

**NATO Persistence and Expansion:  
Case Study of the  
Republic of North Macedonia**

**Ivy Otonye Mcwilson Jamabo**

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Approval of the Institute of Graduate Studies and Research

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Prof. Dr. Ali Hakan Ulusoy  
Acting Director

I certify that this thesis satisfies the requirements as a thesis for the degree of Master of Arts in International Relations.

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Prof. Dr. Ahmet Sözen  
Chair, Department of Political Science  
and International Relations

We certify that we have read this thesis and that in our opinion it is fully adequate in scope and quality as a thesis for the degree of Master of Arts in International Relations.

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Assoc. Prof. Dr. Wojciech Forysinski  
Supervisor

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Examining Committee

1. Assoc. Prof. Dr. Wojciech Forysinski

2. Assoc. Prof. Dr. Moncef Khaddar

3. Asst. Prof. Dr. John Albert Turner

## ABSTRACT

The origin of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) can be found in its members perceived need to balance rising Soviet power in the aftermath of World War II, however, the breakdown of Soviet rule in the late 1980s did not prompt NATO's collapse. Many scholars expected NATO to fade out after the soviet threat disappeared nut NATO continues to persist and even expand in membership, function and structure.

The purpose of this thesis therefore, is to analyse the possible reasons for NATO's persistence, and the factors that make it attractive to new members in the Post-Cold War era.

In this dissertation, it will be argued that NATO persists and expands owing to the fact that, it balances the resurfaced Russian threat, given there exist, the fear of unknown threat, which can be from any country especially with the increase in nuclear activities, also, NATO continues to make itself attractive and relevant by carrying out certain key internal alliance and eternal functions for and on behalf of its allies, lastly there are no feasible alternatives to NATO therefore, considering the cost of establishing one, will lead to the appreciation and growth.

**Keywords:** North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, Expansion, Persistence, Post-Cold War

## ÖZ

Kuzey Atlantik Antlaşması Örgütü'nün (NATO) kökeni, örgüt üyelerinin II. Dünya Savaşı sonrasında yükselen Sovyet iktidarını dengeleme ihtiyacına dayanır, ancak 1980'lerin sonunda Sovyet yönetiminin yıkılması NATO'nun çöküşüne yol açmadı.

Birçok bilim adamı NATO'nun Sovyet tehdidinin ortadan kalkmasından sonra NATO'nun varlığını sürdüremeyeceğini bekliyordu. Ancak, NATO üyeliğini, işlevini ve yapısını devam ettirmeye ve hatta genişletmeye devam ediyor.

Bu tezin amacı, bu nedenle, NATO'nun sürekliliğinin olası nedenlerini ve onu Soğuk Savaş sonrası dönemde yeni üyelere çekici kılan faktörleri analiz etmektir.

Bu tezde, NATO'nun mevcut olmaya ve genişlemeye devam edeceği tartışılacaktır, çünkü var olan Rus tehdidinin, nükleer faaliyetlerin artmasıyla herhangi bir ülkeden gelebilecek bilinmeyen tehdit korkusunun yeniden ortaya çıkması halinde dengelenmesine hizmet ediyor. Ayrıca, NATO, iç-ittifaklar ve ebedi işlevleri yerine getirerek kendisini çekici ve ilgili kılmaya devam ediyor, son olarak NATO'ya uygulanabilir alternatifler bulunmuyor, bu nedenle, birisinin kurulmasının maliyeti göz önüne alındığında, takdir edilmeye yol açacak.

**Anahtar kelimeler:** Kuzey Atlantik Antlaşması Örgütü, Genişleme, Süreklilik, Soğuk Savaş Sonrası

## **DEDICATION**

Holy Spirit this one is for you, for your ever abiding faithfulness towards me. Thank you so much.

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## **LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS**

ACE	Allied Command Europe
EDF	European Defence Community
SHAPE	Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe
SACEUR	Supreme Allied Commander Europe
WEU	Western European Union
WARSAW PACT	Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance

# Chapter 1

## INTRODUCTION

A chain of drastic occurrences took place within the political sphere, from 1947 to 1949 that required adequate attention, some of such occurrences included oppositions to the autonomy of some states like Norway, alongside some states in the western part of Europe, the barricade the Berlin wall, also the coup in Czechoslovakia. In 1948, the Brussels treaty was ratified by Netherlands and some other countries in a bid to create a collective defence structure that would counter any form of threat to their security be it, political, military or ideological. Deliberations followed not too long after for.

These deliberations lead to the ratification of the Washington treaty in 1949, which will create collective defence system among the allies. as at the time of the ratification of the Washington treaty, there were twelve (12) founding members' After its unification, Germany also joined the alliance in 1955, while Spain also joined in 1982.

The alliance treaty, made provisions for the rights of its member states to be upheld while explaining their international responsibilities in line with Article 51,52,53 and 54 of the U.N charter. Treaty also obligates each ally in the risks and rewards of the collective security system. The most challenging issue during the deliberations for the North Atlantis Treaty was finding a balance gave ample time for America to

thoroughly discuss issues of conflict before taking action while at the same time serving the European yearning for an American allegiance that would successfully counteract hostility from the soviet.

The United States' dedication to the success of the alliance was seen as profound, given its previous political isolation and non-involvement or caution against entangling alliances especially when it is not at war. The North Atlantic Alliance move from a mere formal signing of a collective defence treaty, to an actual functional organisation, when south Korean was invaded in 1950 by north Korea. The invasion therefore, prompted the allies to take action as a security organisation because most states in western Europe and NATO allies, as at the time, believed it was a calculated scheme, put forward by the Soviet Union

The United State at some point, began to show some signs of dissatisfaction which stem from the fact that it shouldered a lot of the security weight in Europe. America therefore put forward a proposal that West Germany should create a liberated security army that will share some of the security burden. This was essential because though West Germany had been created as a country, (in 1949) it still operated within an occupational regime and the sovereignty is conditional. However, the proposal by the united states of America meet some opposition within the alliance as the horrific events of WWII still lingered in the minds of some alliance states, who therefore opposed rearming Germany.

In response to the proposal by the United State, France came forth with a counter proposal which sought to create a European Defence Community (EDC). France also made a new suggestion which was quite different from the previous U.S proposal

which proposed the creation of a German army to in case of any soviet attack. France suggested in their proposal that, there be a division of German forces into battalions with each having at least 1000 soldiers, to be evenly distributed across the armies in Europe. This proposal by the French put a restraint on the first proposal by the United States but gradually fizzled out when a more acceptable structure for the establishment of a West German force was derived.

A string of agreements was reached in 1954, (in Paris, France) on the new standing of West Germany. These agreements brought about some changes such as, formalising relationship between West Germany and NATO allies, bringing an end to the occupational regime that was forced on West Germany, acknowledgement of the sovereignty of Germany and an invitation to become full fledged NATO member. In the same year, West Germany joined Western European Union (WEU) alongside the founding members who ratified the Brussels Treaty. A year after in 1955, France gave its approval for West Germany to be welcomed into NATO.

In light of the West German enlistment into NATO, the Soviet Union ratified the Warsaw Treaty in 1955, in this manner establishing the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO). The WTO incorporated the Eastern European nations which came to be known as Soviet satellite countries. These nations included Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany (given specialized autonomy by the Soviet Union in December, 1955), Hungary, Poland, and Romania. In spite of the fact that the WTO was a military union coordinated toward the NATO member states, the formation of the WTO served to balance NATO militarily and politically. An unpleasant parity in European governmental issues before long developed which would go on until the Soviet breakdown in 1991.

Reacting to a disappointment with U.S. atomic strategy, and mastery of the NATO, the then French President authoritatively pulled back French powers from the coordinated military Command Structure in 1956. Additionally, the French mentioned that all American atomic weapons, NATO establishments and offices, be expelled from French soil. While the French remained a piece of NATO for all intents and purposes every other perspective, its withdrawal from the military Command Structure had a huge battle preparedness results. For instance, by expelling NATO establishments from French soil, lines of correspondence and supply were debilitated, necessitating that more assets be drawn more to the east and nearer to the front. The French withdrawal likewise had the impact of requiring more help from the United States, and further necessitated that West Germany assume an increasingly huge function in NATO's military availability.

Relations between the Soviet Union and the Western popular governments loosened during the Nixon organization. During this time, numerous political onlookers were posing inquiries like those that would come after the Soviet breakdown in 1991. In particular, many were scrutinizing the motivation behind NATO during a time of detente between the East and West. In light of this worry with respect to NATO's future, the North Atlantic Council authorized a year-long examination to look at the future errands of the Alliance which came to be known as the Harmel report.

The Harmel report accommodated two fundamental elements of the Alliance. In the first place, the Alliance was to keep up satisfactory military quality and political solidarity to dissuade animosity and different types of weight and to protect the domain of member states if hostility ought to happen. Further, the report likewise made another capacity which expressed that NATO was to seek after the quest for

advancement towards a progressively steady system to resolve issues. Since this report tended to issues both of military readiness just as the political hole between the East and the West, its appropriation gave the establishment of NATO's resulting endeavors in arms control dealings.

As arms control and decrease endeavors acknowledged achievement, and the atomic alternatives accessible to NATO were intentionally diminished, NATO came to be progressively reliant upon ordinary powers. With the expanding dependence on ordinary powers, the quality of NATO put more noteworthy duty on the European part states. In particular, the fall of socialism was maybe no place rougher than in previous Yugoslavia, where NATO in the end wound up partaking in.

NATO's first significant comment on the Civil war in Yugoslavia, in November 1991, gave no sign that the contention would prompt Operation Joint Endeavor, which NATO defence Ministers in June 1996 called the biggest and most complex task NATO has ever attempted, a mission to help carry harmony and security to Bosnia and Herzegovina, Originally, the NATO nations communicated their profound worry over the grisly situations developing there. Through the span of time, in any case, NATO established that it must play an increasingly dynamic job in the Balkans so as to protect European security.

It was in mid-1992 that NATO started peacekeeping obligations in former Yugoslavia. Before the end of that year, NATO in participation with WEU, was upholding UN economic sanctions against Serbia and Montenegro, just as the general arms ban against the whole Yugoslav region. In 1992 and 1995, the Alliance settled on choices that prompted maritime tasks, in participation with the WEU, to

screen and later to implement the UN ban in the Adriatic. NATO activities there started with observing the UN no-fly zone over Bosnia, just as a definitive execution of air strikes to break the attack of Sarajevo and different zones.

In sum, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, made by political and social powers has been a fruitful security alliance. All through the exceptional long periods of the Cold War during the 1950s and mid-1960s, the long periods of detente in the late 1960s and through the 1970s, and into the political unrest related with Mikhail Gorbachevas approaches of glasnost and perestroika, NATO effectively accommodated the security of its part states. In accepting another job of European peacekeeper, and for an assortment of reasons that this examination later talks about, NATO has confirmed that an expanded membership will best encourage the accomplishment of NATO's objectives. However further growth appears a done without end, this arrangement of development has pundits (Christiansen, NATO expansion: Benefits and consequences, 2001).

### **1.1 Purpose of Study**

As a contribution an ever flowing stream of knowledge in the IR discipline, this paper looks at the NATO which strives as opposed to expectations and predictions of some scholars, has gone beyond its primary aim of establishment and has continued to expand and survive. NATO continues to make itself relevant and attractive, as more countries are taking steps to be a part of the organisation. Therefore, this research attempts to give good explanations that accounts for on NATO's tenaciousness, resilience and increased enlargement. its decrease in function, did not result to the collapse of the NATO. Therefore, NATO is frequently alluded as the best military alliance ever. As an effective deterrent to the Soviet Union's attack and



assault on\to the member states, the Atlantic Alliance continues to exist and still thrive.

Therefore, the objectives of this study is to explore The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. With particular focus, to determine the reason for NATO's persistence and to determine why NATO is still an attractive alliance to join. Based on theses the objectives above, this study will therefore attempt to answer the following research questions- what factors can account for NATO's persistence? And why Is NATO still an attractive alliance to join?

## **1.2 Hypotheses**

NATO has solid institutional structure that is constantly seeking to adjusting to current functions, strategies and partnerships that maintains its relevance in the international security environment. Therefore, is preserved by the commitment of its allies, who benefit from its existence and expansion.

## **1.3 Methodology**

The research methodology that will be employed for this research is the qualitative data analysis: principally an explorative research used to acquire an understanding of the rudimentary reasons, opinions and motivating forces that help to create ideas or hypotheses for potential quantitative research, hence the use of primary and secondary sources in the acquiring of data for this study. The primary source is the NATO official site- it will include all documents relevant to the research, and the secondary sources include information derived from textbooks, journals, articles and other e-documents from libraries and the internet. The research will also do reviews on existing data and literature on NATO and analyze the varying dimensions' researchers in the field have examined on the subject matter.

The paper focuses on NATO's persistence and enlargement, with a fundamental aim on determining the factors which accounts for the expansion of the NATO and analyzing evolutionary journey from its establishment in 1949 till date.

#### **1.4 Thesis structure**

This thesis structure will be in six chapters, Chapter one consisting of an introduction, research questions, hypothesis, methodology, significance of the study, scope of the study, theoretical framework, limitations and an arrangement of the chapters. Chapter two will contain mainly reviews of literature on the North Atlantic Treaty(NATO). Chapter three is a theoretical framework, the various theories of particular importance to this research will be analyzed, international organisations, and NATO. Chapter four will present the evidence for my hypothesis and take a look at the NATO membership expansion process- with a case study of The Republic of North Macedonia. the last chapter which is, chapter five will contain the reasons for NATO's persistence while the last chapter, which is chapter 6, will contain the summary and conclusions.

## Chapter 2

### LITERATURE REVIEW

Here, the aim is to identify various debates in literature against and in support of NATO's persistence and expansion.

#### **2.1 Arguments Supporting NATO Expansion**

As noted by David and Levesque, most propositions for the enlargement of NATO find legitimacy in the fact that NATO is a successful international collective defense organization. (David & Levesque, 1999) Indeed, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization is widely regarded as one of the most successful collective defense organizations ever created. Christiansen also added that in discussing the arguments in favor of NATO expansion several areas are seen as the most prominent. It is believed by many that enlargement of NATO to include Eastern European nations will promote democratic reform and stability there, provide stronger collective defense and an improved ability to address new security concerns, improve relations among the Eastern and Central European states, foster a more stable climate for economic reform, trade, and foreign investment, and finally, improve NATO's ability to operate as a cooperative security organization with broad European security concerns.

In addition, some supporters of NATO expansion such as the former U.S Secretary of State Madeleine Albright have put forth the argument that, "the new NATO can do for Europe's east what the old NATO did for Europe's west: vanquish old hatreds,

promote integration, create a secure environment for prosperity, and deter violence’’. (Hartley & Sandler, 1999). Christiansen added to this, by stating that ‘‘the proposed duties of NATO listed above are important because they would take care of problems which have risen only recently and as a direct result of the collapse of the Soviet Union. As.’’ (Christiansen, NATO expansion: Benefits and consequences, 2001) .

### **2.3 Advancing Democratic Reforms**

The most important argument put forward by the proponents of NATO expansion is that, the key argument put forward by proponents of NATO is that, NATO enlargement fosters or promotes democracy and peace among states in central and eastern Europe. Those in support of NATO expansion, see NATO as a vehicle to propagate freedom, safety and friendly co-existence in Europe as a whole. Therefore, they argue that as more states in Europe continue to pursue NATO membership, democratic reforms become spread among more states in the continent, because democracy is a key requirement to join the alliance and at such makes NATO an essential tool to promote positive change (democratic reforms) in Europe. In 1997, NATO accepted Poland, Czech Republic and Hungary into the alliance, this was because, these states had attained a stable political and economic structure, which is in line with the prescriptions of NATO as an alliance. In addition to having a good political and economic structure aspiring NATO member state required to have respect for the rule of law.

Past U.S. Secretary of Defense William Perry put forward a five-point plan that countries aspiring to join NATO should go by, the fifth and the fourth point which outlined thus: ‘‘(potential) new members must uphold democracy and free enterprise, respect human rights inside their borders, and must respect sovereignty outside their

borders. Fifth, their military forces must be under democratic, civilian control.” (Solomon, 1999). Therefore, through its process of enlargement, NATO helps spread democracy, the principle of human right and other reforms that promote freedom and equality.

Therefore, the quest to become a member of the NATO alliance, has encouraged most states in Europe to relate peacefully with one another and in some cases come together to fight and defend the freedom of the territory. Some states have even taken the initiative to apologize and resolve their long running disputes, over borders and territory. A good example is the apology issued by the Czech Republic in January of 1997, for the expulsion of Sudeten Germans from Czechoslovakia as far back as 1945 and 1946. Jeffery Simon also added that, “over a number of years Hungary and Romania transformed their relationship with each other, as did Romania, Ukraine, and, to a lesser extent, Hungary and Slovakia” (Simon, 1993).

Christiansen, also added that “the Polish government sacked a general in 1997 who was unwilling to accept civilian control over Polish military forces. The Baltic states of Latvia and Estonia, who have historically had problems dealing with their Russian minorities have, in recent years, softened their attitudes and policies toward them.” (Christiansen, NATO expansion: Benefits and consequences, 2001).

## **2.4 Denationalization and Peaceful Conflict Resolution**

Added to the benefits that, to the fact that states in democratization offers the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, Sharp asserts that stability in Eastern Europe helps to ensure stability in Western Europe and other areas. Christiansen also made the assertion that, NATO enlargement may also prevent the renationalization

of military programs in the newly sovereign nations of Central and Eastern Europe. If NATO continues to expand to include new members in Eastern Europe, it seems unlikely that these nations would feel politically compelled to pursue their own independent security arrangements. Jeffery Simon (a political analyst), in an article he wrote titled "Does Eastern Europe Belong in NATO" (Simon, 1993), noted that NATO's military policy denationalization is no doubt one key factor that accounts for NATO's success. (Simon, 1993). Denationalization as a procedure in which a state shows its military defence policies to other allies in a bid to avoid insecurity among the members. (Christiansen, NATO expansion: Benefits and consequences, 2001).

Some supporters of NATO enlargement such as Frost Howard believe that if NATO does not expand its membership to more states in eastern and central Europe, or perhaps if NATO goes extinct, some countries will go back to renationalizing their military defence policies, which will renew old suspicions among states. (Frost, 1993). Christiansen also noted that, 'in addition to preventing the renationalization of defense policies of the member states of NATO, the Alliance framework has provided an excellent means by which the members themselves have peacefully settled disputes.'" (Christiansen, NATO expansion: Benefits and consequences, 2001).

Christiansen also noted that, "In the British/Icelandic cold-war of the 1970s, it was NATO's general secretary Joseph Luns who successfully mediated a resolution to the dispute. Similarly, membership in NATO has nominally helped Spain and Great Britain resolve their differences regarding claims of sovereignty over Gibraltar'" (Christiansen, NATO expansion: Benefits and consequences, 2001). He also added

that, although these political problems held great importance to the countries involved, they pale in comparison to the acrimony that has dominated relations between Greece and Turkey for the last forty years. While NATO has certainly done little to address the sources of the strife between Greece and Turkey, their membership in the Atlantic Alliance has at least prevented full-blown war from breaking out between the two countries. As events in the former Yugoslavia amply demonstrate, there is great potential for serious political and military turmoil in Central and East Europe. If NATO's success in preventing all-out war between Greece and Turkey is any indication, it seems likely that the incorporation of Central and East Europe into the NATO family of member states can only improve the political stability of the region. (Christiansen, NATO expansion: Benefits and consequences, 2001)

## **2.5 Checking Russia**

There are arguments that NATO's persistence and expansion could serve to check the remainder of the Russian threat, this view is shared by John Duffield and some others. Christiansen also noted that Specifically, although the Russian reaction to NATO enlargement is generally cited as one argument against the expansion of NATO eastward, some believe that NATO ought to use this opportunity to gain a stronger strategic advantage in Europe. In short, NATO should take full advantage of Russia's present political weakness in order to ensure a stronger position for NATO in the event that conflict again (Christiansen, NATO expansion: Benefits and consequences, 2001)

## **2.6 Arguments Opposing the Expansion of NATO**

According to Christiansen, the arguments against the enlargement of NATO are equally numerous as those in favor of enlargement. NATO's history as a premier

defense organization, according to many political observers, is no justification to transform it into a larger, more argue that to redefine the role of NATO to something of this nature is to invite almost certain disaster. George F. Kennan noted in an interview, the enlargement of NATO would be the most fateful error in American policy in the entire post-Cold War era. (Christiansen, NATO expansion: Benefits and consequences, 2001)

The purpose of this section is to outline the major arguments against the expansion of NATO. In treating this issue, we can see at least three major reasons that support a non-expanded NATO: Russia will be antagonized, exclusion of some countries in Eastern Europe may destabilize instead of stabilize the region, and finally the addition of new member states may prevent NATO from taking the swift and decisive actions that have, for more than fifty years, been largely responsible for the successful security of its member states.

## **2.7 The Russia Factor**

Although NATO leaders assert that Russia has nothing to fear from NATO enlargement, Russian leaders continue to be concerned. No issue is more central to NATO's goal of building a peaceful political order in Europe than relations with Russia. Since the Soviet Union fell apart in 1991, Russia has undergone intense political turmoil and has, at certain times, assumed very different political faces. An examination of these various political trends affords political observers insight to understanding the issues surrounding Russians reaction to the enlargement of NATO.

## **2.8 Enlargement Perceived as a Russian Defeat**

Irrespective of Russia's original and continuous objections to NATO enlargement, political observers can already see the damage that NATO enlargement has wreaked



on relations between Russia and the West. Specifically, enlargement has created four major problems for future Russian political power in Europe and in the world.

First, enlargement has proven to be a disastrous defeat for Russian diplomacy. In spite of Russia's protestations and advancement of an alternate security organization called the Organization on Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), NATO has proceeded with its plan for growth through the addition of new members. Second, NATO enlargement symbolizes Russia's sharply reduced influence in international affairs. It is the most visible sign of Russian decline, and essentially confirms the fact that Russia's political influence stops at the western Ukrainian border.

Third, enlargement signifies a defeat for Yeltsin's policy of engagement with the West. Originally seen as Russia's path to salvation, good relations with the West have not proven sufficiently fruitful in the eyes of Russian leaders. Indeed, Russians see NATO enlargement without their inclusion as a signal that they do not belong in the Western world. Such conceptions in Russia also tend to undermine efforts at Western democratic reforms.

Lastly, the growth of NATO would seem to signify a defeat for Yeltsin's policies vis-à-vis the near abroad and Eastern Europe. Following the breakup of the USSR, many Russian leaders felt that Russia would serve as a political and economic leader to the former WTO members of Eastern Europe in much the same way the United States interacts with Latin America. When such a relationship failed to develop, and Eastern European nations looked west instead of east for political and economic guidance, Russian pride suffered a severe blow. The last thing that anyone should want is a reawakening of authoritarianism in Russia and the development of a

renewed adversarial relationship between the two countries marked out by the will of heaven to sway the destinies of half the globe.

## **2.9 The Problems of Consensus and Exclusion**

In addition to the significant problems surrounding Russia's reaction to the NATO enlargement, the addition of new member states also poses potential dangers for the cohesion of the Alliance itself. Furthermore, enlargement may also contain political risks for Central and Eastern Europe.

### **2.9.1 Exclusion**

While many advocates of NATO expansion assert that the enlargement of NATO into Eastern Europe will help to foster the success of democratic regimes and promote the general political stability of the region, NATO enlargement thus far has only included a few select states in the region. While this inclusion into NATO has undoubtedly allayed the security concerns of these three countries, other countries in the region have been excluded from the benefits of NATO membership. (Christiansen, NATO expansion: Benefits and consequences, 2001)

Many political observers assert that NATO's success in promoting stability in Eastern Europe will depend greatly upon how the organization deals with and relates to the countries that have been denied membership. According to Ronald Asmus and F. Stephen Larrabee, two senior analysts at the RAND institute, how NATO handles the states excluded from membership will directly affect the stability of Europe. The authors contend that, if these countries feel shut out, a destabilizing backlash could materialize, undercutting support for reform and strengthening nationalist forces within these countries. (Christiansen, NATO expansion: Benefits and consequences, 2001)

Asmus and Larrabee also argued that if NATO is going to develop an attainable goal for European security, the issue of excluded nations will have to be sufficiently addressed. Managing NATO's enlargement process— particularly in defining the criteria so as to justify the choice of new members, to prevent destabilizing those not receiving invitations. To some scholars, this is a major challenge. Perhaps the biggest fear of Central and Eastern European countries is that they will also not be invited to join the EU, in short, how NATO and the West deals with the countries excluded from the first round of expansion will have a major impact on the political stability of the region.

### **2.9.2 Consensus**

Although NATO seems, at present to be as politically healthy as it has ever been, many scholars believe that with the loss of its *raison d'etre*, NATO's future effectiveness may not long endure. Most scholars agree that much of NATO's success is at least partially attributable to the relative ease by which the member-states reach consensus. Specifically, it is pointed out that fear of Soviet aggression on the part of Western Europe ensured that NATO members were able to put aside their minor differences in order to agree on big picture issues. Just as the United Nations is widely regarded as an organization too large to take quick and decisive action--as was illustrated during the crises in the former Yugoslavia during the 1990s— critics of NATO enlargement contend that increasing the membership of NATO only serves to increase the likelihood that NATO will become too cumbersome to reach fast consensus and take decisive action.

According to political observer Anton Bebler, the decision-making capability of NATO could be seriously hampered by an increased membership particularly

considering the great political differences that exist among the nations of Central and Eastern Europe.

In sum, clearly the most important argument against the enlargement of NATO is the Russian reaction. While some argue that expansion now may provide NATO with an upper hand in a potential future conflict, most agree that the expansion of NATO without the actual inclusion of Russia into the Alliance simply increases the likelihood that such a conflict may, someday, occur. Moreover, if NATO continues to expand, it risks becoming too large to operate with speed and precision— in short, it risks becoming a Euro-Atlantic United Nations. Last, while the inclusion of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic has undoubtedly benefited these countries, those left out of the first wave— particularly Romania, Slovenia, and the Baltic States are left to deal alone with their own political instability

## **Chapter 3**

### **THEORITICAL FRAMEWORK**

Here, we will focus on determining various theoretical approaches that attempt to explain NATO'S expansion and persistence. Here, three theories will be tested to the case of NATO, the first is neorealism-because it gives it offers good explanation as regards alliance creation, organisational theory, because it gives a good analysis concerning the properties of an organisation that courses it to strive for survival and institutional theory because it talks about the sustaining power of interest by members of an institution that keeps it relevant. This chapter will draw from the well of analysis put forward by Robert B. Mcalla in a similar work. In 1993-which attempted to analyze NATO using all afore mentioned theories, which is relevant to this study even now.

#### **3.1 Neorealism on NATO**

Neorealism theory puts forward a lot of explanation concerning the formation of alliances and the reasons or possible motivations that birth them. This is particularly interesting given the fact that neorealism as a theory is not a big believer in cooperation between states in the international system. In this dissertation however, the neorealism prescription for alliance formation, motivation, and longevity will serve as a good start off point in analyzing NATO from a theoretical point of view.

Neorealism as a theory is built around of key assertions, first of which is that, the state is the focal point in analyzing international politics, that is to say, when one

considers politics on a global scale, the first point of attention should be the states in the system, that make up international politics with emphasis on states with the most power capabilities. Neorealism also asserts that states think rational in order to achieve their set goal and objectives – which is mostly security and survival. Lastly, they make the assumption that the international system is one of anarchy- that is, lacking a central authority or government, which causes states to suspect, fear, and distrust one another, therefore, making cooperation or alliance formation extremely difficult. To neorealists, an alliance formation is possible only when there is any urgent need to balance a common threat or enemy or the structure of the international system requires it.

Looking from the view of neorealism, alliances are seen as tools for states to protect or secure their nation's security through the use of military capabilities, against a common enemy or threat. In essence, states will care less if the states they ally with have a similar political structure as them-just in a bid to outbalance a common threat. Also, states are willing to let go the freedom of seeking their solo national security policies by committing their resources to pursue the security policies of the alliance in place of their own national policies. Therefore, if the alliance becomes less useful or valuable or the apparent threat that led to its formation ceases to exist, members will abandon it or seek more convenient alternatives.

Structure is also quite important to neorealists, given that states exist within a given system, that structural system in which states are aligned also either encourage or discourage the formation of alliances. The international structure refers to how states are ranked or placed with relation to the material capability they possess. In looking at the material ability states possess in the international system, the key focus is on

the big or powerful states whose increase or decreased in material power may cause a change in the ranking of placement of states in the international system. That is, if one state is outstandingly more powerful than other states in the international system, it is called a unipolar system. Per adventure another state rises to compete with the previously powerful state, it becomes a bipolar system- a system divided by two big bricks and lastly, if more states also grow in their material capabilities, the international system becomes filled with lots of powerful states, which is known as a multipolar system. Therefore, to neorealist, alliances have a higher tendency to be successful in a system of bipolarity than in a multipolar or unipolar system, given that, in a bipolar system threats and allies can be easily identified while uncertainty and fear makes it difficult for alliances to succeed in a multipolar or unipolar system. Bringing all these to mind the question here is what is the take of neorealism on NATO.

Neorealist believe that the collapse of the Soviet Union ushered a unipolar system, and giving the earlier stated assertion that alliances are difficult to achieve in a unipolar system, NATO was expected to toll the part of the Soviet Union. That is, neorealist predicted that NATO would in no time after the cold war, fizzle out while others like Mearsheimer, stated that NATO will eventually become a ceremonial alliance which performs little or no function at all-merely existing in documented paper. In addition, Kenneth Waltz stated that, “NATO’s days are not numbered, but its years are” (waltz, 1993). The obvious persistence of NATO has led to neorealist like Waltz reviewing their initial predictions about NATO, Waltz noted that though NATO still persists, the purpose for its establishment has changed, therefore, for

there to be a clear neorealist explanation on the alliance, there has to be a shift of analysis to the new purpose or functions NATO performs.

As Charles Glaser, stated, given the fact that alliances like NATO offer states an avenue to achieve their national goals, one should not be surprised that those states will be willing to make commitments to maintain its existence for a long time. This therefore to neorealist, is what NATO does, it serves as a means to achieve their interest and goals. Building on this analogy, neorealist identify, two patterns of behaviour that occurs as regards to the case of NATO. The first of this pattern has to do with the leadership of NATO. According to neorealist, given that we are in a unipolar system, where the United State is seen as the hegemon, NATO exists to serve the interest of the U.S and because the United States enjoys lots of freedom being the leading super power, it has very little incentive to preserve the alliance and in no time when its interest in the alliance wears out, NATO will be doomed. This definitely one way to look at it, the U.S presence in NATO could also serve as a source of strength.

A second pattern neorealist identify has to do with interest bargaining among small allies in NATO. Neorealist believe that with the demise of the threat which the Soviet Union posed, NATO will be turn by different interest ally states, who seek to pursue their personal interest (these could be expressing their opinions among the powerful states, a need to balance the powerful states or proffering services to big states in a bid to boost their bargain power). This will lead to the creation of multiple interest within NATO which will eventually course allies to stop taking part in collective projects as a result of different sectional interests and ultimately lead to the fall of NATO.



Neorealist in their analysis of NATO make one final exertion which has to do with the economic cost and freedom associated to being in the alliance. Again, the loss of the initial threat which prompted the establishment of the alliance plays a major role in the allies' financial commitment in the alliance. Seeing that the very reason which prompted their joining NATO has disappeared, neorealist believe that NATO members will cut their financial commitment and resources towards NATO because it will be assumed that the cost of being in the alliance is more than the actual benefits they derive from membership in the alliance.

In summary, neorealist say as regards NATO, we should expect that a “shift in the structure of relative power will lead to a change in the national calculation of interests and thus to patterns of alignment. In the absence of an agreed and compelling external threat, this suggests that NATO no longer conforms to the balancing logic which drives the formation and maintenance of alliances. NATO may still persist but its effectiveness and coherence will inexorably diminish. American support of NATO is dependent upon the costs of leadership. Should the benefits outstrip the disadvantages then the US will continue to support the Alliance; should the benefits remain static or fall then its support will be less forthcoming. Other Allies will calculate their interests in NATO according to sectional interest and the status of American leadership. Consequently, should the costs of followership rise then they will seek a recalibration of their role and will reduce their commitment to the Alliance; should followership be regarded as beneficial then their commitment will be maintained or strengthened” (Webber, 2009).

### **3.2 Organisational Theory on NATO**

Moving on to organizational theory, Mcalla's framework suggests that NATO absent from neorealist theories will eventually result in organizational inaptitude as NATO's organizational interests will at times have differing interests from its members. Moreover, many points to NATO's persistence to take action post-cold-war as evidence of NATO's behavior being driven by organizational interests over the members' interests. He also acknowledges that "organizations are comprised of individuals and groups who attempt to fulfill their own goals. Consequently, organizations have no uniform goals of their own. . . . most organizations willingly modify or abandon stated goals if doing so enhances their ability to survive and prosper." (Ness & Steven, 1988). Mcalla, is of the belief that Ness and Brechin's views are functionalistic- they observe international organizations as tools of their creators but rather "live collectivities interacting with their environments, . . . containing members who seek to use the organization for their own ends, often struggling with others over the content and allocation of the product. These dynamics produce a distinctive organizational character over time." (Ness & Steven, 1988)

On the surface of it all it appears NATO as of 1988 has functioned like a corporation; its headquarters in Brussels employees over 3,750 workers with more than 50% being unassociated with national delegations. NATO looks to have become an entity with key role holders, who are in pursuit of their own goals, as evidenced by the organization's behavior since 1988. (NATO, North Atlantic Council Ministerial Communique. NATO, 1990).

Like many large organizations, NATO has employees in various social clubs, whom identify themselves as part of an international community- centered around NATO's interests, forming subgroups based on professional and personal interests. Therefore, these employees have an incentive to see NATO continue to function due to their personal and professional self-interests being at stake. NATO's system allows for a continual influx of such people as civilians and military personnel, are assigned to NATO on three to four-year terms and they are likely to work to ensure that NATO continues to function as usual. Moreover, being on the "inside" in terms of professional and personal benefits, they are likely to be pleased with NATO's performances providing support against the critics.

The question then becomes, how far is NATO willing to go? The organizational literature reveals that their members are willing to engage in resistance to change, and affirmation of organizational necessity in order to survive. (McCalla, 1996). Furthermore, in his analysis, McCalla notes that resistance to change is usually the first organizational response to critics. In this way, organizational self-interest can still be served while members deny any major change in the organization's environment. This allows the organization to continue to sell the public on how essential the organization's services continue to be and that no change is needed. (McCalla, 1996).

Therefore, by continuously denying any changes to the organizational environment, this in turn helps bureaucratic interests – expansion on organizational resources. Organizations are willing to go as far as resisting new roles and missions if they oppose their agenda (McCalla, 1996). Moreover, bureaucratic leaders are relatively indifferent to the organizational direction as long as they can gather greater resources. As such, Matthew Holden's holds a similar argument, noting that the

expansive tendencies of bureaucrats are majorly protective of the status quo as it relates to resources and roles (McCalla, 1996) . Another behavior observed by organization when trying to survive is affirmation of organizational necessity. This is simply the argument of how essential the organization's activities are despite changes in the organization's environment, this is all done because of the organizations 'dependence on outside resources hence the necessity of public support. The organization's material and political support is dependent on the perception of the organization's legitimacy or need hence leaders can be expected to make every effort to deny that the alliance is unneeded (McCalla, 1996). Therefore, it is not surprising to see several clashes between NATO officials and member state officials over the need for the alliance. Therefore, organizational theories of NATO, suggest NATO officials to: Deny the need to change, thus protecting the status quo roles and missions and resisting new ones, and resist efforts to downsize the organization, affirm the value of the alliance to member states in hopes of assuring continued access to resources by engaging in outreach activities to garner the support of political and domestic audiences within member states and modify roles and missions or generate new ones - if they believed the organization's future was at stake - to retain support from members, possibly seeking new members to strengthen support. (McCalla, 1996).

As prove to this point, McCalla notes that, between 1988 and 1989, NATO officials argued for the continuation of past practices of the alliance by repeatedly denying that the Soviet threat had changed significantly. NATO used the military capabilities of the Eastern Europe and Soviet Union as reasons to not change their strategy, this was interpreted as a combination of balance-of-threat and balance-of-power

reasoning. Upon the breaking up of the Warsaw Pact and the dissolving of the Soviet Union, emphasis shifted towards the balance-of-power concerns with more attention being paid to the military potential that remained in the former Soviet Union (McCalla, 1996). Moreover, affirmative behavior was a common trend amongst member states, from NATO's Secretary General to foreign ministers related to the member states. In spite of rumblings of discontent among alliance officials, due to making cuts in their armed forces, all member states stood ground in unity over the usefulness and necessity of NATO. The infraction was caused by the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe, SHAPE, which brought up an initiative to reconfigure NATO's military structure by suggesting the dismantling of one of its three major command stations as a way to appeal to the public as progressive and in-tune with the times. Furthermore, NATO redefined its approach to military missions concerning the security of the alliance. This was done by introducing peacekeeping collaboration with non-NATO organizations. NATO has even shifted resources and personnel, which were previously associated with Nuclear weapons, to other aspects of the alliance.

As observed, organizational perspectives go beyond the scope of neorealism. This is seen in how NATO's organizational interests play themselves out as some actions cannot be easily explained from an organizational perspective; actions such the military's reorganization and downsizing.

Furthermore, strengthening the with global organisations such as OSCE, WEU, and United Nations (UN), and a shared commitment to "consider their requests to utilize NATO forces; and the willingness to see key organizational elements, like its nuclear weapons plans and operations capabilities, decline illustrate some of these limits."

(McCalla, 1996). McCalla's seems to suggest that NATO in spite of the appearance of its organizational strength, the nature of how the organization is run on a daily basis lends to it being labelled a weak bureaucracy. Additionally, NATO's international staffs work exclusively for NATO's Military Committee and the Secretary General. As additional duties such as post-cold war activities have been assigned to these staffs, they barely enough time to do what they are supposed to do which lends credence to the cries of NATO being a poorly run bureaucracy. (McCalla, 1996).

The fact that NATO expressed willingness to work with and at times be directed by outside boards such as the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) and the UN is puzzling as this is not what would be expected of an organization looking to maintain the status quo. NATO's unusual post-cold war behavior can be better understood by looking broadly at the inner workings of its relationship with its members, as this is what drives the organization. Though survival is likely an organizational interest of NATO's, however that's dependent on the satisfaction level of the members of NATO and how they benefit from the alliance. This leads to the final theory in McCalla's analysis, that is the International Institutionalist theory.

### **3.3 Institutionalist theory and NATO**

The third theory that will be employed in our theoretical analysis of NATO is the institutionalist theory. This theory is relevant to our analysis because it looks at the properties or characteristics of an institution that will enable survive over a long period of time owing to the fact that regimes create overwhelming benefits especially for its members, which courses them to outlive their initial reason for their creation. Norms and rules of the institution is seen as important as well as the interest of the

members of the institution and not just the form structure as in the case of the organisation theory.

Robert Keohane's defines institutions as a "related complex of rules and norms, identifiable in space and time" and regimes as "specific institutions involving states and/or transnational actors, which apply to particular issues in international relations," As stated earlier, an important point put forward by the proponents of the institutionalist theory is that regimes create lasting benefits for its members, which goes beyond the initial reason for its establishment. Therefore, regardless of the fact that a regime may be created by a supposed dominant power or hegemon-as the proponents of the hegemonic stability theory would say, or out of the calculations of states with relation to the gains that come with an organized arena, regimes most definitely come with some benefits to states- these include, reducing the short and long term transactional cost for its members. It is also worthy to mention that overtime, members will discover that the cost of maintaining the regime is far cheaper than creating a new one, therefore making it cost effective. Institutional theory propositions about regimes applied to NATO will mean that, NATO makes the security policy process easy and simple to achieve by creating the right mechanisms which will not help members achieve their security policies but also maintain ties in anticipation of future changes.

Given the above explanation, a regime is bond to survive regardless of a change in the reason or process that led to its establishment. Good examples of this are- the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, both of which have experience a visible change in their functions as the years go by, while meeting the demands of their members- to maintain their place as the core international provides of assistance

to countries encountering certain financial challenges. This is the same with the case of NATO especially with the overlap of interest among its alliance members. Members can decide to stretch the regime beyond its initial limit of creation, venture into new task or get rid of previously set goals and make some readjustments to cooperate affairs. Adapting to new purposes and functions is a core aspect of regimes and is supported because regimes- including the international organisation within them, are less stressful to maintain than to establish.

The basic idea therefore, is that in events of problems, there are more benefits to sustain existing regimes than there if to starting a new one. regimes ensure that states comply to the norms values and expectation laid out for them-regardless of whether or not, states completely agree with them, as a way of solving collective action problems. Institutionalist theory predicted that rather than packing up after their victory and proceeding to creating new institutions, members of the NATO alliance will shift the focus of the alliance towards a different direction, while utilizing the already existing structure, procedures and building on previous cases of success to solve new problems. This is quite rational, given that they spent more than four decades learning to work and function as an alliance of advanced military and political structure. Here, the presumption is that NATO members will not decline the economic and political sunk costs of already existing institutional mechanism and will rather continue with the NATO structure that already exists. Establishing a new institution comes with a lot of cost and because these costs have already been paid for, with the existing NATO structure, the alliance appears more appealing. Also, NATO members will consider that it is easier to change the direction of NATO, than to collectively agree and create a new institution.



Members of NATO therefore, will make best use of already existing values, norms and procedures, to solve current problems rather than establish a whole new institution, with an entirely new mechanism, values and procedures. Indeed, events from 1989 show this vital point, put forward by the institutionalist approach. The function clearly given for NATO in its Article 4 and 2 of the NATO charter is that it is to act as a tool to broaden allies' relations on a larger scope of issues, has clearly been extensively expanded. The North Atlantic Council communique in December of 1990 stated that NATO as of that time would begin building on the provisions for political consultation among NATO members and in relation to other states and institutions in a bid to integrate more into European affairs. At the time, a consistent topic by officials of NATO was the fact that NATO sought to strengthen its ties with the UN, WEU and OSCE in order to ensure that allies will continually be important with respect to the security requirements of its allies. These moves were born from the need to show NATO's relevance and that it has a key role to play in the wider group of multilateral international governmental organisations.

Members of the NATO use the alliance as a tool to sort out issues of security (in Europe) which are related to European Union, OSCE, and previous Warsaw Pact states. Though NATO permit sits allies to maintain a relationship with these groups, while putting forward and protecting their interest in ways that may not be possible to attain unilaterally. This pattern exceeds organisational expectations, therefore, it implies hostility (or suspicion of) having activities with other organisations. The extended relations to other organisations and the establishment of various channels to strengthen relations to nonmembers (PFP and NACC) and the addition of new members are all points to support the institutionalist proposition.

### **Does this align with my hypothesis?**

In all three theories employed above, I believe the institutional theory best explains the case of NATO because, institutionalism explains the functional use of institutional cooperation for the benefits of state and sub-state actors. Therefore, NATO is preserved by the interest of its member's states, who see the alliance as beneficial. Though I also believe that organisational theory logic that NATO as an organisation also seeks to preserve its self from extinction by showing certain behaviours such as, affirmative the value of the organisation and modifying their functions or roles or generating new ones. This is in line with my earlier stated hypothesis that NATO that, NATO has a solid institutional structure that is constantly seeking to adjusting to current functions, strategies and partnerships that maintains its relevance in the international security environment.

Therefore, is preserved by the commitment of its allies, who benefit from its existence and expansion. Indeed, in line with my hypothesis, it can be clearly seen that NATO has transformed itself from a mere Cold War military organisation whose only role was to undertake a collective defence function. NATO has incorporated a civilian structure to it, included some functions such as humanitarian intervention, democracy advocacy and international peace keeping some of which it does in partnership with the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). With all these, the interest of NATO members in the alliance remains unshaken therefore, NATO continues to persist and expand.

## **Chapter 4**

# **NATO ENLARGEMENT: CONDITIONS AND PROCESSES**

This chapter looks at the expansion of NATO, the procedure and the pattern to join NATO with a case study of the Republic of North Macedonia. In line with our argument that NATO is still an attractive organisation to join, we will look into the expansion processes that NATO has undergone and how states can join NATO, examining the case of the Republic of North Macedonia who are on their way to become a full-fledged member of NATO. We will look into why it finds NATO membership significant and beneficial as well as the functions it will perform.

### **4.1 NATO Membership Expansion**

The Enlargement of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is the way towards integrating new states into NATO. NATO is a military alliance of twenty-seven European nations and two North American nations. The means through which one can join is represented by its Article 10 of what is named as the North Atlantic Treaty, which allows the inclusion of European States. Nations wishing to join need to meet certain criteria and complete a multi-step rigorous process. This includes political discourse and military incorporation. The promotion procedure is managed by the North Atlantic Council which is an overseeing body over NATO.

## **4.2 The Evolution of NATO's Open Door Policy**

NATO's open door policy is based upon Article 10 of the Washington Treaty, which states that membership is open to any European State which furthers the principles of the treaty as well as contributes to the security of North Atlantic area. The enlargement of the Alliance is an ongoing and dynamic process and since the inception of the alliance in 1949, its membership has grown from the 12 founding members to 29 members. The process has gone through seven rounds of enlargement in 1952, 1955, 1982, 1999, 2004, 2009 and the most recent enlargement was in 2017. Our case study Macedonia is working actively to join this 2019. The first three rounds of enlargement – which brought in Greece and Turkey (1952), West Germany (1955) and Spain (1982) – took place during the Cold War, when strategic considerations were at the forefront of decision-making. After the disintegration of the Soviet Union and dissolution of the Warsaw Pact happened after the fall of the Berlin Wall in November 1989 which brought an end to the Cold War. The reunification of Germany in October 1990 brought the territory of the former East Germany into the Alliance.

The new democracies of Central and Eastern Europe were eager to guarantee their freedom by becoming integrated into Euro-Atlantic institutions. Thus the NATO enlargement was the subject of lively debate in the early 1990s. Many political analysts were not fully convinced of the benefits that the expansion of NATO would bring and some were concerned about the possible impact of the Alliance cohesion and solidarity as well as the relationship it would have with other states. Notably the big Elephant Russia who wanted the continued annexation of states. It defining to see

that based on this context the Alliance carried out what was called the Study on NATO Enlargement in 1995.

### **4.3 Post-Cold War Enlargement**

In 1997 at the Madrid Alliance Summit after a deliberate study of the enlargement the nations of Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland were invited to begin accession talks. These three countries became the first former members of the Warsaw Pact to join NATO in 1999. At the 1999 Washington Summit, the Membership Action Plan was launched to help other aspiring nations prepare for possible membership. Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia were invited to begin accession talks at the Alliance's Prague Summit in 2002 and then they all joined NATO in 2004.

All seven countries had participated in the MAP. At the Bucharest Summit in April 2008, Allied leaders took a number of steps related to the future enlargement of the Alliance and in this regard made certain decisions concerning countries in the Western Balkans. The Allies saw the closer integration of Western Balkan countries into Euro-Atlantic institutions as essential to ensuring long-term self-sustaining stability in this region. NATO has been heavily engaged in peace-support operations since the mid-1990s and at the Bucharest Summit, allied leaders also agreed that Georgia and Ukraine which were already engaged in Intensified Dialogues with NATO were one day to be eligible members.

In December 2008, Allied foreign ministers decided to enhance opportunities for assisting these two countries. In their effort to meet membership requirements they made use of the framework of the existing NATO-Ukraine Commission and NATO-

Georgia Commission without any bias to further decisions which may be taken about their applications to join the MAP.

#### **4.4 Membership Action Plan (MAP)**

The Membership Action Plan (MAP) is a subsidiary NATO Programme that serves as an advisory, assistance and practical support group tailored towards individual states wishing to join the Alliance. Participation in the MAP does not prejudice any decision by the Alliance on future membership. Current participants are Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republic of North Macedonia who are currently pushing towards NATO inclusion.

#### **4.5 The process of Accession**

The process of accession holds primarily with the Allies who first decide to invite a given or stated country to becoming a member of NATO. This is an official invitation to the table to begin accession talks with the Alliance. This is what is called the first step in the accession process a path to formal membership. Below are some stated steps to be taken.

- **Accession talks with a NATO team:** NATO's Headquarters in Brussels plays host to these phase of talk and bring together teams of NATO experts and representatives of the individual invitees. The primary function of this meeting is to obtain a formal confirmation from the invitee nations of their willingness and ability to meet the political, legal and military duties and commitments of NATO membership as stated in the Washington Treaty and the study on NATO Enlargement. (NATO, Enlargement, 2019).

The talks take place in two sessions with each invitee. In the first session, political and defence or military issues are discussed, essentially providing the opportunity to establish that the preconditions for membership have been

met. The second session is more technical and includes discussion of resources, security, and legal issues as well as the contribution of each new member country to NATO's common budget. This is determined on a proportional basis, according to the size of their economies in relation to those of other Alliance member countries. Invitees are also required to implement measures to ensure the protection of NATO classified information, and prepare their security and intelligence services to work with the NATO Office of Security. The end product of these discussions is a timetable to be submitted by each invitee for the completion of necessary reforms, which may continue even after these countries have become NATO members. (NATO, Enlargement, 2019).

- **Invitees send letters of intent to NATO, along with timetables for completion of reforms:**

The second step of the accession process, each invitee country provides confirmation of its acceptance of the obligations and commitments of membership in the form of a letter of intent from each foreign minister addressed to the NATO Secretary General. Together with this letter they also formally submit their individual reform timetables. (NATO, Enlargement, 2019).

- **Accession protocols are signed by NATO countries:**

NATO then prepares Accession Protocols to the Washington Treaty for each invitee. These protocols are in effect amendments or additions to the Treaty, which once signed and ratified by Allies, become an integral part of the Treaty itself and permit the invited countries to become parties to the Treaty. (NATO, Enlargement, 2019).

- **Accession protocols are ratified by NATO countries:** The governments of NATO member states ratify the protocols, according to their national requirements and procedures. The ratification procedure varies from country to country. For example, the United States requires a two-thirds majority to pass the required legislation in the Senate. Elsewhere, for example in the United Kingdom, no formal parliamentary vote is required. (NATO, Enlargement, 2019).
- **The Secretary General invites the potential new members to accede to the North Atlantic Treaty:** Once all NATO member countries notify the Government of the United States of America, the depository of the Washington Treaty, of their acceptance of the protocols to the North Atlantic Treaty on the accession of the potential new members, the Secretary General invites the new countries to accede to the Treaty. (NATO, Enlargement, 2019).
- **Invitees accede to the North Atlantic Treaty in accordance with their national procedures:** Upon depositing their instruments of accession with the US State Department, invitees formally become NATO members (NATO, Enlargement, 2019).

#### **4.6 Case study of The Republic of North Macedonia**

The Republic of North Macedonia was previously known as the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. Since 15 February 2019, following full implementation of an agreement between Athens and Skopje on the issue of the country's name, it is now officially recognized as the Republic of North Macedonia. The country joined NATO's Partnership for Peace (PFP) in 1995. In 1999, the country joined the Membership Action Plan. In July 2018, at the Brussels Summit Allies welcomed the



historic agreement between Athens and Skopje on the solution of the name issue and invited the government in Skopje to begin accession talks to join NATO. Allies also urged further progress on important reforms before and after accession. On 6 February 2019 after talks with the Allies, the Accession Protocol of the Republic of North Macedonia was now ratified by each of the 29 Allies according to procedures. It is interesting to note that for many years the country had provided valuable support to NATO-led operations and missions in Afghanistan and Kosovo thus making them a strategic fit for membership.

As stated NATO provided assistance when violence between ethnic Albanian insurgents and security forces broke out in the west of the country in February 2001. A NATO military headquarters created in Skopje during the operational period of the NATO-led intervention in Kosovo has since been downsized and transformed into a NATO Liaison Office, which assists with security sector reform and host nation support to the Kosovo Force. A NATO Advisory Team is located within the country's defence ministry (NATO, Relations with the Republic of North Macedonia, 2019).

#### **4.6.1 The road to accession**

In view of this, it should be noted that NATO allies are always committed to keeping the door open to Western Balkan partners that wish to join the Alliance. As long as there are shared values and such a nation is willing and able to assume the responsibilities and obligations of membership. Today as we know it the Euro-Atlantic integration is seen as the best way to ensure long-term, self-sustaining security and stability in the region.

In April 2008 at the Bucharest Summit; Allies agreed that an invitation to join the Alliance would be extended to the Republic of North Macedonia (at the time known as the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia) as soon as a mutually acceptable solution to the issue over its name has been reached with Greece. This agreement was consistently reiterated at subsequent Summits. Following this some years later at the July 2018 Brussels Summit, allied leaders welcomed the historic agreement between Athens and Skopje on the solution of the name issue. In line with NATO policy, they decided to invite the government in Skopje to begin accession talks to join the Alliance.

Also as stated that Following the signature by the Allies of the Accession Protocol of the Republic of North Macedonia, the country can now take part in NATO activities as an invitee. Once the Protocol has been ratified in the capitals of each of the 29 Allies, according to national procedures, the country will become a member of NATO. (NATO, Relations with the Republic of North Macedonia, 2019) An important condition for the successful conclusion of the NATO accession process was brought into full implementation of all prescribed internal procedures with respect to the agreement on the solution of the name issue – these procedures were completed by 15 February 2019. The Allies continue to encourage and support the continuation of reform efforts within the country, particularly with a view to ensuring effective democratic dialogue, media freedom, judicial independence and a fully functioning multi-ethnic society” (NATO, Relations with the Republic of North Macedonia, 2019).

## 4.7 Key areas of cooperation

The Republic of North Macedonia's and NATO both enjoy some benefits from cooperation which includes the following:

- **Building capabilities and interoperability**

This is a very important as the cooperation serves as a platform to bring North Macedonia's forces to work together with forces from NATO countries and other partners, especially in peacekeeping and crisis-management operations. Participation in joint planning, training and military exercises as well as other strategic trainings. Participation in the PfP Planning and Review Process since 1999 has also helped develop interoperability, as well as providing set targets that are key to security reform and transformation objectives for the country's armed forces.

N.B: In 2005 The country joined the Operational Capabilities Concept, a mechanism through which units available for operations can be evaluated and better integrated with NATO forces to increase operational effectiveness “Participation in the Defence Education Enhancement Programme is helping improve education and training, which is essential for the country's defence reform efforts.” (NATO, Relations with the Republic of North Macedonia, 2019).

- **Building an integrity based structure:** has also been a key area of cooperation with North Macedonia; strengthening good governance in various areas of the country like in defense, the security sector, and also reducing the risks of corruption by strengthening transparency and accountability are also important key cooperating factors. “In 2013, the country's Public Affairs Regional Centre in Skopje was recognized as a

Partnership Training and Education Centre, opening its activities to Allies and partners”. (NATO, Relations with the Republic of North Macedonia, 2019).

- **Support for NATO-led operations**

The mutuality in cooperation can also be seen as North Macedonia deployed troops in support of the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan from 2002 to end 2014. It is currently supporting the follow-on Resolute Support mission to train, advise and assist the Afghan security forces. The country was also a key partner in supporting NATO-led stabilisation operations in Kosovo in 1999, as NATO forces deployed North Macedonia to halt the spread of the conflict as well as to provide logistical support to the Kosovo Force (KFOR). The Allies also provided humanitarian assistance to help the North Macedonia deal with the flood of refugees from Kosovo and thus even still today the country continues to provide valuable host nation support to KFOR troops transiting its territory.

#### **4.7.1 wider cooperation**

**In view of a wider cooperation, the following can be seen a clearly:**

- North Macedonia supports implementation of the Women, Peace and Security agenda which is very vital point to some of NATO’S agenda.
- The country is strengthening and working hand in hand with its national civil preparedness and resilience with the support of NATO to combat important daunting factors. A practical cooperation with the Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre (EADRCC) is also enhancing crisis management capabilities and interoperability.

- North Macedonia has been actively engaged as well as been a key player with the NATO Science for Peace and Security Programme since 1998. Recent activities have focused in particular on cyber defence and counter-terrorism, defence against chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear agents, and environmental security.

It is also important to note that “National and local non-governmental organisations are on the lookout to provide public information on NATO and its relationship with the North Macedonia with the support of NATO, its Liaison Office, as well as individual Allies and partner countries.

## **Chapter 5**

### **WHY IS NATO STILL PERSISTING AND EXPANDING IN MEMBERSHIP?**

This chapter analyses the possible explanations for NATO's resilience and enlargement in its membership. As stated earlier in this study, against all negative prediction aimed at it, NATO withstood the end of the soviet era the and continues to remain relevant while increasing in its membership. Therefore, this research set out to find out to investigate why NATO persists and keeps expanding.

In a similar, research done by John S. Duffield, which he titled "NATO's Functions after the Cold War" (Duffield, 1994-1995), he identified some important features which made an attempt to explain NATO's relevance and expansion, by identifying key factors, which were left unnoticed by NATO pessimists. Duffield observed that the earlier analyses on the possible future of NATO eluded some crucial features that attributes to NATO's importance and expansion- he identified three main factors that attributes to this continued importance. First; Duffield stated that, initial analysis on NATO's future, overlooked the degree to which the fear of external threats would contribute to the preservation and expansion of the alliance. Indeed, NATO continues to exist to protect "its members against a number of actual or potential dangers coming from outside their territory. These include not only the residual threat posed by Russian military power, but also the relatively new agitations raised by conflicts in neighbouring regions." (Duffield, 1994-1995, p. 766).

According to Duffield, another vital factor which was ignored by NATO critics in their analysis, was the ability of NATO as an institution to adapt to a change of function, given they exist in a different environment now than they did when it was initially created. NATO after the Cold War ended, NATO began to acquire some more functions such as “containing and controlling militarized conflicts in Central and Eastern Europe. And, at a deeper level, it works to prevent such conflicts from arising at all by actively ensuring adequate stability within the former Soviet bloc.” (Duffield, 1994-1995, pp. 766-767).

NATO pessimists failed to recognize that it performs certain alliance functions (intra and inter) that are beneficial to its members and therefore continues to make it relevant-through NATO efforts, stability was brought to Western Europe-states in this region, previously had a lot of rivalry, NATO therefore, served as a common institution for these states to solve their security policy concerns. NATO has contributed to making the use of force in relations among the countries of the region virtually unthinkable. In all these ways, added to the fact that NATO serves to promote the interest of Europe, the United States of America also, seeks to ensure that peace and stability remains in Europe. To add to this, a “strong transatlantic historical and cultural ties, American economic interests in Europe as a leading market for her products, as a source of valuable imports, and as the host for considerable direct foreign investment by American companies-remain substantial.” (Duffield, 1994-1995, p. 767).

The above mentioned findings put forward by John Duffield, is still relevant for explaining NATO’s persistence and expansion today and will therefore constitute the premise of this analysis. In so doing, this research will argue in line with the finds

put forward by Duffield, that NATO continues to persist and expand due to the following- it serves to check the remainder of the threat posed by Russia, it is a safe option against unknown or unforeseen threats, its institutional nature helps it fit in to the needs of the security environment in place, it also, performs some key external and intra-alliance functions.

## **5.1 The External Function of NATO**

In this section, the argument is that NATO has always continued to aid and improve the safety of her members from external menace in different ways: Firstly, by maintaining the Strategic Balance in Europe by nullifying the remaining threats posed by the Russian Military. Secondly, by being on the lookout to combat surfacing threats, Thirdly, it stops such threats from springing up by adding to the fostering stability process in the former Soviet bloc (Duffield, 1994-1995, pp. 767-768).

### **5.1.1 Check and Balancing the Russian Threat**

Duffield noted that, “the military threat that the Soviet bloc could pose to Western Europe declined dramatically between 1989 and 1991. In particular, the threat of” (Duffield, 1994-1995) swift and unexpected invasions done by the soviets on central Europe, was by far the most tasking challenge NATO encountered was dealt with. Though, “the former threat was not entirely eradicated as some successor states of the defunct soviet bloc still possessed some substantial amount of military capabilities. Russia, most importantly still remains the sole Nuclear superpower in Europe”. (Duffield, 1994-1995).

Worthy of mentioning here, is that though the Soviet Union disappeared from central Europe, certain states such as Norway and Turkey still had Russian forces stationed



at their borders. Though many argue that they may or may not be used for hostility, the truth remains that no one can clearly predict what actions may be taken. Indeed, the Russia and the Soviet Union made some effort to collaborate with western states during the tenure of former President Gorbachev and Boris Yeltsin in a bid to water down the over use of force when relating among themselves. However, the unpredictable nature of the Russian politics makes it very possible for them to recede to their former expansionist and aggressive tendencies.

Therefore, one can argue that NATO's serves a fundamental purpose by checking the remainder of the threat, which Russia poses. In the event of any attack, by Russia on any of the NATO allies, NATO will pull in its weight to defend its allies. This in fact, can be said to be a key reason, NATO is seen as relevant today. One instance to further drive this argument is the case of the Republic of North Macedonia accession to NATO,(discussed in the previous chapter) I will argue here, that added to the economic and military advantages North Macedonia stands to achieve by joining NATO, its decision to join NATO has roots in the fear of a possible Russian attempt to use military power against it, possibly to annex it, as it did with Crimea and therefore to find safety, under the umbrella of NATO(collective defense action) seeing that its military might cannot match that of Russia but NATO, in combination with the U.S military might and nuclear power can effectively counter Russia.

### **5.1.2 Settling Disputes in Central and Eastern Europe**

As acknowledged by Duffield, another key function NATO performs in the Post-Cold war era that continues to make it relevant is the protection it gives its members, all unforeseen or unknown threat that may emerge. Truly speaking, there have been a lot of issues springing forth from places like, North Africa and the Middle East,

which are of grave concern to many states. These areas have been experiencing an increased amount of information and knowledge on weapon creation. Top of the list of concerns although, “are ethnic, territorial, and national conflicts within and among the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, as exemplified by the fighting in the former Yugoslavia. Conflicts like this have a tendency to generate large numbers of refugees or even to spill over into the neighboring countries.”(Duffield, 1994-1995, p. 769).

Although, NATO is currently unable to completely put an end to all the conflict in these areas, it plays a role in ensuring that the aftermath of these conflicts, do not in any way affect the absolute its members within or around the region. Even in cases where no NATO member is in any form of danger or threat, NATO still drafts contingency plans to double ensure the absolute safety of its members. NATO therefore, makes sure that its allies are not brought into conflicts of these such. NATO is therefore, relevant, because these actions it takes to protect its members, make them know that they are not alone to deal with the conflicts in their region but will be taken care of by NATO. Therefore, allies resist from taking actions on their own in times of conflict but rely on the swift and effective collective security support which NATO provides to the states in the west and all her members.

NATO have been involved in conflict resolution missions in some parts of the world but with particular focus in Europe. NATO played a key role in resolving the troubles in Bosnia, putting to good use, its, military might-even launching its first air campaign, military to ensure that the crisis stops. Another incidence north worthy, is NATO’s intervention in the Kosovo crisis, though it had a lot of backlash for it because it was not mandated by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), before

embarking on the intervention. However, some also hailed it for the humanitarian role it played in ending the crisis and subsequently laying the ground work for Kosovo's democracy. Therefore, NATO continued to persist because of the key role it performs in resolving dispute.

In addition, NATO indeed will go a long length to ensure the security and safety of its allies from all forms of threat, whether direct or indirect. especially if it perceives that the conflict has tendencies to escalate and affect any NATO member. (this in fact was the justification of NATO intervention in Kosovo). This makes NATO not only important to its allies but also attractive to some countries, who desire this, steadfast commitment to its member's security that NATO offers.

### **5.1.3 Promoting Stability in the Former Soviet Bloc**

NATO also plays a crucial role in promoting stability in the previous soviet bloc as a way of ensuring that there is no future clash or conflict within the region. In the words of Duffield, a closely related function is providing stability to states that were previously part of the former Soviet bloc, as a way of preventing an outburst of conflict. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, a lot of the states that were previously part of it under went certain political and economic reforms. The west also played a key role in the process bearing in mind that conflict in these states will lead to domestic crisis, massive migration into neighbouring western states, violence and possible threats to surrounding NATO allies. Still, "success is not assured. Reform among peoples with no recent experience with democracy or free markets is naturally difficult and these considerable domestic obstacles are often compounded by an uncertain and seemingly threatening external security environment" (Duffield, 1994-1995, pp. 770-772).

Therefore, according to Duffield's research, NATO performs this function of promoting stability in the former Soviet bloc in two key ways first, - as at 1990, NATO began to promote political reforms in these regions. In addition to intervening in conflict areas and resolving them, NATO also maintains its relevance by promoting peace, stability and democratic reforms in the former soviet bloc. Through its programs such as- The NACC and PFP. The NACC creates an avenue for previous soviet bloc states to talk about different kinds of security matters, while the PFP, rooms for participation in NATO lead operations while giving it a door to knock on should it sense an attack on it as a resolve of its role in any NATO operation Second, NATO strengthened the "security of Central and East European states by assuring them that they would not have to face external threats entirely on their own, thereby helping them to forgo potentially destabilizing actions and to pursue their ambitious agendas of domestic reform with greater confidence." (Duffield, 1994-1995, pp. 770-772).

#### **5.1.4 Intra-Alliance Functions of NATO**

A lot have been written about how NATO was established to counter an external threat, in this section, we will be looking at the intra-alliance functions, NATO performs. These include, intra-alliance reassurance, intra-alliance transparency and denationalizing security policy.

#### **5.3 Intra-alliance Reassurance**

As put forward by Duffield, the most important intra-alliance function is that of reassurance. The continued existence of NATO, including its integrated military structure and the U.S. military presence, reaffirms and reassures its members that they have nothing to fear from one another. "NATO reduces the possibility of conflict among its European members in three ways: it increases transparency; it

inhibits the renationalization of their security policies; and by binding the United States to the continent, it ensures the maintenance of a balance of power in the region” (Duffield, 1994-1995, pp. 773-774).

#### **5.4 Increasing Intra-Alliance Transparency**

In his work, Duffield acknowledged that, an important potential source of international conflict is misperception and misunderstanding amongst states. Due to the lack of explicit and well detailed information, decision makers have the tendency to make exaggerated conclusions and thus see an enemy where there is none, while ignoring the possible interpretation that their own actions may give birth to, which will lead to some security concerns, therefore, international relations are filled with certain features as distrust and suspicion. NATO ensures that these features do not surface among its allies by fostering collective trust through a constituent display of intra-alliance transparency. NATO does this, through regular conferences and deliberations on different levels and on different subjects, which provides an opportunity for allies to give essential information on their actions and intentions and when needed, convey their concerns and misinterpretations. Taking part in NATO’s force planning process requires that, members share and receive some sensitive information their own state’s military forces, budget and prospective actions. This organisational transparency, helps NATO members not keep secrets from each other, because they have little or no reason to do so.

#### **5.5 Denationalizing Security Policy**

Another way NATO sustains reassurance, is through an integration of polices on security. NATO members formulate and carry out their security policies as part of the alliance rather than on a purely national basis. This process of denationalization of security policy by NATO members disrupts the need existing struggle for

superiority that subtly exist among the big powers of Europe, which also discourage the use of the alliance military might as a political tool. Should renationalization occur, on the other hand, it could prompt a rise in concerns about internal imbalances in Western Europe and therefore generate renewed skepticism, competition, and even conflict.

NATO advocates the denationalization of security of security policies in a lot of ways, at the very least, it does so through consultation, through the process of force planning and most importantly, through its integrated military structure- which infuses the mind of allies a sense of a common identity. Also, having regular talks or discussion amongst members help clear out misconceptions and increase mutual understanding. In addition, the idea of a joint force helps coordinate the national military structure of each member to reflect that of NATO. Worthy of mention also, is the fact that carrying out certain assignments in the military organisation combined with the civilian bureaucratic process help government officials and military officers from different NATO member countries socialize and instill in them a common NATO culture. NATO member states have a lesser burden or responsibility to bear in terms of their military structure since they already enjoy full benefits from the integrated military structure of NATO, this is specially to states in the central region of Europe. “For n example, many European countries depend heavily on NATO's multinational airborne early warning force and its integrated air defence system” (Duffield, 1994-1995, pp. 775-776).

## **5.6 U.S. Contributions to Reassurance**

NATO's integrated military structure is not the sole reason for which, NATO's members are connected to preserving and expanding NATO. “It is the U.S

involvement in the form of security guarantee and the existing presence of American forces in Europe that perhaps more than any other reason eases the security concerns of other NATO countries. As a result, the renationalization of security policy appears ever needless and even undesirable.” (Duffield, 1994-1995, pp. 776-777). This can be argued as a key factor that contributes to NATO’s persistence and enlargement.

## **5.7 Possible Alternatives**

It can be argued that a possible reason for NATO persistence and enlargement stems from the fact that, there are no possible alternatives to NATO, the possible establishment of one is also very unlikely because of the financial cost it may require owing to the fact that it has to be created brick by brick, that is, the establishment of new institutions will involve advocating a new idea, sorting for states to support or join, sourcing for a budget to build actual physical structures. After all of these is done and a new institution is set in motion, there is a question of effectiveness, especially in its starting years. Therefore, it is generally seen as a difficult task to create new institutions especially one meant to serve as a substitute to an existing one, which many still consider as effective. Having all these in mind, states tend to advocate that the current institutions should be continually improved to carry out its functions as effectively as possible, as it has always done. States feel more assured to carry on with a system that has worked for them in the past out of fear of possible issues that may come with a completely new arrangement.

## Chapter 6

### CONCLUSION

After the second World War, a huge part of Europe was left in complete ruin and alter devastation (though it may be difficult to imagine now) about thirty-six and a half million people lost their lives, nineteen million of which were civilians. There were a lot of refugee camps and rationing became the order of the day. a lot of areas in Europe experienced an infant mortality rate of one in every four children. According to NATO, the alliance was established as part of a bigger effort to stop the Soviet Union from enlarging, dismantling the idea of Nationalist militarism in the European continent (by the presence of North America) and pushing forward the idea of a politically integrated Europe. The signing of the North Atlantic Treaty on the 4<sup>th</sup> of April 1949, saw the formation of the NATO alliance, which essential not just in terms of defence, but also in terms of cooperation as stated in its Article 2, which made provisions for some non-military cooperation and Article 3, which formed the groundwork for military cooperation among the allies.

Given the formation of the Warsaw pact in 1953 and the construction of the Berlin wall in 1961, there was a bit of an uneasy tension in Europe. In this time, NATO adopted a policy or strategy called “Massive Retaliation” which meant that, per adventure, the soviet should launch an attack on any member of the alliance, NATO would reciprocate with nuclear action. This strategy was adopted with the intension of preventing an attack from the soviets and allies of NATO. The slightest action



against either of these, would have led to a full-blown nuclear exchange, therefore, the strategy of mass retaliation helped NATO allies to focus their energies on other important aspects- such as economic cooperation, rather than military security. NATO began to take steps in the direction of more political and military roles. Although from its inception, the smaller states in NATO had agitated for more non-military cooperation.

To add to this, the Suez crisis which took place in 1956, showed even more, the need for a political consultation in the alliance, which led to a further divide among allies. The launch of the sputnik satellite by the Soviet Union in 1956, also served as a source of motivation to the allies for a greater scientific cooperation. Also, the foreign ministers of Italy, Norway and Canada (known as the three wise men) presented a report to the North Atlantic Council, which advocated for an increased scientific cooperation and consultation in the alliance, the result of this report, led to the creation of the NATO Science Programme. Towards the end of the 1960's NATO adopted a new strategy of détente, which brought about an ease to the previously existing tension between the Eastern and Western parts of Europe. In this time also, NATO and SHAPE were relocated.

Pierre Harmel, the Belgian foreign minister, presented a report in 1967, on the "the future task of the alliance" to the North Atlantic Council, which advocated that NATO create an arm that encourages dialogue, politics and détente among allies and Warsaw pact countries. NATO's role therefore, evolved from protecting the existing states quo to courting a transformation or change in the system. With the groundwork done by the Harmel report, a conference on security and operation was held in Europe in 1973, which gave birth to deliberations and negotiations of the

Helsinki final act- which was binding on all who signed (with the inclusion of the Soviet Union and Warsaw pact states). To honor the freedom of their citizenry –this includes freedom of thought, freedom of believe, religion and conscience.

NATO put a pause on the strategy of détente in 1979, when the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan by deploying SS-20 saber ballistic missiles. As a response, to this attack, NATO allies adopted the “dual track” decision to deploy nuclear-capable Pershing II and ground-launched cruise missiles in the western part of Europe while still in deliberations with the soviets, as the missiles were deployed later in 1983. Therefore, the need for the deliberations with the soviets as a way of seeking an option that is void of missile launch.

NATO is not just creating security partnerships with states across the Mediterranean, the pacific and the gulf region, but also, it also cooperates with other international organisations and non-governmental organisations that serve as authorities in key areas as institution-building, governance, development and judicial reform- be it fostering peaceful existence in Kabul or giving military assistance in Sudan. NATO has been making more cooperation with international organisation that can showcase their high-level reconstruction and civil society building capabilities.

Though NATO seems to be partnering with international organisations and institutions to bring peace, wit will appear that in this century (21<sup>st</sup>) they will be involved with a lot more than just peace making. The recent attempt of Russia to annex Crimea illegally in 2014 and the general hostile exertion against Ukraine, goes to show that NATO is still, very much relevant and will be playing more key roles in issues of international security, with collective defense being at the core of its

functions. Added to this, the Syrian crisis, the rise of ISIL and increase in terrorism emphasize the continued importance of the NATO alliance. Cyber-attacks are taking a fast rise and leaving a huge trail of destruction as well. The current security environment therefore, is one that stretches the flexible nature of NATO.

To conclude therefore, it should be known that, from its inception, NATO's flexible nature which had roots in its treaty, has given it the opportunity to adjust to the different security requirement at a given time. NATO was a completely defence based organisation in the 1950's while in the 1960's NATO adopted the strategy of détente and was also a political instrument. In the 1990's however, NATO served as a tool for stabilizing Eastern Europe and Asia by incorporating new partners and members. Lastly. In this 21<sup>st</sup> century, though NATO is boarded by lots of challenges, it seeks to pursue collective defence, peaceful conflict resolution and humanitarian intervention, all these not only contributes to NATO's continued relevance, but its expansion as well.

### **Summary**

The literature review in relation to our analysis revealed that there are a lot of arguments in support and others against the persistence and expansion of NATO. Why does in support of NATO enlargement argue that, NATO serves to check the resurfaced Russian threat, promote the advancement of democratic values and the peaceful resolution of conflict while also advocating the denationalization of security policies, those against the persistence and expansion of NATO put forth some counter arguments. First of which is that, NATO persistence and expansion is a continued threat to Russia especially seeing the rate of former Balkan states joining the alliance. They also argue that has greater of form of exclusion among states in

Europe who are not a part of the alliance. Lastly, the ascension of more states into NATO will lead to too many division and interest groups, which will disrupt NATO's ability to reach any form of consensus in decision making.

Looking at NATO from the perspective of three core international relations theories, which have a direct bearing with our topic- neorealism theory, institutionalist theory and organisational theory are employed. For neorealist, NATO is an alliance formed out of a need to balance the soviet threat and was expected to fizzle out after the demise of the Soviet Union. The persistence of NATO however coursed a reevaluation of the neorealist analyses of NATO. Waltz stated that NATO's function has changed hence its persistence and therefore a proper evaluation of what NATO actually does will help make a clearer picture of neorealist analogy on NATO. The revised preposition of neorealist therefore is that NATO exist as a tool for U.S display of it freedom and military power. Therefore, NATO persists as long as the U.S has interest in it and will fail to do so as soon as it stops. Also neorealist are of the believe that the demise of the soviet threat NATO member state will be to calculate the benefits of the alliance in relation to the financial commitment it entails and the loss of economic freedom and will in no time stop contributing to the alliance budget.

Organisational theory approaches NATO from the stand point of the interest of the organisation itself and not in terms of balancing a perceived threat. Organisational theory considers the interests of the staff members that make up NATO as an organisation and how to exhibit certain behaviours in order to survive and remain relevant. one of is denying the need for change, if it means shutting down the operation of the organisation, affirming the values the organisation represents and

modifying or creating new roles for the organisation that maintains its relevance. The institutionalist approach however believes that because of the benefits an institution like NATO brings to its members, staff and all else, there is an increase in commitment to see it maintained and approved upon. This dissertation also looks at the expansion of NATO, the procedure and the pattern to join NATO with a case study of the Republic of North Macedonia. In line with the argument that NATO is still an attractive organisation to join, while examining the case of the Republic of North Macedonia who are on their way to become a full-fledged member of NATO. We looked into why North Macedonia finds NATO membership significant and beneficial as well as the functions it will perform.

In course of this research therefore, we identified some key external and internal functions, which NATO performs that can account for its continued persistence and attractiveness they include the following- Denationalizing Security Policy, which helps its alliance states to have a collective rather than national front when it comes to security policies. NATO also, makes sure that, misconceptions do not lead to distrust, among its member states by increasing intra alliance transparency by encouraging consultations at different levels and on different issues. Lastly, NATO also reassures its members through. These key functions NATO performs keep the allies interested and committed to building and sustaining the alliance and also serve as a form of attraction to other states who eventually declare their intentions to join the alliance. The absence of a feasible alternative, also accounts for NATO's persistence and survival.

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