

**Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program
(CTR) and Global Partnership against Weapons of
Mass Destruction (WMD): Possibilities for Better
International Cooperation on WMD**

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ABSTRACT

Today, weapons of mass destruction (WMD) seriously threaten international security as states are in need of obtaining nuclear weapons. As the international system is anarchic, states need to provide their own security and as realism suggests the most important objective to achieve this is to have strong military power. States seek to increase their military power by acquiring nuclear weapons, even though there are numerous agreements that ban the production, transfer, and use of nuclear weapons unless they are for friendly purposes. The breakdown of the Soviet Union left states with their nuclear stockpiles and these weapons needed to be eliminated and secured before getting into wrong hands. The Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program is introduced as a case study to show how it can assist states to become nuclear free. The Nunn-Lugar CTR Program was successfully achieved in the former Soviet Union. On the other hand, North Korea has been expanding its nuclear stockpile and testing nuclear weapons. Today, North Korea seriously challenges international security with its nuclear experiments. The aim of the thesis is to provide necessary information to show that the CTR program cannot be applied to North Korea and to demonstrate how Trump Administration is challenged by North Korean nuclear activities.

Keywords: Weapons of mass destruction, international security, proliferation

ÖZ

Günümüzde kitle imha silahları uluslararası güvenliği tehlikeye sokan önemli bir husustur. Uluslararası sistemin anarşik olması ve devletlerin kendi güvenliklerini sağlamak zorunda olmaları, realizme göre güçlü orduya sahip olmaktan geçmektedir. Dünya üzerinde her ne kadar nükleer silahların üretilmesi, kullanılması ve taşınmasını engelleyen sınırlayan ve yasaklayan antlaşmalar olsa dahi, devletler ordularını güçlendirmek adına kitle imha silahlarına başvurmaktadır. Sovyetler Birliğinin yıkılmasından sonra barındırdığı devletler yüksek miktarda kitle imha silahlarıyla birlikte korunmasız hale gelmiştir. Bu silahların terörist grupların ellerine geçmeden yok edilmesi ve güvence altına alınması gerekmektedir. Öte yandan, Kuzey Kore nükleer testler yapmakta ve uluslararası güvenliği tehdit etmektedir. Bu tezin amacı Nunn-Lugar Programının Sovyetler Birliğine uygulanıp başarılı olmasından dolayı aynı şekilde Kuzey Kore’de uygulanabilirliğini test etmek olup, Trump hükümetini ne şekilde tehdit ettiğini ortaya çıkarmaktır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Kitle imha silahları, uluslararası güvenlik, silahlanma

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Chapter 1

INTRODUCTION

The Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program was created in 1991 to contribute American funds and technological skills to assist in securing and demolishing storages of biological, chemical and nuclear weapons and elements in the Soviet Union. Even though major part of the CTR program has been achieved, the capacities of the Nunn-Lugar and the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, which enforces it, have extended to carry out international proliferation dangers. Due to the breakdown of the Soviet Union, numerous developing states were left with overwhelming amount of nuclear related weapons and the foundation that helps them. For instance, Belarus turned into the 8th, Kazakhstan to 4th, and Ukraine the 3rd state with the highest amount of nuclear powers in the world. Fundamentally, the political arrangement and expenditures that had maintained and protected the tremendous Soviet weapons of mass destruction production had dissolved.

The CTR program had to reduce large levels of skepticism on both sides due to the Cold War. Both the United States and the former Soviet Union welcomed the accountability to make sure that arsenals of weapons were protected and demolished in order to prevent them from hostile groups or actors. Today, the CTR is not solely a program, or a financial supplier, or a number of agreements. It is an instrument for non-proliferation collaboration, proficiency and to deal with disputes all over the world. It acts as a mean to respond to proliferation crisis and bonding with states that

require assistance in order to fight against weapons of mass destruction and its supporting foundation. On the other hand, the Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons of Mass Destruction is a safety measure created in the Group of Eight summit in 2002. The partnership necessitates a commitment by group members to contribute funding in order to demolish and safeguard the weapons of mass destruction. Administering weapons of mass destruction is important, not solely because of the fact that it could create tremendous loss of life from assaults but, it could horrify the international economy, additionally strain national financial plans, inhibit human advancement contribution, and cause insecurity throughout the world. Moreover, WMD enhances the possibilities of nuclear proliferation and create foundations for future terrorist attacks. As a result, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is the top factor that challenges the security of global society and the United States. It is not easy to destroy nuclear weapons once and for all. International agreements allow states to use nuclear energy for friendly purposes. Some states severely deny the fact that they have nuclear weapons while some states indicate that they only use for peaceful purposes. As a result, this strongly threatens the international security as no one can be sure about each other's intentions.

Even though there are tons of international agreements that ban the use, transportation and production of nuclear weapons states or non-state actors still have access to nuclear weapons. The CTR program in former Soviet Union had achieved a lot, helping former Union states to go nuclear free and secure their facilities and weapons. However after almost two decades Russia cancelled the program. Today, North Korea is one of the most dangerous states that have nuclear weapons. North Korea is building up its stockpile and estimated to have between 25 and 60 nuclear

weapons. The increased nuclear storage of North Korea concerned particularly the United States and its allies. The United States has been trying to persuade North Korea to abandon its nuclear activities but still no solid outcome has been achieved. The research question is to find out if it is possible to apply the Nunn-Lugar CTR program to North Korea. When we analyze North Korea it can be said that North Korea is not an easy state to deal with. The state appears to be a closed box which makes cooperation difficult and loves to play by their rules in international community. After researching and analyzing both the CTR program and North Korea, the hypothesis I came up with is that, the CTR program cannot be applied to North Korea. As a result, the thesis provides substantial research to indicate why the CTR cannot be achieved in North Korea and how Trump Administration is challenged by threats from North Korea regarding its nuclear activities.

Chapter 2

INTERNATIONAL TREATIES DEALING WITH NUCLEAR TERRORISM

2.1 UN Security Council Resolution 1373

In 2001, the United Nation Security Council Resolution 1373 was endorsed, requiring all countries to participate in suitable agreements and protocols related to terrorism. According to resolution, states must criminalize compensation to terrorism related actions, revoke financial assistance and “safe haven” to criminals and transfer information for the impediment and pursuit of terrorism related acts. Moreover, the resolution also highlights the obligation in order to reinforce a universal response to the threats of illegal trafficking. However, Resolution 1373 does not address weapons of mass destruction (WMD) by itself, as Elizabeth Turpen indicates: “WMD was already on the minds of the resolution’s drafters. Two paragraphs of the resolution—3 and 4—specifically address terrorist possession of WMD-related materials and trafficking in such materials.” (Boureston and White, 2010;Harajan,2014).

2.2 UN Security Council Resolution 1540

United Nation Security Council Resolutions 1373 and 1540 are the singular globally mandatory movements that enforce nuclear safety liabilities on all countries. Furthermore, Resolution 1540 operates deeper than its forebear, in that it completely focuses on WMD safety obligation, appointing these in a strings of arrangements.

According to resolution, all countries are obliged to endorse and embrace relevant compelling standards to constrain any non-governmental actor from producing, obtaining, retaining, creating, transferring, or using nuclear related arms and to develop internal forces to thwart their spread which ratified in 2004 (Boureston and White, 2010). Additionally, that involves enforcing accountancy and control standards; physical security protocols, border supervision, protocols to disclose, prevent and fight against illegal trafficking along with export and import supervision. Moreover, Resolution 1540 can be identified as the most significant backbone of the emerging nuclear safety reign, but its application has been stagnant and erratic. Comprehensive Review of the Status of Implementation of Resolution 1540, the Expert Group reported notably low degrees of application in specific territories, particularly in the physical conservation of nuclear elements, in measures for border and export supervision of nuclear-linked components and in all forms of state persecution of domestic supervision (Boureston and White, 2010;Harajan,2014).

Furthermore, a number of elements are interrupting the implementation of Resolution 1540. Some revolves around the stipulation of some countries over the legality of the Security Council setting obligatory liability on all countries. Other are by reason of state capability issues and competing preferences. In addition, still other is by virtue of shaky order of the 1540 Committee that does not own the resources or the jurisdiction to initiate a compelling overlook duty. Moreover, the ultimate element arose from the path the resolution was enacted- after Osama Bin Laden stated “Al-Qaeda had a mission to deploy nuclear weapons, the Security Council speedily passed the resolution (excluding necessary authentication and administration arrangement in the practice. From the beginning, the rushed resolution provoked

annoyance between some UN participant countries, which questioned the judgment of the Security Council to mislead the conventional UN-treaty making procedure and scrutinized the resolution section of the US- guided counterterrorism program (Boureston and White, 2010;Harajan,2014).

2.3 The Nuclear Terrorism Convention

In 2005, the Nuclear Terrorism Convention was ratified under the patronage of the United Nations. It analysis violations linked to illicit control and appliance of radioactive components, and the appliance or damage of nuclear facilities. The council demands participants to criminalize these violations and to tangibly preserve nuclear and radiological components as advised by the IAEA. Moreover to these accountabilities, the assembly is substantial because it requests countries to collaborate with each other as well as with the IAEA to thwart, disclose and counter to nuclear and radiological terrorism dangers. The congress hence has a substantial role in developing nuclear safety as a universal standard and in legalizing UN and IAEA jurisdiction in forming and managing the nuclear safety agenda (Boureston and White, 2010;Harajan,2014).

On the other hand, the Nuclear Terrorism Convention does have problems. Even though almost five years have gone since the resolution was enacted and three years since it came into force; still the number of participants are sixty-five states. Numerous countries such as Pakistan, Vietnam, North Korea, Myanmar, Indonesia, Iran and Iraq have not ratified the agreement. Furthermore, as being nuclear weapon countries, the United Kingdom and Russia have at present signed it, that gives the wrong signal to the global society. The United States delayed the ratification process because of the information-exchanging foundation and the legitimate limitations that

the assembly could from on military strikes on non-domestic nuclear facilities but recently the US has agreed to ratify the agreement (Boureston and White, 2010;Harajan,2014).

2.4 The CPPNM and Amendment

The Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material can be listed as the only global legitimately mandatory arrangement on the tangible preservation of nuclear elements applied for humanitarian purposes. The CPPNM contributes fulfillment for protection throughout global transfer and creates a foundation for collaboration in the preservation, resumption and recovery of stolen elements (Boureston and White, 2010;Harahan,2014). The congress additionally, records violations that countries must give punishment and for which deportation must be welcomed. Under the CPPNM, IAEA participant countries are only requested to implement standards considered essential in correspondence with their domestic safety necessities.

As of October 2015, the convention has 153 member parties along with Russia, Mongolia, Bulgaria, Hungary, the European Atomic Energy Community and Poland has condemned the convention after authorizing it. On the other hand, states such as Thailand and Vietnam which have nuclear research facilities and nuclear energy plans, or more importantly, other states that is uncertain or accepted nuclear weapons programs like North Korea and Iran have not ratified the agreement. The aim of the amendment is to facilitate collaboration to restore nuclear elements, thwart the outcomes of radiological disruption, create new standards for the physical preservation of nuclear elements, and stimulate actors to criminalize violations in their national constitution. It also substantially expands the IAEA nuclear safety

mandate by consulting supplementary tasks on the organization. However, experts indicate constitutional issues in the CPPNM and its amendment. To begin with, the physical preservation standards ordered are uncertain, and that opaque language could be used as an excuse for countries which do not desire to plan out nuclear safety. Moreover, the CPPNM and its amendment let countries assess their own nuclear safety, such other countries or institutions (for example, the IAEA) cannot rationally request that a participant country enhances its physical safety. The CPPNM and its amendment do not demand recurrent informing to a global institution or designates associate analysis of an individual state's physical conservation standards. The last but not least, some participant countries do not have the financial measures to protect the physical security of their nuclear components (Boureston and White, 2010;Harajan,2014).

2.5 The Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities

The Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities (INFCIRC/225) is an appointed instructions to create an efficient physical preservation standards. The purpose of the INFCIRC/225 is to protect loose nuclear elements and thwart nuclear terrorism. Additionally, it contributes best proceedings from that states can start to establish their nuclear safety structures. It aroused from an IAEA script issued in 1972 and has been amended four times. INFCIRC/225/Rev.4 camouflages the physical security of humanitarian and military nuclear elements in practice, stockpile and transport, both internal and external. However, INFCIRC/225/Rev.4 lacks serious issues. To begin with, the instructions are not mandatory, in other words countries have no requirement to apply them all. Countries can, as a result, apply these protocols entirely, some of them or none of them. Furthermore,

numerous standards that would have enhanced physical security were drained or discarded to get the amendment enacted. These protocols are the minimum mutual factors in confirmed regulations for physical security. Certainly, a state might receive help from the IAEA to make clear these instructions and practice them to its specific security atmosphere. Nevertheless, numerous experts are not overjoyed due to suitable standards are not more certainly represented at the beginning and the stroke is not appointed at a globally high (Boureston and White, 2010;Harajan,2014).

2.6 Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources

The Code of Conduct is not mandatory, universal legitimate mechanisms that contribute instructions and appoint protocols for the supervision of nonmilitant radioactive sources which might constitute a safety and/or a security threat. It was formerly established by the IAEA Secretariat at the end of the 1990s- by the demand of the Group of Eight (G8) and was abstracted, reexamined and enhanced right after the terrorist attacks of 9/11. Furthermore, in September 2003, the theme of the altered code was confirmed by the IAEA Board of Governors and gladly received by the general conference. Consequently, the IAEA Secretariat created rational management on how to abide by the code, which was issued in March 2005. Additionally, it created an official practice of information interchange which is proposed to help the bureau assess process in exertion. Right after the publication of the code in January 2004, numerous countries have enforced their political engagement to it. However, a few have achieved the self-evaluation inquiry, which is engaged to assist the IAEA assess exertion of the protocols. The condition of national exertion is thus crucial to measure, even though most of the signs propose that political engagement has been stagnant to interpret into solid action. Substantial

countries that have not been participating completely in the means of information interchange over their appliance and supervision of radioactive components involve Ukraine, Japan, Israel, Pakistan, Argentina and numerous states in the European Union. Additionally, China has not endured a concluded inquiry to the IAEA (Boureston and White, 2010;Harajan,2014).

2.7 International Atomic Energy Agency Nuclear Security Program

The IAEA contributes management and compensation to countries on a broad sphere of nuclear safety standards to advance the physical preservation of nuclear and other radioactive elements. The IAEA has initiated exertions to integrate and increase these movements, which the IAEA Department of Nuclear Safety and Security came up with a nuclear safety program in 2002. Distinct aids contributed under this movement involve duties to lower indexes of high-risk elements – involving highly enriched uranium- and to reform state capacities in thwarting, identifying and reacting to nuclear and radiological terrorism, illegitimate interactions, and nuclear and radiological dangers, bolstering nuclear safety at large-scale public affairs and human resources for any division of nuclear safety discipline. There are some substantial intensities in the IAEA Nuclear Security Program (Boureston and White, 2010;Harajan,2014).

On the contrary, it is sufficiently created and well appreciated by numerous member countries. The IAEA Nuclear Security Program is assisted by internal scientists and laboratories and it is supported by participant countries in its aim of acquiring accessible elements over the world. Numerous member countries, for instance, have contributed additional-financial funding and provided professionals and training. Most of the programs arise from the agency's inadequacy of jurisdiction to gauge or

authenticate the nuclear safety attempts of participant countries, the hesitancy of countries to authorize it that jurisdiction, and the indisposition of the IAEA Secretariat to provide or persuade for an extended injunction. These impediments have tied up the agency to its conventional cooperation function- it might intercede only at the demand of the country in question and it might determine nuclear safety standards only when requested to do so (Boureston and White, 2010;Harajan,2014).

2.8 The Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI)

The Proliferation Security Initiative is a universal force that desires to impede the expansion of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their associated materials and units. At the beginning, PSI's participation made up of eleven states-respectively- Spain, the Netherlands, Italy, Australia, Germany, Poland, Japan, France, Portugal, the United Kingdom and the United States. It has extended into an international effort including more than one hundred states. Nonetheless, considerable key countries have thwarted endorsing to the PSI structure, involving: South Africa, Malaysia, China, India, Pakistan, Brazil, Indonesia, Egypt and Mexico (Boureston and White, 2010;Harajan,2014).

PSI was officially created in May 2003 by President George W. Bush. A key incentive for Bush's creation of PSI was a backslide 2002 effort by the US and Spanish fleets to seize the cargo of the So San, a North Korean vendor ship transferring ballistic missiles and missile elements to Yemen. Spanish armed forces managed to legitimately impede the ship and analyze its cargo, but existing international law did not permit for the arms to be impounded.

The danger of North Korea's evolving nuclear weapons program along with post 9/11 concerns of nuclear terrorism were the main factors that stimulated President Bush to establish PSI (Boureston and White, 2010;Harajan,2014).

PSI's legislative framework is not similar to other international organizations in numerous aspects. PSI is singular in containing no perpetual corporate structure. Moreover, PSI does not necessitate states to engage in any mandatory legal pledges. Preferably agreeable states utterly show their engagement to the PSI Statement of Interdiction Principles that involves principles as, preventing WMD- associated deportation to states of proliferation concerns within the range of a state's capabilities and legitimate authority, assisting to promotion of an efficient network of information among states on matters of WMD prevention, working to expand legitimate processes for preventing WMD, on national and international standards. The United States has further signed reciprocal Ship Boarding Agreements with 11 naval countries within the PSI foundation. The reconciliation permits the US and the ally countries to board, investigate and confine any ship which is enrolled to the other various state. Procedures like these have enabled the US to support the legitimate position of PSI activities managed in agreement with these countries (Boureston and White, 2010;Harajan,2014).

PSI does not function under the patronage of the United Nations as well as it does not develop any international measures. Substantially, PSI aims to capitalize on current legal powers, not establish any powers. Generally, PSI's attitude to prevent is focused on applying slight infringement by virtue of interrupting containers that are considered to be transferring WMD-associated components. The achievements of PSI, for example, national powers can block a vessel due to of customs negligence

and afterwards use that violation as excuse for confiscating the ship's cargo. For numerous reasons, plenty PSI members are unwilling to confer the details of the prevention actions which they administer. On the other hand, numerous representatives connected to the initiative have acclaimed its achievement with Acting under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security. German and Italian armed forces collaborated on the outstanding prevention of a German-enrolled ship, appointed by the AQ Khan Proliferation chain which was transferring nuclear enhancement technology to Libya in October 2003. Four PSI member countries prevented a ship transferring ballistic missile technology to Syria in 2007. The last but not least, US naval forces interrupted a ship with Belize flag transferring missile technology of North Korea and obliged it to send back to North Korea in June 2011 (Boureston and White, 2010;Harajan,2014).

2.9 The Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT)

On 15th of July 2006, the President of the United States, George W. Bush and the President of Russian Federation Vladimir Putin declared the establishment of the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT) amid the G8 Summit in Russia. The agreement depends upon the Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and its 2005 Amendment and United Nations Security Council Resolutions 1373 and 1540. The initiative has 85 states and 4 official monitoring divisions- International Criminal Police Organization, United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, European Union and International Atomic Energy Agency (Boureston and White, 2010;Harajan,2014).

The aim of the GICNT is to bolster international capability to interdict, encounter and react to nuclear terrorism via multilateral movements which enhances the protocols, methods, agenda and reconcilability of member states. The first meeting that came across in October 2006 in Morocco revealed the Statement of Principles which summarized the pledges of the GICNT that agreed by 13 representative states.

Expand and evolve accounting, supervise and physical safety of nuclear and related radioactive components and elements, develop and reinforce safety at nonmilitary nuclear facilities, enhance the capability to recognize nuclear and alternative radioactive components for the sake of thwarting illegal exchanging involving collaboration in the analysis and establishment of national disclosure capacities that would be practical, enhance capacities to pursue, expropriate and develop secure control over illicitly adhered nuclear or related radioactive components or elements or tools utilizing them, avert the arrangement of secure sanctuary to terrorists as well as financial or economic support pursuing to obtain or practice of nuclear and related radioactive components and elements, assure competent particular national legitimate and administrative foundation satisfactory to contribute for the fulfillment of suitable criminal and if pertinent, civil accountability for terrorists and those who promotes activities of nuclear terrorism, enhance capacities of members for feedback, alleviation and thorough check in situation of terrorist attacks including the application of nuclear and related radioactive elements and components, involving the establishment of technical methods to recognize nuclear and other radioactive components and elements that are or might be included in the occurrence, bolster information distribution referring to the abolition of amendment of nuclear terrorism and their assistance, taking suitable actions persistent with their interstate law and

global accountability to preserve the privacy of any information that they interchange in assurance (Boureston and White, 2010;Harajan,2014).

If a country wants to be a member of GICNT it has to issue a written letter of ratification of the Statement of Principles to the GICNT Co-Chairs. The country is conceded as a participant consequent to United States or Russian Federation' compliance. Only global governmental institutions can act as legitimate spectator of the GICNT. In this capability they can contribute recommendations and competence to the GICNT respecting actions and the establishment of leading exercises. A global governmental institution has to issue a written letter of ratification of the Statement of Principles to the GICNT Co-Chairs in terms of becoming a legitimate spectator. Consequent to Co-Chair reconciliation, the institution achieves spectator position. Presently, the International Atomic Energy Agency, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, the European Union and Interpol are legitimate spectators of the GICNT (Boureston and White, 2010;Harajan,2014).

2.10 World Institute for Nuclear Security

In 2008, in Vienna The World Institute for Nuclear Security (WINS) was established to assist, securing international nuclear and radioactive components and provisions. The aim of the WINS is not to initiate mandatory measures, act in political manner, plead on the side of the nuclear management or bolster or dissuade any sector of the nuclear fuel period. Instead, it seeks to contribute a global setting for nuclear safety professionals to join debate and come up with a solution on how to resolve the best discipline. Moreover, WINS is particularly addresses on assuring that nuclear functioning institutions take formal accountability for safety at all stages and it

stimulates boards of governors to adopt nuclear safety as a matter of joint governance (Boureston and White, 2010;Harajan,2014;Lee,2012).

Whether it will accomplished this intention relies upon to an extensive range on how it is perceived by industry and on whether the institution can create a perception of necessity around the urgency to establish a nuclear safety culture in the private sector. However it may be early to assess how profitable this attempt is going to be. It would be alluring to measure how it is noticed by emerging countries, as the institution was created by Western countries and is chiefly consists of Western people. However, WINS is undoubtedly seeking to execute the significant private sector hole in the nuclear safety reign (Lee,2012).

2.11 The European Union and Nuclear Non-Proliferation Agenda

Nuclear non-proliferation has not been focused in the core of the European Union. For the past twenty years, the EU has started to adopt some actions in terms of preventing the expansion of nuclear weapons among its Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) centering principally on stimulating the generalization of treaties, clarity in export management and some territorial actions. The development of EU non-proliferation act has been settled nevertheless evident discrepancies among the positions of the member countries. Notwithstanding, the appointed-objectives have not been enthusiastic and have not been seek forcefully as well. Conspicuously, they have never been in the center of an integrated agenda. Recently, the demand for the EU to extend its position as a non-proliferation actor has risen severely. To begin with, the US has efficiently abandoned its guidance in arms control and affirmed different paths to thwart the escalation of WMD. As a result, it makes it essential for other states that are enthusiastic to vindicate the current agenda

to enhance their actions. Later on, especially right after 9/11, the proliferation danger was not seen regarding the procurement of nuclear arms not only by countries, but by terrorist group as well. Even though, the 9/11 intrusion did not include the use of WMD, alleges by Al-Qaida to be in occupation of nuclear weapons have brought this issue in the core of the global agenda (Harajan,2014;Portela,2004).

Moreover, the intrusion of Iraq, chiefly rationalized on the foundation of accusations that it was operating a rapid WMD program, has brought proliferation at the core of public attention. This can be seen as a call challenging the EU to impose some competent policies to prevent the escalation of nuclear weapons. In June 2003, at the Thessaloniki Summit, the EU Council reacted by affirming its first action in terms of fighting against the expansion of WMD. This was the most extensive and specific record declared by the EU. Before analyzing the importance of the strategy along with its outlooks for future exertion, it is significant to assess the actions of EU in the domain up till now (Boureston and White, 2010;Portela,2004).

The EU non-proliferation agenda emerged from a situation in that the European Community had a crucial duty in civilian nuclear matters. One of the associations created in 1957 by the Rome Treaties was specifically the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM) that is supplied with widespread capabilities in the nonmilitary nuclear management of the member countries, involving the activity of a verification and surveillance structure for the civilian ammunition course. Even though EURATOM had a transparent non-proliferation duty, its capacity of action was harshly restrained to the nonmilitary sphere by the Treaty which immune all possessions linked to national security from Community rules. The duty of the EC in non-proliferation started to form when the Council determined to create a “working

group” on nuclear questions in the framework of the European Political Co-Operation (EPC) in 1981. As the community enduring accountability for non-domestic profit making nuclear affiliations, member countries comprehended the necessity to regulate national stands in global conventions. While EURATOM had the duty of conducting proliferation inside the community, the EPC Working Group related to nuclear questions was involved with preventing proliferation apparently. As a start, the Working Group contributed some mutual declarations at UN conventions and the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), focusing on the area of security and nuclear relocation. Remarkably, the European Council enforced restrictions on large scale nuclear materials to South Africa in 1986. During the early 1990s, two firmly linked factors urged the European Community to enhance its duty regarding to non-proliferation. Furthermore, during the Cold War nuclear weapon management was nearly absolute territory of the superpowers its termination scrutinized the enlargement of multilateral resolutions. Second of all, the exposure of the Iraqi nuclear agenda in the outcome of the Gulf War in 1992 created an effective desire for extended global actions in preventing proliferation (Boureston and White, 2010;Harajan,2014;Portela,2004).

Moreover, European unification had come to a point in which member countries believed that the right move was to carry out a deeper arrangement of its foreign policies. When the Single European Act had involved economic dynamics of security, the Treaty on European Union generated a subjective upswing in foreign policy arrangement with the development of The Common Foreign and Security Policy, of which safety is an essential factor. The consecutive expansion of foreign policy factors and instruments has chiefly alleviated the establishment of the

European Union's duty in non-proliferation. As a result, when France improved its historic antagonism to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and agreed to join and endorsed the treaty in 1991, European Community policy on non-proliferation could be mobilized. Non-proliferation intentions began to be asserted at the highest degree. The European Council revealed its first declarations regarding non-proliferation in 1990 and 1991 at the Dublin and Luxembourg Summits. It identified disarmament, non-proliferation and arms control as the most important scopes of CFSP. Furthermore, these intentions were rendered into solid actions: European Union Member States started to introduce policy recommendations at international conventions, for instance, in 1992 when the first Twelve proposed combined actions to the IAEA Board of Governors Conventions on the improvement of security.

Nuclear non-proliferation issues are comprised in two Council committees, the Committee on Non-Proliferation (CONOP) and the Committee on Nuclear Affairs (CONUC) which included governmental experts and deputies from the Commission and Council Secretariat as well. During the 1990s the single most significant action of the EU was its movement for the vague expansion of the Non-Proliferation Treaty at the Extension Conference in 1995. In an official manner a CFSP mechanism, this movement did not extend the EU's area of operation above its conventional forums to the major conference of the non-proliferation agenda only but it created appliances of diplomatic, generally bilateral instruments to achieve its purpose as well. As a result, since then, the EU has moderately broadened the sphere of its non-proliferation policy (Harajan,2014;Portela,2004).

Chapter 3

GLOBAL PARTNERSHIP AGAINST WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION (WMD)

The Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction is a safety action declared at the G8 summit in 2002. It requires an assurance by G8 participants to deliver US\$ 20 billion, in ten-year time, regarding the eradication and safety of weapons of mass destruction in Russia and former countries of the Soviet Union. The agreement was proposed counter the 11-9 attacks and particularly seeks to revoke terrorist access to weapons of mass destruction. The agreement requires states to eliminate stores of chemical weapons, demolish deactivated nuclear submarines, along with fissile elements while engaging former weapons experts. During the Summits, the leaders of G8 gather and contribute announcements, official proclamation and protocols in order to reinforce the non-proliferation act.

The triumph of the Summits, the Partnership was advanced in 2011. Until 2014, the group of 8 agreed to create a “senior-level” structure to organize actions, involving supervising process and classifying preferences. Moreover, the president of Russia acceded to administer participant countries the same advantages it confers the United States, specifically approach to sites, tax privileges and accountability security. On the other hand, by virtue of the Russian joining of Crimea, where the leaders of the G-7 gathered and jointly agreed to discharge Russia from the Group as a disciplinary

standard. Gradual development has been achieved in accumulating funding pledges from states. Furthermore, there is, however, no organizing instrument or evident arrangement for the future (Heyes,2013).

Chapter 4

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

The chapter will look into current evaluations on collection of cooperation styles and it will analyze the dynamics of existing forms and introducing Nunn-Lugar CTR Program as a case study in cooperation. Introducing Nunn-Lugar as a case research is compelling in a way that having not only resemblances to current security cooperation shapes but it is seen as the heyday precedent of cooperative security and deterrent defense at the higher standard of quality. Nunn-Lugar is fixed to the particular circumstances after the Cold War. On the other hand, it is specifically this crossing of structures that makes CTR an exclusively case for evaluation. The course in which the Nunn-Lugar CTR case compels the security cooperation structures, indeed, affirms the particular factors aimed to designate an emerging security structure today. Concerning this, western styles of commercialization chiefly and solid structure especially are consecutively helping Russian scientists' transformation into non-weapons actions with the American impetus along with the support of Russian government. The thesis concentrates on security regime theory and the CTR as a developing security regime, but interpretations besides security regime theory can be applied to explain the security collaboration after the Cold War.

Throughout the Cold War, the relationships between states were important and top-down notion of safety that was armed-targeted was conducted apparently. Both leaders of the U.S and Russia allowed the preservation of deterrent security today.

For example, projects like modifications on non-military tasks were more focused. Additionally, both governments' support to assist Russian experts' transformations into non-weapons areas and actions are types of projects which are non-military. This concept, consecutively acts suitable to the Non-Proliferation Treaty's three pillars demilitarization. However, it would be unnecessary to define the cooperation as standardized. The responsiveness of the programs to other elements for instance conflicts regarding transparency and access terms, offers that exertion is created but by no means of routine. As a result, more improved illustration is that the cooperation has evolved into more functional in essence and competent than diplomatic as it was used to be. Nunn-Lugar CTR Program has significantly advanced the lab to lab, scientist to scientist and business to business. The particular impediment in the aftermath of the Cold War is not in extending cooperation in security but advancing available areas (Goodby&Burghart&Cheryl, et.al 2004); Carter,2005).

However, the security interest feature prevails to convey out of the country security cooperation structure. Even though the exertion of these activities is improvement of legislative politics forms and institutional interests have a duty that we cannot exclude the state to state safety collaboration among the Russia and the United States. As it can be observed in non-democratic states, the Russian management and authority framework operated by harsh regulations, instructions and methods. Russian guidance was in charge of the ideas. However, in American style of economic models, ideas and actions, chiefly, are created in the bottom. Scholars, specialists, creators develop and publicize their activities which Russians do not share this concept. It was very difficult to exercise American style of

commercialization on Russia. Russian experts found it difficult to alter their activities into non-military purposes. The last but not least, altering their mind-set has been the most difficult throughout the process. In the Nunn-Lugar situation, the actions in cooperation are uniformly emerging collection of programs, so impetus for collaboration and the exertion of it are blended during the arrangement of Nunn Lugar (Carter,2005).

4.1 International Regime Theory

International regimes theory has maintained to connect the breach among experts in international security and academicians in global politics by administering a mutual perception. Nonetheless the case that there have been various fundamental characteristic disputes between the international relations academicians and a vague partition related to distinctive of international relations that brought primitive casual aspects in regime composition, regime prospect set theoretical premises to lead scholars' evaluation. Distinct schools of thoughts in international relations have determined international regimes applying related conditions for example, mutual concerns, mutual aims or convergence of concerns, international relations academicians indicate to series of propositions, rules and practices that positioned in the center of international regimes that indicate that there is a complementary comprehension of the notion of international regimes. For example, Keohane and Nye analyze regimes as arrays of guiding arrangements, which involve structures of rules, norms and practices that coordinate management and regulate its impacts. In this regard, Keohane underlines the diversity among provisional arrangements and regimes. Keohane indicates that, the purpose of the regime is to promote agreements with the purpose of administering consecutive connections. Similarly, Robert Jervis demonstrates that the concept of regimes signifies not only norms and possibilities

that promote collaboration, but a type of collaboration that is more than the consecutive of short-term self-interests. Moreover, Jervis indicates that interest and power must not alter behavior, that is to say, measures of behavior must not be altered by the momentary judgments of a new government. Since regimes embody rules and norms the service duty has to involve some insight of mutual liabilities. For this reason, reciprocity grows into one such proposition that is emphasized in Jervis's evaluation of security regimes.

Therefore, common prosperity becomes the most important fundamental of regime construction (Jervis,1982; Jervis,1992;Haggard & Simmons,1987). Ernest Haas, additionally, argues that a regime constitutes of a collectively coherent array of practices, rules and norms. In contrary, Hedley Bull, promoting to an absolute scope peculiar terminology, introduces the importance of rules and organizations in international community where regulations stand for comprehensive essential standards which necessitate or empower arbitrary divisions of people or groups to act in recommended ways. Furthermore, Bull highlights the duty of organizations in developing, contacting, conducting, implementing, defining, validating and embracing them into rules regarding to protect conformity in global politics. Instead, Etel Solingen has defined international regimes as common policy arrangements by all engaged countries so that they can advance the status of all sides roughly via help of an institutional organization of regulations, rules and decision-making practices (Herbert,1996).

In comparison to, Stephen Krasner, who is extensively pointed out by IR academician, international regimes are constant or certain precepts, rules, norms and decision-making measures around which actors' assumptions merge in an

accustomed matters in international relations. Regarding to this argument, standards are concepts of facts, roots that what is “common good” and “common interest” is honest integrity. Norms interpreted regarding of integrity and liability- principles of endorsed act. Rules are recommended forms of acts of regulations of action. Decision-making practices are arranged acts or predominant processes for creating and enforcing shared choice with the help of organizations or agreements. This interpretation is compatible with other statements of regime perceptions. As a result, Krasner’s analyze of international regimes will be applied while evaluating the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program (Krasner,1992).

4.2 Relations between Regimes and State Behavior

There are three distinctive concepts in international relations that identify the relation among regimes and state behavior comparatively separately. There are few academicians such as Raymond Hopkins, Donald Puchala and Oran Young who indicate that regimes influence state behavior and so they are inevitably connected. They also believe that regimes are worldwide phenomenon of global politics. Additionally, they demonstrate that no formed state behavior can resist for a longstanding without creating a suitable regime. In respect to that, Puchala and Hopkins claim that regimes are existed and can be noticed in all parts of international relations. Moreover, they can also come out when there is an extensive power conflict among countries. They additionally argue that, decision-makers regularly identify themselves as being forced by rules, norms and principles that define some behavior and hence recognize these behaviors as rationalized and legal. For this reason, Hopkins and Puchala indicate the notion of regime goes further than a realist aspect, which is believed to be restricted for exemplifying a progressively complicated world. They indicate that this notion is solely suitable to situations

where one may await “communalities of interest,” and so to ones where conflict would largely be counted on. Moreover, scholars also argued that, once these illusory aspects of international relations are consolidated, interpretation of state behavior can go further from power, interest and goals (Haggard & Simmons, 1987; Herbert, 1996).

These scholars mention that causal variables, for instance, knowledge hence become a significant variable. Oran Young claims that “patterned behavior” expectedly creates mutual assumptions and interests, whereas condemnation from divergent methods will cause to “conventionalized behavior”. Briefly, method of behavior that endure over extended periods, like principles and norms will introduce normative importance because that will affect the way decision makers regard the reality. These components are likely to introduce the formation of regimes. On the other hand, there are scholars who believe regimes as a deceptive notion. For example, Susan Strange indicates that regime is a deceptive notion that blurs the fundamental power and economic relation. Strange rejects that principles, rules, norms and decision-making processes have significant role in state behavior. Moreover, Strange introduces a more crucial question and investigates whether the notion of regime is actually constructive in analyzing international political economy or global politics. Moreover, she questions the legitimacy of the regime notion on five different regards. School of thought asserts that if regimes might be verified to exist, therefore, they might have limited or no effect. They are believed to be “epiphenomenal” due to the creation of behavior that is identified to be regimes can easily be disintegrated when balance of power or concept of national interest alters between countries which are included in regimes like this. In this manner, international regimes are chosen to

be terminate entirely, yet if they are to be constituted then their influence on state behavior is seen as insignificant (Jervis,1982; Puchala& Hopkins,1982; Young,1986; Herbert,1996).

Moreover, there are scholars who claim that regimes integrate behavior to maintain craved results. The third method claims that, in the international structure, regimes emerge from voluntary arrangement between legitimately comparable actors. The theory of realism indicates that autonomous countries pursue to increase their power as well as national interest. Thus, they apply regimes in order to accomplish craved results in diverse situations. Hereof, such arrangement as Keohane and Stein indicate is alluring in numerous circumstances. For example, if “pareto-optimal” results cannot be maintained by seeking unilateral protocols thus they are more feasible to be established. Therefore, in this third concept, regimes are perceived as arising and causing a significant effect yet only in some deprived circumstances (Haggard & Simmons,1987).

4.3 Regime Security Theory

Regime security theory seeks to demonstrate why countries obtain nuclear weapons while not confronting a vital nuclear danger. Regime security theory postulates a justification to the question that why decision makers in countries not confronting a vital nuclear danger believe that it is for their advantage to produce nuclear weapons. The explanation introduced is that decision makers do not scrutinize nuclear weapons being in the interest of the country, instead believe that nuclear weapons rises the potential survival of the country’s domestic regime. The sanity of regime theory can be explained as a domestic regime facing domestic destabilization infuriated by the movements or inactivity of external actors, might use nuclear weapons not for

dissuading but to alter the priorities of the powerful states as it is in the advantage of those states that the regime sustains. Alteration in priorities is created viable by the risks linked to political volatility and government destroys in a state which retains nuclear weapons. Nuclear weapons generate two important risks for powerful states if it assists volatility or abolish of a regime. To begin with, nuclear weapons initiate the vague nukes matter. Non-state bodies might use the benefit of the power vacuum to protect the country's nuclear stockpile for their own aims. Strong governments firmly protect their nuclear stockpile. If stability in a state diminishes, government assets grow into more tense, the security against robbery diminishes (Jervis,1982;Krasner,1992;Young,1986).

Moreover, when the government comes to a point of an overthrow, there is a possibility that the regime will endorse utilize it or lose it mind-set. This may interpret at using its stockpile for nuclear bribery by threatening to launch against states except the help is upcoming, or firing against unmanageable population inside the state trying to defeat domestic opposition. On the contrary, as survival is the top concern of the regime, a regime in a secure condition will not utilize nuclear weapons outrageously, as that would face vengeance and the termination of its presence. Furthermore, regime security theory considers that decision makers inside the regimes of countries with nuclear potentiality recognize the impact of nuclear weapons have on the preferences of powerful states and with that recognition, pursue to make sure that regime durability by obtaining a nuclear stockpile. Due to the dangers mentioned above, once a country possesses nuclear weapons, powerful states do not share the interest for the regime inside that country to be destabilized (Krasner,1992).

A regime which has traditional arms has to handle with internal opposition and the firm probability of external intervention. Moreover, a regime that has nuclear weapons has to manage internal instability, but external intervention is not probable. Rather, other actors will criticize the regime but at the same time bolstering them in financial manners. The rationale mentioned above brings the hypothesis: Countries that obtain nuclear weapons and do not challenge a vital nuclear danger do so in terms of intensifying the safety of the country's internal regime. The main disparity among regime security theory and conventional security interpretations is that the actor bothered is the internal regime not the country. I assume that a regime security interpretation has not fully identified in the security literature hence due to the fact that realism interprets countries as single actors, while neglecting internal politics, whereas liberal interpretations which handle with internal issues aim not to recognize global security threat as supplementary variables.

Regime security theory presumes that actors are realistic in the most fundamental logic: they expand their service and value durability. Regime security theory does not hold the view that the state is a single body. Nevertheless, it presumes that the regime is a single body, operating internally and externally of the state to expand its own service. In its core, regime security theory tends to explain why regimes produce nuclear weapons in the presence of a threat to security of a state. The theory indicates what variables have to be introduced regarding for this to exist. The theory has to presume that countries that have the requisite situation and independent variables will strongly deduct the justification by that nuclear weapons expand the prospect of regime durability. The debate that regimes, conditionally, should pursue nuclear

weapons to expand their utility can be done deductively (Jervis,1982;Krasner,1992;Young,1986).

Robert Jervis indicates that there are numerous elements that might interpret the shift from the balance of power structure to a security regime. To begin with, he indicates that there might be alterations in ‘offensive and defensive’ approaches of countries. For example, if a given country supposes that the rival has a second attack capability, thus, it might refrains a dispute and might be more enthusiastic to collaborate. Furthermore, he indicates that there could be alterations in outcomes that might reform state behavior. The price of non-collaboration could rise and due to the prices of war or an arms race is relatively huge states might choose to avert needless fulfillment. The price of anarchy, ambiguity and transportation might have expanded. Particularly, it is mentioned that wars might be created by anarchy mainly and by conflicts in economic manners in precise. In this regard, major actors should desire to create a regime like this (Jervis,1982;Jervis,1976;Jervis,1992). Additionally, they have to be rationally contented with the status quo as well to collaborate and enforce a security regime. This growth of prices in conflict might be extremely immense for the country to continue challenging one day.

Moreover, if there is a powerful ideology that all bodies will expand their benefits from collaboration thus this ideology might also cause to greater post-war outcomes for collaboration. In this regard, mutual objectives generate each a share in the prosperity of the other. A regime is created if there is a faith between all actors. Additionally, there has to be interchange between actors. The last but not least, comparatively the conflict of the post-war experience, diminishes the price of a country might be ready to pay if other withdraws. As a result, leans to perform so

that its results are in the controllable lines of the other actor. When an individual actor appreciates diplomatic military and economic benefits off the other actors these benefits authorize it to grow in to a “regional broker.” On the other hand, an increasing contender might seek to disorganize such a regime creation adjustment. Hegemonic approaches claims that creation of a powerful security regime that generates such mutual objectives as peace and cohesion demands existence of a world power such as the United States both enthusiastic and capable to guide and contribute advantages and resources (Krasner,1992; Jervis,1976).

Chapter 5

THE NUNN-LUGAR COOPERATIVE THREAT REDUCTION PROGRAM

5.1 Definition of the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program

As the power of the Soviet Union diminished and authority and dominance over the Soviet Union nuclear stockpile disengaged the demand for support program turned into more agreeable in the former Union and the United States. The outcome of the evolution achieved before and after the Cold War, The Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program came in to force on 27th Of November 1991. The program indicates that, the former Soviet countries that owned nuclear weapons in their region would receive help from the U.S to principally transfer and demolish these weapons. All those states endorsed bilateral Umbrella Arrangements with the U.S government, in regard to promote the friendly use of nuclear energy, encourage nuclear security and practicing safeguards sequential to certify that nuclear elements were not being applied to achieve nuclear weapons (Carter,2005).

Establishment of this program promoted the development of a global security regime in terms of nuclear proliferation where principles, rules, norms and decision-making measures could be described. The CTR Program initiates an important achievement in standardizing a collective interest and it has remarkable triumphs to its recognition

in hindering the progress of weapons escalated as the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty has credit in hampering and diminishing nuclear proliferation (Woolf,2003; Carter,2005; Goodby&Burghart&Cheryl et.al 2004).

5.2 Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program Principles

The main principles of the Nunn-Lugar CTR Program have been appointed in the ideology that the proliferation of nuclear weapons would have a troublesome effect on global peace and security. Additionally, the security conveyance the eradication of the arsenals and the destruction of nuclear weapons from the stockpiles, in this war are the prominent desire of the actors. The main aim is to extend the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty mainly and enlarge the security along with to enhance the disassembly of the Soviet nuclear weapons in precise. Moreover, the pertinent behavior for nuclear related countries would be to not helping other in obtaining a comparable capability, also to protect these arms and restrict any state or non-state actors from obtaining these weapons.

Therefore, particular actions should be noble initiatives that are stem in significant norms and values which will profit from preceding criterions and standards. Moreover, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty is thus principally important in this regard due to contribution of specific measures. The United Nations have introduced measures which have contributed large degree of legality and are globally beneficial. The CTR regime can execute the same action, through extending non-proliferation rules and norms-developed measures (Woolf,2003; Carter,2005; Goodby&Burghart&Cheryl et.al 2004).

The elementary purpose of the Nunn-Lugar program would be to endorse the Non-Proliferation Treaty and provide to the understanding of the precepts of the United Nations Charter, the restriction and eradication of all weapons of mass destruction in particular. Additionally, the main aim of the NPT would also be to administer to the understanding of the aim and standards of the UN Charter. The leading measure of the Nunn-Lugar Program, as the nuclear non-proliferation agenda assumes that the escalation of nuclear weapons would threaten global security and peace. As a result, the Nunn-Lugar and the NPT have the same duty, particularly to ban and eradicate all weapons of mass destruction and eventually to achieve the purpose of disarmament everlasting as the introduction in the Non-Proliferation Treaty the Nuclear Weapon States promise to eventually demobilize nuclear weapons that they possess. Subsequently, the pertinent behavior of the nuclear weapons states not to assist other non-nuclear weapons state in obtaining nuclear capability and for countries that do not have any, not to try or seek to obtain nuclear weapons (Woolf,2003; Carter,2005).

5.3 Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program Norms

The norms of a global security regime can be seen as a directive for the laws along with practices of the security regime. They indicate pertinent behavior for participants of the security regime. Conversely, it appoints what is legal or illegal. The main regulations of the Nunn-Lugar CTR program have explained into precise norms via two groups of organizations. Additionally, the set of treaties for instance START and SORT requiring the eradication of nuclear weapons to increase arms control standards along with the NPT have advanced to the comprehensive principles of behavior of its participants. In this regard, the more substantial structure is the NPT because it specifically outlines the bottom line of the nuclear deal among the

nuclear haves and have nots. Senator Lugar apt the expansion of the CTR into Pakistan, which was recognized right away before and after the termination of the Soviet Union to preserve former weapons of mass destruction of the Soviet Union from non-state actors to obtain these weapons. Moreover, via the CTR Program, the Defense Department of the United States helped to the former Union to extend denuclearization in the newly industrialized states. Nunn Lugar programs have therefore spread further the Soviet Union to Pakistan. Moreover, the Nunn-Lugar Program has also been the primary mechanism behind the initiative of wide-ranging nuclear safety actions involving the G-8 Global Partnership, GICNT and WINS. Therefore, there have been fellow programs backed by states besides the US, for instance, the European Union.

Apart from the EU, other developed states like Canada, Australia and Japan also endorsed bilateral arrangements and created diverse support actions with Russia through the Global Partnership against Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction. Nunn-Lugar CTR program has grew into one of the most substantial authority in forming norms of the developing nuclear security program as head of these institutions. As a result, Nunn-Lugar has created the global disciplines like the Global Partnership which has emerged from the Nunn-Lugar CTR program (Carter,2005; Goodby&Burghart&Cheryl et.al 2004).

Additionally, it has created nuclear safety norms, for instance, physical safeguard of nuclear weapon and associated fissile element and embolden states to give punishments in internal authority. Those new safety norms which are created by the Nunn-Lugar program virtually make sure that countries and non-state bodies will not easily acquire nuclear weapons in precise and weapons of mass destruction in broad.

The program can function as the core of counter terrorism via the Nunn-Lugar Umbrella Agreements along with the diplomacy of nongovernmental institutions. The approachability of suitable legitimate equipment is a crucial element in combating terrorism. The effective consensus measures and Nunn-Lugar CTR program help nuclear non-proliferation and fighting against terrorism, hence determine resolutions to these issues. For this reason, the reassertions of the non-proliferation standards, as nuclear safety measures introduces the global measures which restrict the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, support global behavioral measures. Correspondingly, the NPT between other programs is objects of regime creation which administer management protocols (Woolf,2003; Carter,2005).

5.4 Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program Regulations

Regulations of a security agenda are remedies along with instructions for behaviors of member countries which are proposed to act in a suitable form. That is to say, these regulations describe the predicted behavior and the particular circumstances where the regulations are being functional. Regulations are generally created by a global treaty or an arrangement. The Nunn-Lugar Program has functional regulations which are endorsed with member states to pursue. For example, verification measures exist. Such affirmations are essential to validate that the fissile component has been eradicated or accumulated suitably. Moreover, accountability measures also exist in regulations. Instructions are created to make sure that the US assistance in financial manners is not misused. As a result, this has influenced the United States Department of Defense to finance, for example, warhead stockpile territories will

stay open. Additionally, constraints to the program exercise to regulations created by the NPT as well (Goodby&Burghart&Cheryl et.al 2004).

5.5 The Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program

Decision-Making Procedures

Decision-making practices of a global safety regime are those measures that handle with conditions requiring shared choice of the participants included in a regime. These practices might adapt or interpret the regulations, standards, measures or practices of the regime, and handle with conformity matters involving, supervising, verification and punishments against perpetrators like the NPT. The Nunn-Lugar Program demands supervision of the actions of the participant countries by CTR investigators. In the event of an infringement which is concluded by investigators, it is the duty of the Department of Defense and Department of Energy of the United States to compel the country to obey it's conceded accountabilities under the treaty. If a country does not follow the regulations of the Nunn-Lugar program, therefore, the financial assistance might not be provided to that specific program. Moreover, the experts in decision making procedures might endorse an array of standards to make sure that parties of the arrangement collaborate with its liabilities. In a situation of non-compliance again, the Board has the capability to take the case to the consideration of the U.S State Department. The last but not least, the Accounting Office of the United States records every year if the participants have entirely fulfill the liabilities (Woolf,2003; Carter,2005).

The Cooperative Threat Reduction Act was a considerable giver to demobilization of nuclear weapon stockpiles. This program was applied for the conveyance, storage, protection and elimination of nuclear and related weapons in the Soviet Union, and

to support the impediment of weapons proliferation. Moreover, one benefits of the program has been the consignment of materials to increase the “dismantlement of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles” to the Former Union. The CTR Program made significant improvements in the demobilization of nuclear warheads in numerous states. The program demolished former vital weapons outdoors of Russia. This was the most obvious in the extraction of these materials in Ukraine. Countries such as Belarus and Kazakhstan had Soviet Union nuclear weapons. The CTR Act assisted Russia transfer the nuclear stockpiles in these states to Russia back or dismantling these weapons in these states. Furthermore, the United States appointed almost 700 emergency feedback elements to assist warranty safe and protect transfer of nuclear weapons to Belarus for the cooperation of the eradication of nuclear power in this state. The CTR program had a significant duty in a massive reduction in the amount of nuclear weapons that had been stored throughout the nuclear intensification term (Wood and Bernstein,2010;Wolf,2002;Nikitin and Wolf,2014).

Furthermore, the other substantial input was when the United States dispatched storage tanks to Russia to reserve nuclear elements under their supervision. The United States contributed around 10,000 fissile component storage tanks at the end of the 1995 and a whole of approximately 33,000 tanks by at the beginning of the 1997. These tanks assisted Russia’s capability to stock nuclear elements from demolished warheads. Moreover, another input from the United States to Russia was around 75 million dollars to support Russia in the establishment of a new fissile component storage convenience at Chelyabinsk. The last but not least the reduction program was not only applied to eradicate anything fissionable from Russia but it involved senses for secure storage and conveyance of fissionable components in Russia enhanced

throughout the Cold War and nuclear expansion. “The United States and Russia have eliminated more nuclear weapons than the combined arsenals of the United Kingdom, France, and China. In addition, American and Russian experts have worked together to remove nuclear material from vulnerable locations around the world and to secure it in Russia. In 2008, the last of the nuclear warhead storage facilities identified under the Bratislava Agreement received safety and security upgrades. In May 2009, the chemical weapons destruction facility at Shchuchye began its important work of destroying 2 million chemical munitions” (Bernstein and Wood,2010;Wolf,2002;Nikitin and Wolf,2014).

With the assistance of the U.S, Russia has eliminated significant numbers of nuclear weapons and successfully secured them. However, in 2012, the president of Russia stated that they would no longer renew the Nunn-Lugar CTR program because security is an internal issue and Russia does not need the assistance of the U.S and deal with their security issues on their own. The success in Russia with the help of Nunn-Lugar may lead to a belief that if it is possible to apply the program to other states. North Korea is one of the states that are actively involved in nuclear weapons program and the next chapter will explore whether the Nunn-Lugar CTR can be applied to North Korea.

Chapter 6

THE NUNN-LUGAR CTR AND NORTH KOREA

North Korea first started its nuclear agenda in 1950s. In 1952, Atomic Energy Research Institute was created but the program did not start until having collaborative arrangements with the Soviet Union. North Korea started to assign scientists and technicians to the Soviet Union for education regarding nuclear activities. Moreover, the Soviet Union and North Korea endorsed an agreement in terms of using nuclear energy for friendly purposes while creating a nuclear research facility in Yongbyong with the assistance of the Soviets. The nuclear program of North Korea increased mostly without substantial foreign help. North Korea enlarged its research facilities to maintain its nuclear agenda for humanitarian and militaristic manners in 1960s. North Korea endorsed “safeguards agreement” with the International Atomic Energy Agency and also the Soviet Union bringing the research reactor at Yongbyong under the regulations of the agency.

In 1985, North Korea accepted to sign the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and in turn receiving Soviet help in establishing four light water reactors. South Korea and North Korea has signed the ‘Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula’ where they agreed on not to experiment, develop, obtain, retain stock or apply nuclear weapons. Even though both sides agreed to achieve it, they fell to comply with the implementation. On 30th January 1992 North Korea endorsed safeguards of the IAEA and affirmed it 3 months later.

Based on the agreement, North Korea contributed a primary official proclamation regarding its nuclear facilities and elements and granted access to IAEA officials to inspect and validate the integrity of its proclamation (Waxman, 2017; Ying,2017;Davenport,2017).

According to the evaluation, there was traces of reprocessed plutonium and when the IAEA asked for the visit to two doubtful nuclear waste areas, North Korea stated that they are military zones and restricted. Following the refusal of the demand, the IAEA called for the UN Security Council to permit specific provisional inspections. In return, North Korea declared its objective to disengage from the NPT in 1993. According to the regulations of the treaty, 90 days have to pass after noticing in order to be valid. After having arbitrations with the U.S, North Korea stated that it was holding off its disengagement from the NPT.

In exchange of the suspension, Pyongyang asks for a 'special status'. This status enabled North Korea to carry on the progression of safeguards on its already going on actions but declined to permit investigations that could validate former nuclear actions. In 1994, North Korea started to continue its nuclear activities without the surveillance of IAEA investigators which made the situation worse. Later, the U.S asks for the U.N Security Council to introduce economic punishments, whether North Korea perceived as an approach which can lead war. Moreover, in June 1994, the president of the U.S stated that both of states have come to agree on the Agreed Framework in October 1994. According to the agreement, the government of North Korea conceded to suspend its activities and granted access to the IAEA to validate it. Additionally, North Korea was forced to act regarding the exertion of the North-South Joint Declaration and staying as a member state of the NPT. In return, the U.S

agreed to give incentives which are to contribute 500.000 tons of heavy fuel and to drive a global cooperation to develop two light power reactors. Even though under the Agreed Framework, North Korea froze its plutonium agenda for close to 10 year, none of the sides were entirely convinced. North Korea was displeased with the postponed development of the reactors while the U.S was displeased with the delay of safeguards verification to validate former actions of North Korea (Waxman, 2017; Ying,2017;Davenport,2017).

The global society was disturbed that North Korea may illegitimately producing 'highly enriched uranium' agenda. In 2002, the U.S found out that North Korea was importing enriched uranium elements from Pakistan in return for ballistic missile elements. As a result, the U.S reacted by postponing heavy oil cargos and North Korea responded by removing the freeze regarding its nuclear activities in December 2002, dismissing the IAEA officials validating the freeze and revealing its disengagement from the Non-Proliferation Treaty in 2003. Furthermore, negotiations started on April 2003 with the purpose of stopping North Korean nuclear weapons agenda between the U.S, North Korea, China, Japan, Russia and South Korea. On September 2005, six party talks ended with signing a 'Statement of Principles' where North Korea would relinquish its nuclear agenda, come back to the NPT as well as following the IAEA safeguards as soon as possible. The United States indicated that they have no motivation of striking North Korea by any type of weapons, additionally the U.S administration asserted that no nuclear weapons have been set up in South Korea.

The last but not least, states also affirmed the '1992 Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula that banned uranium enhancement or

plutonium converting must be screened and enforced. During 2006, the nuclear dilemma on the Korean Peninsula carried on to worsen, finding out that Macao-based Banco Delt Asia has been illegally helping North Korea. Moreover, North Korea tested nuclear experiment in October while announcing that the aim of the test develop a strong wealthy socialist state. Right after the experiment, sanctions were introduced on North Korea. Even though six states participated in the Six-Party convention gathered together in December 2006, no effective results have been achieved. In February 2007, the six parties came to an agreement on the 'Initial Actions for the Implementation of the Joint Statement' by which North Korea conceded to relinquish nuclear weapons and current nuclear activities as well as turning to the NPT and IAEA safeguards in return receiving incentives that involved the supply of energy support from other countries. Furthermore, the arrangement developed a 60-day due date where North Korea was to abandon and enclose its leading nuclear establishments via IAEA surveillance. In addition, the U.S conceded to free assets worth 25 million U.S Dollars at Banco Delta Asia. Later, North Korea invited IAEA inspectors in terms of improving relations with the IAEA while in July 2007, North Korea started to terminate and enclose its leading nuclear establishments with the verification of the IAEA (Waxman,2017; Ying,2017;Davenport,2017).

However, North Korea failed to achieve the due date to reveal its affirmation. In June 2008, North Korea introduced its affirmation but the details have not been revealed to the public. Issues with the affirmation have been left to one side as the U.S government decided to take out North Korea from the American list of state sponsors of terrorism while indicating to remove some sanctions against North Korea. Due to the delays in taking North Korea out from the list, North Korea also delayed its

pledges and ultimately revealed that they had reestablished their nuclear activities and prohibited IAEA from entering the zone. Moreover, on October 2008, the U.S removed North Korea from the list whereas North Korea conceded to continue to shut down its nuclear facilities and to permit officials to enter to the nuclear zones. In December 2008, six party talks started again to forecast a ratification procedure. There were some requirements for North Korea. The first was to stop all plutonium and uranium production. Second was to unstick all facilities which are related to the nuclear weapons. Third was to destroy all the nuclear weapons. Fourth was to unstick ballistic missiles and production facilities. Fifth was to destroy all the ballistic missiles. The last one was to stop transfer of nuclear weapons, missiles and all technology related to these. There was need for money to realize these attempts. After realizing all these North Korea can use the money from the Nunn-Lugar approach (Kirk,2008).

But arbitrations failed to come up with an effective ratification procedure. Because of a controversy over rocket launches, North Korea dismissed the IAEA and the U.S officials while restarting its reactors in March 2009. Two months later, North Korea tested its second nuclear experiment. Even though the UNSC introduced Resolution 1874, North Korea stated that they have no intention of coming back to the talks and indicated that they would not be obligated to any decision that agreed at the forum. At the beginning of 2017, the leader of North Korea stated their objectives regarding nuclear activities. These objectives involves expanding and improving their missile and nuclear agenda (Waxman, 2017; Ying,2017;Davenport,2017).

6.1 Applying Nunn-Lugar Tools: Case of North Korea: American Perspective: Applicability of the Nunn-Lugar Tools

It has been discussed by certain American researchers that a new approach would be ideal, which could be the Nunn-Lugar approach. There were some contrary ideas supporting that the money to be used for defense purposes could be used for projects which will be for the benefit of America and traditional negotiations were carried out by applying traditional strategies which did not serve well. While US government intended to solve the North Korean case, there was a lack of trust between the US and the North Koreans. Consequently, Charles Thornton developed a strategy to refer to a Nunn-Lugar model as an international security cooperation, which would help in theorizing the concepts of programs and the experiences. Moreover, the implementation of utilizing Nunn-Lugar tools in various countries and within different governments was discussed by the academic members of US National Defense University, James E. Goodby, Daniel L. Burghart, Cheryl A. Loeb, and Charles L. Thornton.

They argued that different tools worked really well in different countries such as Russia but the US representatives stated that they did not have the necessary tools to be able to defend against threats. Furthermore, it was suggested to make use of traditional tools along with newly developed strategies. This is probably due to the fact that financial investments were made towards non-proliferation programs for the Soviet Union countries in 2008 whereas Senator Lugar made a proposition in order to invest money in urgent necessities including the planned dismantlement of North Korea's nuclear facilities (Nikitin and Wolf,2014).

6.2 The North Korean Perspective: Applicability of the Nunn-Lugar tools?

Although it is quite difficult to make out the general opinion of North Koreans on the Nunn-Lugar approach and to conduct a research regarding this issue as the country is highly introvert, it can be said that the general attitude is positive since a meeting was held between the US officials, including Hecker and Senator Lugar, and North Korean officials in the Yongbyon facility. In this meeting, the main discussion point was the viability of the Nunn-Lugar approach in the issue of North Korea. The results were positive as North Korea was to receive funds for this approach in 2008 (Kirk,2008).

6.3 The North Korean Case: Which Nunn-Lugar tools may be applicable?

Different Nunn-Lugar tools were discussed for their applicability and accountability to the North Korean case such as the improvement of the physical conditions of nuclear weapons and fissile products. The details of the assessment are listed below:

6.3.1 Improving physical control of nuclear weapons and fissile material

As Professor James Cotton stated in 1999, the major threat in the case of nuclear activities by North Korea was the low safety standards and the missing technology to fight against different types of accidents. It was suggested that short-term solutions such as installing security detectors and monitoring in entrances while performing dismantling as carried out in the case of Russia could be the best option to provide security. Moreover, different solutions such as building bricks over windows, decorating security cameras at doors during the dismantling process. Furthermore, taking security measures and improving safety became a priority for the country. IAEA, Nunn-Lugar and their partners cooperated in order to maintain safety by

limiting the access and increasing the types of control as well as enhancing the site security through different systems. Systems including technical information were supported by scientists and technicians from North Korea. At the same time, Russian scientists put efforts in developing the safety of nuclear weapons and fissile materials (Kirk,2008).

6.3.2 Improving accountability for nuclear weapons and fissile material

It is possible for North Korea to benefit from the experience of Russia in terms of the material control and accounting systems, which is used in order to improve the liability of nuclear weapons and materials. In this way, it would be possible to use computer tracking and accounting systems, which would inspect the liability of the nuclear materials (Kirk,2008).

6.3.3 Preventing the leakage of technical and unauthorized recipient

The Nunn-Lugar project helped scientists to improve their intellectual levels and to learn how to share information by finding jobs in the civil field through the help of the project specialists. This would enable them to stop taking risks by selling their sharing of programs and information to other countries as they would start earning higher wages. This would also contribute to the state as the state would be able to employ nuclear experts who could provide nuclear weapons to the country. This situation would be a relationship based on mutual interests if the job is found to be satisfactory (Wood and Bernstein,2010).

6.3.4 Preventing the export of nuclear weapons and fissile material

In order to overcome the problem of transporting nuclear weapons and fissile material to potential proliferating states or non-state actors, national export controls are the best option to develop as used in the Russian experience. It was used in

Russia to improve transparency and take definite measures to overcome this export process (Kirk,2008).

6.3.5 Diverting technical and scientific expertise to peaceful purposes or civil use

It would be a good choice to enhance exchanges in terms of scientists and laboratories to the North Korea. This is due to the fact that the complete nuclear fuel cycle of North Korea is the proof that a large number of nuclear scientists and engineers are employed in weapons program. The Russian case could also be taken as an example and cooperation agreements could be signed as in the dissolution of the Soviet Union. In this way, there would be new topics to be researched in the civilian field (Kirk,2008).

6.3.6 Supporting alternative power sources

Constructing reactors, which were also an issue of discussion in the North Korean case but did not take place as the country did not comply with the Agreed framework, by using Nunn-Lugar funds and third party financial support would be a successful choice to improve the power sources (Wood and Bernstein,2010).

6.3.7 Assisting conversion of defense industries or weapons laboratories to civil purposes

This tool could be used for the conversion of the nuclear weapons of North Korea into civil purposes because the nuclear items are required to be stored or dismantled under the NPT. Therefore, the best way to make use of this tool is to ensure the conversion of these weapons and defense materials into civil purposes. This was also a strategy used in the case of Russia. However, it was not successful since it was not necessary to store the nuclear materials in Russia (Kirk,2008).

6.3.8 Eliminating means of delivery nuclear weapons

The usage purposes of Nunn-Lugar tools in NIS and Russian case were dismantling launchers, bombers and missiles in line with Lisbon Protocol and START I. In terms of the case of North Korea, the funds are available to store and to transfer the vehicles with nuclear delivery purposes as well as nuclear plants (Kirk,2008).

6.3.9 Removing nuclear weapons, fissile material for producing weapons-usable fissile material from countries of concern

The example of the Russian case could be successfully applied to North Korea in terms of removing the nuclear and fissile materials in order to produce weapons-usable fissile materials (Kirk,2008).

6.3.10 Applying CTR to North Korea

In order to find out whether the Nunn-Lugar CTR program can be applied to North Korea, Krasner's five objectives are going to be evaluated. One of the objectives of Krasner's theory is the decision making procedure. There are two ideologies, Juche and Songun which are set in state's constitution. The songun idea was proposed in 2009 while Juche was introduced in 1972. To begin with, Juche which means self-reliance can be identified in four elementary precepts; 'ideological autonomy, political independence, economic self-sustenance, and self-reliance in defense'. The Juche perspective was created by Kim Il-sung who was the leader of North Korea until his death in 1994. To begin with, political independence assigns to the model of establishing not dependent political diplomacy without conceding to the powerful states.

On the other hand, if this perspective is taken too far, North Korea may turn out to be adopting independent procedures neglecting other countries. Similarly, regarding

economic self-sustenance, North Korea cannot neglect the economic relation that develops as a consequence of welcoming foreign investment and technology and participating in trade where it's essential. Moreover, the doctrine of self-reliance in defense was enforced very long time ago. More than 50 years ago, the separation of the Korean Peninsula, around 17.000 U.S military forces are assigned in South Korea; on the other hand, in the North, the Soviet Union pulled back instantly after the state was established and the Chinese forces that participated in the Korean War pulled back entirely in 1958. It is not easy for a modest state like North Korea to support itself. As a result, North Korea has targeted its resources on establishing nuclear missiles and wanted to maintain self-reliance albeit wielding its nuclear capability. The essence of the Juche perspective endures to take place today (Isozaki,2017;Gause,2013;Choi,2005).

Additionally to the Juche perspective, Kim Jong-il who was the leader of the North Korea between 1994 and 2011 created the Songun (meaning military first) perspective as a 'guiding principle of the state'. The perspective 'Songun politics' received attention in 1998. This perspective aims to put military as a first policy. Songun became the main aspect of the Kim Jong-il administration. Moreover, addition to the Juche approach, Kim Jong-il established the Songun perspective as the leading doctrine of North Korea. As a result, the Kim Jong-il administration simplified its determination to put military first, no matter what it takes even the sake of North Korean individuals. Moreover, when Kim Jong-un came into power the Songun and Juche perspectives maintained their status as the leading aspects of the country. On the other hand, Kim Jong-un has addressed 'Kimilsungism-Kimjongilism' numerous times. The term first used in 1970s. But when Kim Jong-il

took place the government it was replaced with the Juche perspective. As it is mentioned above, Kim Jong-un was emphasized on ‘Kimilsungism-Kimjongilism’ and on March 2016, the regime in North Korea has transferred to ‘Kimilsungism-Kimjongilism’ which means simply obeying the absolute leader. Kim Jong-un believes that having strong military is the key factor to protect its regime and in order to achieve that they have to possess powerful nuclear weapons. This brings the question that if decision making policies and mechanisms in North Korea develop around the idea of having strong military and nuclear weapons, how it will be possible to persuade North Korea to follow the Nunn-Lugar CTR program instructions and abandon its nuclear weapons program once and for all? Apparently, the leader has no intention to leave its having strong military idea to one side and move on further. As the regime in North Korea simply indicates that it gives no opportunity and right to its citizens to express their ideas regarding any issue but to simply obey their leader, then it can be said that North Korea will only act according to their leader’s interests. The leader fearlessly states that they are able to do whatever it takes to protect their regime and territory. The Nunn-Lugar CTR program clearly contravenes with the interests of the leader. The United States and its allies have one thing in mind, which is persuading North Korea to diminish or stop its nuclear related activities. As the leader has ready to do anything even being ready to go on a nuclear war with the U.S, the Nunn-Lugar CTR requirements can never be achieved in North Korea (Isozaki,2017;Gause,2013;Choi,2005).

The political power is one of the intervening variables that Krasner indicates in his international regime theory. When we analyze how political power in North Korea is created we can see that it is centered in the ‘suryong’ meaning the supreme leader.

This ideology created in 1967 and the perspective has been applied by the government to require all individuals to memorize and obey the ten principles. Subsequently, the perception of supreme leader is how every individual comprehends administration in the North Korea. Mentioned principles are spread into every citizen varying from economic, political, cultural and militaristic manners where there is no exception for anyone. The ideology can be defined as dogmatic, even racist, distort. Additionally, anti-Japanese attitude, aggression to South Korea and propaganda counter to the U.S deliver legality for the regime. North Korean citizens basically have no right to indicate their personal perspectives regarding any issue. In democratic states citizens have freedom of speech and expression to change any issue influencing their daily lives or to address something which they disagree and try to change government's perspective about that issue.

However in North Korea the situation is very far away from that. As the political power in state depends on solely on obeying the leader then it is quite possible to say that citizens will live according to their leader. The state has absolute control over North Koreans including their personal issues. Furthermore, the leader identified that the state's nuclear capacity was an element in the endurance of the regime. Additionally, despite the fact that many other states perceive nuclear weapons as the ways of deterrent, Pyongyang perceives them as a tool of foreign policy. North Korea is isolated from international community with an outdated mentality and not so strong economy, having nothing but nuclear weapons to provide leverage. When all these are taken into consideration, applying the Nunn-Lugar CTR program to North Korea seems difficult. The state is a closed box and no survey can be done in order to understand what North Koreans think about being a nuclear state or

producing or testing nuclear weapons. Even they are strictly against the program, they have no power and right to change the procedures or the mentality of the administration. As the target of the regime is to have fully control of the state, which already is, bringing the U.S in to the state, regarding security which is both internal and external factor is not something that the government would truly desire. As the mentality circles around anti-U.S propaganda, North Korea would do everything just to protect their regime. The Nunn-Lugar CTR program is guided by the U.S and having the U.S control over domestic issues of North Korea is not something that the regime can accept (Oh, 2003;Collins,2016;Byman&Lind,2010;Kirk,2017).

Norms, principles and rules are other variables that need to be examined to find out the applicability of the program. The principles of the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction are very clear. These principles are established to prevent terrorists or other bodies from having access to nuclear weapons and its related materials. Moreover, states have to secure elements and weapons, which were produced or stored. Additionally, states have to successfully implement these principles and promote adoption of the principles. When we analyze norms it can be said that norms are defined as the rights and requirements of countries as well as determine standards of behavior. North Korea has a reputation of abandoning its pledges easily, withdrawing from treaties and signing but not ratifying the treaty. In 1985, North Korea signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty but withdrew in 2003. Moreover, during six party talks North Korea agreed to freeze its nuclear activities in exchange of incentives but again did not hold their promises. 1994 Agreed Framework treaty which was signed between the U.S and North Korea again failed due to inappropriate actions of North Korea which were against the requirements of the treaty. As a result,

North Korea is not a trustworthy state and creates disputes regarding its nuclear weapons program. In order to apply CTR to North Korea, the U.S and its allies must make sure that requirements of the program would be achieved successfully by North Korea. However, North Korea seems to be a state which acts only according to its interests and does not care international norms or rules or principles of treaties. Also, even if they started the program there is no guarantee that North Korea would cancel or withdraw from CTR. Moreover, Rules are specific prescriptions and forbiddance of certain actions. The Nunn-Lugar CTR has specified rules where particular state must follow. Verification rules and accountability rules are the most important ones. The particular state must allow inspectors for verification procedures of the regarded issue.

However, when North Korea is taken into consideration, it can be seen that the state has some difficulties to provide that. North Korea banned IAEA officials from inspecting nuclear sites before so it is highly possible that they would do the same thing where rules are not being followed properly. When we move on to egoistic self-interest variable, it specifies the desire to expand one's own utility behavior where that behavior does not involve the utility of other side. In another meaning, the egoist is interested in the action of the others only when that particular action affects the egoist's behavior. The U.S and its allies felt threatened when North Korea started both to expand its stockpile and test nuclear weapons. Under the UN regulations, the Security Council states have the right to possess nuclear weapons. But when North Korea withdrew from the NPT and publicly indicated that they are acquiring nuclear weapons tension have escalated. The U.S and its allies do not want North Korea to have nuclear weapons and that is why that they are trying to persuade North Korea to

abandon their nuclear agenda. In this situation egoistic self-interest applies to the U.S and its allies forcing North Korea to abandon via six party talks and sanctions because North Korean nuclear activities have made them anxious but from North Korean perspective having nuclear power is a must for a regime to survive (Heo&Roehrig&Seo,2007;Ruble,2009;Krasner,1982).

Chapter 7

NORTH KOREA AND TRUMP ADMINISTRATION

Dealing with the danger presented by North Korea must be one of the principal national security preferences of the Trump administration. According to the U.S the North Korean reign is hostile policy and it has no option but to obtain a strong nuclear impediment. The North Korea has been testing nuclear and long-range missiles in the prospect of obtaining the capability to get through a pre-emptive attack and initiate vindictive nuclear strikes. Both South Korean and the U.S experts assume that North Korea can already strike South Korea, United States and Japan facilities in Guam with nuclear-tipped missiles. However, the regime in North Korea seems strong-willed to acquire the capacity to attack the United States via nuclear weapons a capacity that experts suppose might be in 5 year-time.

The dictator of the ROK reasonably regards the capability to attack U.S allies, armed forces in East Asia, and ultimately the U.S motherland will dissuade the U.S from striking North Korea, trying to eliminate his dictatorship or enforcing actions to amplify U.S armed forces on the North Korea Peninsula in the case of armed rivalry. Moreover, whether the impulse of the North Korea is substantially in a defensive manner (to make sure the survival of the regime and dissuade strike) or in an offensive manner (to facilitate North Korea to join in traditional incitements and hostilities under the shade of its nuclear disincentives) is the issue of conjecture, even though the dictator regime's aggressive rhetoric and activities, particularly the 2010

drowning of the naval vessel belonged to the ROK and malignant raid of Yeongpyeong Island of the South Korea, are not encouraging in this respect. Regardless of incentives, the anticipation of North Korea with a substantial nuclear stockpile and long-range delivery structure is extremely threatening (Einhorn,2017;Rogers.2017;Standler,2017;Liegel,2017).

There is no way to assume whether, in the case of profound crisis, the regime of North Korea would be discreet and abstain from the application of nuclear weapons (noticing that it would end up in regime-termination vengeance), whether it would launch the application of nuclear weapons in the middle of a traditional rivalry in the promise of having the US and its partners to abandon or whether, out of dread that its survival is endangered and has nothing to give up, it would flash with its nuclear capacity. The advancement of nuclear and missile capacities of North Korea increases worries that, if strict sanctions were to impose Pyongyang under immense economic strains, it may trade nuclear machinery or technology, or fissile elements or nuclear weaponry to other countries or non-state bodies. The documents regarding nuclear exports of the state is not as dangerous as is generally supposed. Even though North Korea has been unrestricted in its application of missile-linked exports to gain 'hard currency' it is regarded to have connected in nuclear transportation and the establishment of a plutonium production reactor located in Syria (Einhorn,2017;Rogers.2017;Standler,2017;Liegel,2017).

Although North Korea has been unrestrained in its use of missile-related exports to earn hard currency, it is believed to have engaged in nuclear transfers only twice—uranium hexafluoride to Libya and the construction of a plutonium production reactor in Syria. Still, given increased concerns about nuclear terrorism and the

possibility that growing inventories of nuclear materials and weapons might increase Pyongyang's readiness to sell nuclear items, the threat of outward proliferation from the DPRK needs to be taken seriously. A persistent challenge Donald Trump will be the fifth American president to address the North Korean nuclear challenge. The first four tried a variety of approaches, including sanctions, engagement, and strategic patience. Sanctions put additional pressure on Pyongyang but did not fundamentally change its behavior. Negotiations succeeded at times in slowing and temporarily suspending its strategic programs but did not stop them. And the DPRK responded to patience by stepping up the pace of those programs. The North Korea challenge has only become more difficult in recent years. Several factors increase the odds against an acceptable solution. China is not willing to apply decisive pressure against Pyongyang (Einhorn,2017;Rogers.2017;Standler,2017;Liegel,2017).

Beijing genuinely does not want North Korea to have nuclear weapons, and it has become increasingly angry at the DPRK for pursuing its nuclear and missile programs in defiance of Chinese appeals for restraint. Beijing and the U.S have been in collaboration in embracing resolutions 2270 and 2321 of the Security Council which substantially bolstered anti-North Korea sanctions, along with introducing a border on the exports of North Korea. The Chinese Commerce Ministry stated that China would hold off coal imports from North Korea on 17th of February for the rest of the year. On the other hand, although North Korea massively needs China for its essential requirements, Beijing is reluctant to apply all the influence at its allocation for concern of provoking volatility in North Korea which may cause to the termination of the regime, getting back together with South Korea and the termination of the North Korea as an intermediary against the U.S. Moreover, North

Korea seems to be more decisive than ever to go ahead with its nuclear weapons. According to the leader of the state, nuclear weapons are needed for a regime to survive- an impediment to the threats of the regime in militaristic manner, as a measure of solidifying and preserving the assistance of the military for his administration. The regime of the state has done a lot in order to obtain a significant nuclear stockpile and might turned into an enduring component. James Clapper who is the head of National Intelligence indicated that it is very hard for North Korea to abandon all of its nuclear related activities. Today the state might have more capability to stand against global pressures. North Korea has never been effortless to press as the regime has comparatively modest material requirements also not that interested in being excluded from the global society. Recently, as a result of the loosening of some regime controls over private economic exercises, North Korea might be influenced from foreign strains. Fixing nuclear issue of the North Korea via military grew into more complicated situation. Even though, back then, when North Korea had an undeveloped and limited nuclear capacity, a pre-emptive strike on the state would have led to the danger of stimulating huge North Korean cannon and weapon force against Seoul. As North Korea has manufactured a significant amount of nuclear weapons and missile delivery structures and discharged and covered them to secure their capability to get through a pre-emptive strike, the possibility of vengeance have rose remarkably (Einhorn,2017;Rogers.2017;Standler,2017;Liegel,2017).

There is a broad scope of alternatives that the Trump administration can decide, varying from armed forced appropriation to joining the North in economic manner and anticipating to deal with the nuclear issue under better circumstances in the

future regarding North Korea. However, using military alternative is too dangerous and a relevant but not that dangerous alternative- intense attempts to thwart and compensate the Kim reign- having slight possibility of accomplishment, considering Kim Jong's fortification of power and China's possible perseverance to impede any U.S practice of regime replacement. On the other side of glass, developing a less antagonistic relation with North Korea in the belief that it will expedite nuclear arbitration is inconceivable as North Korea could be proposed to conceal in the very near future without any objectives to go back to the nuclear matter. Economic strain is one of the best methods that the U.S has for raising the costs North Korean government endures for preserving its weapons course. However, it is not possible to guarantee whether economic sanctions can drive the regime to negotiate. Moreover, one thing is possible to say that sanctions can escalate the regime's impetus to talk; contribute the U.S more methods to collaborate with in a possible future arbitration; and decrease the government's capability to supply foreign technology elements for its nuclear and missile agenda. The addressed sanctions methods that effectively disconnect North Korea from the international economy will soften North Korea's status and set the U.S in a potent position for 'diplomacy and containment'.

Furthermore, North Korea is more reliant on global trade and economic relocation than ever and that causes exposures the global society has started to abuse. However, since 2006, North Korea has been experiencing economic confinement. Even though these sanctions involved some states, particularly China, was unsuccessful to impose these sanctions, proposing North Korea with numerous alternatives for sanction avoidance. On the other hand, in 2016ⁱ, the figures of international trade of North Korea increased around 5 percent, in addition to Bank of Korea indicated that the

GDP of North Korea increased around 4 percent. Moreover, the government of North Korea has complied with pre 2017 U.N restraints by welcoming ‘private commerce’ and by permitting political and business aristocrats to take advantage of inventive profitable and financial actions. Moreover, this concept deceives sanctions, provokes development and welcome foreign technologies, involving the ones that assists the regime’s weapons agenda. Furthermore, the U. S must impose a more focused sanction plan to compel North Korean government to pick among weapons growth and development. Additionally, addressing new susceptibilities and intending for comprehensive economic confinement, mentioned sanctions will need to proceed faster than introduced before, identifying the urgent costs of nonconformity. The last but not least, sanctions have to provide a diplomatic turnoff, pointing out- both the leader and the aristocrats who will experience specifically huge financial trouble under a toughen punishment regime (Lockie,2017;Kaplan, 2017;Baker and Sanger,2017;Hart and Ding,2017).

The pressure and restriction method is another way of dealing with North Korea. This alternative indicates the prevailing preference would be to strengthen strain against North Korea, involving by severely applying current sanctions and introducing new sanctions, diminishing hard currency gains (for instance, remittances from citizens who work abroad, arms trade), and curbing its imports of elements and technology needed for nuclear and missile projects via increased surveillance of cargoes and other suppression methods. Moreover, China would be pushed strongly to implement these actions, involving with the risk of inferior sanctions against Chinese bodies that assist North Korea’s illegal attempts. Beijing would be pressed to farther restrain its imports of North Korean coal and related

components, to impede Chinese banks and other bodies from expediting Pyongyang's procurement of proliferation-sensitive equipment and technology, to enforce on China-located North Korean enterprises and entities participated in illegal actions, to discreetly monitor cargoes going to and coming from North Korea, involving North Korean and Chinese frontiers as well. Furthermore, the refusal of arbitration under this alternative would be depended on the perspective that North Korea's history of conformity with prior arrangements was insufficient, that the restitution it would need for its missile and nuclear compromise would be groundless and disagreeable in political manner that the outlook of it complying to achieve denuclearization is extremely small and that any arrangement incomplete to achieve denuclearization could be understood as legalizing its ownership of nuclear weapons (Einhorn,2017;Rogers.2017;Standler,2017;Liegel,2017).

As trying to strongly expand sanctions on North Korea, the U.S would escalate attempts to bolster the effectiveness of the South Korea-U.S and Japan-U.S affiliations to dissuade and respond any North Korean traditional or nuclear hostility, involving by strengthening territorial missile protection, expanding Japan-South Korea and U.S defense collaboration, helping the allies to augment their traditional military capacities and bolstering the integrity of the U.S expanded nuclear impediment. Furthermore, the aim of this alternative would be to have North Korea unilaterally impede or impeccably abandon its nuclear and long-range missile projects. If this does not turn out feasible, then the attitude would intent to deteriorate or alternatively curb the state's projects by cutting off approach to hard currency and foreign goods and components. However a fundamental premise of this alternative would be that preventing and eradicating North Korea's vital projects in the near

future, via diplomacy or heavy strains, is not probable and that the most pragmatic method of handling with the North Korean danger is via a long-lasting restriction procedure that would impede hostility from North Korea, assure and preserve U.S associates, and eventually cause to the eradication of Pyongyang's dangerous abilities when the regime permanently terminates or is essentially altered. However it has numerous substantial flaws. For instance, China would not quite escalate its pressure on North Korea to assist an approach depended on pressure solely. It would consider the attempt to suppress Pyongyang into giving unilateral adjustments as ineffective and possibly detrimental to cohesion in North Korea. Threatening or enforcing inferior sanctions on the Chinese to encourage them to increase punishments sharply on Pyongyang would erode anticipation for Chinese-American collaboration regarding North Korea, which is vital to any benign outcome, and could eliminate the possibility of productive participation on relevant bilateral matters like trade. It would possible cause the continuation of advancement in North Korea's nuclear and missile abilities for the predicted future. Particularly with China being reluctant to exercise heavier strains North Korea would refuse unilateral hinders on its projects. Moreover, it would administer further experiments of nuclear weapons and long-range missiles and extend more its fissile element manufacturing (Einhorn,2017; Rogers.2017; Standler,2017; Liegel,2017).

Moreover, North Korea won't be sitting on a table willing to relinquish its missile and nuclear agenda. The United States must be ready to propose a guideline of confidence increasing actions that North Korea could embrace, as well as complementary behaviors that the U.S and its partners would be prone to react. Furthermore, the U.S must develop a diplomatic practice. To begin with, the early

action could be for the U.S to develop a practice for diplomatic negotiations, involving determining a constant agenda of participation, an outlook of analysis and a formation. Along with its partners, the U.S must create an index of demands of North Korea, except for complete denuclearization. The primary actions might be small, for instance as a due dated freeze regarding its missile and nuclear experiments and plans. Related concerns to recognize could involve actions to provably restrain proliferation of weapons of North Korea, as well as its missile technology and chemical weapons agenda. Similarly, the U.S and its partners require deciding to what extend they are ready to take to encourage process. These must be methods that contribute something that North Korea perceives as beneficial still prevail easily inverted in any case of a failure. Moreover, this could involve arranging intervals or introducing geographical restrictions on some U.S actions in militaristic manners or exercises, limited sanctions remedy or contributing specific types of humanitarian or economic aid (Lockie,2017;Kaplan,2017;Bakerand Sanger,2017;Hart and Ding,2017).

Furthermore, dual-track strategy is another method that the U.S may impose on North Korea. This strategy includes arbitrations and the application of pressure. This option seems much easier to persuade China to participate. China may be reluctant to agree on stricter sanctions as they are in favor of pressure method, they would notice benefit it escalating pressure to administer influence for arbitration. However, still China would not be anticipated to introduce any sanctions that threatens regime of North Korea. As it is in the pressure and confinement method, the U.S would demand China severely enforce Security Council instructions on impeding imports from North Korea, monitoring cargoes from North Korea and vice versa, and

hindering China-located North Korean companies and Chinese from expediting North Korea's illegal trade and acquisition actions. The U.S government would give notice to Beijing that it would be ready to introduce sanctions on Chinese companies in a case of failure to contribute with the resolutions of the Security Council. However, the dual track alternative would be much better as it is not demanding as the confinement and pressure. This strategy also would urge the U.S to cooperate with South Korea and Japan to bolster their shared prevention and armament capacities, along with expanding tripartite protection collaboration. Apparently and expressly indicating determination to develop affiliation capacities to handle with the increasing North Korean danger would be essential to bring impetus for China and North Korea to seek a beneficial arbitration result but also to make sure the protection of the U.S and its partners in a case of a failure in negotiations.

Moreover, the absolute denuclearization of North Korea would be the eventual purpose of arbitrations but there is practically no anticipation that it could be maintained in the near future, particularly due to what extend China is willing to press North Korea. The arbitrations must be targeted on the provisional goal of a suspension of Pyongyang's nuclear and missile projects, that would be demonstrated as involving a forbiddance of experimenting nuclear weapons and long-range missiles, the termination of all enhancement and reconverting actions, and the existence of IAEA investigators and screening materials to authenticate the suspension (Einhorn,2017;Rogers.2017;Standler,2017;Liegel,2017).

The arrangement would involve a dedication to carry out attempts to maintain absolute denuclearization without stating specific due date while North Korea would not force to abandon its nuclear weapons and elements that already developed.

Furthermore, the North Korea has never approved restraints without rectification and there is no doubt that they would ask for a compensation in any case of a suspension. They may request for the termination of a peace agreement to take over the 1953 Korean War truce, the termination of sanctions both of the United States and United Nations, the normalization of the relations between the U.S and North Korea, the end or cutting down the U.S and North Korean collective military movements, acknowledgement of North Korea's situation as a nuclear weapon country and provide equipment support.

However, it seems that most of their requirements would be inadmissible because they have made extravagant requests and receded to more humble. It is not easy to predict what North Korea would demand in a case of a suspension. Regardless of anything, the U.S believes that limitations of nuclear and missile programs of North Korea would be the target of any arrangement. Additionally, the dual track alternative has numerous benefits. In specific, it is easier to receive Chinese assistance and encourage Beijing to expand restraints against North Korea. Moreover, the possibility of receiving South Korean assistance which is vital to the prosperity of any approach handling with North Korea. In any case of a valid suspension, it could blow the strength of North Korean projects, hinder Pyongyang's capability to gain confidence in its capability to attack the U.S and its partners with nuclear weaponry, and diminish the struggle and liability of ensuing military standards, along with missile protection, to dissuade and respond North Korean abilities (Einhorn,2017;Rogers.2017;Standler,2017;Liegel,2017).

However, there are also certain handicaps. When North Korea's determined affinity to its strategic projects, there is no warranty that arbitration would be successful and even they are, no warranty that North Korea would conform. The U.S citizens believe that negotiations with North Korea would be deceitful and problematic, particularly if there is any case of compensation. Both of alternatives are difficult to achieve but pressing only approach has limited chance of suspending North Korean nuclear agenda. Even though dual-track method gives no warranty of success, it provides better possibility of curbing the development of North Korean missile and nuclear projects and receiving the compelling assistance of Beijing and Seoul (Einhorn,2017;Rogers.2017;Standler,2017;Liegel,2017).

Chapter 8

CONCLUSION

To conclude the use and possession of weapons of mass destruction is a severe threat to global security. Of course it is not possible to fully supervise states as they can deny having nuclear weapons when they do have. Even though there are numerous international agreements that seek to prevent proliferation still it is not enough. CTR programs have achieved impressive accomplishment in diminishing proliferation liabilities in the former Soviet Union. The program contributed financial support and intelligence to eliminate and secure nuclear weapons. However, almost after two decades Russia decided to withdraw from the program while indicating that Russia does not need U.S assistance and has the ability to deal with the situation itself.

As the CTR was successfully achieved in former Soviet Union, it may led us think that whether it may be applied to North Korea as well. North Korea is very aggressive state with its nuclear weapons. The state is not easy neither to negotiate nor cooperate. The goal of the U.S is to persuade North Korea to become nuclear free. However, since Bush Administration all efforts to persuade North Korea have failed. The leader of North Korea believes that having strong military is the only way to guarantee regime survival and prevent other states to attack. It is not easy to persuade North Korea to abandon its nuclear weapons program as the state has no intention of doing it. The thesis attempted to find out if the cooperative threat reduction program applied to Russia can also be applied to North Korea but the result

is not positive. North Korea has been testing nuclear weapons and increasing its stockpile. The regime in North Korea is very strict and this makes cooperation very difficult. Moreover, the Trump Administration should not threat North Korea via military power because this not the best possible solution to the problem and there is no doubt that North Korea would retaliate. Additionally, the U.S absolutely needs China as an ally to deal with North Korea as the state indicates a problem which cannot be resolved with intimidation. It does not seem possible to present one single method or process to handle with North Korean nuclear activities. The U.S and its allies have options along with their advantages and disadvantages. The United States will get used to the idea that North Korea will always be a nuclear state otherwise there is no hesitation that both states would go on a nuclear war.

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