

Brexit: A Case Study of Populist and Personalized Politics

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ABSTRACT

Populism is a concept that has been discussed a lot in the literature, both theoretically and ideologically. While attention to populism increased, the term continued to be contested. Using a qualitative content analysis method, this thesis looks at the Brexit referendum period in the UK to understand the nature and extent of populist discourses. The study covers the period of 1st of January 2014 to 31st of July 2016 and uses newspaper content from Daily Mail, Daily Mirror and The Times.

The most recent populist trend that developed in Europe and the world started to strongly affect the United Kingdom with the Brexit referendum. In the 1980s, the fact that some political groups and actors in Britain began to take a negative attitude towards Europe with Euroscepticism directly impacted the referendum process, along with the populism movements in Europe and America during the referendum process. Most importantly, the Brexit referendum process illustrated that populism was coupled with another political trend: the personalization of politics. The prominence of individual political actors and the fact that populist discourse led by particular individuals such as Nigel Farage and Boris Johnson showed the emergence of this shift in cleavage structures in the UK besides the effects of populism. The study demonstrates that there is a significant level of personalisation of politics during the Brexit referendum.

Keywords: Euroscepticism, populism, personalisation of politics, Brexit referendum, United Kingdom

ÖZ

Popülizm, literatürde hem teorik hem de ideolojik olarak çokça tartışılan bir terimdir. Birçok bilim insanı popülizmi tanımlarken her zaman kavramı konjonktürel ele alarak bir sonuca varmaya çalışmıştır.

Avrupa'da ve dünyada gelişen popülizm akımı, Brexit referandumunu ile Birleşik Krallık'ta da güçlü bir şekilde etkisini göstermeye başladı. 1980'lerde İngiltere'deki bazı siyasi grup ve aktörlerin Avrupa şüpheciliği ile Avrupa'ya karşı olumsuz bir tavır almaya başlaması, referandum sürecinde Avrupa ve Amerika'daki popülizm hareketleriyle birlikte referandum sürecini doğrudan etkilemiştir. Ancak Brexit referandumunu sürecinde siyasi gruplardan farklı olarak siyasi aktörlerin öne çıkması ve popülizmin bireyler tarafından yapılması İngiltere için popülizmin yanında farklı bir konunun ortaya çıkmasına neden oldu: siyasetin kişiselleştirilmesi. Bu çalışmanın sonucunda da Brexit referandumu sırasında ciddi seviyede siyasetin kişiselleştirilmesi ile ilgili bulgular saptanmıştır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Avrupa şüpheciliği, popülizm, siyasetin kişiselleştirilmesi, Brexit referandumunu, Birleşik Krallık

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Chapter 1

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Statement of the Problem

This thesis aims to evaluate how populism and the personalization of politics shaped the Brexit process in the UK. Populism is a term that has been discussed a lot in the literature, both conceptually, theoretically and ideologically. While defining many scholars have always tried to conclude by considering the concept conjectural. For Mudde, populism is a "thin ideology", for Kazin and Brubaker populism is a "political language" or "discourse" and for Norris and Judis, rather, populism is "a political logic, not an ideology". It is argued that it is a way of thinking about politics (Mudde; Kazin and Brubaker; Norris and Judis). It is quite obvious that political figures such as Donald Trump have had an impact on all these discussions, especially with the nationalist and populist trend that has emerged in Europe recently.

The populism trend that developed in Europe and the world started to strongly affect the United Kingdom with the Brexit referendum. In the 1980s, the fact that some political groups and actors in Britain began to take a negative attitude towards Europe with Euroscepticism directly impacted the referendum process, along with the populism movements in Europe and America during the referendum process. However, in the Brexit referendum process, the prominence of individual political actors meant that there was also a compounding factor of personalization of politics.

In the referendum process, it can be said that external actors, besides the actors in the United Kingdom, also had an impact on the process. In this context, the thesis study examines the phenomenon of populism in the statements of political persons (actors). The study achieves this aim by using a qualitative content analysis of 605 newspaper articles within the period of 1st of January 2014 to 31st of July 2016.

1.2 Brexit: Euroscepticism, Populism and Personalization of Politics

Populism, which is seen European wide today, contains many definitions within itself. In Cass Mudde's widely used definition, populism is an ideology that ultimately sees society as two homogeneous and antagonistic groups, "pure people" versus "corrupt elites," and argues that politics is derived from the will of the people (Mudde, 2004, p. 543). Although the parties that helped populism to be European-centred and whose influence is increasing day by day, differ in terms of their national policies in general, the focus of right-wing populist parties is technically on immigrants, nationalism and ethnic diversity. According to Brubaker, both all right-wing populists, which are around the vertical plane on subjects such as immigrants, nationalism and ethnic diversity and left-wing populists, which are around the horizontal plane on subject's economics, globalization and taxes, technically show similarities (Brubaker, 2017, p. 363).

Euroscepticism had previously been nurtured in the UK but remained in the background. Usherwood states that populist political mobilization that resurfaced was in a way further triggered by the populist trends across Europe. Euroscepticism via populist discourses of United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) and Conservative Party in government (Usherwood, 2018, p. 558). This populist political mobilization has also led to participation in politics and turnout in elections.

After the Brexit referendum held in 2016, Euroscepticism became the official tone of government. The changes were seen in the Conservative Party, and the incredible success of a party like UKIP in the "Brexit" process shows the extent of Euroscepticism in the UK (Hughes, 2019, p. 249) (Lynch & Whitaker, 2018, p. 32). There were certain segments of the Brexit referendum on which populist rhetoric was influential. According to Sobolewska and Ford, the majority of those pro-Brexit were white homogeneous classes and voters with lower educational levels. Although the level of education and liberal perspective in the UK increases with each new generation, this is progressing very slowly. Therefore, how issues such as ethnic diversity and immigrants are viewed has been affected by populist discourses (Sobolewska & Ford, 2019, pp. 143–144).

Euroscepticism, developing since the time of Margaret Thatcher, was founded with the ideas that opposed the Maastricht Treaty which was seen to create a Brussels-based super-state mechanism. However, the most important turn of Euroscepticism and later anti-EU populism could be traced back to the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP). Combining Euroscepticism with three other political themes, UKIP marched to success. Firstly, UKIP opposed the transfer of British sovereignty to another authority within the theme of democracy. According to Farage, British national sovereignty was "destroyed" by the Maastricht Treaty (Tournier-Sol, 2015, p. 142). As another theme, they emphasize that the EU restricts UK's freedom. They base the thesis that the EU is bringing the immigration problem to the UK and thus restricting the freedom of British citizens. Finally, they deal with the theme of the EU recognizing the UK as a world power rather than a European regional power. This is Eurosceptic, populist rhetoric, based on Europe not seeing the UK as a European state. With all this

sceptical and populist rhetoric, UKIP proved its undeniable rise before the Brexit referendum, achieving tremendous success in the 2015 general elections (Tournier-Sol, 2015, p. 144,145,154).

It is necessary to disentangle the terms of populism and Euroscepticism. There is a link between exclusionary populism and Euroscepticism. Exclusionary populism is used in the immigrant crisis, which is predicted to have a direct impact on the outcome of the Brexit referendum. As Mudde states, exclusionary populism, one of the two characters of populism, is defined in three dimensions together with its counterparts, inclusionary populism (Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2013, p. 158). Although the material, political and symbolic dimensions revealed by Flic are not clearly explained (Flic, 2010, pp. 128–138), they have adequately explained in Mudde and Kaltwasser's comparison of Europe and Latin America.

Stating that the character of today's right-wing populist parties is exclusionary populism, Mudde and Kaltwasser state exclude them from accessing the resources of a certain group in the society in the material dimension of exclusionary populism. Protectionism is here against "external threats". In the political dimension of exclusionary populism, certain groups from outside are prevented from participating in the democratic system of the society and are not allowed to be represented. They see Muslim immigrants in Europe as a specific group who have a negative effect only on the rules of the majority. Finally, in symbolic exclusionary populism, according to Mudde, the claims of radical right-wing parties that express the voice of the people, such as the voice of the classless, the "silent majority," ensure the exclusion of non-native groups and even ethnicization and exclusion of all foreigners, from illegal

immigrants to legally working immigrants (Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2013, pp. 158–166).

Unlike other regions in the world, Europe has been the region most affected by the refugee crisis. Right-wing populist parties, which use politics mainly based on refugees, mobilize the society with the term's "protectionism" and "there is an external threat". Noting that exclusionary populism includes the instinct of protectionism, Brubaker adds that populist protectionism relies on the rhetoric of the "crisis" (Brubaker, 2017, p. 366). In protectionist discourses, it should be known where the threat is directed so that protection is offered. In addition, the dramatization of the situation in crisis while in power reflects the themes of populism, such as cultural diversity, immigration, and suspicion of terrorism, to society more.

Undoubtedly, there was undeniable character and leadership on the road to Brexit. Prime Minister Cameron and his entourage, Labour Party and liberal democratic parties, who were in favour of "staying" from the beginning, that is, from the decision of the referendum, often put forward their arguments in the socio-economic environment. It could not be said that there was a party or a leader that would provide political mobilization for favour in staying side. However, we cannot say the same for Brexiteers. As Hughes points out, UKIP and its successor, the Brexit party, which progressed in the UK under the leadership of Nigel Farage with the theme of anti-immigration without racism, achieved political mobilization with incredible activism by using the language of "othering" populism (Hughes, 2019, p. 250). In the end, they got the result they wanted in the Brexit referendum.

In the process leading to Brexit, political mobilization was especially supported by the media too. The parallel that Hughes tried to prove in his article between the increase of othering populist rhetoric and the increase of populist-based news in newspapers indirectly shaped the political mobilization in the process leading to Brexit (Hughes, 2019, pp. 255–258). The fact that Goodwin and Heath were trying to point out that the people who follow the news and the agenda from the mainstream media channels in the UK are low-level people in terms of education status and the relatively elderly people have been decisive in the process leading to Brexit (Goodwin & Heath, 2016, p. 327). Political mobilization has shifted in favour of the Brexit side, with mainstream media sources such as the Daily Mail, Express, Telegraph, the Daily Mirror, the Guardian and the Times expressing the populist discourses from populists in their canals.

1.3 Methodology of the Study

To explore how elements of populism existed in political discourses surrounding Brexit, firstly the categories of populism were examined, Then, the attitudes of populist actors were analysed to understand how they have achieved political mobilization. Then, how the issue of immigration is handled by populist actors was examined. Finally, the long- and short-term consequences of Brexit, was discussed. To achieve these aims both primary sources and secondary sources were employed. Primary sources mainly include actors' statements and arguments in the Brexit period. A content analysis of these official documents was carried out with the help of ATLAS.ti, a Computer-Aided Qualitative Data Analysis Software. The thesis also uses a sample of political speeches during and after the Brexit referendum to identify the adoption of populist discourses by mainstream actors of the Brexit referendum period. Additionally, the thesis assesses the extent to which politics was personalised.

1.4 The Limitations of the Study

This study does not engage in a causal analysis and thus does not claim that populism and personalization of politics was the root cause of Brexit. This study explores the extent to which populist discourses and elements identified with populism and personalization of politics were present in the public domain during the Brexit referendum.

1.5 The Structure of the Thesis

There are six chapters in total including the conclusion part of the study. In the introduction, some parts explain the background of the study, the literature review used in the study, a summary of the methodology section, which is also a chapter in the thesis, the explanation of the limitations we used in the study, and a part to explain thesis organisation.

In the second chapter of the thesis, populism, one of the two frameworks used in the thesis, is explained. After the conceptual and theoretical definitions of populism are made, the horizontal and vertical dimensions of populism are explained. In the continuation, the five fundamental elements of populism in the literature are analysed separately and then the populism chapter is summarized together with the conclusion.

In the third chapter of the thesis, the second framework of the study "personalization of politics" is examined. The third chapter first examines the combination of leaders and democracy in politics. Then, the influence of leaders on voter behaviour is explained and analysed in detail in the UK. After examining the effects of institutions, leadership, media and personalization in politics separately, the last section explains

how the personalization of politics is measured in the literature and how this happens in the UK.

Chapter four of the thesis is the methodology part of the study. Qualitative analysis and its techniques (content and discourse analysis) used in the study, computer-aided qualitative analysis software program ATLAS.ti to create the analyses in the study, media landscape analysis for the analyses of the newspapers used in the study, and finally the measurement of the reliability and validity of the analyses are handled separately.

Chapter 5 of the thesis includes the most important part of the thesis, namely data analysis. Here, after explaining how the codebook is prepared for the analysis and how the search sequence is created, the analysis is started. In the analyses, firstly, the sum of the statements of the actors in the newspapers and the sum of the statements of the individual actors were made. Then, the sums of the statements of internal and external actors in the three newspapers are given in separate sections, respectively. The next section gives the sum of the actors' statements on twelve topics in the Daily Mail, the Daily Mirror and the Times. After giving the totals of the statements of the actors on the issues, the evaluations of the statements of the actors in the three newspapers are given in the light of the discourse analysis used in the study. In addition, the analysis also shows the evaluation of official and informal business/financial organizations' statements in the Times newspaper. Immediately after, the sum of the statements pointing to the attitudes of the actors and business/finance sectors in the referendum process is shown. Finally, the total results of the justification of actors' arguments/statements in the newspapers are shown in a table.

In the conclusion part, there is a brief conclusion of the thesis as well as predictions about how populism might evolve in the UK after the Brexit referendum.

Chapter 2

POPULISM

2.1 Definition of Populism

Like most political concepts, populism was handled by many scholars, editors, books and researchers. While there are still many debates on its definition, the origin of the concept essentially comes from the formation and development of political parties. In particular, the decrease in the votes of authoritarian parties in the Western World in the conjuncture after World War II and the sudden increase in the authoritarian party votes in the 1980s gives us a clue as to which base of parties populism begins to be effective (Norris & Inglehart, 2019, p. 26). Although this data is not enough to meet the definition of populism, it shows that it contains a dichotomy between "evil versus good" or the "former versus latter" in the definition of populism.

In the Oxford Dictionary definition, populism is the policies or principles of any political party that claims to represent the interests of ordinary people. However, Michael Kazin, who stated that populism has long been a controversial and ambiguous concept against this definition, defines populism as a mobilizing political language. He has defined populism as a language that perceives the speakers as a noble group instead of ordinary people, sees their elite enemies as selfish and anti-democratic, and also mobilizes the former versus the latter (Kazin, 2014, p. 1). Mudde, who agrees with Kazin that populism is a complex and controversial concept, sees it as a "thin ideology" whose populism is merely a framework: the ideology of the "pure people"

against the "corrupt elite" (Mudde, 2004, p. 543,544). This "thin ideology" can be linked to "thick ideologies" such as nationalism, socialism, anti-imperialism, or racism to explain world politics and set important agendas.

Against this ideological approach, is Pippa Norris who claims that populism cannot be qualified as a political ideology like socialism or liberalism alone, as it lacks theoretical and consistent practical solutions. Even if the underlying ideas of populism do not create a detailed philosophy, it can be seen as a somewhat "thin-centred ideology". Nevertheless, it is very difficult to define populism as ideology, as it will lack essential components (Norris, 2020, p. 698). In addition, Jan-Werner Müller states that not everyone who criticizes the elite is populist, saying that the thin-centred ideology definition is insufficient. According to Werner, populists claim that they only speak for the "pure people" or the "silent majority" and that they recognize an alternative political reality in which they have a monopoly on the representation of the "real people", saying that the "real people" are paramount (Brown, 2017, p. 3,4).

There are also definitions where populism is defined as a set of ideas. The common view of many European academics is that populism is an ideational approach. According to Hawkins and Kaltwasser, populism as a unique set of ideas best understood is a Manichean struggle between the embodied will of the people in politics and the conspiratorial elites (Hawkins & Kaltwasser, 2017, p. 3). Especially these ideas come to the fore in the conflict of good versus evil, and the people against the elite. However, the most important point of the ideas in this approach is that it does not claim to be distinctive. Norris has pointed out that unlike political ideologies such as Marxism, liberalism, or feminism, which contain simple binary judgments about the struggle for good and evil, the "unique set of ideas" expressed by populists is

emphasized authentically, meaningfully, and thus affects populist thoughts and its followers as well as the actions of elites (Norris, 2020, p. 698).

In the definitions so far, ideological and ideational approaches that can be effective in defining populism have been emphasized. However, it is inevitable to mention some definitions that are argued that populism is just a discourse, as a style of speaking, in addition to the definitions of ideational and ideological approaches. Norris argues that the rhetorical approach examines the structure and style of the topic the speaker is discussing, rather than making sense of what the speaker is saying, and states that the populist speaker's goal involves claims to liberate politics from corruption or return power to ordinary people (Norris, 2020, p. 698). As an example of this definition, convincing slogans such as Theresa May's "Brexit means Brexit" or Boris Johnson's "Get Brexit Done" actually the politicians make the public feel that should adopt the "will of the people" or that "the people, not politicians, should make important political decisions", and thus populist leaders reflect it to the public that politics is indeed a conflict in which the good versus the evil and the pure people versus the elite.

2.1.1 Difference Between Nationalism and Populism

It was mentioned above that there are many complexities in the definition of populism and therefore the difficulty of a single correct definition. The most difficult point for many academics in defining populism is the connection of the concept of nationalism with populism. Some claim that populism and nationalism are two different concepts and that nationalism has a connection with populism, depending on the dimensions of populism. Before elaborating these claims, in the dictionary definition of nationalism: To defend and support the interests of one's nation, especially against the exclusion

and detriment of other nations (*NATIONALISM (Noun) Definition and Synonyms / Macmillan Dictionary, n.d.*).

Firstly, according to Dr Benjamin de Cleen, populism and nationalism are two very different concepts. He argues that populist politics creates the "people" by opposing the "elite" and then represents the "people", arguing that populism is formed around a vertical dimension. Contrary to populism, the concept of nationalism is built on a horizontal dimension, not a vertical one. Nationalist politics claims to create and represent the nation that is discourse constructed between those "within the nation" and those "outside the nation" (*Populism, Nationalism and Transnationalism, n.d.*). In this view, all anti-immigrant parties in Europe are essentially nationalist, but at best they are only in secondary level populist or not at all (Stavrakakis et al., 2017, p. 421). Also, as stated by the authors of the Oxford Handbook of Political Ideologies; even if in practice nationalism is always combined with populism, it does not mean that nationalism is a definitive feature of populism. Instead, they argue that the strongest link between nationalism and populism can be found in European populist right-wing parties where authoritarianism, nativism and populism are prevalent (Freedon et al., 2013, p. 509,510).

Contrary to the definition that populism is different from nationalism, populism is already kin of nationalism, and thus the definition of populism is in fact nationalism. Against this rigid conceptual divergence, as Brubaker has argued, populist appeals from the public cannot seize a productive uncertainty and will therefore appeal to the people, evoking the sovereign people and limited society. Since the two-dimensional space in question is understood as an area of inequality and difference, the dimensions generally become intertwined with the representation of the elite outside as well as

above, due to vertical opposition on top and horizontal to the outside. Besides, the ambiguity and two-dimensionality of appeals to the people does not stem from the combination of populism and nationalism, because they are already a founding feature of populism. That is, it is a practical resource that will set the limits of conflict in the construction of political identities and political opposition (Brubaker, 2020, p. 44).

2.2 Dimensions of Populism

As mentioned above, within the definitions of populism, there is a constant conflict of two groups or sides (the good versus the evil / the real people versus the corrupt elite) and it is observed that these conflicts differ in terms of the themes they contain. In these conflicts, where the groups or parties do not change, except for some exceptions, the issues and trends they deal with in the themes of the conflicts also identify the position of political parties against the current policies in-country or global. Many authors who define populism state that populists are shaped in two-dimensional directions: horizontal and vertical.

In populism which is built vertically, the segment called "real people" stands against the economic, cultural and political "elite" segment. On this axis, the "people" are enormously represented innocently, decently and morally, while with the elite they are portrayed as a wealthy, powerful, rule-free, economically degraded segment (Brubaker, 2017, p. 363). The "real people" in Brubaker's definition here can be defined not only in relations with those above but also in relations with "below", also in the vertical dimension. For example, as Müller puts it, those in the lower segment, that is, the "people", can be represented as disorganized, dangerous and not deserving of good or benefit, but supposedly decent, hardworking and moral (Müller, 2016, p. 23).

Instead of the vertical dimension of populism, in the horizontal dimension, “the people” are considered as limited integrity, and here the contradistinction is mainly among inside and outside, which remains central to both right-wing and left-wing populism, albeit of different dimensions indeed. In this context, while populist leftists interpret the restricted integrity with economic and political expressions and define the threats from outside in terms of irregular trade and globalization, American imperialism, and sometimes the European Union (EU), populist rightists, on the other hand, interpret society as a whole with common and different lifestyles and perceive this unity as a threat by outgroups or external forces (even those who live in that state and are citizens of that state are not seen as completely loyal or belonging to the nation as internal foreigners).

For all these reasons, in both left and right variants of populism, the discourses of vertical opposition to the elite represented at the top are intertwined, as well as the discourses of horizontal opposition to outside groups. Also, the economic, political, and cultural elites are seen to be represented outside or at the top, and they are seen not only as isolated from other people but also different in terms of their values and living standards (Brubaker, 2017, p. 363).

2.3 Elements of Populist Discourse

Before starting this part, I think it would be helpful to state the following; the subtitles mentioned below do not make a difference from the sub-titles in the articles of Cass Mudde, Rogers Brubaker and Pippa Norris (Brubaker, 2017; Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2013; Norris, 2020). This is because, as it is aforementioned at the beginning of the chapter, there are significant deficiencies/complexities in the definition and categorization of populism; for this reason, the fact that the three above-

mentioned authors made serious objective contributions to this aspect of populism helped to avoid more complex and controversial, unclear information about this part in the study. However, this does not mean that other sources cannot be used as well, that is, the subtitles "names" used in this section are similar to the subtitles in the articles of the three authors mentioned above. In this section, of course, other sources were also used in terms of content.

2.3.1 Antagonistic Re-politicization

Antagonistic re-politicization is a discourse element used to claim to reassert or regulate democratic control over living spaces that have been removed or seen as distant from democratic decision spaces. Although this type of discourse is generally seen as traditional in left-wing variants of populism, it has also become popular in right-wing populist variants, especially with Margaret Thatcher, who objected to the non-alternativeness of neo-liberal policies. One of its most important features is that it involves "opposing" the transfer of some key elements of sovereignty in the democratization process of the state and the constitutionalization of economic freedoms to an organization (such as the European Union) to which the state is bound by treaties (Grimm, 2015, p. 469). Elites are people who do not trust the people, prefer decisions that are disconnected from the people and therefore isolated from the rationality of democracy. Antagonistic re-politicization is the sharpest of all discourse genres, as it constructs a sharp and incomprehensible boundary between the people and the elite.

2.3.2 Majoritarianism

It is a type of discourse that creates the claim of the interests, rights and will of the majority against the interests of the minorities. Majoritarianism also emphasizes the interpenetration of horizontal and vertical oppositions of populism, as it can be

directed simultaneously at those at the top, those at the bottom, and those on the fringes. Discourses advocating multiculturalism, diversity and minority rights may be opposed because they devalue the rights of the majority or because they devalue the traditional or mainstream situation.

2.3.3 Anti-institutionalism

Anti-institutionalism is the third component. Of course, this is selective anti-institutionalism. Once in control, populists can attempt to create their institutions as well as control and operate through those that already exist. Populism, on the other hand, distrusts the mediating roles of institutions, particularly political parties, the media, and the courts, as an "ideology of immediacy." A lot of the time, even when populists create new parties to participate in elections, they use anti-party rhetoric, and the parties they create are usually poorly structured vehicles for personalistic leadership. They often claim to support direct rather than representative democracy, usually via majoritarian processes such as referendums or plebiscites, but sometimes through experimentation with "horizontal"—"distributed, participatory, and networked"—forms of political participation (Brubaker, 2017). Even as populists attempt to use or dominate the existing media, they also seek to circumvent it and connect directly with their followers. Populists often mistrust institutional mediation because of its complexity and lack of transparency, as well as the diversity and autonomy of institutions. For instance, Trump has challenged the validity of the mainstream media as well as the legitimacy of the courts.

2.3.4 Protectionism

This is the assertion that "the people" will be protected against dangers from above, below, and, more recently, from the outside. Economic, securitarian, and cultural protectionism are the three types of protectionist populist rhetoric, according to

Brubaker (Brubaker, 2017, p. 366). These three are crucial in today's populist era. Domestic producers are threatened by cheap imported products, domestic employees are threatened by cheap foreign labour, and domestic debtors are threatened by foreign creditors, according to economic protectionism. Terrorism and criminality are highlighted by securitarian protectionism. Outsiders who vary in religion, language, cuisine, clothing, physical conduct, and ways of utilizing public space pose a danger to the known living environment, according to cultural protectionism.

The discourse of "crisis" is essential to populist protectionism. Populists overstate and misrepresent the dangers against which they promise to provide protection. They often exaggerate their reaction to crises while they are in power. They do this by organizing events that claim to show jobs being saved or created, barriers being constructed, illegal immigrants being deported, terror suspects being apprehended, and foreign cultural forms like the niqab being removed from public spaces.

2.3.5 Style of Populists

The fifth and final part of the populist repertory concerns communicational, rhetorical, self-presentational, and body-behavioural style, rather than the "what" of populist speech. Ostiguy (Ostiguy, 2009, p. 5) describes the populist style as "low" rather than "high," favouring "raw" and vulgar language and self-presentation above polished and cultured. The high-low dimension, as Ostiguy points out, is completely independent of the left-right axis, resulting in a two-dimensional universe of political appeals or positions that encompasses "high" left and "high" right as well as "low" or populist left and right views. Populist rhetoric, a form of public discourse characterized by straightforwardness, simplicity, and seeming self-evidence, uses strategies that also performatively devalue complexity. This frequently manifests in explicit anti-

intellectualism and an epistemological populism that favours first-hand experience over abstract, experience-distant forms of knowledge. Since the body is a powerful political operator and signifier, closeness to "the people" may be conveyed and performed via gesture, tone, sexuality, clothing, and food, the "low" style is enacted not just through methods of talking but also through embodied ways of doing and being.

Another feature of the populist style is that it pits common sense and straightforward communication against the limitations and restraints of polite speech and political correctness. Populists like not just criticising the norms regulating permissible speech, but also breaking them. They highlighted their readiness to violate taboos, reject euphemisms, and upset the norms of polite speech and "normal" attitude via an attention-seeking technique of provocation (Brubaker, 2017).

2.4 Exclusionary and Inclusionary Populism

Inclusionary and exclusionary populism have been distinguished in comparative studies of populism, with the difference based on these three analytical measurements: material, political, and symbolic. The material factor considers the distribution of resources between social groups, with inclusionary populist parties advocating for large-scale welfare programmes to benefit the poor, and exclusionary populisms trying to defend forms of welfare chauvinism aimed at protecting welfare insiders from immigrant outsiders. The political mobilisation that goes beyond representative democratic channels, including such plebiscitary and local forms of a robust democracy, is referred to as the political dimension. Exclusionary populisms support similar tools but seek the disenfranchisement of immigrant groups, while inclusionary populisms promote similar tools but require the disenfranchisement of disenfranchised

communities. Finally, the symbolic component entails defining "the people's" limits, with inclusionary campaigns emphasising, for example, indigenous communities' "dignity," whereas symbolic exclusion often relies on elements of cultural prejudice.

While exclusionary populism has been linked with far-right, anti-immigration parties in Europe since the 1980s, inclusionary populism has been connected mainly with social democratic parties, and also radical left parties outside social democracy. The term "left" refers to egalitarian, anti-capitalist, and internationalist values. This kind of populism is unheard of on Europe's extreme left. Luke March and Cas Mudde talked of an ideological "mutation" in Europe's radical left party family, which was leading to the development of a new left "social populism" away from classic Marxist–Leninist class analysis. It may seem on the surface that inclusionary and exclusionary populism coincides with left and right populisms, or that the inclusionary–exclusionary divide can be subordinated to the left-right divide when it comes to populist parties.

To put it another way, the analytical distinction between left and right is becoming more difficult to draw, and the relatively new distinction between "exclusionary" and "inclusionary" appears to be more in line with current political discourses and operationalization issues when focusing on party manifestos. This is not to say that the distinction is always obvious; rather, establishing the differentiation on three separate analytical aspects provides for a clearer understanding of the distinctions between various populist parties.

2.5 Conclusion

In this chapter, it was examined how the conceptual complexity of populism was handled by expert writers and journals. As it can be seen in the definitions for populism

in this framework chapter, the debates on defining populism dominantly over "the thin ideology" definition made by Mudde were seen. Norris and Werner's critique of the definition of populism as an ideology consisting of the struggle between "pure people" and "corrupt elites"; its inadequacy as an ideology. As an ideology, the lack of basic philosophy of the ideology and the generalization of everyone who criticizes the elite as a populist has been a criticism of the ideological definition of populism. There is also the definition of populism as a unique set of ideas, a struggle between the embodied will of the people in politics and the conspiratorial elite. Contrary to these ideological approaches, in addition to definitions of populism, there is also a definition of a discourse or a style of speech for populism, which includes the examination of the structure and style of the topic discussed, rather than the meaning of what the populist speaker says, and the speaker's claims that the purpose of the speaker is to save politics from corruption or to give power back to the people.

The most controversial point of the definitions made in the study was the connection of populism with nationalism. Although populism is associated with nationalism in practice, nationalism is not a feature of populism, but the most prominent feature among the definitions of both concepts has been authoritarianism and nativism. In this context, while populism is shaped around a vertical dimension by defending the "people" against the "elites", nationalist politics is shaped around a horizontal dimension due to the claim to create and represent the nation, a discourse constructed between "inside the nation" and "outside the nation". However, on the contrary, there are criticisms that populism is a term related to nationalism since the complexity it contains is compatible with nationalism and it is a concept that it is generally based on as a discourse or speaking style.

Chapter 3

PERSONALISATION OF POLITICS

3.1 Introduction

As Martin Lipset and Stein Rokkan note in 1967, historical cleavage structures have been eroding as societies moved out of their traditional shackles. This trend has recently been compounded by changes in political communication, especially since the advent of social media platforms. This chapter aims to unpack the literature on the personalization of politics and shows how it is explored and even measured by political scientists.

3.2 Phenomenon of Personalization of Politics

Politics has grown more individualized, a tendency that has been seen throughout all liberal democracies. Governments are increasingly often called for their leaders instead of the political party in power, especially when the party and its leader have secured consecutive elections. This is a phenomenon that has been linked to the victory of Margaret Thatcher in the United Kingdom in 1979 and Ronald Reagan in the United States of America in 1980, two powerful, charismatic leaders whose popularity much outstripped that of their respective parties.

The tendency toward personalizing politics isn't limited to presidential systems, which have been its traditional institutional base. Nearly all of the main parliamentary systems, where parties previously took centre stage, now have a popular emphasis on leaders. Over the last two decades, there has been such a strong emphasis on leaders

inside parliamentary systems that it has generated a vast literature that has been dubbed the "presidentialization of politics," "institutional presidentialization," and "presidential parliamentarism." Even though these books have been given a variety of titles, the common underlying thesis is that the functioning of democratic systems is undergoing a profound transformation, without any corresponding change in their formal institutional forms (McAllister, 2007, p. 571).

While the reasons for the personalization of politics differ, one often presented explanation is the development of electronic media and its implications for politics, especially in the conduct of national elections. When it comes to communicating with voters, electronic media has been regarded as important, while party leaders have taken use of their visibility in electronic media to gain votes. Whatever the role of the media in this process, it is evident that there is no one explanation for the growing personalization of politics in liberal democracies, and that what has been happening is complicated and multi-causal. This chapter analyses the evidence supporting leaders being more important, as well as the many theories put forward to explain it.

3.3 Combination of Leaders and Democracy in Politics

The notion that leaders have grown more essential in democratic countries has a lot of shaky evidence to back it up. Major party leaders acquire continuously greater awareness as election day approaches, according to studies of election campaigns, whereas smaller party leaders' exposure remains stable. For three reasons, however, thorough testing of the thesis is uncommon. To begin with, gathering reliable overtime data is challenging, and generating such estimates across several nations is much more complex. Second, since leaders' personalities (and popularity) vary over time, detecting any consistent pattern is riddled with methodological issues. Third, the

characteristics that voters value in their leaders have changed, and some of this shift may be due to improvements in voter education as well as other factors.

Evidence from parliamentary systems attributing the popularity of leaders to the likelihood of voting for a party has repeatedly demonstrated a substantial impact, although to a considerably less degree than is often assumed. Graetz and McAllister utilised summary (thermometer) ratings of party leaders in the 1974, 1979, and 1983 British general elections to demonstrate that, although leader evaluations had a significant influence on defection and conversion across parties, the net effect on the election results was relatively modest (GRAETZ & McAllister, 1987). In 1983, the relative position of the two main party leaders—Margaret Thatcher and Michael Foot—had the most impact, influencing the vote by approximately 4%. Bean and Mughan come to similar findings in a comparison of Australia and the United Kingdom (Bean & Mughan, 1989a, p. 1167).

Interest in political leaders' electoral appeal has risen at a time when academic research has conclusively proved that the way a person gathers information about a candidate—both personal and political—is a powerful instrument for voters to make decisions about the suitability of competing candidates for elective office. The study of how US voters viewed presidential candidates between 1952 and 1984 found that ‘the overall basic structure employed in candidate appraisals’ remained stable throughout the surveys (McAllister, 2007, p. 573). Competence, honesty, and dependability, on the other hand, have become more essential throughout time. Although some data suggested a reduction in the number of non-political, personal comments in recent years, researchers believe the change is more due to the diversity of personalities

among the candidates being assessed than to a structural shift in how voters evaluate candidate characteristics.

Wattenberg's study looked at the percentage of US voters who cited economic, political, and social issues as reasons for voting for or against a presidential candidate during 40 years (LeDuc et al., 2021, p. 291). The percentage of the American voters that spontaneously assessed candidates along party lines fell from about one-third in 1952 to barely 14% in 1992, in line with the fall in polarisation. Over time, sociological variables like group-related remarks stayed largely stable. The percentage of respondents who cited economic considerations in their assessments of presidential candidates increased from 13% in 1968 to 57 per cent in 1992. This bolsters the argument that political leaders have developed electoral importance in their own right by personifying their respective parties' policy agendas.

These results are, of course, the result of a presidential system. Does this also apply to parliamentary systems? Bean claims that they do, and backs up his claim with facts from Australia and New Zealand. His caveat is that under presidential systems, politicians serve as surrogates for their parties, absorbing programmatic characteristics that would otherwise fall within their party's purview. In parliamentary systems, on the other hand, since parties are tougher and more organized, leadership is required to be judged on non-political personal characteristics. Bean and Mughan found evidence to back this up in their research of Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States, but the differences they discover are minor (Bean & Mughan, 1989a, p. 1168). Bean suggests that the voting public's emphasis on performance assessments is about the same in both time and place, whether the politicians are members of parliament or

congress, incumbents or non-incumbents, and regardless of how strong or poor their images are.

When a broad variety of other variables are taken into consideration, leaders are important in influencing election results, albeit by a considerably smaller margin than is generally assumed. Furthermore, there is strong evidence that voters evaluate candidates based on specific characteristics that allow them to make a quick assessment of the candidate's probable performance if elected to office. However, most of the data is country-specific, and drawing strong conclusions is hampered by the shifting personalities involved, as well as the unique events and circumstances preceding individual elections. Despite the lack of certainty, the data shows that voters in parliamentary systems have shifted their focus to the candidates, whereas those in presidential systems have not. At the same time, voters in presidential systems seem to be assessing candidates more objectively and less politically.

3.4 The Effect of Leaders on Voter Behaviour

Personality voting has been criticised as being 'irrational' since the common pessimistic view of politicians is that "they are quickly and effectively packaged products created by image-makers who influence the public's views by highlighting characteristics that have particular appeal to the electorate" (Garzia, 2011, pp. 702–703). Carmines and Stimson, in their own words, have stated: "the consensus has been that voters should focus their voting decisions on policy considerations rather than party allegiance or candidate pictures. The former is the only one that shows advanced behaviour" (Carmines & Stimson, 1980, p. 79). Recently, though, a new perspective has arisen. Gathering knowledge on party leaders, according to some, is an important element of a logical voting strategy. As previously stated, voters prefer to assess party

leaders using a limited number of factors, and such criteria seem to be "hardly unreasonable." Quite the opposite, it seems that "candidate evaluations focus on instrumental concerns regarding how a candidate will handle governmental affairs" instead. The effect of a leader's personality is exactly proportionate to the degree of political knowledge of the individual evaluating it, according to empirical study. Moreover, highly educated people are the most inclined to consider a leader's personality characteristics while casting their vote.

Among the most important outcomes of personalisation is that people's voting calculations will become more influenced by how they view the personalities of the candidates. Previous studies have indicated that social and long-term psychological variables are playing a less influence in determining how people vote. This has resulted in a growing individualization of voting options, implying, among other things, a higher probability of "voting differently from election to election, depending on the specific people competing." Voters are increasingly voting for individuals rather than parties or platforms (Bittner, 2021, p. 3).

3.4.1 Leaders Effect in Britain

It was Butler and Stokes' pioneering study that sparked scholarly interest in the impact of leaders' personalities on voting behaviour in the United Kingdom (Butler & Stoke, 1974). Although these writers do not rule out the potential that leaders' personal qualities influence people's voting decisions, they do point out that "attitudes toward the parties were a stronger predictor to voting behaviour than attitudes toward the leaders" in the early 1970s. Bean and Mughan's most famous paper makes no significant changes to their findings (Bean & Mughan, 1989). While they demonstrate that leaders' personality traits had an effect on vote choice in the 1983 British election,

it must also be noted that once party identification is included in their regression model, "leadership qualities contribute between four and five percentage points to the explained variance." Stewart and Clarke are more optimistic about the personalising hypothesis, claiming that "leader images, net of which was before party identification, had significant effects" in 1987. Mughan has the same opinion about the Conservatives' narrow win in 1992 when widespread praise for John Major meant the difference between a majority Conservative administration and a hung Parliament (Graetz & McAllister, 1987). On the contrary, the data provided by Bartle and Crewe for the 1997 election shows that the image of party leaders has a fairly small impact on voting choice if pre-existing political inclinations are incorporated in the regression analysis. Positive assessments of Tony Blair, according to these writers, earned the Labour Party just 1.7 per cent of the vote on that occasion. Given our knowledge of a voter's social, political, policy, and national context, their judgement of party leader characteristics contributed nothing to our ability to forecast how they voted (Bartle & Crewe, 2002, p. 93). Clarke, Sanders, Stewart, and Whiteley conclude that "all of the models have something to say, but some models have a lot more to say than others" in their study of the 2001 British election (Garzia, 2011a, p. 704). The best explanation is provided by the party leader and identification models. Nonetheless, they note that independently of the voter choice model examined, Tony Blair's party won primarily because of their "dominant lead in party identifiers." To summarise, British party leaders have influenced and continue to influence British voters. However, when individuals' political preferences, such as partisanship, are included in the statistical model, their net impact is routinely reduced.

3.5 Leadership and Institutions in Politics

There are obvious and significant differences in the character and style of political leadership that result from differences in institutional arrangements, with the most significant contrast being between presidential and parliamentary systems. Almost all presidents are chosen by the people, typically via direct election or, on rare occasions, through some kind of electoral college. Because executive power rests with a person who is elected to the post for a certain period, presidentialism usually promotes individual responsibility. Furthermore, party discipline is frequently lacking in presidential systems since the president's political survival is not contingent on the ruling party's unity.

There are two types of parliamentary systems: coalition systems (found across Europe) and majoritarian systems (found in the United States). Parliamentary structures promote collective responsibility, ensuring that the executive is both reliant on and responsible to the legislature's members. In contrast to presidential regimes, parliamentarism promotes party governance, thus party discipline becomes a key element in sustaining executive power (McAllister, 2005, p. 576). For political survival under parliamentary systems, parties often go to great efforts to maintain their elected members' allegiance and maintain party discipline.

Because presidential systems give their leaders set terms, their ability to stay in office isn't usually based on the legislature's confidence on a day-to-day basis. This gives presidents more leeway in developing and enacting policies without the danger of a surprise election destabilising their plans. In parliamentary systems, on the other hand, the executive's existence is contingent on the legislature's trust. As a result, the

legislature has the power to dismiss the executive at any moment, typically when a vote of no confidence is passed. Prime ministers must thus prioritise keeping their party members' trust while also fine-tuning their performance in office since the date by which the administration will be evaluated by voters is less clear at this point.

As a result, presidents have much more executive authority than prime ministers, as well as more autonomy in their capacity to create policy—though not always in their ability to execute it. While it is necessary to differentiate between impacts attributable to particular individuals, there is strong evidence that the functioning of parliamentary systems in the post-war period has started to shift toward this presidential model. As with presidents, several post-war British prime leaders have amassed much more power and influence than their pre-war predecessors. In many Westminster systems, it is often claimed that these developments have weakened cabinet governance based on common responsibility, in part due to the increasing complexity of contemporary decision-making, but also due to the concentration of prime ministerial power. Majoritarian parliamentary systems have given prime ministers enormous control over cabinet careers, which is essential for maintaining conformity and consolidating authority.

Although difficult to quantify and extremely varied between nations, the kind of election system is another institutional structure that may affect the character and direction of political leadership. Unlike presidentialism or parliamentarianism, electoral systems are seldom constitutionally entrenched, making them easy to manipulate by politicians and parties (Bittner, 2021, p. 3).

Electoral systems have traditionally been judged on their capacity to "represent" socioeconomic and ethnic groupings. More lately, the focus has turned to the options available to voters, the implications of those options for democratic stability, and how voters use those options to assess candidates (McAllister, 2005, p. 579). Leaders have a greater chance of influencing the vote under electoral systems that allow voters to distinguish between candidates than in party-list systems, where parties set the order of candidates. The primary difference is between ordinal systems, in which voters have more options, such as selecting several candidates or ranking them, and categorical ballots, in which voters have limited options in deciding the destiny of individual candidates (such as a closed list).

The style and content of political leadership in a nation are shaped by the structure of its legislative, executive, and electoral institutions. Most recent transitions in political leadership, especially parliamentary systems, have happened without any major institutional change. This is true in both nations with officially established constitutional norms and those with unwritten, developing constitutions, such as the United Kingdom. Thus, what has occurred is a shifting understanding of the legal and informal norms governing how politics works with political leaders.

3.6 Media and Personalization in Politics

For example, in developed democracies, the shifts in political leadership roles have been linked to the development of electronic media, particularly television, in the 1950s and 1960s.... Early television coverage of politics was sparse since it was deemed unsuitable for the new medium. Television's ability to advertise to voters quickly altered that perception (McAllister, 2005, p. 578).

By the 1960s, television had established itself as a source of political coverage—particularly of political leaders—and, as a result, television started to affect how people perceived their leaders. British television first systematically covered Britain's general election in 1964, and it was also the first election in which the 'presidential' campaign was used to characterise its nature in Britain (Mughan, 2000, p. 27). Similar results linking television and personalisation have been reported in various areas of Europe, but the effects vary depending on the personalities involved, the political setting, and the topics that prevail throughout the campaign. Television has become an essential weapon for contemporary election campaigns in almost all established democracies by the late 1960s (Norris, 1999).

The concept of a leaders' discussion had expanded to established parliamentary democracies by the 1980s, largely as a result of the United States' experience with televised debates. All but four of the 45 democracies studied in the mid-1990s had conducted a leaders' debate during the previous election. Britain may be the only parliamentary democracy with a long history of opposition to a discussion among its leaders. The main area of contention between the parties is the number of discussions and their proximity to election time, with the incumbent wanting to avoid the dangers of a live televised discussion and the challenger wanting to increase it (McAllister, 2005, p. 579).

There are many reasons for television's focus on political leaders' personalities and how their characteristics are used to define political problems and events. The most apparent example is how television delivers information to its audience. It is simpler for television to distribute information via a recognisable personality rather than an abstract text or an organisation because of the way it transmits information through

visual pictures. As a result, viewers are better able to connect with the leaders they watch on television and sympathise with the causes they support thanks to the pictures shown to them. Viewers may put themselves in the shoes of the people they see or the interviewers who question them, and as a result, get a greater grasp of the politician's viewpoints. Political leaders are a handy visual shortcut for capturing and retaining the viewer's attention on television, especially if the material is related to the leader's personality.

While it is easy to attribute the personalization of politics to media as the driving force behind the trend, political parties play an important role in the process as well. Parties find it simpler to sell political options to voters via a well-known personality who can successfully advocate the party's ideas to voters, as opposed to just disseminating a news release or publishing a policy paper. The leader may advocate the idea while being questioned or discussed by an interviewer who vicariously reflects the voters' interests, thus increasing public interest in the issue. Because of television's ability to reinforce policy and personality when a party is in power (by stressing qualities like authority and competence), incumbency may boost a government's popularity even more (Bittner, 2021, p. 1).

The desire of people to hold governments responsible for their actions explains why the focus on the leaders' personalities is so prominent. Voters tend to hold individuals responsible for government (or opposition) behaviour than abstract institutions or political ideals (Garzia, 2011, p. 704). Parliamentary systems, where collective cabinet responsibilities and the government's fortunes as a whole may obscure legitimacy in the eyes of the public, emphasise this tendency even more. Personalization may be particularly troublesome in a coalition setting when assigning responsibility may be

much more challenging. In contrast to an abstract collective, it is simpler for the public to praise or penalise the prime minister since he is held personally responsible for the government's collective performance (McAllister, 2005, p. 580).

3.7 How Personalization of Politics is Measured in the Literature

The importance of party leaders or those who are seen as leaders by the local people in electoral work in personalizing policies has been mentioned in the previous sections. But how is measured the personalization of policies by politicians or the people who see them as leaders?

Politics is becoming more personal, and this is a phenomenon that has been studied by academics from a variety of disciplines, including political communication, voter behaviour, political partisanship, electoral reform (including referendums), and legislative studies (including bills introduced in legislatures). Within each area, research has naturally concentrated on various signs that are thought to indicate that particular politicians are becoming more famous. Personalization of politics is a snappy unifying term that cuts across many disciplines and relates to a wide range of factual facts. Aside from that, other types of customizations must be categorised. Personalization of coverage in the media provides us with information about current events in the media, but it does not indicate that politics outside of the media has grown more individualised. A rise in political individualization, free of groupthink and social pressure, may imply a decline in public discussion and political connection. Personalization may also lead to a focus on charismatic leaders and a diversification of politics operated by more disorganised political entrepreneurs. As a result, customization may have a wide range of democratic consequences.

While empirical studies from different study fields help us understand political personalisation, we need to know how to compare them and how they fit into the larger trend of customization. To enable the different research to be combined and fitted into a broad framework of political personalization, we need to enhance our categorization.

This thesis proposes that personalization research be divided into three categories: arena, level, and character. This categorization may help in comparing and separating the various results and, as a result, provide more accurate knowledge of where and how political personalisation occurs. The three categorization dimensions are based on existing literature demarcations. Classification work may be simplified and explained better by combining them all into a single scheme (Pedersen & Rahat, 2021).

It is important to note that the personalization of politics is a significant shift in politics that has implications for many areas of the political system. Rahat and Sheaffer propose a personalization typology that separates institutional, media, and behavioural personalisation (Rahat & Sheaffer, 2007). Karvonen utilised it in his very important research, and it is now widely used in the literature (Campus, 2010). A shift from a closed list to an open list voting system is an example of institutional personalising, which emphasises the importance of people. Institutional personalization may arise in both government and non-government organisations, such as political parties. It can also develop inside government institutions. Electoral systems, leadership, and candidate selection have all been investigated in this area of customization (Pedersen & Rahat, 2021).

Media personalisation refers to a shift in the media's emphasis away from collective actors like political parties and toward individuals. There are two types: controlled

media and unregulated media. Controlled media refers to messages delivered by politicians, whereas uncontrolled media covers the news (Renwick & Pilet, 2016). This is the area of customization that has gotten the greatest academic attention.

Finally, and most importantly for this special topic, behavioural personalisation refers to changes in voter and politician attitudes and behaviour. When political players' views of politics and political activities are geared toward individual politicians rather than collective institutions, it is said to be personalised political behaviour. This may be the case for the way people participate in politics (personalization of public behaviour) or the way politicians carry out their responsibilities as political representatives in their respective countries (personalization of the behaviour of politicians). For example, people may align themselves with a political figure, voting and even advocating for him regardless of whatever party he represents (Marino et al., 2021).

3.8 Conclusion

This chapter aimed to review how politics has been personalized. In doing that it has reviewed political science explanations on political cleavage structures and then moved on to explore how personalization of politics is measured in different studies.

Chapter 4

METHODOLOGY

4.1 Introduction

This chapter seeks to explain how populist discourse and elements of personalization of politics could be explored and measured in the Brexit process. The chapter firstly explains how qualitative studies and especially qualitative content analysis is well equipped to measure the said twin concepts. The chapter later moves on to discuss Computer-aided Qualitative Data Analysis and finally shows how the reliability of qualitative content analysis is ensured through inter-coder reliability.

4.2 Qualitative Research of the Study

Qualitative research is a sort of study that is developed through the use of data gathering techniques such as observation and documentation. It embodies the practice of examining events and phenomena holistically in a realistic setting. It looks at how people and groups interact with one another. In the qualitative measuring approach, generalisation is not a priority. It is quite difficult to quantify behaviours using this approach, which is dependent on observation and interview. The measures uncovered throughout the investigations can account for how many individuals acted, but they cannot explain why. Qualitative research is described as a study that aims to answer the why question while also describing human and societal behaviour. Qualitative research is used to answer questions like "why," "how," and "when." It is the goal of qualitative research to discover how individuals develop their sense of community and to discover how they interpret their surroundings (Lamont, 2015).

Data gathering and analysis procedures that focus on the collection and analysis of non-numeric data are referred to as qualitative methods. Qualitative approaches are used to learn more about how we make sense of the world around us, and they demand us to concentrate on the meanings and processes used to create international politics. This is often accomplished by in-depth examinations of certain events, occurrences, areas, countries, organisations, or persons. International relations scholars often confuse the term "qualitative methods" with the research design used in case studies. However, qualitative methods refer to the wide range of methods and techniques we can employ when collecting and analysing data that are expressed verbally or in writing rather than numerically.

Inductive reasoning is often used in qualitative approaches. This is since qualitative researchers often construct theoretical assertions based on our empirical findings. Qualitative researchers include interpretative researchers, who reject scientific reasoning logic in favour of attempting to understand the idea of social activity. The quantitative data collecting and analysis methodologies will include both empirical and interpretative traditions.

Interviews, focus groups, Internet-based research, and archive or document-based research have all been utilised extensively by academics of International Relations (IR) to acquire qualitative data. It's also worth noting that qualitative data might contain things like monuments, maps, paintings, and other cultural objects that aren't textual. Recently, IR academics have resorted to visual approaches to better understand how people view and comprehend the environment. The triangulation of data collecting procedures is beneficial for obtaining qualitative information since it allows researchers to compare and contrast their results (Lamont, 2015).

The most prevalent technique utilised for research is archival or document-based research. Almost no research goal would be complete without archival or documentary study. International warfare, international organisations, environmental policy and human rights all demand us to interact with papers to some degree to fully understand them. These papers are available in two formats. The majority of studies necessitates the use of source materials. Initial records written by persons who had direct access to the material that they are discussing, or who had first-hand knowledge of a specific event, are known as primary source documents. The term "secondary source documents" refers to those that refer to and analyse source documents (Gray, 2014). So, as can be seen in chapter 2, instead of dealing with primary sources by quoting the words of those who make populism, analysis was made with secondary sources based on the articles that analysed the speeches of those who made populism.

4.3 Content Analysis

Reports from the media may be an excellent source of information for researchers. In reality, media sources are often depended upon to tell us about new research topics or to offer us background information on the ones we're already familiar with. The distinction between worldwide media sources, such as CNN and BBC, as well as daily newspapers like The Daily Mail, The Daily Mirror, and The Times, should be made when employing media sources. Local news sources that only have a local audience or circulation should also be distinguished. To determine if the local news sources reviewed are more targeted at specialised audiences or are more widely read on a national scale, it is necessary to speak with local scholars or colleagues when depending on local news services from an unfamiliar field location. Researchers should also learn whether or if their local media outlets appeal to a certain ideological or political faction.

4.4 Qualitative Data Analysis Methodologies of the Study

Researchers are faced with the difficulty of interpreting qualitative data after it has been collected. When reviewing interview transcripts, official papers, or web-based resources, it would be clear that qualitative data exposes itself to a wide range of interpretations and methods of analysis, as will be shown. As a result, qualitative data analysis is far more nominative than quantitative data analysis, as depends on statistical tests or numerical methods, which have clear norms and evidence. Following an analysis of the remarks made by the participants in the Brexit referendum process over a while, a case study was developed, as shown in the study. However, since the emphasis of this section is on qualitative data collection and analysis, I explain two basic qualitative analysis approaches, content analysis and discourse analysis, that are often employed by researchers in the field of international relations (IR) (Lamont, 2015).

Content analysis is one of the most frequent methods for analysing qualitative data. What this means is generating conclusions from data (text, for example) using a methodical approach to discover certain features (classes or categories) inside them. The endeavour to obtain a level of impartiality in this process is handled via the development of certain rules known as selection criteria, which must be set before the analysis can be done. As a result, the content analysis may be assumed to be deductive.

The first step in the content analysis in the thesis was the creation of the search string used in the data collection part. I created the phrases for the "case" I examined while creating the search string. And again, while creating these word groups, I selected the most relevant words related to the "case" and scanned the words in the Factiva database

so that they appear at least five times in the search, in the articles of the selected newspapers, to be more effective in the search. When creating the search string, the topics were determined before the actor selections, and the actors with the most explanations on the topics in the newspapers were selected. For example, as can be seen in the search string, Brexit and its synonyms, topics and their synonyms, and the actors were scanned to appear at least five times in the selected newspapers in the Factiva database. In addition, newspaper articles exceeding 250 words were scanned to obtain better quality and efficient results in the selected newspapers.

The second step will be to establish the categories into which we will categorise the data. As observed in the research, at this point, actors are classified as "internal" or "external" actors under the category "Types of actors." The issues that the actors discussed the most were then identified, and a category called "Topics" was developed. Following that, under the titles of "Evaluation/advocation of the statements of actors, and business/financial institutions," the statements of actors and business/financial organisations were separated into three categories: "positive," "negative," and "neutral." The remarks of actors and business/financial institutions were separated into two groups as "for" and "against" in the first of two categories developed afterwards, titled "actors' and business/financial sectors' statements that advocate for/against Brexit". Finally, at the thesis' most crucial point, under the heading "justification of the actors' statements/arguments," the actors' claims were split into two groups: "populist" and "non-populist," and then all categories were decided.

After the categories have been produced, either inductively or deductively, the text must still be coded with keywords. The act of coming up with terms to represent a certain category notion is known as coding for context analysis. The actors' statements

in The Daily Mail, The Daily Mirror, and The Times, for example, were coded to address the issues they covered, the evaluation of their statements, their thoughts on Brexit, and the justification of their statements in the study. Context analysis software aids in the coding of a variety of words, such as those described above. It will be explained in-depth in the computer-aided qualitative data analysis part of the thesis about ATLAS.ti, the qualitative analysis software application that was utilised in the study.

Another important method of qualitative data analysis is discourse analysis. Discourse analysis is a subset of qualitative analysis concerned with the understanding of linguistic modes of communication. It may be spoken or written, and both official and unofficial modes of communication are acceptable. The study of language structure and organisation focuses on how people create their accounts of events. Discourse analysis, in contrast to content analysis, rejects the notion that language is a pure medium that simply reflects "reality." Recognizing the recurring patterns in a language in the context of patterns and repertoires becomes the analysis. Rather than originating from the person, these repertoires (constructs) are a product of cultural and social contexts (Gray, 2014).

Discourse analysis was employed in a limited section of the study. The actors' discourses were examined by breaking them into three categories in the data analysis under "evaluation/advocation of actors' statements" in chapter 5. Given that all of the discourses were aimed towards the Brexit referendum, a discourse analysis might be conducted by looking at the discourses that the actors supported, opposed, or kept neutral on in their utterances. The remark was classified as positive if the actors tended to support their claims in their remarks on the issue. If the remarks include criticism

of the opposing party's allegations, the statement was coded as negative. The statement was categorised as neutral if it did not make any claims regarding the issue.

4.4.1 Computer-aided Qualitative Data Analysis Software (CAQDAS) Program in the Thesis: ATLAS.ti

Computer-aided data analysis software is becoming more popular among researchers. Because of this, researchers can have more efficient and productive work processes: they save time, and they can acquire better insights into their data that they would not have otherwise gotten. Many academic subjects, including sociology, psychology, political science, medicine, and educational science, employ qualitative data analysis (QDA) software, and it is also a popular tool for corporations and market researchers.

ATLAS.ti, for example, is a computer-assisted qualitative data analysis programme (CAQDAS) that offer insights into qualitative sets of data without making interpretations. The researcher might make conclusions based on the content analysis of the specific study item (e.g., newspaper data). Software solutions for qualitative data make it simple to filter, structure, and analyse huge volumes of text or other data, as well as manage the interpretations and judgments that arise (Lewins & Silver, 2009).

Grounded Theory, qualitative content analysis, mixed methods analysis, group talks, discourse analysis, case and field studies, and other approaches for systematising, organising, and analysing non-numeric data are all utilised in qualitative data analysis (QDA). The computer-aided data analysis software should support and ease the process of sorting, organising, and analysing data material, regardless of the strategy used by the researcher. There is a tendency toward the incorporation and analysis of picture files, audio and video materials, as well as data from social media platforms and newspaper articles, in addition to the usual usage of textual data. Advanced

computer-aided data analysis applications can import and transcribe these recordings immediately. Furthermore, QDA software like ATLAS.ti facilitates the whole analytic process by displaying connections and offering overviews. It also allows for the inclusion of notes (sometimes known as memos), which aid other researchers in comprehending the different analytical stages. QDA software assists researchers in acquiring essential insight by employing automated techniques to visualise data material (Lewins & Silver, 2009).

ATLAS.ti was created to assist researchers in discovering and methodically analysing complex phenomena concealed in unstructured data (text, multimedia, geospatial). The application includes tools for detecting, coding, and annotating discoveries in primary data, weighing and evaluating their significance, and visualising the frequently intricate relationships between them. Researchers and practitioners in anthropology, arts, architecture, communication, criminology, economics, educational sciences, engineering, ethnological studies, management studies, market research, quality management, psychology, sociology, and social work all utilise ATLAS.ti.

ATLAS.ti organises enormous quantities of documents and maintains track of all notes, comments, codes, and memoranda in any discipline that requires in-depth examination and analysis of primary data such as text, photos, audio, video, and geodata. It also includes analytical and visualisation tools that allow for fresh interpretations of the content ('What is ATLAS.ti', n.d.).

4.4.2 Media Landscape Analysis

A type of content analysis is media content analysis, often known as media analysis. Content analysis has numerous meanings, but Jim Macnamara's is particularly interesting. He defines content analysis as "a method aimed at summarising what is

stated on a given topic in a given location at a given time with the greatest impartiality, accuracy, and generality possible" (Macnamara, 2005).

As a result, if done correctly and without prejudice, the content analysis may help researchers identify exactly who said what and when, as well as the context in which it was said. This is useful since it may assist anyone in determining why certain statements were spoken, the potential effect, and how to react (Dill, 2013).

Media analysis concentrates on a single topic: the media landscape. Online news aggregation sites, investigative features and opinion columns are only two examples of editorial media that may be found in this environment, as well as social media like Twitter, Instagram, Facebook and YouTube. Even though media analysis encompasses considerably more than editorial data (and may even include advertorial media data), the thesis focused entirely on newspaper articles from three different newspapers (The Daily Mail, The Daily Mirror and The Times).

All of the statements made by the actors in the thesis were taken from the newspapers in which the tendencies of the parties were most effectively communicated throughout the referendum process, according to the findings. As a result, The Daily Mail was selected as the newspaper in which the conservative inclinations were best transmitted, The Daily Mirror as the newspaper backed by the Labour Party, and The Times as the newspaper with a more impartial approach in the centre of the political spectrum.

4.4.3 Reliability of the Qualitative Content Analysis Studies

Although the term reliability refers to a notion that is used to examine or evaluate quantitative research, it is most often used in all types of research. Given that testing is a method of gathering information, the most significant test of any qualitative

research is the quality of its data collection and analysis. Good qualitative research may assist us in understanding a situation that is otherwise cryptic or perplexing (Eisner, 1991). Good quality research may be defined in terms of a quantitative study's "purpose of explaining" and its qualitative counterpart's "goal of producing understanding" when reliability is used to assess quality in the quantitative study (Stenbacka, 2001). In qualitative research, there is no need to consider dependability because of the differences between assessing studies for quality in quantitative and qualitative research. "The idea of dependability is especially deceptive in qualitative research", says Stenbacka. When qualitative research is examined using dependability as a criterion, the result is that the study is bad (Stenbacka, 2001, p. 552).

However, Patton stresses the need for validity and reliability while conducting a qualitative study, analysing the data and determining the study's overall quality (Patton, 2002). Quantitative paradigms place a premium on concepts like reliability and validity, whereas qualitative paradigms place a premium on qualities like credibility, neutrality, dependability, and applicability or transferability. To be more explicit, Lincoln and Guba utilise the word "dependability" in qualitative research, which roughly matches the concept of "reliability" in quantitative research. They go on to say that "inquiry audit" is one measure that might help qualitative research be more reliable. This may be used to check for consistency in both the research process and the final result. Additionally, Clont and Seale support the notion of dependability in conjunction with the concepts of consistency and reliability while doing qualitative research. Achieving consistency in data will be accomplished when the stages of the study are validated by the inspection of items such as source data, data reduction outputs, and process notes (among other things) (Golafshani, 2003).

The study of trustworthiness is critical in qualitative research to assure dependability. Seale, in discussing the importance of reliability and validity in qualitative research in the establishment of high-quality studies, writes that the "trustworthiness of a research report lies at the core of difficulties traditionally articulated as validity and reliability." Strauss and Corbin argue that "normal canons of 'good science' require revision to match the reality of qualitative research" when grading (testing) qualitative work (Golafshani, 2003).

Stenbacka, on the other hand, argues that since the question of dependability involves measurements, it has no bearing on qualitative research. She goes on to say that when it comes to evaluating qualitative research, dependability is a moot point. As a result, if it's applied, the "consequence is that the research isn't excellent" (Stenbacka, 2001).

To expand the scope of the conceptualization of reliability and to explain the compatibility of reliability and validity in qualitative research, Lincoln and Guba argued that it is necessary to establish the former (validity) to establish the latter (reliability). And, in this context, there will be no validity without reliability. In addition to the researcher's aptitude and expertise in any qualitative research, Patton claims that reliability is a result of the study's validity (Golafshani, 2003).

4.5 Reliability of the Study

4.5.1 Search String

In an academic database or search engine, a search string is a set of keywords, truncation signs, and Boolean operators that researchers type into the search field. In the study, the search string is shown in tabular form in detail in the data analysis section.

The formation of the search string began by selecting the political actors who made the most statements during the referendum process and were most prominently featured by the press in the databases of three newspapers that I accessed from the Factiva data search engine. Then, I identified the prominent topics in both the ProQuest and Factiva data search engines (although the issue of climate issue was rarely mentioned during the referendum process, my reason for choosing it as a topic was that the issue of climate was mentioned a lot in the press all over the world at that time and even now). To determine the topics, in the databases of the newspapers whose topics I accessed from data search engines, I choose twelve of them that were the most talked about in the newspapers by general and kept in the foreground by the press during the referendum period.

4.5.2 Intercoder Reliability

Researchers' agreement on how to code material is called intercoder reliability. In content analysis, it is often employed when the study is aiming to achieve consistency and validity in the analysis. Intercoder dependability assures that when many researchers code the same set of data, their results are consistent.

The procedure in this section is to measure the reliability and validity of the analyses I have done in the thesis by an academic fellow from outside the subject. The computer-aided qualitative data analysis program that I used in coding while doing my analysis in ATLAS.ti. Likewise, to the academic fellow measuring my analysis, first of all, how to use this program, that is; while reading the newspaper articles, I showed him how to code the statements of the actors in the codebook about the topics in the codebook through the ATLAS.ti program. Then I explained how to create code tabs programmatically by explaining the codebook I created earlier, and then helped code

these code tabs on selected newspaper articles. All measurements were made on a total of 30 newspaper articles. Of these, 12 were selected from The Times, 10 from the Daily Mail and 8 from the Daily Mirror. The reason for the difference in these ratios is that the total number of newspaper articles scanned in the three newspapers used in the analysis is different. The 30 newspaper articles I presented to the academic fellow who made the measurement were selected from the newspaper articles that I had coded the most. In the meantime, the coding I have done in no way has been shown to the academic fellow who measured to maintain the reliability and validity of my analyses.

Comparison of the academic fellow's findings on 30 newspaper articles measuring the validity and reliability of my analyses and mine on the same 30 newspaper articles are given in the tables below.

Table 1. Internal Actors' Table that Made by the Academic Fellow Over Selected 30 Newspaper Articles

	Came ron	Fara ge	John son	Hamm ond	Corb yn	Bl air	M ay	Sturg eon	Osbo rne
Sovereignty	2	2	5	0	0	0	1	0	0
Scottish Independence	1	0	0	0	0	0	4	6	0
Border Issues	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Financial Issues	9	0	1	1	0	0	5	3	13
Treaty Issues	1	0	2	1	0	0	2	0	0
National Security	1	2	3	0	0	0	2	0	0
Immigration/M igration Issues	4	1	3	0	0	0	2	0	0
NHS	1	1	1	0	2	0	0	0	0
Economic Issues	11	0	5	0	1	0	2	0	12
Business Sector Issues	6	1	4	0	2	0	0	0	6
Trade Issues	1	0	1	2	0	0	1	0	1
Climate Issues	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

Table 2. Internal Actors' Table that I Coded Over Selected 30 Newspaper Articles

	Cameron	Farage	Johnson	Hammond	Corbyn	Blair	May	Sturgeon	Osborne
Sovereignty	2	2	5	0	0	0	1	0	0
Scottish Independence	1	0	0	0	0	0	4	6	0
Border Issues	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Financial	9	0	1	1	0	0	5	3	12
Treaty Issues	1	0	2	1	0	0	2	0	0
National Security	1	2	3	0	0	0	2	0	0
Immigration/Migration Issues	4	1	3	0	0	0	2	0	0
NHS	1	1	1	0	2	0	0	0	0
Economic Issues	10	0	5	0	1	0	2	0	12
Business Sector Issues	6	1	4	0	2	0	0	0	6
Trade Issues	1	0	1	2	0	0	1	0	1
Climate Issues	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

Table 3. External Actors' Table that Made by the Academic Fellow Over Selected 30 Newspaper Articles

	D. Tusk	C. Lagarde	B. Obama	D. Trump	J. C. Juncker	A. Merkel
Sovereignty	1	0	0	0	0	0
Scottish Independence	0	0	0	0	0	0
Border Issues	0	0	0	0	0	0
Financial Issues	0	1	1	0	0	0
Treaty Issues	1	0	0	0	2	2
National Security	0	0	1	0	0	0
Immigration/Migration	0	0	0	0	0	0
NHS	0	0	0	0	0	0
Economic Issues	0	2	1	0	0	1
Business Sector Issues	0	0	1	0	0	1
Trade Issues	0	1	3	1	1	2
Climate Issues	0	0	0	0	0	0

Table 4. External Actors' Table that I Coded Over Selected 30 Newspaper Articles

	D. Tusk	C. Lagarde	B. Obama	D. Trump	J. C. Juncker	A. Merkel
Sovereignty	1	0	0	0	0	0
Scottish Independence	0	0	0	0	0	0
Border Issues	0	0	0	0	0	0
Financial Issues	0	1	1	0	0	0
Treaty Issues	1	0	0	0	1	1

National Security	0	0	1	0	0	0
Immigration/Migration	0	0	0	0	0	0
NHS	0	0	0	0	0	0
Economic Issues	0	1	1	0	0	1
Business Sector Issues	0	0	1	0	0	1
Trade Issues	0	0	1	0	1	2
Climate Issues	0	0	0	0	0	0

As can be seen from the tables above, there is a 99% compatibility between the codings that my academic fellow made on the 30 newspaper articles I selected and the codings I made on the same newspaper articles. While the academic fellow was coding from a total of 138 internal actors and 16 external actors; I encoded 136 from internal actors and 16 from external actors. With this result, it is concluded that the reliability and validity of the analyses made in the thesis from a different perspective are appropriate.

4.6 Conclusion

This chapter illustrated why a qualitative content analysis method was used in exploring populism and personalization of politics to study the Brexit referendum period. The chapter highlighted how qualitative content analysis software works and how the reliability of qualitative studies is ensured. The chapter finally shows how the reliability of this particular qualitative content analysis study was safeguarded.

Chapter 5

DATA ANALYSIS

5.1 Introduction

At this stage of the thesis, the analyses of the statements of 15 leading politicians (9 internal actors and 6 external actors) in the Brexit referendum period, 1st January 2014-31st July 2016, on the 12 most prominent issues in the Brexit referendum process are discussed. In the analysis phase, the attitudes of the actors towards the Brexit referendum, based on the statements of the actors during the Brexit referendum process, the evaluation of the statements of the actors throughout the process, and finally the justification of the arguments/statements of the actors were analysed.

The analysis took place in 7 stages, as can be seen below: Codebook preparation, search string creation, analysing the total statements made by a total of 15 actors in 3 newspapers, distribution of the total number of statements by the actors depending on 12 topics, the total results of the evaluation of the statements of the actors in the newspapers, the total results of the evaluation of the statements that for/against Brexit in the newspapers, and finally, the stage of evaluating the total justifications of the statements by the actors, in which we measure whether the actors made populism.

The newspapers used in the analysis, namely the Daily Mail, the Daily Mirror and the Times, were accessed through the Factiva database, and then, the statements of the actors on 12 topics were obtained through the previously created search string. In

addition, the analysis was carried out by using the ATLAS.ti program for the preparation of the codebook and the coding of the statements of the actors.

5.2 Codebook

In the preparation of the codebook, the types of actors are divided into two. The actors were determined from the UK politicians who were the most prominent in the Brexit referendum process and foreign politicians who tried to give direction to the Brexit referendum process from the outside. As can be seen below, these are coded as "Internal Actors" and "External Actors". The number of statements by actors in The Daily Mail, the Daily Mirror and the Times is coded according to the 12 most talked-about topics during the Brexit referendum process.

In the codebook, 3 different codings were used to evaluate the statements of the actors. In this tab, which is important for the analysis of the actors' discourses, the actors' explanations are coded in 3 ways positive, negative and neutral. Then, to determine the statements of the actors towards the Brexit referendum, two separate codings were made as "against Brexit" and "for Brexit".

Finally, in the codebook, the statements of the actors were coded in two types: populist and non-populist, concerning the justifications of the actors' discourses in the newspapers.

A. Type of Actors in Brexit Referendum Period

A.1 Internal Actors

A.1.1 David Cameron

A.1.2 Nigel Farage

A.1.3 Boris Johnson

A.1.4 Philip Anthony Hammond

A.1.5 Jeremy Corbyn

A.1.6 Tony Blair

A.1.7 Theresa May

A.1.8 Nicola Sturgeon

A.1.9 George Gideon Oliver Osborne

A.2 External Actors

A.2.1 Donald Tusk

A.2.2 Christine Lagarde

A.2.3 Barack Obama

A.2.4 Donald Trump

A.2.5 Jean-Claude Juncker

A.2.6 Angela Merkel

B. Topics

B.1 Sovereignty

B.2 Scottish Independence

B.3 Border Issues

B.4 Financial Issues

B.5 Treaty Issues

B.6 National Security

B.7 Immigration/Migration Issues

B.8 NHS

B.9 Economic Issues

B.10 Business Sector Issues

B.11 Trade Issues

B.12 Climate Issues

C. Evaluation/Advocation of Actors' statements

C.1 Positive

C.2 Negative

C.3 Neutral

C.4 Statements that Argue for/against Brexit

C.4.1 For

C.4.2 Against

D. Justification of Actors' Arguments/Statements

D.1 Non-populist Statements

D.2 Populist Statements

5.3 Searching the Search String in the Database of Newspaper (The Daily Mail & The Daily Mirror & The Times) with the Factiva Search Engine

Table 5. Searching the Search String in the Database of Newspapers (The Daily Mail & The Daily Mirror & The Times)

Strings	(atleast5 Brexit or atleast5 "UK leaving EU" or atleast5 "UK withdraw from EU" or atleast5 "UK departure from EU" or atleast5 "UK exit from EU" or atleast5 "UK quit from EU" or atleast5 "Britain leaving EU" or atleast5 "Britain leaving Europe" or atleast5 "UK leaving Europe" or atleast5 "UK withdraw from Europe" or atleast5 "UK exit from Europe" or atleast5 "Britain exit from EU" or atleast5 "Britain exit from Europe" or atleast5 "Britain quit from EU" or atleast5 "UK exit from Europe" or atleast5 "Britain quit from Europe" or atleast5 "Britain withdraw from EU" or atleast5 "Britain withdraw from Europe") and wc>250
Date	01/01/2014 to 31/07/2016
Source	Daily Mail (U.K.) Or Scottish Daily Mail (U.K.) and The Daily Mirror (U.K.) and The Times (U.K.)

5.4 Total Statements by Actors in Newspapers, 1st January 2014- 31st July 2016

As mentioned before, the table below shows the total statements of 15 identified actors in the 3 newspapers used in the data analysis. As can be seen, between 1st January 2014 - 31st July 2016 a total of 605 statements about 15 actors appeared in 3 newspapers. About half of the statements were coded from the Times, about one-fourth from the Daily Mail, and only about one-twelfth (54 statements) from the Daily Mirror.

Table 6. Total Statements by Actors in Newspapers

Newspapers	Total statements
The Daily Mail	255
The Daily Mirror	54
The Times	296

As can be seen in Table 7, the total of the statements made by 15 actors in 3 newspapers is given. In the highlights, David Cameron became the actor who made the most statements during the Brexit referendum process with 173 statements during his prime minister era. George Gideon Oliver Osborne, who served as Chancellor of the Exchequer in David Cameron's cabinet, followed the prime minister with 93 statements.

In the referendum process, although Boris Johnson, who was outside the parliament, became the third most influential actor in directing the referendum with his 77 statements. On the other hand, only 23 statements by Nigel Farage, who were claimed as making an impact during the referendum process, were included in three newspapers.

Another important detail is Theresa May, who took office as the prime minister after the referendum, was not as effective an actor in the referendum process as her predecessor David Cameron and Boris Johnson, who was the Mayor of London at that time (Ms May made 58 statements in total). Nevertheless, she was the most influential female actor in the referendum period, despite being prime minister later on.

Table 7. Total Statements by Internal Actors in the Newspapers

Actors	Total Statements
David Cameron	173
Nigel Farage	23
Boris Johnson	77
Philip Anthony Hammond	27
Jeremy Corbyn	12
Tony Blair	6
Theresa May	58
Nicola Sturgeon	55
George Gideon Oliver Osborne	93
Donald Tusk	9
Christine Lagarde	13
Barack Obama	23
Donald Trump	3
Jean-Claude Juncker	12
Angela Merkel	21

Aside from the internal actors, 2 actors are stand out when we look at the external actors: Barrack Obama and Angela Merkel. Of course, apart from being the US president at the time, Obama has been an important figure that tried to influence the referendum process with 23 statements, due to his good relations with David Cameron and the intensity of the US's commercial relations with the UK. Also, Merkel, as Chancellor of Germany, played an important role as an external female figure in the referendum process to draw attention to the UK's position in the EU.

5.4.1 Internal Actors in the Daily Mail

Table 8. Total Statements by Internal Actors in the Daily Mail

Actors	Total Statements
David Cameron	88
Nigel Farage	5
Boris Johnson	32
Philip Anthony Hammond	20
Jeremy Corbyn	6
Tony Blair	0
Theresa May	35
Nicola Sturgeon	31
George Gideon Oliver Osborne	23

Table 8 gives the total of the statements made by 9 internal actors in the Daily Mail newspaper. It is generally similar to the data given in Table 3. David Cameron was the actor who made the most comments (88 statements). However, in the general table, David Cameron was followed by the Chancellor of the Exchequer Osborne and Boris Johnson, respectively, while Cameron, Theresa May (35 statements) and Boris Johnson (32 statements) continued in the Daily Mail newspaper. Osborne, on the other hand, came after Nicola Sturgeon, who tried to influence the referendum with Scottish independence during the referendum (31 and 23 statements, respectively).

5.4.2 Internal Actors in the Daily Mirror

Table 9. Total Statements by Internal Actors in the Daily Mirror

Actors	Total Statements
David Cameron	12
Nigel Farage	3
Boris Johnson	5
Philip Anthony Hammond	0
Jeremy Corbyn	4
Tony Blair	3
Theresa May	11
Nicola Sturgeon	0
George Gideon Oliver Osborne	8

Among the 3 selected newspapers, the newspaper that gave the least space to the statements of the actors regarding the referendum process was the Daily Mirror. As can be seen in Table 9, 12 statements by David Cameron, 11 by Theresa May, 8 by George Osborne and only 5 by Boris Johnson were included. Even a single statement by Nicola Sturgeon was not included.

5.4.3 Internal Actors in the Times

Table 10. Total Statements by Internal Actors in the Times

Actors	Total Statements
David Cameron	73
Nigel Farage	15
Boris Johnson	40
Philip Anthony Hammond	7
Jeremy Corbyn	2
Tony Blair	3
Theresa May	12
Nicola Sturgeon	24
George Gideon Oliver Osborne	62

Table 10 gives the total number of statements made by internal actors. When we look at the general appearance, we can say that The Times newspaper went the same compared to the total results. Cameron (73) said the most, followed by Osborne (62) and Boris Johnson (40). Interestingly, although Theresa May became prime minister in the post-referendum era, she was the actor whose statement was the most featured, with 12 statements, behind Nicola Sturgeon (24) and Nigel Farage (15).

5.4.4 External Actors in the Daily Mail

Table 11. Total Statements by External Actors in the Daily Mail

Actors	Total Statements
Donald Tusk	0
Christine Lagarde	7

Barack Obama	2
Donald Trump	0
Jean-Claude Juncker	5
Angela Merkel	1

As a result of the coding made in The Daily Mail newspaper, as seen in the table above, the total of the statements made by 6 external actors is shown. As a result of the coding, Christine Lagarde (7) and Jean Claude-Juncker (5) came to the fore in the referendum process, while Donald Trump, who tried to impact the referendum process and at the same time, Donald Tusk, who was the President of the European Council, was not included even a single statement in the Daily Mail newspaper.

5.4.5 External Actors in the Daily Mirror

Table 12. Total Statements by External Actors in the Daily Mirror

Actors	Total Statements
Donald Tusk	3
Christine Lagarde	0
Barack Obama	0
Donald Trump	2
Jean-Claude Juncker	2
Angela Merkel	1

As it can be seen in Table 12, the Daily Mirror newspaper remained barren in the statements of external actors, just as it did with internal actors. There were 3 statements by Donald Tusk, 2 statements by Trump and Juncker, and only 1 statement by Merkel, respectively. The statements of Obama and Lagarde regarding the process were not included.

5.4.6 External Actors in the Times

Table 13. Total Statements by External Actors in the Times

Actors	Total Statements
Donald Tusk	6
Christine Lagarde	6
Barack Obama	21
Donald Trump	1
Jean-Claude Juncker	5
Angela Merkel	19

As seen in Table 14, the Times newspaper was the newspaper that gave the most place to the statements of external actors. In the coding, I made in the ATLAS.ti program, the statements of Obama and Merkel regarding the referendum process were given more space than some internal actors (21 and 19 statements, respectively). In addition, Tusk and Lagarde's 6, Juncker's 5 and Donald Trump's 1 statements, which have made statements about the process due to being the EU Commission president at the time, were included.

5.5 Total Results of the Distribution of Statements Made by Actors in Newspapers (The Daily Mail & The Daily Mirror & The Times) by topics, 1st January 2014- 31st July 2016

The sovereignty code deals with the statements made by the actors due to the effect of the Brexit referendum on the sovereign rights (such as territorial waters, fishing areas and situation of the Royal Family) of the United Kingdom.

Scottish Independence code refers to statements made on the issue of a second Scottish Independence referendum, which the actors are trying to address again with the Brexit referendum, after the Scottish independence referendum in 2014.

Border code in the study looks at the border issues with Northern Ireland and Scotland, which are expected to emerge by some actors after the referendum.

Financial code is a compilation of the statements made by the actors during the referendum period about the financial agendas that may occur as a result of the referendum, the situation of sterling against other currencies and the fulfilment of financial obligations within the EU.

The Treaty code deals with statements made by the actors about the effect of the ongoing agreements between the EU and the United Kingdom on the outcome of the referendum.

The issue of national security is meant by actors' statements about the Brexit referendum and its impact on the UK's national security (e.g., terrorism, military force, border security).

Specifically, the subject of immigration/immigrant refers to public remarks made by actors concerning the presence of other EU residents in the United Kingdom and about the influence of immigration flows from countries outside of Europe on the ongoing referendum process.

The NHS problem refers to the actor's statements about the effect of the EU's yearly budget on the UK's National Health Service, as well as the influence of the situation with foreign health professionals on the referendum process.

For this section, "economic issues" refer to actors' explanations about the impact of the referendum on wages in Britain, contributions made by EU nationals living here, as well as tax rates and product prices in the UK in light of the new trade balance that may result from Brexit.

Issues related to businesses include what actors say will happen if there's a negative effect on their profit and loss circumstances due to the vote, whether people in those sectors can maintain their jobs, and if government aid to such industries will continue.

Trade issues refer to actors' statements about whether the UK will be subject to Common Market regulations and the Customs Union within the EU, as well as the benefits and drawbacks of the UK signing individual trade agreements with other countries with the new trade balance that may result from the referendum.

The climate problem refers to the actors' remarks regarding global climate issues as well as the referendum's influence on whether they will remain a party to the UN Climate Agreement.

As you can see below, Table 14 shows the total number of statements made by 15 actors in 3 newspapers on 12 issues they touched on during the Brexit referendum process. The statements were made about 12 topics and the actor types were divided into 2 groups as Internal Actors and External Actors then, tables 11 and 12 were created.

In the highlights, it is seen that during the process, the domestic actors very dominantly made statements about economic issues (128 statements), while foreign actors focused on Treaty and Commercial issues (24 and 20 statements, respectively). In addition, it is interesting that while the issue of immigrants and refugees, which is constantly on the agenda in the EU, was included in a total of 51 statements by local actors during the referendum process, only 2 statements by external actors were included. Moreover, the climate issue, which is constantly on the agenda of the world and constantly put on

the agenda of the member states by the UN, could not find a place in the statements of either internal or external actors.

Table 14. Total Results of The Distribution of Statements Made by Actors in Newspapers (The Daily Mail & The Dail Mirror & The Times) by Topics

	Internal Actors	External Actors
Sovereignty	47	3
Scottish Independence	50	0
Border Issues	6	0
Financial Issues	48	7
Treaty Issues	29	24
National Security	33	6
Immigration/Migration Issues	51	2
NHS	18	0
Economic Issues	128	13
Business Sector Issues	58	6
Trade Issues	55	20
Climate Issues	1	0

5.5.1 Total Statements Made by Internal Actors

As can be seen in Table 15, the total number of statements made by internal actors on 12 issues in 3 newspapers is shown. As a result of the coding I have done, it is seen that David Cameron, who was the prime minister during the process, included more explanations than other actors on financial issues, national security issues, immigration issues, business sector issues and trade issues. It is observed as if they are in a race to make a statement, especially with the Chancellor of the Exchequer Osborne, who is in his cabinet, on topics such as financial, economic and trade issues.

From another perspective, Ms May, who became prime minister after Cameron's resignation after the referendum, managed to get ahead of other actors only on the issues of the Treaty.

The biggest difference between the number of statements by the actors is concentrated on 4 issues. When we look at the issue of Scottish independence, Scottish Prime Minister Nicola Sturgeon naturally made statements about this issue and was way above the number of statements by other actors on this issue. On the national security issue, again, the prime minister of the time, Cameron, was more prominent than other actors in this issue, due to his statements on security and military issues. However, the most obvious difference is seen in the financial issue. The 87 statements made by Osborne and Cameron alone are much more than the number of statements made by the other 7 actors on the subject. The fact that Osborne was the Chancellor of the Exchequer at the time contributed to this difference. Finally, it is observed that the number of statements made by Prime Minister Cameron on the issue of business sector issues to address the employees of the sector is almost twice the sum of the statements made by other actors regarding this issue.

Table 15. Total Statements Made by Internal Actors

	Came ron	Fara ge	John son	Hamm ond	Corb yn	Bl air	M ay	Sturg eon	Osbo rne
Sovereignty	13	4	18	1	1	0	9	1	0
Scottish Independence	2	0	0	1	0	1	6	39	1
Border Issues	0	0	0	0	0	1	3	2	0
Financial Issues	16	3	8	5	0	0	3	2	11
Treaty Issues	5	0	5	6	0	0	9	3	1
National Security	21	1	4	0	0	1	4	0	2
Immigration/M igration Issues	17	2	13	1	3	1	12	0	2
NHS	4	5	4	0	3	0	0	1	1
Economic Issues	41	3	15	8	2	0	9	4	46
Business Sector Issues	32	0	3	2	2	1	2	2	14
Trade Issues	22	5	7	3	0	1	1	1	15
Climate Issues	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0

5.5.2 Total Statements Made by External Actors

As can be seen in Table 16, the total number of statements by the external actors on the referendum process in 3 the newspapers over 12 topics are shown. In the table, it is seen that each actor made a statement on at least 2 topics. Only 3 statements were included in the newspapers in total by Donald Trump, the US Presidential candidate at the time, who only made a statement on the issues of sovereignty and trade. In addition, none of the actors has statements on the four issues related to the referendum process (Scottish Independence, Border issue, NHS and Climate issue).

The US President Obama in that time and the German Chancellor Merkel, who made the most statements in the newspapers, were the actors who made the most statements on Trade and Treaty issues, respectively. Due to Obama's warnings about the trade imbalance that may occur in the UK after Brexit and the difficulties in restructuring the US trade agreements with the UK, as seen in Table 12, the actor who made the most statements on this issue with 8 statements on the trade issue. has been. Angela Merkel, who is the Chancellor of Germany and also the leader of one of the most influential countries in the EU, on the other hand, became the actor with the highest number of statements with 9 regarding the Treaty issue due to the warnings that the UK's Treaties with the EU before and after Brexit could be jeopardized.

Lagarde, Juncker and Tusk, whose statements were given the most place after Obama and Merkel, seem to have concentrated on economic and treaty issues. Christine Lagarde, who was the head of the IMF during the referendum period, was the actor who made the most statements on the topic of the economic issue, with warnings that the UK economy might be in a difficult situation with Brexit. During the referendum period, EU Commission President Jean Claude-Juncker and EU Council President

Donald Tusk were the actors who gave the most statements on the treaty issues topic after Merkel (Juncker 8 and Tusk 6).

Table 16. Total Statements Made by External Actors

	D. Tusk	C. Lagarde	B. Obama	D. Trump	J. C. Juncker	A. Merkel
Sovereignty	2	0	0	1	0	0
Scottish Independence	0	0	0	0	0	0
Border Issues	0	0	0	0	0	0
Financial Issues	0	3	3	0	0	1
Treaty Issues	6	1	0	0	8	9
National Security	0	0	4	0	0	2
Immigration/Migration Issues	0	0	1	0	1	0
NHS	0	0	0	0	0	0
Economic Issues	0	7	3	0	0	3
Business Sector Issues	0	0	4	0	0	2
Trade Issues	1	2	8	2	3	4
Climate Issues	0	0	0	0	0	0

5.6 Total Results of Evaluation/Advocation of Actors' Statements in Newspapers (The Daily Mail & The Dail Mirror & The Times), 1st January 2014- 31st July 2016

As can be seen in Table 17, discourse analysis was made of the statements of the actors in the newspapers. In the analysis and coding, the explanations of the actors regarding the process were divided into 3 groups positive, negative and neutral. Based on the statements made by the actors, if actors talk about the interests of the side they support during the referendum, it is coded as positive, if actors talk about the harms of the other side, it is coded as negative, and if actors are unbiased in their statements, it is coded as neutral.

As can be seen in the table below, then Prime Minister David Cameron was the actor who made the most positive, negative and neutral statements. The negative rhetoric in

his statements best illustrates his statements about the harms of Brexit and his constant criticism of Brexit supporters during the referendum process. At the same time, during the process, he stated at every opportunity that he was in favour of staying in the EU and that he constantly used the benefits of staying in the EU in his statements, which shows the positive rhetoric in his statements. The neutral statements he made were "unpretentious" statements about Brexit after losing the referendum. Likewise, Osborne, who made the most statements after Cameron, is similar to Cameron when the ratios of the number of statements are taken into account.

Another interesting detail is that two-thirds of the statements made by Jeremy Corbyn, the leader of the Labour Party at the time, were neutral and only four statements criticized Brexit.

Table 17. Total Results of Evaluation/Advocation of Actors' Statements in Newspapers (The Daily Mail & The Daily Mirror & The Times)

		Positive	Negative	Neutral
Internal Actors	David Cameron	39	101	33
	Nigel Farage	8	11	4
	Boris Johnson	23	42	12
	Philip Anthony	7	14	6
	Jeremy Corbyn	0	4	8
	Tony Blair	0	5	1
	Theresa May	27	12	19
	Nicola Sturgeon	17	21	17
	George Gideon	11	78	4
External Actors	Donald Tusk	0	9	0
	Christine Lagarde	0	12	0
	Barack Obama	2	14	7
	Donald Trump	3	0	0
	Jean-Claude	0	11	1
	Angela Merkel	2	14	5

5.6.1 Total Results of the Evaluation/Advocation of the Official/Non-official Business/Financial Organisations’ Statements in the Times Newspaper, 1st January 2014- 31st July 2016

The reason for coding formal/informal organizations is to try to show individuals’ prominence in policies, as previously mentioned in section 3. As can be seen in Table 18, it is seen that the statements of the organizations in The Times about the process are not even half of the statements made by "individual" actors. Also, as stated in Table 6, the newspaper that gave the most place to the statements of the actors was the Times, and for this reason, the statements of official/unofficial organizations were coded only through The Times newspaper.

Table 18. Total Results of the Evaluation/Advocation of the Official/Non-official Business/Financial Organisations’ Statements in the Times Newspaper

	Positive	Negative	Neutral
Statements by Business/Financial Sector	13	104	22

5.7 Total Results of Actors’ Statements that Argue For/Against Brexit, in Newspapers (The Daily Mail & The Dail Mirror & The Times), 1st January 2014- 31st July 2016

In this section, the actors' attitudes towards the Brexit referendum are formed by the total of the statements in the three newspapers. As can be seen in Table 19, the 3 actors who took the most opposition in their statements against Brexit stand out. Prime Minister Cameron, Finance Minister Osborne and Scottish Prime Minister Sturgeon were the actors who opposed Brexit the most. On the other hand, it is seen that Nigel Farage, the leader of the UK Independence Party at the time, and Boris Johnson, played the perfect role in the realization of Brexit. We see that the most interesting detail in the internal actors was created by Cameron's successor Theresa May. Although she

took a stance against Brexit during the process, it seems clear that she became almost a Brexiter after she became prime minister aftermath of the referendum.

When we look at the external actors, it is obvious that all actors, except Donald Trump, have an attitude towards Brexit. The main reason for Donald Trump's attitude was that he used the referendum process as a propaganda tool for the US Presidential election. He has succeeded in this as well.

Table 19. Total Results of Actors' Statements that Argue For/Against Brexit, in Newspapers (The Daily Mail & The Dail Mirror & The Times)

		For	Against
Internal Actors	David Cameron	1	107
	Nigel Farage	23	0
	Boris Johnson	75	2
	Philip Anthony Hammond	7	20
	Jeremy Corbyn	0	12
	Tony Blair	0	6
	Theresa May	38	20
	Nicola Sturgeon	0	55
External Actors	George Gideon Oliver Osborne	5	88
	Donald Tusk	0	9
	Christine Lagarde	0	13
	Barack Obama	2	21
	Donald Trump	3	0
	Jean-Claude Juncker	0	12
	Angela Merkel	1	20

5.7.1 Total Results of the Official/Non-official Business/Financial Organisations' Statements that Argue For/Against Brexit in the Times Newspaper, 1st January 2014- 31st July 2016

As can be seen in the table below, organisations in the economic and financial sectors took a stance against Brexit.

Table 20. Total Results of the Official/Non-official Business/Financial Organisations' Statements that Argue For/Against Brexit in the Times Newspaper

	For	Against
Statements by Business/Financial Sector Organisations	16	101

5.8 Total Results of the Justification of Actors' Arguments/Statements in the Newspapers (The Daily Mail & The Daily Mirror & The Times), 1st January 2014- 31st July 2016

Looking at whether the actors practice populism falls within the discourse analysis we explained in the previous chapter. As can be seen in the table below, actors are divided into two groups, populist and non-populist, according to their statements. It would be useful to briefly mention the subject mentioned in the second part of the thesis under this title. In its most rough form, populism is the verbal or written explanation of claims that have no justification or basis. In this context, in the discourse analysis we conducted by considering the statements made by the actors, we understand that the claims of the actors in their statements of populism are unjustified or unfounded. The statements that the actors based on any justification or source, even if it was not true, were coded as non-populism.

When we look at Table 21, we see that the actor whose explanations are given the most in the newspapers is also the actor who makes the most populism. It is seen that almost eighty per cent of David Cameron's statements are populist. In addition, populism is seen in two-thirds of Osborne's statements, the actor who makes the most statements after Camron. The foreign minister of the time, P. Hammond, and the post-referendum prime minister, Theresa May, stand out as two actors whose statements seem balanced.

Interestingly, Jeremy Corbyn, who has a low number of statements, made more conscious statements as a party leader instead of adopting a populist stance like his opponent Cameron. As can be seen in the table, Corbyn was the only actor to base most of his statements on any justification. However, despite the small number of statements he made, the co-leader of the Labour Party and former prime minister Tony Blair, of which five of his six statements were populist, took a populist stance, unlike Jeremy Corbyn.

On the other hand, when looking at the external actors, it is observed that there is a populist trend in all of them. Although they are actors who are out of the election, it seems that they were trying to canalise the referendum process as populists with their statements in the newspapers. An interesting point is that Lagarde, who is the head of the IMF, on issues such as the economic and financial issues that were covered most in the newspapers during the referendum process, did not give a reason in general in her statements, just like the internal actors Cameron and Osborne on these issues.

Table 21. Total Results of the Justification of Actors' Arguments/Statements in the Newspapers (The Daily Mail & The Dail Mirror & The Times)

		Non-populist Statements	Populist Statements
Internal Actors	David Cameron	30	80
	Nigel Farage	1	23
	Boris Johnson	6	51
	Philip Anthony	9	11
	Jeremy Corbyn	8	3
	Tony Blair	1	5
	Theresa May	18	21
	Nicola Sturgeon	13	33
	George Gideon Oliver Osborne	19	39
External Actors	Donald Tusk	2	6
	Christine Lagarde	2	10
	Barack Obama	4	12

	Donald Trump	0	3
	Jean-Claude Juncker	2	7
	Angela Merkel	7	13

5.9 Conclusion

The statements of 15 actors who were influential in the referendum process, which were published in 3 newspapers on 12 topics, were analysed above. The most productive newspaper in the analysis was The Times, followed by The Daily Mail and The Daily Mirror, respectively. Judging by the analyses made above, the refugee/immigrant problems, which were constantly taken into consideration during the referendum process, were not discussed as much as expected, and the issues about economic and financial issues became the most important cornerstone in the shaping of the referendum process. In this context, the statements of the business/finance sector experts have also gained importance, and as it can be understood from the analyses, the most common issues in the statements of the actors have been economic and financial issues.

In the analyses made based on the statements of actors and business/finance sector experts in the newspapers, both sides have an overwhelmingly negative attitude towards Brexit, and the majority of the actors also opposed Brexit in almost all 12 issues. In the study, although Boris Johnson, Nigel Farage and Donald Trump were the only ones who supported Brexit continuously during and after the referendum process, Brexit has taken place. However, a more important result than that was that almost all of the actors made propaganda in a populist manner, resulting in a populist trend in the process. Except for Jeremy Corbyn, one of the actors whose statements are the least given in the newspapers, all the other actors benefited from populism and,

based on the discourse analysis made in the study, they tried to do this by constantly attacking or criticizing the claims of the other party to impose their claims.

In general, the analysis of the thesis study shows that the actors who are in favour of Brexit, although they have a statement on economic, financial and trade issues, are focused on other issues in total, and also dominate on issues other than economic, financial and trade issues, compared to actors who are in favour of staying in Europe. In this context, especially on sovereignty and refugee/immigrant issues, Brexit supporters were able to reach their own goals in the referendum by directing the people on these issues in line with their wills, or in other words, by making populism in those areas.

Chapter 6

CONCLUSION

With the Brexit referendum process as a case study, the primary goal of this research is to get a better understanding of the notions of populism and the personalisation of politics. As a starting point, to comprehend the concepts of populism and personalization of politics, the concepts were attempted to be defined via the use of literature in this context. Following that, the level of populism in the Brexit referendum process was demonstrated by examining the statements of political actors regarding the idea of populism in the context of the process. Afterwards, in the context of showing the effect of personalization of politics in the referendum process, it has been tried to show the importance of the effects of their statements on the referendum process by considering the politicians as political actors, unlike the political parties.

As discussed in Chapter 2, populism is a concept that has been discussed a lot in the literature, both theoretically and ideologically. While attention to populism increased, the term continued to be contested. Populism is a “thin ideology”, according to Mudde's definition. The basis of this ideology is the conflict between the corrupt elite and the poor people. Norris and Werner's critique of the definition of populism as an ideology; its inadequacy as an ideology. As an ideology, the lack of basic philosophy of the ideology and the generalization of everyone who criticizes the elite as a populist has been a criticism of the ideological definition of populism.

The most recent populist trend that developed in Europe and the world started to strongly affect the United Kingdom with the Brexit referendum. In the 1980s, the fact that some political groups and actors in Britain began to take a negative attitude towards Europe with Euroscepticism directly impacted the referendum process, along with the populism movements in Europe and America during the referendum process.

As discussed earlier populism generally consists of two dimensions: vertical and horizontal. "Real people" oppose the economic, cultural, and political "elite" in populism's vertical dimension. The "people" are depicted as innocent, good, and moral, whereas the elite are portrayed as affluent, powerful, rule-free, and economically degraded. Right-wing populism and left-wing populism in a horizontal dimension where "the people" are regarded with limited integrity, with the major contrast being between within and outside. Unlike the vertical dimension, horizontal conflicts are centred on themes like immigration, refugees, globalisation, and identity.

Both dimensions that makeup populism contain five basic discourse elements. One of the discourse elements of populism, antagonistic re-politicization, is utilised to re-establish or control democratic power over living places that are detached or remote from democratic decision-making surroundings. The concept of majoritarianism is another fundamental element, which protects the interests, rights, and claims of the majority in opposition to the interests of the minority as a whole. As an "ideology of immediacy," populism does not place faith in institutions, particularly political parties, the media, and the courts. To participate in elections, populists often join new parties, but these organisations are ill-equipped to serve as vehicles for personal leadership. This leads to a preference for representative democracy at times, resulting in the formation of another populist element, anti-institutionalism. The data collected

illustrates a medium level of antagonistic re-politization but a high level of ideology of immediacy. Another part, the element of protectionism, is the idea that "the people" would be safeguarded from threats coming from above, below, and, more lately, from the outside. Economic, security and cultural protectionism are all included in this category, as are three forms of rhetoric. This is featured very heavily in the data collected. Finally, each populist develops his or her own style, which can be summarised as follows: Every populist has a style of discourse that is accepted as "low" rather than "high," who prefers "raw" language rather than polished and sophisticated, and who emphasises self-presentation rather than self-expression. Instead, then focusing on "what," this populist repertory emphasises communication, rhetoric, self-presentation, and body language as the most important elements. The data does not illustrate the raw language element and there were no distinctive features of high or low styles.

The thesis also examines the personalization of politics within the framework of Brexit and British Politics. It could be argued that the 1979 victories of Margaret Thatcher in Britain and Ronald Reagan in America, two strong, charismatic leaders who were considerably more popular than their respective parties started a process whereby leaders of parties became considerably important. While the motives for personalising politics varied, the main themes were similar. Personalization of politics has four consequences on the evolution of liberal democracies. The notion that leaders are growing more essential in democratic nations is supported by a slew of weak data. According to election campaign research, major party leaders' exposure increases as election day approaches. However, rigorous testing of the idea is unusual for three reasons. Finding good robust evidence is challenging enough, but estimating it across

nations is much more problematic. Second, detecting a continuous pattern is difficult since leaders' personalities (and popularity) fluctuate with time. Third, the characteristics that voters value in their leaders have changed, in part as a result of improved voter education, among other considerations. The evidence from parliamentary systems shows a considerable influence, but far less than often imagined. In this context, research shows that voters' attention on performance ratings is about the same whether politicians are in government or not, and regardless of their image. This displays the personalisation of politics with leaders and democracy.

The influence of leaders on voter behaviour is another aspect of personalization of politics. Personality voting is "quickly and successfully packaged goods made by image producers that affect public opinion by emphasising traits that are especially attractive to voters." The effect of a leader's personality is directly proportionate to the evaluator's political understanding. Also, educated voters are more prone to examine the leader's personality attributes. In addition, people's voting decisions are influenced by their perceptions of politicians' personalities. As a consequence, individuals are more likely to "vote differently from election to election, depending on the specific persons contesting." Voters increasingly choose people over parties or agendas. The study's political players had a clear impact on the referendum. Nigel Farage's individual effect on the Brexit referendum process has been quite evident, especially after his election victory in the UK general elections before the Brexit vote. Immigrants, refugees, and problems of sovereignty have long been a source of contention between the UK and the EU. However, as shown in the research, remarks made by actors such as Boris Johnson and Nigel Farage to direct the public's attention

to these two concerns rather than others reveal that they have major influence on voter behaviour and hence alter the result of the Brexit referendum.

Finally, personalisation in politics has impacted the media. There are several reasons why television and social media concentrate on political leaders' personalities and how they represent political topics and events. The most apparent example is how television and the internet enlighten their viewers. It is simpler to communicate information via an identifiable personality than an abstract text or an organisation since media convey information through visual imagery. As a consequence, viewers and users may better relate to the media leaders they follow and empathise with the causes they support. That is, individuals may better understand the politician's position by putting themselves in their shoes. Political leaders are an effective visual shortcut for catching and holding the audience's attention in the media, particularly when the information is about the leader's personality.

While the media is often seen as the driving factor behind the trend of personalising politics, political parties also play a significant role. Parties find it simpler to offer political alternatives to people via a well-known personality than through a newsletter or a policy statement. While being questioned or debated by an interviewer who indirectly represents voters' interests, the leader might increase public interest in the topic. A mandate in office may boost a government's popularity by reinforcing politics and personality (emphasising attributes like authority and competence).

The study covered the period of 1st of January 2014 to 31st of July 2016 and used newspaper content from Daily Mail, Daily Mirror and The Times. In the analysis phase, the attitudes of the actors towards the Brexit referendum, based on the

statements of the actors during the Brexit referendum process, the evaluation of the statements of the actors throughout the process, and finally the justification of the arguments/statements of the actors were analysed.

The analysis took place in seven stages. A Codebook was prepared and several search strings were created. Then all statements made by a total of 15 actors were coded in three different newspapers. distribution of the total number of statements by the actors depending on 12 topics, the total results of the evaluation of the statements of the actors in the newspapers, the total results of the evaluation of the statements for/against Brexit in the newspapers, and finally, the stage of evaluating the total justifications of the statements by the actors, in which we measure whether the actors made populism.

The Brexit referendum process illustrated that populism was coupled with another political trend, that of personalization of politics. The prominence of individual political actors and the fact that populist discourse led by particular individuals such as Nigel Farage and Boris Johnson showed the emergence of this shift in cleavage structures in the UK besides the effects of populism. The study demonstrates that there was a significant level of personalisation of politics during the Brexit referendum.

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