplay between CSR programmes and the

management of conflict sufficiently as a responsible approach to conflict, and this research will be the point of departure from previous studies, representing a shift in paradigm from other studies on conflicts in local communities hosting multinational oil companies in the region.

This thesis will help provide the platform for policy revamping and reorientation for conflict management practitioners; assisting in evolving sustainable and functional CSR approaches towards addressing the question of the region, to abate conflict reduction. Practically, this research will demonstrate the key inherent contradictions in the CSR projects of multinational oil companies that impedes sustainable conflict management processes in the region. It will provide frameworks for the management of conflict by the government and multinational oil companies via the initiation of sustainable socio-economic policies that are community-based.

1.6 Hypothesis

The following propositions will be evaluated in the course of this thesis:

H1. The Federal Government use of military force to resolve conflict and failure to regulate the activities of the multinational oil companies have affected the problem negatively

H2. The negative environmental impact of the multinational oil companies and the failure of the CSR projects by multinational oil companies have aggravated the region's social conflict

1.7 Methodology

This thesis is a case study that enumerates the failures of CSR programmes and governance inadequacies in oil sector that inadvertently developed into a violent

volatile conflict. This study will mainly adopt a qualitative strategy for data collection and analysis. Although the intention will be to conduct a mixed-method study, lack of resources will hinder the efforts at seeking mixed qualitative methods of inquiry in the form of direct sources such as focus groups and in-depth interviews, however, the use of questionnaires for data collection will be made. This thesis will mainly rely on qualitative data for explanatory purposes, that will be generated from secondary sources like books, policy papers, and journal articles. Other direct sources such as the websites of these multinational oil companies will be employed, with numerical data from direct sources and official documents.

The minimal mixed method that will be employed in this research, is as a result of the nature of corporate practices, especially the implementation of CSRs in most host communities, hence there is a need for utilizing multiple sources of data, respondents/participants, and so on, ‘...to gather multiple perspectives on the same topic’ (Creswell, 2011, p. 534). This will enable the overcoming of the problem of validity and bias, according to Blaikie (2003, p. 18).

1.8 Study Scope and Limitation

In thesis-writing, as a scholarly work, the researcher is often confined in many ways, including but not limited to, lack of funds, constraints from time, and study scope. These are all applicable to this research.

The mixed-methods design employed by this study, will explore the historical Niger Delta environmental degradation crisis, as opposed to the politics of the Niger Delta. This historical component comprised the BRACED States (Bayelsa, Rivers, Akwa Ibom, Cross River, Edo and Delta States), which are reflected in the report of Henry

Willink on the Niger Delta in 1958. The political aspect, however, has to do with the creation of Nigeria's Fourth Republic in 2000, following the administration of President Obasanjo, which added Abia, Imo and Ondo state to the BRACED States, as part of the Oil-producing states. Hence the scope of this research will border the historical Niger Delta states that have mainly felt the negative effects of the activities of oil exploration.

Further research limitations include that whereas about 20 key multinational oil companies are operating in the Niger Delta region, this study will select three multinational oil companies particularly SPDC (Shell), NAOC (Agip), and Chevron. The emphasis on these Corporations stems from their sizes and roles, as they have set the pace in the region's petrochemical industry. Hence, a great comprehension of their CSR is sufficient to ascertain in-depth, the activities of multinational oil companies in the region.

1.9 Theoretical Framework

This study will utilize the stakeholders' theory. The stakeholders' theory and its application to our case study is extensively discussed in the second chapter of the thesis.

1.10 Organization of Chapters

This research will be divided into five chapters. The first one introduces the study, reviewing the background of the study, stating encountered problems with the study, and the aims/objectives of the study, and reiterates the essence of the study, and sets the scope of the research, and briefly discusses the methodology.

The second chapter will contain the literature review and theoretical framework discussions related to the study of conflict and CSR with regards to the multinational oil companies in the Niger Delta. It will explore mechanisms related to oil conflicts and the connotations by different scholars, and consequently establish a direct linkage between CSR and conflict briefly establishing the reason why multinational oil company's situation their sites of operation mostly in countries that are developing. The causes of conflict in the Niger Delta are explicated, culminating in the establishment of the gaps in the existing literature.

Chapter three will present and analyze the second hypothesis.

Chapter four will present and analyze the second hypothesis.

The fifth chapter will conclude the findings, implications of findings for policies, and recommendations. It will also explore the possible policies to be tentatively implemented or employed by the government, multinational oil companies, and the host communities in line with the research questions of this thesis.

Chapter 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1 Theoretical Framework

To avail needed focus for this research, the respective theories: stakeholder theory, and mechanisms of oil conflict, and linkages of conflict with CSR, will be briefly discussed in this chapter.

2.2 Stakeholders Theory

In the view of Freeman (1984, p. 46), any individual or group that can affect or is affected by the achievement of an organization's aims, is a stakeholder. This definition is expanded upon by Freeman (2001, p. 42), as involving groups that are crucial to the success and survival of the corporation, or individuals often affected by the existence of the corporation. According to Hatch (2018, p. 82), "organizations that attend to the demands of all stakeholders will outperform organizations that ignore some of their stakeholders while privileging others". High levels of responsibility exhibited by businesses in their environmental actions are essential to better comprehension and better management in times of turbulence. Thus, this theory provides for a variety of ways of tackling the diversity of demands from different individuals and groups, who have legitimate stakes in an organization.

Regarding CSR, economic theory often proposes two schools of thought: the shareholder's model and stakeholder's model (Wisdom, 2012, p. 60). With the former, the organization has profit maximization to its owners, as its only responsibility,

whereas the latter model emphasizes the business's ability to satisfy its stakeholders (ibid., p. 63). Both seem to be irreconcilable. Because of the notion of profit-making of businesses for shareholders, there is the cynicism that companies participate in CSR for the sake of appearing good before the communities, to exacerbate trade by seeming to care to the host communities. Related to this view is that the government has the responsibility to cater to the needs of the community. Hence, the fact that companies pay taxes and obey the laws, is adequate, whereas the government uses these taxes to improve the lives of taxpayers and communities; thus, any CSR efforts from them will seem like 'double taxation'. The stakeholder's theory is employed in determining who is impacted by business ventures of an organization. Moir (2001 p. 8) has provided a classification of stakeholders into primary and secondary ones. The primary ones are customers, suppliers, employees, and investors, who are the major initiators and hold the capacity to sustain corporate aims. The government and communities that provide legislation aimed at guiding business relationships and public infrastructure for the easy running of a business. The second group consists of a group/individual affected by the business within the environment and excludes those responsible for the day-to-day management of the business (ibid., 2001, p. 9).

Proponents of the CSR concept persuade corporations to be sensitive to the needs of the environment of host communities. But it is difficult to satisfy everyone and no guideline exists in the stakeholder analysis about which classification of stakeholders should command the most attention— primary or secondary.

This view of CSR recognizes that corporations do not operate in isolation, and must have a sensitivity to the needs of their host communities. Freeman (2001, p. 10) established positive connections between good corporate citizenship and profitability.

Hence, CSR is considered as a good investment, since it promotes goodwill towards corporations, their operations and products, and the stakeholders are satisfied with the activities of the organizations within the environment. In the Niger Delta, for example, the CSR strategy enables oil corporations to peacefully cohabit with the local host communities; thus, irresponsible behavior might be detrimental to this peaceful co-existence. According to Ntukekpo, 2012, p. 366, public relations departments of multinational oil companies claim to have a good social responsibility, but locals might not trust their corporate citizenship, making for more reasons for continuous conflict in the region. There might be a perceived gap in the understanding of CSR by multinational oil companies since some of them tend to involve in crisis management than CSR. This perceived gap can be considered yet another reason for conflict. Some corporations have documented ethics of CSR, but not in reality. Example is Shell, which has documented its oil mining best practices like the protection of life and environment, however, the UNEP report on Ogoniland have shown severe land contaminations, adding that Shell could not maintain internal oil-mining standards in Ogoniland, and recommends prompt cleaning action, that should be carried out (Ntukekpo, 2012, p. 366).

Modulo (2009, p. 535) asserts that oil corporations such as Shell, have contributed majorly to the Nigerian economy's development and that of the Niger Delta local communities – evident in the participation of Shell in development activities such as educational programs, scholarships for a good number of residents from the primary to university level, provision of basic societal amenities like good roads, and the construction of water pipelines; provision of electricity within host communities and so on. The stakeholder's theory has been applied in several studies, and Ullman's 1985 research on CSR is the most prominent. The key technique expected of corporations

to be communicated with the people of the local communities is the establishment of rapport via the demonstration of concerns about the social and environmental needs of the people (Idowu, 2014, p. 21; Owusu-Ansah et al., 2015). Alluding to the arguments of Elijido-Ten (2007), CSR encompasses communal involvement of businesses, acknowledgment of concerns for energy conservation, employees, safer products, abatement of pollution and other environmentally-related matters, although not limited to these.

To further apply the theory, Ullmann identifies the stakeholder's power, economic performance, and strategic posture, as being part of the key framework for the discussion of corporate practices (Ullmann, 1985); particularly the case within operational environments. When Elijido-Ten applied Ullmann's framework to the ranking of 100 top corporations' environmental performance in 2002 by the Australian Conservation Foundation, there was a positive relationship between CSR and financial performance. This accounted for the reason why states participated in the Rio de Janeiro Earth Summit as it not only enlightened global citizens on the relevancy of the sustainable development goals, but identified how governments can intercede between businesses and ecosystems of their host (Deegan and Gordon, 1996). The host government can hold businesses to environmental standards and ensure businesses pay close mind to the environment as part of their CSR obligation.

Stakeholder theory spurs multinational oil companies to action by highlighting stakeholders they ought to be responsible to. In the case of the Niger Delta, multinational oil companies become aware of numerous groups and individuals affected directly or indirectly by their activities. According to Obi (2000), Watts

(2004), Ojekarotu (2009), Aghalino (2012), a cordial relationship between host communities and oil corporations in the region do not yet exist.

This thesis will discuss, in part, how effective the CSR initiated by multinational oil companies is concerning perception about CSR in host communities.

2.3 Corporate Social Responsibility

The concept of CSR has its origin from the 1930s, and the modern perception of the concept is taken from the 1950s (Carroll, 1999). CSR has been linked to the actions and decisions of corporations that are interlinked with society's goals and values (Okoye, 2009). Lindgreen and Swaen (2010) tend to regard the concept as an unconditional necessity that organizations mainstream their societal responsibilities efficiently, with emphasis on global legal and ethical practices, to the benefit of the host environment/communities of their operations. Ogula (2012) states that CSR seeks to enhance positive relations and prevent resistance from the host communities. It offers opportunities for re-branding, image-making through well-coordinated projects. Frynas (2005) considers CSR as involving the protection of the interests of stakeholders, setting engagement rules that will curtail abuse or economic injustice of any kind. Other definitions of CSR refer to the sequence of beneficial corporate partnerships between businesses and their environments, hence offering a situation whereby business corporations can gain a positive reputation from all stakeholders (Ekeocha, 2001, p. 46). This implies a direct relationship between corporations and host communities. It requires regular evaluation of the impact of businesses' operations in society.

Despite the essence of the CSR concept, its necessity is still contested. Idemudia and Ittekkut (2006), state that the advocates of CSR are not in consensus about functionality or implementation and have differing perspectives on the importance of businesses in every society. Advocates of the concept hold it in high esteem, while others consider ethical and legal behavior and payment of taxes to the governments enough.

For the aim of this thesis, the concept of CSR is viewed from the perspective of MNCs adopting activities that are environmentally friendly, which would add value to host communities and foster development. However, while multinational oil companies strive to adopt these strategies, they ought to work towards boosting their corporate image via public relations units that bear the responsibility of providing updates on CSR-related projects. According to the World Business Council for Sustainable Development (WBCSD) document by the OECD, the core values of CSR as acknowledged by the World Business Council for Sustainable Development include human rights, environmental protection, employee rights, supplier relations, community development, monitoring and stakeholders' rights (WBCSD, 1999).

My main criticism of CSR is that, there is an absence of a compelling law that takes the decision of engaging in CSR out of multinational oil companies' hands and makes it a requirement of law that, they engage in proper CSR programmes.

The next sections establish the link between conflict and oil in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria.

2.4 Mechanisms of Oil Conflict

Oil conflicts often commence from community levels where oil exploration and exploitation occur, either between communities or between the communities and

agencies of the government. In Nigeria, this is prevalent due to the struggle for a fair share of natural resources, which has resulted in youths in host communities vandalizing and sabotaging pipelines, etc. (Iduh, 2011, p. 124). Oil discovery has thus become quite a paradox since it has brought about repression, environmental devastation, and misery to the oil-producing societies (Evoh, 2009, p. 40).

Concept of Greed and Grievance

There are varied dimensions of conflict caused by human behavior. Humphreys (2005, p. 508) pinpointed two main elements that could cause conflict: the grievance mechanism and the rebel greed mechanism. The latter refers to the perpetuation of violence by groups of people in a bid to compel the government and oil industry operators to meet the needs of the host community. Braunschweiger and Bulte (2009, p. 652) state that rebels seeking loot often exhibit non-conformism, using every means possible to attain their aims. Grievance mechanism on the other hand, has to mostly do with the effects of extraction of resources – environmental damage, marginalization, inequality, etc. (ibid.). Empirical research proposes that conflict could also emanate from the grievances of rebels, who believe that natural resources are not been evenly distributed. Ross (2006, pp. 266-283), asserted that the dependence on natural resources has links to conflict, that might likely end up in military intervention.

The Dutch Disease

Lartey et al (2012) define this model as an economic concept that denotes the prospective negative impacts of natural resources, and accompanying exchange rates, on the rest of other economic sectors. In the Netherlands in the 1970s, the oil boom caused an increase in the country's exchange and a resultant drastic reduction in diversification into other economic sectors. Oil discovery and oil boom of the 1970s

caused neglect of other economic sectors in Nigeria too, and the worst hit was the agricultural sector. Osalor (2012) asserts that agriculture in Nigeria still accounts for over 2.8% of the country's GDP, and even 2/3 of employment, but it has been plagued by dire mismanagement, poor basic infrastructure, and poorly conceived governmental policies. Mining has also witnessed a decline following the advent of the oil boom. The resultant effect is that Nigeria currently imports almost everything, refined petroleum included.

Other mechanisms of oil conflict and concepts such as the Rentier Economy Effect, referring to the saddled responsibility of governments to allocate revenue due to its generation of income via oil and gas exports and rents generally, making tax imposition on the people unnecessary. Oil resources as a curse – referring to the 'resource curse' hypothesis that natural resources, especially oil create war, having links to authoritarianism, economic decline, and corruption (Basedau and Lay, 2009, p. 757). Ross (2008, p. 4) attributes the greatest danger of oil to be the ability to instigate conflict, especially in developing states. Examples include Nigeria, Algeria, Colombia, Iraq, and Sudan. Oil alone cannot generate conflict but might exacerbate latent tensions, especially in states that were relatively poor before the advent of huge revenues from oil.

2.5 CSR and Conflict Linkages

Lots of studies have linked CSR with conflict (Berman, 2000; Idemudia, 2010). Environmentally unfriendly activities of multinational oil companies can contribute to conflicts, while their genuine involvement in CSR can dispel and prevent conflicts. Advocates of CSR suggest that corporations appear to focus on propagating a peaceful

business environment in their host communities, and cannot be neutral in conflict situations (Bennett, 2002; Idemudia, 2010).

In a paradox, the close nexus of CSR and conflict seem disputable, especially in conflict de-escalation contexts. Haufler (2004) argues that no adequate empirical evidence exists to decide whether the involvement of corporations in CSR could reduce or prevent conflict. However, it is possible that while considering the growing role of corporations in mitigating conflict, there seems to be an essence for examining the scope and situation in which these roles are carried out, thus businesses are considered conflict mitigation vehicles (Idemudia, 2010, p. 834). CSR concretely planned, executed, and managed, reduces the effect of business activities on the environment, and multinational oil companies are expected to ensure their business doesn't adversely affect the quality living of local communities. In the instance of oil exploration, multinational oil companies are expected to prevent oil spillage and other accidents detrimental to the local environment because this could fuel conflict as it has in Niger Delta. After all, the fishing waters in the region became contaminated and practically annihilated the fishing trade in the local communities.

In the case of the Niger Delta for instance, as soon as pipeline constructions are completed, multinational oil companies would engage communities in another project, suggesting that projects of CSR are often peace projects, because of the realization that conflict would otherwise emanate. Idemudia (2010) argues that multinational oil companies' failures in involving in CSR mainly triggered the Ken Saro-Wiwa-led protest in the 1990s, which resulted in massive violations of human rights in Nigeria by the Nigerian Government. Multinational oil companies CSR involvement has been carried out quite haphazardly.

2.6 The Key Causes of the Conflict

Being one of the objectives of this thesis, we briefly examine what is said within the literature about the causes of the conflict. These include environmental degradation, legislation and empowerment, colonial legacies, corruption, and poor leadership and governance, and so on. Some of these causes have been explored in the first chapter, and thus this section would focus on environmental degradation, legislation, and subjugation, state-imposed poverty, and failed promises and resource allocation.

2.6.1 Environmental Degradation

Ojekarotu and Gilbert (2010, p. 7) state that for many decades, multinational oil companies have come to be active players in Nigeria's oil exploration and exploitation, which have generated billions of dollars to both them and the Nigerian government. The locals have been at the receiving end of environmental degradation (Ojekarotu and Okeke-Uzodike, 2006, p. 96-7; Aghalino and Okolie-Osemene, 2014). Roughly 60,000 oil spillages occurred in the Niger Delta between 1976-1996, approximately 2,369,471 crude oil barrels, according to statistics provided by Eyinla and Ukpo(2006, p. 4). Shell alone has spilled about 106,000 barrels in 1997-1998, from its Jones creek flow station alone.

Decree 99 enacted in 1979 by the Nigerian Military government (as it then was) was the first decree that attempted to discourage the flaring of gas. This would be modified to allow for gas flaring at a fine to the corporations, and this was preferred by them over stopping gas flaring (Ogunrin et al., 2005, p. 106; Ako, 2015). Ojekarotu and Gilbert (2010, p. 12), states that the degradation is not limited just to spillage, but to waste dumping in rivers, seas, and the environs, whilst falsifying their re-injection into

old oil wells. These deliberate actions are destructive to aquatic and farming life, implying effects on local livelihood.

2.6.2 Legislation and Subjugation

Fidelis and Samuel (2011) have explained that the consciousness of the veritable nature of oil as a massive wealth source and the realization that it is only available in the minority Southern part of Nigeria has led leaders from the major ethnic groups to formulate legislations that are questionable. These are targeted towards the disempowerment of these tribal minorities in the Niger Delta. Others do blame the denial of the people of their natural inheritance on colonial laws (Ako and Okonmah, 2009, p. 54; Ako, 2010).

Some post-colonial regulations as modified by the Nigerian government include:

- The 1969 Decree no. 51 that allowed the transfer of ownership of petroleum products totally to the Federal Government (FGN).

- The 1971 Offshore Oil Revenue Act, that gave the FGN exclusive rights to the coastal areas' continental shelf.

- The 1978 Land Use Act that placed land ownership to the FGN, and its accredited agencies, hence dispossessing the locals of Niger Delta of their rights to ownership and occupancy.

Ojajorotu and Gilbert (2010, p. 6) have argued that these regulations become effectively operational whenever multinational oil companies and the FGN seek to take advantage of the local communities when it comes to the region's natural

resources. These intolerable decrees have yet to be abolished or modified despite the violent and harsh criticisms of their persisted use by Niger Delta activists.

2.6.3 Poverty imposed by the State

Nigeria is the 6th largest oil producer in the world and the Niger Delta is the powerhouse of this revenue source. However, Oviasuyi and Uwadiea (2010, p. 115) find that the locals of the region live in abject poverty and that is an indication of deprivation to the extent that they do not have adequate access to basic amenities like electricity and water. The majority live in creeks, watching corporations amass wealth from their lands. Ejibunu (2007, p. 10) asserts that a sense of despair much like a refugee camp pervades the area despite all its resource abundance.

Research has shown that deprivation and poverty are key factors behind people's agitation. Oviasuyi and Uwadiea (2010, p. 115) corroborate this. When agricultural was the main revenue stream of the government, the region such as Ibadan with cocoa were provided with amenities, and good networks of roads, free schools and so on were provided. In the North of Nigeria, infrastructural facilities were constructed as well. Today, it is quite a paradox that the FGN has not reinvested the proceeds from petroleum into other economic sectors, and failed to give the communities what they deserve.

Undoubtedly, this agitation because of poverty rests solely on the shoulders of the government because a large portion of Nigerian revenue is generated from the region but hardly enough is reinvested into local communities that have lost their means of livelihood due to the devastating environmental consequence of oil exploration.

2.6.4 Failed Promises and Resource Allocation

Calls for compensation to the region's people for the negative effects of oil exploration to the environment have been ignored by the FGN, following impacts such as arable land reduction, oil spillage, wildlife destruction, and so on. Endless promises have been left unfulfilled, which probably explains the resort to hostage-taking and kidnapping by some of the region's youth. These youths also break pipelines to siphon the oil (Afinotan and Ojekarotu, 2009, p. 195). The government reacted in a manner that rendered a lot of people homeless and negatively affected inhabitants of Ogoni, Odi, Choba, and Umuechem communities.

Regarding revenue allocation, the FGN's formula has been heavily criticized for failing to cater to the interest of the people in the region, where more than 80% of the national resources are generated. Ojekarotu (2009, p. 2) opined that agitations in the Niger Delta have grown worse and there is a considerable rise in the number of social groups looking to challenge the State policies. The revenue allocation formula is a major cause of most of the area's conflict, and how well the government manages to resolve it would determine the region's peace and development (Obi, 2001, p. 87).

This failure regarding false promises rests solely on the shoulders of the government who ought to be seeing to the region getting a fair share of the federal allocation apportioned to development and reversing the environmental damage caused by oil exploration.

The people in the region have come to view oil as a curse rather than a blessing due to its link to insecurity, environmental crisis, violence, loss of cultural values, etc. (Aghalino, 2011; Okolie-Osemene, 2015). The Ogoni movement to emancipate the

people from state-imposed poverty led by Saro-Wiwa was prompted by these concerns (Ako, 2015). Some of the organizations fighting for the economic liberation of the region's people include the Pan-Niger Delta Resistance Movement, the Environmental; Rights Action (ERA; the Ijaw Young Council (IYC), to mention a few.

Chapter 3

THE ROLE OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT IN AGGRAVATING CONFLICT IN NIGER DELTA

This chapter explores the first hypothesis of this thesis, it also explores the strategy and methods of data collection and inquiry for this chapter.

3.1 Data Collection

This study adopts qualitative strategies and combines different methods of data collection – through a mixed method of assessing primary and secondary sources of data and conducting inquiry through surveys/questionnaires. For the purpose of exploring hypothesis one of this study, we explore primary (questionnaires and few open-ended interviews), and secondary sources (papers, journals and books by analysts and scholars), to investigate the question about the contributory role of the Federal Government in the crisis, due to its militarized approach and failure to regulate multinational oil companies activities in Niger Delta. In addition, questionnaires are carried out among 50 respondents from the Niger Delta communities via random selection. The small sample is due to the lack of time, study scope and adequate resources. Results of the analyzed data will be presented in frequency tables, with content analysis utilized.

We hence reiterate H1: The federal government use of military force to repress the peaceful movement of people in the Niger Delta and failure to regulate the activities of multinational oil companies have affected the problem negatively.

3.2 Analysis

The Federal Government of Nigeria (FGN) possesses formidable stakehold in the country's Petroleum Industry, reserving exclusive rights to the regulation of the activities of multinational oil companies as they conduct their business operations in the Niger Delta. Emoyan (2008, p. 32) is of the view that, as "a shareholder in the oil and gas industry, government's oversight function has been characterized by legislative acts, regulations and decrees aimed at superseding many environmental problems." In spite of legislative interventions, there has been no significant impact in abating the environmental degradation. Regarding the lack of regulation implementation on the oil producing environment in the Niger Delta, Raji and Abejide (2013, p. 52) opined that despite

"government's efforts to limit gas flaring through legislative intervention, the problem remains unabated because the government's major goal is the continuous exploration of crude oil and the concomitant revenue generation without considering the implication of the activity on the environment and health of the people."

Udeke, Okolie-Osemene and Aghalino (2013, p. 6-8) assert that the Niger Delta could be described as "victim of committees, commissions, reports and counter recommendations which are never implemented as recommended by members without alteration by government, partial implementation or even outright suspension of the reports", when describing the years between 1958-2012. Olumide (2011, p. 99) states that corporate politics had intersections with successive government – that only propelled the signing of laws that assisted the appropriation of oil resources, placing them under the control of the government and multinational oil companies. The host communities were not considered or involved in this case.

3.2.1 The Coercive Responses by the Government

The coercive responses of the Federal Government to the conflict in the Niger Delta did not start in 1999. Confrontations of the people took a drastic turn when the military commenced punitive expedition that resulted in a climax which was the mass killing of Odi residents in the state of Bayelsa, after 12 police officers were killed (Human Rights Watch, 1999; Iduh, 2011, p. 123). In 1999, the government administration of Obasanjo embarked on adopting the establishment of committees, instituting the Joint Task Force, and the incessant arrest of militias and their leaders, as a means to curbing conflict in the region. After the Joint Task Force was established, it became clear that the conflict's resolution could not be attained via militarization, in the light of the casualties. This motivated Obasanjo's establishment of the Socioeconomic Development of Coastal States of the Niger Delta in April of 2006 (Okolie-Osemene and Aghalino, 2011).

The government of Nigeria demonstrated its absolute control of the mineral and oil resources of the region through the usage of security operatives at the government's disposal. The Joint Task Force (JTF) established in 2003 would fail to restore complete order, as had been expected, because the multiple checkpoints and roadblocks all over the region only served to further alienate them from the people (ibid.).

Although the responses of the government focused on the prevention of sabotage of oil production and oil distribution, they were still carried out at the expense of the members of the host communities. Sawyer (2010, p. 245) states that the military which had been sent to address the crisis in Bayelsa state, that had resulted in the Odi massacre, only ended up becoming agents of human degradation that resulted in a great

number of babies without fathers because the soldiers killed most adult males in the village.

There would be a sudden shift in the allocation derivation policy of the federal government in 1999 from what it formerly was in the 1960s, and the host communities saw this as an injustice, because the policy used to be on the grounds of equity. This implies that each region which made contributions in bulk to the country's revenue, earned above the level which others received from the Federal Government (Okoko, Nna and Ibaba, 2006). Majority ethnic groups that controlled agricultural production were reimbursed 100% of the revenue they generated via agriculture. However, as the minority tribes of the Niger Delta came to the fore with their oil revenue, the principle of derivation was cut from 100% to 1.5%, and now increased marginally to 13%, according to Ikporukpo (2004). These Niger Delta host communities continue to hold grievances over this.

With the increase in youth movements and demands to the oil companies and the government for a fair deal, the government embarked on coercively sending military units and special police to occupy, invade, harass, torment, destroy and suppress communities of the Niger Delta. This was done in an effort to keep the region's people at arm's length from oil exploration, as the government prioritized uninterrupted flow of oil over the good health of the region's people. As Ojakorotu and Gilbert (2010, p. 5) outline some of these acts of militarizing the oil-bearing communities, to include:

- The usage of the Nigerian Mobile Police Force (MOPOL) to brutally repress a non-violent protest by the youths against Shell at Umuechem in Rivers state. This community would consequently be practically destroyed on the 31st of October 1990,

resulting in the murder of about 80 indigenes and the destruction of hundreds of buildings, with internal displacement on the rise (ICG, 2006A, p. 6-7).

- The formation of the Rivers State Internal Security Task Force, one of the best equipped military squads, was for the suppression, repression, humiliation, harassment, arrest and detention of Movement for the Survival of Ogoni People (MOSOP) and its supporters, unlawfully, for their movement against Shell and the demand for the self-determination in Ogoniland between the year 1993 and 1996.

- The Nigerian military carried out wanton destruction of the people of Ogoni, apart from the unconstitutional execution of the Ogoni nine (Ken Saro-Wiwa and his compatriots). The military evolved into an occupation, carrying out rape, maiming, torture, looting and the execution of some 2000 people, unconstitutionally (Human Rights Watch, 1999, p. 9; Adeola, 2001, p. 40).

- In 1999, a joint team of the Nigerian Mobile Police and the Army carried out an invasion of the Choba community, to oversee the repression of a peaceful protest against a foreign oil servicing firm (WILBROS); and 10 people were murdered, about 25 women raped and the community temporarily deserted (CLO, 2002, pp. 50-61).

- A state of emergency was declared in January 1999, in Bayelsa state by the Federal Government of Nigeria, with heavily armed and militarized men in armored vehicles, sent to battle against the militants of the Niger Delta, specifically the IYC and Egbesu Boys of Africa (Sesay et al, 2003).

- The most tragic and internationalized militarization in the Niger Delta region, took place in November 1999. Through the Hakuri 2 operation, the Nigerian state carried out one of its most horrible genocidal attacks in the region by the deployment of the army to invade the Odi people, which was Bayelsa state's second largest town. As a consequence, over 1000 people were brutally killed and several others were declared missing, their houses demolished, save for about three houses that were left standing; properties worth several millions of naira were destroyed and the community became deserted (Civil Liberties Organization, 2002, pp. 67-74).

- A set of the Nigerian military set up as a Joint Task Force (JTF), nicknamed "Operation Restore Hope" was formed, in 2003. It was mostly peculiar for its aggressive, consistent and persistent suppression of protests related to oil in the Niger Delta, and made up of 4,000 troops (Ikelegbe, 2005).

- Odioma was also attacked in October 2005, leading to the loss of 17 lives, including that of a two-year old (ICG, 2006a, p. 7).

Against this backdrop of militarization of the communities of the Niger Delta, alongside the infringement of human rights, several ethnic environmental movement organizations (EMOs) and armed state youth organizations emerged (Grear and Kotze, 2015). These groups were formed out of the belief of countering the Nigerian state and the oil companies, as they constantly pressurize, terrorize, rape, suppress and subjugate the people of the Niger Delta. These EMOs have included some of the following: MOSOP, Ikwerre Youth Movement (IYM), Ijaw Youth Council (IYC) and the Urhobo Youth Movement (UYOMO). Some of the armed groups include the Membutu Boys, the Federated Niger Delta Izon Communities (FNDIC), the Coalition for Militant

Action (COMA), the Niger Delta Peoples Volunteer Force (NDPVF), the Martyrs Brigade and the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta.

Most of these groups did not have arms from the onset and did not acquire them on their own. They would receive their guns from the oil companies and government prior to their evolution into militants. Most of the members were employed as political thugs in election campaigns, and for election rigging purposes, and were hence armed fully. These arms were never returned after the elections were over, but then used to counter the repression of the government afterwards.

Rather than encourage CSR from multinational oil companies, the government permitted the embrace of the by-cutting processes by Shell, and allowed it to use government troops, to employ youths and arm them to protect the oil pipelines of the corporation. These arms were then used in the fight against both the government and the companies, contributing also to disorder in the community in form of inter-communal and intra-communal conflicts (Tuodolo, 2009, p.338).

3.2.2 Failure of Government to Regulate Multinational Oil Companies Activities

There was a decree in discouraging gas flaring in 1979, as mentioned in the previous chapter, but the Nigerian government would modify its decree (Decree 99) that aimed to eliminate the phenomenon into a provision that oil corporations could keep at flaring at the expense of a fine. Many corporations simply preferred this measure over ending gas flaring and the environmental mess it created.

Additionally, the policies of the Nigerian government in disempowering minorities of the Niger Delta are evident in post-colonial regulations that are effectively operational whenever it means benefits to the government and its corporate partners. Hence, the

government are unable to regulate multinational oil companies. Some of these regulations include the 1969 Decree 51 that transferred ownership of the totality of the Niger Delta region's petroleum products to the Federal Government, the 1978 Land Use Decree of 1978 which placed the ownership of land in Nigeria to the Federal Government and its accredited agencies, as well as the 1971 Offshore Oil Revenue Act that granted the exclusive rights over the continental shelf to the Nigerian Government.

Occasionally, the Federal Government make unfulfilled promises to the Niger Delta people to compensate for the negative impact of production activities of the multinational oil companies. These motivates the communities towards certain vices to which, in turn, the Federal Government responds with violence and militarization.

During the colonial era, the relationship of multinational oil companies and African states rested solely on economic benefits, and as such the multinational oil companies and their colonial protectors had zero tolerance for trade obstructions (Pakenham, 1991). Modern multinational oil companies have become complicated and influential, having great impact on the culture, environment, security and development of African states. They are sources for employment, infrastructure, foreign direct investments, taxes to government and so on (Huniche and Pedersen, 2006). Due to the power and influence they have come to embody, the Federal Government have been quite lackadaisical to the havoc they have caused environmentally, socio-politically, economically to the region's people, and so on; in addition, the Federal Government's benefits from their operations.

3.2.3 The Divide and Rule Strategy of Multinational Oil Companies Permitted by the Federal Government

“Divide and rule” has been the strategy of oil companies in Nigeria for so many years, challenging the peaceful co-existence in the Niger Delta region. This strategy is employed to infringe on existing strong power structures – to break up relationships that exist among individuals and groups in the region. In partnership with the Nigerian state, this strategy has been in use within these oil host communities (Faleti, 2009, p. 17). Rather than seeing that these oil companies follow due international oil mining standards, the Federal Government does not do enough in curtailing these companies from thriving on bribing of the people who are most vocal in the communities, to quell pressures to these multinational oil companies to have corporate responsibility. This has destroyed traditional community systems of governance like elders, chiefs, age grades and so on.

Lack of trust emanates amongst communities, since these persons that used to keep the peace have become powerless, resulting in inter-communal and intra-communal strife, as well as clashes with the Nigerian Federal Government. Multinational oil companies like Shell would appoint liaisons from the community, connected to the company, to the communities, and this worked against the traditional governance systems. The youths would normally act on the instructions of the elders and chiefs but would soon discover that they have been deceived. The Federal Government supplies armed military troops to multinational oil companies like Shell to safeguard facilities while the communities are at each other’s throats (Idemudia, 2010). This indicates that the government seem less interested in the people’s welfare than it is in the oil of the Niger Delta, since communities have been allowed to destroy each other without any governmental interference. Some group leaders considered to spearhead

conflicts in the Niger Delta, are even granted recognition from the political ruling elite of Nigeria (Social Action, 2009, pp. 17-19).

Consequently, this greed utilized by multinational oil companies are also used to motivate high-level government officials, who participate in the looting of oil resources in the region, but with the amnesty program implementation, the military controls the area (Vidal, 2013, p. 4). This has an implication of the theft of oil no longer being about breaking oil pipelines, but instead a collaboration between the military and the vandals of pipelines. Theft of oil now involves naval officers, army officers, important politicians and so on (Katsouris and Sayne, 2013). Such thefts have become highly organized, as illegal vessels can even be arrested and discharged without any prosecution (Vidal, 2013).

The MT African Pride vessel of Russian origin, that carted away tanker worth 11,000 crude oil tons, from Nigeria, disappeared from Navy custody (Adeniyi, 2013, p. 2).

Western support for the militarization efforts of the Federal Government of Nigeria in the Niger Delta has also been an encouragement to the government's fight against protests in the region (Donwa, Mgbame and Julius, 2015). In December 2005, for example, there were reports that the then American President, George W. Bush, had planned to deploy US Marines to help crush the militants of the Niger Delta to ensure unhindered oil flow to the US. In 2006, the report was that his administration had also donated six gunboats to the government of Nigeria to assist in the suppression of the militants, so that the energy needs of the US would be met (Dagne, 2005).

3.3 The Federal Government's Role in CSR Related Conflicts

Questionnaires were carried out among 50 respondents from the Niger Delta communities, via purposeful selection regarding the subject of the response and performance of the Federal Government on important Oil related Issues in the Niger Delta. All the respondents are residing in the community.

Out of the 50 respondents from the communities, 30% were youth leaders (this being leaders duly elected to head peaceful groups formed to represent the interest of the youth. In Niger Delta), 8% were militant leaders, 10% were opinion leaders (this consists of scholars and high-level government civil servants), 40% had no position (this consists of normal citizens across all ages living in Niger Delta), and 8% were women leaders (that is, leaders of interest groups with women agenda). The involvement of the government in oil exploration makes it culpable in resolving and managing the conflicts in the region related to oil, between the different stakeholders. As a result, the FGN has played a few roles there. The government has made certain amount of progress by strengthening the legal frameworks required for the regulation of multinational oil companies' activities, via intervention of third parties, setting up of committees and commissions for the acceleration of the region's development.

Several meetings have been held between the government and sometimes with the Niger Delta Militants themselves, and sometimes with their representatives. An instance is the series of meetings in July and August 2007, attended by the then Vice President of Nigeria, Goodluck Jonathan, and other key actors in the creeks of Warri, alongside representatives of oil states' Peace and Rehabilitation Committees (Watts, 2009, p. 21). This offered a chance for the discussion of potential ways to broker peace,

and demilitarize the Niger Delta, and a truce between the militants and the Joint Task Force.

Other efforts of the government at conflict resolution has included the establishment of the National Oil Spill Contingency Plan (NOSCP) and the National Oil Spill Detection and Response Agency (NOSDRA) in 2004 (Ugochukwu and Ertel, 2008, p. 145). NOSDRA evaluates and determines spillage causes and tries to respond appropriately, and allows NGOs, CBOs and communities to send delegations to ensure transparency during spillage investigations. Although this has huge legislative significance, the major setback of these laws is that some do not have guaranteed enforcement and sanctions. At some points, the Federal Government depends on multinational oil companies to provide the technical expertise to authenticate issues of spillage (Ibid.). How can there then be efficient sanctions enforced on multinational oil companies that are expected to provide the technical expertise required to investigate their own actions? This portrays a conflict of interest and limitations on the federal government to effectively represent the host communities' interests (Epelle, 2004, p. 19).

Had the Petroleum Industry Bill Governance (PIBG) been passed into law as the Petroleum Industry Act, the strategies of the government could have been strengthened to allow for the increase of local content in the oil sector, and a participatory approach of the industry, granting indigenes greater sense of belonging. It had the objectives to develop local manpower, use of resources and services, and hence contribute to economic empowerment.

From the response of the youth respondents, they had the belief that the government did not get to the grassroots to identify the locals' most important needs. From some of the thoughts in the responses, it could be observed that the generation of employment for women and youth seemed very paramount as needs that the government and multinational oil companies ought to prioritize.

The respondents made up by locals from Niger Delta were asked about the role of the government in resolving the conflict and they replied thus:

- What is the Federal Government's role in the resolution of the Niger Delta conflict?

Table 1: Questionnaire data, 2020 (Part 1)

	Percentage	Frequency
Indifferent	20%	10
Some	70%	35
Plenty	10%	5
Total	100%	50

From the above, in assessing the efforts of the Federal Government in resolving the conflicts in the Niger Delta region, about 10% of respondents, from the data gathered, were indifferent to the question, and about 70% disclosed that the government made some efforts in the management of the region's conflict. Only 10% disclosed that the government had made a lot of efforts in the region. Some of these programmes by the Government include: the establishment of the Niger Delta Development Board, OMPADEC, NDDC, the National Directorate of Employment, Amnesty, the Ministry

of Niger Delta Affairs, and others. Except for the 2009 Amnesty Initiative, the other programs have been unsuccessful. The considerable level of success recorded by the Amnesty was due to the empowerment of militants with paid jobs and prevocational jobs or contracts.

•What role the Government has played so far in Conflict Resolution?

Table 2: Questionnaire data, 2020 (Part 2)

	Percentage	Frequency
Participatory Planning	12%	6
Policy, Legal and Regulatory Framework such as NDDC, etc.	32%	16
Local Dialogue	6%	3
Capacity Building	8%	4
Infrastructural Development	34%	17
All	6%	3
None	2%	1
Total		50

12% of the respondents denoted that the government ought to adopt the strategy of participatory dialogue for conflict resolution between host communities and

multinational oil companies (Ugochukwu and Ertel, 2008, p. 145). 32% indicated that the government should facilitate relations between the host communities and the multinational oil companies through institutional initiatives like the Petroleum Trust Fund and the NDDC. Around 6% believed the emphasis should be on local dialogue, and 8% on the facilitation of building the capacity of the host communities, whereas 6% believed the government should play all roles. The number that indicated none as a response is negligible.

The respondents were further quizzed about their perception regarding the government's use of military to quell peaceful protests.

•Is the government military involvement responsible for the escalation of conflict in the crisis?

Table 3: Questionnaire data, 2020 (Part 3)

	Percentage	Frequency
Yes	56%	28
No	36%	18
Indifferent	8%	4
Total	100%	50

According to the table 3, around 56% of the respondents, said that the government is responsible for the conflict, when asked about the involvement of the government in

the escalating crisis. 36% responded in the negative, and around 8% were indifferent. This is an indication of the host communities' perceptions that the government possesses culpability in the escalation of the region's conflict, and this hence makes the role of the government more difficult. The fact about the Federal Government's collaboration with multinational oil companies like Shell, as partners in a joint venture, undermines its role as a broker of peace. Among locals in the Niger Delta, the government is not looked at favorably when it comes to its policies translating to action.

•Are the promises by the government turned into formal policies and resolutions in timely delivery and action?

Table 4: Questionnaire, 2020 (Part 4)

	Percentage	Frequency
Yes	34%	17
No	52%	26
Indifferent	14%	7
Total	100%	50

34% stated the government's commitment to policy implementations to be delivered at the right time and into tangible projects, and 52% argue the opposite, and only 14% were indifferent. Once again, a shortcoming is perceived by majority of the

respondents in the role of the government, and thus the federal government ought to convince the communities of the concerned of its goodwill and seriousness.

- Are there promises left unfulfilled by the government to the Niger Delta people?

Table 5: Questionnaire data, 2020 (Part 5)

	Percentage	Frequency
Yes	78%	39
No	14%	7
Indifferent	8%	4
Total	100%	50

On the respondents' perceptions of the commitment of the government to their promises made, 78% denoted that the government still had unrealized promises, and 14% said that the government had no outstanding promises, but 8% felt indifferent. These responses for this question align with the last question where 52% believe that the government had not been effective in converting policies promised into projects in the host communities. These show that the government enacted legislations for regulation and set up interventionist agencies, but results have been quite underwhelming.

The respondents were quizzed on the subject of delivering promises made to the locals of Niger Delta and whether the government is making efforts to ensure the fulfillment of these promises.

•What is the government doing to ensure the fulfillment of undelivered promises?

Table 6: Questionnaire data, 2020 (Part 6)

	Percentage	Frequency
Plenty	30%	15
Few	50%	25
None	20%	10
Total	100%	50

Around 30% of the respondents believe that a lot (plenty) is being done, whereas 50% said that few efforts to deliver on the promises were being made, and 20% said there was nothing. This can be seen as explaining the local communities' impatience with the government and the recourse to kidnapping and other anti-social channels to address their frustration.

The respondents were asked whether conflict in the region has led to fatalities in the region.

- Do you think host community members have lost lives because of conflict in the Niger Delta?

Table 7: Questionnaire data, 2020 (Part 7)

	Percentage	Frequency
Yes	90%	45
No	Nil	Nil
Indifferent	10%	5
Total	100%	50

Regarding the rate of deaths induced by the conflict, around 90% of the respondents affirmed that there were fatalities related to oil in the region, implying that several people have lost their lives due to the CSR/Oil conflicts. In few interactions, multinational oil companies and security operatives are named as actors that caused the deaths of protesters of unhealthy practices on the local lands.

3.4 Conclusion

Behaviors of the federal government cementing its role in contributing to the conflict include the following observations:

- Legal limitations prevent government agencies from sanctioning oil corporations and also the government being a stakeholder in joint ventures with these companies, the intervention of the government is usually slow. It is unable to rein in multinational oil companies, due to its rentier status, when multinational oil companies brazenly default on the environmental laws of Nigeria.
- The militant youths are of the conviction that the Nigerian state and the multinational oil companies have been playing lip service mostly to their demands for environmental justice and resource control
- The government believes itself to be doing its utmost best for these host communities and that the set-up of interventionist agencies like the NDDC, NOSDRA, and the Amnesty program, will assist the addressing of the matter of the region's long-standing neglect.
- Militarization has often been the tool of the government to contain the restiveness of criminal gangs and youths in the Niger Delta, to prevent the hinder of oil production and distribution without attention paid to the reasons for the grievances of the people. This cost billions of naira to sustain such military/security presence in most communities in the region. Confrontation was the strategy via the military intervention principle, utilized by former President Obasanjo from 1999 to 2007.

It can be deduced from our argument that the federal government's failure to regulate the operation of multinational oil companies and the government's propensity to using the military to stifle peaceful protest has indeed aggravated the conflict and unrest in Niger Delta.

Chapter 4

HOW MULTINATIONAL OIL COMPANIES CONTRIBUTED TO CONFLICT IN NIGER DELTA

This chapter explores the second hypothesis of this thesis, it also explores the strategy and methods of data collection and inquiry, for this chapter.

4.1 Data Collection

This study adopts qualitative strategies and combines different methods of data collection – through a mixed method of assessing primary and secondary sources of data and conducting inquiry through surveys/questionnaires, and few interviews. For the purpose of exploring the second hypothesis of this study, we explore primary (questionnaires, and few informant interviews), and secondary sources (papers, journals and books by analysts and scholars), to investigate the question: How did multinational oil companies and their CSR contribute to the conflict in Niger Delta? Questionnaires were carried out among 50 respondents from the Niger Delta communities, via purposeful sampling, and consequently of about 6 multinational oil companies' employees of the public relations departments of Chevron, Shell (SPDC) and Agip (NAOC) via purposeful sampling. The small sample is due to the lack of time, study scope and adequate resources to get more employees involved and by-pass the necessary permission protocols and access within the corporations. Some of the respondents from Shell, Agip and Chevron, saw the exercise as academic and did not want anything to do with it. Data is also borrowed from researchers who have

conducted similar studies, and the results of the analyzed data will be presented in frequency tables, the use of content analysis.

I hence reiterate H2: The negative environmental impact of multinational oil companies' activities and the failure of the CSR projects by multinational oil companies have aggravated the region's social conflict.

4.2 Rationale for the Oil Companies Chosen

Several factors were considered in choosing the multinational oil companies for this mixed-methods study, and the key ones concerned their involvement and stakeholder levels in the oil industry. Hantrais and Mnagen (2007) stated these considerations in the selection of a sample, including the possibility of obtaining access, the quality of data, and adequate data. To this regard, a purposeful sampling has been adopted to enable the addressing of the aims of this study.

The choice of multinational oil companies is inspired by their involvement in development and transformation of the host communities and the oil industry. Considering that Shell is a leading member of the World Business Council for Sustainable Development (WBCSD) and was the co-chair of the working group that produced WBCSD's Corporate Social Responsibility Report (Natufe, 2001), it cannot be ignored. Chevron and Agip have similar status as Shell. These companies operate in the various communities of the Niger Delta region, including the Ogoni, Odioma, Nembe, Twon, Warri and Oluashiri.

4.2.1 Shell

When the history of the Nigerian oil industry is reviewed, one can see that it is a company which is a product of the merger of the British Shell Trading and Transport

Company and the Royal Dutch Group of Companies, in 1907. Shell obtained its concession for exploration in 1937 from the British colonial administration having exclusive rights over the entire area of the country, as well as the Southern Cameroon that was administered as a part of the Nigerian colony. Its initial headquarters was in Owerri, present Imo state, and commenced exploration of the totally unchartered territory after its merge with D'Arcy Exploration activities in Nigeria, in the early 1930s (Udeke, 1995). With this merger of the British Petroleum and Shell D'Arcy at the end of WWII, its name was changed to Shell BP. When oil was discovered in Oloibiri (present Bayelsa state) in commercial quantity, its headquarters was relocated to Port Harcourt from Owerri. With the construction of residential and office complexes in 1957, relocation was completed in 1959.

Port Harcourt was a better location due to its air links and superior telecommunication links with the then Federal Capital, Lagos. Production doubled to 8,000 barrels per day (ibid., p. 21). An ordinance in 1914 colonial administration of Nigeria, postulated British corporations only legitimate parties to oil licenses in Nigeria. Hence, Shell BP dominated the Nigerian oil industry up till 1973 when the Land Use Act was passed by the Legislative arm of the government. Aghalino (2004, p. 2) stated that "Shell has 25.6% production in the Nigeria Liquefied Natural Gas Company (NLNG), and works as an adviser to the NLNG, while the other partners are NNPC 49%, Elf 15%, and Agip 10.4%).

4.2.2 Agip

Formed in Nigeria in 1962, the Nigerian Agip Oil Company (Agenzie Generale Italiana Petreliche – NAOC) is an agreement between the Nigerian government and Agip Mineraria SPA of Milan, on oil-prospecting. Its subsidiary in Nigeria is known

as the Nigerian Agip Oil Company (NAOC) – a member of the Italian Government-owned E.N.I. group of companies.

The agreement was in line with the global policy of Agip which encouraged its host country's participation in the oil exploration and production of the company (Udeke, 1995). It was granted an oil-prospecting license in 1963 over an area of 5,313.5 km sq. in Rivers and Delta states of the Niger Delta swamp. Its first two exploratory attempts were a failure but it finally struck oil on March 1, 1965, in its Ebeocha 1 well – its third exploratory well.

Following this discovery, activities of exploration would then spread to neighboring communities such as Mbede, Idu and Omoku, as well as in parts of Egbema (ibid.). Its oil barrel production increased to 250,000 between 1970 and 1977 from its twenty producing fields. One cannot complete the growth of the oil industry of Nigeria without mentioning Agip's role, although it has been struggling to manage its broken relationship with some host communities, due to its failure to keep its promises and execute its CSR efficiently.

4.2.3 Chevron

Another significant player in the industry of petrochemicals in Nigeria is Chevron Nigeria. It is also a well-known stakeholder in the country's oil production. It is involved in oil exploitation and explorations in the Niger Delta region with their other activities encompassing blending, marketing and manufacturing across Nigeria.

4.3 Analysis

According to the OECD (1998, p. 40), there is emphasis on three dimensions for sustainable development, and often times, little attention is paid to the social

component. These economic, environmental and social justices' dimensions could curb the agitation of host communities in the Niger Delta, if applied by multinational oil companies in developing countries such as Nigeria. For this study, environmental justice means the objective involvement and treatment of the local communities in the implementation and processes of the CSR, and implementations in tandem with the enforcement of environmental policies by the Government (Ako, 2015).

This study attempts to establish the extent of involvement of respective multinational oil companies in tangible CSR, and the implication for the contemporary society of Nigeria, where the concern is in the personal benefits from the corporations and the government, rather than on physical projects for development. That is, whether CSR projects are designed to be beneficial to the community or it's just the multinational oil companies developing infrastructures to optimize its production (take for example building of roads to aid easier movement of it workers which means the aim of the project isn't to aid the community but just a scheme to help its own interest). Great expectations are placed on multinational oil companies to adhere to stipulated best global practices of crude oil exploration and exploitation with a core emphasis on environmental sustainability. There is the belief that this is able to enhance multinational oil companies' relationships with the host communities. To understand the impact of CSR programmes and how they are perceived in Niger Delta, 60 respondents were interviewed.

Overall, about 56 questionnaires were filled correctly from an initial sample size of 60. These are including host communities and multinational oil companies.

Table 8: Questionnaire data, 2020 (Part 8)

	Percentage	Frequency
Rivers	50%	28
Bayelsa	37.5%	21
Delta	12.5%	7
Total	100%	56

The respondents, made up of indigenes of Niger Delta communities and also employees of Multinational Oil Companies lived within three core Niger Delta states – Rivers, Delta and Bayelsa. They have awareness about the effect of exploration activities in relation to environmental degradation compared to those residing outside the region. Hence, the inhabitants of other six political Niger Delta states created by the Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC) 2000 Act (discussed in chapter one), were excluded. The distribution is portrayed above in Table 8.

The six multinational oil company employees had 4-7 years of work experience and portray a good indication of their knowledgeability about the region and companies, as well as liaison with the particular heads of community development. They also had experience regarding the causes of the conflict.

What are the main causes of the Niger Delta conflict and how are these issues managed?

Oil is a centerpiece to the Niger Delta conflict and hence Umar and Naibbi (2015) stated that, “Oil is, by far, the most disputed resource, followed by land, market and cattle grazing.” This is as a result of the way it inspires different groups’ struggles for consequent benefits that come with it, more than those who not only own the resources, but bear the brunt of environmental degradation due to oil exploration.

The region’s residents seem resistant to the CSR delivery and strategy of delivery. Multinational oil companies have been involved in corporate philanthropy, prior to the CSR global endorsement, implying that they do not consider CSR to be an obligation.

The staff of multinational oil companies often reside in the cities while seismic and drilling activities happen in the local host communities, who tend to feel the brunt of oil drilling waste. Respondents of the survey hailing from the communities assert that since multinational oil companies do not experience the negative effects of oil drilling wastes, they are reluctant in the calls for environmentally friendly activities such as clean-ups. Most feel that the projects of multinational oil companies are often exaggerated in the media, and websites of corporations.

A potential factor behind the reason why CSR implementations by multinational oil companies fail to abate the conflict in host communities, is their linkage to the actions of the historical Royal Niger Company (RNC). With the deaths and violence that the region experienced, this gives a negative perception from these communities, of multinational oil companies and the government officials. The Niger Delta situation has denigrated with militant activities disrupting the exploration of oil, among other issues, due to the inability of stakeholders to play their expected roles and execute agreements made with other stakeholders.

This explains why a linkage exists between oil, death and marginalization in oil-resource communities. When people feel excluded from benefits of economics that accrue from their environmental natural resources, the result is resistance and confrontation. The underdevelopment that emanate from the exploitation of oil requires urgent intervention by multinational oil companies via timely public relations that is friendly and open to dialogue. The 60/40 partnership of the government with multinational oil companies has weakened the government's implementation of its environmental policies. With the realization of costs of environmental degradation and oil politics dynamics, the people have started to demand better CSR from the companies. A multinational oil companies employee respondent mentioned that oil companies and the government are blamed for the neglect of the environment and the region's people, especially the people of Ogoni, that made demands for self-determination and designed a Bill of Rights, before and after the murder of Saro-Wiwa in 1995, by the Abacha administration (Aghalino, 2009, p. 283). A strained relationship exists between multinational oil companies, government and communities, with the restiveness reaching its peak in 2006-2007, characterized by economically and politically motivated kidnapping in the region (Akhigbe and Koleoso, 2013, p. 2).

From the perspective of CSR, the crisis in the region is linked to the availability of resources and the feeling of deprivation, exclusion and grievance (Watts, 2004, p. 51). Stakeholders are both crucial beneficiaries and contributors in every project, and makes them qualified to identify involvement areas and expectations, as well as roles when CSR is concerned. Majority feel that multinational oil companies have not played their part well as responsible stakeholders. Some of the grievances listed included the failure of multinational oil companies to minimize and manage grievance

via timely responses to issues related to the environment, caused by incessant gas flares; the neglect of the host communities by both multinational oil companies and the government; lack of employment due to appropriated land traditionally used for farming by the locals. Some of the prominent spillages of Niger Delta communities, as outlined by Ugochukwu and Ertel (2008, p. 114) include: the Bomu II blowout of 1970, the Funiwa oil well blowout of 1980, the Oshika pipeline spillage of 1993, the 2011 Bonga oil spill among others, just piles on to illustrate the frequency of these spillages and the negative impact on the relationship between local communities and multinational oil companies.

Over 64 Itsekiri communities like Ajibeku, Orere, Oguwan, Oboro and so many others, entered into conflict with Shell over the Bonga spillage that caused massive environmental degradation. This also inspired some Ijaw indigenes in the Ilaje part of Ondo state to petition against Shell's insensitivity in 2014. This spillage killed children in the coastal shorelines of villages (Akeredolu, 2014). So much was the state of the degradation that even neutral individuals and bodies, like the German Minister of Development, decried the deplorable state of oil extraction standards during his visit, so much that he stated that people would refuse to Shell's petrol station, if they saw things for themselves. He mentioned that Shell prioritized profit over environmental concern (Gbemre, 2014, p. 9).

This further illustrates that the Niger Delta's conflict driver is not the endowment of natural resources, but the poor measures in abating environmental degradation that multinational oil companies usually adopt to gas fracking and flaring, that contaminate the water and a lot of other things (Ugochukwu and Ertel, 2008). This is the crux and driver of the conflict, because of the toxins that end up in people's lands and into

surrounding water bodies. At least 2.5 billion USD revenue is lost annually, due to the flare of about 2.5 billion standard cubic feet of natural gas per annum in Nigeria. Gas flaring is identified by respondents to be a major source of health complications in the host communities. Then what follows is the frustration borne out of the neglect by multinational oil companies after environments have been destroyed by oil waste and spillage. The Oloibiri case best describes the devastation of oil spillage and gas flares. It is a desolate community today after the activities of multinational oil companies. This means that they leave behind despair, unsustainability, mass poverty and so on – a bleak picture of hopelessness.

When we compare conflict involvement of Shell, Agip and Chevron in the Niger Delta, Shell takes the lead for having the most contributory effect on violent crisis and conflicts due to poor CSR delivery than others, for a few reasons. The initial one is that it has been involved in the oil business since the inception of oil production in Nigeria, and has explored the resources, in most parts of the Niger Delta region. The second is that both Chevron and Shell are more susceptible to involvement as they have more active onshore oil fields than other major oil companies. Thirdly, Shell and Chevron are both branded as most infamous for their massive undermining of best global practices in environmental laws, for CSR, among oil-resource communities. This trend is identified by the Nigeria Watch database 2007 and 2008, the crux of the formation of local social movements that led to repression by the government, and several deaths (Olubayo, 2014). ExxonMobil was often praised by some respondents as providing sense of belonging within its host communities, and the reason why it has less CSR conflict involvement (Olubayo, 2014).

Thus, it is essential for multinational oil companies to keep timely fulfillment to promises made. Some of these failed promises have included good roads, provision of portal water, employment, eradication of clashes between elders and local community youths, and so on.

To gauge the perception of the people in the Niger Delta on issues relating to multinational oil companies and its CSR, questioned were posed to the respondents of the survey.

How would you describe the Niger Delta Situation?

Table 9: Questionnaire data, 2020 (Part 9)

	Percentage	Frequency
Complex	82.1%	46
Minimal	17.9%	10
Total	100%	56

82.1% of the respondents agreed that the Niger Delta conflict was complex, and 17.9% thought it was minimal. This complexity is as a result of the involvement of different actors, leading one to believe that this relationship requires involvement of neutral actors in the international community. It is evidence that multinational oil companies must work on their relationship with aggrieved members of host communities, only achievable through a joint strategy that seeks to build channels of communication to enhance the confidence of the people in them and eradicate shared suspicions.

The respondent to the survey were also asked about the effect of oil exploration on the environment.

How would you describe the negative impact of oil exploration on the environment in the region since 1958?

Table 10: Questionnaire data, 2020 (Part 10)

	Percentage	Frequency
Enormous	85.7%	48
None	14.3%	8
Total	100%	56

85.7% indicated that the environmental impact of oil was devastating and enormous, while 14.3% indicated none as a response. The level of hydrocarbon that exist in groundwater in over 98 oil-mining sites in the region, has exceeded Nigerian, and even international standards. This has caused great loss for farmers, and severely depleted the aquatic ecosystem. Serious health concerns have emanated within local communities, due to the high hydrocarbon levels, conceived to be 1000 times higher than the parameters of the World Health Organization (WHO). Life expectancy has dropped significantly, for the Niger Delta people (World Health Organization, 2016).

4.3.1 CSR Programs and the Effectiveness of CSR Strategies

The respondents interviewed saw the poor CSR strategies of multinational oil companies in relation to environmental ethics as a problem. Even After the death of Saro-Wiwa a Niger Delta activist and environmental, demands did not stop but

escalated. Ken Saro-Wiwa was a human rights and environmental activist who was one of the earliest members of the Movement for the Survival of Ogoni People (MOSOP) who had been the main victims of oil spillage by the Royal Dutch Shell Company. He was the Vice Chair of the Unrepresented Nations and People Organization (UPO) a group that adhered to non-violent means of protest. Ken Saro-Wiwa orchestrated a peaceful march of 300,000 people before he was arrested by Nigerian authorities on the behest of Royal Dutch Company and was convicted alongside eight others in a specially convened tribunal highly criticized for alleged manipulation of the trial. The “Ogoni nine” were executed on 10th of November 1995 (Vaughan, 2011).

Shell agreed to the payment of a sum of £9.6m out of court settlement, as a result of these disturbances, in 2009, as a response to legal actions that named the company as collaborating in Saro-Wiwa’s execution, and that of the other eight. Hundreds of other minor court cases were instituted within this period, over the oil pollutions and spills. Shell admitted to the spillage of about 14,000 tons of crude oil in 2009 (Vaughan, 2011).

Two notable methods of delivery of CSR have been emphasized by Idowu (2014, pp. 23—24) in Nigeria. The first is the internal: corporate philanthropy – implemented directly via use of community-based foundations; the second is external: involving intermediaries, strategic partnerships, foundations and schemes of multi-stakeholders. Ogula (2012, p. 4) mentioned that the former, through agricultural projects, scholarship awards, cash rewards, provision of healthcare centers, roads and schools etc., have been the mode of CSR delivery, without a doubt, but limitations have arisen as a result of the inadequacies of those projects long-term.

The latter strategy has led to the signing of memorandum of understanding (MOUs) in the Niger Delta, between communities especially, multinational oil companies and the Niger Delta Development Commission overseeing the development project of the communities. Here Shell and Chevron feel skeptical of such agreements, where different groups present themselves as representing same communities, to demand similar things and makes it difficult to identify genuine groups that represent the interests of the entire community. Nonetheless, the strategy of Shell has been to continue to create partnerships which are strategic, with other oil sector stakeholders, to provide roads, healthcare and other societal needs (ibid., p. 5).

4.3.2 Effectiveness of Multinational Oil Companies CSR Strategies

Shell, Agip and Chevron, are expected to provide support in developing countries like Nigeria, where they operate. However, the effectiveness of multinational oil companies CSR Strategies is often questioned by recipients in the local communities. We can determine the respondents' stances by verifying this effectiveness. CSR is considered as successful if the beneficiaries are well taken care of, and effective/sustainable when the communities' basic needs are taken into consideration, during the projects' conceptualization, design and execution. It is also expected to tackle the people's pressing needs. On another hand, this yardstick could also not solely emanate from projects that exist but from developmental levels, the host communities' observations, and the reports of the involved multinational oil companies.

All major companies have implemented different CSR projects, ranging from water to power supply, young graduate trainings in skill acquisition, and road rehabilitations that offer links between various communities as well as inter-group trade relations. However, what could be considered as lacking from the findings is the CSR

effectiveness in transforming the lives of the local people in the rural areas. Watts (2009, p. 20), mentioned that resentment among youths emanate as a result of CSR projects designed, but executed without completion. This can be corroborated from recent reports in November 2014, that presented over 100 youths of the communities of Ogoloma in Bayelsa state, occupying the town hall and preventing the inauguration of the funded projects of the Shell Petroleum Development Company – executed by the Gbarian-Ubie Cluster Development Board - that had been scheduled (Idio, 2014, p. 7). The reasons alleged were that the projects were old and unfinished, and failed to reflect the huge wealth from oil that the area accrued. The unsuccessful CSR strategies have caused rumblings perpetually in these oil-rich communities. Complaints about secret Memorandum of Understanding between multinational oil companies and elders or local chiefs that are not accountable to the local communities (Watts, 2009, p. 20), were made by few respondents to the survey.

In summary, communities might be aware of multinational oil companies CSR projects, but the study so far shows us that the communities are not nearly as satisfied with the efforts thus far, especially with matters that have to do with economic empowerment and achieving environmental sustainability.

4.3.3 Effect of CSR Projects on Conflict Resolution

Are you aware of your company's corporate social responsibility?

Table 11: Questionnaire data, 2020 (Part 11)

	Percentage	Frequency
Yes	66.7%	4
No	33.3%	2
Total	100%	6

The above table portrays that about 66.7% of the respondents (employees of the multinational oil companies) indicated yes to knowing about CSR while 33.3% indicated no.

It is argued that Saro-Wiwa's death led to the inception of Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) in Nigeria for the regulation of the relationships between the host communities and the multinational oil companies for the acceleration of the region's development. Alfred (2013, p. 124) mentions that this made the CSR project delivery by Shell, Agip and Chevron, and other multinational oil companies, to be carried out in a way that prioritize the interest of the community. This is in no way implying that multinational oil companies' development projects stop at CSR as there are other forms of support they can provide outside it.

MOUs are meant to provide and address issues of relevance, like infrastructure and social amenities, portable drinking water, skills acquisition, electricity, development and improvement of schools, good roads, suitable healthcare centers; preventing air, water and land pollution, amongst others (Nwaeke, 2015).

Most of the CSR projects have been targeted at the youths, who are considered to be the most volatile segment of the population. This is expected to douse tensions in oil-rich communities, but rumblings from the communities have not abated.

What is your assessment of the developmental impact of corporate social responsibility?

Table 12: Questionnaire data, 2020 (Part 12)

Program Assessment	Percentage	Frequency
Satisfactory	24%	12
Moderate	16%	8
Unsatisfactory	60%	30
Total	100%	50

On the assessment of the impact of CSR on the host communities, 30 people making up 60% of the respondents, described it as unsatisfactory, and 24% stipulated it to be satisfactory, while 16% felt it was moderate. This supports the hypothesis that CSR projects that are not implemented, or implemented haphazardly, continue to upset the region, since the host communities will continue to consider them unsatisfactory.

Out of the options of CSR or Crisis Management, which has been your company's strategy to resolve the conflict in the region?

Table 13: Questionnaire data, 2020 (Part 13)

	Percentage	Frequency
CSR	50%	3
Crisis Management	33.3%	2
Indifferent	16.7%	1
Total	100%	6

3 of the staff, representing 50% saw that multinational oil companies have been more involved in the delivery of CSR. 33.3% indicated that it was more crisis management, and 16.7% were indifferent. But this tells us that multinational oil companies involvement in CSR, does not necessarily mean commitment to realizing its positive impacts on the host communities, since many CSR projects are not completed, or are abandoned after execution; some do not even reflect the needs of the people, and some are used to buy some time from these communities. Even the most genuine CSR, could convert to a crisis management project, more or less.

Some respondents lamented about the effects of environmental degradation on lands, and other areas of communal life. These are true to the assertions of scholars who argue that forced migration of game animals, destruction of farmlands that impact employment, and cultural crisis of the region, are caused by the flaring of gases and oil spillage and has led to agitations in the region which eventually contributed to the rise of militant groups (Udeke, 1995; Aghalino, 2009; Report on the Technical Committee on the Niger Delta, 2008).

4.4 Conclusion

It is evident that the CSR programmes did not have the desired effect of fostering development and promoting a peaceful coexistence between the multinational oil companies and the locals of Niger Delta. As discussed in the chapter, this is largely down to the choice of programmes and the mode of execution coupled with the extensive damage multinational oil companies are perceived to have incurred on the environment with little attempt to undertake the tasking responsibility of cleaning up the oil spillage.

For this reason, it is conclusive that the CSR programme has failed thus far and this has contributed to heightened tension and conflict in Niger Delta.

Chapter 5

SUMMARY, CONCLUSION, AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5.1 Introduction

This thesis investigated how multinational oil companies and failure of their CSR projects created social conflict in Niger Delta region, and how the Federal Government's militarized approach to the conflict and their failure at regulating multinational oil companies' activities have negatively affected the problem.

Chapter one provided a background on the exploitation perceived in the Niger Delta, from the pre-colonial era of palm oil production to the present era of crude oil exploration, and the various resistance in the region by traditional institutional heroes of the pre-colonial era and modern militants. The Niger Delta's conflict tumulted in the 1990s, when the extent of wealth that could be accrued from their lands' oil became more apparent to them and they felt a sense of resource deprivation due to unfair previous colonial ordinances, regulations and laws. The inability of the multinational oil companies in the region to abide by the MOUs signed with the local host communities and the government's handicapped stance in disciplining multinational oil companies for their abuse of the environment contributed to the conflict's escalation. These are evident in the failure of the government to reinvest taxes paid by multinational oil companies in the Niger Delta, and these have contributed to the underdevelopment and impoverishment of the host communities.

In chapter two, we explored the literature and theoretical frameworks related to the study of CSR and conflict on multinational oil companies in the Niger Delta. The stakeholder's theory is adopted as the framework of analysis. Mechanisms related to oil conflicts and the link between conflict and CSRs were examined, as well as the causes of the region's conflict explored briefly.

Consequently, the first and second hypothesis of the thesis were explored in chapters three and four, with the methodology and process of inquiry briefly explained. The mixed-methods design was used in this study, adopting few interviews and questionnaires as a primary data-gathering technique, as well as reference to secondary data sources. The sample included three oil companies – Shell, Agip, and Chevron.

The fifth and final chapter is the summary and conclusion of the thesis and additionally provides recommendations and essence for further studies in line with the findings of this research.

5.2 Summary of Research Findings

Considering the research questions and hypotheses explored in the first chapter of this study, these are some of the summaries of the findings:

- Despite the government's and multinational oil companies attempts to pacify and mediate with the people of the Niger Delta region, conflict continues due to the unfriendly means employed by multinational oil companies for their oil production and exploration activities, and their lack of adequate and concrete CSR projects. If these multinational oil companies were to begin to have relationships with the host communities, they ought to revisit their strategies of CSR, the community relations practices, and public relations in these communities.

- Majority of the survey's respondents have awareness of the conflicts in the Niger Delta and the main causes. Hence, protests might be continuous due to the environmental concerns and the marginalization/deprivation.

- The disdainful exploitation and exploration of oil by multinational oil companies have made the region's rivers and lands lose resources, rendering these communities poor and jobless. Multinational oil companies might blame the spillages on sabotage of their activities but their collective activities (gas flaring included) have caused the pollution of the environment. In the Niger Delta, there is hydrocarbon pollution of the soils, up to 5 meters in several places in the region.

- There are about three main actors involved in the region's conflict, which include: (a) the members of the host communities, which would include its youths, traditional institutions, and militants (b) multinational oil companies and their staffs, and (c) the federal government, its ministries, agencies and departments, and its officials.

- On the issue of CSR projects and programs, the staff/workers of the oil companies of focus asserted that their companies have carried out CSR delivery and community development, but respondents from the communities had contrary views, with beliefs that these companies have not engaged in concrete CSR, even if they have done some projects. The projects were flawed and unattainable.

- In the resolution and management of the ongoing crisis, the Federal Government of Nigeria has played several roles, according to the research findings. The respondents identify that the program for amnesty came the closest to having substantial effects in managing the crisis. Its sustainability is however questionable. Agencies set up by the

government were accused of corruption and not been effective in their work to accelerate their development mission of the area. The Federal Government of Nigeria ought to adjust obsolete laws and strengthen its agencies that engage in regulations within the industry to checkmate these multinational oil companies and their negative practices, although this may become a Herculean task due to the Nigerian state's rentier nature.

- There has been a failure on the part of the Nigerian state to establish initiatives to curtail the multinational oil companies' activities, due to its rentier status, which makes it dependent on the revenue from oil. Another justification for this failure is the joint-venture partnership of the multinational oil companies, with the government stipulated to bear 60% of whatever the benefit or costs emerging from oil exploration. To abate the conflict in the region, the revenue allocation formula should be adjusted by the government to the levels of 1963, when the basis was 100% derivation. The militarized response of the government to the crisis has been aggravating.

- Lastly, the study has established a correlation between the concrete execution of MOUs that multinational oil companies enter with the local communities and the cordial relationship that emanates. There is the belief that this provides good corporate citizenship status to multinational oil companies.

5.3 Recommendation

Some of these recommendations based on the stated conclusions can be denoted:

- There should be sensitization of multinational oil companies regarding the essence of abiding by General Memorandum of Understandings (GMOUs), signed with host communities since there is a likelihood for a CSR conflict to be triggered from

defaults. They ought to also ensure timely and relevantly implemented CSR projects, with the aim of people's genuine socio-economic needs.

- Processes that are environmentally friendly in oil exploration and maintenance, and the replacement of antiquated oil pipelines should be carried out by multinational oil companies because such pipelines have not been replaced since 1958 when oil was discovered in commercial quantity. They should be obligated to guard against negligence by staff and equipment failures that could cause oil spillage.

- There should be the inclusion of the host communities in the joint venture agreement made with multinational oil companies, rather than the 60/40 government-multinational oil companies' partnership. The Petroleum Industry Bill, now the Petroleum Industry Governance Bill (PIGB) was believed to have addressed this problem if it had been passed by the National Assembly of 2011-2015. A 10% share of the oil business could have been reserved for the host communities, and if this had been carried out, the host communities might have seen themselves as stakeholders in the exploitation and exploration of oil, and play their utmost part in the protection and preservation of the oil business since it is beneficial. It would also help alleviate the demands for resource control.

- The revival of the traditional economy of oil production of these communities should be attempted, and clusters created out of them, based on what they produce. These cluster communities should be offered agro-allied cottage industries and given technical support and funds by the government and the multinational oil companies, while the communities engage in fund management. The revenue allocation formula should be upwardly reviewed from the present 13%.

- A sustainable model of development which would examine the needs of the people should be employed by the government, and not just for electricity but one that is consistent, as well as for the provision of accessible healthcare, availability of drinking water and construction of good road networks.
- The federal government ought to ease and avoid the militarization and work towards efficient measures that resolve and prevent rather than manage conflicts related to oil and CSR.
- The government should eliminate the proviso that allows multinational oil companies to flare gas with just a fine. In place of this, the flared gases should be conserved instead and converted into liquefied forms that can be sold for exports and domestic use.
- The Federal Government might proceed to separate the Niger Delta Developmental Commissions' responsibilities with the state to prevent duty duplications and ensure that both parties are monitored in their duties to enhance the sense of responsibility. This would aid the planning and award of projects, properly, and the situation where both parties are awarded the same project at the same time is avoided.

5.4 Opportunities for Further Research

Because of the conflict's complex nature, this study's findings reveal the need for further research. The prominent one would be the amnesty program's dwindling nature and concerns for its durability. Although this current study emphasizes the strategies of CSR of multinational oil companies in the Niger Delta conflict, further research can focus on the essence of continuing and strengthening the programs for amnesty by the evaluation of its role in the resolution of the Niger Delta oil conflict.

More studies could be carried out also to assess the effect of ethnicity and religion on the Niger Delta conflict. The reason for this is because of the historical incidences of inter-communal conflicts, where tribes fought each other for selfish reasons and gains. At the federal level, the opposition has been made to agitation for resource control from the main ethnic tribes in the country against the minority groups' wills.

This research has found that several leaders of regions including the traditional institutions and politicians have sought to enrich their coffers to the disadvantage of the communities, and future research can explore the effects of such corruption by leaders on these local economies and the occurring underdevelopment.

5.5 Conclusion

This research concludes that the strategies adopted by multinational oil companies for their CSR have been inadequate and unable to effectively manage and resolve the ongoing crisis in the region of the Niger Delta. This can be attributed to multinational oil companies' double standards strategy which is not effective for a sustainable commitment to CSR projects. The strategy of CSR of Shell in the United Kingdom differs from its strategy in developing countries like Nigeria, for instance. Shell was reluctant to carry out the cleaning of the Ogoni (in the Niger Delta), where it had spill oil measured at 1400 tons per day, but it was quick to address leakages in the North Sea, followed by the resignation of its station Chief Executive for a 200 tons per day spill (UNEP, 2011). This demonstrates their commitment to CSR and sustainable development, just not at the same level as in the Niger Delta where efforts are minimal. These have contributed to the anger of the youths, from the responses of respondents during the collection of primary data for this study.

The environmental pollution from fracking, flaring and spillage, etc., have disastrous consequences for the environment and the livelihood of many as well as the health in the host communities. Multinational oil companies are implored to adopt other seismic activity processes that would be less harmful to the people and the environment.

It is possible that as multinational oil companies increase funding for CSR projects, they would face greater resistance from the host communities because these projects are carried out carelessly, and not directed at the host communities' empowerment or the local economies' stimulations. An instance is giving Christmas gifts to local communities, that would be considered insulting and irrelevant in comparison to the revenue generated by the region, since the former is not sustainable and do not come close to replacing the lands lost to gas flaring by multinational oil companies, their mining wastes, and fracking.

Some lessons can be drawn from this study, that could also be a model for other states in their initial oil production stages, or if they have any intentions to engage in oil resource mining. Countries that are in development in Africa such as Kenya, Ghana, and Uganda, where oil has been found in commercial quantities may want to implement policies that will not anger the host communities like it did their Nigerian counterparts.

Nigeria's 60/40 partnership with the multinational oil companies, with no share in percentages for the host communities is a cause of agitation too, contributing to the feeling of negligence by the host communities who do not feel valued for their contributions to the economy of Nigeria. This partnership ratio also makes it such that the government of Nigeria cannot implement its policies on the environment towards

the multinational oil companies since it collects the biggest share of the profit from the oil business. Intending states should opt for Indonesia's diversification model, because they applied good oil revenue management, despite having the same per capita income in the 1970s as Nigeria. This accounts for the country's development levels compared to Nigeria's. Hence, a shift away from oil and the enactment of diversified tax systems can contribute to the economic growth of Nigeria. Other sectors of the Nigerian economy should be developed: agriculture, maritime, etc., to reduce or abate the rentier status of the Nigerian state.

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APPENDICES

Appendix 1: Lead questions for the semi-structured interviews with staff of multinational oil companies of focus (Chevron, Agip and Shell).

INTRODUCTION

Date_____

Name of Interviewee_____

Position in multinational oil companies _____

Years of Experience_____

Interview Lead Questions:

- What are the major causes and players in the Niger Delta conflict?
- How should the existing issues be handled/managed?
- What are some of the prevalent strategies of CSR of the oil companies in the Niger Delta region?
- Are they successful? / How are they successful?
- What has the Federal Government's role in the resolution of the conflict?
- How successful are their strategies?

Appendix 2: Leading Question for Private Citizens and Government Workers.

This questionnaire contributes to a research study at Eastern Mediterranean University leading to an MA by Ogunlola Damilola

Answers will be handled with strict confidentiality, and the responses analyzed such that individual responses cannot be traced to particular respondents.

1.	BIO INFO	Research
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Questions

Please tick (X) in the appropriate option below:

- a. Gender; Male [] Female []
- b. Residential place in the Senatorial zone of Niger Delta; Rivers [] Bayelsa [] Delta []
- c. Name of Community in the Niger Delta _____
- d. Position in the community _____

e. Current job title _____

f. Years of experience: (a.) 0-3 (b) 4-7 (c) 8-11 (d) 12-more

1. CAUSES OF CONFLICT

A. What are the key causes of the oil conflict in the Niger Delta region?

B. What are the causes of the conflict?

C. What major impact to the environment has the exploration of oil in the region had since 1958?

i. Enormous damages

ii. None

iii. Fair

D. Does the ongoing conflict have linkages to the region's environmental degradation by multinational oil companies?

i. Yes

ii. No

iii. Indifferent

E. Has there been changes to the region's economic development since oil discovery and exploration?

i. Yes

ii. No

iii. Indifferent

F. Have multinational oil companies executed any PR Campaigns in the media at addressing the region's conflict?

i. Yes

ii. No

iii. Indifferent

G. What is the perception of the local community to these multinational oil companies' public campaigns?

i. Poor

ii. Good

iii. Excellent

H. Is there more that can be done in these efforts to improve the situation by the multinational oil companies in the region?

- i. Yes
- ii. No
- iii. Indifferent

I. What is the environmental impact of the exploration of oil by multinational oil companies?

J. What is the Federal Government's role in the resolution of the Niger Delta conflict?

- i. Some
- ii. None
- iii. Plenty (please specify)

K. Are the promises by the government turned into formal policies and resolutions in timely delivery and action?

- i. Yes
- ii. No
- iii. Indifferent

L. Are there promises left unfulfilled by the government to the Niger Delta people?

- i. Yes
- ii. No
- iii. Indifferent

M. What is the government doing to ensure their fulfillment?

- i. A lot
- ii. None
- iii. Indifferent

1. MULTINATIONAL OIL COMPANY (MNO)

- A. What are the CSR projects/programs that are executed by multinational oil companies?
- B. Are you aware of your company's corporate social responsibility?
- C. What is your assessment of its development impact?
- D. What do you think your organization could do differently to manage/resolve the conflict?
- E. What is the impact of a Corporate Social citizenship which is efficient/effective, by multinational oil companies in the region's conflict?

F. What is the Federal Government's role in the conflict's resolution?

- i. Do you know of the oil conflict in the region?
- ii. How would you describe the situation, if yes?

- iii. Have the government's policies contributed to aggravating the conflict?
- iv. What could the government do differently?
- v. Do you think militants/communities in the Niger Delta have interests in the derivation principle?

G. What are the effects of the conflict on the Niger Delta's host communities?

- i. Do you think host community members have lost their lives in the cause of the region's crisis?
- ii. Does the conflict impact the region's traditional culture and institutions in any way?
- iii. Does the community have portable drinking water?
- iv. How would you describe the region's electricity system?
- v. Do the host communities have good education, health, transport, employment and housing?
- vi. What would you expect from the host communities given the situations of the conflict?