

# **Deterrence Stability between India and Pakistan: Challenges and Threats in the Political Domain**

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## **ABSTRACT**

The study intends to investigate deterrence stability between India and Pakistan, particularly emphasizing the challenges and threats within the political domain. Despite nuclear deterrence, the adversarial relationship between these two nations has consistently manifested as political tensions, conflicts, and risks to regional stability. The primary goal of this research is to identify and analyze the prominent challenges and threats that significantly influence the stability of deterrence within the political context. Moreover, the study aims to propose viable strategies for mitigating these challenges. The research seeks to better comprehend the dynamics of connections between India and Pakistan by delving into the complexities of this complex relationship. Ultimately, it aims to provide valuable insights that can assist in maintaining stability and foster harmonious ties in the region. The study's central premise is that sustained cross-border tensions and active conflicts harm the stability and deterrence between Pakistan and India. To frame this analysis, the research will embrace a theoretical framework grounded in new classical realism within international relations. By accentuating the significance of power dynamics, military capabilities, and the equilibrium of power, authenticity provides a fitting groundwork for comprehending the intricacies of nuclear deterrence within this context. Qualitative research methodology was used for this investigation.

The nuclear policies that both Pakistan and India have adopted and the interplay of deterrence gaining a more profound knowledge of the topic under study is the aim of this deterrence dynamics and stability between India and Pakistan. By scrutinizing the intricate interplay between cross-border tensions, conflict dynamics, and regional

security through the lens of realism, the study aspires to proffer invaluable insights that can potentially guide policy architects and stakeholders in their endeavors to usher in sustainable tranquility and stability in the Indo-Pak region.

**Keywords:** Deterrence, Nuclear, Non-State Actor, Military Doctrine, CBMs, Stability, Instability, Arm Race, Political Instability

## ÖZ

Çalışma, özellikle siyasi alandaki zorlukları ve tehditleri vurgulayarak, Hindistan ve Pakistan arasındaki caydırıcılık istikrarını araştırmayı amaçlamaktadır. Nükleer caydırıcılığa rağmen, bu iki ülke arasındaki düşmanca ilişki, sürekli olarak siyasi gerilimler, çatışmalar ve bölgesel istikrara yönelik riskler olarak kendini gösterdi. Bu araştırmanın birincil amacı, siyasi bağlamda caydırıcılığın istikrarını önemli ölçüde etkileyen öne çıkan meydan okumaları ve tehditleri belirlemek ve analiz etmektir. Ayrıca, çalışma bu zorlukları hafifletmek için uygulanabilir stratejiler önermeyi amaçlamaktadır. Araştırma, bu karmaşık ilişkinin karmaşıklığına inerek Hindistan ve Pakistan arasındaki bağlantıların dinamiklerini daha iyi anlamayı amaçlıyor. Sonuç olarak, bölgede istikrarın korunmasına ve uyumlu bağların geliştirilmesine yardımcı olabilecek değerli içgörüler sağlamayı amaçlamaktadır. Çalışmanın temel önermesi, sürekli sınır ötesi gerilimlerin ve aktif çatışmaların Pakistan ile Hindistan arasındaki istikrara ve caydırıcılığa zarar verdiğidir. Araştırma, bu analizi çerçevelemek için uluslararası ilişkiler içinde gerçekçiliğe dayanan teorik bir çerçeveyi benimseyecektir. Özgünlük, güç dinamiklerinin, askeri yeteneklerin ve güç dengesinin önemini vurgulayarak, bu bağlamda nükleer caydırıcılığın inceliklerini kavramak için uygun bir zemin sağlar. Bu araştırma için nitel araştırma metodolojisi kullanılmıştır.

Hem Pakistan hem de Hindistan'ın benimsediği nükleer politikalar ve incelenen konu hakkında daha derin bir bilgi edinen caydırıcılık etkileşimi, Hindistan ile Pakistan arasındaki bu caydırıcılık ve istikrar dinamiklerinin amacıdır. Çalışma, sınır ötesi gerilimler, çatışma dinamikleri ve bölgesel güvenlik arasındaki karmaşık etkileşimi gerçekçilik merceğinden inceleyerek, politika mimarlarına ve paydaşlara

sürdürülebilir sükunet ve istikrarı sağlama çabalarında potansiyel olarak rehberlik edebilecek paha biçilmez içgörüler sunmayı amaçlıyor. Hint-Pak bölgesi.

**Anahtar Kelimeler:** Caydırıcılık, Nükleer, Devlet Dışı Aktör, Askeri Doktrin, CBM'ler, İstikrar, İstikrarsızlık, Silah Yarışı, Siyasi İstikrarsızlık

# DEDICATION

To My Late Parents,

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I am grateful to the Almighty Allah for removing the darkness of my soul.

My heartfelt gratitude to my gracious supervisor, Prof. Dr. Erol Kaymak, for his support, encouragement, and suggestion during this course of the research, it has been a tremendous honor to collaborate with him on this study project. I feel incredibly privileged to have the chance to show my sincere appreciation to my dearest Asst. Prof. Dr. Günay Aylin Gürzel Aka for her unwavering guidance and support, as well as my sense of loyalty, inventiveness, tender criticism, and keen attention.

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# TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT .....	iii
ÖZ .....	v
DEDICATION .....	vii
ACKNOWLEDGMENT .....	viii
LIST OF TABLES .....	xii
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS .....	xiii
1 INTRODUCTION .....	1
1.1 Research Problem and Objectives .....	3
1.2 Hypothesis .....	3
1.3 Literature Review .....	4
1.4 Methodology .....	9
1.5 Division of the Research .....	10
2 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK .....	12
2.1 The Concepts of Deterrence Stability .....	20
2.1.1 Elements of Deterrence Stability .....	25
2.1.2 Characteristics of Deterrence.....	27
2.1.3 Deterrence School of Thought in Nuclear Era .....	29
2.1.4 Nuclear Deterrence Theory and Strategic Stability .....	32
2.1.5 Nuclear Deterrence and Social Media .....	36
2.2 The Nexus Between Political Stability and Deterrence Stability.....	37
2.3 Concluding Remarks .....	39
3 BRIEF HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF INDIA AND PAKISTAN RELATIONS .....	41

3.1 Background and Context of the India-Pakistan Adversarial Relations.....	41
3.1.1 Political Challenges in the India-Pakistan Relationship .....	47
3.2 Military Doctrines and Deterrence Stability .....	48
3.2.1 Cold Start Doctrine of India and Full Spectrum Deterrence of Pakistan	50
3.2.2 Impact of Military Doctrines on Deterrence Stability.....	56
3.3 Military Modernization and Arms Race in the Region.....	60
3.3.1 The Role of Conventional Forces in Deterrence Stability .....	66
3.4 Concluding Remarks .....	70
4 ANALYSIS OF POTENTIAL THREATS TO DETERRENCE STABILITY .....	72
4.1 Political Domain .....	72
4.1.1 Pakistan Political Instability.....	77
4.1.2 Political Instability and Terrorism .....	79
4.2 Escalation Risks and Proxy Conflicts .....	84
4.2.1 Strategic Miscalculations and Limited War.....	87
4.2.2 Arms Race and Nuclear Proliferation .....	91
4.3 Diplomatic Initiatives against Threats .....	101
4.3.1 Confidence-Building Measures (CBMs).....	102
4.3.1.1 Political Domain .....	107
4.3.1.2 Military Domain.....	111
4.3.2 The Role of Third-Party Mediation in Promoting Peace and Stability .	114
4.3.3 The Potential for Regional Cooperation in Enhancing Deterrence Stability	
.....	117
4.4 Concluding Remarks .....	119
5 CONCLUSION AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS .....	122
REFERENCES.....	126

APPENDICES .....	154
Appendix A: Semi-Structured Interview .....	155
Appendix B: Questionnaire for Interview .....	157

## **LIST OF TABLES**

Table 1: India Pakistan's Major Diplomatic Engagements.....	109
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## **LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS**

BJP	Bharatiya Janata Party
BMD	Ballistic Missile Defense
CBMs	Confidence Building Measures
CMD	Credible Minimum Deterrence
COAS	Chief of Army Staff
CSD	Cold Start Doctrine
CWC	Chemical Weapon Convention
DGMOs	Director General Military Operations
FSD	Full Spectrum Deterrence
HIMADS	High & Medium Altitude Air Defense System
IAF	Indian Air Force
IOK	Indian Occupied Kashmir
IOR	Indian Ocean Region
ISPR	Inter-Services Public Relations
LOC	Line of Control
MCBM	Military Confidence Building Measure
NCA	National Command Authority
NFU	No First Use
NPT	Nonproliferation Treaty
PAEC	Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission
PAF	Pakistan Air Force
RSS	Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh
SLBMs	Submarine Launched Ballistic Missiles

SPD	Strategic Plan Division
TNW	Tactical Nuclear Weapon
WMD	Weapon of Mass Destruction

# Chapter 1

## INTRODUCTION

Deterrence is the concept that was first introduced during the Cold War between the USA and the USSR. The concept of deterrence strategy guides them on how to tackle nuclear weapons. In South Asia's landscape, the study of deterrence stability become a complex subject. The rivals of the Cold War, the USSR, and the USA, had long geographical distances, and the deterrence they exercised was quite different. Though Pakistan and India share a common border in South Asia's model of deterrence stability, missile flight time and limiting response time are almost nothing. As stated by Henry Alfred Kissinger,

“Deterrence is trying to stop an enemy from adopting a certain course of procedure by posing dangers that seem excessive to him compared to any potential rewards. The greater the stakes, the more severe the prospect of annihilation facing him. However, the opposite is also true; the sanction should be less the smaller the goal” (Kissinger, 1957).

The international community continues to be concerned about the deterrence stability between Pakistan and India. With a conflict-ridden past as nuclear-armed neighbors and enduring political tensions, the difficulties and threats to deterrence stability in the political sphere pose significant risks to the stability and peace of the area.

The challenges and threats to deterrence stability in the political domain pose tremendous risks to regional peace and security as nuclear-armed neighbors with a

history of conflicts and deep-seated political tensions. According to Zafar Nawaz Jaspal,

“Deterrence is not the same as strategy, the general arts, or resolving conflicts. It uses passive force to maintain the status quo and avoid war between strategic rivals” (Jaspal, 2009).

In the relationship between India and Pakistan, there are plenty of threats to deterrence stability. Political challenges, terrorism, strategic miscalculation, limited war scenarios, arms race dynamics, and political instability are among the threats. Each of these factors contributes to increased tension and the potential for escalation, necessitating a thorough examination of their significance. As a smaller nation with a vulnerable economy, Pakistan cannot engage in a full-fledged arms rivalry while maintaining some level of conventional equilibrium necessary to resist any limited, unforeseen incursion by the armed forces of India. Since the formation of the new State, Pakistani political leadership has stayed under pressure to balance the countries' security and the rest of the necessities.

During the Cold War, deterrence strategy was used to avoid nuclear attacks between adversaries and maintain peace and security. The threat of war is the key that boosts states to be nuclearized.

“Nuclear weapons' incredible power for destruction has made the expense of using them prohibitive. ... The main purpose of these weapons is to threaten future opponents because nuclear war rarely, if ever, achieves political goals” (Baral, 1987).

This study examines the challenges and threats, assesses their implications, and identifies ways to improve stability.

## **1.1 Research Problem and Objectives**

This study aims to provide valuable insights into the challenges and threats to deterrence stability in the India-Pakistan relationship by answering these research inquiries. The findings will contribute to policy discussions and inform decision-makers on potential strategies and initiatives for mitigating risks, enhancing stability, and fostering regional peace. Furthermore, it emphasizes the importance of collaboration between India, Pakistan, and the international community in building trust, promoting dialogue, and finding peaceful resolutions to disputes.

What are the major threats to deterrence stability in the India-Pakistan relationship, including political challenges, terrorism, strategic miscalculation, limited war, arms race, and political instability?

Additionally, this study aims to answer the question of the main geopolitical, economic, and political deterrents to regional stability. Readers will be better informed about how internal factors might disturb regional peace if they understand the intricate relationship between the two countries.

## **1.2 Hypothesis**

Political challenges, including domestic politics, leadership changes, and differences in strategic cultures, significantly affect deterrence stability between India and Pakistan. The potential research will help to prove this hypothesis after analyzing the collected data, counter hypothesis will present more clear understanding of the subject.

## **1.3 Literature Review**

Deterrence can be 'instinctive' and 'natural' to living things, according to the author of Lawrence Freedman's book *Deterrence*, which also discusses its rise and fall,

meaning, and practical applications (Freedman, 2004). The ‘origins’ of deterrence can be found in the story of Adam and Eve, where God purposefully used threats to influence their behaviors. In antiquity, the Romans used a deterrence approach to restrict possible adversaries. With the development of technology in the early half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, ‘relation in kind’ was utilized to discuss potential opponents attacking targets that were intended to be counterproductive. Deterrence, as we know it now, emerged with nuclear weapons development. Throughout the Cold War, deterrence worked. The fact that the West has experienced ‘long peace’ because both superpowers have abstained from going to war determines how long it will last. To revive the idea of deterrence as one that ‘might still have a part to play’ in relation, he has described the ‘principle’ of deterrence today.

Lawrence Freedman claims that deterrence can be ‘coercive’, ‘consensual’, or ‘controlling’. Strategic deterrence occurs when Entity A prevents Entity B from acting in a way that serves B's interests. He rejected this tactic because situations could be misunderstood, threats could be bluffed, and miscommunication between the two parties could fail strategic deterrence. However, internalized deterrence based on ‘self-induced fears’ may be practical. It concentrated on the likely reaction of those who had been prevented by involvement and wise acts.

Freedman outlines the challenges of putting the idea of deterrence into reality in the chapter titled ‘Deterrence in Practice’. Due to the ‘multiple audiences’ involved, the ‘communication’ between the deter and the deterred can be complicated and result in undesirable outcomes. The pressure on decision-makers to comprehend the effects of conditioned risks and develop policies appropriately rises. He discusses the ‘dichotomy’ between challenger and defender in terms of incorrect signaling, false

perceptions, and misinterpretations of the danger that might result in deterrence failure. Therefore, a ‘deterrent effect’ that combines ‘reassurance’ with military and non-military threats must be developed while considering risks.

A known Kanti Bajpai discussed Nhruvianism, neoliberalism, and hyperrealism as three layers of strategic cultures discussed in ‘Indian Strategic Culture’. He concludes that India's foreign policy is likely to take a more hardline stance because, from September to December of 2001, much has altered in the nation's mentality. Such opinions have led India to consider finding a pretext for a short conflict with Pakistan, which is risky given the nuclear threat (Bajpai, 2002). According to the research, this strategy could result in an all-out conflict between Pakistan and India, opening the door for nuclear exchange, whatever small it may be.

Some scholars refer to post-nuclearization motivations for rivals to alter their conduct, mainly to catch the notice of other parties. According to Kapur, nuclearization has made Pakistan, a weaker, ‘revisionist’ nation, more aggressive (Kapur, 2005). Here is another useful Michael Krepon offers an explanation when he analyses India-Pakistan relations in the context of the stability-instability problem by pointing out how both governments responded to the crisis of 2001–2002 differently, but how the post–crisis period was a relatively stable environment now includes an increase in restricted diplomatic involvement, short-range ballistic weapons, and proactive military posture. In this circumstance, both sides' potential for stabilization and deterrence was limited (Krepon & Thompson, 2013).

Additionally, Sander Ruben Aarten concentrates on deterrence stability between Pakistan and India, which the author claims have been broken since 2015. The conflict

between India and Pakistan has harmed the stability of deterrence as a result of the cancellation of the 2016 SAARC conference in Pakistan, the Pathankot incident and purported Indian charges against Pakistan, covert Indian support for Baloch separatist groups, and a rise in tensions on the Line of Control (Aarten, 2021). Similarly, Zafar Nawaz Jaspal believes that hybrid warfare's non-linear and unorthodox character explains the Modi government's harsh stance toward Pakistan. The author cited deception and information warfare as the main tactics used in the information war and the use of proxy troops to support terrorist groups in Pakistan (Jaspal, 2020).

Senior Policy Analyst Arpit Rajan works at the Mumbai-based; in New Delhi, there is a center for global studies. China, India, and Pakistan's nuclear deterrence in Asia, his hefty monograph included information on the triadic connection between China, Pakistan, and India and their nuclear weapons policies (Rajain, 2005). The three nations' strategic culture, how nuclear arms fit into their more extensive military plans, public opinion trends, responses to various arms control treaties, and foreign policy decisions have all been assessed. The book focuses on how these nations, with their different political structures, respond to essential concerns, including foreign policy, deterrence, weaponization, proliferation, and the use of both, despite their long record of bilateral disputes, adversarial misinformation, and bombastic diplomacy, these nuclear powers must grasp the consequences of this new strategic paradigm and sustain their trilateral partnership despite continued challenges. This book is handy for those who seek to comprehend the nuances of the nuclear conflicts in Asia.

Adil Sultan underlined the consequences of the nuclear agreement; if transparent efforts by the parties concerned do not address the international community's worries about proliferation, negativity will continue to accompany discussions about the

implications of the nuclear agreement (Muhammad, 2006). If the pact is left unchecked, the South Asian area could experience long-term consequences, including a potential alteration of intra- and interregional alliance structures.

Andre Beaufre's findings profoundly impacted deterrence theory analysis. He described the only deterrence method with the effectiveness of nuclear that has the desired consequence of preventing or putting an end to war (Beaufre, 1966). The Cold War's bipolar environment, where the prospect of nuclear war was potent, provided the setting for deterrence and strategy. This menace had a psychological impact and discouraged enemies from arming themselves. Before starting a crisis, rivals needed to weigh their risks because the outcome would have caused economic, political, and social-moral harm that would have been difficult to recover from. Perceptions and psychological factors significantly influenced the deterrence effect. According to Beaufre, military action should be avoided and victory achieved by inflicting indirect harm on the foe in a nuclear scenario. In addition to intimidating the opponent, one must also conceal their fear by acting in ways that appear to be fearless.

The nuclear threat better secured peace than by conventional weapons. Beaufre viewed the issue primarily from a French strategic perspective; he believed nuclear power was the most dangerous of all threats. Conventional deterrence did not satisfy him, saying that "the nuclear race fosters stability, just as the traditional arms competition does. In a traditional conflict", the winner is declared in a single blow. Still, in a nuclear one, both sides are destroyed. It is pessimistic to suggest that employing atomic weapons is the only way to achieve global stability. The inconsistencies between nuclear and conventional deterrence are what make him so suspicious. Instability happens when one party becomes more offensively capable than the other.

In connection with continuing research on nuclear tactics and defensive attitudes, Rodney Jones wrote *Minimum Nuclear Deterrence Posture in South Asia: An Overview: A Review of Pakistan's and India's Putative Minimal Nuclear Deterrence Postures* (Jones, 2001). It carefully examines nuclear doctrine, policies, posture, strategies, and capabilities currently in use and under development. He claims that there is a severe and significant threat of war. Conventional military imbalance within Indo-Pak has the potential to lead to nuclear crisis instability; hence, both countries should refrain from nuclear arms races. Kargil warned the world that the subcontinent is highly vulnerable to nuclear war. The experience might have made Pakistan proponents of the theory that nuclear deterrence should only be used as a last resort stronger. Indian thinking that nuclear deterrence does not rule out conventional conflict was clarified by Kargil.

E. Sridharan examines the explanatory potential of the nuclear deterrence theory in describing India and Pakistan's nuclear standings. To fully resolve the issue and establish a permanent peace, it is vital to stabilize the deterrence relationship between the two countries over the long term (Sridharan, 2005). Military and non-military confidence-building measures are essential to avoid a war from starting accidentally or due to miscalculations for sustaining peace. He has also brought up China's involvement in Pakistan's acquisition of nuclear weapons. China has greatly aided Pakistan's progress in missiles.

Brigadier Agha M.U.Farooq investigates nuclear deterrence and nonproliferation theories and applies them to the contemporary Pakistan-India conflict (Farooq, 2004). The strategic considerations behind Pakistan's and India's nuclear programs and their consequences for global politics and long-term regional stability are addressed.

The report discusses the merits and drawbacks of all these rivals developing theatrical nuclear weapons as a potential. He claims that although regional stability is clinging on by a thread, there are still doubts about its long-term viability. Finally, it makes some recommendations about the strategic ramifications for Pakistan and India after identifying additional regional issues relating to prestige, stability, and long-term strategic consistency.

The credibility of nuclear deterrents is integral to the peace between India and Pakistan. Ironically, the relative nuclear vulnerability will determine whether this stability is sustained. Certain areas of collaboration between India and Pakistan are necessary to maintain this hazardous balance. Each party must understand the unjustifiable effects of war and the danger and futility of accelerating the development of WMD. Bilateral agreements, such as the Kashmir issue, are the key to increased stability, reduced risk, and the containment of WMD proliferation.

#### **1.4 Methodology**

In this research design the research will be qualitative in nature, with an in-depth examination of the India-Pakistan case as a case study. Additionally, descriptive and historical types—which examine the present status of the subject of study—will be used in empirical research.

Instruments and Processes for Data Methods, Document analysis, semi-structured interviews, and the archival technique will be the tools used to obtain qualitative data. Secondary data sources will serve as the foundation for the data techniques used to create the qualitative research instrument. Academics, research fellows from think

tanks, specialists in security studies, and former Armed Generals will make up the qualitative population for this study.

Sampling Method: purposive selection will be used in the research study's qualitative sampling to conduct an archive technique using official documents from the governments of Pakistan and India, such as doctrines and agreements. The examination of research papers, books, reputable newspaper stories, and news; semi-structured interviews with three security experts, Retired Armed Generals, One national security minister, several think tanks, and research fellows with experience in South Asia's deterrence stability.

### **1.5 Division of the Research**

There are five chapters in this work. The first chapter is an introduction that discusses the research question, methodology, hypothesis, literature review and definition of essential terms. The concepts of nuclear, deterrence stability and theoretical frame work is discussed in the second chapter. Deterrence and stability are described, and. The third chapter, conflicts and a historical overview of political challenges is provided. Military doctrines and military modernization also discussed in 3<sup>rd</sup> chapter. The fourth chapter discusses a detailed analysis of political instability, terrorism effects further studies Arm race and types of confidence building measures. Regional cooperation, and analysis of diplomatic initiatives. The fifth and last chapter logically concludes the research.

## Chapter 2

### THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

In this chapter, a broad spectrum of literary work, including the potential roles that strategic actors play in promoting South Asia's nuclear equilibrium development, was consulted to gain a more explicit knowledge of how both states would contribute to deterrence stability in the region. There are different views among analysts and writers regarding the theoretical work on the subject. This chapter presenting a detail study of characteristics of deterrence and explain how social media and politics effect deterrence stability and regional security and these all are interlinked.

Neo-classical realism is employed in international relations not because it can explain a variety of occurrences but rather because it excels in highlighting several levels of analysis and avoids the simplistic dogmatism that other theories experience. In actuality, neo-classical realism is a fresh take on classic and neo-realism. 'Gideon Rose' is the one who invented the idea. Neo-classical realism is a product of foreign policy research examining domestic and global variables and their intricate interrelationships.

The notion of neo-realism, which contends that systemic influences will instantly affect unit behaviors, is rejected by neo-classical realists. They argue that in anarchic systems, state internal characteristics and relative power determine the extent of systemic influences on state behavior. To analyze international politics, neo-classical

realism utilizes hypotheses such as anarchy, structure-agent impacts, and power's importance in shaping behavior, national interests, survival, and safety, among others.

Neo-classical realism adopts a novel strategy by utilizing both independent and intermediary factors. Neoclassical realism, therefore, takes into account a wide range of intervening elements to comprehend the foreign policy of various nations. Thucydides' "The History of the Peloponnesian War" is considered the first example of neo-classical realism, and it outlines his theory that the dread that the Spartans felt as Athena's influence grew was the primary driver of the conflict. Neo-classical realism contends that to study the foreign policy of states within the context of the international system, one should pay attention to both the analytical strengths of neo-realists like Waltz and Gilpin as well as the analytical strengths of unit-level studies classical realists like Wolfers, Morgenthau, Kissinger, and several others (Taliaferro, 2000).

Waltz established the defensive neo-realist theory, commonly referred to as structural realism. Still, he strangely overlooked the significance of a state's military prowess as a major objective of their survival in the 'world of the jungle'. The primary focus of John Mearsheimer's international system analysis is the security struggle between superpowers. The offensive neo-realism advocated by John Mearsheimer contrasts Kenneth Waltz's defensive neo-realism by emphasizing the need for hegemony for state security in the twenty-first century. That, in his opinion, is brought on by the international system's chaotic structure.

The fundamental tenets of defensive neo-realism by Kenneth Walt form the basis of Mearsheimer's main premises. These are listed below.

- 1- Every nation has some offensive military capabilities.
- 2- The main objective of a state is survival.
- 3- States are logical actors, able to devise sound plans of action that maximize their survival chances.
- 4- States can never be sure of what other states' objectives are.
- 5- The principal players in international politics are great countries, and the global system is anarchic (Mearsheimer, 2001).

As opposed to Thucydides, Niccolo Machiavelli, and Thomas Hobbes, Aaron Friedberg, William Wohlforth, and Randal Schweller are regarded as the most well-known scholars of neo-classical realism who emphasize the dispersion of power in the international system using terms like dependent variable, independence variable, and intervening variable (Donnelly, 2000).

Both Thomas Hobbes' *the Leviathan* (1651) and Nicollo Machiavelli's *The Prince*<sup>1</sup> (1532) offer a general application of classical realism and underline the core principles of the theory. According to Machiavelli and Hobbes, humanity has a specific propensity to want absolute power because, throughout history, people have been prone to uphold their egos and self-interest based on their needs and obligations (Hobbes, 2018).

In historical records, the twentieth century was the most destructive. Millions of innocent people perished in the two bloodiest conflicts that humanity has yet experienced.

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<sup>1</sup> Niccol Machiavelli, an Italian diplomat and political thinker, wrote *The Prince* in the 16th century as a manual for aspiring princes and kings.

Realism recognized once more dominated international affairs in the first half of the 20th century, defeating the idealist doctrine and demonstrating that a world without conflict, instability, or security was still a mirage. This has caused scientists to reconsider the prospects for the continued existence of civilization.

Realism is frequently compared to idealism and liberalism and efficiently addresses all queries concerning the war, its fundamental drives, and its motivations. It highlights the adversarial nature of world politics that frequently promotes the interests of states. The school of thought known as realism distinguishes between national and international politics because, in their view, while national politics relies on moral and legal norms, international politics are more forceful, competitive, and more likely to favor a system that encourages self-help (Griffiths et al., 2016). In contrast to Hans Morgenthau, Sullivan, Organski, and Waltz are genuine proponents of modern neo-realism theory and bring up the question of the "struggle of power" amongst the nations. They contend that traditional liberals and classical realists have a faulty perspective on how the balance of power should be understood. Waltz says states must focus more on properly dispersing the power than using it permanently for national goals. Despite classical realism, Waltz emphasizes the growing significance of security rather than utilizing the force itself (Sleat, 2016).

The execution of realism in international relations has been started for many centuries. Though, given that it has been discovered that contemporary diplomacy frequently draws from the realist theory, there are still parallels between modern international relations theory and ancient state behavior. Thinkers associated with the resistance include Mao Tse Tung of communist China, Machiavelli from Italy, Thomas Hobbes during the English Civil War, and Hans J. Morgenthau of the United States in the

1950s (Cristol, 2009). These all realists have come to the same conclusion: international relations are conducted generally following realism. Realists base their assertions on the following core notions: States play a significant role in world politics, the international system is anarchic, and all of the states in it desire morality plays no part in it because it requires power to exist. (Challahan, 2010). Realists rely on power politics, a concept rooted in global politics.

Realists view states as the main actors in international relations, believing that states exist primarily to pursue their national interests and national security (Cozette, M. 2004). Realists contend that egoism and self-interest are innate traits of humans and that morality is absent from international politics (Walker & Morton, 2005). When pursuing their national interest, states frequently act unethically and strongly emphasize their own authority and self-interest (Conces, 2009).

Cozette contributes to the realists' case by noting that:

“Since man is the primary decision-maker within a state and is essentially driven by a desire for power, the fundamental idea underlying both domestic and foreign politics is the same. Internal and foreign politics include a battle for power; the only difference between them is the diverse contexts in which they play out.” (Cozette, 2004).

The states in the international system supposedly share the same underlying interests in surviving, according to Kenneth N. Waltz's theory of international relations. He claims that classical realists and conventional liberals disregard "a broader socio-political sphere" (Waltz, 1979). He makes a distinction between the domestic and international spheres. He contends that in the chaotic system of international politics, governments are compelled to act in a manner that prioritizes securing their security, which, contrary to itself, raises the likelihood of conflict between them.

Realists firmly consider that respectable human qualities like morality, ethics, tolerance, and decency should only be attained by individuals; however, the state has a very severe nature because its primary goal is to defend its citizens from the assault of other states. They contend that the state's interests can justify anything in world politics (Bull, 1995).

The fundamental beliefs of neorealism regarding the state, relative power, and the preeminence of the anarchical material structure are shared by neo-classical realists as a starting point. However, they wonder if these will be sufficient to account for the behavior of the state. Neo-classical realism broadens the analysis by incorporating state-level factors, such as leaders' perceptions of other countries. So rather than just one or two individual interests, rulers of state should take into account the interests of the state overall. Realists believe that starting a war is a legitimate and permitted action and contend that states should use all available resources to accomplish the objectives they have insofar as the outcomes are in their best interests (Griffiths et al., 2016).

According to the realism theory, the lack of a worldwide government causes people to become egoists, resulting in concepts based on conflict between states. Realists often contend that egoism, power, and security take precedence in international affairs, leaving minimal or no room for morality and simply serving as a tool to excuse state behavior (Spegele, 1987). However, realists nonetheless maintain that international relations contain ethical conduct. Carr disputes the idea of pure realism by arguing that there is still an idealistic component to world politics. Another scholar, Mearsheimer, says that preserving a state's national security is its top priority and that it is solely dedicated to building up its arsenal to deter aggressors. This point illustrates Carr's statement (Mearsheimer, 2005). Carr argues that states are concerned with calculating

strength and gathering tactical information and supplies to reach supreme effectiveness in international relations. Carr believes that international politics still has an idealist component (McWilliams & Piotrowski, 1990).

In the international sphere, states are there to serve people's interests; historical proof demonstrates that leaders seek power to pique those passions. Regarding international politics, self-interested competition drives realism (Kunz, 2010). The idea of realism has long dominated international relations. Based on the perspective of classical realism, states behave in the same way; in the absence of a hierarchical international order, states frequently protect themselves by defending their national interests (Hall, 2006). States attempt to understand how other states behave concerning power struggles, and politicians consider power a necessity that should be maintained at all times. According to classical realists, international politics' primary idea is power. A state's level of power typically influences its strategy and results from numerous economic and military conflicts (Nuri, 2006).

Although the classical realists' debate about the attitude of states, neo-classical realists were attacked by the classical realists of the twentieth century over the grounds that states should refrain from power contests, uphold international law, and that international order must be established in order to prevent a world war. (Lawson, 2011). In the opinion of twentieth-century realists, both the First and Second World Wars were sparked by nations vying for power, and this way of thinking gave rise to idealism (Sinclair, 2011).

The debate on military doctrines, according to deterrence stability, is deficient without analyzing the role of theories. The theory is a set of propositions that helps academics

comprehend international relations. Additionally, it is essential to the progress, growth, and conclusion of research that aims to confirm or deny preexisting information (Venable, 2006). Here, the research aims to highlight and connect some notions to Pakistan's nuclear doctrine. The study's theoretical framework is based on realist philosophy and its offshoots. The intentional full-spectrum deterrence strategy adopted by Islamabad is based on offensive realism principles of self-preservation to stave against Pakistan's survival, which is ensured by Indian hostility. It is not intended to execute a first-strike decapitation. It is far from being possible to attack first and destroy the enemy's forces (Sauer, 2009). According to the realist perspective, weak conventional nations use purposeful first use to protect themselves from outside threats. Pakistan is situated in a strategically fragile region with a shaky past, with the episode of East Pakistan separation and the remaining ongoing threats for Pakistan. Since the 1970s, Afghanistan has been unstable. In the years following 9/11, Afghanistan and India have worked together to weaken Pakistan. Therefore, it is asserted here that Hobbes' theory of nature accounts for Pakistan's perception of external threat. Neo-classical realism is an outcome of foreign policy studies examining domestic and global variables and their intricate interrelationships. Neo classical realism's major objective is to understand how nations' objectives and subjective attitudes toward the international system and the power dynamics in that system influence their foreign policy.

In order to wrap up, the following might be used to describe the main distinction between structural (neo-realism) and neo-classical realism: Though structural realism upholds the norms of rationality in global affairs, it also recognizes a far more comprehensive range of factors that influence a state's foreign policy and acknowledges that some of them are less testable than others. As a result, it aims to

blend positivism and classical humanism, emphasizing the formulation of foreign policy over generic principles of international relations (Freyberg-Inan et al., 2009). Power has evolved as the most essential and decisive instrument of international affairs since the earliest early state formations came into being. While small governments struggle to preserve their independence and national identity, morality has no place in the political savage where "the law of the jungle" reigns. The most potent political actors use every available means to broadly spread their hegemonic desires over inferior states, grab control, and accomplish their political objectives.

## **2.1 The concepts of Deterrence Stability**

There are three components required for effective deterrence: communication, capability, and credibility. To create a stable environment for deterrence, appropriate nuclear capability must be believable, immune to a first strike, and adequately stated to the opponents. Deterrence must meet some fundamental criteria to be effective when there is a genuine threat as opposed to one that is imagined or overstated.

### **Communication**

One of the key elements of deterrence is communicating the danger to the adversary. The ability to carry out the threat is an effective deterrence. Still, it is insufficient to constitute a deterrence unless the threat is made known to the opposing party. The various forms of communication include press and media statements, covert diplomacy, and nuclear weapon testing. Therefore, effective communication is a crucial necessity for a deterrent stance. Successful communication has significant challenges since many opportunities exist for inaccuracy and misinterpretation. If obligations are unclear, deterrence may not succeed. Since misunderstandings of red lines were a major factor in the Cold War crisis (such as the Berlin Blockade of 1948-1949), it is vital to establish realistic and explicit red lines. There are many other types

of communication, such as nuclear doctrine and policy statements. To be believed, the information must be accurate. A credible or approved source must issue the nuclear threat and correctly relay it to the enemies, as was the case with the Brasstacks Operation in 1986-1987 and the Kashmir crisis in 1990.

### **Capability**

Capability is a force that is very corrosive, extremely accurate, and able to penetrate. It is implied that a state must possess dependable nuclear delivery systems and effective nuclear weapons in a nuclear deterrent scenario. They must have valuable enemy targets within their delivery vehicles that can be credibly destroyed. They are most likely to be employed if attacked and could result in an enemy incurring unacceptable expense. There are two different sorts of capability: first-strike capability, which allows for a nuclear first strike against enemies, and second-strike capability, which guarantees the ability to launch a solid nuclear second strike after a nuclear first strike against an enemy. Both a nuclear first-strike danger and a no-first-use policy can be supported by it.

### **Credibility**

Being believed is a quality of credibility. The power and leadership of the state should be credible. It refers to the capacity to summon strength during adversity. Combining nuclear weapons and a deterrence strategy creates a powerful impulse for peace. Only a credible set of threats and inducements can serve as a deterrent, which calls for both political will and capability. A deterrent tactic must inform any potential adversary that the risks of engaging in illegal behavior can outweigh the benefits for it to be effective. Due to fear and a lack of will, France and Britain, for instance, did not intervene when Germany invaded Austria in 1938, the Czech Republic in 1938-1939, and Poland in 1939.

As long as there is no possibility of any conventional confrontation that could escalate to reach the nuclear threshold, deterrence stability can be guaranteed. To maintain Pakistan's conventional deterrence, Pakistan's strategic planners are adopting other strategies. Pakistani political and military authorities have created strategic forces to prevent India from having the chance to "cut Pakistan down to size" by maintaining an efficient nuclear and conventional deterrence. According to former prime minister Benazir Bhutto,

Pakistani political and military authorities have created strategic forces to prevent India from having the chance to "cut Pakistan down to size" by maintaining an efficient nuclear and conventional deterrence. According to former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto, "India's military power is five times greater than theirs. Consequently, Pakistan's security crisis is a matter of survival". The nuclear threshold will also narrow if the difference between the two nations' conventional capabilities widens. Pakistan must exercise caution to employ its nuclear option earlier than before. The imbalance in conventional weapons directly impacts nuclear stability. Nuclear weapons can be used to intimidate an adversary psychologically and prevent war. Kenneth Waltz analyzed, "First off, deterrence tactics encourage prudence everywhere, which lowers the likelihood of warfare. Secondly, a country with strategic nuclear weapons may retaliate if its critical interests are threatened; hence, wars launched in their face must be carefully controlled. Thirdly, after deducting those gains for the numerous uncertainties of war, prospective punishment need only be commensurate to an enemy's anticipated gains in battle" (Waltz, 1981).

Perhaps Military conflict in the presence of nuclear weapons did not achieve political goals. Because no South Asian state is now committed to fulfilling any political dreams

through significant conventional war and nuclear war, the prospects for deterrent stability are excellent. Tellis clarified the circumstance by adding, "In a crisis, starting nuclear attacks might not be justified, but neither India nor Pakistan have the strategic capabilities to carry out those effective damage-limiting first strikes" (Tellis, 2001).

In the early phase of the newly independent India, it advocated for global nuclear disarmament. Mohandas Gandhi, India's prestigious leader, wrote that after the war of 1965, Pakistan had a modest, scattered debate about establishing a nuclear arsenal to combat conventional power inequality, but 'going nuclear' received little serious consideration. India's 'peaceful nuclear explosion' (PNE) inspired Pakistan to develop a nuclear deterrent in 1974. The choice to build nuclear weapons was made in response to an impending nuclear threat from India. The decision to protect Pakistan from a significant external threat drove the development of the atomic program, which was based on a 'steal' attitude.

After its independence, India became one of the leading proponents of global nuclear disarmament. Mohandas Gandhi, a spiritual and well-known political figure from India, "I see the use of the atom bomb for the mass murder of men, women, and children as the most sinister application of science," wrote Harijan in 1948. (Merton, 1965). In 1954, Jawaharlal Nehru proposed a 'complete ban on nuclear testing' claiming that by doing so, "India will rise above and try to put an end to the global nuclear weapons race as a sign of its leadership in the world" (Singh, 2001). A few years after gaining independence in 1950, New Delhi showed evident interest in acquiring nuclear technology and began the 'Peaceful Nuclear Program' to meet civilian purposes (Thomas, 1986). The Indian leadership began to come to a consensus around the idea of getting nuclear weapons in the middle of 1950. Due to their deterrent

effects, nuclear weapons were regarded as a component of realpolitik, an "instrument of power" and a weapon of "nation's greatness." According to Indian researchers, the burgeoning Sino-Pak US alliance and the Chinese nuclear test 1964 made nuclear weapons necessary for New Delhi.

Pakistan began its nuclear program in its early phases with the same objective of using it for peace. Eisenhower's 'atom for peace' initiative enabled Pakistan to receive nuclear energy for "civilian benefit," which fueled the country's nuclear development into the 1960s. Pakistan's nuclear program has entirely evolved with an Indo-centric focus due to the ongoing competition in the period following division and the existential danger that has existed since then. According to Feroz Khan (2012), "India started advancing in the nuclear field in the 1960s; this was a turning point and significant occasion in Pakistan's nuclear program's history. Two groups existed in the middle of the 1960s when India began to make strides in the nuclear field. One was the "nuclear enthusiast lobby, " backed by Pakistan's nuclear program and led by Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, Pakistan's Foreign Minister. The other was the "nuclear cautious lobby" President Ayub Khan headed. The Indo-Pak war in 1965 brought Pakistan's strategic depth limitations to light, but the challenging security climate revealed them. By the end of the conflict, Mr. Z. A. Bhutto attempted to use the contentious "Tashkent Pact" against President Ayub Khan while strongly emphasizing the nuclear option. However, until he rose to the top of Pakistan's leadership, particularly in the years following 1971, only a few people agreed with his opinion. The 1971 Indo-Pakistan War, which left Pakistan with severe national damage and the loss of half of its land (east Pakistan split off and formed Bangladesh), undoubtedly impacted Islamabad's final decision to choose nuclear technology for defense and military operations. Second, in light of Indian actions, the Pakistani ruling class decided there was a need

of the hour to build their arsenals, not in reply to India but for their own better defense and survival.

According to Mr. Z. A. Bhutto, Pakistan's nuclear capacity will elevate its standing among Muslim countries and restore some of the public's lost confidence following the Dhaka disaster. Mr. Bhutto might have also wanted to improve his political position at home. Adamant that Islamabad would not fall victim to or be frightened by "Indian nuclear blackmailing," Prime Minister Z. A. Bhutto referred to the Indian nuclear tests of 1974 as a "fateful development" (Perkovich, 1999).

### **2.1.1 Elements of Deterrence Stability**

There are three different methods to define stability: crisis stability, deterrence stability, and strategic stability. For strategic forces to be safe, secure, and capable of surviving in times of peace, crisis, and war, strategic stability must be ensured. It guarantees neither party is driven or pressured to employ force or nuclear weapons.

#### **Deterrence stability**

It is critical to advance strategic stability, for instance, ensuring neither party is compelled nor encouraged to deploy nuclear weapons. The mutually recognized commitment to maintain and deploy credible nuclear capabilities when necessary is known as deterrence stability (Cleary & Delaney, 2003). All the elements or circumstances that work to prevent nuclear deterrence collapse are referred to as nuclear stability. Its main goal is to avoid nuclear conflict between rivals. When it is reasonably safe from shock, alarms, and perturbations, a balance of deterrence—a condition in which the incentives on both sides to start a conflict are outweighed by the disincentives—is stable. It remains steady in the face of internal or external political upheaval, technological advancement, mishaps, false alarms,

misunderstandings, crises, limited wars, or sufficient to make deterrence fail (Millet, 1974).

Perhaps there is equilibrium when there is no threat of war and stability is maintained. Because it has had to address both the issue of defense and the idea of deterrence by threat of punishment, the nuclear deterrence strategy contains a dialectical component. Stability is aided by deterrence since it keeps aggressiveness to a minimum. It improves crisis stability by empowering the person who deters to withstand nuclear intimidation and preventing progress toward war's horizon (Buzan, 1987). Strategic stability and deterrence are strongly related. Two crucial components that make deterrence stability are as follows:

Armed Race Stability is the lack of incentives for the adversaries to increase the quantity or quality of their nuclear arsenals rapidly. Trends in the development of armaments, whether quantitative, qualitative, or both, including the advancement of new technologies, do not threaten that stability (Gregory & Sultan, 2005). Thus, maintaining stability in the arms race prevents the competition from increasing the risk of nuclear war by introducing new dangerous weapons. One cannot dismiss the effectiveness of weapons control accords.

The fundamental conditions of nuclear deterrence for fostering stability in the warring region were worked out by several academics. Preventive or preemptive strikes and effective, reliable first and second strikes should be avoided. Both Nation's nuclear arsenals should be protected from illegal and unintentional use.

Crisis stability is strong when a crisis arises. It is resilient when there are expected threats to values, fundamental norms, and interests, which are marked by a sense of time urgency and the possibility of an impending nuclear escalation. In a crisis, stability is the absence of motivation to use military force and do nuclear first. The second is that one side did not experience the pressure of employing or losing strategic weaponry (Kumar, 2008). When enemies stop a proactive counterforce strike, there is crisis stability. When there is a significant political crisis and a likelihood of a military conflict, it is realistically thought to be necessary. A nuclear weapon should deter low-intensity adventuring as well.

### **2.1.2 Characteristics of Deterrence**

The period known as non-weaponized deterrence began in the middle of the 1980s. The following other types of deterrence may apply to South Asia's strategic environment: Minimum deterrence (Credible minimum deterrence), Existential deterrence, and Mutual deterrence.

#### **Era of Non-weaponized Deterrence**

The nuclear ambiguous period, often referred to as Recessed deterrence or Existential deterrence, is characterized by non-weaponized deterrents. In South Asia, George Perkovich suggested the idea of non-weaponized deterrence so that Pakistan and India might continue to have access to fissile material and nuclear weapons technology but refrain from producing nuclear warheads. The phrase "recessed deterrence" was coined by Jasjit Singh to describe this stage, "which encourages the creation of warheads and nuclear weapon gadgets, but also requires that they be kept unassembled" (Singh, 2013).

#### **Established Deterrence**

Well-known McGeorge Bundy contends that the sheer possession of nuclear weapons by the adversary constitutes a nuclear war threat. Any nuclear warfare between the superpowers, according to Bundy's argument during the Cold War, would be accompanied by "terrible and unavoidable uncertainties" (Hagerty, 1998). They "have significant meaning for the deterrence theory." Because of the enormously destructive potential of nuclear power, the concept of "Existential deterrence" was born. In the late 1980s, when Pakistan and India partially acknowledged the other's nuclear weapon capacity, the term "deterrence" first appeared in South Asia. It has been used to describe how a hidden nuclear capability would affect deterrence. When making decisions during a conflict or a crisis, adversaries displayed caution and restraint, and despite the rhetoric, both states' actual crisis behavior was to avert war.

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### **Credible Minimum Deterrence**

According to Peter Gizewski, it is when "the fewest number of nuclear weapons are used to threaten the lowest level of damage necessary to deter attack". In their definition of minimal deterrence, Ken Booth and John Baylis wrote, "It is an effort to stop an enemy attack by relying on a weak nuclear retaliatory force that can only destroy a small number of important objectives" (Booth & Baylis, 1989). The concept of "minimum deterrence" is not to compete in making advanced weapons by numbers against enemies; so far, in developing countries like Pakistan and India, which have limited resources and technological restraint, minimum deterrence is appropriate. Due

to its ability to provide the enemy with a crushing blow, deterrence is likely to be achieved. Pakistan and India both have nuclear weapons capabilities as of the post-1998 era. Pakistan's nuclear policy is still being developed, while India's nuclear doctrine first appeared in August 1999. In his definition of this stage, Neil Joeck explained: "A method of deployment, which entails delivering bombs or payloads to military units for storage and quick mating with delivery systems at military facilities, is a process of developing, testing, and combining warhead components into a military-usable weapons system" (Chari, 2001).

### **2.1.3 Deterrence School of Thought in Nuclear Era**

The 1998 nuclear test in Indo-Pak changed South Asia's nuclear posture, revealing transparency and clarity in their deterrent capabilities. The researchers reevaluated deterrence stability between Pakistan and India and observed new dynamics of the strategic situation. Two schools of deterrence theorists have offered their theories in the age of weaponization. One group contends that nuclear South Asia will stop a major confrontation, while the opposing group claims it will encourage subcontinental escalation. Optimists and pessimists are included in these two groups. Deterrence advocates argued that since nuclear weapons could make conflict extremely expensive, states prefer peace between rivalries. The adversaries are drawn to the stability equation by this circumstance.

#### **Deterrence Optimists**

There are some challenges to command-and-control security; effective deterrents, CMBs, security, and arms control will arise due to the announced nuclear weapons capability. The credibility and signaling of deterrence forces are necessary for effective deterrence. Deterrence stability requires sensible decision-makers to handle the issue and is concerned with the ratio of nuclear safety between the two nations, guaranteeing

nuclear stability. An effective deterrence will be guaranteed once these conditions are met. These necessary conditions for stable nuclear deterrence include,

- Credible delivery system
- CI network
- Early warning system
- Second strike capabilities, including survivable weapons capabilities.

The danger perception affects these stability characteristics. The primary aspect that affects deterrence stability is the perception of dangers that adversaries conjure up and subsequently, at various points, adopt as reactive security measures. Rational decision-makers should handle the violent scenario to promote peace, and the military's size should be reliable to cope with any perceived threat (Cheema, 2007). As long as there is no possibility of any conventional confrontation that could escalate to reach the nuclear threshold, deterrence stability can be guaranteed. To maintain Pakistan's conventional deterrence, Pakistan's strategic planners are adopting other strategies.

According to Devin Hagerty, a deterrence optimist, nuclear weapons, which are not intended for combat use, operate as a stabilizing force between two adversaries,

“The nuclear dynamics in India and Pakistan add to the growing body of Data indicating.... Nuclear weapon states do not fight war" (Hagerty, 1998).

Waltz, K. also asserts that deploying nuclear arsenals in India and Pakistan makes war less likely. He said, the understanding that aggressive activities may result in (their) own. Destruction will serve as a deterrent (from aggressiveness) (Wallace, 2008).

Nuclear arsenals can be used to intimidate an adversary psychologically and prevent war. Deterrence stability took the overly-optimistic stance that India and Pakistan's inherent problems could be solved by nuclear weapons, and that this was the best course of action for promoting stability in the region of dispute.

### **Deterrence Pessimists**

The second school of thought, known as "Deterrence Pessimists," contends that because of the uncertainties surrounding the nuclear balance between Pakistan and India, most of the newly nuclear states won't be able to meet the essential conditions for deterrence stability. Nuclear-armed governments can't avoid engaging in hostilities with one another. They will be prepared to engage in preemptive conflicts, be obedient to preemptive war pressures, create forces impregnable to second strikes, and develop nuclear weapons that may be threatened with unauthorized or accidental deployment.

Nuclear states won't be able to meet the essential conditions for deterrence stability.

The inherent conflict between the need to survive and the problematic escalation dynamics in the emerging Pakistan-India deterrent equation has been noted by Clayton P. Bowen and Denial Wolven. According to that

“Even if Pakistan and India’s newly acquired nuclear weapons meet the criteria for credibility and durability. It is extremely doubtful that these powers won't provoke in the same way" (Bowen, 1999).

According to Naeem Salik, both countries in South Asia have nuclear environments, as he said, "Lack of real-time monitoring, warning, and obtaining target methods that will not only restrict employment opportunities but also, increase crisis" (Salik, 2004).

To close the gap and guarantee deterrence stability, rational decision-makers should consider the deterrence pessimists' viewpoints. Discussions have made it evident that Pakistan and India are still in the initial stages of developing nuclear warheads and could accidentally cross the line. To stop enemies from going nuclear, credible deterrence is necessary. Political, military, and strategic scholars are crucial in reducing instability. Henry Kissinger discussed that,

“Above everything else, deterrence is a psychological issue. In the face of a weapon of unprecedented originality and destructiveness, the risk assessment it depends on becomes less accurate. Taking a bluff seriously is preferable to taking a serious threat and mistaking it for a bluff” (Kissinger, 1964).

To strengthen deterrence stability, ongoing efforts are needed. By advancing political discussion to find a solution to the Kashmir conflict, India and Pakistan should be required to increase their political stability. The use of nuclear weapons must be subject to political oversight. By using psychological techniques and diplomatic influence to preserve a stable strategic environment, deterrence has the power to prevent nuclear war. The debate of this chapter showed that a modest nuclear force can be used for deterrence; the conventional arms race is just physiologically threatening because all states do not have the same economic situations so they cannot enter in arms race. Deterrence stability is promoting peace in the region.

#### **2.1.4 Nuclear Deterrence Theory and Strategic Stability**

In the Early nuclear age, deterrence was considered to mean "frightening someone with the implications of their behavior to dissuade them from taking that action. Deterrence is based on one's ability, not will (Waltz, 1990). The history of war and conflict is as old as the concept of deterrence. The concept and definitions today, however, reference the development of nuclear weapons in 1945. The nuclear deterrence strategy Bernard Brodie believed that "if aggressor feared retaliation in

kind, he would not attack" (Brodie & Dunn, 1946). Brodie continued, "Until now, our military's principal objective has always been to win wars. Its primary objective to proceed must be to stop them" (Brodie, 1945). Deterrence, however, is not a given; it must be acquired and achieved through certain acts and methods. Additionally, it is relative and not universal.

Phil Williams described it as an effort to intimidate the opponent into passivity. It is considered that without the deterrence threat, the opponent would be tempted to act against the state's interests. This is typically regarded as successful deterrence when those activities are avoided. Threat is defined as "the imposition of unfavorable outcomes that will outweigh the benefits of the contested action" (Buzan, 1987). For a nuclear reaction to be effective in the face of nuclear threats. The "possibility that the attack may cause the (enemy) to lose money, or at least suffer a bigger net loss as a result of the action" is the cornerstone of deterrence (Synder, 2015). Nuclear war may become a possibility if deterrence.

The most destructive weapons are nuclear ones. As weapons technology advanced, nuclear strategy also altered, and countries created strategic doctrines to control how these weapons would affect international relations. Instruments that have ever been created have stabilized superpower relations by making wars unaffordable.

Deterrence has dominated the field of nuclear strategy. Nuclear weapons have the ability to produce alternatives that are less devastating than a nuclear inferno, not to start wars. Nuclear weapons' deterrence uses the power to resolve international and regional conflicts. It serves as a deterrent before engaging in actual combat. To intimidate and threaten to deter are the definitions of deterrence. Deterrence is based

on political will, credible competence, and effective communication—the capacity to prevent adversaries from taking action against one's national interests. Deterrence is particularly employed in the context of restrictions to stop a nation from using nuclear weapons out of concern for a nuclear reprisal. Deterrence is defined as an action to prevent a nuclear attack in the Encyclopedia of Social Sciences. Deterrence in the military prevents the start of a conflict or a significant escalation of a war. The goal of deterrence is to make a specific course of action seem expensive and undesirable rather than to stop or prevent it (Kuper, 1985) physically. A deterrence strategy aims to shape the opponent's perspective or frame its image so that he feels it is best to avoid taking adverse action.

A well-known theorist of deterrence theory is Herman Khan. Deterrence was additionally helped by the work of other strategic theorists such as Bernard Brodie, Phil Williams, Andre Beaufre, J.M. Collins, Kenneth Waltz, Thomas Schelling, and Lawrence Freedman. They contend that the deterrence theory can be used to advance peace and security, which the significance of nuclear weapons lies not in their "overkill" but instead in their "mutual kill." In a changing strategic context, new researchers' perspectives on deterrence, such as those of Patrick Morgan and Robert Jervis, are crucial (Robert, 1988). Their key beliefs in terms of deterrence are as follows:

To keep the world in order, deterrence is essential. A sizable amount of peace and stability can be achieved through nuclear deterrence. Deterrence, according to Andre Beaufre, is the act of using force in a demonstrative manner (Beaufre, 1965). By training, Bernard Brodie was a historian and is widely regarded as an academic who made significant contributions to the U.S. and the thinkers in the West regarding their

strategic thinking about nuclear weapons in the years following World War II. He was a highly inventive, analytical, and explicative American civilian strategist. It also contends that the presence of nuclear arms has negated Clausewitz's maxim that war is merely the continuation of policy through various means. He said, "Thus, winning wars has always been the main goal of our military apparatus. Its main goal moving forward must be to avoid them. There is no other meaningful use for it" (Herken, 1986). He underlined that the viability of nuclear deterrence between belligerent nuclear-capable states depends on the survivability of retaliatory nuclear forces.

According to the literature on its evolution, there are only a few conditions that must be met for nuclear deterrence theory to be successful and credible. The deterrence theory was initially more.

Prescriptive and less concerned with the variables that are empirically connected to deterrence's success or failure. Admittedly, the main concern has been on what constitutes a reliable nuclear deterrence strategy. The credibility of threats, ideas of stability and reason, sizable capability, and effective communication of threats are just a few of the foundational tenets around which the deterrence theory is built (Herken, 1986). In response, Morgan says persuasively that it is to convince your foe:

“Efficient and effective military capability that you have that may put pressure on the enemy and inflict unacceptable costs. If attacked by your enemy, you would use it” (Morgan, 2003).

It is crucial to distinguish between deterrence strategy and nuclear deterrence theory while discussing both. "The theory addresses the fundamental precepts on which any strategy is to be based, whereas the term "deterrence strategy" refers to a state's precise military stance, threats, and methods for communicating them” (Morgan, 2003). In

another discussion, Patrick M. Morgan said that contrary to popular belief, there aren't many deterrence theories; instead, there are primarily theoretical slivers. Therefore, rather than deterrence theories, several deterrence techniques may be taken as theories.

### **2.1.5 Nuclear Deterrence and Social Media**

In current challenges, one is the increasingly globalized world; electronic, print, and especially social media can favorably influence public options. Pakistan's public is exposed to Indian media. The press from Pakistan is very well received in India. If the media begins to educate the general public about bilateral difficulties, it persuades them that a bilaterally cordial relationship will alter their future. To the utter dismay of those who want to see a secure region, a base discussion is continuously promoted on India's media against Pakistan. The overwhelming weight of empirical data demonstrates that throughout the recent Pulwama crisis, the media served as a factory for fabrications and lies (Sadiq, 2022). Social media, news outlets, and newspapers exacerbated tension between people through their propaganda of hatred and war hysteria. The general population was misled by the media, political leaders, and military (Burkle et al., 2022).

In this scenario, India has been heavily involved in hybrid tactics to destabilize Pakistan internally and externally for the past few years. Some of the main strategies used by India against Pakistan include the spread of false information and propaganda, shaping media perceptions of Pakistan, inciting identity-based conflicts and anti-state feelings, supporting militant and separatist groups, and attempting to sabotage the CPEC project. General Qamar Javed Bajwa, the COAS, said in 2018 that the conflict we are currently experiencing is hybrid, emphasizing insurgency on ethnic, religious, sectarian, and socioeconomic concerns. A broad National reaction is required (Reporter, 2018). This assertion captures the complex area of coercion and conflict

and the classic conventional security threat from India that Pakistan is currently experiencing. "Unfortunately. It's a major part of the fifth-generation warfare," recently said significant General Babar Iftikhar, DG ISPR (Dawn, 2020). In light of this, the following outlines the characteristics of Indian hybrid warfare against Pakistan, which India frequently employs for destabilization.

It has been noted that India uses electronic and social media to propagate false information about Pakistan. The spread of misinformation and anti-state content via YouTube, Facebook, web links, and Twitter accounts is one such instance. A European organization in Brussels exposed an alleged India misinformation network in December 2020, which allegedly attempts to undermine Pakistan and other Indian opponents. The report claims that 265 bogus local media networks, dubious NGOs, and think tanks are operating in 65 different countries (Cook, 2005). Their primary goal was to damage Pakistan and China's reputation by creating and promoting their phony content in India and around the world. The discussion above implies that recent Indian coercive actions and hybrid tactics have significantly increased tensions between India and Pakistan.

## **2.2 The Nexus between Political Stability and Deterrence Stability**

Political stability is an essential element of deterrence stability due to the efficiency of deterrence in lowering rewards for significant coercive political changes, that is, the adjustments in conduct brought on by the prospect of deploying force. Due to deterrence's effectiveness in reducing the motivation for large violent political shifts, such as the adjustments in behavior brought through the imminent danger using force, Politics is the art of possibilities.

Political stability is also a crucial component of deterrence stability. The importance of rational decision-makers, who refrain from implementing forceful policies in times of calm and crisis and always proceed in a progressive manner, cannot be understated. Diplomacy and mediation can resolve internal conflicts instead of using nuclear or conventional weapons. For successful deterrence, the rational adversary should perform predictable cost-benefit calculations. This assessment is performed when a specific act is thought to favor the defendant. Still, the costs outweigh the advantages because a different course of action delivers a better result. Threatening the opponent with unacceptably high harm is a crucial step. It's critical to comprehend the cost-benefit analysis of the opposition.

The vital significance of the stakes, the size and likelihood of the costs, and the size and probability of reaching the goals are some of its variables. The psychological component is often emphasized in deterrence methods. Psychology plays a role in stability to some extent. Physical competence is the basis for threat, but psychological factors really influence potential enemies. These variables significantly impact the computations. Physical competence is the basis for danger, but psychological factors really influence potential enemies. These variables significantly affect the analyses.

A known scholar, Kenneth Waltz, argued that nuclear weapons made it difficult for wars to break out and that as deterrent and defensive capabilities rise, the likelihood of war falls (Sagan & Waltz, 1960). New nuclear states will experience the same limitations existing nuclear states have, and they will be more concerned with their security and aware of the risks of a nuclear holocaust. Although deterrence seems relatively straightforward, as the USSURI River battles and the 1962 Cuban missile crisis show, it hasn't proven easy to implement. The application of the theory to

practice presented challenges for both competitors. Nuclear weapons heavily burden decision-makers to weigh all potential outcomes and diffuse the emergency.

Therefore, deterrence stability is a condition in which two antagonists mutually forbid violence toward one another, with the result that none of them ever needs to react to the other's violent conduct. The governments should adopt fresh, beneficial strategies for deterrence stability. Peace in the area can be improved via political determination and actual action. The other course of action would be disastrous. The best course of action to bring peace and security to nations is deterrence stability.

### **2.3 Concluding Remarks**

This research examines how the security system in South Asia is risky and intricate and how other elements affect the balance of deterrence in this South Asian Region. To maintain a stable equilibrium in the area, India and Pakistan should adopt a framework to specify and affirm minimal credible deterrence. Their nuclear deterrence stances would be stabilized. India and Pakistan should continue to be able to control one another with a credible threat of reprisal.

Deterrence stability is essential for preserving peace and stability in South Asia. It is crucial because it is widely held that maintaining a strategic balance and a credible nuclear deterrent is the only way to assure stability, peace and avoid conflict in the region's three nuclear-armed competitors, Pakistan, India, and China.

In the increasingly globalized world, media (electronic, print, & social) can positively influence public sentiment. Indian media has inroads into the Pakistani public, and Pakistani media is well-received in India. If the press begins sensitizing ordinary

people regarding bilateral issues, it persuades them that a bilateral amicable relationship will change their destiny.

## **Chapter 3**

### **BRIEF HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF INDIA AND PAKISTAN RELATIONS**

In this chapter brief discussion about Indo-Pak historic rivalry and also including the potential roles that strategic actors play in promoting South Asia's nuclear equilibrium development, was consulted to gain a more explicit knowledge of how both states would contribute to deterrence stability in the region. Some potential threats to deterrence stability between India and Pakistan include the nuclear arms race, arms modernization, shift of nuclear doctrines and its impact on deterrence stability.

#### **3.1 Background and Context of the India-Pakistan Adversarial Relations**

Pakistan and India are distinctive countries by their locality, those are sharing, Long-running border skirmishes, and never-ending border disputes, terrorism, which has a built-in hazard of nuclear escalation, the weapons race, and conventional imbalance are all features of the precarious security environment between Pakistan and India. Pakistan's strategic location, as well as the fact that British India was divided at the same time as the Cold War, this new nation quickly gained notoriety. Tension was rising in the northern state of J&K as the citizens of the newly created state continued to celebrate their long-awaited independence. In actuality, the Radcliffe Commission's "boundaries were purposefully drawn so that India could access the state of Jammu and Kashmir," as stated by Justice Javid Iqbal. Therefore, in this sense, British rule is still felt in the Kashmir crisis (Iqbal, 1993).

In South Asia, both nuclear states believed that strategic balance and capability of credible nuclear deterrence is the only guarantee to prevent conflict and sustain stability and peace in the world; the 1962 Cuban missile crisis is a good illustration of the efficacy of deterrence. Nuclear arsenal balance creates rationality among two nuclear states (Dimitri, 2019). Perhaps India and Pakistan have unique cases of study in perspective of deterrence stability, and they have a history of four full-scale wars along with a long list of LOC clashes and the eternal Kashmir Issue. The adversarial relationship between Pakistan and India is based on their religious and cultural differences; their relations never get a standard form since the region was separated into two independent states, Pakistan and India, in 1947. British partition plan proved injustice; the division of combined Indian assets, territorial issues, refugee settlement, and water claims merged the enduring enmity of the century.

After the war of 1965 in Pakistan, some modest scattered debate was started about establishing a nuclear arsenal to combat conventional power inequality. India's "peaceful nuclear explosion" (PNE) inspired Pakistan to develop a nuclear deterrent in 1974. The option to build nuclear weapons was made in response to an impending nuclear threat from India. The decision to protect Pakistan from a significant external threat drove advancements in the nuclear initiative, which was based on a 'Steal' attitude. No consideration was given to an atomic doctrine or the operational oversight of this emerging capability as a nuclear program in Pakistan was developing through numerous stages.

When the South Asian strategic elite faced an escalation in their relations during the period known as the "Brasstacks Crises" (1986/87)," they established the idea of deterrence. This time, Pakistan's ambiguous nuclear policy employed deterrence tools

to prevent Indian aggression against its territory. As soon as India set off its first atomic explosion in 1974, the world was aware of its nuclear capacity, but Pakistan's remained a mystery. Mr. Mushahid Hussain Syed revealed inconsistency regarding the availability of nuclear weapons during a conversation with Dr. A. Q. Khan, which at the time turned the situation in Pakistan's favor.

Pakistan was forced to react to Indian bombings in May 1998 to restore South Asia's strategic balance. Pakistan's nuclear tests were interpreted as measures of self-defense. They have advanced South Asia's interests in peace and security by stimulating mutual deterrence. The nuclearization of Pakistan and India eliminated nuclear uncertainty. Regarding nuclear threats from both sides, South Asia's strategic and security environment has been evident since May 1998. The region that was prone to strife was then given significant consideration. Supporters of nuclear deterrence are aware of the disastrous effects of using nuclear warheads in an Indo-Pak scenario. The two nuclear-armed regimes' leaders knew the dangers of taking nuclear. Nuclear deterrence proponents know nuclear weapons' catastrophic consequences in the Indo-Pak scenario. The leaders of the two nuclear-armed governments understood the consequences of going nuclear.

The scholarly and intellectual endeavors aimed to stabilize South Asia's politically and militarily precarious environment. But would South Asia's nuclearization and deterrence help to promote peace and stability? New hopes for amicable ties were generated at the February 1999 Lahore Summit between the prime ministers of Pakistan and India; meanwhile, the Kargil crisis (Kargil war) made it a transient event. A brief but devastating combat was fought in May/June 1999 at Kargil, a small town in Kashmir on the Indian side of the Line of Control. India declared the conflict to

have been started by the Pakistani establishment, while Pakistan downplayed it as an action committed by Kashmiri independence fighters. Nearly after one year of nuclear tests and shortly after the Lahore Summit, hostilities escalated significantly across the Line of Control (LOC) at Kargil, a portion of Kashmir under Indian control. The U.S. dispatched troops to Afghanistan to confront the attackers after the September 11, 2001, terrorist attack on the United States of America. India and Pakistan backed American efforts to combat terrorism and allied operations in Afghanistan. Due to its geographical location, Pakistan became the hub of operations across the Afghan border. Unfortunately, Pakistani partnership with the United States was eclipsed by the contentious bilateral agenda between Pakistan and India. Pakistan vehemently refuted India's accusation that it organized a December 2001 terrorist attack on its Parliament. After 1998, Pakistan and India consolidated nuclear into their national defense systems.

They were bringing about an entirely fresh phase of nuclear politics. In 1999 and 2001/02, full-scale war was only narrowly averted. Future events are always unexpected when nuclear deterrence is used as the trump card in war scenarios to control the escalation. The question is whether deterrence was influential during the crisis, as mentioned earlier, stabilized things, and stopped nuclear weapons from being used on the battlefield. Many academics believed in the success of nuclear deterrence. Deterrence Was the cause of why there was no full-scale war after the fight in Kargil. An error in judgment or misinterpretation perhaps sparked a nuclear conflict between the two South Asian nations. Does nuclear deterrence's credibility make it less likely to deploy nuclear weapons? However, deterrence as an analytical tool for crisis stability and conflict management in South Asia's emerging dynamics must be thoroughly reexamined.

On the other side, Pakistan is concerned about the increasing US-Indo relations and the introduction of the Indian ballistic missile defense, which could threaten the tactical harmony between India and Pakistan. Islamabad is wary of the term "strategic" used to describe the U.S. talks with New Delhi. Pakistan has consistently been a trustworthy "partner" of the United States of America and has always expected that the latter will accommodate Pakistan in maintaining its strategic significance in the area concerning India. Pakistan fears that the United States has diminished Pakistan's security worries by allowing India to act as the region's law enforcement agency. It will probably cause Pakistan to worry that America will forsake them. Pakistan has established strong links with China, and if Indo-US relations improve, Pakistan and Beijing may become much more intertwined. What effects does it have on South Asian regional stability?

Nuclear doctrine and the region's stability of deterrence are directly related. On August 17, 1999, a draft of an Indian nuclear doctrine was released. It has two key characteristics contributing to the fragile nuclear balance between Pakistan and India. According to this definition, the idea of "credible, minimum nuclear deterrence" is dynamic and linked to the needs of national security as well as technological requirements and strategic atmospheres. (Joeck, 2008). Foreign policy officials stated that Pakistan's capacity to counteract the Indian nuclear threats strategy would be in jeopardy (Krepon, 2013). As a result, Pakistan implemented a first-use policy: India's geographic proximity and the imbalance in conventional weapons. Pakistan would consequently adopt a flexible reaction posture and, if necessary, employ nuclear weapons first. India evaluated its No First Deploy policy in January 2003, In the case of a biological or chemical attack, nuclear weapons. The strategic stability of South Asia would be jeopardized.

The rational leadership's thought process, expressed in the nuclear doctrine, will be necessary for stable nuclear deterrence.

Will there be a discussion between India and Pakistan at odds over nuclear policy? The creation of a reliable deterrence is hampered by factors such as the vulnerability of nuclear assets, gaps in surveillance, early warning, and intelligence capabilities, deeply ingrained mistrust and ongoing disputes like the Kashmir conflict, and the absence of standardized crisis management mechanisms among India and Pakistan. To accomplish stability in the region, an effort should be made to lower the amount of these components. Analyzing novel ways to address pressing strategic problems, including safety, proliferation, and security, is necessary to stop the deliberate or unintentional use of nuclear arsenals.

Nuclear weapon systems pose a severe challenge to its governance. Internal political stability and robust institutions are in high demand. Political instability in South Asia provides a more significant threat than nuclear weapons since one cannot forecast the political motivations behind any given circumstance, such as the current Indian aspirations behind the Bombay attacks on November 26. Pakistan and India's military and political authorities should be familiar with considering minimal deterrence and evaluating the stability of deterrence in light of contemporary strategic circumstances. Evaluating deterrence stability and its key components' potential can raise the stability level between hostile states. What steps would have to be taken to stabilize deterrence in South Asia?

Solving the problems that lead to war between nuclear-armed states is the best approach to guaranteeing peace, security, and stability. It is necessary to investigate

the variables that can jeopardize the stability of deterrence. If certain precautions were taken, there would be a greater likelihood that peace through deterrence would prevail. These include arms control, risk reduction, and strategic restraint regime action. Working on a "restraint regime" in which nuclear weapons are employed as war prevention and deterrence tools should be a priority for decision-makers in Islamabad and New Delhi. Should we increase the number of nuclear CBMs to improve deterrent stability? The proposals for improving the atomic environment in South Asia will come after the conclusion, with the majority calling for Pakistan to take unilateral measures and some calling for India and Pakistan to cooperate.

### **3.1.1 Political Challenges in the India-Pakistan Relationship**

Historically, India and Pakistan have been embroiled in a tense relationship since the subcontinent was divided. Since 1947, the possibility of crisis turning into conflict has existed. Both of the nuclear rivals have engaged in several battles. All wars, with the exception of the one in 1971 that saw Pakistan torn apart, have the Kashmir dispute as their justification. By starting wars in 1947-1948, 1965, and 1999 (Kargil conflict), both states have failed to settle their disagreement over Kashmir. The stability of nuclear deterrence is negatively impacted by Pakistan's and India's support for the separatist movements in Baluchistan and Kashmir, respectively. The distinctive actions of both states, often illogical and aggressive, can start a war that could develop into a nuclear clash. India aspires to be a significant force on the international stage, whereas Pakistan is thought to have been a territorial revisionist state from the beginning.

Some local difficulties in the strategic calculus present a seemingly challenging task despite being less discussed in India-Pakistan nuclear dynamics. Right-wing religious and political organizations on the subcontinent actively and aggressively compete

between India and Pakistan. The lack of trust between the two results from the local political dynamics, which is one of the major factors affecting the bilateral relationship and is the cause of ongoing difficulties. Due to regional difficulties, both states have different approaches to dealing with problems, especially the Kashmir conflict. In contrast to Pakistan, which believes India has been exploiting the issue, especially in the aftermath of 9/11, India believes Pakistan promotes terrorism in Kashmir. Baharat has attempted to associate the sincere Kashmiri liberation movement with terrorism. India purposefully brings up the subject of terrorism even at multilateral economic gatherings to harm Pakistan's reputation. Sadly, cultural exchanges haven't precisely produced any noticeable results. The so-called "spoilers" within communities and the power networks on both sides may be to blame. Both states political relations have an adverse historical legacy; the prominent cause of this rivalry is different religious ideologies that promote extremist behavior in both nations across the borders.

### **3.2 Military Doctrines and Deterrence Stability**

This research aims to extensively analyze India-Pakistani military doctrines during the period following 9/11 when a battle between the two neighbors with nuclear weapons appeared unavoidable. A doctrine is the foundation upon which organizational and force structures are created. It describes the standards for force composition and the kinds, numbers, distribution of weaponry, and associated delivery systems required to carry out the doctrine (Salik, 2014). He explained, in other words, that military doctrine is "a military principle or set of strategies." As described by Scoot D. Sagan, Military doctrine is defined as "the underlying assumptions and specific directives provided to military officers who develop operational principles for the application of military troops. (Sagan, 2009). He used the Truman Doctrine as an example of how nations should behave in international relations. Understanding that a doctrine might

be political, military, or a combination of the two while utilizing other sectors helped me realize how important this was for achieving goals.

India first believed that the non-alignment strategy was the most effective way to pursue its interests after becoming an independent nation. However, it changed its mind in light of the shifting South Asian strategic environment and adopted offensive postures (Summar, 2021). India was forced to make the required changes in the military-strategic environment to participate in regional politics due to its two-fronted strategic arch rivalry with Pakistan. India's strategic environment is centered on Pakistan and China but leans more toward Pakistan. New Delhi has portrayed China as its principal enemy since the Sino-Indo War of 1962, but the present military modernization and doctrinal shift reveal its imperial aims to subjugate Pakistan.

The Nehru era saw the beginning of the strategic shift in Indian thinking when Nehru advocated for economic stability in India and further sought to handle bilateral disputes with its immediate neighbors by diplomatic and political means rather than through force. The Nehru doctrine sought to control the Indian Ocean and deter other powers from spreading their influence in this crucial geographic area. However, in the early 1970s, India requested military assistance from the USA before signing a friendship agreement with the USSR, the Indo-Pak War of 1965, and the Indo-Sino War of 1962; these wars highlighted internal flaws (Ministry, 1971).

Indira Gandhi adopted a more aggressive doctrine and made strategic moves to address these deficiencies in order to pursue India's hegemonic goals by bolstering its military power. Focusing on mechanized infantry, three striking corps, and sophisticated armor divisions, K Sunderji devised a 20-year strategy for the army (Khattak, 2020). These

attempts had the clear intention of striking Pakistan on its soil. However, India refrained from any military ventures due to Pakistan's successful cricket diplomacy and the potential threat of gaining nuclear warheads. The danger of non-state actors obtaining and utilizing nuclear weapons is another worry prompted by their presence in the area. Both countries' doctrines must address the challenge of securing their nuclear assets effectively to prevent unauthorized access.

### **3.2.1 Cold Start Doctrine of India and Full Spectrum Deterrence of Pakistan**

Since the early 1980s, Indian conventional warfare tactics have been based on the "Sunderji Doctrine," and have tended to be somewhat defensive (Hilali, 2001). In April 2004, the Indian military adopted the "Cold Start Doctrine" (CSD) as a fresh, Pakistan-specific combat tactic. The CSD was created as a result of interactions between the ideas of "coercive diplomacy," "hot pursuit," and "limited war under a nuclear umbrella." (Yuan, 2001). The Cold Start Doctrine (CSD) was approved for adoption by the Indian Chief of Army Staff (COAS), General N.C. Vij, at the biennial conference of the army's commanders-in-chief in April 2004.

It took time and effort for India to mobilize its three strike corps—the 1 Corps, located in Mathura; the 2 Corps, based in Ambala; and the 21 Corps, based in Bhopal—from their headquarters in central India to the Pakistani border during the armed standoff in 2002–2003.

India wanted to open up the possibility of a little conflict carried out by Integrated Battle Groups (IBGs) below the nuclear threshold. Its main purpose was to carry out aggressive actions quickly after mobilization. There has been a low-intensity confrontation between Pakistan and India alongside the Working Boundary (WB), Line of Control (LoC), and Actual Ground Position Line (AGPL) in Siachen for more

than 70 years (Ladwig, 2007). After seeing that this presents a clear opportunity for a conventional conflict below the nuclear threshold, India's strategic community believes it is still a persistent aspect of the conflict due to unsettled border disputes. As a result, it is likely that the first goal of an Indian military attack launched in response to the CSD will be to harm Pakistan's ability to wage war. The supporting goal would be to breach the international boundary (IB) and seize some land for negotiation purposes. India attempted to cross the IB with simultaneous attacks that would prevent the Pakistani army's integration by assembling three to five IBGs with 72 to 96 hours' notice. India would utilize a territory it has conquered as a negotiating chip in peace talks after the fight.

(Kanwal, 2017). General Bipin Rawat, the head of the Indian Army, stated in a conversation that Indians would, "IBG is soon going to be tested" (Rawat, 2018).

Speed is emphasized during both deployment and operational execution in order to combat the disadvantage of working from outside lines and accomplish timely break-ins. (Sahgal, 2019). Indian Army Chief Bipin Rawat confirmed India as the CSD's operator in 2017 after previously being unwilling to accept the presence of such an idea in public. (Ahmed & Ashraf, 2019). Brigadier Arun Sahgal, an Indian strategic analyst, believes that the CSD is a way of thinking that is focused on creating eight to ten IBGs that could be launched with a 48 to 72-hour notice. According to him, the primary goal of the Cold Start doctrine is to confuse the enemy, destroy its organic cohesiveness, paralyze its military leadership, and lead it to make tactical mistakes from which it will be challenging to recover.

According to India's new military doctrine, CSD, using the entire army to accomplish "limited objectives" is inappropriate. In reaction to terrorist assaults or other problems, it is a too rigid and unsophisticated war-fighting approach to mobilize a massive armored force within Pakistan (Gady, 2019). India's air force, navy, army, and strategic forces have all undergone modernization due to economic clout, specifically to face threats from Pakistan and China (Mastro, 2019). However, given the creation of tactical nuclear weapons (TNWs) and Pakistan's military reactions to the IBG, it is still unclear if India has the credibility and capability to carry out the CSD. In a small-scale confrontation, it is debatable whether the Indian military has the organizational and material might to overcome the Pakistani army's defensive prowess and geographic advantages (Narang & Walter, 2017).

Ladwig asserted that the leadership of India had discovered three crucial shortcomings in the Sunderji Doctrine's operationalization during Operation Parakram. First of all, it was highly challenging to deploy and manage the enormous strike corps. Furthermore, President Musharraf delivered his "U-turn speech" after the strike corps approached the international boundaries alongside Pakistan in 2001-2002. India was subjected to full USA pressure to exercise restraint. Numerous senior Indian officials believed that Pakistan had "outplayed India." They said that Islamabad used its sponsored proxies to assault the Indian capital and that it could also profit from the mobilization and deployment times of the Indian army. According to Indian strategic experts, the delay allowed Pakistan to bring in its friends, particularly the US, and to internationalize the situation. The failure of India to exact revenge was caused by India's political elite losing their cool and being incapable of withstanding criticism from overseas.

In essence, even between nuclear nations, conventional military capabilities still govern the balance of military power. This reasoning seems to support the Indian military's policy of employing conventional weapons, given that the primary goal of implementing the CSD is conducting a major conventional strike on Pakistan in the hopes that it will forgo a nuclear exchange. (Stewart & Derrick, 2010). However, the most significant risk and difficulty with Indian CSD and Pakistani TNWs is that they make competence very challenging. For instance, if you begin employing CSD, we will use TNWs, and if we foresee a cross-border terrorist attack, we will strike first. However, Pakistani TNWs and Indian CSDs present the most risk and difficulty because they make competence difficult to enforce. The scenario has made deterrence incredibly difficult because both Pakistan and India eventually want to resort to coercion.

### **Full Spectrum Deterrence of Pakistan**

Entire spectrum: To defeat the opponent's missile defense systems and employ conventional second-strike capability to deter the enemy, deterrence is a strategy that asks for the development of multiple nuclear and missile capabilities. Tactical nuclear weapons should be deployed at the lowest practicable level, and cruise missiles should be used. After Pakistan effectively tested the Hatf IX or Nasr, a surface-to-surface multi-tube short-range ballistic missile capable of transporting nuclear bombs with the necessary yield, Full Spectrum Deterrence (FSD) gained attention. Nuclear, conventional, and sub-conventional threat scenarios are all categorized. To accommodate all envisioned threats, the capabilities are built under the needs. When Pakistan launched its so-called tactical nuclear weapon (TNW), the short-range ballistic missile Nasr, In April 2011, Lieutenant-General (Ret.) Khalid Kidwai stated, "The test was a significant turning point in Pakistan's development of strategic

deterrence across all threatening levels” (ISPR, 2011). This was more than just a proclamation; Pakistan was switching from CMD to FSD to "plug the deterrence gaps and contain the CSD" (Khan, 2016). The Pakistani military establishment is confident that TWNs will benefit strategic stability and provide Pakistan with a useful tactical and strategic tool to thwart Indian forces' aggressiveness under the "Cold Start Doctrine." Widespread criticism was leveled at Pakistan's change in nuclear strategy from both domestic and foreign quarters. Whereas prominent Pakistani professor and defense analyst Zafar Nawaz Jaspal said, “In the Southern Desert Theatre, the enemy's pursuing rapid cavalry/armor may be destroyed by Pakistani defensive structures using (tactical) nuclear attacks advance or seize Lahore by taking advantage of the city's proximity to the border." Feroz Hassan Khan argued in favor of, “Nasr is not a weapon for fighting in battle, but rather it is used to dissuade attacking armies tactically" (Ahmed, 2016).

The NCA declared, "The nuclear program is essential to Pakistan's defense because it would not ignore shifting dynamics of security in South Asia and continues to adopt a full spectrum deterrence approach to thwart all forms of assault”. Lt. Gen. K. Kidwai noted in December 2017, “The emergence of nuclear capabilities is guided by the Full Spectrum Deterrence policy, putting every Indian target within striking distance of Pakistan. Pakistan is, therefore, creating a broad range of arsenals in each of the three groups and covering the vast Indian Land mass's remote regions with strategic, tactical, and operational depth (Lavoy, 2015).

After the September 2015 NCA meeting, the D.G. ISPR reiterated Pakistan's intention to maintain full spectrum deterrence capability under the principles of "credible minimum deterrence" to thwart all forms of aggression and its commitment to pursuing

peace and stability in the South Asian region (Yousaf, 2015). Pakistan also benefits from having nuclear weapons because it is free to choose from a wide range of targets, despite the Ballistic Missile Defense, including battlefield, counterforce, and counter value objectives (Basrur & Rajesh, 2009).

Full spectrum deterrence aimed to reaffirm Islamabad's policy of favoring India and its intention to support the sub-conventional and strategic levels; there is strategic equilibrium. Islamabad believes nuclear weapons are the final choice and has never ruled out using them as a first resort against a nuclear opponent. Additionally, in order to counter or prevent any Indian advances in the field of battle, Pakistan's strategic leadership has decided to gradually fill the strategic gaps in its force structure by employing air-based sea and land methods of delivery. This has led to a revision of Islamabad's "conventional war-fighting doctrine," also known as a comprehensive response. Pakistan currently has 140-150 warheads, according to an evaluation of its nuclear arsenal made in 2018 by the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists. Therefore, minimum credible deterrence principles are incompatible with Pakistan's full-spectrum deterrence posture (Abdullah, 2018).

In a 2015 editorial, according to certain USA media pundits, Pakistan was portrayed in the New York Times as a country rashly building nuclear weapons that would only be used in a conflict with India. Pakistan has "The most rapidly increasing nuclear arsenal in the world" (Bronson, 2019). When a generally larger India threatens Pakistan, nuclear warheads are frequently brought up in security discussions. Some Western observers, such as Michael Krepon and Toby Dalton, interpreted Pakistan's FSD as Pakistan was urged to "normalize" its actions in reaction to the use of both short-range and long-range Nasr & Shaheen-III missiles as signs that its national

security was becoming more nuclearized (Dalton & Krepon, 2015). General Kidwai asserted during his speech, "Possibly taking operating level ranges into consideration, the weaker ballistic missiles," according to the International Nuclear Policy conference at Carnegie. The lack of a full spectrum of deterrence was what they found appealing, which presumably encouraged them to identify the place below this gap for conventional warfare. We have called this "full spectrum deterrence." (Lavoy, 2015).

However, there has been significant and quick technological advancement. Pakistan needs more fissile material to fulfill its inventory needs for more missiles. According to Dr Adil Sultan, "the range of the different abilities of Pakistan's construction is under the control of CMD. It is false to think that the state of Pakistan has fully moved from CMD to FSD" (Sultan, 2019). Pakistan might be looking for an opportunity that can ensure a second-strike capability to keep India at bay. Pakistan is highly conscious of India's advancements in developing nuclear submarines and other aspects of its second-strike capacity. Pakistan will want a limited modernized second-strike capability because of the limitations of fissile material. Pakistan cannot compete against India in a race for arms because fissile material and other resources are limited. The legitimacy of Pakistan's deterrence cannot be compromised, but this does not guarantee that Pakistan will prevail in a gun-to-gun battle with Indians. However, Pakistan's most minor would continue to fluctuate and be proportional to India's nuclear program Both CSD and FSD support balance to deterrence stability in Indo-Pak meanwhile supporting our hypothesis.

### **3.2.2 Impact of military doctrines on deterrence Stability**

As discussed previously, doctrines are the manifestations of a state's shared framework for how its armed forces would support the opponent who will decide not to go over

them and avoid escalation because of the disastrous effects of a nuclear war exchange by deterrence by clearly defining its red lines. According to James Wirtz, governments attribute intents by concentrating on military doctrines because it can be challenging to discern a state's goals (Lavoy et al., 2000). According to Bajpai, relations among Indo-Pak were positive before nuclear testing. The two nations had chosen eight topics for discussion between 1991 and 1996, and on three of them, Siachen, Wullar, and Sir Creek, they had nearly settled by 1993. Bajpai, however, asserts that the failure of all negotiations was brought on by the summer of 1998 nuclear testing (Sagan, 2009). The region's stability depends on India's and Pakistan's military doctrines, especially regarding nuclear deterrence. Both countries have nuclear weapons, and their respective defense plans center on the idea of nuclear deterrence to avoid a protracted war between them. The consequences for regional stability are examined in this article, along with how India's and Pakistan's nuclear deterrence plans are shaped by military doctrine.

The only brief period between the two nations when peace was established was the so-called non-crisis period, which ran from 1979 to 1986. The effect of Pakistan's surrender in the war versus India in 1971 happened, and Pakistan maintained its calm until the creation of nuclear weapons. However, Pakistan shifted its foreign policy towards India after acquiring nuclear warheads in the late 1980s. It supported infiltration into India, especially into Kashmir and Punjab, which ended in the 1999 Kargil war. The “No First Use” (NFU) strategy, which signifies India's pledge to forgo nuclear weapons as a first resort in any confrontation, is the foundation of India's nuclear doctrine. In order to reaffirm India's commitment to nuclear restraint, stability, and responsible nuclear stewardship, the NFU policy acts as a declaratory statement. It comforts other countries, knowing that India exclusively uses its nuclear weapons

defensively and will only use them if it comes under nuclear assault first. Pakistan's nuclear doctrine contrasts with India's NFU strategy, "Full Spectrum Deterrence," uses different nuclear explosives. Pakistan has not vowed unequivocally to forgo using, first and foremost, nuclear arms. Instead, it strongly emphasizes a convincing minimum deterrent stance, meaning that it will keep an adequate and credible nuclear arsenal to thwart any type of aggression from India, whether it be conventional or nuclear (S. Malik, personal communication, July 17, 2023). Pakistan's strategy incorporates the idea of "First Strike Instability," in contrast to India's conventional military focus. Pakistan seeks to counterbalance India's traditional edge by maintaining the right to first use. This is done to warn India that any significant conventional strike could result in a limited nuclear retaliation, discouraging India from taking military solid action (N. Salik, personal communication, July 16, 2023).

The Nehru era saw the beginning of the strategic shift in India Thinking when Nehru advocated for economic stability in India and further sought to handle bilateral disputes with its immediate neighbors by diplomatic and political means rather than through force. The Nehru doctrine sought to control the Indian Ocean and deter other powers from spreading their influence in this crucial geographic area. Nevertheless, as India asked the US for military support and signed a friendship treaty with the USSR in the early 1970s, the Indo-Pak War of 1965 and the Sino-Indian War of 1962 highlighted their internal flaws (Ministry of External Affairs, 1971). The key elements of prior military doctrines are combined to create the 2018 Land Warfare Doctrine (Khattak, 2020). The concepts of integrated battle groups, hybrid warfare, surgical strikes, network-centric warfare, and military modernization were taken from earlier doctrines, and the land warfare doctrine was finally introduced after these concepts had been refined and updated in light of fresh challenges.

The limited war concept served as the foundation around which the Indian military based its strategy after the development of nuclear weapons. The Indian military must mobilize quickly for restricted, precise movements to further the goals of the small fight. India requires force multipliers to deploy them on its borders in case of war or missions on the northern and western fronts of a conflict. At the same time, China poses a threat to India (Mitra, 2019). A full-scale confrontation is likely due to the vast conventional and non-conventional inequalities between the two countries, and the nature of the dispute is likely to remain manageable. India, hence, leans more towards Pakistan.

An earlier version of the Land Warfare Doctrine 2018 is the Cold Start Doctrine, which likewise emphasized limited, shallow, sharp, and quick military actions across the border to seize a small portion of the enemy land that could then be utilized as a negotiating chip on various topics. Cold Start Doctrine kept the number of soldiers in each battle group between 20,000 and 25,000. However, the Indian army could not meet the necessary goal for mobilization time. Indian strategists lowered the size of IBGs in the Land Warfare Doctrine 2018, where one IBG included 8,000 and 10,000 soldiers, having learned from the shortcomings of the Cold Start Doctrine. Depending on the geography, target, and purpose, each IBG's composition is different. However, all IBGs share the same fighter jets, artillery regiments, engineering and signal corps, infantry battalions, and gunship helicopters (Khattak, 2020).

The Land Warfare Doctrine 2018 is to modernize military technology with the assistance of similar-minded nations like Russia, the USA, and Israel. States occasionally upgrade their armed forces to maintain deterrence against their adversaries and then use this military might to achieve political goals. States

occasionally modernize their armed forces to maintain deterrence against their enemies and then employ this military might to achieve political ends. The state's defense lines need to be strengthened, another apparent argument. The South Asian strategic environment's arms race and military rivalry could worsen security. As three nuclear powers share borders, the region's delicate strategic fabric is already enduring frequent and severe blows (Walter, 2015). Surgical strikes are one of the cornerstones of land warfare doctrine.

In this chapter, the findings explain the supremacy of the Indian defense system. In light of that, we can presume that shortly, India may propose a new doctrine in which the prospect of modifying its military posture is foreseen, according to a closer examination of the country's military policy. Prior to this, IBG and limited warfare strategies were not used by the Indian military. On the other hand, Pakistan is also developing pertinent and timely solutions. This study, which focuses on the Indian new ground combat doctrine 2018, identifies tendencies in transforming Indian military doctrine. First, this study's key conclusions are that Pakistan is the primary focus of the Indian military's doctrinal reform.

### **3.3 Military Modernization and Arms Race in the Region**

The result of military modernization and an arms race in South Asia has positive and negative consequences. It will positively impact enhanced defense capabilities, technological advancement, and assured deterrence. It will discourage the aggressions and contribute to regional stability by reducing the likelihood of war. However, it has negative repercussions as well. It will negatively impact the region in such a way that it will cause increased tensions, the proliferation of arms and armaments, escalation risks, diversion of resources, arms race, and reduced trust and cooperation. Military

modernization takes place in two domains; one is the conventional, and the other is the nuclear domain. As far as conventional is concerned, India is far ahead of Pakistan, and they are including modern technologies.

Nuclear arsenal upgrading and the competition for arms in the region can be brought on by nuclear weapon possession. Both Pakistan and India might feel the need to hold onto or acquire a perceived advantage, which might heighten hostilities and spread instability (S. Malik, personal communication, July 17, 2023).

The Land Warfare Doctrine 2018's main principle is to improve military technology with the assistance of like-minded nations such as the US, Israel, and Russia. States occasionally modernize their armed forces to maintain deterrence against their adversaries and then use this armed might to achieve political goals. The state's defense lines need to be strengthened, another apparent argument. The arms race and military rivalry could cause the security situation to worsen in the South Asian strategic context. While three nuclear powers share borders, the region's delicate strategic fabric is already enduring frequent and severe blows (Walter, 2015). President Pervez Musharraf said, "In order to ensure regional stability, South Asia's traditional equilibrium must be maintained" (Ramana & Mian, 2003). It should come as no surprise that the Indian military's developing qualitative and quantitative capabilities have prompted worries from Pakistani analysts (Mustafa, 2008). Furthermore, according to some, the latest boom of foreign weapons obtained from nations like Russia and Israel is intended to improve the Indian military's command and control capabilities, precision strikes, and surveillance, which form the component of the termed Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA).

Israel and India together launched various space-related programs to protect Indian space, including the spy satellites RISAT-2, GSAT-6, and GSAT-7 (Khattak, 2020). In particular, Israel is helping. India will improve its capabilities for network-centric and technological warfare. The Indian military sites have installed Iron Dome and Israeli Arrow-2 defense systems. They have different kinds of cruise missiles with dual use that can be used for conventional and strategic missions, and the United States has given them special privileges status to import the missile. They have got advanced military technologies from there. India has BA surveillance aircraft, which are very helpful in maritime surveillance and anti-submarine warfare. Nothing is stopping India from getting modern equipment from anywhere. So, the Russian markets are open to them (Jaspal, 2005).

Pakistani security experts have hypothesized that Pakistan's conventional deterrent capabilities will decline, leading to a decline in strategic stability due to South Asia's expanding conventional military gap. The possibility of conflict escalating is increased by abrupt changes between pairs of governments' conventional military balance, in particular long-standing adversaries, according to several researchers' findings (Geller & singer, 1998) The pressure to increase Pakistan's military has grown as a result of Islamabad's failure to match the military might of New Delhi buildup, according to informed observe the nation's past ambassadors to the United States and the United Nations, retired senior officers from the Command, the organization in charge of administering Pakistan's nuclear arsenal (Oswald, 2011). Retired employees and non-government observers have made similar remarks, and current officials have reiterated them. A representative for Pakistan's Foreign Office issued a warning in 2009, saying, "our neighbor has acquired advanced weapons that will upset decrease the nuclear threshold between our nations and maintain the conventional balance" (Sajjad, 2009).

Beyond the subcontinent, there are worries India's military modernization is weakening the conventional deterrent of Pakistan. For instance, Peter Layoy, a former deputy defense secretary, claims that the military development program of India has increased the gap between Pakistan's and India's conventional military capabilities, which could result in a regional arms race or a lower nuclear threshold level. (Layoy, 2015). India also gets weapons and equipment from the UK, mainly from the USA. So, they have all avenues open, requiring whatever they need from anywhere they can get. Compared with that, Pakistan has limitations, mainly one source: China. That is because Pakistan does not have the funds to purchase these weapons and equipment from Western countries, and the Chinese are giving on concessional terms or loans, which Pakistan can continue to pay later. Pakistan has been facing this problem recently, but what Pakistan has got is that after the nuclearization in 1998, this conventional asymmetry matters little because India cannot exploit its advantages in the conventional domain.

Observers worry that this conventional asymmetry, which fuels India's arrogance and Pakistan's disappointment, will make the nuclear arms race more dangerous as India gains transformative military capabilities (Hundley, 2012). Nuclear expert Paul Bracken shares this opinion, saying that India has significantly invested in satellites, signals intelligence, cutting-edge radars, and reconnaissance assets to develop new military skills (Bracken, 2012). Rodney Jones, a South Asia expert who has maintained for over ten years that India and Pakistan's rising conventional military disparity destabilizes their nuclear relationship, is much more confident of the impact. Concerning "revolutionary" military equipment like comprehensive area communications, high-performance aircraft, surveillance, and combat awareness, Jones contends that India is outpacing Pakistan (Jones, 2005).

There are some disagreeing voices; although India's substantial and growing conventional military capacities pose a genuine threat to Pakistan's conventional deterrence, some Indian analysts contend that Pakistan's budget for massive military modernization, which is supported by the US and China, is truly eroding India's tenuous conventional supremacy. (Kanwal, 2012). Following the 2008 Mumbai attacks, When the Army was called upon to respond to terrorist attacks, it was not prepared for war. The Indian Army's hollowing out was most visibly demonstrated by this episode (Unnithan, 2017). Dr. Naeem Salik said, " The delivery system of Pakistan has various range of missiles which are good enough to reach every part of India and India has gone into ICBMs range missile because they feel that they need long-range missiles to be used against China" (N. Salik, personal communication, July 16, 2023).

Lately, Stephen Cohen and Sunil Das Gupta recognized the "Indian government's perplexing failure to produce enough military might to change its strategic relationship with Pakistan." Likewise, India's efforts to modernize its military are hindered by an incredible lack of political direction, supporting this perspective from within India.

Military modernization is taking place in two domains. One is the conventional, and the other is the nuclear domain. As far as conventional is concerned, India is far ahead of Pakistan, and they are inducting modern technologies.

These latest aircraft got 26 of a layer card from France, and they have got another 26. They have also signed a deal with France for Scorpion submarines. They are building there. Hyper, they have tested the hypersonic missiles. They have different kinds of cruise missiles.

These are dual uses, which can be used for conventional as well as strategic missions, and they have been given special privilege status by the United States to import the missile. They have got advanced military technologies from there. They have BA surveillance aircraft, which are very helpful in maritime surveillance and anti-submarine warfare.

The continuing arms race among Asian nuclear states has become the main threat to the nation's deterrence and stability. The recently launched declassified versions of Indian and Pakistani security documents, such as the Indian Land Warfare Doctrine 2018 and the National Security Policy of Pakistan 2022-2026, have mentioned the intentions of both competing governments for acquiring and implementing modern warfare technology in their formal strategic postures. The recent trends of force modernization in Pakistan and India have dragged with their standpoint of strategic communities towards AI technology, and the incorporation of AI weaponry with the formal armed forces of both states will further damage the stabilizing role of deterrence in the South Asian region. In this perspective, again, the role of India is superior due to the handsome budget allocations to the Indian weapon industry through the Defense Research and Development Organization (DRDO). The robotic wing of DRDO emphasizes the development of fully autonomous and semi-autonomous weapons systems for the regular Indian armed forces. In the April of 2023 India have achieved hypersonic missile its great breakthrough in present military modernization age. On the other hand, Pakistan is government cannot match its defense budget with India due to several economic crises in domestic state affairs.

### **3.3.1 The role of conventional forces in deterrence stability**

The nuclear threshold would be lower the more remarkable the conventional imbalance. Therefore, it is essential to maintain at least rough Pakistan and India are

conventionally on level with one another. (A. Sultan, personal communication, July 18, 2023). Conventional forces play a crucial role in deterrence stability in the case of the Pakistan and Indian conflict in the region. Although nuclear armaments are frequently believed to be the perfect deterrence, conventional forces are still important in shaping security dynamics. Since the introduction of nuclear weapons in the South Asian region security calculus, there has been a stability-instability paradox whereby the conventional forces play an essential role at the conventional level. While continuing to play its traditional role, it will strengthen the defense of any nation against limited wars. Moreover, it will also contribute to border management and ceasefire engagement, counterterrorism operations, crisis management, and confidence building.

Dr Adil Sultan states, "the nuclear threshold would be lower the greater the conventional imbalance. Therefore, it is important to maintain at least rough conventional parity between India and Pakistan" (A. Sultan, personal communication, July 18, 2023). According to then-President Pervez Musharraf, "the region's conventional equilibrium is crucial to maintain peace." The cornerstone of Pakistani policymakers' strategic deterrent capabilities is their conventional military forces (Ladwig III, 2015).

States cannot thrive in today's globalized world by cutting themselves off from the rest of the globe. The wealthy states have friendly connections with other nations. India strengthened its military foundation by extending its ties to significant arms suppliers. India now buys weapons from us, France, Germany, Israel, and Russia. India acquired modern military equipment thanks to its effective military diplomacy. Pakistan can also get the newest weapons by strengthening its strategic connections with these

nations. The partnership between Pakistan and China is an effort to close the gaps, but more work is needed to compete with India. To divert Pakistan's attention, Indian planners made a few alterations to their military postures. Following the cold start doctrine, offensive components were added to the holding corps to engage Pakistan's forces during a war in several areas. Strike Corps will use this period to conduct attacks on various targets. Pakistan should implement such changes by making the required adjustments in a military-strategic context. In order to counter Indian threats of limited incursions, Pakistan can also deploy IBGs and place them in various locations.

To divert Pakistan's attention, Indian planners made a few alterations to their military postures. Following the cold start doctrine, offensive components were added to the holding corps to engage Pakistan's forces during a war in several areas. Strike Corps will use this period to conduct attacks on various targets.

Following the agreement's signing, the US increased its military assistance to India. This agreement is named the Defense Technology and Trade Initiative 2005. The USA now provides India with C-130J super Hercules, C17 Global Master, Chinook heavy lifter helicopters, and Apache tank-destroying aircraft (Khattak & Kundi, 2019). The Russian Federation is India's second-largest weapon supplier. The strategic alliance between India and Russia has its roots in the period of the Cold War era. When India embraced a non-alignment strategy and forged alliances with both blocs, the relationship between India and Russia took on a new dimension in the 1970s after the friendship treaty was signed. After implementing modern military doctrines, India requires more sophisticated weapons and technology to achieve its hegemonic ambitions in the region. Israel is India's third-largest defense trading partner. Pakistan may have serious concerns regarding the Indo-Israeli defense coordination. Israeli and

Indian defense cooperation dates back to the early 2000s and includes network-centric and electronic warfare equipment. Israel is cooperating with India in all three domains: military, Armed, Air Force, and Naval Force. From that perspective, we have reconnaissance capabilities well into India with the help of some effective AWACS and F16 electronic pods. Within India, they can conduct surveillance for 30 to 40 miles. However, we are unable to perform what an overall satellite can. They can discover our tendencies. The world is aware of the locations of our bases, but if they had instant access to information regarding the movement and deployment of our troops, they would have an advantage (N. Salik, personal communication, July 16, 2023).

The Indian military's aggressive border behavior has been restrained in several areas by the Pakistani military, which has maintained stability there. The underdog's defensive strategies, plans, and tools are extensively emphasized in conventional deterrence. These are the words that John Mearsheimer used to emphasize that idea in his work on conventional deterrence, “The arsenals of the opposing parties have a tremendous impact on how a battle turns out. More importantly for our purposes, when defensive firearms are used, deterrence is more likely to be effective, in control and less likely when offensive weapons are in control” (Mearsheimer, 1983).

There is a chance of limited war in this region given the South Asian political framework, constant doctrinal wrangling by the Indian military, modernization of the armed forces, and persistent war-mongering by the leadership of political and military in India. Indian COAS reaffirmed in 2017 that Pakistan will be attacked by the Indian forces after crossing the Line of Control (Singh, 2017). Additionally, he stressed that CSD-style offensive operations are still feasible in the present day despite Indian Prime

Minister Narendra Modi's 2015 prediction that "future battles will be smaller, and wars will become unusual" during the combined commanders' conference. Senior fellow at Carnegie Endowment, Ashley J, believes, "The potential of limited war among Pakistan and India is low, but the risk is more closely tied to terrorist actions against India than Jammu and Kashmir. Although a large conventional battle between Pakistan and India is possible, it would be expensive and destructive for both nations" (Tellis, 2020). The possibility of a slight dispute between Pakistan and India might increase due to the conventional disparity between the two nations. Although the Pakistani military has maintained a sufficient conventional balance, due to India's size and economic growth, the Indian military may eventually have the upper hand in terms of conventional capabilities. The doctrinal juggling and significant military modernization of the Indian military would put Pakistan in South Asia in a precarious security situation. The Indian military would be able to carry out unconventional operations, a limited war strategy, or targeted strikes on Pakistan due to the growing conventional disparity. However, to keep South Asia strategically stable and prevent the Indian military from acting aggressively, Pakistan must increase its conventional deterrent toward India.

The role of conventional forces is essential in the debate on deterrence stability due to the persistently growing reliance of Indian and Pakistani armed forces on the modern weapon system. The ability of the United States to wage conventional war will be enhanced by the integration of new military technologies. Of the two-sided defense force, and this scenario will increase the probability of a limited armed conflict between both nuclear powers. This conventional armed conflict could also emerge as the result of sub-conventional warfare between Pakistan and India, and the probability

of both scenarios will push both competing governments on the escalation ladder, which will question the stability of deterrence in the area region.

Due to India's size and economic growth, the Indian military Political leadership's behaviors and perceptions about the conventional arms race may be playing a very crucial role in conventional wars. Pakistan's conventional military capabilities are practically on par with those of the Indian military. Without engaging in any sporadic arms race, Pakistan may retain strategic parity with India for the foreseeable future.

### **3.4 Concluding Remarks**

In conclusion, Pakistan would face security challenges in South Asia due to the Indian military's doctrinal shifting and tremendous military modernization. There are many different ways that military doctrine affects the stability of deterrence. Any potential aggression would be deterred by nuclear doctrines. Both parties could be able to stave off any international pressure or intervention to show their resolve. Such an event might push both nations into a "nuclear disaster." Deterrence is strengthened when emphasis is placed on clarity, credibility, and de-escalation. Maintaining stability requires striking the correct balance between nuclear and conventional forces, addressing regional security issues, and adjusting to technological advancements. A sound military strategy should ultimately be centered on averting conflicts and promoting peaceful cooperation with other countries.

All states of the region should establish and bolster security and confidence-building measures, which go a long way toward reducing the likelihood of developing constrained warmongering doctrines. India's military modernization has dramatically exacerbated the regional strategic instability to compete with China and oppose

Pakistan. The South Asian arms race presents a severe security risk and upsetting the balance of power in the area.

With Chinese assistance, Pakistan can get past its long-range air defense concerns. Pakistan may purchase a Chinese long-range air defense system that can counter the Indian Air Force's standoff capabilities and destroy any modern aircraft in the globe. Additionally, it is known that manufacturing of the fifth-generation aircraft has already started and that China and Pakistan are currently producing planes together. These improvements will aid Pakistan in preserving conventional parity with the Indian military soon, preserving strategic equality in the area, and thwarting any offensive actions carried out under CSD, proactive and sub-conventional military operations, or surgical strikes.

## **Chapter 4**

### **ANALYSIS OF POTENTIAL THREATS TO DETERRENCE**

#### **STABILITY**

This chapter will elaborate the threats and challenges that deterrence stability suffering in the region. In the political domain, several potential threats can affect the deterrence stability in South Asia. It can be referred to as the state of balance and equilibrium in which both India and Pakistan feel secure in their ability to deter each other from aggressive actions. Some potential threats to deterrence stability between India and Pakistan include the nuclear arms race, arms modernization, terrorism and proxy warfare, border skirmishes and escalation dynamics, nuclear doctrine and temptations for modification, third-party involvement, Confidence building measures, and lack of communication and crisis management mechanisms.

#### **4.1 Political Domain**

Some significant local difficulties in the strategic calculus present a seemingly challenging task despite being less discussed in India-Pakistan nuclear dynamics. Right-wing religious and political organizations on the subcontinent activity aggressively compete with one another between India and Pakistan. India's desire to emerge as a regional hegemon and the growing assertiveness of the current BJP leadership are some political challenges to deterrence stability in South Asia (A. Sultan, personal communication, July 18, 2023). The bilateral relationship is primarily influenced by the local political dynamics, which also contribute to a lack of trust between the two and the recurrence of disputes.

According to Indian political scientist Bajpai, relations between India and Pakistan were positive prior to the nuclear testing. The two nations had chosen eight topics for discussion between 1991 and 1996, and in 1993, they had come close to an agreement on three of them: Siachen, Wullar, and Sir Creek. However, Bajpai asserts that all negotiations fell through due to the summer of 1998 nuclear testing (Kanti, 2009). The only brief time between the two nations when peace was declared was the so-called non-crisis period, which ran from 1979 to 1986. This happened as a result of Pakistan's surrender in the war with India in 1971, and Pakistan maintained its calm until the creation of nuclear weapons. However, Pakistan shifted its foreign policy towards India after acquiring nuclear warheads in the late 1980s. It supported infiltration into India, specifically Punjab and Kashmir, which concluded in the 1999 Kargil war.

There is an explanation founded on a domestic component that comes from an aggressive pursuit of domestic political goals and a strategy for petitioning to recognize a just role in the global order. Given that numerous prime ministers from various backgrounds in politics and ideology continue favoring the weapon application, the external prestige justifications, and BJP ideology (Kampani, 2019). However, the BJP's timing and philosophy posed an immediate obstacle to the 1998 bomb test. The second rationale is based on the current state of global security, particularly the general deterioration of regional security conditions caused by India's sense of threat from the presence of missile and nuclear programs in its area. Deterrence against nuclear threat and usage is the justification behind Indian acquisition of atomic weapons. The 1962 border conflict with China and the subsequent Chinese nuclear test on October 16, 1964, took place when the Indian political leadership authorized its nuclear scientists to advance the scientific knowledge necessary for producing a nuclear warhead (Kanwal, 2001). One day after

performing its atomic test in 1998, the Indian Premier, Atal Bihari Vajpayee, wrote to U.S. President Bill Clinton expressing similar worries:

Since a few years ago, India's current nuclear context, particularly the deteriorating security situation, has been a source of my concern. Our frontiers are bordered by a country that openly has atomic weapons and engaged in in 1962, there was an armed invasion of India. Our relations with that nation have improved over the past ten years, but there is still a climate of mistrust, primarily because of the unresolved border issue. That nation has actively aided one of our neighbors, Pakistan, in developing secret nuclear weapons, increasing suspicion (New York Times, 1998).

Here is the most common kind of Hindu nationalism in India is known as Hindutva, often known as Hinduness, a noun by Vinayak Damodar Savarkar in 1923. It became the official ideology of the Bharatiya Janata Party in 1989. Along with the more traditional term Hindu Rashtra, Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sang (RSS), a Hindu nationalist volunteer group, and its affiliates, particularly the Vishva Hindu Parishad, support it. (Noor-ul-Haq, 2017). Hindutva organizations that have pushed anti-Muslim and anti-Pakistan sentiments at the societal and state levels and sidelined Muslims in Indian society frequently display contempt for Islam and Muslims (Manzoor, 2015). Due to increased cross-border violations, the Indian military has recently taken a strong stance toward Pakistan (Tooba, 2016). Relations have deteriorated further since the Narendra Modi-led Bharatiya Janata Party (B.J.) took office in 2014 due to increase across-the-border offenses and aggressive remarks by Indian officers. The priority of Modi's administration continues to be terrorism and Kashmir.

The relationship between Pakistan and India is also negatively impacted by historical, religious, and cultural factors. There was communal violence between Muslims and Hindus even before Partition due to disparities in social values, customs, and traditions. Since its establishment, India has refused to acknowledge Pakistan and has worked to obstruct its progress. India's foreign policy also exhibits this ingrained hostility toward Pakistan (Dixit, 2003). The dynamics of relations between India and Pakistan have drastically shifted since Modi took office in 2014. The RSS now plays a much larger part in determining Indian policy. Numerous prominent members of the Indian government, including the BJP General Secretary, have close ties to RSS. In his election manifesto, Modi vowed to repeal Article 370 of the Indian Constitution, construct the Ram temple on the former site of the Babri masjid, reconsider India's nuclear policy, and other anti-Muslim and anti-Pakistan behaviors (Manifesto, 2014).

In a lethal attack, 41 personnel of the Indian Central Reserve Police Force were killed in an incident in Pulwama (J&K) that was carried out by a jihadi cell with a base in Pakistan. On February 14, 2019, just before the campaign's start, in a few weeks. As a result, Modi ordered air strikes to be carried out on Pakistani territory. However, security issues dominated Modi's populist campaign rather than welfare programs. In the Balakot airstrike, it is claimed that a Jaish-e-Muhammad training center was demolished. Six airmen were killed when the Indian Air Force accidentally fired down one of its helicopters while conducting the operation, losing a plane and a pilot (who would later be repatriated to India). Despite the conflicting results of these airstrikes, Modi was able to position himself as the guard of India during a campaign in which nationalist and even belligerent rhetoric dominated.

The threats to strategic stability in the political domains are mainly linked with the changing political scenarios in India and Pakistan under the nuclear shadows. The change of governments and the ideological orientations of leadership in both countries treat their foreign relations while paying less attention to the deteriorating nature of strategic stability in the region. The prevalence of fanatical ideological trends in the political mindsets of the leaders in this way is pertinent to mention here. This factor is overwhelming in the case of Pakistan, but the government of Pakistan is well aware of this development. It has introduced various policy measures to defuse fanatical ideological mindsets' impacts on the country's mainstream strategic priorities. The same situation in India has emerged recently with the support of the BJP's government. The anti-Pakistan narrative of Hindutva's ongoing agenda has dramatically changed India-Pakistan's nuclear hostility. In this way, the South Asian concept of strategic stability cannot be separated from the political communications of Pakistan and India, which are both undergoing a major ideological upheaval.

Political leadership and state relations across the border continue to be strained by Modi's uncompromising stance toward Pakistan and the residents of the IOK. Islamabad's flexibility and goodwill toward New Delhi during the past ten years have diminished due to India's ridiculous stance towards Pakistan, which has instead forced Islamabad to oppose. Kashmir's unresolved issue is a historical fact that cannot be neglected for long. In pursuit of its foreign policy goals of eroding Islamabad's will to resist, India could make even a little error that could destabilize the entire region. Therefore, India and the rest of the world should understand that no other course of action but "dialogue" involving all parties would successfully resolve the long-standing concerns, specifically the central dispute of Jammu and Kashmir.

The extremist approach of political leaders directly affects security issues. When politicians' live enmity across borders for their political benefits, they will enter a state of an arms race.

#### **4.1.1 Pakistan Political Instability**

The political stability and democracy are a darkest chapter in the history of Pakistan. Almost half of the time since her creation state ruled by military leadership. Aziz discusses the political tendencies in Pakistan in his writings. The turbulent political past of Pakistan and how politics have been practiced up to this point have ensured that the belief in democracy has been weakened and that the dictatorial ghost has been correspondingly strengthened. The distinction between democratic leadership and dictatorship, according to K.K. Aziz, is that while the former relies on compromises, reciprocation, and consultation, the latter lacks an accountability structure and views the leaders of other parties as rivals.

Although a genuinely democratic system could not be developed during these decades, the culture of politics was corrupted, and its effects persisted even after this. The dictatorial political system had divided the political parties, and as a result, different coalitions and groups were incorporated into the mainstream of national politics. None of these groups were motivated by a desire to restore democracy; they were only interested in power sharing (Aziz, 2001).

Pakistani political soil does not allow any politician to flourish; for instance, every famous and popular leader faced the same fate in the past, from the first Prime Minister Liaqat Ali Khan, to the last elected 22nd Prime Minister Imran Khan, who suffered the same circumstances. On the way to democracy and maintaining political supremacy, three Ex-Prime Minters lost their lives: Liaqat Ali khan was murdered in 1951,

Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto Judicial murdered 1979, Benazir Bhutto murdered 2007, Imran Khan faced three murder attempts in 2022.

The current political unrest has increased domestic and external threats to Pakistan's society and state. Pakistan is dealing with significant difficulties, particularly in the political and economic spheres. The International Monitoring Fund is giving Pakistan loans and assistance. Still, in the face of dishonest leadership and unstable political situations, massive amounts of foreign aid are needed to produce beneficial outcomes.

To fight terrorism and track down terrorists who might be hiding in these areas, NATO soldiers led by the USA have been targeting Pakistan's frontier regions since September 2008. Attacks like these are becoming more frequent. This war creates serious security threats for citizens, during USA drone attacks many innocent civilian become victims and local population become anti America and anti-state.

Economic situation is going worst day by day, that directly relate with deterrence stability. As in last two-decade corruption is made a common culture in country. Foreign aid is due to international investors' need for more interest in making foreign direct investments and Pakistan's access to attractive markets.

Because of the instability of the system and the public servants' consequent lack of accountability to the general population, corruption has become a widespread practice. Misusing help after major catastrophes like the 2005 earthquake and the 2010 flood's aftermath has damaged donors' willingness to provide Pakistan with adequate support, especially during its most challenging moments. The mismanagement of the difficulties was noted, and it was made apparent that the nongovernmental

organizations should handle the responsibility rather than provide direct assistance to government workers.

The Army has cemented its position as the state's most crucial element in Pakistan. It is not a junior staff employee or the 'arm' of the 'Executive,' as some may believe. Out of the whole seventy-six years of its history, it has significantly impacted Pakistani politics for the 31 years under army control.

The people of Pakistan, who are the true victims of all this, especially an economic slump, natural calamities, and political instability, face a complex predicament as a result of the foreign community's mistrust of Pakistan's governmental systems.

Pakistan has fought for many years to create a lasting democratic system in which the country's military is subordinate to elected civilian administrations.

#### **4.1.2 Political Instability and Terrorism**

Unfortunately, Pakistan has not seen political stability since its independence. Numerous military interventions have taken place. Corrupt practices, inefficiency, and conflicts between multiple institutions have been hallmarks of recent civil politics. Politics had not become more stable when civilian and military governments alternated in power. The military took over Pakistan in 1958, 1969, 1977, and again in October 1999. The political unrest has forced military involvement, which the people of Pakistan have applauded.

Nevertheless, the current scenario has changed; Pakistani people want a stable political Government, and they are struggling hard for it directly and indirectly. A stable Government can only make bold decisions against terrorist groups. In South Asia,

terrorism and the measures taken to combat it have harmed the political system by encouraging racism, right-wing extremism, militarism, and an aggressive sense of patriotism (Muzafar, 2016).

The involvement of non-state actors has been one of the recurrent sources of instability since the Kargil War in 1999. It is essential to consider the possibility of another crisis being brought on by non-state actors since it might spiral out of control (Malik, 2003). These non-state actors have frequently pushed the two nuclear-armed nations to a point of conflict while operating with a fair amount of impunity. The ability of non-state actors to start operations that fuel rivalry and misconception between the two regional adversaries appears to be a growing threat, given the experience of the last 15 years. It has become complicated to maintain security in South Asia due to the relative ability of a few hard-core terrorists to undermine deterrence. Terrorist groups can also plan an assault since their actions are unpredictable and threaten the region's strategic stability.

It is a fact that terrorist organizations have frequently succeeded in generating misunderstandings between India and Pakistan. In the opinion of a reputable researcher, it is plausible that terrorists or non-state entities may encourage nuclear violence through subterfuge and deceit (Potter, 2008). Numerous reasons, such as territorial issues, traditional animosity, and ideological divisions, can exacerbate the bilateral ties and further deepen them.

The worldwide security agenda is undergoing significant upheaval at the start of the twenty-first century. Violence is in front of us, and its face is changing. Traditional threats like conflict between states or state coalitions are no longer our main concern.

The majority of disputes today are non-traditional in origin, ranging from intrastate strife to translation difficulties. Globally, the South Asian region is most vulnerable to these new difficulties. The potential of nuclear terrorism and blackmail has considerably increased in recent years due to the proliferation of nuclear arsenals, the proliferation of the civilian nuclear program, and the rise of terrorist-related extreme political groups (Saideman & Azahar, 2008). It is one of the few places in the world that has not successfully transitioned toward the growth of trust, openness, and collaboration, as well as the building of institutional frames and mechanisms that enable security concerns to be resolved peacefully and at levels of politics, moving away from the use and management of military might. The connection between terrorism and regional nuclear policy is one topic that has not gotten enough attention.

As nuclear tensions rise, particularly in the aftermath of Pakistan's and India's 1998 nuclear tests, the threat of broad, indiscriminate violence by terrorists, who are present and active in the region of South Asia (Hersh, 2009). There are several ways in which the long-rooted animosity between both states could aid nuclear or radiological terrorism. The nuclear positions of India and Pakistan have the same vitality for terrorists to influence the course of events in the surrounding area. Each nuclear posture has a certain level of risk for terrorist involvement. Much of the planet is under this expanding threat (Riedel, 2009). A country's lax or insufficient nuclear security could be used as a springboard for atomic terrorism and blackmail in other nations.

The concern over Pakistan's nuclear weapons safety has developed due to the Jihadi movement's steady expansion, which the ruling Military establishment sponsors. Religious extremism in Pakistan began to flourish during the Ziaul Haq administration, which supported Nizam-e-Mustafa and American military action in Afghanistan

against the Soviet Union. However, following the September 11, 2001, events, there was a massive deal of analysis and worry regarding the security of Pakistan's nuclear arsenal in international circles. After the 9/11 attacks, there were rumors that the nuclear weapon had scattered among many locations. Determining the relationship between the spread of nuclear weapons into weak states and the likelihood that terrorist organizations will acquire and use nuclear weapons is crucial if we are to comprehend the magnitude of the risk of nuclear terrorism in the future. Terrorists who strongly desire nuclear weapons include Osama Bin Laden and the Al Qaida network. With this kind of strategic perspective, terrorist leaders are unlikely to use nuclear or radioactive weapons against moderate states (Sagan, 2001).

A laboratory, a research reactor, or a nuclear power facility for civilian use could be taken over or sabotaged if nuclear facilities' security is inadequate, giving terrorists waging an internal war an opportunity to incite widespread terror. The likelihood of nuclear terrorism has dramatically increased due to terrorist groups' rising technological expertise and renewed zeal to pursue political objectives. In this study, the rising threat of terrorism and nuclear dangers in South Asia are examined. Soon after the nuclear standoff between neighboring states and the precarious state structure of Pakistan, concerns about South Asia's stability, security, and safety attracted attention from around the world. The research makes the case that there is a threat to the entire world and the region, particularly from the relationship between terrorist organizations and the Pakistani military establishment.

After the September 11, 2001 tragedy, there is no question that terrorists may be motivated to carry out a large-scale assassination. Today, Greater danger exists from terrorist threats than the spread of nuclear arsenals than states employing these bombs

as a final deterrent on a battlefield. Many Western observers are worried about Pakistan's nuclear future as military and Taliban fighters battle in the arid tribal territory (Bender, 2009). The terrorist's ultimate objective is to persuade both countries to push for a nuclear exchange, leading to devastation in the area. This will create a favorable climate for non-state actors to use violence. For this reason, they often plan terrorist attacks like those in Mumbai on November 26, 2008, and Lahore on March 3, 2009, which targeted Sri Lankan cricket players.

A key factor in rising violence is a nation's political unrest. However, there are other factors at play in Pakistan. India, for instance, has political stability but also deals with insurgencies and terrorism in several other states, including Nagaland, Mizoram, Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, and Jharkhand. Thus, there are a variety of causes that have raised the number of terrorist attacks in Pakistan. First, poverty, illiteracy, and a lack of employment prospects all contribute to terrorism in Pakistan. The ex-Fata region's Balochistan and Southern Punjab are severely affected by terrorism, according to analysis. Extreme poverty, widespread illiteracy, a high percentage of unemployment, and an undereducated youth population in these places further encourage extremist attitudes and make these individuals easy prey for radical organizations and foreign intelligence services. Second, Pakistan's geographical proximity to Afghanistan also significantly impacted the recent rise in terrorist occurrences. After 9/11, most terrorist organizations relocated from Afghanistan to Pakistan, sparking a new wave of terrorism in that nation. In particular, Al-Qaeda, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), the Eastern Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM), and the Afghan Taliban worked with regional tribes and terrorist organizations like the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ), the Tehreek-e-Taliban-e-Pakistan (TTP) and others, creating a vicious cycle of terrorism that severely compromised Pakistan's security. Thirdly, Afghanistan and

India are the key components. Against Pakistan, both of these countries engaged in hybrid warfare. As evidenced by the detention of Kulbushan Yadav, TTP commander Latif Mehsud, and Ehsan Ullah Ehsan, India exploited Afghan soil to support, cultivate, and train TTP and the Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA) fighters. Fourth: Last but not least, Pakistan's government is somewhat to blame for the rise in violent extremism. Such radical groups against the Soviet Union and India were fostered in the past by Pakistani policymakers. These people were not relocated after the collapse of the Soviet Union, and impoverished regions like ex-Fata and Balochistan were not developed. All of these elements have contributed to terrorism and extremism in Pakistan.

## **4.2 Escalation Risks and Proxy Conflicts**

Escalation has been defined as stepping up attempts in some trends in the hopes of succeeding, particularly if the opposing side does not counteract this effort by doing the same. In other words, Herman noted that it could result, as demonstrated by the Pulwama crisis in 2019 and other instances of measured risk-taking, which is a known component of limited combat in the nuclear age (Lusky, 1965). The possibility for escalation and unintentional conflict is one of the most enormous difficulties in a nuclear-armed zone. India and Pakistan agree that escalation control measures are necessary to keep the situation from getting out of hand (I. Ali, personal communication, July 6, 2023).

After the Kargil conflict, the Pulwama situation <sup>2</sup> in February 2019 was the deadliest and rapidly escalating.

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<sup>2</sup> The 2019 Pulwama incident took place on February 14, 2019, when a vehicle-borne suicide bomber attacked a convoy of cars transporting Indian security personnel on the Jammu-Srinagar National Highway at Lethapora in the Pulwama district of the former state of Jammu and Kashmir.

The use of air power by both nations against one another in a constrained time and place, together with a significant military deployment along the border/Line of Control (LoC) and regular encounters, had all the making of an out-of-control situation.

Given both countries' risky "tit-for-tat" policies, the escalating India and Pakistan's offensive and defensive moves, respectively, raise some crucial and pertinent questions concerning the long-term strategic stability of the region as a whole. The evaluation of both nations was based on their "strategic choices," which were also based on assumptions about risks and subjective judgments about the worth of the stakes (Richard, 2000). This presumably constituted a risky strategic bet that had a high likelihood of failing.

Therefore, it is anticipated that any intentional act of escalation will have detrimental political and diplomatic effects on South Asia's strategic stability. Examining the sequence of incidents that led to the risky clashes between the two is crucial. Both countries came perilously close to starting a full-fledged war during the skirmishes. There is a description of how several incidents preceded the crisis. A Kashmiri teenager from Indian-occupied Kashmir (IoK) carried out a suicide assault on Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) members on February 14, 2019, resulting in the deaths of 40 people. Indian government charged Jaish-e-Muhammad, a militant group outlawed in Pakistan, with funding this terrorist act shortly after the incident. In addition, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi said he has given the military a "free hand" to attack Pakistan when and where appropriate. He also reaffirmed that India's nuclear weapons are not designed for the Hindu holiday of Diwali and that it was not "scared of Pakistan's threats" (Modi, 2019). Such escalating remarks from the chief of state imply that India was probably neither critically "looking backward" to learn from

past crises nor "looking forward" to prevent a repeat of the situation (Betts, 2000). It is crucial to remember that threatening a country with nuclear weapons will likely have adverse military effects.

The Pulwama incident indicates that Pakistan's counterattack was acceptable and did not overstate the rewards that could be gained; somewhat, it was restricted to a modest military operation and aerial maneuver in which two infiltrating Indian military aircraft were shot down. Pakistan's apparent military preparedness did succeed in keeping India from worsening the situation. Consider the difference between threats of nuclear reprisal, which primarily need a judgment of intent, and threats of negate action, which are likely to be judged by the attackers in light of the deterrer's powers (Snyder, 1961). In the Pulwama crisis, Pakistan's political fortitude, sagacity, and deft use of force also restrained India. Deterrence was maintained even in the face of significant ground and air combat.

The Prime minister of Pakistan, Imran Khan, reaffirmed this in a speech to the nation at the height of the crisis. However, he said that if India increased tension, Pakistan would undoubtedly retaliate. Before engaging in any military activity that would have dangerous repercussions for the entire region, he recommended that India consider the cost and benefits analysis. He noted that while starting a war is simple, controlling it will be challenging because of battle dynamics (Sultan, 2019). Escalation would have made confrontation more likely, which would have fueled mistakes and set off a series of occurrences that would have undermined the usefulness of nuclear deterrence. The worldwide community enabled excellent crisis management of this disaster.

India believes that using its conventional forces edge to allegedly coerce Pakistan may establish an escalation domination over that country. A perilous cycle of brinkmanship is threatening South Asia's tense security climate. The perceptions, misunderstandings, posturing, and insecurities between India and Pakistan and their bilateral diplomatic communication will be crucial in controlling the escalation. Finally, the behavior of both governments will be influenced by cultural impressions of the opposite side and historical lessons from prior crises. Therefore, policymakers in both nations must examine how their divergent approaches will affect regional stability and security, covering the rest of the South Asian region, Pakistan, India, and Bangladesh.

#### **4.2.1 Strategic Miscalculations and Limited War**

Security issues and conflicts in the third decade of the twenty-first century, these issues are still essential to the study of international relations. This premise continues to be especially important in light of the complicated security considerations and challenges in relations between India and Pakistan. Future crises and wars involving nuclear-armed rivals will be reshaped by increasingly powerful and intrusive digital information technologies, improved dual-use military weapons, and dispersed global power structures, which will challenge conventional escalation and stability ideas. According to Richard Betts, "Without a plan, force cannot achieve objectives that are worth the cost in human lives and material resources. War is mindless without a plan, and force is a loose gun" (Betts, 2000).

The benefits of limited war as a strategy against Pakistan's Indian limited war doctrine have been criticized by critics as being ineffective. Tarapore has vehemently contended that the advantages of a limited war are, at worst, small and reversible (Tarapore, 2005). Ahmed agrees that the risks involved in a short battle may not be worth it (Ahmad, 2009). A successful limited war will, at most, slake local retaliation

desires, boost Indian military reputation and importance, giving it "something to do" in other words, or attract greater international attention.

British colonizers left the subcontinent but left some problems unaddressed and unresolved because they desired hostility and enmity amongst these states. After independence, several border difficulties occurred, covering the maritime water concerns, Siachin, Ladakh, Kashmir, and the demarcation of northern borders. The Kargil conflict and a brief war between Pakistan and India were primarily caused by the Kashmir dispute (Lamb, 1997). After the Lahore Declaration (it might have caused the end of fifty-year hostility between Indo-Pak), the Kashmir issue was put on hold, and it was necessary to reawaken it, which is what the Kargil war is for. Meanwhile, the global community was highly pleased with Pakistan and India's declaration and leadership.

According to Malik in his book, "Indian army was informed by a local shepherd in early May 1999 that several intruders were occupying the heights close to Darass" (Malik, 2015). The Kargil War began when Indian soldiers became aware of the penetration into the region along the Lo. It was eventually determined that the infiltrators were Mujahideen with assistance from the Pakistani army. After a thorough investigation, the Indian Army realized that the plan was more significant in scope. The Indian government began to draw out military options for repelling the onslaught once India's forces and political leadership grasped the severity of the situation. It began Operation Vijay, mobilizing 200,000 Indian soldiers and war aircraft to join the fight, but this effort was unsuccessful when Pakistan downed two MIGs on May 28 (Qadir, 1999). The international community was highly alarmed by these nuclear powers clash and worked hard to persuade fighting partners to commit to discussion,

even though Pakistan and India both had nuclear capacity at the time. In this scenario, nuclear deterrence was fully realized, and neither party could transform a conventional conflict into a nuclear one.

The fact that the civilian government was not adequately aware of this military action was a significant aspect of the Kargil war. Military elite intending to undertake a planned military campaign against India (Malik, 2015). In December 1998, the Prime Minister Nawaz Shareef was also briefed about the procedure, but not in full detail on its benefits and drawbacks. Since both states were just acquiring nuclear weapons, PM Nawaz Shareef approved this action without considering its consequences or the reaction it might cause abroad. Due to incomplete calculations by the army and government, the Kargil War was an incorrect and miscalculated chapter in Pakistan's history. The Kargil conflict made a reason to improve relations between the US and India on the diplomatic front and paved the way for numerous summit-level meetings between the two nations (Riedel, 2012).

Nevertheless, "Pakistan's dangerous plan in Kargil flopped. Greater international attention was paid to it, but there was no international backing for Pakistan's intention to separate Kashmir from India (South, 1999). Politically, militarily, and diplomatically, the Indian response was prompt and unanimous. The tension between the nuclear-armed neighbors could develop into a full-fledged conflict. The government leadership of India set the politico-military goal of "eviction of intruders and restraint" (G. VP. Malik). Pakistan's Kargil strategists made faulty assumptions, and most observers have blamed estimations regarding India's willingness to retaliate for the failure of Kargil's expansion.

Kargil starkly illustrates how overconfident and even overly reliant Pakistan's military leadership is on covert operations. Deterrence not only prevents the enemy from acting in a way that one does not want it to, but it also allows the country to choose a course that it feels is in its best interest on a level that its enemy may not have anticipated. The Theories of deterrence were also put to the test. For instance, claims that nuclear powers do not engage in direct combat came under intense scrutiny. Still, other ideas, like more evidence, emerged supporting the potential of limited combat under the nuclear umbrella because the conflict did not spread horizontally (N. K. Lodhi, personal communication, August 1, 2023).

The Kargil conflict clearly shows the lack of a plan to handle conflict and crisis situations. It was not unusual when the conflict began because Pakistan and India lacked a comprehensive policy to move past the nuclear testing era, which is evaluated using the P2 model. According to the P2 model, the Kargil conflict was caused by the fact that both India and Pakistan failed to see the possibility and probability of the events playing out and, as a result, lacked the necessary policies and strategies to handle the changing circumstances.

The Kargil conflict was resolved in less than three months. However, it served to underline the theoretical elements of deterrence that it might not be effective in peripheral areas where the states' essential interests are not in danger. Limited armed confrontation is feasible due to the presence of nuclear weapons.

The following characteristics are necessary for a limited war started by India against Pakistan to stay limited successfully: In order for military operations to appropriately calibrate following political restrictions, the political leadership will need to set

restricted, precise, and declared adversary objectives (Sethi, 2009). Therefore, the area of the conflict, the number of military assets deployed (both in terms of quantity and type), and the length of the fight should be chosen to discourage the spread of the conflict. Finally, effective negotiation with the opponent demands effective communication, and the political ruling class must be able to persuade local audiences to accept the ambiguous victory.

The preceding causes and factors, according to critics of India's efforts to formulate limited war policies, will act to undermine the tenets of a limited war. If such a policy is put into practice, it most certainly develops into a nuclear disaster. However, it is much less likely than they say that a limited battle will escalate to nuclear conflict. According to Robert Osgood, a limited war is one that "Leaves the civilian life and the armed forces of the belligerents largely intact and is fought for objectives that fall well short of the absolute subjection of one state's will to another employing tactics that use far fewer military resources than the belligerents as a whole". According to Kissinger, "It reflects an attempt to affect the opponents' will, not to crush it" (Singh, 1995). An Indian-limited war, in Chandran's opinion, should "secure India's interests in Jammu and Kashmir aimed the larger issues of Indo-Pak relation," he said (Chandran, 2005).

#### **4.2.2. Arms Race and Nuclear Proliferation**

Understanding the anarchic system in which governments with similar objectives struggle with one another and eventually go to war is crucial to understanding international affairs. It reveals the underlying rationale for political tensions and worries between competing governments for security. The issue is that weakening an adversary's defenses simultaneously weakens a state's barriers. It's dangerous to lower the enemy's defenses because doing so will make the enemy feel more exposed and more interested in gaining more authority to protect himself. As a result, increased

capabilities are less likely to dissuade the state, and security is viewed as a zero-sum game (Glaser, 1997). The maintenance of the military balance between the South Asian rivals has been crucial for the region's stability ever since they engaged in a terrible struggle. With fewer resources than the United States and China, India has the second-largest population, the third-largest army, and the third-largest military expenditure (Al Abd, 2022). Pakistan's efforts to achieve this balance are hindered. In terms of purchasing power parity, India is also the fourth-largest economy (Bose et al., 2019).

India and Pakistan are involved in the continuing nuclear arms race for various reasons. India's decision to acquire nuclear weapons is motivated by its projected international stature and threat from China. Pakistan, on the other hand, just imitated to ensure its deterrence against India. The South Asian nuclear arms race can be broken down into three phases; according to Andrew Futter, "Both nations constructed the bomb for conventional safety reasons, but they also regarded nuclear weapons as a way to modernize and elevate their worldwide prestige as well as crucial for internal politics and national identity" (Futter, 2021). The first phase runs from Pakistan's dissolution in 1971 until its statehood in 1947. During this stage, nuclear scientific knowledge and nuclear technologies are amassed for "peaceful application." With the so-called Multan conference in 1972, the second phase got underway. Pakistan decided to begin its clandestine nuclear program, which ended in 1998 with the nuclear explosions by Pakistan and India. It is possible to think of this stage as "nuclear ambiguity." Since both states disclosed their nuclear capabilities in 1998, the third phase, known as "overt nuclearization," has been ongoing. Scholars have referred to this nuclear arms race's relationship between India and Pakistan as an action-reaction cycle. In response to

India's decision to acquire nuclear weapons, Pakistan did likewise to preserve its strategic parity and deterrence (Jalil, 2017).

After the May 11 and 13, 1998, nuclear tests by India, Pakistan came under intense external pressure, nervous arms-twisting, and cries for restraint from major players worldwide, particularly the United States. The United Nations and other European nations tried to encourage Pakistan not to follow India's lead. Pakistan felt that Indian nuclear tests had upset the strategic balance. On May 28 and May 30, 1998, Pakistan conducted atomic and thermonuclear weapons tests in the Chagai Hills. In direct reaction, the nuclear arms race in South Asia was ignited after a 2-week gap. Pakistan provided a quid pro quo plus six tests in answer to India's five, "One in response to India's test from 1974 and five in response to New Delhi's tests" (Sagan, 2001). The most significant component of India and Pakistan's arms race is the creation and acquisition of almost similar nuclear weapons. According to assessments of weapons-grade plutonium and the number of nuclear-capable delivery systems in use as of April 2021, India and Pakistan are anticipated to have 156 and 165 nuclear warheads, respectively, in their nuclear arsenals (Kristensen & Korda, 2021).

At the DRDO's Golden Jubilee Celebration, former Indian President Abdul Kalam declared that the organization has the capability to intercept and destroy spacecraft and will use this capability if it threatens Indian Territory. According to Kalam's statement, "newly emerging technology, as future military operations would be significantly impacted by robotics or artificial intelligence, as well as several industrial sectors, according to India Vision 2020" (Monsonis, 2010). The missile tests are not an absolute proof that India and Pakistan are engaged in an arms race because India is improving the range and accuracy of its missiles in retaliation to China. Pakistan's

priority is ensuring its missiles can hit any city in India. Initially focusing on ballistic missile testing, Pakistan has shifted its focus to cruise missile testing. These tests' regularity, timing, and pattern suggest that Pakistan and India engage in action-reaction and signaling activity. Additionally, the number of tests carried out annually by the two shows that since 2007, India has been testing more missiles. Despite having superior equipment and maintaining a numerical advantage over Pakistan, the IAF has qualitative and quantitative areas for improvement when dealing with the threat of Pakistan's cooperation with the Chinese Air Force (Pant & Sing, 2020).

### **Air Force**

It is believed that Pakistan and India both have a nuclear triad of delivery mechanisms. A nuclear trio denotes land, sea, and air as the bases for the nuclear delivery systems. Pakistan and India are engaged in an extensive arms race beyond missiles. In order to protect its aircraft against Pakistani aircraft or missiles, the Indian military needs a flawless air defense system to carry out its aggressive war-fighting doctrines. To counter Pakistan's air force and preserve its aerial superiority in the region, the Indian military intends to purchase cutting-edge air defense equipment. The purchase of the S-400 and Barak-8 long-range air defense systems owned by the Indian military will help India maintain air power and give assurance for any disasters. Such as surgical strikes. These tools would put Pakistan's planes, missiles, UAVs, and AWACS in danger. At a safe distance of roughly 400 kilometers, India could locate and destroy Pakistan's aircraft assets. Vice Admiral (retired) Muhammad Haroon. A former senior officer of the Pakistan Navy believes that the S-400 poses a severe threat to Pakistan and could spark an arms race in the region. These (S-400-Barak-8) objects are present; they cause us problems and may give the appearance that our missiles would miss India. You cannot fill the air with 100 missiles. They should not have it, according to

us. It would likely encourage Pakistan to produce more weapons (Robock & Toon, 2010).

According to Ashley J. Tellis, Senior Fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in Washington, DC, Pakistan will confront the S-400 or Barak-8 air defense system "with more nuclear weapons" (Tellis, 2020). In the opinion of former Air Marshal (retd.) Muhammad Ashfaq, "India's current air defense system has a solution in the form of Ababeel, a multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle (MIRV) that can launch multiple nuclear bombs" (Khattak, & Kundi, 2019). They are vying with one another to modernize their air forces. There are 36 Rafale jets in France, which are used for nuclear missions. Are expected to be delivered to India. It is difficult for Pakistan to compete against the IAF quantitatively because of its economic situation, but it may compete qualitatively by marshaling sufficient air force to meet any challenges the IAF faces. During airstrikes by the Indian Air Force (IAF) ON Pakistan during the crisis in February 2019, the Pakistan Air Force (PAF) showed off this capacity, which led to the dismantling of an Indian MiG-21 Bison by the IAF (ISPR, 2020).

Former Pakistani Director General of Pakistan Air Force Strategic Command, Air Marshal (retd.) Ashfaq Arain stated that the PAF was "constantly enhancing its capacity." Certain weapons being added to the PAF armory would severely threaten India's air force dominance. To correct the imbalance brought on by the introduction of new planes into the IAF, to correct the imbalance brought on by the introduction of new planes into the IAF, work on the fifth-generation fighter is now underway.

Because of its shaky economy, Pakistan may be unable to purchase costly air defense systems from Russia or the United States. However, because of their close strategic and defense relations, the Pakistani military can easily introduce Chinese HIMADs. One could argue that Pakistan has improved significantly and closed any strategic gaps in air defense. The HIMADs would prevent the IAF from gaining air supremacy and create a realistic conventional deterrence.

### **Navel**

In order to preserve maritime supremacy in the Indian Ocean Regions, the government of India has allotted billions of dollars for upgrading the Navy of India. The Indian Navy recently operated one aircraft carrier and plans to add two more (Dubey, 2018). However, the introduction of an aircraft carrier won't immediately threaten Pakistan's security. Claims by Tahir Rafique Butt, a former Air Chief Marshal (ret), and India must maintain it 600 miles distant from Pakistan in order to pose a threat since we might kill it in two days. They would be experiencing a period of national grief, and their national flag would fly half-staff in honor of the lost aircraft carrier. We possess weapons with a 200-kilometer range. Therefore, in my opinion, an aircraft carrier has little bearing on Pakistan. Vice Admiral (ret.) Muhammad Haroon, a senior member of the Pakistan Navy, asserts that "Basically, it is a projection of power. Okay, that's OK. Our submarines would find it to be a nice target" (Khattak & Kundi, 2019).

Over the past two decades, the Indian Navy has made great strides. It presently ranks among the top ten naval powers in the world and maintains a fleet of 16 submarines, two of which are nuclear-powered. It has around 67,000 employees, including 57,240 sailors and 10,000 naval officers (Hemanth, 2020). However, the marine interests of Pakistan in the IORs and the Arabian Sea would be significantly impacted by India's introduction of stealth frigates, other warships designated as spy satellites, nuclear

submarines armed with far-reaching submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), P81 anti-submarine maritime observation planes.

Shashank Joshi claims that Pakistan will confront more difficult naval problems as India's naval power increases. It will be simpler for India to isolate Pakistan during a war and project power along the Makran coast. However, Pakistan's own A2/AD capabilities are growing, and China's presence at Gawadar will act as a significant defensive barrier or perhaps a tripwire (Joshi, 2017).

### **Space**

The militarization of space by India will generally affect both Pakistan and the rest of the world. India currently outclasses Pakistan in conventional warfare, and its space program will boost its tactical and military capabilities. The dominance of space would increase power. When space satellite services are used effectively, India will have an advantage over a rival or enemy. Therefore, information dominance will enable India to make better plans. It will improve Indians' surveillance and reconnaissance capability. It will give India precise knowledge of opponent missile silos, military preparations, and army movements. Furthermore, Pakistan's fragile economy will make Pakistan's ability to maintain a lead with India in this respect difficult.

For India and Pakistan, the militarization of space would have fewer benefits but higher economic and strategic costs. These countries would endure more significant strategic instabilities, financial collapse, inadequate deterrence, and decreased reliability certainty due to a prospective space arms race, with the exception being increased imitated technological superiority and prestige.

"The greatest hazardous region of the world," as President Bill Clinton famously described the area, the effect of nuclear proliferation on South Asian regional security (Charles & Pamela, 2000). However, despite much discussion in the literature on international relations, current research needs to provide a clear evolution of the implications of expansion across the subcontinent. Given the presence of nuclear weapons, several academics believe that conflict in South Asia is doubtful. According to Kenneth Waltz, for instance, the possibility that aggressive conduct could result in (their) own annihilation "knowledge that malicious action may result in (their) own devastation will deter [from aggression]". Devin Hagerty discussed that "additional proof that nuclear weapon states do not wage war has been provided by Pakistan, India nuclear dynamics (Hagerty, 1998).

The armaments race between Pakistan and India is apparent and is not a typical instance. It is rife with uncertainties and disparities. The South Asian strategic equation's dynamic is becoming increasingly complex due to India's rising strategic collaboration with advanced, progressive, and technologically sophisticated nations, particularly the United States, Japan, and Australia. Meanwhile, the strategic equation in South Asia is becoming more complex due to Pakistan's ties with China. Both Pakistan and India have various security goals and views of threats. They are moving along a track that has no clear end. It is more appropriately referred to as a "competition" than an "arms race." To ensure its deterrent, Pakistan competes with India, and India competes with China. Perhaps the world's leading powers are paying contributions to the regional arms race for the sake of their economic benefits.

In conclusion, Pakistan need not engage in an arms race against India. Pakistan does not have to match them gun for gun, aircraft for aircraft, and helicopter for helicopter.

India can get anything it wants, but Pakistan is only now compelled to match some acquisitions that it makes. So, because Pakistan is ultimately at the back of her conventional forces, Pakistan has the nuclear deterrent, which gives her the ultimate security assurance.

This chapter aims to extensively analyze India-Pakistani military doctrines during the period following 9/11 when a battle between the two neighbors with nuclear weapons appeared unavoidable. A doctrine is the foundation upon which organizational and force structures are created. It describes the standards for force composition and the kinds, numbers, distribution of weaponry, and associated delivery systems required to carry out the doctrine (Salik, 2014). He explained, in other words, that military doctrine is "a military principle or set of strategies." As described by Scoot D. Sagan, Military doctrine is defined as "the underlying assumptions and specific directives provided to military officers who develop operational principles for the application of military troops. (Sagan, 2009). He used the Truman Doctrine as an example of how nations should behave in international relations. Understanding that a doctrine might be political, military, or a combination of the two while utilizing other sectors helped me realize how important this was for achieving goals.

India first believed that the non-alignment strategy was the most effective way to pursue its interests after becoming an independent nation. However, it changed its mind in light of the shifting South Asian strategic environment and adopted offensive postures (Babar & Mirza, 2021). India was forced to make the required changes in the military-strategic environment to participate in regional politics due to its two-fronted strategic arch rivalry with Pakistan. India's strategic environment is centered on Pakistan and China but leans more toward Pakistan. New Delhi has portrayed China

as its principal enemy since the Sino-Indo War of 1962, but the present military modernization and doctrinal shift reveal its imperial aims to subjugate Pakistan.

The Nehru era saw the beginning of the strategic shift in Indian thinking when Nehru advocated for economic stability in India and further sought to handle bilateral disputes with its immediate neighbors by diplomatic and political means rather than through force. The Nehru doctrine sought to control the Indian Ocean and deter other powers from spreading their influence in this crucial geographic area. However, in the early 1970s, India requested military assistance from the USA before signing a friendship agreement with the USSR, the Indo-Pak War of 1965, and the Indo-Sino War of 1962; these wars highlighted internal flaws (Ministry, 1971).

Indira Gandhi adopted a more aggressive doctrine and made strategic moves to address these deficiencies in order to pursue India's hegemonic goals by bolstering its military power. Focusing on mechanized infantry, three striking corps, and sophisticated armor divisions, K Sunderji devised a 20-year strategy for the army. These attempts had the clear intention of striking Pakistan on its soil. However, India refrained from any military ventures due to Pakistan's successful cricket diplomacy and the potential threat of gaining nuclear warheads. The danger of non-state actors obtaining and utilizing nuclear weapons is another worry prompted by their presence in the area. Both countries' doctrines must address the challenge of securing their nuclear assets effectively to prevent unauthorized access.

### **4.3. Diplomatic Initiatives against Threats**

This chapter provides an in-depth investigation of the method of confidence-building measures between Pakistan and India that led to increasing peace and reducing the existing mistrust and animosity between the two disconnected neighbors.

Confidence Building Measure (CBM) as a concept emerged during the Cold War from the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) process as a realistic and practical tool of foreign and security policies (Bajpai, 1999). These first-generation CBMs successfully mediated a strategy for conflict settlement between the USA and the Soviet Union and an agreement on disarmament and arm control arms control. The main goal of these measures was to increase transparency, aid in facilitating and opening channels of communication, and reduce unforeseen and unpredictable adversarial action, which could help strengthen stability and ultimately promote and encourage adversaries in defining fresh forms of security relations (Marie-France, 1996).

The main query, however, that arose over the years was whether CBMs as a concept were as reliable and ethical as portrayed. Despite their value as icebreakers, nations frequently utilized them as adequate substitutes for a sincere and institutionalized peace process. The state actors are not compulsive to respect and carry them out, depending on mutual goodwill and voluntary commitment. As a result, CBMs gradually lost attraction and significance over the years and were almost forgotten. However, once they were implemented, they assisted in creating the ideal atmosphere to lessen and prevent tensions, allowing political and military leadership on opposing sides to interact. However, the success of these methods ultimately depends on the

belligerents' political willingness to use effective accommodation, communication, and compromise to facilitate successful discussions. But as we already noted, instead of being means to assist and realize greater objectives, they have easily and selectively been used as a substitute for sustainable peace and solutions, which is what they were never intended to be. According to Bajpai, "Clearly, CBMs are not intended to address the underlying causes of conflicts but... is the initial step in transforming antagonistic interactions into accommodative ones" (Khalil, 2014).

#### **4.3.1. Confidence-Building Measures (CBMs)**

A significant confidence-building for Pakistan and India or a risk-reduction regime has been of limited benefit due to the deeply embedded conflict fault lines that have become harder over the years. CBMs have typically been implemented in the region due to pressure from outside parties or because of a crisis that could escalate into a full-fledged conflict. In conflict case studies, when "The main benefit of CBMs is observed in reverse, and the opponent picture is a dominant aspect," Desjardins' remark is accurate. This is also true for Pakistan and India (Desjardins, 20). These contemporary potential flashpoints also include hybrid forms of conflict, ranging from provocative actions that have led to an unsettling stability (Tellis, 1997) to adventurism in the form of low-intensity competition, false flag operations, surgical strikes, creating hate constituencies at the domestic level, and India's ongoing quest for power maximization, which leaves little room for interaction and peaceful engagement.

The 1991 Non-Attack on Nuclear Installations agreement was the first significant pact between Pakistan and India to create a standardized system. As a result of this agreement, India and Pakistan would cease attacking one another's respective nuclear facilities yearly and desist from attacking each other's military and civilian nuclear facilities. However, such an exchange may appear redundant in the modern context

given the development of satellite technology, and given that it has become routine and reduced to relative insignificance measure. Given the level of mistrust, even this straightforward exercise took the two neighbors several years to sign and put into effect, with a few restrictions still in place (F. H. Khan, personal communication, July 11, 2023).

Following the Cuban missile crisis, bilateral arms control pacts between the USSR and the US prevented a nuclear conflict that was not meant. For the purpose of atomic stability, Washington and Moscow have signed a number of bilateral and international treaties. The nuclear constraint regime resulted from a protracted and challenging negotiation process for arms control measures between the USSR and the USA. The enemies' enhanced communication channels led to less ambiguity and regional strategic stability, which improved the nuclear restraint regime. The Cold War arms control treaties between the superpowers were the 1963 Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT), 1963 Hotline Agreement, 1968 Non-Proliferation Treaty, and 1972 Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT I and SALT II Treaties). The superpowers' common desire to prevent nuclear war was recognized due to all these factors (Thee, 1979).

Over the previous three decades, several CBMs have been completed, and the process between the two states is still underway. The two states were unable to come to an amicable agreement despite numerous attempts, including the UN resolution (1948-1949) and the Tashkent Agreement (1961). Among these are the Shimla Accord (1972), the Lahore Declaration (1999), the Agra Summit (2001), the Joint Statement following the SAARC summit, the UNGA yearly discussions, and the fifth phase of composite discourse.

In 2015, the 50<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the Indo-Pakistani War of 1965, New Delhi and Islamabad could think about swapping some war memorabilia as a sign of good faith. This would align with the essence of the Tashkent Declaration 1966, which included the clause to "debate the return of the assets and property seized by each side during the battle" (Rajan, 1966).

Given the lack of confidence among the various stakeholders, CBM's success concerning security and arms control problems remained minimal. Furthermore, the readiness of adversaries lacking confidence but open to preventing confrontation is necessary for CBMs to provide the intended military outcomes (Alford, 1979). The author of this research is concentrating on the following domains to assess relations within Pakistan and India.

- (i) Nuclear and military domain CBMs.
- (ii) Conflict resolution and political domain CBMs.

Military confidence-building measures, or MCBMs for short, are a variety of actions that include exchanging vital information, notifying parties to drills and testing, adopting observational measures, upholding munitions constraints, and taking steps to reduce forces (UNO, 2002). Pakistan and India have participated in various military and nuclear CBMs despite their poor relations. A hotline that linked the armies was established in 1971 as the first step in developing military CBMs, following the example provided by the parallel military ties within the US and USSR. Although there were no tangible benefits to maintaining good relations, the hotline linking the two countries' directors general of military operations remained simply symbolic. The hotline works well when things are calm, but it is shut off when things get worse, ultimately rendering it useless.

The two current prime ministers of the two countries, Rajiv Gandhi and Benazir Bhutto, signed the second key CBM for the Nuclear Threat Initiative. This CBM attempted to prevent attacks on each other's nuclear installations but provided no defense against assaults by foreign allies on such sites. This action made it possible for a list of nuclear sites to be sent between the two countries in 1992, which assisted in establishing trust and ensuring that both nuclear rivals upheld the agreements in peaceful and more severe crises. (Shahid, 1992).

Relationships between the two countries on various stages impeded CBM's growth and success in the military and nuclear domains. As a result, Pakistan's and India's projected force postures against one another have been significantly impacted and forecasted by the ongoing territorial disputes and associated security challenges. Some say South Asia is particularly vulnerable, and Kashmir is the continent's nuclear hotspot. Afterward, the Korean Peninsula, the Indo-Pak zone of the Korean Peninsula is thought to be the second atomic hotbed in Asia, where the possibility of a conventional battle turning nuclear is still relatively high (Chari, 2005).

India and Pakistan's CBM progressed in 1991 due to a contract for advance warning of military exercises and air space breaches, especially near the LoC. This collection of CBMs offered new channels for collaboration in the military and diplomatic realms to stop a repeat of prior crises. However, the lack of execution structures prevented it from yielding the desired results. Another CBM landmark was the declaration by both nations that they were free of chemical weapons in the 1992 agreement on the total prohibition of such weapons. However, since India disclosed its arsenal stockpile following the Chemical Warheads Convention, these CBMs experienced a significant setback (Nuclear Threat Initiative 2011). Such instances exacerbated the two countries'

already tense relationship's mutual mistrust. The incident, which Pakistan saw as a violation of the bilateral agreement, widened the trust chasm between the two countries. There was no further development after this disaster until 1999. After the 1998 nuclear explosion, Vajpayee and Nawaz Sharif signed a vital peace-building agreement in Lahore, Pakistan, in 1999. The Idea of creating and utilizing CBMs in both the nuclear and conventional military domains was introduced into this agreement to prevent any undesirable nuclear weapon launch scenarios and lessen the likelihood of future hostilities (Nuclear Threat Initiative, 2011).

Then, newer military and nuclear CBMs were devised that asked for fewer soldiers along the LoC, a halt to creating new military enclaves, and advance notification of ballistic missile launches (Krepon, 2017). The composite dialogue process was a significant step forward in finding the answer to the issues separating the two countries that would satisfy their demands (Padder, 2012). Sadly, this series of CBMs was undermined by the Kargil Conflict that started a few months after the declaration. The Pakistani side thwarted the peace efforts since the civilian and military authorities now do not agree. Tensions between the two states remained high from 1999 to 2003 due to substantial postings at the LoC, terrorist attacks in Srinagar, the Indian parliament, and extensive troops deployed along the LoC. During the UN General Assembly meeting 2003, a strategy for a ceasefire and later-directed engagement between the governing bodies of both countries was laid out (Ali, 2019). Following Mumbai terrorist attempts, in which Pakistan held India responsible, all of these CBMs came to an end in 2008. Following that, very little effort was made in 2014 and 2015, but those failed because of pre-existing ideas of a deficit and new allegations of terrorist strikes (Gul, 2007).

The following action-reaction cycle has worsened matters as one country's increased capabilities threaten its neighbor's security- classic reasoning. Implementing military CBMs and the strategic concerns that both Pakistan and India have about one another considerably impact the evolution of their bilateral relationships. The two nations' relations on many levels hampered CBM development and success in the military and nuclear spheres. As a result, border disputes not resolved and related security issues have significantly influenced and projected Pakistan's and India's force postures toward one another.

#### **4.3.1.1. Political Domain**

To create a setting for resolving the issues, the two nations' political leadership have participated in various CBMs. However, rigid boundaries set by governmental institutions and individual administrations damaged the CBM processes. As a result of numerous crimes, particularly those involving women and children, a treaty for safeguarding migrants from both sides was signed as the first CBM. However, this process quickly came to a standstill due to problems with openness and a need for supporting procedures. For similar reasons, in the study, Table 1 lists some diplomatic endeavors that fell short of meeting their anticipated goals. The most important element in implementing any sort of CBMs is political will, according to the light that important treaties between Pakistan and India were forged during conflicts and crises (Khan, 2010). This argument indicates that the CBMs' main goal was crisis management, and neither party made the necessary incremental efforts to bring about a lasting peace. Conflict over water distribution led to the signing of the Indus Basin Water Treaty, and various political agreements and CBMs, such as the Shimla Agreement, came after the 1971 war.

Though the political CBMs were more successfully implemented under the Musharraf, Vajpayee, and Manmohan governments, the effectiveness of all such CBMs was questioned in the wake of the 2008 Mumbai attacks. The Mumbai attacks stopped the process of resolving the Kashmir Issue. Although there were many CBMs in the political sphere, only a few resulted in peace benefits for both nations. During the 2015 Shanghai Cooperation Organization meeting in Ufa, Russia, the two nations' prime ministers reached an agreement on the most recent CBMs. The visit of a Kashmiri politician to the Pakistan High Commission in India risked the fulfillment of this substantial accord despite the fact that a wide variety of actions were agreed upon in the economic, societal, military, and political sectors. In both nations, the media and the political establishment significantly hampered progress. Relationships continued deteriorating as both countries got caught up in a never-ending blame game.

Due to the mutual enmity and strife that persists between India and Pakistan on the continent, nuclear technology has an ambivalent influence. Comparisons to the Cold War nuclear conflict are only seldom useful. The following regional realities make the South Asian nuclear competition much more dangerous: The first is geographic proximity; the second is the existence of the ongoing crisis, including the Kashmir conflict, the water issue, nuclear proliferation, and terrorism; and the third is the mindset of the political elite, which, combined with the US's declining influence, hinders confidence-building measures (CBMs) from taking root.

Table 1: India Pakistan's Major Diplomatic Engagements

Title	Purpose	Assisted by	Result
Ceasefire, 1949	Ceasefire in Kashmir	United Nation	Uneven Success
Liaquat –Nehru Agreement, 1950	Hindu Muslim Minority Right of Migration	Bilateral	Uneven Success
Indus River Water Treaty, 1960	Sharing of Rivers	World Bank	Successful with some Violations Concerns
Tashkent Declaration, 1966	Concluded the War of 1965	Russia	Failure
Shimla Accord, 1972	Agreement for Settlement after the War of 1971 and for Future Relations	Bilateral	Failure, Many Conflict after the Agreement
Lahore Declaration, 1999	Positive Engagement for Dialogue and Settlement of Issues	Bilateral	Failure, Reason Kargil War
Agra Summit, 2001	Lay the First Stone after Kargil War	Bilateral	Incomplete
Islamabad Summit, 2004	For Peaceful Future Moves	Bilateral	Major Development but Insubstantial
Composite Dialogue, 2004-08	Multiple Level Engagement for Resolve the Issue	Bilateral	Spoiled, by the Mumbai Attack and Smjhota Express Blast
Shanghai Cooperation Organization Meeting, 2015	Multiple Domain Engagement for Peaceful Relations	Bilateral, Statement on Multilateral Forum	Due to the Kashmiri Visit and Following Backlash, the CBMs not Finalized
Kartarpur Corridor, 2019	Initiative Took Pakistani Government to Accommodate Sikh Pilgrimage	Bilateral	Successful, The International Community Highly Appreciated

Sources: Ashraf (2018), Effendi and Choudhry (2016), Makeig (1987)

An overview of these diplomatic initiatives shows us how international community also organizations can effectively maintain peace and balance deterrence between countries. This argument also supports our hypothesis. Both countries continue the efforts for peace throughout the Indo-Pak history, but some elements that most of the time spoiled these efforts are discussed here. Between Pakistan and India, Confidence-building measures have been generated with an awareness of the inherent ideological tensions, security concerns, and polarizing perceptions. The field of CBM has become tricky due to factors such as mutual mistrust, a painful socio-political background, suspicious conduct, and phobia against one another that have led to parochial tendencies. Although recent surveys of public opinion in both nations across the border people just wish to live in peace, they insist governments for mutual dialogue and opening trade on both sides.

- Especially in India, the exploitation of the vote bank, where internal politics have constantly harmed relations between neighboring countries. The political sphere is one of the biggest game changers. As Prime Minister Modi did before the 2019 elections, even politicians embrace the narrative to adopt a tougher stance toward the other nations. Both countries were on the brink of nuclear war when the BJP used its political platform to win the election. (Haider & Azad, 2021).
- Non-state actors have significantly harmed bilateral ties and peace efforts in both nations. For instance, a terrorist attack on the Indian Parliament on December 13, 2001, resulted in a military standoff on the Line of Control in 2001-002, which persisted until November 2008. The attacks in Mumbai provide a preview of the worst-case scenario. (Azad, 2016).

- The current governments on both sides have instituted short-term state policies of violence solely for their political advantages in India, particularly once radical nationalist parties like the BJP win office. These parties have adopted an aggressive approach to bilateral issues, seriously damaging such ties. (Sriram, 2019).
- Another major barrier to the saboteur of current and future CBMs is the breach of previously agreed-upon agreements, such as the violation for examples of this problem include violations of the LoC ceasefire and the Indus Basin Water Treaty. Another big spoiler is the Indian network, and lobbying efforts harm Pakistan's reputation abroad, such as the struggle to keep Pakistan placed in FATF's gray list. This intercontinental enmity sabotages the peace efforts (Haider et al., 2020).

In light of these drawbacks, if both nations want peace and resolve, they must focus on sustainable and long-lasting policies. So, the entire region becomes secure.

#### **4.3.1.2 Military Domain**

Therefore, to prevent repeats of these situations, experts are encouraging both nuclear-armed South Asian countries to improve military-to-military relations. In this regard, the border armed forces behave sensibly; both parties know that any accidental nuclear incident will prove a complete disaster for both countries and the whole region. Both militaries signed multiple agreements about nuclear sights and how to ensure its security. In comparing political CBMs, military CBMs are more successful, although they need more collaboration.

- 1965: In the Rann of Kutch, a wide-open desert region, India and Pakistan refrain from utilizing air power. Both sides opt not to attack cities.

- 1971: The director generals of military operations of the two nations established a special hotline to communicate urgent information quickly.
- 1988: Accord to refrain from targeting one another's reactors, including fuel manufacturers, uranium enrichment plants, and isotope separation and recycling facilities.
- 1990: An accord to establish a hotline between the directors general of military operations so they can communicate often and speak once a week. Installations.
- 1991: An agreement to communicate information and exchange an updated list of nuclear sites on January 1 of every year was ratified, as was a clause prohibiting attacks on nuclear.

A deal on alerting the public in advance about military training exercises, maneuvers, and troop movements.

No land, naval, or air force operations within 5 kilometers (3.1 miles) of an international border.

A required notification for workouts with more than two divisions.

A close Line of Control alert for any training involving division-level personnel or higher.

Division-level drills will occur just 25 kilometers (15.5 miles) from the border.

- 1992: The two nations concur to include information on nuclear facility locations in the annual exchange of nuclear lists.

They formally ratify a deal to prevent airspace infractions.

- 1993: When the weekly hotline between the director generals of military operations resumes, a memorandum of agreement is signed.
- 1999: The Lahore Declaration, which contains a pact to prevent maritime mishaps and guarantee the safety of both nations' navigation aircraft and navy vessels, is signed.
- 2003: The Line of Control informal cease-fire and the Siachen Glacier ground position line are mentioned.  
Cooperative border patrolling and recurrent flag gatherings.  
A ban on the construction of new front posts.
- 2004: Indian Border Security Forces and Pakistani Rangers held their bi-annual meeting for the first time.
- 2005: Establishing a connection between the Pakistan Maritime Security Agency and the Indian Coast Guard.  
The humming of a ballistic missile test advance notice agreement. Now an agreement, the 1999 Memorandum of Understanding.
- 2007: Signing of a contract to lower the danger of nuclear weapons-related incidents, which is extended for another five years until 2012.
- 2018: The first-ever declaration of a cease-fire in Kashmir by the Indian military during the holy month of Ramadan.  
The 2003 cease-fire agreement's conditions are reinstated.

- 2021: Reverting to the 2003 cease-fire agreement along the Line of Control in Jammu and Kashmir has been announced jointly by the director generals of military operations (Gilani, 2022).

#### **4.3.2 The Role of Third-Party Mediation in Promoting Peace and Stability**

In the case of Pakistan and India, third-party mediation can significantly contribute to regional harmony and stability. A third party, potentially the US/Russia/China/UN, can play their role in mediation and contribute to peace and stability by facilitating dialogue, bridging the trust and confidence, bridging the differences, and providing technical expertise. However, in the current polarized world, these roles cannot be expected shortly due to major differences among the potential players and the stance of both countries over the Kashmir dispute. The only country that had an effected role to play was the US because Russia does not have that kind of political cloud which it can use both India and Pakistan also Russia cannot influence the decision making of both. The US has mainly been the third party helping both Pakistan and India mutually maintain stability. With the growing India-US strategic partnership and the latter's preference to further strengthen its partnership with India, the US may no longer be seen as a neutral arbitrator in the region.

The participation of the extra-regional powers must be constructive if regional deterrence stability and escalation control are feasible options in the South Asian context. The US must engage in significant diplomacy to keep the international non-proliferation system in place.

Russia and China are also significant players in the Indian nuclear region, in addition to the US. Both Russia and China are included even though the US remains the major focus because of their crucial roles that cannot be disregarded. However, with a

balanced US strategy, Initiatives for arms control can improve regional stability and advancements in the political resolution of the region's main Kashmir problem. Since the US military withdrew from Afghanistan in 2014, its position in the region has fluctuated (Ackerman, 2017). Due to Pakistan's proximity to India and the notion of autonomous and distinct interests, its decision-makers have shunned the US. (Burns, 2007).

Concerning the participation of outside parties in their disputes, particularly the United States, India and Pakistan have long had opposing viewpoints. Due to Pakistan's unequal relationship with India in terms of population, relative military capabilities, size, and economic power, and primarily out of worry about unclear results, India has consistently resisted the engagement of a third party like the United Nations, especially on the issue of Kashmir (Rahul, 2004). For instance, on September 23, 1965, the "Tashkent Agreement," which had previously been mediated by the Soviet Union.

Historically, the US attempted to start direct talks between India and Pakistan in the 1950s and 1960s, but these efforts were unsuccessful, and by the middle of the 1960s, the US had all but given up on Kashmir. The security environment following 9/11 has significantly impacted both countries' perspectives. Considering that two states with nuclear weapons do not ratify the NPT, they have not opened most of their nuclear facilities to IAEA safeguards. They have already engaged in several wars and continue to have serious disagreements that could erupt into a nuclear conflict that would wipe out the entire region and engulf other regions (Kapur, 2009). Since 1998, both countries obtained nuclear arsenal; the area has twice been on the brink of nuclear war. Since 1980, nuclear weapons have been used in every India-Pakistan war, including

Brasstack (1986–1987), the complex crisis (1990), Kargil (1999), and the military standoff (2002) (Clary, 2013).

The Indian-Pakistani military standoff in December 2001 and the ongoing Global War on Terror in South Asia, despite the United States' involvement in resolving the Kargil conflict, radically altered American strategy in the region. As a result, a sizable number of American military troops and equipment were stationed in Pakistani military locations. Even Indians were shocked by the US's legal settlement of the Kargil conflict in India's favor during the Kargil crisis since it was the first time in 50 years that the US has sided with India against Pakistan "openly and firmly." Kargil started a period of improved relations between the US and India, resulting in a strategic alliance (Cohen, 2003). Due to the United States' war on terror, Pakistan has become a frontline state for American crucial logistics support and surveillance facilities in Afghanistan.

The role of a third party has always remained important in the case of India-Pakistan's decades-long hostility. South Asian regional politics have always depended on the changing patterns of international power politics. In other words, the association of South Asian regional politics with international power politics cannot be marginalized in discussing South Asian regional politics. The competing governments of India and Pakistan have always remained in search of substantial support from the great powers or extra-regional powers in the domestic affairs of South Asia. Moreover, the enduring rivalry between New Delhi and Islamabad remained a central attraction for the extra-regional players. The leaders of India and Pakistan always compelled external players to address their regional conflicts (Rehman, 2023).

During the Kargil crisis, the most important action taken by Washington at this point was to exert pressure on India to refrain from attacking Pakistan in early January.

This situation poses a greater responsibility to the extra-regional powers, but the role of the extra-regional great powers must be connected to their geo-strategic interests. In this way, it is not easy to imagine the role of a third party in mediating peace and stability between two competing nuclear powers. In the contemporary scenario, the US withdrawal from Afghanistan has questioned the American-South Asian engagement in managing regional peace and stability.

Together, the US intervention and the Pakistani and Indian replies confirm our hypotheses, which are related to isolation avoidance by the principals and Fair-Weather Friend crucial deterrence by the third party, respectively. Indeed, Pakistan came under excessive pressure from the USA during the Kargil conflict. Clinton warned that if Pakistan rejected the demand for a withdrawal, he would essentially label Pakistan a pariah and threaten Sharif with isolation. Successful implementations of CBMs contribute to maintain deterrence stability in region.

On the other hand, the Chinese-brokered Saudi-Iranian deal has started the international intellectual community to visualize the second episode of Chinese mediating powers in the South Asian region. These arguments validate that the role of a third party is essential in addressing the values of peace and stability in the nuclearized subcontinent.

#### **4.3.3 The Potential for Regional Cooperation in Enhancing Deterrence Stability**

Due to various factors, including religion, race, autonomy, economics, border disputes, and many others, South Asia has a long history of being an area prone to war. These

factors include both intrastate and interstate conflicts. One of the longest-running hostilities in modern times is the one between Pakistan and India (Michael, 2018).

In a rare instance when the long-standing competition has produced a beneficial byproduct, the second and third-largest troop supplies to UN peacekeeping missions are made by India and Pakistan, respectively. As a result, peacekeepers from India and Pakistan occasionally deploy together in disputed zones. Both parties deployed for their mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo deployed roughly 4,000 troops, which serves as a contemporary instance (Banerjee, 2013). In various instances, a Pakistani commander has taken charge of Indian peacekeepers and vice versa. Insofar as they do not interfere with the mission's goals for maintaining peace, such relationships among states holding blue helmets are highly advantageous. As an extra CBM, the two militaries might work together to disseminate the best techniques for UN peacekeeping to listeners in Pakistan, India, and other nations.

This study seeks to examine. Relations between both states are undermined for many reasons, including the failure of the several CBMs executed, the absence of willingness regarding reconciliation, and numerous instances of situations that betray confidence. Discussion of this chapter highlighted that most CBM projects have never succeeded due to strategic considerations, an absence of transparency, political will, and implementation institutions. The confidence-building measures required some strategic initiatives that proved helpful in spreading confidence on both sides. Nations of both countries want to live peacefully and have much in common. Perhaps both states need an integrated, joint, comprehensive approach for confidence-building measures in economic, political, environmental, military, and crucial social dialogue that will prove helpful for harmony. In the brief history of nuclear politics, the factors

supporting the scope of deterrence stability between nuclear rivals have remained an area of less scholarly attention. The history of the Cold War provides specific evidence to visualize the scope of deterrence stability between two nuclear rivals. In the case of South Asia, it is hard to imagine the prevalence of a stable deterrence condition because of certain factors like the inflexible ideological competition between India and Pakistan, which originated from the partition of the subcontinent, the contrast in strategic aspirations of both states mainly linked with territorial disagreements, and the geographical proximities of both states (A. Rehman, personal communication, June 20, 2023).

The geographical proximities have even nullified the Indian efforts to maintain a deterrence policy by denial. In this way, there are specific scenarios to imagine the role of several potential actors in supporting deterrence stability in the South Asian region; these actors are restricted to theoretical debates without having any significant relevance to the complex South Asian regional security environment.

#### **4.4 concluding Remarks**

The significance of this research found that, for the second nuclear age, the nuclear model of the Cold War offers important lessons. Stabilizing mutual nuclear deterrence zones and resolving all persistent difficulties require dialogue. Both countries have given up on using war to further their regional foreign policy objectives. Another crisis between the two states is hugely likely to break out. If that occurs, each state will strive to preserve the credibility of its nuclear deterrence.

The political instability in Pakistan cannot be treated as an exception in the ongoing regional nuclear politics because the varying levels of political instabilities are

standard features of all states and are irrelevant to the strategic capabilities of the states. The history of the Cold War is again essential to mention here due to the persistently changing nature of US-Soviet domestic politics in the presence of their nuclear weapon capabilities. Moreover, the debate over terrorism is also irrelevant because terrorism in Pakistan is not the outcome of political instability.

The nation's major foreign policy interests have changed due to the Islamic reforms. The development of the latter stage of the Cold War resulted from foreign policy priorities and the advent of Islamic reforms in the nation. It was mainly supported by the US under its Soviet-containment policy. Furthermore, the religious parties in the country have a strong standing in politics without having a strong influence on the legislative circles of the government. Therefore, the future of regional politics in the debate over political stability and the rise of terrorism is difficult to predict in any direction. A strong, democratic, peaceful Pakistan will improve the region's security and stability. A stable political government would be able to make decisions against terrorists.

The Kargil incident inspired Pakistan as well as India to act logically and finally exercise restraint by realizing the danger of a potential nuclear escalation. Taking significant action regarding their nuclear doctrines, command and control systems, and declared policies introduced a new dimension of nuclear deterrence. To overcome the solvable bilateral issues, the two traditional enemies, Pakistan and India, must engage in a proactive and goal-oriented discussion process. The Indian and Pakistani leadership must give up their purely nationalistic worldview.

Third-party mediation is suitable, but India will only accept that if India loses the Kashmir, Siachen, and Sir Creek areas because, legally, these areas would go to Pakistan. In addition, mediation must be by a neutral entity. Most major modern powers favor India because of its \$3.8 trillion economy, 1.44 billion Population-(market), and deep-rooted strategic ties. Ultimately, both nuclear states would have to resolve their outstanding issues amicably; otherwise, this region would suffer.

## Chapter 5

### CONCLUSION AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

The complex and hostile relationship between India and Pakistan has created significant obstacles and risks to deter political instability. This MA thesis has illuminated various factors that influence deterrence stability, underscoring the pivotal role of political challenges in heightening tensions and undermining regional stability. The conclusions derived from this research offer a comprehensive understanding of the intricacies involved, enabling policymakers and stakeholders to make well-informed decisions to address these issues effectively.

One of the primary findings is that historical grievances, territorial disputes, and conflicting political ideologies have perpetuated mistrust and animosity between India and Pakistan. It has led to a continuous cycle of escalation, diminishing the efficacy of nuclear deterrence as a conflict prevention tool.

Both countries have participated in offensive operations despite the availability of nuclear weapons and the dread of conventional combat, as evident from past instances of conflict.

Another significant point is the races and military modernization's significance as threats to deterrence stability. The ongoing buildup of conventional and nuclear arsenals in both countries has heightened the probability of unintentional aggression

and false impressions, offering a disastrous dispute. Additionally, the acquisition of advanced military technologies and the importance of these two countries' inability to communicate with one another.

Furthermore, the influence of external actors in the India-Pakistan relationship cannot be underestimated. International involvement from major powers can escalate tensions or facilitate conflict resolution. The shifting geopolitical landscape and the interests of other countries in this zone may impact the dynamics among the nuclear states, underscoring the importance of considering regional stability in a broader global context.

Finally, addressing the challenges and threats to deterrence and stability in the political domain necessitates a multifaceted approach. To mitigate tensions and promote peace in the region, the following policy recommendations are proposed:

- **Diplomatic Engagement and Confidence-Building Measure:** Both states must participate in sustained diplomatic discussions to foster mutual understanding and confidence. Confidence-building measures, such as regular high-level talks, cultural exchanges, and cooperation on non-security issues, can help build trust and reduce the likelihood of miscalculations and misperceptions.
- **Conflict Resolution Mechanisms:** Both countries should strengthen their conflict resolution mechanisms to de-escalate crises promptly. Formal crisis management channels, hotlines, and joint military exercises for disaster management can be established to enhance communication and prevent misunderstanding during tension.
- **Nuclear Risk Reduction:** To escape the any accidental application of nuclear arsenal, both countries must reach a formal agreement on nuclear risk

reduction. It may include measures such as early notice of missile launch, information sharing on nuclear doctrines, and periodic risk reduction dialogues.

- **Regional Cooperation:** The South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) can assist zonal cooperation and confidence-building measures within belonging nations. Initiatives for economic and cultural exchanges can foster interdependence and reduce potential conflict.
- **International Mediation:** The international community preeminent powers, should actively support and facilitate dialogue between India and Pakistan. Mediation efforts by neutral third parties can offer a platform for addressing contentious issues and finding mutually acceptable solutions.
- **Cyber Security and Disinformation Control:** Given the increasing use of cyber warfare and disinformation campaigns, both countries need to enhance their cyber security capabilities and cooperate to counter disinformation to prevent misunderstanding and crises.
- **Track-II Diplomacy:** Think tanks, academic institutions, and non-governmental organizations have a crucial role in advancing Track-II diplomacy. These unofficial channels can provide innovative ideas and recommendations to complement official dialogues.
- **Long-term Conflict Transformation:** With sincere efforts, the root causes of Pakistan and India's conflict can be addressed, such as historical grievances and territorial disputes. Long-term conflict transformation initiatives involving civil society and cultural exchanges can foster mutual understanding and reconciliation.

- Encourage international collaboration and shared interests by supporting projects in industries like emergency preparedness, environmental protection, and healthcare.

Given the deep-rooted animosity and historical baggage within Pakistan and India, it is hard to identify that implementing these recommendations will be challenging. Nevertheless, sustained efforts and commitment from both countries, supported by the international community, can gradually pave the way toward better relations. Deterrence stability between Pakistan and India proved crucial for regional peace and global security, making it a shared responsibility of all stakeholders to work towards achieving it.

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## **APPENDICES**

## Appendix A: Semi-Structured Interview

	Interviewee	Interview Date	Designation	Affiliation	Research Interest
1	Feroz Hassan Khan	11-07-2023	Retired Brigadier Director	Pakistan Army  Arms Control and Disarmament Affairs in the Pakistan's Strategic Plans Division, Joint Services Headquarters. Pakistan.	South Asia, Pakistan, Afghanistan Nuclear Strategy and Proliferation
2	Naeem Khalid Lodhi	01-08-2023	Retd. Lieutenant General  Minister of Defense	Pakistan Army 1974-2011 Federal  Minister for National Security, Pakistan 2018-2018	Security. India Pakistan Relation, Nuclear Policy
3	Dr. Naeem Salik	16-07-2023	Director and founding member	Pakistan Army 1972-2005  Pakistan's National Command Authority and served as Director Arms Control and Disarmament Affairs at the Strategic Plans Division from 2001-2005.	Nuclear Policy, Missile Issues, South Asian Security, CBMs, Military Technology
4	Dr. Salma Malik	17-07-2023	Asst. Professor	Department of Defense and Strategic Studies, Quaid-I-Azam University, Islamabad, Pakistan	War, Arms, Control & Disarmament, Military Sociology, South Asian Affairs and Conflict Management & Transformation, CBMs & Micro-Disarmament
5	Dr. Adil Sultan	18-07-2023	Dean Of Department	Faculty of Aerospace and Strategic Studies (FASS) and Acting Chair of Department of Strategic Studies (DSS) Pakistan	Nuclear Nonproliferation, South Asian Nuclear Weapons

6	Dr. Iftikhar Ali	06-07-2023	Assistant Professor	Karakorum International University Gilgit Pakistan	Nuclear, Deterrence Stability, Arm Race
7	Dr. Attiq Ur Rehman	20-06-2023	Assistant Professor	National University of Modern Languages Islamabad Pakistan	Deterrence, Global Nuclear Politics, Proliferations, Traditional and Nontraditional Security
8	Dr. Manzoor Afridi	22-06-2023	Associate Professor	International Islamic University Islamabad	International Relation, Terrorism and Pakistan Tribal Area, Pakistan Foreign Policy
9	Dr. Ayesha Ashfaq	14-06-2023	Assistant Professor	The University of Lahore, Pakistan	International Security, Deterrence Issues, Nuclear Proliferation
10	Dr. Shahid Bukhari	27-06-2023	Head of Department Professor. Dr.	Bahauddin Zakariya University Multan Pakistan	International Security, International Relation Theory, Security Studies
11	Dr. Masood Ur Rahman Khatak	02-07-2023	Lecturer in IR Dept.	International Islamic University Islamabad. Pakistan	South Asian Security, International Security

## Appendix B: Questionnaire for Interview

**Talat M Randhawa**  
**Student - International Relations**

**Master Research Topic**

**“Deterrence stability between India and Pakistan: Challenges and Threats in the Political Domain”**

**Department of International Relations**  
**Eastern Mediterranean University**  
**North Cyprus**

**Note:** You can answer as per your own convenience. I will be more than happy for your intellectual input.

1. What are the potential threats to deterrence stability in Political domain?

**Ans:** -----  
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2. What is the impact of Military’s Modernization and arm race in region?

**Ans:** -----  
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3. What would be role of conventional forces in deterrence stability in case of Indo-Pak?

**Ans:** -----  
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4. How do you see the role of third-party mediation in promoting peace and stability in the region?

**Ans:** -----  
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5. What would be the Potential for regional cooperation in enhancing deterrence stability in the region?

**Ans:** -----  
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6. In your opinion, Is Pakistani Political instability is an important cause of terrorism?

**Ans:** -----  
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7. Kindly suggest some policy recommendation for enhancing deterrence stability and promoting regional peace and security.

**Ans:** -----  
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