Regionalization of Peacekeeping: An Appraisal of ECOWAS and African Union Peacekeeping Operations

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ABSTRACT

Article II (4) of the UN Charter forbids the use of might by member state against the national sovereignty or political freedom of any country. The deployment of peacekeeping missions and peacekeeping operations has therefore been the traditional province of the UN. However, the emergence of local peacekeeping assignments towards the end of the 20th Century brought in some controversies that preoccupied the attention of some scholars. Such controversies range from the legality of such operations in international law. This thesis probes into the efficacy of the regionalization of peacekeeping operations in Africa with reference to the current debate about legitimacy and cooperation with the United Nations.

Keywords: Regionalization of Peacekeeping, Legal Positivism Theory, Process Theory, Effectiveness of Operations, Legality of Operations.

ÖZ

Kuruluşundan bugüne, Birleşmiş Milletler (BM) uluslararası hukukta güç kullanımına yetki vermek için ayrıcalık ve yegane sorumluluk. BM Şartı'nın 2 (4) maddesi, üye devletin aleyhine olan güç kullanımını yasaklamaktadır. herhangi bir devletin toprak bütünlüğü veya siyasi bağımsızlığı. Barışı koruma misyonlarının ve barışı koruma operasyonlarının konuşlandırılması, Birleşmiş Milletler'in geleneksel eyaleti olmuştur. Bununla birlikte, 20. yüzyılın sonlarına doğru bölgesel barışı koruma misyonlarının ortaya çıkması, bazı bilginlerin dikkatini çeken bazı tartışmalara neden oldu. Bu tür tartışmalar BM ve barışı koruma operasyonları yürüten bölgesel kurumlar arasındaki işbirliğinden, uluslararası hukukta bu tür operasyonların yasallığına kadar uzanmaktadır. Bu tez, Birleşmiş Milletler ile meşruiyet ve işbirliği hakkındaki mevcut tartışmalara istinaden Afrika'daki barışı koruma operasyonlarının bölgeselleştirilmesinin etkinliğini ortaya koymaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Barışı Koruma Bölgeselleşmesi, Hukuki Pozitivizm Teorisi, Süreç Teorisi, Operasyonların Etkinliği, Operasyonların Yasallığı.

DEDICATION

Dedicated to my lovely mother Mrs Akih Janet Neba. Thanks for all the sacrifices.

ACKNOWLEDGMENT

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AMIS   African Union Mission in Sudan

AMISOM   African Union Mission in Somalia

AU   African Union

DPKO   Department of Peacekeeping Operations

ECOMICI   Ecowas Mission in Cote D'ivoire

ECOWAS   Economic Community of West African States

NATO   North Atlantic Treaty Organisation

OAU   Organisation of African Unity

PSC   Peace and Security Council

RAs   Regional Arrangements

UN   United Nations

Chapter 1

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Statement of Problem

Former UN Secretary General identified Article 2 (4) as a sacrosanct principle whose preservation constitutes the most critical challenge confronting UN Secretary Generals[1]. The UN Charter however allows two specific exceptions to the aforementioned principle that authorizes the usage of strength in Chapter VII: the first entrust the UN security Council the prerogative to consent the use of force under well specified circumstances (were other forms of sanctions provided in Article 41[2] becomes inadequate) enshrined in Article 42[3]; and the second being actions carried out in self-defence within the framework of Article 51[4].

Chapters VII alongside Chapters VI of the UN Charter form the lawful foundation for the authorization of peacekeeping operations by the UN. Customarily, the UN has based the mandates of its peacekeeping tasks solely on Chapter 6 (which is concerned with the "Conciliatory settlement of Disputes"[5], however peacekeeping missions involving the usage of vigour requires authorization in Chapter VII.

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[1] Wood, "International Law And The Use Of Force: What Happens In Practice?."
[2] UN, "Chapter VII: Article 41 — Charter Of The United Nations — Repertory Of Practice Of United Nations Organs — Codification Division Publications."
[3] UN, "Chapter VII: Article 42 — Charter Of The United Nations — Repertory Of Practice Of United Nations Organs — Codification Division Publications."
[4] UN, "Chapter VII: Article 51 — Charter Of The United Nations — Repertory Of Practice Of United Nations Organs — Codification Division Publications."
[5] United Nations, "United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles And Guidelines.

Against the above backdrop, the distribution of peacekeeping missions and peacekeeping operations has therefore been the traditional province of the United Nations. From its first peacekeeping mission instructed by the Security Council to oversee an armistice between belligerents in the Arab-Israeli conflict in 1948 (an operation later dubbed United Nations Truce Supervision Organization), the UN has deployed over 70 peacekeeping missions till date.

However, the emergence of regional peacekeeping missions just before the end of the 20th Century brought in some controversies that preoccupied the attention of some scholars. Such controversies range from the legality of such operations in international law.

Though Article 53 (1) of Chapter 8 of the UN Contract make available the participation of "local engagements and actions" in universal peacekeeping efforts, it expressly required the permission of the UN Security Meeting of regional peacekeeping endeavours[6]. This provides for a complicated evolution of regional efforts. Dorn is more categorical in his assessment of regional peacekeeping efforts. While admitting in some instances to the veracity of the contention that proximity to the conflict zone gives regional organizations a better understanding of the situation and permits them to intervene more rapidly, he argues that "local peacekeeping is, in common, a ruthless notion" as evidenced in history of regional peacekeeping operations like ECOWAS/Nigerian interference in Liberia, CIS/Russian involvement in Georgia, and the interference of India in Sri Lanka[7].

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[7] Dorn, "Regional Peacekeeping Is Not The Way."

Most regional peacekeeping efforts so far has taken place in Africa. Williams (2017) expressly notes this. The legitimacy of some of these operations can be put into question based on whether or not they had authorization from the UN Security Council. This research study probes into the efficiency of the regionalization of peacekeeping tasks in Africa with reference to the current debate about legitimacy and cooperation with the United Nations.

1.2 Research Question

Bearing in mind the above background, this work is going to focus on the succeeding question;

Is the concept of regionalization of peacekeeping effective in Africa with respect to the efforts of the African Union and ECOWAS?

1.3 Research Hypothesis

The following hypothetical statement shall be tested in this thesis: The initiatives taken by the African Union and ECOWAS in the area of peacekeeping shows the regionalization of peacekeeping is a concrete reality in the African continent.

1.4 Research Intentions

The primordial intention of this work is to donate to the body of knowledge as well as current scholarly debates on the regionalization of peacekeeping in Africa. It would seek to unearth relevant data that can help address the controversy on the effectiveness of African peacekeeping mission in general and its legitimacy within the agenda of international law in particular. The analysis and outcomes of the study can also aid as a basis of guidance or inspiration to organisations, policymakers, diplomats, technocrats and other stakeholders involved in peacekeeping efforts on the African continent.

1.5 Research Methodology

This work shall extensively utilize qualitative method given the lack of resources and time to carry out comprehensive quantitative analysis. Relacion adds that as a qualitative method of research is associated with the utilization of qualitative form of data like documents, observation, and interviews[8]. Mahoney and Goertz on their part stressed that the primordial objective of qualitative research is to explain the "outcomes in individual cases" with the qualitative analyst adopting what he terms a "cause-of-effects" explanation approach[9]. Sauro identifies five types of qualitative methods: narrative, ethnography, phenomenological, grounded theory, and case study[10].

The present study falls under the category of case-study and shall make use of mostly secondary sources (books, articles, and data published online) for its analysis.

This research shall also make use of primary source material precisely structured questionnaire survey to be administered online to African students to sample their opinion on the efficacy of the AU and the ECOWAS in peacekeeping on the continent. This will enable the triangulation of data obtained from secondary sources with primary sourced data.

1.6 Theoretical Framework

This research work shall make use of positivism as its principal theoretic framework given that issues of legitimacy and collaboration in peacekeeping operation adhere to established rules and regulations in international law. Positivism or 'Legal Positivism'

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[8] Relacion, "Qualitative Research Methods DEFINITION OF QUALITATIVE RESEARCH."
[9] Mahoney and Goertz, "A Tale Of Two Cultures: Contrasting Quantitative And Qualitative Research."
[10] Sauro, "5 TYPES OF QUALITATIVE METHODS."

refers to "a viewpoint of law that stresses the conformist nature of law—that it is informally assembled"[11].

Another legal theory of interest to this study is the process theory. In her acclaimed work on international law entitled Problems and Process: International Law and How We Use It, Rosalyn Higgins defines universal law as a procedure, and "a process, a structure of commanding policymaking and not just the unbiased use of rules". Higgins process theory is particularly relevant in this study because the concept of peacekeeping its evolutionary.

1.7 Scope and Limitations

This study shall limit its scope to two case study on the regionalization of peacekeeping in Africa: The AU and ECOWAS. The reason for this selection is the fact that both organisations are the regional bodies that have deployed the most peacekeeping missions on the region: eight for the AU (Burundi, Central African Republic, Comoroes, Mali, Somalia, Sudan, and adhoc regional security coalition to fight Boko Haram and the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA); and five for ECOWAS (Liberia, Sierra Leone, Ivory Coast, Guinea and Guinea-Bissau) Ftnte.

The major limitation of this study is the inability to make extensive use other quantitative and qualitative methods that could enrich this work like interviews with key stakeholders and field research.

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[11] Himma, "Legal Positivism | Internet Encyclopedia Of Philosophy."

Chapter 2

LITERATURE REVIEW AND HISTORICAL

BACKGROUND

The regionalization of peacekeeping in Africa, with the increase activities and initiatives taken by the AU and ECOWAS as central and regional police in Africa and the West African Sub-region respectively, has recently captured some scholarly attention. The present chapter revisits current scholarship on the aforementioned subject identifying the angles or prisms put forward by numerous authors. On the one hand are pro-regionalization authors who are delighted with the drive towards regionalization of peacekeeping in the continent and on the other regionalization sceptics who are critical of this new wave of peacekeeping on the continent. This Chapter shall probe into both perspectives. It shall also trace the history of peacekeeping from its origins within the United Nations to the first attempts towards its regionalization in Africa under the defunct Administration for African Unity (OAU) and ECOWAS.

2.1 Literature Review

As earlier mentioned, the present review of literature shall focus on the contrasting perspectives of pro-regionalization scholars and regionalization sceptics in terms of African peacekeeping. While some authors defend the phenomenon of regionalization of peacekeeping in Africa, others are very reticent and critical towards it.

2.1.1 Peacekeeping in Africa from the Prism of Pro-Regionalization Scholars

In the current African academic landscape, the gospel of "African Solution to African Problems" seems to be falling on deaf ears as few scholars speak in favour of the regionalization of peacekeeping in Africa. Most within this restricted group of scholars are specifically enchanted with the work of ECOWAS in maintaining peace in the West African sub-region. Francis for instance, underscores that ECOWAS and its Monitoring Group for Ceasefire (ECOMOG) has made some remarkable strides to peace and security in the West African Region which he describes as a "violent and 'bad neighbourhood'.

In the same light, Author showers praises on ECOMOG as the beacon of light in the West African region.

Ofuatey-Kodjoe on his part, salutes ECOWAS intervention in Liberia which, in his opinion, culminated to the Cotonou Agreement of 1993 which not only secured a ceasefire and disarmament of fighters but also paved the way for a transitional government.[12] While acknowledging that ECOWAS had miscalculated the nature of its post-Cold War security challenges (which became more internal, intractable and fought using light weapons and small arms), Iwilade and Agbo point out that the organisation was able to do a self-reconfiguration to enable it become effective. They agree that ECOWAS response to violent conflict and ensuring stability following the Liberian political war was better than its limitations.[13]

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[12] Ofuatey-Kodjoe, "Regional Organizations And The Resolution Of Internal Conflict: The ECOWAS Intervention In Liberia."
[13] Iwilade and Agbo, "ECOWAS And The Regulation Of Regional Peace And Security In West Africa1."

Concerning the AU, Victor underscores huge strides have been made in the regionalization of peacekeeping in Africa in the Cold War aftermath era through cooperation among African states in international peacekeeping. He argue out that the preparedness and readiness of African states to deploy troops evidenced by the successful deployments of AU peacekeeping forces in Darfur in Sudan and Somalia has made many Western states to now depend on African peacekeepers in the addressing conflicts in the continent.[14]

2.1.2 Peacekeeping in Africa from the Prism of Regionalization Critics

A majority of peacekeeping and conflict management scholars are not enticed by the philosophy of 'African Answers to African Setbacks'. They are precarious of the regionalization of peacekeeping in Africa looking at past experiences and sceptical about its future prospects. Prominent amongst those harbouring this perspective is Paul D. Williams. In an article entitled "Keeping the Peace in Africa: Why ''African'' Answers Are Not Sufficient", Williams identifies three pitfalls in the logic of "African solutions": undermining the UN's authority; providing a room for African dictators to deflect criticism from international community against their policies; and availing an ideal justification for powerful Western countries who do not want to donate troops to African peace missions.[15]

In review of past peacekeeping operations conducted by the AU, Williams highlights four principal weaknesses: the uneven support level for such operations amongst African states reflected in paucity of states participating in them; dependence on external support as reflected in what has been termed the "Prodi Report". the challenge of reaching an agreement on the peace operation mandates particularly in instances

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[14] Victor, "African Peacekeeping In Africa: Warlord Politics, Defense Economics, And State Legitimacy."
[15] Williams, "Keeping The Peace In Africa: Why "African" Solutions Are Not Enough."

where the host countries of such missions is also an AU member and can count on other friendly AU member states to support its position; and lastly the ad hoc nature of such operations which are usually designed as a temporal measure in prelude to a UN peace operation.[16]

Møller on his part questions the rational of the philosophy of "African Answers to African setbacks". He goes further to point out that there is a gap between matching such rhetoric with "actual accomplishments".

Feldman takes issue with the operational capacity of the AU to deliver on peace operations. He points out four factors that impede the capability of the AU to effectively react to the need for peacekeeping in the continent: shortage of funding; the barriers of language and culture; lack of agreement among member states on issues like border demarcations; and inadequately trained and equipped soldiers.[17]

Coleman addresses the ambiguity the regionalization of peacekeeping in Africa brings to the important dichotomy between regional and global (UN) peacekeeping. She reveals three important trends that has blurred this dichotomy: the attitude of sub-Saharan countries to drift away from independent long-term regional peace operations, and opt for short term peace operations which serves as a prelude rather than a substitute for UN peace operations; the ambiguity between regional peace operations and the distinct tradition of "solidarity deployments" (military aid offered to governments facing crisis) in sub-Saharan Africa; and the increasing trend among sub-

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[16] Ibid.

[17] Feldman, "Problems Plaguing The African Union Peacekeeping Forces."

Saharan African states to address regional conflict by taking part in UN peace operations.[18]

Some critics of the regionalization of peacekeeping have focused their criticism on the peace processes commenced by the AU and ECOWAS. Beswik indicts the motivation of Rwanda's participation in the AU Task in Sudan (AMIS). She argues that the motive of Rwanda becoming the second largest contributor to the aforementioned mission resides in an effort by the country's ruling party to secure domestic power and to draw or sustain the assistance of vital bilateral donors.

Kasaiji criticise the failure of the AU to walk the talk about "African Answer to African setbacks" in the Libyan predicament. In this respect he points to the failure of AU participant states to speak in one voice on the strategy to handle the crisis, and its lukewarm reaction to it. He accounts the AU's poor record in peacekeeping is its inability to mobilize funds and mobilize man power to conduct or support peace operations as the case was in Darfur, Sudan.[19]

The African Union Mission in Somalia has become a frequent target of critics of the regionalization of peacekeeping in Africa. In this light, Anderson provides a gloomy assessment and prospects for AMISOM. In contrast to the statement made by Abdi Farah Shirdon (Somali Prime Minister) that the al-Shabaab rebels were uniformly overpowered and abridged to a lessening rebel force on the brim of extermination, Anderson analysis of AMISOM's operation points out the rebel group remains capable meanwhile AMISOM suffers from a number of weaknesses such as insufficient staff;

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[18] Coleman, "Innovations In 'African Solutions To African Problems': The Evolving Practice Of Regional Peacekeeping In Sub-Saharan Africa."
[19] Ibid.

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lack of resources needed to fulfil its objectives and the capacity to endure a long-term combat operation.[20] Wondermagegnehu and Kebede also criticised the initial mandate of AMISOM as being driven by event rather than context and operated upon an arrangement of logistic supply which failed to synchronize with overall operational requirements.[21]

Williams on his part provided a stark assessment of why AMISOM endured a perilous initial 30 months which triggered international debate on its termination.

Abatan and Spies examine the controversy over the implementation of Responsibility to Protect (R2P) in the case of post-electoral the humanitarian crisis that erupted in Côte d'Ivoire in 2010. They criticized the AU's inability to translate norm of R2P, institutionalized in the organization's institutional foundation into action. They point out that not only was the AU unable to implement R2P but was also hesitant to invoke it thereby putting into question its willingness to check humanitarian atrocities carried out by governments against their citizens.[22]

Patrick takes a swipe at the AU's inability to handle its own peace operation in the crisis in Darfur categorized as a genocide by the United States and as "the world's gravest human rights abuse," by the United Nations.[23]

Concerning ECOWAS peace operations, Obi presents a relative examination of ECOWAS peacekeeping tasks in Sierra Leone, Liberia, Côte d'Ivoire and Guinea

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[20] Anderson, "Peacekeepers Fighting A Counterinsurgency Campaign: A Net Assessment Of The African Union Mission In Somalia."

[21] Wondemagegnehu and Kebede, "AMISOM: Charting A New Course For African Union Peace Missions."

[22] Abatan and Spies, "African Solutions To African Problems? The AU, R2P And Côte D'ivoire."

[23] Paterson, "Darfur And Peacekeeping Operations In Africa."

Bissau. He points out the aforementioned cases reveal the organization was confronted by multiple challenges such as leadership, managerial, institutional and resource inadequacies; the role of great powers, Nigeria, the international community; and the need for the region to take ownership of its agenda of peacebuilding.[24]

2.2 Historical Background of Peacekeeping Tasks

The word "Peacekeeping" was initially introduced in May, 1948 when the UN Security Council sent its first peacekeeping mission to the Middle East. From inception, the UN peacekeeping objectives solely revolved around stabilizing situations on hostile grounds and the maintenance of ceasefires in a bid to resolve conflicts peacefully. Involved in operations, most at times in very dangerous and harsh climatic conditions, these men and women under the "Blue Helmet" have been a source of hope and liberation to millions of people.

Given the complexity of most conflicts today, peacekeepers have had to deal with the ever evolving demands brought about from the multiple skirmishes. Activities such as rendering humanitarian assistance, elections monitoring, protection of civilians, restoration of the statute of law and the promotion of human privileges have become inculcated into the peacekeeping architecture. It is vital to note that not only men and women in the army partake in these operations but civilians themselves who serve in strategic positions during a mission such as in the area of strategic communication, human rights, logistics, political and civil affairs. Peacekeeping itself is not gender bias reasons why the demand for more women in missions continue to increase partly due to their contributions in the medical sector.

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[24] Obi, "Economic Community Of West African States On The Ground: Comparing Peacekeeping In Liberia, Sierra Leone, Guinea Bissau, And Côte D'ivoire."

The United Nations peacekeeping exists today thanks to the joint effort of the Sections of Peacekeeping Operations and that of Field Support[25]. Peacekeepers have had to deal with the toughest and most precarious spots in the world with each deployment trained to suit the needs on the ground with most of them losing their lives on the frontline. Three key principles of the UN peacekeeping are taken into consideration before any formal deployment of troops, they include; consent by both parties in disputes, fairness and disinterestedness of peacekeepers, and the non-usage of might by the peacekeepers except for in situations of self-protection or in protection of the status quo.[26] With the emergence of many local societies such as the AU and the, EU, it became a lighter burden for the UN to carry as most of these organizations preached peace, cooperation and solidarity for all thus a decline in the UN peacekeeping missions globally.

The primordial objective for the formation of the AU is to encourage harmony, collaboration, and care among African states in a bid to arrive a shared goal[27]. Before the change from the OAU to AU, there existed an OAU instrument for conflict anticipation, administration and resolution which was created in July, 1993 in Cairo Egypt to assist deal with the conflict situation on the continent and promote collective security.

Nevertheless, given the nature and scope of conflicts on the continent, its limitations were enormous thus leaving most of its load on the UN to carry. Of course, the end of the Cold War and the disappointment by the global community to halt the killing in Rwanda in 1994 made it clear to Africans they needed an African answer to their setbacks. This paradigm shift has undoubtedly left the AU at the forefront of keeping

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[25] UN, "Department Of Peacekeeping Operations - United Nations And The Rule Of Law."
[26] UN, "What Is Peacekeeping."
[27] African Union, "AU In A Nutshell | African Union."

peace and solving African conflicts. With the help of local, joint and multinational efforts, peacekeeping operations mostly involve Africans themselves as such generating keen interest as to how the AU plans to address security worries in the continent.

In a bid to assist the African Union in its peacekeeping processes, other actors like the UN, the European Union (EU), together with regional actors like ECOWAS and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) like the International Community of the Red Cross (ICRC), have shaped the nature of peace operations in Africa. Promoting peacekeeping efforts has become a vital share of the AUs peace and security agenda as most of its UN partnership operations mostly address issues relating to peacekeeping and reconciliation on the continent. Even though the AU has kept the faith, it has encountered significant difficulty in conflict-affected countries like Somalia and the Central African Republic. The founding of the AU Peace and Security Council in 2004 saw a transformation in African continental security in general as seen in the deployment of uniformed peacekeepers made up of troops and police to peacekeeping missions. According to Brubacher, Damman & Day, this task forces are well adapted to meet the security threats posed by the aforementioned transnational armed groups.[28]

African Union peacekeeping has been charged with the tasks of protecting civilians, preserving peace and stability, safeguarding democratic transitions and counter terror. Even though the AU's Constitutive Act still supports the OAU values of non-interference by every member state, article 4(h) of the Act licenses the Union to

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[28] Brubacher, Damman and Day, "The AU Task Forces: An African Response To Transnational Armed Groups."

interfere in fellow states in event of severe situations like exterminations, war crimes, and crimes against humanity[29].

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[29] Amvane, "Intervention Pursuant To Article 4(H) Of The Constitutive Act Of The African Union Without United Nations Security Council Authorisation."

Chapter 3

CONCEPTUAL AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

To effectively analyse the regionalization of peacekeeping in the West African sub-region (under ECOWAS) and the African continent (under the AU), there is need to establish a concrete conceptual and theoretical foundation. This Chapter devotes itself to the aforementioned task. It examines the theories underpinning this research and the major concepts it uses. The main theory that would be used this thesis is positivism or legal positivism given the fact that the phenomenon under study revolves heavily on positive international law (covenants, charters, treaties, protocols, norms and procedures). The process theory shall also be used in a lower scale based on the fact that peacekeeping is an evolving concept spanning across three generations or waves. This chapter shall also revisit the two main concepts of the present thesis: 'peacekeeping' and 'regionalization'.

3.1 Conceptual Framework

The current study will be based on two major concepts in conflict resolution: Peacekeeping and Regionalization of peacekeeping.

3.1.1 The Concept of Peacekeeping

The notion of peacekeeping has been subject to various interpretations and misinterpretations given its total absence in the Charter of the UN. Analysts, universal organizations and governments are at odds concerning that constitute a peace operation

and making a distinction between peacekeeping and 'sister' concepts like peacebuilding and peace-making.[30] What then is peacekeeping?

Several authors have attempted a definition of the concept of peacekeeping. Kernic defines peacekeeping as a tool for the controlling and resolution of political violence and armed conflict in a bid to help societies make the alteration from a situation of combat to that of peace.[31] Cappola see it as an activity that permits the use of non-combatant force to monitor peace on a location with the goal of maintaining a halt in the conflict.

Given the fact that modern peacekeeping was introduced by the UN in 1948 during to monitor a cease-fire brokered during the Arab-Israeli War, it would be natural to give pre-eminence to the UN definition of peacekeeping. The mandates of initial UN peacekeeping missions consisted primarily of maintenance of ceasefires, stabilization of the situation at hand and the provision of vital assistance for political endeavours to peacefully resolve the conflict.[32] There are three central values guiding UN peacekeeping: "Accord of the parties; Neutrality; Non-usage of might except in self-protection and protection of the mandate."[33]

Bellamy, Williams and Griffin recognized seven types of peacekeeping operations: Preventive deployments (which pursues to avert the emergence of a violent conflict); Traditional peacekeeping (which seeks to build political space needed for a negotiated political settlement by the belligerents); Wider peace-making (which includes

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[30] Bellamy, Griffin and Williams, *Understanding Peacekeeping*.
[31] Kernic, "Peace Keeping."
[32] Roser and Nagdy, "Peacekeeping."
[33] UN, "What Is Peacekeeping."

additional task like the provision of humanitarian assistance); Peace enforcement (which seeks to enforce the UN Security Council's resolution on belligerent parties), Peace support operations (which seeks to put in install a system of liberal democracy); Transitional administrations (which assumes sovereign prerogatives in a specific territory); and Assisting transitions (support political transitions after the attainment of political settlements).[34]

According to Alan James, peacekeeping operations have three functions: Diffusion (providing belligerents the opportunity to save face); Stabilization (maintaining stability in the conflict zone); and helping belligerent parties to resolve their dispute.[35]

3.1.2 The Concept of Regionalization of Peacekeeping

There is no clear explanation of the notion of regionalization of peacekeeping but scholars usually conceive it from the perspective of regional arrangements for peace and security. Bures explains that there has been a tendency to employ the terms 'regional arrangement' interchangeably with 'regional organizations given the absence of an official definition.[36] Williams reveals that there has been a number of local provisions in terms of peacekeeping like the operation contracted out by NATO in Kosovo in 1999 and Macedonia from 2002-3; the AU's task in Burundi from 2003-4 and that in Sudan in 2004.

According to Bellamy and Williams, the major issue concerning the regionalization of peacekeeping has to do with the debates on the actor or institution that can legitimately authorize and effectively perform peace operations.[37] The bone of contention here has

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[34] Bellamy, Griffin and Williams, *Understanding Peacekeeping*.
[35] James, *Peacekeeping In International Politics*.
[36] Bures, "Regional Peacekeeping Operations: Complementing Or Undermining The United Nations Security Council?1."
[37] Bellamy and Williams, "Who's Keeping The Peace? Regionalization And Contemporary Peace Operations."

to do with the relationship between the UN and local provisions. While Griffin argues in favour of the legitimacy of regional peace operations without UN authorization, an overwhelming majority of scholars uphold the contrary.

Whereas McDougall[38], Bures, Encalade[39], Bellamy and Williams all underscore the primacy of the UN Security Council in Chapter VIII of its Charter in approving peacekeeping missions. From the perspective of legal positivism which is the main theory guiding this thesis, and the process theory, this work is going to probe into arguments for and against the legitimacy of regional peacekeeping operations in Africa.

3.2 Theoretical Framework

The theoretical foundation of this thesis reposes on two philosophies of international law: legal positivism and process theory. International law has other theories that guides analysis like: Policy-oriented jurisprudence (New Haven School), international relations theories (realism, liberalism, constructivism). However, legal positivism and process theories have been chosen for the analysis in this thesis because they offer a better contextual framework that facilitates the understanding of the phenomenon under study. Legal positivism is best suited for issues that revolves around positive law (the law as it exists divorced from the moral justification) and the phenomenon under study very much revolves positive law (covenants, charters, treaties, protocols, norms and procedures). The process theory shall throw more light on the recent evolution in the justification of the regionalization of peacekeeping like the Responsibility to Protect (R2P).

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[38] McDougall, "The Regionalization Of Peacekeeping And Peacebuilding: Comparing Recent Developments In East Timor And The Southwest Pacific."
[39] Encalade, "The Regionalization Of Peacekeeping: A Solution To African Violence?."

3.2.1 The Theory of Legal Positivism

Legal positivism is one of the most prominent ethical theories on what constitutes the nature of law. As one of the prominent contemporary positivist HLA Hart underscored, legal positivism is based on the debate that "it is in no logic an essential certainty that laws replicate or gratify definite demands of ethics, though in fact they have often done so."[40]

According to Gardner, while historical figures of the aforementioned legal tradition (positivism) may differ in some interpretations they all converge on the proposition that what makes a given norm legally binding and constituting part of the law in a system is its source and not its merits.[41] In this respect, one of the fathers of legal positivism underscored: "The presence of law is one thing; its worth and drawback another. Whether it be or be not is one question; whether it be or be not conformable to an expected standard, is a different query."[42]

In contrast to naturalists, positivists see law as s social construct.[43] Positivists believe law is law when it is associated with positivist norms, which are, those enacted by the lawmaker or regarded as case law or common law. Positivist employ proper standards of the derivation, implementation, and efficiency of law to the appropriate means to assess the qualification of social norms as law.[44]

Positivists believe it is both possible and important to have a theory of law that is morally neutral and descriptive. Therefore, the 'legal positivism' has been employed

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[40] H.L.A. Hart, *The Concept Of Law–Second Edition* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994).
[41] Gardner, "Legal Positivism: 51/2 Myths."
[42] Austin, "Austin: The Province Of Jurisprudence Determined."
[43] Moore, "Legal Positivism."
[44] Himma, "Legal Positivism | Internet Encyclopedia Of Philosophy."

on a more general scale to englobe the motion that one should construct his concept of law by removing the moral criteria as a basis for legal validity. According to Green and Adams, by emphasising on sources, legal positivists do not dismiss the importance or rationality of the merits of law but only underline they are not what determines the existence or not of laws.

Legal positivism has come under attack strong attacks especially in the 20th Century with critics charging it as being "descriptively and/or conceptually false. In spite of these criticisms, legal positivism seems to have endured over age. Schauer and Wise account this persistence to the quality of legal positivism.

3.2.2 Process Theory

Another important theory that would be used in the analyses of this study is the process theory. One of the most prominent proponents of the process theory is Rosalyn Higgins who developed the theory in one of her masterpiece. Higgins defines international law in the aforementioned text as "an enduring procedure of commanding choices" and insists it has to do with "the full policymaking process, and not just the mention to the trend of past decisions which are termed 'rules'."[45]

Though the process theory came to prominence with the publication of Problems and Process in 1994, it is important to underscore that this theoretical approach traces its roots far back to the 1960s when Higgins began expressing her process approach in an article entitled "Policy Considerations and the International Judicial Process" she published in 1968. Meanwhile their American counterparts like McDougal, Lasswell,

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[45] Higgins, *Problems And Processes*.

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Schachter, Friedmann, Falk, Goldie, Jessup, Dillard, Henkin, and MacChesney had process and policy-oriented perspective of international law.[46]

Another major contribution in the development of the process theory was Higgins 1977 article on changes in the law of sovereign immunity in the United Kingdom. Here she highlighted significant developments in the way the doctrine of sovereign immunity was interpreted and implemented in Courts in England. She underscored the courts a doctrine of complete immunity regardless of claims alleged on foreign sovereigns where applied in English Courts, up till the cases of The Philippine Admiral and the Central Bank of Nigeria in the 1970s were a restrictive interpretation of immunity was upheld in both.[47]

Process-oriented international lawyers see a nexus between authority and power with the former been accompanied by the latter. Process theory doesn't view law as a static set of rules irrespective of the surrounding circumstances. In fact, Higgins dismisses this notion at the beginning of her work by stating strongly that "International law is not rules."[48] Higgins underscore that there is an element of choice involved in decision taken by judges when confronted with a case and not a restriction to a set of rules. In her words, judges "make choices rather than "find rules". Given the aforementioned argument and the fact that Higgins sees a nexus between "law and policy", process-oriented jurisprudence entails taking into consideration societal and governmental factors that shapes the judge's decision.[49]

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[46] Higgins, "Policy Considerations And The International Judicial Process."
[47] Higgins, "Recent Developments In The Law Of Sovereign Immunity In The United Kingdom."
[48] Ibid.
[49] Kinsella and Harrison, "Problems And Process: International Law And How We Use It By Rosalyn Higgins."

Chapter 4

PEACEKEEPING UNDER THE AFRICAN UNION AND ECOWAS

The regionalization of peacekeeping in Africa has been pursued by two principal institutions, one at the continental level and the other at the sub-regional level. At the continental level, the AU has been at the front of efforts to walk the talk of African Answers to African Hitches when it comes to peacekeeping. At the sub-regional level, ECOWAS has been the only institution which has been able to put boots on the ground for peacekeeping operations. This Section throws emphases on the operationalization of the concept of regionalization of peacekeeping in Africa. The analysis in this section will aid respond to the research question of this thesis concerning; the efficacy of the localization of peacekeeping in Africa in the light of the undertakings of the AU and ECOWAS. It would also provide empirical evidence to test the veracity of the hypothesis set forth at the beginning of this study which holds that "The initiatives taken by the African Union and ECOWAS in the area of peacekeeping shows the regionalization of peacekeeping is a concrete reality in the African continent." The Chapter begins with an exploration of peacekeeping operations under the AU and moves to a similar analysis of such operations under the ECOWAS.

4.1 AU Peacekeeping Operations

From its inception in 2002, the AU has been involved in numerous continental peacekeeping operations. Such operations range from the deployment of peacekeeping missions in member states to monitor ceasefires, protect non-combatants and the

distribution of humanitarian aid, to the formation of regional taskforce to combat regional terrorist organization. Before delving into their effectiveness, legitimacy, and future it is important to present an overview of some of these operations.

4.1.2 Overview of Peacekeeping Operations Conducted by the AU

From its conception till date, the AU has conducted a total of nine peace operations of different nature and purpose. It is important to point out that the distinguishing characteristic for a peace operation to be categorized under the AU is for such an operation to be initiated, staffed and led by the AU. Such distinction is important in the sense that it helps makes a difference between peace operations carried out by the AU and peace tasks in which the AU has been involved which include United Nations missions which benefited from the partnership and troop contribution from AU or AU member states. This section specifically deals with peacekeeping operations independently carried out by the AU. These operations include:

4.1.2.1 African Union Task in Burundi (AMIB)

The first AU experience in peacekeeping on the continent happened in Burundi in 2003 with the distribution of the AU Mission in Burundi (AMIB) in a bid to talk a settlement to the protracted civil war in the country (Burundi).[50] AMIB was a mixed mission in its composition: a military force which at its peak comprised 3128 soldiers from South Africa, Ethiopia and Mozambique; military observers from Tunisia, Togo, Burkina Faso, Mali and Gabon; as well as a civilian component which worked in collaboration with UN.

AMIB emerged from a truce arrangement signed in October 2002 which provided for either the UN or the AU to deploy an international mission. By the time the UN

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[50] Paul D. Williams, "The African Union's Peace Operations: A Comparative Analysis", *African Security* 2, no. 2-3 (2009): 97-118, doi:10.1080/19362200903361937.

inherited and established the UN Peace Operation in Burundi in June 2004, AMIB had succeeded in de-escalating the situation restoring relative calm to a majority of the Burundi's provinces excluding the outskirts of the capital Bujumbura which was still haunted by arm resistance from the *Forces Nationales de Libération*.[51]

4.1.2.2 African Union Mission to Sudan (AMIS)

The second AU peace task was that installed to oversee a truce brokered between the aggressive parties in the Sudanese civil war in the first decade of the 21st Century. AMIS emerged from two ceasefire agreements: the 8th April 2004 N'Djamena Humanitarian Armistice Agreement between warring parties and the 28th April 2004 Addis Ababa Agreement which called for the establishment of an Observing committee to oversee the ceasefire.[52]

The command assigned to the 680-person force (600 soldiers and 80 military witnesses) was to oversee the implementation of the aforementioned humanitarian ceasefire agreement; protect the distribution of humanitarian aid, secure the coming back of refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) and help in the confidence-building process.[53]

The activities of AMIS in the field produced mitigating results. While significant improvements of the security situation (protection of IDPs from attacks from the Janjaweed militia) was witnessed in areas where AMIS troops were deployed the security situation was soon compromised with increased violence registered from the

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[51] Tim Murithi, "The African Union's Evolving Role In Peace Operations: The African Union Mission In Burundi, The African Union Mission In Sudan And The African union Mission In Somalia", *African Security Review* 17, no. 1 (2008): 69-82,

[52] Paul D. Williams, "The African Union's Peace Operation"

[53] HENRI BOSHOFF, "THE AFRICAN UNION MISSION IN SUDAN", *African Security Review* 14, no. 3 (2005): 57-60, doi:10.1080/10246029.2005.9627371.

Janjaweed against IDP villages and camps, as well as against AMIS soldiers. Though the AU later expanded AMIS personnel to 3200 in October 2004 and 7560 (that is 6000 soldiers and 1560 civilian police), the operation was hampered by three principal factors: capacity insufficiencies, questions of command, and working in an area mounted by persistent conflict.[54]

4.1.2.3 AU Mission for the Support to the Elections in Comoros (AMISEC)

AMISEC was formed as a response to the appeal for help made to the AU by the President of Comoros at the time Azali Assoumani to safeguard the smooth running of the 2006 Presidential Elections in the island. AMISEC's deployment was approved by the Peace and Security Council (PSC) of the AU on 21 March 2006 with a mandate of: monitoring the presidential elections, establishing a stable environment, protecting civilians near polling stations, and ensuring that was no interference in the electoral process by Comorian security forces.[55] The elections were carried out successfully but the AMISEC also took part in a military operation dubbed "Operation Democracy" to restore the authority of the Comoros central government on the island of Anjouan and displace its outgoing President Bacar who had refused to step down. This mission was successfully carried out thanks to the partnership between 1800 AU forces and 1500 troops from the Comorian National Army.[56]

4.1.2.4 African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM)

AMISOM was instituted by the AU in January 2007 with the following mandate to: "supporting the Somali TFIs in their efforts to stabilise the country. AMISOM initial deployment comprised a total of nine infantry battalion (each numbering 850

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[54] Richard Kamidza, Karanja Mbugua and Venashri Pillay, "AMIS: Sudan (Darfur)", *Media.Africaportal.Org*, 2020, https://media.africaportal.org/documents/ct_2005_4.pdf.

[55] Paul D. Williams, "The African Union's Peace Operations: A Comparative Analysis", *African Security* 2, no. 2-3 (2009): 97-118, doi:10.1080/19362200903361937.

[56] World Peace Foundation, "Comoros Short Brief", *Sites.Tufts.Edu*, 2017, https://sites.tufts.edu/wpf/files/2017/07/Comoros.pdf.

personnel) alongside civilian, coastal, air, and maritime component.[57] Of the 54 AU member countries, only five ended up contributing troops to AMISOM: with Uganda and Burundi in 2007 being at the forefront.

Williams reveals that the first 30 months of the mission was the most challenging and exposed certain inadequacies of the operation: the challenge of keeping peace in a place where there was none to keep, the AU's incapacitation in handling peacekeeping (especially in terms of troop mobilization and provision of necessary logistics).[58] Notwithstanding, AMISOM achieved some milestone with regards to its mission.

4.1.2.5 African Union-led Regional Task Force for the Elimination of the Lord's Resistance Army (RCI-LRA)

For more than two decades, the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) has terrorized the people of northern Uganda and neighbouring countries (Southern Sudan, Democratic Republic of Congo and Central African Republic). In November 2011, the Peace and Security Council (PSC) of the AU approved the establishment of a regional initiative to coordinate efforts to eliminate the LRA[59]. This initiative was structured into two components: the coordination body known as the Joint Coordination Mechanism (JCM) under the leadership of the AU's Peace and Security Commissioner and including the Defence Minister of the various states affected by LRA attacks, a Regional Task Force (RTF) comprising troops contribution from the affected states with an expected total strength of 5000, and a headquarters for the RTF with a Joint Operations Center[60].

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[57] World Peace Foundation, "AMISOM Short Mission Brief", *Sites.Tufts.Edu*, 2020, https://sites.tufts.edu/wpf/files/2017/07/Somalia-brief.pdf.

[58] Paul D. Williams, "Into The Mogadishu Maelstrom: The African Union Mission In Somalia", *International Peacekeeping* 16, no. 4 (2009): 514-530, doi:10.1080/13533310903184713.

[59] World Peace Foundation, "AU Regional Task Force Against The Lord'S Resistance Army Mission", *Sites.Tufts.Edu*, 2020, https://sites.tufts.edu/wpf/files/2017/07/Lords-Resistance-Army-Mission.pdf.

[60] African Union, "3Rd Ministerial Meeting Of The Regional Cooperation Initiative For The Elimination Of The Lord'S Resistance Army (RCI-LRA), Addis Ababa, Ethiopia | Union Africaine", *Au.Int*, 2013,

The results of the activities of the RCI-LRA on the field have been mixed. On the positive side, the deployment of the RTF had a substantial impact in reducing the number of outbreaks by the LRA on local population and inducing defections from the terrorist groups.[61] In terms of setback, the RCI-LRA was bedevilled by some impediments common to operations conducted by the AU like inadequate training, feeble intelligence arising from national security protocols, significant shortages in equipment, and inefficient rotation of troops.[62]

Though the mandate of the RCI-LRA was renewed by the PSC of the AU on 18 May 2017 to last through 22 August, the United States (US) withdrew its support to the operation (both special forces, and logistical assistance) in May 2017. This was followed by troop withdrawals from Uganda (2500), and the South Sudan's cancellation of its participation.

4.2 ECOWAS Peacekeeping Operations

Another major regional player in peacekeeping on the African continent is ECOWAS. In fact, ECOWAS was the first regional actor on the continent to launch a peacekeeping operation. This happened when the ECOWAS Standing Mediation Committee (SMC), put in place to seek a diplomatic solution to the civil war that escalated in Liberia in 1989, decided to deploy forces of the Economic Community of West Africa Cease-fire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) into Liberia on 7 August 1990. These operations have witnessed different fortunes with the West African regional hegemon Nigeria usually bearing the brunt in terms of contribution.

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https://au.int/fr/newsevents/26641/3rd-ministerial-meeting-regional-cooperation-initiative-elimination-lord%E2%80%99s.

[61] Andrea Prah, "Regional Security Cooperation In Africa An Evaluation Of The Regional Cooperation Initiative For The Elimination Of The Lord'S Resistance Army", *ACCORD*, 2019, https://www.accord.org.za/ajcr-issues/regional-security-cooperation-in-africa/.

[62] Ibid.

4.2.1 Overview of Peacekeeping Operations Conducted by ECOWAS

Since its inception with the signing of the Treat of Lagos in 1975, ECOWAS has carried out five peacekeeping operations so far in territories of some of its member states. These operations and will be briefly reviewed below and their effectiveness and legitimacy analysed in subsequent sections.

4.2.1.1 ECOWAS Interventions in Liberia ECOMOG and ECOMIL

ECOWAS intervened in both civil wars that took place in Liberia (the first from 1989-1996 and the second from 1999-2003). ECOWAS interference in the Liberian civil war began with the establishment of the SMC during the 13th session of the conference of ECOWAS Heads of States and Government in Banjul, Gambia in May 1990. The role entrusted by the ECOWAS leaders to the SMC was to "intervene, in a timely fashion whenever such disputes arise".[63] The SMC (encompassing Nigeria, Ghana, Gambia and Togo) called for cease-fire to the conflict and founded ECOMOG. ECOMOG contained troops from (Ghana, Gambia, Nigeria, and Sierra Leone) with the goal to implement and monitor the cease-fire as part of an overall goal to restore law and order, establish an acting government and laying the groundwork for elections.[64]

ECOMOG forces succeeded to prevent Taylor's forces from capturing Liberia's capital, Monrovia. The pressure exerted by ECOMOG forces forced Taylor to yield to a cease-fire in November 1990 and October 1991. A peace settlement was reached on 9 August 1995 after some mid-year meetings between Taylor and Nigeria's President, Gen. Sani Abacha. This led to a fragile peace that would pave the way for the

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[63] Jinmi Adisa, "Nigeria In ECOMOG: Political Undercurrents And The Burden Of Community Spirit", *Small Wars & Insurgencies* 5, no. 1 (1994): 83-110, doi:10.1080/09592319408423070.

[64] Cyril I. Obi, "Economic Community Of West African States On The Ground: Comparing Peacekeeping In Liberia, Sierra Leone, Guinea Bissau, And Côte D'ivoire", *African Security* 2, no. 2-3 (2009): 119-135, doi:10.1080/19362200903361945.

organization of presidential elections in 1997.[65] Presidential elections were held in Liberia in July 1997 which witnessed a landslide victory (75 percent of votes casted) of former warlord Charles Taylor putting an end to the first Liberian civil war.[66]

The second Liberian civil war took place from 1999 - 2003 pitting the Liberian United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD) forces backed by Guinea, against the regime of Charles Taylor. Obi argues that the war was provoked Taylor's "winner-take-all attitude" which saw him limiting the benefits of power uniquely to his loyalists (Cyril Obi).[67] The rebels came close to Monrovia in 2003 after the emergence of a novel dissident force dubbed Movement for Democracy in Liberia (MODEL). At the same time (in 2003), Taylor was accused by the UN war crimes tribunal in Sierra Leone. The LURD forces carried out a siege of Liberia's capital Monrovia in July 2003 which claimed the lives of over a thousand civilians and ended with a unilateral cease-fire that concreted the way for the distribution of an ECOWAS peacekeeping mission dubbed ECOWAS Mission in Liberia (ECOMIL).

4.2.1.2 ECOWAS Military Intervention in Sierra Leone

The second ECOWAS peacekeeping task was positioned in Sierra Leone in 1998 to reinstate the exiled administration of President Ahmad Tejan Kabbah. Kabbah made an appeal for military assistance to the then ECOWAS Chairman, Nigerian President Gen. Sani Abacha within the context of the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA).[68] ECOWAS responded by dispatching Nigerian led ECOMOG forces to Kabbah's rescue. By March 1998, ECOMOG forces had succeeded to push back the AFRC and

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[65] Herbert Howe, "Lessons Of Liberia: ECOMOG And Regional Peacekeeping"
[66] David Harris, "From 'Warlord' To 'Democratic' President: How Charles Taylor Won The 1997 Liberian Elections", *The Journal Of Modern African Studies* 37, no. 3 (1999): 431-455, doi:10.1017/s0022278x99003109.
[67] Cyril I. Obi, "Economic Community Of West African States On The Ground: Comparing Peacekeeping In Liberia, Sierra Leone, Guinea Bissau, And Côte D'ivoire"
[68] Ibid.

Revolutionary United Front (RUF) Insurgents and reinstate Kabbah to power.[69] Kabbah returned to power in Sierra Leone on 10 March 1998 becoming the first constitutionally voted African President to be reinstated to power through a military interference.[70]

A reinvasion of the Sierra Leonean capital Freetown was carried out in 1999 by the AFRC and RUF Rebels. However, the capital was successfully defended by an alliance between ECOMOG forces and member of the local Civil Defense Forces (CDF) which is a group of hunter-militia elements formed by many Sierra Leonean communities across the nation.[71] Not being able to find a military result to the conflict (even with ECOWAS support) Kabbah's government negotiated and agreed to a peace deal with RUF in the Togolese capital Lome in July 1999 that laid the groundwork for the disposition of a UN Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL). A substantial number of ECOMOG soldiers were absorbed by UNAMSIL.[72]

4.2.1.3 ECOWAS Peace Operations in Guinea-Bissau

As the case in Liberia, ECOWAS intervened twice in Guinea-Bissau first to put an end to a civil war and second to resolve a political crisis. The first ECOWAS intervention took 1998 as part of struggles to put an end to a civil war between Guinea-Bissau's President Joao Viira and his former Chief of Armed Forces. The war began in June 1998 with gunfire exchange in the country's capital Bissau between forces loyal to President Vieira and those supporting his rival Mane.

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[69] Cyril I. Obi, "Economic Community Of West African States On The Ground: Comparing Peacekeeping In Liberia, Sierra Leone, Guinea Bissau, And Côte D'ivoire"

[70] Karsten Nowrot and Emily W. Schebacker, "The Use Of Force To Restore Democracy: International Legal Implications Of The ECOWAS Intervention In Sierra Leone", *Am. U. Int'l L. Rev.* 14 (1998): 321.

[71] Ismail Rashid, "The Sierra Leone Civil War And The Remaking Of ECOWAS", *Research In Sierra Leone Studies (RISLS): Weave* 1, no. 1 (2013): 1-21.

[72] Ibid.

At the request of President Vieira, who had asked for the intervention of ECOMOG to restore peace in his country, ECOWAS intervened and established a Committee of Seven (referring to its seven constituent members) charged with carrying out conflict mediation.

The ECOMOG operation in Guinea proved to be a failure. Late deployment caused by financial and logistical constraints limited the effectiveness of the ECOMOG mission and render them powerless to prevent a recapture of the country by Mane's forces in May 1999.[73]

The second ECOWAS intervention in Guinea Bissau occurred during the political crisis that rocked the country from 2015-2019. The political crisis was triggered by the sacking of Prime Minister Domingos by Guinea Bissau's President José Mário Vaz and the subsequent rivalry between both men and failure by Vaz to find a consensus Prime Minister.[74] The ECOWAS Task in Guinea Bissau (ECOMIB) was established in April 2012 with combine staff strength of 689 and initially charged with implementing measures to safeguard a return to representative rule after the April 2012 military coup.[75] ECOMIB's mission was expanded in 2015, with the emergence of the aforementioned political crisis that weakened state institutions, to cover stabilization, post-election assistance and capacity building.

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[73] World Peace Foundation, "Guinea-Bissau Short Brief", *Sites.Tufts.Edu*, 2020, https://sites.tufts.edu/wpf/files/2017/07/Guinea-Bassau-brief.pdf.

[74] Brown Odigie, "ECOWAS'S Efforts At Resolving Guinea-Bissau'S Protracted Political Crisis, 2015–2019", *Conflict Trends* 2019, no. 2 (2019): 3-11.

[75] European Union, "Action Document For "Support To The Economic Community Of West African States (ECOWAS) Mission In Guinea Bissau (ECOMIB)"", *Ec.Europa.Eu*, 2020, https://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regdoc/rep/3/2015/EN/C-2015-7696-F1-EN-ANNEX-1-PART-1.PDF.

The dismissal of Domingos embroiled the country into a political crisis marked by government instability evidenced by the failure of four successive appointments of a new government. This prompted the Power of Heads of States and Governments of ECOWAS to dispatch a presidential mission in September 2016 to mediate the crisis. After talks with a range of stakeholders and associates of the international community, a crisis resolution six-point road map was endorsed in Bissau on 10 September and 10-point agreement known as the "Conakry Accord" signed in Conakry, Guinea.[76]

ECOWAS allowed Vaz whose mandate was due to expire in June to be in office until elections were held in November with the condition that he was not going to stand for the elections.[77] Presidential elections effectively took place in November 2019 during which Umaro Cissoko Embalo (a former Prime Minister of the Vaz regime) defeated Domingos (Vaz' first Prime Minister) putting an end to four years of political instability.[78]

4.2.1.4 ECOWAS Mission in Cote d'Ivoire (ECOMICI)

An ECOWAS peace task was also stretched to Cote d'Ivoire during the first Ivorian civil war that took place from 2002-2007. The civil war began in September 2002 when a group of former Ivorian soldiers under the leadership of Guillaume Soro, a civilian, took control of the north of the country.

Reacting to the conflict, ECOWAS took a decision in September 2002 to deploy a peace operation dubbed ECOWAS Mission in Cote d'Ivoire (ECOMICI). Of the 2386

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[76] Yaya Bappah Habibu, "Why Peace Fails In Guinea Bissau? A Political Economy Analysis Of The ECOWAS-Brokered Conakry Accord", *Africanleadershipcentre.Org*, 2020, https://www.africanleadershipcentre.org/attachments/article/552/FES-PSCC-Brochure-No26-A4-VA-web-05%20version%20finale-Habib%20Yaya.pdf.

[77] Oxford Analytica, "Resignation Of 'PM' Will Damage Guinea-Bissau's Vaz | Emerald Insight", *Emerald.Com*, 2019, https://www.emerald.com/insight/content/doi/10.1108/OXAN-ES247673/full/html.

[78] Ricci Shryock, "Embalo Wins Guinea-Bissau Presidential Election", *Voice Of America*, 2020, https://www.voanews.com/africa/embalo-wins-guinea-bissau-presidential-election.

soldiers earmarked for this operation by December 2002, only 500 soldiers were deployed as of February 2003.[79] With the support of France (who had deployed its own troops to Cote d'Ivoire under what was known as 'Force Licorne') ECOWAS initiated negotiations which ended with a ceasefire agreement in the Togolese capital Lome in January 2003.[80] ECOWAS also worked with France as well as the AU and the UN in getting the belligerent parties to emblem the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement on 24 January 2003 which called establishment of a national reconciliation government saddled with the duty of preparing the country for elections and to undo the problems caused by ethnic (Ivoirité-driven) politics (World Peace Foundation).[81]

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[79] World Peace Foundation, "Ivory Coast United Nations Operation In Côte D'Ivoire (UNOCI)", *Sites.Tufts.Edu*, 2020, https://sites.tufts.edu/wpf/files/2017/07/Ivory-Coast-brief.pdf.
[80] Lansana Gberie and Prosper Addo, "Challenges Of Peace Implementation In Côte D'Ivoire", *Files.Ethz.Ch*, 2004, https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/118328/105%20Full.pdf.
[81] World Peace Foundation, "Ivory Coast United Nations Operation In Côte D'Ivoire (UNOCI)"

Chapter 5

THE EFFECTIVENESS OF PEACEKEEPING UNDER THE AFRICAN UNION AND ECOWAS

The regionalization of peacekeeping in Africa cannot be judged exclusively by the mere presence of peacekeeping operations initiated by the AU and ECOWAS. To better grasp the viability of this phenomenon within the African continent it is also important to look at the efficacy of AU and ECOWAS peacekeeping operations. A standard measurement of effectiveness is hard to come by among scholars who have written on African peacekeeping operations. However, based on the exploration of a range of operations masterminded by the AU and ECOWAS in the previous Chapter, I will employ the following parameters to measure my research question: logistical efficiency (the adequacy of personnel and logistics earmarked for the operation), funding autonomy, the attainment of the objectives of the operations and its legality.

5.1 Effectiveness of AU Peacekeeping Operations

The effectiveness of the of the AU in the regionalization of peacekeeping would be analysed through the prism of the aforementioned standards or measurement: logistical efficiency, funding autonomy, attainment of the objective of the operations, and legality of the operations.

5.1.1 Logistical Efficiency

Most operations so far have suffered from significant personnel and logistical deficiencies. Apart from AMIB which had adequate staffing and logistical support at the beginning[82] and AMISEC where all countries fulfilled their pledge of troops, most AU peacekeeping operations have struggled on those two fronts. In terms of personnel, AMIS at its peak had 8000 troops which was small compared to the 40,000 - 45,000 government forces and 10,000 - 20,000 Janjaweed militia elements operating in Sudan's Darfur Region[83].

AMISOM also suffered serious personnel and logistic problems as it struggled to attain just 60 percent of the authorized 8000 troops with only Uganda and Burundi fulfilling their pledge of troops. AMISOM also suffered from the absence of vital pieces of material and equipment for its mission.[84]

The issue of logistical efficiency of AU operations has also been addressed by some scholars, experts, and practitioners most of whom have been very critical of the level it has attained so far. Brigadier General James N. Mazimba of the Zambian Arm force argues economic limitations adversely affect the volume of African states to provide logistical support to peace missions on the continent.

Feldman also highlights the issue of logistical inefficiency from the perspective of inadequate firepower. He points out that equipment used by AU peacekeeping forces are "woefully inadequate" with respect to the job to be done. He cites the example of

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[82] Annemarie Peen Rodt, "The African Union Mission In Burundi", *Civil Wars* 14, no. 3 (2012): 373-392, doi:10.1080/13698249.2012.706951.
[83] Paul D. Williams, "The African Union's Peace Operations: A Comparative Analysis"
[84] Paul D. Williams, "Into The Mogadishu Maelstrom: The African Union Mission In Somalia"

AMIS troops who were armed with AK-47s and officers armed with pistols, and an RPG-7 for every group of ten AU combatants all of which was inadequate when tackling government backed factions.[85]

5.1.2 Funding Autonomy

In terms of funding autonomy, the AU relies extensively on external partners for most of its peacekeeping operations. The European Union (EU) has been the chief promoter of AU peacekeeping operations. Through the African Peace Facility (APF) the EU has contributed the most part of the funding for the following operations: AMISOM, MISCA, RCI-LRA, and the MNJTF.[86]

Some scholars have highlighted the problem of dependence on external donations by the AU to fund its mission. In their report to the AU on the constraints, challenges, and opportunities of peace missions in Africa, Berhe and de Waal underscore African Peace and Security Operations are "typically financed by benefactors and UN. To illustrate this dependency and dilemma, Berhe and de Waal cite the case of AMISON whose mandate comes from the AU to which it reports but funding is derived from a UN managed Trust fund.[87]

Jentzsch also emphasizes the issue of the AU's dependence on external funding. She points out the deficiency of sufficient monetary and logistical resources has made the AU to be reliant on the global community notably in the area of addressing major crisis. This according to her goes against the grain of the AU's Pan-Africanist

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[85] Major Robert L. Feldman, "Problems Plaguing The African Union Peacekeeping Forces", *Defense & Security Analysis* 24, no. 3 (2008): 267-279, doi:10.1080/14751790802321388.

[86] European Commission, "African Union Mission In Somalia (AMISOM)"; European Commission, "Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) Against Boko Haram", *European Commission - European Commission*, 2019, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/MEMO_15_5041.; European Union, "African-Led Peace Support Operations", *Africa-Eu-Partnership.Org*, 2020, https://www.africa-eu-partnership.org/sites/default/files/documents/african-led-psos-v2.pdf.

[87] Ibid.

ideological foundation which challenges Africans to embrace the responsibility of providing for their own security and development.[88].

5.1.3 Attainment of the Objectives of the Operations

Where the AU has really been successful in the regionalization of peacekeeping operations is the attainment of the objectives of the tasks. AMIB has been reckoned as one of the AU's greatest milestones; AMISOM is recognized as having registered significant breakthroughs against the Al-Shabaab rebels in Somalia[89]; AMIS has made a positive impact in the some areas in spite of the limitation in their mandate and in personnel[90]; AMISEC helped ensure the successful tenure of the presidential elections in the Comoros[91]; while the deployment of the RCI-LRA helped in significantly reducing attacks of the LRA on civilians in the areas where they were deployed.[92]

5.1.4 Legality of AU Peacekeeping Operations

One of the bone of contention amongst scholars on the regionalization of peacekeeping in Africa (as highlighted in the literature review) is the legality of peace operations carried out by regional and continental bodies. In this light, it is important to probe into the legality of the aforementioned AU peace operations. What establish the lawful basis for the launching of peace operations by the AU? So far, there are there are two legal bases that can be invoked for the distribution of a peacekeeping operation by the AU: an authorization from the UN Security Council, or the invocation of Article 4 (h) of its constitutive act.

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[88] Corinna Jentzsch, "Opportunities And Challenges To Financing African Union Peace Operations", *African Conflict And Peacebuilding Review* 4, no. 2 (2014): 86-107.

[89] Matt Freear and Cedric De Coning, "Lessons From The African Union Mission For Somalia (AMISOM) For Peace Operations In Mali", *Stability: International Journal Of Security & Development* 2, no. 2 (2013): 23, doi:10.5334/sta.bj.

[90] International Crisis Group, "The AU's Mission In Darfur: Bridging The Gaps", *Crisis Group*, 2005, https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/horn-africa/sudan/aus-mission-darfur-bridging-gaps.

[91] Paul D. Williams, "The African Union's Peace Operations: A Comparative Analysis"

[92] Andrea Prah, "Regional Security Cooperation In Africa.

Most AU peacekeeping operations so far have been done on the basis of an authorization from the PSC of the AU with the acquiescence of the UN Security Council. AMIB was later transformed into a UN peace operation (ONUB) with the adoption of UNSC Resolution 1545 of 2004 through which ONUB inherited AMIB troops as its initial staff.

In a similar trend, AMIS was established by the AU's PSC in 2004 (on the base of Article 4(h)) then transformed into a hybrid UN/AU peacekeeping operation following Resolution 1769 of the UN Security Council in 2007.[93] In the same light, AMISOM was put in place by the PSC of the AU in January 2007 with the approval of the UN Security Council (Resolution 1744(2007)13).[94] The MISCA peace operation deployed in 2013 was authorized by both the PSC of the AU[95] and the UN Security Council.[96]

The RCI-LRA operation against the Lord's Resistance Army and that of the MNJTF against Boko Haram were both authorized by the PSC of the AU and endorsed by the UN Security Council.[97]

[93] Emma Birikorang, "Towards Attaining Peace In Darfur: Challenges To A Successful AU/UN Hybrid Mission In Darfur", *Media.Africaportal.Org*, 2009, https://media.africaportal.org/documents/no_26.pdf.; CONFLICT | Meetings Coverage And Press Releases", *Un.Org*, 2007, https://www.un.org/press/en/2007/sc9089.doc.htm.

[94]AMISOM, "AMISOM Background - AMISOM", *AMISOM*, 2020, https://amisom-au.org/amisom-background/.

[95] United Nations, "Report Of The Secretary-General On The Central African Republic Submitted Pursuant To Paragraph 22 Of Security Council Resolution 2121 (2013)", *Securitycouncilreport.Org*, 2013, https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_2013_677.pdf.

[96] United Nations, "Security Council Authorizes United Nations Multidimensional

[97] https://sites.tufts.edu/wpf/files/2017/07/Lords-Resistance-Army-Mission.pdf.; ReliefWeb, "The African Union-Led Regional Task Force Scores Success Against The Lord'S Resistance Army - Central African Republic", *Reliefweb*, 2013, https://reliefweb.int/report/central-african-republic/african-union-led-regional-task-force-scores-success-against-lord-s.; *Securitycouncilreport.Org*, 2012, https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/UNOCA%20PSC%20MIN%20(CCCXXI).pdf.; Camillo Casola, "Multinational Joint Task Force: Security Cooperation In The Lake Chad Basin", *ISPI*, 2020, https://www.ispionline.it/en/pubblicazione/multinational-joint-task-force-security-cooperation-lake-chad-basin-25448.; United Nations, "Security Council Presidential Statement Condemns Boko Haram Attacks, Supports Joint Strategy To Combat Terrorist Group'S Threats | Meetings Coverage And Press Releases", *Un.Org*, 2015, https://www.un.org/press/en/2015/sc11983.doc.htm.

It can be deduced from the aforementioned that the peace operations of the AU have dual legality given the fact that it is authorized at the regional level by the AU and endorsed at the international level by the UNSC.

5.2 Effectiveness of ECOWAS Peacekeeping Operations

As was the case with the AU, the effectiveness of the of ECOWAS in the regionalization of peacekeeping operations would be analysed through the prism of the aforementioned standards or measurement: logistical efficiency, funding autonomy, attainment of the objective of the operations, and legality of the operations.

5.2.1 Logistical Efficiency

In terms of logistical efficiency, most ECOWAS operations have been bedevilled by the same predicaments as the AU peace operations; understaffed due to failure of states to send pledged troops, and inadequate resources. An exception to the aforementioned trend is ECOMOG's deployment in Liberia which witnessed a massive participation in terms of troop contributions with some coming even from non-member states (Tanzania, and Uganda). A total troops deployment at the onset of the operation in 1990 was 3000; it moved to 8,430 in 1995, and peaked at 16,000 in 1993.[98]

The other operations witnessed logistics flaws especially with troop deployment and management. Obi notes that ECOMOG peacekeeping forces in Sierra Leone where "ill-equipped" and had to shut down operations in 1999 when the biggest troop contributor Nigeria (contributing 90% of the funding) became overstretched and decided to terminate its operations.[99] In Cote d'Ivoire they underscored the limited capability of ECOWAS to ensure the provision or financing of logistic support.

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[98] Christopher Tuck, ""Every Car Or Moving Object Gone"The ECOMOG Intervention In Liberia.", *African Studies Quarterly* 4, no. 1 (2000): 1-16.

[99] Cyril I. Obi, "Economic Community Of West African States On The Ground: Comparing Peacekeeping In Liberia, Sierra Leone, Guinea Bissau, And Côte D'ivoire"

In his assessment of ECOWAS peacekeeping tasks in Sierra Leone and Liberia, Kohou acknowledged the operation was bedevilled by a serious logistics problem as each of the states contributing troops worked with its own assets.[100]

5.2.2 Funding Autonomy

In terms of funding autonomy, most of ECOWAS Peace operations depended largely on outside funding. Apart from ECOWAS operations in Liberia and Sierra Leone were Nigeria is said to have provided 90 percent of its funding[101], the rest of the operations received external funding notably from France (Guinea-Bissau, and Cote d'Ivoire)[102], and the US, the EU, Japan, France, Germany, and Bahrain (Mali).[103]

Kohou notes that there were significant financial difficulties in the ECOWAS peace operations in Liberia and Sierra Leone. He revealed that "While UN peacekeepers were paid $1000 per soldier per month, ECOMOG peacekeepers received $100-150 per month."[104] Omeje on his part underscores ECOWAS missions generally have been impeded by financial challenges. He points out that the capacity of ECOMOG forces have been severely hampered by what he termed "endemic funding and logistical constraints".[105]

Ajayi underscored the dependence of ECOWAS on external financial assistance by highlighting the withdrawal of ECOWAS forces from Guinea-Bissau within a few

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[100] Leopold Kohou, "PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS IN WEST AFRICA", *Apps.Dtic.Mil*, 2000, https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a425341.pdf.

[101] Cyril I. Obi, "Economic Community Of West African States On The Ground

[102] Jeff Cooper, "CONFLICT: ECOMOG Extends Peacekeeping Operations To Guinea Bissau | Inter Press Service", *Ipsnews.Net*, 1999, http://www.ipsnews.net/1999/02/conflict-ecomog-extends-peacekeeping-operations-to-guinea-bissau/.; Maja Bovcon, "France's Conflict Resolution Strategy In Côte D'ivoire And Its Ethical Implications", *African Studies Quarterly* | 11, no. 1 (2009): 1-24.

[103] Taddele Maru Mehari, *African-Led International Support Mission In Mali (AFISMA): Military Ahead Of Politics* (Doha: Al Jazeera Center for Studies, 2013).

[104] Leopold Kohou, "PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS IN WEST AFRICA"

[105] Kenneth C Omeje, *The Crises Of Postcoloniality In Africa* (Baltimore, Maryland: Project Muse, 2018).

months as a result of the absence of financial and logistical support from both the UN and the international community in general.[106]

5.2.3 Attainment of the Objectives of the Operation

In terms of the attainment of the objectives of the operation, ECOWAS has made great strides with a vast majority of its operations achieving their principal objectives: In Liberia, ECOMOG forces were able to repel Taylor's rebellion and restore democracy; In Sierra Leone, ECOMOG forces succeeded to reinstate the constitutionally elected President Ahmad Tejan Kabbah back to power; In Guinea-Bissau, ECOWAS succeeded to stabilize a volatile political situation and ensure a peaceful transition of power through the conduct of a democratic election; In Cote d'Ivoire, ECOWAS helped brokered a cease-fire between the belligerents and contributed to the conclusion of the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement on which the crisis was resolved. The only setback has been in MALI where AFISMA played the second fiddle to the French forces in the drive to restore democratic order in the country.

5.2.4 Legality of ECOWAS Peacekeeping Operations

ECOWAS peace operations have enjoyed mostly on the grounds of consent from the UN Security Council. All of the aforementioned ECOWAS peace operations received prior endorsement from the UN Security Council except in the case of Liberia and Sierra Leone where the concept of humanitarian intervention could be tried. However, the argument of humanitarian intervention appears weak and contested in the Liberian and Sierra Leonean cases.

While many will think ECOWAS mission in Liberia and Sierra Leone should qualify as humanitarian interventions given the concern of the regional body to stop the civil

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[106] Titilope Ajayi, "The UN, The AU And ECOWAS – A Triangle For Peace And Security In West Africa?", *Library.Fes.De*, 2008, https://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/usa/05878.pdf.

wars in these countries, several legal scholars vehemently disagree. In the case of Liberia, Levitt argues that the ECOWAS Treaty does not empower did not put in place a mechanism for regional security that handles distinctly domestic conflicts.

Nowrot and Schebacker on their part take the same position with the ECOWAS intervention in Sierra Leone.

However, both operations enjoyed *dejure* legality from a retro-active authorization granted them by the UN Security Council.

5.3 Cooperation between the UN and African Peacekeeping Operations (AU and ECOWAS)

Another important aspect that explains the efficacy of the localization of peacekeeping in Africa is the relationship between African peacekeeping tasks and the United Nations. From the prism of positivism (taking the law as it or has been established), the prerogative to authorize the usage of force rests in the hands of the UN Security Council. Though Chapter VIII of the UN Charter provides a role for regional arrangements (organizations in peacekeeping it nevertheless safeguards the asymmetric relationship when it comes to authorization of peacekeeping which gives the UN pre-eminence over regional organizations. While Article 52 offers the foundation for the intervention of local organizations like the AU and ECOWAS in peacekeeping, Article 53 emphasize unequivocally that such interventions can only be carried out with explicit approval from the UN Security Council.

From this perspective, the regionalization of peacekeeping cannot be seen as a *sui generes* in the peaceful settlement of dispute but rather as a decentralization or

devolution of power and responsibility from the UN to regional arrangements (organisations and entities). In this sense, regional organizations act as auxiliaries to the UN to help its achieve its overriding goal of peaceful settlement of disputes across the globe.

Within the above framework, it is crucial to look at the connection between the AU and ECOWAS with the UN in the area of peacekeeping. So far, there has been a smooth collaboration between the AU and ECOWAS and the UN in the area of peacekeeping. This is evidenced by two important empirical realities:

First is the fact that all the peacekeeping operations undertaken by the former (the AU and ECOWAS) have received the endorsement (prior and retroactively) and support (including funding for some) of the latter (the UN).

Second is the fact that some the peacekeeping missions undertaken by the AU and ECOWAS were ultimately transformed to UN peace tasks. In the case of the AU for instance there was a shift from AMIS to UNAMID in Sudan; AMIB to ONUB in Burundi; MISCA to MINUSCA in Central African Republic; and in the case of ECOWAS; ECOMIL to UNMIL in Liberia; ECOMOG operations in Sierra Leone to UNOMSIL; ECOMICI to UNOCI in Côte d'Ivoire.

Article 92 - 96 of the resolution adopted by the summit was focused on peacekeeping. Article 93 specifically addressed the issue of regionalization of peacekeeping with the UN reaffirming Chapter VIII in no uncertain terms.

Thus the efficacy of the localization of peacekeeping in Africa can also be seen from the perspective of recognition and collaboration of the UN of African peacekeeping operations under the AU and ECOWAS as demonstrated above.

In sum, it is apparent from the above analysis that both the AU and ECOWAS peacekeeping operations suffer from similar limitations and can boast of similar strengths. In terms of limitation both are highly dependent on external funding and encounter logistical deficiencies. In terms of strength, both organisations have been largely successful in achieving the purpose of their peace operations.

Chapter 6

CONCLUSION

The regionalization of peacekeeping in Africa has become a subject of significant contemplation amongst specialists and experts in the field of conflict resolution and peace studies. The thesis began with the statement of research objectives and methodological issues. Qualitative methods were solely chosen given the constrain of time and resources to combine it with quantitative studies (notably surveys and interviews). This thesis used the AU and ECOWAS to analyse the efficacy of regionalization of peacekeeping in Africa. The AU is the lone intergovernmental organization at the continental level and has for the past years been significantly involved in peacekeeping operations. ECOWAS is the most prolific sub-regional organization carrying out peacekeeping operations on the African continent.

This work depended on both primary and secondary sources for it analysis. Secondary sources used in this work include: journal articles, published books. While, primary sources employed include: treaties and conventions were also accessed from online organizational repositories.

This thesis utilized two theories for its analysis. The principal theoretical framework adopted is positivism given the fact that regionalization of peacekeeping hovers so much around conventional law and formal sources. The process theory was also used

to make allowance for recent evolution in the domain of peacekeeping like humanitarian intervention.

A review of literature and the historical background of the practice of peacekeeping was carried out. The literature review captured the debate between pro-regionalization scholars and regionalization sceptics. Pro-regionalization scholars approach the concept from a positive angle within the overall agenda of "African Answers to African Glitches". Regionalization sceptics on the other hand question the legitimacy of African peacekeeping operations, and highlight its pitfalls such as logistical inadequacies and dependence on foreign support. The history of peacekeeping operations was traced from the first UN peacekeeping experiment in the Middle East to the peacekeeping under the two case-study organizations (AU and ECOWAS).

A theoretical and conceptual framework was also established and used for analysis. A definition and explanation of the principal theory (positivism) and secondary theory (process theory) was given and the main concepts of the thesis (regionalization and peacekeeping) thoroughly explored.

An extensive amount of attention was given to the operationalization of the concept of regional peacekeeping within the AU and ECOWAS. It explored all the seven peacekeeping operations that have been carried out by the AU. An evaluation of the effectiveness of the aforementioned operations was made based on three criteria: logistical efficiency, funding autonomy, attainment of the objectives of the operations and legality of the operations. The chapter also probed into the legitimacy of the explored AU peace operations. A similar analysis was also carried out for the ECOWAS five peace operations so far carried out.

Grounded on the empirical data explored the following deductions could be drawn concerning the research question and hypothesis.

Concerning the research question, an analysis was made on the efforts put in place by both the AU and ECOWAS to pursue peacekeeping on the continent and their level of effectiveness. The efforts of the AU and the ECOWAS towards peacekeeping was explored in Chapter Four which presented a detail account of peace operations undertaken by both organizations in response to conflict situations within their respective jurisdiction. It was revealed that both the AU and ECOWAS have carried out a significant number of peacekeeping operations by dispatching military and civilian personnel in trouble zones in a bid to restore peace and constitutional order.

The level of efficiency of the peacekeeping tasks under the AU and ECOWAS was critically analysed based on four standards of measurement: logistical efficiency, funding autonomy, attainment of the objectives of the operations and legality of the operations. In terms of logistical efficiency, it was revealed that most of the operations carried out by both organizations suffered from a high level of logistical deficiency. In terms of funding autonomy, it was discovered that both organizations are profoundly reliant on external financing especially from the EU and the UN.

On the positive angle, it was reported that nearly all of these peacekeeping operations accomplished their objectives most of which was geared towards the reinstatement of legitimate order and political stability. The legality of the operations was ensured from two angles: predominantly by authorization of the United Nations within the perspective of legal positivism which requires a justification based on the law in force and not a moral argument; and secondly from the perspective of responsibility to

protect (R2P) specifically with the case of the AU whose Constitutive Act grants the organization the right to intervene militarily in a member state in the case of a grave human rights violation and crimes against humanity.

From the accounts of the peacekeeping operations explored in Chapter Four and the analysis of their effectiveness done in Chapter Five, it is obvious that there is a high level of efficiency of the peacekeeping tasks carried out so far by the AU and ECOWAS. This thesis demonstrated that the concept of regionalization of peacekeeping has been fully operationalized on the ground with both institutions being able to deploy peacekeeping missions in trouble spots within their area of jurisdiction. In spite of some logistics and financial challenges, almost all these operations succeeded to attain their objectives. There is certainly room for improvement especially in the domains of funding and logistics but one can say with a comfortable level of certainty that regionalization of peacekeeping in African has moved from rhetoric to action. All these validate the hypothesis that the initiatives taken by the African Union and ECOWAS in the area of peacekeeping shows the regionalization of peacekeeping is a concrete reality in the African continent.

At the end of this work, I have two observations to make, one from the area of future research and another in the area of policy.

In terms of future research, I start by recognizing the fact that perfection is not human and therefore this research enquiry into the regionalization of peacekeeping in Africa is far from being exhaustive. As earlier mentioned, the present thesis comes with a methodological incompleteness given the inability to explore quantitative aspects which could have adequately complemented the qualitative analysis carried out. A

questionnaire-based survey to sample opinions of Africans from countries that have hosted AU and ECOWAS peace operations is therefore recommended for future studies.

This would enable future research to get the views of the people concerned on the effectiveness of these operations in their countries. Equally of significant for future studies will be interview with officials in both organizations (AU and ECOWAS) in charge of the deployment of peacekeeping operations. Such interviews will enable researchers to get a deeper understanding on the some of the intricacies and nitty-gritties involved in such operations.

In the domain of policy, I wish to recommend that both the AU and ECOWAS come out with effective strategies to own the funding or sponsorship of their peacekeeping operations. The regionalization of peacekeeping and the concept of 'African Answer to African Setbacks' can only be complete, in my opinion, when Africans themselves take full responsibility over their peacekeeping initiatives by providing the funding and logistics necessary for their operation.

I also wish to recommend that all regional organizations in Africa like ECOWAS, Southern African Development Community (SADC), Economic etc., should institutionalize R2P like the AU by making it part of their constitutive document. This will greatly help in addressing the tendency of leaders or governments exploiting the concept of sovereign parity and non-interference to prevent regional or international peacekeeping interventions.

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