

Effects of the US Foreign Policy Shifts on the Eastern Mediterranean Region

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ABSTRACT

This thesis will evaluate how changes in US foreign policy during 2000s may affect the countries within the Eastern Mediterranean region. Recent shifts in the US Foreign Policy, where the US decided to lift the arms embargo on the Republic of Cyprus through the Eastern Mediterranean Security and Energy Partnership Act of 2019 could bolster the Greek Cypriot's power and reshape the geopolitical context. My hypothesis is that this recent foreign policy shift will increase tensions within Cyprus and between Cyprus and other nations in the Eastern Mediterranean region. As the United States makes its foreign policy decisions based on its self-interests, this research will touch up on the neo-realism of Kenneth Waltz and will be assessed through the offensive realism of John Mearsheimer. It will touch upon historical and recent events where the US used buck-passing strategies to achieve its national interests. The study will concentrate on how US foreign policy is formulated and the factors that influence US foreign policy choices. The design of the research will be based on qualitative analysis to identify perspectives of the major powers involved within the Eastern Mediterranean region. The limitation of this research is that alternative hypotheses can exist where the US decision to lift the arms embargo leads to tensions dissolving within the region or there being a much more even dynamic regarding the Cyprus Conflict. Overall, this thesis will provide insight into how recent US foreign policy shifts can shape the regional relations among the nations within the Eastern Mediterranean region and provide assumptions about possible future scenarios.

Keywords: US Foreign Policy, Eastern Mediterranean Region, Cyprus, Foreign Policy Shifts

ÖZ

Bu tez, 2000'lerde ABD dış politikasındaki değişikliklerin Doğu Akdeniz bölgesindeki ülkeleri nasıl etkileyebileceğini değerlendirecektir. ABD'nin 2019 tarihli Doğu Akdeniz Güvenlik ve Enerji Ortaklığı Yasası aracılığıyla Kıbrıs Cumhuriyeti'ne yönelik silah ambargosunu kaldırmaya karar vermesiyle ABD Dış Politikasındaki son değişiklikler, Kıbrıslı Rumların gücünü artırabilir ve jeopolitik bağlamı yeniden şekillendirebilir. Benim hipotezim, bu son dış politika değişikliğinin Kıbrıs içinde ve Kıbrıs ile Doğu Akdeniz bölgesindeki diğer ülkeler arasındaki gerilimleri artıracığı yönünde. ABD dış politika kararlarını kendi çıkarları doğrultusunda aldığı için bu çalışmada Kenneth Waltz'un neo-realizmi ele alınacak ve John Mearsheimer'ın saldırgan realizmi üzerinden değerlendirilecektir. ABD'nin ulusal çıkarlarına ulaşmak için sorumluluğu başkalarına yükleme stratejilerini kullandığı tarihsel ve güncel olaylara değinilecek. Çalışma, ABD dış politikasının nasıl formüle edildiğine ve ABD dış politika tercihlerini etkileyen faktörlere odaklanacaktır. Araştırmanın tasarımı, Doğu Akdeniz bölgesinde yer alan büyük güçlerin perspektiflerini belirlemek amacıyla medya kaynakları, kitap bölümleri ve dergi makaleleri gibi ikincil kaynaklara bakılarak nitel analize dayanacaktır. Bu araştırmanın sınırlılığı, ABD'nin silah ambargosunu kaldırma kararının bölge içinde gerilimlerin erimesine yol açtığı veya Kıbrıs sorununa ilişkin çok daha dengeli bir dinamiğin ortaya çıktığı durumlarda alternatif hipotezlerin var olabileceğidir. Genel olarak bu tez, ABD dış politikasındaki son zamanlardaki değişimlerin Doğu Akdeniz bölgesindeki ülkeler arasındaki bölgesel ilişkileri nasıl şekillendirebileceğine dair içgörü sağlayacak ve olası gelecek senaryoları hakkında varsayımlar sağlayacaktır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: ABD Dış Politikası, Doğu Akdeniz Bölgesi, Kıbrıs, Dış Politika
Değişiklikleri

DEDICATION

To my loving and supportive family

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AHEPA	American Hellenic Educational Progressive Association
API	Arab Peace Initiative
BRI	Belt and Road Initiative
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
EEZ	Exclusive Economic Zone
EU	European Union
IMET	International Military Education Training Program
ITAR	International Traffic in Arms Regulation
MENA	Middle East and North Africa
NAFTA	North American Free Trade Agreement
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NIE	National Intelligence Estimate
NLF	National Liberation Front
NSC	National Security Council
ROC	Republic of Cyprus
TRNC	Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus
UAE	United Arab Emirates
UN	United Nations
US	United States
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

Chapter 1

INTRODUCTION

Recent foreign policy shifts of the United States, especially after 2000s and post 9/11 events were significant, most importantly, the lifting of the arms embargo that was put during 1987 on the Republic of Cyprus. This recent shift raises concerns about whether tensions will rise between regional actors in the Eastern Mediterranean region. Through this thesis, US foreign policy shifts will be assessed through offensive realism of John Mearsheimer. In order to analyze the research question, this thesis will first look at US foreign policy trends and what is the motivating force behind US foreign policy construction and US foreign policy shifts. Later on, it will focus on how US foreign policy is affecting the Eastern Mediterranean region countries. It will look into what kind of implications US foreign policy shifts had on Cyprus throughout history and what were the reasons it shifted. Then it will suggest possible outcomes of how the recent US foreign policy shifts on Cyprus will enhance tensions between the actors of the Eastern Mediterranean region.

1.1 Research Question

This thesis aims to evaluate how recent foreign policy shifts of the United States during 2000s, especially the lifting of the arms embargo on the Republic of Cyprus¹, through the Eastern Mediterranean Energy and Security Partnership Act will affect the regional relations between actors within the Eastern Mediterranean Region.

¹ Here, Republic of Cyprus (ROC), refers to the Southern part of Cyprus that is administered by the Greek Cypriot community and is recognized by all countries but Türkiye.

1.2 Hypothesis

The arms embargo that was enacted during 1987 on Cyprus was a conflict preventing strategy by the United States. Their foreign policy back then was to prevent any conflict from occurring within Cyprus as this could be detrimental for all parties involved in the region such as the guarantor powers, Britain, Turkiye and Greece. Preventing conflict between these actors was significant for the US as they were both very powerful members of NATO and protected the South-eastern part of the NATO alliance.

Recent foreign policy shifts of the US show that their stance regarding Cyprus has changed. My hypothesis is that The Eastern Mediterranean Security and Energy Partnership Act of 2019 and the lifting of the arm embargo on the Republic of Cyprus by the United States will cause tensions to increase within the Eastern Mediterranean region. Regional actors such as TRNC², Turkiye and Russia will perceive these events as offensive moves to their nations and react in an offensive way as well.

1.3 Methodology

The use of guidelines, protocols, and directives in the course of conducting research is known as methodology. Qualitative research is more frequently preferred in social science investigations. Rather than concentrating on general laws, the goal of qualitative research is to make sense of the phenomena under study.

This research will be based on qualitative research through looking at secondary sources such as journal articles and book chapters written by advances authors and

² Here “TRNC” refers to the Northern part of Cyprus that is administered by the Turkish Cypriot community and is only recognized by Turkiye.

scholars. I will be conducting qualitative analysis of media sources, news articles and look into perspectives of the major powers involved within the Eastern Mediterranean region in different time periods.

To enhance the findings of this thesis, Offensive Realism of John Mearsheimer will be applied to the research. The US foreign policy shifts will be assessed through buck-passing strategies under offensive realism to point out how US achieves its self-interests in international relations. Additionally, comparative analysis of how recent foreign policy shifts of the US have differed from traditional foreign policy of the US will be examined to understand how the US's actions can lead to high tensions between the actors of the Eastern Mediterranean region.

1.4 Limitations

This study makes the assumption that tensions between the various players in the Eastern Mediterranean region will rise as a result of the US's recent changes in foreign policy, particularly the easing of the arms embargo on the Republic of Cyprus. It clarifies that the relaxation of the 1987 arms embargo and the Eastern Mediterranean Security and Energy Partnership Act are hostile to Russia, Turkiye, and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus and could spark intense hostilities between the parties. The first limitation of this thesis is the possibility of the opposite scenario happening, in which the ROC's advanced weapons and the removal of the arms embargo prevent the two communities from starting a conflict within Cyprus. Additionally, because of concern for a possible regional confrontation that would result in zero-sum solutions, it might discourage regional actors such as Turkiye and Russia from pushing the US and ROC on the offensive.

The second limitation of this thesis is that due to my identity of being a Turkish Cypriot, my perspective might be biased and subjective. However, with enhanced research on the topic, I will try to be as objective and prevent any ideographic shading that would change my presumptions and outcomes.

The third and final limitation of this study is the fact that, even if advanced research is done to prove my hypothesis, it is hard to access primary sources particularly those that include direct official information from the states themselves which could lead to a more reliable research.

1.5 Theoretical Framework

The present study will employ a theoretical framework to examine the research question of the thesis, which concerns the potential impact of recent changes in US foreign policy—particularly the lifting of the arms embargo imposed in 1987 on the Republic of Cyprus, a Greek Cypriot entity—on tensions within the Eastern Mediterranean region. The thesis will begin with an explanation of realism and move on to discuss neorealism, which Kenneth Waltz highlighted. It will discuss John Mearsheimer's explanation of Defensive Realism. The primary theoretical focus of the thesis and the research question analysis will be Mearsheimer's Offensive Realism and how US foreign policy reforms have made regional actors more offensive. Next, this chapter will concentrate on major breaking points where the US was acting offensive using buck-passing strategies.

1.5.1 Realism

Classical realism harks back to the Peloponnesian War narrative of Greek historian Thucydides. While acknowledging the importance of power in politics throughout human history, it also recognizes that in some circumstances, this power may be

counterproductive. It is crucial to take into account the moral conundrums and base impact on persuasion and common interests. Order, justice, and change on a local, regional, and global scale have been issues for classical realists like Morgenthau, Thucydides, and Machiavelli. To promote stability both within and between countries, they highlight the parallels between domestic and international politics and place a strong emphasis on ethics and community. According to the Classical Realists, the unrestricted pursuit of unilateral benefit by individuals, factions, and states can weaken communal relationships. In addition to failing to keep the peace, conflict resolution techniques like alliances and the balance of power may increase the likelihood of both domestic and international conflict. Eventually, attempts to establish order would destabilize those who think they are in a position of unparalleled power (Dune et al., 2021).

1.5.2 Neorealism

Kenneth Waltz popularized neorealism and focused primarily on how expected state behavior affects the results of international relations. States desire to survive on their own. One possible result of international relations is a balance of power. According to neorealism, a state's material might is an indicator of its degree of influence in global affairs, and therefore the more influence a state has, the more chances they have of surviving on their own and securing themselves. According to neorealists, the most important thing that shows the strongness of a country's foreign policy in international relations is how well they can ensure the security of their country and how strong they can stand against other nations. (Waltz, 1979).

1.5.3 Defensive Realism

Defensive Realism and its supporters such as Waltz, hold that governments are not very motivated by the international system to pursue further expansions of their

authority. Rather, the existing order forces them to uphold the current power structure. States should strive to maintain their current level of power rather than trying to enhance it. Defensive realism expresses that excessive power and security can be disadvantageous where it leads to times when security purchases become worthless to avoid hegemony. States with a defensive orientation act in reaction to structural limitations (Mearsheimer, 2001).

1.5.4 Offensive Realism

Mearsheimer developed offensive realism in response to defensive realism. It explains that the anarchy of the international system pushes aggressive state behavior across international relations. The main way that offensive realism and defensive realism diverge is in how a state attempts to maintain security by growing in strength. Because it contends that competition for interstate security would inevitably result in hazardous wars, Mearsheimers' offensive realism is hesitant when it comes to international relations. According to Mearsheimer, nations are constantly seeking to increase their influence and authority. They never seem to be content in their roles. States that engage in offensive activities will reap the desired strategic and economic rewards. A sovereign nation is said to be secure when its fundamental interests are untouchable due to its immense power. Offensive realism defines security as successive territorial expansion in which a powerful nation acquires resources that belong to other nations. When a state gets the upper hand over its competitors, it tends to act more assertively since it knows it cannot be resisted. Great powers will always be wary of one another and will work to reduce this anxiety by increasing their proportion of global power (Mearsheimer, 2001).

In multipolar systems that are in equilibrium, like the world we live in today, a strong state will select the buck-passing strategy. The act of taking no action to place the responsibility of resistance on another state is known as "buck-passing." This tactic is cheap and could incite a confrontation amongst other powers that would favor the buck-passing strategy's influencer. Conversely, balancing involves maintaining the current power structure, for instance by backing a state that is opposed by a revisionist state (Mearsheimer, 2001).

1.5.5 Assessing US Foreign Policy Shifts from an Offensive Realist Perspective

On November 19, 1987, the US Senate amended the 1961 Foreign Assistance Act to prohibit Greece or Türkiye from transferring or using defense articles manufactured in the US on Cyprus. This arms embargo was lifted in 2019 through the adoption of the Eastern Mediterranean Security and Energy Partnership Act. This act expressed that on the condition that the Republic of Cyprus prevents military vessels of Russia from entering their port, the non-lethal armament of the US can be sold to Cyprus from 2020 onwards when the act is signed into law (Kokkinidis, 2022).

The Eastern Mediterranean Security and Energy Partnership Act of 2019 is offensive to both Russia, Türkiye, and Turkish Cypriot-administered TRNC. Firstly, it aims to find an alternative to Europe's need for gas. It aspired to eliminate Russian energy through alternatives and jeopardize relations between Greek Cypriots and Russia. It aims to lessen Russian influence in Cyprus. Secondly, it applauds the discrimination of Türkiye and TRNC from the energy agreements that are being done with the Greek Cypriots with other energy actors such as Israel (Prince, 2019). While it accepts the Greek Cypriot side's contempt for the TRNC regarding maritime and energy rights, it also ignores the maritime powers given by the TRNC to Türkiye and treats them as an

illegal activity. Sales of F-35s to Türkiye are prohibited, and Türkiye is subject to requirements to stop energy searches in Cyprus' Exclusive Economic Zone. Türkiye is also instructed to cease violating Greek airspace. Türkiye is expressing to the US that they should stop this unilateral offensive act as it disregards both Türkiye and TRNC who also have energy rights in the region. Thirdly, it might lead to Greek Cypriots acting offensively against the Turkish Cypriots on the island, as they will have the upper hand in arms technology. This is also an offensive act to Türkiye, who is residing on the island as a guarantor power with its military, trying to maintain the security of the Turkish Cypriot community against the potential conflict between the two communities of the island. The US seems to be supportive of advancing the Greek Cypriots militarily, as it is also providing International Military Educational Training program and Foreign Military Assistance to Cyprus (Kontos & Georgiou, 2023).

Recent evidence also shows that the US troops are residing on the island through British Military Bases. This raises questions about what their intentions are (Kennard, 2023). The US being highly cooperative with the Greek Cypriots is not a traditional US foreign policy however US aims to prevent Russian influence within Cyprus. During the 1960s and 1970s, the US aimed to keep Russia out of the picture by giving support to the Turkish and Turkish Cypriot claims on the island. Their support was also due to preventing their two NATO allies from starting a regional conflict (Couloufoukakis, 2004). However, recent foreign policy shifts, especially the US decision to lift the arms embargo that was enacted in 1987, show that the US is using the buck-passing strategy that Mearsheimer presented, by preventing Russian and Turkish influence in the region by giving further power to the Greek Cypriot community. Through this, the US is getting itself out of the picture and letting the Greek Cypriot

community deal with the reactions that they will get from Türkiye and Russia about their offensive agreements while enjoying being the regional hegemon (Mearsheimer, 2001).

Even though Türkiye expressed on many occasions that the lifting of this arms embargo is offensive to both themselves and TRNC, the US ignored and went along with the agreements. Assessing this from an offensive realist perspective, the US is using its unrivaled power in the world to achieve its national interests, which in this case is to be the only regional influence by removing Russia as a competitor. Since Cyprus is far from the US, if a potential war occurred between the parties involved, it would not have to get involved. Through the Eastern Mediterranean Security and Energy Partnership Act of 2019, it's achieving energy advantages as well as preventing potential regional rivals from rising to power, such as Russia. This act being offensive to Russia, Türkiye and the TRNC which is administered by the Turkish Cypriot community might produce outcomes that could raise the tensions further (AFP, 2019).

This chapter have focused on introducing the topic and doing a theoretical analysis of how the US foreign policy shift of lifting the arms embargo and establishing the Eastern Mediterranean Energy and Security Partnership Act have been offensive to actors in the region. In order to better understand how the US foreign policy decisions are made, its important to look into how much the executive and legislative organs are active in the foreign policy construction process during different time periods. Formulation of US foreign policy will be explained further in the next chapter.

Chapter 2

US FOREIGN POLICY

This chapter will focus on how much influence the executive and legislative have in the foreign policy decisions. It will explain important institutions such as the National Security Council and CIA that the US Presidents and the Congress use to achieve their foreign policy aspirations. It will explain how US foreign policy differed from Cold War era to post-Cold War era. This section will also touch up on how the US foreign policy is influenced significantly by the Grand Strategy and who mainly influences US foreign policy decisions.

2.1 Foreign Policy

Foreign policy, as Alan Dobson explains, is the goal of a nation to advance their national interests in the nation's external interactions with other countries of the world. It is influenced by a nation's desire to achieve the best economic, political, and security-promoting outcomes through its interactions with other actors of the global system. Constructing their foreign policy is a complicated task for countries as they constantly face new challenges in the everchanging international arena. These challenges include unpredictable terrorist activities, and international and multinational organizations who care less about national interests and more about international interests and interdependent global economic relations (Dobson et al., 2007). Foreign policy of countries might change due to many reasons. Governments might shift their foreign policies due to the influence of entities that give certain support to them. These entities might include, religious groups, military, interest

groups, and rich people who can be considered leaders of important groups or own significantly large amounts of land. Other than the people and entities of a country, foreign policy can also be changed due to sudden economic and political changes, new technological developments, or sudden threats such as terrorist activities within the international system (Herman, 1990).

2.2 US Foreign Policy

The US foreign policy is important for many nations across the globe as it has the strongest economy and military power. Nations across the globe want to benefit from the great sources of the US through getting military aid or military support and having good economic partnerships that benefit them. When they create new policies regarding security and peace matters, these reflect on the countries they collaborate with as well, influencing almost all of the people of the world. As the US economy and the US dollar are so strong, all nations want to collaborate with the US on economic matters. The US has a big say in the work of many significant international institutions such as the UN and NATO which many countries are a part of. As it is so strong and has the power to influence almost all nations of the world, when there are certain foreign policy shifts in the US, it might reshape the whole of international affairs (Clementi et al., 2018).

2.3 Formulation of US Foreign Policy

US foreign policy focuses on how to enhance US national interests in the international system. These national interests include bolstering their national security, achieving beneficial partnerships that enhance the US economy, keeping up with technological developments, and preventing potential threats from affecting the US. The foreign policy formulation in the US shifts between the executive and legislative branches due

to different policies of different US presidents and failures of foreign policy decisions in different periods (Cox & Stokes, 2018).

2.3.1 The Executive

According to Article 2 of the Constitution, the president's duties in foreign relations include signing contracts and selecting diplomatic officials with the Senate's consultations. They can recognize foreign governments and carry out diplomatic relations with other actors through their ability to designate and receive ambassadors. They have the authority to use military force and gather foreign information since they hold the post of commander-in-chief. Congress has the power to enact laws granting the executive branch more power to take action on particular foreign policy matters. For example, the president can put economic sanctions on actors abroad through the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (Khan & Sabir, 2013).

2.3.2 The Legislative

Congress, according to Article 1 of the Constitution, can wage war, manage trade with other countries, oversee the army, navy, and their budgets, and set rules for the the armed forces on land and at sea. Additionally, the Congress authorizes diplomats and makes treaties. When necessary, the Congress has the authority to enact laws pertaining to any matter of foreign policy. They have the right to identify foreign policy problems—like the 9/11 attacks—that give rise to worries about national security. The executive branch agencies are subject to creation, dissolution, and restructuring by Congress, as they frequently do in the wake of significant disputes or emergencies. National Security Council, which certain presidents use to apply their foreign policy was an agency that was created in such a way (Khan & Sabir, 2013).

The President's foreign policy decisions are restricted by the War Powers Act (1973) and Congress's right to wage war. The War Powers Act of 1973 permits the president to send troops to other countries for almost 90 days. If the president wants to send troops to another country for more than 90 days, they need to get approval from Congress. The main aim of the War Powers Act is to foster productive dialogue about matters of war and peace between the legislative and executive branches. It also attempts to grant further constitutional war power to Congress (Fisher & Adler, 1998). However, Congress's power to veto is limited as it would be unconstitutional for them to veto a Commander of Chiefs' decision to send troops to other nations. Their veto being unconstitutional is because of The Chadha Supreme Court Case of 1983 allegation that executive measures vetoed by Congress are prohibited. This eradicates the power that the War Powers Act gives to Congress regarding the foreign policy of the US (Dobson et al., 2007).

2.3.3 The Executive vs The Legislative

The cooperation or the division between the executive and the legislative depends on how the elected party in the United States aims to pursue its foreign policy. Where some elected political parties favor a strong Congress presence within their foreign policy decisions, some political parties like to construct their foreign policy more independently or through other institutions of the state (Rockman, 2000).

The relationship between the president and the Congress resembles bipartisanship. In bipartisanship, rival political groups collaborate to reach a compromise and discover points of agreement. Compared to the Congress, the presidents have a more evident position and more sphere of influence to express what their countries' national interests are. They are also responsible for starting consultations to reach a common ground

with Congress regarding their foreign policy decisions. If consultation between the two bodies is not initiated, two different foreign policy decisions may confuse internal politics (Khan & Sabir, 2013).

Congress has the power to restrict the power of the president when the president is making appointments. They do this restriction through advice and consent as is any person is to be appointed to a post, it has to pass through the Senates' approval (Rottinghaus & Bergan, 2011).

The president is vested with the authority to command the United States army and navy abroad, while Congress can declare war. Before the Vietnam War, the President and Congress worked together more harmoniously (Yankelovich, 1978). Congress has chosen to be more enthusiastic in shaping foreign policy because they were dissatisfied with the way Presidents Johnson and Nixon handled the Vietnam War. War Power Resolution of 1973 was created due to the dissatisfaction of the Congress with the way the US foreign policy was conducted by the Presidents (Nathan, 1993).

Treaties can be negotiated by the president and ratified by the Senate with a two-thirds majority. Before the treaty is presented to the Senate for a vote, it must first be investigated by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. The Senate also has the right to disapprove a treaty. However, the president can control the whole environment as they can keep any discrete information about their decisions regarding foreign policy from the Congress (Wallner et al., 2020).

When assessing how trade agreements are made, Congress has more authority over national trade agreements under the Trade Promotion Authority, whereas the President

has less authority. The Congress aims to have as much control as the President has over national trade through bills such as the Omnibus Trade (Khan & Sabir, 2013).

In many instances, the Congress and the President disagreed about arms sales to other nations. When conducting a foreign policy decision regarding arms sales, Congress created "the Nelson-Bingham Amendment for Foreign Aid Authorization" to limit the president's authority, requiring the president to notify Congress of any arms purchases that were over \$25 million. This gave Congress the power to veto any sales of weapons by a concurrent resolution. The President's arms sales agreements with recipient nations have frequently been blocked by Congress, which either believes them to be unethical or believes they will exacerbate tensions in international relations. The president, however, retains the upper power even in cases where Congress attempts to forbid arms sales by passing resolutions. The president will still be able to proceed with the arms sale to the recipient nation after the Congress's review period has ended (Grimmett, 1982).

The president has the power to issue statements jointly or unilaterally with other countries. The joint declarations have no legal force and effect. Congress may attempt to modify the policy, encourage these relationships, or participate in the overall process, however can not prevent presidents actions to issue statements. One way Congress can limit the president is through exercising "the power of the purse" to restrain the president's foreign policy decisions. This is an occasion when Congress tries to use the withholding of funds to influence the president's actions. Signing statements are the means by which presidents hope to eliminate this impact. The Budget Control and Impoundment Act was crafted by Congress with the intention of using financial constraints to exert control over the presidency. The President may

impound funds through two different channels, both of which are subject to congressional review, as this statute highlights. This is crucial for the Congress because corruption could arise if the President funds wars through other channels and the Congress is unaware of these funding methods (Ellwood & Thurber, 1981).

2.3.4 Significance of National Security Council & Central Intelligence Agency

The Cold War was an awakening for the US to realize that they need more expertise when it comes to gathering information and conducting their foreign policy to achieve strong national security. After the National Security Act of 1947 was passed by Congress, all military organizations were placed under the Department of Defense. These developments led to the establishment of The National Security Council and the CIA (Hoxie, 1982).

National Security Council operates under the President to defend US national security through giving the president advice regarding matters relating to defense and treasury. The Council fills in the gaps that the president misses by collecting knowledge through having meetings with the heads of executive departments of the US to see what kind of domestic and global issues there are to advance foreign policy decisions of the US (Hoxie, 1982).

The CIA is seen as the distinct government in contrast to the National Security Council, which the president employs to conduct foreign policy decisions. For the benefit of the president and the NSC, the CIA gathers intelligence and carries out covert operations on behalf of the state in matters of national security. The CIA's role is troublesome since it occasionally finds itself caught between the president and the Congress, whereas the NSC is solely under the president's jurisdiction. The executive may have problems as the CIA assessments make their way through the congressional

intelligence communities. The executive does not want to make foreign policy decisions and risk criticism, exposure, or obstruction from the legislative branch (Gates, 1987).

Both the CIA and the NSC are crucial in assisting the executive in determining which foreign policy choices will best advance US national security objectives. The fact that the CIA was discovered by both the legislative and the executive branches, however, presents problems for policymakers because they don't always agree on foreign policy decisions. One could argue that the NSC is a more trustworthy source of counsel for presidents seeking unrestricted authority from Congress to manage their foreign policy (Gates, 1987).

2.4 US Foreign Policy During & Post-Cold War

2.4.1 US Foreign Policy During the Cold War

Following World War II, US statements about how the Cold War started indicate that the US was merely responding to Soviet Union actions rather than actively initiating the conflict. From the Soviet Union's point of view, the Soviet Union was just responding to US expansionist policies. By opening their economies to US investments, the US sought to persuade the countries of East Europe to adopt the world economic system it was leading and to become more capitalist in order to further US objectives (Kennan, 1947).

When considering the Truman era and the Truman Doctrine, the US was inspired not only by the USSR but also by other communist groupings that were opposing pro-Western regimes in places like Greece. They feared that the situation would spread to neighboring nations. The American people were urged under the Truman Doctrine to

stand up for free people who were struggling against outside pressure to comply. Eventually, this evolved into containing communism (Merrill, 2006).

The US supported an open and liberal international trading system through the Bretton Woods system. The Bretton Woods arrangement would provide the US with economic advantages over nations in Western Europe. However, the US has two concerns as a result of the geopolitical tensions with Moscow and the economic challenges facing Western Europe. First, economic downturns may force nations to enact more protective laws and shut down their markets. Second, pro-Soviet sentiment could be shifted in Western European nations by crises. The US provided aid to the European countries under the Marshall Plan, which was adopted in 1947 in an attempt to end the problems. The US involvement in the internal politics of other capitalist nations demonstrated that the Cold War was about more than just diplomatic and geopolitical disagreements; it was also about how the interests of the US would be supported by the internal politics of other capitalist nations (Rupert, 1995).

In the 1950s, containment policies became applicable more through military power. The US attempted to draw Japan closer to itself in the 1950s after losing China to communism and believing that Japan would be threatened by communist influence. US forces intervened militarily in defense of South Korea in 1950 against an invasion by North Korea. They established a large rearmament program as suggested by NSC-68 and sent troops to the Korean Peninsula. French forces fighting the communists in Indochina received military support from the US during the Korean War. They also consented to West Germany's rearmament inside NATO during this period (Ambrose, 2010).

The Saigon regime was unable to contain the communist danger posed by the NFL on its own, which led to US intervention in Vietnam in 1965. If they refrained from intervening militarily, South Vietnam would turn communist, endangering the security of America's regional allies as well. The Johnson administration convinced the public that North Vietnamese soldiers had assaulted US ships, and as a result, US Marines were sent to Vietnam to combat communism. The US withdrew from Vietnam when President Nixon was appointed and the US was unable to contain the NFL as they had hoped. The US's reasoning for participating in Vietnam was more about ideological than geopolitical considerations, concerning the removal of communism (Bradley, 2008).

When revolutionaries and communists gained power, their influence grew, which had an impact on neighboring governments' security and altered international relations. The way the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis emerged from the 1959 Cuban Revolution best illustrated the geopolitical ramifications of revolutionary transformation (Weldes, 1999).

It was evident that President Reagan contained the Soviet Union and its supporters in the Third World by escalating hostilities and building up armaments. During his first administration, Reagan pursued more forceful measures aimed at controlling the Soviet Union and communism. During his second tenure, this changed as Congress started to act more assertively. Another factor contributing to this shift was the increasing pro-negotiations stance taken by Gorbachev, the elected leader of the Soviet Union. All of these factors contributed to the end of the Cold War, but the Soviet Union's inability to withstand the ongoing geopolitical opposition was the main factor in its demise. Their economy came to a grinding halt as a result of this geopolitical

antagonism, and their internal politics collapsed to such an extent that they were forced to switch to a US-accepted policy (Halliday, 1986).

The US foreign policy during the Cold War was more about containing communism and getting all the capitalist countries to alter their internal politics in such a way that it benefits the US. The US aimed to isolate the Soviet Union economically from other nations in the region which led to its eventual demise and its subjugation to capitalism (Brands, 1993).

2.4.2 US Foreign Policy Post-Cold War

Post-Cold War, the US foreign policy relied heavily on internationalism. Different presidents adopted distinct strategies following the end of the Cold War. For starters, President Bush wanted to maintain strict control over the administration, therefore the foreign policy he recommended positioned the United States of America against the rest of the globe (Mandelbaum, 2019).

Bush's primary contribution to US foreign policy following the Cold War was the concept of the New World Order, which placed a strong emphasis on internationalism and was dedicated to democratic idealism. According to him, there are situations in which the possible advantages of using force outweigh the possible drawbacks (Melanson, 1996). The primary concern of US foreign policy was how to handle the unanticipated changes taking place in Russia and Eastern Europe. Following the fall of communism and the Berlin Wall, President Bush was eager to work with the Russian government to introduce them to the capitalist system (Engel, 2017). The US needed to make more decisive foreign policy decisions in the post-Cold War era, as evidenced by the invasion of Panama in 1998. Despite the United States' claims of defending democracy, there was no international legal basis for this invasion (Fisher,

1995). The US evolved and responded to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in a more appropriate manner. The US post-Cold War was eager to deploy its military might to defend its national interests around the world, and they were successful in forcing Iraq out of Kuwait, winning support from international actors like the UN (Karsh, 1994).

Clinton gave domestic concerns a greater priority than international affairs. Clinton prioritized economic enlargement first, followed by engagement and enlargement as foreign policy, in order to strengthen the domestic economy. He wanted to elevate the US to the top of the world economy using this strategy. His second goal in foreign policy was to make rogue governments more visible to the outside world (Lake, 1994). Clinton prioritized free trade against forces of protection and the ratification of NAFTA. In addition to pursuing global security, the US sought to join the large economic market and work with other developing nations like China and Brazil. The US-backed Eastern European and Russian democratization. They offered Yeltsin a lot of support. It was crucial for them to integrate Russia into the global capitalist economy and make them an active participant in international security matters. The only apprehension was that Russia might launch a nationalist movement in response to NATO's expansion into Eastern Europe. Clinton used a selective engagement strategy, refusing to have the US get involved in other nations' humanitarian crises. In instances like the genocide in Rwanda, the US did not respond, and it provided Haiti with minimal military assistance (Brinkley, 1997).

Further US unilateral moves were taken during Clinton's second term in office. They intervened in other nations' internal problems for humanitarian reasons and sought to stop the emergence of international terrorism. NATO forces defending the minority of Albanians against Serbia is one instance. They did not want Russia to veto their

humanitarian help, thus they took part in this battle unilaterally, without notifying the UN. Through the Wye River Accounts of 1998, the US also sought to bring about peace between Israel and the Palestinians in the Middle East (Nelson, 1998).

After the Cold War, the US motivations within foreign affairs were regarding selective engagement where they participated in humanitarian wars unilaterally. They aimed for internationalism, economic engagement, and enlargement where the US aimed to be the hegemon of the global economic market. They achieved free trade through NAFTA and started economic relations with countries such as China and Brazil. The US supported the democratization of Russia and Eastern Europe and wanted to increase its sphere of influence through NATO (Crothers et al., 1999).

2.4.3 Comparison of US Foreign Policy During & Post-Cold War

The US during and after the Cold War had the aspiration to integrate all economies of the world to collaborate with them through the Bretton Woods System and then post-Cold War through Nafta. Bretton Woods System was to incorporate all economies in a trading system where the US eliminated all protectionist policies of governments and gained benefits for its own economy. Post-Cold War era aspirations were similar. Through their policies of internationalization and NAFTA's free-trade rules, the US aimed to remove countries' protectionist policies and make economic collaborations with them that would extend their economies' power. Establishing an economic arrangement where most nations were trading with and contributing to the US economy was a general aspiration during and after the Cold War (Ciccantell, 2001).

The Congress and the President had disagreements regarding foreign policy during and after the Cold War. During the Cold War, this occurred with the Vietnam War, where Congress was not happy with the President's decision to wage war in Vietnam.

As a result of their disagreements, the Congress came up with the War Power Resolution to control and limit the Presidents' unilateral actions. Their disagreements are evident post-Cold War as well. For instance, regarding the Trade Promotion Authority, which aims to eliminate barriers to trade, the President sees it as advantageous to the US economy. However, the members of Congress are not as optimistic as the president which creates challenges when the two institutions are formulating foreign policy (Shapiro, 2015).

After the Cold War, there is no more ideological conflict among the superpowers regarding whether capitalism or communism will dominate world politics. After the demise of communism, capitalism is the leading ideology. However, the US aspiration of being a hegemon within a unipolar world order was evident during and after the Cold War. During the Cold War, when the world had a bipolar order with the Soviet Union and the US, the US aimed to eliminate the Soviets' influence and be the only power that dictated world politics. After the Cold War, when the world became multipolar with America's rival countries such as China and Russia, the US is still aiming to be the hegemon by eliminating the other powers' influence in the region. The US aspiration of being the only world hegemon with the strongest economy and military is evident in both periods (Goldmann et al., 2000).

2.5 What Influences US Foreign Policy

The "Grand Strategy" has been an important influence on the United States' foreign policy. Three headings can be used to analyze the Grand Strategy.

2.5.1 Primacy

The American desire to be the only supreme power among other global actors is explained by primacy. In a unipolar system, the US emerged victorious from the Cold

War and became the hegemon. The US wants to keep its regional hegemony while limiting the influence of emerging nations like China. They want to have the strongest military, station troops abroad, and keep out any rival state to become the global hegemon (Brzezinski, 2016).

Primacy also conveys the idea that the US, as a leader, has the authority to take unilateral action to further its goals or defend itself against security risks like terrorism or the deployment of WMD by hostile actors. Because the Grand Strategy is predicated on the idea that international institutions exist to limit US power, it is imperative that the US act independently. The US sought to maintain its primacy among international actors and the unipolar system, as evidenced by the Bush Doctrine. US invading Iraq without consulting the Security Council of the UN is significant proof of the US perceiving international organizations with suspicion and acting unilaterally without them. Another significant development was when President Clinton went on with the National Security Strategy, which placed a major emphasis on maintaining a potent military, preventing the spread of nuclear weapons, and removing economic barriers (Christopher, 1993).

2.5.2 Liberal Internationalism

According to liberal internationalism, the US should support the global expansion of democracy rather than engage in military conflict. It illustrates why free trade policies ought to be supported globally since they cause economies of different nations to become more interdependent, discouraging them from going to war with one another. International laws and institutions are crucial in managing international relations and the economy within an interdependent system (Dueck, 2003).

Liberal internationalists criticized the Bush Doctrine for being overly aggressive in its pursuit of unilateral war declarations while disobeying international agreements and conventions. Liberals argue that in order for the US to continue to remain powerful and sustain international peace, it is critical that it adhere to its democratic values and the institutions to which it has contributed (Ikenberry, 2002).

2.5.3 Offshore Balancing

Offshore Balancing accepts that the US cannot anticipate if the global order will remain unipolar or multipolar, but it can maintain its relative strength in relation to other countries by safeguarding its interests in a multipolar system that is forming. According to the balance of power theory, states ensure their survival by impeding other countries' ability to dominate the world and have the strongest military. Other states that want to maintain the balance of power reject any state that wants to become the hegemon. An excellent illustration of what happens when a state has unmatched power is the US. In numerous instances, the US acts unilaterally and suspiciously to further its own interests, demonstrating the perils of its unparalleled power (Brands et al., 2016).

Through offshore balancing, the US could maintain its position of relative strength in the international system while allowing other nations to handle their own security issues independently. The US's internal politics and developments would advance if they could break from the internal politics of other nations. Offshore balancing, in contrast to primacy, explains why the US should uphold democratic norms and laws and refrain from starting avoidable wars. In particular, the 9/11 attacks and the danger of terrorism serve as evidence of what happens when a country meddles too aggressively in the internal affairs of other countries. The United States should limit

its international actions and concentrate more on its domestic politics and security (Brands et al., 2016).

2.6 Who Influences US Foreign Policy

2.6.1 Epistemic Communities

Policymakers may need the counsel of knowledge-based experts from think tanks and the academy due to the recently rising global concerns. Their ability and significance could change how international policy is handled. The legislative and executive branches may create foreign policy that advances US national interests more through their recommendations for the formation of alternative policies (Haas, 1992).

Because of their superior knowledge, epistemic communities are better able to analyze how other governments formulate their foreign policies, which helps US policymakers compete with their rivals. This demonstrates the importance of epistemic communities to the US government when compared to formal interest organizations. Epistemic communities tasks in US foreign policy is through explaining to the decision-makers how they are going to solve foreign policy or national issues and help them detect the best possible policy outcomes (Haas, 1992).

2.6.2 Organized Interest Groups

Large domestic membership organizations have the power to work with the US legislative and executive branches to influence foreign policy through member votes. With their significant national investments, corporate firms, in particular, can exert pressure on policymakers to enact certain forward-looking policy changes (Lipset, 1986).

This was demonstrated historically when powerful remarks about communism and the Vietnam War were made by organized labor groups. It is evident that their views might have been heard far more easily through their investments in the nation, even though there is little evidence that their contributions resulted in major changes to foreign policy. However, as their social circle is wide, their contribution to the economy is significant and their members' votes are a large amount, they have the ability to penalize the ruling political party. Interest groups have been more active since the World War 2. They have been active in persuading the international organizations as well through lobbying efforts for many reasons. We can see the lobbying' activities importance on foreign policy decisions of the US further in the coming chapters (Milner, 1997).

Business organizations have exerted greater influence on changes to foreign policy concerning the economy and global trade. It is also clear that organized pressure has a greater effect on Congress and the representatives who are susceptible to the advantages that organized groups may be able to provide them. In contrast to Congress, the executive branch isn't paying much attention to its views (Milner, 1997).

2.6.3 Public Opinion

Due to the electoral competitiveness, governments place a high value on public opinion because they fear losing votes if they disregard it. There is evidence that public opinion determines 62% of US foreign policy decisions. Competitive elections, according to studies on democratic peace, make democratic leaders extremely receptive to public sentiment since, should they become insensitive, democratic elections will remove them from Office (Page & Shapiro, 1983).

Research indicates that US public opinion is more outspoken when the current issue is salient and less responsive when the topic at hand is not as important. The executive branch, with its longer-term in office and indirect elections, is less vulnerable to public opinion than institutions that hold regular elections in dispersed districts, like the House of Representatives. Public opinion is important as it symbolizes main national interests. Recent research shows that the new generation are more active in influencing the foreign policy decisions compared to their elders (Jacobs & Page, 2005).

This chapter focused on the positions of the executive and the legislative in foreign policy construction. It reflected on the differences of the executive and legislative when constructing the foreign policy. It can be concluded that the president have more influence on foreign policy decisions compared to the Congress. This was evaluated further in Cold War and posr-Cold War periods. It finally focused on the Grand Strategy and who influences foreign policy makings and shifts. In order to assess these explanations, the next chapter will talk about how US foreign policy influences the Eastern Mediterranean region.

Chapter 3

US FOREIGN POLICY IN THE EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN REGION DURING 2000s

The United States developed its foreign policy during the Cold War with the goal of stopping the spread of communism around the world, accordingly with the containment strategy. Through the Truman Doctrine, the United States provided \$400 million worth of military and economic support to countries such as Türkiye and Greece, which were threatened by the Soviet Union's expansionist goals (Merrill, 2006).

After the Cold War and the expenses the US spent on Middle Eastern wars, the 2000s show that the US is not as active in the region as before. The US foreign policy has shifted during 2000s due to the 9/11 attacks. Through the National Security Strategy, the Bush administration focused more on how to defeat global terrorism through creating new alliances. They emphasized on economic and political liberty of people. They aimed to deter countries from using weapons of mass destruction through adjusting the US foreign policy to combat the challenges of the new era. They focused on how to advance the security of the US to never relive something similar to the 9/11 attacks. They aspired to deactivate rouge states' terrorist actions through getting US relatively stronger to any other country of the world (Leffler, 2015). The 9/11 attacks changed the dynamic of the relations the US had with Arab countries as there

developed a mistrust. The new dynamic of the US and the Arab countries were most based on the security of Israel and to remove Russian influence from the region.

During 2010-2011 there was again significant foreign policy decisions. The US invasion in Afghanistan and Iraq to relieve those nations of oppressive governments did not deter the threats of terrorist groups. As the US retreated from solving regional conflicts in the Middle East, this gave way to Iran to become stronger. The only way Iran can be deterred from the region was for the US to try to solve the conflict between Israel and Palestine. As the US does not desire multipolarity and aim to get all the actors of the Middle East aligned with US domestic interests, they were less willing to solve regional conflicts. They lost their hope of democratizing the region. Instead of engaging in the region to solve regional conflicts and create stability, the US post 9/11 used other actors to achieve their regional interests. In general, the US foreign policy post-9/11 has shifted to be more cautious with their alliances and became more prominent on using smart power when needed to defend their national interests and secure their nation against terrorist attacks (Hazbun, 2010). For their long-term interests, in the Obama era, the US has shifted between soft and hard power within the Middle East and Eastern Mediterranean region (Guerlain, 2014). Even though Donald Trump administration shifted from smart power to hard power in times, the US still tried to achieve peace within the Middle East through the Abraham Accords during his presidency (Norlen & Sinai, 2020). President Biden had the desire to continue the Abraham Accord that president Trump began initiating. However, with the Hamas attack on Israel during 2023, the US foreign policy shifted from normalization to supporting Israel in its intense attacks towards the Palestinian people. This corrupted the normalization efforts made by the Abraham Accords as many Arab countries

refuses any normalization with Israel as long as the war between Israel and Palestine is not solved based on a two state solution (Whitson, 2023). If the US can use smart power to achieve normalization between Arab countries and Israel and eliminate regional conflicts, they can combat anti-Americanism of Islamist and populist groups in the Middle East to gain their bigger aspiration which is restricting Russia and China from the region to become the regional hegemon.

Even though the US has become more passive in the Eastern Mediterranean region in recent times, its military presence is still intact, speculating 21 countries (Lawrence, 2022). The United States aspires to have strong alliances with countries such as Israel, Türkiye, Egypt, and Greece due to their unipolar position being threatened by a growing Russia and China in the Eastern Mediterranean region (Yegin, 2022). The US does not want any other major power to overthrow its position as a regional hegemon (Mearsheimer, 2001). European strategic autonomy is another threat to US strategic interests in the Eastern Mediterranean region as it can be taken as an alternative to NATO's defensive power and lessen the need of countries in the region to rely on the US (Retter et al., 2021). The US goals in the Eastern Mediterranean are to protect Israel's security as well as to increase interdependence between its allies to prevent violent conflicts. The main tool that will lead the countries of the Eastern Mediterranean to interdependence is the region's energy reserves (Yegin, 2022).

This chapter will assess the United States' relations and foreign policy in accordance with Türkiye, Greece, Israel, Russia and China. It will look into what influences the US to be closer to certain countries and distant to others. The main argument of the chapter is that the US constructs its foreign policy in the Eastern Mediterranean

region in order to be the regional hegemon through restricting Russian and Chinese influence within the multipolar system.

3.1 US and Türkiye's Relations in the Eastern Mediterranean

Region

America's perspective on Türkiye varies from the Trump era to the Biden era. Trump remained silent as Erdoğan strengthened his authoritarian system and military power. The Blue Homeland strategy was declared during Erdoğan's presidency. Blue Homeland is the doctrine declared by the Republic of Türkiye in the Black Sea, Mediterranean, and Aegean, covering territorial waters, continental shelf, and exclusive economic zone, including maritime jurisdiction areas. These developments were disappointing for countries that were involved in the region such as the Republic of Cyprus as well as for the European Union (Ozturk, 2021). During the Trump era, Trump and the US administration were not on the same page when it came to Türkiye. While Trump had friendly relations with Erdogan, the US administration and Congress were supporting other regional powers such as Israel and Greece against Türkiye (Tziampiris, 2014). As two countries that did not get along with Türkiye, Israel, and Greece participated in energy cooperation in the waters of the Eastern Mediterranean. East Mediterranean Gas Forum which included Israel, Greece, Egypt, Cyprus, France, Italy, Jordan, and Palestine was formed to establish a gas pipeline to Europe. This was problematic for Türkiye's national sovereignty as they were excluded from the forum and the pipeline would pass from Türkiye. Türkiye's response was to demonstrate its military might by sending gunships to accompany its drilling vessels while they conducted hydrocarbon resource explorations in disputed waters. Türkiye's maritime agreement with Libya further increased the tensions (Seufert, 2020). Neither the European Union nor Trump could silence Türkiye for the actions they considered were

against their national interests. However, the new president of the US, Joe Biden, was not as tolerant towards Türkiye as President Trump was. Biden expressed to Türkiye that if they did not democratize and mend their relations with other countries in the region to satisfy US national interests, they would be isolated from the Eastern Mediterranean. Biden's warnings were effective as his encouragement led to Türkiye mending relations with Israel and acting in a more restrained way in the Eastern Mediterranean (Ozguler Aktel, 2022). Türkiye aimed to normalize its relations with Israel, Egypt, and Greece to prove to the United States that they were acting according to the US interests and not causing disharmony in the region (Pierini & Siccardi, 2021).

3.2 US and Greece's Relations in the Eastern Mediterranean Region

The US support to Greece when they were in a debt crisis in 2015 was crucially significant for their relationship. Through this support, the US also encouraged Greece to better its relations with Israel. As Greece was more obedient to the US compared to Türkiye, the US used them as promoters of regional stability by limiting both Türkiye and Russia. Greece also acted as an intermediary regarding the immigration crisis in Europe. These were the reasons why the United States perceived Greece as an "anchor of stability in the Mediterranean and Western Balkans" (Yegin, 2022). The United States saw Greece as a promoter of their interests in the region and gave them two main tasks. One was to restrict Türkiye's offensive actions and the other was to always promote Israel's security. The US support for Greece-Cyprus-Israel trilateral discussions regarding energy partnerships was not only backed by domestic interests but was also influenced by the Greek-American lobbying efforts within the US Congress. However, as Türkiye was acting according to US aspirations in the region, Biden withdrew its support from the pipeline project. Greece-US relations continued

to evolve as they renewed the Mutual Defence Cooperation Agreement which expresses the continuation of United States security investments in Greece. The United States also used Greece as a transporter of their weapons to countries that were threatened by Russia (Yegin, 2022). These two countries collaborated on other matters such as investment, trade, and law that were represented by the 2018 Strategic Dialogue. Important US companies, such as Tesla, made investments in Greece to prevent Greece from getting closer to other potential regional powers such as China (Argyri, 2022).

3.3 US and Israel's Relations in the Eastern Mediterranean Region

Israel and the United States always had a close relationship in the region as can also be seen by their support in many fields such as energy. New gas discoveries in Palestine, Israel, Egypt, and Cyprus could either create new settlements or new conflicts between actors. The US aims to use these new gas discoveries as a way to enhance Israel's security in the region by getting the actors interdependent on one another (Elbassoussy, 2018). Israel and Türkiye were keen on getting to an agreement regarding the Tamar and Leviathan fields. When Türkiye got involved in supporting Gaza in the Israel-Palestine conflict, all their agreements halted. The United States tried to reconcile their relationship, however, the two countries did not reach an agreement and the potential pipeline construction was stopped. Israel's EEZ agreement with the Republic of Cyprus and Greece further angered Türkiye. The United States supported Cyprus however emphasized that the Turkish community should also get their share from the drilling explorations. The US administration supporting the East Mediterranean Gas Forum as an observer and lifting the arms embargo that was enacted in 1987 further complicated the issue. Türkiye aiming to develop relations with Greece and Israel softened the US policy towards them as well (Yegin, 2022).

Israel's security is crucial for the US and it aims to preserve this security through normalizing Israeli relations with Arab countries in the Middle East. The US is also known for its aims to create stability in the Middle East region through creating interdependence between countries. The Abraham Accords is the best example that portrays US motivations. The US was able to achieve this stability through interdependence with countries such as the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain. The cooperation areas included economic, trade, security, and intelligence matters. The common concerns that pushed them to these agreements were about the threats caused by Iran and extreme Islamist groups. The mediator in all these agreements was the US whose main aim was preserving Israel's security (Guzansky & Marshall, 2020). Arab states in general were not willing to normalize their relations with Israel as most of them were a part of the 2002 Arab Peace Initiative. This initiative expressed that the only way Arab countries would ever consider normalizing relations with Israel was on the condition that Israel and Palestine's conflict ends and their relations normalize (Guzansky & Marshall, 2020).

The agreement with UAE included that they would normalize their relations with Israel on the condition that the US provides them security and armament to protect from threats in the region such as the threat of Iran. The UAE also believed that these agreements would cause tensions to lessen in the Middle East and promote a two-state solution between Israel and Palestine. This was the first time the US promised to supply weapons to a country and Israel did not demand anything in return (Ketbi, 2020).

In the case of the normalization between Bahrain and Israel, there was a lot of US pressure as they were also a part of the API. They were also the first Arab country who

support the Israel and UAE agreement. Due to divided perspectives within their country, Bahrain had more cautious agreements with Israel when compared with UAE and Israel agreements. This was due to al-Wefaq, the main opposition party of the government protesting against the agreement. They did not have a fully accepted peace agreement. Rather their agreements were based more on achieving peaceful diplomatic relations between one another (Singer, 2021).

The Abraham Accords' future and whether or not they could include other Arab countries in the region to normalize relations with Israel is unstable. Both UAE and Bahrain agreed to normalize relations with Israel because of US pressure and the condition that the US would provide them security and weapons. Many of the other Arab Countries that were a part of the API refused to normalize until the conflict between Israel and Palestine was settled. UAE and Bahrain were thinking of being a part of the Abraham Accord due to believing that these agreements could lead to stability between Palestine and Israel. The recent violent conflict that occurred due to the attack of Hamas on Israel's territory raised questions about the type of security the US can provide to countries in the region. This war is now offensive to all countries that are a part of the API. Bahrain stopped Israel flights from coming to their country and many other countries that are a part of the API will not consider normalizing relations for a long time (Northam, 2023).

3.4 US and Russia's Rivalry in the Eastern Mediterranean Region

Russia is one of the potential rivals to counter US regional hegemony in the Eastern Mediterranean region. Russia's main goal in the Eastern Mediterranean is to replace America as a global power where no other power can go against its sovereignty. They aim to have energy partnerships with other countries in the region by eliminating US

influence (Alterman et al., 2018). Especially, since the US retreated from the Middle East in 2011, Russia made a point of attracting those Middle Eastern countries to partnerships with themselves. Russia supported leaders that the US did not approve such as General Abdel Fatah el-Sisi in Egypt (Naumkin, 2015). Russia also gave military support to President Bashar al-Assad in Syria who was believed to use chemical weapons and condemned by the US for this. Through engaging in Syria, Russia gained the advantages of having a naval and aerial appearance in the Eastern Mediterranean which can challenge America militarily (Goldberg, 2017).

The crucial strategy that Russia usually adopts is that whenever the US decides to be neutral in a certain region, Russia starts to be more active. Another example of this, besides within Syria, is Russia's indirect involvement in Libya through Wagner, a Russian military group that gives clear support to Vladimir Putin. As the US and other Western powers stopped their support to Libya due to the rising conflict within the country, Russia extended its assistance to the Libyan National Army controlled by Marshal Khalifa Haftar. Haftar aims to get control of the Tripoli region. Other countries such as Türkiye are on the opposite side of this conflict, giving their support to Prime Minister Fayez al-Sarraj who authorizes the Government of National Accord and who has control of the Tripoli region (Bezhan, 2020). Russia's support of Haftar is unstable as it is refusing to accept that they have any influence on what Wagner does in Libya. As they are not showing clear support for Wagner, their support for Haftar is indirect and in a sense, discrete. Russia's unstableness is further emphasized in its communications with the al-Sarraj government. It can be seen that Russia is aiming to keep its relations with both Haftar and al-Sarraj strong to have a strong voice in the negotiations regarding Libya. The reason why Russia is not only relying on Haftar is

because they are not as prominent a factor for Haftar as other more influencing actors such as Egypt and UAE (Tekir, 2020).

Russia's aspirations in the MENA region, even during the Soviet Union have always been to get rid of US influence and create multipolarity. When the Western Powers declined, this gave Russia and Putin a big chance to expose the bad consequences of the United States' unilateral involvement in world politics. Russia is aiming to have non-ideological partners in the region to balance against US power, prevent radical Islamist groups, have strong military bases, and conduct beneficial partnerships regarding energy and arms. They are conducting most of their agreement with MENA countries by offering them to partner on the condition that these countries' debts are relieved (Blank, 2018).

When it comes to the major powers, the US does not like competition. The US aims to get rid of Russian influence in the region by allying with other countries against them. The biggest hit to Russian influence in the Eastern Mediterranean region was the consequences of their involvement in Ukraine. The countries in the West responded to the Russia-Ukraine war by isolating Russia economically and politically from many international spheres. Together, the United States, the United Kingdom, and the European Union implemented sanctions on the Russian central bank, preventing its \$643 million in foreign exchange reserves and depreciating the value of the rouble. The United States chose the method of rewarding their allies who did not partner with Russia and punishing the ones who did. For instance, Türkiye's acquirement of the S-400 missiles from Russia threatened both NATO and the US. In 2020, this purchase led to Türkiye being sanctioned by the US through the Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act. Türkiye was also prevented from getting the F-

35 Jet from the US (Kontos & Georgiou, 2023). Another example is when Egypt was planning to purchase a Russian Sukhoi 35 Multi-Role Fighter Aircraft, but the US condemned it. As Egypt was obedient to US desires, they were rewarded through US improving H-64D Apache Longbow attack helicopters (Iddon, 2022).

The US supported Israel-Egypt-Cyprus trilateral agreements as it could also benefit them in the region. They also supported the Israel-Greece-Cyprus agreement as mentioned before. The goal of the United States was to promote security in the Eastern Mediterranean region through encouraging energy partnerships. This motivation was passed into law as "Eastern Mediterranean Security and Energy Partnership Act of 2019". This act was important for Russia because it expressed the threats that Türkiye buying S-400 from Russia caused to the other countries in the region. It also pushed the countries to find an alternative to Russian gas that was dominantly sold to Europe to decrease the dependence of countries on Russia and isolate it. The bill exclaimed that Russian interference in the Eastern Mediterranean region should be stopped with mutual effort by the countries involved. It also promoted the ending of money laundering activities in Cyprus which was claimed to be done mostly by Russian elites (Dempsey, 2013). The Republic of Cyprus was not happy to isolate Russia in the first place. However, after the Russian involvement in Ukraine, Cyprus restricted access to Russian ships to Cypriot ports (Knews, 2022).

3.5 US and China's Rivalry in the Eastern Mediterranean Region

When it comes to China, its relations with the Eastern Mediterranean countries are not as active as the US or Russia. However, the amount of foreign direct investment China has been enacting is threatening US interests in the region. As the US shifts its focus away from the MENA region, other powers like China seek potential there. China aims

to reach its goals through the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) which is a network of land routes that connects Europe with central Asia. Through the BRI, China will be able to participate in many infrastructure deals that will gain prominence in the Eastern Mediterranean region. China and strong Chinese companies have important investments in Greece, Israel, Türkiye, Lebanon, Syria, Cyprus, Jordan, and Egypt (Kontos & Georgiou, 2023). In Greece, Chinese company COSCO Shipping has taken 67% of the port of Piraeus. Chinese-owned, Shanghai International Port Group is constructing a container port terminal in Israel. When looking at Türkiye, their third largest container terminal is 65% owned by investment groups that are related to COSCO. BRI has significant investments in the Suez Canal Economic Zone, in Egypt. They also have a Trade Cooperation Zone. In Syria, China has large stakes in important petroleum companies such as the Syrian Petroleum Company. Huawei is reconstructing its systems of telecommunication as well. In Cyprus, China is leading the construction of the LNG station (Kontos & Georgiou, 2023).

The United States may not have to balance militarily against China. However, to satisfy their interests in the region, without the interference of another major power, they do have to stop their allies from creating long-lasting bonds with China. The US is aiming to do this by cooperating with the EU to suggest that BRI's development should be detected as they could be against environmental or safety measures expressed through the Strategic Compass for Security and Defence. Another regulatory issue to BRI projects will be the 2020 EU Commission White Paper on Foreign Subsidies which explains the repercussions of foreign subsidies in the Single Market. The spread of 5G in the Eastern Mediterranean region through US efforts, also shows that China will be further detected and their relations with the countries in the

region will be restricted (Kontos & Georgiou, 2023). Even though the United States is very powerful when it comes to military means, it has not been successful enough to balance against China's investments in its ally countries. The US can not stop their allies such as Egypt and Türkiye from forming economic ties with China due to their energy sales. Their other allies such as Greece and Israel are also willing to continue having stable relations with China to enhance their national interests (Egozi, 2021).

3.6 US Attitude Towards the Aegean Sea Dispute

The dispute between Greece and Türkiye to define and expand their respective spheres of jurisdiction over the Aegean Sea is known as the "Aegean issue.". After the military intervention of Türkiye in Cyprus in 1974, the Aegean issue became a topic of conflict again. Greece believed that just like Türkiye intervened in Cyprus, they could pursue more offensive acts towards Greece through the Aegean Sea. Türkiye started investigating the Aegean Sea, where the continental shelf overlapped, in 1974, which made the dispute more pressing. In 1966, when Greece attempted to explore oil and increase its dominance in the Aegean, which Türkiye perceived as an act of war, tensions increased even more. The US is a significant actor when it comes to the Aegean issue as it is the only country that can deter both Türkiye and Greece from conflict. Both sides' distrust of each other, alongside their disagreements regarding the Cyprus issue, led to increased tensions (Bolukbasi, 2004).

The delineation of exclusive economic zones, the use of the flight information region, the demilitarization of the Greek islands in the Aegean Sea, and the boundaries of territorial waters and national airspace are among the Greek and Turkish concerns surrounding the Aegean. Türkiye disagrees with Greece, which dismisses most worries and claims that the continental shelf is the only point of contention between the two

countries. Turkiye wants to begin talks regarding all pertinent topics, while Greece wants to resolve the conflict through the International Court of Justice (Gross, 1977).

The United States position changes when it comes to the Aegean issue but it always rotates around its own national interests which is always protecting the security of the United States. Greece and Turkiye are both significant members of NATO which in turn makes them important allies for the US as well. When there is conflict between Turkiye and Greece, this affects NATO which in turn affects the US. When assessing US relations with Turkiye and Greece, it can be said that the US sees both countries as important NATO actors that prevent Russia's reach into the Eastern Mediterranean (Kalaitzaki, 2005).

Regarding the Aegaen dispute, the US supported Turkiye more because they disagreed with Greece's expansion of their territorial waters to 12 miles. This extension would be insensitive to the United States' status as a maritime powerhouse. Although the US was prepared to intervene between Greece and Turkiye, they focused more on Turkiye's benefit because Turkiye was a more significant NATO ally than Greece (Coulombis, 1983). However, the US also gave support to Greece as the Greeks were able to persuade the US to give them 70% of the military aid that they sent to Turkiye. This demonstrates how Greece was able to establish a state of regional equilibrium with Turkiye. Additionally, Turkiye attempted to lessen Greece's power in the area by a variety of means, including preventing Greece from joining NATO until 1980 and attempting to internationalize the Lemnos issue—that is, Athens' attempt to militarize Lemnos. Turkiye contends that militarization of this island is prohibited by the Lausanne Treaty (Clogg, 1991).

During the 1976 Sismik crisis, where Turkiye began exploration against Greece within the Aegean Sea, the US was a passive mediator, not doing enough to stop a potential conflict between Greece and Turkiye. The US retreated and expressed that Sismik doing exploration of disputed areas was not illegal. Even though the US did get the parties to agree to negotiations through resolution 395, It seems that during 1976, the US was not a mediator but by giving support to Tukey, they were almost factious regarding the Aegean dispute (Rizas, 2009).

Recent changes indicate that the United States is giving military support to the Greek islands of Lesbos and Samos, which is against international law, offensive to Turkiye, and in violation of the islands' non-military status (Jazeera, 2022). The US's intention to expand its military presence in the area may be a response to Turkiye purchasing S-400 missiles from Russia, which are intended to destroy NATO aircraft. Turkiye is attempting to distance itself from the US and forge relationships with Russia in an effort to retain its dominance in the area. Greece and Turkiye's relations within NATO as well as other issues like the Eastern Mediterranean oil conflict may deteriorate if the US develops new military bases on the Greek islands. The US is clearly trying to warn Turkiye about the consequences of continuing its hostile actions with Russia by supporting Greece in the Aegean conflict. Its goal is to lessen Russian influence over the area. (Lister, 2019).

When comparing the United States' foreign policy adjustments over the Aegean Sea dispute to its foreign policy towards the Eastern Mediterranean, it is clear that the driving reason behind both is the desire to maintain US dominance in the region by limiting Russian influence. The US views Greece and Turkiye as border nations that keep Russia out of the Eastern Mediterranean, making the Aegean Sea conflict

extremely important. The US's interests were threatened when Turkiye switched from the US to Russia by obtaining S-400 missiles. As a result, the US increased its cooperation with Greece in the Aegean Sea to alert Turkiye to its actions and maintain Greece as a border country to thwart Russian influence in the Eastern Mediterranean. The US can effectively encircle Russia in the Aegean Sea by deploying ships there, which benefits both the US and NATO. In order to achieve its national goals in the region—namely, to end Russia's influence—the US is buck-passing through Greece (Ozgur, 2022).

3.7 US Attitude Towards the EastMed Project

The goal of the EastMed pipeline project is to build a natural gas pipeline that would travel across Cyprus and Crete to link Greece with the energy resources of the Eastern Mediterranean. The project will carry natural gas into Greece from the Levantine Basin's offshore gas reserves. It will also work with the Poseidon and IGB pipelines to carry gas into Italy and other parts of Europe. (Manolis & Loverdos, 2013). States in the region are willing to cooperate and make agreements regarding the pipeline project as it has the potential to bring prosperity to all. Due to their shared interest in safely extracting natural gas reserves and in collaborating on pipeline development and other projects, Cyprus, Egypt, Palestine, Israel, Greece, Italy, and Jordan established the EastMed Gas Forum in 2018 (Winter, 2019).

TRNC has granted Turkiye the EEZ rights to explore for natural gas in Block 3 of Cyprus, as Turkiye and the Turkish Cypriot community are being overlooked by this pipeline project. The European community is objecting to Turkiye's use of gunboat diplomacy to protect the EEZ rights of Turkish Cypriots. Tensions with Turkiye and other energy-producing countries in the Eastern Mediterranean were expected to

increase as a result of the EastMed project, further dividing the island of Cyprus' two communities (Troulis, 2019).

The pipeline proposal has the support of the United States since it would lessen Europe's reliance on Russian gas. A recent change in United States foreign policy, however, indicates that the US has withdrawn the support for the project, citing reasons such as excessive costs and insufficient sustainability. Türkiye agreed to this change and stated that it would be too expensive to proceed with any pipeline project without Türkiye. It appears that US foreign policy may now more subtly reflect Türkiye's stance. Additionally, the initiative goes against the EU's Green Deal, which aims to drastically reduce carbon emissions (Dilek, ND).

This chapter have focused on how US foreign policy shifts effect the Eastern Mediterranean region in relation to specifically, Türkiye, Greece, Israel, Russia and China. US foreign policy in the Eastern Mediterranean region is to be the regional hegemon by restricting the influence of Russia and China and by enhancing the security of Israel. Post-Cold War have seen a shift from unipolarity to multipolarity with new actors such as Russia and China arising. Before the 9/11 attacks, the US had better relations with Arab countries. Drastic foreign policy shifts during 2010 and 2011 with the invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq also re-shaped their relations with Arab countries. However, in order to benefit from the energy resources of the Eastern Mediterranean and to reduce China and Russia's influence from the region, the US has shifted to normalize relations between Arab countries and Israel through the Abraham Accords. They aimed to buck-pass through Israel to get Arab countries' anti-American perspective shifted. In order to keep other major powers out, the US aimed to have regional allies and eventually be the regional hegemon. They used reward and sanction

system where they kept their allies such as Greece close and deterred their enemies such as Russia through sanctions. The US constructs and shifts their foreign policy in a way where it suits their national interests. This can be further seen in how US has constructed and shifted its foreign policy in relation to Cyprus as will be analyzed in the next chapter.

Chapter 4

US FOREIGN POLICY IN RELATION TO CYPRUS

This chapter will look into the major breaking points of the US foreign policy in accordance with Cyprus during 1960s and 1970s. Then it will compare how the US foreign policy shifted from tradition times to 2000s when energy explorations in the Eastern Mediterrean began in 2012 and Turkiye aligned more with Russia. The US have given support to Turkiye regarding the Cyprus conflict. This could be seen during 1974 when the US did nothing to prevent Turkiye's military intervention to Cyprus. However, the Eastern Mediterranean Security and Energy Partnership Act of 2019, shows that the US has shifted its foreign policy to supporting the Republic of Cyprus against Turkiye and Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. This chapter argues that this recent shift occurred due to Turkiye distancing itself from NATO and the US from 2011 onwards to be closer to other regional powers such as Russia. As this is against US interests, through the Eastern Mediterranean Security and Energy Partnership Act, the US has lifted the arms embargo on the Republic of Cyprus and sanctioned both Russia and Turkiye. This foreign policy shift in accordance with Cyprus will be analysed and compared with US foreign policy in the Eastern Mediterranean region.

4.1 US Foreign Policy at Major Breaking Points

Cyprus has been in a protracted unresolved conflict for decades. When looking at US foreign policies' influence on the Cyprus Conflict, certain motives have always been prominent. Their main aims included reducing Soviet influence through containment policy in the region as well as preventing a possible conflict between Türkiye and

Greece who are both very significant NATO allies. The US also reached to gain advantages from the energy resources in the Eastern Mediterranean by preventing conflict through creating interdependence between the countries in the region and protecting Israel were also among their interests (Nicolet, 2002).

4.1.1 US Foreign Policy in Cyprus During 1960s

The 1959 London and Zurich agreements were important for US interests as they could enhance stability in the region. The settlement of the Cyprus problem could prevent war between Greece and Türkiye, who were important NATO allies, could prevent security issues in the Balkans and the Middle East, and prevent the downfall of Greek internal politics (Coufoudakis, 1976).

In the 1960s, the US was not interested in getting involved in the Cyprus issue, until the United Kingdom could not deal with the issue by themselves and asked for US assistance. The threat of strong NATO allies going into conflict as well as potential Soviet involvement in the region led them to intervene to settle the dispute. This was a type of power mediation where a superpower, which was the US in this scenario, gets involved in a conflict to settle it by promoting advantages or potential punishments to get to the desired end (Fisher, 2001).

In 1963 events, the Greek Cypriot community was influenced by a revisionist approach that aspired to renew the 1959 agreements, whereas the Turkish Cypriots were happy with the 1959 agreements and wanted to keep the situation as it was (Hatzivassiliou, 2005). When the conflict escalated between the two communities on the island, the US intervened through the UK's push. They tried to get both sides to negotiate to prevent violent conflict through a ceasefire (Coufoudakis, 1976).

US containment policy played an important role. Greek Cypriot leader Makarios had connections with the Soviets. This alongside Greek Cypriots having a strong communist party called AKEL who also supported Makarios, was against the US's policy of containment. Cyprus is important for the US due to its geopolitical position as within the Eastern Mediterranean region it can provide the US with unsinkable bases. Other reasons why Cyprus is very significant for the US is due to the Soviet Union's large fleet in the region, its growing military and political advisory missions in numerous Arab States, and the protracted Arab-Israeli dispute. Cyprus became extremely important for multiple reasons such as the potential reopening of the Suez Canal, the loss of US bases in Libya, US concerns over Middle Eastern oil, and the security of shipping lanes (Coufoudakis, 1976).

When the mediation efforts by the UK at the London Conference in 1964 showed no success, the United States aimed to get both Greece and Türkiye to appease to prevent further tensions in Cyprus. The NATO Commander, General Lemnitzer communicated with both Türkiye and Greece to prevent Türkiye's military intervention and stabilize the situation in Cyprus according to Western and Turkish interests through peacekeeping and mediation efforts (Xydis, 1972). The Anglo-American NATO plan to solve the Cyprus issue failed due to the Greek President Makarios not accepting peacemaking or peacekeeping resolutions attempted by NATO, which was in their perspective, an organization that only took into consideration Türkiye's interests. Additionally, Khrushchev forewarned Makarios of NATO's 1964 penetration in Cyprus. The US's interests were threatened by this and by AKEL's existence due to their fear of communism (Windsor, 1964).

4.1.2 The Formulation of the Acheson Plan

During February of 1964, the Cyprus Issue was brought up to the Security Council's agenda. Security Council Resolution 186 gained support from the United States. With their support, the US prevented the Turkish military presence in Cyprus however they could not get Greece and Türkiye to stabilize their conflicting perspectives regarding Cyprus. In March of 1964, the US also suggested that the conflicting communities in Cyprus be eliminated through a voluntary population swap. When these diplomatic measures failed, the United States came up with the Acheson Plan (Brands, 1987).

The Acheson plan aimed to protect American interests in the conflict. It proposed enosis as well as protected Turkish strategic and political aspirations in the region as well. It looked forward to ending the independent Republic that was formed through the 1959 Agreements. This was beneficial for the United States' interests due to many reasons. Firstly, Türkiye intervening in Cyprus would cause a war between Greece and Türkiye. Secondly, it would make Türkiye and Greece less dependent on the United States. Thirdly, it would enhance the prominence of AKEL and the Soviet Union in Cyprus which also could lead to the spread of communism on the island. Finally, it would create issues both for the UN as well as NATO. These threats could be eradicated by ending sovereignty in Cyprus through enosis (Nicolet, 2002).

The first Acheson Plan expressed that certain parts of the island would be controlled by Türkiye as military bases. The plan provided security measures to the Turkish Cypriots who were going to reside in parts of Cyprus that were controlled by the Greek Cypriots. Even if the Turkish Cypriots had areas that they controlled separately, they would be under Greek Cypriot authority. There would be an administration set for Turkish Cypriots in Nicosia to detect and deal with issues that are important for the

Turkish Cypriot community. Lastly, the plan expressed that there would be a commission appointed by the International Court of Justice of the United Nations to safeguard all people of Cyprus (Nicolet, 2002).

This plan was rejected by both communities in Cyprus as well as Greece. Through this plan, the United States aspired to reduce the influence of communism and President Makarios as well as implement a way to control Cyprus through Greece, Türkiye, and NATO. After the plan was unsuccessful, the United States even tried to use EOKA hero Grivas to neutralize Makarios' influence in Cyprus (Coufoudakis, 1976).

Britain and the United States proposed the concept of an international force commanded by the Security Council on February 18, 1964. The UN presence in Cyprus fuelled US and NATO interests in the region. The most important benefit was that UNFICYP's existence on the island deterred both sides from inter-communal violence to a certain extent. The US enjoyed sharing the burden of trying to solve a protracted and very complicated conflict with another international organization as all their alternative peacemaking methods had failed. However, the UN and the US had different peacemaking aspirations. This divergence was first seen in 1965 when the UN viewed Cyprus as a sovereign state and expressed that the conflict between the two communities on the island should be solved between these two communities with the outcome being respected by other international parties (Joseph, 1997). The UN mediator, Plaza, did not view Enosis or the idea of a federal state as an option for Cyprus because of reasons regarding the economic, political, or social dynamics of the island. They emphasized respecting minority rights and leading through majority rule. The UN mediator resigned due to his plan being rejected by both Türkiye and the Turkish Cypriot community. The US and the UN's different aims regarding Cyprus

became prominent again in December when Cyprus assigned the UN to defend their sovereignty through resolution 2077. The US reaction to this resolution was with Türkiye and supported the continuation of the Acheson Plan (Joseph, 1989).

Greece was seen as a supporter of American interests in Cyprus because both parties were against President Makarios's actions regarding getting support from communist party AKEL and the Soviet Union. Greece also did not want a conflict with Türkiye because of Makarios's revisionist aspirations. They sent Grivas to Cyprus to enhance their defense capacity and to introduce a new influence to the Cypriot community which was more conservative and contrary to Makarios's ideas. Greece was reluctant on the role of the US when it came to matters such as the Acheson Plan and the active role of NATO in Cyprus. However, the United States used Greek fears of a possible conflict in Cyprus, which could lead to a conflict between Türkiye and Greece, as a condition against Greeks to support the US interests. The US warned the Greeks that they would not stop Türkiye from intervening in Cyprus and made them believe the only way to gain their national interests would be through a solution like the Acheson Plan (Xydis, 1972).

The negotiations between Greece and Türkiye regarding the Acheson Plan in the 1960s were done through the CIA report, National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) that suggests two motherlands influencing enosis or double enosis on Cyprus would be to achieve a middle ground between the two communities (Dobell, 1967).

The first Acheson Plan which was supportive of enosis and Greece making certain concessions to Türkiye was supported by Türkiye and rejected by Greece as Greeks could never give Cypriot territory to Türkiye. Greece suggested that Türkiye could

share British base areas under British sovereignty. The US realized that they had to get rid of Makarios' influence on the island so they also aimed at "instant enosis" where Greece, Türkiye, the US, and the UK would conspire against Makarios and oust him to achieve enosis without his interference. When Grivas attacked the Turkish Air Force, there was again a threat of Soviet involvement in Cyprus as Makarios was insisting on them. This fuelled the US to pressure the Greeks to communicate further with Türkiye for enosis and to get rid of Makarios. If Türkiye and Greece did not see eye to eye, the US would have to get aircraft and The Sixth Fleet into the Eastern Mediterranean region to prevent violent conflict while attempts would be made to oust Makarios (Stearns, 1992).

The second Acheson Plan was based on a coup d'etat instead of a plebiscite. The condition was that Greeks would be leasing Türkiye a lesser version of the base area that they wanted, for 50 years instead of fully giving the areas to them to control with full sovereignty. Both Türkiye and Greece rejected the plan as it was against their national aspirations. Türkiye rejected it because the First Acheson Plan benefitted them more and they did not want to seem as selling out their interests to the Greeks to the public. Greek Cypriots were not ready to make any concessions when it came to Cyprus anyway (Dobell, 1967).

The Third Acheson Plan expressed that since no negotiations were achieved, Greece and Türkiye would share control and occupy the island through the London and Zurich agreements with NATO support until every party was confident that there would be no more attacks from the other side. It could be seen that during this time, the US was favoring Greece's lead in Cyprus more as they pursued their national interests further. They favored Greece more than Türkiye due to their aspiration to prevent Russia and

Cyprus from getting closer through agreements such as the Moscow and Cyprus axis. On the other hand, the UK wanted Türkiye to be involved as that was the only way they could get rid of the influence of Soviet-supported Makarios from Cyprus. The Third Ball Plan also rested on the same aspirations of the US however without involving the motherlands who constantly rejected plans. After these attempts, the US realized that the Cyprus issue was not so important that they had to create issues for NATO and turned to support Türkiye. The reason for this shift was due to the US believed that getting Türkiye as an enemy would cause national security issues (Camp, 2001).

The US's goals during the Acheson Plan were straightforward, according to offensive realism. In order to further their own interests it used the buck-passing method—a divided Cyprus between the home countries—it sought to navigate Greece and Türkiye. In addition to strengthening US dominance in the area, this would make it less likely that Russia would show interest in the island or the surrounding area (Dobell, 1967).

4.1.3 Influence of the Greek Conservative Minority Cabinets in 1965

In 1965, Greek Conservative minority cabinets which gained their main support from the US were against Papandreou as they were putting pressure regarding what they were going to do about Makarios. These cabinets had discrete conversations with Türkiye regarding how to enable enosis as well as how to achieve Turkish and United States interests in the region. Papandreou responded by expressing how the US plans regarding Acheson and the existence of NATO were a threat to Greek interests. Centre Union needed US support to reduce the influence of communism, however,

Papandreous' anti-US actions caused complications for Greece and American relations (Draenos, 2008).

4.1.4 Grivas' Attack of 1967

In 1967, the military took over Greece's control and even though NATO attempted to get Türkiye and Greece to communicate regarding Cyprus, their attempts were unsuccessful as Türkiye realized Greece lacked diplomatic skills. When Grivas attacked the Turkish Cypriot community in 1967, Türkiye threatened Greece that they would intervene and stop this conflict in Cyprus. Through this action, Greece did not only threaten US interests but also NATO's interests. The US, through Cyrus Vance, convinced Greece to make all the necessary moves such as removing the military and Grivas from Cyprus. This gave more power to Makarios, however, calmed the tensions within Cyprus as it also led to Türkiye removing their threats in the region to respect the sovereignty of the island (Papandreou, 1971).

It's crucial to explain that contrary to the events of 1964 where the Soviets were supportive of Greece, in the 1967 crisis, the Soviets were supportive of Türkiye due to their developing relations and coup d'état that occurred in Greece through the US-supported anti-communist junta. To calm the 1967 crisis, Ambassador Hart and Ihsan Sabri came together and drafted a 5-point proposal. It expressed that Türkiye would respect the integrity of the island, all troops from motherlands would be reduced to the numbers which were agreed in the London-Zurich agreements, UNFICYP would detect these withdrawals and their role in Cyprus would be enhanced, Turkish Cypriots that were harmed due to the Ayios Theodoros and Kophinou conflicts would get paid reparations and special protection would be provided to Turkish Cypriots. During these times, the US pursued quiet diplomacy and then through assigning former Deputy

Secretary of Defence, Cyrus Vance to Cyprus, they pursued shuttle diplomacy. Through Vance, both Türkiye and Greece negotiated without feeling humiliated (Hart, 1990).

4.1.5 The US During the Intercommunal Talks of 1968

In 1968, when the intercommunal talks between the two communities in Cyprus were occurring, the US aimed to reach an agreed settlement in Cyprus. They adopted this conflict-solving approach after 1968. This was due to reasons such as Cyprus and Makarios gaining enough international support to defy US pressures, a possible influence of the Soviet Union in Cyprus, and a general imbalance in the Middle East, which made Cyprus strategically an important island for the US. The idea of Cyprus becoming an independent republic was not the United States' first choice however it was considered as a practical policy alternative as they continued to aspire for a solution that satisfied US interests. The United States aimed to use Türkiye and Greece as sources that could achieve their interests in Cyprus as long as there was no threat of the Soviet Union getting involved. This again shows a pattern of buck-passing from the US to achieve their main interest of removing Russia from the region (Constandinos, 2011).

4.1.6 Türkiye & Greece's Efforts to Divide Cyprus in the 1970s

In 1969, the National Front which supported Greece's aims in Cyprus was formed. They aimed for enosis as well as getting rid of all those other parties that were against enosis. Through the secret plan "Hermes" which was constructed with Greece, this nationalist group aimed to get rid of Makarios and divide Cyprus between Türkiye and Greece. This idea of partitioning the island between Türkiye and Greece was further emphasized in Lisbon where foreign ministers within NATO met in 1971. The main

idea was that the Cyprus problem had to be solved in favor of these two guarantor countries (Camp, 1980).

In intercommunal talks that followed Greece was pushing the Greek Cypriot community and Makarios to accept a solution that benefitted Türkiye, which was partitioning the island between Türkiye and Greece. Secretary General of the UN, U Thant also offered UN mediation to the intercommunal talks. As the plan got approved by many international actors such as Britain, the U.S.S.R, and France, the US rejected it when Türkiye was excluded from the process. This might have been also due to the U.S.S.R involvement in the plan. Only when Greece and Türkiye offered to start intercommunal negotiations on a more expanded dimension, has the US give its support. Another important development that happened in 1971 was the return of the enosis dreamer Grivas to Cyprus. The US did not care about who was leading the Cyprus government as long as their interests in the region were secured. They did not mind enosis and as Makarios had a potential alternative, Grivas, he would also act accordingly to keep his position. When it came to what the Soviets would do regarding Cyprus, they did not care much about Cyprus gaining independence but more about how the US could not implement Western-type solutions within the region. The US had to act fast on its partition plans for Cyprus (Camp, 1980).

4.1.7 The Threat of the Czech Weapons

When Czech weapons came to Cyprus, Greece was threatened by this and gave Makarios a nine-point ultimatum about returning these weapons to UNFICYP to ensure the Cyprus National Guards' strength and exclaimed how the independence of Cyprus was not acceptable as Cyprus was just another part of Greece. Greece threatened that if Makarios refused they would intervene in Cyprus accordingly with

the Treaty of Guarantee. The US realized Makarios was a necessary actor in Cyprus to prevent violent conflict (Stergiou, 2007).

4.1.8 The US During the Events of 1974

There is no direct link between the 1974 events and the United States however there are sources that express that the US was sending arms to Cyprus. Anti-government terrorism which was led by EOKA-B and Grivas ousted Makarios and slowed down the negotiation process between the two communities in Cyprus. The main US interests in Cyprus had to do with the Cold War and the US aiming for their national security motivations (Constandinos, 2011).

In 1974, Makarios wanted Greek Army officers out of Cyprus which was an attempt to reduce Greece's influence in Cyprus and disrupted Cyprus and Greece relations. This led to the attempted assassination of Makarios by the Cyprus National Guard (Kıralp, 2021). This assassination was also backed by the US who still supported enosis. Alongside Greece becoming against Makarios, Türkiye, and Greece also had issues regarding oil rights in the Aegean Sea. All of these fuelled Türkiye to land in Cyprus through the Treaty of Guarantee. The US motives shifted to end the further conflict between Greece and Türkiye over Cyprus as well as to prevent the Soviets from getting involved in Cyprus. As an outcome, Makarios was exiled from Cyprus (Couloudakis, 1976).

4.1.9 US Shifts Regional Balance of Power in Cyprus to Türkiye

Through Türkiye landing in Cyprus, the US for the first time since the first Cyprus Republic, allowed the regional balance of power to shift. The US never wanted Cyprus to go back to becoming an independent state so it encouraged the intervention of Türkiye. It could be seen that the United States encouraged Türkiye's military presence

in many ways. It can be seen that they did not take any action to prevent the breakdown of the Geneva Conference regarding Cyprus which was followed by the enhancement of the number of Turkish Army in Cyprus. The US gave further support to Türkiye and Turkish Cypriots by expressing how it was needed for the Turkish Cypriot community to have further autonomy and claim that Türkiye's withdrawal might lead to anarchy in Cyprus (Constandinos, 2011).

It can be seen that the US took a passive stance against Türkiye's intervention in 1974 because they did not want to push Türkiye to have better relations with the Soviets (Joseph, 1997). They were also dealing with their domestic issues regarding the Watergate Scandal (Kissinger, 1982). They did not intervene as they shifted their foreign policy from supporting enosis to partition in the island due to their support of Türkiye (Camp, 1980). At this point, the US did not care about the Cyprus conflict as long as it did not affect their domestic interests in the region. According to offensive realism, their main aim was to preserve the stability in Cyprus through the motherlands so Türkiye's military presence in Cyprus achieved their interests in a more unofficial way (Kassimeris, 2008).

4.1.10 The 1974 Arms Embargo on Türkiye

When Türkiye did a military intervention in Cyprus, they used arms that were supplied to them by the US which was against the Foreign Assistance Act of 1962, the Mutual Defense Pact of 1959, and the 1974 Foreign Assistance Act. As this became an issue for Congress and the Executive, the US threatened to cut aid. In response to American concerns, the Turks cited the right to self-defense, Article 4 of the Cypriot Treaty of Guarantee, and the necessity of preserving a powerful Türkiye in NATO in the wake of Greece's withdrawal from military action. On 24 September 1974, the US banned

military supplies to Türkiye as long as the President did not express good intentions to reach an agreed settlement in Cyprus. This embargo was protested in Türkiye, as Türkiye searched for alternative ways to find arms and threatened to put sanctions on the US as a reaction. Due to these issues, Türkiye's NATO membership was put on the table to be reassessed. The US intentions in putting this embargo were to prevent violent conflict from escalating to a longer period and to reach peace within Cyprus based on the interests of the Cyprus Republic. This caused Türkiye and US relations to suffer and created a path for the U.S.S.R to get Türkiye on their side (Campany, 1984).

This embargo divided the executive and legislative organs in the US. The executive, especially Henry Kissinger was against the Congress intervening in how US foreign policy was conducted abroad. However, Türkiye using US weapons to conduct such an intervention in Cyprus was too much for Congress so they had to intervene and enforce the arms embargo (Hackett, 1977). The legislation clearly expressed that US arms that were supplied to other parties could only be used for national self-defense and other internal security issues. They were prohibited from being used for aggressive aspirations (Legg, 1981). Another reason why Congress was pushed to take this decision was due to the intense support they got from Greek-American lobbying. The two main institutions that supported the Greek community in the US were The American Hellenic Educational Progressive Association (AHEPA) and the American Hellenic Institute. They were responsible for collecting information about parties that were involved in Cyprus and sharing this information with the Greek Americans in the US (Kitroeff & Constantinides, 1998). The Greek-American lobbying was significant for the decision-making process of the Congress and had influenced the foreign policy

back then, however, their influence on the results was minimal. (Hicks & Couloumbis, 1977).

Even when Türkiye was willing to make concessions and remove some of the troops from the island, the Congress was determined to not lift the arms embargo until Turkish military forces were fully out of Cyprus and a settlement was sealed (O'Malley & Craig, 2001). During this period, Türkiye also faced aid cuts because of its inability to stop growing opium and exporting it to the US (Legg, 1981). In both cases where aid cut-offs and embargoes were put in, Congress and the administration were inconsistent with each other. Türkiye was an important strategic partner for the administration and they did not want to threaten their relations, however, the Congress could not bypass the fact that Türkiye violated their laws regarding arms usage (Kassimeris, 2008).

Kissinger warned the US that the sanctions Türkiye experienced were much harsher than any other country and that this would cause issues regarding security within the Eastern Mediterranean area. Alongside Kissinger, the executive also exerted pressure on Congress, and the embargo was partially lifted with the Foreign Act of 1976 being passed (Kissinger, 1981). Lifting the arms embargo was important because it could lead Türkiye to make concessions regarding Cyprus, to achieve stability with Greece and allow their reintegration into NATO. On 13 September 1975, a Federal Turkish Cypriot state was established. Türkiye's insistence on not conforming to the US and even re-considering its position in NATO showed how they were diplomatically more advanced than Greece (Laipson & Koumoulides, 1986). Türkiye even used the Aegean dispute to convince Greece to apply pressure on the US to lift the arms embargo. However, the US would not portray itself as a country that would bow down to external

influence regarding its foreign policy decisions (Kassimeris, 2008). Six months after the embargo, Congress expressed that the arms agreements that were made before the ban could be permitted. Through this way and NATO's maintenance and supply agency, Türkiye was getting access to arms. When the Soviets started supplying arms to Türkiye, the US realized that their interests were under threat and they had to lift the arms embargo to prevent Soviet-Turkish relations from extending (McDonald, 1989).

When President Carter was appointed, he, through the influence of his National Security Advisor Brzezinski, was able to lift the embargo on Türkiye. He could achieve this by emphasizing the threat of Türkiye becoming close to the Soviets and using the Democrats' majority within the Congress (Ioannides, 2001). The embargo was lifted on 13 September 1978 and formally through the amendments made to the Law of Foreign Aid through a chapter called "US Policy in the Eastern Mediterranean" (Kassimeris, 2008).

The US Senate modified the 1961 Foreign Assistance Act on November 19, 1987, stating that Türkiye or Greece could neither transfer nor utilize defense articles made in the United States on Cyprus (Rubin, 2021).

4.1.11 S-300 Crisis of 1997

On 4 January 1997, the US was again faced with a crisis in Cyprus. Republic of Cyprus expressed their plan to acquire S-300 anti-aircraft missiles from Russia to be able to defend themselves from a possible expansionist move from Türkiye. Türkiye and Cyprus expressed that they are one in this conflict and whoever is against one is considered to be against the other as well (Güney, 2004). Even though Greek Cypriots aimed to lessen Türkiye's influence on the island, from the US's point of view, this

move would create insecurities in Cyprus and would not prevent Türkiye from further intervention in Cyprus (Gordon, 1998). Russia aimed to increase its influence in the Eastern Mediterranean Region and cause issues within NATO. They could use Cyprus for espionage aspirations. Issues in Cyprus would create issues within NATO and the southern alliance of the organization would be in crisis. Russia could also use Cyprus for money laundering purposes. Even though the Greek Cypriots gave in to all the pressures and gave up on the missiles, the US aimed to be more aware and involved in Cyprus to get rid of potential conflicting threats in the future (Güney, 2004).

4.1.12 Cyprus' EU Membership

On 16 April 2003, the Republic of Cyprus signed its Accession Treaty to be a part of the European Union. Their official membership was going to begin on 1 May 2004. The United States was not against Cyprus' membership in the EU but emphasized that Türkiye must be included in the process as well. The US supported Türkiye so significantly that they exerted pressure on Greece to remove their veto over Türkiye's EU candidacy. The EU did not have good relations with the US due to the approach the US took towards Iraq. This affected Türkiye as well because the EU became unresponsive to the US's requests to give Türkiye an exact accession date into the EU. Türkiye perceiving US intervention in Iraq as illegitimate also damaged relations between Türkiye and the US (Güney, 2008).

In the Clinton era, the US was supportive of Cyprus's EU accession, however, they aimed to solve the island before their accession. In 1998, the US asked for the Turkish Cypriot community to be recognized through Holbrooke. When the topic of Cyprus came up during the 1999 G8 summit, the US persuaded the UN Secretary-General to take the political position of the Turkish Cypriots into consideration. The US

advocated that both sides should participate in negotiations where they settle all questionable issues regarding borders, settlement, and three freedoms to finally be able to create two independent states. This was an aim to end the Republic of Cyprus that dated back to 1960 (Coufoudakis, 2004).

The US's influence on the Secretary-General could be seen clearly on 12 September 2000, as this was the first time the Secretary-General took both Turkish and Greek Cypriots as equals to one another. When President Bush came into power, he also argued that Cyprus becoming a party to the EU without a solution would cause issues between Türkiye and Greece, and increase the threat of war within Cyprus and the Aegean. It would also lead to Türkiye moving away from Europe and the partitioning of Cyprus being formalized. Washington also urged Türkiye to pressure Denktas to go further with negotiations as Turkish Cypriots had more options to gain their interests in Cyprus before the Republic of Cyprus entered the EU. Also, Cyprus was a burden on Türkiye's economy and could move it into war with Greece. These issues caused threats to American interests in the region and they had to find valid solutions to prevent them from occurring. Bush administration supported Kofi Annan in his methods of mediation. They also gave Türkiye the image of the promoter of democracy in an Islamic country which was an important success for US foreign policy. When the Greek Cypriot's vote came out as negative at the end of the referendum, the US condemned their vote (Coufoudakis, 2004).

4.1.13 The US Influence on the Annan Plan

After the events of 1974, there were many attempts by the United Nations to get rid of the hostilities between the two communities and achieve peaceful settlements. The Annan Plan, designed by Kofi Annan, was one of the failed settlement plans for the

Cyprus Conflict. The Annan Plan suggested a loose bi-zonal federation with two member states named the Turkish Cypriot State and the Greek Cypriot State. The Annan Plan was a workable strategy that pushed both parties to make concessions to one another in order to protect their basic requirements. (Sozen & Ozersay, 2007).

The plan was unsuccessful for many reasons. Without engaging the Turkish and Greek Cypriots, Kofi Annan developed the Annan Plan, raising doubts about its motivations among both communities. It was unclear to both parties whether this plan would work in their favor or against them. The second error made by Kofi Annan in creating the Annan Plan was to overlook Greece's and Türkiye's roles as guarantor states. Since both populations were heavily impacted by their motherlands, communication with the Cypriot state was insufficient for a working solution. When considering Cyprus in the 1960s, it was a product of the actions of external powers. Both the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities in Cyprus aspired to establish "Taksim" and "enosis" connections with Türkiye and Greece. The inability of the two groups to create a shared Cypriot identity was the reason they were unable to come to an agreement on a settlement plan to resolve the Cyprus issue. Ethnic nationalism has a strong influence on both of them. All political parties in the Greek-Administered Republic of Cyprus are in favor of uniting the island and admitting Turkish Cypriots as a minority. On the other hand, Turkish Cypriots demand that their state, the TRNC, be recognized and are unwilling to live as minorities. This was another reason why Kofi Annan's efforts to settle the Cyprus issue were unsuccessful (Yılmaz, 2005).

During the Annan Plan, the US was not as actively involved as Britain. However, Britain was clearly acting together with the US and the UN who had similar aspirations of getting a "yes" from the referendum. In the US, the Greek American lobbies, such

as the American Hellenic Institute, showed their discontent with the Annan Plan through many institutions. They expressed that the US should not support the Annan Plan as the plan needed revisions to benefit the Greek Cypriot community further (Rossides, ND). After the EU accession of Cyprus was ratified, the US played a more enhanced role in supporting the Annan Plan. Talks between the two presidents of the two communities in Cyprus, Papadopoulos and Denktas, took place in New York and final negotiations between Greece and Türkiye took place in Switzerland. However, the major political parties such as DISY and AKEL that were more optimistic about a settlement did not approve of the way the US and Britain constructed the plan as they expressed that the plan did not meet their security wishes. They asked for a UN Security Council Resolution that would have more security guarantees. The UK went for the Resolution, but with Papadopoulos's influence on Russia, Russia vetoed the resolution. This led to a no from DISY and AKEL as well, which were the only political parties that supported the plan (Kyle, 2004).

Since the United States was, in some instances discretely, supportive of Türkiye during and after the events of 1974, they alongside Britain did not make any efforts to get Türkiye to make concessions regarding the Annan Plan. The United States' aspiration in the region was to have a Cyprus that was separated, as they believed that an independent Cyprus would be too vulnerable to Russian influence. Their efforts to stabilize were never effective. As Türkiye was a needed ally in NATO they did not want to complicate their relations with them and push them closer to Russia which is the reason why they supported a settlement that also benefitted Türkiye (Kaloudis, 1999). From an offensive realist perspective, the US is not actively involved in the Annan Plan process, however, it is still present through backing Britain's plans of

settling the issue according to their interests. The US here is using the back-passing strategy to not actively involve itself in a conflict but aiming to influence it by motivating another actor (Mearsheimer, 2001).

4.2 Evaluation of the US Foreign Policy Shifts in Respect to Lifting of the Arms Embargo

4.2.1 EEZ Agreements of Cyprus and Shifting US Interests

By Law 64/2004, President Tassos Papadopoulos established an exclusive economic zone (EEZ) in April 2004. Even though Türkiye has been against Cyprus's agreements regarding the sea with Israel, Lebanon, and Egypt, saying these agreements violate the rights of the Turkish Cypriots, the US has been silent. The US could even be considered supportive since in October 2008, Noble Energy, a US-based company, was granted exclusive exploration rights to one of the plots that Cyprus has established within its EEZ (Kariotis, 2011).

4.2.2 The Eastern Mediterranean Security and Energy Partnership Act of 2019

Between 2018 and 2019, it could be seen that The United States and the Republic Of Cyprus were working together more than ever before. A Statement of Intent on bilateral security agreement was agreed by the US and the ROC towards the end of 2018. For the first time, Cyprus joined the U.S. International Military Education Training Program (IMET). International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) limitations were temporarily waived to permit the sale of non-lethal defense goods and services to and from the ROC. With significant bipartisan support, the Eastern Mediterranean Security and Energy Partnership Act of 2019 was signed into law in December 2019, underscoring American security interests in the Eastern Mediterranean region (U.S. Department of State, 2021).

The US mandated that defense articles cannot be exported, reexported, or transferred to Cyprus unless the president approves to congressional committees that those in charge are working with Washington to carry out financial regulatory oversight reforms and prohibitions on money laundering. Cyprus met the requirements outlined in the Eastern Mediterranean Security and Energy Partnership Act, which is why the US eased the arms embargo on the country. The United States will be allowed to transfer non-lethal weaponry to Cyprus following the removal of the arms embargo. Cyprus will, among other things, refuse to allow Russian military ships to land in ports within the zones under government control in exchange. Additionally, the US is limiting Russia's economic ties to Cyprus with this move. (Kokkinidis, 2022). This act is significant because the US aims to reduce Europe's dependence on Russia and Russian energy. Alongside releasing the arms embargo on Cyprus, the US also provided Greece and Cyprus with further security support through this act. To strengthen cooperation between the US, Israel, Greece, and Cyprus, it approved the creation of an Energy Center. The only concern is that the regional security issues might delay the drilling activities of Cyprus which is another reason why the US is taking extreme measures to enable security. The biggest threat to the Republic of Cyprus is Türkiye which is constantly aiming to prevent Cyprus's drilling activities without involving them and the Turkish Cypriot community (Prince, 2019). Türkiye and TRNC also expressed major dissatisfaction with the lifting of the arms embargo through lobbying against it. Representatives of Türkiye and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus claimed Congress was approving moving Cyprus into another war through contributing arms (AFP, 2019).

Apart from lifting the arms embargo on the Republic of Cyprus, the Eastern Mediterranean Security and Energy Partnership Act supports the ongoing creation of a new energy triangle in the Eastern Mediterranean by promoting the discovery of natural gas, particularly in the Republic of Cyprus' Exclusive Economic Zone. The act distributes millions for Foreign Military Assistance to Greece and Cyprus as well as the International Military Educational Training program. It requires a joint resolution from Congress before F-35s can be physically delivered to Türkiye and limits the sale of F-35s to Türkiye until Türkiye proves to be a more trustworthy companion. The reports on Turkish violations in the Aegean and eastern Mediterranean must also come from the Departments of State, Defense, and Energy. The investigation will specifically look into Türkiye's incursions into Cyprus's Exclusive Economic Zone and its infringements of Greek airspace (Kokkinidis, 2022).

4.2.3 US Interests in Cyprus Through the UK

The United States does not have an official military base in Cyprus. However, recent developments show that the US military personnel are deployed in the British Bases in Akrotiri and Dhekelia, the numbers of the personnel being discrete. US Air Force is increasing the number of their airmen to 129 in RAF's Cyprus base. They are also using RAF Troodos as a way of collecting intelligence such as hacking Israeli drones. They also extended the number of housing for their personnel that are located in Cyprus. Their investments in housing in Cyprus have reached \$27 million. Another important factor to note here is the US spy force, the 1st Expeditionary Reconnaissance Squadron, is also set up at the British Base. The crucial point is that the numbers of military personnel are being kept discrete. Even the Pentagon is refusing to give proof of how many airmen they have located in Cyprus. Cyprus has become a good location for the intelligence facilities of the US and the UK, who are discretely collaborating.

Although their military presence is not official, It is clear that the US has significant interests in Cyprus that they are pursuing through British Military Bases and the UK (Kennard, 2023).

4.3 US Foreign Policy Shifts in Cyprus from Traditional to Recent Times

In the 1960s and 1970s, it could be seen that United Foreign Policy was more about preventing Russia from becoming a potential rival to the United States' unipolar power in the Eastern Mediterranean region. The US aimed to prevent Russian influence in Cyprus as well as to prevent a potential war between their two important NATO allies, Türkiye and Greece. The US aimed to find the perfect advocate for their interests in the island and decided that the only way to achieve their desired end was through partitioning the island which they had tried to establish through the many versions of the Acheson Plan and then through staying neutral to events of 1974 and giving silent support to Türkiye's military presence in Cyprus (Coufoudakis, 2004).

Energy is another moving factor that determines and shifts US foreign policy in the Eastern Mediterranean region. As energy developments are occurring in the Eastern Mediterranean region around Cyprus and as Russia is becoming a relevant actor in Cyprus with its investments there, the US has shown significant changes in its foreign policy during 2012. This can be seen prominently with the US support to the EEZ agreements of the Republic of Cyprus with other countries in the region, even though the Turkish Cypriot community is disregarded from these agreements (Kariotis, 2011). It can also be seen through the Eastern Mediterranean Security and Energy Partnership Act of 2019 that the US signed with the Republic of Cyprus. Through this act, the arms embargo that has been intact since 1987 has been lifted and the Greek Cypriots will be

acquiring US weapons freely which might threaten the still conflict between the two communities. The arms embargo was lifted with the condition that the Republic of Cyprus would limit its relations with Russia (Kokkinidis, 2022). The US is also developing its relations with the Republic of Cyprus by providing them with military training programs such as the “Silver Falcon 23” operations (Shkurko, 2023). Although the US does not have an official military base in Cyprus, recent findings show that the US is increasing its influence in Cyprus by discretely engaging its military personnel in the British Military bases in Cyprus. All these recent foreign policy shifts show that the United States' foreign policy is becoming more offensive to TRNC to enhance its power in Cyprus by reducing Russia's influence and giving more power to the Greek Cypriot community. It can be said that recent foreign policy trends of the US show that it is using buck-passing through the Republic of Cyprus (Kennard, 2023).

4.4 Comparing US Foreign Policy on Cyprus and the Eastern Mediterranean Region

When looking at the United States foreign policy in Cyprus and the Eastern Mediterranean region, there are clear similarities. In both cases, the United States takes action to prevent a potential conflict between their NATO allies, Türkiye and Russia. They want to establish stability in the Eastern Mediterranean region and within Cyprus as well (McCormick, 2023).

The United States aim to abolish Russian influence both in Cyprus and within the Eastern Mediterranean region. Their reason for this is that they don't want any other regional hegemon in the region preventing their self-interests. The US aims to deter Cyprus from contributing to the Russian economy, especially through the Eastern

Mediterranean Security and Energy Partnership Act of 2019. These actions are all due to the US being afraid that their power will be taken away by Russia and that they will be replaced by another regional hegemon (Alterman et al., 2018).

The United States, both in the case of Eastern Mediterranean and Cyprus foreign policy strategies, does not want to make Türkiye their enemy, as they believe that this would cause issues for the security of the region. It can be seen within the Acheson Plan and then in the events of 1974, how the United States took on a passive role. When they could have deterred Türkiye, they chose to stay silent as getting Türkiye against them and NATO would have been against their self-interests and would have put their security under threat. The same passive acts can be seen when it comes to the Eastern Mediterranean region as well. Even during Biden's presidency, encouragement instead of sanctions was given to them (Yegin, 2022).

The United States does not like nationalistic regimes in either Cyprus or the Eastern Mediterranean region as they are more prone to rebel against outside influence (Chomsky, 1991). This can be seen in the Cyprus case as well. When the Republic of Cyprus aimed for independence and being a sovereign independent country, the United States did not accept this. They did not want a feeling of common nationalism on the island, separate from Türkiye and Greece. This is one of the reasons why they did not get involved to stop Türkiye from the 1974 intervention in Cyprus. Cyprus being governed by two NATO allies, Greece and Türkiye, was more beneficial for them, as it meant that, they would have more control over it. It also meant that Cyprus would not fall into the Soviet hands, as it was controlled by countries who were loyal to the US (Constandinos, 2011).

The United States' foreign policy in Cyprus and the Eastern Mediterranean, revolves around preventing other potential regional hegemonies such as China and Russia from arising and replacing the US as the regional hegemon. It revolves around preventing the rebellion of nationalist countries, protecting Israel's security, and keeping the region stable by getting the countries to depend on each other regarding energy resources in the region while also serving US national and economic interests (Kontos & Georgiou, 2023)

Concluding this chapter, it can be seen that the US foreign policy was in favour of Türkiye regarding the Cyprus issue during 1970s. However, with the beginning drilling explorations in the Eastern Mediterranean region and with Turkey getting closer to one of US's biggest regional rival, Russia, the US has shifted its foreign policy to be in favour of the Republic of Cyprus through the Eastern Mediterranean Security and Energy Partnership Act of 2019 and the lifting of the arms embargo that was put during 1987. Assessing all of this from Mearsheimer's offensive realism, the US is now buck-passing through the Republic of Cyprus to achieve its interests in the Eastern Mediterranean Region which is to reduce the influence of all other potential regional hegemonies such as Russia and China and be the sole power. When comparing US foreign policy in accordance with Cyprus and the Eastern Mediterranean region, it can be explained that the US constructs its relations with countries to achieve its domestic interests, reduce Russian and Chinese influence and be the only regional hegemon. The US has hard times adapting to the multipolar world order and instead of creating alliances, its aim is to deter its rivals through buck-passing strategies. It gets its ally countries to restrict their relations with its rival countries, rewards the ones that obey and sanctions the ones that rebel. The rivals and the countries that are sanctioned also

have potential to respond to the US's offensive actions which will be explained further in the next chapter.

Chapter 5

FINDINGS

The Eastern Mediterranean Security and Energy Partnership Act of 2019 might lead to certain developments as a reaction from the countries in the region to the lifting of the arms embargo, energy agreements that disregard certain actors in the region as well as laws within the act that are offensive to Türkiye, TRNC, and Russia. I hypothesize that this recent policy shift of the US will raise tensions within the Eastern Mediterranean region.

In accordance with offensive realism, recent shifts in Türkiye's foreign policy are also significant. It could be seen that since 2011 Türkiye is not as actively pursuing the international organizations such as EU and UN anymore. Türkiye took a more active role with its unilateral decisions and it is not afraid to use military force when needed. It has also been aiming to solve regional conflicts in many countries such as Azerbaijan and Somalia. From an offensive realist perspective, Türkiye distancing from the Western powers and acting as peace broker in certain countries show that, it is aiming to be a regional power (Kutlar & Onis, 2021). Türkiye may establish a joint naval base with the TRNC in response to the injustices committed against the TRNC regarding maritime jurisdiction and arms embargo. It can also modernize TRNC's weapons technologies to keep them in equal conditions with the Greek Cypriot community. While such a development increases tensions on the island, it may also be condemned by international organizations that support peace, such as the United Nations, and may

increase tensions between Türkiye and other actors in the international environment (Prakas, 2022). New developments may also present different alternatives. The agreements signed by Türkiye and Greece at the 5th High-Level Cooperation Council showed that they reached common ground on education, tourism, sports, social services, agriculture, economy, customs, and most importantly energy. If Türkiye develops such energy agreements and makes agreements with other countries, such as Israel, with which the Greek Cypriot Administration negotiates, it may act offensively as a reaction to the conditions of the Eastern Mediterranean Security and Energy Partnership Act of 2019 (Ensonhaber, 2023). It can be seen that Türkiye is also buck-passing through Turkish Republic of Cyprus to go against the wishes of the Republic of Cyprus.

According to the recent developments, where the Greek Cypriot community claims that they support a federation, the Turkish Cypriot community supports a two-state solution on the island. Both communities in Cyprus increasing their military technology and due to their ideological differences, this might lead to armed conflict. In this case, the possibility of conflict between the two communities is high, and this speaks to the importance of buffer zones. Buffer zones create a significant deterrence effect, and newly rising tensions show that we still need them (Colin, 2023).

America aimed to initiate the normalization process between Israel, Bahrain, and the UAE by creating the Abraham Accords to reduce Russian influence in the region.

America can also use the same strategy within Cyprus. It can lead to a bilateral solution by changing its policy, seeing Türkiye as an ally, and supporting a solution on the island just like it did in the 1970s. From an offensive realist perspective, the US can

shift and buck-pass through Türkiye to achieve its interest of removing other powers influence in the region. This could also lead to them forcing the Republic of Cyprus which is now a strategic partner of the US to accept a solution that they do not favour (Camp, 1980).

As the Greek Cypriot community is acting offensively to Russia by becoming interdependent with the US, Russia might respond to this by supporting Türkiye with its TRNC cause and getting closer to recognizing TRNC as a state. The development that expressed Russia opening a consular office within TRNC shows that they are moving more to support the Turkish Cypriot case which might be a reaction to the Greek Cypriots abandoning their agreements with Russia. In other words, Russia could buck-pass through TRNC to have more influence in the Eastern Mediterranean region and to go against the US (Kanlı, 2023).

All of these findings show that the Eastern Mediterranean Security and Energy Partnership Act and the lifting of the arms embargo on the Republic of Cyprus were offensive to actors in the region to benefit US aspirations of isolating Russia. However the US, through offensive buck-passing strategies is putting Republic of Cyprus through the burdens that these offensive acts will get them into. The US uses its energy companies, fighting against money laundering and sanctions against Russia to be the regional hegemon. It seems that the actors in the region will respond accordingly as offensive as these new developments were which will lead to tensions increasing further within the region.

Chapter 6

CONCLUSION

The US's internationalization policies, which result in interconnected economies across nations, make the US's foreign policy significant to many other countries. The way that US foreign policy is formulated reveals the differences that exist between the legislative and executive branches of government. The present thesis demonstrates the supremacy of the president and the National Security Council in formulating foreign policy decisions. The President's power cannot be restrained by Congress in most cases, yet Congress may have an impact on occasions. When considering the Cold War and the post-Cold War Era, this becomes more evident (Rockman, 2000). The US foreign policy formulation can be influenced by the Grand strategy as well as important epistemic communities and public opinion (Jacobs & Page, 2005).

When assessing how US foreign policy affects Cyprus, this thesis looks at it from two dimensions. Firstly, it assesses US foreign policy shifts from major breaking points throughout the history of Cyprus, and then secondly, it evaluates the recent shift in US foreign policy with respect to the lifting of the arms embargo. The assessments show that the US foreign policy has shifted from supporting the Turkish claims on the island to supporting the Greek claims. This might be due to Türkiye's offensive moves such as agreeing to acquire S-400 missiles from Russia (Kariotis, 2011). This research's theoretical background rests on the offensive realism of John Mearsheimer. It mainly looks at the times when the US used buck-passing strategies to gain their national

interests. The Eastern Mediterranean Security and Energy Partnership Act of 2019 shows that the US used the Republic of Cyprus to achieve its interest in the region which is to reduce the influence of Russia and deter any actor from challenging its' regional hegemony. The US is buck-passing through the Republic of Cyprus to achieve its interests in the region. It's eliminating itself from engaging into a war with other nations. Its getting the Republic of Cyprus to fight its conflicts with Turkey and Russia (Kokkinidis, 2022).

The US foreign policy in the Eastern Mediterranean region shows similar traits to US foreign policy in relation to Cyprus. The US's main aim is to eliminate any other regional hegemon such as Russia and China from arising to challenge its position. It can be seen that the shift from unipolarity to multipolarity did not benefit the US. The US conducts all its relations in the Eastern Mediterranean to prevent its allies from having deep political and economic connections to Russia and China to get the world to stay in a unipolar order with the US as the hegemon. The Abraham Accords that were conducted with UAE, Bahrain, and Israel to normalize relations is an example of how the US aims to pull all these actors away from Russia and towards themselves. In the case of the Eastern Mediterranean we can see that the US is buck-passing through Greece, Israel and ally Arab countries to fight against the influence of Turkey and Russia.(Ketbi, 2020).

The reason for the worsening relations between the US and Türkiye may be that Türkiye is getting closer to Russia, contrary to the US interests. Due to this, America plans to reduce Russian influence by acting even more aggressively, by cutting off the sale of F-35s to Türkiye, by supporting Greece in the Aegean dispute, and by supporting the Republic of Cyprus in the Cyprus problem by providing them with arms

technology. This will naturally increase tensions among actors in the region. Türkiye and Russia will not remain indifferent to these actions of the USA, and this will increase the possibility of conflict in the region (Kanlı, 2023).

The US is using Mearsheimers' buck-passing strategies in Cyprus and in the Eastern Mediterranean Region to get the actors involved to achieve US interests subconsciously. In the Cyprus case, it's using the Republic of Cyprus to act offensively against Türkiye, Russia, and TRNC. This shows that the US is making another actor fight its case without getting their hands dirty. This is also evident in the Eastern Mediterranean. The US by siding with Greece regarding the Aegean dispute is acting offensively towards Türkiye. However, just like in the Cyprus case, the US is not the main actor that is under threat of a regional conflict, Greece is (Bolukbasi, 2004). The US is raising tensions between actors in the Eastern Mediterranean and pulling itself back from any potential conflict that will occur between them.

Unless circumstances shift, such as the recent warming of relations between Greece and Türkiye, the Eastern Mediterranean Security and Energy Partnership Act of 2019 and the lifting of the arms embargo will lead to even more counter-reactive offensive acts from the actors in the region. These include, Türkiye allying even further with Russia to the point that TRNC gains Russian recognition. Türkiye might enhance the military technology of the TRNC which could cause tensions to increase within Cyprus. In order to be offensive to the Republic of Cyprus, Türkiye might engage in energy agreements with other energy actors in the region such as Israel and Egypt, and eliminate ROC from the process. All of these will lead to increased tensions between the actors of the Eastern Mediterranean region.

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