

# **Nigeria's Peacekeeping Missions: A Study of Nigeria's Foreign Policy**

**Victoria Chimamaka Okorafor**

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Approval of the Institute of Graduate Studies and Research

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Prof. Dr. Ali Hakan Ulusoy  
Director

I certify that this thesis satisfies all the requirements as a thesis for the degree of Master of Arts in International Relations.

---

Prof. Dr. Ahmet Sözen  
Chair, Department of Political Science  
and International Relations

We certify that we have read this thesis and that in our opinion it is fully adequate in scope and quality as a thesis for the degree of Master of Arts in International Relations.

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Assoc. Prof. Dr. Wojciech Forsysinski  
Supervisor

---

Examining Committee

1. Assoc. Prof. Dr. Wojciech Forsysinski

2. Assoc. Prof. Dr. Moncef Khaddar

3. Asst. Prof. Dr. Nuray Ibryamova

## ABSTRACT

The preponderance of peacekeeping in international relations discourse cannot be overlooked. Nigeria has enunciated her appreciation and her attitude towards this United Nations machinery. This research resolves to investigate Nigeria's peacekeeping exploits. Concurrently, the inspirations for her involvement will be portrayed, especially noting the rate of her contributions since her independence. The examination of Nigeria's foreign policy, which has been described as Afrocentric in nature, and peacekeeping will be observed, in an attempt to depict a connexion between the two. The impediments faced by this Western African state in achieving peace internationally, most notably the Boko Haram insurgency within her borders, will be viewed including the impact of her pacifist participations.

With the aid of primary sources, secondary data and democratic peace theory, this study utilises comparative analysis by contrasting between several missions, specifically in Africa and headed by different international organisations to show the extent of the country's endeavours. The motivations for intervention have remained almost the same; yet, the rate of peacekeeping involvements was discovered to have decreased in recent years due to demands for internal security boost in light of Boko Haram attacks. Overall, this research definitively provided insight into Nigeria's peacekeeping predilections, illustrating why it acquired popularity as a peace leader, despite the challenges faced.

**Keywords:** Peacekeeping, Foreign Policy, Afrocentrism, Democratic Peace, United Nations, Responsibility to Protect (R2P)

## ÖZ

Uluslararası ilişkiler söyleminde barışı korumanın üstünlüğü göz ardı edilemez. Nijerya, bu Birleşmiş Milletler mekanizmasına karşı takdirini ve tutumunu dile getirdi. Bu araştırma, Nijerya'nın barışı koruma istisमारlarını araştırmaya yöneliktir. Tutarlı bir şekilde, katılımına ilişkin ilhamlar, özellikle bağımsızlığından bu yana yaptığı katkıların oranına dikkat çekilerek tasvir edilecektir. Doğası gereği Afrika merkezli olarak tanımlanan Nijerya'nın dış politikasının incelenmesi ve barışı koruma, ikisi arasındaki bağlantıyı tasvir etme çabasıyla gözlemlenecektir. Bu Batı Afrika devletinin uluslararası barışa ulaşmada karşılaştığı engeller, özellikle de sınırları içindeki Boko Haram isyanı, onun pasifist katılımlarının etkisi de dahil olmak üzere görülecektir.

Birincil kaynaklar, ikincil veriler ve demokratik barış teorisinin yardımıyla, bu çalışma, ülkenin çabalarının kapsamını göstermek için, özellikle Afrika'daki ve farklı uluslararası kuruluşlar tarafından yönetilen çeşitli misyonlar arasında zıtlık oluşturarak karşılaştırmalı analizi kullanır. Müdahale için motivasyonlar neredeyse aynı kaldı; ancak son yıllarda Boko Haram saldırıları ışığında iç güvenlik artırımı talepleri nedeniyle barışı koruma müdahalelerinin oranının düştüğü keşfedildi. Genel olarak bu araştırma, Nijerya'nın barışı koruma tercihlerine ilişkin kesin bir fikir vererek, karşılaşılan zorluklara rağmen neden bir barış lideri olarak popülerlik kazandığını gösterdi.

**Anahtar Kelimeler:** Barışı Koruma, Dış Politika, Afrika Merkezilik, Demokratik Barış, Birleşmiş Milletler, Koruma Sorumluluğu (R2P)

# **DEDICATION**

**To God & My Loving Family**

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## **LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS**

AFRC	Armed Forces Ruling Council
AMIS	African Union Mission in Sudan
AU	African Union
DPKO	Department of Peacekeeping Operations
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
ECOMIL	ECOWAS Mission in Liberia
ECOMOG	ECOWAS Monitoring Group
ECPF	ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework
Et al	And Others
ICISS	International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty
MFA	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
MONUC	United Nations Organisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
MONUCSO	United Nations Organisation Stabilisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo
OAU	Organisation of African Unity
ONUC	United Nations Operation in the Congo
PSC	Peace and Security Council
R2P	Responsibility to Protect
RUF	Revolutionary United Front
UN	United Nations
UNAMID	United Nation- African Union Hybrid Operation in Darfur

UNAMSIL	United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone
UNEF	United Nations Emergency Force
UNIFIL	United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon
UNITAR	United Nations Institute for Training and Research
UNMIL	United Nations Mission in Liberia
UNSC	United Nations Security Council

# Chapter 1

## INTRODUCTION

### 1.1 Importance of Study

The end of colonisation and the gaining of independence amongst African states resulted in the upsurge of intra-state conflicts and civil wars. Rampaging several countries in the African continent, these conflicts are a consequence of ethnic divides created during the colonisation era, including religion, corruption, poverty, to say the least. Palpably, such struggles rendered devastating blows to the countries witnessing them. The year 1996 highlighted the gravity of the situation in Africa, with the continent recording half of deaths emanating from wars. These newly-independent states suffered greatly from their colonialist past. Without the necessary backbone and enforcement measures to combat and tackle these clashes themselves, governments, if there existed a recognised one in the first place, sought the assistance of outside powers.

It was towards this end that the United Nations (UN) found its purpose. Following its forerunner, the League of Nations which was a response to the dire situation of the early 1900s and a tool to prevent the repetition of the world wars, the UN, an improved version of its predecessor, saw the need to develop an instrument that will sufficiently handle the diverse conflicts and humanitarian disasters. This mechanism, peacekeeping, was formed and its introduction majorly changed international norms and rules of behaviour such as non-interference. Peacekeeping's debut and its

metamorphosis through the years were welcomed differently. However, it has been recognised as a UN invention.

Nigeria, though, was no exception to the disruptions plaguing the rest of Africa. Upon gaining its independence on 1<sup>st</sup> October 1960, the Federal Republic of Nigeria underwent its period of military rule and dictatorship between 1966 to 1979 and 1983 to 1999. Additionally, the Nigerian Biafran War of 1967 afflicted the country and showcased the struggles faced by this populous nation, contentions that resonated with other countries over the turn of the 20<sup>th</sup> century. Nonetheless, Nigeria permanently operationalised democracy on May 29<sup>th</sup> 1999 with the election of Olusegun Obasanjo to the office of president. His presence as Nigeria's leader marked the solidification of Nigeria's role as a peace advocate in the region.

Regardless of Nigeria's past shrouded in a civil war, dictatorial rule and even human rights violations, the West African state has shown increasing and ever-present concern for and involvement in peacekeeping missions. The struggle of its fellow African states, especially those neighbouring its borders drew the attention of Nigeria and its leaders. With most states fighting for or having recently acquired independence, and in most cases plunging into instability and hostilities almost immediately after, Nigeria was against the idea of former colonialists such as France and the United Kingdom intervening in such states, as they (Nigeria) regarded it as a means for colonialists to regain or attain indirect control. As a result, the importance of intervening and reaching out to those in need was emphasised and propagated even amongst its allies.

Stipulated in Section 19(b) and (c) of the 1999 Nigerian Constitution, Nigeria asserted its foreign policy to endorse “African integration and support for African unity” as well as “promotion of international co-operation for the consolidation of universal peace and mutual respect among all nation and elimination of discrimination in all its manifestations.”

It made its first contribution to peacekeeping in 1960, a few months following its independence and acceptance into the United Nations (UN). With the breakout of conflict in Congo, Nigeria posted a regiment under the banner of the United Nations, forming the third major state force involved in peacekeeping. Furthermore, Nigeria has been involved in several other UN missions such as operations in Mozambique, Angola, Namibia and Lebanon.

Within the African continent, Nigeria has been the conveyor of peace and security. It spearheaded the formation of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in 1975, as General Yakubu Gowon of Nigeria and Gnassingbe Eyadema of Togo promoted the idea of a West African integration organisation. Subsequently, this federal republic played a significant part in the establishment of the ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG), initially formed as a response to the Liberian civil war, one in which Nigeria was seen at the frontlines. It deployed a majority of ECOMOG’s military and civilian personnel at the height of the Liberian and Sierra Leonean civil wars in the 1990s, spending over US\$10 billion without any reimbursement. Consequently, Nigeria participated in the establishment of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) and equally occupied a headlining position in its transformation to African Union (AU) in 2002.

Prominently, Nigerian nationals have gained employment in several positions such as commanding peacekeeping operations as evinced in the Liberian and Sierra Leonean civil wars, with Major General Victor Malu serving as commander of ECOMOG missions to both conflicts.

For this reason, this paper will focus primarily on the involvements of Nigeria within the African continent.

## **1.2 Statement of Problem**

Nigeria has faced limitations to its peacekeeping actions, especially its Afro-centred foreign policy. Labelled as the armed cornerstone in certain missions such as the peacekeeping mission in Liberia, Nigeria has contributed remarkably to UN peace operations. (UN, 2018). Ranking 8<sup>th</sup> in the number of contributing nations in Africa as of 2016, behind Ethiopia, Burkina Faso, Egypt, Ghana, Rwanda, Senegal and Tanzania, Nigeria is the world's 14<sup>th</sup> largest troops contributing nation to UN Peacekeeping operations. (UN, 2020). More so, it was known as one of the countries with the most considerable female peacekeepers. However, as of March 2020, Nigeria plummeted, positioned as the 25<sup>th</sup> country in Africa contributing military and police workforce and 43<sup>rd</sup> globally. The formation of the African Capacity for Immediate Response to Crises (ACIRC) was not fully received by Nigeria and as a result, it failed to contribute to the African Union mechanism. It is disputed that the failure of the African giant to supply resources and personnel is due to its military restrictions based on internal mishaps.

The Federal Republic of Nigeria has in a similar manner been celebrated and critiqued. Some argue that the country has lost its position as 'giant of Africa' whilst others

believe that its poor performance of recent is merely a glitch in its road to success and domination. Regardless, Nigeria has been vocal about the need for peace and security in its neighbourhood, although if one should look within the country itself, the same may not be said in return. Irrespective of the debates, Nigeria has played a leading role in maintaining order in Africa. However, this ‘big brother of Africa’ or the country that should it sneeze, “the neighbouring countries catch cold” (Oladeji, 2015) has not been without its challenges. These hindrances will be analysed and aid in granting an understanding of Nigeria’s changing involvement in international and regional peacekeeping has taken over the past few years.

One of such challenges is the emergence and activities of Boko Haram. An Islamic terrorist group that reappeared in 2011, Boko Haram is claimed to be responsible for thousands of death, kidnappings and bombings and is prominently operational in north-eastern Nigeria. Its menace has been felt in neighbouring countries as well, such as in Chad, Niger and Cameroon. Thus, it has morphed into a terrorist group posing a problem for the Sahel region. Nigeria has found it particularly difficult to control the menace of the extremist group hence affecting its contributions to peacekeeping. Also, other issues within the country such as corruption and bad government can be viewed as additional factors contributing to the country’s slowing efforts.

Therefore, to fully explore Nigeria’s contributions, this research is directed at discovering its involvements and the diverse roles evinced in several peace operations within the African continent since its independence in 1960.

Also, the focus must be given to the groundwork and framework on which the country’s external actions are built, by examining Nigeria’s African-centred foreign



policy, specifically as it pertains to ensuring peace and order within the continent. Also, it is paramount that to maintain an unbiased stance in the research, analysis of the various factors inhibiting the country from full participation in peacekeeping recently ought to be performed.

Consequently, showcasing and deliberating on the work of Nigeria in peacekeeping in Africa is incomplete without major reference to the impact of such actions, be it positive or otherwise. Aside from adding to the pre-existing literature on this area of study, this research intends to grant the reader the opportunity to appreciably scrutinise the extent of Nigeria's African-centred foreign policy as well as the rationale behind it all.

Disputedly, Nigeria's preoccupation with maintaining security within the African continent is connected to its desire to gain a permanent seat in the Security Council of the United Nations. Other reasons for its predilection for peace missions are associated with enforcing its stance as a regional hegemon.

Nonetheless, whatever the reasons may be, Nigeria has made a notable name for itself in Africa, albeit disputed, as one of the forerunners of peacekeeping. This research intends to evaluate this stance.

### **1.3 Research Questions**

To fully grasp the subject matter, several questions will serve as a roadmap to better clarity. These questions intend to give a direction to the research and improve the scope and quality of the work.

It will, first and foremost, reveal what Nigeria's foreign policy is concerning peacekeeping in Africa, and as a whole. With this objective in mind, attention will not only be given to its 1999 Constitution but to the work and involvement of other ministries and state entities as well as instruments that influence its foreign policymaking.

Furthermore, it will address the justification for the state's major provisions in peacekeeping to clarify and expatiate the driving force behind its actions or inactions as the case may be.

In explicating Nigeria's involvement in diverse peacekeeping operations in Africa, care will be taken to consider the various functions that peacekeepers play in peacekeeping missions, ranging from monitoring ceasefires to participating in conflicts to protect civilians and properties.

Subsequently, the effects of Nigeria's involvement in peacekeeping missions on the African continent will be indicated, in terms of the outcome of the missions it engaged in.

Consequently, this research will showcase the evolution of Nigeria's peacekeeping intervention. Indeed, the rate at which the state has participated in peacekeeping missions has altered over the past years, which will be demonstrated herein, whilst also ensuring to depict the factors enhancing and or limiting its involvement.

Finally, but equally importantly, the challenges to the nation's efforts in achieving its peacekeeping objectives will be defined in this research.

## **1.4 Methodology**

Methodology refers to the usage of procedures, directions and or rules employed in executing research. Its emphases are on the formation, collation and presentation of data as well as study. The aim is to allow for the critical evaluation of the study's overall validity and reliability. Methodology puts forward the measures used by the researcher to permit transparency and effectual critical analysis.

In this case, qualitative and explanatory research will be used by referring to secondary data such as existing works of literature by organisations, scholars and authors. In addition to this, primary data will be applied such as the Constitution of Nigeria, UN Documents and releases, AU and ECOWAS documents.

To enhance this analysis, a theoretical framework will be employed to be precise democratic (liberal) peace theory. Tying this to the research topic, the theory will enhance the understanding of peacekeeping including posing a possible *raison d'être* behind its preponderance. At the same time, due diligence will be given to consider the significance of concepts such as peacekeeping and responsibility to protect, appreciating the relationship between both.

Examining peacekeeping will be done under certain organisational structures such as the UN and ECOWAS. It will further apply case studies to indicate the extent of Nigeria's peacekeeping. As a result, mixed methodology, to be precise sequential approach will be in play. The sequential approach in this sense makes use of methods that work closely together and build on each other to provide answers to a question. (Andreassen, Sano and McInerney-Lankford, 2017). Thus, the usage of case studies and comparative analysis falls within this approach.

## **1.5 Scope and Limitations**

The purpose of this study is to analyse Nigeria's Africa-centred foreign policy approach in connection with its peacekeeping initiatives and strides in the continent from the time of its independence in 1960 till the time this research was conducted and written. Particular restrictions experienced by the researcher in conducting this research include the inability to access official federal and state documents from certain ministries due to its sensitivity or privacy. More so, time was another factor that affected the researcher due to the need to organise and prepare the research in a timely and appropriate manner.

Additionally, the researcher faced difficulties as it pertained to acquiring certain sources from the internet as some were unavailable to the public, had been deleted or required financial payment before its availability could be made possible. Thus, finance constituted an encumbrance.

## **1.6 Outline of the Research**

This section seeks to evince the format that this study will take, delineating the content of each chapter all geared towards answering the research topic and questions.

Chapter one constitutes the introduction to the research. It consists of the importance of the study, statement of the problem, research questions, methodology including scope and limitations.

Chapter two presents a literature review outlining the work, comments and opinions of authors and scholars in line with and related to the field of this research. It will examine the different facets of peacekeeping such as principles of peacekeeping and the importance of mandate, including the difference and relationship between

peacekeeping, peacebuilding and peacemaking and also delve into the effectiveness of peacekeeping and or otherwise.

The third chapter on which this study would be founded comprises a theoretical framework that will address the liberal peace theory. Correspondingly, the chapter will include a conceptual framework taking note of important concepts such as peacekeeping and the responsibility to protect.

The fourth chapter will give a concentration on the formulation of Nigeria's foreign policy in line with peacekeeping and will examine the history of the country to the extent that it contributed to such foreign policy conceptualisation. Beyond that, Nigeria's relationship and approach towards the UN and regional organisations such as ECOWAS will be buttressed.

The next chapter encompasses a timeline of peace operations in Africa in which Nigeria was involved. It will highlight the role peacekeepers play in missions. Moreover, the rationale behind Nigeria's peacekeeping actions will be examined, including the challenges faced by the West African state, whilst finishing with the impacts on both Nigeria and Africa in general.

The final chapter will serve as the conclusion for the study and provide a bird's-eye view of the entire study.

## **1.7 Conclusion**

The UN's invention of peacekeeping has created an avenue for states globally to uphold democracy, peace and security. Above all else, it has trumpeted the decline in unchecked sovereignty, wherein states could do whatever they wanted without the

knowledge or fear of external intervention or retribution. States whose people were left to suffer and immersed in wars, poverty and destruction were made to account for their actions and or inactions. Human rights could not of course be protected in such situations and with the inexperience of most infant states, assistance had to be rendered. Seeing the demand for peacekeepers, Nigeria entered the international arena from the onset with peacekeeping in mind. Its involvement has been enjoyed not just universally as seen in the UN but regionally and sub-regionally. In line with its Afro-centric policy, the West African state has shown its heart for peace and likewise unity.

## **Chapter 2**

### **LITERATURE REVIEW**

This chapter is dedicated to comprehending the peacekeeping mechanism. The focus will be given to explaining the principles of peacekeeping, the responsibility to protect and its relationship to peacekeeping, the importance of mandates whilst ensuring to describe the role played by peacekeepers. Additionally, an effort will be geared towards unveiling the requirements to be met before peacekeeping is initiated. The changes occurring in peacekeeping operations will be underlined specifically the difference between classical peacekeeping and multidimensional peacekeeping; contrasting between peacekeeping and peacemaking, peacebuilding and enforcement actions. Especially vital to denote is the effectiveness or otherwise of peacekeeping being sure to point out the conditions to be met by troop-contributing states.

Peacekeeping has witnessed several changes, gaining widespread support and criticism. Certain authors and even states might regard the notion as a license to the control of outside negative influence whilst others consider it a noble and novel invention that has increased humanitarian aid, brought peace and preserved lives.

#### **2.1 Defining Peacekeeping**

Peacekeeping is a term that is differently defined and understood. The debate on defining peacekeeping is majorly influenced by the lack of official definition as it is not mentioned in the UN Charter and thus makes it challenging to accurately define.

The Agenda For Peace contributed to this ambiguity. Written by former Secretary-General, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, it endeavoured to define peacekeeping as “the deployment of a United Nations presence in the field, hitherto with the consent of all the parties concerned, normally involving United Nations military and/or police personnel and frequently civilians as well.” He went further to state that it is a mechanism that promotes “the possibilities for both the prevention of conflict and the making of peace”. (Agenda For Peace, 1992, p. 5).

Furthermore, the UN (2008, p. 18) in its “Capstone Doctrine” defined peacekeeping as “a technique designed to preserve the peace, however fragile, where fighting has been halted, and to assist in implementing agreements achieved by the peacemakers.” The document also makes mention of the involvement of different entities like the military, police and civilians, all collaborating to secure peace and stability.

Goulding (1993) also considered peacekeeping to be an UN-invented tool, defining it as:

Field operations established by the United Nations, with the consent of the parties concerned, to help control and resolve conflicts between them, under United Nations command and control, at the expense collectively of the member states, and with military and other personnel and equipment provided voluntarily by them, acting impartially between the parties and using force to the minimum extent necessary. (p. 455)

His definition differs from that provided by Boutros-Ghali in that it takes into consideration the expenses incurred on member states in embarking on peacekeeping missions.



Badmus and Jenkins (2019, pp. 52-53), in line with Goulding, stated that peacekeeping is a form of machinery employed by the UN for conflict resolution. However, the authors depicted the several duties encompassed by peacekeeping. They averred that it (peacekeeping) included the “interposition of forces between the warring parties by creating a buffer zone” and is a venture geared towards ensuring a ceasefire is sustained. In their view, peacekeeping is not the end-all-be-all along the conflict resolution spectrum; however, guaranteeing its positive accomplishments requires the application of other machinery such as good offices, negotiation, mediation, to name a few.

Owing to the lack of an official definition, certain chapters in the UN Charter have been used to support the notion of peacekeeping such as Chapter VI which delves into the peaceful means of settling disputes and Chapter VII that centres on actions to take in the event of a breach of peace and aggression.

It is in line with this that Pilbeam in Hough et al. (2015, p. 295-296) mentioned the idea of ‘Chapter VI and a Half’ first idealised by former UN Secretary-General, Dag Hammarskjöld, to denote that peacekeeping existed between Chapter VI and Chapter VII of the UN Charter. They argued that peacekeeping was an approach to confronting the Cold War conflicts which led to a division in the Security Council and subsequently affected its ability to execute its duties.

Weiss, Forsythe and Coate (1994, p. 48) mention the difficulty in assigning a universally approved definition of peacekeeping and also include the advent of ‘Chapter VI and a half’, showcasing the ad-hoc nature of peacekeeping and how it is usually tailored to “the specific requirements of individual conflicts.”

Henderson (2010, p. 231) also deliberated on the concept of peacekeeping and its position between Chapter VI and Chapter VII of the Charter, referring to peacekeepers as a “thin blue line” due to their blue-headwear and describing their duties as a form of barrier between the disputing parties till concrete peace or an end to the conflict has been reached.

In the same vein, Fetherston (1994, pp. 8-12) exemplified peacekeeping as a type of third party or external intervention directed towards settling disputes as peacefully as possible. She outlined the history of peacekeeping and buttressed the importance of the ‘Uniting For Peace’ Resolution that birthed peacekeeping operations. Executed by the General Assembly, the resolution gave the General Assembly authority to act in a situation where the Security Council is unable to act or decide.

Durch (1993) also looked at the debate concerning peacekeeping by analysing it as a technique that fortifies the self-help nature of global politics by contributing an independent form of international intervention with the desire to assist the involved parties in discontinuing the conflict. He evinced the first peacekeeping mission that occurred during the Suez Canal Crisis of 1956 with the deployment of the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF). (pp. 3-7)

Kaya (2015, p. 41) observes peacekeeping as an avenue to aid states wrangled by conflict to achieve lasting peace, through the provision of amongst others, military personnel and civilians with the mission of supervising peace processes following the end of hostilities. However, Dauda, Ahmad and Keling (2017, p. 7) in analysing peacekeeping deem it as “more a palliative, rather than a cure.” Additionally, Diehl (1994) refers to peacekeeping as the:

imposition of neutral and lightly armed interposition forces following a ceasefire of armed hostilities, and with the permission of the state on whose territory these forces are deployed, in order to discourage the renewal of military conflict and promote an environment under which the underlying dispute can be resolved. (p. 13)

He points out that peacekeeping is rather different from collective security and peace observation operations. Peacekeepers are not meant to be part of the conflict or cause bloodshed. However, he expands the definition of peacekeeping stating that peacekeeping missions can be applied to situations beyond “post-cease-fire arrangements” (p. 164). In his view, peacekeeping ranges from cease-fire supervision to monitoring of elections and dealing with arms control. Hence, peacekeepers may and can be sent out before or without a cease-fire arrangement.

Iwanami (2017, p. 86) also fails to recognise the need for a cease-fire agreement, describing peacekeeping as a method of tackling contention by ensuring all factors that could contribute towards the worsening or extension of the conflict is impeded. Peacekeeping ranges, according to the author, from monitoring elections even to “post-conflict-state-building.” Therefore, the actions of peacekeepers do not stop once the conflict has been resolved; however, it extends to restoring the order of the state by contributing to state reconstruction.

Thakur (2017, pp. 41-43) opines the thoughts of the previous authors, drawing attention to the interchangeable use of the words “peacekeeping” and “peace operations”, describing them as undertakings that barely fall within the category of military enforcement performed between identifiable conflicting parties.

In a nutshell, there is an agreement that there is indeed a lack of a universally accepted definition for the term peacekeeping. The consent of parties to the conflict was considered necessary by most of the authors, without which the operation itself might be unsuccessful. On the other hand, other authors argue that peacekeeping is the placement of forces to act as a buffer between warring factions. The venture is regarded by some as a temporary fix rather than a permanent solution to a conflict. Whereas certain authors see the need for a ceasefire agreement to be in place, the opposing thought asserts that this is not necessary before peacekeeping is deployed. Finally, writers contend that peacekeeping can be extended beyond ceasefire agreements to include post-conflict state-building.

## **2.2 Principles of Peacekeeping**

In this subsection, principles of peacekeeping including consent, non-use of force except in self-defence and impartiality (neutrality) will be discussed.

### **2.2.1 Consent**

As a successor to the League of Nations, the UN, with the hope of avoiding the same mistakes made in the past, developed certain principles that peacekeeping operations generally and peacekeepers specifically ought to pay attention to. The importance of consent, application of force as a last resort or in the event of self-defence and impartiality was pointed out by Dauda et al. (2017, p.52). Additionally, Onoja (1996, p. 52) looked at peacekeeping and the principle of non-enforcement while also pointing out that consent, collaboration, acceptability and recognition from all parties in the conflict is necessary for a peacekeeping mission's success.

Mateja (2015, pp. 351-360) expounded on three principles required for the operationalisation of peacekeeping missions. Consent, being the first principle, is

meant to reflect the determination of the major parties to the conflict in finding a solution, and making the work of the peacekeepers easier. However, he viewed the problem with this by evincing how this has not been the case in certain missions such as those deployed to the DRC where peacekeepers had a mandate to support one disputing party, thus not acquiring the consent of the other party (parties). This leads to the next principle, neutrality. In essence, peacekeepers are to fulfil their mandate unbiasedly, picking no sides neither supporting the wishes of a party over the other. The issues Mateja claims are that this has been compromised as well because peacekeeping missions have aided the government in certain conflicts. The final principle, the non-employment of force, the author evinced has experienced a shift as well. Originally, the principle granted for the use of force as a form of defence. The author avers that force has and is used not only as self-defence but as an offensive tactic, highlighting that mandates have included the usage of force as a necessity in executing mandate.

Furthermore, an interesting principle was demonstrated by Goulding (1993, pp. 454-455) in the importance of the “United Nationsness” of a peacekeeping mission. In essence, for a peacekeeping operation to receive credibility, it needs to be recognised as a UN operation. It needs to be headed by the Secretary-General and the costs of the said mission to be covered by member states. However, Goulding dwelt on the complications with consent demonstrating that it could be given and later withdrawn as was the case in UNEF I where then-President Nasser withdrew his approval to the occupancy of the peacekeeping troops. The author also makes mention of the principle relating to the troops to be deployed to such operations and how such troops could be extracted from member states’ militaries.

The UN “Capstone Doctrine” (2008, pp. 31-35) elaborated on the principles of peacekeeping, consent, fairness and nonapplication of force. However, it distinguished between impartiality and neutrality. Impartiality requires treating all parties with fairmindedness, remembering to avoid being neutral or to respond in a situation wherein a party performs an act that negatively affects the conflict resolution proceeding. Jeong (2004, p. 23) tackled the problems with the principles of peacekeeping and argued that impartiality cannot be applied blanketly as it fails to consider how peacekeepers handle offending groups and criminals. This was similarly shown in the Brahimi Report (2000, p. ix) affirming that “equal treatment of all parties by the United Nations can in the best-case result in ineffectiveness and the worst may amount to complicity with evil”, additionally mentioning that impartiality inherently means respect for the Charter and its values.

Overall, the significance of consent, non-application of force unless in moments of self-defence and impartiality is viewed as major principles to abide by. However, there was contention over the principle of consent as some authors pointed out that that principle has not been adhered to in every mission. Impartiality was problematised due to its fragility and challenges in applying it generically. Conclusively, other principles were propounded such as the ‘United Nationsness’ of the mission and the need to deploy troops from warring members’ militaries.

### **2.2.2 Roles and Functions of Peacekeeping**

Peacekeepers perform diverse duties, functions and roles. Henderson (2010, p. 232) deliberated on the roles and functions of peacekeepers asserting that their tasks include protecting borders, teaching in schools, defusing landmines and helped in the construction of institutions meant to help in state administration, to highlight a few.

On the other hand, Kaya (2015, pp. 46-47) categorised the functions of peacekeeping missions and peacekeepers into two- surveillance and administration, whilst outlining the different tasks and responsibilities that both functions demand. Fetherston (1994, pp. 31-33) utilises a different approach in her analyses by limiting her focus to UN peacekeeping only. She distinguishes the functions that peacekeepers perform into three categories- “military” functions, “governmental or political and civil”. Nonetheless, the concerns with the division are rather vague with there being a connexion between them.

Diehl (1994, pp. 53-60), however, regards the duties of peacekeepers as belonging either to one or more of four types. The first function he mentions is monitoring which includes several tasks such as observing the behaviours of the parties to ensure compliance to cease-fire agreements. The second function he describes as interpolation duties wherein peacekeepers act as a barrier between the disputing parties to prevent escalation. The third function is the preservation of peace and this embraces safeguarding an area. Humanitarian roles characterise the last function and describe tasks that positively benefit the population.

To conclude, peacekeeping entails executing and fulfilling diverse role and functions, and in most cases, those functions are streamlined according to the demands of the mission.

### **2.2.3 Mandate**

Generally, when peacekeeping operations are established, they are designed to serve a particular purpose(s). Mandates fundamentally offer instructions on actions to be carried out and those to be avoided, whilst stipulating guidelines to be adhered to.

Mandates need to be agreed on by the conflicting parties and according to Goulding (1993, p. 464), they must be precise and realistic.

There are several advantages to having a clear mandate. It minimises the risks of ill reception from the population to which peacekeepers are sent. Also, Weiss et al. (1994, pp. 49-53) indicate the importance of granting leeway to peacekeepers in their interpretation of mandates as it provides the opportunity for them to adapt to different and sudden emergencies or situations.

However, Fetherston (1994, pp. 37-38) captured the complexities in creating and agreeing on a mandate, delving into the problems that an unclear mandate might cause. According to her, such mandates leave room for doubt and plague commanders and peacekeepers with interpreting the mandate how they see fit. The importance of a follow-up document containing directions contributes to the success of the operation.

Pilbeam (2015, p. 300) indicates the setbacks caused by a poorly detailed mandate. Using the example of the failure of the UN in both Rwanda and Somalia, the authors revealed the struggles of commanders in relation to “weak or unclear” mandates.

Siding with Fetherston in the debate concerning mandates, Durch (1993, pp. 26-31) labels mandates as a replication of “the political play in the Security Council.” Durch asserts that although obscure mandates can negatively affect a peacekeeping mission, it is the lack of political agreement propelling the operation and not the nebulosity of the mandate that serves as a detriment to the peacekeepers. He simultaneously points out the advantages that an abstruse mandate might have such as providing states with the ability to approve particular actions without being seen to show support for one or



the other. The duties that a mandate outlines are equally important as the mode in which it is to be done.

#### **2.2.4 Conditions for Troop Contributing States**

The UN, despite its reputation in the field of peacekeeping, lacks a permanent army. It relies on the contributions of member states. As a result, peacekeeping operations have remained ad hoc in nature. Generally, the UN depends on the national armed forces and police corps of its members. Article 43(1) of the UN Charter highlights some of the standards the UN looks out for when recruiting forces to peacekeeping operations. The level of preparation, nature of the force and kind of resources to be made available are given due attention. It is worth noting that troop-contributing states are paid by the UN for their contributions and the facilities used.

Fetherston (1994, pp. 39-40) outlined the need for adequate and proper training for troops. However, this is still problematic. There is no well-recognised, focused training program and instead, recommendations have been made for localised or geographical training facilities. Also, the author reviews the problems faced by states contributing troops and the Secretariat. Troop contributing states tend to want their troops to be given priority and top-tier positions such as force commander. Likewise, peacekeeping troops are mandated to report to the Force Command and not to their home countries., This is not always strictly adhered to.

Durch (1993, pp. 62-67), notwithstanding, pointed out another factor considered when recruiting which is the geographic location factor. The UN tries to ensure that opportunities go round regionally. In addition, the UN demands that units recruited for peacekeeping missions provide their equipment like armoured vehicles and communication devices. However, Durch discloses how troops from poorer countries

usually lack up-to-date equipment and the UN's often-time reliance on richer countries to provide gear.

Of most importance is the UN's "Operational Readiness" document (2018). It dictates the procedures and requirements to be met by individuals that intend on joining a peacekeeping mission. States are required to judge their contingents' competence before deployment. Conditions to be met range from preferred age, physical capabilities to a knowledge of rules of engagement (ROE). Also, the financial prowess of the troop-contributing country is another factor. Richer and or western states, especially those that characterise the Permanent Five of the Security Council are frequently expected to contribute more as they can sacrifice more in terms of funding, manpower and devices. Hence, recruitment to a peacekeeping operation is not an easy task. Consideration is made to the mission type and what units are required, be it civilian, military or police. What is requested is typically confined to the capabilities of individuals and the financial status of states.

#### **2.2.5 Factors Considered before Peacekeeping is Engaged**

When a crisis breaks out and the idea of deploying peacekeeping troops is placed on the table, certain considerations affect whether such a mission is launched.

The "Capstone Doctrine" (2008, pp. 47-48) outlined six factors. The first factor considers whether there exists a circumstance which if allowed to persist might become a danger to international peace and security. Secondly, the presence or lack thereof of a regional or sub-regional body or organisation with the capabilities and willingness to intervene is reviewed. Thirdly, focus is given to the availability or otherwise of a ceasefire agreement between the disputing parties and whether they are willing to seek a resolution to the conflict. Fourthly, regard is given to the existence of

a transparent political agenda that can be translated into a mandate. Fifth, the possibility of establishing a mandate for a UN mission is considered; and finally, priority is given to the protection of the UN workforce by seeking out assurances from the parties involved in the conflict.

Dauda et al. (2017, p. 53) discussed the question of motivations for sending out a peacekeeping unit, differentiating the reasons into two- the announced reasons and the concealed. There are known motivations broadcasted via recognised government channels while the concealed reasons are the silent factors that are not publicly mentioned yet have an influence on the deployment. Furthermore, they refer to two issues that are factored in when deciding to send out a troop: the current security status in the affected country or countries and the political realities at that point in time amongst the “organisation’s member states”.

Additionally, the authors give attention to the challenges tied to the mandate of peacekeeping missions. The issue of formulating a mandate acceptable to all parties involved is paramount and can be a hurdle that could take time to overcome. In deliberating on peacekeeping and its applicability, Fetherston (1994, pp. 40-42) saw peacekeeping to be more applicable when a conflict had reached a critical point. Additionally, the writer refers to the constraints of insufficient funding, propounding that the lack of payment on the part of member states will keep plaguing the UN until it is handled. Ergo, mandates are a factor and unclarity in its form can pose a challenge.

More so, another factor emanates from the state dealing with the conflict. Most states regard referring a conflict to the UN as a measure of last resort when it has escalated beyond the state’s control. Several reasons were given as an explanation including the

issue of national sovereignty. Lastly, the matter of the contributing troops can be challenging as most states may be unwilling or unable to provide troops.

Thus, the deployment of peacekeeping troops is an intense and lengthy process. Added to this is the lack of a standing force for emergency dispatch.

### **2.3 Difference between Classical/Traditional Peacekeeping and Multidimensional Peacekeeping**

Since its first usage by the UN, peacekeeping has experienced several changes. For this reason, different authors have different views regarding the forms and types of peacekeeping. Traditional peacekeeping is understood to be supported by Chapter VI of the UN Charter, despite the fact that peacekeepers are barely armed. (Weiss et al., 1994, pp. 30, 42).

Goulding (1993, pp. 456-460) is of the opinion that there are six different forms of peacekeeping. This includes amongst others, pre-emptive deployment, traditional peacekeeping, humanitarian form of peacekeeping and “ceasefire agreement”. He defines traditional peacekeeping as a type of peacekeeping mandated to assist in settlement efforts by forming and securing an environment for negotiations. This form of peacekeeping consists of three types- “unarmed military observer groups”, “armed infantry-based forces” and “operations, armed or unarmed, which are established as an adjunct of... a peace enforcement operation”.

Contrastingly, Bellamy (2004, pp. 20-21) drew attention to the problems with classifying peace missions. The first problem pertains to the confusing effect of categorising peace missions into generations. Also, the author delves into the issues

with categorising peace missions based on the roles performed. A notable issue is the lack of consensus on what peace operations are; this ties into the issue related to a lack of unanimity on what criteria there should be to analyse the successful outcome or insufficiency of peace missions. Regardless, Bellamy, Williams and Griffin (2010, pp. 153-214) use a typological approach based on the roles played by peacekeepers to evaluate the forms of peacekeeping. According to the authors, the five types include inter alia, “traditional peacekeeping”, “wider peacekeeping” and “peace support operations”. Traditional peacekeeping, as understood by the authors, are “operations that attempt to create a space for the political settlement of disputes between states.” On the other hand, “wider peacekeeping” are missions that are geared towards broader humanitarian responsibilities exercised during a time of disorder. Interestingly, peace support missions are multidimensional consisting of both military and civilian units and are meant to sustain liberal democracy and apply an expanded understanding of the principles of peacekeeping.

Fetherston (1994, pp. 145-146) followed a similar path as Bellamy by skipping ‘generations’ and differentiating between classical and multidimensional peacekeeping. The latter is considered an operation with a level of force and consists of a sizable civilian unit, directed to handle socio-political and humanistic parts of the dispute. This type of peacekeeping is employed in long-drawn-out social conflicts with deep-seated issues. Au contraire, classical peacekeeping resonates more with conflict settlement. “The crucial difference between classical and multidimensional peacekeeping is more a matter of degree and of concerted organisation.” Multidimensional peacekeeping employs third party strategies such as mediation and

negotiation which according to the author, is systematic. However, in classical peacekeeping, it is disorganised and on an as-needed basis.

Durch (1993, 8-18) portrays certain examples of classical/traditional peacekeeping in discussing the changes peacekeeping has encountered. The first two classical peacekeeping operations were the Suez Crisis of 1956 and the Six-Day War of 1967. It involved the deployment of military forces to observe and ensure adherence to peace and ceasefire agreements as well as watching borders. They lack long-term preparation and are meant to act as a barrier to the escalation of violence. Conversely, multidimensional peacekeeping was first utilised in the Congo with the creation of the United Nations Operation in the Congo (ONUC) in 1960. It was the first operation to make use of civilian and military units.

Alternately, Hough et al. (2015, pp. 297-299) used the idea of peacekeeping generations. The first, traditional peacekeeping, was operational during the Cold War and witnessed the employment of small-case units acting as buffers and supervising agreements and conscious about heeding to the peacekeeping principles. Essentially, traditional peacekeeping was concerned with monitoring and supervision. The second generation of peacekeeping was a response to the changing nature of conflict with there been more intra-state conflicts. This form is more multifaceted and rather similar to peacebuilding and involved efforts to reduce large-scale humanitarian hardship and provide lasting positive change and peace. The last and third-generation comprise of peace enforcement which is the application of “force to secure humanitarian ends.”

In conclusion, traditional peacekeeping was limited in terms of the roles played by peacekeepers. With the changing political climate, traditional peacekeeping would

have been inadequate in meeting the demands of conflict-ridden states. Thus, multidimensional peacekeeping gained more ground and challenges the very principles of peacekeeping.

## **2.4 Effectiveness of Peacekeeping**

For a peacekeeping operation to be regarded as successful, conditions to measure success needs to be instituted and evaluated. The “Capstone Doctrine” (2008, pp. 18-19) mentions four signs that help determine the likelihood of success. The first is the inclination of the parties to settle- peacekeeping is less likely to work where there is a lack of commitment to finding a solution. Secondly, there is a necessity for the involvement of regional bodies or neighbouring actors to participate in resolving the conflict as their backing can encourage the parties to seek peace and also avoid the spill-over effects of a protracted conflict. Thirdly, the consensus and backing of members of the Security Council are vital as it puts forward a strong message to the parties, whilst the opposite, a divided Security Council can have serious consequences. Finally, a mission’s mandate can contribute to its success or otherwise. The mandate needs to be transparent and attainable and reflect the capabilities of the Organisation.

Diehl (1993, pp. 33-40), however, contradicts the major part played by a mandate in the success of a mission. He claims there are two problems tied to using mandates as a yardstick. The first examines how often mandates are ambiguous and their effects on the mission, making it problematic to measure accomplishments. Also, mandates have the effect of reducing the ability to draw comparisons between peacekeeping operations. The author introduced certain criteria that need to be considered when assessing the success of a mission such as the capability of the peacekeeping mission to “deter or prevent violent conflict in the area of deployment” judged by reduced

hostilities, and the second, the resolution of the misunderstandings driving the conflict. Diehl proceeds to express four strategies that should result in successful peacekeeping- first, the consent and recognition of the parties participating in the conflict; the employment of peacekeeping majorly for interstate struggles; lastly, the importance of maintaining neutrality when addressing the parties and the conflict generally.

Merrills (2011, pp. 277-278) further brought to light the need for parties or states to hand over control to the UN for there to be progress. He states that the failure or success of a mission echoes the (in)capability of those at the reins and as former Secretary-General, U Thant stated, “the failure of the United Nations is the failure of the international community”.

As all inventions do, peacekeeping has altered and reinvented itself to suit the needs and demands of those in conflict. Whether the changes which have occurred and those presently happening is one to celebrate is based on a matter of perspective. However, there is indeed room for improvement; consequently, the future of peacekeeping in line with the various forms and offshoots should be one to watch and appraise.

## **2.5 Peacekeeping and Related Concepts**

### **2.5.1 Linkage between Peacekeeping, Peacemaking and Peacebuilding**

The terms peacekeeping, peacemaking and peacebuilding are notable due to the rather related nature of the functions required by each. As a result, the lines dividing each of these terms have become indistinct. The relationship between these three concepts has been heavily disputed in literature.

Boutros-Ghali in his “Agenda For Peace” (1992, pp. 5-15) describes peacemaking as “the responsibility to try to bring hostile parties to agreement by peaceful means” by



making use of several methods such as mediation, negotiation and good offices. He opines that peacebuilding consists of “efforts to identify and support structures which will tend to consolidate peace” and includes such actions as supervising elections and training police.

Fetherston (1994, pp. 133-143) examines the notion of and connection between peacekeeping, peacemaking and peacebuilding. Peacemaking comprises of the usage of peaceful means of dispute settlement by “diplomats or specifically appointed high-level UN Secretariat officials”. At the global level, peacemaking aids in presenting a resolution deal before peacekeeping is engaged and is still utilised after the engagement of peacekeepers. At the domestic level, peacekeepers perform forms of peacemaking. They engage in negotiations with parties and the population on the ground and attempting to push for better understanding amongst the target groups. Additionally, Goulding (1991, in Fetherston, 1994, p. 130) analysed the relationship between peacemaking and peacekeeping, portraying the former as “the negotiation for agreements on disputes whereas peacekeeping is the implementation of those agreements.” Similarly, peacekeeping can be seen as steps taken to end the disorder whilst “peacemaking is the attempt to restore the severed interactions.” (UNITAR, 1987, in Fetherston, 1994, p. 130).

The “Capstone Doctrine” Document (2008, p. 97) showcases peacebuilding as “measures aimed at reducing the risk of lapsing or relapsing into conflict, by strengthening national capacities... and laying the foundations for sustainable peace.” Conversely, Fetherston believes that although peacebuilding comprises reconstruction after the cessation of conflict, there is rarely a linkage between peacekeeping and peacebuilding at the global level. At the domestic level, the link between peacekeeping

and peacebuilding can be shown in how peacekeepers assist in infrastructure and construction by aiding in rebuilding houses and bridges as exemplified in Bosnia and providing protection as shown in Cyprus. “Every time a peacekeeper interacts with a civilian or a member of the opposing military forces, for whatever reason, she or he has the opportunity to carry out... peacebuilding.” (1994, pp. 137-138).

In summary, peacekeeping, peacemaking, peacebuilding are synergetic. One does not occur without the other and they are usually engaged in a manner that may not reflect order as one may be employed before the other.

### **2.5.2 Responsibility to Protect (R2P)**

The Responsibility to Protect (R2P) was devised by the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) in its 2001 report “The responsibility to protect”. The principle places three responsibilities on the international arena. These are the “responsibility to prevent; the responsibility to react; and the responsibility to rebuild.” (Scanlon, Eziakonw & Myburgh, 2007, p. 6). The norm dictates the duties of states to protect their citizens, the international community to aid in that regard and third the responsibility falling on the international arena to protect citizens where the state has failed and such intervention entails the usage of peaceful means with military action a last resort.

According to the ICISS Report (2001, pp. xi-xiii), there are four principles which guide this notion- “the just cause threshold” which demands intervention in the event of grave maltreatment happening to people; “the precautionary principles” that portrays cautions and limits to be heed if and when intervention is embarked on; “the right authority” places the crux of the responsibility on the UN Security Council to grant permission for the execution of intervention, also giving it directions and providing

alternatives where there is a deadlock in the Security Council; and finally, “the operational principles” incorporates the form and shape that the intervention should have, including the rules and command control.

Moreover, Hough et al. (2015, pp. 302-303) dealt with the fact that the framework is centred on four human rights violations- genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity- and does not cover all human rights violations, hence a limitation in its applicability.

Nevertheless, Evans (2004, p. 75) posits there are five criteria to be met to ensure such interventions are warranted. The first looks at the gravity of the threat. Secondly, the aim of military intervention must be for the purpose of preventing a particular peril. Thirdly, non-military alternatives should already have been depleted. Next, the usage of military intervention must match the level of security danger. Finally, the likelihood of military intervention facing up to the threat or danger must be great. Enuka and Ojukwu (2017, p. 38) believed R2P was formulated to handle reprehensible abuses of human rights exemplified by the unanswered tragedy of such catastrophes as the Rwandan genocide of 1994.

Nonetheless, Hehir (2015, pp. 675-676, 685-686) alluded to the concept of R2P to be based on the “misplaced” belief that those in authority and with major control of the reins can be inclined to alter their conduct by those with a better moral compass. He contends that R2P has failed to make so much progress due to the power held by the five permanent members of the Security Council and their ability to veto any action that might affect their self-interest.

McClellan (2008, pp. 131-149) delves into the notion of R2P and how it is based on the idea of ‘sovereignty as responsibility’ which amounts to the obligation of states to take responsibility for their actions and inactions. Problematising the concept, the author focuses on how the area of responsibility to rebuild, following an intervention is barely given enough attention as well as the responsibility to prevent. McClellan maintains that the forecast of R2P as a context for battling grievous human rights violations is grim due to the divisions in the Security Council.

In this vein, R2P has been operated when peacekeeping is contemplated. The responsibility to intervene when states and governments have failed to fulfil their obligations is placed on the international community. Following that responsibility, peacekeeping is engaged. Deploying troops and intervening in a conflict is considered a means to not only institute change in relation to peace and stability but falls under the R2P principles.

### **2.5.3 Difference between Peacekeeping and Enforcement Actions**

The “Agenda For Peace” (1992, p. 12) discusses the concept of peace enforcement. Such a contingent will “be more heavily armed than peace-keeping forces and would need to undergo extensive preparatory training within their national forces” and may be required to enforce ceasefire agreements. More so, Weiss et al. (1994) allocate the area of enforcement as existing in a supposed “Chapter six and three-quarters” because of its proximity to Chapter VII of the Charter which provides for firm action.

Nonetheless, in comparing peacekeeping to peace enforcement Durch (1993, p. 6) looks at how the latter demands more human and financial sacrifices on the part of the intervenors. Likewise, Hough et al. (2015, p. 296) distinguish peacekeeping from peace enforcement. The former is a method of protecting peace where violence has

ceased whilst the latter necessitates the employment of several types of forceful actions all done with the approval of the Security Council. J.G. Merrills (2011, p. 262), similarly, in his analysis, examines “quasi-enforcement” which he describes as consisting of a use of force much greater than that required for self-defence.

However, there are problems with peace enforcement which Goulding (1993) portrays. He brings to light the difference between peacekeeping and peace enforcement stating that:

there is... all the difference in the world between being deployed with the consent and cooperation of the parties to help them carry out an agreement they have reached and, on the other hand, being deployed without their consent and with powers to use force to compel them to accept the decisions of the Security Council. (pp. 10-15)

Mateja (2015, pp. 352-353, 359, 366) further went down the same path to analyse the problems posed by peace enforcement. Enforcement is revealed in boosting attempts to ensure consensus to political agreements performed by backing up a government’s state-wide motivations and upholding military successes through the application of force. Hence, the divide between peacekeeping and peace enforcement has become blurry. The exemplified the alteration from defensive to offensive peacekeeping in the crisis in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). Enforcement actions are performed to foster the agenda of and protect the ‘host state’ and as a result, direct their force to certain parties involved in the conflict. Peace enforcement arguably goes against the very principles of peacekeeping. The repercussions of this include the increased likelihood of attacks on and more fatalities of peacekeepers. Finally, the author likens enforcement to the stabilisation operations in Afghanistan and Iraq which were unsuccessful for the most part and claims the “future of peacekeeping is at stake” if the doctrine is not altered to reflect the present state of affairs.

## **2.6 Conclusion**

The goal of this chapter was to demonstrate to some degree, the length and breadth of peacekeeping, examining its characteristics and its interaction with other forms of intervention such as peacebuilding and peacemaking. Of course, the depth of the challenges faced by peacekeeping and the varying arguments of authors is more than could be covered herein. Nonetheless, the appreciation of this mechanism along with its faults and successes were hopefully revealed.

## Chapter 3

### **THEORETICAL AND CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK**

To address the research questions set out in the first chapter, the democratic peace theory will be applied. Moreover, comprehending specific concepts such as peacekeeping will form part of this chapter, making sure to take into account the commitment of international organisations such as the UN, AU and ECOWAS and their respective institutions and framework that permit their peacekeeping roles. As previously stated, peacekeeping in one way or another defends R2P and can be perceived as the muscle behind it. Hence, an extension of R2P will be provided here, addressing its normativity.

#### **3.1 Democratic (Liberal) Peace Theory**

Irrespective of its universal recognition, the democratic peace theory still raises questions as to its empirical backing and findings. Nevertheless, the theory has been applied as a way to reflect the importance and extent of peacekeeping in modern-day conflicts. A prominent theory in its right, this theory is significant as it promotes the benefits of democracy and how such a system can aid in curbing major conflict, be it between states or within states. It advocates peace and brought about not only by the democratic nature of states but the limitations imposed on it both internally and externally. Thus, it is necessary for this body of work as it ties into the substance of peacekeeping.

The democratic (liberal) peace theory was initially devised by Immanuel Kant in his essay “Perpetual Peace”. He discussed the idea that states practising politically democratic forms of government were hardly probable to become involved in interstate hostilities. This, according to Kant, is due to the fact that the electing civilians were usually against conflict and would thus hold their government accountable for their actions. Therefore, republican governments were not able to act with impunity as they had to report back and needed the approval and votes of the population before going to war or remaining in power. This can be compared to other systems of government such as monarchies or dictatorships where those in power are not at the mercy of the people. In essence, this idea has been extended to assert that liberally democratic states do not wage or engage in war with other democratic states. Certain factors aside from elections are also responsible for this. These include “free press, individual rights, the rule of law and free trade”. (Hough et al., 2015, pp. 20-21, 101).

Doyle (2012, p. 18), stated that part of the central argument of this theory is that should all states acquire liberal or democratic status, war would cease to exist. Essentially, such liberal states may still witness conflicts with other like-minded states; however, this will rarely deteriorate to a full-blown out war.

Distinguishing between peace and conflict is essential at this juncture. Eckstein (1980, in Fetherston, 1994, p. 99) propounded two theories in assessing conflict- contingency and inherency theory. The former stipulates that for conflict to be contingent, “its occurrence depends upon the presence of unusual... conditions that occur accidentally.” Hence, factors that may lead to violence or conflict may be present; however, such factors may not be present all the time. Moreover, violent conflict is a



consequence of changes in the environment which will subside once said changes cease to exist. The latter, inherency theory, claims that violence or conflict is inevitable and factors that could lead to conflict is and will always be present. Burton (1990, in Fetherston, 1994, p. 97) adopted a different form of analysis by attempting to distinguish between conflicts and disagreements. The latter entails “situations in which the issues are negotiable, in which there can be compromise, and which therefore, do not involve consideration of altered institutions and structures”. On the other hand, conflict finds its origination in factors such as unconventional views and beliefs, pursuits and inclinations. Thus, disputes can be easily resolved whilst conflicts demand more effort and investment to attain resolution. Ott and Luhe (2018, p. 7) put forward a definition of violent conflict as encompassing amongst other things, “some level of violence inflicted on the conflicting parties by one another” and “can involve state and non-state actors”. Thomas (1992, p. 265) distinguishes conflict as “the process which begins when one party perceives that another has frustrated, or is about to frustrate, some concern of his”.

Peace, on the other hand, as defined by Kant (1795 in Marcantonio, 2017, p. 79) is “the whole of right (that is, what is right in the sense of correctness or an ultimate end) and that striving for peace was a moral imperative for society writ large.” He promoted the idea of a union of states intending to preserve peace, this being done by the impact of beneficial norms and democracy. Also, Richmond (2014, p. 81) thought that liberal peace involved the operation of democracy, free trade, and a basic form of human rights.

The concept of peace has, nevertheless, being viewed both from the positive and negative. Fetherston (1994, p. 93-95) noted that peace is commonly defined in the

negative sense, “as the absence of war or the cessation of fighting.” Hence, this description regards peace in light of what it fails to be rather than what it is. However, the author contributed to the idea of positive peace by stating that it is a “process or a ‘means’ to an end” rather than an end-point in itself, adding that the term involves facilities that help in alleviating or resolving conflict and encourage constructive human progress. Curle (1990) showcases positive peace as consisting of certain effects such as “close diplomatic ties, frequent exchanges of political, cultural and educational visits, minimal restrictions on commerce and, above all, sufficient mutual trust and understanding to resolve without friction any differences that might arise.”

Enuka and Ojukwu (2017, p. 40) raise an interesting point regarding peace being the absence of war. They denote that “there can be peace even when there is war, as in situations when there are peaceful interactions between countries that are engaged in active war.”

Therefore, liberal democracy can be understood through a normative lens as it promotes principles and standards that tend towards peace such as freedom and cooperation by using such tools as information sharing. Also, states that are democratic are easily trustable compared to other systems of government. Similarly, these states exercise separation of powers which in turn provides for checks and balances, therefore limiting the chances of the government to declare or engage in war. Most importantly, liberal democracy propagates the value of globalisation which in turn has resulted in increased trade and economic interconnection. This poses as another factor why democratic states will be reluctant in waging war as it may affect economic relations.

Owen (1994, p. 93-94, 113) further deliberates on the role played by international institutions that abide by certain principles and guidelines of which is the renunciation of war and the promotion of peacekeeping and other means of peaceful settlement of disputes. Hence, states are additionally constrained by these organisations. Furthermore, Badmus and Jenkins (2019, pp. 63-64) also assert that such operations are in the best interests of states and liberal democracy as it promotes peace. They further clarify that the basic argument of the theory, that liberal states do not engage in war with each other, does not necessarily mean that such states do not participate in war or “that they are less warlike in their inter-state relations with illiberal states.” The idea is that democratic states ought to avoid engaging in war because of their liberal nature and, in comparison to unlike states, are more peaceful, thus underpinning the reasoning that “democratic states are the least likely to fail and collapse into anarchy.”

On the other hand, Placek (2012) asserts that should democratic states declare war, they are highly probable to win compared to undemocratic states. This is due to the fact that civilian backing for war efforts reduces over time, thus governments are more likely to participate in wars they can win and those that can be won promptly.

What is more, Gat (2005, p. 78) reviewed the reasons for the popularisation of the democratic peace theory, stating that wealth and modernisation were the driving forces behind its popularity and ascension. The author claimed that “economically developed democracies” are “far less prone to civil war than poorer democracies have been.” Hence, globalisation and economic interdependence as promulgated by Kant play a major part in the democratic peace.

Additionally, Mello (2014, p. 3) put forward the “transparency argument” which dictates that democratic processes underlying institutions within the state and government are clear and open, thereby reducing problems caused by the security dilemma and doubts about the intentions of other state actors within the international arena that might contribute to hostilities.

However, some authors have elaborated on the theory’s downsides and have criticised its arguments and ventures. Firstly, there is no concrete evidence to prove that this theory is accurate but this has not stopped it from garnering large-scale endorsement. Moreover, there have been incidences where war could be said to have taken place amongst liberal states such as the 2006 Lebanon War fought between Israel and Lebanon. To label these states as liberal is arguably based on understanding and perception. Also, critics maintain that there have been instances where liberal states have declared war on states on the opposite side of the spectrum, with most declarations pioneered by liberal states. As a result, critics claim that liberal states are not as peaceable as made to think, highlighting the possibility of liberal states going to war against each other if such can be done against a different counterpart. Finally, the question has been raised as to how liberal democracy can be extended globally to bring all states under the umbrella. They question the methods that will be used, such as imposition or imperialism, which contradicts the very notion of liberalism. (Hough et al., 2015, p. 101).

Likewise, Gartzke (2006, 2007, in Kahler and Walter, p. 20, 156) posed another ideal for the promotion of peace. Rather than focusing on the democratic nature of states, he posits that capitalism and “economic globalisation” is responsible for the prevention of war.

Badmus and Jenkins (2019, p. 65) evaluate the problems with the theory from the point of view of third world states, who view peacekeeping and the increased role played by peacekeepers as a means of enforcing liberal democracy on states as well as pushing forward the agendas of the West. Thus, “International actors therefore own the peacebuilding process instead of local populations.”

In conclusion, the theory despite its assertion has its critics and supporters. Indeed, with the domino effect in the gaining of independence amongst states, conflicts became more frequent, taking into account the different weapons at the disposal of both states in modern-day warfare. This has made it difficult to pinpoint the instigator of wars or conflicts, with multiple parties involved, as compared to before. For this reason, it is safe to say that both supporters and critics have valid points.

## **3.2 Conceptual Framework**

### **3.2.1 Peacekeeping**

In recent times, during and especially following the Cold War, the notion of peacekeeping has garnered more steam and acceptance amongst scholars, international organisations, non-governmental organisations and civil society. This section attempts to appreciate the structure of peacekeeping under certain organisations.

### **3.2.2 UN and Peacekeeping**

The Charter of the United Nations signed on 26<sup>th</sup> June 1945 outlined one of its primary tasks of preserving global peace and security, empowering the Security Council with the power of doing so. With this responsibility and power in its wings, the Security Council is at liberty to employ several measures it deems fit to maintain peace and security, one of which is the authority to deploy peacekeepers. Nonetheless, peacekeeping is not specifically depicted in the UN Charter. Regardless, when

employed, such actions have found a legal foundation in Chapter VI, VII and VIII of the UN Charter. Chapter VI covers peaceful means of dispute settlement, whilst Chapter VII allows for enforcement actions in order to protect the peace. Scholars have popularly claimed that peacekeeping has found its basis between Chapter VI and VII and have coined the idea of ‘Chapter VI and a half’. However, the Security Council is not mandated to invoke a chapter when deploying peacekeepers but recently, “has adopted the practice of invoking Chapter VII of the Charter when authorizing the deployment of United Nations peacekeeping operations into volatile post-conflict settings where the State is unable to maintain security and public order.” This reference to Chapter VII can be seen as proving the legal basis of peacekeeping. (Capstone Doctrine, 2008).

### **3.2.3 AU and Peacekeeping**

The Charter of the UN provides for regional organisations and bodies in Chapter VIII. Ultimately, it permits the utilisation of such bodies due to their proximity to whatever conflict at the time, especially in times of emergency where the Security Council might be slow to act. Irrespective of this recognition, any action taken by a regional body must be done with the approval of the Security Council. Accordingly, certain organisations have been formulated and have exercised peacekeeping at least once since formation.

The Organisation of African Unity (OAU), the predecessor of the African Union, was formed in 1963, with Nigeria among the thirty-two states to originally sign the OAU Charter. It marked the “first post-independence continental institution”. (AU Handbook, 2020, pp. 15-16). Due to the incompetency and failures of the organisation and the rising demands in the African Continent especially in a time where several

states were gaining independence, member states saw it fit to transform and reformulate the organisation, enhancing and equipping it to the point of making it effective enough to handle and meet the demands of member states and the African continent at large. Thus, the African Union was born in 2001 with the endorsement of the African Union Constitutive Act by member states.

The leading instrument of the AU, the Constitutive Act contains the responsibility to protect principle. It stipulates “the right of the Union to intervene in a Member State... in respect of grave circumstances, namely: war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity”. (Art. 4(h), 2000). Moreover, the AU consists of organs that are geared towards the fulfilment of its R2P mandate. These include the Assembly of Heads of State and Government and the Commission.

The Protocol on Amendments to the Constitutive Act of the African Union extended the principle laid out in Article 4(h) to include intervention if there is “a serious threat to legitimate order to restore peace and stability to the Member State of the Union”. Moreover, Packer and Rukare (2002, p. 372) evinced that other reasons for intervention privy to the Union include mediation and peacekeeping operations. Also, member states can request the Union to intervene. (Art. 4(j), 2001). Additionally, the Protocol on Amendments to the Constitutive Act created the Peace and Security Council (PSC) responsible “for the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts.” (Art. 9(1), 2003). Within the Protocol of the Peace and Security Council, the Council may “recommend to the Assembly of Heads of State intervention, on behalf of the Union, in a Member State in respect of grave circumstances, namely war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity, as defined in relevant international conventions and instruments”. (AU, 2002).

Murithi (2010, p. 17) opined that this legal framework marked the first in African history where a regional organisation “has the right and the responsibility to protect” by intervening in states where civilians are in great danger.

Interestingly, the conflict in Burundi and the role played by the African Union preceded the formal adoption of the principle of responsibility to protect. (Kabau, 2012, p. 64). It marked the first peace operation by the regional body and the first trial in its capacity to ensure peace and security.

### **3.2.4 ECOWAS and Peacekeeping**

A subsequent sub-regional body is the Economic Community of West African States (hereafter ‘ECOWAS’). Formed in 1975, this regional organisation consists of 15 states located in the Western African region and is designed to enhance economic cooperation and integration with interests in guaranteeing peace and security through its peacekeeping, mediation and preventive diplomacy mandate.

The organisation recognises the importance of conflict management and has included certain R2P-like norms within its legal and formulative instruments and documents. Initially, its main focus was on economic integration and cooperation. Nonetheless, it eventually created the Protocol on Non-Aggression in 1978 which highlighted its belief in the non-use of force. This changed when ECOWAS adopted the 1991 Declaration of Political Principles which inscribed the right of the organisation to intervene in the territory of a member state under certain circumstances such as grave violations of human rights. Significantly, ECOWAS’ constitutive instrument, the 1993 Revised Treaty showcased the organisation’s respect for peace and security and the importance of peaceful resolution of disputes. Additionally, the Protocol on the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peace-Keeping and



Security was adopted in 1999 creating several organs in the organisation that contribute to ECOWAS' role in preventing, managing and resolving conflicts. Sampson (2011, p. 517) buttressed the provisions of the Mechanism which stipulates the conditions for intervention such as an "internal conflict that threatens to trigger a humanitarian disaster or poses a serious threat to peace and security in the region; where serious and massive violation of human rights and the rule of law have occurred or occurring..."

Moreover, the ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework (ECPF) initiated in 2008, share resemblances with R2P. Its major aim is peace-building and prevention, including in the event of a humanitarian crisis. Hence, ECOWAS is committed to acting in line with the "responsibility to prevent-actions taken to address the direct and root causes of intra- and inter-state conflicts that put populations at risk; the responsibility to react... and the responsibility to rebuild- actions taken to ensure recovery, reconstruction, rehabilitation and reconciliation in the aftermath of violent conflicts, humanitarian or natural disasters." (Art. 41, ECPF, 2008).

Although most of these provisions and instruments were formulated before the official adoption of the R2P principle, they serve to show that Africa, especially ECOWAS, was already one step ahead and it is in light of this that its intervention in Liberia was hailed by the Security Council, despite their failure in seeking approval from the UNSC beforehand.

### **3.2.5 The Responsibility To Protect**

The purpose of this section is to analyse the criticisms directed at this principle. The Responsibility to Protect penetrated global discuss and acquired international attention prominently following the publication of "The Responsibility to Protect" 2001 report

created by the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS). It asserted the notion of ‘sovereignty as responsibility’, initially conceived by Francis Deng, former UN Special Adviser for the Prevention of Genocide and Mass Atrocities, which essentially maintained that states had the responsibility to protect their citizens from war crimes, genocide, crimes against humanity as well as ethnic cleansing, and in the event of failure to do so, the “international community must act regardless of political sensitivities.” (Scanlon H. et al., 2007, p. 7).

The R2P doctrine is centred on three ideals which are the responsibility to prevent, the responsibility to react and the responsibility to rebuild. (ICISS, 2001). It thus posits the significance of the role performed by the state. Primarily, for the state to fully enjoy the claim of sovereignty, it is mandatory that it also incurs and fulfils the demands laid on it by those being governed. That responsibility rests on the global arena where the state fails to handle that responsibility. Worth noting is the point that in the past, the principle of non-intervention especially in the domestic affairs of a state was prevalent. This, in essence, meant that states were required to respect each other’s sovereignty and refrain from prying even in events of crises or harm, instead limiting response and actions to urging the responsible governments to do better.

Nevertheless, this interpretation of law is not without its critics. Specifically, it has been critiqued for being rather vague, especially in its failure to clearly outline the requirements to be met or the circumstances in which intervention by the international community is needed or can be engaged.

Moreover, the theory has been utilised as an unnecessary license creating leeway for the expansion of the agendas of Western or global states. On the other hand, some

regard the theory as insufficient and in need of rework, especially taking into consideration the dilemma faced by African states; others, however, consider that a rework of the theory or its enlargement, may result in an ineffective concept. (Scanlon H. et al., 2007, p. 18).

Nonetheless, R2P has taken root and progressed especially within the African continent. As it was discussed in the previous chapter, the responsibility to protect and peacekeeping might be perceived as two sides of the same coin or one flowing from the other. The deployment of peacekeeping missions can be traced to the need to prevent a conflict from escalating, to institute or reinstate democracy which in turn brings with it, benefits for those affected in the conflict. Simultaneously, peacekeeping preserves this responsibility; it announces and reinforces the gravity and the weight of the responsibility placed on all members of the international community. Ignoring such responsibility will serve negatively to the R2P principle which is safe to argue is now a norm.

The 2005 'Ezulwini Consensus' proposed by the African Union (AU) clarified Africa's stance on the changes to be made to the United Nations and how to tackle global security problems such as poverty, human trafficking and terrorism. (African Union, 2005). However, of importance to this study, the AU recognised the role played by subregional organisations inter alia the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the Southern African Development Community (SADC) in combating African problems due to their proximity, with the endorsement of the United Nations Security Council, accepting that in certain situations requiring emergency intervention, such an endorsement may come following the action.

Therefore, it is safe to say that the ‘responsibility to protect’ has become an international norm as a result of its widespread recognition. Not only has it aided in increasing the number of interventions by the international and regional organisations, but it has also influenced how states treat their people and handle internal crises as failure to do so could lead to condemnation from the international community.

### **3.3 Conclusion**

In summary, the theories and concepts discussed herein endeavour to exhibit the changes witnessed within the international community over the past few decades. Peace and sovereignty, despite being terms with varied understanding, have progressed in terms of what they entail, particularly the responsibilities they demand. Conflicts are no longer limited to state-to-state misunderstandings but now entail new features such as poverty and income inequality due to globalisation and technological advancements. Thus, theories, concepts and principles have had to alter and expand to reflect the changing order of things globally.

## **Chapter 4**

### **PEACEKEEPING IN NIGERIA'S FOREIGN POLICY**

Appreciating Nigeria's enthusiasm for peacekeeping requires acknowledging her foreign policymaking process. Hereafter, emphasis will be given to gaining insight into and assessing the manner in which foreign policy is formulated and the respective organs, institutions, organisations and individuals involved, referring also to internal and external influences to this process. Simultaneously, this chapter will look at the history of Nigeria in so far as it shows the evolution of foreign policy. Likewise, it will evaluate her relationship with organisations like the UN, AU and ECOWAS in connection to peacekeeping operations. Last but equally important, Nigeria's policy specifically concerning peacekeeping will be scrutinized.

#### **4.1 Foreign Policy Making In Nigeria**

Foreign policy is an integral device in the hands of states and governments. It forms the basis of their relations and interactions with other states, institutions, societies and groups within the international community.

Dauda et al. (2019a, p. 107) regard 'foreign policy' as an indicator of a state's interest to be pursued or sought after. The aims or goals of the policy contributes to the country's influence and portrayal in the international arena. Moreover, Adeniji (2000, in Dauda et al., 2019a, p. 109) evinced the role played by the international arena in the formation of foreign policy, claiming that "the nature of the international system in

which nations operate, primarily determines the foreign policy of especially the developing countries”.

Ezirim (2010, p. 1) further took on the issue of foreign policy, depicting it as a range of activities and measures which a state carries out comprising of such things as global economic and political interactions as well as defence. It involves a government’s relations with “other States, non-governmental organizations, international organizations, and certain individuals.”

Fayomi, Chidozie and Ajayi (2015, p. 181) show the importance of foreign policy by deliberating on a state’s image and perception both domestically and in the international arena. A country’s national image can be determined by how that country is regarded by the international community, the method in which that country attempts to achieve its national interest, its interactions with other states and the actions of citizens domestically and internationally. Aside from a state’s foreign policy having to conform to its national objectives, it should correspond with the image outlook of others in the international arena.

However, Bojang (2018, p. 2) gives a broad definition of foreign policy, maintaining that it “is a vision of a desired outcome or set of interests in interacting with another state or actor, the strategies and ideas used in achieving these goals, and the available resources at a state’s disposal, in guiding her interaction with other states.” He expounds on the several elements that influence foreign policy formulation ranging from the role played by international organisations to the disposition of the leader, culture and technological advancement.

In the case of Nigeria, foreign policy concerns emerged with the attainment of independence from British colonial rule in 1960. Over the following 60 years, the federal republic has witnessed both military rule and four republics as well as a civil war. As a result, the state's foreign policy has witnessed some alterations, especially in the manner in which it is pursued and depending on the state of the international community and domestic affairs. Examples of such foreign policy principles include "non-alignment, the legal equality of states, non-interference in the domestic affairs of other states, multilateralism, and the "Africa Centrepiece" doctrine". (Olusanya and Akindele, 1986, pp. 3-5). Similarly, other principles prevalent upon independence comprise of the advancement of the human rights of all black people and freedom from colonial oppression, preservation of the sovereignty of the state of Nigeria and the securement of the rights and welfare of its indigenes, ensuring security within states and equality amongst all people, ensuring respect and freedom to practice and enjoy cultural, economic and political rights within Nigeria and in Africa, amongst others. (Lamido, 2002, in Oni, Taiwo, 2016, p. 64). However, most of these principles are anachronistic such as those regarding colonialism and non-interference. They reflected the prevailing status quo in the international arena at the time of their formulation.

Nonetheless, Nigeria's foreign policy goals and targets have been delineated in her 1999 Constitution, specifically in Section 19. These are:

- a. Promotion and protection of Nigeria's national interests
- b. Promotion of international cooperation for the consolidation of universal peace and mutual respect among nations and elimination of discrimination in all its manifestation
- c. Respect for international law and treaty obligations as well as seeking settlement of internal dispute by negotiation, mediation, conciliations, arbitration and adjudication; and
- d. Promotion of a just world economic order.

Gambari (1989, 2017, in Dauda et al., 2019a, p. 108) developed a way to view Nigeria's foreign policy through four concentric circles. The first circle of the foreign policy reflects Nigeria's interest; the second element of the foreign policy is the concern of the West African sub-region; thirdly, the consideration for Africa and its problems and finally, the attention to the rest of the world. The nature of Nigeria's foreign policy was and still is Pan-African and Afrocentric in nature based on its concern for African problems.

The making of foreign policy does not subscribe to a universal pattern or framework. That is to say that not all states follow the same procedures in the creation of foreign policy. However, most states ascribe authority to their constitution which outlines the parts played by certain ministries, individuals and agencies and gives an outlook on the country's foreign policy. With the ushering in of the fourth republic in 1999 and the amendment made to the Constitution in the very same year, particular bodies and agencies were formed and equipped to contribute to foreign policymaking in Nigeria.

The first and most prominent is the presidency constituting of the office of the President of the Federal Republic whose tasks involve among many, creating both national and foreign policies, executing the daily businesses of the state, transacting agreements and signing treaties. He is in charge of steering the ship of the country's foreign policy which is usually influenced by his insights and ideas amongst other factors. The president is also responsible for devising bills and sending them to the National Assembly to be approved before they are passed into law. Likewise, the National Assembly when formulating bills, will require the approval of the president. Thus, this executive arm of government enjoys checks and balances preventing it from acting in extremity. An example of this is the power granted to the President to deploy



troops outside the state, with the approval of the Senate (Chapter I, Part II, Section 5, subsection 5, 1999). Despite the president being designated the commander-in-chief of the armed forces, she or he is not at liberty to expend military assets at a whim.

The next organ responsible for foreign policymaking is the National Assembly. This comprises both the House of Representative and the Senate. The National Assembly, under Chapter I, Part II, Section 4 of the 1999 Constitution, fulfils various functions and possesses certain legislative authority in the furtherance of effective governance. It can approve or otherwise the commissioning of armed forces outside of Nigeria and review the appointment of ambassadors and personnel in charge of diplomatic missions to other countries. Also, the Assembly is in charge of the national coffers, without whose consent, money and resources cannot be withdrawn from the 'Consolidated Revenue Fund'. Furthermore, it holds the power to ratify or enact laws by choosing which treaties or covenants get passed into national law. (Section 12).

A vital element in the foreign policymaking process is the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (hereafter the 'MFA'). Previously recognised as the Ministry of External Affairs, this body is in control of the "formulation, articulation, conduct and execution of Nigeria's foreign policy as well as management of the country's external relations." (Osondu-Oti and Tolu, 2016, p. 75). The MFA fulfils various functions including the administration of the country's foreign policy and international affairs, representation of the country at intergovernmental organisations such as the UN and AU, supervision and governance of diplomatic and consular missions and affairs. This organ abides by the objectives set out in Section 19 of the Constitution. Outlined, for example, in the MFA's Annual Report (2007, in Osondu-Oti and Tolu, 2016, p. 76) its directive is the "pursuit of the vital national interest of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, and the

promotion of African Integration and Unity...” Despite the MFA’s role in supervising foreign policy and affairs, the President is the instigator and driver of external relations.

Alongside the aforementioned organs, several other ministries, branches and offices play different roles in foreign policy decision making and concerns. These range from the Ministry of Trade and Investment, the Ministry of Finance to the Ministry of Defence.

Formulation of foreign policy is not a linear process. A state’s decision to adopt certain policies and drop others can be influenced by several factors, both internally and externally. Different voices and situations end up affecting or altering the trajectory of a country’s responses to and perceptions on certain international and even domestic matters. An important internal factor that may impact foreign policymaking in Nigeria is the existence and the role played by civil societies as well as non-governmental organisations. These are communities, groups and organisations that strive to bring to attention diverse causes including those relating to humanitarian and human rights matters. They can act as a check on the actions of the state through protesting, naming and shaming, amongst other tactics. Subsequently, the role performed by communications media and public awareness is prominent in foreign policymaking. However, authors like Sesay and Ojo (2002 in NOUN, 2015, p. 18) state that determining the implications of public opinion on foreign policy creation is hard to discover due to its unstructured form. Nevertheless, unity of voices has been seen in Nigeria as evinced in the stance taken by Nigerians against Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender (LGBT) Bill and in the case of the Nigeria-Cameroon Bakassi

squabble where the outcry of Nigerians against the decision of the International Court of Justice nearly led to an appeal.

Another factor that can affect foreign policy is the personality of the leader or the president. According to Adamu, Muda and Ahmad (2016, p. 1452), personality involves the expression of a person's disposition or character. Consequently, the manner in which the president handles his job and responsibilities and his perception of matters may affect foreign policy decision making. Furthermore, a notable and interesting factor that has affected Nigeria's foreign policy is corruption which has affected Nigeria's economy and investment opportunities. (Pham, 2007, p. 8).

In terms of external factors that may influence foreign policy formulation, the part played by international law and norms cannot be ignored as it sets limits on the actions of states. Moreover, the international organisations that a state(s) are a part of affect the policies that are formulated. Other factors include national interest, the state of the country's economy, especially in terms of Nigeria, the role played by the oil sector, the state's geographic location, the climate of the international arena and the state itself based on events occurring or that occurred. Most importantly, the fact that Nigeria is surrounded by francophone countries has also affected her foreign policies due to Nigeria's opposition to outside influence especially coming from France.

## **4.2 Evolution of Nigeria's Foreign Policy**

Nigeria's foreign policy can be traced back to 1960 with the efforts made by Alhaji Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, the first Prime Minister of Nigeria. He propagated four tenets for which the country was to follow. These were, friendliness and cooperation of Nigeria with all states and involvement in the activities of the United Nations; the

desire to assist African states especially in the effort to gain independence and push for the furtherance of peace and advancement within the African continent; acknowledgement of the membership of Commonwealth and the resolve to remain nonaligned with any major alliances and lastly, Nigeria's disinterest in conquering or expanding into other states. (Fawole, 2003, in NOUN, 2015, p. 47 ).

The leadership of Balewa, also considered the first republic, which lasted between October 1960 to January 1966, ended due to a coup that introduced Aguiyi Ironsi into the limelight. However, his tenure was short-lived because General Yakubu Gowon initiated and succeeded in his counter-coup. His time in office saw the outburst of a civil war within Nigeria and the struggle of Biafra. Thus, this period between 1966 and 1975 witnessed the strive to maintain and prevent Nigeria from disintegrating. Also, Nigeria was more prominent and active in the UN, AU and contributed to the creation of ECOWAS. It was Gowon who remarked in 1972 that "Africa is the Cornerstone of Nigeria's Foreign Policy". (Jibril 2004, in Kia, Nwigbo, Ojie, 2016, p. 24).

A subsequent coup was executed that saw the rulership of General Murtala Muhammad and his Chief of Staff, General Olusegun Obasanjo, who both pushed for the African-centred Nigerian policy. This administration was invested in Liberation Movements and assisted in the independence movement in such places as Angola and Rhodesia. Likewise, it was more independent in terms of its foreign policy endeavours. Following the assassination of Murtala Muhammad as a result of a botched coup, Obasanjo's administration carried out an election that witnessed Alhaji Shehu Shagari becoming President in 1979, ending the military regime period of thirteen years in Nigeria and marking the second republic to take place. Remaining in office till 1983, Shagari's tenure ended with Buhari's successful coup, plunging the country into

another military regime period. Although Buhari's administration was met with mixed feelings due to his perceived aggression towards Nigeria's neighbours, the country was still firm in its stance to assist other African states in their drive to gain independence.

Babangida launched a coup in 1985, cutting short Buhari's time in office and introducing the concentric circles notion of foreign policy, with Nigeria's national interest taking pre-eminence. He was concerned with economic redevelopment and pushed for Structural Adjustment as well as enhancing ECOWAS and the AU. Rife with human rights abuses and the nullification of the election of June 12, 1993, which was considered free and fair by the international community, Babangida's regime severely contributed to the smear of Nigeria's image. Subsequently, an Interim Government was formulated in 1993 led by Chief Ernest Shonekan but was later toppled by General Sani Abacha in November 1993. His tenure witnessed the departure of support from the West and other African allies and caused Nigeria's foreign policy to suffer greatly. (Arowolo, 2008, in NOUN, 2015, p. 28). With the death of Abacha in June 1998, General Abdulsalam Abubakar took charge of the country and organised elections leading to the presidency of Obasanjo commencing in May 1999. This marked the beginning of the fourth republic. Obasanjo proposed a zestful foreign policy that saw the enhancement of relationships with Nigerian neighbours alongside increased commitment to international organisations such as the UN. Hence, Obasanjo's foreign policy was concerned with democratic principles, building a better image of Nigeria and improved human rights record including tackling African problems as evinced in Nigeria's leading role in handling the conflicts in Sierra Leone and Liberia amongst others. His successor, Alhaji Umaru Yar'adua, who came into power in 2007 had a short tenure due to failing health and eventual

death. He was eventually replaced by Dr Goodluck Jonathan who promoted a “transformation agenda” which encompassed “good governance, electoral reform and preparations, transparency and anti-corruption, energy (electricity supply) reform and investment” amongst others. (Alao, 2011, p. 218). Muhammadu Buhari followed suit in 2015 and remains in office, sustaining the pre-existing aspects of Nigerian foreign policy. (Amuwo 2016, p. 112).

Comparing the foreign policy evinced in section 19 of the 1979 Constitution and section 19 of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria will depict that there is not much difference in terms of the principles outlined. Section 19 of the 1979 Constitution states:

The state shall promote African unity, as well as total political, economic, social and cultural liberation of Africa and all other forms of international cooperation conducive of the consolidation of universal peace and mutual respect and friendship among all peoples and states, and shall combat racial discrimination in all its manifestations.

Section 19 of the 1999 Constitution reflects the same point but adds the importance of a ‘just world economic order’. This proves that over the years, irrespective of the various regimes, republics and the varying nature of the character and personalities of its presidents, Nigeria’s foreign policy objectives have remained nearly consistent except in the area of how it was or is executed and to what degree.

Consequently, under military rule, Nigeria adopted a foreign policy that was limited and linear, majorly ad hoc, and additionally initiated and executed by the head or leader at the time. Due to the nature of the military regime, there was no room for dissenting opinions; the ideologies and proposed plans of the head of state, which usually resonated with their perception of the international arena and domestic issues, was

final. This negatively affected Nigeria especially concerning the economic consequences and the standard of living of Nigeria as well as its images. On the other hand, with the dawn of democratic and civilian rule, institutions were formulated and equipped with power and the ability to contribute to the making of foreign policy. Also, checks and balances were put in place to prevent the absolute and illegitimate exercise of power.

### **4.3 Nigeria's Attitude Towards UN Peacekeeping**

Nigeria's foreign policy acts as the yardstick and the basis for the country's relation with other states, organisations and even non-state actors. (Umezurike et al., 2017, p. 19). The United Nations formed in 1945 was intended to ensure peace and security across the world, the adherence to and protection of human rights and the attainment of shared goals for all states. Upon acquiring independence in 1960, Nigeria became a member of the UN on 7<sup>th</sup> October 1960. Her attitude towards the organisation has been that of collaboration and avid participation. Nigeria has endeavoured to abide by the organisation's values and standards especially in the area of international law and human rights. Although she has not always maintained a clean human right record as seen in her history, this has been a concern for recent heads of states and their administrations. Additionally, Nigeria pays membership dues to the UN, as shown for example in 2018 with the payment of \$5.08 million. (Vanguard, 2018).

Moreover, the West African country has been one of the leading African nations in UN peacekeeping efforts. Its first peacekeeping mission engagement occurred during the Congo Crisis in 1960, which saw Nigeria contributing peacekeepers to the United Nations Operation in the Congo (ONUC). Thereafter, Nigeria has been involved in numerous UN peacekeeping missions and as of 2014, ranked as one of the "top 20

contributors of Uniformed Personnel to UN Peacekeeping Operations”. (UN, 2014). She has supplied personnel fulfilling various functions such as police officers, experts, armed recruits and military inspectors. It has participated between 1960 and 2015, in about forty (40) UN peacekeeping operations, within the African continent and beyond. (Abba, Osman & Muda, 2017, p. 399). In addition, Nigerians have received several awards and have filled certain prominent posts under UN peacekeeping such as Lt. General Chikadibia Obiako’s appointment as Peacekeeping Adviser and Assistant Secretary-General at UN Headquarters by former Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon. Also, Nigeria has aided in formulating and shaping the policies of the UN due to the positioning of her people in strategic positions such as the late Dr Taslim Elias who headed the International Court of Justice and Dr Ibrahim Gambari who has worked for the UN, including Nigerians occupying the position of president of the General Assembly and that of the Security Council respectively. (Arowolo, 2008, quoted after NOUN, 2015, p. 124). Most importantly, Nigeria’s attitude towards the structure of the UNSC has been that of a desire for reconstruction. Nigeria has expressed its discontent with the strict nature of the permanent seats of the Security Council and has advocated for a restructuring and an opportunity to be appointed as one of the permanent members of the Council based on its international peacekeeping efforts amongst other factors.

The West African nation has benefited from her membership of the organisation such as the boosting of Nigeria’s image, provision of aid and creating an arena for the expression and discussion of matters and issues of importance for the state.



#### **4.4 Nigeria- Organisation of African Unity / African Union (OAU / AU)**

The OAU, created with a Pan-African vision, was succeeded by the African Union (AU) which commenced operation in 2002 and consists of fifty-five (55) states.

Indeed, Nigeria has exploited the OAU/AU forum as a channel “to champion African course in many perspectives including politics, economics and socio-religious issues.” (Umezurike et al., 2017, p. 20). It has been very prominent and has been a frontrunner in the drive towards the reformulation of the organisation from OAU to AU, with her president at the time, Olusegun Obasanjo, pushing for restructuring. What helped Nigeria’s case in getting other states on board with the reformation was due to “Nigeria’s goodwill and contribution to stability in many African countries which attributed to the consents of many African states...” (Dauda et al., 2017, 2019b, p. 144).

Furthermore, the West African state’s relationship with and the attitude towards the AU has been evidently and verbally predicated on her ‘Afrocentric policy’, which has led to the efforts and contributions made for and towards the organisation. This is depicted in Nigeria’s signing and approval of the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Good Governance among other documents. More so, she has participated in the settlement of disputes involving African states under the banner of the AU, such as the usage of president-mediators as the case of then-president President Obasanjo in the Darfur Conflict. Moreover, she has been involved in peacekeeping activities through the organisation and has contributed financially, materially and in terms of personnel. Her first peacekeeping operation under the OAU was during the Chadian crisis between 1981 and 1982, where she proffered

peacekeepers to the operation. This operation cost an estimate of US\$80 million and created the image of a chief leader in global peace and security. (Okolie, 2010; Akpuru-Aja, Ndifon & Nwaodu, 2013, in Eureka, Ojukwu, 2017, p. 45). Also, Nigeria was a promoter of independence and freedom from the shackles of colonial masters and therefore, facilitated the end of Apartheid in South Africa by voicing out her support for anti-apartheid movements, providing funding for and training of South Africans. She also formed part of the frontline states and helped in the decolonisation process in countries such as Angola and Namibia, likewise assisting states in their democratic operation, as was the case for Senegal and Guinea-Bissau. Additionally, Nigeria has catered for refugees, provided aid for struggling countries such as the Niger Republic and helped build state defences. Additionally, Nigeria worked hand-in-hand with the AU during the ‘Ebola’ outbreak by sending out volunteers to the disease-ridden countries.

Nigeria has been a major contributor to the Union especially with regards to finances. Amongst the ‘Big Five’ countries- Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Nigeria and South Africa- that contribute the most to the budget, Nigeria paid US\$14.4 million in 2008 and “as much as 15 million dollars to the running cost of the organisation in 2012 alone.” Nigeria’s attitude towards the AU can be seen in the efforts she made in the creation of the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), which she created in close tandem with South Africa and other countries and eventually gained acceptance in July 2001 during the OAU Summit. Intended as a tool of the AU, NEPAD “is a strategic policy framework for removing poverty in Africa with idea of putting the continent on the road to sustainable socio-economic growth and development.” Last but equally paramount, Nigeria has held and hosted AU Summits, sessions and peace

talks within her borders and has structures such as the National Defense College located in Abuja, Nigeria which is “AU’s centre of excellence in the training of Peace Support Operations (PSOs) at the strategic level.” (Ashiru, George, 2013; Okereke, 2012; Gusau, 2013 in Umezurike et al., 2017, p. 20-21).

#### **4.5 Nigeria- Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)**

In 1964, Liberian President William Tubman proposed the idea of a West African community which led to the signing of an agreement between Cote d’Ivoire, Liberia, Guinea and Sierra Leone in 1965. However, this failed in yielding any substantial result. General Yakubu Gowon of Nigeria and General Gnassingbe Eyadema of Togo in April 1972 rejuvenated the plan and visited twelve countries in a bid to gain support. In 1973, a meeting was held to deliberate on a draft treaty. After several reviews, the treaty for the Economic Community of West African States otherwise known as the ‘Treaty of Lagos’ was signed by 15 West African States in 1975. The following year, 1976, in Lomé, Togo, the protocols that marked the official operationalisation of the ECOWAS were signed.

Presently, the headquarters of ECOWAS is located in Abuja, Nigeria and this can be tied to the major influence played by Nigeria in the formation of the organisation. Also, Nigeria is the member state with the largest population and a diverse economic market. As a result, she has made huge sacrifices and contributions to the organisation both financially, materially and in terms of manpower. Evident in the breakout of the Liberian civil war, Nigeria consolidated support and troops to help the situation in the country, thereby forming the Economic Community of West African States Ceasefire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) consisting of forces from such member states as

Ghana, Gambia, Guinea and Sierra Leone. Nonetheless, Nigeria provided the bulk of military personnel to the Group, constituting 70 per cent of ECOMOG and sustaining 80 per cent of the expenses tied to the deployment. (Njoku, Nwafor, 2005 in National Open University of Nigeria, 2015, p. 137). Also, Nigeria is known to contribute more to the budget than other member states, remunerating over a third of the organisation's funds. (Pham, 2007, p. 15). It has been argued that Nigeria is the reason behind ECOMOG's strength and longevity, resulting in it gaining a reputation "as the 'Nigeria-led intervention force'." (Dokubo & Joseph, 2011; Euka & Ojukwu, 2017, p. 46). More so, Nigerians have always occupied the position of Chief of Staff of ECOMOG since its creation.

In addition, Nigeria has exported and still exports to other member states due to ECOWAS' trade liberalisation structure which affords for the elimination of customs duties and tariffs placed on imports and exports to the end of achieving a free-trade zone amongst member states. (ECOTIS). As a result, Nigeria has exported diverse products such as vehicles, petroleum and agricultural goods and gas. This has helped respective member states handle their electrical and transportation issues. Of importance is Nigeria's attitude towards bolstering security within the territories of member states. Hence, she has been involved in training security officials. An example of this is the training of Liberian policemen to enhance their knowledge and skills at the Nigeria Mobile Police Training School located in Nigeria. (National Open University of Nigeria, 2015, p. 138).

Thus, it is obvious that Nigeria's involvement in the creation of the sub-regional organisation has extended to the very sustenance of the organisation shown through her drive, contributions and sacrifices.

## 4.6 Nigeria- Policy on Peacekeeping

Nigeria's peacekeeping policy can be derived from its 1999 Nigerian Constitution, with the Preamble stating "We the people of the Federal Republic of Nigeria... dedicated to the promotion of inter-African solidarity, *world peace*, international co-operation and understanding... give to ourselves the following Constitution". This is backed up by her foreign policy objectives as outlined in Section 19 of the same constitution. For emphasis, it states, inter-alia:

promotion of African integration and support for African unity... *promotion of international co-operation for the consolidation of universal peace*... respect for international law and treaty obligations as well as the seeking of settlement of international disputes by negotiation, mediation, conciliation, arbitration and adjudication...

While it may not have specifically mentioned peacekeeping, the above-mentioned foreign policy objectives and Preamble demonstrates the motivation behind Nigeria's peacekeeping, who concerns itself with the settlement of disputes and resolving conflicts to the point of even priding itself as a 'Big Brother' and the 'Giant of Africa', and personally taking it upon itself to advocate and expound on African affairs. In the words of Olusanya "it is in the pursuit of world peace that Nigeria has taken part in important peacekeeping operations [outside of the African continent]" (1991; quoted after Mays, 1997, p. 62). The popular notion among Nigerians is that the country's involvement in peacekeeping is because it "...is obliged to send out a peacekeeping force in accordance with treaty obligations, especially as, under Article 25 of the UN Charter, all members of the UN agree to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council in accordance with the Charter". (Nwogugu, 1981, in Mays, 1997, p. 61-62).

However, it has been pointed out by several authors that Nigeria has failed to articulate peacekeeping objectives when deploying soldiers to conflict-torn zones. It has, in the past, neglected to stipulate a structure or an arrangement for mandates, costs, benefits, logistics and equipment as exemplified in the deployment of troops to Liberia, where lives of Nigerian soldiers were lost and the amount spent on the mission was enormous has not been repaid. (Saliu, 2007, p. 115; Nigerian Voice, 2011). This has caused Nigerian troops to be mocked or made a laughing stock due to inadequacies in their equipment. Thus, the state's reasons behind its peacekeeping endeavours cannot be tied to economic or financial interests. Ade-Ibijola (2013, p. 571) pointed out the irony evident in Nigeria's actions and its state of affairs. In a country, where poverty is at an all-time high, the state is so concerned with peacekeeping yet has been unsuccessful in formulating a framework where she benefits from the peacekeeping missions it is massively involved in.

In consequence, although this 'Giant of Africa' has been a frequent provider of troops and personnel to peacekeeping and observer missions, she is yet to construct a scheme or arrangement outlining the borders, aims and objectives of its peacekeeping deputation. Undeniably, participation in peacekeeping need not entirely be predicated on personal or national interest, if at all; however, this is not a phenomenon in and of itself as states in the past have considered what can be derived from its involvement in a conflict.

#### **4.7 Conclusion**

Foreign policy construction in Nigeria has undergone a positive and needed change since 1960. Her history has influenced the interests and actions of the state. Irrespective of the personalities of the leaders, the groundwork has been laid to follow,

for which, failure to adhere has posed problems and has had adverse effects as showcased in the tenures of such leaders as Babangida and Abacha. Essentially, for one to argue that Nigeria's major contributions to peacekeeping came from the desire to alter its image is not at all false. Analysing her steps over the years will reveal the benefits gained by the country pales in comparison to the contributions and sacrifices made. Indeed, the state has created an undeniable dent in the area of peacekeeping, economic development of African countries especially those in West Africa and humanitarianism. It is difficult to discuss bettering Africa and dealing with African-prone problems without highlighting the power and influence of Nigeria. It is almost impossible to imagine ECOWAS without Nigeria's contributions nor AU's notability without her huge steps and voice in seeking African solutions to African problems. Notwithstanding, the huge expenditure of this 'Giant' has failed to adhere to a policy, a framework, a peacekeeping guideline. Therefore, it is no surprise that most Nigerians, although acknowledging their country's peacekeeping efforts, argue for the monies spent outside her borders to be spent within.

To put this chapter in context, the role foreign policy plays in connection to Nigeria's peacekeeping drive will be greater understood in the next chapter, where her peacekeeping commitments will be showcased.

## Chapter 5

### NIGERIA'S PEACEKEEPING PRACTICE

#### 5.1 Introduction

Nigeria's peacekeeping strides have extended beyond her neighbourhood to include other continents including, for example, the Interim Force of the UN in Lebanon. Moreover, it has been contended that Nigeria has spent huge sums of money on supporting peace and ensuring stability in African countries since her independence, to the tune of US\$10 billion. (Oyinlola (2010) in Oni, Taiwo, 2016, p. 68). In consequence, Nigeria's participation in several missions under such organisations as the UN, ECOWAS and AU will be analysed. This chapter will be a descriptive and comparative analysis with the latter intended to draw a contrast between different missions. The criteria of such distinction include the number of troops and or personnel deployed, the role played by such personnel, the area of financing and how much was expended, the mandates set out for each mission and the success and or failure of said mission, noting that in certain scenarios, whether a mission is considered successful or otherwise is rather subjective and based on one's criteria. Even further, the chapter discovers certain patterns of Nigeria's involvement in peacekeeping mission by focusing on missions from three organisations- international (UN), regional (AU) and sub-regional (ECOWAS). Due to the frequency at which Nigeria participates and the promptness in its response to the conflict in its neighbourhood (Western Africa) including its proximity geographically and the popularity of these operations, two cases involving ECOWAS will be examined. Subsequently, two cases from the UN



have been chosen because of their intensity and their duration, especially due to the fact that the mission in Congo marked Nigeria's first peacekeeping engagement, showing that even as an infant democratic state, the democratic peace theory and R2P seemed to hold weight, as both are committed to finding lasting peace. Lastly, an operation initially led by AU with the participation of the UN will be studied, to show the diversity of Nigeria's commitment to resolving conflict as it showcases mediatory efforts and were the largest troop-contributing state to that mission.

These operations have been selected due to their occurrence at different times to show the evolution of Nigeria's participation.

## **5.2 Nigeria In ECOMOG's Peacekeeping Missions In Liberia [1989-1997 / 1999-2003]**

The Liberian conflict consisting of the first Liberian civil war between 1989 and 1997 and the second civil war between 1999 and 2003 saw the commission of genocide and the eventual intervention of ECOWAS. In response, Nigeria led the creation of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOMOG) with the aim of intervening in Liberia. ECOMOG's mandate was to avert the war and restore peace. (Levitt, 1998, pp. 341-347). This regional force was novel and unique resulting in its popularity within the international arena, with its actions in Liberia been regarded with major attention. (Daniels, 2018, p. 18). The first civil war sparked by the actions and eventual toppling of Samuel Doe from power and the insurrectionary actions of the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) headed by Charles Taylor in 1989 led to mass atrocities. As a result, ECOMOG which was initially launched as a cease-fire and monitoring endeavour was transformed into a peacekeeping initiative. It has been argued that the deployment of ECOMOG to Liberia was based on the personal interest

of Babangida, who was president of Nigeria at the time and a known friend of Doe. Given its regional leadership in Africa, Nigeria contributed 80% of the troops and by 1993, possessed 15,000 among a total of 17,000 ECOMOG troops. Also, she shouldered 90% of the financial responsibilities, disbursing more than US\$8 billion over this course of time. Furthermore, about 500 troopers were either killed or reported missing during the conflict. (Bukarambe (2011) in Enuka, Ojukwu, 2017, p. 46; Obi, 2008, p. 190). Addedly, Nigeria was involved in the peace discussions between the disputing factions, with the Abuja Peace Agreement of 1995 signed in Abuja, Nigeria, creating an avenue for elections to be held in 1997 and the formal rise to power of Taylor as president of Liberia. (Atuobi, 2010, p. 32-33).

However, this brokered peace was short-lived as another civil war broke out in 1999. Howbeit, this time around, Taylor faced opposition from certain rebel groups such as the Movement for Democracy in Liberia (MODEL) and the Liberian United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD). The ECOWAS Mission in Liberia (ECOMIL) was launched in 2003 with troops from such West African states as Nigeria and Senegal. Additionally, Taylor was granted asylum in Nigeria forming part of a peace deal, which he eventually took. A Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) was signed in 2003 which provided for a transitional government for the next two years until the time for elections. ECOMIL was subsequently replaced by the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) in a 'rehatting' measure, due to constraints in terms of funding and ability to preserve peace. (Obi, 2008, p). It should be emphasized that this conflict and the involvement of an organisation such as ECOWAS / ECOMOG marked the first time that the UN joined forces with a sub-regional organisation to promote peace. (Fetherston, 1994, p. 29).

Nigeria's pivotal function in the drive to restore peace in Liberia especially in connection to the formation of ECOMOG resulted in the force being dubbed as the "Nigeria-led intervention force". (Enuka, Ojukwu, 2017, p. 46). Her actions also marked a notable shift in her policy on non-interference in the domestic affairs of a state. Nonetheless, ECOWAS' mission in Liberia faced problems including poor and insufficient resources and financial support especially revealed in substandard battlefield equipment, language and communication barriers, divisions within the organisation between anglophone and francophone countries on what steps to take particularly on what ECOMOG's mission should be (Berman, Sams, 2003, in Boulden 2003, pp. 43-44), the biasedness of the mediator and the mission itself due to the argument that the mission was only launched in line with Babangida's interests and ties to Doe. All in all, the mission in Liberia was successful as it led to the restoration of peace and the promotion of democracy, visible by the election of Ellen Johnson Sirleaf in 2006.

### **5.3 ECOMOG in Sierra Leone [1997-2002]**

The conflict in Sierra Leone commenced in March 1997 and is perceived to be a spillover of the disruption in Liberia. It began following the ousting of President Ahmed Tejan Kabbah by the joint efforts of the military and the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), a rebel group allegedly supported by Charles Taylor of Liberia and had acquired "military training in guerrilla warfare in Libya and Burkina Faso". (Orluwene, Onah, 2011, p. 87). This displacement was led by Foday Sankoh, who was in support of Major Johnny Paul Koromah, the founder of the Armed Forces Ruling Council (AFRC). Both the AFRC and RUF posed a threat to Kabbah's government. Following Kabbah's pleas for external intervention, Nigeria spearheaded the mission

to the country by leading the ECOWAS' ECOMOG troops, ultimately battling with RUF rebels and the AFRC.

Consequently, Nigeria supplied 12,000 from a total of 13,000 ECOMOG troops to Sierra Leone. (Adebajo (2004) in Obi, 2008, p. 190). Also, the aforementioned \$8 billion included costs spent in this peacekeeping mission, as well as incurring significant fatalities as in the Liberian mission. Additionally, Nigerians continuously occupied the position of ECOMOG force commander in Sierra Leone. (Berman, Sams, 2003, p. 46 ). This peacekeeping force was given the objective of supervising a cease-fire, “enforce sanctions and embargo and secure the peace”. (Kabia, 2009, p. 111). The Lome Peace Accords of 1999 contributed to the restoration of peace between the warring parties and also permitted the UN to intervene and take over from ECOMOG by forming its peacekeeping force, the United Nations Missions in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL).

Although ECOMOG had previous experience from the Liberian mission, it still suffered from rather similar problems as those faced in the Liberian mission. There was discord amongst ECOWAS members in relation to what an effective response should be, especially because Liberia and Burkina Faso, despite being ECOWAS member states, were supporting the RUF. A central trend seen in Liberia as well was the concern of ECOWAS member states over Nigeria's dominance in the ECOMOG force and mission in the country. Also, ECOMOG peacekeepers were poorly equipped and struggled to counter “the AFRC/RUF alliance in guerrilla war”, therefore dealing with frequent attacks. (Obi, 2008). This was evinced in the military coup that occurred ousting Kabbah, even with the presence of ECOMOG in the country. (Atuobi, 2010, pp. 33-34). Ofuatey-Kodjoe (2003, pp. 132-147) asserted that ECOMOG and

UNAMISIL troops were converted “into peace enforcement operations” hence becoming “two of the leading contestants for power, in the armed conflict.” Corruption and failure to properly recompensate troops and personnel was rife amongst not only Nigerian contingents but other ECOMOG troops. According to Atuobi (2010, p. 34), the success of the Sierra Leonean mission in reinstating peace is chiefly as a result of the participation of the UN which had “sufficiently strong mandate and personnel to enforce the peace agreement.”

#### **5.4 UN Peacekeeping Missions in The Congo [1960-1966 / 1996-1997/ 1998-2003]**

The UN peacekeeping mission in former Belgian Congo / Zaire, now the present Democratic Republic of Congo, was the second militarised peacekeeping endeavour of the UN since its inception and marked the largest operation “for thirty years... involving 20,000 troops and civilians.” (Durch, 1993, p. 315).

Following the attainment of its independence from Belgian rule in 1960, a mutiny sparked chaos and conflict in the country. The state was managed by a Force Publique consisting of 25,000 men renamed the Armée Nationale Congolaise (ANC) after the country’s independence. Included in this force were Belgian officers that remained even after independence. Shortly after, a mutiny occurred and the Belgian officials were expelled leading to a breakdown in law and order. As a result, Belgium responded by deploying troops to the unstable state to protect its citizens, claiming that it was a humanitarian intervention to protect the lives and safety of Europeans. Furthermore, Moïse Tshombé announced the separation of Katanga and selected Belgians to occupy administrative positions. However, the UN demanded Belgium retract its actions and remove all its forces from Congo. It did not stop there but went on to equip the UN

Secretary-General with the power to render support and backing to the government of the Congo, especially in the area of military development till the point that it determined that the state's forces will be able to effectively execute their duties. (UN, 1960 in Durch, 1993, 328).

In the same year, 1960, Nigeria attained her independence and embarked on her first peacekeeping rodeo almost immediately after joining the UN in November 1960. Even before she gained her freedom, Nigeria was called upon by the UN to contribute forces to the mission. In response, Nigeria deployed 1,350 of her soldiers to the Congo by the end of November. (Chigozie, Ituma, 2015, p. 4). In addition to that, Durch (1993, pp. 335-336) highlighted that Nigeria was among the largest contributors of troops to the mission, with all of the Nigerian army alongside those from three other countries being “cycled through the Congo.” More so, in 1960, she was the African nation to send out the first group of Individual Police Officers in Africa. (Oni, Taiwo, 2016, p. 67)

The Nigerian contingent along with other armies characterising the ONUC force was mandated to assist the government of Congo in reinstating and preserving the “political independence and territorial integrity of the Congo”, as well as protecting and ensuring “law and order in the country” and establishing a long-lasting plan to offer training and technical aid. (Chigozie, Ituma, 2015, pp. 4-5). In terms of the mandate to end the secession of Katanga, the UN was successful. However, authors like Durch (1993, p. 345) argue that the operation was a mess as it fell short of the criteria required for a fruitful peacekeeping venture such as “consistent support of all local parties, a clear mandate, stable and adequate funding...”

Admittedly, while Nigeria was applauded for her bravery, conflict broke out again but, in the DRC, resulting in disruption as evinced in her first and second war (popularly known as ‘Africa’s first world war’). (Nwolise, 1986 in Chigozie, Ituma, 2015, p. 5). The UN sent out a peacekeeping mission known as the United Nations Organisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) in November 1999. Negotiations and peace talks were underway and in July 2002, the Pretoria Accord between Rwanda and Congo and the Luanda Agreement between Uganda and Congo put the war to an official end. During this time, African leaders were used as mediators to help resolve the conflict, emanating from such countries as Botswana, Nigeria, South Africa and Zambia. Subsequently, the first free and fair elections were conducted in 2006 which appointed Joseph Kabila as president. In 2010, the UN renamed MONUC to the United Nations Organisation Stabilisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) to reflect the situation in the country, with the mandate of safeguarding civilians and assisting in the “stabilisation and strengthening of state institutions in the DRC and key governance and security reforms.” (UN, MONUSCO, 2020).

Based on data derived from 30 November 2020, Nigeria contributed personnel to the mission, in terms of four individual police, five staff officer and four experts on the mission. (UN Peacekeeping, 2020). This figure compared to the formidable number of troops sent to ONUC and other missions like that of Liberia and Sierra Leone is not as encouraging and noteworthy. Thus, it is considerably difficult, if not impossible, to analyse the impact made by Nigeria in this mission.

## **5.5 AU – UN in Sudan / Darfur [2003-2020]**

The Republic of Sudan has faced conflict prior to and even following its independence in 1956. The 2003 crisis in Darfur resulted from an attack by the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA), an offshoot of the Sudan Liberation Army (SLA), and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) directed at the Khartoum government's failure to provide for the people. The government responded by executing a series of airstrikes on the rebel regions through its "proxy militias (the Janjaweed)". (Agena, 2011, p. 20). However, these attacks were not just limited to rebel areas and factions but included raping of women and mass killings. The AU intervened and negotiations occurred between the Sudanese government and the rebel groups leading to four agreements.

The 2004 N'Djamena Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement was arranged by the AU and the Republic of Chad. The African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) was deployed as a result, with the initial mandate to observe the ceasefire and to protect civilians. Despite the fact that AMIS possessed less than 7000 troops at the end of 2007, deployed to man an incredibly large area, Nigeria contributed 1,500 soldiers to the mission which made it the largest troop-contributing country in the now-defunct AMIS. Moreover, she was the first to deploy troops to the conflict-stricken country. (Abdulwaheed, 2012, p. 18; Oni, Taiwo, 2016, pp. 66-68). In addition to granting troops, Nigeria was involved in mediation efforts, with former president Olusegun Obasanjo hosting the Abuja peace talks in 2004 which set the ball rolling and led to two more rounds of talk, at the end of which, the Darfur Peace Agreement was signed in 2006. In spite of everything, the agreement was unsuccessful largely due to a lack of effective implementation and the role played by the parties to the agreement.



In 2007, AMIS merged with the UN to form United Nations- African Union Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) with the mandate to, amongst others, secure the lives of civilians and humanitarian personnel and “Mediate between the Government of Sudan and non-signatory armed movements based on the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur”. (UNAMIDa, 2014).

Although the number of troops was increased, transforming it from AMIS I to AMIS-II Enhanced, it still failed to fulfil its mandate in ensuring the protection of civilians and the monitoring of the N’Djamena Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement due to lack of training, funding and like the Liberian and Sierra Leonean conflict, failed to meet up to the equipment standard. Mansaray (2010, p. 37) asserted that “Implementing a protection of civilians mandate with the limited number of troops and resources at its disposal proved impractical.” Also visible in the previously discussed conflicts, the Sudanese government failed to cooperate with AMIS and there were contentions within the AU as to the approach to take in tackling the Sudanese conflict.

Nonetheless, Nigeria was involved in and organised some of the discussions that led to the “Declaration of Principles” signed between the Central Sudanese Government and the Sudanese People’s Liberation Movement approving “the principle and conditions for self-determination for the Southern Sudan.” (Ebegbulem, 2012, p. 70).

In April 2019, Sudan’s president at that time, Omar al-Bashir was ousted, after months of protests and the ICC charging him for war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide. The following year, in August 2020, a peace agreement was signed between the government and some rebel groups which provided for a transitional government

“under a three-year power-sharing agreement between the military and civilian groups that is meant to lead to free and fair elections.” (Aljazeera, 2020; TheNewArab, 2020).

UNAMID’s mandate which ended 31<sup>st</sup> December 2020, detailed the manner in which the mission will wrap up its involvement in Darfur, giving a deadline of 30<sup>th</sup> June 2021 for the withdrawal and closure of all official UNAMID activities, whilst announcing to the Sudanese government the responsibilities it is to fulfil. (UNAMID, 2020 (b)).

### **5.7 UN in Lebanon [1978-1983]**

The conflict in Lebanon commenced due to the Israeli and Palestinian division which has lasted decades. Against this background, the Lebanese conflict worsened in 1978 with the incursion carried out by Israel on Southern Lebanon territory, in an attempt to strike back against Palestinian forces who had attacked Israel from the area. Following the invasion, the government of Lebanon requested that the UN intervene to restore order in southern Lebanon and reassert the authority of the central government. Accordingly, the UN formulated the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) with the initial mandate to “confirm the withdrawal of Israeli forces from southern Lebanon; restore international peace and security; assist the government of Lebanon in ensuring the return of its effective authority in the area.” (UN, UNIFIL, 2019). Additional duties have been allocated to the force over the years.

When the UN requested troops from member states, Nigeria was amongst the first eight countries to contribute troops to the mission, deploying about 600 soldiers in September 1978. (Ghali, 1993, in Durch 1993, p. 190). This unit, recognised as Nigerian Battalion (NIBATT) was responsible for manning specific areas, conducting patrols and carrying out checks. Also, these Nigerian units were changed every six

months, amounting to a total of nine units been deployed, consisting of around 5,500 personnel present between 1978 and 1983. (Chigozie, Ituma, 2015, p. 6). The West African state further suffered casualties within that period. Nigerian troops were finally withdrawn due to the increased security challenges.

Compared to other conflicts outlined, Nigeria's military contribution was not more extensive than her counterparts in the mission. Unlike Sierra Leone and Liberia, their military contributions were matched and even exceeded by other states. Also, the mandate of this mission was stipulated, although argued by some to be outlandish and impossible to attain. Moreover, Nigeria did not lose as many men in this mission as compared to the other conflicts.

Similar to some of the aforementioned conflicts, the UN failed to acquire consent from all the parties to the conflict which also affected its effectiveness. Along with this, there was contention within the Organisation regarding what was the best or suitable option, evinced in the actions of the Soviet Union and signatories to the Warsaw Pact in refusing to contribute financially to the mission. (Ghali, 1993, pp. 186-187).

Although Israel finally withdrew troops from southern Lebanon in 2000, her relations with Lebanon have remained tense especially due to the operation of Hezbollah, a "recognised political party in Lebanon." (Washington Post, 2020). UNIFIL remains in the country with the UNSC annually reviewing and renewing UNIFIL's mandate and as of 2020, the number of soldiers was reduced from 15,000 to 13,000 with the force given leeway to execute measures as a response to the explosions that happened in Beirut in August 2020. (UN, Press Release, 2020).

## **5.8 Nigeria's Peacekeeping Operations: A Comparative Analysis**

The escalation of conflicts globally especially after the formation of the UN came with a bid for regional and sub-regional bodies that could effectively meet these new disputations. It is in line with this that most organisations adopted similar patterns in terms of their structure and also in addressing the needs of the international community. Peacekeeping, R2P, recognition of human rights and humanitarian intervention became prominent and universal. Bodies like AU and ECOWAS for example have applied and recognised certain legal norms and principles. Hence, it is not out of the ordinary that their reactions to conflicts to be quite similar.

The conflicts analysed above have shown resemblances as well as differences. Nigeria was a forerunner in troops contribution, evident in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Congo, the DRC and Darfur (Sudan). If she was not the leading contributor, then she made up one of the largest contributors of troops and personnel, whilst in Lebanon, she was part of the first few countries to deploy troops. As a result, she suffered casualties, especially significant in Liberia and Sierra Leone.

In addition to troops and personnel dispatched, the Federal Republic has disbursed a substantial amount of money in pursuit of her peacekeeping interest. She expended more money than her counterparts in ECOWAS chiefly in the Liberian and Sierra Leonean conflict. It is further worth noting that most of these monies have yet to be reimbursed.

It is also important to highlight the fact that Nigerian personnel and troops have played different roles during peacekeeping missions. These roles include occupying the position of force Commander as seen in Sierra Leone and Liberia and partaking in

mediations. The usage of Presidents as mediators has become prevalent and was practised in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Congo DR and Darfur (Sudan).

Furthermore, the mandates of most of the missions discussed share certain objectives. Darfur, Sierra Leone and Liberia focused on ensuring adherence to ceasefire agreements. However, in all these conflicts including Lebanon, the agreements drafted or reached were either broken or discarded at a certain point. Also, all the missions promoted the importance of restoring and protecting peace and security but only the DRC and Darfur missions precisely outlined the need to protect civilians. On the other hand, the Liberian conflict added the mandate to prevent war as one of the directives whilst in Sierra Leone, peacekeepers were required to impose respect for sanctions. Troops in the DRC meanwhile were required to provide training and technical support and to enhance and reinforce institutions, especially state institutions, including ending the Katanga secession, which in some ways, reflects a form of peacebuilding. However, in Darfur, peacekeepers were specifically authorised to partake in mediating between warring parties.

A major difference between Lebanon and the rest of the aforementioned missions' mandates is that that of UNIFIL was clearly outlined and undergoes a yearly review and renewal. More so, the peacekeeping mission seems to take on a peacebuilding role, quite similar to MONUSCO (DRC), visible in the mandate to "assist the government of Lebanon in ensuring the return of its effective authority". (UNIFIL, 2019). Added to that, it was argued that the mandate in Lebanon was too massive and impossible to achieve due to the loss of power by the Lebanese government, making it unrealistic for UNIFIL to assist a dying, if not already dead government. (Durch, 1993).

This ties into the area of limitations or constraints faced by the missions in the execution of their respective mandates. All the missions discussed above had to grapple with insufficient funding at one point or the other or even throughout the mission. Alongside a lack of funding, insufficient equipment, resources and logistical support was predominant in Liberia, Sierra Leone and Darfur (Sudan). Apart from this, divisions within the organisation as to the adequate mode of action or response as witnessed during the Lebanese, Darfur, Congo DR, Sierra Leone and Liberian conflicts plagued the effectiveness of the different missions. Besides that, the conflict in Sierra Leone experienced a coup that hampered the progress and operation of the mission. The missions in all West African states discussed regarded the prominent role of Nigeria as a constraint as ECOWAS member states were of the opinion that Nigeria was trying to dominate the mission and organisation. In particular, the different Anglophone, Francophone and Lusophone countries within West Africa acted as a limitation in the Liberian conflict as language and communication barriers affected peacekeepers. The biasedness of the mediator was also seen in Liberia whilst in Sierra Leone, corruption and the unpaid peacekeeper dues affected morale and eventually the mission.

Of most importance is the success and failure of the diverse missions. For the sake of this analysis, the success of a mission will be understood in terms of how effective the mission was in achieving the prescribed mandate(s).

The missions in Liberia and Sierra Leone were largely successful, although they required the assistance of the UN. Nonetheless, peace was restored and democracy prevailed.

However, in the case of Congo, the mission, which is still ongoing, can be perceived as an accomplishment in certain areas and failure in others. As part of its mandate, the secession of Katanga was prevented. Nevertheless, present-day Congo still battles with violence and conflict, with MONUSCO continuing in the country and striving to fulfil all of its mandate including the institutional, state-building and protection of civilians. Therefore, it is both a success and a failure. In the same vein, UNIFIL can be considered an achievement and a flop. It managed to get Israeli forces out of Southern Lebanon but is presently pushing towards achieving the remainder of its mandate which entails amongst others, providing support to the Lebanese government in reinstating its authority. Conversely, the Darfuri mission's mandate was terminated in 2020, with the instalment of a transitional government and in this regard, may be considered a success, a fragile one at best, as time will tell the extent of the peace process underway in the country.

## **5.9 Conclusion**

Examining the role of Nigeria and her inputs and participation in peacekeeping is not restricted to the conflicts scrutinised above. Indeed, the power of her contributions have been enjoyed in certain conflicts like Liberia and her absence felt in Guinea Bissau. Moreover, her participation in Congo, which marked the first time the newly independent state partook in such an enterprise goes to show that even as an infant democratic state, the extent of her potential is seen, recognised and appreciated. Whether it is a ploy to create a positive image for herself, a means to support a friend (Liberia) or a sincere concern for the safeguarding of peace and democracy (as in Lebanon and Sierra Leone), the 'West African giant' has created a dent in the area of peacekeeping, showing that countries in the Global South are capable after all.

## Chapter 6

### CONCLUSION

This body of work has sought to demonstrate Nigeria's peacekeeping involvements. To achieve this, the previous chapters have pinpointed Nigeria's rationale behind its peacekeeping agenda which also ties into the benefits to be gained by the country. In line with that, she has also faced challenges in her drive to maintain peace and security in other countries.

The struggle to define peacekeeping is still prevalent and although diverse authors and organisations have rendered their definitions, the lack of an official description given by the United Nations in the UN Charter has contributed to the diverse and somewhat dissimilar understandings of the concept. Nonetheless, the principles derived from this concept (peacekeeping) remain endemic, notably consent, neutrality (impartiality) and the non-use of force.

By the same token, the Responsibility to Protect was analysed conceptually and the democratic peace theory was used as a basis for this research denoting the benefits of democracy whilst influencing the actions of Nigeria and affecting the outcomes of the missions. Therewith, understanding peacekeeping is empty without exploring the varying roles and functions that peacekeepers engage in. From overseeing cease-fires to serving as buffers between disputing parties, peacekeepers are expected to adhere to mandates meant to serve as guidelines and instructions on courses of action.



Of significance is the connection made between peacekeeping, peacemaking and peacebuilding whilst considering the differences between the notions. Indubitably, peacekeepers have been known to engage in peacebuilding and peacemaking. Likewise, the same comparisons were drawn between traditional (classical) peacekeeping and multidimensional peacekeeping, and peacekeeping and enforcement actions. Whether the line demarcating all these concepts can be seen is subjective and based on one's standpoint, as evinced by the authors employed in this study. However, to take a subjective stance, it is clear that there is increased obscurity in the roles and functions performed by peacekeepers. This obscurity might stem from the desire to grant peacekeepers more leeway and freedom to act as conflict situations might and can be unpredictable. At the same time, the provision of peacekeeping is no longer limited to international organisations as states and intergovernmental alliances such as NATO have provided peacekeeping. No longer is peacekeeping just about peacekeeping; however, it has become more far-reaching and extensive, developing into this being that may be hard to consider and categorise as peacekeeping.

Regardless, the conditions to be met by troop-contributing states, the factors regarded before the deployment of a peacekeeping mission and the effectiveness of peacekeeping was elaborated upon. In relation to the conditions to be met, training of the troops and the economic position of the troop-contributing state amongst other factors were highlighted. The UN has made efforts to assist troop-contributing states in the area of training by providing materials such as the Specialised Training Materials for UN military contingents. (UN Peacekeeping Resource Hub, 2020). However, these contributing states are in charge of training their troops before deployment and are expected to meet the standard of the UN.

Subsequently, a look at peacekeeping in Nigeria's foreign policy in its 60 years of existence and its policy formulation was made, whilst also discussing foreign policy as it pertains to peacekeeping. The missions discussed in this research are not all-encompassing due to the fact that Nigeria has participated in quite a number; however, those referred to have shown the variations and the effects of her involvement and or lack thereof. Remarkably, although peacekeeping has been the theme of this work, it does not characterise the totality of Nigeria's foreign policy. In actuality, peacekeeping is but a fraction of Nigeria's foreign policy as outlined previously and is merely a means to an end, a tool of foreign policy and not an end goal or destination.

From the analysis proffered, Nigeria highly prioritises peacekeeping and ensuring security and stability not only within her neighbourhood but at large. Nigeria has established itself as a prominent and appreciable front runner in the peacekeeping field. From attaining independence in 1960, this West African nation has revealed its eagerness to safeguard peace and security worldwide. Her involvement has been demonstrated sub-regionally (ECOWAS), regionally (AU) and universally (UN). Such involvements have not been confined to rendering peacekeepers but include supplying mediators as well. Nigerians have occupied diverse positions in international organisations and have headed certain missions. This is proven by her previous position as one of the foremost nations providing peacekeepers to the UN.

Nigeria's reason for its peacekeeping preoccupation is not only based on peace and security but other factors. One major factor is the desire to create a good image due to its tumultuous history as discussed in this study. Another reason underlined relates to the personal motivations of the president at the time. As an illustration, Nigeria through President Babangida at the time desired to support Doe by deploying troops to troubled

Liberia. Therefore, personal agendas do play a role in the country's involvement in missions. (Schiel, Powell and Daxecker, 2020, p. 258). A subsequent factor postulated by such authors as Bellamy and Williams (2013, p. 6), is Nigeria's motivation to attain a permanent seat on the UN Security Council, unveiling the country's regional pursuits. Moreover, Nigeria has indicated a desire to protect its borders and citizens and is highly concerned when conflict breaks out in countries in its backyard due to the negative effects brought about by a disrupt in the status quo. This bears a connection to the "Big Brotherly Syndrome", another influence on Nigeria's participation tied to its aim of helping and solving African state and problems. (Barnabas, 2017, p. 52). With these in mind, the democratic peace theory still encapsulates Nigeria's relationship with peacekeeping. Viewed as a democratic state, it has showcased its respect for international law and legal principles, by so doing recognised the importance and benefits of democracy, envisioned in its struggle against colonialism and military rule including adherence to organisational demands and in the case of the UN, the demand for peacekeepers. All the same, Nigeria's democratic nature which it has enjoyed does not subtract from its intentions.

Nevertheless, at the present moment, Nigeria has fallen behind with regards to deploying UN peacekeepers. According to UN statistics, as of December 2020, Nigeria is 43<sup>rd</sup> in the rank of troop-contributing countries, a shadow of her previous position and 'glory'. (UN Peacekeeping, 2020). However, this does not reflect the state's receding support or appreciation for peacekeeping. Rather, a factor that has contributed to this massive decline is tied to the growing insurgency and instability within Nigeria's borders in relation to tackling the incessant violence of the terrorist group, Boko Haram resulting in the redeployment of troops to affected areas. Furthermore,

Nigeria is faced with other challenges such as grave corruption affecting the manner in which troops are deployed and appropriately reimbursed, a consequence of a lack of peacekeeping policy.

Even though her peacekeeping contributions have fluctuated and even declined, Nigeria has unquestionably benefited from its concerns for and pursuits of peacekeeping, although deciding whether these benefits outweigh the costs is subject to frequent data and one's analysis. Nonetheless, aside from trying to boost her image and create the notion of a trailblazer state especially to her neighbours, Nigeria has profited in terms of revenue accrued from payments and reimbursements made to her troops, particularly with regards to the UN. Moreover, Nigerian troops acquire the chance to receive first-hand training when deployed in terms of experience gained during the mission and as well gain knowledge on the latest military equipment, technique and expertise. (Dauda et al., 2017, pp. 63-64).

In conclusion, analysing and gathering the data meant for this research was enlightening undeniably. A major positive was the availability of information from previous research on Nigerian peacekeeping that was conducted and the presence of statistical data from such organisations like the UN. However, nothing quite beats acquiring first-hand information from those in and on the field; yet, doing so would have been complex and strenuous due to the present-day limitations encountered by this researcher. Irrespectively, the knowledge accrued from this body of work can be enhanced and used as a basis to procure more information and make necessary improvements, be it in terms of a better Nigerian foreign policy with regards to peacekeeping, a more Africa-finetuned form of peacekeeping or in the field of peacekeeping altogether.

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